[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE DEFENSE SECURITY SERVICE: HOW BIG IS THE BACKLOG OF PERSONNEL
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
VETERANS AFFAIRS, AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 20, 2000
__________
Serial No. 106-267
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
Carolina ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
BOB BARR, Georgia DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas
LEE TERRY, Nebraska THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
GREG WALDEN, Oregon JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California ------
PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho (Independent)
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
Robert A. Briggs, Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International
Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida TOM LANTOS, California
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
JOHN L. MICA, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
Carolina BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
LEE TERRY, Nebraska (Independent)
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
J. Vincent Chase, Chief Investigator
Jason Chung, Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on September 20, 2000............................... 1
Statement of:
Leonard, J. William, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Security and Information Operations, Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence, Department of Defense; and
General Charles Cunningham, Director, Defense Security
Services................................................... 54
Schuster, Carol R., Associate Director of National Security
International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting
Office; and Donald Mancuso, Acting Inspector General,
Office of Inspector General, Department of Defense......... 5
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Cunningham, General Charles, Director, Defense Security
Services, prepared statement of............................ 72
Leonard, J. William, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Security and Information Operations, Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence, Department of Defense,
prepared statement of...................................... 58
Mancuso, Donald, Acting Inspector General, Office of
Inspector General, Department of Defense, prepared
statement of............................................... 23
Schuster, Carol R., Associate Director of National Security
International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting
Office, prepared statement of.............................. 7
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............ 3
THE DEFENSE SECURITY SERVICE: HOW BIG IS THE BACKLOG OF PERSONNEL
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS?
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 2000
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans
Affairs, and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher
Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Shays and Biggert.
Staff present: Lawrence J. Halloran, staff director and
counsel; J. Vincent Chase, chief investigator; Alex Moore,
fellow; Jason M. Chung, clerk; David Rapallo, minority counsel;
and Earley Green, minority assistant clerk.
Mr. Shays. This hearing of the Committee on Government
Reform Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and
International Relations is called to order.
Our subject this morning: Oversight of the Defense Security
Service: How big is the backlog of personnel security
investigations?
Seven months ago we heard testimony on the serious risks to
national security posed by a staggering backlog of background
investigations and reinvestigations, a backlog then estimated
to approach 900,000 individuals seeking confidential, secret
and top secret clearances. The Defense Security Service [DSS],
the agency responsible for screening those in the DOD, have
access to national secrets, said plans were in place to reduce
the backlog to increase the quantity and improve the quality of
personnel security checks.
Today the subcommittee revisits issues raised by
longstanding deficiencies at DSS. We look for tangible progress
toward repairing a vulnerable link in our very important
security shield. The time for optimistic plans and rosy
projections has long passed.
The longer the backlog festers, the greater the threat to
security and productivity at DOD.
Awaiting reinvestigation are thousands who should not be or
need not have access to classified material any longer. At the
same time, agencies are losing qualified new hires who cannot
wait almost a year for DSS to complete an initial
investigation. In addition, defense contractors have found
themselves unable to perform billions of dollars worth of work
because employees have not obtained routine clearances.
This frankly just boggles my mind. How big is the backlog?
Incredibly even this central question still cannot be answered
with any accuracy. According to the General Accounting Office
[GAO], DOD continues to rely on episodic surveys of fragmented
questionably accurate data bases to determine the extent of
overdue clearances and future needs.
With only a guess at the scope of the problem, DOD can only
speculate about the dimensions, the complexity and the costs of
a longterm solution. The capability to anticipate DSS workload
and budget needs and to prioritize security investigations,
will not be in place for 2 years. Yet critical decisions are
being made now about how many cases to direct to outside
contractors and the optimal capacity of the internal DSS
computer system.
That DSS remains a high risk enterprise, as the
Department's Inspector General observed, was convincingly
demonstrated when the agency's case control management system
suffered a critical failure in July. Despite some subsequent
success in stabilizing the system and reaching productivity
goals, DSS plans to eliminate the backlog in a matter of months
now appears to stretch out for years.
Over that time, DSS will require the sustained attention
and support of senior Pentagon leadership, both civilian and
military. DSS has not had that support in the past. Indifferent
oversight and outright neglect by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Command Control Communications and Intelligence
allowed DSS to degenerate. Only proactive management and
unwavering budget support at the same level will restore a
security function that touches almost every aspect of DOD
operations.
So there is no time to quibble over the meaning of the word
``backlog'' or indulge in the happy fiction, ``failing more
slowly equals success'' for DSS.
We look for an unguilded description of DSS recovery
efforts to date and a frank assessment of the challenges that
remain. Repairing the personnel security investigation process
requires an unrelenting focus on protecting national security,
not public relations.
We welcome the testimony of all our witnesses this morning
as the subcommittee continues our oversight of the Defense
Security Service.
We have two panels comprised of two people at each panel.
Our first panel is Ms. Carol R. Schuster, Associate Director of
National Security International Affairs Division, U.S. General
Accounting Office; Mr. Donald Mancuso, Acting Inspector
General, Office of Inspector General, Department of Defense.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]
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Mr. Shays. At this time if you would stand, I would swear
you both in.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. Let me just say, before you both begin, in
reading and preparing for this hearing it's fairly clear to me
that we don't have happy news. But the purpose of this
subcommittee is not to just expose unhappy news, the purpose is
to make it right. And so I'm not looking to cast blame at
anyone. I am looking to be part of what I hope all of us are, a
solution and one that comes quickly.
My view, when I read the testimony, every time I read it, I
get more outraged by the fact that we spent billions of dollars
to try to improve our defense, and this area here would do
wonders to improve our national defense. So I hope that we come
up with concrete solutions and some real specific discussion as
to what can be done to improve and make better this terrible
situation.
Ms. Shuster.
STATEMENTS OF CAROL R. SCHUSTER, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
SECURITY INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE; AND DONALD MANCUSO, ACTING INSPECTOR
GENERAL, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Ms. Schuster. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be here today
to discuss GAO's recent report related to DOD's backlog of
overdue personnel security clearance investigations. As you
have acknowledged in the past, periodic reinvestigations are an
important part of the government's efforts to protect national
security information and lessen the Nation's vulnerability to
espionage. Completing these investigations when due is critical
because individuals retain access to classified information,
even though their clearances may be out of date. Yet, in
January 2000, DOD estimated that its backlog of overdue
reinvestigations had grown to about a half million cases or
about one of every five individuals holding a clearance.
Today I would like to briefly summarize the major findings
of our August 2000 report and ask that my full statement be
submitted for the record.
Last February, when we testified before this subcommittee
on the quality and timeliness of DSS investigations, questions
were raised about the accuracy of DOD's backlog estimate. At
your request, we examined the methodologies, the deputy used to
estimate its backlog and found that DOD does not have a data
base that can provide a real time accurate estimate of the
backlog. As a result, it is variously estimated the size of the
backlog on an ad hoc basis through data calls to the services
and statistical sampling methods. Resulting estimates since
1998 have been widely divergent, ranging from 452,000 to
992,000 cases. It's two most recent estimates which use very
different methods coincidentally achieve similar estimates of
about 505,000.
The first relied on a data call that asked security
managers throughout DOD to manually count their overdue
reinvestigations. The second relied on statistical sampling to
refine what it knew to be a grossly inaccurate estimate
extracted from existing data bases. While the two most recent
estimates were close, neither is particularly reliable due to
their methodological limitations. For example, when the
counting method was used, we found that because guidance was
not specific, the services used different ``as of'' dates and
inconsistent methods to arrive at their estimates. Some of the
input was 6 months old or older by the time the estimate was
reported. And DOD made no effort to validate methodologies or
the accuracy of the counts.
Likewise, the second estimate was also flawed in that only
half of the 1,200 individuals sampled responded to the survey
and the necessary followup was not performed to make the
estimates statistically valid. And, based on the definition
used, both estimates excluded as many as 94,000 overdue
reinvestigations that had been submitted to DSS for processing.
The vast majority of these cases were overdue. One estimate
also excluded those holding confidential clearances.
DOD will begin testing a new joint personnel adjudication
system data base in November 2000, which it believes will allow
real time accurate counts of overdue reinvestigations. However,
it will not be fully operational until November 2001. In the
meantime, an enormous amount of effort continues to be expended
to manually estimate the backlog. As recently as September
11th, the Deputy Secretary of Defense made yet another data
call for DOD components to estimate the size of the backlog.
This will be the seventh estimate since October 1998, yet,
because the directive did not specify methodology to follow,
there's no assurance that this estimate will be any more
reliable than the succession of estimates that have already
been made.
But, I would like to end my remarks on a more positive
note. We recommended in our recent report that DOD design
routine reports showing the full extent of the backlog and
develop incentives to ensure that reinvestigation requests are
submitted on time. I am pleased to report that DOD's controller
has redefined the backlog to include all investigative workload
including that awaiting processing at DSS. This will enable the
department to better plan how it will address the full extent
of the backlog. Also in June, DOD set forth a detailed phased
plan for eliminating the backlog by September 30, 2002.
Implementing guidance now specifies as was the case in 1999,
that security managers must either terminate or downgrade
clearances if a reinvestigation request has not been made by
this date. This should provide an important incentive for DOD
components and their security managers to submit
reinvestigation requests in a timely manner and hopefully head
off any future potential backlog.
Finally, DOD has acknowledged the importance of increased
oversight of this vexing national security problem, and has
asked each component to designate a senior official to monitor
execution of the phased plan for eliminating the backlog. This
latter action is responsive to an earlier GAO recommendation
and should serve to emphasize within the Department the
importance of ensuring that personnel security clearances are
based on up-to-date investigations.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would
be happy to answer any questions that you have.
Mr. Shays. Thank you Ms. Schuster.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Schuster follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Mr. Mancuso.
Mr. Mancuso. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to
discuss the results of recent Inspector General audits related
to the vitally important functions of personnel security
clearance investigation and adjudication. Simply put, the
inability to track and promptly complete personnel security
investigations has had a devastating effect on a department's
ability to ensure that national security is protected, and that
military civilian and contractor employees have the timely
clearances needed to complete their jobs. On a human level, the
lack of timely clearances prevents people from obtaining
employment in DOD, and in the case of contractor employees,
causes the loss of hundreds of millions of tax dollars paid to
contractors from employees awaiting clearance. As with most DOD
management challenges, the huge scale of the program makes it
inherently difficult to administer. More than 700,000 initial
investigations are needed annually as well as several hundred
thousand reinvestigations to update existing clearances.
