[Senate Hearing 106-186]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-186
ANSWERING THE CALL FOR HELP:
THE IMPACT OF Y2K ON 911 AND LAW ENFORCEMENT?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE
YEAR 2000 TECHNOLOGY PROBLEM
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
on
THE IMPACT OF Y2K ON TWO SPECIFIC AREAS OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, 911
SYSTEMS AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
__________
APRIL 29, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate
----------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
56-951 CC WASHINGTON : 1999
_______________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, DC 20402
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE
YEAR 2000 TECHNOLOGY PROBLEM
[Created by S. Res. 208, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998)]
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah, Chairman
JON KYL, Arizona CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut,
GORDON SMITH, Oregon Vice Chairman
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina
TED STEVENS, Alaska, Ex Officio DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, New York
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Ex
Officio
Robert Cresanti, Staff Director
T.M. (Wilke) Green, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
------
STATEMENT BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Robert F. Bennett, a U.S. Senator from Utah, Chairman, Special
Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem.................. 1
CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF WITNESSES
Jack L. Brock, Jr., Director, Governmentwide and Defense
Information Systems, Accounting and Information Management
Division, United States General Accounting Office.............. 3
Michael K. Powell, Commissioner, Federal Communications
Commission..................................................... 8
Stephen R. Colgate, Assistant Attorney General, Justice
Management Division, Department of Justice..................... 13
Harlin R. McEwen, Deputy Assistant Director, Criminal Justice
Information Services Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation. 15
John S. Karangekis, Chief of Police, Wethersfield Police
Department, Wethersfield, Connecticut.......................... 17
James N. Brown, Chief of Police, Hudson Police Department,
Hudson, Ohio................................................... 19
ALPHABETICAL LISTING AND MATERIAL SUBMITTED
Bennett, Hon. Robert F.:
Opening statement............................................ 1
Prepared statement........................................... 25
Brock, Jack L.:
Statement.................................................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 26
Responses to questions submitted by Chairman Bennett......... 32
Brown, James N.:
Statement.................................................... 19
Prepared statement........................................... 35
Responses to questions submitted by Chairman Bennett......... 37
Colgate, Stephen R.:
Statement.................................................... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 39
Responses to questions submitted by Chairman Bennett......... 43
Dodd, Hon. Christopher J.: Prepared statement.................... 44
Karangekis, John S.:
Statement.................................................... 17
Prepared statement........................................... 45
McEwen, Harlin R.:
Statement.................................................... 15
Prepared statement........................................... 46
Responses to questions submitted by Chairman Bennett......... 47
Powell, Michael K.:
Statement.................................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 49
Responses to questions submitted by Chairman Bennett......... 55
ANSWERING THE CALL FOR HELP: THE IMPACT OF Y2K ON 911 AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 29, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Special Committee on the Year 2000
Technology Problem,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
room SD-192, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert F.
Bennett (chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senator Bennett.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT F. BENNETT, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM UTAH, CHAIRMAN, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE YEAR 2000
TECHNOLOGY PROBLEM
Chairman Bennett. Good morning. The committee will come to
order.
Our hearing today marks the second time in 6 months that
this committee will address the important topic of Y2K
emergency preparedness. On October 2, 1998, we focused on
emergency management, and that hearing included testimony from
FEMA and the National Guard Association, the National Emergency
Managers Association, and the National Governors Association.
Today, we will concentrate on the impact of Y2K on two
specific areas of emergency preparedness, 911 systems and local
law enforcement. We touched somewhat on those issues during the
October 2 hearing, but today, we will address them with a more
focused concentration and a heightened sense of concern.
Our concern about these two areas is heightened for two
reasons. In a report released last month, the Network
Reliability Interoperability Council [NRIC]--we always have to
use acronyms in Washington--estimated that only 10 percent of
over 7,000 public safety answering points, or PSAP's, where 911
calls are processed, are prepared for Y2K. Let me repeat that.
A council that is focusing on this issue says that only 10
percent of the public service answering points where 911 calls
are processed were prepared for Y2K.
In an updated report received from the FCC yesterday, this
committee was informed that the number might now be as high as
35 percent. Thirty-five percent is a whole lot better than ten,
but it is still not comforting enough for us to cancel the
hearing. It should be noted that this refers only to the
equipment provided to the PSAP's by the telephone companies.
There is still a large amount of equipment and information
systems utilized within the PSAP's about which we know very
little. An ongoing survey being conducted by the U.S. Fire
Administration about overall readiness of 4,300 of these PSAP's
indicates that overall readiness is about 17 percent. Survey
results indicate some strong concerns about funding on the part
of the PSAP's. In other words, they say, well, we think we know
what to do, but we do not have any money so we probably are not
going to do anything.
Now, put this in perspective. In the United States, there
are approximately 300,000 calls for emergency assistance made
via the 911 system every day. That does not count the
additional 86,000 911 calls made from cellular phones every
day. That is over 110 million 911 calls per year. If the
problems within the system supporting the answering points that
handle these calls, the PSAP's, are not properly addressed, the
systems will fail, leading to degradation in the processing of
911 calls.
Let me stress the word degradation does not mean
elimination. The 911 calls will still be answered. Someone will
still try to handle the emergency. But they will not have
available to them all of the computer-assisted support that is
there right now, and so the whole system will be degraded and
there will obviously be an impact. But it is not a case of
either all on or all off.
I would like to announce that Senator Dodd and I are
jointly sending a letter to Commissioner Michael Powell, who is
with us today and will be on our first panel, from the FCC, and
Administrator Carrye Brown of the U.S. Fire Administration
asking that they work together to identify those PSAP's that
are not yet prepared and those who have not yet responded to
the Fire Administration's survey. We have also asked that they
provide this information to the appropriate 911 commissions,
State Y2K coordinators, and other appropriate regulatory bodies
governing those PSAP's.
We hope that this will help the States and local
jurisdictions identify potential problems so that help can be
provided to those that need it. There may be some people out
there who have a problem but do not realize it, even at this
late date and after all of the work that has been done to try
to publicize this. The supervisor of one PSAP told the
committee staff that the radio system in his dispatch center
required a $60,000 patch and without this patch they would have
been unable to communicate with emergency service units at all.
Now, in regard to local law enforcement, the committee has
noted the absence of any overall assessment of the Y2K status
of our nation's local law enforcement agencies. At the Federal
level, we have captured much information about Federal law
enforcement agencies within the Justice Department, Treasury
Department, and their subsidiary agencies, FBI, DEA, Customs,
ATF, Secret Service, and so on. This information comes to the
committee and to the country through the quarterly OMB reports
and the work of the inspector general offices of these
departments.
The news about these agencies is very good. If not already
completely prepared, they are well on their way to being so and
we have every confidence they will be able to meet their
challenge by January 1, 2000. However, we are concerned about
the lack of information on that segment of law enforcement that
our citizens rely on most in their everyday lives, and that is
the local law enforcement sector, and this means approximately
17,000 police and sheriff's departments across the country.
We do not want to overstate the problem or needlessly set
up public panic. We have no reason to believe that our
emergency services are not taking this problem very seriously
and working to prepare for Y2K, but there are vulnerable,
highly vulnerable areas in the 911 sector as well as the local
law enforcement sector and we are concerned about the lack of
assessments, the lack of information, that leaves us without
any hard data. That is why we are holding the hearing today.
Our lead witness on the first panel will be Mr. Jack Brock,
who is Director of Information Management Issues at GAO. Those
who follow this committee know that we depend heavily on GAO
and Mr. Brock is here often and members of his agency are here
often, either in the hearing or working with our staff. Mr.
Brock, once again, on behalf of the entire Congress, we thank
the GAO for your efforts and your diligence on following
through on this. He will explain to us how the 911 systems work
and discuss GAO's examination of these systems and its review
of the Justice Department and law enforcement working groups'
outreach efforts.
He will be joined in the first panel by Commissioner
Michael Powell of the Federal Communications Commission.
Commissioner Powell is also a familiar face to this committee
and to this issue. I have seen him on a number of speaking
assignments where I have been, and he has, likewise, been very
diligent in following this through. So I think between the two
of them, we are going to get a frank and direct response to the
challenge that we face. He will explain where the problems in
the system may exist and speak to us about what may be the big
problem from our point of view, the lack of regulatory
authority over PSAP's.
We will proceed with that first panel and start with you,
Mr. Brock.
STATEMENT OF JACK L. BROCK, JR., DIRECTOR, GOVERNMENTWIDE AND
DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS, ACCOUNTING AND INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT DIVISION, UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Mr. Brock. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased
to be here today. I am also pleased to be on a panel with
Commissioner Powell. I think that Commissioner Powell has done
a good job on leading the Communications Sector Work Group, and
as a result of his and the Sector Work Group, there is a lot
more known about the telecommunications system than we knew a
year or so ago.
I would like to briefly summarize my statement. You asked
us to comment on a couple of things. First of all, our
awareness of the status of 911 systems and State and local law
enforcement entities. To that point, unlike Federal agencies,
we have no direct audit authority there, so much of our
information that we are discussing today has come from surveys
and material that are gathered by national associations, that
are gathered by the working groups on the President's
Conversion Council.
Second, you asked us to comment on the efforts of the
President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion and specifically to
comment on the outreach efforts of the Department of Justice.
I would like to address 911 first. I am going to give you a
very simplified explanation of what happens to a 911 call.
There is a chart up behind you, sir. It is also in our
statement for people who cannot read it well. But, basically,
we are talking about an enhanced 911 calling process. FCC has
told us that about 90 percent of the country is covered by 911
services. Of that 90 percent, 95 percent of those services are
enhanced, and my description will be a brief overview of an
enhanced system.
The first thing, if you notice the telephone up there, the
most critical step to making the 911 call is, in fact, picking
up the phone and getting a dial tone. If the telephone does not
work, then the call stops right there. Fortunately, I think
information that has been made available to us by the
Communications Working Group, through their efforts working
with NRIC and in turn working with the Telco Year 2000 Forum,
we have increasing confidence that there will be dial tone.
So we are pretty sure you are going to pick up the phone
and you are going to get a dial tone. You are going to go
through a switch. That is the next thing. That is going to
route you to the appropriate public safety answering point. I
will just refer to that from now on as PSAP.
When it goes to the PSAP, it is going to go through their
PBX system. If the PBX system does not work, and this is not
owned by the telephone company, this is owned by the PSAP, and
one of the things that FCC will tell you, that the biggest
worry now in communications is not the public switch network,
it is the customer premise equipment. They have no control over
what you have on your location. That is up to each individual
jurisdiction or private party or whatever to make sure that is
compliant.
When it goes through there, it is attached with what is
called an automatic number identification [ANI], and that comes
from the phone company and it goes into a controller, a phone
number controller that is maintained by the PSAP. At the same
time, it goes back out to the telephone company and at the same
time goes to the operator.
The telephone company then supplies from what is called an
automatic location index [ALI], the address. So the operator is
now getting, over there on the call taker, is now getting from
the phone up on their screen the location and the identifier
for the phone, and this is only on wire line equipment. If you
are making a cell phone call, none of that is coming in.
After the operator takes the call, they typically would
verify the information and it would be automatically recorded
and time stamped. Then the operator would code the call, enter
it into a computer-aided dispatch system, and notify the
appropriate response unit. The dispatch system would do such
things as----
Chairman Bennett. And that is not on the chart?
Mr. Brock. That is not on the chart. That would go outside
the chart. But when it goes into the computer-aided dispatch
system [CAD], all sorts, depending on the jurisdiction, all
sorts of decisions are made for the jurisdiction. What is the
most appropriate unit to respond? Does the address they are
responding to have situations that might endanger law
enforcement officials or would it contain explosives that might
endanger fire officials or any certain amount of information.
If these things do not work, if the location index is not
compliant, if the number system does not work, if the CAD
system does not work, you essentially revert back to the old
basic 911 system, where you get the dial tone, you call in, you
reach an operator. This information has to be taken down
manually, and then the dispatch is no longer automatic, it is
manual and it takes time.
The two PSAP's that we visited locally both said if their
systems did not work that there would be a definite degradation
of service. There would be an increased waiting time. And
depending on the volume of calls, it could affect the safety
and well-being of certain individuals.
Chairman Bennett. Let me see if I understand what you are
saying. The phone call would come in off the phone there and go
directly to the call taker without any of the other information
along the way, is that correct?
Mr. Brock. Typically, yes. It would be routed through the
telephone switch, the tandem switch that is at the telephone
office, to the PSAP. Some of the other features, if they did
not work, perhaps would not supply the location or the phone
number. That would have to be manually input by the operator,
and that happens on cell calls right now. That is typically not
provided on cell calls, so they are well-equipped to deal with
that. The key thing----
Chairman Bennett. It would just slow everything down.
Mr. Brock. It would slow things down.
Chairman Bennett. OK.
Mr. Brock. The key thing would be the automatic dispatch
equipment. That really makes the whole system more efficient in
making sure that you send the right unit out there and that
that unit has appropriate information on the address they are
going to if it is, in fact, in the system.
Chairman Bennett. OK.
Mr. Brock. Now, the other thing that we were told when we
visited the two PSAP's, that if you have not started
remediation of your equipment, it is probably too late, that
the lead time for bringing in one of these systems, training
your personnel, and getting it up and operational is greater
than the amount of time that is available. So if you have not
done much now, it is time to go to contingency planning and it
may not be possible to bring in the necessary fixes to the
system, depending on how extensive they are.
Chairman Bennett. Do you have any sense of how many people
are in that condition, that have not done anything and for whom
it is too late?
Mr. Brock. Well, this gets back to the point of our
statement. No. We do not have a good sense of that. While, as I
said, we have increasing confidence in what is going on in the
public switch network, that confidence resides in the fact that
a lot of people are reporting, that appropriate organizations,
such as the Telco Year 2000 Forum are doing testing, and that
you have information that remediated systems will work. You
still have to complete the remediation.
We have much less information on PSAP's. The information
that we have that has been supplied back to FEMA is on a very,
very small sample. Only 18 percent, as you mentioned, of the
respondents replied back. Sixteen percent said that they were
ready now. You had some updated information that was not
available to us that indicates that 35 percent say they are
ready.
There are a couple of issues here. This is self-reported
data. We do not know the extent that testing has been done and
we are not sure of the status. So there is a lack of awareness,
a general lack of awareness of where these PSAP's stand.
FEMA is now working to update their survey. They are going
to be doing telephone surveys now. They are going to try to get
a much more vigorous response so the assessment data will be
more complete.
Chairman Bennett. When it comes in, it will all be self-
reported?
Mr. Brock. It will all be self-reported. We do know from
the two local jurisdictions that we went to that they have done
extensive tests. For example, on April 14, Fairfax County did
do a complete test of their system, of the equipment that they
own, and they have been working over a year and a half to
remedy the situation, and it worked. They had a successful
test.
Chairman Bennett. Have you done any examination in the
District?
Mr. Brock. We are doing District Y2K work. As I reported a
couple of months ago, the District is far behind. We did not
specifically look at their 911 system, but all of their systems
are far behind and they are not scheduled to begin testing
until late in the year on most of their key systems.
We have evidence here in the local community that
Montgomery County, Fairfax County, Arlington, places like that
have made good progress. The District's progress has not been
as good, generally.
In terms of outreach, we found, because of the interaction
at the local level with the PSAP's that FEMA has some
responsibility for, in its outreach committee, the emergency
services outreach, and then, of course, the Communications
Working Group that SEC and GSA co-chair, that there has been a
fair amount of outreach. FEMA has had a number of events all
across the country. They have been targeting PSAP's.
Associations that are connected with PSAP, as well as the
telephone companies, have also been very active in contacting
PSAP's to discuss their Y2K readiness. So there has been a fair
amount of outreach. That outreach has not always generated the
kind of information that would allow us today to say, this is
the status. We do not know.
And again, echoing your remarks, Mr. Chairman, I do not
want to alarm people. We believe that, at a minimum, basic 911
service will work, but there could be a degradation of service
if remediation action is not directed.
You also asked us to look at State and local law
enforcement agencies, and we have almost no information there.
I would like to read a quote from the first sector assessment
of the President's Conversion Council, where they reported
that, ``Based on informal assessment information, there is a
high level of awareness of the problem among non-Federal
police/law enforcement entities. State police/law enforcement
entities and departments in larger metropolitan areas are
making good progress. However, most departments at the county
and municipality level lack the sophistication to assess the
Y2K readiness of their service providers. These departments do
not have their own dedicated IT resources. They do not have
money or professional staffing and are instead dependent on the
IT departments of the county, city, or municipality of which
they are a part. Dedicated radio communications and dispatch
systems are a concern for all public law enforcement
organizations and the working group is encouraging departments
to focus on contingency planning in this area.'' So the
assessments are basically informal and there is not a lot of
direct information on the status of law enforcement entities,
and there are about 17,000 of these across the country. Of
course, some States, some jurisdictions, have done very
detailed assessments, so there is information in pockets, but
there is not a good source of national information.
In fact, because of the importance of 911 systems and law
enforcement systems throughout the country, this was exactly
one of the reasons that the Y2K Conversion Council was created,
that in areas that were of immense national concern but where
there may not be direct Federal intervention, it was thought
that the Conversion Council, in conjunction with associations,
civic groups, et cetera, could work together and
collaboratively to determine the status of various key sectors
and then recommend remedial action.
We recommended last April that the Conversion Council begin
to do assessments to determine the status of their relevant
sectors. In October, the Council did send out guidance to all
of the working groups to develop such information. Information
was developed on PSAP's. To date, no information has been
developed by the working group, except informal stuff, on law
enforcement. We understand last week that the law enforcement
sector has agreed to do a survey in conjunction with FEMA to
develop some initial assessment information, and this should be
useful once that is done.
One of the key points, though, I would like to make, Mr.
Chairman, in closing, that just gathering assessment
information is not enough. You have to do something with it.
So, for example, depending on the status of that information
and what it indicates, you have some options ranging from
wringing your hands and saying, ``We are in a bad situation,''
to taking some decisive action, and I think that is what is
going to be incumbent upon the various sectors as this
information rolls in.
Again, depending on what the information says, you are
going to need to be a lot more specific in terms of what sort
of action you can take that will be effective, because the
types of services that we are talking about at the local level
are really the services that are going to impact citizens most
often on January 1.
I mean, a lot of the Federal systems that we are looking at
are critically important to the nation, but midnight Friday
night and into Saturday morning, those are not going to be the
systems that affect you and I in our house. I am going to turn
on my light switch, I am going to pick up my phone, I am going
to see if my power is on, my water turns on. These are the
kinds of things that we are going to be looking at, and if
these services do not work, there will be an impact at the
local community level.
Again, not to be an alarmist, we do not know the status,
and that is the concern. If the status is known, then there can
be decisions made on the appropriate action that should be
taken.
That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Bennett. Thank you very much. I appreciate it and
appreciate your patience in allowing me to question you back
and forth and thus interrupt you. I think that helps us
understand the scope of the problem.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brock can be found in the
appendix.]
Chairman Bennett. Commissioner Powell.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL K. POWELL, COMMISSIONER, FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Mr. Powell. Thank you, Senator Bennett. As always, it is a
pleasure to be here. If I could just take a moment to echo the
sentiments that you expressed in terms of the strong working
relationship we have had with the committee, we have enjoyed it
and I think we have made some substantial progress.
I would also like to thank GAO, who have worked
increasingly with us on this pressing national problem,
particularly with respect to public safety, which, of course,
in many cases Y2K failings or shortcomings will range from
humorous to bothersome. In this case, it could cost lives, and
so that places an exclamation mark on the urgency of these
efforts.
I also wanted to state unequivocally we would be more than
happy to accept your suggestion and invitation to work with the
Fire Administration to advance our outreach efforts and we will
start on that immediately as an extension of things we are
doing. I think it is a nice complement to something we have
been trying to emphasize already, which is we have been
imploring State regulatory commissions, particularly through
the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners,
to make PSAP's and public safety a central component of their
Y2K efforts because of their localized responsibilities and
their ability to more easily canvas. They have regularly
committed to me that they would be willing to do that and I
think that we can use that effort as one vehicle to advance the
goals expressed in your letter, so we will be working on that
immediately.
I also would like to take a second to talk about the 911
system. I think Jack has done a terrific job in explaining how
basically it works. I would point out, just for point of
emphasis, that one of the things that makes this problem
difficult is there is no national unified emergency system.
Even within the category of enhanced services, there are any
number of variations on the basic model.
Sometimes a local telephone company is in full control of
the location data base. Sometimes that data base is separately
provided and resides within the control of the PSAP itself.
