[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE POLITICAL FUTURES OF INDONESIA AND EAST TIMOR
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
__________
SEPTEMBER 9, 1999
__________
Serial No. 106-68
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
61-319 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
DANA ROHRABACHER, California SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PETER T. KING, New York PAT DANNER, Missouri
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South BRAD SHERMAN, California
Carolina ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MATT SALMON, Arizona STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
AMO HOUGHTON, New York JIM DAVIS, Florida
TOM CAMPBELL, California EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
KEVIN BRADY, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BARBARA LEE, California
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
GEORGE P. RADANOVICH, California JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff
------
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska, Chairman
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
PETER T. KING, New York ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South Samoa
Carolina MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
MATT SALMON, Arizona SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
JOHN McHUGH, New York ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina JIM DAVIS, Florida
PAUL GILLMOR, Ohio EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
Mike Ennis, Subcommittee Staff Director
Dr. Robert King, Democratic Professional Staff Member
Matt Reynolds, Counsel
Alicia A. O'Donnell, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
----------
WITNESSES
Page
The Honorable Thomas R. Pickering, Undersecretary for Political
Affairs, U.S. Department of State.............................. 08
Ambassador Paul Wolfowitz, Dean, School of Advanced International
Studies, Johns Hopkins University.............................. 31
Dr. Donald K. Emmerson, Senior Fellow, Asia/Pacific Research
Center, Stanford University.................................... 36
Ms. Sidney Jones, Executive Director, Asia Division, Human Rights
Watch.......................................................... 40
APPENDIX
The Honorable Craig Thomas, a U.S. Senator from Wyoming.......... 54
The Honorable Doug Bereuter, a Representative in Congress from
Nebraska....................................................... 55
The Honorable Benjamin Gilman, a Representative in Congress from
New York....................................................... 59
The Honorable John Kerry, a U.S. Senator from Massachusetts...... 61
The Honorable Alcee Hastings, a Representative in Congress from
Florida........................................................ 63
The Honorable Eni Faleomavaega, a Delegate in Congress from
America Samoa.................................................. 65
The Honorable Tomas R. Pickering, Undersecretary for Political
Affairs, U.S. Department of State.............................. 68
Dr. Donald K. Emmerson, Senior Fellow, Asia/Pacific Research
Center, Stanford University.................................... 77
Ms. Sidney Jones, Executive Director, Asia Division, Human Rights
Watch.......................................................... 82
THE POLITICAL FUTURES OF INDONESIA AND EAST TIMOR
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Thursday, September 9, 1999
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,
Committee on International Relations,
Jointly with U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Bereuter
[Chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific]
presiding.
Mr. Bereuter. The joint Subcommittee hearing will come to
order. Ordinarily, we would like to wait for our first witness,
but because there has been a vote called in the Senate, I am
going to defer to former House Member, Senator Craig Thomas,
who chairs the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, so
he can make an opening statement. Thank you, Senator Thomas for
co-chairing this hearing. The gentleman from Wyoming is
recognized.
Senator Thomas. My pleasure. Thank you very much for having
this hearing and including us in it.
There is a present crisis in East Timor. I will keep my
statement brief so we can get on with the witnesses. This is
apparently only the second time in about 15 years the
Subcommittees of the House and Senate Foreign Relations have
held a joint hearing. In fact, the joint hearing was on China
in 1996. And so I believe that sort of underscores the
seriousness that we both take at the current situation.
Indonesia is one of the most important and, regrettably,
overlooked countries in Southeast Asia. The world's fourth
largest country, Indonesia is the keystone in the regional
stability and a guiding force in ASEAN's growing importance.
Despite tremendous internal economic difficulties, the country
has undertaken some admirable series of political reforms which
has culminated in the first democratic election in 40 years.
On the topic of East Timor, the government has taken a big
step by allowing a plebiscite with the possible outcome of East
Timor becoming independent. I have generally been a supporter
of Indonesia as Chairman of the Subcommittee, have tried to
recognize not just its shortcomings as some do, but its
accomplishments as well, but the crisis in Timor threatens to
put all that Indonesia has achieved in jeopardy.
To avoid that outcome, the Indonesian government needs to
act and act now, forcefully, decisively, and unequivocally, to
quell the violence in East Timor. The Indonesian military needs
to make it absolutely clear that it is not condoning or
assisting the militias, explicitly or implicitly, and move
quickly to restore order. Then both the government and the
military need to move forward with implementing the outcome of
the recent plebiscite.
I believe that Indonesia has the ability to do this. The
question is whether it has the will. If it does not act and
soon, then it may be necessary to pursue measures in Congress
and the U.N. aimed at causing Indonesia to live up to its
responsibilities. I would support some form of international
peacekeeping force if Indonesia does not act. I do not believe,
however, that the United States should be prominently involved
as we already are shouldering a number of peacekeeping burdens
throughout the globe. We do not need to add East Timor to this
list.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have to run, but I shall return
because I am interested in your panel.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you very much, Senator Thomas.
[The prepared statement of Senator Thomas appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Bereuter. The Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, as
noted, meets with the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific
Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today to
receive testimony on the political futures of Indonesia and
East Timor in the aftermath of the vote for independence by an
overwhelming majority of East Timorese. As mentioned by our
colleague Senator Thomas, it is uncommon for us to hold joint
hearings between the two Houses, but these are uncommon times
in Indonesia, to say the least.
I want to welcome our Senators on their return from their
vote.
In the wake of the vote in East Timor, both Indonesia and
East Timor face a future filled with portent. For Indonesia,
the referendum comes at a time of very sensitive political
maneuvering and fragile economic recovery. When the
Subcommittee last held hearings on Indonesia on May 12, 1999,
we were anxiously awaiting the June 7 national election.
Despite some violence, a very slow vote count, and a limited
amount of election irregularities, that election was,
nonetheless, judged by the international community to be a
success. It buoyed optimism about Indonesia's ability to
overcome its profound political and economic crises.
However, this election also created new complexities. No
one party achieved a majority, and, in fact, the opposition
PDIP, led by Megawati Sukarnoputri, won a plurality of the
vote. Therefore, for the first time in modern Indonesian
history, political coalitions will need to be formed to elect a
new president, to form a new government, to carry out further
economic and political reforms, to address the subject of
rescinding the 1976 law which integrated East Timor into
Indonesia as its 27th province, and to address separatist
sentiments in other parts of Indonesia such as Aceh. Indeed,
this is a new experience for these relatively immature
political forces. How they carry out their responsibilities
will determine how legitimate the new government will be viewed
in the eyes of the Indonesian public and of the international
community.
Of course, the most obvious and immediate test is the
crisis in East Timor. After years of Indonesian intransigence,
President Habibie took bold steps toward resolving this
longstanding problem. In January, he seemingly brushed aside
the reservations of the military and surprised the world by
offering the people of East Timor an opportunity to determine
their own future through the ballot box. Many of us were
encouraged by this bold and positive development. There was,
perhaps, a general sense of guarded optimism prompted by the
assurances of President Habibie and Armed Forces Chief General
Wiranto that Jakarta would maintain order and create an
environment conducive for a fair and safe election. That,
however, proved not to be a realistic assessment.
Despite increased violence and intimidation by Indonesian
military-supported militias in the recent East Timorese
elections, a record 98.6 percent of registered voters turned
out to vote, with 78 percent of them apparently choosing
independence. The will of the East Timorese people is clear,
and it is overwhelming.
It is evident by the horrific events in East Timor over the
past week that the Indonesian government, and in particular the
Indonesian military, has been deliberately unwilling or,
perhaps in some cases, unable to uphold its responsibility to
provide peace and security. I emphasize that this is
Indonesia's responsibility. Indonesia demanded this
responsibility from the United Nations, and the international
community entrusted it to Indonesia. It is reported that the
United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan has made very
strong representations to the Indonesian government about its
obligations and about the negative consequences Jakarta could
face from the international community for jeopardizing the
integrity and the subsequent implementation of the expressed
citizens' desires of this U.N.-sponsored election.
While reports to date have been negative, we all should
hope and insist that the recent imposition of martial law in
East Timor is a sincere effort to restore order. Martial law
should be used to disarm and disband the militias and to
provide genuine protection to the people of East Timor. This is
the obligation of Indonesia until the transition to
independence is complete and the responsibility for security
and protection of civil liberties is then transferred to the
United Nations. Indeed, that is all the more reason for the
United Nations not to completely withdraw from East Timor and
thus to ensure that Indonesia fulfills its responsibilities.
I have just returned from Australia where I participated in
high-level discussions with the Australian Foreign Minister,
the Defense Minister, and all of the key parliamentary leaders.
I want to commend Australia for its willingness to take the
lead in efforts to appropriately respond to this crisis and for
its readiness to send military forces under U.N. auspices, if
necessary, to East Timor. I hope that a U.N. force is not
necessary.
While I believe that the United States should work closely
with her Australian allies and others to address the needs that
they may have should the deployment of foreign forces to East
Timor occur, I strongly believe that any effort in the Congress
or by the Administration to deploy American ground forces in
East Timor is extremely premature. Given the way that the
Administration effectively bypassed Congressional involvement
in its decisions to deploy armed forces to conflicts in Bosnia
and Kosovo, it is incumbent on the Administration that it now
consult closely with the Congress before it considers any acts
to deploy any U.S. military forces in East Timor.
Unfortunately, it appears that some political forces in
Jakarta may be trying to manipulate this crisis to strike at
their political opponents or enhance their political standing
with a view toward the upcoming November presidential elections
in the People's Consultative Assembly. It is time for the
Indonesians to put politics aside. The continuing crisis in
East Timor is putting the future of Indonesia and its standing
in the international community at grave risk. They should
understand that reality.
While previous Congressional actions focused on East Timor
have largely had counterproductive results--they have resulted
in us losing overall access and leverage in Indonesia,
particularly the Indonesian military--the U.S. nonetheless
remains a key element in Indonesia's economic recovery
strategy. One very important point of leverage remains, and,
accordingly, I join many of my colleagues in warning Jakarta
that Congressional support for pending and future IMF and World
Bank resources to Indonesia are at grave risk unless acceptable
order is restored in East Timor. At risk, too, is the foreign
investment and capital that Indonesia so desperately needs for
economic growth and recovery. The leadership in Indonesia only
needs to look at what the world markets are saying and then to
focus on the sharply negative drop in the value of Indonesia's
currency. That should tell the leadership to properly restore
order in East Timor now.
While the tragedy in East Timor has dominated the headlines
and directly affects Indonesia's international credibility and
status, we cannot let it be the only factor influencing our
policy toward Indonesia. Since President Suharto resigned 16
months ago, Indonesia has taken large strides toward the
establishment of a more open and more genuinely democratic
political system. The importance of this development is not as
widely appreciated as it should be in the United States, for,
among our citizens, it is the least well-known large nation. I
could go into some detail about its importance in the region,
its size, and its previous positive actions in the region, but
I think my colleagues are well aware of those contributions.
I am pleased today that we will have the opportunity to
hear from both the Administration and a distinguished panel of
private witnesses. Testifying for the Administration will be
the Honorable Thomas R. Pickering, the Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs. It should be noted that Ambassador
Pickering is presently serving as acting Secretary of State in
Secretary Albright's absence. Ambassador Pickering has a very
long and distinguished career in the Foreign Service, as all of
you know in great detail.
We are honored to have an excellent second panel of
distinguished witnesses, Ambassador Paul Wolfowitz, presently
Dean of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns
Hopkins University, and formerly Ambassador to Indonesia.
Dr. Donald Emmerson is a senior fellow at Stanford
University's Asia/Pacific Research Center and a University of
Wisconsin-Madison Professor of Political Science and Southeast
Asian studies. He just returned from East Timor, having been
there to monitor last week's election with the Carter Center.
Finally, we welcome Ms. Sidney Jones, the Executive
Director of the Asia Division of Human Rights Watch. Ms. Jones
is a longtime observer of Indonesia, and her insights are
invaluable.
I did think I should first set the atmosphere here and next
to turn to my colleague, Tom Lantos, the Ranking Member of the
Asia and Pacific Subcommittee, and then to the Chairman of the
Full Committee Mr. Gilman for statements that they might like
to have. Then, I hope that we can proceed, Ambassador
Pickering.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bereuter appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Bereuter. Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
commend you both for calling this hearing and for the exemplary
manner in which you have Chaired this Committee on Asia.
I would like to begin my observations in what I think will
be a somewhat surprising manner. Whenever we don't deal with
human rights issues when they first emerge, later on we will be
forced to deal with them under far less favorable and far more
serious circumstances. When we of the Congressional Human
Rights Caucus initially dealt with Kosovo, nobody knew the name
Kosovo, but we have come to learn the name Kosovo at an
enormous cost in treasure and in human life.
May I say that there is a parallel between the lack of
interest in the Congress in Kosovo 15 years ago and the
preoccupation with Kosovo in the last year and the lack of
interest in East Timor in years gone by and the sudden interest
today. It was the Congressional Human Rights Caucus which held
the first hearing on the persecution of the East Timorese, and
I suspect that if we could arouse early interest on the part of
our colleagues across the spectrum in dealing with human rights
outrages in the early stages, we will not be confronted with
these crises.
Now, what about this crisis? This crisis, Mr. Chairman, is
of Indonesia's making. I hold the Government of Indonesia fully
responsible for precipitating this crisis, and I hold Indonesia
fully responsible for the outrage which is unfolding as we
meet. It is perfectly clear that the Indonesian military has
the resources to put an end to the rampaging militias overnight
if they choose to do so, and I think they need to be put on
notice that it is their responsibility, and if they don't act
promptly, there will be long-term and devastating consequences.
It is their responsibility to see to it that the bloodshed, the
looting, the pillaging, the burning, the gangsterlike behavior
must come to an end. The top military leader, Mr. Wiranto, has
the capability of bringing this crisis to an end overnight. I
call on him to do so.
Mr. Chairman, our Administration has been exemplary in its
attempt to advise President Habibie, the military, and others
that they need to prevent this outrage from unfolding. It is
simply not true, as some claim, that we have not cautioned the
Government of Indonesia to prevent what was a predictable
outburst of violent behavior.
You mentioned that 98.6 percent of the people of East Timor
voted, and this is a tremendous tribute because they were under
horrendous pressure and intimidation and physical assault not
to participate in the election. And 78.5 percent of them voted
in favor of independence. A more ringing endorsement for
independence you could never get. Yet the militia, supported by
some elements of the Indonesian military, the official
military, is now attempting to undo the results of a relatively
free and open election, and I underscore relatively, because
the people of East Timor were intimidated and harassed.
I think it is absolutely critical that the community of
civilized nations insist that the results of this election
remain. They cannot be undone by violence on the part of the
militias and segments of the military. I think it is equally
important that humanitarian organizations, non-governmental
organizations, intergovernmental organizations have immediate
access so they can conduct their humanitarian work in East
Timor.
I think it is extremely critical, Mr. Chairman, that the
Indonesian government take full responsibility for restoring
order. If, in fact, we should need an international force, I
want to pay tribute to Australia for its forthcoming stand on
this matter, and I think we should, in fact, give full support
to an international force under U.N. auspices.
I also believe that we need to recognize that the
overwhelming bulk of the Indonesian people are not responsible
for this outrage, and I think at this stage to advocate
terminating aid that help the most needy, the poorest, the
destitute who have suffered so much in Indonesia would be a
mistake. There was no social safety net in Indonesia when the
Asian economic collapse came, and I want to pay tribute to both
the U.N. and the World Bank for moving in an effective way of
providing some kind of a safety net. So however well-
intentioned calls are for immediately terminating all
assistance to Indonesia, I think saner heads will have to
prevail. We don't want to punish destitute people in Java and
Sumatra for the outrages of the militia in East Timor. We need
to deal differently with structural long-term aid. We need to
deal differently with IMF funding. But I think the humanitarian
assistance on which millions of Indonesians outside of Timor
are depending for their daily survival must be continued.