Approximately 2.4 million DOD and contractor personnel hold
clearances at any given time. Unfortunately, as your
subcommittee hearing last February indicated, the program has
serious problems in the area of automation and resources. As
GAO reported, in their September 1999 audit, some actions taken
by previous DSS management team were ill-advised and merely
created new problems, especially in quality control over
investigations. The failure of CCMS, the DSS Case Control
Management System, was also a major setback.
Finally DOD has lacked accurate information on the existing
or forecasted workload and related resource requirements for
both the investigative and adjudicative portions of the
program.
Over the past 2 years, DOD managers have become more
involved in the problems at DSS than they had previously, and
several changes have been made beginning with the appointment
of General Cunningham in June 1999. Over the past year, DSS has
taken action to implement GAO and IG recommendations, cancel
questionable policies, outsource more work and acquire Air
Force assistance to remediate their information system.
In April 2000, I testified on the issues confronting DSS
before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Our position at
that time, which remains essentially the same today, is that
the DOD plan to quickly eliminate the backlog of overdue
clearances through a combination of outsourcing and internal
changes was overly optimistic. Specifically, the plan assumed
DSS could close an average of 2,500 cases per day beginning
this year. In practice, however, DSS has completed over 1,500
cases per day in the first 11 months of the year and was unable
to reduce the backlog. We also question the workload
projections believing them to be significantly understated and
cautioned that it would probably take years, not months, to
overhaul the entire personnel security program.
We specifically recommended that the Department needed to
actively oversee and manage the workload at DSS in the
adjudication facilities, implement performance metrics,
periodically assess and adjust resource requirements, develop a
DOD-wide security system, improve tracking of security
clearances, and closely monitor management of CCMS and JPAS,
the Joint Personnel Adjudication System. All those actions
remain very necessary today, and most of them entail sustained
senior management attention.
I'll emphasize the last three of those items, beginning
with our concern over the need to prioritize security
investigative case workload, which has been perhaps our most
controversial recommendation. In our April 2000 report on
priorities, we discussed a number of case management issues.
The principal concern is the lack of a meaningful process for
prioritizing the workload. We determined that the resources
were generally applied on a first-in/first-out basis.
The clearance requests for important programs and higher
risk programs often languished while investigators often worked
on routine cases. C3I, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense Command Control Communications and Intelligence,
initially disagreed with the feasibility of developing a
prioritization method but has subsequently changed its position
and has been working with the services and DSS to comply with
the recommendation. I'm still frankly disappointed, however,
with the slow progress, and am concerned that it appears so
difficult to implement what is to us a basic workload
management tool.
As with many other problems facing the department, the
desire to gain consensus resulted in a time-consuming process.
We believe this delay was unnecessary and could have been
avoided through firm decisionmaking by leadership. We haven't
seen the current plan and we are anxious to work with the C3I
people on that and share our thoughts with them and I know they
indicated they welcome that coordination.
In May 2000, we issued another report in which we noted
that DSS lacked an effective means for tracking the status of
security clearance requests. DSS could not identify on a case-
by-case basis why more than 12,000 electronic requests received
between July and December 1999 did not result in investigative
cases being opened. Similarly we found more than 50,000
investigative cases that were opened during that period without
electronic requests, although using electronic requests was
mandatory and was important for maintaining control and
improving efficiency.
DSS and C3I agreed with our findings but noted that the
necessary corrective actions depend partially on improving the
CCMS and implementing the JPAS. Because JPAS will not be
operational until at least 2002, we continue to believe that
DSS should be seeking interim measures. The need for a modern
system with the capabilities intended for CCMS is undeniable,
but has often been the case over the last decade with DOD
information technology investments, the execution of this
system acquisition project was flawed.
In retrospect DSS and its contractors badly underestimated
the technical risk and failed to test adequately to manage
those risks. We are currently auditing the system and plan to
issue a draft report in the next few weeks.
As previously noted, DSS has prudently turned to the Air
Force systems acquisition management support, and indications
are that the system is being stabilized. DSS reported an
average of 2,523 cases closed per day in August 2000, which is
certainly a very positive sign, assuming that this high level
of performance can be sustained.
The CCMS will reach a critical milestone in 2002 when the
Department must decide whether to deploy an overall enterprise
system architecture for DSS. In the interim, the system must
prove that it can process an average of 2,500 cases closing per
day. Various initial design inefficiencies must be resolved and
additional reliability and maintainability testing is needed.
In addition, DSS should aggressively benchmark the system
against other systems performing similar functions.
We're also conducting several other reviews involving the
security and investigative and adjudication processes. These
reviews have been coordinated with GAO to prevent duplication.
So in summary, the enormous scope of the defense personnel
security program makes an inherently difficult management
challenge. It is important that the Department avoid piecemeal
solutions such as its ill-fated attempt to address productivity
and capacity at DSS by arbitrarily limiting the number of
security clearance requests that DOD components were allowed to
submit.
We believe that with the somewhat stronger recent support
of the Office of Secretary of Defense, DSS is making reasonable
progress in its current reengineering effort, although not as
quickly as planned earlier this year. DSS will need continued
close oversight and adequate support. It is particularly
important that lingering confusion about the size and
definition of the backlog and the likely investigative and
adjudicative workload over the next several years be eliminated
to enable proper planning.
Thank you for considering our views on this subject and I
certainly welcome questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mancuso follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Would you, Mr. Mancuso, would you read your
opening paragraph again. It's not--which you're more than
welcome to do. I couldn't find the statement in your draft that
you submitted. So would you--if would you read the opening
paragraph again.
Mr. Mancuso. Simply put, the inability to track and
promptly complete personnel security investigations has had a
devastating effect on the Department's ability to ensure that
national security is protected and that military civilian and
contractor employees have the timely clearances needed to
complete their jobs. On a human level, the lack of timely
clearances prevents people from obtaining employment in DOD,
and in the case of contractor employees, causes the loss of
hundreds of millions of tax dollars paid to contractors or for
employees awaiting clearance.
Mr. Shays. This is the second hearing we've had, and we
have some of the same people back. We had a hearing on February
16th entitled ``Defense Security Service Oversight'' and this
is on top of a hearing we had on the inability of the Defense
Department to even do basic audits. But devastating effect, as
you describe it, is a pretty strong wording. Ms. Shuster, would
you describe it the same way?
Ms. Schuster. I have not used the word ``devastating,'' but
I do believe that it is an important impediment to our national
security when you have a half million people that have not had
up-to-date clearances. These people are continuing to handle
classified information and so it does pose a major threat to
our national security, in my opinion.
Mr. Shays. Maybe you can just make sure we're talking the
same language. You say 500. You point out it can be between 400
and 900, why do you choose 500? What gives you the right to do
that?
Ms. Schuster. I suppose any of the estimates is probably as
valid as the next one.
Mr. Shays. But I'm just curious, you're giving validity, it
could be much more than that.
Ms. Schuster. It could be. The latest two estimates are the
ones that we're using, which are coincidentally the same, but
as we pointed out, there are methodological limitations that
raise questions about that. So it really does not have
validity.
Mr. Shays. OK. Explain--if both of you would explain to me
what makes this such a difficult task? To me, let me just
preface my remarks by saying that I represent an area with a
lot of IT companies. And they point out to me Priceline.com,
for instance, is in the District, Jaywalker and others, and the
people at IT firms will point out to me, it used to be the big
ate the small. But now they say the small--the fast eat the
slow. And so I know DOD is big, but I know it's extraordinarily
slow. It doesn't make me feel very comfortable about other
things that go on in DOD if we can't get a handle on this.
And so the question I have is, in your judgment, what makes
it such a difficult task, both of you? I mean, in seems to me
to be kind of like widgets in a way. I mean, you know what you
got, and you know what you got to produce and you do it.
Ms. Schuster. If I could just answer that, I think Mr.
Mancuso put the right emphasis in his comment about the source
of the problem that we have here, and that is that there were
quotas placed on the number of submissions that could be sent
to DSS for 3 years from 1996 to 1999. No one was supposed to be
submitting these periodic reinvestigation requests. That led to
a pent up demand. So that's why we had this backlog.
Mr. Shays. Is that kind of like a deferred maintenance
program? That's what they used to have in the State of
Connecticut, and all of a sudden the bridges fall and the roads
break apart.
Ms. Schuster. Right. Pay me now or pay me later kind of an
approach. So because it didn't have visibility--they were not
submitted--no one really knew how many were out there. And then
the problem became apparent back in basically October 1998.
There was a joint security commission review, and then there
was a Presidential budget decision in December 1998 that really
brought the problem to light. And at that particular time the
backlog was estimated at 866,000. So if you were just dealing
with an ongoing steady State workload, it would be a big
workload to begin with. But when you have that many extra
cases, then it just magnifies the problem.
Mr. Shays. Let me--Mr. Mancuso.
Mr. Mancuso. I think you started off, you said, well, we
know how many widgets or we know what's coming in. That's the
real issue, we don't know. And DSS doesn't know. And that's why
we don't know what the backlog is. It's very hard to develop an
organization that can be responsive to a level of work when you
yourself don't know how much work is out there and the
Department, unfortunately, seems to be unable to get their arms
around that. Which is why we don't know if the backlog is
500,000 or 900,000. So we don't really know what's out there.
Over the years with the downsizing of DOD, there's been an
artificial depression of the level of resources in DSS. It's my
understanding that the cut that they have taken over the years
is dramatically more than the overall average cut in DOD. So
once you lost that base of knowledge, once you lost that base
of employees, you're playing a major game of catch-up. So the
best you can do is limit how much you're willing to accept. And
they did that.
So one of our main proposals has been there needs to be an
honest look at what is the resource need. What is out there.
Mr. Shays. But we had that discussion in February.
Mr. Mancuso. And as I mentioned it was our recommendations
earlier this year, and it remains today that we feel there
still needs to be a better accounting for measurement of what
are exactly the resource needs of DSS and the adjudicative
bodies as well. Because even if DSS is corrected and is able to
produce a high level of output, we already know that the
adjudication facilities are swamped and will not be able to
process that output.
So for the customer, it doesn't really matter if it's taken
a year in DSS or a month in DSS, if they're not going to see it
because it's sitting in the adjudication facility. So we're
concerned. So the Department has been putting resources in some
of those areas, but not all.
Mr. Shays. I will get back to that in 1 second. I would
like to take care of some housekeeping so I don't forget it.
We're joined by Judy Biggert, the gentlewoman from Illinois.
Ask unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee be
permitted to place an opening statement in the record and that
the record remain open for that for 3 days for that purpose.
Without objection so ordered.
Ask unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted to
include their written statements in the record. Without
objection so ordered.
Let me ask you, then, you've broken it up in two parts--
actually there are three. Identifying the number, second doing
the actual investigations, then the adjudication of it which in
my simple mind is just the analysis of the investigative
working, the adjudication.