Sometimes there is no such data base at all. Sometimes it is
supplemented with computer-assisted dispatch technologies that
do everything from keep track of the closest fire hydrant to
keep track of whether that house has called before, whether
there are toxic materials in the area, et cetera. So there are
any number of variations on that and we need to keep that in
mind.
I would just divert for a second to supplement something
Jack said that you may not be aware of. In the cellular phone
context, there is a regulatory proceeding underway to bring
enhanced 911 functionality like was described here to wireless.
As of April 1 of, I think, 1998, cellular carriers were
required to implement phase one of that enhanced 911 service,
which means cellular calls should be able to transmit
information about at least the cell from which the call came
from and the caller's call-back number. That is being deployed,
and in some instances even been tested, by the Telco Year 2000
Forum and ATIS and fixes that are necessary have been developed
and are beginning to be deployed.
Phase two of 911 for wireless will come too late for this
problem, but by 2001, we hope that technology will allow you to
get the location within 125 meters of the actual phone itself.
So I just wanted to make you aware of those efforts.
Last, I wanted to make you aware that there is a movement
in the Congress to nationalize 911 as the national emergency
number, as I think Jack sort of alluded to, that 911 right now
is somewhat discretionary within States and localities and not
everyone actually uses 911 as their emergency calling system.
Indeed, I caution consumers with respect to wireless services,
rarely is 911 actually the number that you will use to get an
emergency service and you would be well advised to check with
your carrier.
For example, AT&T's wireless mobile service, which I
discovered recently, if you dial 911, you will get nothing, but
if you dial 9 by itself and leave it alone, you will get
emergency services, and I would not have known that, and did
indeed when I was trying to use it, until I had spoken with
them, so another caution.
I would also like to describe very briefly the 911 system
and use slightly different components simplistically to give
you an illustration of both where I think the problems and
challenges are, and second, where I think we may have venues
for attacking this problem.
I would break the emergency communications system down into
three pieces, and I will borrow Jack's chart, with his
indulgence, to make these points. There is the first phase,
which I consider to be just 911 call delivery, getting the call
from the phone to the PSAP. The second area is call processing
at the public safety answering point. Third is the wireless
dispatch component used to deploy emergency services to the
location. And fourth is the emergency alert system, the use of
broadcasting properties and cable systems to alert the public
to national emergency, which are frequently used in times of
weather emergency or other local crises.
With respect to call delivery, I think as you rightly
stated in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, that is largely
within the control of the telecommunications companies. The
public switched telephone network and up through the E911
tandem are things that the phone companies take direct and
immediate responsibility for, and when we report on the general
positive progress in the telecommunications industry with
respect to that network, I think as Jack alluded to, as well,
we would include those components.
So we have, again, as we used with the telephone system
generally, guarded confidence about that dimension of the
system. In fact, in the telecommunications industry tests that
were conducted this spring by the industry, they included
testing of functionalities of the 911 specific component.
With respect to the second dimension, this call processing
area, that is, to be simple, a host of computers that do any
number of variations on data bases, lining up information
associated with the telephone number. We tend to put most of
that information in the category of customer permit equipment.
Again, as Jack mentioned, this is stuff that State and local
governments buy and own and make choices about how
sophisticated or unsophisticated it is. They are provided by
separate vendors in most cases. Indeed, the two leading
manufacturers, which I believe are Positron and Plant
Equipment, Incorporated, produce that equipment. So that
problem is the classic problem of CPE, trying to get individual
institutions to address those problems and get with their
vendors to remediate the situation.
We have some confidence that, with respect to that
equipment, fixes have been developed and are available. I think
that the challenge is going to be largely in deployment.
Also, I wanted to highlight another venue we have for
potentially attacking this problem, which we have already made
some efforts to utilize, and that is that the telephone
companies. Because of historical legacy, telephone companies
often have service and maintenance contracts with public safety
answering points for not only the telephone side but some
components of the call processing within the PSAP. In fact,
what NRIC did was attempt to survey its members, that is, the
eight largest telephone companies, and say, hey, look at your
service contracts and tell back to us what efforts you have
engaged in remediation because you are one of the parties that
they are likely to hire to do this.
They come up with a number somewhere in the neighborhood of
7,000 PSAP's, 6,739, and I would point out the discrepancy in
the numbers FEMA reports and we report is explainable by the
fact that FEMA's numbers come from primary PSAP's and often
localities will have secondary PSAP's and our numbers probably
capture those secondary PSAP's, as well. These are institutions
that the phone companies have contracts with.
That is where you get the reported number of 35 percent
remediation, from the phone companies who are reporting on
their efforts pursuant to their contracts for that equipment.
And again, as you correctly pointed out, that probably only
gets you sort of midstream into that processing component and
there are probably other components of that processing
component and then the dispatch side which are not captured by
that number.
That takes me to the dispatch side. Once you get past the
PSAP processing, it is time to deploy a fire truck, time to
deploy an ambulance. There is wireless communications equipment
utilized for that purpose. Two major pieces there, one in which
the FCC has a great deal of control over, which is frequencies
and the allocation of frequencies and management of those
licenses and the people who have them as licensees. But, of
course, the airwaves are the airwaves. As far as I know, they
do not have a Y2K problem yet.
But the central problem is probably in the equipment that
is being utilized, and we have done lots of assessment with
some of the basic kinds of wireless equipment in our normal
course of work with wireless manufacturers. The manufacturers
report relatively positive news about wireless equipment. Most
of it being used by public safety authorities do not contain
the more sophisticated date-sensitive information and are
likely going to be capable of transmitting basically a
telephone call or a dispatch call. But, nonetheless, that has
to be checked and we do not really have any tangible
information with respect to it.
Finally, a part that Jack did not refer to which does come
under our jurisdiction, as well, is the Emergency Alert System.
You have seen it. It used to be referred to as the Emergency
Broadcasting System and you got that annoying beep when they
tested it. We do not use that anymore. There are now more
sophisticated technologies to scroll information across
television screens and audio alerts over the radio. Cable
companies for the first time are required by law to provide
these warnings, as well.
Because these systems are very new--we have required these
only over the last couple of years--Y2K has been a prominent
concern in the deployment of that equipment from the get-go and
we are pretty confident that the Emergency Alert System is
likely to function and function well, and we are also confident
that it has a lot of redundancies. That is, in any given
neighborhood, like our own, there are multiple television and
radio stations and if one or two of them were to have a
failure, you are likely not to be fatally excluded from news
and information.
I will stop there and am happy to take any questions you
might have.
Chairman Bennett. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Powell can be found in the
appendix.]
Chairman Bennett. Between the two of you, I think you have
covered this very well. Let me just emphasize again, so that I
understand, if there is a failure, the call will still go
through?
Mr. Brock. If there is a failure on the----
Chairman Bennett. That is assuming that you get a dial
tone.
Mr. Brock. Yes. In most cases, we believe the call will go
through. In some cases, if the whole phone is replaced by a
computer, the call may not go through in the PSAP, but we do
not believe there are that many systems that use that.
Chairman Bennett. And if it goes through, it will be
handled the way a cellular call is handled now?
Mr. Powell. Probably, in all likelihood. Before the PSAP
system was created, I think the late 1960's or early 1970's,
essentially what you have is a trained operator whose purpose
it was to keep you on the phone and collect that information
and then be simultaneously dispatching that information.
I suspect if there were a collapse of the automated
assistance of that system, you would essentially revert back to
sort of pre-PSAP era in which the training and the abilities of
your operator become much more critical and central.
The second backup which we should allude to is PSAP's were
designed for efficiency. There are numbers to call the police
department directly. There are numbers to call your fire
station directly. In the contingency phase, we need to make
sure that one thing we consider is making sure the public knows
that there are alternate ways to call for emergency services,
should it have trouble with basic 911.
Chairman Bennett. You have come back to one of my recurring
themes as people say, well, what should the average America do,
and I think the answer you are giving here is that the average
American should first call his local official and do a little
analysis by himself as to how far they are along on the
readiness scale, and then, second, record these emergency
numbers so that if the 911 system gets jammed, and that is what
I see happening from your testimony.
You have all of these calls coming in and they end up with
an operator and pretty soon you are on hold or you have busy
signals, the kinds of things that were the plague of 911 in the
early days that have been eliminated by the PSAP come back,
only they come back with a vengeance now because the traffic is
much higher than it was in the early days of 911.
So as a personal contingency plan in my own household, I
need to get the number of the local police station directly so
that if I get hung up on 911, I can still make that call and
still get through.
Mr. Powell. And I would just emphasize another point which
we alluded to in our consumer tips in the telecom report that
we issued a few months ago. With regard to 911 services, time
is more critical than anything, and I would urge consumers who
often wait until the very last second before they decide
someone is hurt enough or ill enough to make a call, that
understanding that it could take longer than it might normally
take, I think at the first sign of trouble, one would be well
advised to get on the telephone and accommodate for that
potential lag in time.
Chairman Bennett. That is a good piece of additional
counsel and information. We thank you both and appreciate your
testimony and your effort in this area.
Mr. Powell. Thank you.
Mr. Brock. Thank you.
Chairman Bennett. We will go to our second panel now. On
this panel, we welcome Mr. Stephen R. Colgate, who is the
Assistant Attorney General from the Department of Justice. He
coordinates the President's Working Group on Law Enforcement.
We look forward, Mr. Colgate, to your testimony about the
Justice Department and the working group's outreach efforts.
Mr. Colgate is joined by Mr. Harlin McEwen, who is the
Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI. He will testify about
those FBI information systems which support State and local law
enforcement agencies. He is also a former chief of police,
which I think will give us an opportunity to draw on that
expertise.
Finally, we have two witnesses from the front line of law
enforcement, Chief John S. Karangekis of the Wethersfield,
Connecticut, Police Department. He serves as President of the
Connecticut Police Chiefs Association. He will be joined by
Chief Jim Brown of the Hudson, Ohio, Police Department, who is
President of the Summit County, Ohio, Police Chiefs
Association.
From the Department of Justice to the FBI to two chiefs of
police who are on the front line every day, we appreciate your
being here. Mr. Colgate, we will start with you.
STEPHEN R. COLGATE, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, JUSTICE
MANAGEMENT DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Colgate. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Steve
Colgate and I serve as the Assistant Attorney General for
Administration and also the Department's Chief Information
Officer. I am pleased to share with you some observations about
Y2K readiness in the State and local law enforcement community.
I welcome the participation at this hearing of the FBI's
Harlin McEwen. As you have pointed out, Harlin was a former
local law enforcement officer and is a key player in the
development and deployment of the Department's Criminal Justice
Information System.
Your invitation identified five subject areas, and I see
them from two separate viewpoints. First, I have the viewpoint
of my own role in the management of the Department of Justice.
Then I have the viewpoint of the working group that I lead
under the President's Council for Y2K Conversion. That working
group has a very broad scope that involves more than policy and
highway patrol agencies and includes law enforcement in the
context of such Federal regulatory activities as clean water.
First, from the viewpoint of the Department of Justice, the
Department has a mutually dependent relationship with State and
local law enforcement agencies. We share concerns for smooth
operational business continuity at the year's end. However,
because those relationships are so numerous and diverse and so
many of the information interactions are so sophisticated, it
is proper for DOJ's Y2K readiness responsibility to be in the
Department's bureaus and divisions in all of our components.
They are responsible for all aspects of their missions,
including addressing mission partner readiness. I am pleased to
tell you they have been working very hard for a great many
months and are in a very good position to make an uneventful
transition at this year's end.
We are also emphasizing continuity of operations planning,
in which our components are layering and laying the groundwork
to deal with any business process anomalies that might occur
over the new year period and in the days and weeks to follow.
As of April 28, 1998, 93 percent of the Department's mission
critical systems are compliant, and I am very pleased with
that.
Your invitation addressed specifically the Y2K readiness of
State and local law enforcement. I see this as having two
principal dimensions. One is the awareness relative to their
mission partner interactions with the Department. The other is
awareness relative to the activities that are purely and
entirely State and local, not involving the mission
interactions with the Federal Government.
DOJ strategy has been to concentrate on the operations in
which we are a party. In so doing, we have encouraged our State
and local mission partners to follow our lead and look to all
of their operations, including those that do not involve the
Federal Government. Over the past 10 months, the Department has
undertaken a Y2K readiness awareness with its mission partners
in all areas, especially in law enforcement. That campaign has
included the Attorney General herself, and the FBI has have
been working hard at communicating Y2K awareness to all of its
partners, which are all the 50 States and territories.
My feedback indicates that State and local officials know
well the two things that are of paramount importance to the
Department, namely, that the Department is doing its own Y2K
readiness so that States can depend on our systems and the
States must do certain things to ensure their end of the
partnership, as well. Those include data exchanges as part of
information system operations and are being tested as a part of
the Department's overall Y2K readiness validation and
verification process. In that context, I believe that it is
important to bear in mind that our principal law enforcement
interfaces are with State and local officials on whom we rely
for reaching local officials in their many small jurisdictions.
From my second viewpoint as a leader of the Working Group
for Police, Public Safety, Law Enforcement, and Criminal
Justice of the President's Y2K Conversion Council, I have an
interest in the unusually wide spectrum of entities that
include not only those that are part of the State government
but those that exist at the county, city, and township levels.
In the case of just police, the entities number in the tens
of thousands because almost all the small villages and towns,
like their big city brethren, have their own police
departments. I believe that smaller police departments are very
numerous and they tend to rely greatly on other local
government entities for their information technology sources
and support.
For all of our working group participants other than DOJ, I
believe the Department of Transportation's Federal Highway
Administration has the most potential impact on State and
local, simply because of the issue of traffic control, and I
think that they have done a good job in identifying the issues
on traffic control.
I would like to conclude with some general observations. I
have some concerns with many small rural departments that do
not have their own expertise and rely on the infrastructure
support from other units of government. Because of this
concern, the President's Y2K Council, under the leadership of
the Domestic Interagency Working Group, will sponsor a sector
roundtable session with both the Law Enforcement Working Group
and the Public Safety Emergency Management Working Group to
discuss contingency planning and readiness.
In conclusion, I believe that the Department of Justice
systems are in good shape and will meet the challenge of Y2K.
There have been outreach efforts with our State and local
partners and my informal discussions with some of the law
enforcement associations indicate a good general overall
awareness. However, more needs to be done, and to that extent,
we will be working with the Federal Emergency Management Agency
and the Public Safety Emergency Management Working Group to
undertake a more thorough assessment of State and local
readiness, and we will, of course, keep the committee fully
apprised of our efforts.
Thank you for this opportunity.
Chairman Bennett. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Colgate can be found in the
appendix.]
Chairman Bennett. Mr. McEwen.
STATEMENT OF HARLIN R. McEWEN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
Mr. McEwen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning. I am
Harlin McEwen. I am Deputy Assistant Director of the Criminal
Justice Information Services Division of the FBI. I apologize
for my gravelly voice, but I am just getting over a case of
laryngitis. This is the first day I have really attempted to
try to speak publicly.
I am pleased to have this opportunity to inform you of the
work that we have been doing at the FBI as it relates to
assisting State and local law enforcement on the topic of year
2000 readiness and the criminal justice information systems. As
you mentioned, I am a former city police chief of over 20 years
and I currently serve as the Chairman of the Communications and
Technology Committee of the International Association of Chiefs
of Police, a position that I have held for 21 years.
I have been personally involved in educating and assisting
State and local law enforcement agencies on year 2000 matters
for the past four to 5 years. At the FBI, we have taken a very
proactive role in keeping the Y2K issue before the States and
encouraging them to plan for and institute changes to make
their systems compliant with our nationwide system.
In the FBI advisory policy process, our primary interaction
is with the State Control Terminal Agencies--we call them the
CTAS, as you mentioned, another one of these little
references--who are responsible for providing the appropriate
interconnect with the FBI system and for providing the
necessary Statewide systems and access for State and local
agencies to the FBI system.
The following is a brief chronology of the actions by the
FBI to assess the readiness of the State CTA's and to ensure
that they were aware of the consequences if State systems are
not ready for the date change. Starting in the spring of 1996,
the FBI CJIS Division prepared a staff paper for the Advisory
Policy Board Working Group meetings presenting the Y2K issue
and proposing alternatives for compliance. The working group
recommended converting all dates in the NCIC system, or
National Crime Information System, to the Y2K format. This
recommendation was approved by the APB at their June 1996
meeting.
In September 1997, the FBI CJIS Division and the
Information Resources Division of the FBI hosted over 400 State
and local criminal justice agency representatives at the NCIC
2000 Technical Conference in Tulsa, Oklahoma. At this
conference, the timetable and formats for the Y2K date were
presented and the need to plan for necessary changes was
stressed.
On September 25 of 1997, the FBI CJIS Division sent a
technical and operational update to all the States informing
them of the timetable and the formats for the date changes.
In January 1998, the FBI surveyed the States and requested
information regarding the readiness of the States for NCIC and
Y2K compliance. At the request of our Advisory Policy Board,
the States were sent a letter explaining the Y2K schedule and
the consequences of not being compliant with nationwide systems
by July 1999. The reason for the July 1999 reference is that
that is when we will be actually delivering our new NCIC 2000
and our new Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification
System and it is necessary for the States to be able to
interact with those systems at that point in time in a Y2K
format.
The letter enclosed a form requesting that the agency head
sign a statement acknowledging that the schedule and the
consequences are understood. All States responded with a signed
statement. Unfortunately, the District of Columbia did not
respond.
In December 1998, the District of Columbia Metropolitan
Police Department contacted the FBI and indicated they were
having difficulty with Y2K compliance and requested FBI
assistance. The FBI CJIS Division and our Information Resources
Division responded to the District with technical consultants
and the conversion software developed by the FBI to convert
NCIC dates.
Subsequent to this, the city government provided the
Department with additional resources and we have been assured
that the situation is now under control. This is particularly
critical, because the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police
Department provides the interface to our FBI system for all law
enforcement agencies in the District. This includes all the DOJ
components, such as the FBI, the Drug Enforcement
Administration, U.S. Marshals Service, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, and the Bureau of Prisons. It also
includes the Treasury law enforcement agencies such as the U.S.
Secret Service, ATF, U.S. Customs, and agencies that are quite
prominent in your traveling around, the U.S. Park Police and
the Postal inspectors.
Between November 1998 and April 1999, the FBI has been
conducting external interface checkout testing with all States.
The States have been strongly encouraged to use this Y2K
compliant data format in these tests. However, we did not make
it mandatory, as some States are still in the process of
converting their software or have contracts with work in
progress to make their systems Y2K compliant.
In February of this year, the FBI hosted another conference
of over 400 State and local criminal justice agency
representatives at our Integrated Automated Fingerprint
Identification System [IAFIS], technical conference held in Los
Angeles. At this conference, again, the timetable and other
issues related to Y2K issues were presented and the need to
plan for necessary changes was stressed.
Between February and May of this year, we have started
conducting site operational tests. We call it the SOT. Those
States which did not use the Y2K compliant date formats in the
EIC are now required to do so in these site operational tests.
In July, as I mentioned, we will be delivering the NCIC
2000 and IAFIS systems and we expect that they will be fully
operational. Of course, at that time, the Y2K date formats are
mandatory.
I will mention that the Attorney General has expressed
continuing concern about the Y2K issue, and Mr. Colgate has
mentioned it in his remarks. She had asked us at the FBI,
because we do have to be sure that this is going to be all
working when this all happens, to take one extra effort, and
yesterday, I spent a great deal of the day discussing with our
FBI team how we were going to take one last effort to try to
make sure that we have done everything possible to assist the
State governments to be prepared.
So we have made the decision now that in the next 2 weeks,
we will start sending out teams. We are planning on sending out
five teams of two to three States a week and we expect that in
five to 6 weeks, we will have visited every State once again,
and we will, hopefully, complete that by late June and we will
have a complete sense of whether the States are in final
readiness.
I would mention that, again, our primary interface is with
the States and their primary responsibility is to make sure
that the State and locals will comply with their State formats,
which will then, of course, come on to the FBI. We are prepared
to offer assistance to all of these States and I think that
what we have done and what we are doing are appropriate from
the Federal Government perspective in our role in assisting
them.
I thank you for the opportunity to give you this overview
and would welcome any questions.
Chairman Bennett. Thank you for your testimony and for your
work. We will look forward to the results of that State-by-
State survey that you just described to us.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McEwen can be found in the
appendix.]
Chairman Bennett. Chief Karangekis, we appreciate you being
here and we will hear your testimony.
STATEMENT OF JOHN S. KARANGEKIS, CHIEF OF POLICE, WETHERSFIELD
POLICE DEPARTMENT, WETHERSFIELD, CONNECTICUT
Mr. Karangekis. Thank you, Senator. Basically, what I have
heard this morning in previous testimony pretty much parrots
many of the things that I have in my short presentation.