I look forward to hearing from Secretary Pickering. I want
to commend you again for holding this hearing.
Mr. Bereuter. Mr. Lantos, I thank you very much for your
strong statement. We may have some minor points of discussion
on how we use any leverage we have with the IMF, but I think as
usual, and not surprisingly, we should be able to approach this
in a strong bipartisan fashion.
I would like now to call upon the Chairman of the Full
Committee and then, as a matter of equity, upon Mr. Gejdenson,
the Ranking Member of the Full Committee.
Mr. Bereuter. Mr. Gilman.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
Chairman Bereuter for holding this very timely hearing today at
this appropriate time. I want to welcome our Senate colleagues
who are here from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We
welcome you to the House, and we welcome you to our Committee.
All of us are very troubled by the deteriorating situation
in East Timor. I am troubled by the Administration's response
to this situation. I hope that Secretary Pickering who is here
with us today will be able to supply answers to some of the
questions that we have.
It appears that we are abrogating our Nation's leadership
in Southeast Asia, and I am greatly concerned by that prospect.
Some questions that I hope our witnesses can answer will be,
how is the so-called ``Clinton Doctrine'' going to be applied
to East Timor, and has our Nation ruled out the use of American
troops in a peacekeeping force? Is there a double standard for
Europe and the rest of the world? And why is the Administration
not taking a more leading role in resolving this crisis which
occurs in a region of the world enormously significant to our
national security interests--a nation that has the fourth
largest population in the world? And why is the Administration
not calling for an immediate review of current international
financial assistance to Indonesia? And why hasn't the
Administration called for the immediate cessation of bilateral
military assistance to Indonesia? Hopefully our witnesses today
can help provide some answers to these questions.
Our Nation should coordinate its approach to the East Timor
crisis with our allies in the region. It is inappropriate to
limit American options at this point, particularly economic
sanctions and American participation in peacekeeping
operations. The Government of Indonesia should be convinced to
shoulder its responsibilities in this crisis.
What is happening in East Timor today is nothing short of
ethnic cleansing. The scorched earth policy of these marauding
gangs must be stopped and stopped quickly. Genocide and the
specter of civil war loom. The Indonesian government must act
quickly to restore order to the island and end another tragic
episode in East Timor's history. There could be grave
consequences for Indonesia's relations with our Nation and the
international community if the appropriate steps are not
undertaken to control renegade police militias and the armed
forces. As a last resort, the international community should be
prepared to assist in the restoration of order to stop this
kind of senseless violence against the East Timorese.
Patience with Jakarta's promises is wearing thin. I call
upon the Government of Indonesia to abide by its commitment to
respect the results of the referendum and the rights of the
East Timorese to a peaceful transition to independence. And
when the situation stabilizes, I am going to urge the
Administration to provide ample humanitarian assistance to the
long-suffering people of East Timor. President Clinton should
not limit American policy options. It only diminishes our
ability to lead. East Timor may be a small island in Southeast
Asia, but the United States does have a moral imperative to
prevent another genocide in this strategically important part
of the world.
Mr. Chairman, I understand you will be taking the lead in
crafting legislation to deal with this crisis, and I look
forward to working with you on that. I look forward to the
testimony of Secretary Pickering and the other distinguished
panelists who are here today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Chairman Gilman.
[The prepared questions referred to appear in the
appendix.]
Mr. Bereuter. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Connecticut, Mr. Gejdenson, the Ranking Member of the Full
Committee.
Mr. Gejdenson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join with my
colleagues, and I know I join with the Administration, in
urging the Indonesian government to act swiftly. I know,
contrary to the implication of today's Washington Post story,
my conversation with Mr. Berger yesterday evening indicated
that he and the Administration were pressing the Indonesians,
both the government, military and nonmilitary there, to take
every and immediate action to bring this violence to an end. It
will endanger Indonesia's economic recovery and political
reintegration into the world community if this situation isn't
resolved immediately. I certainly, again, unlike the story in
the Washington Post, in my conversation yesterday with Mr.
Berger, got the indication Mr. Berger felt that it was
imperative that the Indonesians immediately take this action
and that the world community needs to respond as quickly as
possible. I think we have a unanimimity of opinion here that is
seldom seen in Washington about the situation in East Timor.
I am glad to see Mr. Pickering here to express the
Administration's opinion today.
Mr. Bereuter. I thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.
Mr. Bereuter. All Members' opening statements will be made
a part of the record without objection.
I want to recognize Senator Thomas' statement began this
session. He has returned for a vote. We have been joined by
Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska and Senator Paul Wellstone of
Minnesota. Congressmen Brian Bilbray has also joined us. He not
a Member of the Committee but has important knowledge and
personal interest in the area. We welcome all of you gentlemen
to this joint hearing.
Mr. Bereuter. Ambassador Pickering, you may proceed as you
wish.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS R. PICKERING, UNDER SECRETARY FOR
POLITICAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Pickering. Mr. Chairman, Senators, Members of the
House, thank you very much for receiving me today and for
holding this unusual joint hearing to discuss Indonesia and the
disturbing developments in East Timor. I want to apologize for
being a few minutes late. Apparently this and other hearings
are very popular today, and getting into the building is
somewhat slower than normal.
I come before you under grave circumstances with the fate
of the territory of East Timor still very much in question. The
devastating events of the past few days in East Timor compel us
to begin today with that very important subject. Because of the
complexity of this problem, I ask your indulgence in allowing
me to make a full statement.
Before turning to the specifics of what is happening on the
ground, I think it is important for all of us to put East Timor
in perspective by reminding everyone of where this crisis is
taking place. East Timor, as you know, occupies half of an
island in the vast Archipelago of Indonesia at the eastern
extremity. Indonesia, as we all know, is the world's fourth
most populous nation and home to the world's largest Muslim
population. It is resource-rich, spans some of the most
strategic waterways in the world, and plays a significant key
role in political and economic stability in Southeast Asia, a
region in which the United States has great economic and
strategic interests. What happens to Indonesia thus matters to
the region, and it matters to the United States.
This, Mr. Chairman, makes the current crisis in East Timor
doubly troubling, for it is clear that Indonesia's handling of
East Timor will have an enormous impact on its ability to
maintain cooperative relations with the international
community. But Indonesia's future is solely in its own hands
right now. This is a crisis of its making, and only Indonesia
can decide to do the right things right now.
With that as my preface, let me turn to the events of the
past week and a half. As is known to the Members of these
Subcommittees and indeed to the whole world, hundreds of
thousands of East Timorese defied months of intimidation by
military-backed armed prointegration militias to express their
opinion on East Timor's future status in the United Nations-
administered election on August 30. Over 78 percent of the
voters rejected Jakarta's autonomy plan in favor of a future
independent of Indonesian rule. While the balloting took place
without major incident, prointegration militias fomented
violence before the vote and reacted even more violently almost
immediately after the voting ended.
The situation deteriorated further after the results were
announced on September 3, with militia groups targeting
foreigners, including journalists, for intimidation, leading
most of them to flee the island. They also forced thousands of
people from their homes or places of refuge, trucking them off
to locations and fates still unknown, a very worrying
development for all of us.
The militias have attacked concentrations of internally
displaced persons and set siege to the homes and offices of
prominent community leaders, burning down the home of Nobel
Laureate Bishop Belo. They are now attempting to drive out the
remainder of the United Nations Mission in East Timor, UNAMET,
as well as Australian diplomats and representatives of
nongovernmental organizations present in the island. As these
appalling events have unfolded, the Indonesian military, the
TNI, formerly ABRI, and the police appear to have either stood
by or indeed supported the militias.
Through successive stages of the consultation process in
East Timor, initial deployment and preparations, registration,
the campaign period and the vote itself, the Government of
Indonesia has been increasingly unwilling, and perhaps in some
cases unable, to live up to the commitments it made under the
May 5 agreements with the United Nations and with Portugal. In
those agreements, the Indonesians clearly assumed
responsibility for maintaining security in the territory and
for the United Nations Mission. Despite these agreements and
subsequent assurances from Indonesia, Indonesian authorities
have never firmly controlled the militias and established
security in East Timor. Moreover, it is now well-established
that elements of the military have backed, encouraged and
perhaps even directed some of the barbaric militia activities.
President Habibie's declaration of a military emergency in
East Timor on September 6 has not really improved the
situation. Defense Minister General Wiranto has sent additional
troops to East Timor, but these reinforcements have failed to
rein in the militia despite the fact that the militias are a
far inferior force.
The United States has frequently and forcefully expressed
its grave concerns about rampant militia activity and
repeatedly urged the Indonesian government at all levels to
fulfill its security obligations. The public record is clear
and voluminous. Our diplomatic efforts have been equally
aggressive. President Clinton has communicated American
concerns directly and personally to President Habibie. He has
conferred with the leaders of Australia, Portugal and other
countries. He has talked to the Secretary General of the United
Nations. Secretary Albright has conveyed our views to President
Habibie and to Foreign Minister Alatas in several telephone
conversations and in face-to-face meetings. She has also spoken
directly to General Wiranto. Secretary Cohen has sent two
letters to General Wiranto about East Timor. Stanley Roth,
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, and our Ambassador in Jakarta, Stapleton Roy, have
repeatedly and insistently delivered the same unambiguous
messages to all senior Indonesian leaders. Both General
Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Vice
Chairman General Ralston have telephoned General Wiranto
several times over the course of this crisis. Admiral Blair,
Commander in Chief of the Pacific Area Command, who questioned
General Wiranto about the situation in East Timor on his
initial visit to Indonesia, just met with Wiranto earlier this
morning to make clear the severe consequences of Indonesia's
failure in East Timor in terms of its relations with the
international community and particularly the United States. The
United States has worked in the U.N. Security Council as well,
and with the Secretary General of the United Nations, and the
United States is supporting an early meeting of that body to
discuss the evolving situation.
Despite all of these efforts, East Timor is still a
territory under siege.
The United States calls for an immediate stop to the
killing and destruction in East Timor. The Government of
Indonesia has had ample opportunity and the capability to
achieve this. The time has clearly come for Indonesia to invite
international assistance to restore peace and stability to the
territory. A number of concerned countries have expressed
willingness to participate in a multinational force under
United Nations auspices authorized by the U.N. Security
Council. Such a force would protect the remaining United
Nations presence, create conditions for return of the full
United Nations Mission, and provide security for the United
Nations to carry out its mandate to implement the clear results
of the consultation, as the referendum is known. United Nations
Secretary General Annan first proposed this option to President
Habibie earlier this week.
We welcome and are grateful for the leadership role played
by the Government of Australia, which shares our perspectives
and concerns about the situation in East Timor and Indonesia.
Our Australian allies have requested that we consider
assistance to a multinational force, and we are indeed prepared
to help. While the President has made no decisions as to what
kind of support the U.S. would be willing to provide, any
decision would be made in close consultation with you, the
Members of the Congress. The nature of U.S. participation under
current discussion was how we could bring our special
capabilities to bear in providing material support. Among other
issues, we have been discussing with our friends and allies
logistical support, lift, planning, communications and other
areas where we bring significant capacities to the table.
However, I must emphasize that our discussions are preliminary
and subject to consultation here.
Again, let me reiterate that we are prepared to support
such an effort in a material way. You might ask me if in a
material way I mean would Americans be present on the ground to
carry out such tasks as the President might agree to. My answer
to that would be yes.
We have made no decisions now, but we expect to work
closely with you in the Congress as this process unfolds. While
we are prepared to contribute to this mission, to date the
Indonesians are still unwilling to accept international
assistance. Meanwhile, conditions on the ground, as I have just
noted, have not measurably improved.
To demonstrate our profound concern, I would like to
announce that the United States is suspending its military-to-
military relationship with Indonesia. It would be inappropriate
to have operational military contact given the TNI's
culpability in this tragedy. Admiral Blair informed General
Wiranto of this development when they met earlier this morning.
As I said at the outset of my testimony, how the Indonesian
government deals with the challenges of East Timor will have
implications for the international community's ability to
engage with Indonesia, including support for Indonesia's
economic program. The situation in East Timor is already having
a damaging effect on the confidence that is so necessary and
important for economic recovery, and will have significant
implications for the capacity of the international community,
including the United States, to support economic reform going
forward.
Some in Indonesia and within the pro-integration camp in
East Timor claim that the result of the August 30 vote is
invalid, blaming United Nations bias and fraud for the strong
rejection of Indonesia's autonomy plan. Let me take this
opportunity to make two statements. First, UNAMET has carried
out its mission with great professionalism and shown
determination and courage under the most difficult of
circumstances. Charges of bias and fraud are not credible given
that the overwhelming majority voted peacefully and openly to
separate themselves from Indonesia. This strategy of blaming
the United Nations and crying foul is not legitimate, and it
will not be accepted or tolerated by the international
community.
Second, I understand that the Governor of East Timor,
Abilio Soares, has made recent statements to the press
declaring his intention and that of his followers to seek to
partition East Timor into a western and eastern half in order
for pro-Indonesia groups to retain control of the western
portion of East Timor. The August 30 vote has clearly
demonstrated the will of the East Timorese people. There is no
legal, historical or moral basis for a strategy of partition.
Let me state categorically, this strategy is contrary to the
plans to which Indonesia has agreed and will also not be
tolerated by the international community.
Indonesia is a society struggling to transform itself into
a democratic Nation while recovering from a severe economic
recession. The United States has a profound interest in
assisting Indonesia to emerge from its current political and
economic crisis as a stable, prosperous and democratic nation.
It will be a tragedy for the Indonesian people as well as for
the East Timorese if the East Timor situation severely
constrains the willingness and ability of the international
community, including the United States, to work with Indonesia.
If Indonesia addresses the problem of East Timor in the manner
to which it originally agreed, it will substantially enhance
its ability to pursue effectively its economic and political
transformation. Conversely, continued failure to respond to the
will of the people of Timor in a process undertaken
independently by the Government of Indonesia and strongly
supported and financed by the international community will
substantially impair Indonesia's relations with the
international community and put at risk these critical
political and economic objectives.
Before moving on, Mr. Chairman, to Indonesia and its
overall political situation, let me take a moment to speak
about the special circumstances of East Timor. The United
Nations and the International community have long recognized
that East Timor had a unique colonial history, that a valid act
of self-determination would have been appropriate, and that
such an act did not take place in 1975 prior to Indonesian
annexation. This indeed makes East Timor different not only
from other provinces around the world, but also from other
provinces within Indonesia. While some Indonesian officials may
be concerned that permitting East Timor to separate could set
off independence movements in other parts of Indonesia, we
believe that humane and orderly management of the transition to
East Timorese independence, in cooperation with the
international community, could, instead, communicate clearly to
the various ethnic groups in Indonesia a reason to have a sense
of confidence in Indonesian leadership.
As you well know, Mr. Chairman, Indonesia is a society that
has been struggling to transform itself into a democratic
nation while recovering from a severe recession. It is a key
strategic country in the region, and the United States has a
profound interest in helping it to emerge from this transition
as a democratic, peace-loving and economically prosperous
state. It is important that we not lose sight of this context.
You will recall that after Suharto's resignation in May
1999, the Administration of President Habibie launched
ambitious and far-reaching steps toward a more democratic form
of government by lifting controls on the press, political
parties, labor unions and nongovernmental organizations. As a
result, in a remarkably short time civil society has opened up
in Indonesia to an unprecedented degree. While the foundations
of systemic reforms are being set by these changes, much
remains to be done. Entrenched institutions that reflect the
priorities of the authoritarian past still need thorough going
reform. These institutions include the military, police and
judicial systems. Corruption remains an extremely serious
concern for all of us.
The most tangible achievement to date in this democratic
transition was the nationwide elections for a new Indonesian
Parliament, DPR, which were held on June 7. Over 100 million
enthusiastic Indonesians participated. The opposition
Indonesian Democratic Party of Megawati Sukarnoputri gained the
greatest percentage of votes, and the ruling Golkar came in a
distant second. Other opposition parties also attracted
significant popular support in a fundamentally free and fair
election. The Indonesian people gave clear expression to their
desire for democratic change and reform. The United States
provided more than $30 million, joining in international
community efforts to support the June election.