Mr. Mancuso. The adjudication facilities as I understand it
review the work done by the investigators and consider whether
or not to eventually forward the clearance.
Mr. Shays. Right.
Mr. Mancuso. But there's a huge glut of work that involves
clearances that are contested for some reason. The derogatory
information that needs to be pursued, that requires additional
time by adjudicators and followup.
Mr. Shays. Where is the big bottle neck as far as you know?
Mr. Mancuso. There's certainly a bottle neck in both
places. But right now what we see is improvements in DSS has
shown in their ability to produce 2,500 a day.
Mr. Shays. One simple thing would be if they could move
forward with adjudication if they in fact have already done a
number of investigations. It would seem to me if they don't--
the longer they wait from when the investigation work was done
to the adjudication makes almost the investigative work
meaningless.
Mr. Mancuso. That's correct. That's why we agree that the
Department needs to continue to put resources there. But we
don't feel that they're actually doing the analysis to
determine the appropriate level of resources, and, in fact,
we're just completing an audit in that area.
Mr. Shays. It almost strikes me that needs to happen in
tandem with their just moving forward. In other words, there's
a basic concept, if you have a pile of paper on your desk, you
don't just keep looking at the pile, you take one and just get
it done. And the less times you handle the paper, the more
ultimately efficient you are. But I guess what--I'm ending my
time and come back, after Mrs. Biggert is recognized, but I
guess what I'm trying to understand when I use the concept of
widgets, this is not rocket science, it doesn't strike me. You
do investigative work, you have a certain number of people that
come on and off, you do investigative work, you also then have
to analyze your investigative work and make a decision. And
we're not talking about a lot of new scientific processes.
We're talking about really what I think of as a lot of grunt
work and just getting the job done.
Mr. Mancuso. We are talking about increased numbers. I know
in some of our analysis we found, we looked at a single month
in the summer of 1999 compared to a month in the summer of this
year, if I recall on one facility, the difference was between
3,000 and 12,000. And the adjudication facilities for the
services of the DOD are of different sizes. But the workload
changes in some of those offices are beyond anything that could
be just simply handled by knowing a little more efficiency.
What we feel is that a good solid look needs to be done to try
and properly project what that workload may be, make the
decision and to staff those positions, whether on a temporary
basis or longterm basis and move forward. Some of that has been
done by the Department. We feel in our audit reports, that are
out for comment, I believe, that more needs to be done.
Mr. Shays. OK. I'll come back. I'd like to recognize Mrs.
Biggert.
Mrs. Biggert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In your written
testimony, you state that the backlog is estimated by DOD to be
505,000 people, or that has grown to that. If all these people
are--are all these people, does that mean that their security
clearance is outdated?
Ms. Schuster. Yes. Anyone who's in the periodic
reinvestigation backlog is overdue for a clearance. There are
some time periods within which they're supposed to be updated,
and all of them have passed that time and many of them are way
past that time.
Mrs. Biggert. So what does that mean?
Ms. Schuster. It doesn't mean too much that individual--
because the individual is allowed to continue to handle
national security information, even though his clearance is not
up to date. That's what makes it so important that we solve
this problem.
Mrs. Biggert. So if it doesn't mean anything, then they're
probably not as worried about updating?
Ms. Schuster. Right. There hasn't been an incentive up to
now to do that. Now, as I mentioned in my earlier statement,
recently there has been a directive put out that if at the end
of this 2-year period when they're trying to have all the
backlog submitted to DSS for investigations, their clearance
has not been submitted--October 1, 2002--then they're supposed
to downgrade or terminate the clearance. That does provide an
incentive for security managers to submit the request on time.
Mrs. Biggert. And then have you suggested that or talked
about putting in new computer equipment, or to help to do this
so that they can work on the backlog.
Mr. Mancuso. There is a system and the system, until very
recently, was unable to keep up with the level of manual work
that was being done, collective work that was being done to
track it.
That system appears to be back online now and we're hoping
that the system will continue in its ability, as it did last
month, to be able to track these things. By having an automated
system, working properly, the level, the number of clearances
that can go through the overall DSS review process will
certainly increase.
Mrs. Biggert. OK.
Mr. Mancuso. I would add, there is always some confusion
when we talk on this subject when we talk about backlog and
700,000 initials a year that come through. I think just by way
of example, we're not just talking about someone who has a
reinvestigation. I may have a reinvestigation, and mine may be
overdue, and that may or may not be an issue to some people.
But what we see are outstanding issues--and I can give you a
couple of examples. I have a military officer that works for
me, I have small number of military officers in my civilian
organization, and he's a major in the U.S. Army. We put him in
our audit section and we need him to upgrade his clearance for
top secret. It has taken 13 months to do that. And during this
time we can't use him in those areas. I can go through any
number of examples like this.
Mr. Shays. But that's just astounding--if the gentlelady--
that's just astounding. You're saying it like it's, you know,
just a fact.
Mr. Mancuso. It is a fact.
Mr. Shays. I know. But it's not just a fact, it's an
outrage.
Mr. Mancuso. Well, it's a concern that we all have, and as
I pointed out in my remarks, there is a human level. Now, DSS
is sensitive to this situation.
Mr. Shays. So what does he do while he's there?
Mr. Mancuso. We have him do other work that would not
involve him being involved on the particular projects that his
skills may be used for.
Mr. Shays. The whole point of his being there is that he
have some security to be able to do the job. So it makes you
less efficient, it makes you unable to cover the things that
you need to find. I mean, the ripple effect of this is truly
mind boggling. I mean, I appreciate the gentlelady yielding,
but it's almost like you're used to it now, so even you are
kind of that's the way it is.
Mr. Mancuso. I will say and want to say this very quickly
in defense of the people that manage DSS, General Cunningham
and others, they're certainly extraordinarily sympathetic to
that and they could probably tell you 100 other stories they've
heard like that. It is a huge problem. There are a large number
of people, we have weak systems to support it, and they're
making some management changes that we feel are appropriate.
They need to learn to prioritize better. And that's a major
concern we have that I spoke about. They need their information
systems to work. They're trying to get them online. They need
to probably get some additional resources or reallocate
resources in a few areas. I think they're looking at that.
Those are all recommendations that we've made and that GAO has
made. They need to know what's coming in the door. So they need
the cooperation of who are involved.
Mr. Shays. But these are basic simple kinds of questions
that you learn in high school. I mean, these are not things
that take an advanced degree.
Mr. Mancuso. I agree. We have to personally explain to
someone to get the results and I'll give you another example in
the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, which also works
for me, they've developed an expertise in computer intrusion
which is a major problem in the Defense Department. They needed
one computer engineer, just one computer engineer. I believe
it's now been 17 months since we submitted the clearance
request. That person has not been hired. Now, at some point,
that person may tell us, I'm getting a job with IBM or
something, and we'll start the process all over again. We don't
have the person on board. But I'm not blaming DSS. I'm blaming
the system, and this is a big problem.
Mr. Shays. Let me get back to Mrs. Biggert. But basically,
you know, it was just pointed out to me that's basically the
life-cycle of the whole generation of a computer.
Mr. Mancuso. That's true.
Mr. Shays. It makes me very afraid for my country. Because
it is the fast that eats the slow. That truly is where we're
at. When we met in February, I remember saying that we were
going to have everybody back, and the story is really worse
rather than better. It is.
Mr. Mancuso. I think that people are in a better position
now to understand the full breadth of the problem. I think what
you heard was somewhat overly optimistic.
Mr. Shays. I'm sorry. We'll get to that later. I mean----
Mr. Mancuso. Well----
Mr. Shays. You can say it again. I want to give Mrs.
Biggert her time back.
Mrs. Biggert. This too troubles me, if you have somebody
for 13 months that's waiting for a clearance means that his
talents that he was put into that position to do are wasted for
13 months while he's sitting doing other work, that might be
important but not as important as having this to be
accomplished.
On page 10 of the GAO with the estimates of the periodic
reinvestigation backlog, just Ms. Schuster, the basis for
determining overdue investigations, and you have a table, and
I'm sorry, I don't know what this ``access'' means.
Ms. Schuster. I can explain that. There are two methods for
determining whether a person's clearance is overdue. One is
eligibility, and that means if they were originally cleared at
the top secret level, that's their eligibility. In the interim,
perhaps the person no longer needs to have access to top secret
information. So perhaps their clearance would only need to be
updated at a secret level. The time periods are different for
those two. The time period for top secret is every 5 years, the
period for secret is every 10 years. So that's the difference
between access and eligibility.
Mrs. Biggert. You also state, though, that it seems that
according to the DOD, that many individuals are eligible for a
higher clearance than are required to do the job. It almost
sounds like do they put the higher clearance in so that if they
want to move them up, that they have that clearance, and it
wouldn't take the 13 months then for somebody to have that
clearance?
Ms. Schuster. In the last couple of iterations, when
they've tried to estimate the size of the backlog, what they
have done is tried to emphasize access. So when they go back to
the security managers and ask whether people need a clearance,
they say ``Do they still need the clearance at this level or is
it a different level?'' So now they're trying to move to a
system where they only are putting people in for the clearance
at which they have access to, not the one that they originally
got which might be higher.
Mrs. Biggert. OK. Is that because then they don't have to
redo it as often?
Ms. Schuster. That's part of it. That has had the effect of
lowering the number of periodic reinvestigations that are in
the backlog. I think there was a decrease from 624,000 to
505,000 by emphasizing access.
Mrs. Biggert. So it really wasn't that those were taken
care of, it might have just been a reduction in the
classification that they needed?
Ms. Schuster. It has to do with the definition that they
used to determine the backlog. They used the definition of
access, and they also used the definition of only those that
have not been submitted to DSS for processing.
Mrs. Biggert. So it's not as if there's been an improvement
in numbers, but just----
Ms. Schuster. It's definitional.
Mrs. Biggert. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Let me do this, let me--I'll exercise my right
to interrupt the staff, but I'd like the staff to ask some
questions, and we'll start with Larry Halloran, then we'll go
with you, David.
Mr. Halloran. I would like to explore the issue of
prioritizing cases with you if I could. It's something that was
discussed at the February hearing that was imminent, and that
it was a way to weed out the easy stuff and the deadwood from
the backlog and get to the more critical security risk type of
cases or investigations in the backlog and get to them first.
Apparently that is--we'll hear later that hasn't happened yet.
Can you tell us, you know why not or what's the challenge to
their--where they stand?
Mr. Mancuso. Well, it was only after some time after April
that the Department agreed to, in fact, implement our
recommendation and seek a priority action plan.
Mr. Halloran. So they oppose it's in the first instance.
Mr. Mancuso. They opposed it initially.