An informal survey of a cross-section of police agencies in
the State of Connecticut reveals that agencies vary in their
level of progress to remediate Y2K issues prior to the turn of
the century. There is consensus that it is imperative that each
law enforcement agency show due diligence in their efforts to
mitigate any adverse impact resulting from non-compliant
technology. It is believed that the Connecticut experience is
probably similar to that of all other law enforcement agencies
throughout the country, and I am beginning to pick that up as I
hear some of the testimony.
The majority of large cities and towns in Connecticut
appear to be much ahead of some of the smaller police
departments and communities. It is clear, however, that law
enforcement agencies recognize, at this point, particularly,
the importance of due diligence and are actively addressing
those issues in their own communities, again, I repeat, at
various levels of completion.
A recently released Y2K readiness report distributed by the
State of Connecticut, the Department of Information Technology,
regarding Y2K remediation efforts gives strong indicators that
they anticipate there will only be a minimal adverse impact
during the turnover. That is based on their projections that
most of the State will have addressed all the technological
issues, the interfacing, both at the State, Federal, and local
level, obviously, and that these systems will, for the most
part, do what they are supposed to do.
Most significantly, it appears that in our State, who we
have just recently redone the entire 911 system with both new
hardware and new software--that is being done as we speak and
those systems will be turned on sometime during the late
summer, I believe. They are all in place, local PSAP's. They
have not been interconnected yet because there is still some
work going on on the technology and servicing end, but this
system in Connecticut is Y2K compliant. The issue, of course,
is again to make sure that any system or technology that those
systems interface with is also Y2K and we are in the process of
doing those things now.
Like many communities, the town of Wethersfield has
initiated a town-wide year 2000 readiness. We have committees
that have been set up. Each department in our town government
as well as State government determines their own issues. They
determine what their technology is all about. They go about
getting assistance to determine whether, in fact, their
hardware and software are all Y2K compliant.
It appears at this time that approximately 80 percent of
all the towns in the State of Connecticut, town and police
technology, including computers, telecommunications, alarm
systems, internal data systems, and records systems are Y2K
compliant. Progress is being made through follow-up, software
upgrades, and/or replacement.
Progress is being made. However, the one thing that we have
noticed is that it has become increasingly difficult for us to
get specific answers from some of the vendors, some of the
manufacturers, particularly in the telecommunications area.
There is a reluctance on their part to specifically say, ``You
are all set.'' It is very, very difficult to get them to put it
on paper. They do couch their words when they talk to you, and
even when they come out and do an assessment, the report you
get is permeated with disclaimers. That seems to be a problem
and we are hoping that that is going to rectify itself as time
goes on.
The one thing that I have noticed and have particularly
taken concern with is that we perhaps started a little too late
to deal with Y2K. We probably should have started 5 years ago,
because now the situation is that everybody is rushing to make
sure that they are going to be adequately in place at the time
that the century turns over.
Contingency planning, obviously, is the most important
thing for us at this point because of the unknown factors here.
In the police service, contingency planning is something that
we do frequently, Statewide, locally. We have had disasters
before. We have had power outages before. We have had
situations where we have had to come together. I feel
reasonably certain that at least from the point of responding
to public safety situations in local communities and at the
State level, that we will be able, in fact, through our
contingency planning and replacement of certain kinds of
equipment that is not affected by Y2K bugs, we are going to be
able to deliver police services, perhaps at a slower rate and
dependent on how many failures may occur, if they do occur.
I believe that we have to be very diligent in our efforts.
Time is short. There are some law enforcement concerns that are
very paramount, particularly for smaller police departments. I
would name some of those as the reluctance of vendors to
guarantee Y2K compliance clearly. We concern ourselves about
the reaction of the community when the time comes for the
turnover. We almost anticipate that at 1 minute after midnight
January 1, 2000, that everybody is going to be picking up their
telephone and trying to call all public safety points to see if
we are in business. That in itself would cause some problems.
There are significant costs associated with contingency
planning and staffing and costs for updating hardware and
software. That is a difficult situation, particularly for small
communities where there has not been much significant long-term
planning for these things, and that is why I say I am sorry we
did not start these things several years ago.
But we are prepared. I believe that any situations that
occur will be minimal, but we have to continue to pursue Y2K
compliance in all areas of public safety and I believe that we
will be able to do that if everybody wakes up. Thank you.
Chairman Bennett. Thank you very much. I have always said
that the way to solve your Y2K problem is very simple. Just
make sure you start in 1994 and you will not have any
difficulty.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Karangekis can be found in
the appendix.]
Chairman Bennett. Chief Brown.
STATEMENT OF JAMES N. BROWN, CHIEF OF POLICE, HUDSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT, HUDSON, OHIO
Mr. Brown. Good morning, and thank you, Senator Bennett. I
am honored and privileged to come before you this morning to
provide you with a municipal law enforcement administrator's
perspective concerning Y2K and the contributing factors that
have led to varying degrees of apathy from within the law
enforcement profession, which has not emphasized a strategic
response in the form of a community-wide contingency planning
objective.
As the Chief of Police for the city of Hudson, Ohio, a
community of approximately 23,000 residents located between the
cities of Cleveland and Akron, I have oftentimes found myself
having to contend with problems categorized in broad terms as
safety and security matters. Safety and security can be
compromised if we trivialize or ignore various indicators of an
impending problem or crisis, and Y2K presents classic
indicators of such a nature.
Basic utility services alone are critical components of a
community's safety and security, and although their
dependability is remarkable, it has correspondingly lulled many
of us into a false level of expectation, whereby failure is
thought of as being virtually impossible.
In the absence of active discussion at various association
meetings, regional conferences, et cetera, and the virtual non-
existence of Y2K-related training sessions specifically
designed for law enforcement to address Y2K from something
other than a technology perspective, it is unlikely that most
agencies have even discussed the possible implications that Y2K
poses. Most law enforcement administrators, on the other hand,
are sufficiently motivated to prepare their respective agencies
and communities if they are exposed to some basic guidance and
direction that originates from within our own profession.
The law enforcement profession is equipped with vast media
resources through its many associations, and yet, with few
exceptions, there has not been much substance in coming to
terms with contingency planning.
There is a considerable level of apathy from within the
profession, as I mentioned, concerning Y2K and a variety of
factors have influenced this response. There is considerable
contradiction and rhetoric amidst the voluminous amount of
documentation being made publicly available, which I believe
have clouded the issue and drastically minimized Y2K's
credibility as a potentially serious problem.
Terminologies such as ``minimal impact'' or ``sporadic
disruption'' have created a comfort factor for skeptics in all
professions. Sporadic almost implies the existence of some
distant community on the other side of the globe to which we
have no allegiance or direct responsibility. The immensity of
our communities oftentimes jades our sense of the enormity of
the United States. The perspective changes rather dramatically,
however, when I suggest the placement of a straight pin into
one's hometown on a wall-sized map of the United States and I
pose the question, ``Could your hometown be Sporadicville?''
Perhaps it is the absence of the threat of structural damage
and property destruction that has caused many law enforcement
administrators to downplay the significance of Y2K. Perhaps it
is the absence of a sustained media campaign to bring Y2K
implications to the attention of the American public, which to
date has been limited. One local television reporter
representing a large network was advised by management that the
Y2K issue was too frightening and might induce fear and cause
panic, this from the same network that daily provides graphic
pictorial details of human misery and death worldwide.
Several weeks ago, I forwarded a letter to the general
managers of 12 different major media outlets advocating the
necessity for additional media exposure. To date, I have
received not so much as a single response.
There is a relatively small percentage of communities and
law enforcement agencies throughout our country who have
experienced crisis in its infinite forms, managed it
effectively, and are thoroughly prepared to implement a
successful contingency plan at a moment's notice, and then
there are all the rest.
Even a perfect plan loses its luster and brilliance if the
true beneficiaries of its development and execution, our
residents, are unaware as to how they summon critically needed
emergency services in the absence of a functioning
telecommunications network; the availability of predetermined
shelters, if they have exhausted their own resources or their
homes are and/or become uninhabitable; and we have failed to
provide simplistic, yet essential, guidelines as to how the
average family can sustain itself in the absence of government
assistance.
The character, the grit, and the determination of the law
enforcement profession, continually faced with challenge and
adversity, lend themselves to a successful outcome regardless
of the nature of the event. The local law enforcement agency is
in some respects the first and last line of defense for our
communities and they will be looking at us, as law enforcement
administrators, for direction and guidance as 1/1/2000
approaches. The law enforcementprofession must recognize this
responsibility and meet the challenges that it presents.
Be there no mistake, however. Our dependability and
reliability is, as always, rock solid, and with special regard
to Y2K, it is the lone absolute amidst a world of uncertainty.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brown can be found in the
appendix.]
Chairman Bennett. Thank you all very much. We have just
started a vote, so I have my eye on the clock perhaps a little
more than usual.
Let me go back to a comment you made, Mr. Colgate, and get
everyone's quick response to it. You mentioned traffic control.
Does anyone have a sense of how reliable the traffic systems
are, the signals are and so on are? Has anybody looked at that?
Yes, Chief Karangekis?
Mr. Karangekis. Senator, I can only speak for the State of
Connecticut, only because within the past few days, we have
networked with State traffic control and they are of the
opinion that they are going to be ready, that they feel they
are going to be able to handle the traffic function. I am
hoping that that is a correct statement.
Chairman Bennett. I was struck by your comment about
everybody picking up the phone after they have celebrated and
calling to make sure everything works. This can become a self-
fulfilling scenario for panic. Gee, everything does not work
and the whole thing must have failed, and it did not fail, it
is just overloaded.
So we come back to the whole question that you were
addressing, I think, Chief Brown, of getting the media to
understand what is real, what is not. This is an unfair
generalization, but elements of the people in the media seem to
swing between this is the end of the world as we know it, or
you are wasting our time to even hold these hearings because
everything is going to be fine. The reality, of course, is
between those two extremes. We could get some help from people
in the media if they could just be a little more measured in
their reporting, but somehow, being measured does not fill
airtime. You were going to comment on that further?
Mr. Brown. As I stated, I think the local police
administrators are anxious to learn as much as they possibly
can about the whole issue. Furthermore, I think the communities
are looking for the leadership and guidance from, in some
jurisdictions, it is the law enforcement agency head for
guidance. And I think it is important that, obviously, we spend
the time in meeting with our respective communities to bring
them into an awareness level, teach them how to prepare, and
some guidance, as was just mentioned, in terms of suggesting to
folks that they not pick up the phone routinely to make sure
that the system is working, et cetera. So I think the public is
looking for our assistance in that regard.
Chairman Bennett. Mr. McEwen, can you give me the typical
failure mode for crime information systems? In the worst case,
what could happen, arrest warrants or a person's information be
erroneously dropped from the system? Is that something that
could happen?
Mr. McEwen. Well, I do not think so, because the main data
base, we maintain, and we have complete assurance that our
systems are Y2K. It is the connectivity that is the more
dangerous that we are trying to address. The scenario is that
you started back with the earlier panels the discussion about
911. It all starts kind of in the beginning at the local level
and all of those connections until it gets to the FBI, like the
NCIC system, where they are checking for a wanted record on an
individual, every one of those links has to work.
The worst case scenario is that any one point in that whole
communications link fails and they are not able to get timely
information. We have pretty good assurance, as I said, that the
States are prepared to handle that. What we really do not have
a good sense of, and one of the things that we will do in our
visits in the near future will be to ask once more, how well
are the States set in their readiness with the local agencies,
such as these chiefs in Connecticut and in Ohio.
Mr. Colgate. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add to that----
Chairman Bennett. Sure.
Mr. Colgate. In my discussions with John Koskinen on the
Council, the best way I can describe this is that we are very
confident in the Federal system, that the Federal system will
be up and running. But my concern is, to give you an anecdotal
example, is that you have a very small police department, let
us say less than half a dozen sworn officers, and they do a
traffic stop and they have a particular individual, and because
they are not Y2K ready, they will not impact the Federal
system. The Federal system will be able to operate.
What I am concerned about is the officer on the street not
having the ability to do a search about somebody who he has
temporarily detained and ascertain who is this individual? Does
this individual have a criminal history? Am I exposing myself
and the community to danger? The system will be there and
available to him. It is just our concern that he will not have
the capability to make that query.
That is why the Attorney General has asked the FBI to
really focus its efforts now and really get out there and deal
with the States who we hope, in turn, will be that leveraging
agent down to that very small local police department.
Chairman Bennett. Thank you for that. I would hope that as
you go through this assessment on the part of the FBI under the
direction of the Attorney General, that you try to put together
a road map of where the remaining problems are and fairly firm
indication of who needs help.
We are getting a general picture here, which, frankly, is
not unlike that which we get from the business community as a
whole. That is, the big companies are probably going to be all
right. You are telling us the Justice Department is going to be
all right. You are telling us the State of Connecticut is going
to be all right. It is the smaller to medium-sized companies,
and from the testimony overall that I am hearing here, it is
the smaller and medium-sized law enforcement agencies that have
the most problem.
But we do not know. We are guessing. We have two chiefs
here who tell us that they are going to be fine, primarily
because they are doing the prudent thing and getting
contingency plans in place so that if the connectivity that you
talked about does not work, they can still see to it that their
law enforcement is available.
It is the fact that we are flying blind in these areas that
causes us the concern, and I would hope that the Justice
Department would look to try to construct that kind of road map
and say, all right, here are some more specific statements of
exactly where we are and what we are doing.
Mr. Colgate. If I could just respond briefly, Mr.
Chairman----
Chairman Bennett. Certainly.
Mr. Colgate. I agree with that assessment. We have met
informally with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and
because of the smaller communities, we are dealing with very
small law enforcement operations, usually, you have sort of a
combined emergency response capability in those very small
rural areas. We are going to be entering into a partnership
with FEMA to engage in a telephonic survey to really focus on
some of those smaller locations so that we can get a better
sense and get a better assessment of the issues that they face.
We have a good window with the FBI because of the fact that
we constantly have a window into their operations at the State
level. But we hear you loud and clear and we will be working
with FEMA to really focus on those smaller communities where
there is a combined emergency/public safety response to get a
better snapshot.
Chairman Bennett. Finally, and then we will have to adjourn
the hearing, Mr. McEwen, you have talked about people who have
a very late timeframe to get this under control, and I would
hope as you do your State-by-State assessment you would focus
on that, because the fear we have in this committee is that a
lot of people who give us their assurance, yes, we will be
ready, are saying, we will be ready because things will be
delivered to us in October or November or by the 15th of
December and so on. Life being what it is in the IT world,
something that is delivered in November is not going to be
reliable in January.
The President set March 31 as the deadline for the Federal
Government to be compliant. There are some Federal agencies who
missed that. Then we are saying, well, as a backup date, June
30, or the second quarter. That is really as late as we can go
with the big systems.
Now, there may be some small systems that could survive if
the fix shows up in August or September, but as you go around,
try to make a list of those who are saying, everything is going
to be fine and it is going to show up on Halloween. That is
really pretty scary and we would like that information, if you
would share it with us.
Mr. McEwen. I totally agree with you, Mr. Chairman, and I
think that is exactly why the Attorney General has asked us to,
one more time, just go out there. We are convinced that there
may be some cases where they have told us that everything is
fine and when we get there, they are going to say, well, we are
still working on it and we are not quite sure. We need to know
that, so we hope we can help them with that.
Chairman Bennett. We thank you all. The committee is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:52 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
------
ALPHABETICAL LISTING AND MATERIAL SUBMITTED
______
Prepared Statement of Chairman Robert F. Bennett
Our hearing today marks the second time in six months that this
Committee will address the important topic of Y2K emergency
preparedness. Our October 2, 1998 hearing focused on emergency
management, and included testimony from FEMA, the National Guard
Association, the National Emergency Managers Association, and the
National Governors Association. Today we will concentrate on the impact
of Y2K on two specific areas of emergency preparedness: 911 systems and
local law enforcement. We touched somewhat on these areas during the
October 2 hearing, but today we address these issues with a heightened
sense of concern.
Our concern about these areas is heightened for two reasons. In a
report released last month, the Network Reliability Interoperability
Council, or ``NRIC'', estimated that only ten percent of the Public
Safety Answering Points or ``PSAPs'' where 911 calls are processed were
prepared for Y2K. In an updated report received from the FCC yesterday,
the Committee was informed that this number might now be as high as 35
percent. However, it should be noted that this refers only to the
equipment provided to the PSAPs by the telephone companies.
There is still a large amount of equipment and information systems
utilized within PSAPs about which little are known. An ongoing survey
being conducted by the U.S. Fire Administration about overall readiness
of 4,300 PSAPs indicates that overall readiness is only about 17
percent. Survey results indicate some strong concerns about funding on
the part of the PSAPs.
Keep in mind that in the United States, there are approximately
300,000 calls for emergency assistance made via the 911 system each
day, not counting the additional 86,000 911 calls made daily from
cellular phones. That is over 110 million 911 calls made per year. If
problems within the systems supporting these public safety answering
points are not properly addressed, these systems will fail, leading to
degradation in the processing of 911 calls.
I would like to announce that Senator Dodd and I are jointly
sending a letter to Commissioner Michael Powell of the FCC, who is here
with us today, and Administrator Carrye Brown of the U.S. Fire
Administration asking that they work together to identify those PSAPs
that are not yet prepared, and those who have not yet responded to the
Fire Administration's survey. We have also asked that they provide this
information to the appropriate 911 commissions, state Y2K coordinators,
or other appropriate regulatory body governing those PSAPs. Hopefully
this will help the states and local jurisdictions identify potential
problems so that help can be provided to those that might need it.
There may very well be some people out there that have a problem, but
don't yet realize it, even at this late date. The supervisor of one
PSAP told Committee staff that the radio system in his dispatch center
required a $60,000 patch. Without the patch, they would have been
unable to communicate with emergency service units at all.
In regard to local law enforcement, the Committee has noted the
absence of any overall assessment of the Y2K status of our nation's
local law enforcement agencies. At the federal level, we have captured
much information about our federal law enforcement agencies within the
Justice Department and Treasury Department, such as the FBI, DEA,
Customs Bureau, ATF, and Secret Service. This information has come to
us through the quarterly OMB reports, and the work of the Inspector
General offices of various departments. The news about these agencies
is very good. If not already completely prepared, they are well on
their way to being so, and we have every confidence they will be ready
to meet their challenges on January 1, 2000. However, we are concerned
about the lack of information on the segment of law enforcement that
our citizens rely on most in their everyday lives, and that is the
local law enforcement sector. This includes approximately 17,000 police
and sheriff's departments across the country.
As I have emphasized previously, we don't want to overstate the
problem, or needlessly incite public panic. We have no reason to
believe that our emergency service departments are not taking very
seriously their responsibility to prepare for Y2K. We recognize
however, that they are highly vulnerable to Y2K both in the 911 area
and other areas of vital information technology. We are especially
concerned about the lack of assessments of local law enforcement
preparedness. Due to the lack of any hard data, we are unable to
accurately make any statements about the level of preparedness in this
area. As such, we find it necessary to hold this hearing today.
Law enforcement agencies at the federal, state, and local level
rely on a wide variety of criminal information data bases in order to
safety and effectively do their jobs everyday. The National Crime
Information Center (NCIC), the National Law Enforcement
Telecommunications System (NLETS), the El Paso Intelligence Network,
(EPIC), and the Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information System
(NADDIS) form the backbone of crime information systems at the federal
level. Some of these systems, particularly the National Crime
Information Center and National Law Enforcement Telecommunications
System also function as vital tools for all state and local law
enforcement. Additionally, there are similar systems managed
individually by each of the fifty states, as well as numerous regional
crime information centers upon which local law enforcement agencies
rely. Each police department also maintains its own arrest and criminal
record systems. These systems play a vital role in increasing officer
safety and the safety of the public, and enable the police to rapidly
identify suspects and solve crimes.
We hope that this hearing will help ``turn up the heat'' as one
might say in police jargon, and to encourage more active assessments in
these areas.
The events in Littleton, Colorado last week stand as a sad and
tragic reminder of the importance of our topic today. Before we begin,
let me ask that we all keep the victims, their families and friends,
and all those effected by that incident in our thoughts and prayers.
__________
Prepared Statement of Jack L. Brock, Jr.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Special Committee:
Thank you for inviting me to discuss the impact of the Year 2000
computing challenge on the nation's emergency and state and local law
enforcement systems and our review of the Department of Justice and the
President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion efforts to facilitate
remediation and contingency planning and to gauge the Year 2000
readiness of these two important sectors.