We continue to call on President Habibie and other high-
level officials to ensure that each successive step in
Indonesia's political transition is taken in a free, fair and
transparent manner. We have strongly encouraged further
Indonesian reform through our assistance programs and by
consistently stressing Indonesia's responsibilities to respect
human rights, release political prisoners and protect the
rights and physical security of all minorities, including those
of ethnic Chinese Indonesians.
The next major political step for Indonesia will occur this
fall, probably in November, when the people's consultative
assembly, MPR, consisting of the 462 newly elected Parliament
Members, 38 military representatives and 200 appointed
provincial and functional representatives, will select a new
President and Vice President. Leading Presidential contenders
are seeking to build coalitions and form a working
parliamentary majority. This maneuvering is far from over. This
MPR will not resemble the almost wholly hand-picked legislative
bodies in the Suharto era of the past. However, with one-third
of the incoming MPR seats either indirectly elected or
appointed, we share the concerns of many Indonesians that the
process of selection of these Members must be transparent and
that their actions be considered legitimate by the people of
Indonesia. The process has strong implications for the future
stability of the country. Only if the people deem the process
of choosing the new national leader legitimate will Indonesia
have taken another credible step toward becoming the world's
third largest democracy.
It is important to keep in mind that the question of East
Timor has now become enmeshed in this larger political
transition. According to the May 5 tripartite agreements, the
MPR must endorse the result of the vote in East Timor before it
can begin its U.N.-administered transition to autonomy. As
such, various political actors are using the stage for
political advantage. Some key figures, including Ms. Megawati,
have made responsible statements accepting the outcome of the
ballot on Timor, calling on the military to stop abuses on the
ground, and expressing her willingness to work with an
independent East Timor. We commend Ms. Megawati's principled
and admirable stand in this respect.
The political and economic changes of the last 16 months
have come in an environment of increased civil disorder.
Political pressures growing out of rising expectations, the
economic desperation of the poor, breakdowns in law and order,
and longstanding sectarian and ethnic tensions have all
contributed to unrest in many parts of the nation. Popular
reaction to military abuses in Aceh, East Timor, Irian Jaya and
elsewhere in the country have sometimes led to violent
protests. In the past year, the government's record of
protecting minorities generally and in unique local situations
has been poor. Grassroots social, ethnic and religious
pressures exacerbated by continued economic dislocation and
eroding respect for police authorities remain intense and
explosive.
The security forces, the TNI, faced with street rallies,
demonstrations and riots, have reacted with violent suppression
in some cases and unresponsive inaction in others. Many
Indonesians believe that the TNI should cease to play a
political role under Indonesia's dual function system. Morale
has suffered. All these factors degrade the government's
ability to maintain order.
The causes of civil strife are various, but a significant
influence on civil order has been the sharp decline in the
economy. Indonesia was the Southeast Asian country hardest hit
by the Asian financial crisis. A dramatic economic collapse
beginning in early 1998 pushed the number of Indonesians living
below the poverty line from 20-28 million, making food and
other essential goods increasingly expensive for many.
Unemployment, combined with rising inflation, dramatically
reduced purchasing power. The United States responded to these
crises of a humanitarian character by providing Indonesia with
several hundred million dollars in food, humanitarian
assistance and development aid in the last two years.
The Indonesian government has been working with the
International Monetary Fund on an economic reform program since
the autumn of 1997. Indonesia's stabilization package provides
for unprecedented accelerated structural reforms in every
sector of the economy and major changes in the trade regime.
Indonesia has generally complied, but more effective corporate
and bank restructuring, which will be crucial to resumption of
sustainable growth rates, is necessary. Corruption and the lack
of transparency remain very significant problems for companies
doing business in Indonesia, and the Government of Indonesia
has stepped up efforts to address these concerns, but the
recent Bank Bali scandal in particular has shaken confidence in
the government's ability to make significant progress in this
area and will clearly impact negatively IMF decisions on future
disbursements. Indonesia's economy has been making a slow
recovery from the depths of the crisis last year. After
shrinking by 13 percent in 1998, GDP rose by 1.8 percent in the
second quarter of 1999, while in August 1999, annual inflation
fell to 5.8 percent, the lowest rate since 1997.
The economic recovery is slow and fragile. In addition,
Indonesia is faced with internal demands for a redistribution
of wealth from resource extraction, a concern which is
complicated by growing separatist sentiment in Aceh and Irian
Jaya.
Some make parallels between East Timor and another area of
separatist activity, Aceh. Sumatra's oil- and gas-rich
northernmost province is home to a long-standing separatist
movement that has grown in size and popularity over the past
year in reaction to past and current military abuses and the
lack of redress over economic grievances. But unlike East
Timor, Aceh is seen by all Indonesians and recognized by the
international community as an integral part of the Indonesian
state. Aceh has deep historical and cultural ties to Indonesia.
An independent Aceh threatens the very integrity of the
Indonesian state. The central government in Jakarta initially
tried some conciliatory steps, but Jakarta's response has since
been dominated by military actions which have only inflamed the
situation. The TNI, frustrated by losses to armed separatists,
has reportedly targeted civilians whom they claim are helping
the insurgents and has engaged in fresh atrocities. The United
States has pressed Jakarta to end the abuses and return to
dialogue in order to promote a political solution.
Several groups in the Irian Jaya province are pursuing
independence for what they term West Papua. They argue that
despite U.N. brokering of the process, the people of the region
never approved its incorporation into Indonesia, and the Papuan
people have been systematically oppressed by the Indonesians.
There is conflict between Indonesia's people and transmigrants,
Indonesians moved in from elsewhere in Indonesia. Over the
years, there have been regular reports of killings and rapes of
indigenous people in Irian's central highlands and elsewhere in
the province. Churches and the Indonesian Human Rights
Commission have documented these credible accounts of
widespread human rights abuses by security authorities. Irian
Jaya separatists, who also have economic grievances based on
low redistribution back to the province of profits from mining
and exploitation of other local resources, primarily press
their case through nonviolent means.
The United States has expressed concerns about human rights
abuses in Irian Jaya and has urged the Habibie Administration
to foster dialogue and negotiation. In February 1999, President
Habibie participated in a meeting with 100 representatives of
local civic leaders and leading Indonesian political figures in
accordance with a terms of reference for dialogue negotiated in
September 1998. The second dialogue meeting which was scheduled
to be held in July has yet to take place. Indonesian security
authorities reportedly have harassed the civil society's
leaders from Irian Jaya who attended the February meeting. The
government requires travel permits for journalists and
researchers wishing to visit Irian Jaya, which has delayed
investigation of reported human rights abuses.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, Indonesia has an historic
opportunity to transform itself into a democratic country. In
attempting to do so, it faces manifold and significant
difficulties. Its tragic handling of East Timor, the failure of
the Indonesian government to make good on its commitments and
its responsibility for the present diplomatic and humanitarian
disaster will have far reaching consequences and most
importantly for Indonesia itself. The Government of Indonesia
needs to right this wrong. If they cannot do so themselves, as
is already abundantly clear, they have a clear alternative, to
let the United Nations through a multinational force assist
them.
Even if the East Timor situation can be put back on track,
Indonesia's transformation will continue to be complicated. The
United States hopes to remain fully engaged to help see
Indonesia on a path to democracy, prosperity and stability. But
the bottom line is clear. The future is now in Indonesia's own
hands.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of both
Subcommittees, for allowing me to make such a lengthy
statement. I look forward to addressing your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pickering appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Bereuter. Ambassador Pickering, thank you for your
forthright and very important statement. I think it will help
inform the American public about the situation in East Timor
and about the prospects for Indonesia and American relations.
It will also provide the basis for some possible questions and
comments from my colleagues and, perhaps for a common policy
response to the crisis in East Timor between the Congress and
the Executive Branch.
I appreciate your effort today. Chairman Thomas is involved
in a particular amendment right now and will return as soon as
possible. It is our intention to proceed, and it is the
Chairman's intention to proceed under the 5 minute rule for
questions and comments from Members of the Joint Committee. In
a bicameral courtesy, I want to recognize first the
distinguished gentleman from Delaware, the Ranking Member of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Joseph Biden,
first for comments and questions that he might like to make
under the 5 minute rule.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Since we
don't have many grazing rights in Delaware, I am able to stay.
That is the issue we are debating right now. No cattle grazing.
We have other kinds of grazing rights but not those. I will be
very brief, hopefully not take the 5 minutes.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for your testimony. I have one
question. I have many, but I will limit it to one, and that is,
is anyone from the Australians to anyone else, including our
government, talking about an international force without a U.S.
mandate and without the invitation of Jakarta--the U.N., excuse
me, without a U.N. mandate--thank you very much--and without
Jakarta's permission, blessing, invitation?
Mr. Pickering. Senator Biden, to the best of my knowledge,
none of the countries in the category that you named is now
talking about an international force without a United Nations
mandate or a Jakarta invitation. I happen to think that a U.N.
mandate would not be possible today, at least without a Jakarta
invitation.
Senator Biden. China would veto any----
Mr. Pickering. I believe that is a significant possibility.
I don't want to make----
Senator Biden. You don't want to speak for China?
Mr. Pickering. I don't want to speak for China. I would
like to allow them room to make their own decision. I don't
want to put them in a box where they don't feel they belong if
I can put it that way.
Senator Biden. Does the Administration think there should
be any outside force introduced if Jakarta refuses to invite an
international force?
Mr. Pickering. The Administration's view is that an outside
force is necessary, as I have said. It respects the views that
have been expressed by the principal participants in this force
that it can't be done without an Indonesian invitation and a
Security Council approval and we have therefore been making
extremely serious efforts to try to obtain that. Politically we
have cutoff assistance, as you know, today on the military
side. We believe in effect that any future assistance from the
international financial institutions is effectively cutoff as
of now, will not be more forthcoming because of a number of
factors, including some that antedate the East Timor crisis
but, I am sure, the East Timor crisis worsens that. Our own
bilateral assistance is being intensively reviewed. We want to
continue at least for this period of time to be able to protect
that assistance that goes directly to the basic human needs of
Indonesians who will require it and protects democracy, but we
are looking at it from that point of view to determine whether
and, if so, how quickly any should be cutoff beyond the present
programs.
So I believe we are adopting a posture, if I could call it
that way, of building maximum strength at this particular time
in the direction that is outlined in terms of moving ahead, but
the bulk of the countries would have to participate. If that
doesn't work, then we will clearly have to seriously re-examine
additional economic, political, trade sanctions and other steps
in an effort clearly to bring that about.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much. Thank you for your
courtesy, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Senator Biden. The Chair has had
an opportunity to express his views and will wait till the end
for questions if necessary. I turn now to the next Republican
in attendance. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Sanford,
is recognized.
Mr. Sanford. I thank the gentleman. I want to go back to
what the Senator was at least touching on, and that was this
issue of invitation from Jakarta and sanctioning if you will by
the U.N. given the precedent that the Administration has set in
places like Kosovo and the fact there was hardly invitation
from Belgrade for our involvement in that part of the world,
how can you have both policies? It seemed to me there would
be--to the degree they are mutually exclusive, given the fact
we were involved for humanitarian reasons in Kosovo, how could
the Administration sit idly by in East Timor?
Mr. Pickering. I explained, I believe, Mr. Sanford, the
reasons why or at least the fact that other countries who would
be principal participants in this particular effort have drawn
a clear line.
Mr. Sanford. That is why they have. But my question is for
the Administration.
Mr. Pickering. As I said clearly in my opening statement,
we are prepared to support efforts undertaken under the
leadership of Australia to have an international force go in
and that we are supporting Secretary-General Annan's request to
Prime Minister Habibie. Incidentally, it was a request which
was originally accepted by Prime Minister Habibie that if he
couldn't reestablish law and order in a particular short time
and a Security Council Commission is out there reporting on
that effect, he let it be known, we believe, to the Secretary-
General that he would invite such a group in. That is ongoing
now. There have been other statements from Indonesia but our
preference, our clear hope, the direction in which we are
currently moving, all of the diplomatic efforts that we have
made have been to move in that direction.
Now, you raised a question of comparisons. In each one of
these cases obviously what is practical, what is going to be
effective on the ground, what will work, what is feasible are
clearly measures that have to be used to judge which is the
appropriate policy to follow and how far to pursue that and how
to make it work.
Mr. Sanford. I understand. But in other words, going back
to what you just said, you said preference, the
Administration's strong preference was to act in accordance
with invitation of Jakarta and in accordance with the United
Nations. What you are saying, that is a preference. If push
came to shove, the Administration would act unilaterally?
Mr. Pickering. I think it is very, very difficult for me to
address hypotheticals from this particular position right now
and I would not do it. I think that those are questions that
are reserved for the highest level decision in the Executive
Branch after, as I have said, full consultation with all of
you. That process, in my view, is a viable process. It will
give us the opportunity to be flexible if that is necessary.
What it means, as the Chairman has just invited, I hope, is
that we will be pursuing a bipartisan, bi-branch policy on a
very difficult issue and at this point I am not here to rule
things, that are beyond, frankly, where we have just come in
the clear statement I believe I have made about where we stand.
Mr. Sanford. One last question because I know my time is
running short, Mr. Chairman. Some people have suggested that
the agreement in Rambouillet was that sign this or we will bomb
you. Could one argue that basically we are going down that same
route again in that we are cutting off assistance, we are
disengaging in terms of military contact? Are we increasingly
isolating them to the point where in either come to agreement,
sign up with the United Nations, invite us in or we are sending
people in unilaterally?
Mr. Pickering. I think that again that is another way of
asking me the question that I think I just provided you a clear
answer to and I admire your efforts to try to somehow recast
this in a different form.
Mr. Sanford. Fair enough.
Mr. Pickering. What I would say, however, Mr. Sanford, and
I think it is extremely important that we are pursuing
diplomatic efforts, including obviously taking serious actions,
which we have today and serious actions are clearly a part and
parcel of the attitude of the international financial
institutions which we are both interested in and we believe in
fact, as we have in other crises of this sort, that it is the
use of diplomatic and related steps to bring about the
appropriate answer to the question which must be clearly
explored and thoroughly used by the United States, and that is
important. The fact that we have begun a series of diplomatic
efforts and indeed I would say pressures, and I think Indonesia
is isolating itself in this particular situation and we have
warned it about isolating itself, doesn't necessarily either
preclude or prescribe any other set of steps that might be
taken down the road.
Mr. Sanford. I thank you, sir.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you. The Chair is about to recognize
the distinguished gentleman from California, the Ranking Member
of the Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee and then would ask
unanimous consent and contravention to Committee rules to
recognize the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts,
Senator John Kerry, Ranking Member of the East Asian and
Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, and, next, the gentleman from
California, Mr. Bilbray. Then we will return to regular order.
Hearing no objections, that will be the order. Gentleman from
California.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First I want to
commend Secretary Pickering for an extremely eloquent and
powerful and to my mind extremely reasonable statement on this
difficult issue. Since I don't have any of the constraints of
not answering hypothetical questions, I will take it upon
myself, speaking neither for the Administration nor for China,
I will take it upon myself to answer my good friend's question.
I think there is a world of difference between the Kosovo
situation and the East Timor situation. The difference doesn't
stem from the suffering of the individuals that are raped or
murdered, whose homes are looted and set on fire. In that
context, the two situations are very parallel. But there is a
world of difference because with respect to Kosovo, we have
NATO, the world's most powerful military alliance in human
history, which was able for two generations to prevent the
Soviet Union from making a move of a single millimeter anywhere
in Europe, and finally NATO decided that it had to deal with a
new dictator and they dealt with him effectively and
successfully.
