[Senate Hearing 106-263]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                        S. Hrg. 106-263


 
                    THE CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                       ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                             MARCH 17, 1999

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations


                                

 Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate



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                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                 JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana            JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia              PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska                CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon              JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota                 RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas                PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming                BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri              ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
                     James W. Nance, Staff Director
                 Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director

                                  (ii)


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Biden, Senator Joseph R., Jr., prepared statement................    15
Coverdell, Senator Paul, prepared statement......................     1
Einhorn, Robert J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
  Nonproliferation Affairs, Department of State..................     2
    Prepared statement of........................................    16
Fertel, Marvin S., senior vice president, Nuclear Infrastructure, 
  Support, and International Programs, Nuclear Energy Institute..     9
    Prepared statement of........................................    18
Helms, Senator Jesse, prepared statement.........................    15
Jones, Gary L., Associate Director for Energy, Resources and 
  Science Issues, Resources, Community and Economic Development 
  Division, General Accounting Office............................    11
    Prepared statement of........................................    22

                                 (iii)


                    THE CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY

                              ----------                              


                       WEDNESDAY, MARCH 17, 1999

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m. in room 
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Paul Coverdell 
presiding.
    Present: Senator Coverdell.
    Senator Coverdell. On behalf of Senator Helms, Chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I on his behalf call 
this meeting to order on the question of the Convention on 
Nuclear Safety. I will be strictly as a facilitator on his 
behalf today, administrator, facilitator.
    Each witness will be given 5 minutes for their testimony. 
The hearing record will be open for 5 business days for 
statements and questions by members. If you would indicate you 
are inserting material--I will be inserting statements for 
Senator Helms and Senator Biden in the record.
    [The statements referred to are in the appendix on page 
15.]
    Senator Coverdell. Let us see. The first--we have two 
panels and the first presenter will be Mr. Robert Einhorn, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation 
Affairs.
    I will be inserting my own opening statement into the 
record formally, and I turn that over to you, Alex. And we will 
proceed with you, Mr. Einhorn. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Senator Coverdell follows:]

              Prepared Statement of Senator Paul Coverdell

    I am pleased to convene this hearing today on the issue of nuclear 
safety standards and, specifically, the Convention on Nuclear Safety. 
Let me say from the outset that I believe that this Convention stands a 
chance of making a modest contribution to the improvement of 
international nuclear safety. This Convention seeks to achieve and 
maintain a high level of safety for countries around the world that 
operate civil nuclear power reactors. It also provides the United 
States with a mechanism to encourage countries with civilian nuclear 
programs that do not meet Western safety standards to improve the 
safety at their installations. I think we all agree on the importance 
of ensuring that the use of nuclear energy is safe and well regulated. 
The Convention on Nuclear Safety is a step towards this goal, and I 
therefore am willing to support its ratification.
    I believe that the U.S. secures several key objectives in the 
Convention. First, the treaty is limited to land-based civilian nuclear 
power plants designed for commercial electricity generation and does 
not include other nuclear facilities such as nuclear power reactors 
with military applications. Second, the convention articulates core 
principles for nuclear safety, rather than a detailed itemization of 
standards or rules. Third, the Convention does not establish a new 
international bureaucracy but rather relies on each ratifying country 
to prepare a report of its nuclear power program. While this might have 
weaknesses of its own, I think it is preferable to the creation of 
another international bureaucracy.
    However, there are some shortcomings in the Convention that we need 
to be candid about and that I hope some of our witnesses will touch on 
today. For example, the method to ensure and to review compliance with 
the treaty has not, to my knowledge, been finalized. As it is written, 
the Convention does not impose sanctions for noncompliance but seeks to 
encourage compliance through peer pressure. Each ratifying country will 
prepare a self-assessment report of its nuclear power program, which 
will be looked at by a ``review group'' of other member countries at 
periodic meetings. The potential problem with this approach is that the 
U.S. may not be in the ``review groups'' of countries who receive U.S. 
nuclear safety assistance. We need to make sure that the U.S. is 
present in all review meetings where a country receiving U.S. nuclear 
assistance is being reviewed.
    There are other potential weakness that I will not go into great 
detail on today. But I would mention that it is my understanding that 
the costs to implement the treaty have not been fully determined. And, 
also, that the number of organizations dealing with nuclear safety 
issues continues to increase rapidly, often at the expense of the U.S. 
nuclear industry. I think we need to take measures to eliminate 
redundant or duplicative U.S. nuclear safety activities.
    Despite these weaknesses, I believe that the Convention is a 
positive step toward the strengthening of nuclear safety standards 
around the world. I look forward to working with all of you in the 
coming years to move ahead with the implementation of this treaty.
    Before our distinguished panelists begin, I would like to introduce 
the witnesses today and thank you for your participation. The witness 
on the first panel is Robert Einhorn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for Nonproliferation Affairs. Thank you for appearing before the 
committee today and we look forward to hearing the administration's 
views on this treaty. On the second panel, we will hear from Marvin 
Fertel, Senior Vice President for Nuclear Infrastructure, Support and 
International Programs from the Nuclear Energy Institute, and Gary 
Jones, Assistant Director for Energy, Science, and Resource Issues from 
the General Accounting Office. I know that our own domestic nuclear 
power industries set the lead for developing and maintaining nuclear 
standards around the world, so I especially look forward to hearing 
from you. Thank you all for your participation.

 STATEMENT OF ROBERT J. EINHORN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
    STATE FOR NONPROLIFERATION AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

    Mr. Einhorn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be 
here today to discuss with you our views on the Convention on 
Nuclear Safety and to ask that you take urgent action on the 
administration's request for advice and consent.
    I have provided a longer written statement to the committee 
and I request that you include it in the record.
    Senator Coverdell. It will be inserted into the record.
    Mr. Einhorn. Thank you very much.
    The United States played a central role in drafting and 
negotiating the Nuclear Safety Convention. It was open for 
signature in September 1994 and entered into force in October 
1996. The 49 contracting parties include all states with 
significant nuclear programs except the United States and 
India.
    The convention can make an important contribution to 
raising levels of nuclear safety worldwide. It is the first 
international instrument to establish legal obligations on the 
safety of nuclear power plants. It codifies principles judged 
vital by technical experts to improve nuclear power safety 
worldwide. It reflects a longstanding U.S. interest in 
promoting an effective nuclear safety culture worldwide.
    The convention covers land-based civilian nuclear power 
plants. Such facilities pose the most significant safety risks 
due to the magnitude of their inventory of radioactive 
material, the complexity of their technology, known 
deficiencies in certain older reactor designs, and weak 
regulatory regimes and nuclear safety cultures in certain 
countries.
    A key focus of the convention is on the requirement for all 
states parties to establish a strong and effective nuclear 
regulatory body with adequate authority, competence, and 
financial resources to perform effective and independent 
oversight. The convention also addresses safety at the facility 
level, with specific provisions for siting, design, 
construction, and operation of nuclear power plants. The United 
States fully meets all provisions of the convention.
    I also want to emphasize what the convention does not do. 
It does not create a new multilateral regulatory body or 
another international organization or bureaucracy. Nor does the 
convention impose detailed prescriptive standards or rules.
    Instead, the convention advances fundamental principles and 
obligates each party to implement those principles consistent 
with the requirements of differing reactor technologies, 
differing legal systems, and other national factors.
    The convention will provide an important tool that 
regulators and operators can use to argue for the national 
resources they need to meet their safety obligations. The 
information provided by the national reports can also help 
nuclear safety assistance donors, such as the United States, to 
target their assistance more effectively.
    On the key issue of financing convention activities, the 
modest secretariat functions for meetings of the parties will 
come from the IAEA--that is the International Atomic Energy 
Agency's--regular budget. The United States will also expend 
limited resources to prepare and review national reports and to 
attend meetings.
    Senate advice and consent is needed next week to enable the 
United States to participate in the first review meeting of the 
parties, which begins April 12. Unless we ratify before that 
meeting, we will not be able to participate in the formal 
review of the national reports of other parties, including 
Russia and other recipients of U.S. nuclear safety assistance.
    If we are to be able to ratify--if we are able to ratify 
the convention quickly, we can seek agreement from the states 
parties to waive the requirement that parties ratify 90 days in 
advance of a review meeting in order to participate in that 
meeting.
    In conclusion, the administration believes that the 
convention can make a significant positive contribution toward 
raising levels of nuclear safety worldwide, particularly in the 
New Independent States, in Central Europe, in Eastern Europe, 
and in the developing world.
    The U.S. nuclear industry has been kept informed of 
developments on the convention through periodic briefings. The 
industry supports the Nuclear Safety Convention as a means of 
enhancing the global safety culture, which can improve public 
acceptance of nuclear power and improve business opportunities.
    We urge your favorable action. Thank you very much, Mr. 
Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Einhorn is in the appendix 
on page 16.]
    Senator Coverdell. Mr. Einhorn, as I said a moment ago, the 
chairman has several questions that he would pose. If you will 
forgive me for reading those, but these are--I am facilitating 
this, as I said, for the chairman.
    Question No. 1: Mr. Einhorn, one benefit of the Nuclear 
Safety Convention to the American taxpayer is that once it is 
ratified the administration will be able to scale back 
participation in other redundant areas. We are a member by last 
count of at least eight defense nuclear safety clubs and 
groups, most of which duplicate activities to be performed 
under the convention.
    Do you agree that we should focus our efforts and our 
limited resources on performing nuclear safety activities under 
the auspices of the treaty rather than through a variety of 
nonbinding international clubs?
    Mr. Einhorn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Indeed, we agree that 
our participation in the safety convention will be a critical 
focus of our international effort on safety. But there are a 
number of other efforts that are complementary and not in any 
way duplicative.
    We support the committee's resolution of ratification, 
which addresses this point. There is a provision in section 2 
of the resolution of ratification which requires the President 
to make a certification, and he is asked to certify to the 
appropriate committees that the U.S. Government will not engage 
in any multilateral activity in the field of international 
nuclear regulation or nuclear safety that unnecessarily 
duplicates a multilateral activity undertaken pursuant to the 
convention.
    We will be pleased to recommend that the President provide 
that certification, because we do not believe there is 
duplication here. Other international efforts we are engaged in 
we believe are complementary.
    Senator Coverdell. I thank you.
    Mr. Einhorn, the chairman wanted to ask you about one of 
these international clubs in particular, the International 
Nuclear Regulators Association, INRA. In a February 21, 1997, 
letter, the chairman of the NRC mentions that she sent to you 
an INRA terms of reference for your review. So I assume you are 
familiar with them.
    Mr. Einhorn, in your mind is there a difference between 
INRA's purpose and that of the Nuclear Safety Convention?
    Mr. Einhorn. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I believe there are very 
important differences between these two, these two groups. The 
Nuclear Safety Convention, of course, is a formal, legally 
binding international agreement. There are 49 contracting 
parties today. We hope the United States will be the fiftieth 
contracting party.
    The INRA, the International Nuclear Regulators Association, 
is an unofficial group, an informal group, a very small one. It 
consists of the senior official involved in nuclear programs in 
eight of the advanced industrialized countries, countries with 
advanced civil nuclear power programs. As I say, it is an 
informal group. They do not meet pursuant to a legal 
obligation.
    They meet twice a year, whereas the Nuclear Safety 
Convention requires its parties to have review sessions once 
every 3 years.
    The purposes are very different. The Nuclear Safety 
Convention sets up a system of national reporting and peer 
reviews that provide strong peer pressure to ensure that all 
the contracting parties are meeting their obligations to meet 
international safety standards.
    The INRA has a very different function. These are 
individuals who meet informally twice a year, and their purpose 
is to exchange views on emerging nuclear regulatory challenges. 
Each of them have certain responsibilities in their own 
government. They look at various trends they see in the 
regulatory world, and it is an informal exchange of views. It 
is helpful to each of them in performing their own national 
responsibilities, but they are not in that capacity speaking 
for the U.S. Government.
    So we see these organizations as very different. These are 
apples and oranges.
    Senator Coverdell. Mr. Einhorn, the chairman of the NRC has 
argued that one principal difference between INRA and the 
convention is membership. Specifically, she has claimed that 
INRA is important because it only brings together like-minded 
western countries with advanced regulatory systems rather than 
the global community, as is the case under the convention.
    When asked by committee staff, however, if she would assure 
the committee that membership in INRA would remain limited to 
like-minded countries, she refused. The chairman thinks he 
knows why. According to United States negotiating guidance at 
the time of INRA's creation, the delegation was instructed to 
ensure that INRA would discuss at the earliest possible 
opportunity steps to be taken to broaden the initial 
membership. ``Further, the issue of extending membership to 
nations without nuclear programs should be discussed.''
    So it hardly seems like the administration intends to keep 
INRA just a group of like-minded western countries. Do you 
agree?
    Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, frankly, I am not aware of any 
plans for expanding membership. But one of the reasons that the 
group now consists of like-minded countries or representatives 
of like-minded countries is that it provides a good forum to 
discuss issues of real sensitivity. Unlike the national reports 
that will be widely shared, these discussions will be rather 
private and they can touch on matters of real sensitivity, and 
it could enable these representatives to speak with great 
frankness.
    Senator Coverdell. Let me just read this U.S. Government 
position on INRA. It relates back to the question, and then I 
can look up and actually listen to your answer for a moment.
    ``The U.S. delegation should request INRA discuss at the 
earliest possible opportunity steps to be taken to broaden the 
initial membership, taking into consideration such criteria as 
geographical distribution, activity of programs, and inclusion 
of other national policy-setting regulators, example those with 
environmental or health responsibility.
    ``Further, the issue of extending membership to nations 
without nuclear programs should be discussed in light of the 
widespread use of nuclear energy and radioactive materials.''
    Mr. Einhorn. Because this record is important and we have 
to move quickly if we are to meet our deadline, rather than get 
back to you with an answer for the record, let me just consult 
my colleagues.
    Senator Coverdell. Please.
    [Pause.]
    Senator Coverdell. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Einhorn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding off for a 
moment.
    What you read is a position of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission. The chairman of our NRC, of course, represents the 
NRC on this group. This is not a U.S. Government position that 
you were reading.
    I understand from my colleagues that participants----
    [Pause.]
    Senator Coverdell. Let me do this. It is the committee 
staff's view these are instructions issued to the chairman of 
the NRC. I have said the record will be open for 5 days. This 
is obviously a critical point to the chairman, so we will 
clarify the question. The source of this is redacted, so we 
will clarify where we feel--where this emanates from, and give 
you an opportunity then to respond formally following the 
meeting.
    Mr. Einhorn. That is a very good idea. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman.
    [The following response was received subsequent to the 
hearing:]

    The Committee's question concerns a preliminary draft of the 
instruction cable for the first meeting of the International Nuclear 
Regulators' Association (INRA). At the request of another NRC 
Commissioner, the cable instructed NRC Chairman Jackson to recommend, 
at the first meeting of the INRA, that future expansion of the group's 
membership be discussed at that meeting. She did raise this matter at 
the first INRA meeting, held in Paris May 29-30, 1997. The consensus 
reached was that the group would begin small, with only the eight 
original members (nuclear regulators from the U.S., U.K., Canada, 
Germany, France, Spain, Sweden, and Japan). Only after an initial two-
year period of consolidation (which coincided with NRC Chairman 
Jackson's chairmanship of the group) might the question of membership 
be reconsidered.
    Chairmanship of INRA has now passed to Mr. Laurence Williams, 
Director and Chief Inspector of the United Kingdom's Nuclear 
Installation Inspectorate. At this time the consensus of all INRA 
members, including the U.S. member, is that the membership should 
remain limited to the current eight heads of nuclear regulatory 
agencies, all from Western developed countries with substantial civil 
nuclear power sectors.