Briefly, we found that
Limited information is available about the Year 2000
status of 9-1-1 call answering sites throughout the nation, known as
Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs). The Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) in conjunction with the National Emergency
Number Association \1\ has surveyed 4,300 primary PSAPs on their Year
2000 readiness; however, as of April 1999, only 18 percent responded.
Of those that did respond, only 16 percent reported that their systems
were compliant. However, the majority of the rest of the respondents
reported that they will be compliant by 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This is a trade association seeking to foster the technological
advancement, availability, and implementation of a common emergency
telephone number system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Little is known about the status of state and local law
enforcement agencies. No assessment surveys have been conducted. Last
week, the Chairman of the working group focusing on law enforcement for
the President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion informed us that such
an assessment would soon be initiated in cooperation with a follow-on
FEMA assessment of emergency services.
Outreach efforts by FEMA, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), the National Emergency Number Association, and other
organizations have been fairly extensive, ranging from the development
of contingency planning guidance to the hosting of forums for the 9-1-1
community on meeting the Year 2000 challenge.
Outreach efforts by Justice generally have been targeted
to raising awareness and, with the exception of the Bureau of Prisons,
largely ad hoc in nature.
To prepare for this testimony, we reviewed the FCC's March 1999
report on Year 2000 readiness in the communications sector; transcripts
of the FCC's emergency services forum held in November 1998; and the
April 1999 Network Reliability and Interoperability Council (NRIC)
report on Public Safety Answering Positions. We reviewed test
documentation prepared by Bellcore and the Telco Year 2000 Forum to
assess the scope of Year 2000 interoperability testing conducted on
both the local public network in general, and on the continued ability
of this network to successfully process 9-1-1 calls for emergency
services. Further, we reviewed information published on the Internet by
manufacturers of computer systems supporting 9-1-1 sites as well as by
the FCC, NRIC, FEMA, the President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion,
National Emergency Number Association, International Association of
Emergency Managers, National Emergency Management Association, National
Association of Counties, National Public Safety Telecommunications
Council, State of Minnesota, and the State of Texas. We also toured 9-
1-1 sites located in Arlington County and Fairfax County, Virginia, and
we interviewed members of the Telco Year 2000 Forum and staff at both
FEMA's U.S. Fire Administration and the National Emergency Number
Association.
We also reviewed available outreach strategies and plans for the
Department of Justice and its component bureaus and documentation on
actual outreach activities that they have conducted. We discussed with
department and bureau officials their respective approaches to managing
outreach activities, including outreach goals. Additionally, we
attended meetings of the Police/Law Enforcement/Criminal Justice
working group, reviewed documents prepared by the working group, and
conducted interviews with the Chairman of the group. We performed our
work in March and April 1999 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
FEDERAL EFFORTS TO ASSESS CONTINUITY OF 9-1-1
AND STATE/LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICES
For the most part, responsibility for ensuring continuity of
service for 9-1-1 calls and law enforcement resides with thousands of
state and local jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the success of these
efforts is of great interest at the national level as these services
are critical to the safety and well being of individuals across the
country. Thus, the lack of status information has increased concern
about which, if any, critical emergency communications and law
enforcement systems may not be compliant in time.
The President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion was established in
part to help provide leadership and work with state and local
governments to address the Year 2000 computing challenge. Last April,
we recommended that the Chairman of the Council develop a comprehensive
picture of the nation's Year 2000 readiness, which would include
identifying and assessing the Year 2000 risks within the nation's key
economic sectors, including those posed by the failure of critical
infrastructure components.\2\ By gathering basic information on Year
2000 status and impact on public well being, the Council would be
better prepared to advise any necessary action to mitigate risks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Potential for Widespread Disruption
Calls for Strong Leadership and Partnerships (GAO/AIMD-98-85, April 30,
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In October 1998, the Council tasked each of its working groups to
complete sector assessments. These assessments were to be based on an
assessment guide developed with input from GAO and were to be conducted
in conjunction with related umbrella groups and trade associations. The
Council's Emergency Services working group, which is chaired by FEMA,
was responsible for conducting the assessment of emergency services,
including 9-1-1 services. Because of the reliance of 9-1-1 services on
the public switched network, this particular assessment was also
dependent on results of the assessment conducted by the
Telecommunications working group, chaired by FCC. The Council's Police/
Public Safety/Law Enforcement/Criminal Justice working group, chaired
by the Department of Justice, was responsible for conducting the
assessment of state and local law enforcement agencies.
The first report summarizing the results of the Council's
assessments was issued on January 7, 1999. The Council's second
assessment report was issued on April 21, 1999. After the first report
was issued, we testified \3\ that, while the study was a good step
toward obtaining a picture of the nation's Year 2000 readiness, the
picture remained substantially incomplete because assessments were not
available in many key areas, including 9-1-1 and fire services. Also,
some surveys did not have a high response rate, calling into question
whether they accurately portrayed the readiness of the sector. We
stated that the Council needed to remain vigilant and closely monitor
and update the information in the sectors where information is
available and obtain data for those where it was not.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Readiness Improving, But Much Work
Remains to Avoid Major Disruptions (GAO/T-AIMD-99-50, January 20,
1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9-1-1 SERVICES YEAR 2000 READINESS
9-1-1 is the standard telephone number most Americans dial to
quickly obtain assistance from police, fire, or emergency medical
service providers. When dialing 9-1-1, callers depend on the country's
telecommunications infrastructure, a high degree of automation, and
emergency dispatchers to ensure that emergency personnel can be reached
when needed.
If Year 2000 issues are not adequately addressed, the response to
an emergency could be degraded. Fortunately, a number of positive
outreach efforts have been undertaken to assist local governments as
well as telecommunications providers in preparing for the Year 2000.
Unfortunately, with less than 9 months remaining before the millennium,
the status of thousands of 9-1-1 answering sites is still largely
unknown.
9-1-1 and the Year 2000 Problem
According to the FCC, about 90 percent of the population has access
to 9-1-1 service and uses it to place most of the nearly 110 million
emergency calls made in the United States each year. The remainder of
the population, without access to 9-1-1 service, dials an ordinary
seven-digit telephone number to contact emergency service providers.
The National Emergency Number Association estimates that there are
approximately 4,400 primary PSAPs operating nationwide. These PSAPs, in
turn, may have one or more associated secondary PSAPs. For example, the
City of Falls Church, Virginia, operates a PSAP that is secondary to
Arlington County's primary PSAP, 9-1-1 calls originating in Falls
Church would be delivered to the primary PSAP in Arlington County.
Following initial processing, that call would be forwarded for dispatch
to the secondary PSAP operated by Falls Church.
The 9-1-1 system is a multi-step process that can vary from one
PSAP to the next. However, 9-1-1 calls are initiated over the public
switched network and most calls are made using ``enhanced'' 9-1-1
service--that is, service that uses automation to provide dispatchers
with the address and telephone number associated with the caller.
The following figure depicts a typical 9-1-1 call.
As the figure illustrates, the telecommunications component of the
9-1-1 system includes the public switched network, the local telephone
office, and one or more PSAPs. A computer system at the local telephone
office--called the E911 tandem switch--automatically routes incoming
calls to the proper PSAP. At the PSAP, the call is recorded and
information, such as the caller's location and directions on how to get
there, is retrieved from a database normally provided by a local
telephone company called the automatic location identification (ALI)
database. Other equipment common to PSAPs are telephones, answering
equipment, and personal computers.
The systems used by PSAPs and supporting telecommunications
networks have processes such as day/time logging, call recording,
computer aided dispatch, and records management systems that could be
disabled by a Year 2000 failure. Should this occur, the following could
happen.
If the automatic number identification (ANI) database
computers fail, 9-1-1 calls would not be selectively routed to a PSAP
for processing, unless a default was established to route any call
without ANI data to a specific PSAP. Depending on the service area, the
loss of a 9-1-1 tandem switch could affect more than one million access
lines.
Also, if the automatic location identification database
computers fail, the 9-1-1 attendant would get a voice path but not
receive location data from the ALI database. The operator would then
have to get location data from the 9-1-1 caller (which is routinely
done with calls originating on wireless telephones) who may be confused
or anxious.
If the automatic call distributor fails, incoming calls
would not automatically be delivered to available call takers.
If a computer telephony integrated system (where the
telephone has been totally replaced by computer) fails, the 9-1-1
attendant would lose all functionality and no calls would be received.
Another Year 2000-related problem is potential congestion in the
public switched network arising from individuals making 9-1-1 calls to
simply test the system. According to the Network Reliability and
Interoperability Council, an increase in 9-1-1 traffic could result in
callers getting circuit busy signals, put on hold for long periods, or
disconnected.
Limited Information Is Available Concerning
The Status of Year 2000 Readiness for 9-1-1
Successfully completing a 9-1-1 call next January 1--and taking
full advantage of all the features of enhanced 9-1-1 service--is
dependent on two major factors. First, the ability of the public
switched telecommunications network to transmit the call and, second,
the ability of the PSAP to process the call.
With respect to the public switched network, the Telco Year 2000
Forum on Intra-Network Interoperability Testing, which is made up of
local exchange carriers representing 90 percent of all access lines in
the nation, recently conducted tests to determine whether the public
switched network could carry calls in a Year 2000 environment. The
tests were performed on 54 different configurations of central office
equipment that included a majority of the network components used in
North America.
Only six Year 2000 problems were identified by the Telco Year 2000
Forum in over 1,900 test cases on these configurations, which involved
80 products from 20 different vendors. Assuming these tests were
carried out effectively, their results provide some confidence that, if
remediated, the public switched network should continue to function
into the new millennium with no major service interruptions caused by
Year 2000 dates. However, these tests did not focus specifically on 9-
1-1 services and, as such, they did not test numerous ``back end''
systems that a PSAP might use, such as computer-aided dispatch systems,
call logging systems, call recorders, and radios. PSAP operators are
responsible for ensuring that these systems operate and interoperate
properly after the date change.
The status of the ability of PSAP efforts to ensure that they can
effectively process 9-1-1 calls is less clear. The Network Reliability
and Interoperability Council \4\ reports that major local telephone
companies have taken action to ensure that PSAP systems they provide to
their customers have been remediated. However, as of April 16, 1999,
only 18 percent of 4,300 PSAPs had responded to a readiness survey
conducted by FEMA and the National Emergency Number Association. Of the
766 sites that did respond, only 16 percent reported that they were
ready for the Year 2000. Another 70 percent of those responding
reported that they will be Year 2000 compliant in time for the
millennium. Because of the low response rate, FEMA is planning to
conduct telephone interviews with those sites that did not respond to
the initial survey.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The Network Reliability and Interoperability Council (NRIC) is
a federal advisory committee that provides guidance to the Federal
Communications Commission on how to promote the reliability of the
public switched network.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Network Reliability and Interoperability Council developed its
own assessment of PSAP Year 2000 readiness. The NRIC estimated that at
present, fewer than 10 percent of the nation's PSAPs have completed
upgrades of the 9-1-1 call processing equipment. However, according to
the Council, many upgrades have been scheduled and should be completed
within the second and third quarters of this year. The Council's
evaluation did not address the Year 2000 readiness of any of the other
equipment employed within the PSAPs that support call processing or
personnel dispatch. The proper functioning of that equipment is the
responsibility of PSAP managers.
Positive Outreach Efforts to Ensure
9-1-1 Year 2000 Readiness Are Underway
To help ensure that emergency services will be accessible after the
century date change, many organizations are engaged in outreach
activities to state and local governments and even the
telecommunications providers that support networks critical to 9-1-1
calls. For example:
In December 1998, FEMA included an informational Year
2000 brochure with a survey that was sent to primary answering points.
It also developed Year 2000 contingency and consequence management
planning guidance that specifically identifies 9-1-1 systems as being
at risk because of the Year 2000 problem. This guidance was made
available to state and local government emergency managers through a
series of Year 2000 workshops held throughout the country. The guidance
was also presented in a multi-state teleconference of state Year 2000
coordinators.
The National Emergency Number Association is working to
modify its technical standards, which cover a number of issues related
to 9-1-1, to include Year 2000 compliance statements. The association
is also advising its approximately 6,000 members to check their mission
critical computers and equipment for Year 2000 readiness.
The National Association of Counties has been working
with the National League of Cities, the International City/County
Management Association, and Public Technology, Inc. to address the Year
2000 challenge and its potential to impact services provided by local
governments. Together, these organizations have developed and
distributed over 20,000 copies of a Year 2000 information kit and have
sponsored a nationwide Year 2000 satellite broadcast for local
government officials and employees.
On November 16, the FCC hosted a forum--attended by
federal, state, and county government officials, telecommunications
providers, and equipment manufacturers--on maintaining emergency
response communications and potential Year 2000 issues. Topics
discussed included potential Year 2000 threats to the system,
strategies for averting those threats, and the need to convey the
importance of the Year 2000 challenge to other emergency response
organizations.
The Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials
International Inc., is planning to hold a Year 2000 symposium on May 20
and May 21 directed towards agency and company preparedness planning.
Speakers will include officials from the FCC, the President's Council
on Year 2000 Conversion and other federal government agencies, major
utility companies, public safety communications center directors,
volunteer associations and communications manufacturers and
consultants.
STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
YEAR 2000 READINESS
Over 19,000 state and local law enforcement entities provide
services to protect the American public. These entities vary greatly in
terms of specific services provided, geographic coverage, and use of
computer and communication tools. Management information systems,
computer aided dispatch systems, and radio communications are typically
used throughout the law enforcement community. All need to be
thoroughly checked to determine their Year 2000 vulnerability and then
fixed, if necessary.
Little Is Known About Year 2000 Status
For State and Local Law Enforcement Entities
The working group for Police/Public Safety/Law Enforcement/Criminal
Justice has not done an assessment of state and local law enforcement
agencies. Rather, its focus has been on increasing awareness through
speeches, participation in conferences, and other similar activities.
In the President's Conversion Council first report this past January,
the working group reported:
``Based on informal assessment information, there is a high
level of awareness of the problem among non-Federal police/law
enforcement entities. State police/law enforcement entities and
departments in larger metropolitan areas are making good
progress. However, most departments at the county and
municipality level lack the sophistication to assess the Y2K
readiness of their service providers. These departments do not
have their own, dedicated IT resources--money and professional
staffing--and are instead dependent on the IT departments of
the county, city, or municipality of which they are a part.
Dedicated radio communications and dispatch systems are a
concern for all police/law enforcement organizations and the
working group is encouraging departments to focus on
contingency planning in this area.''\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ ``The President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion: First
Quarterly Summary of Assessment Information (January 7, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The working group made no report in the second national assessment
summary issued earlier this month.
Late last week, following our inquiries, the working group decided
to develop an assessment of state/local law enforcement entities in
conjunction with FEMA's efforts to develop more information on
emergency services. The working group plans to conduct the survey by
telephone to increase the response rate and to complete the survey by
the time of the next sector summary report, which is expected in July.
Justice Outreach Efforts are Limited
According to the Justice CIO, the three department components with
primary responsibility for outreach to state and local agencies are the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA), and Bureau of Prisons (BOP). With the exception of the BOP,
neither the department nor its component bureaus have formal outreach
programs with stated goals and defined strategies for actively reaching
out to counterparts in state and local and international governments.
In lieu of formal programs, the department and its bureaus are
conducting largely ad hoc activities aimed towards increasing Year 2000
awareness.
Bureau of Prisons
In January, we recommended that the Bureau of Prisons proactively
identify organizations needing assistance and share their experiences
and lessons learned in remediating and preparing for Year 2000
problems.\6\ The Bureau agreed and has established a proactive outreach
program. For example:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Status of Bureau of Prisons' Year
2000 Efforts (GAO/AIMD-99-23, January 27, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
BOP established a formal outreach program with stated
goals and defined strategies for reaching out to its counterparts in
the state and local correctional community. BOP's plan called for this
work to be conducted through professional associations, with an aim to
deliver relevant information to corrections officials and to provide
direct assistance where needed. In addition, BOP plans to evaluate the
effectiveness of its outreach activities, for example, by monitoring
access to the BOP and National Institute of Corrections (NIC) Internet
sites to assess the effectiveness of this mechanism in reaching its
targeted audience.
On March 1, 1999, BOP sent a letter to all members of NIC
informing corrections officials about possible Year 2000 problems
beyond those related to computer software and hardware. It mentioned
such matters as embedded microchips in equipment like metal detectors,
X-ray machines, and elevators, and encouraged officials to look into
the compliance of such equipment. The letter informed recipients about
the BOP and NIC Internet sites and provided the addresses to reach
them. It also provided phone numbers to call if the recipients needed
further assistance. BOP plans two more follow-up mailings throughout
the year that will provide updated information, as appropriate, to
state and local correction officials.
Also, BOP plans to make a limited number of follow-up
phone calls to recipients of the letter. The calls will be used to
assess the usefulness of the initial mailing, and depending on the
findings, to modify future mailings to better meet needs of the state
and local facilities. Second, the calls will ask whether state and
local facilities need assistance in their remediation. BOP officials
admit that they have limited ability to provide direct assistance, but
they believe they can share lessons learned during the course of their
own remediation work.
Other Justice Outreach Efforts
Following are descriptions of other outreach efforts being carried
out by the Department of Justice:
On December 11, 1998, the CIO chaired a Year 2000
outreach session with the Government Advisory Group for the Global
Criminal Justice Information Network. Members of the Advisory Group
include the American Correctional Association, the International
Association of Chiefs of Police, the National Sheriffs Association, and
the National Association of Attorney Generals, among others. The FBI
made three presentations at the outreach session concerning the
compliance of its key systems and forensic laboratories.
On January 25, 1999, the Attorney General sent a letter
to the presidents of seven law enforcement/criminal justice
associations intended for publication in association newsletters. The
letter discussed potential Year 2000 problems associated with law
enforcement and the formation of the President's Council on Year 2000
Conversion. It also provided the address of the Council's Internet site
and encouraged state and local law enforcement agencies to take a hard
look at their buildings, computers, and other devices that could be
susceptible to the Year 2000 problem.
The FBI has engaged in a number of activities to educate
state and local law enforcement officials about the status of the FBI's
mission-critical systems. FBI officials have spoken at law enforcement
conferences about their Year 2000 program primarily to discuss the
status of key systems, such as the National Crime Information Center
system, and to provide assurance that these systems will be unaffected
by Year 2000 problems. The FBI has also recently published an article
in several law enforcement publications \7\ discussing the experiences
the FBI had with its system remediation and encouraging state and local
law enforcement groups to institute their own Year 2000 programs. The
FBI is also using the Criminal Justice Information System Advisory
Board, run by state representatives, to communicate Year 2000
information to state and local users of FBI systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Law Enforcement News, September 30, 1998, Law Enforcement
Technology, August 1998, The Police Chief, March 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Office of Justice Programs is working to build
awareness through two forums. First, in July 1998, it distributed a
notice to all grant recipients that all new equipment purchased with
grant money is required to be Year 2000 compliant. The notice provided
an Internet address and a phone number where recipients could obtain
Year 2000 information. Second, at regional financial management
training seminars held throughout the country, the Office has been
working to build Year 2000 awareness by discussing some basic
information about the problem.
The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has stated that the
focus of its outreach efforts is making sure that its system interfaces
with state and local and other counterparts are fully compliant. The
DEA is also working with state and local law enforcement in field
offices where DEA shares facilities with local or state counterparts.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, not enough is known about the status
of either the 9-1-1 system or of state and local law enforcement
activities to conclude about either's ability during the transition to
the Year 2000 to meet the public safety and well-being needs of local
communities across the nation. The Emergency Services and
Telecommunications working groups have been active in this area and
plan to follow up on their initial surveys. The Police/Public Safety/
Law Enforcement/Criminal Justice working group has further to go to
develop a more defined assessment but is moving forward.
However, more needs to be done than simply determining the status
of these two critical sectors. More specifically, these sectors, under
the leadership of the Council should use the information made available
through the working group assessments to identify specific risks and
develop appropriate strategies and contingency plans to respond to
those risks.
______
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you or the Committee members have.
__________
Responses of Jack L. Brock, Jr. to Questions Submitted by
Chairman Bennett
Question 1. In your testimony, you say that only 18 percent of the
4,300 9-1-1 call answering sites throughout the nation responded to a
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) survey, and that of those
800 or so respondents, only 16 percent or a little over 100 reported
their systems Y2K compliant. That is frightening! It means that most of
the nation's 9-1-1 systems, i.e., over 4,000, are not compliant. And it
does not raise our comfort level that, with a little over 8 months
remaining before the date change, most assert that these complicated
systems will be made compliant in time. Are these statistics as
alarming as they appear? What assurances do we have that Americans will
have uninterrupted 9-1-1 service after the century change? Can you
offer any reasons first for the low survey response rate, and second
for the dismal performance of this group? Do you agree that, in
general, those with the best programs are more likely to respond to
surveys and, if so, are these statistics even more dismal than they
appear?