Now, it is self-evident that Indonesia, the fourth most
populous and one of the potentially wealthiest nations on the
face of this planet, is 200 million plus people, is not a place
where either the United States or Australia or anybody else
will begin a war because of human rights violations. In Kosovo,
we crossed the Rubicon. Kosovo is the first war in human
history not waged for territory, not waged for oil, not waged
for power, not waged for colonies, but waged for human rights.
I for one would love to see the civilized global community have
the power to do this everywhere but being a realist, I
recognize that it can do it only in very few places where very
unique circumstances prevail. That is why I so strongly support
it, our Administration, with respect to Kosovo, and that is why
I believe I will so strongly support the Administration in the
unlikely event that the Indonesian government does not comply
not to undertake military action against Indonesia, which in my
judgment would be an absurdity. I don't think anybody in his
right mind recommends it.
So to answer you forthrightly and without any qualification
and speaking not for the Administration, there will be no
unilateral military action against Indonesia. Indonesia will
have to invite an international presence if there is to be an
international presence. Indonesia should take care of the
problem itself and in the case Indonesia refuses to put an end
to this outrage, there will be severe economic consequences
ranging from the very measures that keep Indonesia afloat right
now. Without the IMF Indonesia is bankrupt. Now, if this
Indonesian government wants to make its society totally
bankrupt economically, it can continue to allow or to acquiesce
in or to support the outrage which is unfolding in East Timor.
I trust that saner counsels will prevail in Jakarta, that
the Indonesia military will put an end to this outrage, and
they will invite an international force and the U.N. under
those circumstances will approve such a force.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. Under the unanimous
consent, the gentleman from Massachusetts, Senator Kerry, is
recognized for 5 minutes for a statement or questions.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
thank Chairman Thomas also for calling for this joint meeting.
And I would ask unanimous consent that my opening statement be
placed in the record. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Hon. John F. Kerry appears in
the appendix.]
Senator Kerry. Mr. Secretary, thank you for taking time to
come up here. I apologize for being late and I apologize I will
leave a little early, but we have Sandy Berger on the other
side on this very subject and I would like to spend a minute
with him.
Mr. Secretary, it is my sense that the current situation in
East Timor may well have a great deal more to do with the
internal politics of the Presidential election of Indonesia
than it does specifically with just the problem of transferral
or transition in East Timor. There seems to be a lot of
speculation behind the scene about General Wiranto's role, the
military's role, Ms. Megawati's role and so forth. I wonder if
you might just shed some light. Is it wrong to assume that
those who are waiting for an invitation to go in may be singing
the wrong song here because of the way in which this is tied to
the political situation with the Presidential election coming
up and the results that the party raises?
Mr. Pickering. Senator Kerry, I made clear in my statement
that we believe that the electoral process is having an effect
and indeed that East Timor may be having an effect on the
electoral process. I would hope, however, that it not get to be
seen as totally an adjunct to an electoral process in Indonesia
on the one hand, or that in order to have it worked out, we
have to wait for the end of those electoral processes on the
other. I say this, I think, for the obvious reasons. This is an
urgent and emergent problem and we have talked of the human
dimensions and they are extremely serious. Second, I have
reason at least to be in part optimistic in the information I
provided on the attitude of a leading candidate for the
presidency, Megawati and her willingness, which she stated very
clearly, to see an Indonesia living alongside peacefully and
fruitfully, an independent East Timor, and I think this is
important.
I do believe, however, that there are other causes and
other actions that are also involved in this situation. There
are Indonesians who, I think, have failed to understand the
importance of the arrangements made with the United Nations and
who have an iridescent view, if I could phrase it that way, of
East Timor and its role in the future of Indonesia. Some may in
my view be falsely addicted to the idea that Indonesia can only
deal with its own internal problems, some of which I mentioned
by a harsh repressive policy in East Timor and allowing in a
sense the pro-integrationists to have freedom to overturn,
indeed to be aided and abetted in overturning the United
Nations result. Now, I think they are falsely misguided in this
particular idea. I believe quite the contrary, that an ability
to carry out its commitments to deal with security, to provide
the opening for the transition, to allow the process to go
ahead, to encourage the Indonesian parliament to have the
appropriate approvals of the election results are the ways in
which the Indonesian government can assure its own population
that it is prepared to deal with grievances in an exemplary
manner, to consider human rights concerns, to recognize that
abuses and force do not solve the problem.
Senator Kerry. I want to interrupt you for a moment because
the light is about to go on and I just wanted to just ask you a
follow-up question to that. Assuming all of that doesn't
happen, there seems to be no stomach for anybody to go in
without an invitation. Therefore, what is plan B if these
political machinations don't permit the request? What is plan
B?
Mr. Pickering. Plan B, I think, is quite clear and I
addressed the elements of plan B when I spoke to Senator Biden
when he asked this original and seemingly irrepressible
question, that plan B is the examination which is ongoing of
additional steps and measures to deal with the problem of
Indonesia invitation in the area of economics, trade,
sanctions, political relations and so on, and I believe it is
important that we consider these. No decision has been made
because we believe still that the remaining part of the U.N.
process has to be played out. The team that went from the
Security Council which is to visit East Timor on Saturday will
come back and provide a report. We hope that they will--if they
are going to report, and that is not certain, that Indonesia
still is unable to meet its requirements. We will also report
that President Habibie is prepared to carry through with what
we understand was his statement to the Secretary-General that
he is prepared to issue this invitation despite the fact that
we know other Indonesians are saying quite the contrary. There
is not a united voice in Indonesia but we look to President
Habibie to keep this commitment that was made to allow the
United Nations in to review the situation, to bring in a United
Nations force to assist Indonesia in the maintenance of
security and carrying out of their obligations under the May 5
arrangement to respect the referendum and transform the
territory to the independent status that it has voted for.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. If I
could just make a 30 second comment. I am not sure what that
has to do with anything. What we're seeing there today may be a
retribution. It may be a reaction but none of your response, it
seems to me, deals with violence or the humanitarian problem
per se. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you. The Chair will next call on the
gentleman from California, Mr. Bilbray, and then in order Mr.
Faleomavaega, Mr. Hastings, and Mr. Davis. The gentleman from
California.
Mr. Bilbray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I have
got to first apologize to you. Just as there are some Members
who come with a special insight to Eastern Europe, being the
only Member of Congress that I know of Australian extraction, I
come with my own prejudices on this whole issue and I have just
got to be frank with you. After 10 years of extensive
discussion with representatives of Australia going back to
Prime Minister Hawke, members of parliament and just discussion
with the premier in New South Wales this month, it has just
given us, those of us, that have discussed with Australia that
the United States, while it is focused on Eastern Europe
extensively, has tended to have a blind eye when it comes down
to the southern Pacific and especially Indonesian problems, not
just here but Papua New Guinea and other places.
The real thing I want to get out is that the frustration I
have gotten from my relatives and from the discussion of
Australia is what appears to be a mixed signal that has been
sent to Australia and Indonesia about the human rights issues
in the southern Pacific. Hopefully to clarify this, what is
your interpretation of the Australian position?
I want to just sort of pre-empt that. I find it rather
refreshing to hear a country that says we don't want America to
go in and do this; we just want America to back us up if we go
in and do it. I wish we heard that from NATO more. What is your
perception of Australia's position about placing peacekeeping
forces in East Timor? Is your position that unless the U.N.
makes a proclamation or Indonesia specifically requests it,
that Australia does not want anybody to consider intervention?
Mr. Pickering. Let me first put my cards on the table. I
happen to have an earned degree from an Australian university
so I join you in appreciation of the special circumstances that
Australia faces. Second, it is my clear view and I had the
opportunity personally to discuss this with Foreign Minister
Downer that Australia is ready to put a force in on the basis
of an invitation and U.N. Security Council approval. But in the
absence of that, it is not ready to do so.
Mr. Bilbray. Are they communicating at all that they will
not consider under any consideration a multinational force
intervening in East Timor without an invitation or a U.N.
Resolution?
Mr. Pickering. I understand plain Australian and that is
what the Prime Minister told me.
Mr. Bilbray. Let me just say this. Do you or does the
Administration perceive the commitments to Australia and New
Zealand and the South Pacific Anzac alliances, you perceive our
alliances and commitments to that part of the world equal to
our commitment to NATO?
Mr. Pickering. Yes. I believe that the United States must
meet its treaty commitments all around the world and our
security treaty commitments with Australia are important and we
should both live up to the letter, and I have no doubt that
either side has any reservations about that.
Mr. Bilbray. Do you perceive that the offer made by
Australia may if we are successful--let's just say in a perfect
world, that Australia is willing to take the lead in its back
yard, only asks for the United States to be a minor logistical
supporter. Do you perceive that this, if everything works out,
could be the prototype, could be the model that we then try to
initiate not just in South Pacific but also sub-Saharan Africa,
Latin America, and the rest of the world? Do you see that maybe
Australia is giving us a model that can lead us into the next
millennium of our appropriate position in foreign policy not
doing everything for everyone everywhere but being supportive
of people taking care of their own back yards?
Mr. Pickering. I do and I want to say that with you I feel
very strongly about the importance of Australian leadership in
this particular effort, and I hope that our Australian friends
and allies feel that we are working very closely with them
because we have been on an hourly to hourly basis on both the
diplomacy and the military side of this effort and of course
the President will have an opportunity to meet Prime Minister
Howard and the Secretary Foreign Minister Downer in the coming
two days in Auckland at the APEC meeting. I believe that we
have never been closer and I believe that this is a model. It
may not be the exclusive model but it is one obviously, as you
know, we longed for in Bosnia years ago and didn't see
produced. I think we should be very careful in having only one
model. One size doesn't fit all always, and it is the nature of
the task, the size of the task, the urgency of the task I think
that helps to determine how partner states become involved and
how effective they can be.
In this particular instance, although he is not here, I
join Congressman Lantos in recognizing that one of the unique
elements of our military involvement in Kosovo was that we had
a large number of our NATO partners with us. Ten or 11 flew
active air combat missions and some of the others flew air
support missions and that doesn't arrive merely by having a
treaty. It arrives through a long process of integrating
efforts over many years of working out ahead of time how your
aircraft and their aircraft can be as a military say
deconflicted in common air space, how we can operate with
common tactics, how we can operate with common communications.
So in these kinds of situations, I think the tougher the
job, often the more the necessity for prior experience, prior
training, prior planning, prior coordination, prior doctrinal
arrangements between us.
Mr. Bilbray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just hope we send
the message clearly. We heard about Europe, in the last two
years. A lot of people are watching South Pacific. The
Australians have been trying to tell us for over a decade that
this was coming down the road. I hope America sends a clear
message that human rights in the South Pacific or anywhere else
in the world is just as important as human rights in Europe,
and I think we need to make that clear, take the stand that no
matter what the color of your skin, no matter what your ethnic
background, no matter what part of the world you are in, human
rights are still a valued commodity in the United States.
Mr. Pickering. Could I make just one brief comment, Mr.
Chairman. The implication has come in this and other questions
that somehow we didn't know this was coming. I think quite the
contrary. We spent a long time working on it. There were a lot
of steps taken some time ago in order to deal with this
possibility. It is in my view extremely important to understand
that we have been preparing for this contingency even if in
fact we hoped against hope that it wouldn't come and our close
relationship with Australia did not begin a week ago on this
particular issue. It began some time ago.
We remain committed obviously to work with international
partners, including close allies like Australia, on this
particular issue as well as in the United Nations system, but I
wanted to make that point because I think there is a growing
sense that somehow this was something that just started a week
and a half ago and we had just begun to address it.
Many weeks ago we sent many of our people to participate
with the U.N. to the maximum that the Indonesians allow to deal
with the elections, for example.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Ambassador. I appreciate that
perspective. I want to say that Members of this Committee have
been very much involved and informed on this issue and have
been attempting to inform our colleagues, some of whose actions
occasionally are counterproductive. Unfortunately we are at
this state today. I want to thank the gentleman from California
for his perceptions and perspective and certainly appreciate
the fact he took the time to join us today.
Mr. Falomavaega, the gentleman from American Samoa, is
recognized.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to
thank Senator Thomas for calling this joint hearing this
afternoon and for the Members of the Committee to raise
questions concerning this very important issue. I certainly
want to commend you, Mr. Secretary, for your very comprehensive
statement concerning the crisis that we are faced with at this
time.
I suppose one can say that we planted the seeds and this is
the results we have produced. I say this sincerely, Mr.
Secretary, because the relationship that exists between the
East Timor and Indonesia is not unique. The military of
Indonesia simply went over and conquered these people and said
you are now part of Indonesia. I don't consider that as a
unique relationship. I could also say, Mr. Secretary, we cannot
talk about East Timor and ignore West Papua New Guinea because
this is the same thing that the Indonesian military did to
these people.
Now, we could talk about the tortures, the atrocities that
were committed against 200,000 East Timorese for the past 20
years as well as the 100,000 Melanesians that lost their lives
are the same actions taken by the Indonesian military, and this
is what we produce as a result.
I take this very seriously and also associate myself with
the comments made earlier by my good friend from California. I
do have a little prejudice concerning this, Mr. Secretary,
because I happen to come from this region. I am very, very
concerned. The fact of the matter is one of the darkest pages
of United Nations history was partly contributed to the mess
that we are faced with now in Indonesia not only in East Timor
but as well as West Papua New Guinea. I am very appreciative of
the fact that you did make comments in your statement
concerning Irian Jaya, West Papua New Guinea.
I am not going to get into that but I do want to raise a
question. Assuming the Security Council doesn't approve sending
a peacekeeping force to Indonesia without Indonesia's consent,
where do we go from here, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Pickering. Thank you very much. I believe that the
answer I gave to that question before I would be glad to repeat
for you. We go into a next stage of doing all that we can in
partnership with the international community and the Security
Council to bring Indonesia along with the United Nations
process that it was originally committed to, that at the moment
we have doubts, you and I, I am sure, about whether it remains
committed because since it is not doing what it is supposed to
do with respect to security, it has made uncertain noises so--
--
Mr. Faleomavaega. My time is short. I know the diplomatic
route. We go through all this. My next question. I think there
has been an assurance from General Wiranto that they are unable
militarily to control these vigilante--these people that are
doing these killings at this time in East Timor. Is that a
correct assessment?
Mr. Pickering. I don't know specifically to which
expression of opinion of General Wiranto you refer. But let me
say this. General Wiranto has expressed a number of opinions,
some on the more positive side. What I am concerned about has
been a history of saying one thing and apparently doing
something else, of saying that they were going to control the
security and aiding and abetting the militias, and so to put
faith in one or another of the comments of someone who at least
now appears to be knowledgeable of, if not engaged in that kind
of activity, is a pretty tough sell.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Secretary, I know my time is coming
up. I have one more question. We don't have a NATO-like
regional security organization in Southeast Asia, but I think
you are aware that recently the foreign ministry or someone
from the high officium of the People's Republic of China
visited the ASEAN country nation and suggested why do we not
have a regional security organization like NATO has among the
Europeans and answering this very same problem here; what is
your perspective about a possibility of ASEAN becoming a
regional security organization similar to what we have in NATO?
Mr. Pickering. It didn't begin that way. It is not an
organization of which we are members. It has carefully guarded
its own decisions in that regard, and I believe this is a
decision that ASEAN itself would have to make. I do believe,
however, that there needs to be in this particular case as much
participation as possible into any force led by Australia that
might involve itself in helping the United Nations work out the
problem, and we certainly were very pleased that at the foreign
ministers meeting yesterday in Auckland to discuss this
subject, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore were
represented by their foreign ministers as well as other Asian
countries because clearly in an Asian problem I believe Asians
ought to be there very much present in the working out of the
answers.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Just 30 seconds, Mr. Chairman. I know my
time is up. I just want to say this, Mr. Secretary. In all the
Nation leaders that we visited as Members of this Committee
throughout the Asian Pacific region, there is one common
response and concern that every one of these countries have
been giving to us. In the absence of U.S. presence, whether it
be diplomatically, economically, or militarily, someone else is
going to take that place and I believe it is going to be the
People's Republic of China if we don't act.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you. The gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Hastings, is recognized. I want to commend him on the
initiative he has already taken on a resolution. We will work
with him on this issue.