Mr. Halloran. Did they say why?
Mr. Mancuso. They felt it would be very, very difficult,
time consuming, and would take them away from the plan that
they had to move forward to reduce backlog. We felt it was
important and they listened to us and eventually agreed to
pursue that plan.
And they've done that and they've coordinated with the
services and department agencies. But the process has taken a
long time. When you're seeking consensus and agreement on how
to prioritize, it's going to take a while longer than it would
take to simply direct it from the top. It's my understanding
that that process is continuing, that the Department hopes to
have some sort of a process in place in the next few months. We
haven't been briefed on that process. We welcome the
opportunity and we will be, I understand, offered the
opportunity to comment on it and work with them on it. And
that's really where we are right now.
Mr. Halloran. As I understood your recommendation it was
that the same system of prioritizing or ranking be applied both
to the backlog and to new requests, that both be prospective
and retrospective; is that correct?
Mr. Mancuso. That would certainly be our preference.
Mr. Halloran. What would your comment or reaction be if the
plan they eventually shared with you was only prospective?
Mr. Mancuso. I'll attempt to discuss that. I think the only
way to really handle the problem is to allow the various DOD
components the opportunity to prioritize what they feel is
truly important in their work, and to, therefore, fit those
concerns into the plan. So I think it should be on a broad
basis and not just for a few of the high risk programs.
Mr. Shays. That doesn't happen now.
Mr. Mancuso. Oh, no. Now it's pretty much first come/ first
serve, other than they certainly have a list of a number of
programs.
Mr. Shays. See, I can't believe that. Intuitively, I can't,
because there has to be certain clearances that are so
important to national security.
Mr. Mancuso. There are certain programs that absolutely
receive preference and are handled quickly. And there's a long
list of them, I don't know what the number is, maybe 70. It's a
large number. But if you look at the number of people that are
affected by that compared to the numbers that we're talking
about, it's a fraction. So what we're saying is it needs to
cover a lot more of the people, and it needs to allow some
flexibility for the component to truly bring on people that are
important, or to update clearances that they feel are truly
important.
Mr. Halloran. Ms. Schuster, it would be helpful for our
general discussions if you could talk a little bit more in
depth of your work in terms of the backlog and some kind of
subsets of that. I mean, there are reinvestigations that are at
DSS and overdue. They're reinvestigations that are out there
some place that are either about to be due or overdue that
haven't been shipped in yet. There are new investigative
requests coming in. Give us a sense with the numbers that you
came across in your work as to how big each bucket might be,
or--and also, second part of the question is given us a sense
of when the Deputy Secretary puts out, one of these data calls,
I mean, who is he calling, or where are they looking? What do
they have to look at?
Ms. Schuster. Let me answer the first question. This is a
moving target. You've got things coming due all the time, and
you've got some cases being closed, so it's a moving target. If
it was static, it would be a real easy problem to solve. But
it's not. So even trying to analyze the statistics is
difficult. But one move in the direction that we have
recommended is to get an entire estimate, as flimsy as it might
be, of the workload that is existing at DSS and OPM, as well as
the backlog of the estimated 500,000, and put it all together.
This is exactly what they have done. The plan that they now
have on the table for the next 2 years includes both of those
pieces. The things that are continuing to come in, the things
that are already on the table that haven't been opened yet, as
well as the backlog. That total new is 2.2 million cases over
the next 2 years.
Mr. Halloran. So that's their estimate, the kind of
universe of work over the next 2 years, including working so-
called backlog, however, somehow defined down to nothing?
Ms. Schuster. What they are trying to do is to get all the
backlogged cases submitted into the investigative community
over the next 2 years. That's what the controller's plan is.
And there's a detailed plan that has been set forth for the 2
year period.
Mr. Halloran. Does the plan also have an average processing
time, that DSS goal, so we'll know when those submitted cases
will come out the other end?
Ms. Schuster. As I understand it, they are working within
C3I guide to come up with some metrics that would have
expectations for how long it should take for each kind of case.
When we looked at investigations before, they were all over the
board. So there isn't any standard right now for how long it
should take for a particular kind of case. And there are any
number of kinds of cases in this 2.2 million backlog. Some of
them are very automated and don't take really very much time,
and others are full field investigations that require a whole
lot of work and over 200 days to complete.
Mr. Halloran. Do you find the assumptions underlying that
2.2 million estimate to be fairly sound? And second part
thereof, is what external factors confound that estimate
further?
Ms. Schuster. The 2.2?
Mr. Halloran. Yes.
Ms. Schuster. Well, first of all, we've already gone over
how flimsy the 500,000 is, so we don't really know whether
that's a good estimate or not. We do know how many cases are
called carryover cases--these already submitted to DSS. Over
the next 2 years, they've got 435,000 of those cases. Then
you've got the backlogged cases and then you've got new cases
that are coming in. So all told, we're talking about an
enormous workload here of 2.2 million cases coming into the
investigative community. As I understand it, the spending plan
for this 2-year period is just to get the cases submitted, and
then it's up to the investigative community to somehow deal
with that. And they have been trying very diligently to ramp up
to prepare for that. We haven't really seen the influx yet. A
lot of the cases that are going to OPM really start at the
beginning of the fiscal year in October. And so, it's really
hard to tell exactly what kind of an effect this large influx
of cases is going to have and whether the ramp-up with private
contractors and reservists and the like are going to make a
dent in that.
We understand that the cases at OPM are highly automated.
They also have some longer investigations on civilians, but
many of the cases that have been shifted over to OPM are highly
automated. They seem to be keeping up with those so far. But we
haven't seen the large influx into OPM either. The real problem
seems to be, in my mind, at DSS, and whether the capacity there
will be enough to cover this large influx. I think they can
submit the cases within the 2 years, but whether they can get
them investigated and adjudicated, I have questions about that.
Mr. Rapallo. Just back very quickly on the question of
prioritization, what do you recommend, Mr. Mancuso, as sort of
an ideal system for implementing that?
Mr. Mancuso. We didn't propose an ideal system in our
audit. We looked at the overall issues, we analyzed it, and we
said there needs to be a prioritization system, and it needs to
cover various programs, etc., and that it needed to address the
concerns of the customers.
We did not dictate a program. We thought the Department
needed to pull one together and, hopefully, to coordinate it
with us. At this point, I am not fully aware of what they will
be proposing.
Again, I do welcome the opportunity to discuss it with
them, and I would hope that they would listen to our ideas and
that we would succeed in agreeing on what a good system is.
But, frankly, it will be their system. In the end, they will
make the decision as to what the system will be.
Mr. Rapallo. There was a suggestion, I think it was DSS,
for a central requirements facility. What do you think of this
idea?
Mr. Mancuso. I am not specifically aware of that.
Ms. Schuster. I talked to General Cunningham about that. I
think General Cunningham has the right idea in trying to get
the services to come up with a way to integrate the
requirements into the PPBS system so that they can somehow
project their workload and budget for it.
One of the problems that has occurred over the last couple
of years is they have mandated these submissions, but the money
has not been behind it. So the services have been cajoled to
put in submissions, but the money has to be reprogrammed from
other programs in order to cover it. That has been true for
1999, it has been true for 2000, and it is true for 2001. They
hope to put money in the budget for 2002 to cover it, but when
the money is not there and the services choose not to reprogram
the money for that purpose, then the submissions are not made.
And it is going to be the same thing this year, I am afraid,
because the money is not there this year either. They have to
reprogram funds to cover it.
Mr. Rapallo. In terms of how it would actually work, it
sounds like both of your opinions are that it can't be just an
individual program determination within their own purview. If
has to be something more systemic and department-wide.
Mr. Mancuso. I would hope that would be the case, or at
least have some flexibility to address some of the more
routine, if you can call them routine, clearances, but to
address those as well as the ones that are applied just to
certain programs.
Mr. Rapallo. One other question. Ms. Shuster, your report
talked about the lack of incentives for submitting these
reinvestigations. In your oral testimony you gave an update.
Could you just describe again what the process will be, as you
understand it?
Ms. Schuster. As I understand it, in this recent directive
from C3I, they said if the submissions are not made by the end
of fiscal year 2002, any clearance that has not been submitted,
should be downgraded or terminated.
The other provision in that directive is that if at some
point after it has been downgraded or terminated there becomes
a need for that person to have that clearance level reinstated,
then they would be allowed to do so on the condition that they
have submitted their paperwork for a reinvestigation. So there
is a little wiggle room there for them to work with.
Mr. Rapallo. So they submit the reinvestigation; otherwise,
it will be terminated or downgraded or something?
Ms. Schuster. Downgraded.
Mr. Rapallo. Why do you have to wait until 2002 for that to
kick in?
Ms. Schuster. That could happen right now, but I think they
are just allowing a little lead time. That provision was in an
earlier directive back in 1999, and it was omitted in this more
recent memo of March 2000 when they sent out that directive it
wasn't in there. And so in our report we recommended that they
reinstate some sort of an incentive for submitting these things
on time. If they are not submitted on time, then the backlog
becomes invisible and you can't deal with it. You can't plan
for it if you don't know that it is there.
Mr. Rapallo. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Is it possible that a number of the
investigations they do become irrelevant because the people
have left?
Ms. Schuster. In this latest data call where they have gone
out and tried to get a more accurate estimate of the people,
they have tried to cull out the people who are no longer
employed by DOD. What others have found before this is that
some of the people that were in the backlog actually were no
longer employed by DOD.
Again, this is a weakness in the data system that they have
right now.
Mr. Shays. I said try. My question was very simple. My
question was, is it possible that they are doing background
checks and adjudicating people that may have already left?
Ms. Schuster. I don't think that is probably the case.
Mr. Shays. Under what basis can you make that claim?
Ms. Schuster. They have to verify residency. I don't
think--the original application would have to be made, and it
has to be a real person there in order to make the application.
Mr. Shays. A person can live in the same house--I don't
understand your answer.
Ms. Schuster. The starting point for the investigation is
an application, and so the person would have to fill out an
application for the investigation.
Mr. Shays. But the application is 6 months old or 7 months
old or 8 months old or a year old.
Ms. Schuster. I think General Cunningham will have to say
what the starting point is for the investigation, but I am sure
one of the very first things would be to verify that that
person is still on the role.
Mr. Shays. Why? Tell me. You are sure. Why are you sure?
Ms. Schuster. I guess I am not entirely sure. I think
General Cunningham can answer that question.
Mr. Shays. Yes, but you attempted to answer it, and you
gave me a definitive answer, and I am just puzzled why you
would do that. I am beginning to be a little suspect of the
system. Tell me this, both of you. Why isn't the system in
meltdown? Tell me a reason why I shouldn't think it is in
meltdown right now?
