[Senate Hearing 106-48]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-48
THE EUROPEAN UNION: INTERNAL REFORM, ENLARGEMENT, AND THE COMMON
FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 24, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
56-319 CC WASHINGTON : 1999
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
James W. Nance, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Feldman, Dr. Lily Gardner, Senior Scholar in Residence, Center
for German and European Studies, Georgetown University,
Washington, DC................................................. 26
Prepared statement of........................................ 28
Gedmin, Dr. Jeffrey, Residence Scholar, American Enterprise
Institute; and Executive Director, the New Atlantic Initiative,
Washington, DC................................................. 17
Prepared statement of........................................ 21
Rodman, Peter W., Director of National Security Programs, The
Nixon Center, Washington, DC................................... 33
Prepared statement of........................................ 35
Wayne, E. Anthony, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of European Affairs..................................... 2
Prepared statement of........................................ 9
(iii)
THE EUROPEAN UNION: INTERNAL REFORM, ENLARGEMENT, AND THE COMMON
FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on European Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:13 p.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Gordon Smith
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senator Smith.
Senator Smith. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. We
welcome you to this hearing of the Foreign Relations
Committee's European Affairs Subcommittee.
Today's hearing is about the European Union: Internal
Reform, Enlargement, and the Common Foreign and Security
Policy.
Today the committee is convened to discuss the current
situation in the European Union, and we do so as, literally,
the defensive arm of our alliance is dropping bombs on
Belgrade.
Our first panel will consist of Mr. Anthony Wayne,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the State Department's
Bureau of European Affairs. After we hear from Mr. Wayne, the
committee will welcome Dr. Jeffrey Gedmin from the American
Enterprise Institute and the New Atlantic Initiative; Dr. Lily
Gardner Feldman from Georgetown University; and Mr. Peter
Rodman of The Nixon Center.
Today, the EU is holding a summit in Berlin during which
some of the more contentious issues of internal reform,
including the Common Agricultural Policy, are going to be
discussed. The summit's agenda, however, has necessarily been
dominated by the en bloc resignations of the European
Commission last week. I fear that we have only seen the tip of
the iceberg when it comes to allegations of mismanagement
within the institutions of the European Union. I hope that I am
wrong.
I understand that former Italian Prime Minister Romano
Prodi has been nominated as the new President of the European
Commission. It is my hope that Mr. Prodi and the new
commissioners that comprise his team will be successful in
tackling the fraud and mismanagement that has infected the
Union.
With regard to enlargement, I must admit some skepticism
about why countries in Central and Eastern Europe would want to
join the European Union. For example, the economies of Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic are growing faster and are
experiencing far less unemployment than countries in the
European Union. Furthermore, excessive EU regulations, taxes,
subsidies, and labor laws could just as easily hurt the
economic development of these countries more than EU membership
would help them.
One final note. Last night the Senate was faced with a
difficult decision on whether to authorize NATO air strikes
against Serbs as a result of that country's brutal crackdown
against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. I supported that
resolution, but I must say that from now on, I will no longer
have much sympathy when I hear complaints from some about U.S.
dominance on issues of mutual interest.
The experience in Kosovo highlights the inability of the EU
to act together on matters of foreign and security policy. No
one can deny that, when the crisis in Kosovo first erupted and
for some time thereafter, countries, such as Italy and Greece,
were pressing for a policy that differed both in substance and
in approach from that favored by other members of the EU,
including Great Britain.
Its military arm, the Western European Union, refused to
take action in Kosovo as it has on other instances where
European interests have been threatened and, instead, turned to
NATO to address the problems on the continent.
I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses this
afternoon regarding their views on these and other issues.
Mr. Wayne, we turn to you first and invite your testimony.
STATEMENT OF E. ANTHONY WAYNE, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
Mr. Wayne. Thank you very much, Senator, for your remarks
and for taking the initiative to have this hearing on what
indeed is an important long-term development for the United
States, even if today our focus is somewhat to the south or
southeast of much of the EU.
As you, I think, well know, the origins of the EU come
directly out of the devastation of World War II, when a number
of the leaders of Europe at that time came away convinced that
they had to find a way to bind together the nation-states of
Western Europe to avoid another world war.
The United States supported and encouraged that development
and eventually, through several steps in the process over four
decades, now, in fact, arrived at where we are with the
European Union.
At this point, indeed, as you noted, the 15 members of the
European Union are about to undertake the largest single
Enlargement that they have ever tried to manage. This is going
to be a major challenge for both the members of the European
Union and for those countries that would like to join.
We have traditionally and consistently supported European
integration because we think there is a lot of benefit in it
for us, and we are supporting this process of integration in
the sense that we see that there can be, an expansion of the
zone of stability, prosperity, and democracy to all of Europe.
The Enlargement does offer the candidate countries the
prospect, as they see it, of achieving the high level of
economic prosperity and quality of life enjoyed in the 15
current members.
There is some immediate practical benefit in line for the
potential members. The EU has put forward its own plans to
spend about $82 billion between 2000 and 2006 in what some have
called a new ``Marshall Plan'' for the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe. This will amount to a series of assistance
efforts designed to bring these economies in line with the rest
of the European Union.
Equally important, this process will encourage cooperation,
reinforce democracy, and greatly reduce the possible damage
from nationalistic and ethnic tensions. We, of course, are
seeing and currently experiencing the costs of those kinds of
tensions in the Balkans at present.
In the end, if the current round of Enlargement is
completed successfully, the European Union would comprise the
world's largest single market, with over 500 million citizens,
with free movement of goods, people, and services, and capital,
and with an economy significantly larger than our own.
Now, as is clear from that potential, our strategic
economic and commercial interests are inextricably bound up in
this process.
The Enlargement will be a difficult process. Unlike NATO
expansion or what we did with NAFTA, it involves a significant
transfer of sovereignty from one nation to a central authority.
It addresses a host of very sensitive legal, social, and
economic issues, such as the movement of goods and people.
It is somewhat analogous to us asking another nation to
sign up to every provision of the Code of Federal Regulations,
and there are, I have been told, something like 20,000 pages of
what is called the Acquis Communitaire, the EU's laws and
regulations, to which these new States would need to adhere in
the process of Enlargement.
Now any country in Europe can apply for EU membership.
Thirteen have done so, so far: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey.
There are three basic steps in this process. First, there
has to be an opinion from the European Commission that the
applicant is suitable to become a member; second, the Council
of Ministers has to approve opening an accession negotiation,
which then becomes a very long process; and, finally, at the
end of that, there will be an accession treaty, which is
ratified by the European Parliament and the parliaments of all
the current member states.
So, talks have begun now with all the applicant countries,
aside from Turkey and Malta. They are in the middle of talks
with 6 of the 13 countries. They call these the ``first wave
countries.'' Those are Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. They have begun a pre-accession
process with 5 others: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
and Slovakia. This just started last month.
There has, as yet, been no date set for the completion of
any of these negotiations and, indeed, the year 2003 is thought
to be the earliest possible date for accession. There are a
number of predictions among various observers that it will be
later than that. But nothing firm has been set yet.
On the whole, we estimate that Enlargement should be good
for U.S. exports of goods and services to the countries of
Eastern and Central Europe. As the prospect of EU membership
and membership itself produces accelerated rates of economic
growth, our investment in the region should position us to take
advantage of this further market opening and growth.
But it is interesting to look at the figures of trade and
investment.
In 1997, the European Union accounted for over 60 percent
of the imports into the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe. The United States accounted for 2 percent.
We have made just over 20 percent of the foreign direct
investment in Central Europe, while EU member States account
for over 60 percent.
Now if we compare that to our overall trade and investment
relationship with the European Union, which is worth about $1
trillion, you can see that we have a great deal invested in the
overall relationship and a significant amount in Central
Europe. There is great synergy in those two promises: a buoyant
market for our own goods and services and opening that market
to a wider area. Many of our companies are well ensconced in
the European Union already.
Nonetheless, we have been working very hard to ensure that
our commercial and economic interests are not disadvantaged in
this process. We are working with both the European Union and
the member countries to prevent the erection of new barriers.
There are, and have been some specific cases where
significant tariff differentials do exist on American goods
imported into the accession States, and we are working with the
candidate countries on a case by case basis to deal with those
problems and to insure that U.S. companies are not adversely
affected by commercial decisions and, particularly, of course,
by commercial decisions taken for political reasons.
At the same time, I think we do need to recognize that the
European Union means more than just market potential. It has
the potential to be a very important partner in addressing
common political, social, and security concerns around the
world.
I think if we reflect on a number of instances, we can see
that where the United States and the European Union are able to
act in concert toward common challenges, those challenges can
be overcome and we can do a lot of good together.
The converse also holds. Where we are not working together,
we often run into stagnation and blockage in solving those
problems.
At present we work on a very wide range of issues, from
bringing peace to the Balkans and promoting democracy in Africa
and Southeast Asia, to assisting nuclear waste cleanup in the
former Soviet Union. We are working to develop and deepen our
cooperation.
Many commentators have described the U.S.-EU relationship
as a zero-sum game; that EU growth and prosperity, whether from
the success of the Euro or the continuing Enlargement can only
come at the expense of American power and prestige.
Certainly, we are and will continue to be economic
competitors. But with our combined strength, together we can
also set a global agenda that supports democracy and open
markets.
Now, as you said at the opening of the hearing, Mr.
Chairman, there is an important summit going on in Berlin among
European Union leaders and it will be hard to predict exactly
what comes out of that. But they are dealing with some of the
largest issues on their agenda.
As Enlargement of the EU requires that the candidate
countries conform their laws and practices, it also requires
significant changes and important decisions about resources on
the part of the EU member states.
As part of that preparation, the European Commission
published what they call ``Agenda 2000.'' This proposed a
number of structural, budgetary, and agricultural reforms that
would be required to make Enlargement work and work well.
There are a number of proposals in this reform that,
indeed, would benefit the United States also. The largest step
for the EU is reform of the Common Agricultural Policy [CAP].
We very much hope that this reform will reduce the unfair
competition faced by our farmers.
As a whole, reduction in the subsidy and import funds would
help rationalize the EU economy and, we believe, make it more
prosperous. Almost half--that is, about $50 billion--of the
EU's 1999 budget is earmarked for agricultural subsidies. The
EU's budgetary reform, necessary to bring in new member states,
would be impossible to undertake if they do not change the
Common Agricultural Policy.
The EU originally sought to lower EU commodity prices to
world levels in order to export without subsidies and to bring
EU internal prices closer to those in potential new member
states.
The agricultural ministers have reached a compromise which
has been forwarded to the summit that is a step in the right
direction. But, unfortunately, it falls short of the more
ambitious goals that had been laid out.
It is possible, but we do not think too likely, that the EU
leaders will review that compromise and, indeed, make
additional cuts. But, in any case, they will be grappling with
this budgetary debate today.
The CAP debate pits the net recipients of agricultural
subsidies, led by France and Spain, against the net payers, led
by Germany and the U.K. Even the reform that they came up with,
which had a 20 percent cut in cereals, 20 percent in beef, and
15 percent in dairy in 2 and 3 stages over a number of years,
even these reforms have set off massive agricultural protests
in France, Brussels, and in other places.
It is our fear that these smaller cuts won't wean the
agricultural sector in the EU away from its dependence on
export subsidies. There will continue to be an impact on world
prices and our trade interests from the CAP policy even after
these reforms have gone into effect.
Now I do not want to be mistaken. We are very happy that
they are reforming CAP. But many of the proposed reforms just
do not meet the minimum expectations that we had for the
upcoming WTO negotiations.
The United States has an ambitious agenda for the next WTO
round in agriculture, including the elimination of export
subsidies and the decoupling of domestic supports from
production. The danger is that the EU will present Agenda 2000
Common Agricultural Policy reform as a ``fait accompli'' in
order to avoid substantive negotiations in the WTO on domestic
support and export subsidies.
I hope that danger does not turn into reality.
Some speculate that the EU might be holding back in order
to have something to concede in the next round and there may be
further agricultural reforms possible early in the next
century. But we will have to see.
Now, one of the other big items in the Agenda 2000 that the
leaders are grappling with today is to reduce the amount of
funds available for direct regional transfers to those parts of
the community which are economically disadvantaged. The
European Union has set up a process in which the poorer areas
get economic assistance from the wealthier areas.
But, as you are going to bring in countries whose economic
standard of living is lower, that means a number of those
member States currently who are relatively below the mean will
become above the mean. A number of these current recipients,
especially Spain, Portugal, and Greece, are not happy with the
prospect that they may have some of their subsidies, structural
and cohesion funds, as they are called, taken away.
Another area that they are looking at today is how to share
more equitably the burden of the $100 billion annual budget.
There are a number of member States, particularly Germany and
the Netherlands, that complain that they pay too much to
support the European Union relative to their partners. The
others, of course, are trying to say no, no, you do just fine
and we want to preserve the current balance.
In sum, this is really an effort for the EU to get its
house in order to be ready for Enlargement. We will be looking
very carefully at what comes out today from the summit. But it
is not at all clear that there will be a breakthrough in the
very short term.
Let me say a few words about institutional reform that has
been going on.
Historically, in every step to expand the European Union,
there has also been an effort to deepen the Union--that means
to make a closer integration of decisionmaking in one area or
another.
It is often to our eyes and ears pretty arcane stuff to try
to figure out all the processes that are going on here. They
are very complex, even to Europeans. They are not immediately
transparent. But they can make a big difference in how
decisions are made and, thus, how well we can achieve our
common goals with the Europeans.
In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty came into effect. That is
the treaty that, in its most famous part, committed movement
toward the Euro, which, of course, has now been completed. This
was a major step forward in integration in Europe.
Following the Maastricht Treaty, the EU leaders very
quickly realized they needed to do some more, both to bring the
Union closer to its citizens. There had been a lot of criticism
in Europe for what they called a ``democratic deficit,''
meaning that decisions were made by bureaucrats very far away
from the citizens. Europeans did not understand the bureaucrats
and did not identify with them. The leaders of the European
Union saw that and said we need to deal more clearly and in a
better manner with the problems facing our citizens.
This led to the Treaty of Amsterdam. The Treaty of
Amsterdam is going to take a number of additional steps forward
in the intergration process. One is bringing something called
the Schengen Agreement into the EU. This has to do with police
and judicial cooperation, cooperation in fighting against cross
border crime.
Another factor brought into the EU is now combatting
discrimination on the basis of gender, race, religion,
disability, age, ethnic origin, or sexual orientation. Also,
for the first time the EU will have a clear role in employment
policy and in the environment.
Now there are a number of areas where these changes can
make the EU a better partner for us. I think particularly about
working together to fight international drug smuggling and to
fight international crime. It is clear that on some other
issues we will have some differences. In the environment, for
example, we have had some significant differences about dealing
with global climate change.
One big area that you have mentioned, Mr. Chairman, that
will also change a bit with the Amsterdam Treaty has to do with
how the EU conducts its foreign policy.
There will be a new High Representative for the Union's
Common Foreign and Security Policy. The idea is to give the EU
a greater visibility on the international scene, a greater
ability to speak with one voice.
An effective EU with an effective CFSP would be a power
with shared values and strong Atlantic ties with which we could
work to solve a number of the global problems and regional
problems in other parts of the world.
We do a pretty good job right now in coordinating with the
European Union on long-term programmatic issues when we are
dealing with providing development and technical assistance
over a long period of time to Central Europe or to the former
Soviet Union, or dealing with providing humanitarian assistance
to areas in Africa or other places, where disaster has hit.
There is a lot that we do well together.
Even recently, in Central America the EU was one of the
first to step forward with significant assistance in the
aftermath of Hurricane Mitch.
But where there have been problems is responding quickly to
crises and agreeing on common EU positions where we can act
together with them.