    Senator Coverdell. I am going to--please.
    Mr. Einhorn. I was just going to say that the members of 
INRA now do have in mind that this group stay small so that it 
can operate with frankness on sensitive issues. Some of the 
members have an interest in some expansion, but we understand 
that they are not interested in making this a large and 
unwieldy body.
    It is primarily because they themselves have neighbors or 
friends that, for a variety of reasons, they may wish to bring 
into the group or the club, as you mentioned. But it is not any 
intention of ours or of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to 
expand this group. Its value is in its being compact and its 
ability to operate in an informal manner.
    Senator Coverdell. Well, both in the resolution you have 
and in the nature of the questions and the opportunity to 
respond, I think there is a clear sense where the chairman of 
the committee is moving, and the exchange might reinforce the 
view you just expressed.
    Mr. Einhorn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That comes through 
very clearly, but I do not think there is a real difference 
between us on this. We are not interested in promoting a large 
body that in any way rivals or duplicates the functions of the 
Nuclear Safety Convention.
    Senator Coverdell. I thank you, Mr. Einhorn. I have two 
more questions and then we will move to the next panel.
    The chairman has a question about the negotiating position 
taken by the United States on INRA. The guidance states that 
the group will not create a super--supra-national organization 
nor engage in oversight of national programs or site visits. 
Yet, according to information provided the committee by an 
anonymous source within the administration, the chairman of the 
NRC uses her position at NRC to acquire access for the 
foreigners to facilities, such as Lawrence Livermore National 
Labs, the Plutonium Facility, and AVLIS, A-V-L-I-S.
    I am reading from a memorandum on the letterhead, ``United 
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission,'' from Shirley Ann 
Jackson, dated February 11, 1998. The first paragraph says: 
``The International Nuclear Regulators Association, INRA, held 
its second meeting January 8th through 9th, 1998, at the NRSC 
Walnut Creek Field Office in California. The meeting was 
extended to include a facility visit to Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory in California and the Yucca Mountain site 
characterization project in Nevada.''
    I will not proceed with this. I think you have the thrust 
of the question here.
    Mr. Einhorn. Senator, these colleagues of the chairman's 
were the kinds of officials in other regulatory agencies of 
other countries that would normally visit her and her 
colleagues in the NRC, that would visit various kinds of sites 
in the United States in their own national capacities. It is in 
my thinking not their participation in INRA that gives them any 
kind of a special access to these facilities. These are the 
very individuals who would normally be interacting with the NRC 
in this fashion.
    Senator Coverdell. If you will give me just a moment.
    [Pause.]
    Senator Coverdell. I am going to read from the anonymous 
source two paragraphs. It alludes to: ``The fifth document is a 
letter from the chairman of Taiwan's Atomic Energy Council. 
Taiwan has wanted to join INRA from its inception, but was 
refused. Instead, at the last meeting the People's Republic of 
China was asked to join. The potential for harm to the U.S. 
Government foreign policy from this move could have 
repercussions in the future.
    ``The seventh document shows that, notwithstanding 
Jackson's claim that the INRA would take less than one FTE and 
no dollars from the NRC budget, she is hosting the INRA 
participants, has stationery and pamphlets specifically 
designed and printed for INRA, and, more importantly, Jackson 
uses her position at the NRC to acquire access for the 
foreigners to facilities such as Lawrence Livermore National 
Labs, the Plutonium Facility, and AVLIS''--which is a 
restatement of the question I just issued.
    Would you have any additional comment?
    Mr. Einhorn. Just to say, Mr. Chairman, that China was not 
asked to join INRA. It was asked at a certain point to make a 
presentation. It is not under consideration for membership in 
INRA.
    On the question of access, again, INRA participation is not 
being used as a basis to invite colleagues to certain 
facilities in the United States. These colleagues would be 
invited to these kinds of facilities in performance of their 
normal national responsibilities in any event. It is not as if 
INRA gives them a special claim to access.
    Senator Coverdell. I thank you very much.
    The final question, then. The chairman says he is puzzled 
by a January 23, 1998, letter on INRA stationery from the 
chairman of the United States NRC to the U.S. Secretary of 
Energy. At the outset Ms. Jackson states: ``I am writing on 
behalf of the International Nuclear Regulators Association, 
INRA, concerning preparations for the energy ministerial 
scheduled for March 30th to the 31st in Moscow.''
    Mr. Einhorn, do you believe it is appropriate for a senior 
U.S. Government official to lobby another senior U.S. 
Government official regarding the United States' negotiating 
position at an upcoming summit on behalf of an international 
club of countries?
    Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, it was not clear from the 
passage you read that this was an effort to lobby another 
member of the U.S. Government to take any kind of position. It 
was not clear at all what the request was of the Secretary of 
Energy.
    Senator Coverdell. Mr. Einhorn, what I am going to suggest 
we do here--I am seeing the letter for the first time. I do not 
know whether you have seen it or not. I think the chairman 
could rightfully draw, just from my quick perusal, rightfully 
draw the conclusion that is embraced in his question. So in the 
5-day period for exchange, this is obviously a letter that you 
can see, and you might review the letter and then formally 
respond to the question that I just gave you.
    Mr. Einhorn. Thank you. I would like the opportunity to do 
that.
    [The following response was received subsequent to the 
hearing:]

    In the spring of 1996 the U.S. and other G-7 governments plus 
Russia held a special Summit meeting in Moscow to address issues of 
nuclear safety and security. Since that special Summit meeting these 
matters have been important elements of the agenda for each G-7/G-8 
Summit. The January 1998 letter in question was written by U.S. NRC 
Chairman Jackson in her capacity as Chairman of the International 
Nuclear Regulators' Association (INRA) to inform Secretary of Energy 
Pena. It contained the views of INRA members on the importance of 
sustaining safety as the first priority in nuclear plant operations as 
competition and deregulation of the electricity industry grow. These 
views were particularly relevant to the G-7/8 process, since INRA's 
membership is comprised of the heads of nuclear regulatory agencies of 
the eight Western countries with the most advanced nuclear industries. 
Six of the eight INRA governments are also G-7 members. The INRA 
members also offered some thoughts on technical safety issues and their 
view that safety should remain on the Summit agenda. The INRA members 
proposed that energy ministers ``reaffirm their commitment to safety as 
the fundamental requirement for a nuclear program'' and ``reaffirm the 
principles and elements recently codified in the Convention of [sic] 
Nuclear Safety.'' The heads of these nuclear regulatory authorities 
further state that ``Parties to the Convention should actively 
participate in this peer review process in the most transparent, 
candid, serious, and technically competent manner.'' The views 
expressed in the letter are shared by the Administration. We hope the 
Committee and other Members in Congress are supportive as well.

    Senator Coverdell. All right. Mr. Einhorn, I appreciate 
very much your testimony and your responsiveness to the 
questions.
    Mr. Einhorn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Coverdell. Thank you.
    The second panel will consist of Mr. Marvin Fertel, senior 
vice president, Nuclear Infrastructure, Support, and 
International Programs, Nuclear Energy Institute, and Ms. Gary 
Jones, Associate Director for Energy, Resources and Science 
Issues, Resources, Community, and Economic Development 
Division, General Accounting Office.
    We will begin with you, Mr. Fertel. Thank you for coming.

 STATEMENT OF MARVIN S. FERTEL, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, NUCLEAR 
 INFRASTRUCTURE, SUPPORT, AND INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS, NUCLEAR 
                        ENERGY INSTITUTE

    Mr. Fertel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and may I request that 
my full statement be included in the record.
    Senator Coverdell. It will be included in the record.
    Mr. Fertel. Let me first express our gratitude to you, 
Senator Coverdell, for taking the initiative to facilitate, in 
your terms, this hearing today and for really providing an 
opportunity for getting the convention ratified in time for the 
first review meeting coming up in April.
    The Nuclear Energy Institute sets policy and positions on 
various issues affecting our industry. NEI represents over 275 
companies, including every U.S. utility that operates a 
commercial nuclear plant in this country. We also have all of 
the vendors, fuel suppliers, and engineering firms that support 
those people.
    Mr. Chairman, the nuclear energy industry supports 
ratification by the U.S. Senate of the Convention on Nuclear 
Safety. The Nuclear Energy Institute's executive committee in 
1997 passed a resolution encouraging Senate ratification of the 
convention and that resolution is included with my prepared 
remarks.
    Before I discuss the importance of ratification of the 
convention, I would like to briefly provide the committee with 
a sense of the benefits provided by nuclear energy in the 
United States and the world. Today nuclear power plants produce 
about 20 percent of America's electricity. It is our second 
largest source of electricity. Nuclear power plants are also 
our largest source of emission-free electricity, an important 
consideration as Congress and other policymakers recognize the 
growing nexus of energy and environmental policy. Globally, 441 
nuclear plants in 33 nations generate 17 percent of the world's 
electricity.
    Within this broad context, ratification of the convention--
--
    Senator Coverdell. Excuse me for interrupting. Would you 
repeat that number again?
    Mr. Fertel. Yes; 441 nuclear plants in 33 countries 
generate 17 percent of the world's electricity.
    Senator Coverdell. Thank you.
    Mr. Fertel. I caught a sore throat from my wife over the 
weekend.
    Senator Coverdell. I have been dealing with the same 
subject here for a while.
    Mr. Fertel. I apologize.
    Within this broad context, ratification of the convention 
by the United States is important for the following reasons. 
First, the U.S. Government and the nuclear energy industry have 
provided leadership in shaping the convention and it reflects 
the safety practices, programs, and culture inherent in the 
U.S. program. The industry believes these programs are 
necessary for the safety and reliability of nuclear programs 
worldwide.
    Second, as Mr. Einhorn said, all other countries that have 
significant nuclear energy programs except the United States 
and India have already ratified the convention. We believe that 
U.S. participation and particularly leadership is necessary.
    Third, the convention provides a forum for the United 
States to systematically review the nuclear programs for 
countries such as Russia and the Ukraine, to which the United 
States provides nuclear safety program assistance.
    Finally, the convention also provides an excellent 
framework and process to support the development of new safe 
nuclear power programs in countries that may be looking to 
establish such programs.
    In implementing the convention, the industry encourages the 
administration to ensure that the Government gets appropriate 
input and involvement of the U.S. industry prior to and 
possibly at review meetings. Also, U.S. ratification of the 
convention should not impose any new regulatory requirements on 
the U.S. industry beyond those already required to meet Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission regulations.
    Moreover, the administration should not fund activities 
associated with implementing the convention from user fees 
collected from NRC licensees for the agency's regulatory 
activities. Rather, we believe, given the benefits to the 
Nation, funds should be appropriated from other sources.
    The administration should also--and it sounds like the 
ratification resolution does this--look to eliminate existing 
governmental activities that are intended to achieve benefits 
that would be derived through the convention.
    Given the scheduled April 12, 1999, review meeting, NEI 
urges the committee and the U.S. Senate to act promptly to 
ratify the convention so that the United States can attend this 
first review meeting. U.S. leadership and participation is 
essential for successful implementation of the convention and, 
given the importance of assuring safe operation of nuclear 
plants worldwide, it is clearly in the best interest of our 
Nation and the world at large.
    The Convention on Nuclear Safety establishes a framework 
for improving nuclear safety among all countries that operate 
nuclear power plants and provides a basis for dialog with those 
countries planning to build and operate commercial nuclear 
facilities.
    In conclusion, the U.S. industry encourages prompt Senate 
ratification of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and is 
committed to working with the U.S. Government on implementation 
of the convention.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Fertel is in the appendix on 
page 18.]
    Senator Coverdell. Thank you, Mr. Fertel.
    Ms. Jones.