Ms. Schuster. I think they have a plan in place now at
least. The last time when we came before the committee, they
did not have a plan. Now they have a very detailed plan to have
the entire backlog submitted by the end of 2002. That is an
improvement over what they had before.
Now, whether they are able to handle the investigations in
take period, I think there are still questions about that. But
at least it will become visible. You will have them in the
system and you will be able to hopefully ramp up to handle the
extra investigations.
Mr. Shays. Ms. Shuster, when you came before us in
February, you came here in February, was the system in
extraordinarily bad shape?
Ms. Schuster. I would say that even before we completed our
work and testified with you before, DSS had made tremendous
strides in implementing our recommendations.
Mr. Shays. Is that the question I asked?
Ms. Schuster. You asked if it was in shambles, I guess.
Mr. Shays. I want you to listen to the question, and I want
you to answer the question. When you came before us in
February, wasn't it your testimony that the condition was in
extraordinarily bad shape?
Ms. Schuster. What we testified to at that particular time
was the quality and the timeliness of the investigations that
had been done at DSS over a period of time, and we found
significant weaknesses in both the quality of the
investigations and the timeliness of those investigations.
Mr. Shays. Didn't you also share with this committee that
we had a very large backlog?
Ms. Schuster. Yes, I believe we did. That was not the focus
of our statement, but, yes.
Mr. Shays. Is the backlog better or worse? Just answer the
question. Then you can tell me other things if you want to.
Ms. Schuster. Our analysis gets very complex. Our bottom-
line is that we believe that the periodic reinvestigation
backlog has been reduced by about 44,000. However, the pending
investigations at DSS have increased by 50,000. So you can sort
of see the backlog moving into the investigative community.
Mr. Shays. So it is your testimony that investigations, we
have caught up on investigations, but we still have
adjudication. I am trying to understand your answer.
Ms. Schuster. What we have seen is that the backlog----
Mr. Shays. Which backlog are we talking about?
Ms. Schuster. The periodic reinvestigation backlog that is
estimated at 500,000. Counting the ones that have been added to
as new requirements for periodics and taking off the ones that
have been submitted, we think that they have cut into the
backlog by about 44,000. So we think it is an improvement in
terms of the backlog.
Mr. Shays. Let me ask you this question: Do we have more
pending investigations now than we did then?
Ms. Schuster. Yes, 50,000.
Mr. Shays. So the number at DSS has grown. It has not
decreased.
Ms. Schuster. The number has grown consistently.
Mr. Shays. This sounds like tremendous bureaucracy in terms
of your answer to me. The answer, it seems to me, is the number
has grown, not decreased. So we are worse off rather than
better off.
Ms. Schuster. The backlog number has been decreased by
44,000.
Mr. Shays. But what good is that if the numbers keep
increasing? That seems kind of silly to me.
Ms. Schuster. What you are seeing is a movement of the
backlog from not----
Mr. Shays. If my staff said to me, the backlog--they had
gotten the backlog of the letters down, but they have more
letters today, I wouldn't think that was an accomplishment.
Ms. Schuster. The bottom line is that we are not getting
the things through the system, and interim clearances are being
granted to make up for this backlog. It is just moving through
the system, and I think it will move into the investigative
community, and then it will move into the adjudication
community. So it is going to move through the system.
Mr. Shays. Do we have more to investigate now than before
or less?
Ms. Schuster. The backlog----
Mr. Shays. I didn't say backlog.
Ms. Schuster. The workload at DSS----
Mr. Shays. I didn't ask adjudication, I asked
investigations.
Ms. Schuster. The investigations have grown from 181,000
cases a year ago at DSS to 439,000 now. So that is the whole
workload of many different kinds of cases. The periodic
reinvestigations number has grown from 61,000 a year ago to
113,000 now.
Mr. Shays. I am talking about that they have actually
investigated? That they completed?
Ms. Schuster. These are pending.
Mr. Shays. So the pending number of investigations has
grown rather than decreased.
Ms. Schuster. Correct.
Mr. Shays. OK. It took us a long time to get that answer.
Ms. Schuster. Sorry.
Mr. Shays. Now, if you want to tell me I shouldn't be
concerned with that, feel free, but I just want the answer, and
the answer is the number of investigations, pending
investigations, has grown. It has not decreased. It was pretty
bad before, and you are telling me somehow that I should feel
comfortable that it is better now, even though it has grown.
And don't tell me it is complex.
Ms. Schuster. I don't know how to answer that question,
other than the definition that they used for periodic
reinvestigations has, from our complex analysis of it, shows
that number----
Mr. Shays. I don't understand what you say, from your
``complex analysis.'' What does that mean? What is your
definition of a complex analysis?
Ms. Schuster. Well, what makes it complex is things are
going in and coming out and opening and closing and moving.
Mr. Shays. You call that complex?
Ms. Schuster. It was for us.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Mancuso, can you shed some light on this?
Are we better off today?
Mr. Mancuso. The best light I could shine would be, because
we are the IG's office small DOD component, 1,300 people, and
we have pending investigations, those are investigations for
people we want to hire, we have reinvestigations for people who
are already hired.
Mr. Shays. I understand.
Mr. Mancuso. I believe I understand exactly what Ms.
Shuster is saying. In our case, what we would probably find is
the number of reinvestigations that we have pending is probably
getting better.
Mr. Shays. What do you mean better?
Mr. Mancuso. Meaning they are coming out faster and the
number is going down, the ones that are in there. But the ones
that we are pushing in on the front end, the pending ones, is a
larger number, because we are funding them now, we have been
ordered by the Department to fund them, and we are pushing them
out at DSS.
Mr. Shays. Turn off the light.
Mr. Mancuso. I would assume Ms. Shuster is right, that
among DSS, as the components do that, the number of pending
cases is increasing, whereas DSS's work is----
Mr. Shays. Is getting worse. Their workload is increasing.
Mr. Mancuso. Their workload is certainly increasing.
Mr. Shays. So we are not better off. You are trying to tell
me that I should feel better that their productivity has
increased, but their productivity is slower than the increase
in their workload.
Mr. Mancuso. I didn't think I told you you should feel
better, sir. I don't feel better. I feel they have a huge
problem.
Mr. Shays. I will take the word off, feeling better. The
bottom line is they are getting more productive, but their
workload is increasing, and that we have a greater backlog, and
it is--do we have a greater backlog? Excuse me, do we have more
pending cases?
Mr. Mancuso. In the sense you are describing the term----
Mr. Shays. I don't want to get into the silly argument of
backlog. The number of cases has increased to a point there are
more cases that haven't been dealt with today than were a while
ago. Basically, that is your testimony. Both of you are
agreeing. So you both understand each other, and I am happy you
both understand each other. But the bottom line is the
implications of that are kind of mind-boggling. To me, it says
there are more people who are waiting to have their cases
reviewed, rather than less.
Now, maybe your comment to me would be, yes, but they don't
have to wait as long.
Mr. Mancuso. I would also add, though, and I am sure that
is going to be in the testimony of the next panel, that if I
were speaking to you earlier this year, I would be telling you
that, yes, it--the backlog--is going to get bigger and bigger.
They are only producing 1,400 cases a day and they need to
produce 2,500 a day in order to make a dent. What we have seen
now, at least in August, they have reached their target of
2,500 cases a day.
We predicted earlier in the year that it would take a long
time to reach 2,500 cases a day, and their belief they could
average 2,500 cases a day for the whole year is too optimistic.
Mr. Shays. When they came to us----
Mr. Mancuso. I would argue we should see continuing
progress. We have to monitor it, we have to measure it, we have
to stay on top of things, we have to make sure their
information system stays on line and is capable of processing
those things, we have to make sure the adjudication facilities
have the resources to take the work and finalize it and get it
out. But it is fair to say that there is improvement. It is
fair to say that all the indicators now are that they are
reaching a turning point.
But, yes, in answer to your question, certainly the volume
of the problem is at least as large as it was months ago.
Mr. Shays. I am not a particularly negative person, but the
analogy I could give you is that you got a lot of water in the
boat, and it ain't moving very quickly because there is so much
water in the boat, and it is sinking. And you are saying, well,
now we are bailing out more water, but more water is coming in
than we are bailing out.
So my simple mind says the boat sinks.
Mr. Mancuso. My simpler mind would say we are finally
fixing the hole a little bit.
Mr. Shays. And you want to make that based on--perhaps,
because you wanted to make it based on 1 month's basic--a month
and a half's record.
Mr. Mancuso. No, we are paid to be skeptics.
Mr. Shays. No, based on what has happened since August.
Mr. Mancuso. I was very careful in my written statement to
say I think that it is a positive sign. We also think it has to
be shown they think they can continue to do it.
Mr. Shays. I didn't say it was a positive sign that you are
bailing out more water, but what is a negative sign is more
water is coming in than is going out.
Mr. Mancuso. And that is a fact.
Mr. Shays. And that is a fact. All I want to do is
establish facts. I was willing to have you qualify and
everything, but I just wanted to understand that more water is
coming in than is going out. But you are happy now, and I am
happy to have you say that, that you think that maybe in the
last month they proved that maybe they can get more water out
than is coming in.
You are free to say that. But I just want to understand
what you are saying. It is illogical to me--I mean, it seems
logical to me to at least understand that the system we were--
we were told in February by the organization, DSS, that we
would be better today rather than worse. And we said, you will
be back here, which is something the committee sometimes does.
You know, when people make claims like that, sometimes we say,
great job. Maybe I am going to say great job to the fact they
have done this. I don't know. But it is not going to be great
job. They have done part of it.
It tells me we have a very, very serious situation.
Sometimes C-SPAN covers hearings, and I think why do they cover
that hearing? And then they don't cover this hearing, and I am
thinking, this is a hearing that the American people need to
see. They need to know that you have people that even you have
said work for you and have worked for longer than a year that
haven't yet had their clearance, so they are not a waste to
you, but they are not being optimized. We know that contractors
are spending billions of dollars because they can't simply get
the job done on time or get the job done at all, and we know
that there are probably people that have clearances who
shouldn't have clearances, and we know there are people who are
just getting wasted.
What I see is, in my judgment, a meltdown. That is what I
see. You don't have to see it as a meltdown, but I see it that
way, because I don't see the Secretary saying we are going to
use all the resources necessary to get the job done.
When I worked at the State level, it could take years to
build a new entrance or exit on the throughway; and then when
we lost the Mianus bridge, we had a ramp built in 2 days.
Admittedly, it wasn't up to spec and the cars didn't move on it
as quickly, but they literally had to get off the throughway,
I-95, get off and on. People said, my God, what are we going to
do? We had to do something. They came together and got the job
done.