So the EU hopes that these steps to have a new High
Representative will help them be a bit more efficient and
effective in this process.
One of the other steps they also approved is that for the
first time they will have something called a ``Common
Strategy'' where the EU, as a whole, will agree on an approach
to an area. The first areas they are looking at are Russia and
the Ukraine. They are doing that right now.
It remains to be seen how well these changes will work. But
we look forward to working with the new High Representative and
the European Union to see if we can improve our cooperation.
Another area that is currently being discussed that is not
in the Amsterdam Treaty but that is on the agenda, both in NATO
and within the EU is the establishment of an operational
defense identity for the European Union.
We anticipate that the outlines of an ESDI, as it is called
will be visible at the April 25 NATO Summit here in Washington
and then also will be discussed at the EU's European Council
meeting in Cologne in June. It will focus on enabling the
European Union to better undertake its responsibilities in such
areas as regional peacekeeping, humanitarian and rescue
missions.
An EU with an effectively functioning ESDI we believe would
benefit the United States. It would provide us with a Europe
that has the capabilities and the mechanism to permit it to act
to deal with problems within Europe, even when we do not want
to join in that effort.
We will be monitoring these developments closely,
especially to insure that the primacy of NATO is not undermined
in the process.
Beyond these reforms, the EU leaders have agreed that,
before the next Enlargement round can be completed, there have
to be a number of reforms in the EU's institutions and
decisionmaking processes.
For example, the European Union arrives at its decisions
through consensus on many important issues, including external
relations. This often results, we have seen, in a lowest common
denominator policy when there are gaps in positions between the
15 member states.
The practical effect is that the EU has often been slow to
respond in crises. While this procedure is difficult with 15
members, once the European Union expands to 21 members, say,
the process could be exceptionally slow and difficult.
We expect EU institutional reform to address the three key
issues which I just mentioned and others, about which I will
not now go into detail: the number of commissioners, the weight
of the votes that each of the member States has in the Council,
and the extension of a qualified majority voting versus
consensus decisionmaking on a wider range of policy issues.
With the advent of the Amsterdam Treaty, we are witnessing
a dramatic shift in power. I think that might be of interest to
you. It will give the European Parliament, I think, an enhanced
role in future decisionmaking.
With the new treaty, the Parliament will enjoy the power of
co-decision--that means it has to have a say in any decisions--
on more than two-thirds of all European Union legislation,
compared to less than one-third today.
The European Parliament's views will now matter much more
than ever before and will need to be taken into account as we
work with the Europeans. In this vein, I urge that you and your
colleagues consider participation in a recently announced
initiative by some of your colleagues on the House side and
some members of the European Parliament to establish a Trans-
Atlantic Legislative Dialog. The goal is to provide an
opportunity for direct exchange on bilateral issues of concern
and to help resolve the irritants in relations before they
become major problems.
Now let me say just a little bit on the recent Commission
crisis. Indeed, the group resignation of the Commission derived
directly from an investigation and pressure engineered and
required by the European Parliament. They requested a ``wise
men's'' report on reports of fraud, nepotism, and
mismanagement. It was in response to this that the Commission
resigned.
This was an unprecedented event. So, as you indicated,
there was and is still a bit of uncertainty about how this will
all be worked out.
At the summit today, as you indicated, the member states
have agreed that former Italian Prime Minister Prodi should be
nominated as the next President of the Commission. He would
need to be confirmed by the current Parliament. We believe that
is the idea. Then, once confirmed by the Parliament, he would
work with member states and others to designate a new
Commission.
The current Commission remains on duty until replaced.
Throughout this period, we have been continuing our regular
consultations with the EU on the full range of issues before
us. Indeed, as you know, we have a number of difficult trade
issues on the platter right now and we are continuing to work
those both with the member states and with the Commission to
try to resolve them.
We know Mr. Prodi well from his period of prime
ministership in Italy and we worked with him well then. If
confirmed, we look forward to working with him in his new role
as Commission President.
At the same time, as you indicated, Mr. Chairman, the
Commission itself has become the object of calls for
significant internal reform. Subjects currently under
consideration include tighter controls over spending, more
transparent procedure for awarding contracts, stricter
accountability standards, and disciplinary procedures for
officials who are found to abuse those standards.
There is a groundswell to bring the European Union back to
its citizens and to address that democratic deficit that I
mentioned earlier.
We are working at this time to insure that our relations
with the EU are strengthened by the outcome of these events. We
will continue to use our influence and prestige to encourage
the EU to become a more responsive, open, and reliable partner
for the United States.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wayne follows:]
Prepared Statement of E. Anthony Wayne
Time and again this century the U.S. has been drawn into European
conflict. Seared by the devastation of the Second World War, the
founders of the European Union dedicated their nations to ending the
scourge of war on the European continent. With U.S. help and
encouragement, Western European nations started the European
integration project that brought bitter rivals together and produced,
first, the European Coal and Steel Community, then the European
Community, now the European Union.
The fifteen member EU is now about to undertake its largest single
enlargement ever. It will be one of the most important challenges
facing Europe as it moves into the 21st century. We support this
historic opportunity to further the integration of the continent by
peaceful means, extending a zone of stability, prosperity, and
democracy to new members who have thrown off the yoke of Communism.
Enlargement offers the candidate countries the prospect of
achieving over time the high level of economic prosperity and quality
of life enjoyed by the fifteen current EU members. The EU plans to
spend $82 billion between 2000 and 2006 in a new ``Marshall Plan'' for
the counties of Central and Eastern Europe to help bring their
economies into line with the rest of the EU. Equally important, it will
encourage cooperation, reinforce democracy and greatly reduce possible
damage from nationalist and ethnic tension, which have been such a
tragedy for the people of the former Yugoslavia. In the end, if the
current round of enlargement is completed successfully, the European
Union could comprise the world's largest single market with over 500
million citizens with an economy significantly larger than our own.
The United States has long recognized the importance of these goals
and fostered them since we laid the foundations for international
cooperation in Europe, which eventually blossomed into the European
Union. Our political, strategic, economic, and commercial interests are
inextricably bound up in this process.
Enlargement will be a difficult process for the European Union.
Unlike NATO expansion or NAFTA, it involves a significant transfer of
sovereignty from one nation to a central authority. It addresses
sensitive legal, social, and economic issues like the movement of
people and goods. The task facing the EU in its enlargement would be
analogous to the U.S. asking another nation to sign on to every
provision of the Code of Federal Regulations.
Any European country can apply for EU membership, and 13 countries
have done so: Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and
Turkey.
The accession process requires (1) an opinion from the European
Commission on the applicant's suitability to become a member, (2) the
European Council of Ministers' agreement to open accession
negotiations, and (3) ratification of the resulting accession treaty by
the European Parliament and the parliaments of all the Member States
and the candidate country.
Accession talks have begun with all the applicant countries except
Turkey and Malta. We differ from the Europeans in the way we view
Turkey. We focus on the strategic advantages of including Turkey in the
EU, while the Europeans see the huge practical, social and economic
problems presented by the entry of such a populous and relatively
underdeveloped nation to the community. However, both the Commission
and the Council of Ministers have recently indicated, however, that
they consider Turkey a ``candidate'' country.
We also expect Malta to start its accession conference by the end
of this year.
The Commission is in the middle of negotiations with six of the 13
applicants (the so-called first wave--Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia). Bilateral screening of the
legislation of five other candidates (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, and Slovakia) started last month, a necessary prerequisite for
the opening of their accession negotiations by year's end.
No end date has been set for the completion of any of the accession
negotiations. The negotiations themselves will cover thousands of pages
of EU legislation, which candidate states must adopt. The Commission
has indicated that, by the end of this year, it would like to set
provisional dates for accession as a way of promoting the Union's
commitment to enlargement. The year 2003 is the likely ``earliest''
date for accession of the first of the candidates.
On the whole, enlargement should be a boon for U.S. exports of
goods and services to the countries of Eastern and Central Europe as
the prospect of EU membership and membership itself produces
accelerated rates of economic growth. Our investment in the region,
together with our very good bilateral relations with each of these
countries, should position us to take advantage of this future economic
upswing. In 1997, the European Union accounted for over 60% of imports
into the countries of Central and Eastern Europe while the U.S.
accounted for 2%. We had made just over 20% of the Foreign Direct
Investment, while EU member states accounted for over 60%. Our trade
and investment relationship with the European Union is worth more than
$1 trillion. We look to achieve in the East what we now have with the
West: a buoyant market open to U.S. goods and services.
Nonetheless, we will ensure that our commercial and economic
interests are not disadvantaged. When countries accede to the EU, it
will liberalize trade to us in most areas. We are working with the
European Union and the candidate states to prevent the erection of new
barriers to trade. Where none now exists, let none be raised. As
Eastern European candidate states adopt the EU's Common External
Tariff, most tariff levels will drop in the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe. In specific cases where tariff differentials do exist
on American goods imported in to accession states, we are working with
the candidate countries to find suitable remedies. We are monitoring
developments closely to ensure that U.S. companies are not adversely
affected by commercial decisions made for political reasons.
At the same time, we must recognize that an enlarged European Union
means more than market potential. It will be our greatest partner in
addressing common political, social, and security concerns in the
world. The European Union is increasingly ``the other power.''
Repeatedly, we have shown that, where the United States and the
European Union act in concert toward common challenges, those
challenges are overcome. The addition to the EU of countries--such as
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and others with whom the United
States has worked closely and productively in their transition from
Communism to democracy--should reinforce our efforts to create a
productive, forward-looking partnership with the European Union.
The United States and the European Union are working side-by-side
all over the globe to address problems that affect hundreds of millions
of ordinary people. From bringing peace to the Balkans, to promoting
democracy in areas as far flung as Africa and Southeast Asia, to
assisting with nuclear waste clean-up in the former Soviet Union, the
U.S. and the EU are setting new levels of cooperation.
We will therefore continue to work with the European Union, both
during and after enlargement, on problems around the world. We will
especially strive to make sure that Russia and the other states of the
former Soviet Union see the enlargement of the European Union as a real
opportunity from which they too can prosper, rather than an obstacle.
We do not view the U.S.-EU relationship as a zero-sum game. Some
commentators seem to believe that EU growth and prosperity, whether
from the success of the euro or the continuing enlargement, can only
come at the expense of American power and prestige. Certainly, we will
be economic competitors, but with our combined strength, together, we
will be able to set a global agenda that supports democracy and open
markets. Where we cannot act together, we risk stalemate.
agenda 2000
Much of what I say here may be overtaken by events today and
tomorrow in Berlin. The Special EU Summit there is hammering out
compromises on budgetary reform. We cannot predict what tradeoffs will
be made, but we can outline the issues.
Enlargement of the European Union requires the candidate countries
to conform their laws and practices to European Union norms. But it
also requires preparation on the part of the EU member states.
As part of that preparation, in July 1997, the Commission published
``Agenda 2000,'' its proposals for structural, budget, and agricultural
reforms required for enlargement of the Union. We can benefit from EU
reform.
The largest step for the EU is reform of the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP). We hope that reform will reduce unfair competition faced
by our farmers. As a whole, reduction in subsidy and support funds will
rationalize the EU economy, making it more prosperous. Almost half,
$50.5 billion, of the EU's 1999 budget is earmarked for agricultural
subsidies, and the EU's budgetary reform will be impossible without
reform of the CAP. The EU originally sought to lower EU commodity
prices to world levels in order to export without subsidies and to
bring EU internal prices closer to those in potential new member
states.
The member-state Agriculture Ministers have agreed on reform of the
Common Agricultural Policy that right now unfortunately falls short of
the goal. It exceeds the earlier $43.7 billion target spending level by
$6.8 billion. It is possible but not likely that, when EU leaders
review the compromise agreement this week at Berlin, they will propose
additional spending cuts.
The CAP debate has pitted net recipients of agricultural subsidies,
led by France and Spain, against the net payers led by Germany and the
UK. The Agriculture Ministers' compromise calls for support price cuts
of 20% for cereals over two years, 20% for beef over two years, and 15%
for dairy products. Farmers would receive compensation for lost income
in the form of direct income supports rather than price supports.
Even these cuts are engendering farmers' protests, yet the small
cuts are unlikely to wean European agriculture from its dependence on
export subsidies. The CAP will continue to have an impact on world
prices and our trade interests. Further cuts will probably be necessary
before new Member States could join in the Common Agriculture Policy.We
are glad the EU is reforming the CAP. There is a long road to travel to
bring the EU into a more open and efficient world agricultural market.
Many of the proposed compromise agricultural reforms do not currently
meet our minimum expectations for the upcoming WTO negotiations. The
United States has an ambitious agenda for the next round of WTO
agriculture negotiations, including the elimination of export subsidies
and de-coupling domestic supports from production. The danger is that
the EU will present Agenda 2000 Common Agriculture Policy reform as a
``fait accompli'' in an effort to avoid substantive negotiations in the
WTO on domestic support and export subsidies. Others believe the EU is
holding back so that it has something to concede in the next round.
In a debate that largely pits the less developed south, against the
wealthier north, Agenda 2000 reform also seeks to reduce the amount of
funds available for direct regional transfers to aid those parts of the
Community which are economically disadvantaged. Under a proposed
compromise, eligibility for these monies would be tightened to areas
with greatest social and economic welfare needs. This is obviously
unpopular with current recipients, especially Spain, Portugal, and
Greece.
Agenda 2000 also seeks to achieve a more equitable sharing of
member states' financing of the EU's $100 billion annual budget. Some
member states like Germany and The Netherlands have complained they pay
too much to support the European Union relative to their partners. The
proposed Agenda 2000 agreement seeks to redress this imbalance by
changing the method by which the Union raises its funds. Also on the
table is the United Kingdom's $3 billion annual rebate. Won by Prime
Minister Thatcher in 1984, the rebate seeks to rationalize the UK's
relatively large contribution with its relatively small return from
Brussels.
The EU conceived Agenda 2000 as a major effort to put its financial
house in order in anticipation of enlargement. It is important to note
that, in an effort to safeguard the enlargement process, EU leaders
have agreed to exclude from budget-cutting consideration the projected
expenditures linked to enlargement. Despite this carve-out for
enlargement, it is not clear that any breakthrough on the EU budget
will be forthcoming in the short term.
institutional reform
Historically, every enlargement of the European Union to include
new member states has been preceded by the member states' deepening the
level of internal cooperation. This ``deepening'' usually includes
fundamental reforms that give EU institutions a greater say over
actions of member states and change how the EU legislates and makes
decisions. The current enlargement process appears to be no different.
To American eyes and ears, these innovations often seem arcane,
bureaucratic, and complex. Nevertheless, they do serve to permit member
states to pool their sovereignty while protecting their people's
interests. We have to learn to work with the new institutions, and
insure they help us further our agenda.
With the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the
leaders of the European Union committed themselves to a most ambitious
step toward integration, the launch of the euro. As of January 1, 1999,
for the first time, participating EU member states have a common
monetary policy, conducted by a European Central Bank. This important
project is considered an important stimulus for still further
integration of the European Union.
In the next major step in the integration process, and to prepare
the European Union for new member states and bring the European Union
closer to its citizens, EU leaders negotiated and agreed upon the
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997.
Expected to enter into force this spring, the Amsterdam Treaty will
incorporate the ``Schengen'' accords on the abolition of border
controls, giving EU institutions more say over the control of the
European Union's external borders, including immigration and asylum
policy. The new Treaty also increases EU attention to police and
judicial cooperation and the fight against crime. It commits the
European Union to combat discrimination on the basis of gender, race,
religion, disability, age, ethnic origin, and sexual orientation. For
the first time, it also places employment and environment at the center
of EU policy concerns.