Answer. The general lack of information increased our concern about
which--if any--critical emergency communications and law enforcement
systems may not be compliant in time. However, we testified that
successfully completing a 9-1-1 call next January 1--and taking full
advantage of all the features of enhanced 9-1-1 service--is dependent
on two major factors for which some good information is available.
First, the ability of the public switched telecommunications network to
transmit the call and, second, the ability of the Public Safety
Answering Points (PSAPs) to process the call.
With respect to the public switched network, the Telco Year 2000
Forum on Intra-Network Interoperability Testing, which is made up of
local exchange carriers representing 90 percent of all access lines in
the nation, recently conducted tests to determine whether the public
switched network could carry calls in a Year 2000 environment. The
tests were performed on 54 different configurations of central office
equipment that included a majority of the network components used in
North America. Only six Year 2000 problems were identified by the Telco
Year 2000 Forum in over 1,900 test cases on these configurations, which
involved 80 products from 20 different vendors. Assuming these tests
were carried out effectively, their results provide some confidence
that, if remediated, the public switched network should continue to
function into the new millennium with no major service interruptions
caused by Year 2000 dates. However, these tests did not focus
specifically on 9-1-1 services and, as such, they did not test numerous
``back end'' systems that a PSAP might use, such as computer-aided
dispatch systems, call logging systems, call recorders, and radios.
PSAP operators are responsible for ensuring that these systems operate
and interoperate properly after the date change.
The status of the ability of PSAP efforts to ensure that they can
effectively process 9-1-1 calls has become more clear since our
testimony. The Network Reliability and Interoperability Council (NRIC)
reports that major local telephone companies have taken action to
ensure that PSAP systems they provide to their customers have been
remediated. And since the time of our testimony, FEMA and the
Department of Justice have worked to increase the response rate to the
public safety organization Year 2000 readiness survey conducted by FEMA
and the National Emergency Number Association. As of June 30, 1999, of
the over 2,200 sites responding, 37 percent reported that they were
ready for the Year 2000. Another 55 percent of those responding
reported they would be Year 2000 compliant in time for the millennium.
We have no information regarding FEMA's initial poor response rate.
Question 2. We understand that contingency planning for most
emergency service providers will consist of direct answering and
dissemination of 9-1-1 calls, i.e., without today's level of
automation. It strikes me that many organizations may not have the
manpower or corporate knowledge to field calls ``the old way.'' Do you
think this is a viable option for contingency planning? If not, what
concerns would you have with this type of contingency plan, and can you
suggest an alternative?
Answer. The business continuity and contingency planning process
focuses on reducing the risk of Year 2000-induced business failures and
on safeguarding an organization's ability to produce a minimum
acceptable level of services in the event of failures of mission-
critical information systems. Falling back to disseminating 9-1-1 calls
without today's level of automation is a viable contingency plan, to
which there is no feasible alternative, for the three 9-1-1 sites that
we visited. Nevertheless, implementing contingency plans is not a risk-
free proposition and requires careful preparation to ensure that core
business processes are adequately supported. This preparation includes
thoroughly testing the contingency plans, dedicating required resources
to implement the plans, and training staff to fulfill their roles
during contingency operations.
During our tours of 9-1-1 sites located in Arlington County and
Fairfax County, Virginia, we were told that both sites use manual
procedures when their computer assisted dispatch systems are not
operating (such as during periods of scheduled maintenance or during
unforeseen system outages). Similarly, during a more recent tour of the
District of Columbia's Fire and Emergency Medical Services 9-1-1 site,
we were told that the District of Columbia can operate using manual
dispatching procedures and has recently practiced doing so. All three
organizations recognize that operating without computer assistance
lengthens service delivery times, but that performance remains within
acceptable limits.
Question 3. You indicate in your testimony that outreach efforts by
Justice have been targeted to raising awareness only, and have been
largely ad hoc in nature. Did your review uncover any particular
reasons why Justice's outreach efforts to the over 17,000 law
enforcement organizations in this country have been so lacking? What if
anything in your opinion should Justice do to step up its outreach
activities?
Answer. The Department's outreach activities have been ad hoc in
large part because Justice lacks a formal outreach program with stated
goals and defined strategies for proactively reaching out to state and
local law enforcement entities. With the exception of the Bureau of
Prisons, Justice's component bureaus also lack formal outreach programs
with goals and strategies. As discussed further in the following
question, the FBI has taken actions recently to assess the capability
of states to receive and send information through the National Crime
Information Center (NCIC).
Since many of Justice's components have the same law enforcement
counterparts at the state and local level, the department's efforts
could be more effective if the department centrally defined and
implemented a clear strategy, with measurable goals, objectives, and
timeframes, and targeted activities that were assigned to specific
bureaus and were aimed at expediting the Year 2000 efforts of late
starters.
Question 4. As you indicate in your testimony, little is known
about the status of state and local law enforcement agencies because no
assessment surveys have been conducted. We understand that the law
enforcement working group of the President's Y2K Council now plans to
conduct such a survey. What recommendations would you make to maximize
the timeliness and value of this survey? Considering that there is
little over 8 months remaining until January 1, 2000, what should be
done with the results of this survey? Would a survey even do any good
at this late date?
Answer. According to the Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General
for Information Resources Management, the FBI recently completed a
survey of the 50 states to assess their readiness to send and receive
transactions with NCIC 2000 (the NCIC replacement system) and is in the
process of summarizing the results. The FBI could use this information
to target those state and local law enforcement agencies most at risk
of not being Year 2000 compliant and develop appropriate strategies and
contingency plans to respond to the risks.
Question 5. What do you believe are the biggest problems facing the
emergency services sector at this stage?
Answer. At a nationwide series of workshops for state and local
emergency services managers sponsored by FEMA, the main issues raised
by participants were (1) developing and disseminating public
information, (2) successfully completing contingency plans and Year
2000-related tests and exercises, (3) obtaining resources to address
the Year 2000 problem, and (4) addressing concerns about human services
including medical care, needs of special populations, and provisions of
food and shelter.
Question 6. Considering the seemingly low level of preparedness in
the emergency services sector, particularly with Y2K compliance of
complicated 9-1-1 systems, do you think it is likely that all of these
systems can be repaired on time?
Answer. Since we have not examined the remediation plans for the 9-
1-1 systems in the sector, we are not in a position to assess the
likelihood of their being ready on time. However, we recently collected
data on the Year 2000 preparations underway in the nation's 21 most
populous cities. Thirteen of the cities reported that their 9-1-1
systems are already Year 2000 compliant. Another five cities reported
that their systems will be compliant by the end of September 1999. Two
cities did not expect their 9-1-1 systems to be compliant until the
fourth quarter of 1999. One city does not own or operate a 9-1-1
system.
Additionally, based on the results of FEMA and Justice survey work,
the number of PSAPs reported to be compliant has increased, as well as
the number of PSAPs indicating that they will be ready for the Year
2000.
Question 7. We understand that you recently toured one of the 9-1-1
centers in the area. Can you tell us about that?
Answer. On April 21, we visited the Emergency Communications Center
(ECC) in Arlington County, Virginia. Arlington County leases its 9-1-1
systems from Bell Atlantic, which has stated that the leased equipments
is Year 2000 compliant. This equipment includes a call recording
system, a computer-aided dispatch system, and a radio communications
system.
Arlington County's ECC is served by eight 9-1-1 communication lines
provided by Bell Atlantic. To minimize the likelihood of outages due to
communication disruptions (such as severed cables), the trunks do not
all come to the ECC from a single Central Office; four trunks come from
one Central Office and four trunks come from another. In the aggregate,
these trunks represent the ECC's communications capacity to accommodate
peak traffic loads. Arlington County also operates a scaled-down ECC
located at an alternate location that functions as a back up in the
event of a disaster at the primary ECC. In the event of primary site
failure, staff would literally flip a switch to re-route calls to the
alternate site.
The ECC Administrator described the 9-1-1 call process for a
hypothetical emergency call placed from Centreville, Virginia. The call
would not be directly routed to the emergency response provider, but
would instead travel to a service point operated by the local telephone
company (in this example, operated by Bell Atlantic) located in either
Baltimore, MD, or Philadelphia, PA. At this service point, a lookup is
done in an Automatic Location Information (ALI) database.
The call is then routed from the ALI lookup to the PSAP responsible
for dispatching an emergency response unit to the caller's location;
this is referred to as ``selective routing.'' At the PSAP, an
operator's computer screen displays the following information: calling
party address, community, state, etc. The operator verbally verifies
the caller's address. If the address information is correct, the
problem is coded, notes may be added, and an appropriate response is
dispatched. If the information is not correct, the operator overrides
the ALI information, inserts the correct problem location, codes the
problem, and dispatches the appropriate response.
Arlington County has completed its Year 2000 assessment of the
systems in use in their ECC and spent $60,000 to remediate non-
compliant software used in its touch-screen radio consoles. A
contingency plan is in place and manual backup procedures are used in
the event of computer-aided dispatch system failures.
On April 27, we visited the Fairfax County Public Safety
Communications Center in Annandale, Virginia. Fairfax County has been
working on the Year 2000 issue in conjunction with its PSAP vendor for
about 18 months. On April 15, 1999, Fairfax County conducted a Year
2000 test of its PSAP system. The test was run for 2 hours during an
off-peak period, during which time all systems clocks were advanced.
Based on the successful results of that test, Fairfax County officials
expressed confidence that their PSAP systems are ready for the Year
2000. However, in the event of a service disruption, PSAP staff would
revert to the use of manual processes to deliver service to the public.
We based our answers to these questions on interviews with
Department of Justice and Federal Emergency Management Agency
officials, analyses of 9-1-1 survey data, and our visits to PSAPs in
Virginia and the District of Columbia. We conducted this work from
April through July 1999 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. We did not verify reported data or
status information.
__________
Prepared Statement of James N. Brown
This committee, with a strong sense of focus and determination, has
done an admirable job of confronting a virtually unparalleled challenge
in the form of the Year 2000 ``Millennium Bug'' technology issue that
carries with it an enormous responsibility, considering the global
implications at stake. I am honored and privileged to come before you
this morning to provide you with a municipal law enforcement
administrator's perspective concerning Y2K and the contributing factors
that have led to varying degrees of apathy from within the law
enforcement profession which has not emphasized a strategic response in
the form of a community-wide contingency planning objective.
As the Chief of Police for the city of Hudson, Ohio, a residential
white collar professional community of approximately 23,000 residents
within a 25 square mile geographical boundary between the cities of
Cleveland and Akron, I have oftentimes, as have my colleagues, found
myself having to contend with various problems that society has either
chosen to ignore or has elected to categorize in broad terms as a
``safety and security'' matter. In the blink of an eye, our safety and
security can be compromised by a terrible experience that was perhaps
manageable or avoidable had we been attentive to the various indicators
of an impending problem or crisis. Y2K presents classic indicators of
such a nature that the law enforcement profession would be hard pressed
to ignore.
Basic utility services alone are critical components of a
community's safety and security. Although their dependability is
remarkable, it has correspondingly lulled many of us into a false level
of expectation whereby failure is an anomaly. This phenomenon is
obviously not law enforcement specific, and there are certainly a
number of communities nationwide who can readily attest to nearly
insurmountable difficulties attributable to power outages and
telecommunications failures, as can the law enforcement agencies who
faced these challenges.
In the absence of active discussion at various association
meetings, regional conferences, etc., the virtual non-existence of Y2K-
related training sessions specifically designed for law enforcement,
and a general lack of law enforcement specific web sites addressing Y2K
from something other than a technology perspective, it is unlikely that
most agencies have even discussed the potential ramifications that Y2K
poses not only for their own operations but ultimately for the
communities whom they serve. Conducting an inventory of critical IT
(Information Technology) systems for Year 2000 compliance is an
important component of the Y2K situation, but a fractional one amidst a
possible avalanche of problems.
I have found in my experience to date that most law enforcement
administrators are genuinely concerned about the potential implications
Y2K may generate and are sufficiently motivated to prepare their
respective agencies and communities if they are afforded multiple
training resources, informative documentation, and some basic guidance
and direction from colleagues within our own profession. The law
enforcement profession is equipped with vast media resources through
its many associations, and yet, with few exceptions, there has not been
much substantial in coming to terms with contingency planning. Thanks
to the courage, wisdom, and vision of Kent State University, the Ohio
Chiefs Association, and most recently the International Association of
Chiefs of Police, I believe I may have finally succeeded at opening a
few doors to an otherwise well-secured fortress.
There is a considerable level of apathy from within the profession
concerning Y2K, and a variety of factors have influenced this response.
There's considerable contradiction and rhetoric amidst the voluminous
amounts of documentation being made publicly available which, I
believe, has clouded the issue and drastically minimized Y2K's
credibility as a potentially serious problem. Terminology such as
``minimal impact'' and ``sporadic disruption'' have created a comfort
factor for those skeptics within my profession who, now more than ever,
appear willing to role the dice and take their chances. Perhaps a
dangerous game of Millennium roulette. ``Sporadic'' implies the
existence of some distant community on the other side of the globe to
which we have no allegiance or direct responsibility. The immensity of
our communities oftentimes jades our sense of the enormity of the
United States. The perspective changes rather dramatically when I
suggest that a person approach a map of the United States armed with a
straight pin and place the pin through the center of their hometown. I
then pose the question: ``Could your hometown be Sporadicville?''
Perhaps it's the absence of the oftentimes overwhelming collateral
structural damage and destruction normally associated with most natural
and man-made disasters that has caused many law enforcement
administrators to downplay the significance of Y2K. Responsible police
administrators have absolutely no choice other than to plan for the
worst-case scenario and hope, as you, for something significantly less.
It would be unacceptable and irresponsible to do anything less. We have
before us an opportunity and a challenge to transform our concern into
a creative and effective action plan that will pay significant
dividends to our communities whether Y2K-related problems come to pass
or not.
Perhaps it's the absence of a sustained media campaign to bring the
Y2K implications and possible ramifications to the attention of the
American public, which to date has been sporadic. One of two local
television reporters representing large networks who personally assumed
an active interest in Y2K was advised by management that the issue was
``too frightening'' and might induce fear and cause people to panic.
This from the same network that daily provides graphic pictorial
details of human misery and death worldwide.
Several weeks ago, I forwarded a letter to the general managers of
12 different newspapers and radio and TV stations, along with some
general Y2K information, advocating the necessity for additional media
exposure. I received not so much as a single response suggesting that
they had at least received the information, considered it, and decided
against pursuing it further. When I wrote one of the more prolific
nationwide law enforcement publications and provided them with
significant amounts of ``contingency planning'' and ``personal
preparedness'' documentation I have authored and felt would be
beneficial for my colleagues, I was informed that the publication did
not accept articles of a similar title. The article printed prior to my
suggestion dealt strictly with IT issues. I expect an aggressive amount
of media exposure in the final 8-12 weeks of 1999, which poses
particular difficulties for law enforcement agencies who have failed to
create a communications bridge with their residents concerning
community-wide contingency planning and some basic guidance surrounding
``personal preparedness.'' Quite frankly, we can most assuredly
anticipate fear, panic, and a chaotic response from the public if we
fail to educate our communities and dispel the Armageddon/ survivalist
mentality, the prevalence of which will continue to grow
disproportionately due to a lack of information from well-respected
sources. The creative magic of communication carried out in a positive,
informative, and well-intentioned, forthright manner will prove
beneficial to the community, even if a worst-case scenario were to come
to pass.
With the exception of a relatively small percentage of communities
and law enforcement agencies throughout our country who have
experienced calamity, managed it effectively, and are thoroughly
prepared to implement a successful contingency plan at a moment's
notice, there are all the rest who need to revisit their ``disaster
planning'' manuals or write a simplistic, yet functional one in earnest
in the upcoming weeks/months, if one fails to exist.
Although there are indeed many agencies who do in fact possess a
comprehensive disaster plan that would certainly address any
difficulties Y2K may pose for their communities, these plans are also
typically voluminous and sophisticated beyond practicality.
Furthermore, even those plans that are simplistic in nature and capable
of being readily implemented and sustained for varying durations can be
complicated from an operational standpoint due to personnel
limitations, equipment resource shortages due to strained budgets, and
the general chaotic environment routinely experienced at the onset of
any crisis. Most crises possess multiple personalities and a
relentless, ever-changing, and dynamic penchant for sustaining
themselves for seemingly prolonged durations until surrendering to a
semblance of order and normalcy.
The perfect plan loses its luster and its brilliance if the true
beneficiaries of its development and execution, our residents, are
unaware as to how they summon critically needed emergency services in
the absence of a functioning telecommunications network; the
availability of predetermined shelters if they have exhausted their own
resources, or their own homes are, and/or become, uninhabitable; and we
have failed to provide simplistic yet essential guidelines as to how
the average person or family can become self-sustainable in the absence
of government assistance.
Most of us have fortunately never experienced a crisis of
disastrous proportions, and yet that, unfortunately, breeds a false
sense of security and complacency that can cause us to be caught off-
guard if ill-prepared or unprepared. Law enforcement has typically had
to manage every conceivable type of catastrophe at a moment's notice,
and it has done so with a confident bravado and an envious swagger that
are reassuring characteristics and attributes in the absence of order.
We have exhibited a prevailing sense of ``winging it,'' expecting a
successful outcome with a bit of luck, a serious dose of common sense,
and the on-scene dramatics of an effective leader challenged by the
impossible. Continual reviews, updates, and modifications are
maintenance issues of disaster manuals that are oftentimes tabled due
to more pressing priorities. There is, however, no such thing as being
too prepared or being so well schooled as an organization in disaster
management or contingency planning that some level of attention cannot
be devoted to tailoring some Y2K specific planning. It is anticipated
that as law enforcement administrators continue to be educated and
updated on the possible implications Y2K may pose for their
organizations and the communities they serve, a much more aggressive
contingency planning and personal preparedness campaign will be
launched in earnest well in advance of December 31, 1999.
There are those people, law enforcement administrators included,
who contend that the Y2K issue is all hype, is well on its way to being
adequately addressed, and is nothing whatsoever to be concerned with.
Perhaps, and I hope they're correct! However, contingency planning
and community preparedness will serve us all well, no matter what
happens on January 1, 2,000--or any other date beyond 1/1/2000 for that
matter. The character, grit, and determination of the law enforcement
profession continually faced with challenge and adversity lend
themselves to a successful outcome, regardless of the nature of the
event. The local law enforcement agency is, in some respects, the first
and last line of defense for our communities, and they will be looking
at us, as law enforcement administrators, for direction and guidance as
1/1/2000 approaches. The law enforcement profession must recognize this
responsibility and meet the challenges it presents. Be there no mistake
about it, however; our dependability and reliability is, as always,
rock solid, and with specific regard to Y2K, it's the lone absolute
amidst a world of uncertainty.
Thank you.
__________
Responses of James N. Brown to Questions Submitted by
Chairman Bennett
Question 1. Chief Brown, you testified that there is an absence of
active discussion of Y2K preparedness at law enforcement association
meetings and regional conferences, and that there are few Y2K-related
training sessions for law enforcement. Who, in your view, has ultimate
responsibility for ensuring that Y2K issues are addressed in such
forums?
Answer. I believe that the editorial staffs of all the major law
enforcement publications have a responsibility to address the Y2K issue
from something other than an information technology perspective, i.e.,
contingency planning, disaster management, personal preparedness, etc.
In addition, each state chiefs' association likewise has a
responsibility to encourage its membership to think along the lines of
contingency planning, preparedness, etc., as do the various local
county chiefs' associations.
Question 2. You testified that one reason for the level of apathy
from within the law enforcement profession concerning Y2K is the
contradictory information about the issue, as well as terminology that
you believe creates a ``comfort factor.'' Do you think there is any way
that the law enforcement profession can wade through this contradictory
information in order to conduct adequate preparations for Y2K
emergencies?
Answer. Those within the profession are more apt to take direction
and guidance from their colleagues also within the profession. There
are very few of us out there attempting to deliver this message. The
necessity for media cooperation through the various associations and
their periodicals is critical. It is incumbent upon the state chiefs'
associations, as well as the International Association of Chiefs of
Police, to host a number of conferences to address the Y2K issue, with
particular emphasis on contingency planning and personal preparedness.
Question 3. Chief Brown, you testified that you've had trouble
getting the media to cover the Y2K issue because, in part, of the
media's fear of causing panic. Do you think that it's possible for the
media to find a balance between causing panic and providing responsible
information to communities? If so, what is this balance?