If I hear an analogy that this is like changing a car tire
while the car is moving, I am not going to think that it is
Firestone. But what I am going to think of is, why don't you
get two damn cars? And you have one on the side and you get the
other system working and you work them both in tandem. The only
reason you wouldn't do that is money, and that says to me that
the Department feels that this is not a problem. And yet we are
wasting billions of dollars.
So I just think it is a major mess. I am happy you all
think things are going pretty well.
Ms. Schuster. I would just like to correct the record, if
you got the impression that I thought things were going well,
because I do not believe things are going well. What I see is a
shift in the backlog into the investigative community, and I
have real questions about whether they have the capacity to
deal with it.
Mr. Shays. You know what? I put words in your mouth
purposely to elicit the statement that now I know you believe--
now, what is your statement?
Mr. Mancuso. Exactly, Mr. Chairman. There are significant
problems. I mean, the train--to use another analogy, the train
seems to be back on the track and moving. It could fall off
tomorrow.
Mr. Shays. But it is going backward.
Mr. Mancuso. It is sliding a bit backward, that is right.
All I can tell you is we looked to evaluate their progress.
What we finally see is some hint that they are moving in the
right direction. It remains to be seen how successful they will
be over time.
Mr. Shays. Fair enough. I accept the word hint. I can live
with the word hint.
Why don't we get on to the next panel?
Do you have a question?
Mr. Rapallo. Just one question. Has anyone tried to
evaluate--you talked about the number of new investigations
that might be submitted over the next few years at 2 million
and something. Has anyone tried to evaluate the number of cases
per day DSS would have to do so that it was decreasing that,
all this backlog, and we would be improving? Is it 2,500 or
something higher than that?
Ms. Schuster. I think DSS would have to answer that, but
the target they have today is 2,500 per day, which they met in
August for the first time.
Mr. Shays. That is a pretty basic question, though.
Ms. Schuster. That is right. It is a basic question.
Mr. Shays. If that is the target and you feel happy about
the target, but there are--but the numbers have increased,
maybe this should not be the target.
Thank you all, both of you, very much. We will get to our
next panel.
I would ask Mr. Leonard, if you remain standing, and
General Charles Cunningham, we will swear you in and get right
to your testimony.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. Note for the record both witnesses responded in
the affirmative.
Your written testimony will appear in the testimony. You
are free to read that or basically make any statement you want.
You are also free to answer any questions that have been asked.
I want to say to both of you that I don't put the blame in
any one place. I think the blame belongs in Congress, the blame
belongs in the Department, the blame belongs in the agency. It
belongs in many places. But the bottom line is I would like to
think we are going to see a major change, so that is my motive.
What is it going to take to see a real improvement?
We first want to know how you assess the problem, and then
we will go from there.
So, Mr. Leonard, why don't we start with you, sir?
Mr. Leonard. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Let me make another comment. I will let the
clock run, because I want both of you to make whatever
testimony you need to make. We will do it in 5-minute segments.
STATEMENTS OF J. WILLIAM LEONARD, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR SECURITY AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS, COMMAND,
CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE; AND GENERAL CHARLES CUNNINGHAM, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE
SECURITY SERVICES
Mr. Leonard. Thank you, sir. I would like to just summarize
my statement and submit the full written statement for the
record.
But right up front, let me acknowledge to you, Mr.
Chairman, that I am sitting here before you as the individual
who is personally responsible and accountable from an
oversight, policy and guidance perspective to oversee a
solution to this problem and to ensure that it doesn't happen
again. In no way, shape or form do I or anyone else associated
with my organization minimize the seriousness necessary of this
issue.
I am hard-pressed to identify any similar type of situation
that so permeates every aspect of DOD operations as does this
issue. Maybe finance, it may be the only other one that maybe
permeates every element so severely, and I am truly cognizant
of that impact.
Also, I am sitting before you with the full knowledge that
a significant part of the solution is to address shortcomings
in past oversight from my organization, especially with respect
to things such as overseeing the acquisition of a major
automation system such as CCMS. I recognize that and am very
much committed personally and organizationally to ensure that
we address these issues in the months to come.
At the last hearing, the Department--at that time we were
engaged in the process of developing plans and procedures and
funding to implement the recommendations of an overarching
integration process team that then Deputy Secretary Hamre had
convened to address and refine and resolve the PR backlog
problem.
On March 31st, Dr. Hamre directed that the OIPT
recommendations for eliminating the PR backlog, at least, the
505,000 cases, and that the necessary resources identified be
obligated to accomplish this objective.
This plan included removing CCMS as a choke point by
vectoring a substantial portion of DOD's high volume, lesser
scope investigations to the Office of Personnel Management
[OPM], in fiscal year 2001 and 2002. It balances the DOD
investigative workload with 45 percent to be retained at DSS,
40 percent vectored to OPM, and 15 percent to DSS's private
sector providers. The plan also extended the deadline for
elimination of the investigative backlog until fiscal year
2002.
More recently, the GAO completed a report, as we just heard
before, for your committee on the backlog; and we did concur
with the two recommendations contained within the report. There
were some concerns expressed with respect to the various
methodologies used to arrive at the size of the backlog, and at
the same time it was also acknowledged that a more accurate
assessment would prove quite problematic. I personally am very
frustrated by our inability to achieve greater granularity and
insight into the exact scope of this issue.
However, in the near term, the problem will be resolved, at
least a long portion of it will be, when DOD fields the Joint
Personnel Adjudication System [JPAS], in fiscal year 2001,
which is the migration DOD personnel security system, which
will require the continuing tracking and input of an
individual's actual access requirement upon which a periodic
reinvestigation is based.
DOD has agreed with GAO with respect to the fundamental
need to do a better job in this area. We have also agreed with
the recommendation to administratively terminate or downgrade
individual security clearances unless their PR is completed or
in process by September 30, 2002.
In addition, in June of this year, the DOD comptroller, in
close coordination with my organization, the DOD components,
DSS and OPM, issued a spend plan, which provides detailed
guidance regarding the submission of PR backlog cases to both
DSS and OPM over a 24-month period beginning next month. The
plan, as recommended by the OIPT, requires that all military,
secret and confidential, both initial and periodic
reinvestigations, be sent to OPM for completion. This includes
investigations for military recruits as well. All contractor
investigations and military top secret initial and periodic
reinvestigations will remain with DSS, as will Army accessions
investigations.
Prior to this initiative, DOD components were directed by
my organization to begin submitting all civilian investigations
to OPM beginning in October of last year.
All told, the spend plan calls for the conduct of almost
2.2 million investigations, both initial and periodic, over the
next 2 years, at a cost of over $700 million. The total number
of investigations destined for OPM over the next 2 years is in
excess of 800,000 at a cost of just over $200 million. OPM has
been a close and cooperative partner in these initiatives and
has ramped up its resources in order to accommodate the
additional work that will begin arriving actually in less than
2 weeks time.
In addition, in August of this year, my organization issued
detailed instructions to the DOD components designed to
successfully accomplish the comptroller's spend plan. This
action has the advantage of relieving pressure on CCMS, thereby
allowing it to more rapidly process incoming investigations for
top secret investigations, both initial and PR, for military
and contractor personnel. It will also help ensure the
expeditious completion of accession investigations in less than
75 days so that most recruits should be immediately eligible
for a security clearance by the time they complete their basic
training.
While the above initiatives should assure that all
delinquent PR investigations are initiated by the end of fiscal
year 2002, it does not complete the process. The DOD Central
Adjudication Facilities [CAFs], will require additional
staffing to accomplish the significant increase in workload to
ensure that the backlog of cases does not languish while
awaiting adjudication.
The Deputy Secretary of Defense has recently commissioned
yet another review of this plan to ensure that it can be
accomplished at all levels and that all impediments have been
identified and addressed. As we heard, the DOD IG is currently
working on a report on the same subject, and several of our
CAFs are already embarked on plans to hire temporary
adjudicators as well as to utilize reserve personnel to ensure
a smooth and timely flow of cases.
There are a number of key successes to the overall spend
plan. First, the components must provide cases and funds as
scheduled. Second, DSS and OPM must be able to meet their
production goals. Third, adjudications must be accomplished in
a timely manner. Fourth, quality must be maintained in all
phases of the process. Finally, and not least, DOD must do a
better job in identifying investigative and clearance
requirements and incorporating them into the planning,
programming and budgeting system so as to ensure the
availability of necessary resources and to preclude a
reoccurrence of a problem.
There is a little bit of good news. The defense agencies
have funded this backlog out of hide and will for the most part
be current by the end of fiscal year 2000, this month.
In addition, the DOD intelligence agencies, like----
Mr. Shays. I don't understand what you say. They will be
current?
Mr. Leonard. Their individuals who have security clearances
in defense agencies and in the DOD Intel agencies will be
current with respect to reinvestigations in accordance with the
national standards, 5 years for top secret, 10 years for
secret.
Mr. Shays. Current in what way?
Mr. Leonard. Again, they will meet the national standard.
The national standard says, if you have a top secret clearance,
your investigation must have been completed within the past 5
years. If you have a secret clearance, the investigation must
have been completed within the past 10 years.
Mr. Shays. You mean it will have been submitted?
Mr. Leonard. Will have been submitted, yes, sir. Submitted
and funded.
Mr. Shays. But not investigated and adjudicated.
Mr. Leonard. Clearly, a number of them will be in the
queue.
Mr. Shays. Be careful what you are saying there. Don't play
a mind game with me here.
Mr. Leonard. Certainly.
Mr. Shays. You are saying that there will be no one in the
Department who is up for review whose name won't have been
submitted----
Mr. Leonard. In the defense agencies and in the DOD portion
of the Intel community, yes.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Leonard. In the interest of time, what I would like to
do is really then defer to the rest of my written statement and
turn it over to General Cunningham and, more importantly,
answer your questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Great.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Leonard follows:]
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Mr. Shays. General Cunningham.
General Cunningham. Thank you very much, sir. I would like
to submit my statement for the record.
Sir, this is a very serious problem, and while we are
working it hard, this does not mitigate the seriousness of the
backlog. We are now able to do more work. Our system is working
much more in accordance with architecture and specification
than before.
As I reported to you before, we were going to have those
elements in place. They are now in place and we are conforming
to them. Steady improvement is coming not only in the system
but also through the use of private sector augmenting
contractors. They are coming up to speed. Last time I was here,
I told you we were bringing them on. They are all on, except
one. Which means we have five, lacking one, which we expect to
get completely in place within the next couple of weeks. Good
progress there.
I would like to talk now a little bit about the Case
Control Management System itself. A year ago, CCMS was
described in a TRW study as appropriate to be scrapped; that
the future of it was highly in doubt. I reported to you before
that we would bring TRW back at an appropriate time this summer
to do an outside assessment. They are conducting that
assessment now.