Mr. Hastings. I thank the Chairman very much for that
assertion, and thank you for holding this timely hearing and,
Ambassador Pickering, my good friend, I thank you for your very
comprehensive statement and forthrightness in responses.
I urge all of my colleagues to take into consideration that
this hearing today is taking place at the same time that the
APEC meeting is taking place in Auckland, New Zealand, and like
you, Mr. Chairman, previous speaker, my good friend from
American Samoa, Mr. Faleomavaega, along with Chairman Gilman
and several other Members of Congress visited Australia and New
Zealand and, Brian, my colleague from California Mr. Bilbray, I
would like to say to you that I for one, and I believe the
Chairman will assert this, have argued continuously on Asian
matters that Australia should be consulted a great deal more
actively than I believe they have been in the past. Lest I move
forward without mentioning New Zealand, New Zealand also has
indicated a very strong willingness to participate in an
appropriate peacekeeping force.
I would also like very much, Mr. Ambassador, to assert that
all of this is taking place in a very fragile area, as you have
pointed out, economically and socially with President Habibie
maybe not being in control of the military. One example of that
would be that he set forth the self-determination matter
without apparent active consultation with the military. The
military patently obviously has been in complicity with the
militia. Either that or I can't believe my lying eyes. Even on
the CNN bits and the little bit of journalism that is coming
out of there, which is frightening, the fact that journalists
are being excluded allows for transparency not to be as much as
those of us here in this country would expect.
I join my colleague Mr. Faleomavaega in calling for us to
recognize that an Asian, Australian, New Zealand, Portuguese,
all of the presidents of the Philippines and Thailand, all have
a vested interest of bringing this matter to a resolution. But
as we are speaking, people are dying, and so to the person just
shot, all of this high sounding rhetoric and intellectualizing
allows that action has to be taken.
Ambassador Pickering, you will remember that I was the
first person in Congress to call Rwanda genocide. It took three
years for this nation, through Secretary Albright, eventually
to say the -G word. Now, the -G word gives all of us some cover
to protect human rights, as has been so amply modified and put
forward here today by my colleagues. I don't know that genocide
has occurred, but I would like to ask you a series of questions
and ask just a yes or no answer in spite of what I know is your
propensity to be prolix. Please, sir, am I correct that on
September 4, 1999, the people of East Timor overwhelmingly
voted, at least 78 percent of them or more, for independence
from Indonesia?
Mr. Pickering. Yes.
Mr. Hastings. Am I correct that after the voting was
concluded, violence broke out in East Timor?
Mr. Pickering. Yes.
Mr. Hastings. Is it also true that the violence is being
perpetrated in East Timor by army backed militias and it is
unclear who is directing these militias?
Mr. Pickering. We at least believe that to be true. I would
have to be a little cautious in saying I know categorically
without fail, but we certainly believe that to be true. A
qualified yes.
Mr. Hastings. Has the government of Indonesia declared
martial law in East Timor to quell the violence?
Mr. Pickering. Yes. It has declared a state of military
emergency. I want to be a little careful about the fact there
might be a difference.
Mr. Hastings. The establishment of this martial law in East
Timor so far as we know has failed to stop the violence?
Mr. Pickering. Yes.
Mr. Hastings. It has been reported that hundreds if not
thousands of people have been killed, certainly hundreds, and
injured, killed and injured since the violence began in East
Timor?
Mr. Pickering. Yes, it is true that has been reported, not
only that but we believe it probably to be true.
Mr. Hastings. We do know that many of these Timorese,
800,000 residents, have been forced to flee East Timor.
Mr. Pickering. Yes.
Mr. Hastings. That the United Nations compound in Dili was
besieged or access to food, water and electricity was
intentionally cutoff there?
Mr. Pickering. We believe that to be true.
Mr. Hastings. The international community has called upon
the government of Indonesia to either take immediate and
concrete steps to end the violence in East Timor or allow a
United Nations-sponsored international force to enter East
Timor and restore order?
Mr. Pickering. Yes, through the person of the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, who was speaking for himself,
but I think he represents the broad opinion of the
international community.
Mr. Hastings. Mr. Chairman, I have substantiated pretty
much through the Ambassador my very feeble effort at trying to
address something I think we can do rather than just talk.
Mr. Bereuter. I thank the gentleman from Florida. Another
gentleman from Florida, Mr. Davis, is recognized, and then we
will turn to Mr. Royce for the last word.
Mr. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Pickering, my
concern is the price we pay for the passage of time as we allow
the government in Indonesia to do what we believe is the right
thing. Let me offer you a painfully clear example of that.
Sister Judith Supres, who is the provincial of the American
Order of Salesian Sisters based in New Jersey, has contacted
Congressman Bill Pascrell and me asking for help. You
apparently are aware of this. There are eight sisters of that
order trapped in East Timor right now, at least one of which is
a United States citizen. Two days ago Sister Supres lost
communication with them although before she did, she had been
told that those sisters are going to be evacuated to Baukau,
which apparently they were not. The sister in East Timor was
also told the militia was about to burn down the convent that
was housing these eight sisters as well as the children they
were taking care of. This United States citizen and others are
in grave danger as we discuss here today how to pressure this
country to protect people there.
So I would like to ask you for your help in reviewing the
letter I wrote to Ambassador Roy to this effect and also why
shouldn't we immediately be much more specific and much more
clear as far as the sanctions you have alluded to in an effort
to exert maximum pressure on the government to take control of
the situation immediately?
Mr. Pickering. We are clearly prepared to look in that
direction, as I signalled earlier. I think it would be
premature for me to begin to outline a specific series of
steps, but I think you know from past experiences we have that
particularly joined in a multilateral way through the United
Nations and otherwise sanctions can have a powerful effect on
the situation. We have begun the process already by the three
steps that I have previously outlined, the end of military-to-
military programs, the discussion with the international
financial institutions, particularly the IMF in which it is now
clear that there will be no forthcoming IMF steps because of a
series of factors, I am sure including East Timor, but
including other questions and the fact that we are rapidly
undergoing a review of our bilateral assistance to make sure
that it fits in the categories that we believe ought to be
continued. Other programs would then of course not be
continued. So we believe that these particular initial steps
are steps that we have taken immediately today, ought to have,
I hope, an effect on the situation but if not, as I have said,
we are reviewing a wide range of additional steps that could be
taken and I am not in a position to prefigure those but we will
consult with you as we do because some of them may well depend
on the help and cooperation of the legislative branch to
actually put them in effect.
Mr. Davis. Mr. Secretary, if you would take the time if you
could to look at a copy of this letter and direct it to the
appropriate person to reinforce----
Mr. Pickering. I will. I do want to say that through both
Ambassador Roy and directly, we have been in regular and
constant contact with the four American Salesian nuns who are
in East Timor and worked very hard to protect them and ensure
their safety and where they wish to come out, to provide an
opportunity for them to come out, a decision that they
themselves of course have to make, and in at least several of
these cases some have chosen to do that, but we share a concern
for any American citizen in East Timor and clearly have watched
and followed that very, very carefully.
Mr. Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you. The gentleman from California,
Vice Chairman of the Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee, Mr.
Royce, is recognized.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Pickering,
the outbreak of this violence seems to have caught the
international community and certainly the United States
completely off guard. Now we are scrambling. Yet there were
reports prior to the election that the Indonesian military was
in the process of organizing an anti-independence militia.
Looking back over the last several weeks, is there something we
could have done to preclude this type of violence? Is there
something, knowing now what was transpiring in terms of the
training of the militia, some action that could have been taken
by the United States?
Mr. Pickering. I recognize that hindsight sometimes makes
for brilliant pupils.
Mr. Royce. It might save us the process of going through
this again.
Mr. Pickering. Let me be careful. First, we always knew
that this was a possibility. We looked at a large number of
contingency plans, possibilities, and options as it unfolded,
and very early on. We came to the conclusion that a number of
responses that may make sense were not realistic unfortunately
without the Indonesian agreement that we are still trying to
seek for the present response. Indonesian agreement in our view
would not be forthcoming on a number of those. Some of those
took us beyond where the United Nations Secretary and other
concerned countries at the time were prepared to go. Working
within those realities, we nevertheless pushed very hard, for
example, for a large on-the-ground presence, including both
civilian police and military liaison officers, to ensure that
the process could be carefully monitored. For the campaign
phase, we supported a UNAMET of 300 civilian police and 50
military observers. The United States contributed 30 of the
police and three of the military observers. This required very
expensive consultations up here, including some reprogrammings
which wasn't necessarily always easy to get done. For the
immediate post election period, the United Nations has called
for 460, almost 500 police and 300 military observers, and we
supported that in a Security Council resolution, I believe I am
correct, either last Friday or a week ago Friday. Under the May
5 agreement that covers the arrangements between the United
Nations, Indonesia, and Portugal, the government of Indonesia
insisted on and was given responsibility for security, clearly
something it didn't take up. As Kofi Annan, the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, said yesterday, the government
of Indonesia was able to control the territory for the past 25
years. The international community had reason to expect that
Indonesia had the capacity and, since it insisted upon doing
it, the will to carry out this solemn international commitment.
Nevertheless, we did everything we could to insist on as
large a presence to provide the transparency and the monitoring
of this capacity as we could. I am sure in hindsight we could
have proposed other things. What I am concerned about since we
looked at them was the fact that they were nonfeasible. They
were nonfeasible for three reasons. Indonesia and the U.N.
weren't going to buy it. The other partners were not prepared
for it and in some cases we were not able to generate the kind
of financial support that we thought such a series of steps
might require in order to be carried out on our own part. This,
I think, points up the fact that in future such circumstances,
this kind of a lesson be applied. We felt in fact that there
were significant enough possibility of this happening that our
efforts to do larger things, even if they were not workable,
were the right way to view the problem.
Mr. Royce. The Indonesian military, as far as the reports
that they were organizing an anti-independent militia, when we
became aware of that, did we attempt to broadcast that
information? Did we attempt to share that information?
Mr. Pickering. Yes, we did, and it was self-evident and
apparent and we took it up many times with the Indonesians.
Mr. Bereuter. The time of the gentleman has expired. I
thank the gentleman. Despite my assurances, Mr. Secretary, we
have a Member of the Senate East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Subcommittee, the gentleman from Wisconsin, Senator Russell
Feingold, who now is recognized. Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Secretary, I know you have been here quite some time. I was not
here because I just spent over an hour with nine or 10 other
Members from both Houses talking to National Security Advisor
Sandy Berger in great detail about this problem and expressing
the fact that the Members of Congress, many of us feel great
passion about this subject and I think it even surprised him
how many of us feel so strongly that what is going on now in
East Timor is completely out of control. Yesterday I introduced
legislation, S. 1568, and Representative Patrick Kennedy has
introduced an identical bill in the House, I understand, to
impose immediate suspension of assistance to the government of
Indonesia until steps have been taken to allow the results of
the August 30, 1999, vote to be implemented. The bill calls for
the immediate suspension of all U.S. Military assistance to
Indonesia, including the licensing of military exports. It
calls on the United States also to oppose any loans or other
assistance by international financial institutions and to urge
other donor countries to do the same and express its support
for an international peacekeeping mission.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committees, I obviously
want this legislation to pass or something like it, but
specifically we need the Administration to make much tougher
and stronger statements in support of getting Indonesia to back
off and allow this peacekeeping force to come in now. I do not
think it is sufficient to have the kind of statements that we
have had to date. In fact, I would like to see the President,
and I understand he will be speaking on this in an hour or less
than an hour and a half or so, I would like to see him ask us
for this legislation so he can have it on his desk when he goes
to New Zealand and so that he can be able to actually have a
credible threat to the Indonesians that if they don't do the
right thing within a few hours, that something real will
happen, that we will send a real message to the Indonesian
power structure, not just to Mr. Habibie.
I am afraid we are not moving strongly enough on this or
quickly enough, and I think it would be one thing if we had
just not engaged the country in a lengthy attempt to convince
some of the wisdom of the action in Kosovo. The action in
Kosovo was perhaps premised on security reasons but the reason
articulated was humanitarian. The reason articulated was
genocide, and the President of the United States said that he
regretted that our country did not act in Africa in the case of
Rwanda and he said he would never let it happen again. But it
is happening again and it is happening in East Timor.
So I would urge all Members of the Committees in both
Houses that the best thing we can do at this point is to
immediately pass this legislation, place it on the President's
desk so that when he goes and has this meeting with the
Indonesian government and the officials realize that we mean
business and that we don't want to wait for a few days to find
out that they are going to say no and then after that try to
figure out what we are going to do. We must raise the stakes
now as high as we possibly and responsibly can.
Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate this opportunity so
late in the day to make my feelings known.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.
Ambassador Pickering, thank you very much for your
statement and for your responses to our questions. We wish you
well in pursuing your activities in this respect. We have
another distinguished Senior Member of the Foreign Service,
Stapleton Roy, on the scene as Ambassador to Indonesia, who,
along with your leadership, gives us confidence. We look
forward to working with you.
Thank you for your time.
Mr. Pickering. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
Members. I appreciated the opportunity to come up here.
Mr. Bereuter. Regrettably, the House has a series of two
votes. We must pursue those, and we are recessed to take up the
second panel at 4:15.
[Recess.]
Mr. Bereuter. The Subcommittee will come to order.
I would like to call the second panel of witnesses to the
testimony table. I regret imposing on so much of our
distinguished second panel's time. What you have to say is
important to us and, I think, will be important in informing
the American public about the situation in East Timor and about
the futures of Indonesia and East Timor.
As I previously introduced you, I will just simply
summarize the details about you. First, Ambassador Paul
Wolfowitz, currently the Dean of the School of Advanced
International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University. Among
other important posts in the State Department and Defense
Department, he was our Ambassador to Indonesia and served with
distinction.
Dr. Donald Emmerson is Senior Fellow at Stanford
University's Asia Pacific Research Center and the University of
Wisconsin-Madison Professor of Political Science and Southeast
Asia studies. He recently was in East Timore as a monitor on
the elections.
Finally, I introduce Ms. Sidney Jones, Executive Director,
Asia Division of Human Rights Watch, a welcome and frequent
witness before this Subcommittee.
Your entire statements will be made a part of the record.
I would like to proceed. Ambassador Wolfowitz, we will
start with you. Please proceed, and thank you for your time.
STATEMENTS OF PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEAN, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
Mr. Wolfowitz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
time that you and the Committee are devoting to this important
issue. My apologies. I just got back from out of town 24 hours
ago. I have been trying to do my best to get on top of this
issue. The result is I have a prepared statement, but you do
not have a copy of it, so I can't summarize it. I will try to
be brief, however.
Mr. Bereuter. I think I know where you have been. In some
cases I have matched your schedule.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I know. In fact, I think I last saw you in
Sydney.
Let me begin by saying the obvious, which is that what has
taken place in East Timor over the last few months and
particularly the last week is appalling. It is appalling in
character, it is appalling in scale, it is appalling in the
level of direct involvement by the Indonesian military. I would
say, too, in the last 24 hours I have had briefings from people
within our own Defense Department, and it is very dismaying to
hear what they have to report that confirms what eyewitnesses
are saying about the involvement of Indonesian military.
It may seem superfluous to say all of this to this panel.
It seems pretty obvious perhaps to Americans, but in speaking I
am also speaking to Indonesians, and I am speaking as a former
Ambassador. We Ambassadors are sometimes accused of forgetting
whether we are Ambassadors to a country or from a country. I
always tried to remember. I was the American Ambassador to
Indonesia, not the Indonesian Ambassador to the United States.
But I did develop an enormous affection for Indonesia.