Answer. Media professionals are unquestionably capable of providing
responsible information to the communities. Finding a balance can, of
course, be a difficult proposition because each reader interprets what
he has seen or read from his own perspective. Actually, the media has
an opportunity to promote contingency planning and personal
preparedness for use in any disaster scenario by merely utilizing Y2K
as the vehicle to deliver the message.
Question 4. Tell us about your own participation in Y2K awareness
activities.
Answer. Personally I have spent well over a thousand hours of
research on the subject, I have been involved in a number of public
presentations for various communities and community groups, and I have
been actively involved at the state level with training for law
enforcement officials through the Ohio Chiefs Association. I have sent
mailings to all county administrators, be they Mayors or City Managers,
and have offered presentations for their staff members. As the
President of the Summit County Chiefs Association, I have inundated my
membership with information. Most recently, a web site was created by a
member of the Hudson community for purposes of sharing my thoughts and
views with other law enforcement agencies around the country, as well
as with private individuals. The web site address is www.hudson-oh-
pd.org.
Question 5. I understand that you contributed to the recent Project
Impact initiative on Y2K which the International Association of Chiefs
of Police sponsored. Can you tell us about this initiative?
Answer. I provided them with the documents that I authored
concerning the Year 2000 issue and its impact on law enforcement.
IACP's editorial staff then chose limited portions of my documents, as
well as those of others who also provided information. I thought the
initiative was well done; however, I also think each police agency
should be on the receiving end of numerous other such mailings between
now and the end of October.
Question 6. How would you assess the activities of the major law
enforcement associations regarding Y2K?
Answer. I think I have previously addressed this subject; however,
generally speaking, I think the coverage of the Y2K issue has been far
too limited to the information technology difficulties that various
agencies may experience. Y2K presents a unique opportunity for every
law enforcement agency to address the issue of community-wide
contingency planning.
Question 7. What are your greatest concerns regarding the impact of
Y2K on local law enforcement?
Answer. I have addressed well over 500 police officers representing
over 300 police agencies and have posed a simple question: How many of
you have a plan in place to address emergency calls for service in the
event the telecommunications network becomes disabled, for whatever
reason, in your community? Two agencies out of 300 indicated they had a
plan in place. I am extremely concerned that many mid-America law
enforcement agencies who have fortunately not experienced a serious
crisis or disaster are extremely ill-prepared to do so. Y2K planning
will prove to be of significant benefit in any disaster scenario. Every
agency speaks confidently of the existence of a disaster plan, and yet
very few have ever worked with one. America's well being is dependent
upon the reliability of local law enforcement. It is absolutely
essential that every police administrator within every law enforcement
agency from east coast to west coast recognize that responsibility. The
preparedness/ contingency plan need not be complicated or costly, but
there MUST be a plan, and it has to be understood by every member of
their organization and as many residents within their respective
communities utilizing every available media outlet and community
policing opportunity to convey that message.
__________
Prepared Statement of Stephen R. Colgate
Good morning. I am Stephen R. Colgate, Assistant Attorney General
for Administration, and the Chief Information Officer of the United
States Department of Justice (DOJ). I am pleased to be able to share
with you today some of my observations about Year 2000 (Y2K) readiness
in the state and local law enforcement community. I hope you will
appreciate that those observations are from the perspective of one who
is not a member of the state and local community, and whose perspective
is that of the Federal Government as a mission partner with different
operational and resource considerations.
I would like to speak to the five subjects areas of your invitation
from two separate viewpoints. First, I will address them from the
viewpoint of the DOJ, then from the viewpoint of the working group that
I lead under the President's Council for Year 2000 Conversion. That
working group has a very broad scope that involves more than local and
state police agencies, and includes law enforcement in the context of
such Federal regulatory activities as clean water and safe food.
The DOJ has a mutually dependent relationship with state and local
law enforcement agencies in many respects, including the temporary
housing of Federal prisoners in local jails, the transfer of grant
monies with the need to monitor and account for them, the collaboration
in team-based criminal investigations, and the operation of large-
scale, national telecommunications and information technology networks.
We have as big a stake in smooth operational continuity at the year's
end as do our non-Federal mission partners. Yet, it is important to
note that those partners are extremely diverse and numerous, and not
all of them are typically called ``law enforcement agencies.'' For
example, university departments of criminal justice that are grantees
of our Office of Justice Programs are not necessarily included in the
law enforcement agency category, and neither are the manufacturers,
prescribers, and dispensers of controlled substances that file
regulatory reports with our Drug Enforcement Agency. Yet, both are DOJ
mission partners and both involve the flow of information that is
potentially affected by Year 2000 problems. I could mention also the
information activities of Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
that involve mission partners that are not usually considered law
enforcement agencies, but are most important to the INS and to DOJ.
DOJ bureaus and divisions are responsible for all aspects of their
missions, including addressing mission partner readiness. I am pleased
to tell you that they have been working extremely hard at this for a
great many months, and are in a very good position to make as smooth a
transition at year's end. We have been reporting our progress regularly
to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which has been sharing it
with the Congress, and we are continuing to do so along with the other
Federal agencies. In addition, OMB has singled out three DOJ mission
areas, Immigration, Federal prisons and the National Crime Information
Center (NCIC), as ``high impact Federal programs'' requiring additional
reporting.
Your invitation addressed specifically ``the Y2K awareness of state
and local law enforcement.'' I see this as having two principal
dimensions. One is the awareness relative to their mission-partner
interactions with DOJ. The other is awareness relative to the
activities that are purely and entirely state and local, not involving
the mission interactions with the Federal Government. Examples of the
former include those I have mentioned above, plus the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI) fingerprint processing, the FBI's forensic
laboratory services, and the FBI's NCIC. Examples of the latter include
city police enforcement of parking meters and regulations, and city
police maintenance of safe vehicular traffic on city streets.
DOJ's strategy for Y2K awareness has been to concentrate on the
operations in which we are a party. In so doing, we have encouraged our
state and local mission partners to follow our lead and look to all of
their own operations including those that do not involve the Federal
Government. We are mindful that Y2K readiness starts with awareness,
but if that awareness is not accompanied by the combination of timely
and appropriate funding and the availability and employment of the
necessary specialized technical skills, the awareness will yield
nothing.
Over the past 10 months, DOJ has waged a campaign of Y2K awareness
with its mission partners in all mission areas, and especially in law
enforcement. That campaign has included the Attorney General, myself,
component senior officials, operations and staff personnel who are on
the front lines of telecommunications and information systems, and
laboratory operations. The campaign has included Y2K messages in
speeches to national law enforcement agency audiences such as the
International Association of Chiefs of Police, letters to the heads of
such national law enforcement associations as the National Sheriffs'
Association and National Association of Police Organizations,
presentations made to national mission partner audiences by the
Department's Y2K program manager, and instructions and other materials
sent to the thousands of Office of Justice Programs grantees.
I am pleased that Harlin McEwen of the FBI is here today to tell
you some of the specific awareness activities that the FBI has been
conducting. These have been so extensive that we have been getting some
informal anecdotal feedback that many state and local officials have
heard the message so loudly and so many times in so many venues that
they can practically recite it from memory. There is no doubt in my
mind that the FBI has done a stellar job of communicating Y2K awareness
to all of its mission partners, which is all of the fifty states and
United States Territories. They now know well the two things that are
of paramount importance to DOJ, namely that DOJ is doing its own job of
Y2K readiness so that the states can depend on DOJ's end of the partner
relationship, and that they--the states--must do certain things to
ensure that their end of the partner relationship will be Y2K ready.
Those things include data exchanges that are part of information system
operations, and are being tested as part of DOJ's overall Y2K readiness
validation and verification processes.
I would like now to address your topics from the viewpoint of the
leader of the working group for Police/Public Safety/Law Enforcement/
Criminal Justice of the President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion.
That group title is a mouthful that covers an extraordinarily wide
spectrum of activities and entities. The activities include not only
all that we usually associate with police, but all of the criminal
justice enforcement dimensions of environmental laws and regulations,
Federal lands and waterways management, and the public safety
dimensions of mass transit systems and infrastructure. The entities
include not only those that are part of state governments, but those
that exist at county, city, and township levels. In the case of just
police, the entities number into the tens of thousands, because almost
all of the smallest villages and towns, like their big-city brethren,
have their own police departments. Those departments may consist of
just a chief and a deputy, but it's still a separate police department
with dispatch and recordkeeping.
What is important to note for this ``sector'' of the nation, is
that the smaller the police department, the more of them there are, and
the more they rely on parties outside the Department for their
information technology services and support. They look for their Y2K
leadership and support to their municipal governmental structures and
to their state capitols. To the extent that DOJ's Office of Justice
Programs reaches down to the township level in grants administration,
and our U.S. Marshals Service and INS work with local sheriffs on
housing Federal prisoners or detainees in local jails, we have had the
opportunity to interact at this smaller-entity level. As Mr. McEwen
will indicate, the FBI's interactions are particularly strong at the
state government level, and rely, for example, on state police entities
to ensure that the NCIC links to the municipalities in the state, which
are on state-operated networks, will transition smoothly to January 1,
2000.
As you may know, the working group includes several different
Federal agencies. Two principal common elements are the enforcement of
Federal statutes the violation of which carries criminal sanctions, or
a mission-partner involvement with state and local law enforcement
agencies. One working group member, the Postal Inspection Service, is
in the group because of the first element, while the Federal Highway
Administration is with us largely because of the second element. The
greatest emphasis on state and local Y2K readiness has come from the
agencies that have the most state and local mission partner
interactions or are the most effected by what state and local agencies
do. Let me give you a brief sketch of some of the more prominent
endeavors.
In the case of the Federal Highway Administration, they recognize,
as do we in DOJ that problems in traffic signal systems could tie up
police officers until the problems are resolved. That could prove at
least as troubling as the traffic disruption from an electrical outage.
Because of the possible scope and impact of signal system malfunctions,
such as confusing work days with a weekend days, the FHwA has been
going to great lengths to advise city roads and highway administrators
about possible problems with specific devices and systems, and
strategies for their remediation. Of all of the working group
participants other than DOJ, the FHwA has the most potential impact on
state and local law enforcement even though those agencies are not its
mission partners. They have been doing a thorough job of state and
local agency awareness, but I have the impression that the critical
issue now for state and local administrators is the size of the
available pool of engineering expertise. If the demands on that pool
exceed its capacity, some remediation efforts will be pushed beyond
January 1, 2000, even though jurisdictions may have the funds available
before the year-end.
Similarly, the Coast Guard and Interior Departments have been
working extremely hard with their respective state and local mission
partners to do more than just communicate Y2K awareness, but to
interact with them to pursue actual readiness, as DOJ has been doing
with its mission partners. In the case of the Coast Guard, the focus is
on port operations and navigation systems. The Interior Department
plays a major role in certain parts of the country and in certain
states, such as Utah. Interior operates major dams and hydroelectric
systems, road and communications systems, and other activities that
fall under such components as the Bureau of Reclamation, Bureau of Land
Management, and Bureau of Indian Affairs. Many of these involve
embedded chips, which is why the Interior Department has created an
office specifically to address the Y2K embedded chip issues for
Interior-operated systems. I believe that the Interior Department has
been working very hard on awareness and remediation, especially
concerning embedded chips.
In recognition of the potential impact on law enforcement of
problems with water and sanitation systems, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) was included in our working group. It enforces
statutes involving criminal sanctions, as well as operates mission-
partner activities with all of the states. The EPA has been
particularly concerned with the avoidance of major Y2K anomalies not
only in water and sanitation systems, but also in industrial chemical
discharges into the air or water. I believe that EPA has done a
magnificent job of Y2K awareness with its state and local mission
partners, and has been addressing regulatory provisions that can
stimulate Y2K readiness by industrial operations that fall under its
discharge reporting regimens.
In a similar vein, the Agriculture Department's Food Safety and
Inspection Service (FSIS) has an enforcement mission that recently
joined our working group. Should problems arise with food supplies,
like water supplies, state and local law enforcement agencies might be
called upon to provide protective services at warehouses or retail
outlets. In an effort to obviate this, the FSIS has been pursuing a
systematic Y2K food industry readiness campaign, starting with the
largest corporations and working down the size pyramid to the smaller
suppliers and outlets.
Additionally, our working group has had the earnest participation
of the Department of Defense (DOD), and I am deeply appreciative of the
DOD's support. In the Y2K context, I view DOD in two ways. First, DOD
operates many facilities in the U.S. with weapons systems that employ
computers. Should something go wrong with any DOD weapon,
manufacturing, or discharge system on or just after January 1, 2000, it
is conceivable that law enforcement agencies might have to assign
resources to deal with the event. On the positive side, National Guard
organizations represent an immediately available pool of trained
personnel who can be tapped to assist state and local law enforcement
should such assistance be needed. If the situation warrants, Active and
Reserve forces could also be brought to bear. I do not anticipate such
need, but it is comforting to know that our nation has these resources.
Your invitation asked also that I speak to assessment, readiness
concerns, and recommendations.
In light of what I have described above for the Police/Public
Safety/Law Enforcement/Criminal Justice Working Group, any efforts
toward assessment need to be more narrowly drawn, so as to focus on
aspects that are reasonably homogeneous in mission and size. In this
context, I would like to speak specifically to law enforcement, as
comprising state and local agencies staffed with sworn officers having
the power of arrest.
As I noted above, just these entities number into the tens of
thousands when one includes all the tiny departments in towns and
villages, all the sheriffs, and all the entities with police powers
that aren't responding to domestic calls, such as transit police and
park police. Most of these entities receive all of their funding from
local or state legislative bodies. Perhaps even more significant, most
receive all or the bulk of their computer support from sister agencies
in their local or state governments that provide computer services and
support and that possess computer expertise. Very few small law
enforcement entities have their own computer expertise. Many do not
even operate their own dispatch systems, but share dispatch operations
with local fire and ambulance services.
We have made available our assistance to independent, non-
governmental entities in which local governments participate, in the
formulation of their own Y2K support endeavors. Those endeavors include
the development of guidance publications, such as issued recently by
the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and assessment
surveys such as the one about to be conducted by the National
Association of Counties.
Quite apart from the formal assessment activities of surveys, we
get feedback of an informal and anecdotal nature from our mission
partners in the conduct of our mission activities. Because the FBI has
the most such interactions, I will let Harlan McEwen share with you
their sense of where things stand with their mission partners. In
general, the assessment picture appears to be one where there is now
widespread awareness in the law enforcement community of what the Y2K
problem is and what needs to be done, generally, to remedy it. In the
larger metropolitan agencies and at the state government level, there
is usually an in-house capability to identify and remediate Y2K
vulnerabilities. In the smaller agencies, that identification and
remediation must come largely or sometimes entirely from sister
entities that have computer budgets and expertise, and that usually
provide computer services to multiple governmental activities.
It is my view that when one looks at municipal law enforcement
agencies, apart from the Federal and state interactions that I have
addressed above, one sees basically three activities. The first and
most important is a presence on city streets and neighborhoods.
Generally speaking, that comes down to automobiles with gas in their
tanks and officers reporting for duty. The word about Y2K has gotten
out sufficiently that most agencies will have their officers all
available for duty if not actually reporting for duty on January 1,
2000.
The second activity is communications. This involves the dual
aspects of radio dispatch and the ability of mobile units to operate
with their dispatchers. Unfortunately, it is in this area that the
embedded chip issue most affects local law enforcement. You have
already heard from various sources about the issue of embedded chips,
which affects much more than just communications devices. I wish I
could give you assurances that all law enforcement agencies of all
sizes will have on December 31 dispatch systems and mobile radio unit
devices that are Y2K ``certified'' by their manufacturers. The good
news is that many of these systems and devices that are not so
certified will nevertheless operate satisfactorily. Within DOJ, we have
given careful attention to our own land mobile radio systems to ensure
their Y2K readiness.
The third activity of local law enforcement entities that has Y2K
vulnerabilities is recordkeeping. This is the activity area most
associated with Y2K and computers. The Y2K problem is usually couched
in terms of date computations in the context of records, such as the
age of a person, or the expiration of a warrant, or the determination
of a date for release of a convict from jail. It is for these
recordkeeping activities that small law enforcement agencies rely most
on services and support from outside their own agencies. Even in those
agencies where a recordkeeping system resides in a desktop computer
inside the agency office, the design and programming of the system as
well as its maintenance has probably been done by someone not on the
agency payroll. The design, programming, and maintenance have probably
been coming from either a governmental counterpart to the Federal
General Services Administration or from non-government contractors. The
Y2K remediation of these recordkeeping systems is almost always a
matter of funding, and the funds are entirely local or state or a
combination of state and local. I am hopeful that the National
Association of Counties survey that we understand is soon to be taken
will give us all some insights into this activity area and confirm our
belief that law enforcement and public safety sector is sufficiently
addressing Y2K readiness.
Regarding your fourth question, about specific concerns the
Department or the working group has regarding the Y2K readiness of
state and local law enforcement, I would like to offer a few
observations. In particular, I am somewhat concerned about the
possibility that state and local law enforcement agencies may be called
upon to deal with Y2K-related problems that may fall outside their
sphere of professional preparation. As we all know, when a cat gets
stuck in a tree or a rabid animal is seen in a neighborhood, the police
get the call for help. Law enforcement agencies are viewed by the
public as a first line of defense and protection against almost
anything that is perceived as dangerous or upsetting. The police can't
possibly anticipate everything that the Y2K bug may bring to their
communities that will produce a call from a distraught citizen, but
they will be willing and able to handle the many challenges brought to
them.
To summarize, what state and local law enforcement will need on
January 1, 2000, are highly visible uniformed officers with Year 2000
compliant radios. That date may bring a need for more men and women
than are on an agency's payroll, particularly if they have to perform
significantly more time-consuming tasks such as traffic management, in
which case state and local governments may wish to consider using
auxiliary or reserve personnel, including retirees still in the local
area.
This brings me to your final question seeking recommendations for
Congressional or governmental actions that might have a positive impact
for state and local law enforcement. I believe that the Congress has
been pursuing important actions in providing maximum incentives for the
manufacturers of communications devices and systems with embedded chips
to make full disclosure of their products' Y2K vulnerabilities. Nothing
will affect law enforcement more than problems with radio dispatch
operations, traffic signal systems, or with devices such as building
security systems. Next to these, and the possible effects of such
unusual major events as a chemical manufacturing plant malfunction, the
computer-based law enforcement recordkeeping systems are relatively
minor by comparison.
Thank you for this opportunity to share with you my observations on
the Y2K readiness of state and local law enforcement. I welcome your
questions.
__________
Responses of Stephen R. Colgate to Questions Submitted by
Chairman Bennett
Question 1. You mentioned in your testimony that at this point the
awareness level about Y2K in local law enforcement appears to be fairly
high. That being said, what impediments to Y2K preparedness remain for
local law enforcement?
Answer. We have no concrete reason to believe that there are
impediments of such magnitude as to cause national concern. We believe
that such impediments as may be found are (1) funding limitations and
(2) the available supply of trained technical human expertise. We have
been working closely with our state and local mission partners for many
months, in all states, and these impediments are the only two that have
been mentioned. They have not been mentioned universally--only
occasionally.
Question 2. You mention in your testimony the extensive contact
that the Justice Department has with its state and local partners in
the law enforcement area. Has funding for Y2K been an issue for local
agencies? Have there been many requests for federal funding from the
local law enforcement agencies for Y2K?
Answer. As noted above, funding has been mentioned anecdotally and
in the context of informal interactions. However, we have seen no
formal requests for federal funding.
Question 3. One of the reasons we invited you here today is the
Committee's concern about the absence of any substantive assessment
information on the status of local law enforcement in the quarterly
assessment report of the Year 2000 Conversion Council. What will be
done to remedy this?
Answer. We are attaching to this set of questions and answers the
full text of the assessment report that we sent to the Council for its
July Quarterly report. We believe that it contains much substantive
information. We understand the Committee's concern, and trust that this
assessment report will alleviate that concern.
Question 4. Your testimony highlights a good level of activity on
the part of the Justice Department to reach its partners. What we
really need to hear about is what is being said at the other end of
this equation. How can the comments and concerns of the state and local
agencies best be captured and conveyed back to us?
Answer. We will continue to send to the President's Council our
formal periodic assessment reports, which we understand are shared with
the Committee, and related reports such as our quarterly readiness
reports and our reporting on high-impact areas such as the FBI's
National Crime Information Center. Additionally, we keep the Council's
Chair, John Koskinen, apprised of significant items that come to our
attention from activities such as end-to-end systems testing with local
entities. The local concerns we have heard thus far deal with matters
that are between local law enforcement agencies and the local
governments of which they are a part and that provide their resources.