On one hand, these changes should result in a European Union that
is a better partner for the U.S. as we confront the global challenges
before us, particularly international drug trade, and transborder
crime. Nonetheless, on issues such as the environment, reaching
agreement with the EU could well become more difficult.
The Amsterdam Treaty will also result in major changes in the way
the European Union conducts its foreign policy. A new ``High
Representative'' for the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) will give the EU greater visibility on the international scene.
An EU with an effective CFSP would be a power with shared values, and
strong transatlantic ties with which we could work globally to solve
problems. Now we do well coordinating with the EU on long term
programmatic issues. A better-integrated CFSP would enable the EU to
act effectively in crises as well. We anticipate that the new ``Special
Planning and Early Warning Unit'' will permit greater coordination of
U.S. and EU policies. In the near future, more foreign policy decisions
will be taken by qualified majority voting instead of unanimity. A new
type of decision--the ``common strategy''--will be introduced to
establish general policy guidelines and give greater coherence to EU
foreign policy. The EU has decided to focus initially on a common
strategy with respect to Russia.
Our hope is that with these changes the European Union will become
an even stronger, more responsible foreign policy partner after the
entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty.
Another critical reform currently being discussed that may affect
U.S.-EU cooperation is the establishment of an operational defense
identity for the European Union. We anticipate that the outlines of a
fresh approach to European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) will be
visible at the April 25 NATO summit here in Washington and the June 3-4
European Council meeting in Cologne. It will focus on enabling the
Union better to undertake its responsibilities in regional
peacekeeping, humanitarian and rescue missions, and other so-called
``Petersberg tasks.'' An effective EU with a functioning ESDI would
benefit the U.S. It would provide us with a Europe that has the
capabilities and the mechanisms to act when NATO chooses not to. We
will monitor this development closely to ensure that the primacy of
NATO is not undermined. We have emphasized the three ``D's'' in
discussing ESDI with our European friends: no duplication of NATO
structures, no de-linking from NATO's core missions, and no
discrimination against non-EU members of NATO.
Beyond these reforms, European Union leaders have agreed that
before this next enlargement round is completed, there must be further
reform of the Union's institutions and decision-making processes. For
example, the European Council arrives at decisions through consensus on
many important issues, including external relations. With members
representing nations as disparate as Sweden and Greece, this often
leads to a lowest common denominator policy. The practical effect is
that the EU is slow to respond in a crisis, and while this procedure is
difficult with fifteen members, once the European Union expands to 21
members, the process could grind to a halt.
We expect EU institutional reform to address three key issues: the
number of Commissioners, the weight of votes for each member state in
the Council, and the extension of qualified majority voting to more
policy areas.
Currently there are 20 Commissioners, with the five largest
countries each having two. EU leaders must decide how this formula can
be revised to ensure that a larger European Union can still operate
efficiently. Member states have indicated that a larger Commission
would be too unwieldy and have been trying to design a formula that
would accommodate new members without increasing the number of
Commissioners.
The member states must also re-assess the weighting of their
relative voting power in the Council at the same time; they may also
extend ``qualified majority voting'' to most of the policy and
legislative decisions they take. This would mean less reliance on
achieving unanimity, thus potentially increasing the speed and
efficiency of the decision-making process.
With the advent of the Amsterdam Treaty, we are witnessing a
dramatic shift in power which will give the European Parliament a
greatly enhanced role in future EU decision making.
Under the Treaty, the European Parliament will enjoy the power of
co-decision with the Council of Ministers on more than two-thirds of
all EU legislation, compared with less than one-third today.The
European Parliament's views will now matter much more than ever before.
We will need to take this into account as we work with the Europeans on
our trade, agricultural, environmental and other interests. In this
vein, I strongly encourage you to participate in the recently
established Transatlantic Legislative Dialogue, which will provide the
opportunity for direct exchange on bilateral issues of concern and will
help us resolve irritants in our relations before they become major
problems.
commission crisis
In response to a highly critical wise men's report tasked by
Parliament on fraud, nepotism, and mismanagement in the European
Commission, the entire Commission resigned on March 16. This is an
unprecedented event in the history of the European Union, and we are in
uncharted territory.
Member states, especially the German presidency, have taken on the
resolution of the Commission crisis, and EU leaders at the Summit now
going on in Berlin have chosen former Italian Prime Minister Prodi as
the next Commission President. Once confirmed by the current
Parliament, Prodi will work with the member states to select his
Commission. The EU is aiming to have that new Commission confirmed by
the newly elected Parliament in July. Commission legal experts tell us
that under the Community treaties, the Commissioners will remain on
duty until replaced. Throughout this period, we have been continuing
our regular consultations with the EU on the full range of issues
before us. We realize progress could become more difficult. We know Mr.
Prodi and have worked well with him before. It confirmed we look
forward to working with him in his new role as Commission President.
In many ways, the resignation of the Commission reflects the major
institutional change the Union is undergoing. A change that will propel
further change. The Commission itself has become the object of calls
for significant internal reform. Subjects currently under consideration
include tighter controls over spending, more transparent procedures for
awarding contracts, stricter accountability standards, and disciplinary
procedures for Commission officials.
There is a groundswell to bring the European Union back to its
citizens, to address the EU's ``democratic deficit'' effectively. We
are working to ensure that our relations with the European Union are
strengthened by the outcome of these events. We will continue to use
our influence and prestige to encourage the European Union to become a
more responsive, open, and reliable partner for the United States.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Wayne. That was excellent
testimony.
I wonder if you can comment on a headline. As a preface to
that, I would say I have always been of a mind that, as
Americans, we should support Europe in however their self-
determination takes them. My belief has always been that that
will raise the European vote and, therefore, improve life for
them and us as a trading partner and as an ally.
But I notice this headline: ``The New Europe: Menace or
Farce.'' This is going to be read by a lot of people in this
town.
I wonder if you think that either ``menace'' or ``farce''
characterizes the European Union accurately. How would you
characterize it?
Mr. Wayne. Indeed, Mr. Chairman, I would not choose those
words to characterize their relationship.
Senator Smith. I didn't think you would.
Mr. Wayne. I think what indeed is clear is, first, that we
have an extremely important economic relationship with the
European Union. As I said, it is worth $1 trillion, and there
are at least 6 million people--3 million on each side of the
Atlantic--directly employed by companies originating on the
other side of the Atlantic. This does not include all of the
secondary employment that comes from that.
Senator Smith. The thesis of one of the articles is,
essentially, that this is being done to decouple the United
States and Europe, to put up trade barriers and, seeing it as a
zero-sum game, that this is a way to make America lose so that
Europe can win.
Do you think they see it that way?
Mr. Wayne. No, I don't think so.
I mean, of course, on both sides of the Atlantic there is a
wide range of opinion, and I cannot speak for every opinion.
But no, I don't think that is the driving force at all or even
an important consideration in the majority on the European
side.
In fact, we have undertaken with the European Union and
with the blessing of all the member States a range of
initiatives, indeed to deepen the integration across the
Atlantic and to reduce the additional barriers.
Last May, in London the President and the leaders of the
European Union agreed to launch a new process called the
``Transatlantic Economic Partnership.'' Then we worked until
December, when we had a concrete action plan which we put
forward. This talked about 10 very important areas to reduce
regulatory barriers while maintaining high standards of health,
safety, and protection of consumers; indeed, to allow freer
exchange back and forth across the Atlantic.
One of the important points to remember is that, with
Europe, we can take these kinds of steps and feel much more
secure that we are talking about the same kind of level of
standards on both sides to protect our citizens.
So, there is a whole active program going on to deal with
further taking down of barriers, to bring us closer together.
In fact, if you look at some of the high profile disputes
that we have been having, some of that is a direct result of
the degree of integration of our two economies right now, which
has been increasing under what is called ``globalization,''
most broadly, in many commentaries. The degree of integration
across the Atlantic has increased.
So when on one side or the other side of the Atlantic
somebody undertakes what they may consider in their head a
regulatory reform only affecting their side, there are
immediate shock waves on the other side of the Atlantic. This
is a problem that we have to deal with. But it really is a
measure of the health of the economic relationship that we
have.
Just to answer on the other, menace, part of this,
certainly as we look at the relationship, we see a great
potential for cooperation in dealing with problems that neither
of us can deal with by ourselves effectively.
When we can combine the assistance resources and the
diplomatic resources of Europe and the United States to deal
with a regional problem somewhere else, it is much more likely
that we can get a better outcome working together than we could
working alone.
So we see that potential and, try to work with it.
Senator Smith. I was in Poland not too long ago. I am
generalizing now, but, essentially, what they told me they were
being told in their accession talks is raise your taxes, accept
our regulations and you may get in but you still won't sell us
your potatoes.
Mr. Wayne. Right.
Senator Smith. I guess my comment is why would a country
like Poland, whose economy is coming out of communism and doing
very well, or a country like Estonia, that seems to be adopting
a Hong Kong model, want to get into the European Union, which
are essentially socialist democracies--heavy statist, welfare
systems? Why would they want to be part of that if they are
actually trying to improve their standard of living?
Mr. Wayne. It is because the standard of living at the EU
is so much higher than theirs. They are growing at wonderful
rates and, as you said, at higher rates than any in the EU.
Senator Smith. Will they retard their rates of growth if
they accept the high taxes and regulatory burdens of the EU?
That is up to them, I know.
Mr. Wayne. My guess--I am not speaking as a trained
economist here--my guess is no, that they are going to continue
growing because they have a dynamic space to grow in right now.
They are not at the more mature level economically of the
European Union.
So I think they will probably continue to grow well.
Senator Smith. What is your sense of what Britain will do?
Will they get fully integrated or will they just stand apart or
take a hybrid approach to it?
Mr. Wayne. I think the U.K. has gradually moved closer and
closer to the European Union. The big next challenge is whether
they will join the Euro.
It is clear that there are still divided opinions in the
U.K. about that. The government is certainly preparing the
ground for a decision to be made to do this.
There is strong sentiment in the business community
favoring further integration. But there is strong sentiment
elsewhere in society the other way around. I just really cannot
predict right now where in 2 or 3 years opinion will be in the
U.K.
But it is very interesting that the U.K. has taken the lead
in proposing internal reforms to the Commission in the midst of
this current crisis. They have really come in, and Blair has
said we need a ``root and branch'' reform of how things are
done here.
So there is no pulling back from being involved in European
Union affairs. And, in fact, part of the new reflection on the
European Security and Defense Initiative was initiated by Tony
Blair.
Senator Smith. Can you briefly comment on Norway and Turkey
as it relates to the European Union? I, at least, would regard
them as European. Certainly there is no question about Norway.
But they are not a part of this and they are not a part of the
foreign policy apparatus, apparently.
Mr. Wayne. That is correct.
Norway did undertake negotiations to join the European
Union with the last wave of entrants, with Sweden, Finland, and
Austria. They then went to the voters and the voters said ``no,
we don't want to join.''
This had to do with the opinion of the Norwegian people.
They saw more benefit in staying out than in coming in and, in
a sense, overruled their officials and the government at that
time, which had wanted to come in.
Now they still have a very, very close economic
relationship. They have negotiated something that is almost the
same as full membership in a number of economic areas. But they
do not sit at the table with the other EU leaders when they
make a number of the big decisions.
On the part of Turkey, I think it is fair to say that there
are divided opinions in the European Union about Turkey, about
when and if Turkey will become a member, though the European
Union of late has been calling Turkey a ``candidate country.''
There have been a number of proposals put forward by the
Commission to deepen the Turkey-EU relationship.
We think that, there is a shared perspective, that Turkey
is very important to Europe, that there should be a closer
relationship between Turkey and Europe. It is not a surprise
that we have been perhaps more enthusiastic supporters of
Turkey moving closer to the EU than certain members of the EU.
This will remain, I think, an issue that will have to be worked
on by the European Union.
But I think there is general agreement that that
relationship is a very important one.
Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Wayne. I appreciate
your testimony and your answers to questions.
We will now call up Dr. Jeffrey Gedmin from the American
Enterprise Institute and the New Atlantic Initiative; Dr. Lily
Gardner Feldman from Georgetown University; and Mr. Peter
Rodman of The Nixon Center.
If you would just allow me a moment, I want to find out if
there is any vote pending immediately.
[Pause]
Senator Smith. There is a vote scheduled at 3. Let's start
the testimony and I will quickly go over and vote and will come
right back.
Why don't we start with Mr. Gedmin.
STATEMENT OF DR. JEFFREY GEDMIN, RESIDENT SCHOLAR, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE; AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE NEW ATLANTIC
INITIATIVE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Gedmin. Thank you, Senator, Mr. Chairman, for the
opportunity and invitation to testify today. I have prepared a
statement which I submitted for the record. But I am happy to
summarize my statement before answering any questions you might
have.
First, Senator, I should mention that you did hold up the
weekly issue of The Weekly Standard. You asked Mr. Wayne if he
agreed with the language, ``Europe: Menace or Farce.'' I am the
author of one of those two articles and I must say I did not
choose that language, either.
I am the ``menace'' guy and I would not argue that Europe
is a menace--not yet. At any rate, I do want to go on record as
saying I still adore the Europeans. I am just deeply skeptical
about some of what they are doing.
Let me make brief remarks about two areas that you have
already discussed with Mr. Wayne today. One is the European
Union's enlargement and second is what the European Union wants
to do with a deeply integrated Europe that perhaps one day
adopts a common foreign and security policy.
First of all, on the subject of enlargement, I think it is
important to remember that in 1989-1990, our West European
allies faced a strategic choice in the midst of stunning
changes--the fall of the Berlin Wall, German unification,
dissolution of the Soviet Union. The European Union had a
chance either to concentrate on widening the EU and including
the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe or deepening
and concentrating, then, on internal consolidation of power.
In my view, it would have been a better choice to
concentrate on widening, rather than deepening.
You, Senator, have raised very interesting questions as to
why our friends in Central and Eastern Europe wish to join this
institution. That is an interesting conversation in and of
itself, genuinely. But the fact is, as you well know, they do--
desperately and intensely. They do. It is the only game in
town.
I think that the West Europeans could have served
continental and transatlantic interests more effectively had
they been a little more open and inclusive institutionally.
Broadly speaking, I think there are three reasons why, over
the last decade, West Europeans have put their eggs in the
basket of deepening.
The first has to do with Helmut Kohl's argument. His
thesis, as you know and as you will recall, is and was if we
don't internally unify Western Europe, if we do not create
economic and political unity--and, remember, they were talking
about West European unity, and that is unity of the EU members.
You rightly pointed out that there are other European countries
that do not belong to the European Union, including Norway and
Western Europe. Kohl's argument was that the opposite
alternative would lead to new dissolution, maligned
nationalism, and lethal fragmentation in Europe.
I must tell you that I have never bought this argument, as
much respect as I have for Helmut Kohl. It strikes me as an
argument that maintains that we must stop ourselves before we
kill again.
It has always struck me that if we have so much confidence
in our democratic allies in Europe and in Germany, they should
have a little more confidence in themselves.
The second reason why the European Union chose to focus on
internal deepening rather than enlargement in my view has to do
with an argument advanced, including by people like Germany's
current Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, that deepening of the
European Union is a key to modernization. This is the principal
means by which we can become competitive in the global economy.
Well, here, too, I must tell you that I found this rather
puzzling. I just looked at the statements of two leading
politicians in Europe today. Tony Blair, for example, contends
that the adoption of the Euro, for instance, will make the EU
``more efficient and less subsidized, more open and less
heavily regulated.''
Across the Channel, though, French Finance Minister,
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, calls the Euro ``a tool in the service
of a better society, of a better social model; that is to say
the European model, based on greater solidarity than in the
United States.''