  STATEMENT OF GARY L. JONES, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR ENERGY, 
RESOURCES AND SCIENCE ISSUES, RESOURCES, COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC 
        DEVELOPMENT DIVISION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

    Ms. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I would also like to request that my full statement be 
included for the record.
    Senator Coverdell. It will be included in the record.
    Ms. Jones. Thank you.
    Let me briefly summarize our work on the Convention on 
Nuclear Safety. We have issued two reports since 1993 that have 
tracked the convention's development and implementation. My 
comments this afternoon will focus on its objectives and scope, 
the process for reviewing compliance, the dissemination of 
information related to convention proceedings, and 
implementation costs.
    The need for a global focus on nuclear safety was 
underscored when radioactive materials from Chernobyl were 
carried beyond the national boundaries of the Soviet Union to 
East and West European countries. The Convention on Nuclear 
Safety is viewed as one of the chief policy instruments to 
promote a nuclear safety culture and encourage countries with 
Soviet-designed nuclear reactors to improve their safety.
    The convention is not viewed as a solution or a quick fix, 
but as a positive step toward improving nuclear safety 
worldwide. It does not provide sanctions for noncompliance, nor 
will it require the closing of unsafe nuclear reactors. Rather, 
as Mr. Einhorn noted, it seeks to achieve its safety objectives 
through adherence to general safety principles, such as 
establishing an independent body to oversee safety, rather than 
by requiring compliance with binding technical standards.
    The convention's peer review process is central to its 
success. Countries submit self-assessment reports detailing the 
measures they have taken to implement the convention. Groups of 
countries will then critically examine and comment on those 
reports to encourage countries to improve their nuclear safety 
programs.
    However, the convention does not specify the form and 
content of the peer review process. Therefore it is unclear how 
the process will actually work and how peer pressure will 
accomplish change.
    Another issue that will impact the success of the peer 
review process is the quality of the individual country self-
assessment reports. Because of the differences among the 
countries and nuclear safety programs and available resources, 
NRC officials told us that they anticipated unevenness in the 
quality and detail of these reports, and that could affect the 
level of review and analysis.
    The convention also allows for countries that are outside a 
particular country grouping to submit comments or questions as 
an observer. NRC believes that this will enable the concerns of 
the United States about any country's report to be heard. 
However, we will not really know how effectively this will work 
until after the first peer review meeting.
    Public dissemination of information about the country's 
progress in meeting the terms of the convention can play a role 
in influencing compliance and will enhance the credibility of 
the process. However, it is uncertain how much information from 
the peer review meeting will be available to the public. The 
countries can limit distribution of their reports. At least one 
report that has been prepared for the April 1999 peer review 
meeting has not been made public, but others are available to 
the public. Some can be accessed on the Internet.
    The convention also provides for the public distribution of 
a report summarizing the issues discussed and the decisions 
reached during the peer review meeting. However, it appears 
that the report will be generic and will not identify countries 
by name. NRC officials told us that the convention did not 
specifically provide for the kind of openness that they would 
prefer, but they believe that over time more information would 
be made available.
    Costs to the United States to prepare for and attend the 
first review meeting will be significantly less than the $1.1 
million we reported in 1997. Since the United States has not 
ratified the convention, U.S. officials have not participated 
in the full range of meetings and activities related to the 
convention.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement, including attachments, of Ms. 
Jones, is in the appendix on page 22.]
    Senator Coverdell. Thank you both.
    Mr. Fertel, you obviously followed the drift of the 
questions of the chairman and you alluded to some concerns as 
related to those questions in terms of overlapping and 
redundant responsibilities and costs and their effect on your 
members.
    You might comment on it now, but, more importantly, 
measuring these questions, your institution may want to respond 
to those, use those questions as an opportunity to clarify more 
fully your concerns with regard to costs, treaty costs and 
other associated costs through these other organizations, 
clubs, whatever. You are welcome to comment if you would like.
    Mr. Fertel. I think sharing within the nuclear industry is 
part of the culture and has tremendous value. That is how we 
try and avoid safety problems, with openness and sharing. Just 
speaking from the industry side, having said that and we 
encourage it and we foster it as much as we can, we find in our 
own industry we have loads of special interest groups. We have 
not called them clubs, but we call them special interest 
groups, which often divert our resources from what they should 
be doing, with all the best intentions.
    Generally what we find is that it is useful, but very 
duplicative of other things that are going on and generally not 
something that management when they look at wants to continue. 
I think that the statement in the resolution of ratification 
for the Government to take a hard look across the spectrum of 
activities probably has real value.
    Senator Coverdell. Has the General Accounting Office, 
citing that redundancy section of the resolution, had any 
reflections or thoughts with regard to redundant costs that are 
pointed to by the questions of the chairman and-or are noted in 
the section in the resolution?
    Ms. Jones. Actually, Senator, the chairman of the committee 
has asked GAO to look at the duplication between INRA and other 
organizations that you have alluded to in the questions today. 
So we have just started our work in that area, so we are not 
able to comment on that today. But we will when our work is 
completed.
    Senator Coverdell. Do you have any idea as to how long it 
will take for that work to be completed?
    Ms. Jones. We are looking to get back to committee staff in 
a couple of months and let them know what our preliminary 
thoughts are on that issue.
    Senator Coverdell. With that, I am going to thank our panel 
for its presentations. As I said, we have included your full 
statements in the record. There are 5 days open for other 
committee members and-or others to insert questions in the 
record. We welcome you to elaborate to any greater extent that 
you would like in that open period.
    With that, we will adjourn the meeting.
    Ms. Jones. Thank you.
    Mr. Fertel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Coverdell. Thank you.
    [Whereupon, at 3:12 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
                            A P P E N D I X

                              ----------                              


               Prepared Statement of Senator Jesse Helms

    I am pleased that the Committee will undertake consideration of a 
resolution of ratification for the Nuclear Safety Convention. This 
resolution enjoys the support of the Administration, Senator Biden, and 
myself.
    The Convention, if used to its fullest potential, could serve as an 
important tool to encourage countries (most particularly, those 
possessing Soviet-era nuclear power plants) to improve their safety 
procedures. It will do so without harming the U.S. nuclear industry or 
imposing foreign pressure on the United States' domestic regulatory 
process.
    I am pleased that the administration secured a number of critical 
U.S. objectives in the process of negotiating the Convention. 
Specifically, I note that the treaty is limited to land-based civilian 
nuclear power plants and does not cover nuclear power reactors with 
military applications.
    Second, the Convention simply establishes a few fundamental 
principles for nuclear safety, rather than a detailed itemization of 
standards or rules. Detailed technical provisions would unnecessarily 
intrude on our sovereig authority to regulate the U.S. nuclear 
industry.
    Third, the Convention does not establish any new international 
bureaucracy.
    For these reasons, I support the treaty and urge adoption of the 
resolution.
                                 ______
                                 

           Prepared Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

    I want to thank Chairman Helms for scheduling today's hearing and, 
especially, Senator Coverdell for chairing this hearing.
    The Convention on Nuclear Safety is a modest step toward improving 
nuclear power safety around the world, especially among countries that 
lack the many years of experience that we have with these systems. The 
convention is sensible and low-cost, and the Senate should give its 
advice and consent to ratification before the Easter recess.
    One concern has been the costs of implementing this convention. I 
am pleased that the Contracting Parties have decided to conduct nearly 
all of their work in English, to minimize translation costs. I also 
note that the United States has to pay its share of the costs whether 
we join the convention or not. That is because the convention is 
administered by the International Atomic Energy Authority, with the 
costs included in our regular IAEA contribution. In practice, the U.S. 
share of administrative costs for the convention is expected to be 
under $100,000 per year.
    This convention creates a process in which, once every three years, 
each Contracting Party submits a report on its nuclear power safety 
procedures. Then each of the other Contracting Parties may request 
further clarification or critique that report. This will give 
experienced countries like the United States a forum in which to 
critique the reports submitted by countries with less nuclear power 
experience.
    The first reports have already been submitted, as this convention 
came into force many months ago. (It was signed in September 1994 and 
submitted to the Senate in May 1995.) The first Review Conference will 
take place next month, and it would make sense for the United States to 
become a Contracting Party before that conference, so that we could 
comment on those reports. Otherwise we will have to wait three years 
for that opportunity. So I urge quick action on a resolution of 
ratification.
                                 ______
                                 

                Prepared Statement of Robert J. Einhorn

    Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: I am pleased to provide the 
Senate with our views on the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The 
Administration strongly supports United States adherence to the 
Convention and hopes the Senate can take prompt action to permit 
ratification.
                               background
    The process of developing this Convention was formally launched by 
a resolution of the 1991 General Conference of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). The United States was a key supporter of that 
resolution and played a central role in drafting and negotiating the 
Convention. After three years of work by over 120 experts from 50 
countries under IAEA auspices, the Convention was opened for signature 
in September 1994. There are currently 65 signatories, including the 
United States. Most countries with major nuclear power industries moved 
quickly to ratify the Convention, and it entered into force in October 
1996. The 49 Contracting Parties include all states with significant 
nuclear power programs, except for the United States and India.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ To date the Contracting Parties are: Argentina, Armenia, 
Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Republic 
of Korea, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mali, Mexico, 
Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, the Russian Federation, Singapore, the Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and 
the United Kingdom.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
               what the nuclear safety convention can do
    The Convention can make an important contribution to raising levels 
of nuclear safety worldwide. It is the first international instrument 
to establish legal obligations regarding the safety of nuclear power 
plants. It codifies a comprehensive range of principles judged vital by 
technical experts to improve nuclear power safety worldwide. The scope 
of the Convention is limited to land-based civilian nuclear power 
plants. Such facilities pose the most significant safety risks due to 
the magnitude of their inventory of radioactive material, the 
complexity of the technology, known deficiencies in foreign-designed 
reactors in some countries, and the fact that regulatory regimes and 
nuclear safety culture in some countries are weak.
    A key focus of the Convention is on the requirement for all States 
Parties to establish a strong and effective nuclear regulatory 
authority. The Convention obligates States Parties to maintain a 
national regulatory body with adequate authority, competence, and 
financial and human resources to perform effective oversight. 
Regulatory responsibility must also be effectively separate from 
nuclear power promotion and utilization responsibilities. In this 
respect, among others, the Convention implements long-standing U.S. 
policy to support development of an effective nuclear safety culture 
worldwide for civilian nuclear power programs.
    The Convention establishes key obligations for States Parties. 
Governments are committed to take appropriate steps to ensure that:

   Priority is given to safety;
   Licensed plant operators have the prime safety 
        responsibility;
   Both the operator and the nuclear regulator have adequate 
        financial and human resources to meet their safety obligations;
   Quality assurance programs are established and implemented;
   Comprehensive and systematic safety assessments are made 
        throughout a reactor's life, and are verified;
   Radiation protection measures keep population exposure as 
        low as reasonably achievable;
   Off-site and on-site emergency response plans are in place 
        and tested routinely.

    The Convention also addresses safety at the facility level, with 
specific provisions relating to siting; design and construction; and 
operation of nuclear power plants.
    The United States fully meets all provisions of the Convention. 
However, this is not the case for all countries, and some States 
Parties will need to take further actions to comply with these 
obligations. Identifying and facilitating those further actions is a 
primary purpose of the Convention.
    The Convention is implemented in part by a process of national 
reports subject to peer review. The States Parties convene a Review 
Meeting not less frequently than every three years. Before the meeting 
each State Party submits a national report addressing how it is meeting 
its responsibilities under the Convention. Each national report is then 
subject to rigorous peer review by competent officials from the other 
States Parties at periodic meetings. The first Review Meeting will 
begin April 12, in less than four weeks. States that are now Parties 
submitted their national reports to the Convention's Secretariat at the 
International Atomic Energy Agency in October 1998. These reports were 
distributed to all States Parties for review and analysis before the 
first Review Meeting.
             what the nuclear safety convention does not do
    It is important to note what the Convention does not do. First, it 
does not create a new multilateral regulatory body, or another 
international organization or bureaucracy. Nor does the Convention 
impose detailed prescriptive standards or rules. Instead, the 
Convention advances fundamental principles. Detailed technical 
provisions would intrude on the responsibility of national governments 
to regulate their nuclear industries consistent with the requirements 
of differing reactor technologies, legal systems, and other factors. 
Further, negotiating such technical provisions might have resulted in a 
Convention with lowest common denominator requirements.
    We believe, from experience, that peer reviews are an effective 
mechanism for inducing change. The Nuclear Safely Convention is 
frequently referred to as an ``incentive'' convention. It is intended 
to help countries bring their nuclear safety systems up to an 
acceptable international level through a process that does not alienate 
those governments with weak safety systems, but rather gives them 
motivation to join and tools to evaluate and strengthen their programs. 
The Convention can also provide an important means for regulators and 
operators to argue for needed national resources to ensure they can 
meet their safety obligations. The information provided by the national 
reports can also help nuclear safety assistance donors, such as the 
United States, to target their assistance more effectively.
    On the key issue of financing Convention activities, the modest 
secretariat functions for the meeting of the parties not less than 
every three years will come from the IAEA's regular budget. The U.S. 
will also expend modest resources to prepare and review national 
reports and to attend meetings of the parties.
                       why the u.s. should ratify
    At the April 1996 Moscow Nuclear Safety Summit, and at the Denver 
and Birmingham G-8 summits in 1997 and 1998, and the March 1998 Energy 
Ministerial in Moscow, the participants committed to ratifying the 
Convention as soon as possible as a keystone of their nuclear safety 
actions. Our G-7 partners and the Russian Federation have since become 
parties to the Convention and continue to urge all countries to become 
parties to it. Delay in U.S. ratification would give some the 
inaccurate impression that the U.S. is not as committed to the 
principles of nuclear safety agreed to at successive Summits. Delay 
would also make it harder for the U.S. to argue persuasively that 
others should raise their safety standards, and could encourage others 
not listen to us on safety issues. More immediately, however, Senate 
advice and consent next week is needed to enable the U.S. to 
participate in the first Review Meeting of the Parties, beginning April 
12. Unless we ratify before that meeting, we will not be able to 
participate in the formal review of the national reports of other 
Parties, including Russia and other recipients of U.S. safety 
assistance.
    The U.S. chaired three meetings of signatories (in March and 
November 1995; and June 1996) to develop options and alternatives for 
implementing the Convention. The U.S. has worked actively to protect 
U.S. interests, including undue intrusion on our own nuclear industry 
and domestic nuclear regulatory process. In January 1997, at the 
request of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) presented an update of its 1993 report on the 
Convention, focusing on (1) how the Convention will be enforced, and 
(2) what the expected costs to the U.S. will be in implementing the 
Convention.
    At an April 1997 Preparatory Meeting the States Parties took 
decisions that respond directly to these concerns. At that meeting 
implementing procedures--guidelines regarding the review process, 
guidelines regarding national reports, and rules of procedure and 
financial rules--were reviewed and recommended for adoption. In 
addition, decisions were taken on languages to be used, with English 
designated as the single working language for most aspects of the 
review process; and on the conduct of country group discussions.
    The issues which the GAO report highlights were also discussed at 
the April 1997 Preparatory Meeting. Despite having played a leading 
role in developing the Convention, as a non-party the United States 
could not participate in that meeting. However, we were able to make 
U.S. views known informally through like-minded delegations, and as a 
result the decisions taken reflect our views.
    The important Organizational Meeting was convened September 29-
October 4, 1998. At that time national reports were submitted. The 
Contracting Parties were organized into country groups of 6-8 members, 
and group Rapporteurs were selected. Contracting Parties have had over 
four months to review all national reports and submit questions or 
requests for clarification to Rapporteurs. Outside of one's assigned 
country group, participation in group discussions will be permitted for 
those countries which submitted questions to the Rapporteur at least 
two months before the first Review Meeting, which begins April 12, not 
quite four weeks from today.
    It is essential that the U.S. continue its strong influence on the 
development of these activities. Our inability to participate in the 
Organizational Meeting was unfortunate. However, if we are able to 
ratify the Convention before the end of March, we can seek agreement 
from the States Parties to waive the requirement that Parties ratify 90 
days in advance of a review meeting in order to participate in that 
meeting. With Senate advice and consent next week; if the United States 
is able to complete and distribute our national report before the 
meeting; and if the other States Parties agree to waive the 90 day 
requirement, we will be able to participate in this very important 
first review of national reports. As you know, some of the governments 
submitting reports receive assistance from the United States to 
strengthen their nuclear reactor safety programs, and participating in 
this first Review Meeting would provide important insight into the 
degree to which that assistance is having effective results.
                             in conclusion
    The Administration believes that the Convention can make a 
significant positive contribution towards raising levels of nuclear 
safety worldwide, particularly in the New Independent States, in 
Central and Eastern Europe, and in the developing world.
    The U.S. nuclear industry has been kept informed of developments on 
the Convention through periodic briefings. The industry supports the 
Nuclear Safety Convention as an effective mechanism to improve the 
global nuclear safety culture, which can improve public acceptance of 
nuclear power and improve business opportunities.
    We urge quick and positive Senate action on advice and consent to 
ratification. Your favorable action will permit us to seek agreement of 
the other States Parties to participate in this very important first 
meeting on the Convention. This will give us the opportunity to review 
national reports and use the information to better focus our assistance 
programs. In this way we can work more effectively to realize our 
objective of an effective global nuclear safety culture, one that 
establishes effective, independent nuclear safety regulatory 
authorities in all countries with nuclear power programs to enforce 
safety at the plants.
    Thank you Mr. Chairman.
                                 ______
                                 