I believe that such comments and concerns can best be captured and
conveyed by parties with a state and local focus, such as the
professional and state/local associations, e.g., the International
Association of Chiefs of Police, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors.
Question 5. While your statement indicates that a fair amount of
activity on Y2K has occurred in the law enforcement area nationwide,
there appears to have been no attempt to analyze the impact these
activities have had, nor to provide any road map regarding the
remaining problems or firm indications of who else needs to be helped.
How can we remedy this?
Answer. It is unfortunate that our assessment reporting to date has
given the impression of lack of analysis, road map, or indications of
needed help. We hope that our July Assessment Report, attached, will
show that considerable analysis has indeed been done. As the report
notes, we are about to engage in the end-to-end testing of systems that
reach well into local agencies. We anticipate learning very much in
that process. Our goal is that it will be a smooth, reassuring
experience, and we anticipate reporting our findings in the next
quarterly assessment report. We will be encouraging other Federal
Government agencies with systems interactions at the local law
enforcement level to pay similar attention to their findings and the
reporting of those findings.
Question 6. We appreciate the fact that local law enforcement is
indeed a huge sector, but it certainly is no larger than that of the
small business sector of our economy, and surveys have successfully
been done in that area. Have you devised a strategy for at least
conducting some type of limited survey?
Answer. We believe that no survey can reveal as much as is revealed
in the process of the end-to-end testing of operational systems. That
process includes all mission partners, the selection of a
representative sample, and then the in-depth interaction with the
selected entities that comprise the sample. Just as the DOJ has been
conducting end-to-end testing of its systems, so will the other Federal
Government agencies with whom local entities interact. A recommended
strategy would be to focus on the compilation and reporting of what is
learned in end-to-end systems testing. I will be addressing this within
the Sector Working Group that I chair.
Question 7. In general, across most industries, professional
associations have been the workhorses in Y2K preparedness in many ways.
How would you rate the responsiveness of the professional law
enforcement associations on the Y2K issue?
Answer. We have been most pleased with their responsiveness. We
especially direct the Committee's attention to the work of the
International Association of Chiefs of Police, and the fine document
that is posted on the association's World Wide Web site. We note that
this association has a larger full-time staff than many other
associations in the law enforcement community, and has more resources
to devote to the issue. When viewed in the context of their resources
and the mix of issues that they are confronting, we are gratified by
the responsiveness on Y2K of all of the associations with which we have
dealt.
__________
Prepared Statement of Vice Chairman Christopher J. Dodd
911 is the national life line that allows Americans to reach out
for help from wherever they are. Americans use 911 more than 300,000
times every day to access emergency services, law enforcement and
medical services. While we all recognize the contribution that 911
systems make to public safety, few of us recognize how advanced the
technology underpinning these systems have become. Dialing 911 gets a
caller to a Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP). When that 911 call
comes in to the PSAP, the phone number and location of the caller is
transferred from special location databases and displayed at a computer
console where an attendant verifies the accuracy. Each 911 call that
reaches a PSAP is handled according to its location and nature.
Typically, calls are then referred to law enforcement, emergency
medical services, or local fire departments. The telecommunications
industry has gone to great lengths to assure that 911 calls will not be
disrupted by Y2K related problems. But the telephone companies can only
ensure delivery of the calls to the PSAPs.
However, I would like to point out that we potentially have a very
serious problem on our hands. The Y2K readiness of America's Public
Service Answering Points may be in jeopardy. Recent survey information
from the United States Fire Administration found that approximately 16%
of the nation's PSAPS were ready. The Fire Administration surveyed over
4300 PSAPs and received answers from only 766 PSAPs. So, we have no
idea how prepared 3534 critical answering points are for Y2K. Of the
less than 20% of the answering points that responded 16% say they are
ready. If these systems are not repaired they will increase response
time and present a grave risk to the public.
Of the surveys they did receive, the Fire Administration was
surprised to learn that only 40% of the responding organizations had a
contingency plan. I quite frankly am a little surprised that such a
critical link in the emergency response chain would not have
contingency plans. I have had a chance to review some of these survey
responses. The respondents consistently cite a lack of leadership, lack
of funding, concerns about interdependency and the failure of vendors
to supply compliance information.
Y2K failures in public safety answering points have the potential
to hinder police and emergency responders from protecting our families.
We cannot allow a lack of awareness about Y2K or a lack funding to
compromise public safety. We need to find out exactly what the
readiness problem is with the public safety answering points. One
possible problem is that PSAPs are not regulated by anyone and there is
no single entity charged with coordinating a nationwide assessment and
prompting remediation.
The lack of 911 readiness may be symptomatic of larger problems in
law enforcement. When the President's Council released its second
quarterly assessment on April 21st there was no assessment of law
enforcement. We hope that this hearing will help ``turn up the heat''
as one might say in police jargon, and to encourage more activity in
this area. I look forward to learning how the Department of Justice
will reach out to the law enforcement community and help them address
Y2K.
I am pleased to have Commissioner Michael Powell with us today.
Commissioner Powell you have been doing excellent work on this issue. I
understand that you will be presenting some updated information
regarding PSAP readiness. I look forward to getting an update on these
numbers. Commissioner Powell, the Chairman and I have written you a
letter asking for help. While neither agency currently has any
regulatory authority over the PSAPs, the Committee believes that a
collaborative FCC and US Fire Administration effort could provide the
critical leverage needed to reach this community. In fact together the
FCC and the Fire Administration can hand the state Y2K coordinators or
emergency managers a list of possible problem PSAPs. This will provide
the states a valuable tool to ensure that the public does not suffer in
any tangible negative effects because of Y2K.
I also want to welcome Chief John S. Karangekis of Wethersfield,
Connecticut. Chief Karangekis is president of the Connecticut Police
Chiefs Association and will give the Committee specific insight into
the challenges local law enforcement face in arresting Y2K problems.
__________
Prepared Statement of John S. Karangekis
OVERVIEW
Informal survey of a cross section of police agencies in the State
of Connecticut reveals that agencies vary in their level of progress to
remediate Y2K issues prior to the turn of the century. There is
consensus that it is imperative that each law enforcement agency show
due diligence in their efforts to mitigate any adverse impact resulting
from non-compliant technology. It is believed that the Connecticut
experience is likely similar to that of other law enforcement agencies
throughout the country.
The majority of large cities and towns in Connecticut appear to be
ahead of some smaller communities in addressing the issues. It is clear
however that all law enforcement agencies recognize the importance of
due diligence and are actively addressing those issues in their own
communities. A recently released Y2K Readiness Report distributed by
the State of Connecticut, Department of Information Technology,
regarding Y2K remediation efforts, gave strong indicators that only
minimal adverse impact is expected. Utilities, water systems, petroleum
and natural gas providers surveyed indicate that their services are
either currently Y2K compliant or will be December 1999. The majority
of those services will have contingency plans before the end of 1999.
Most significantly, it appears that telephone service, E911 and other
law enforcement technologies will be operational.
Like many communities, Weathersfield has initiated a town-wide Year
2000 Readiness Committee consisting of representatives from each town
department or division. Individual departments determine Y2K compliance
and remediation needs in their own department. Technologies that
network with or interface in-house or with other town departments, or
technologies that network or interface with outside agencies at the
state or federal level, are identified and evaluated for compliance. At
the present time, approximately 80% of all town and police technology,
including computers, telecommunications, alarm systems, internal data
systems and records systems are Y2K compliant. Progress is being made
through follow-up, software upgrades, and/or replacement. Due to
delays, ascribed to vendors' reluctance to provide clear information
regarding their products, some technology has yet to be classified.
CONTINGENCY PLANNING
Regardless of perceived level of Y2K compliance, it is imperative
that law enforcement have in place adequate contingency plans to
address failures that may occur. During the initial Year 2000 turnover
sufficient safeguards must be in place to insure public safety and the
orderly maintenance of government. The delivery of services must not be
significantly compromised during the turnover in the event that some
failures occur.
It is the consensus of public safety officials that the majority of
their technology will be Y2K compliant prior to the Year 2000. The
first 72 hours of the rollover will be the defining test period.
Minimal technological failures will not significantly impact the
ability of law enforcement to maintain order or respond to the needs of
the community.
LAW ENFORCEMENT CONCERNS
1. The failure or delay in gaining specific information from
various vendors as to the Y2K status of their equipment.
2. Reluctance of vendors to guarantee Y2K compliance.
3. Possible panic reaction by community residents prior to the 2000
turnover.
4. Significant costs associated with contingency planning, staffing
and costs of updating hardware and software.
5. Developing emergency funding resolutions through grants.
INFORMATION RESOURCE
The International Association of Chiefs of Police recently
conducted a survey of their membership relative to the Year 2000
readiness of law enforcement. The study resulted in the compilation of
a 27 page document that has proven to be an invaluable resource for
addressing Y2K public safety issues. The document is available on the
IACP Web Page (www.theiacp.org).
__________
Prepared Statement of Harlin R. McEwen
Good Morning. I am Harlin R. McEwen, Deputy Assistance Director,
Criminal Justice Information Services Division, of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI). I am pleased to have this opportunity to inform
you of the work we have been doing at the FBI as it relates to
assisting state and local law enforcement on the topic of Year 2000
(Y2K) readiness in their Criminal Justice Information Systems.
As a former city police chief of over 20 years, and as Chairman of
the Communications & Technology Committee of the International
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), I have been personally involved
in educating and assisting state and local law enforcement agencies on
Year 2000 matters for the past four to five years.
At the FBI we have taken a very proactive role in keeping the Y2K
issue before the state and encouraging them to plan for and institute
changes to make their systems compliant with our nationwide systems. In
the FBI Advisory Policy Process, our primary interaction is with the 50
State Control Agencies (CTA) who are responsible for providing the
appropriate interconnect with the FBI Systems and for providing the
necessary statewide systems and access for state and local agencies to
the FBI Systems.
The following is a chronology of the actions by the FBI to assess
the readiness of the state CTAs and to insure they were aware of the
consequences if state systems are not ready for the data change.
Spring, 1996
The FBI Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division
prepared a staff paper for the Advisory Policy Board (APB) Working
Group meetings presenting the Y2K issue and proposing alternatives for
compliance. The Working Group recommended converting all dates in the
NCIC System to the Y2K format. This recommendation was approved by the
APB at the June, 1996 meeting.
September, 1997
The FBI CJIS Division and the Information Resources Division (IRD)
hosted over 400 state and local criminal justice agency representatives
at the NCIC 2000 Technical Conference in Tulsa, Oklahoma. At this
Conference the timetable and formats for the Y2K data were presented
and the need to plan for necessary changes was stressed.
September 25, 1997
The FBI CJIS Division sent a Technical and Operational Update to
the states informing them of the timetable and formats for the data
changes.
January, 1998
The FBI CJIS Division surveyed the states and requested information
regarding the readiness of the states for NCIC 2000 and Y2K compliance.
July, 1998
At the request of the CJIS Advisory Policy Board, the states were
sent a letter explaining the Y2K schedule and the consequences of not
being compliant with the nationwide systems by July, 1999. The letter
enclosed a form requesting the agency head sign a statement
acknowledging that the schedule and consequences are understood. All
states responded with a signed statement. The District of Columbia did
not respond.
December, 1998
The District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department contacted
the FBI CJIS Division and indicated they were having difficulty with
Y2K compliance and requested FBI assistance. The FBI CJIS Division and
Information Resources Division responded to the District with technical
consultants and the conversion software developed by the FBI to convert
NCIC dates. Subsequent to this, the city government provided the
department with resources and we have been assured that the situation
is under control. This is particularly critical because the District of
Columbia Metropolitan Police Department provides the interface to the
FBI Systems for all law enforcement agencies in the District. This
includes all DOJ components such as the FBI, the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), the US Marshals Service, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, and the Bureau of Prisons (BOP). It also
includes the Treasury Law Enforcement agencies such as the US Secret
Service, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF), US Customs,
and other agencies like the US Park Police and the US Postal
Inspectors.
November, 1998--April 1999
The FBI CJIS Division and IRD have been conducting External
Interface Checkout (EIC) testing with all states. The states have been
strongly encouraged to use Y2K compliant data formats in these tests.
However, it has not been mandatory as some states are still in the
process of converting their software or have contracts with work in
progress to make their systems Y2K compliant.
February, 1999
The FBI CJIS Division hosted over 400 state and local criminal
justice agency representatives at the Integrated Automated Fingerprint
Identification System (IAFIS) Technical Conference in Los Angeles,
California. At this Conference the timetable and other issues related
to Y2K issues were presented and the need to plan for necessary changes
was stressed.
February--May, 1999
The CJIS Division and IRD are conducting Site Operational Tests
(SOT). Those states which did not use Y2K compliant date formats in EIC
are required to do so in SOT.
July, 1999
NCIC 2000 and IAFIS are scheduled to be fully operational, Y2K date
formats are mandatory.
The FBI is prepared to offer assistance to a state that indicates
they are having difficulty with Y2K compliance. We have encouraged them
to come to us if they have problems. The response will be dictated by
the circumstances, the particular needs of the state involved and the
resources available at the time. We have been advised that all states
are following a plan of action to get their systems compliant. However,
as in all endeavors, they must succeed in that plan in order to avoid
the consequences of noncompliance. Such consequences range from loss of
some services to complete system failure. While some states have a very
close time schedule, the only agency to have contacted the FBI and
requested direct assistance has been the District of Columbia.
Thank you for this opportunity to inform you of the work the FBI
has been doing to assist state and local law enforcement in getting
ready for Y2K. I welcome any questions.
__________
Responses of Harlin R. McEwen to Questions Submitted by
Chairman Bennett
Question 1. You testified that as Chairman of the Communications
and Technology Committee of the International Association of Chiefs of
Police (IACP) that you have personally been involved in educating and
assisting state and local law enforcement agencies on Y2K matters for
the past four to five years. That is extremely commendable. What
significant outreach activities has the IACP performed during this
period? What have been the critical areas you have found that required
education and assistance? What remains to be done?
Answer. The IACP has been active in educating the law enforcement
community on Y2K issues. The IACP has prepared a brochure entitled
``PREPARING LAW ENFORCRMENT FOR Y2K''. The IACP has widely disseminated
this brochure to Police Chiefs and other law enforcement officials
throughout the country. The IACP has also conducted workshops at the
Annual Conferences, published Y2K related articles in ``The Police
Chief Magazine'' and arranged for presentations on Y2K at various
Committee Meetings. The most critical areas of discussion from
participants has been the ``unknown'' in what are generally very
complex communications systems. Many Police Chiefs report they are not
able to reasonably assess or identify the potential problems and
therefore it is difficult to attempt to solve them. At this late stage,
the IACP approach has been to recommend contingency plans in the event
of system failures.
Question 2. A great deal of information is known about the
readiness of those information systems and support services systems
managed by the FBI, for which state and local government are primary
``customers.'' What centralized assessments have been made of
individual systems managed directly by local law enforcement agencies?
Many of these systems connect to federal and state criminal information
systems in various ways, what is known about these interconnections?
What plans are there to perform end-to-end testing of these systems and
their connections?
Answer. As I explained in my testimony to the Committee, the FBI
manages the national systems on behalf of state, local, and federal law
enforcement and must depend upon a single point of contact in each
state and in the federal systems. We rely upon the states to administer
the statewide networks which connect to the FBI national systems and
the FBI does not have the resources to deal directly with the over
17,000 law enforcement agencies nationwide. On Sunday, July 11, 1999,
the FBI activated the new NCIC 2000 systems which required that the
states be Y2K compliant to work with the new NCIC 2000 protocols. With
some minor exceptions the new NCIC 2000 system is performing to
expectations and all states are communicating with the new system. In
preparing for actual Y2K many states have been pro-active in conducting
statewide user conferences and in surveying local agencies in order to
inform them of potential problems, assess their situation, and assist
in solutions where possible.
Question 3. The FBI is responsible for administration of the
National Crime Information Center and has assured Committee Staff that
this system will be fully able to meet its Y2K challenge, and that its
links to the systems of all 50 states will remain fully operational.
What type of independent verifications and validation has been done in
this area? What plans are there for end-to-end testing of this system
to ensure its operational capability? Given the criticality of this
system, what type of continuity of operations and contingency planning
has been done?
Answer. Please refer to the Answer to Question #2. A contingency
plan was prepared by the FBI in preparation for the activation of the
NCIC 2000 system on July 11th and FBI plans to use the same basic
contingency plan for Y2K problems at year 2000 start.
Question 4. You noted the proactive role the FBI has played in
encouraging states to plan for Y2K and make necessary changes to their
systems. How receptive have the states been to the FBI in this role?
What changes have you encouraged them to make? In your estimation, how
have the states been in completing, implementing, and testing these
changes?
Answer. Most of the states have been very receptive and
cooperative. The states have been very responsive in completing,
implementing and testing recommended changes.
Question 5. What are the consequences if state control agencies'
(CTAs) systems are not ready for Y2K?
Answer. Loss of service. Although we are hopeful that will not
happen, we have a contingency plan in place to handle, in the most
appropriate manner, the specific state problem.
Question 6. You noted that the FBI stands ready to assist states
that indicate they are having difficulty with Y2K compliance and have
encouraged them to come to you if they have problems. The District of
Columbia has requested direct assistance. What type of response have
you had from the states in this regard? Do you anticipate any
particular assistance requests that will require additional resources?
Answer. The response from the states has been very good. There may
be some additional requests for assistance during the remainder of 1999
and if the FBI receives any we will respond accordingly.
Question 7. You have been advised that all states are following a
plan of action to get their systems compliant with a very close time
schedule. Is the FBI tracking progress of the states in some manner?
Could you briefly explain? Do these action plans include business
continuity and contingency planning in addition to independent
verification and validation (IV&V)?
Answer. We are tracking the progress of the states and as I
reported in my testimony we have conducted a state by state visit to
get updated information and offer assistance where appropriate. This
survey was conducted on a voluntary basis and with the understanding
that we had no role in reporting state readiness to the public. This
allowed for candid response and allowed us to be of assistance. It
should also be noted that this survey is considered a ``snapshot in
time'' and we have already seen significant progress in the efforts of
those states requiring attention. As noted in my answer to Question #2
we have already activated the FBI NCIC 2000 system on July 11th and
that gives us further assurance that the states will be ready for Y2K.
Following is a summary of the results of that survey:
__________
Prepared Statement of Michael K. Powell
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today. As you are well
aware, emergency services are crucial to the life and safety of
Americans, and the Year 2000 (Y2K) Problem poses a real and palpable
threat to the continued operation of these services. Unless providers
of these services take appropriate steps to identify and remediate Y2K
related problems within every facet of the emergency response process,
Americans are likely to experience delays and perhaps even a failure of
emergency response.
At the FCC we recognize that emergency communications are crucial
to the emergency response process. For over a year now we have had an
aggressive campaign aimed at identifying the risks posed to these
systems by Y2K and raising awareness of the potential problems with
those entities that provide emergency services. Forums, speeches, and
articles are just a few of the ways in which we have reached out, and
continue to reach out, to this community.
THE EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
Before elaborating on our efforts and the assessment of this
sector, I would like to take a moment to describe for you the emergency
communications system. There are four main components to emergency
communications: 1) 911 call delivery; 2) call processing at the Public
Safety Answering Point (PSAP); 3) wireless call dispatch; and 4) the
Emergency Alert System (EAS).
These four components are not part of a unified national system.
Rather, there is extensive variation among the nation's counties,
cities and towns in terms of the number, function and sophistication of
the communications system employed. And any one system typically
involves any number of components, each with a different set of vendors
and suppliers, and each with potentially different regulatory or
jurisdictional oversight. Yet, inasmuch as the system is comprised of a
variety of systems, these systems must interoperate in order to achieve
a successful response to an emergency.
The figure on the following page demonstrates this graphically.
There are approximately 300,000 emergency calls per day in the
United States. The 911 Emergency Reporting System is the portion of the
emergency communications system that enables a caller to dial a common
three-digit number for all emergency services. Today, some form of 911
covers over 90 percent of the population.
Enhanced 911 (E911) is an advanced form of the basic 911 service.
With both wireless and wireline E911, the telephone number of the
caller as well as other stored information about the location of the
caller is transmitted to the Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) where
it is cross-referenced with an address database to automatically
determine the caller's location. The emergency dispatcher can then use
this information to direct public safety personnel responding to the
emergency.
1. 911 Call Delivery
The first step in an emergency communication involves delivering
the call from the person reporting the emergency to the appropriate
dispatch center as indicated by the Number 1 on the figure. 911 call
delivery is a traditional telecommunications service provided by the
local telephone company. Remediation and testing of the switching and
transmission equipment used in 911 service is part of the overall
remediation efforts currently underway by the telephone companies. It
is important to note that unlike other segments of the emergency
communications process, the FCC has direct authority over the companies
that route this initial call.