I read this as code words for shielding inefficiencies and
protecting against what Strauss-Kahn calls ``the free market
illusion.''
The third, and I think the most interesting and compelling
reason why West Europeans have concentrated on deepening
integration rather than enlargement in the last decade, is
rather actually appealing, seductive, and most problematic for
American policy. This is that a stronger, more self-reliant
European Union will not only be more capable of tending to
problems and security in its own neighborhood, it will also be
a more effective partner of the United States both within the
transatlantic community and around the world.
Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by just giving you three
reasons why I am skeptical of this overall thesis. Of course,
it has been said today and it bears repeating that we, as the
United States, for decades have supported European integration
and over the last decade we have supported the West Europeans
in their ambition for a Common Foreign and Security Policy and
also the so-called European Security and Defense Identify
which, as we have discussed today, would mean the Europeans can
act on their own without American participation but relying on
NATO assets.
Now, briefly, I have three points of skepticism.
The first has to do with the general emerging political
climate in the European Union itself, which I believe has
tendencies, not dominant today, but tendencies which, at their
best, are anti-hegemonic in sentiment and, at their worst,
outright anti-American.
Of course, the French are notorious and to cite our French
friends is probably a little unfair because it is so
predictable. The French Interior Minister keeps telling us we
have our interest, the Americans have theirs. And, doubtless,
we don't have to go through all the mischief vis-a-vis Russia,
Serbia, or Iraq that the French have put on our table.
But it is worth noting that leading French politicians
quite explicitly say that the ``raison d'etre'' of the new
European Union should be to represent European interests in the
world, not transAtlantic interests, certainly not American
ones, and that the European Union should be ready to play the
role of counterweight vis-a-vis the United States, either
directly or outflanking us in international institutions.
Now before one says well, that is the French, that is
predictable, and that is part of the love/hate relationship, I
would hasten to add that our friends the Germans, too, become
now, in my view, increasingly prickly about American leadership
or what they would call American hegemony.
I took careful note of Helmut Schmidt's comments recently.
The former German Chancellor said that the arrival of the Euro
``means that the United States can no longer call all the shots
in the world.''
I take note of German commentators who argue that with
European unity, Europe will no longer ``be seconding U.S.
global policies.''
Finally, I make the observation that it is not only the
French but other West Europeans and the Germans, too, who refer
now to America as the rogue super power and focus great
attention on the United Nations; this is to say the U.N.'s
Security Council should become the sole, indisputable legal
basis for the use of force in international relations.
Now there is much talk about the need and the desire to
uphold international law. But in my view, this is a desire
amongst some of our allies to check American power and room for
maneuver.
Before leaving this point, let me just mention that I do
believe there is much we can do in the United States to alter
the style and substance of our leadership. The rules of the
game have changed and allies are tired of being junior
partners, and understandably so. But I also worry at times that
the old, maligned nationalism of the Nation-State that Helmut
Kohl was so committed to getting rid of could become replaced
by a new, maligned nationalism of a European Super State.
The second point I want to mention has to do with burden
sharing and our desire and the West European desire to become
self-reliant and to take care of security in its back yard.
Of course, we have had, already, two instances in this
decade--Bosnia and Kosovo--and the results have not been very
good. But I would like to point out that in my view, I think we
Americans should not underestimate the structural and
historical obstacles to the West Europeans doing what we want
them to do.
I mention two points. First of all, the EU, with all its
desire for institutional fixes, still hasn't and will not have
for any foreseeable future a national leader. I think Bismarck
had something when he said that every alliance needs a horse
and a rider.
I think in crisis people need leaders and I think that the
European formula institutionally may be a formula for common
foreign and security policy, but the common part may often be
for paralysis, inaction, and lowest common denominator
politics.
The other point I want to make is the American argument
continually and persistently that the West European friends
need to spend more on defense. In fact, I think that is true.
But I don't think that is a panacea.
I think that we have to remember that one of the reasons
why we at times have been so successful--that is, Americans and
American leadership--is that we have successfully combined
military power, military power with the unwillingness, the
determination not to appease dangerous tyrants. And for reasons
of history, culture, and temperament, I don't think our West
European friends share the same lessons in the same way.
The last and final point, Senator, that I would like to
make has to do with the EU as a partner in helping America
defend a liberal world order--something that I am for but that
I think we are far from, in fact.
First of all, I point out that it is important to remember
when we are nostalgic about the days, the good old days, of the
cold war, when, as we are told frequently, things were
conceptually so much easier, that when it came to our allies,
things were never easy, as you know. Whether it was coping or
contending with crises like martial law in Poland, the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, battling Marxist insurgencies in
Central America, getting the European Community to help us
react when Americans were taken hostage in Tehran in 1979, in
general, the West European friends reacted with temporizing,
reacted with equivocation, and were often reluctant to go
along.
Today, the scene has changed dramatically. West Europeans
without the cold war feel less dependent on the United States.
Generational change in underway and, as we are discussing
today, they are busy developing European institutions with
minimal American participation and consultation.
I think we have to be very sober in our expectations. Take
one example--how difficult it has been for us: bipartisan
consensus, as it has existed at times in the United States, to
convince our West European friends of the danger of the Iranian
threat.
I should tell you that I just read in a German newspaper
last week an interview with German Chancellor Gerhard
Schroeder, who just announces unilaterally to his interview
partner that ``it is time now to improve the already
traditionally good relations between Germany and Iran.''
Finally, Senator, in closing let me just mention that by no
means in my view, by no means should this be an argument for
disengagement from Europe. I think we need allies. Some of the
best allies we have are in Europe, and the allies still need
us.
I think it is terribly important, when we are working on
these problems, to realize that we do want more burden-sharing,
but I believe that we want to be a super power. That has costs
but also benefits.
I believe that it makes sense to support the choices our
European colleagues make. They are sovereign, democratic
Nation-States. But I think of what Deputy Secretary of State
Strobe Talbott says: for this process we have ``hopes and
apprehensions.''
I would like to see us emphasize much more the
apprehensions, openly and candidly.
Finally, when our West European friends tell us that most
important to their part is the project of European integration
and deepening of the European Union, we should challenge them
to transfer at least some of this energy to deepening of the
Atlantic community and NATO.
My overall fear is this. In the future, I think Americans
will be increasingly unwilling to support a NATO that looks
backward. However, Europeans today I think are far from taking
this project in the future and looking forward.
Thank you, Senator.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Gedmin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Jeffrey Gedmin
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I want to thank you very
much for the invitation to appear before you today to testify on
developments in Europe and within the European Union specifically. With
NATO poised for airstrikes against Serbia, a mission designed to stave
off a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo, I welcome the opportunity for
this conversation with you about issues that are not unrelated. In my
view they are issues of strategic concern which relate directly to the
long term health of Atlantic Community.
1. west europe's strategic choice: deepening over widening
After the stunning changes in Europe between 1989-91--including the
fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany's unification, and the dissolution of
the Soviet Union--West European leaders were faced with a strategic
choice: to widen the European Community to include the new democracies
of central and eastern Europe and to help consolidate the gains of Cold
War victory; or to concentrate on ``deepening'' the European Community
by promoting greater West European internal unity through economic and
political consolidation and harmonization. At the time, West European
leaders were fond of saying that both processes--widening and
deepening--were compatible, complementary, and by no means mutually
exclusive.
A decade later we know differently. Deepening is on track. Eleven
of the fifteen members of the European Union adopted a single currency
on January 1 of this year. And monetary union is now to be followed by
deepening economic and political union, features of which include the
West European ambition for a European Security and Defense Identity
(ESDI) and ultimately a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
Meanwhile, ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, not a single
nation from the old Soviet bloc has been admitted to the European
Union; nor is any single nation on the verge of becoming a member of
the EU--not this year, not next, not the year after. In my view,
American interests, Western interests, and European interests would
have been better served had the European Union acted over the last
decade as openly and inclusively as its sister institution NATO has
acted.
What explains this pattern of behavior, what one might describe as
a form of West European isolationism? There have been primarily three
different arguments driving the EU's inward looking, self-absorbed
behavior of recent years. First, there was the argument advanced by
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Germany is the country in Western Europe
which most closely shares the American interest in seeing to it that
the doors to Western institutions of consultation and cooperation are
open to the young democracies of the east. And Germany has been the
leader among West European countries in providing by far the largest
amount of assistance to central and eastern Europe and the Newly
Independent States of the former Soviet Union since the end of the Cold
War.
At the same time, however, while in power Helmut Kohl's government
remained principally preoccupied with deepening of the EU.
``Unification'' as a cure all to Europe's ills has been an idea of
statesmen, princes, and poets on the continent for centuries. And in
step with the historical ethos--and, one should add, acutely conscious
of Germany's own tragic history in this century--Kohl devoutly believed
that economic and political unity would serve as antidote to Europe's
darker inclinations. Simply put, unity would once and for all, in
Kohl's view, lock in cooperation and lock out the demons of malign
nationalism, blood rivalry, and lethal fragmentation.
In my judgment, Helmut Kohl's thesis, however sincere, was simply
out of date and out of step with developments in modern, democratic
Europe. At the beginning of this decade, liberal democratic nation-
states existed throughout Western Europe. And without having ceding
inordinate amounts of sovereignty or democratic control to
supranational institutions in Brussels or elsewhere, West Europe's
democracies were doing just fine. It was the central and eastern
European democracies that needed help. It was on this part of the
continent where stability was needed. But for the new democracies, the
EU's doors remained closed. I think U.S. envoy Chris Hill pointed in
the right direction, incidentally, when last year he criticized West
Europeans for ``toasting themselves and claiming that they have
achieved a united Europe'' while the Balkans go up in flames.
Others have argued (and Germany's new Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder
belongs to this second school) that deepening of the EU--including
specifically the adoption of the euro--will help modernize the
economies of Western Europe and better permit the EU to compete in a
global economy. But here, too, the argument is hardly persuasive. In
fact, the divergence of views within the EU itself is striking. British
Prime Minister Tony Blair contends that the euro will make the EU
``more efficient and less subsidized, more open and less heavily
regulated.'' Across the channel, though, French finance minister
Dominique Strauss-Kahn calls the euro a ``tool in the service of a
better society, of a social model, that is to say the European model .
. . based on greater solidarity'' than in the U.S.--code words for
shielding inefficiencies and protecting against what Strauss-Kahn calls
the ``free market illusion.''
Finally, they are those across the West European political
establishment who have argued that an economically and politically
united Europe--and I always want to remind that what they are
developing thus far is a united Western Europe--is an essential part of
a maturation process. A united Europe will be better equipped, they
contend, to care for security in its own neighborhood. And a united
Europe will be a stronger partner for the United States both within the
transatlantic community and around the world. This third argument is
the most interesting, most compelling, and the most problematic for
U.S. policy. Before pointing out what in my view some of problems with
its assumptions are, though, let mention that West Europeans have not
abandoned the project of EU enlargement.
2. eu internal reform and enlargement
Making the EU fit for enlargement. That's what the ambitious
reforms known as Agenda 2000 are primarily about. Reform of the EU's
finances, farm, and regional policies is necessary if the EU is to
start admitting poorer countries from central and eastern Europe. EU
officials report that progress on Agenda 2000 has been made; and that
remaining problems will be resolved at a special EU summit which takes
place today and tomorrow in Berlin. (At the same time, negotiations
with five applicant countries from eastern Europe and Cyprus have been
creeping along since last November). What's more, the mass resignation
of the European Commission recently, EU officials argue, ``should not
delay enlargement.'' \1\ Nevertheless, it is hard to find grounds for
optimism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ With an annual budget of $100 billion, the Commission
negotiates trade issues and is the final arbitrator on antitrust policy
and other economic matters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To be sure, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, whose government
currently holds the rotating EU Presidency, will push hard in Berlin
for a full agreement on outstanding issues, probably arguing that the
EU's credibility is at stake in light of the European Commission
fiasco. But success will be in the eye of the beholder. As for the EU's
farm deal, for example, the Economist writes recently that it is
largely:
an Augustinian package of promises and postponements: yes, we
will cut subsidies, but not yet. Cuts in prices guaranteed to
farmers for beef, cereals and milk will be phased in, but
farmers will be paid directly instead. A review of the quota-
ridden diary industry will take place in 2003, but quotas will
stay in place until 2006 at least.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The Economist, March 13, 1999, p. 40.
Meanwhile, difficult issues relating to the financing of the EU
budget have yet to be resolved. These issues include Germany's wish for
a reduction in its net contribution, and pressure from other EU
countries for cuts in or the elimination of the UK's budget rebate
negotiated by Prime Minister Thatcher in the 1980s.\3\ Regardless of
what comes out of the Berlin summit, I expect EU enlargement to proceed
at a snail's pace. Before Christmas, senior European officials were
already confiding privately that ``slippage'' could be expected in the
current pace. More to the point, a senior adviser to the Prime Minister
of one EU country told me recently, ``publicly, everyone's for
enlargement; privately, there's really little enthusiasm.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Prime Minister Blair has thus far refused to consider giving up
the rebate Great Britain received from the EU budget that Mrs. Thatcher
secured as compensation for the comparatively limited aid British
farmers receive from the EU.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. common foreign and security policy (cfsp) and european security and
defense identity (esdi)
There remains considerable enthusiasm in West European capitals for
the project of deepening integration, however. In fact, just as NATO
engages in its debate about a revised Strategic Concept, the EU is
devoting considerable energy to modernizing its own institutions,
outlook, and mission.
Support for European integration has been a hallmark of U.S.
foreign policy for decades. And the administration has welcomed new
steps, including the arrival of the euro and the parallel movement in
recent years toward defense integration. In the 1991 Maastricht Treaty,
the EU committed itself to the development of a Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP). And since that time, the European Union has
taken some practical steps by encouraging, for example, EU foreign
ministers to develop common analyses; and by agreeing to adopt the post
of ``high representative'' for foreign policy (Mr.CFSP), to act as EU
spokesman. In the 1994 NATO Brussels Summit initiatives and in the 1996
NATO agreement in Berlin, the U.S. pledged to support the creation of
the so-called European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)--presumably
another move forward in the EU's transition from adolescence to geo-
strategic adulthood. As British Defense Minister George Robertson puts
it, ``without effective military capability to back up European foreign
policy, we are wasting our time.''
In theory, ESDI means that NATO's European members, relying on NATO
assets, would in the future be able to undertake missions in which U.S.
forces would not participate. And the U.S. position has been clear:
Yes, to ESDI, as long as this trend does not, as the Secretary of
Defense puts it, ``undermine or supersede NATO institutions and
missions.'' \4\ In theory, it sounds like West Europeans taking
responsibility. It sounds like burden-sharing. And for these reasons,
enthusiasm in some circles in Washington has been equally clear. Such
steps toward greater European responsibility would fit well, for
example, with the idea of those, like Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, who
argue for an increasingly neat division of labor in the alliance:
``Europe leads with the United States as backup on the European
continent; the United States leads with European and other allies as
back up in the rest of the world.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ ``Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense: A
Report to the United States Congress by the Secretary of Defense,''
March 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Any honest discussion of these developments must recognize however,
in my view, that these trends carry promise and peril. Deputy Secretary
of State Strobe Talbott talks about ``hopes'' and ``apprehensions.'' As
he put it recently, ``We want to see Europe define its identity and
pursue its interests in a way that not only preserves but that
strengthens the ties that bind [us together].'' Of course, this is
exactly the question. Can and will the EU define itself in a way that
strengthens the transatlantic bond? A recently published article on
``Building a European Defense Capability,'' coauthored by a respected
American, French, and British analyst, contends that any argument
``that a stronger, more assertive Europe will undermine NATO as well as
U.S. interests is simply wrong.'' I'm skeptical about the certainty of
such statements; just as I'm struck by the vehemence of the authors'
tone.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ ``Building a European Defence Capability.'' Kori Schake, Amaya
Bloch-Laine, Charles Grant. Survival. Spring 1999, p. 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The EU and its members are entitled to their choices. And of
course, we want to encourage our allies to shoulder greater burden
within the alliance. But I'm not at all certain that it remains in the
American interest to continue offering unqualified support for
deepening European integration. Not, at least, without asking hard
questions of our allies and ourselves. And not without considering
carefully what we can simultaneously do to strengthen Atlantic ties in
security, trade, and political cooperation.