                 Prepared Statement of Marvin S. Fertel

    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Biden and distinguished members of the 
committee, my name is Marvin Fertel. I am the senior vice president for 
nuclear infrastructure support and international programs at the 
Nuclear Energy Institute, the Washington, D.C., policy organization for 
the nuclear industry. I am pleased to testify this morning in support 
of U.S. ratification of the Convention on Nuclear Safety.
    The Nuclear Energy Institute sets industry policy positions on 
various issues affecting the industry, including federal regulations 
that help ensure the safety of 103 operating nuclear power plants in 31 
states. NEI represents 275 companies, including every U.S. utility 
licensed to operate a commercial nuclear reactor, their suppliers, fuel 
fabrication facilities, architectural and engineering firms, labor 
unions and law firms, radiopharmaceutical companies, research 
laboratories, universities and international nuclear organizations.
                         summary of key points
    The nuclear energy industry supports ratification by the U.S. 
Senate of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Nuclear power plants 
produce nearly 20 percent of America's electricity--the second largest 
source of electricity. Nuclear power plants also are our largest source 
of emission-free electricity--an important consideration as Congress 
and other policymakers recognize the growing nexus of energy and 
environmental policy. Among the Congress, and indeed across the United 
States, there is a growing awareness that this is a proven industry 
with more than 2,000 reactor years of operating experience and with a 
product that will become even more valuable as we meet the demands of 
the 21st century.
    Globally, 441 nuclear power plants in 33 nations generate 17 
percent of our electricity. These nuclear energy facilities are 
becoming more important as the clean air benefits of nuclear energy, 
energy security considerations and economic factors are prompting many 
countries to pursue the expansion of their existing nuclear power 
programs, or the development of new nuclear power programs.
    Ratification of the Convention on Nuclear Safety by the United 
States is important for these reasons:

   The U.S. government and the U.S. nuclear energy industry 
        have provided leadership in shaping the Convention and it 
        reflects the safety practices, programs and culture inherent in 
        our programs. The industry believes these programs are 
        necessary to the safety and reliability of nuclear programs 
        worldwide;
   All other countries that have significant nuclear energy 
        programs, except the United States and India, have already 
        ratified the Convention;
   The Convention provides a forum for the United States to 
        systematically review the nuclear programs for countries, such 
        as Russia and the Ukraine, to which the United States provides 
        nuclear safety program assistance; and
   The Convention also provides an excellent framework and 
        process to support the development of new, safe nuclear power 
        programs in countries that may be looking to establish such 
        programs for energy security and environmental reasons.

    The Nuclear Energy Institute's Executive Committee, representing 
the leadership of the U.S. commercial nuclear industry, passed a 
resolution in 1997 encouraging prompt Senate ratification of the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety. The resolution noted ``that in 
implementing the Convention, the U.S. government is encouraged to fully 
engage the U.S. industry through NEI and to include industry expertise 
through representation on the U.S. delegations to deliberations under 
the Convention.''
    The industry fully supports ratification of the Convention, and 
encourages the Administration as part of its implementation to ensure 
that appropriate input and involvement of the U.S. industry prior to, 
and possibly at, review meetings. U.S. ratification of the Convention 
should not impose any new regulatory requirements on the U.S. industry 
beyond those required to meet Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
regulations.
    Moreover, the Administration should not fund activities associated 
with implemention the Convention from user fees collected from NRC 
licensees for the agency's regulatory activities. Similarly, the 
Administration should eliminate existing governmental activities that 
are intended to achieve benefits that would be derived through the 
Convention.
    Given the scheduled April 12, 1999 review meeting, NEI urges the 
Committee and the U.S. Senate to act promptly to ratify this Convention 
so that the United States can attend this first review meeting. U.S. 
leadership and participation is essential for successful implementation 
of the Convention, and given the importance of assuring safe operation 
of nuclear plants worldwide, it is clearly in the best interests of our 
nation and the world at large.
    Mr. Chairman, the U.S. commercial nuclear industry is committed to 
achieving and maintaining a high level of safety at commercial nuclear 
power plants worldwide. The Convention provides an internationally 
accepted and reasonable framework for enhancing the already high levels 
of safety at commercial nuclear power plants in the United States and 
internationally.
    Without nuclear energy, the United States and many other nations 
will find it impossible to meet increasing electricity demand, domestic 
clean air goals or global efforts to reduce the effects of carbon 
dioxide on the global climate. U.S. nuclear power plants provide clean 
air benefits while producing electricity at a competitive price with 
production costs that are a fraction of a cent higher than coal-fired 
electricity and more cost-effective than natural gas, solar or wind 
power. Members of Congress and other policymakers increasingly are 
recognizing the important benefits of nuclear energy to our cconomy, 
our environment and our energy future.
                               background
    The United States has the largest commercial nuclear power industry 
in the world, and we are the global leaders in the development of 
advanced nuclear power plant technology. Between 1973 and 1996, nuclear 
energy met 40 percent of the increase in demand for electricity in the 
United States. Over this same period, U.S. nuclear power plants 
displaced 2.3 billion barrels of oil, 3.4 billion tons of coal, and 
12.1 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The oil alone would have cost 
$74 billion (in constant 1996 dollars). Worldwide, nuclear energy 
displaced 10 billion barrels of oil between 1973 and 1995, valued at 
over $290 billion. During the same period, nuclear energy displaced 56 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 8.9 billion tons of coal.
    In 1997, nuclear energy generated more electricity--631 billion 
kilowatt hours in the United States than any other fuel source except 
coal. More than 100 nuclear power plants achieved an average capacity 
factor of 70.3 percent. (Capacity factor, a yardstick for plant 
performance, measures the amount of electricity actually produced 
compared with the maximum output achievable.) The 1997 average is 
nearly 16 percentage points higher than the 1980 average. Nationally, 
each percentage point increase in capacity factor is roughly equivalent 
to adding 1,000 megawatts of generating capacity to the electricity 
grid. Improved nuclear power plant performance thus helps meet the 
growing demand for electricity in the United States.
    Since 1980, more than 40 U.S. nuclear power plants have entered 
service The number of nuclear power plants in commercial service now 
stands at 103 up from 68 in 1980.
    In providing one-fifth of U.S. electricity supply, nuclear energy 
is our nation's largest source of emission-free electricity. Nuclear 
energy also provides clean air benefits at a competitive price with 
production costs that are a fraction of a cent higher than coal-fired 
electricity and more cost-effective than natural gas, solar or wind 
power. Most U.S. nuclear power plants compete as low-cost electricity 
providers today and are well-positioned as states open their 
electricity markets to competition. Measured solely by economic 
factors--operating and maintenance costs plus fuel costs, ongoing 
capital requirements and general and administrative expenses--most 
nuclear units will be very competitive in a deregulated electricity 
market. In fact, many nuclear plants should be able to improve their 
economic performance even further.
    Production costs at nuclear power plants in the last three years 
continue to fall well below those the nuclear energy industry incurred 
at the start of the decade. Meanwhile, plant performance measured by 
the capacity factor of plant operation has in the last two years 
reached record high levels.
    The industry has built a solid record of safe, efficient 
performance at nuclear power plants as it enters a new business 
environment. But the industry's continued commitment to safe nuclear 
plant operation must be accompanied by the NRC's ability to fulfill its 
mission as a strong and credible regulator. Both are essential to build 
and maintain public trust and confidence in nuclear energy.
    Unlike any other electric generation source, nuclear power is 
unique because the costs of the entire electricity production 
lifecycle--including the uranium fuel manufacturing process, NRC 
regulation, waste management and plant decommissioning--are included in 
the cost of electricity to consumers. To remain competitive with other 
generation sources that do not internalize many of these expenses, all 
costs in the nuclear fuel cycle must be appropriate and reasonable. 
Plants will close if they cannot compete, raising potential electricity 
system reliability problems. Moreover, the nuclear electric generation 
will be replaced by power plants that emit greenhouse gases and other 
air pollutants. If that scenario unfolds, the United States will find 
it impossible to meet increasingly stringent U.S. clean air regulations 
and international carbon dioxide reduction goals.
    The foundation for the United States' leadership role in the 
nuclear energy industry is the extensive use of nuclear power in this 
country and the industry's improved safety performance. The industry's 
commitment to excellence in plant operations has resulted in dramatic 
gains in both safety and efficiency. Since 1985, for example, NRC data 
shows that the average number of significant events at U.S. plants has 
declined from nearly 2.5 per unit in 1985 to an average of .04 per unit 
in 1998. Moreover, improvements in nuclear plant operating efficiency 
since 1990 are equivalent to adding 11 large generating units to the 
national electric grid--further evidence of the industry's contribution 
to serving new electricity demand while meeting our nation's clean air 
goals
    Next week will mark the 20th anniversary of the accident at the 
Three Mile Island nuclear plant in Pennsylvania. Notwithstanding the 
reality that the accident hurt the unclear energy industry's public 
image, the practical reality is that Three Mile Island was the catalyst 
for significant institutional and operational changes that translated 
into dramatic improvements in plant safety and efficiency.
    Disciplines in training, operations and event reporting that grew 
from the lessons of the accident have made the nuclear power industry 
demonstrably safer and more reliable. During the 1980s, U.S. utilities 
committed to a major nuclear power plant improvement program. Its 
success is partly due to the initiatives of the Institute of Nuclear 
Power Operations (INPO), an industry-sponsored organization that works 
to ensure the highest levels of safety and reliability in all aspects 
of nuclear plant operations.
    Teams of qualified and experienced specialists visit each U.S. 
plant about every 18 months, but at least every 24 months. They perform 
a two-week examination of workers' performance, the condition of the 
plant systems and equipment, the plant's operating history, the quality 
of programs and procedures and the effectiveness of the management. The 
teams then report their findings to plant and corporate management--
including recommendations for improvement--based on the best practices 
found in the nuclear industry worldwide.
    Since 1983, INPO has collected performance data from each nuclear 
power plant and published annual industrywide performance indicators. 
This data helps utilities evaluate how well each plant is performing 
and sets specific goals for operating excellence.
    As part of its program, INPO monitors 10 key performance 
indicators, such as unplanned automatic shutdowns and safety system 
actuations. INPO collects these data from each nuclear unit, then 
calculates national averages, and submits them to the World Association 
of Nuclear Operators (WANO). Each of WANO's performance indicators 
reveals that nuclear power plants are operating more safely, more 
productively and more competitively.
            u.s. nuclear regulatory regime is a global model
    The United States has the most mature commercial nuclear regulatory 
regime in the world. Within the context of exceptional plant 
performance, both the industry and the public still need and demand a 
credible and effective regulatory oversight process to ensure adequate 
protection of the public health and safety.
    Although the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has been an effective 
regulator during the first decades of nuclear power plant operation, 
the agency has recognized the inherent value of changing the existing 
regulatory process to make it more effective and safety focused. In 
this new regulatory process, regulation must have a clear nexus to 
objective safety standards. The key to reform is in the efficient use 
of risk insights, which can greatly improve the safety focus of 
regulatory requirements. In conjunction with risk-informed regulation 
is a need for a performance-based approach, where the NRC would decide 
how best to meet those goals. Performance-based regulation is more 
sharply focused on safety than the current approach, because resources 
are applied to plant systems and components commensurate with their 
importance to safety.
    The Nuclear Safety Convention would augment national regulatory 
programs, like the NRC, reaffirming the commitment to a high level of 
safety worldwide. U.S. leadership in international nuclear development 
has been critical to ensure safe, reliable and environmentally 
beneficial uses of commercial nuclear technology around the world. The 
United States has been a leader in technical exchanges with other 
nations that operate nuclear power plants. Together, industry leaders 
and plant operating personnel from the West and the East have 
recognized that nuclear power safety and operations transcend national 
boundaries. They have worked side by side with peers from all over the 
world to provide assistance and operating experiences.
    Shirley Jackson, chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
said in a speech earlier this month that ``nuclear operators long have 
recognized the value and the imperative of combining their national 
efforts in the cause of enhanced safety.'' Indeed, the United States 
has been extremely active in cooperative assistance efforts, including 
those designed to address the safety of Soviet-designed reactors in 
Central and Eastern Europe. The Convention on Nuclear Safety would 
augment International Atomic Energy Agency efforts in international 
safety. By ratifying the treaty, the United States would maintain U.S. 
leadership in ensuring that nuclear power plant designs in Eastern and 
Central Europe, as well as in developing countries, are safe. Although 
it does not address the full scope of global safety issues, the 
Convention promotes a nuclear safety culture worldwide by providing 
technical cooperation on safety-related issues.
    U.S. participation in implementing the Convention on Nuclear Safety 
is an important component of providing this U.S. leadership. 
Importantly, the treaty will ensure that all contracting parties will 
report, for review, all measures they have taken to implement the 
safety obligations in the Convention. This reporting is thorough and is 
not subject to national confidentiality.
    The Convention on Nuclear Safety establishes a framework for 
improving nuclear safety among all countries that operate nuclear power 
plants and provides a basis for dialogue with those countries planning 
to build and operate commercial nuclear facilities. The U.S. nuclear 
industry is committed to working with the United States government on 
the Convention and urges U.S. companies to continue their long-standing 
assistance programs to improve efficiency, reliability and safety of 
nuclear power plants worldwide.