They gave us an interim report, and I emphasize interim
report, because they have another week or 10 days to spend with
us, but they are surprised, in a positive way, with the
progress that we have made. They complimented us on the way we
have done our interdocumentation and improved the performance
and reliability of this system. Their forecast for bringing up
the system is positive.
They agree with us and with the community that this system
should likely be replaced at some print. Indeed, with all IT
you should have that on your horizon, and we expect to bring
that into our next program objective memorandum, a replacement
system into the 5-year defense plan. Nevertheless, it will be
served years before this would come to fruition.
Our field operations have----
Mr. Shays. Let me say, and it is not meant to be a cheap
shot, but your comment that a system is always meant to have a
new system in place, that is the competitive model in the
private workplace----
General Cunningham. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. The competitive model in the private workplace
is, if you can't do the job, you go out of business. And if you
were a business, you would be out of business. Because we
haven't been able to do the job, and there would be a new
business that would have replaced you.
So I just make the point to you that the more I think about
this, the more incredulous I feel. Because in the private
workplace, they would simply have solved the problem much more
quickly, or they wouldn't exist. That is the problem we have in
a government model.
So, it is interesting the analogies we are going to draw to
the private workplace.
General Cunningham. Sir, your point is well taken. But if I
may, this is the system we had a year ago. The mission is
security. You don't stop or just shift gears like that. We had
to work hard to make this thing come into spec to the degree it
could be brought. We did that. We have done that in a
reasonable fashion. But, at the same time, we would be fools to
continue to say this is the ``forever system,'' operating with
the future year's defense plan, and not put anything else in
there to replace it. That is the point I was trying to make.
Mr. Shays. I understand that.
General Cunningham. In the field, and there is a lot of
human participation in this, where our agents in the field
conduct their investigations, we have improved the software for
them. So, if you will, their front office, their laptop, is now
working in a much more responsive way. The results are that we
did get our target of 2,500 completed investigations in August.
It was not a flash in the pan.
The systemic changes that have been made, sir, if I may
continue----
Mr. Shays. You can continue as much as you want. I just
want to give you a sense of every 5 minutes.
General Cunningham. Thank you, sir.
We know that we have to continue to be able to do better
work and to do it faster, and mechanization is very important
in this. We know that our system is not rocket science, and
indeed that we have to take care of our people. We are doing
that.
We know that we have a backlog. The backlog is serious,
and, indeed, we have had a major input. But to be able to
sustain our 2,500 DMC contract is not to stay at 2,500 but to
go beyond that. We feel we will do that.
I am happy to report to you today, two-thirds through the
month of September, that the August numbers met our contract,
and we will again meet our contract this month. In fact, we
hope to go a little bit beyond. That is going to be a regular
thing with us. Are there going to be problems along the way?
Sure, but we are in a far better position to deal with them.
Let me go on to what I think gets to your point, and it is
an excellent one. What are we doing about it? What is in our
future and what do we need to do better? We have had a lot of
discussion within the Department of Defense, and I am happy to
report there is considerable progress, but the discussions that
you had here with the previous witnesses highlight that you
must know the requirements up front in order to work a three-
part process.
We talk about investigations, feeding adjudications.
However, little is said about the importance of that well-
defined, scrubbed and prioritized requirement that is the first
element in this three-part process. We talked about this
briefly the last time I was here.
What I am suggesting and what Ms. Shuster alluded to is our
ongoing discussions now with the military departments and the
need to plan, program and budget for security clearances in the
same way they plan, program and budget for everything else that
they do under Title X responsibilities within the military
departments. The reception to that idea has been, I think, very
good; and that, too, is not rocket science. It is practiced
every day in the Department. It is simply a matter of rolling
this kind of requirement into that same process. If you know
you are going to have a digitized battlefield and there are
certain security clearance requirements that will grow with
that, then you program for the MOSs to have those security
clearances when they come.
All kinds of things follow from that. You understand as you
move into budget development what is eventually going to be
required, so you can shape that. Indeed, we agree with the plan
that the Department has to work this backlog, and we think it
will work. But what happens after that will be driven largely
by how we plan, program and budget.
Sir, in the interests of further discussion and your
limited time, I would like to leave it at that.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Cunningham follows:]
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Mr. Shays. I have a vote, and I will vote and be back. It
will take between 10 and 15 minutes. We will be in recess, and
I will be back in 10 to 15 minutes.
[Recess.]
Mr. Shays. Mr. Leonard and General Cunningham, what I am
going to do is ask our staff on both sides of the aisle to ask
some questions first, and then I may interrupt them and have
some questions myself.
I will first recognize Vincent Chase.
Mr. Chase. General, Mr. Leonard, I would like to ask a
series of questions as relates to the Case Control Management
System.
First of all, it is our understanding that the initial
system was approximately--the cost to acquire and implement
this system was about $100 million. Can you tell us at this
point how much money you have spent to try to upgrade the
system in order to handle the DSS workload?
General Cunningham. Yes, sir. Last year, when we knew that
work had to be done oin the system, the President's budget in
January 2000 included an additional $22 million. We are now
working that within our base.
Our approved funding from 2001 on, that we have total in
the program for CCMS, is $180 million.
Mr. Chase. So if I understand that, in order to implement
the three phases that we have discussed and the new target
architecture, it is going to be how much?
General Cunningham. OK, let me go to what it took to get
the system working, stabilized. I think that was the first part
of your question.
That was the $22.9 million. Then to go beyond the stable
and approved system the future years' defense plan, and to take
it out to the target architecture, requires an additional $94
million. That is currently in the budget development process.
That is across all years, out to 2007. No decision, of course,
has been made on that within the Department.
Mr. Chase. Right. So we are talking about $116 million as a
grand total, roughly $116 million.
General Cunningham. That is in the approved program, to run
all of our operations and maintenance, everything involved in
the CCMS, not just developing it.
Mr. Leonard. Actually operating it on a day-to-day basis.
Mr. Chase. Do you see the additional funding that is going
to be needed down the road to get the system up?
General Cunningham. To take it through to our project
architecture is reflected in our POM. We see nothing in
addition to that.
Now, a follow-on system that would be included, should it
make sense in our next POM, that all needs to be worked out and
priced. That needs to be done within DSS and taken through the
process in C3I and through the whole comptroller process.
Mr. Chase. The next question has to do with OPM, and it is
related to the whole Case Control Management System.
We have transferred roughly, what, 40 percent of the
workload out of DSS. A portion of that has now gone to OPM.
Mr. Leonard. As of October 1st.
Mr. Chase. Before you made that decision, did you look at
their Case Control Management System? I didn't know if they
called it that, but basically the Case Control Management
System they have got, did you look at their system?
Mr. Leonard. For incorporation----
Mr. Chase. To make sure they could handle the workload.
Mr. Leonard. Yes, we did look at their system. I can't
recall the exact numbers off the top of my head. I can get back
to you on them.
But OPM was able to clearly demonstrate to us they were at
a fraction of their capacity from a system perspective, and
that in order to ramp up, so to speak, principally what they
would have to do would be to hire data input personnel, the
people part of it. That was the most significant part of their
ramp-up.
From a system capacity point of view, yes, sir, they had
the capacity to absorb roughly 400,000 additional
investigations a year for the next 2 years.
Mr. Chase. Did you consider why their system was working as
well and maybe--did you, frankly, look at their system?
Mr. Shays. Would the gentleman just yield? Excuse me. Hold
on 1 second. I just want to make sure I understand. You said
400,000 in the next so many years. I think that is too
imprecise for the committee; 400,000 when?
Mr. Leonard. 400,000 in--it is either several thousand
above or below--I can't recall off the top of my head--400,000
in fiscal year 2001 and 400,000 roughly in fiscal year 2002,
for a total of 800,000 roughly investigations over the next 2
years.
Mr. Shays. That is good.
Mr. Leonard. I can provide the precise numbers for the
record, if you would like.
Mr. Shays. I just wanted to have that.
Mr. Chase. Just a couple more questions. When you looked at
OPM's system, did you look the at the cost of their system?
Mr. Leonard. From what perspective? From a perspective of
incorporating----
Mr. Chase. From a perspective of procurement and
acquisition and implementation?
Mr. Leonard. That clearly will have to be part of the
equation.
As I mentioned right up front, oversight from my
organization has had shortcomings, especially with respect to
the acquisition of a major automation system. Clearly--and I am
not telling the committee they don't know--one of first steps
you need to do in that process is to analyze your alternatives.
Clearly, one of the alternatives is, rather than build it
yourself, can you get it somewhere else?
That was not done to the fullest extent in the case of
CCMS. We are committed in terms of applying a maze-like process
to the future architecture, and those types of issues will be
addressed up front before the Department commits itself to a
future architecture above and beyond what is needed to
accomplish the plan as laid out in the comptroller's memo and
to ensure that DSS has the continued capacity and capability to
do that portion of the work that will be directed toward them.
Mr. Chase. Will that process be part of the--it was
recently implemented last year. It is the General's contract he
has with the Department of Defense. Is that process part of
that council review?
Mr. Leonard. The maze-like process? That will be a process
in accordance with the 5,000 series of directives within the
Department of Defense and also under C3I's role also as the
Chief Information Officer and Clinger-Cohen Act and the
appropriate OP-OMB directives.
Mr. Chase. I just want to switch gears. General, the
outside consultant was developing an algorithm that was going
to ferret out the riskiest cases in the backlog. Could you give
us the status of that?
General Cunningham. Yes, sir. The algorithm to which you
are referring to was the algorithm to discern from the
electronic personnel security questionnaires those
investigations that were likely to be complicated and those
that were likely to be fairly simple and clean. We were able to
make a very good correlation between responses given on the
EPSQ and those who lose clearances later.
That has been completed; it has been tested; it will be
implemented with our 2.2 version update of our software for
CCMS. That is scheduled to take place in 30 days, and we will
have that algorithm operating.
Mr. Chase. OK.
Mr. Shays. David.
Mr. Rapallo. General Cunningham, how many cases did you
close per day as of last February when we had the hearing?
General Cunningham. Last February we closed about 1,500.
That was our first move up after implementing our first
improvements into the system. Prior to that, for the duration
that we had CCMS, we averaged between 900 and 1,000 a day.
Mr. Rapallo. You are up to now----
General Cunningham. 2,500, slightly over.
Mr. Rapallo. So your goal last February was an average of
2,500. So you are not quite there, but you are up to the 2,500?
General Cunningham. Yes, sir. When I signed the Defense
Management Council contract, which was agreed to previously, I
knew that we could not do an average for the year of 2,500. It
was out of the question. I was signing that off well into the
fiscal year. I knew the state of the system. I watched daily
what we were producing and where the problems were. But that
train had left the station, and so I lived with it.