I would like to speak not only to the Congress, but to the
millions of Indonesians who feel that the world is biased
against them on East Timor. I am not biased against them. I
have no a priori proindependence bias, but I believe one cannot
ignore the overwhelming vote in East Timor in favor of
independence or the overwhelming evidence of Indonesian
atrocities in East Timor. I sympathize with the millions of
Indonesians who fear that the independence of East Timor might
lead to a breakup of their country, but the actions of the
Indonesian military in East Timor can only make the people of
Aceh and other regions in Indonesia more unhappy about being
governed by such authorities.
The key to preserving the unity of Indonesia, which I
believe is strongly in the interests of the United States, is
to make the case that East Timor is fundamentally different,
historically and politically, and for the Indonesians to act
quickly to regain the respect of the international community.
I sympathize with the millions of decent Indonesians who
believe that there has been bias in reporting of events in East
Timor, that proindependence atrocities are often not reported
at all. But I would say to them that if even half of what is
reported is true, or even if one-quarter of it is true, and I
believe a good deal more than that is true, it is appalling.
The evidence of complicity by Indonesian military
authorities is also convincing and appalling. It is a stain on
the honor of millions of decent Indonesians, and it is
indefensible. I sympathize with those millions of Indonesians
who fear for the safety of those people in East Timor who are
prointegration. It is true it was an overwhelming vote in favor
of independence, but let's not forget 20 percent of the
population of East Timor are against independence as expressed
in that vote, and I am sure those people do fear for their
lives and their safety, but the present violence does nothing
to ensure their safety. That safety would best be assured, I
believe, by accepting the proposals for some kind of
international security force, but it is certainly not assisted
by this kind of violence.
Finally, I do sympathize, although I don't really agree,
with those who object that the process by which Indonesia got
here was precipitous, that it lacked political legitimacy and
perhaps constitutional legitimacy, and that the referendum
itself should have offered a third, more gradual alternative to
the stark choice between integration permanently or immediate
independence. But whatever one says about how we got here, I
believe, and I think an increasing number of decent Indonesians
understand, that there is no turning back, that last month's
vote has created an irreversible situation, and I believe the
best thing for Indonesia is to move forward quickly and
smoothly, not to get mired in a backward-looking effort to
reverse the course of history.
Finally, I have no sympathy whatsoever for those
Indonesians who are claiming that what is taking place there is
a result of some kind of international conspiracy aimed at
breaking up the country. I would have been enormously happy,
although I admit I would have been surprised, if there had been
an 80 percent vote in favor of integration. I have no, as I
say, a priori bias. But what we are seeing is not the result of
any international conspiracy. It is a result of a 24 year
failure of Indonesian policy. Perhaps that policy never could
have succeeded. Perhaps one can say it did succeed in
preventing in the 1970's a Cuba on Indonesia's doorstep, but
that is not a threat any longer. If there is a conspiracy at
all, it is a conspiracy by those authorities in East Timor and
perhaps elsewhere in Indonesia who have sought and are still
seeking to keep the truth from the Indonesian people and from
the world.
The immediate needs in East Timor, I think, are clear: to
restore order, to deal with the humanitarian catastrophe that
has taken place, and to implement the tripartite agreement.
What I would like to emphasize for this Committee and for
the Congress is that I think in addition to East Timor, there
is a task of at least equal importance, and that is for the
United States and the international community to support the
democratic transition that is taking place hopefully in the
rest of Indonesia. I think a democratic government in Indonesia
will ultimately provide a solution for many of the problems
that Indonesia faces today, and also I think it will help the
problems of East Timor.
But in the short term it has to be admitted that democracy
complicates the situation, because it is a fact, and we can
discuss the reasons why, that I think the overwhelming majority
of the 200 million or more Indonesians outside of East Timor
are opposed to East Timor's independence and fear it. And so
there is indeed a short-term conflict between democracy in
Indonesia and moving forward on implementing the referendum.
But I do believe as the knowledge of what has taken place in
East Timor sinks in, as the recognition that 80 percent of the
people of East Timor do indeed believe in independence, that
the actions of the Indonesian military in East Timor have been
indefensible, that Indonesian opinion will change, and
particularly the opinion of the important new democratic
leaders of Indonesia will change as it seems to be changing
already.
I have gotten a number of private laments from Indonesian
friends. Let me just quote from one e-mail that came my way in
the last 24 hours:
``believe me when I say that whether or not most of the
Indonesian people agree with the referendum on East Timor, most
are saddened and shocked at what is going on there. Please do
not let this incident which has had direct and immediate
consequences for the people of East Timor hinder the progress
that is made in Indonesia. Habibie has no legitimacy.
Therefore, the policy is not the policy of the Indonesian
people. The country is on the verge of finding democracy and
the foreign community should continue to give their support in
spite of the situation in East Timor.''
It would compound the tragedy of East Timor a thousandfold
if we were to isolate Indonesia in such a way as to drive the
new democratic forces in that country into the arms of the
thugs who have orchestrated the present tragedy in East Timor
and doom the promising but still fragile prospects of a
democratic transition in Indonesia. Without being starry-eyed
about democracy solving all the problems of the world, I
believe that democratic transition is extremely important for
Indonesia and 200 million Indonesians. I believe it is a key in
many respects for them to dig out of the present economic and
social crisis that they face. I think the democratic transition
is important for the stability of Indonesia, and therefore it
is important for the whole region and for U.S. interests in the
region. If one can look beyond the many problems of the present
and think about the future a few years from now where Indonesia
might have successfully become the third largest democracy in
the world, one of the only democracies in the Moslem world,
then I think Indonesia's success will become very important for
the rest of Asia and for the rest of the Moslem world.
I don't believe that Americans understand very well the
importance of Indonesia. I couldn't say it better than you
have, Mr. Chairman, on the bottom of page two of your opening
statement. I would just perhaps summarize it all by saying I
don't think there is any country in the world as important as
Indonesia about which Americans remain so ignorant.
So the question is, how is it possible to square this
circle? How is it possible to bridge the requirements of
democracy in East Timor and the requirements of democracy in
Indonesia, particularly if they conflict, at least in the short
term? It is a very hard problem. I don't have a magic answer,
but I would suggest five policy principles that I think would
be useful in guiding the actions of the Congress as well as the
Administration.
The first is I think it is very important in what we do and
particularly in what we say to distinguish between the
Indonesian people and those Indonesian authorities responsible
for what has taken place in East Timor. I was on a USIA
sponsored program roundtable last night with two former
Indonesian Ambassadors to the United States based in Jakarta,
and Ambassador Artin Searagar, who actually had been a minister
in President Suharto's government, was profoundly critical as
was his colleague Ambassador Habib of the actions of Indonesian
authorities in East Timor, and he pleaded for us to distinguish
between the Indonesian people and those authorities.
I think part of doing that, though, is also to make clear
that we understand that East Timor is a special case, that the
breakup of Indonesia would be harmful to the United States and
the region, and also that militarized tactics of the kind that
are being used in East Timor will only hasten the
disintegration of the country.
At the same time, I think Indonesians have got to recognize
that there is no turning back after an 80 percent vote in favor
of independence. I think they are recognizing it, and I think
they can recognize it increasingly. I think it is important in
what we say to speak about facts and speak in a way that people
can listen, because they need to understand the facts which are
coming at them, I think, rather fast and rather hard.
The second principle is I would say more radically
diversify our contacts with political leaders in Indonesia,
recognizing that we are now well into the--I guess not well
into, but beginning the fourth month of a lame duck government.
It would be as though the United States had held an election in
early November, and 3 months later we still hadn't decided who
the President-elect was.
There is an enormous vacuum of authority in Indonesia.
That, in fact, has contributed, I believe, to the problem. But
there are people, and particularly obviously Megawati
Sukarnoputri, who have achieved important democratic
legitimacy. I think we need to talk with them about their
prospective future roles. They are not yet the government, but
I think we need to treat them as people who may very well be
the government. And I believe as part of that, if there is
anything we can do to encourage them to shorten this
agonizingly long transitional period, the sooner Indonesia has
a new President, the sooner Indonesia has a legitimately based
government, the more effectively the military can be brought
under control, the more effectively the results of the
tripartite agreement can be implemented constitutionally.
Third, I don't see in the present circumstances how one can
continue with generalized economic assistance to a government
that not only seems incapable of controlling what its military
does in East Timor, but at best incapable of controlling what
banks and money goes into. I think there inevitably has to be a
moratorium on assistance other than that assistance that does
go directly to relieve the suffering of the many Indonesians
who have been affected by the disastrous economic crisis that
country faces. But I think substantial assistance has to wait
until a new government is formed, or at least until the present
government and not just the President, who I think would like
to implement the results of the referendum, but the whole
government has changed course in East Timor.
Fourth, I support very strongly what one of your colleagues
was saying earlier about Australia's unique role. I don't
believe there is an ally in the world who has consistently
fought on the side of the United States and supported the
United States as loyally and faithfully as Australia. We need
to recognize that for Australia this is a crisis in their
backyard. I heard one senior Australian official quoted as
saying that this is the most serious security crisis Australia
has faced since the battle of the Coral Sea. Even if that may
be slight hyperbole, it tells us something about how the
Australians feel about this, and I think it is very important
that we make clear that we will, in fact, support our faithful
ally. Indeed, I think we should all be grateful that Australia
is willing to step up to its responsibilities in the region as
strongly as it has been willing to do.
Fifth and finally, I think we should do everything possible
to relieve the humanitarian suffering in East Timor. Ultimately
I think it will be the best thing for Indonesia to implement
the referendum as quickly as possible and turn over the
responsibility for East Timor, including the security of East
Timor, to the international community. I believe that
Indonesians and Americans should be grateful to the Australians
and others who have indicated a willingness to take on this
kind of responsibility, but that major change obviously
requires Indonesian agreement. Until we move that far, I think
it is very important to do everything possible to limit and
alleviate the humanitarian suffering. That means doing
everything possible to keep observers in East Timor. Nothing
more intimidates, I think, or at least restrains human rights
violations than the knowledge that they are going to be known
to the outside world. There are obviously enormous relief
requirements, and hopefully perhaps there will be the
possibility of returning refugees.
Let me just conclude, Mr. Chairman, really by repeating
what I said earlier. It is very important to try to undo as
much as possible the tragic consequences of the last week in
East Timor and to move ahead in implementing the results of
that referendum, but it is at least equally important that we
move forward on Indonesia's democratic transition, and I think
the goal of Congressional action and Administration policy has
got to be how to figure out how to square that circle and to
accomplish both.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you very much, Ambassador Wolfowitz.
Mr. Bereuter. Dr. Emmerson, you have submitted a written
statement. The entire statement will be made part of the
record. You may summarize as you wish.
STATEMENT OF DONALD K. EMMERSON, SENIOR FELLOW, ASIA/PACIFIC
RESEARCH CENTER, STANFORD UNIVERSITY
Dr. Emmerson. Thank you. I would like to begin by
expressing my thanks to the Subcommittee for inviting me to
speak today, to the National Bureau of Asian Research in
Seattle for facilitating my travel to Washington, and to the
Carter Center in Atlanta for having enabled me to help monitor
the popular consultation conducted by the United Nations in
East Timor on the 30th of August.
Since I was, as it were, on the ground rather recently, I
hope you will forgive me if I focus just on two questions. The
first question is: who is, in fact, responsible for the
violence? The second question is: with what implications for
U.S. policy?
Early on the morning of the 30th of August, I and my fellow
monitor from the Carter Center, Annette Clear of Columbia
University, were at the extreme eastern tip of East Timor on
the road from Tutuala to the voting center in Mehara. The
courage of the East Timorese people and their desire to choose
their future were immediately evident to us. On the side of the
road, we passed hundreds of people walking to the polls. At the
seven different voting centers we visited that day, from Mehara
westward to Baucau, thousands of Timorese waited patiently for
hours under a hot sun to cast a ballot, either to accept
autonomy inside Indonesia, that is, integration, or to reject
integration in favor of separation leading to independence.
As we know, the vote went overwhelmingly for separation,
and then the voters suffered a catastrophe of truly egregious
proportions. The militias had embarked on a policy that might
be termed ``political cleansing'', killing independence
supporters, injuring them, hounding them out of the territory.
Some of the Timorese staff who facilitated the Carter Center's
monitoring mission in East Timor managed to escape, but I
deeply regret to say that some have still not been heard from.
Meanwhile, the death toll mounts. Of particular concern to me
is a woman named Mena and her five children. Mena prepared
meals for the Carter Center Team during our stay in Dili. She
was last reported with her children to be in the CARE
compound--before, unfortunately, it was attacked.
Five main explanations for this paroxysm of violence in
East Timor are being put forward by various parties. I would
like to compare them and assess them. The first explanation is
the one favored by the Indonesian government. It pictures a
civil war unfolding in East Timor between prointegration and
proindependence forces, with Indonesian authorities caught in
the middle, understandably hard-pressed to restore peace. As my
colleagues and I saw with our own eyes, this account is
blatantly false. If I may quote from the press release issued
by the Carter Center earlier this week, ``Carter Center
observers have on numerous occasions witnessed militia members
perpetrating acts of violence in full view of heavily armed
Indonesian police and military personnel who either stand by
and watch or actively assist the militias.''
According to the second explanation, the militias' rampage
has been locally organized and instigated by Indonesian
military officers and units stationed in East Timor, but
without the knowledge, or with the knowledge but without the
approval, of their superiors in Jakarta. This argument crops up
frequently, for example, in journalistic accounts. But the
argument is, if I may say so, implausible, for several reasons.
Anyone who has interviewed high-ranking Indonesian officers
in Jakarta in recent years will have been struck by their
reluctance, if not their outright refusal, to let East Timor
go. Even reformist officers who say they support
democratization and eventual civilianization for East Timor
typically draw the line at independence for the territory.
In the past, senior commanders have been aware of, and have
supported, military backing for the militias. Since the 1970's,
when the territory was first invaded and annexed by Indonesia,
Jakarta's army has been incubating, irregular bands of young
Timorese men to support its anti-independence war. Furthermore,
when he was President of Indonesia, Suharto streamlined its
armed forces. His highly centripetal rule removed the
possibility that local warlords could arise on the periphery of
the archipelago to pursue policies opposed by the central
leadership in Jakarta.
It is true that, over the years of Indonesian repression in
East Timor, special forces and intelligence units established a
proprietary role for themselves in the territory. Indonesian
dominion itself grew out of covert operations conducted by
officers with backgrounds in intelligence. In May 1998, the
commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces, General Wiranto,
disciplined and ousted from the army a former head of special
forces, Prabowo Subianto, who had threatened his position. But
Wiranto did not purge Prabowo's network of allies and
supporters, who remain to this day active and influential in
East Timor.
Perhaps I might share a brief anecdote with you. Because of
the China Airlines crash in Hong Kong, I was delayed 26 hours
and had to fly to Kupang (in West Timor) and take a six hour
cab ride to the border of East Timor. By the time I got to the
border, it was dusk, and I had been told in no uncertain terms
by the Carter Center not to travel on the roads at night.
Furthermore, there was no one who would take me across the
border at night. The drivers were all terrified of the
roadblocks that they knew had been set up by the militias just
a few kilometers down the road, inside East Timor, on the way
to Dili.
There was, however, one driver who came to me and said, ``I
will take you. In fact, I already have a passenger. He's an
Indonesian army intelligence officer, in the back seat, and I'm
taking him to Dili. Would you like to join us? '' The driver
went on to say that many of the militias were personal friends
of his, and that therefore he could guarantee my security.
Needless to say, I opted not to become a passenger in that
taxi, but it struck me as curious that an Indonesian military
intelligence officer would seek that route, at night, into East
Timor.
Some say Wiranto is too weak to order the local commanders
in East Timor to arrest and disarm the militias. But he was
strong enough to remove Prabowo last year, and since then
arguably Wiranto has consolidated his position. Indeed, he is
often discussed as a possible candidate to be elected vice
president of the country by the People's Consultative Assembly
in November. Perhaps he is reluctant to discipline the Timor
command lest doing so jeopardize the intramilitary support he
will need to pursue higher political office.