                               Resolution

      WHEREAS, thirty-three countries operating four hundred and forty-
one nuclear power plants currently produce seventeen percent of the 
world's electricity;

      WHEREAS, environmental benefits of nuclear energy, energy 
security considerations and economic factors, are causing many 
countries to pursue the expansion of their existing nuclear power 
programs, or the development of new nuclear power programs;

      WHEREAS, the U.S. nuclear energy industry is committed to 
achieving and maintaining a high-level of nuclear safety at commercial 
nuclear power plants, worldwide; and

      WHEREAS, the ``Convention on Nuclear Safety'' provides an 
internationally accepted and reasonable framework for enhancing the 
safety at commercial nuclear power plants worldwide;

      NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED,

that NEI encourages the prompt ratification of the ``Convention on 
Nuclear Safety'' by the Senate of the United States; and

that in implementing the Convention, the U.S. government is encouraged 
to fully engage the U.S. industry through NEI and to include industry 
expertise through representation on the U.S. delegations to 
deliberations under the Convention.
                                 ______
                                 

                  Prepared Statement of Gary L. Jones

    Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
    We are here today to provide information on the Convention on 
Nuclear Safety--a multilateral treaty to improve civil nuclear power 
safety. Our statement today summarizes (1) the Convention's scope and 
objectives, (2) the process for reviewing compliaince with the 
Convention, (3) the dissemination of information related to the 
Convention's proceedings, and (4) the costs to implement the 
Convention. We have issued two reports that track the Convention's 
development and implementation. \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Nuclear Safety: Progress Toward lnternational Agreement to 
Improve Reactor Safety (GAO/RCED-93-153, May 14, 1993) and Nuclear 
Safety: Uncertainties About the Implementation and Costs of the Nuclear 
Safety Convention (GAO/RCED-97-39, Jan. 2, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In summary
   The Convention on Nuclear Safety, which focuses on civilian 
        nuclear power reactors, is viewed by the United States as one 
        of the chief policy instruments to encourage countries with 
        Soviet-designed nuclear reactors to improve the safety of their 
        reactors. The Convention seeks to achieve its safety objectives 
        through countries' adherence to general safety principles, such 
        as establishing an independent body to oversee safety, rather 
        than binding technical standards. The Convention does not 
        provide sanctions for noncompliance nor require the closing of 
        unsafe nuclear reactors.
   The Convention's peer review process is intended to 
        establish a forum where groups of countries will comment on 
        reports that are self-assessments of their nuclear programs and 
        thereby encourage countries to improve the safety of these 
        programs. However, the Convention does not specify the form and 
        content of the peer review process nor the quality of 
        countries' reports; therefore, it is unclear how peer pressure 
        will accomplish change or even whether sufficient information 
        will be contained in the reports.
   Although public dissemination of information about the 
        countries' progress in meeting the terms of the Convention can 
        play a role in influencing compliance, it is uncertain how much 
        information from the peer review meetings will be available to 
        the public. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) officials told 
        us that the Convention does not specifically provide for the 
        kind of openness that they would prefer, but they believe that 
        over time, more information will be made available to the 
        public.
   In January 1997, we reported that the United States 
        estimated that it could spend up to $1.1 million through fiscal 
        year 1999 to prepare for and attend the first review meeting. 
        However, according to an NRC official, the actual costs for 
        this time period will be significantly less because U.S. 
        officials have not participated in the full range of meetings 
        and activities to date related to the Convention.
         scope and objectives of the nuclear safety convention
    The development of the Nuclear Safety Convention is one of a number 
of cooperative efforts being undertaken by the international community 
to improve nuclear safety. The impetus for these efforts is based 
largely on the continuing concern about the safety of the older Soviet-
designed reactors. Many of these reactors are operating without basic 
safety features, such as protective structures to contain radioactive 
releases and adequately trained personnel. Although the Convention is 
not viewed as a panacea or ``quick fix,'' it is believed to be a 
positive step toward improving worldwide nuclear safety. Importantly, 
though, the Convention does not require any specific actions like 
closing unsafe nuclear reactors, and its focus is limited to civilian 
nuclear power reactors.
    The Convention seeks to achieve its safety objectives through 
countries' adherence to general safety principles rather than binding 
technical standards. These principles include (1) establishing and 
maintaining a legislative framework and an independent regulatory body 
to govern the safety of nuclear installations; (2) establishing 
procedures to ensure that technical aspects of safety, such as the 
siting, design, and construction of nuclear power reactors, are 
adequately considered; and (3) ensuring that an acceptable level of 
safety is maintained throughout the life of the installations by such 
things as considering safety to be a priority and establishing a 
quality assurance program.
    The majority of the country representatives that we met with during 
the early drafting stages of the Convention supported these principles. 
A few country officials stated, however, that without establishing 
procedures for addressing existing problem reactors, including time 
frames for upgrading their safety, the Convention would not improve 
nuclear safety. Nevertheless, 65 countries have signed the Convention, 
and 49 of the 65 have ratified it. As you know, the United States has 
signed but not ratified the Convention.
       peer review process is central to the convention's success
    As noted, the Convention does not impose sanctions for 
noncompliance. Rather, it seeks to encourage compliance through a peer 
review process, which is considered central to the Convention's 
success. According to officials of the Departments of State and Energy 
and NRC, this process will enable countries' safety practices to be 
brought before the ``bar of world public opinion.'' The Convention does 
not specify the form and content of the peer review process but calls 
on the parties to (1) submit sell-assessment reports of the measures 
they have taken to implement the Convention and (2) hold meetings to 
review these reports. As you are aware, the first meeting of the 
parties will take place next month at the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Austria.
    Review groups composed of members from participating countries 
serve as the foundation of the peer review mechanism. Each group 
includes members from several countries that have ratified the 
Convention. As the process is currently envisioned, the countries with 
the most operating nuclear reactors will participate in separate groups 
along with several other countries that have ratified the Convention. 
Within this group setting, all countries will critically examine and 
review how each country is complying with the Convention. Because the 
United States has not yet ratified the Convention, it has not yet been 
assigned to one of the country groups. In our 1997 report, we pointed 
out that NRC officials had expressed some concern about the potential 
grouping of countries. For example, the United States, which has spent 
tens of millions of dollars to improve the safety of Soviet-designed 
reactors, will not be in the same review group as Russia, which 
operates many of these reactors.
    Although U.S. representatives had misgivings about the country peer 
review groups, the Convention states that each country shall have a 
reasonable opportunity to discuss and seek clarification of the reports 
of any other party at the review meeting. As a result, NRC officials 
believed that regardless of how the countries are ultimately grouped, 
the United States would have ample opportunity to review and comment on 
the self-assessment reports of all countries. According to NRC, the 
procedures on the peer review process have been clarified since the 
issuance of our 1997 report. The process will begin with discussions by 
group members but will then allow countries that are outside a 
particular group to obtain information of interest to them. Outside 
parties will be permitted to sit in on the full discussion of any 
report about which they have submitted questions or comments as 
observers. NRC believes this process will enable the United States' 
concerns about any country's report to be fully heard.
    We would like to point out that this process is still somewhat 
theoretical and neither we nor anyone else can be fully certain that it 
will work precisely as described. Furthermore, it is unclear what form 
peer pressure will take and how it will cause changes in a country's 
nuclear power program. As we noted in our May 1993 report, overall 
responsibility for nuclear safety rests with the country where a 
nuclear installation is located.
    Another issue that will affect the success of the peer review 
process is the quality of the individual countries' sell-assessment 
reports, which are expected to describe how the parties are complying 
with the Convention. Because of differences in countries' nuclear 
safety programs and available resources, NRC officials anticipate 
unevenness in the quality and detail of the reports. In their view, 
this unevenness could affect the level of review and analysis. 
Similarly, an NRC official recently told us that there is no standard 
format for the reports and that quality issues will remain problematic.
 public access to information resulting from the convention's meetings 
                        can influence compliance
    The public dissemination of information about the countries' 
progress in meeting the terms of the Convention can play a key role in 
influencing compliance, according to some experts familiar with 
international agreements that rely primarily on peer review. Although 
U.S. andIAEA officials believe the Convention will encourage greater 
openness about many countries' safety records and programs, it is 
uncertain how much information resulting from the periodic meetings 
will be made available to the public. According to NRC officials, the 
countries can limit the distribution of their reports. While several 
countries have made the reports prepared for the first review meeting 
available to the public and even accessible on the Internet, an NRC 
official told us that one country, for example, has not made its report 
public. According to an NRC official, the United States plans to make 
its report publicly available.
    Our 1997 report pointed out some concerns about what type of public 
record would result from the periodic meetings. We noted that the 
Convention provides for the public distribution of a report summarizing 
the issues discussed and the decisions reached during a meeting. 
However, an NRC official recently told us that the report will be 
generic in nature and unlikely to identify countries by name. Overall, 
NRC officials told us that the Convention does not specifically provide 
for the kind of openness that they would prefer but they believe that 
over time, more information will be made available to the public. 
Certainly, promoting greater openness about countries' nuclear safety 
regimes will enhance the credibility of the process.
                   costs to implement the convention
    In January 1997, we reported that the United States estimated that 
it could spend up to $1.1 million through fiscal year 1999 to prepare 
for and attend the first review meeting. However, according to an NRC 
official, the actual costs for this time period will be significantly 
less because U.S. officials have not participated in the full range of 
meetings and activities to date related to the Convention.
    The Convention states that IAEA will bear the costs of 
administering the meeting of the parties, which were expected to total 
about $1 million. Our 1997 report noted that IAEA planned to support 
the Convention through its operating budget, which the United States 
supports through an annual 25-percent contribution. NRC officials had 
told us that they were concerned about IAEA's potential costs for 
administering the Convention. The factors affecting IAEA's costs 
primarily involve the number of languages used to conduct the meeting 
of the parties and the corresponding translation services. Recently, 
though, an NRC official told us that costs are being contained because 
English will serve as the working language for the meeting of the 
parties. If more languages had been used, then the costs would have 
been higher given the corresponding costs for translation. As noted in 
our 1997 report, IAEA's then Deputy Director General for Nuclear Safety 
told us that the Convention might uncover additional safety problems 
that require attention. As a result, the countries with the most acute 
safety problems may seek to use the Convention process as leverage to 
obtain additional nuclear safety assistance.
    This concludes our statement. We would be happy to respond to any 
questions you or other Members of the Committee may have.

    [Attachments.]

           [GAO Report to Congressional Requesters--May 1993]

   Nuclear Safety--Progress Toward International Agreement to Improve 
                             Reactor Safety

                    U.S. General Accounting Office,
   Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division,
                                      Washington, DC, May 14, 1993.

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Regulation,
Committee on Environment and Public Works,
United States Senate

The Honorable Bob Graham,
United States Senate

    Representatives of nearly one-half of the 114 member states of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including the United States, 
have participated in the development of an international nuclear safety 
convention--a proposed multilateral treaty to improve civil nuclear 
power reactor safety. A preliminary draft of the convention has been 
developed (referred to as the draft convention for this report), but 
discussions are continuing, and when the final convention text will be 
completed and presented to IAEA member states for signature is 
uncertain.
    This report responds to the former and current Chairman's request 
that we provide information on the development of the nuclear safety 
convention, including a discussion of (1) the draft convention's scope 
and objectives, (2) how the convention will be implemented and 
monitored, (3) the views of selected country representatives on what 
provisions should be included in the draft convention, and (4) the 
convention's potential benefits and limitations.
                            results in brief
    The scope of the convention as currently drafted focuses on civil 
nuclear power reactors. Thus, other nuclear facilities, including those 
dealing with waste management, military activities, fuel cycle 
activities--such as reprocessing and/or enrichment plants--and research 
reactors, are not covered under the convention's provisions. For 
example, the draft convention would not cover the nuclear reprocessing 
facility at a military complex in Russia where an accident occurred in 
April 1993.
    The objectives of the draft convention are written in general terms 
and call on countries to achieve and attain a high level of safety to 
prevent nuclear accidents. Because the convention's premise is that the 
regulation of nuclear safety is a national responsibility, safety goals 
would be achieved through countries' adherence to general safety 
principles, such as establishing a legislative framework and an 
independent regulatory body to govern the safety of nuclear 
installations, rather than to binding detailed technical standards. The 
convention has been characterized as incentive-oriented, designed to 
encourage widespread support, particularly among countries operating 
Soviet-designed reactors that lack basic safety features.
    The draft convention provides for a peer review process to monitor 
adherence to the provisions of the convention. Through this process--
the details of which have not been determined--it is envisioned that 
country representatives would have an opportunity to review other 
countries' measures to improve safety and could exert peer pressure to 
affect changes.
    Although the convention concept is supported by a diverse group of 
IAEA member state representatives, views differ regarding several 
issues. For example, the United States and 6 other country 
representatives told us that they favor a scope limited to civil 
nuclear power plants, while 16 country representatives told us that 
they support a broader convention covering, for example, radioactive 
waste facilities or reprocessing facilities in addition to power 
plants. One country did not provide a final position on the scope of 
the convention. Representatives from 21 of the 24 IAEA member states 
that we met with, including U.S. officials, told us that they favor a 
convention based on general safety principles and oppose an 
international enforcement mechanism because the safe operation and 
maintenance of nuclear reactors is a national responsibility. Most of 
these countries operate nuclear power plants. Representatives we spoke 
with from three countries--none of which operate civil nuclear power 
plants but do neighbor countries operating nuclear power plants--prefer 
binding technical standards and an international regulatory body to 
oversee the convention's implementation.
    The majority of country representatives and some IAEA officials 
believe the convention is a positive step towards promoting and 
strengthening international nuclear safety and perhaps increasing 
public confidence in the nuclear power industry. However, a few other 
representatives and other IAEA officials were less optimistic. They 
noted that without establishing procedures for addressing existing 
problem reactors, including time frames for upgrading their safety, the 
convention will not improve nuclear safety. In addition, they told us 
that the convention could easily be considered weak and lacking in 
substance by nuclear poweropponents; thus, unless the convention 
addresses those reactors where perceived safety deficiencies exist, it 
is technically flawed.
                               background
    The development of the nuclear safety convention is one of a number 
of cooperative efforts being undertaken by the international community 
to improve nuclear safety. Financial and technical assistance from 
various bilateral and multilateral sources, such as the Commission of 
the European Communities, is under way to address some of the most 
urgent safety problems. The impetus for these efforts is based largely 
on the growing concern about the safety of the older Soviet-designed 
reactors in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Many of these 
reactors are operating without basic safety features, such as emergency 
core cooling systems, protective structures to contain radioactive 
releases, and adequately trained personnel. In addition, many of these 
reactors are in countries that do not have independent or effective 
nuclear regulatory organizations.
    The IAEA member state representatives developing the draft 
convention, known collectively as the working group, have met three 
times in Vienna, Austria, during the period May 1992 through January 
1993. The Department of State heads the U.S. delegation to the working 
group, which also includes representatives from the Department of 
Energy (DOE) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The group 
plans to meet again in May 1993. A State Department official told us 
that discussions have been complex and difficult because the convention 
concerns the sovereign rights of nations to regulate and manage 
important domestic industrial activities that will be affected by the 
provisions of the convention when adopted. As a result, according to 
the State Department official, a diplomatic conference will be 
necessary to negotiate the final terms of the convention.
              scope and objectives of the draft convention
    The scope of the convention, as currently drafted, applies only to 
civil nuclear power plants. Thus, other nuclear facilities, including 
those dealing with waste management, military activities, and fuel 
cycle activities--such as reprocessing and/or enrichment plants--and 
research reactors, are not covered by the terms of the convention. The 
convention as it currently exists would not cover, for example, the 
nuclear reprocessing facility at a military complex in Russia where an 
accident occurred in April 1993.
    The objectives of the draft convention are written in general 
rather than detailed, technical, and prescriptive terms. For example, 
the convention calls on countries to take all appropriate measures to 
(1) protect people and the environment from the harmful effects of 
radiation and (2) prevent the occurrence of nuclear accidents. The 
convention proposes that countries cooperate to reach these objectives 
and achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear safety. The convention 
does not seek to impose penalties for noncompliance.
    The convention has been described as incentive-oriented designed to 
maximize the number of countries that will support and sign it. A State 
Department official said that a major reason for developing an 
incentive-type convention was to make it acceptable and useful to 
countries with problem reactors, particularly the former Soviet Union 
and eastern European nations. According to U.S. officials, the main 
purpose of the convention is to get these countries, as well as 
developing nations, to make commitments to improve their reactors and 
develop a safety culture.\1\ The U.S. officials believe that these 
countries probably would not sign a prescriptive or stringent 
convention that they could not comply with.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Safety culture implies individual and organizational awareness 
of and commitment to the importance of safety. It also refers to the 
personal dedication and accountability of all individuals engaged in 
any activity that has a bearing on the safety of nuclear power plants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The draft convention states that overall responsibility for nuclear 
safety rests with the country where a nuclear installation is located. 
Therefore, the convention seeks to achieve its objectives through 
countries' adhering to general safety principles rather than to binding 
technical standards. These principles, or safety fundamentals, embodied 
in the draft convention represent international consensus by experts on 
basic safety concepts for the regulation and operation of nuclear 
installations. The principles comprise the most general level of 
guidelines in the hierarchy of IAEA's nuclear safety series 
publications. \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ IAEA's safety series also includes more detailed standards, 
guides, and practices. In total, these guidelines provide a reference 
for developing national safety regulations in certain cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The principles, in part, call on each country to take the following 
actions:

   Establish and maintain a legislative framework and 
        independent regulatory body to govern the safety of nuclear 
        installations through regulations, licensing, inspection, and 
        enforcement.
   Establish procedures to ensure that technical aspects of 
        nuclear reactor safety are adequately considered and 
        continuously evaluated throughoutthe life of the installation. 
        These technical aspects include siting, design and 
        construction, and operation and maintenance. For example, 
        countries would be required to establish procedures to evaluate 
        the impact of a nuclear installation's site selection on the 
        environment and ensure that the design of the installation 
        provides for levels of protection against the release of 
        radioactive materials.
   Establish a safety management system to ensure that an 
        acceptable level of safety is maintained throughout the life of 
        the installation. This is to be achieved by giving priority to 
        safety, establishing a quality assurance program, ensuring that 
        staff are adequately trained, performing periodic safety 
        assessments, and establishing an emergency preparedness plan.
          convention to be implemented by peer review process
    As currently drafted, the convention would be implemented by 
periodic meetings of the signatory countries--a peer review process. 
Although the details of this process have not been determined by the 
working group, the draft convention contains proposals that the 
meetings will (1) establish the structute, content, and time frames for 
status reports to be submitted by the signatory countries; (2) review 
and assess how the countries are meeting the convention's obligations; 
and (3) carry out advisory functions to achieve and maintain a high 
level of nuclear power plant safety.
    These meetings are an essential element of the convention and 
should provide a forum for reviewing countries' measures to improve 
safety. At a February 1993 IAEA general conference meeting, the U.S. 
representative noted that the convention should establish a mandatory 
process for exerting peer pressure on countries with weak nuclear 
safety programs to substantially improve them.
    The role of IAEA--an agency that promotes improvements in nuclear 
power reactor safety--in implementing the convention has not been 
agreed upon, but it is unlikely that the agency will have any 
enforcement or regulatory responsibility. As drafted, the convention 
proposes that IAEA serve as the Secretariat to the meeting of the 
parties. In this capacity, IAEA would (1) convene, prepare, and service 
the meetings; (2) transmit reports and information to member countries; 
and (3) perform other duties and provide support services and technical 
expertise as requested. Most of the country officials, including the 
U.S. delegation, believe that IAEA also can play a useful, 
nonregulatory role in implementing the convention, such as technical 
adviser.
    Both the Director and Deputy Director of IAEA's Nuclear Safety 
Division believe the agency can play an active role by more fully 
utilizing the skills and expertise of the agency. They noted that in 
addition to the proposed Secretariat role, IAEA could facilitate the 
procedural meetings of the parties in a variety of ways. For example, 
IAEA could (1) prepare reports for the meetings, (2) analyze countries' 
status reports, (3) verify countries' progress in improving safety, (4) 
establish criteria to serve as a benchmark for measuring progress in 
meeting the convention's obligations, and (5) provide other technical 
assistance as required.
  country representatives expressed differing views on nuclear safety 
                               convention
    We interviewed representatives of 24 IAEA member state countries 
\3\--18 of which operate 87 percent of the world's civil nuclear power 
plants--to obtain their views on the convention's scope, whether they 
favored a convention based on detailed technical standards or general 
safety principles, if there should be a mechanism to ensure adherence 
to the convention, and the convention's potential benefits and 
limitations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ We interviewed representatives from Argentina, Austria, 
Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Cuba, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, 
and the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mixed Views on Scope of Convention
    Various views exist among country representatives over what 
facilities and elements of the nuclear fuel cycle should be included in 
the convention. All of the representatives we spoke with agreed that, 
at a minimum, the convention should cover civil nuclear power plants. 
However, the majority of these representatives told us that the final 
convention should not be limited to these installations. Of the 24 
representatives, 16 favored a convention covering a wider range of 
facilities and most frequently cited the need to include radioactive 
waste disposal. Other facilities or elements mentioned were fuel 
reprocessing, transportation of nuclear material, military facilities, 
and research reactors. One country representative did not provide a 
final position on the scope of the convention.
    Representatives told us that a nuclear accident, regardless of its 
source, is potentially dangerous. In their view, a convention 
addressing other sources of radiation would demonstrate the 
international community's recognition of the broader issues involving 
nuclear safety. Many of the representatives who support a broader scope 
for the final convention told us that their countries might be willing 
to accept a convention limited to nuclear power plants as a first step, 
with the understanding that additional nuclear facilities would be 
addressed in future conventions.
    Seven country representatives, including the United States, favor a 
scope limited to nuclear power reactors, in part because they pose the 
most serious risk. In addition, State Department and NRC officials told 
us that it was thought early agreement could be reached on a final text 
of the convention if it was limited to nuclear power reactors. In 
addition, an NRC official told us that the United States is committed 
to continuing the convention process and would be an active participant 
in any future safety conventions addressing other nuclear facilities.
Most Countries Favor General Principles Over Binding Standards
    Of the 24 countries whose representatives we interviewed, including 
the United States, 21 support a convention based on general safety 
principles, not binding safety standards. With one exception, these 
countries have nuclear power plants in operation or under construction. 
Several member country representatives said that the general principles 
included in the draft convention are adequate to establish minimum 
acceptable standards of safety. Officials from the United States and 
several other countries noted that standards could infringe on national 
sovereignty or conflict with national laws and policies. A DOE official 
said that detailed standards are not well suited for development into 
international standards. He said that the diversity of plants in 
operation worldwide and of those planned for the future makes it 
difficult for a set of detailed standards to be applied broadly and 
still to provide recognition of individual reactor design requirements.
    The representatives of the United States and other countries told 
us that it would be time-consuming and complex to translate safety 
standards into acceptable binding international language. Furthermore, 
the United States has maintained that international standards could 
commit the signatory countries to a less rigorous set of obligations 
than many national programs have adopted--a ``lowest common 
denominator'' approach to nuclear safety.
    Representatives from three non-nuclear power countries, all of 
which neighbor countries with operating nuclear power reactors, told us 
that they favor a convention based on binding international technical 
safety standards. Officials from these countries said that detailed, 
prescriptive standards would provide firm obligations and serve as 
criteria for measuring progress made toward nuclear safety. Two of 
these countries' officials disagreed with the lowest common denominator 
argument made by the United States. The officials said that the Western 
nations already exceed the proposed international nuclear safety 
standards. Furthermore, the officials believe that standards are 
necessary to bring countries with problem reactors up to minimum 
acceptable levels of safety.
    While most countries do not favor a convention based on binding 
standards, working group delegates are debating the value of using 
standards as a reference to measure countries' progress toward 
improving safety. Various countries in the working group favor using 
international standards for this purpose. Furthermore, some 
representatives that were opposed to a convention based on technical 
standards supported the idea of using standards for the peer review 
process. The U.S. delegation was among several countries opposed to 
this idea, especially if the standards were to be assigned special 
recognition in the convention. The United States based its opposition, 
in part, on the belief that experience and expertise in operating 
nuclear reactors are the key to the peer review process, not standards. 
At the last working group meeting in January 1993, no agreement was 
reached on what role, if any, standards should play.
Most Countries Oppose International Enforcement or Regulatory Body
    Representatives of 21 countries, including the United States, told 
us that they are opposed to having an international organization, such 
as IAEA, enforce the convention. The same countries that favor general 
principles over technical standards oppose international enforcement 
for many of the same reasons. These countries are opposed to a 
regulatory body, primarily because they believe it would infringe upon 
their national sovereignty.
    Several country representatives told us that countries with problem 
reactors would be discouraged from signing an enforcement-oriented 
convention. In their view, these countries should be part of the 
process if the convention is going to have a positive impact on 
improving international nuclear safety. Representatives from three non-
nuclear power countries told us that enforcement and verification 
procedures are essential to ensure that countries are meeting their 
obligations. Furthermore, two of these countries favor mandatory 
international inspections, possibly by IAEA.
   potential benefits and limitations of the proposed nuclear safety 
                               convention
    The nuclear safety convention concept enjoys broad support among a 
diverse group of countries. Although many member country 
representatives do not view the convention as a panacea or quick fix, 
the majority believe it is a positive step toward improving 
international nuclear safety. A U.S. government representative said 
that theconvention's primary benefits would be (1) promoting a nuclear 
safety culture and (2) obtaining improvements in nuclear reactors 
located in eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and developing 
countries. Various member country representatives said that, in 
addition to promoting a global safety culture, the convention could 
increase public awareness and confidence in nuclear safety. Some IAEA 
officials, who are assisting in the working group, believe the 
convention is a worthwhile effort because it will bring countries 
together to discuss safety issues as part of a systematic process.
    A few primarily non-nuclear power countries, as well as some IAEA 
officials, believe that the proposed convention has serious 
limitations. One country representative said that the convention needs 
to change the status quo and improve the safety of problem reactors. 
However, in his view, the draft convention would not achieve this 
objective. A few member country officials noted that without 
establishing procedures for addressing existing problem reactors, 
including time frames for upgrading their safety, the convention would 
not improve nuclear safety. The Director of IAEA's Division of Nuclear 
Safety told us that the convention could easily be considered weak and 
lacking in substance by nuclear power opponents. The Deputy Director 
noted that unless the convention addresses those reactors where 
perceived safety deficiencies exist, it is technically flawed.
                              observations
    Development of the draft international nuclear safety convention 
has been complex and difficult. This is understandable, given the 
various perceptions and expectations of countries as to what a nuclear 
safety convention should contain and what it should accomplish. 
Agreement has not been reached on the substantive provisions regarding 
the scope and the level of technical detail of safety standards or 
principles to be adhered to by member countries.
    The sovereign rights of participating countries could be affected 
by the final convention document. Although member states differ on the 
elements that the convention should contain, they share the common goal 
of wanting to improve nuclear power reactor safety through greater 
international cooperation. The member states also seem to agree that 
safety is an international responsibility because of the potential 
transboundary effects of radiation released from an accident.
    It is premature to assess the impact of the nuclear safety 
convention, the success of which depends on many factors, including 
getting most of the nations with nuclear power plants to sign onto the 
convention and adhere to its terms. However, some preliminary 
observations can be made at this time. The draft convention does not 
provide measurable criteria to gauge the safety improvements of the 
countries, particularly those with problem reactors. Using benchmark 
criteria in the peer review process could aid in assessing and 
monitoring progress in upgrading the safety of civil nuclear power 
plants. In addition, although it is clear that most member state 
representatives do not envision an enforcement role for IAEA, it is not 
clear what role IAEA will ultimately serve. IAEA's technical expertise 
and safety services could be used to facilitate the peer review 
process.
                            agency comments
    We discussed the facts presented in this report with the State 
Department's Director, Office of Nuclear Technology and Safeguards; 
NRC's Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research; DOE 
officials in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Domestic and 
International Energy and in the Office of General Counsel; and the 
Counselor of Nuclear Policy, U.S. Mission to the United Nations System 
Organizations. We discussed the report with the following officials 
from IAEA's Division of Nuclear Safety: the Director, the Deputy 
Director, and the Head of the Safety Standards and Coordination 
Section. We also met with officials from IAEA's Legal Division.
    In general, these officials agreed with the facts presented in this 
report and gave us additional clarifying information. We have revised 
the text as necessary. However, as requested, we did not obtain written 
agency comments on a draft of this report.
                         scope and methodology
    To obtain a broad range of views on the nuclear safety convention, 
we judgmentally selected 24 IAEA member countries to include in our 
review. As of December 31, 1992, 18 of the 24 countries operated 87 
percent of the worid's nuclear power plants. Among this group of 
countries, we wanted to ensure that we solicited the views of 
representatives from both highly industrialized and less-developed 
countries. We obtained the views of some of those countries with 
Soviet-designed reactors, such as the Russian Federation and Bulgaria. 
We also sought views from two countries that do not currently operate 
civil nuclear power plants but are constructing them--Cuba and Romania.
    Finally, we met with representatives from four countries that do 
not currently have active civil nuclear power programs--Austria, 
Ireland, Italy,and Portugal. We selected these countries to ensure that 
we included the views of non-nuclear power countries that neighbor 
countries operating civil nuclear power plants.
    We met with officials from all of these countries to obtain their 
views on the draft convention. These officials included country 
representatives to IAEA, legal and technical experts, and other 
knowledgeable government officials. Whenever possible, we sought to 
verily foreign countries' positions by comparing their representatives' 
views with formal statements provided at IAEA general conferences and 
other available information. We provided officials from each country 
with a summary of information and requested that it be reviewed by 
other cognizant government representatives for accuracy and 
completeness. Representatives from all 23 foreign countries responded 
between December 1992 and March 1993. One country's positions were 
presented as preliminary and subject to further review.
    To obtain the views of the U.S. government, we met with officials 
from the Departments of State and Energy and NRC. We also met with 
officials from the U.S. Mission to the United Nations System 
Organizations, Vienna, Austria; and the U.S. Mission to the European 
Communities, Brussels, Belgium. We obtained pertinent documents that 
detailed U.S. positions on the safety convention.
    To help identify key elements and objectives of the convention, we 
attended the October 1992 and January 1993 sessions of the nuclear 
safety working group in Vienna, Austria. We reviewed pertinent 
convention-related reports prepared by IAEA and other relevant 
documentation prepared by the participating countries. We also obtained 
the views of officials and additional documentation from IAEA the 
Paris, France, Center of the World Association of Nuclear Operators; 
the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development; and the Commission of the European Communities.
    We performed our review between August 1992 and March 1993 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
                                        Victor S. Rezendes,
                               Director, Energy and Science Issues.