West European officials increasingly argue, for example, that an
economically and politically unified EU is the best vehicle to advance
Europe's interests in the world. Fair enough. But should we not be
asking what those interests are? And whether they are compatible with
American interests, and what we frequently view as, common
transatlantic objectives?
For clues to the answers, start by considering the current French
lament of America as ``hyperpower.'' French President Chirac speaks of
a new ``collective sovereignty'' to check American power and sees the
EU as playing a crucial role. Meanwhile, French mischief has directly
encouraged Russian support for Slobodan Milosevic's Serbia. French
Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine has advocated accommodationist policies
toward Iraq, noting that the French position is that ``of all
Europeans, . . . the Arab world, the position of the Russians, the
Chinese.'' And France's interior minister, Jean-Pierre Chevenement,
fondly says: ``We have our interests and the Americans have theirs.''
For those of us who still like to believe in the idea of the West, our
French friends are not very inspiring these days.
Of course, French mischief--and outright anti-Americanism--are
nothing new, of course. But consider the changed conditions of the
post-Cold War world. With the Soviet threat gone, our allies across
Western Europe are feeling less dependent on the United States.
Generational change is underway, and younger politicians--on both sides
of the Atlantic, of course--no longer have the same intuitive reflexes
about the importance of transatlantic relationship that their
predecessors had. And, as we've started discussing, West Europeans
remain busy developing their European institutions with great
enthusiasm--and often minimal American participation or consultation.
It is in this wider context that I believe we should consider
developments within the European Union.
At the summit between French and British leaders in the French port
of St. Malo in December, there was talk of Europeans' working ``within
or outside NATO'' in the future. The tone and level of interest our
British allies are now taking in European Security and Defense Identity
is striking and unprecedented, even with all the predictable footnotes
about how great European independence will not undermine the
transatlantic link. I believe it's appropriate, then, for Americans to
ask whether the special relationship with Britain is to fade as the
United Kingdom seeks amalgamation with a European federal state.
Incidentally, under majority voting in a future Common Foreign and
Security Policy, it is possible that our British allies could find
themselves at times prevented from joining the U.S., as they did in the
bombing of Libya during the Reagan administration, for example, because
the EU's majority dissents. I believe it's also appropriate to ask,
when the British and French issue a communique affirming that ``the
European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the
international stage,'' what exactly Europeans envisage this role to
be--and how it will relate to NATO.
I should mention that there are those among our European allies who
genuinely believe that the developments we are discussing are fully
compatible with Atlanticism and a strong NATO which retains its unity
and credibility. There are others, though, who promote in various ways
a different vision for the future of U.S.-European relations. Former
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt boasts, for example, that the arrival
of the euro means ``the United States can no longer call all the
shots'' in the world. Prominent German commentators applaud the fact
that a stronger EU, as they see it, means that Europe will no longer be
``seconding U.S. global policies.'' French and German leaders alike
these days insist that the United nations assume greater power and
influence and hold alone the ``indisputable legal basis'' for the use
of force in international affairs. Support for the idea in Western
Europe grows. The Europeans apparently argued initially that the use of
force in Kosovo required explicit UN authority. There are noises about
dangerous precedents and the need for stronger international law. The
primary intent, in my view, is the EU's desire--and of course, the
desire of others--to check America's room for maneuver.
Having said all this, it's clear--and understandable--that West
Europeans have tired of playing the junior partner in the alliance.
Simply put, our allies want to assert their new feelings of
independence, and they want to be treated as grown-ups. All fair and
reasonable. There's increasingly prickliness about American hegemony
throughout Western Europe. And we can do our part in adjusting the
style and substance of our leadership at times. At the same time,
though, one wonders whether the old nationalism of the nation-state
which Helmut Kohl was so determined to bury, may be reborn in a malign
supranationalism of a European superstate. Even if such a scenario does
not develop, it's still wrong, in my view, for the U.S. to assume that
the new EU will share our analysis of problems and our goals in the
world.
Although it is easy to be nostalgic, it was, in fact, never easy
with our allies during the Cold War. Remember the Europeans opposed
American efforts to resupply Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War and
to forge a unified Western response to the oil cartel's embargo and
price hikes. Remember that after U.S. embassy staff was taken hostage
in Tehran in November 1979, the United States appealed to its EC allies
for support in applying sanctions, to no avail. When the Soviet Union
invaded Afghanistan, the Europeans mustered condemnation and little
more. When martial law was declared in Poland in December 1981, the EC
offered a temporizing response--and massive resistance to U.S.-
sponsored sanctions. When the U.S. battled Marxist insurgencies in
Central America in the 1980s, the Europeans equivocated; when an EC
commissioner warned, for instance, of the danger of ``external
intervention feared by all,'' he was understood to be referring as much
to the United States as the Soviet Union. And those were the days of
Cold War dependency.
And today? I am concerned that NATO's new Strategic Concept, to be
unveiled at the Washington Summit next month, will paper over important
fissures that are not easily mended. Is a united EU ready to join the
U.S. in promoting and defending a liberal world order? I'm doubtful.
And if we want to promote a common strategic culture we have enormous
work to do. To take but one example, remember that our policy of
containing Iran has faltered in large part because our allies have been
unwilling to take the Iranian threat seriously. And now, despite
interesting but also contradictory signals from Tehran over the past
year, Gerhard Schroeder calmly tells a German interviewer that ``the
time is ripe for an improvement in the traditionally good'' relations
between Germany and Iran.
And what about the EU in its own neighborhood? West Europeans are
desperate to do more. And rightfully so. Remember Luxembourg's foreign
minister Jacques Poos in 1991, who declared that this was ``the hour of
Europe.'' He also said, ``if one problem can be solved by the Europeans
it is the Yugoslav problem. This is a European country and it is not up
to the Americans. It is not up to anyone else.'' I don't think it's
premature to say that with Kosovo a second chance has already
tragically come and gone for the Europeans to solve a problem in their
neighborhood without the help of the Americans.
And with all the institutional fixes in the works, and all the
obsession with new structures, mechanisms, and institutional
arrangements, it's hard to imagine the EU--which lacks a natural
leader--moving in times of crisis beyond the suffocating confines of
lowest-common-denominator politics. Nor am I confident that our West
European allies are otherwise on the right course. Defense spending
remains low. Our allies spend about 2.2 percent of GDP on defense, one-
third less than the United States. In Germany, defense spending as a
share of GDP dropped by 1.5 percent last year, down by almost half from
its 1990 level of 2.8 percent. And conscientious objection reaches
record levels.
But there's more to the story. American leadership has been
successful when the United States has combined military power with the
determination not to appease dangerous tyrants. Even if the EU were to
grow its own autonomous military capability, there is no reason for
Americans to assume that Europeans, with the advantages, but also in
instances the obstacles created by their different history, culture,
and temperament, will pursue policies in which we would have
confidence. When the West Europeans tried to ``lead'' in Bosnia earlier
this decade, we should not forget that leadership often took the form
of traditional power politics, with major powers siding with
traditional regional proteges, and often turning a blind eye to the
victims of aggression.
All these points of skepticism that I've raised today should not be
misconstrued as an argument for U.S. engagement from Europe. On the
contrary. America, the lone superpower still needs allies, just as
Europe, its own superpower pretensions notwithstanding, still needs the
United States. Issues like Bosnia and Kosovo cannot be solved without
American military power and leadership. NATO's enlargement--and the
expansion of freedom and prosperity into Central and Eastern Europe--
cannot happen without active American support and participation. At the
same time, terrorism, proliferation, rogue states and other new threats
are effectively combated only when America and the alliance of
democracies band together. With all our differences, that's how the
Cold War was won. It is my hope that a successful Washington Summit,
the promotion of new Atlantic initiatives--and a healthy dose of
skepticism regarding deepening European integration--will help keep the
Atlantic community together and moving forward on the best possible
path.
Senator Smith. Thank you very much.
If we could stand in recess, I am going to go to vote. I
will be right back and we will carry on.
[Recess]
Senator Smith. I apologize. There were two votes, not one.
But we are now back and I appreciate your indulgence. This is
such an important topic and I want to make sure each of you has
a chance to contribute to the understanding of this committee
on this issue.
Dr. Feldman, we will go to you next.
STATEMENT OF DR. LILY GARDNER FELDMAN, SENIOR SCHOLAR IN
RESIDENCE, CENTER FOR GERMAN AND EUROPEAN STUDIES, GEORGETOWN
UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Gardner Feldman. I'm Lily Gardner Feldman, Senior
Scholar in Residence at the Center for German and European
Studies, Georgetown University.
I am pleased to address the committee today, Chairman
Smith, and request that a longer written version of my
presentation be submitted for the record.
Senator Smith. Without objection, that will be done.
Dr. Gardner Feldman. I will confine my remarks here to the
5 to 7 minutes I have been given.
Both the internal character and the external profile of the
European Union are changing in ways that are significant for
the United States, especially given the European Union's status
as America's most important partner in global commerce and in
global problem solving.
It behooves the United States, then, to appreciate and
anticipate the nature and consequences of the EU's internal
deepening and external widening which, I believe, unlike my
colleague, have been twin goals since 1989.
I congratulate the committee for recognizing the importance
of the European Union by holding this hearing.
I will divide my remarks today into three parts: first, an
outline of three scenarios for how enlargement of the European
Union could occur; second, an indication of the institutional
and policy reforms that will determine which scenario likely
will prevail; and, third, a specification of enlargement's
implications for the United States.
Let me begin with the scenarios for enlargement of the
European Union.
The scenarios for near-term expansion of the EU relate to
the six candidates with whom negotiations already are
underway--Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia,
Slovenia, and Cyprus--and not the other seven applicants,
including the special case of Turkey.
The presumed date of accession would be 2004-2005, with a
20 year transition period to fulfill all the obligations of
membership.
There are three main scenarios for enlargement: (1) the
total failure of enlargement, due to member State opposition or
growing influence in candidate countries of the probable
``loser'' economic sectors, or the refusal of the European
Parliament to grant its assent to widening in the absence of
major deepening; (2) the achievement of enlargement involving
minimal reform and a divisive and piecemeal process. This means
perpetuation of the European Union as a hybrid, yet
functioning, organization that combines ``flexible
integration'' of moving toward a common goal at different
speeds; ``variable geometry'' involving a permanent core on
certain issues coexisting with countries who opt out; and the
pillar system of supranational, mixed, and national
competencies.
Some of the six current candidates may not make it into
this untidy entity.
Finally, the third scenario is the realization of
enlargement with all candidates in the context of overall,
fundamental reform of institutions and policies from which the
EU would emerge as a decisive, coherent actor with a sense of
direction, streamlined instruments, and a reinvigorated agenda.
I predict that scenario two will prevail due to current
developments in policies and institutions that affect the
internal and external functioning of the EU. Simultaneously,
the EU is racing uphill and spinning its wheels.
I will turn now, then, to the second part of my
presentation, institutional and policy reform.
The EU has demonstrated remarkable progress in the area of
Economic and Monetary Union and, thus, its capacity for
fundamental change. Yet key areas of institutional and policy
reform necessary to facilitate the basic functioning of a 20 or
21 member body remain unresolved.
The EU's special summit in Berlin today and tomorrow
probably will reach a compromise on the future financial
framework, reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, and
alteration of the apportionment of Structural Funds. But that
compromise will fall short of the far-reaching proposals of the
Commission or the current German presidency of the EU.
Similarly, the Cologne summit in June will agree to a
procedure for resolving the key institutional issues not caused
but magnified by enlargement, namely the distribution of seats
in the Parliament and Parliament's decisionmaking role, the
size of the European Commission, and the reweighting of votes
in the Council.
Fundamental change in the EU is highly complicated. Turmoil
in the Commission and the attendant public disappointment with
the EU's efficacy make some institutional reform likely,
particularly in the European Parliament and the Commission.
But it will be highly contested and probably will not
involve including areas like Common Foreign and Security Policy
in the EU's supranational competence. The final say in that
area will remain with Nation-States.
These developments amount to incremental change, leaving
the EU as a patchwork quilt arrangement and a multi-tiered
organization. This outcome does not preclude enlargement, but
it renders it more difficult, with specific consequences for
the United States.
In closing, allow me to address these implications.
I deem the first scenario of enlargement's total failure
unlikely. Due to the EU's political commitment to success, a
lot has been invested in this project. I also doubt the third
scenario of enlargement with thorough-going, effective reform.
Nonetheless, U.S. officials should still contemplate both
scenarios for they would change fundamentally U.S.-EU
relations.
So what are the implications for the United States of the
second scenario of incremental reform preceding enlargement? It
will have positive economic and political benefits for the
United States if it spurs further trade liberalization and the
compensation negotiations for trade diversion are not
acrimonious.
The second scenario's enlargement implies a continued
partnership of relative economic equals between the United
States and the EU, particularly if economic and monetary union
is successful. But the United States will need to continue to
live with the frustration of a messy partner.
Enlargement will increase EU credibility on the European
continent in U.S. eyes if the United States accepts that EU
power will remain economic and diplomatic and not become
military.
Enlargement will permit consolidation of international
political cooperation between the United States and the EU in
traditional conflicts and in newer areas such as global climate
issues and international crime if the United States recognizes
that the European Union must still devote energy to ongoing
internal reform to guarantee that enlargement is an asset and
not a liability.
The EU faces greater challenges today than at any time
since its founding. The United States should continue to
support staunchly the process of integration, including
enlargement, but it should pay more attention to the specific
character and consequences of those changes.
Thank you, Senator Smith.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Gardner Feldman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Lily Gardner Feldman
introduction: the importance of the european union for the united
states
In the current six-month German presidency of the European Union,
the fifteen member-states face a fuller agenda than at any time since
the 1955 Messina conference that led to the Treaty of Rome and the
creation of the European Economic Community in 1957. The magnitude of
the challenges confronting the European Union (EU) was clear to the
world in the unprecedented resignation of the entire 20-member European
Commission on March 16, 1999. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder, who
holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union, has
deemed the resignation a ``crisis'' but also an ``opportunity'' for
redefinition and renewal.\1\ Both the internal character and the
external profile of the European Union are changing in ways that are
significant for the US, especially given the EU's status as America's
most significant partner in global commerce and international problem-
solving.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Speech in Brussels, March 17, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Combined, the US and the EU account for more than 50% of global
trade, and produce approximately 50% of goods and services in the
world. The EU represents the largest commercial partner for the US with
an annual value of trade of some $250 billion, and is twice as large a
market for the US as Canada and Japan together. The US and the EU are
each the largest investor in the other's market; one in 12 US factory
workers works for a European company; the jobs of some 7 million
Americans are related to transatlantic trade.\2\ Trade disputes over
bananas and hormone beef may be bitter, but they are dwarfed by the
immense flow of goods and services between the US and the EU.
Partnership and mutual dependence extend beyond commerce. The US and
the EU together account for 90% of all humanitarian aid. The EU is a
central financial donor in key areas of conflict such as Bosnia and the
Middle East, and plays a significant political role in the peace
processes of those regions. The US and the EU cooperate significantly
in confronting human rights violations, the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, and cross-border crime. In President Clinton's words,
the EU is ``perhaps our best natural partner for the 21st century.''