Another reason to suspect high-level military complicity in
what is going on in East Timor is the desire of army leaders to
prevent events in East Timor from entraining the dismemberment
of Indonesia. By ratcheting up the violence immediately after
the vote, the military may be sending an intimidatory message
to Aceh, Irian Jaya and other restive outlying provinces. That
message might be summarized thus: Do not go for independence.
The Timorese did, and look what it got them.
For these reasons, I am inclined to accept this third
explanation: that ultimate responsibility for the catastrophic
conditions prevailing in East Timor must be assigned to the
Indonesian military, not only local units but also their
superiors in Jakarta who by action or inaction have encouraged
or tolerated the present frenzy of destruction.
The fourth explanation is that the killing, burning, and
looting in East Timor were ordered by Indonesian President BJ.
Habibie himself. I doubt this. It was, after all, Habibie who
initiated the process of self-determination last January when
he proposed consulting the East Timorese on their fate, and he
took that radical step without first obtaining army approval.
Army leaders, never close to him before, were furious that he
had gone over their heads to innovate an act of self-
determination in their, that is, the army's, territory, even
though the event was billed as an advisory consultation, not a
binding referendum. That army units could instigate so
blatantly the thwarting of Habibie's plan shows, I think, how
little control over them he has. Indeed, it is possible that
his presidency may not survive this crisis.
The fifth and final explanation attributes the depredations
in East Timor to Suharto, who resigned his presidency in favor
of Habibie in May 1998 and returned to private life. But
Suharto is seriously ill, too ill to be directing events in
East Timor by remote control. The recourse to official violence
that characterized his authoritarian regime did create a
climate and an apparatus conducive to repression, including
repression in East Timor, but the militias are not being
manipulated by Suharto himself.
If I am right to place responsibility for the mayhem in
East Timor on the Indonesian army including its leadership, it
follows that American policy should pay particular attention to
that institution and that leadership. In this context I was
delighted to learn just now from Ambassador Pickering that the
U.S. government has cut all military-to-military relations with
Indonesia, for that is exactly what I recommended when I wrote
this draft early this morning before flying to Washington. By
singling out the military in this manner, the United States has
also sent a message to the civilian leadership in Indonesia
that we are not--I repeat not--trying to make an enemy of their
country.
By this same logic--the need for selectivity--I would think
twice before trying to cancel all foreign assistance to
Indonesia as punishment for what is happening in East Timor. In
this regard, perhaps, I differ with Senator Feingold. Take the
World Bank's effort to provide a social safety net to
Indonesia's many poor people, including those impoverished by
last year's double-digit shrinkage in GDP, or USAID's and the
congressionally funded Asia Foundation's efforts to support
NGO's, civil societies, democratic governance, the rule of law.
One may wonder at the consistency of a policy that in the name
of democracy, self-determination, for 850,000 East Timorese
threatens to terminate programs to help bring democracy to 220
million Indonesians.
Depending upon the behavior of Indonesia's government, it
may well be appropriate to delay the next installment on the
IMF-led package of structural loans. We should realize,
however, that actually slashing such support could cause budget
and subsidy reductions that could lead to higher prices for
basic commodities and services, food, kerosene, bus fares, and
so on. That could cause more violence, especially in already
volatile urban areas. A growing number of Indonesians already
believe that Australia, the United States, and other foreign
countries are scheming to break up their nation.
Whatever else it does, the U.S. government should
substantially increase the pressure on President Habibie to
allow an armed peacekeeping force to stop the violence in East
Timor and restore order there if Jakarta cannot do so. Such an
intervention should be coordinated with Australia and Asian and
other countries, the prospective members of a ``coalition of
the willing'', that is the phrase being used, that would assume
this responsibility with the approval, or at least the
acquiescence, of the Indonesian government and the United
Nations.
I can understand the reluctance of Defense Secretary
William Cohen to commit American troops to such an undertaking.
Asians and Australians can and should take the lead. But
American support, at least in the form of logistics such as
airlift capability, would send an appropriate signal to
Indonesia and to the world that the United States cannot stand
passively by while a legitimate act of self-determination is
drowned in blood and flames.
Thank you.
Mr. Bereuter. Dr. Emmerson, thank you very much for your
excellent statement.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Emmerson appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Bereuter. Ms. Sidney Jones, we will be pleased to have
your testimony. You may summarize as you wish.
STATEMENT OF SIDNEY JONES, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ASIA DIVISION,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
Ms. Jones. Thank you very much. I just learned that this
morning when the Security Council delegation that is now in
Jakarta was meeting with Xanana Gusmao, who is likely to be the
leader of an independent East Timor, they were informed that
militias had just killed Xanana's father. I spoke to a member
who was present at that meeting. He said it was the most
wrenching meeting he had ever attended and that both Xanana and
members of the Security Council delegation were in tears by the
time it was over.
I believe that what we are seeing in East Timor today is
part of a deliberate military plan to thwart independence, and
that plan began in January 1999 just after President Habibie
announced that he would give East Timorese the option of
leaving Indonesia. It involved establishing a network of armed
anti-independence militias and trying to intimidate
independence supporters into not registering and not voting in
the referendum that was held on August 30. When that strategy
failed, the fallback, which many diplomats in Jakarta were
aware of as a fallback, was to do exactly what the militias are
doing now, have the losers challenge the vote as unfair and
unleash such violence that further moves toward independence
would become impossible. That plan has gone exactly according
to script.
I think the militias should have been stopped much, much
earlier, and I believe what we have to do now is look at five
very difficult measures, but we have got to look at all of
them.
I strongly support the idea of a multinational peacekeeping
force, although I do agree that you have to get Indonesian
permission for such a force, and I believe that the United
States should contribute to that in a very significant way. But
one thing that hasn't been mentioned thus far is that the
political climate in Jakarta now is very tense and increasingly
anti-U.N. and anti-Western. There is a real backlash in Jakarta
now to what has happened in East Timor. As Don said, the
message being conveyed to the public by the Indonesian press is
not that the violence in East Timor is a murderous, one-sided
rampage, but that it is a civil war between proautonomy and
proindependence forces. Moreover, it is portrayed utterly
unfairly as having been sparked in large part by a U.N.
operation that was biased from the beginning and designed only
to further the strategic interests of Australia and the United
States, and the Jakarta press mentions the strategic interest
and machinations of Australia and the United States on a
repeated basis. There is more of a backlash against Australia
than against Americans, but the anti-Western backlash is
growing.
In this climate agreeing to an international force led by
those same powers would be political suicide for either Habibie
or Wiranto, and they both know it. This means that even
relatively explicit warnings of the economic consequences of
letting this violence continue are not going to have an effect,
so the only option is to act, not threaten.
We believe that all nonhumanitarian assistance, and
especially direct budgetary support to the Indonesian
government, should be suspended immediately, together with any
pending sales or deliveries of military equipment, including
spare parts. If the Indonesian government agrees to an
international peacekeeping force within days, some nonmilitary
assistance should be resumed, but full economic and military
relations should not be restored until three conditions are
met: UNAMET is able to fully resume its functions in all 13
districts of East Timor, the displaced are able to return home
safely, and militia commanders responsible for acts of violence
are arrested and prosecuted.
We also believe that for maximum impact, this suspension of
military and economic aid must be coordinated with Japan,
Germany, Australia and other members of the donor consortium,
called the Consultative Group on Indonesia, or CGI, which in
July pledged $5.9 billion to Indonesia to assist in its
economic recovery.
The second measure that the United States should take is to
get relief workers and aid agencies back into East Timor as
soon as possible. All health and humanitarian workers in East
Timor without exception have now been evacuated. There are no
witnesses to what is happening on the ground.
Telecommunications were cutoff as part of Habibie's martial law
decree of September 6 and have only been partially restored.
There were reports from one humanitarian agency forced to
evacuate on Tuesday that hospitals and clinics were being
systematically destroyed. Just as when Indonesia invaded East
Timor in 1975, the majority of deaths may come less from
killing than from the inability of a huge and growing displaced
population to find food or get medical care.
As discussions take place with the Indonesian government
over a multinational force, one consideration should be how
this force can assist with the return and protection of
humanitarian agencies to address this looming disaster. Without
such a force, East Timorese will be left at the mercy of the
Indonesian Army, and the Indonesian Army has shown no mercy
thus far.
The third measure is to press Indonesia to remove all
restrictions on relief and humanitarian work in West Timor as
soon as possible. East Timorese today were pouring into West
Timor at a rate of 3,000 people per hour, according to the
International Committee of the Red Cross, and there were
believed to be some 60,000 there as of yesterday. Some had been
forcibly expelled with the direct involvement of Indonesian
military and police.
This morning I called the town of Atambua, the West
Timorese town on the border with East Timor, and learned that
members of the Dili based militia called Itarak were
accompanying truckloads of refugees into town, and some of
these were taken directly to the district military command and
police headquarters. Numerous eyewitnesses report that militia
members have a presence in some of these refugee camps.
I actually learned today that militia members are now in
control of the Kupang airport, although I haven't verified
that. Those fleeing or forced out by militia violence have no
protection against assault, nor are they likely to get any at
all unless international agencies are able to have a full-time
presence in the camps in West Timor, we are not even talking
about East Timor, carry out a full range of humanitarian
services and have enough confidence in local authorities to
know that reports of abuses against refugees will be thoroughly
investigated. But instead of cooperation from local
authorities, relief workers are being denied access to the
refugees and told that they blame foreigners for what has
happened to them and that their own security is in danger.
It is not only critical that forcibly expelled refugees are
protected and have access to assistance, it is also essential
that their stories get out so that the world understands how
and by whose hands they got to West Timor. In discussions on
East Timor at the APEC meeting in New Zealand, the
Administration should give high priority to this issue and work
out with other APEC members a strategy for persuading the
Indonesian government to lift restrictions on access.
Fourth, the results of the August 30 referendum have to be
protected. The East Timorese defied the guns and machetes to
turn out in such overwhelming numbers. The army that created
and backed them must not be allowed to do to independence what
the Burmese government did to democracy in 1990. They are
trying to do this now by the scorched earth policy and forcible
expulsions of people and by a smear campaign going on against
UNAMET, and the statements made repeatedly by Indonesian
officials, including Foreign Minister Alatas, that the U.N. was
biased, allowed major fraud in the referendum and only half
heartedly investigated allegations of irregularities in the
registration and polling process.
This scorched earth policy and these expulsions will leave
the militias in charge of large parts of East Timor unless they
are disarmed and pushed out. The militias have publicly
rejected the results of the referendum, and there is a concern
that they will have tried to effectively partition East Timor
with the western districts refusing to join an independent
state.
The countries that encourage the formation of UNAMET and
helped finance it, including the United States, cannot let this
happen. It is for this reason that it must work to see that
Indonesia ensures the safe return of refugees and arrests the
perpetrators of violence. The smear campaign against the U.N.
means, I think, for the first time that there is a real
possibility that the MPR, the People's Consultative Assembly,
which meets in November, may refuse to ratify the results of
the referendum on the ground that it was not fairly conducted.
And even though Megawati has given different signals on this, a
senior official of her party said yesterday that the PDI might
refuse to endorse the results of the referendum. So U.S.
officials need to use every opportunity to remind Indonesian
officials and opposition leaders that they are on record as
promising to respect the results of the referendum, and that
both President Habibie and senior members of the Cabinet
acknowledged on the day of the vote that it had been orderly,
free and fair.
Finally the United States needs to press Indonesia to end
the martial law that was just imposed. We do not believe that
martial law is either justified or desirable. The army could
have stopped the violence with the troops it had on the ground,
and it had 15,000, at least. If some militia leaders are saying
today, as they are, that they have declared a cease-fire, it is
not the result of a new military commander or the increased
powers granted to the military under martial law. It is because
an order given by Jakarta was made that could and should have
been given 6 months ago.
Violence is still likely to continue when and where the
army sees fit. The fact that soldiers operating under martial
law and accompanying a UNAMET convoy to its warehouse on
Wednesday, yesterday, did nothing to stop the militias from
attacking is all the evidence one needs that new troops will
not necessarily be guarantors of peace.
We fear that martial law will be used to keep restrictions
on communication to ensure the army's work takes place out of
public view. We fear it will be used to mount operations
against the guerillas, who, it should be noted, between January
and the referendum largely refrained from the use of violence,
and against members of CNRT, the proindependence political
organization. Today we received reports that at least one
senior leader of CNRT, Mouhodo, was arrested in East Timor and
brought to Kupang, West Timor, where he is believed to be in
police detention. That may be the beginning of a pattern.
Finally we fear that martial law will be used as a cover to
find, quote, evidence, unquote, that the August 30 referendum
was unfair, such as allegedly uncounted proautonomy ballots
found today. With no impartial witnesses to document how this
evidence was uncovered, any claims of such discovery should be
treated with the greatest skepticism.
I should also point out there is no indication of how long
martial law will endure or who other than the military will
decide when order has been restored. The United States should
make clear to the Indonesian Army that arrests of key military
leaders would be a key test of the army's will to restore order
and that martial law should be lifted.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you for your powerful statement. Among
all the other distressing things, I am particularly distressed
to hear reports about Mr. Gusmao's father.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jones appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Bereuter. I will start with questions under the 5
minute rule and then turn to my colleagues.
One thing that I have noticed over a period of time is that
the amount of U.S. assistance to a country--be it Mexico or
Indonesia--is always overestimated by our colleagues and by the
American public. When we were proposing to cut off aid to
Mexico, we had no foreign aid to Mexico. We have a relatively
small amount of leverage in terms of a bilateral aid sense to
Indonesia at this point. The military aid is minuscule. It has
no impact whatsoever except in a symbolic sense. Mr. Lantos and
I had a brief discussion about the next tranche of money, the
IMF funds, for part of the $43 billion assistance, to
Indonesia. Do any of you at this panel believe that such aid is
inappropriate to hold in abeyance the next payment?
Ms. Jones. No, I don't believe it is inappropriate at all,
but I also believe that the relatively small amount of American
aid could be vastly enhanced in its power if it were joined
with Japanese economic assistance, and I believe the U.S. has
some leverage there.
Mr. Bereuter. Yes.
Dr. Emmerson. Could I also agree? I don't think it is
inappropriate to withhold or delay that tranche.
Mr. Bereuter. You do?
Dr. Emmerson. I do not think it is inappropriate. Actually,
I should say it is appropriate.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I believe it is also not only appropriate
but essential. There is obviously a caveat, as Don Emmerson
said earlier, that one has to be careful about creating an even
more serious economic crisis in Indonesia from which even more
innocent people suffer, but I think clearly withholding the
next tranche of IMF lending I think is essential.
Mr. Bereuter. The markets are indicating the possibility we
may withold aid along with all the other national and
international actions is having an impact on Indonesia's
currency. In some ways, witholding aid may have a greater
impact than anything else we do in a direct sense. I think that
is an appropriate kind of leverage.
I think it is particularly important that United Nations
forces not be forced out. I am not unsympathetic or unconcerned
about the danger such forces face, but I think we need to do
whatever we can to continue their presence and activities of
U.N. officials at this point.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, if I just might say, the best
thing that has happened for strengthening the Indonesian
currency in the last 12 months was the successful democratic
election on June 7. The thing that has done the most damage has
been the atrocity in East Timor in the last week.
Mr. Bereuter. I think that is absolutely right. Bearing in
mind what I was saying about the United Nations, is there
anyone among you who has some ideas about U.N. action against
Indonesian membership? Do we have any precedent for a deferral
or partial abatement of the privileges of membership in the
United Nations since they are acting against a United Nations
force at this point? Can we suspend membership in the United
Nations of a member or suspend any of the rights and privileges
of a member?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Well, certainly we can't.
Mr. Bereuter. Not we, but ``we'' meaning a part of the
international community.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I don't think the U.N. would do it. I think
there is this terrible danger that we end up taking actions
that appear to be so anti-Indonesian that people in Indonesia,
who are horrified by what their own military have done, begin
to be more horrified of what the world is doing to Indonesia. I
think that is the kind of symbolism that probably is harmful.