                               appendix i

                         COUNTRIES ATTENDING THE NUCLEAR SAFETY CONVENTION WORKING GROUP
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  Civil nuclear power
               Country                 Operating civil nuclear       reactors under        Not operating civil
                                            power reactors            construction        nuclear power reactors
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Algeria..............................  .......................  .......................                        X
Argentina............................                        X                        X  .......................
Australia............................  .......................  .......................                        X
Austria..............................  .......................  .......................                        X
Belgium..............................                        X  .......................  .......................
Brazil...............................                        X                        X  .......................
Bulgaria.............................                        X  .......................  .......................
Canada...............................                        X                        X  .......................
China................................                        X                        X  .......................
Croatia\1\...........................  .......................  .......................                        X
Cuba.................................  .......................                        X                        X
Czech Republic\2\....................                        X                        X  .......................
Denmark..............................  .......................  .......................                        X
Egypt................................  .......................  .......................                        X
Finland..............................                        X  .......................  .......................
France...............................                        X                        X  .......................
Germany..............................                        X  .......................  .......................
Greece...............................  .......................  .......................                        X
Holy See.............................  .......................  .......................                        X
Hungary..............................                        X  .......................  .......................
India................................                        X                        X  .......................
Indonesia............................  .......................  .......................                        X
Iran.................................  .......................                        X                        X
Ireland..............................  .......................  .......................                        X
Israel...............................  .......................  .......................                        X
Italy................................  .......................  .......................                        X
Japan................................                        X                        X  .......................
Republic of Korea....................                        X                        X  .......................
Luxembourg...........................  .......................  .......................                        X
Malaysia.............................  .......................  .......................                        X
Mexico...............................                        X                        X  .......................
Netherlands..........................                        X  .......................  .......................
Nigeria..............................  .......................  .......................                        X
Norway...............................  .......................  .......................                        X
Pakistan.............................                        X  .......................  .......................
Peru.................................  .......................  .......................                        X
Philippines..........................  .......................  .......................                        X
Poland...............................  .......................  .......................                        X
Portugal.............................  .......................  .......................                        X
Romania..............................  .......................                        X                        X
Russian Federation...................                        X                        X  .......................
Saudi Arabia.........................  .......................  .......................                        X
Slovak Republic\2\...................                        X                        X  .......................
Slovenia\1\..........................                        X  .......................  .......................
South Africa.........................                        X  .......................  .......................
Spain................................                        X  .......................  .......................
Sweden...............................                        X  .......................  .......................
Switzerland..........................                        X  .......................  .......................
Thailand.............................  .......................  .......................                        X
Tunisia..............................  .......................  .......................                        X
Turkey...............................  .......................  .......................                        X
Ukraine..............................                        X                        X  .......................
United Kingdom.......................                        X                        X  .......................
United States........................                        X                        X  .......................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Not all countries listed attended all meetings of the working group.

\1\ Yugoslavia attended the May 1992 meeting. Two former Yugoslavian republics of Slovenia and Croatia attended
  the later meetings.
\2\ Czechoslovakia attended the 1992 meetings. Following the dissolution of Czechoslovakia on December 31, 1992,
  the Czech and Slovak Republics attended the January 1993 meeting.

Source: IAEA, December 31, 1992


         [GAO Report to Congressional Requesters--January 1997]

Nuclear Safety--Uncertainties About the Implementation and Costs of the 
                       Nuclear Safety Convention

                    U.S. General Accounting Office,
   Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division,
                                   Washington, DC, January 2, 1997.

The Honorable Jesse Helms, Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate

The Honorable Bob Graham,
United States Senate

    The 1986 explosion of the Chernobyl nuclear power reactor in 
Ukraine underscored the global importance of nuclear safety, as 
radioactive material was carried beyond the national boundaries of the 
Soviet Union to East and West European countries. In the aftermath of 
the Chernobyl accident, representatives of over 50 nations participated 
in the development of a Convention on Nuclear Safety, a multilateral 
treaty that seeks to increase the safety of civil nuclear power 
reactors. As of December 1996, the Convention had been signed by 65 
countries, including the United States. The Secretary of Energy signed 
the Convention on behalf of the United States in September 1994. 
However, in order for the United States to become legally bound by the 
Convention, the U.S. Senate must ratify it. In May 1995, the 
administration transmitted the Convention to the Senate, but the Senate 
has yet to take action. (See app. I for a list of countries that have 
signed--or signed and ratified--the Convention.)
    As requested, this report provides information on (1) how 
compliance with the Convention's terms and obligations will be reviewed 
by the ratifying countries (hereinafter, also called parties) and (2) 
the potential costs to the United States to participate in the 
Convention.
                            results in brief
    The method to review compliance with the Convention on Nuclear 
Safety has not been finalized. The Convention does not impose sanctions 
for noncompliance but seeks to encourage compliance through peer 
pressure. The Convention relies on each ratifying country to prepare a 
self-assessment report of its nuclear power program. These reports 
will, in turn, be reviewed by other member countries at periodic 
meetings to determine how each country is complying with the 
Convention. The level of detail to be included in these reports has not 
been finalized, nor has the process by which countries will critically 
review these reports been fully determined.
    As the method is currently envisioned, groups composed of five or 
six countries would form the core of the review process. The countries 
with the greatest number of operating nuclear reactors--the United 
States, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Russia--would 
participate in separate review groups made up primarily of several 
other countries with operating reactors. Although U.S. government 
officials did not originally favor the country-grouping approach, they 
believe the United States will have adequate opportunities to review 
the safety programs of all countries through other mechanisms 
established by the Convention.
    The costs associated with the United States' participation in the 
Convention have not been fully determined. The Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, the Department of State, and the Department of Energy have 
estimated that it could cost as much as $1.1 million to (1) participate 
in planning meetings to develop the Convention's policies and 
procedures; (2) prepare the first U.S. self-assessment report; (3) 
review other countries' reports; and (4) participate in the first 
review meeting, which will probably be held in April 1999. These costs 
are made up primarily of U.S. government-related salaries and benefits. 
Other costs--a portion of which the United States will incur--
associated with the International Atomic Energy Agency's administration 
of the Convention are less certain but could range up to $10.3 million 
through the first review meeting, according to a 1993 estimate. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission officials believe, however, that the actual costs 
will be significantly less--about $1 million to administer the first 
review meeting. The costs for subsequent review meetings have not been 
estimated.
                               background
    The Convention on Nuclear Safety, which became effective for the 
ratifying countries on October 24, 1996,\1\ seeks to achieve and 
maintain a high level of safety for all nations that operate civil 
nuclear power reactors. (According to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency [IAEA], as of December 31, 1995, 32 countries operated 437 
nuclear power reactors.) The U.S. government views the Convention as 
one of the chief policy instruments to encourage Russia and other 
countries with reactors that do not meet Western safety standards to 
improve safety. The Convention calls on countries to take action to, 
among other things, (1) establish and maintain a legislative framework 
and independent regulatory body to govern the safety of nuclear 
installations; (2) establish procedures to ensure that technical 
aspects of safety, such as the siting, design, and construction of 
nuclear power reactors, are adequately considered; and (3) ensure that 
an acceptable level of safety is maintained throughout the life of the 
installations by such things as giving a priority to safety, providing 
adequate financial resources, and establishing a quality assurance 
program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Under the terms of the Convention, any country that ratifies 
the Convention subsequent to October 24, 1996, must wait 90 days to 
participate in it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Department of State, the Department of Energy (DOE), and the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) have participated in the 
development and implementation of the Convention.\2\ NRC, in its 
capacity as the U.S. civilian nuclear regulatory authority, will play a 
central role in implementing U.S. obligations under the Convention. The 
Convention establishes IAEA as the Convention's secretariat primarily 
to (1) convene and prepare for the meetings and (2) transmit reports 
and information to member countries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ See our report entitled Nuclear Safety: Progress Toward 
International Agreement to Improve Reactor Safety (GAO/RCED-93-153, May 
14, 1993) for more information about the development of the Convention.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          process to review compliance has not been finalized
    The method to review countries' compliance with the Convention has 
not been finalized. The Convention relies on the ratifying countries to 
prepare reports (self-assessments of their nuclear power programs) that 
are expected to describe how they are complying with the Convention. 
However, the reports' level of detail and specifics and the process for 
examining the reports have not been fully determined. Although U.S. and 
IAEA officials believe the Convention will encourage openness about 
countries' safety programs, it is uncertain how much information will 
be made available to the public.
Peer Review Process Is Central to the Convention's Success
    The Convention does not impose sanctions for noncompliance but 
seeks to encourage compliance through peer pressure. To determine 
compliance with the terms of the Convention, countries are required to 
meet periodically to review one another's safety programs.\3\ State, 
DOE, and NRC officials have stated that this peer review process is 
central to the Convention's success, noting that it will enable the 
countries' safety practices to be brought before the ``bar of world 
public opinion.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ The Convention requires that the first meeting of the parties 
to review the self-assessment reports occur within 30 months of the 
Convention's entry into force, which means not later than April 24, 
1999. Subsequent meetings are to be held at intervals not to exceed 3 
years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Convention does not specify the form and content of the peer 
review process but calls on the parties to (1) submit self-assessment 
reports of the measures they have taken to implement the Convention and 
(2) hold meetings to review these reports. Representatives of over 40 
countries, including the United States, have met on several occasions 
over the past 2 years to develop options for implementing the peer 
review process. The United States has chaired these sessions. In June 
1996, the representatives agreed on a model to implement the peer 
review process, but final decisions will not be made until all of the 
ratifying countries meet no later than April 1997, as required by the 
Convention.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Because the Convention provides that a country must wait 90 
days after ratification, the United States would not be entitled to 
participate in the April 1997 meeting unless it ratified the Convention 
by January 24, 1997. NRC officials told us that it is likely that some 
form of informal participation could be arranged, however, if the 
United States ratified before the April meeting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As the process is currently envisioned, the five countries with the 
most operating nuclear reactors--the United States, France, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, and Russia--would participate in separate groups made 
up of several other countries that have ratified the Convention. The 
remaining countries are placed in each group on the basis of the number 
of reactors in each country, as shown in table 1. Within this group 
setting, all countries would critically examine and review how each 
country is complying with the Convention. IAEA officials told us that 
the country-review groups form the core of the peer review process.

                      TABLE 1.--POSSIBLE GROUPING OF COUNTRIES FOR THE PEER REVIEW PROCESS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              Countries (number of reactors)
 Group  --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A        United States  Republic of    India          China          Argentina      Armenia        Italy
         (109)          Korea          (10)           (3)            (2)            (1)            (0)
         .............  (11)           .............  .............  .............  .............  .............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B        France         Sweden         Spain          Slovak         Lithuania      Slovenia       Romania
         (56)           (12)           (9)            Republic       (2)            (1)            (0)
         .............  .............  .............  (4)            .............  .............  .............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C        Japan          Ukraine        Belgium        Hungary        Mexico         Pakistan       Cuba
         (51)           (16)           (7)            (4)            (2)            (1)            (0)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
D        United         Germany        Bulgaria       Finland        The            Kazakhstan     Philippines
         Kingdom        (20)           (6)            (4)            Netherlands    (1)            (0)
         (35)           .............  .............  .............  (2)            .............  .............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
E        Russia         Canada         Switzerland    Czech          South Africa   Brazil         .............
         (29)           (21)           (5)            (4)            (2)            (1)            .............

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Numbers in parentheses show the total number of reactors operating in the country as of December 31, 1995.
  The table assumes that all of the countries had ratified the Convention.

Source: June 1996 Meeting of the Signatory Countries to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and IAEA.