\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Address by Stuart Eizenstat, Under Secretary for Economic,
Business and Agricultural Affairs, Johns Hopkins University, May 4,
1998.
\3\ Quoted in Eizenstat, ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It behooves the US, then, to appreciate and anticipate the nature
and the consequences of the EU's internal deepening and external
widening. I will divide my remarks into four parts: (1) an overview of
the enlargement process; (2) an outline of three scenarios for how
enlargement of the EU could occur; (3) the identification of
institutional and policy reforms that will determine which scenario is
the most likely; (4) and a specification of the implications of
enlargement for the US.
significance of enlargement and the process of expansion
The current round of enlargement of the EU is the most challenging
ever undertaken in terms of number of applicants (10 in Central and
Eastern Europe plus Cyprus, Malta which recently reactivated its
application, and Turkey as a special case); the magnitude of economic
and social differences between applicants and current member states;
combined size of population; vastness of territory; and organizational
challenge (actual negotiations have started with six countries, to be
joined by Malta at the end of 1999, but simultaneously a screening
exercise for eligibility is being conducted with six potential
candidates).\4\ Sir Leon Brittan has noted that complete enlargement,
i.e. with all applicants, would mean an EU of 540 million citizens; a
GDP that well exceeds that of the US, and a 20% share of world trade
outside the EU.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ For a detailed analysis of the enlargement process and its
implications for US-EU relations, see: Lily Gardner Feldman, "The
European Union's Enlargement Project and US-EU Cooperation in Central
and Eastern Europe," in Fran Burwell and Ivo Daalder, eds., The United
States and the European Union in the Global Arena (Macmillan, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the 1993 Copenhagen European Council, the EU specified the
political, economic and human rights criteria for membership:
-- ``stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of
law, human rights and respect for the protection of
minorities;''
-- ``the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the
capacity to cope with the competitive pressure and market
forces within the Union;''
-- ``ability to take on the obligations of membership including
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary
union.'' \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Bulletin of the European Communities, No. 6, vol. 26, 1993, p.
13.
Most American officials have recognized that the EU expansion
process distilled in fulfilling the three criteria is more intricate
and arduous than NATO enlargement, yet at times chastise the EU for
slowness. Some American politicians have been less understanding of the
complexity of the task, as reflected in the 1998 NATO enlargement
debate when some former and current senators attempted to set as a pre-
condition for NATO membership the accession of Central and Eastern
European states to the EU. ``Moving the goal posts'' or lessening the
criteria serves neither side: it would undermine the EU's achievements,
and would engender in the candidate countries a false expectation of
what membership entails.
The EU could have been more vocal earlier (it is now) in its belief
that enlargement can occur, but it has tried to make the process
digestible through a ``pre-accession strategy'' of devising incremental
steps toward membership and adoption of the whole complex of existing
EU legislation and regulations (some 80, 000 pages). The strategy has
escalated from trade and cooperation agreements to complex Europe
Agreements and Accession Partnerships, from specific and ongoing
screening (by criterion and sector) of whether the candidates and
would-be candidates meet the Copenhagen requirements to ``twinning''
arrangements for strengthening institutional and administrative
capacity in the candidate countries through the secondment of EU
advisors.
The process of preparing countries for enlargement has involved a
monumental aid package (6.7 billion Euro, or some $7.7 billion, in the
main aid program, PHARE, for the period 1995-99; beginning in 2000, aid
will amount to some 3 billion Euro, or $3.5 billion, annually), and
significant loans (1.7 billion ECU from the European Investment Bank in
1997 alone, with plans for 7 billion Euro, $8 billion, over three
years). According to the EU Ambassador to the US, Hugo Paemen, between
1990 and 1999 the EU has provided $85 billion in aid to Central and
Eastern Europe, the ``equivalent in today's dollars to the US Marshall
aid for the reconstruction of Europe after World War II.'' \6\ Clearly,
the EU is serious about enlargement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Lecture to the Center for German and European Studies,
Georgetown University, March 15, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
scenarios for enlargement of the european union
In developing scenarios for near-term expansion of the EU the
reference point is the six candidates with whom negotiations already
are underway: Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia,
and Cyprus. The EU is reluctant to specify dates for actual accession,
for as Commissioner van den Broek has noted ``While speed is desirable,
quality is essential.'' \7\ Candidate countries, however, seem to be
aiming for 2002 or 2003. The assumption of these scenarios is accession
in 2004-2005 with a twenty-year transition period for the complete
adoption of the acquis communautaire.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Press conference, Vienna European Council, December 11-12,
1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are three main scenarios for enlargement:
(1) The total failure of enlargement, due to member-state
opposition, or growing influence in applicant countries of the probable
``loser'' economic sectors, or the refusal of the European Parliament
to grant its assent to widening in the absence of major deepening.
(2) The achievement of enlargement, involving minimal reform, and a
divisive, piecemeal process. This means perpetuation of the EU as a
hybrid, yet functioning organization that combines ``flexible
integration'' of moving toward a common goal at different speeds;
``variable geometry'' involving a permanent core on certain issues
coexisting with countries who opt out; and the ``pillar system'' of
supranational, mixed and national competences. Some of the six current
candidates may not make it into this untidy entity.
(3) The realization of enlargement with all candidates in the
context of overall, fundamental reform of institutions and policies,
from which the EU would emerge as a decisive, coherent actor with a
sense of direction, streamlined instruments, and a reinvigorated
agenda.
I predict that scenario 2 will prevail due to current developments
in policies and institutions that affect the internal and external
functioning of the EU. Simultaneously, the EU is racing uphill and
spinning its wheels.
internal reform and external profile
Three areas of EU reform bear directly on enlargement: the so-
called ``leftovers'' from the Amsterdam Treaty; key areas of economic
and political union; and the Agenda 2000 plans to facilitate expansion
through policy reform and stable financing of the EU. In all three
areas, there is both progress and standstill.
Amsterdam ``Leftovers''
The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty (which will soon go into effect following
France's ratification on March 16) was unable to reach agreement on
some key institutional questions whose need for reform has been
magnified by the prospect of enlargement, to avoid what German Foreign
Minister Joschka Fischer has termed an ``institutional heart attack.''
\8\ Institutions that operate with difficulty among 15 member-states
will not be able to function with 20 or 21 members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Speech to the European Parliament, January 12, 1999,
Strasbourg.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The EU put off at Amsterdam major expansion-related issues
involving the Parliament, the Commission and the Council, even though
institutional reconfiguration for enlargement was a key aim:
(1) The size of the European Parliament (although it was agreed
that the total number of members should not exceed 700 after
enlargement), together with the issue of proportional distribution
among member-states, and the further expansion of European Parliament
rights to fill a democratic deficit as the EU tries to spread democracy
eastward.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ For a detailed discussion of the institutional issues, see:
Michel Petite, The Treaty of Amsterdam, Jean Monnet Paper Series,
Harvard University, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) The size of the Commission with a plan of one national per
member state with the first wave of new member-states, and the
convening of an intergovernmental conference one year before there are
more than 20 EU members to evaluate the Commission's composition and
functioning.
(3) Further extension in existing EU programs of qualified majority
voting (as opposed to unanimity), as well as reweighting the Council
votes. Large member states, especially Germany, are concerned that
enlargement will only magnify the existing disproportionate weight of
small states in all three institutions.
The European Council in Cologne at the end of the German presidency
is scheduled to decide on the procedure for resolving the institutional
questions, which would then occur at an intergovernmental conference in
2001. The Commission's recent demise, in part due to the European
Parliament exercising vigorously its right of investigation, could
augment the Parliament's decision-making role and clarify its
composition, especially after the June 1999 elections for the European
Parliament. Both Prime Minister Tony Blair and Chancellor Gerhard
Schroder, who are emerging as the EU's leadership duo, have called for
a strong commission president, a reversal from the previous British
position which preferred a weaker, controllable president.
The charges of personal lack of accountability, based on dubious
employment arrangements with nationals of particular commissioners,
could in 2001 hasten the reduction of the Commission from the planned
20-member entity to enhance and make effective the Commissioners'
commitment to act supranationally, devoid of national connection. With
regard to the extension of majority voting in the Council, or Council
decisions to extend new supranational competences to the Commission,
prospects are less auspicious, and indeed the chances of a paralyzed
Commission in the near-term are high. Given the Commission's central
role in monitoring the candidates' progress toward meeting the
Copenhagen criteria, the enlargement process could become more drawn
out and cumbersome. A hobbled Commission also has implications in a
major area of policy development it has championed: Common Foreign and
Security Policy and a European Security and Defense Initiative.
Key Policy Developments
Fortunately, the EU entered the third stage of Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) before the Commission crisis, and while EMU
demonstrates a flexible arrangement (Sweden, Denmark, and the UK have
chosen not to join now; Greece did not meet the criteria), it shows a
monumental capacity to surrender key areas of national policy to EU
authority. The opposite appears to be the case with Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) which remains an area of intergovernmental (as
opposed to suprantaional activity).
Efficiency and coherence in CFSP might now improve as the Amsterdam
Treaty provisions begin to go into effect: a High Representative for
CFSP, who is the Secretary General of the Council; a Policy Planning
and Early Warning Unit; a new troika of the Presidency, future
presidency, Commission and High Representative; closer ties with the
WEU and inclusion of the Petersberg tasks of peace-keeping, crisis
management and humanitarian operations into the Amsterdam treaty; and
the possibility of flexible decision-making in the form of
``constructive abstention.''
Recent developments in CFSP and the related European Security and
Defense Initiative (ESDI), including Prime Minister Blair's October
1998 initiative in Portschach and the joint French-British December
1998 St. Malo declaration suggest more movement along the lines of
creating a core of countries to develop a European capacity for
military action when the US does not wish to participate, a plan
embellished by German Foreign Minister Fischer at the EU Foreign
ministers' meeting in mid-March, 1999. These suggestions emphasize the
uniqueness of NATO for collective security, but recognize the need for
greater European assets and capabilities to permit autonomous military
action. Fischer's proposal for an EU Military Committee with military
representatives has met resistance from the British, the neutrals, and
the Netherlands, and there is still considerable divergence over
merging the WEU into the EU, as well as Fischer's idea of regular
meetings of Defense Ministers. While ESDI may now become more focused,
efficient, and purposeful, it will involve coalitions of the willing.
CFSP's character likely will stay intergovernmental and its initial
decision-making (as opposed to implementation) will remain unanimity-
based, despite German efforts to render it supranational and grounded
in qualified majority voting.
Developments in EMU and CFSP have implications for enlargement,
both in the character of the EU that is expanding as noted above, and
in the role the new members will play in these two areas. The first
five Central and Eastern European countries will not meet the EMU
criteria for a long time, but their currencies are already being linked
now to the Euro. The first wave of Central and Eastern European
accession will intensify the tangled mess of uneven participation of EU
member states in the WEU, but the candidate countries are also
committed to CFSP, for with a self-image as small, vulnerable states,
the Central and Eastern European countries ardently want to
collectivize their security risks and burdens. The fulfillment of NATO
membership in March 1999 has eased the military aspects of security for
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, but the broader conception of
security--foreign policy, diplomacy--rests in the EU, particularly for
Estonia and Slovenia who are not likely candidates for NATO membership.
As part of the process of enlargement, through the ``structured
dialogue'' Central and Eastern European ministers have participated in
a consultative way in deliberations in CFSP, and have coordinated their
policies with the EU in international organizations and in third
countries, as well as in transnational issues such as international
crime.
Agenda 2000
All three Agenda 2000 issues will be the focus of the special EU
summit in Berlin on March 24-25, 1999: (1) the future financial
framework of the EU for the period 2000-2006, and the related issue of
gradually reducing the burden for the net contributors (Germany, the
Netherlands, Austria and Sweden); (2) reform of the Common Agricultural
Policy, which accounts for 50% of the EU budget, in terms of price
reductions for crops and agricultural products, compensation for
farmers, and a rural development policy to replace lost agricultural
employment; (3) and alteration of the system of apportioning structural
funds, which make up 30% of the EU's budget, by reducing and
simplifying the number and nature of needy regions. Following
Chancellor Schroder's meetings in member-state capitals, there is
German optimism that compromises can be reached in all three areas, but
they will fall short of the major overhaul Germany and the Commission
have proposed. Success in Berlin would send a signal to the candidate
countries, according to Foreign Minister Fischer ``that the EU is
seriously preparing for their accession . . . whereas failure in Berlin
would endanger the schedule for enlargement.'' In light of the public's
negative reaction to the Commission, compromise on reform in Berlin
would also demonstrate to skeptical EU citizens the community's
capacity for fiscal responsibility, accountability, and belt-
tightening. The three domains of reform--Amsterdam leftovers, key
policy questions, Agenda 2000--will be addressed during the remainder
of the German presidency, either now in Berlin or at the June 1999
European Council summit in Cologne. The outcome will be mixed,
reinforcing the character of the EU as an incremental actor, a
patchwork-quilt arrangement, and a multi-tier organization. Such an
outcome does not preclude enlargement, but it renders it more
difficult, with specific consequences for the United States.
implications for the united states of the three scenarios for eu
enlargement
The first scenario--the failure of enlargement--could increase
American involvement in Europe as a stabilizing factor, but, under
Congressional pressure, it also could push the US to react adversely to
EU indecisiveness. The failure of enlargement could increase NATO's
burden and make it the premier organization, further antagonizing
Russia. For the US, a fragmented Europe would be more difficult to deal
with than the current collage of actors and authorities; and it would
be much less calculable. It would undercut US aspirations of working
with the EU to solve global problems. American officials consider such
a scenario of failure disastrous, for it would invalidate the
conception of security that combines the strengths of both NATO and the
EU. While the failure scenario is unlikely--due to a sufficient degree
of dynamism in the EU, a growing political commitment to proving to
citizens the capacity for efficacy, and a large investment in a
successful outcome--American officials should contemplate failure and
prepare for it.
The second scenario will have positive economic benefits for the US
if it spurs further trade liberalization, and the compensation
negotiations for trade diversion are not acrimonious. It implies
continued partnership of relative economic equals between the US and
the EU, particularly if economic and monetary union is successful, but
the US will need to continue to live with the frustration of a messy
partner. Enlargement will increase EU credibility on the European
continent in US eyes, if the US accepts that EU power will remain
economic and diplomatic, and not become military. Enlargement will
permit consolidation of international political cooperation between the
US and the EU in traditional conflicts and newer areas such as global
climate issues and international crime, if the US recognizes that the
European Union must still devote energy to ongoing internal reform to
gurantee that enlargment is an asset and not a liability.
The third scenario--enlargement coupled with thorough-going,
effective institutional reform--eventually would establish the EU in a
position of dominance on the continent, with the US playing a
supporting role. The third scenario could imply greater economic and
political competition between the US and the EU. It could also mean the
addition of military resources to the EU's international profile
through a complete integration of the WEU into the EU, and a unified
CFSP within the supranational ambit of the EU. While improbable in the
near term, given the multiple challenges and crisis of confidence in
the EU, the community method of progress on occasion has amounted to
great leaps forward in the face of stagnation, impasse, and sclerosis,
for example the Single Market Program, and Economic and Monetary Union.
For the purposes of long-term planning, the US should envision such a
European Union even if it is not to be anticipated in the next decade.
The EU is confronting now and in the next months monumemtal
challenges. The US should continue to support staunchly the process of
integration, including enlargment, but it should pay more attention to
the specific character and consequences of change.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Dr. Feldman.
Mr. Rodman.
STATEMENT OF PETER W. RODMAN, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY
PROGRAMS, THE NIXON CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Rodman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, have a
prepared statement which I would like to submit for the record.
Senator Smith. Without objection.
Mr. Rodman. Thank you very much.