Ms. Jones. I also think that because we want UNAMET to stay
there, and because we want to rely on Security Council approval
for any peacekeeping force that was sent in, we can't toy with
Indonesia's membership there. But I think there is a lot we can
do on the bilateral, multilateral side aside from that.
Mr. Bereuter. Do all of you agree that stopping bilateral
assistance at this point except for humanitarian purposes is
appropriate?
Ms. Jones. Yes.
Mr. Bereuter. Does anyone disagree?
Dr. Emmerson. In my statement I commented that in the case
of the United States, we provide assistance to Indonesia of a
variety of kinds. One kind of assistance, for example, is to
strengthen the process of democratization. I don't think that
should be cut.
Mr. Bereuter. And part of that, of course, does go to the
government?
Dr. Emmerson. Right. But a lot of it goes to
nongovernmental organizations.
Mr. Bereuter. You make that distinction. I take that point.
Ambassador?
Mr. Wolfowitz. If I could backtrack a minute on your
question about the U.N. I think a better way to try to use
sentiment in the United Nations would be to have the kinds of
resolutions from the United Nations, and actually if possible,
I don't know if it is possible, even more from the General
Assembly than the Security Council that will convince
Indonesians that this is the whole world that is concerned and
not just the United States and Australia. I think the U.N.
really could be a very important vehicle of informing public
opinion in Indonesia if it is used properly.
Dr. Emmerson. I am skeptical on this one. I would like to
remind the Committee that the United Nations presence in East
Timor was going to go through three phases. Phase Two was going
to begin after the popular consultation, and Phase Three was
going to begin after the meeting of the Assembly coming up
presumably in October or November. I don't think that just for
the sake of using the United Nations as a club with which to
beat Indonesia, we should abandon the prospect that a UNAMET
presence in East Timor could perhaps continue to pursue a plan
that would help to implement the vote on the 30th of August.
Mr. Bereuter. As I said, I certainly want to do everything
possible to keep the U.N. presence there and to continue their
activities, being pursued in conjunction with the original
plan.
We may have a time for another turn, but I turn to my
colleagues now. The gentleman from American Samoa is
recognized.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do want to thank the Members of the panel for their
comprehensive statements. I have been listening to the comments
that have been made, and I am sure that some of you have
probably also heard what Secretary Pickering had said and some
of the concerns expressed by both Senators and Members of this
Chamber. We seem to have taken a blind eye in terms of the
history how this whole thing came about. The East Timor crisis
did not just happen yesterday. This was a situation, a crisis
that has been brewing for the past 20 years. Over 200,000 East
Timorese have been tortured, murdered, killed by the military.
The East Timorese did not ask the Indonesians to come and make
them a democracy. The East Timorese military simply took over
militarily. It was not a peaceful annexation.
Please forgive me if I am wrong on the history. This was an
outright unilateral move by the Indonesian military 20 years
ago to take over East Timor when Portugal decided to get rid of
its colony. The same thing is also true with West Papua and New
Guinea. I think we are looking at the situation as if all of a
sudden this is a crisis, and I am a little interested in the
fact that our Ambassador, Secretary Pickering, said the
Administration has been preparing for the options of what was
to come about as a result now that we are in with the militia
and the military supporting this. As a matter of fact, it seems
to me that we really are just--and I have a very famous
expression in the Hawaiian language called ``waha.'' it means
just a bunch of hot air with no real substance in terms of what
we really have to do, as a point of fact, substantively to
handle this situation.
I noticed also that there was some mentioning of the fact
that this place is so isolated all the way on the other side of
the world that really the United States should have no real
national interest. My understanding of elementary history as I
took it in elementary school is that some prince in Serbia's
assassination started the whole World War I. That was as
isolated a case as I could remember, how World War I started.
So East Timor now comes in to bear, and as a matter of
history we have not had a very good relationship with the Asia
Pacific region when it comes to military.
I would just like to ask the question, China has recently
proposed to the ASEAN member nations that it would be nice if
we could also set up a regional security organization similar
to what the Europeans have set up. They call it NATO. Would you
support this kind of a thing? Because now--and understanding
that the United States will not unilaterally move in to stop
this atrocity--do we prefer the People's Republic of China Army
go in to prevent this atrocity from happening? What is your
thinking on this?
Ms. Jones. I could just say that I don't think there is any
prospect whatsoever that even if a regional security
organization were formed in Asia that any member would have any
desire to go in and resolve in East Timor or in Irian Jaya or
in Aceh at all, and the human rights problems that we have in
all of those places are not going to be solved by such an
organization.
Dr. Emmerson. My comment would be this. I think you put
your finger on a sore spot. Unlike Europe, where you have NATO
and other networks of security cooperation, the situation in
East Asia is not as promising. There is the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF), as I am sure you are aware, but it is a very young
organization and has yet to prove itself.
I do feel that the United States must come to terms, if you
will, with this dilemma. On the one hand we want to reserve the
right to act unilaterally. We are nationalists, too, in our own
way. At the same time we are interested in getting others to
contribute their share, share the responsibility. That is in a
multilateral setting. I think there is ambiguity in U.S.
policy. To what extent do we support, let's say, the ARF as
opposed to reserving our right to intervene? I think there has
to be a combination of the two.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I agree with you, Dr. Emmerson.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I guess I would just say, Congressman, quite
a few multilateral organizations are designed for inaction, not
for action. If you had one in which China played the leading
role, I don't believe if it acted, it would act on behalf of
human rights. The one country in the region that has taken a
leadership role is Australia on this. Australia is an ally that
deserves American support. I believe in the right
circumstances, that is to say if there were a consensus that
included Indonesia to bring in an international force, other
countries in the region have indicated a willingness to
participate. I don't know if I like the term ``coalition of the
willing,'' but I don't have a better one. I think that is the
best way to try to put something together. I think it is
absolutely right that other countries should be encouraged to
lead, and when other countries are willing to lead, the United
States should follow, not feel we have to lead all the time.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Chairman, if I may, just for 30
seconds more, I would like to share with Members of the panel
and the Subcommittee an article written by Mr. Walter Shapiro
that appeared in the Washington Times, I believe yesterday. It
says, quoting his comments, ``Having blessed the independence
referendum, that is, our Nation, the United States, it would be
a cynical betrayal of East Timorese aspirations for freedom for
America to now turn its back on Indonesian-sponsored brutality.
Adopting an ostrich-like isolationist policy in East Timor
would run counter to every moral imperative that buttresses our
foreign policy.''
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bereuter. If the gentleman would yield on his
nonexistent time, in light of the comments we heard about anti-
West and anti-U.N. sentiment, it would seem to me that if we
had any kind of multilateral force, it ought to involve
Southeast Asian countries and ASEAN countries, in particular,
as a part of that force so that it is not strictly an Anglo/
Australian/American or some such force.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Would the Chairman yield?
Mr. Bereuter. I would yield.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I would strongly advocate that we ought
to organize a similar NATO-type organization in the Asia
Pacific region with the United States as a full participant. I
think it is good and in our national interest.
Mr. Bereuter. I am pleased to yield now 5 minutes to the
gentleman from Florida Mr. Hastings.
Mr. Hastings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I came
back to learn, and learn indeed I did. I respect so very much
the Chair and Mr. Faleomavaega, who I believe have few peers
that could rival them in their understanding of the dynamics
that are ongoing there. Our three panelists, the portions of
Dean Wolfowitz' comments that I did hear and the other two,
were most enlightening and leave me with as many questions as I
believe they afforded or anyone else have afforded us answers
today.
Mr. Chairman, I come to this as perhaps the least
knowledgeable of all the remaining persons that are discussing
this issue, but I also come with a fair grip on street life,
and that is something that I think does not rise always when we
are discussing a matter. Ms. Jones' propositions that she put
forward I am in thorough agreement with, as I am with the
statements of everyone else. What bothers me is Senators--and
all of us give forth with ruminations about cutting off money,
and rightly we should, but cutting off the money isn't going to
cutoff the killing. Therein lies the dilemma that we have.
Thugs don't respect but one thing, and that is force. The
people that are conducting themselves in a thuggish manner, in
the militia especially and perhaps more than likely with the
complicity of the military, they don't care about the
International Monetary Fund or the United Nations peacekeeping.
That isn't what is on their mind until they see something hit
the ground.
Thus, I raise the proposition that if anything is going to
solve this problem, it is going to be an international
peacekeeping force, period, and that has to be done with or
without, at some point, the Indonesian government's consent.
Ideally we should move diplomatically, as we are. Ideally we
should legislate along the lines that we as policymakers can,
and the Executive Bbranch should do everything that it can to
be persuasive. But how can you persuade, for example, Ms.
Jones, if Habibie and Wiranto would be committing suicide if
they agreed to let the international community come in as you
proposition, and I agree with, then you don't expect that they
are ever going to agree. And if they are the controlling agents
at this point to a relative degree, then I don't know how we
communicate with all of these other people, Dean, for example,
that we should be communicating with.
I do believe that we should separate the people of
Indonesia from military persons who act in complicity with
thugs and make that very clear, but it is a difficult thing.
But understanding what genocide is not difficult.
Now, I don't know whether genocide has occurred here, but I
am willing to go on record as saying that before long we will
begin using that term. It is a term of art that is given to us
under the United Nations treaty that allows for the
international community to act. I don't understand why when
people are being killed indiscriminately, that we cannot, under
that aegis, act.
I don't know how you modify genocide. I have read that
treaty over and over again. It doesn't say little genocide. It
doesn't say big genocide. It doesn't say pretty genocide. It
doesn't say ugly genocide. It defines the terms that I believe
these actions fall under.
And so I ask you all, I beg all of my colleagues to begin
paying attention to that. Otherwise, all of the executive
actions, all of the actions of APEC in New Zealand, all of
Clinton's using the bully pulpit, all of our resolutions that
we pass, are not going to stop the killing until we put some
people on the ground to stop the killing. I don't know whether
that should be United Nations or states' troops, but I do know
we are going to have to undertake to do something and if you
wake me up at 4 o'clock in the morning, I will tell you how I
really feel.
Mr. Bereuter. I thank the gentleman. I do have one point I
would like to ask in a second round here. Dr. Emmerson, in
pointing to his five possible explanations, and No. 3 as I have
marked it down, said responsibility for the recent turmor must
be clearly assigned to Indonesia military. I recognize what you
said, but I am going to ask a question, nevertheless, that
seems to fly partially in the face of that.
It is my understanding that there was a concerted effort to
recruit Timorese--East and West Timorese--to the military units
that were involved and assigned in that region as a positive
feature for dealing with the difficulties there. In the
military forces on the island of Timor, it is my understanding
you have a disproportionate number of Timorese as compared to
the overall military. I guess my question--and right now it
would seem to me that might have been a counterproductive step
at this stage--is as follows:
Is there an element in the Indonesian military, in your
judgment, that could effectively be deployed by Wiranto or
President Habibie that could be expected to implement an end to
the terrorism that is prevailing there? Is there an element
that can be rapidly deployed within the military--Is there a
force within it that can be counted upon to do the job that the
current forces are not doing?
Dr. Emmerson. My answer is yes, there is.
Mr. Bereuter. What is that?
Dr. Emmerson. Kostrad, to cite just one example. The
Indonesian military is a broad and manifold organization. It
has many units with a variety of functions. Kostrad would be
one possibility--the Army Strategic Reserve, which has the
capacity of being airlifted to various parts of the
Archipelago.
I think you are quite right to point out the issue of
recruitment from local sources. If you had a unit that came in
strictly under top command with instructions to arrest the
militia and end the killing, and if that unit were recruited
from somewhere else in the archipelago and did not include
Timorese with an interest in maintaining ties with the militias
and with Indonesia, or Indonesian officers that own land in
East Timor, or who have married Timorese wives--if you have a
unit, if you will, that comes from outside of that context,
yes, the answer is quite clearly yes, with firm Indonesians to
do so, it could in fact end the killing.
Ms. Jones. I would like to differ a bit because I think out
of the 15,000 people that I mentioned, the troops in East
Timor, there are 2,000 East Timorese. There are only two
battalions of East Timorese. All the rest are non-East
Timorese. So that it is not just a question of people being
caught up in the emotion.
Second, there are Kostrad battalions on the ground now. It
is precisely those Kostrad battalions that let this U.N. convoy
go through and be attacked by the militias.
Mr. Bereuter. I don't want to confuse East Timorese with
Timorese. I am talking about Timorese in part now being a
problem, whether they are from East Timor or West Timor. Could
you give me statistics that relate to the Timorese as opposed
to just the East Timorese, because the East Timorese recruits
into the army are not the whole problem, if they are a problem.
Ms. Jones. That is true, but I don't think the West
Timorese recruited are a significant portion of the other
battalions.
Mr. Wolfowitz. There may be a problem in having Timorese in
the forces, but the real problem is the orders that they are
all getting. Until they get orders to do anything, nothing will
happen. You asked if they got orders to do something, would
Timorese carry them out.
Mr. Bereuter. No, I really asked is there a unit within the
military that would respond to orders.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I think there are. I think there are many. I
think there are two different kinds of orders. I think it would
be much easier to find many units who would respond to orders
if they got them to protect UNAMET, for example, and to protect
civilians. The hardest part will be getting units to actually
go after militias and arrest them, because then I think you
begin to find people saying more these are the people we
created. These were our allies and now we are supposed to put
them in jail. That is why I think the Indonesians ought to see
the offer of international force as a great blessing to
Indonesia. The sooner they hand over the security
responsibilities to someone else, the better off the Indonesian
military will be.
Mr. Bereuter. I understand your point. I am still looking
for a specific alternative if in fact they do not go. Dr.
Emmerson gave me a very specific one.
Dr. Emmerson. Let me also be specific in responding to
Sidney. I couldn't disagree more. If Sidney is correct, then
the Indonesian military is simply incapable of ending the
violence even if Wiranto wanted to. That is absurd. I was in
Ambon in June for the Indonesian elections, monitoring that
event. It was Kostrad troops that were able to separate Muslims
and Christians that previously had been killing each other. I
don't believe for a moment that the entire Indonesian military
is so corrupted by Timor that they are incapable of following
authority a true instructions to end the killing. That is not
the case.
Ms. Jones. What I was saying is that you can't just take a
unit and assume that because it is Kostrad and because it is
well trained and specially trained and elite, that therefore
that background gives it somehow a greater ability than other
units if, in fact, you are not getting the appropriate orders
from the top. I do think if you did get orders from Wiranto,
everything would be very different.
Mr. Bereuter. I understand. There are two elements. One is
the commitment and the orders that follow it. The second one is
a force that will implement it. Both can be and is currently a
problem.
Thank you. The gentleman from American Samoa for a round.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I have about 501 other questions I want
to raise. I know we can continue the dialogue for the next five
hours very--quite easily; but I do want to commend you for
calling this hearing which I think has been very purposeful. I
sincerely hope that not only the Members of the Committee but
the American public will have gotten a little more education
about where this place is and the importance of this crisis and
what impact it will have not only for our own national
interests but especially for this region of the world.
I also want to commend our good friends here for their very
fine statements and their participation in the hearing. I want
to thank you again.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you. The gentleman from Florida have
another statement?
Mr. Hastings. I don't have a question. I just have a
request of Ms. Jones if she would be kind enough to provide me
a copy of your paper publication in the Australian journal,
that is in your biography, ``Regional Institutions for
Protecting Human Rights,'' I would just like to read it.
Ms. Jones. I will.
Mr. Hastings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing. Thank you all so very much for your enlightening
testimony.
Mr. Bereuter. I join my colleagues in expressing our
appreciation to the panel for your exceptional assistance here
today. We appreciate the fact you have taken so much of your
day to do it. Thank you very much.
The Subcommittees are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:25 p.m., the Subcommittees were
adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
September 9, 1999
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