    NRC officials have expressed some concern about the potential 
grouping of countries. In their view, this approach may not provide the 
most meaningful, professionally technical review. For example, the 
United States, which spent about $89 million through March 1996 to 
improve the safety of Soviet-designed reactors, would not be in the 
same review group as Russia or Ukraine, countries that operate the 
majority of these reactors. In addition to its ongoing safety 
assistance program, the United States also has significant technical 
expertise and years of practical experience working to improve the 
safety of these reactors and improve these countries' civilian nuclear 
regulatory capabilities.
    The United States had earlier supported a different approach in 
which each country's self-assessment would be reviewed by separate 
subject matter committees. This review would be based on three main 
elements of the Convention: (1) governmental organization; (2) siting, 
design, and construction; and (3) operations. The U.S.-favored approach 
was replaced by the country-grouping model proposed by France and the 
United Kingdom. Representatives of these countries maintained that the 
smaller groups of countries would allow for a more thorough and unified 
review of a country's report than would a functional review of part of 
a country's report, as initially envisioned by the United States.
    The Convention states that each country shall have a reasonable 
opportunity to discuss and seek clarification of the reports of any 
other party at the review meeting. As a result, NRC and IAEA officials 
believe that regardless of how the countries are ultimately grouped, 
the United States will have ample opportunity to review and comment on 
the self-assessment reports of all countries.\5\ For example, according 
to NRC and IAEA officials, countries may be permitted to participate in 
other groups' meetings as observers and discuss their concerns in 
supplemental meetings. Countries are also expected to have 
opportunities to comment on the self-assessment reports at general 
sessions held during the review meeting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ According to the June 1996 ``Draft Guidelines Regarding the 
Review Process Under the Convention on Nuclear Safety,'' the self-
assessment reports of all countries will be submitted to IAEA 6 months 
prior to the first review meeting. Each country may send questions and 
comments on any report to the coordinators of the relevant groups up to 
2 months before the first meeting. The coordinators would then 
distribute the comments to all parties to the Convention.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The detail and specifics of the self-assessment reports--which 
serve as the basis for the meeting of the parties--have not been 
finalized. These reports are expected to describe how the parties are 
complying with the Convention. Because of the differences in countries' 
nuclear safety programs and available resources, NRC officials 
anticipate an unevenness in the quality and detail of the reports. In 
their view, this unevenness could affect the level of review and 
analysis. U.S. officials also stated that the countries with a 
significant number of nuclear installations may produce a generic 
rather than a plant-specific report.
Public Access to Convention's Proceedings Is Unclear
    The public dissemination of information about the countries' 
progress in meeting the Convention's obligations can play a key role in 
influencing compliance, according to some experts familiar with 
international agreements that rely primarily on peer review. Although 
U.S. and IAEA officials believe the Convention will encourage greater 
openness about many countries' safety records and programs, it is 
uncertain how much information resulting from the periodic meetings 
will be made available to the public. According to NRC officials, the 
countries can limit the distribution of their reports. These officials 
noted, however, that the United States plans to make its report 
available to the public.
    Although the Convention provides for the public distribution of a 
report summarizing the issues discussed and decisions reached during 
the review meeting, preliminary information indicates that this report 
is unlikely to identify any country by name. IAEA officials told us 
that they do not expect this report to provide detailed information 
about the key issues addressed during the review meeting.
    According to IAEA, the Convention explicitly prohibits 
nongovernmental organizations from participating in the meetings. NRC 
officials told us however that these organizations, such as public 
advocacy or industry groups, might participate as members of their 
national delegation or be called upon to review and comment on self-
assessment reports. U.S. nuclear industry representatives told us that 
they would like to assist in developing the U.S. report and participate 
in the meeting of the parties. NRC officials acknowledged that the 
Convention does not specifically provide for the kind of openness they 
would prefer, but they believe that over time, more information will be 
made available to the public through the Convention process.
    costs to implement the convention have not been fully determined
    To prepare for and attend the first review meeting in 1999, the 
United States estimates it could spend as much as $1.1 million. As the 
Convention's secretariat, IAEA will also incur costs to administer 
these meetings. IAEA's costs, which the United States will partially 
fund, have not been fully identified but could range as high as about 
$10 million, according to a 1993 estimate. NRC officials told us that 
they believe IAEA's costs will be significantly less--about $1 million.
U.S. Costs to Implement the Convention
    The United States estimates that it could spend between $700,000 
and $1.1 million through fiscal year 1999 to prepare for and attend the 
first review meeting, which is expected to be held in April 1999. 
Additional costs to participate in subsequent review meetings, which 
are expected to be held every 3 years, have not been estimated. 
Officials from NRC, State, and DOE told us that the costs associated 
with the first review meeting are based on (1) participating in four 
planning meetings held between December 1994 and June 1996 to develop 
the Convention's draft policies and procedures, (2) preparing the first 
U.S. self-assessment report, (3) reviewing other countries' reports, 
and (4) participating in the April 1997 preparatory meeting and the 
first review meeting. The agencies' estimated costs include the 
existing and planned travel costs associated with attending meetings at 
IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria, and salary and benefit costs 
related to the time spent preparing for these meetings. Figure 1 shows 
the breakdown of estimated costs by agency through the first meeting of 
the parties.

    U.S. Government's estimated costs to implement the Convention on 
Nuclear Safety through 1999:

        --Department of State  $42,000 (4 percent)
        --Department of Energy  $124,000 (11 percent)
        --Nuclear Regulatory Commission  $954,000 (85 percent)

    Note 1: These costs include $99,500 actually expended in fiscal 
years 1995 and 1996.
    Note 2: These costs are based on a high range of costs projected, 
as discussed in app. II.
    Sources: NRC, DOE, and State.

    Salary and benefits constitute 94 percent of the agencies' costs; 
the remainder is for travel and per diem expenses. The salary and 
benefit costs result from the efforts of agency staff to prepare the 
first U.S. self-assessment report, review all other countries' reports 
as part of the peer review process, and participate in all aspects of 
the first review meeting. (See app. II for a breakdown of expenditures 
by each agency.)
Full Costs of IAEA Support Are Not Known
    In late 1993, a working group that participated in the drafting of 
the Convention estimated that IAEA's costs could range from $10,800 to 
$10.3 million for the first review meeting. NRC officials told us that 
they believe that IAEA's actual costs will be significantly less--about 
$1 million to administer the first review meeting. The factors 
affecting IAEA's costs primarily involve the number of languages used 
to conduct the meeting of the parties and the corresponding translation 
and interpretation services.\6\ IAEA's costs to administer future 
review meetings have not been estimated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ The lowest range of estimates, based on English as the primary 
language, was considered artificial, since a number of incidental 
expenses were not included. The high end of the estimates is based on 
the use of six languages--Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, 
and Spanish.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Convention states that IAEA will bear the cost of administering 
the meeting of the parties. IAEA's cost of holding the meeting in 
Vienna is expected to be funded from IAEA's operating budget, which the 
United States supports through an annual 25-percent contribution. 
IAEA's 1997 and 1998 budget shows that IAEA plans to dedicate about 
$330,000 in 1997 and 1998 for Convention-related activities. According 
to an NRC official, IAEA, whose regular budget has been subject to a 
policy of ``zero real growth'' since 1985, may have difficulty 
financing the initial review meeting. As a result, this official said 
that additional financial assessments of participating countries may be 
warranted to provide the necessary funds for IAEA to administer the 
Convention. The need for additional financial assessments will have to 
be addressed during the April 1997 preparatory meeting. NRC officials 
told us they were concerned about IAEA's potential costs to administer 
the Convention and that the United States will seek to keep these costs 
to a minimum.
    The Convention also permits participating countries to request, 
after receiving consensus approval from the other countries, additional 
support and administrative services from IAEA. IAEA's Deputy Director 
General for Nuclear Safety told us that it is likely that IAEA will 
receive requests for such assistance and would cover these costs from 
its regular budget.
    NRC and DOE officials told us that they believe the Convention will 
not stimulate any significant requests for additional assistance to 
upgrade unsafe reactors. An NRC official told us that as a result of 
the meetings, there may be some reordering of assistance priorities, 
but he noted that requirements have already been identified over the 
past several years through regular multilateral and bilateral 
assistance channels. A DOE official noted that by the time the first 
meeting of the parties occurs in 1999, some Western assistance efforts 
should be winding down, and many safety upgrades will have already been 
made.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ For more information on assistance efforts, see our reports 
entitled Nuclear Safety: Status of U.S. Assistance to Improve the 
Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors (GAO/RCED-97-5) and Nuclear Safety: 
International Assistance Efforts to Make Soviet-Designed Reactors Safer 
(GAO/RCED-94-234).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    IAEA's Deputy Director General for Nuclear Safety told us, however, 
that the Convention may uncover additional safety problems that require 
attention. As a result, the countries with the most acute safety 
problems may seek to use the Convention process as leverage to obtain 
additional nuclear safety assistance.
                            agency comments
    We provided copies of a draft of this report to NRC for its review 
and comment. NRC obtained and consolidated additional comments from the 
departments of State and Energy. On December 23, 1996, we met with NRC 
officials, including the Director, Office of International Programs, 
and State's Director, Nuclear Energy Affairs, to discuss their 
comments. In general, these officials agreed with the facts and 
analysis presented. They gave us additional clarifying information, and 
we revised the text as appropriate. The officials noted that the 
Convention is fairly well developed because of the significant amount 
of work already done by various countries' representatives during 
several preliminary meetings. In their opinion, it is very important 
that the United States ratify the Convention before the April 1997 
preparatory meeting in order to (1) shape the peer review process to 
create the most rigorous and systematic analysis of the self-assessment 
reports, (2) keep the implementation costs as low as possible, and (3) 
use the United States' diplomatic and political strength to make the 
Convention an integral component of a network of binding international 
legal instruments that enhance global safety.
    We also provided IAEA with a copy of the draft report. In its 
comments, IAEA, including the Deputy Director General for Nuclear 
Safety, suggested some technical revisions to the text, which we 
incorporated as appropriate. IAEA noted that the April 1997 preparatory 
meeting will provide countries with the opportunity to decide on the 
review process and factors that will determine the costs to implement 
the Convention. IAEA also views the Convention as a major 
accomplishment that will assist in achieving and maintaining a high 
level of safety worldwide. In its view, the Convention will provide for 
a degree of openness about national safety programs that has not 
existed in the past.
                         scope and methodology
    To obtain information on how the Convention will be reviewed for 
compliance, we examined relevant parts of the Convention and 
interviewed agency officials from the Department of State, DOE, and NRC 
and other officials knowledgeable about international agreements from 
the Congressional Research Service, Georgetown University Law Center, 
and New York University. We also discussed the Convention with 
officials from IAEA, including the Director General, the Deputy 
Director General for Nuclear Safety, and the Senior Legal Officer. 
These matters were also discussed with officials from the U.S. Mission 
to the United Nations System Organizations, Vienna, Austria, and the 
Nuclear Energy Institute, Washington, D.C. We also reviewed relevant 
documentation provided by these agencies and officials.
    To identify cost information, we obtained cost data from the 
Department of State, DOE, and NRC. We also obtained data developed by 
IAEA's Division of Nuclear Safety. We did not independently verify the 
accuracy of these data.
    We performed our review from October 1996 through December 1996 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
    Copies of this report are being sent to the Secretaries of State 
and Energy, the Chairman of NRC, the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget, and other interested parties. We will also make 
copies available to others on request.

                          Allen Li,                
         Associate Director, Energy, Resources, and Science Issues.

                               appendix i

      COUNTRIES THAT HAD SIGNED OR SIGNED AND RATIFIED THE CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY AS OF DECEMBER 1996
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                           Number of operating
               Country                    Signed convention       Ratified convention      civil nuclear power
                                                                                               reactors\1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Algeria..............................                        X  .......................                        0
Argentina............................                        X  .......................                        2
Armenia..............................                        X  .......................                        1
Australia............................                        X  .......................                        0
Austria..............................                        X  .......................                        0
Bangladesh...........................                        X                        X                        0
Belgium..............................                        X  .......................                        7
Brazil...............................                        X  .......................                        1
Bulgaria.............................                        X                        X                        6
Canada...............................                        X                        X                       21
Chile................................                        X  .......................                        0
China................................                        X                        X                        3
Croatia..............................                        X                        X                        0
Cuba.................................                        X  .......................                        0
Czech Republic.......................                        X                        X                        4
Denmark..............................                        X  .......................                        0
Egypt................................                        X  .......................                        0
Finland..............................                        X                        X                        4
France...............................                        X                        X                       56
Germany..............................                        X  .......................                       20
Ghana................................                        X  .......................                        0
Greece...............................                        X  .......................                        0
Hungary..............................                        X                        X                        4
Iceland..............................                        X  .......................                        0
India................................                        X  .......................                       10
Indonesia............................                        X  .......................                        0
Ireland..............................                        X                        X                        0
Israel...............................                        X  .......................                        0
Italy................................                        X  .......................                        0
Japan................................                        X                        X                       51
Jordan...............................                        X  .......................                        0
Kazakhstan\2\........................                        X  .......................                        1
Republic of Korea....................                        X                        X                       11
Latvia...............................  .......................                        X                        0
Lebanon..............................                        X                        X                        0
Lithuania............................                        X                        X                        2
Luxembourg...........................                        X  .......................                        0
Mali.................................                        X                        X                        0
Mexico...............................                        X                        X                        2
Monaco...............................                        X  .......................                        0
Morocco..............................                        X  .......................                        0
Netherlands..........................                        X                        X                        2
Nicaragua............................                        X  .......................                        0
Nigeria..............................                        X  .......................                        0
Norway...............................                        X                        X                        0
Pakistan.............................                        X  .......................                        1
Peru.................................                        X  .......................                        0
Philippines..........................                        X  .......................                        0
Poland...............................                        X                        X                        0
Portugal.............................                        X  .......................                        0
Romania..............................                        X                        X                        0
Russia...............................                        X                        X                       29
Slovak Republic......................                        X                        X                        4
Slovenia.............................                        X                        X                        1
South Africa.........................                        X  .......................                        2
Spain................................                        X                        X                        9
Sudan................................                        X  .......................                        0
Sweden...............................                        X                        X                       12
Switzerland..........................                        X                        X                        5
Syria................................                        X  .......................                        0
Tunisia..............................                        X  .......................                        0
Turkey...............................                        X                        X                        0
Ukraine..............................                        X  .......................                       16
United Kingdom.......................                        X                        X                       35
United States........................                        X  .......................                      109
Uruguay..............................                        X  .......................                        0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total............................                       65                       29                      431
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Number of operating reactors as of December 31, 1995.
\2\ The installation is a sodium-cooled fast breeder reactor.

Sources: Nuclear Regulatory Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency.


                              appendix ii
    the nuclear regulatory commission's, department of state's, and 
   department of energy's estimated costs to implement the convention
    This appendix provides information on the costs that have been or 
may be incurred by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the 
Department of State, and the Department of Energy (DOE) in implementing 
the Convention on behalf of the United States. NRC, State, and DOE 
estimated together they could spend about $1.1 million in travel and 
salary and benefit costs to prepare for and participate in the first 
review meeting, which is scheduled to take place no later than April 
1999. This amount--based on the number of NRC staff needed to prepare 
for and attend meetings--represents a higher-range estimate of a figure 
that could be as low as about $700,000.

                 TABLE 2.--NRC's, STATE's, AND DOE's ESTIMATED COSTS TO IMPLEMENT THE CONVENTION
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Element of cost                        NRC            State            DOE            Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Travel..........................................         $45,000         $12,000          $8,000         $65,000
Salary/benefits.................................      \1\909,000          30,000         116,000       1,055,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................         954,000          42,000         124,000       1,120,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Actual costs incurred to date by these agencies total $99,500 for fiscal years 1995 and 1996.
\1\ NRC's reported costs range from $450,000 to $909,000.

Sources: NRC, Department of State, and DOE.

                                  
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