2. Call Processing at the PSAP
The second step typically involves processing of the emergency call
at the PSAP as indicated on the figure by the Number 2. This step
primarily involves computer processing and often employs sophisticated
systems and software. At the PSAP, the operator verifies or obtains the
caller's location, determines the nature of the emergency, and decides
which emergency response teams should be notified. In most cases, the
caller is then conferenced or transferred to a secondary PSAP from
which help will be dispatched. Secondary PSAPs might be located at fire
dispatch offices, municipal police headquarters, or ambulance dispatch
centers. Often, a single primary PSAP will answer for an entire region.
Communities without PSAPs rely on public safety emergency operators and
communications centers to process these calls.
The PSAP, either primary or secondary, is especially vulnerable to
Year 2000 problems because it generally relies on sophisticated
computer technology and then interconnects many private networks with
different types of equipment. As mentioned previously, there is no
single configuration for emergency communications, nor is there a
uniform entity responsible for maintaining the system across the
nation, or even within a particular state. Thus, unlike the routing of
911 calls to the PSAP, which is under the control of the local
telephone company, the processing of the call at the PSAP is controlled
by a myriad of different entities, none of which have a regulatory tie
to the FCC.
3. Wireless Call Dispatch
Upon processing the call, the PSAP operator or dispatch center will
typically alert the appropriate emergency response team through a
wireless land mobile radio system as is indicated by the Number 3 on
the figure. During the emergency, these radio systems can be used by
emergency units and officers at the scene to coordinate activities
amongst themselves, with those units still on their way and with
dispatchers and command bases. The FCC regulates the frequencies that
these radio systems use, but the systems themselves are customer
premises equipment sold directly to the local community by a vendor or
vendors. Thus, it is the responsibility of the state and local entities
using these wireless systems to inventory them for Y2K related problems
and to remediate those problems that are found.
4. The Emergency Alert System
The Emergency Alert System (EAS), designated by the Number 4 on the
figure, is also an important element of emergency communications. EAS
is a national emergency communications system designed to give
governments the ability to rapidly communicate with the entire
population in times of national emergency.
THE FCC's EMERGENCY SERVICE EFFORTS
The FCC takes responsibility, for its part, to ensure that the Year
2000 challenge vis-a-vis emergency communications is properly
addressed. However, inasmuch as the FCC plays an important role by
providing information and guidance to companies and critical users
(including state and local authorities), encouraging companies to share
information, and facilitating the development of readiness and
contingency plans, the Commission's ability to address the Year 2000
Problem is not without limits. Only private communications firms and
consumers themselves have the ability to address properly the Year 2000
Problem.
For our part, for example, I convened the FCC's very first public
forum on Y2K, on the issue of emergency services, in June 1998.
Following on the heels of that forum, I felt compelled to promote
further this and other important issues, by authoring Y2K awareness
articles in as many periodicals as possible. So since the summer 1998,
I have authored pieces for the trade magazines of the International
Association of Fire Chiefs and the Association of Public Safety
Communications Officials-International Inc., as well as a healthy
number of telecommunications-related and general media periodicals. I
have raised the Y2K issue, in this country and abroad, in numerous
speeches. In fact, last week, I addressed the membership of the
National Association of Broadcasters at a Y2K Super Session. In
addition, FCC Staff members have reached out to numerous members of the
public safety community to raise awareness and advocate action on Y2K.
A compilation of our efforts to date is appended hereto as Attachment
1.
The FCC has also dedicated much of its Year 2000 efforts to
monitoring and assessment of the communications industry's readiness
activities including emergency communications. Through surveys, forums,
meetings with the industry, information sharing with industry
associations and public sources, such as congressional testimony by
industry members, the FCC has been monitoring the industries' efforts
to the Y2K challenge. In June and July 1998, the FCC organized several
roundtables with representatives of different sectors of the
communications industry to facilitate information sharing.
A tremendously important contributor to this effort has been the
Network Reliability and Interoperability Council (NRIC) which has
advised the FCC on the status of the various communications industries'
readiness. As you know, much of the information and data that is
available to the public, even for areas of concern that are well beyond
the FCC's regulatory purview such as foreign telecommunications
providers and public safety communications, has been compiled by NRIC.
To cite a specific example of this valuable partnership, on March 30,
1999, the FCC in conjunction with NRIC issued its comprehensive Report
on the Y2K-readiness. These data and other are continually refreshed as
the FCC and NRIC develop a much fuller and well-developed understanding
of the efforts of industry sub-sectors.
With fewer than 246 days to January 1, 2000, we continue to develop
strategies and approaches to raise industry awareness, to assess and
monitor the industries' efforts, and to facilitate the development of
effective contingency plans in the event that a disruption to any
segment of the communications industry should occur. We will never lose
sight of that mission.
ASSESSMENT OF 911 CALL DELIVERY
As previously noted, the FCC issued its comprehensive Y2K
Communications Sector Report in March 1999. In our analysis, it was
indicated that large local telephone carriers--accounting for 92
percent of the total local telephone lines in the United States--had
achieved 85 percent readiness of their central office switches as of
January 1999. These major U.S. carriers are expected to be 100 percent
ready by the second quarter of 1999. For their part, small to medium-
size carriers lag behind the readiness of their large counterparts and,
on average, expect to achieve Y2K-readiness in the fourth quarter of
1999.
These are particularly important statistics because 911 service is
provisioned over the public switched telephone network. In brief, 911
calls are routed from the caller to the PSAP by the telecommunication
network's 911 tandem switch. The 911 tandem switch is a part of the
telephone company's network and is remediated, as required, as part of
the telephone company's total Y2K-readiness effort. As a consequence,
the readiness of 911 service is, according to the companies, on the
same track as the rest of their remediation efforts.
The Telco Year 2000 Forum, the Alliance for Telecommunications
Industry Solutions (ATIS), and the Cellular Telecommunications Industry
Association (CTIA) have engaged in testing of remediated
telecommunications equipment, including 911 testing. In March 1999, the
Telco Year 2000 Forum released the results of 1,914 tests and
identified only 6 anomalies, none of which affected call processing.
The Telco Year 2000 Forum tested 911 emergency call origination as part
of four ``clusters'' of tests of remediated equipment and found no
anomalies. On April 14, 1999, ATIS released the results of its efforts
on inter-carrier interoperability testing, during which no Year 2000
problems were reported. Finally, also in April 1999, CTIA released the
results of its testing efforts, which focused on wireless-to-wireless
and wireless-to-wireline, including 911 PSAP calls. In over 825 tests
of equipment that that been assessed and remediated, if appropriate, no
anomalies relating to the date change were reported.
ASSESSMENT OF CALL PROCESSING AT THE PSAP
PSAP equipment is not telecommunications equipment either under the
direct jurisdiction of the FCC or within our area of expertise. We
recognize, however, that emergency communications are essential
elements at the front and back end of the process. Therefore, we have
made every effort to raise awareness in this community of the potential
dangers posed by Y2K.
The assessment of the readiness of PSAPs is difficult in general
due to the disaggragated nature of the control and ownership of this
equipment. We recognize, however, that many telephone companies do have
a contractual relationship within their area of service with PSAP
owners, most commonly in the form of service and maintenance
agreements. As a result, NRIC has made the study of PSAPs through these
relationships one of its key study areas within Focus Group 2, the
group that concentrates on customer premises equipment.
The NRIC assessment was limited to the 8 largest telephone
companies who were asked to estimate the number of PSAPs in their
service area, the number of those for which there were service or
maintenance agreements with the telephone company, and the number of
those for which remediation was complete. On April 14, 1999, NRIC
estimated that there were over 7,000 PSAPs total and that the 8 largest
telephone carriers had some type of a service contract with 80 percent
of the PSAPs in their territory. Of those, NRIC reported, only 10
percent had been remediated. NRIC went on to recommend advising the
public to have available the local emergency telephone numbers for
police, fire, hospitals, and other emergency services in the event that
the PSAPs experience difficulties and the public needs to contact
emergency services directly.
Since the time of the release of the NRIC Report, which was based
on data gathered in February 1999, there has been an improvement in the
number of PSAPs remediated within the service areas of the 8 largest
telephone carriers. According to recent reports from the telephone
companies, NRIC now estimates that there are a total of 6,739 PSAPs in
the territory of the 8 largest telephone companies, and that the
companies have service contracts with 81 percent of those, or 5,456
PSAPs. Of that, 5,456, 35 percent of the PSAPs have now been remediated
for 911 call processing. The telephone companies also report that they
have contacted the remaining PSAPs in their areas with whom they have
existing contracts and the they have either begun work or are waiting
for the work to be initiated by the PSAP owner.
While these numbers are encouraging, they do not take into account
several important factors. First, the new numbers represent only 81% of
the PSAPs within the territory of the 8 largest local telephone
companies. Further, they do not account for the numerous PSAPs served
by the over 1,200 small telephone companies around the country. Second,
this assessment is only of PSAPs that have had 911 call processing
remediation. It does not necessarily reflect efforts to remediate the
wireless call dispatch side of the PSAP process, or other processes the
computer may provide for a particular jurisdiction. And while the
telephone companies bring expertise and experience to the problem, they
too do not have any direct control over the PSAP and therefore cannot
necessarily foresee all the ways in which Y2K may have an impact on the
equipment.
We also recognize that the numbers released by NRIC are not
consistent with other data released on the overall number of PSAPs. I
would stress that the NRIC numbers are only the companies' best
estimate of the number of PSAPs in their footprint. The differences,
however, only serve to point out the difficulties encountered in trying
to get a handle on this issue.
ASSESSMENT OF WIRELESS CALL DISPATCH
Although the FCC has no direct control over the wireless
telecommunications equipment used by various emergency response teams,
we have made a concerted effort to identify where problems with this
equipment may exist and to raise awareness of the need of each service
provider to check their own equipment.
Manufacturers report that analog and digital radio systems
operating in unencrypted, conventional mode (non-trunked mode not
involving computer switching) are not date-sensitive and therefore are
not typically at direct risk for Y2K failure. According to data
obtained by the Public Safety Wireless Network (PSWN), these systems
are the kind operated by the vast majority of state and local public
safety agencies, including nearly all smaller and rural agencies. For
radios systems using computerized trunking, encryption, gateway and
other advanced computerized features that are at higher risk for Y2K
failure, manufacturers report that they are engaged in active user
notification and remediation assistance programs. The major
manufacturers controlling 90 to 95 percent of the public safety
equipment market have reported that all new equipment now being sold is
Y2K ready, and upgrades or remediation packages for all legacy
equipment is now or will shortly be available.
Certain advanced dispatch services such as computer assisted
dispatch (CAD) may be at greater risk for Y2K failure, and we
understand that replacing these complicated and expensive systems may
take more than one year. This means that CAD systems identified now as
non-compliant might not be able to be replaced before the year 2000. We
understand from the industry, however, that failure of one of these
systems, however, should not prevent manual, non-computer assisted
emergency dispatch activities until the problem can be solved or a
replacement CAD system obtained.
THE EMERGENCY ALERT SYSTEM
The Emergency Alert System (EAS) is also an important element of
emergency communications. EAS is a national emergency communications
system designed to give governments the ability to rapidly communicate
with the entire population in times of national emergency. All
broadcast stations and cable systems must participate in EAS; other
communications providers may participate voluntarily.
While the EAS system has never been used on a national basis, it is
used frequently on a state and local level in times of severe weather
or other localized emergency. EAS is structured so that messages can be
injected into the system to alert the public. Industry volunteers work
to develop EAS plans that use industry facilities in a coordinated,
efficient and timely manner. For example, the National Weather Service
digital signaling technique used on NOAA Weather Radio and the EAS
digital signaling technique are identical.
The EAS system only recently replaced the Emergency Broadcast
System, and new equipment capable of receiving and decoding the EAS
header codes and emergency messages was required to be installed at
broadcast stations by January 1, 1997. Accordingly, virtually all EAS
equipment is new and, according to statements by EAS hardware and
software manufacturers, both the equipment and software is either
compliant or if not compliant, is being updated and provided to
customers. Participants at the Commission's Emergency Preparedness
Forum confirmed these statements and the overall readiness of the EAS
System. Nevertheless, participants did recommend that stations and
systems take steps to ensure that they are staffed the night and the
morning of December 31, 1999/January 1, 2000.
CONCLUSION
Successful emergency service operations require the coordination
and function of many different technical systems and organizations.
None can afford not to be Y2K-remediated. As such, with so relatively
few days left until January 1, 2000, it is tremendously important that
we collectively bring to bear the unique strengths and powers of
Congress, the Administration, State and local governments, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, the U.S. Fire Administration, the
Department of Justice, the FCC and all other interested stakeholders to
address this critical issue.
For the FCCs part, while the direct measures to address Y2K vis-a-
vis emergency communications frequently reach well beyond the agency's
communications jurisdiction, we do not treat it as though ``it's
someone else's problem.'' Indeed, Henry Kissinger once remarked,
``competing pressures tempt one to believe that an issue deferred is a
problem avoided: more often it is a crisis invited.'' We at the FCC
look forward to contributing in whatever meaningful form to move public
safety organizations towards meeting the Y2K challenge and averting any
potential crisis.
__________
Responses of Michael K. Powell to Questions Submitted by
Chairman Bennett
Question 1. Commissioner Powell, it seems as the telephone carriers
have done a good job of trying to reach out and prompt the PSAPs to
make the necessary phone upgrades. However, even if the PSAPs customer
premise equipment is fixed couldn't there still be problems with the
other information systems that interface and distribute calls to the
emergency responders?
Answer. Yes. The ``other information systems that interface and
distribute calls to the emergency responders'' consist, we are
informed, of internal routing systems, computer assisted dispatch
(``CAD'') systems and land mobile radio systems transmitting both voice
and data. Because of the vast number of PSAPs across the country, each
with a different mix of equipment elements, it is impossible to predict
with any level of specific certainty all the theoretically possible
modes of PSAP Y2K failure.
Analog and digital land mobile radio systems of the kind operated
by the vast majority of state and local public safety agencies are not
date-sensitive and therefore are not typically at direct risk for Y2K
malfunction. Radio systems that use trunking and other advanced
computerized features are at higher risk for Y2K malfunction. However,
manufacturers report that the Y2K vulnerabilities of most of this kind
of equipment are well documented, and upgrades and remediation packages
are available to agencies that have the resources to acquire them.
Often these expensive systems cannot be remediated cost-effectively
and must be replaced. Reversion to manual record keeping and
dispatching, though slower and inefficient, is an available contingency
method if a PSAP system fails. Internal routing systems also are of
many different varieties and may or may not rely on computers that are
susceptible to the Y2K Problem.
The most vexing problem confronting even those PSAPs that have been
diligent about Y2K preparation is that even though their individual
equipment elements test as Y2K-ready, the interaction of all the
elements together cannot be certified because the whole system is in
operation twenty-four hours per day and cannot be safely taken offline
to be tested.
Question 2. In August, you published an article in a public safety
communication magazine published by the International Associations of
the Chiefs of Police. Did you or the FCC get a sense that the law
enforcement community understood the risks they were facing from Y2K?
Answer. It is difficult for us to say. Although the Federal
Communications Commission licenses the radio systems in the possession
of tens of thousands of state and local law enforcement agencies across
the country, the agency is not the best situated to observe or describe
the sate of understanding in the law enforcement community as a whole
regarding the complicated Y2K issue. That being said, the Commission,
along with other federal agencies like the Federal Emergency Management
Agency and the Departments of Justice and Treasury, and organizations
like the Association of Public Safety Communications Officers,
International, the International Association of Chiefs of Police and
the International Association of Fire Chiefs, have made significant
efforts in the past sixteen months to alert the public safety community
to the serious risks of the Y2K Problem.
Many agencies, to their credit, have also responded to this
important technical problem. For example, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, inaugurated its NCIC 2000 system last Sunday, July 11,
1999. On July 28, 1999, that agency will begin operating its Integrated
Automatic Fingerprint Identification System (``IAFIS''). Both systems
provide nationwide electronic access to criminal record information for
law enforcement. Every state has become qualified to participate in
both systems, where qualification included a certification of Y2K
readiness for each state's law enforcement computer system.
Overall, the evaluations of Y2K awareness proffered by members of
the law enforcement community indicate that most of the law enforcement
agencies at the state level and in the larger metropolitan counties and
cities, with larger budgets and technical staffs, are generally well
aware of the Y2K Problem. Although progress is by no means uniform,
many have designed or implemented Y2K remediation plans, contingency
plans for their agencies and their jurisdictions, and are, or will be
prepared for the millennial date rollover. We are told that it is
likely, however, that many more smaller, more rural and more resource-
strapped agencies, despite the best efforts of many to reach them, are
as yet still unaware of, unwilling or unable to address this problem.
Question 3. You mentioned that the Public Safety Wireless Safety
Network feels that small and rural radio systems are typically analog
and as a result are less vulnerable to direct Y2K failure. Would it be
safe to say that the fast growing counties and rapidly modernizing
communities are at an increased risk from Y2K?
Answer. In 1998 and 1999, the Public Safety Wireless Network
conducted a survey of 3,398 of the more than 36,000 state and local
fire and emergency medical agencies in the U.S. and found that 75%
operated conventional, not trunked, radio systems. Approximately 90% of
fire and EMS agencies with fewer than 50 personnel operated
conventional mode radio systems. Because the majority of emergency
service organizations do not rely on computerized switching or
trunking, these systems, including both analog and digital systems, we
are told by the industry that these systems are generally at low risk
for Y2K malfunction.
The same Public Safety Wireless Network survey found that nearly
40% of fire and EMS agencies with more than 250 personnel employ
trunked radio systems. These statistics support the theory that the
public safety agencies in larger cities and counties and those that
have upgraded their communications equipment to employ the most
advanced features are at relatively heightened risk for Y2K malfunction
of the date-sensitive computers and electronic components that provide
those features.
Question 4. How successful was the September 98 rulemaking on the
development of operational and technical spectrum through 2010? Do you
feel it has been successful in getting the wireless community to take
Y2K seriously?
Answer. Our actions in the September 1998 First Report and Order
and Third Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, WT Docket No. 96-86, The
Development of Operational, Technical and Spectrum Requirements For
Meeting Federal, State and Local Public Safety Agency Communication
Requirements Through the Year 2010 Establishment of Rules and
Requirements For Priority Access Service (``First Report''), took
significant steps toward resolving certain of the telecommunications
challenges facing the public safety community, including, but not
limited to, making available sufficient spectrum to take advantage of
innovation in technology.
Specifically, in the First Report, the Commission concluded that it
is important to increase our efforts to alert the public safety
communications community to the nature and seriousness of the Year 2000
problem and to ascertain both the current state of Y2K readiness and
the progress and range of compliance initiatives in that community. The
Commission sought comment on how best to ascertain the extent, reach,
and effectiveness of Year 2000 compliance initiatives that have been or
are being undertaken by public safety entities, so that we can better
understand the nature of the Year 2000 problem and the potential risks
posed to public safety communications networks.
I believe that the Commission was successful in raising the
awareness of the Year 2000 Problem. For instance, nine of 23 formal
commenters and three of 14 reply commenters addressed the Y2K issues
for which we sought comment. The commenters include, the Association of
Public-Safety Communications Officials-International, Inc. (``APCO''),
the Federal Law Enforcement Wireless Users Group (``FLEWUG''), the
International Association of Chiefs of Police (``IACP''), Joint
Comments of American Association of State Highway and Transportation
Officials (``AASHTO''), Forestry Conservation Communications
Association (``FCCA''), International Association of Fire Chiefs
(``IAFC''), International Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies
(``IAFWA''), International Municipal Signal Association (``IMSA'') and
National Association of State Foresters (``NASF'') (collectively,
``Joint Commenters''), National Public Safety Telecommunications
Council (``NPSTC''), Public Safety Wireless Network Program (``PSWN''),
Motorola, Inc., the State of California, the State of Florida, and the
National League of Cities and the City of San Francisco.
These aforementioned commenters represent a significant cross-
section of the public safety wireless community and stated that they
view the Y2K Problem as an important issue that can affect their
operations. They generally stated that the Commission should continue
its outreach effort and offered to assist the Commission to inform the
community regarding the Y2K Problem. As an example, APCO, which reaches
a majority of public safety users through its frequency coordination
efforts, held a national Y2K symposium in Illinois on May 20-21, 1999
in an effort to further educate users. FCC staff attended and
summarized information the commenters provided in WT Docket No. 96-86
regarding the Y2K matters, as well as summarized the FCC/Network
Reliability and Interoperability Council's joint document ``Y2K
Communications Sector Report.''