My focus is on the political and security dimension of
these issues, the so-called Common Foreign and Security Policy
of the EU and also the defense initiative, the British-French
initiative to develop an EU defense capability which was
launched in December at a summit in Saint-Malo in Brittany.
The British-French document in Saint-Malo was ambiguous
about how this EU defense entity would link with NATO, whether
it would be ``inside'' or ``outside the NATO framework.''
Let me make five points about these issues.
My first point is that I would say the jury is still out on
whether this EU defense initiative is a problem for NATO or
not. I suspect from my conversations with British and French
diplomats that they are not sure what this really means
operationally or institutionally. They have not fleshed it out.
It is just a vague idea.
If it is done in the right way, it could be more effective
in the alliance. It could have a burden-sharing value. If the
Europeans are able to coordinate their efforts, then that is a
way to maximize their effectiveness in the defense area if it
is in the NATO framework.
As I say, the British and French have been going out of
their way to reassure Americans that that is what is meant. But
none of us really knows how it will evolve. None of us really
knows how this EU institution will fit into NATO or link with
NATO.
The fact is the Europeans are doing it for their own
reasons. They are doing it to promote their own autonomy. They
are not doing it to ``bear our burdens.'' So I think, again,
the jury is still out.
The second point is that the role of Britain is pivotal.
Britain, under Tony Blair, has shown, of course, an
extraordinary dedication to the special relationship. The
British have stood with us in these Iraq crises, much to the
annoyance of a lot of their European partners. So perhaps we
should trust the British, and we should trust the intentions of
the British who, I do believe, have no intention of disrupting
the NATO alliance.
But Britain, under Tony Blair, is also taking unprecedented
steps toward Europe. In fact, this new initiative in the
defense area actually was a British idea. The general
interpretation of it is that Tony Blair, because he was not
going into the common currency, was looking for another way to
show that Britain was a good European. That makes a lot of
sense.
On the other hand, in the last few weeks, the Blair
Government has taken a number of preparatory steps to enter the
common currency. So you see the British moving toward Europe in
both dimensions. I think this testifies to the very strong
gravitational pull that Europe seems to exert on this
particular British Government.
Over time, it could conceivably lead to a future British
Prime Minister who hesitates about whether to stand with the
United States in some controversial crisis. I cannot prove that
this is going to happen. I don't think Mr. Blair intends for
that to happen. But, again, this is the gravitational pull of
Europe on this British Government.
If such a thing were to happen, of course, it would be a
major shift in transatlantic relations.
My third point is this. In the formative stage of all of
this in Europe, the United States has a right and a
responsibility to weigh in with its concerns. The relationship
with the United States is precisely what is being affected. The
relationship with the United States is at the core of what is
being developed in Europe.
As Dr. Gedmin was describing, there are a lot of statements
by Europeans that they want to be more equal to us or they want
more autonomy from us. A lot of what is being done is being
done somehow vis-a-vis us or with us in mind. I think we
obviously have a right to comment on what we think is healthy
for the future of the Atlantic alliance.
My fourth point is, I give credit to the administration
because I believe that this administration has been making
these points to the Europeans after Saint-Malo, mostly in
private. I was happy to see in Mr. Wayne's prepared statement
what they call the ``three D's,'' these criteria by which we
will judge what they are cooking up. They are: no duplication
of NATO functions; no decoupling or delinking; and no
discrimination against countries like Turkey, which are not in
the EU.
So I am happy that they are now doing this more publicly
because the United States should say these things publicly in
order to emphasize what we are concerned about. I would add
that the Congress too should express itself in some fashion to
indicate that we care a lot about whether these institutions
develop in a way that is consistent with NATO's integrity or
not. The Congress could do this in a ``sense of the Congress''
resolution or in some legislation. You would know better how to
do this.
If Congress did that, it would strengthen the
administration's hand as the administration tries to make these
points to the allies.
In addition, if the United States seems to be silent on
these points, this undercuts people in Europe, Atlanticists in
Europe, either in governments or in opposition parties, who
have the same concerns. I know people in Europe who are worried
about the implications of some of these recent initiatives.
They would be demoralized if they thought the Americans were
being totally passive here.
So that that is an additional reason for us to make clear
that we care about how this evolves.
My fifth point is a word about Kosovo. Obviously, this is a
separate subject and a huge subject. But there is a connection
in two respects.
One is that the earlier hesitations about Kosovo had a lot
of influence on Tony Blair. It was last fall that Tony Blair
developed some of these ideas about an EU defense capability.
One of the arguments he made was: ``Look at how hesitant the
Europeans were as the Kosovo crisis developed. Look how we were
dependent on the United States, incapable of doing anything on
our own.'' He thought that should be remedied.
Now today we are at the other side of the coin. Whatever
one thinks about the wisdom of being there, I have to say that
once we are committed, now that we are committed, it is a test
of our effectiveness as a leader in Europe.
I pray that, whatever the administration is undertaking, we
should prevail. This is because if this effort should fail, if
we should fall on our faces, which is not inconceivable, and if
this American-led operation should somehow turn out to be
ineffective, one of the consequences of it could be to spur
some of these impulses that we have seen in Europe--to somehow
cut loose from us, to develop an institutional framework that
is not dependent on us. I am not sure how it would work. But
this would very much weaken our leadership in Europe on these
questions that we have been discussing.
So, obviously, there is a lot at stake in this Kosovo
operation. But one of the things at stake is really our
influence in Europe and the evolution of some of the things we
have been discussing here today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rodman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Peter W. Rodman
``nato and the european union's `common foreign and security policy' ''
Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee:
I want to commend the Chairman and this Subcommittee for holding
this hearing on a topic which is very important to American strategic
interests but which has received amazingly little public attention in
this country.
Our disputes with the European Union (EU) range over a variety of
topics, from bananas to American cultural exports to Middle East
policy. Many of these disputes go back years. But we are at an
important and historic new stage of Europe's integration, which is
bound to bring some further changes in the way Europe and America deal
with each other.
In my view, the problem in our relations goes deeper than the
specific disputes. Or, to put it another way, the disputes are now
exacerbated by a structural problem: Since the collapse of the Soviet
Union, and America's emergence as the sole superpower, Europe has
accelerated the process of its integration with the purpose, in large
part, of building a counterweight to what it sees as American
dominance. Europeans are quite explicit about it. This is my concern,
especially as Europe now moves from Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
toward a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). There is a greater
eagerness than ever before in Europe to be more of an equal to the
United States and to enhance its autonomy from the United States. To a
considerable degree, this is a natural and healthy phenomenon. Beyond a
certain point, it can do harm to vital common interests.
The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy is the subject I wish
to focus upon. Let me organize my comments around two propositions:
-- First, CFSP in a strict sense raises issues of procedure more than
it does of substance.
-- But, second, for better or worse, implicitly or explicitly,
Europe's relationship to the United States is at the heart of
what is being changed.
cfsp: procedure and substance
As the Europeans seek to develop their Common Foreign and Security
Policy, they like to cite a reputed complaint by Henry Kissinger that
``Europe'' didn't really exist until there was a single telephone
number he could call to find out what ``Europe's'' policy was.
The story is apocryphal. In fact, ironically, when Kissinger was in
office, his complaint was exactly the opposite.\1\ The Nixon
Administration intended 1973 to be the ``Year of Europe,'' when the
United States, after several years of preoccupation with the Soviet
Union, China, and Indochina, turned once again to revitalizing its
Alliance relations, and in an historic year when the European Community
(EC) was expanding from six members to nine, including Britain. The EC
in 1973 also launched its first experiment in foreign policy
coordination, designating the Foreign Minister who was in the rotating
chair of the Council of Ministers as its foreign policy spokesman. This
happened at the time to be the Danish Foreign Minister, Knut Borge
Andersen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown,
1982), pp. 700-707.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The procedure didn't work. Secretary Kissinger found the Danish
Foreign Minister an able and charming man, but, through no fault of his
own, not capable of negotiating with the United States. If the U.S.
Secretary of State asked a complicated question, the Danish Foreign
Minister couldn't answer without going back to Brussels and
renegotiating the EU consensus. If Kissinger asked another question, or
made a proposal, the same problem arose again. Meanwhile, while this
ritual continued, the United States was asked to sever its bilateral
communication with all the European nations that were its closest and
most important allies. The procedure died an unlamented death, which is
one reason that there were no further attempts at such a unified
foreign policy for nearly two decades.
The Maastricht Treaty of 1991 revived the idea of a Common Foreign
and Security Policy. Later this year, in accordance with the further
agreement at the Amsterdam Summit in 1997, a High Representative for
CFSP is to be appointed. He (or she) will likely be a senior person--
probably a retired politician rather than a professional diplomat or
civil servant. But it is not clear that he or she will be able to
escape the burdens of the unfortunate Mr. Andersen.
Leaving aside the unworkability of dealing with the United States
in this manner, there remains the strong concern of some major European
states that ``Mr. (or Mme.) CFSP'' should not have such autonomous
authority that it derogates from the national sovereignty that these
states are likely to insist upon for the foreseeable future in vital
matters of policy. The French, in particular, are far from being
federalists yet in the national security field.
In another sense, of course, Europe has long enjoyed a certain
coordination in its foreign policy. Many an EU or EC summit has made
pronouncements on foreign policy issues--the most famous, perhaps,
being the Venice Declaration on the Middle East in 1980. That document
insisted on a role for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in
the peace negotiations, at a time when the United States was firmly
conditioning such a role on the PLO's prior acceptance of UN Security
Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and of the existence of Israel, and its
renunciation of terrorism.
If a consensus exists on a topic, the EU can pronounce on it even
under pre-CFSP procedures. It already has an ambassador-level Middle
East envoy who keeps in contact with American counterparts on the Arab-
Israeli peace process. It has already taken unified positions of
complaint against a number of American actions, particularly our third-
country sanctions against Cuba, Libya, and Iran.
Thus, it is not yet clear whether the appointment of a ``Mr. (or
Mme.) CFSP'' will make a significant difference in the EU's ability to
``make'' foreign policy. The real question is what degree of consensus
will exist in Europe on what issues. Middle East policy, especially in
the Persian Gulf, may find the Europeans more united against us as time
goes on. This may vindicate the prediction of British Conservative
politician Michael Portillo, who said in January: ``The United States
didn't need the latest Iraq crisis to tell it that a European policy
based on consensus isn't going to be pro-American.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Michael Portillo quoted in New York Times, January 4, 1999, p.
A23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A great deal depends on Britain's pivotal role. As on many other
issues, the British have stood solidly with us in the whole series of
Iraq crises since the Gulf War, much to the frustration of other
Europeans who deplored, for example, last fall's U.S.-British bombing
of Iraq that Mr. Portillo referred to. The question is whether, over
time, Britain will be drawn more and more by the gravitational pull of
Europe to the point where a Prime Minister in the future will be more
reluctant to stick with the United States.
relations with the united states
The fundamental issue here is whether the new steps in European
integration are being driven by, and will in turn intensify, an impulse
to differentiate from the United States in substance. It is clear that
the Economic and Monetary Union is meant to create an economic
counterweight to the United States. Even so stalwart a friend of the
United States as Helmut Kohl declared in 1996 that Europe needed to
``unite our powers to realize our common interests,'' including to
``assert ourselves against the trade blocs of the Far East and North
America.'' \3\ All the more so the Common Foreign and Security Policy,
which Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok explicitly described last fall as
building a ``counterweight to the United States.'' \4\ The French, of
course, are even more passionate on this. French Foreign Minister
Hubert Vedrine has stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Helmut Kohl, address at Catholic University, Louvain, Belgium,
February 2, 1996, reprinted in Internationale Politik, Vol. 51, No. 8
(August 1996), pp. 82-84.
\4\ Wim Kok quoted in Der Standard (Vienna), October 27, 1998, p.
2.
Today there is one sole great power--the United States of
America. . . . When I speak of its power, I state a fact . . .
without acrimony. . . . But this power carries in itself, to
the extent that there is no counterweight, especially today, a
unilateralist temptation . . . and the risk of hegemony.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Hubert Vedrine, remarks at a conference of French ambassadors,
Paris, August 28, 1997.
Europe's role, he went on, was to be a ``factor of equilibrium'' to
ensure the emergence of a more ``multipolar'' international system.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The most significant recent development in CFSP is the Anglo-French
initiative, proclaimed at a summit last December in Saint-Malo, in
Brittany, to promote an EU defense capability. The wording of the
Saint-Malo declaration refers ambiguously but disturbingly to the
possibility of autonomous European military operations either ``within
NATO's European pillar or . . . outside the NATO framework.'' \7\ Both
the British and French governments have since sought to reassure the
United States that the primacy of the Atlantic Alliance will always be
respected.\8\ But, again, the British role is pivotal. The whole idea
was an initiative by Prime Minister Tony Blair first broached last
October, reversing Britain's long-standing opposition to such an EU
project. It was widely interpreted as a way for Britain to appear a
``good European''--indeed, in a field in which Britain could be a
natural leader in Europe--at a time when Britain was holding back from
the EMU. But now, in recent weeks, the Blair government has taken
preparatory steps to join the EMU. Thus, the UK is moving toward Europe
on both fronts. All this testifies to the strength of the gravitational
pull of Europe on this British government. The momentum of EU
institution-building is more powerful than that in the Atlantic
Alliance. Where will this lead?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Declaration on European Defense, UK-French Summit, Saint-Malo,
3-4 December 1998, reprinted in Survival, Spring 1999, pp. 23-24.
\8\ E.g., Tony Blair, ``It's Time to Repay America,'' the New York
Times, November 13, 1998, p. A29; French Minister of Defense Alan
Richard, ``The Future of the Atlantic Alliance,'' address at the 35th
Conference on Security Policy, Munich, February 6, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The jury is still out on this question, with respect to the EU
defense initiative. Measures taken by the Europeans to coordinate their
own defense efforts more effectively could have a great burden-sharing
benefit to the Alliance. This is something that Americans, and
particularly the Congress, should welcome.\9\ On the other hand, the
Berlin NATO Summit in 1996 developed a concept for autonomous European
military actions within the NATO framework, through such mechanisms as
Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) that could have U.S. logistical or
other support even if U.S. forces were not involved. The new Saint-Malo
concept is, of course, an EU concept, not a NATO one. How it fits into
or is linked to NATO is not yet clarified.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Kori Schake, Amaya Bloch-Lain3, and Charles Grant, ``Building a
European Defense Capability,''Survival, Spring 1999, pp. 20-40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a practical matter, the United States may have little to worry
about. The Europeans are shrinking their defense budgets with such
abandon that it will be a long, long time before they have an
autonomous capacity to act militarily without U.S. backing. So the odds
are that this EU concept will be empty without the constant involvement
of NATO. If managed wisely, it could all work out for the better.
However, the more that either EMU or CFSP has an anti-American
undercurrent, and the more that EU efforts seem to take a form that
tears at the integrity of NATO procedures, then concerns could only
mount in this country that damage is being done to the Alliance. If
NATO is thought by Europeans to be dispensable, the same idea might
catch on here (though I would think it a strategic disaster for the
United States as well as for Europe)
The Clinton Administration, I understand, has raised questions in
private with European governments about the meaning and direction of
Saint-Malo. It is right to do so. Its goal is, and should be, not to
block an important EU initiative but to focus on specific concerns that
could spell damage to NATO's integrity and efficiency. Administration
spokesmen can speak to this more authoritatively than I, but I
understand that they have stressed certain criteria that they call the
``3 D's'':
-- no duplication of NATO functions or personnel in any new EU
structures;
-- no decoupling of Europe from NATO; and
-- no discrimination against key allies (referring, e.g., to Turkey,
which would be excluded if the present Western European Union,
or WEU, of which it is an Associate Member, were to be
abolished and folded into the EU, of which it is not a member.)
Perhaps it is time for the Administration to speak out publicly on
these points, to make its concerns clearer at this important
informative stage. Certainly, the Congress could declare itself in the
same vein, in a ``sense of the Congress'' resolution or as part of
other related legislation. If not, our silence may only undercut those
Atlanticists in Europe, whether in governments or in opposition
parties, who are themselves worried about the implications of recent
initiatives.
kosovo
A final word on Kosovo. The issues discussed here are more
fundamental issues of transatlantic relations; they long antedate the
Kosovo crisis and will be with us long afterwards. But it is clear that
Kosovo has helped to drive recent developments. Prime Minister Blair,
in launching his initiative last fall, complained of how ``hesitant and
disunited'' the Europeans were over Kosovo, and of how inappropriate it
was for Europe always to have to wait for the (sometimes equally
hesitant) Americans.\10\ An EU defense capability was meant to remedy
this.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Prime Minister Tony Blair, address to the North Atlantic
Assembly, Edinburgh, November 13, 1998, p. 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kosovo, of course, is a huge subject in itself which I do not want
to belabor here. But, part of the stake we have in handling Kosovo
correctly lies in the impact that our actions might have on this
European impulse to develop the capacity for autonomous action. On the
one hand, encouraging our European allies to bear more of the
responsibility in the Balkans is the right thing; that's what we want.
On the other hand, if we fail to provide the degree of leadership or
support without which the NATO effort will fail, then we risk spurring
the wrong kind of reaction in Europe--a greater desire to cut loose
from us. That is not what we want.
If we wish to remain a leader in Europe and retain an influence
over events, we cannot abdicate. We must remain relevant to major
security challenges taking place there. A position of leadership
doesn't come for free.
I thank the Chairman and the members of the Subcommittee.
Senator Smith. Mr. Rodman, I agree with your assessment of
the potential consequences, not all good consequences, that
Kosovo could have on this transatlantic relationship if it
turns out badly. But it does seem to me that the Europeans are
wanting a win-win but may be going another way. As they talk
about a European defense initiative, they are all cutting their
military budgets. The technology gap between the United States
military and their own continues to widen.
I don't know how realistic this is or what our response
should be. Is there something in our response to them that
needs to change?
I sense very strongly when I go over there that they love
us and they hate us. There is a way around that, but that is
the body language if not the words.
Mr. Rodman. Well, we are schizophrenic, too, or maybe I am,
because I share what many Americans have always thought, the
idea that the Europeans should do more--that it is healthy, in
fact essential, that they improve their ability to act.
I have always thought that coordinating among themselves
was one way to improve their effectiveness, whether or not they
were willing to add to their budget. There is truth in that.
But we have always preferred that they do it in the NATO
framework, which is really the only serious security
organization in Europe, and that they not do anything that
tears at the integrity of the NATO procedure.
So my nervousness is that they are starting down a road of
an EU framework. You may be right that, as a practical matter,
they may never be able to do anything that is without us. I
mean, their ability to do anything in the future without us may
never materialize. Therefore, maybe we have nothing to worry
about.
But at the formative stage of something, it is important to
shape it, to make sure that they get it right, that this is not
something that tears away at the cohesion of NATO.
If it is within the framework of NATO, then more power to
them in every sense of that word. Since the 1996 Berlin NATO
decision, there is a framework that the alliance has worked out
to give the Europeans greater responsibility if they wish to
use it. Obviously, we should encourage that.
Senator Smith. The Germans now are saying nothing outside
of our boundaries in NATO without a mandate of the Security
Council--excuse me--the French are saying that. The Germans are
saying renounce first use of nuclear weapons.
These are fundamental doctrines, rather a change from those
fundamental doctrines that NATO has had. I don't expect our
country would ever use nuclear weapons to start a war, even
though we used them once to end a war.
How serious is this? Is this for domestic consumption? Are
they serious about this? If they are, I just have to say
publicly that I cannot imagine anything that would, in addition
to perhaps the consequence of NATO doing badly in Kosovo--I am
not saying that we will; I voted for it and I hope we will
win--but if you put on that an overlay of these challenges to
the fundamental nature of what NATO is, there could be a
stampede out of that alliance if they are not careful in how
they talk to us about that.
I wonder how real this is. Is it for domestic consumption
or are they serious about it?
Mr. Rodman. I think we will win these two debates. As for
the no-first-use debate, my impression is that it is domestic
politics in Germany, that it was part of the coalition treaty
of the parties that won. We have firmly rebuffed it, and we had
British and even French support. The other two nuclear powers
in NATO have no interest in this. So we have won that debate. I
think it is settled.
The U.N. mandate is a much tougher issue because there is
widespread support for it in Europe. The French and the Germans
and a lot of others like this idea that there should be some
restraint on the United States through the Security Council.
That issue is a central point, as you know, in the
Strategic Concept, so-called, that is being finished for the
NATO summit. I suppose by April, by next month, that will be
resolved. I suspect that there is a way to paper it over.
Our position is that, of course, we never will act in a way
inconsistent with the U.N. Charter, and case-by-case is the
American preference. I expect that we will stand firm on that
and it will be papered over in some way.
So maybe both of these issues will prove to be temporary
issues.
Senator Smith. If that is a serious proposal on their part,
that is going to meet with serious resistance among the
citizenry of the United States.
Mr. Rodman. The administration I think understands that.
Senator Smith. It will start with me. But I will be on the
majority side.
I would imagine all of you probably have opinions about
some of the ideas that you have heard discussed here, about the
statements of the others. If you want to offer opinions or
clarifications, I would enjoy hearing them.
Dr. Feldman.
Dr. Gardner Feldman. On this ESDI question, I think it is
important to look at all of the statements, beginning with Tony
Blair's statement in Potschach, which really started this, and
then Saint-Malo and then Fischer, Joschka Fischer also said,
first of all, that NATO is the unique organization for
collective security; and, second, that one of the reasons for
contemplating this obviously was perhaps to do it within the
NATO context, to have an effective European component, but also
to contemplate--and this was Blair, not Germans who started
this--but also to contemplate situations in which the United
States did not want to act.
So I don't think this should be construed as anti-American
or challenge to the United States. I think it is an effort to
be a partner. I think it is a very incipient effort. It has a
long way to go. But I think we have to commend that it is not a
challenge to the United States.
I think if we see it as a challenge to the United States,
then I think it could go in the wrong direction.
I agree that there wasn't the potential for it to become
something major. But I do think it is an effort to be a
partner.
On no first use, I think that was absolutely a domestic
issue. It was an issue within the Greens, that Fischer had to
give something within the party. I don't think we should
overplay that or exaggerate it. I think that the SPD, when
Scharping was here, the SPD has tried to tone this down.
I don't think it is a big issue.
On the U.N. mandate question, again, I don't think this is
an effort to try to contain the United States. I think this is
very much a question of German history and Germans wanting to
limit the exercise of military power for themselves, and that
it has to be in an international framework because of German
history.
I think those are points that I would like to add to what
has been suggested.
Senator Smith. Dr. Gedmin.
Dr. Gedmin. Senator, I would add a couple of remarks.
First of all, on ESDI and similar parallel movements, I
think it is fair to generalize that there are two schools in
Europe right now, in Western Europe, with lots of hybrids. But,
broadly speaking, there is the school that Peter Rodman
referred to--those Atlanticists who are of like mind who
believe that Europe should move from adolescence to
geostrategic partnership and adulthood and that it can be a
partner within the transatlantic framework. And we want to work
with them, we want to do everything we can to make sure that
tendencies do not move toward delinking and decoupling.
I do believe, however, though it is usually only the French
who say so openly and publicly, I find more and more West
Europeans who will say privately that we do want an EU which
creates a voice for us that is separate and distinct from the
United States so that when we choose, we can work in opposition
to the United States and move in our own direction.
Now, look--fair enough. They are free, democratic,
sovereign Nation-States. But let me use that as a segue to the
U.N. issue.
I had a German politician say to me recently--and it
contradicts what one of my colleagues has said--yes, it is
true. One of the reasons why we are so fond of using the U.N.
as the indisputable legal basis for use of force is because for
us littler guys, it can check the unilateralism of you bigger
guys. Then he added: I know that that is in our interest; but I
must confess, maybe it is not in yours.
Well, I am sure it is not in yours. I agree with you,
Senator, I think that's something we should massively resist.
I also think that what my colleague, Dr. Gardner Feldman,
said about Germany and history does play a role. But I don't
think anybody believes that the predominant issue of the day is
how do we check German military power and adventurism abroad.
In fact, most of our time is spent trying to tease them out
a little bit so that they will send a few medics with us here
and there.
Senator Smith. Interesting.
Mr. Rodman, do you have anything further to add?
Mr. Rodman. There are different scenarios which would test
whether this EU capability is a problem or not. The easy
scenario is a case where the Europeans want to do something on
their own and they have our blessing. This is the case that the
Berlin procedures contemplate, that maybe we would give
logistical support or they would be able to use NATO assets.
But it would be done with our blessing.
So it obviously fits into the NATO framework, and yet it
might be an autonomous European action.
The ``contingency that dare not speak its name'' is the
case where the Europeans want to do something and we don't like
it, we don't want it to happen.
Senator Smith. What might that be?
Mr. Rodman. Well, if it is in NATO and if the only
procedures that exist are in NATO, then they cannot do it. If
it is a truly independent capability--and I think you are right
to say the bottom line may be that they may never have this
capability--but if it is a truly autonomous and independent EU
capability, it would be totally free of dependence on the
United States, to put it politely.
That is the theological issue.
As a practical matter, we may never have to face that. I
mean, can you envision a case in Europe where they would want
to do something and we would violently object? I think our
interests are congruent enough, certainly in Europe, that it is
hard to imagine a case where that kind of conflict would
develop.
Senator Smith. I think back to the Suez Canal.
Mr. Rodman. Well, outside of Europe is different. That is
where a lot of cases do exist.
Senator Smith. That is the only thing that comes to my
mind.
Mr. Rodman. Well, Middle East contingencies are exactly the
category that would come to mind.
That is the test of all this. The question is, how much do
the Europeans now insist on having something that could evolve
in that direction, to give them that capability?
I think we ought to firmly steer it in the direction of
staying within the NATO framework, which has practical
advantages for everyone and obviously meets this concern.
Senator Smith. As you look at phase 2, if phase 2 becomes
necessary in Kosovo, meaning ground troops, and the Europeans
have proposed a presence of 20,000 troops with only 4,000 of
them being U.S. troops, is that a European effort to say we are
going to try to bear a bigger part of the burden?
Mr. Rodman. Yes, and I would give them credit for that.
Senator Smith. We should encourage that.
Mr. Rodman. Absolutely. I think this is a case where we
seem to be cooperating and having a common strategy. I hope it
is crowned with success.
Senator Smith. Let me pose a hypothetical.
Should a phase 2 become necessary, the Kosovars are 90
percent of the population of Kosovo. When the Serbs have lost
their military power to wage war, why shouldn't they be the
ground troops? Why shouldn't we arm them?
Mr. Rodman. If the NATO effort fails, the only other
leverage we have is the Kosovars themselves. It is an option
which I think our governments have chosen not to use. It is
what used to be the Nixon Doctrine--your first resort should be
to help people on the ground who are willing to fight for
themselves.
This is something we have chosen not to use. Therefore, we
are required to substitute NATO's military leverage, and we are
about to find out whether this is effective.
Senator Smith. I think that is going to be an interesting
debate in the U.S. Senate, should it come to that. I think we
have to hold out the possibility of ground troops. But,
frankly, I am hard-pressed to understand why we should ignore
the people who have a stake in this.
I said to Madeleine Albright yesterday and I said to Strobe
Talbott a minute ago on the phone, when you talk about
autonomy, you are talking about imposing a political
arrangement on an area that nobody supports anymore.
The Kosovars want independence. The Serbs want to dominate
Kosovo. And we are trying to say go back as you were. It does
not seem to me that that is an achievable political end.
So when you go and bomb someone, you have taken a side
there. I don't know whether you can go back to just saying hey,
we are neutral again after we have justly eliminated his
capacity to make war on his neighbors and destabilize this
area.
Mr. Rodman. I don't know whether the other allies would go
along with the strategy of arming the Kosovars. I just don't
know.
Senator Smith. My question is why not? What is the motive?
What is the European fear of the Kosovars?
What I am being told is that they don't want, they don't
necessarily like these Kosovar Albanians. They don't like them
coming into Germany. This is creating lots of tension in other
countries, all these refugees pouring out of the Balkans into
their country. Therefore, they don't want an independent
Kosovo.
Am I missing it?
Dr. Gedmin. I cannot fully and definitively explain it, but
I share your analysis. It is true. In Europe, there is less
sympathy for the Kosovars. Broadly, and I think also
disturbingly, if I may generalize, Senator, when Europe has
taken a lead in the Balkans in the last decade, frequently, not
always, it has had an inclination--``it,'' the Nation-States of
Western Europe--an inclination to lean toward traditional power
politics and associations with regional proteges. And, often,
when we have pushed very, very hard, or I believe we should
have pushed perhaps harder at times, to draw a distinction
between victim and aggressor, which is so important for any
kind of enduring peace settlement, the Europeans have been
fonder of leaning on the victim rather than the aggressor.
Now I don't know if that helps to explain or not.
Senator Smith. Yes.
Dr. Gedmin. The other thing I wanted to add as an
observation, if I may, is I hope that, whatever we do after
this initial phase of military bombing or air strikes, we
develop some sort of success strategy, which I don't think we
have. I hope that exit strategy, as important as it is, takes a
back seat. And I hope that bean counting over how many
soldiers, which is important, too, takes a back seat.
It seems to me that if we, the United States, believe that
stability and security in Southeastern Europe is in our
interest, and staving off a humanitarian catastrophe is just
and in our interest, the first and single criterion ought to be
how do we prevail. How do we guarantee a success?
I am very doubtful that we have such a success.
I am interested--I have not thought deeply about it--but I
am interested in your idea of arming the people, as we tried to
do in Bosnia, by the way. The idea was let's level the playing
field to create a deterrence so that the Slavic Muslims can
defend themselves.
I am keenly interested in your idea not only as an interim
solution, but it seems to me, by the way, that any solution
like that has to be--and I am going to be quite politically
incorrect on this--has to be part of a larger and a longer-term
strategy aimed at the source of the problem. And we know the
source of the problem has a name and an address.
I would venture to guess that, whether Milosevic comes to
the table of not in 1, 2, or 3 weeks, as long as he and this
regime is in power, you and your colleagues will be discussing
the problem in the Balkans in one form or another next year and
the year after. I believe that.
Senator Smith. My big fear, once a decision is made to pull
the trigger, is that they don't finish the job. Frankly, what
that means to me is removing Mr. Milosevic's capacity to wage
war on his neighbors and his own citizens.
Now beyond that, how democracy takes hold and how they
develop in Kosovo and Serbia is really their business. But it
is our business that this is occurring in the backyard of our
international commitments. It is in our interest to make sure
that he does not continue to foster regional instability.
I mean, he sits geographically among our NATO allies. I
just would hate to see the administration do half the job. That
is what I have said to them and I hope they follow through
because a lot is at stake in this.
If we mishandle Kosovo, it will have long-term implications
for the willingness of the American people to support NATO and
to support our continuing leadership of the Free World. I think
a big debate has erupted in the homes of Americans all over our
country.
Thank you all for your testimony and your comments. It has
been very enlightening for me and I am grateful to you.
Dr. Gardner Feldman. Thank you, Senator Smith.
Mr. Rodman. Thank you.
Dr. Gedmin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Smith. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:13 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
-