At first, it was troublesome to me to be sitting with a
contract, knowing that I couldn't deliver. Nevertheless, after
I thought about it for a while, I said, ``This will be good for
you. This will give you something to work for.'' And it was.
We put the mark on the wall in February, some months after
I had briefed Secretary Hamre, having done a regression
analysis with what we planned to do in the system, we would hit
out DML contract no later than August. Of course, that contract
kept us moving in that direction. We improved, as I predicted,
in February, March, April, May and June.
In late June, we ran into a situation, due to manual
archiving, we overshot the system. A data base administrator
working hard in the middle of the night and let it overshoot.
It overshot, it overwrote times, it brought us down, and it
took us most of the month of July to recover.
That is more than a hiccough. That was devastating to us
because we could have hit our 2,500 in June. We would have a
longer track record. We don't have that. We can't cry about
that.
How do you fix that? Oracle version 8.1 that we will
install in 4 months does not allow that to occur. That is part
of our continuing development on this system.
Mr. Leonard. Mr. Chairman, if I could add, this was your
fundamental point; and it is important to acknowledge that,
even with DSS achieving their goal of 2,500 a day, this
situation is getting worse, because, quite frankly, General
Cunningham is getting 3,000 a day in every day. You don't have
to be a rocket scientist to figure out if you are getting in
3,000 and only putting out 2,500, the problem is getting worse.
However, that in part was the fundamental reason to enter into
this partnership with OPM; and in essence what our strategy is
now is we will be vectoring off the high volume but low
intensity from a scope point of view, investigations, the
highly automated investigations, to OPM. Their system can
absorb this very easily.
These are the automated record checks for recruits, for
example 18-year-olds, and all you need to check is, do they
have an arrest record, those types of things. By vectoring
those off to OPM, that will create an environment for General
Cunningham and his folks where, quite frankly, if they keep
up--they don't even need to keep up with 2,500 to be able to
start eating into that backlog. That's a very significant
point.
General Cunningham. Sir, if I may complement that a little
bit, add to that, even before the OPM strategic partnership,
which we applaud, last summer we began the development of these
contractors to augment from the private sector as discussed
last time. The first two that were brought on were done before
I got to DSS and were done out of Mr. Leonard's office to go by
letter contract. Those contractors alone, are producing now a
little over 100 a day themselves. They will grow to 150 a day
in the near future. That's over and above what we were
considering within this 2,500.
In addition to that, the next batch of contractors that we
brought on, of the four I described earlier, we now have three
on board. They have the capability to eventually reach 250 a
day, each, and I expect them to hit that level in about a year.
Mr. Rapallo. I think that capacity building is really
positive, but my question relates more to how you know ``how
many are coming down the pike'' kind of thing. It seems like
there are a lot of factors that could affect that. What are
some of those factors? You have reinvestigations coming due.
That's something you're trying to figure out now.
Mr. Leonard. I have to sit before you here this morning to
express continued frustration and dissatisfaction from a
departmental perspective that we cannot to this day we cannot
answer that question with the granularity that it deserves. The
reasons for that are varied. I don't want to belabor that. I'll
be happy to go into any depth you'd like to.
Mr. Rapallo. Some, you can figure out.
Mr. Leonard. Yes, we can figure it out in a rough order of
magnitude. That's what we have done. But the basic problem is,
we have had a culture in the department where the clearance
stuck with the person as opposed to being tied to the job. And
so individuals then, once they got put in for a TS SCI
clearance, somehow, some way that stuck with them irrespective
of what future assignments they might have and what have you.
General Cunningham is absolutely, positively right. What we
do as a building, day in and day out, is we plan program and
budget for what our requirements are, whether it's ships,
ammunitions, training for pilots and what have you. The problem
is, clearances up to this point in time have been treated like
a commodity, just like a government pen. I go to the file
cabinet, I reach in and pull it out, and that's how it had been
treated in the past; and that culture in part has led us to
this problem.
What we have to instill within the Department is a culture
that this is--instead, as an asset; it's an asset no different
than people, than systems, than training, and it has to be
managed as an asset. And if you don't manage it as an asset,
you are going to be given even more headaches from a management
point of view, as we heard from Mr. Mancuso in terms of his
headaches, just as a manager in terms of effectively utilizing
his personnel.
I think Ms. Schuster said, pay me now, pay me later; that
lesson has been driven home, I think in spades, to every user
within the Department. And then the recognition, if I don't
plan and program and budget for these like I do everything else
in the Department, we are never going to get to the heart and
soul of this.
The Joint Personnel Adjudication System that we're going to
start beta testing in 2 months, that's not the answer, but it's
a tool. It will be a tool that will be available to the
services and to the other components to begin to instill the
discipline and the management that this very valuable asset
needs; and we can't be treating them like office supplies, like
we may have in the past when you didn't have to manage them.
Mr. Rapallo. Just to be fair, though, there are some
circumstances where you just can't predict when you might need
them. I can't remember if it was the GAO report or the IG's----
Mr. Leonard. And there are provisions, then, to work around
that. And we have been employing those provisions to work
around that when that happens. There are risk tradeoffs. And
obviously mission requirements can't wait for an investigation,
especially if that investigation is going to take a year or
more, especially if your mission requirement is a military
operation of some sort. There are provisions for interim
procedures, for risk-based approaches to granting interim
access, supplementing them with extra supervision or what have
you, those provisions have been used in the Department.
It's a greater challenge. I have to manage my resources
more so. But there are these built-in provisions to the system
that allow you to manage it if you utilize these provisions
appropriately.
Mr. Rapallo. I think I understand what you're saying. I was
talking about more systemic changes, like retirement age of a
lot of people.
Mr. Leonard. It goes beyond that, even. Just the way we
conduct operations as a department; the revolution in military
affairs, what that means. What we saw in Kosovo is, we're in an
environment today now where our objective is to have a short
cycle time between eyes on target and when that shooter gets
that information. What that entails now is that now your
shooter, if you will, F-15 pilot or whatever, needs real-time
intelligence. It's a change in the way we do business. It's a
change in our doctrine. It drives these types of requirements.
We need to be smarter when we're recognizing that we're
upgrading our technical capabilities in this area, that, hey,
these have consequences; and what it means now is, I have more
people having real-time, hands-on access to real-life
intelligence. That means they're going to need the higher level
clearances where they may not have necessarily needed them in
the past.
So you're absolutely right. Again, I go back to my opening
comment, it permeates every element to interpret how we do
business.
Mr. Rapallo. Maybe I could have one more question.
General, do you have any control over the number of cases
coming into your office?
General Cunningham. No, sir.
Mr. Rapallo. So you have no control. So you've just
established your goal at 2,500.
General Cunningham. No, the Defense Management Council.
Mr. Rapallo. They establish the goal for you?
General Cunningham. OSD, which has a good sense of history,
established that goal because, as I understand it, it was very
wisely done. That was their sense of the number we would have
to do to be sure we would take care of initial requirements.
But even at that, that was an estimate, that was not a
programmatic detailed assessment.
Mr. Rapallo. The number might go up, incoming, it might go
down in the future. Is your funding at all tied to that?
General Cunningham. Yes. I defer that to Bill.
Mr. Leonard. Yes. Again, if you want to go back to how do
we get into this position, clearly one of the fundamental
problems we had--this goes back years; it's nothing recent--is
that there has been a fundamental disconnect between
requirements and this man and his predecessor's budget. We need
to fix that if we're going to preclude this from happening
again.
Mr. Shays. Bottom line--I have about 10 minutes, and I'd
like to just ask a few questions.
The bottom line question I have is just to get an answer to
David's question, in the sense of understanding what it means.
Mr. Leonard, you said that because you're transferring 40
percent of the cases, be they small cases, to OPM, that you
don't even need to do the 2,500.
And I need to know under what context you make that
statement. What is your goal?
Mr. Leonard. Basically the goal is, we have the challenge
to do 2.1 million investigations over the next 2 years. Of that
portion, 45 percent of that belongs to DSS.
Mr. Shays. If you do 2.1 next year what does that mean?
Mr. Leonard. That's 2.1 million over 2 years. So----
Mr. Shays. What does that mean?
Mr. Leonard. It means that 45 percent of those, a little
less than 900,000-and-some-odd will be coming in the front door
at DSS over the next 2 years.
What they need is, they need the cap----
Mr. Shays. I want to know what it means to the backlog.
Mr. Leonard. What it means to the backlog?
Mr. Shays. I want to know what it means.
Mr. Leonard. What it means is that at the end of that
period, if we generate----
Mr. Shays. After what? Don't say ``after the period.'' What
period?
Mr. Leonard. At the end of fiscal year 2002, September 30,
2002.
Mr. Shays. We're talking basically 2 years from now.
Mr. Leonard. Two years from now, yes, sir, 2 years from
next week what that will achieve is that everyone who has a
security clearance, an active security clearance, will either
have an investigation that is current in accordance with the
national standards or they will have submitted the paperwork
and identified the funding to accomplish that investigation.
That's what that means.
Mr. Shays. What will the backlog be?
General Cunningham. Sir, may I try that? The backlog will
be eliminated because that work that's coming in will be
initial work within our workload. That's--in a business that's
called ``carry-in.''
Mr. Shays. I understand that. So basically your definition
of backlog--so then how long will it take to do a current case?
General Cunningham. By then, we will be able to do a case
within 180 days. Our target is going to be less than 100 days.
Mr. Shays. I think that's a joke. You mean, it takes 6
months when we're current, potentially it will take 6 months
when we're current? If I were the President of the United
States, I would be outraged with that logic. In my own mind, I
think I've got 4 years to be President of the United States,
and you're telling me that basically one-eighth of my time is
going to be spent with people who are in process. You would
just drive me crazy with that logic. Why would we want it to
take 6 months?
General Cunningham. We don't want it to take 6 months, sir;
however----
Mr. Shays. I just say this: Why would we want to take 2
years to get the backlog down? So you're telling me that the
next President of the United States is basically, potentially
going to have a backlog for half of their term.
General Cunningham. Sir, everybody who applies for a
security clearance does not have a clean background.
Mr. Shays. So?
General Cunningham. There are matters that need to be
pursued.
Mr. Shays. Yes, sir.
Mr. Leonard. And that 180 days is an average. There will be
cases that will be done especially for those critical positions
critical missions, that will be accomplished in 35 days.
Mr. Shays. And?
Mr. Leonard. Pardon?
Mr. Shays. And?
Mr. Leonard. ``And?''
Mr. Shays. And then finish off the average. So it will be
longer than 6?
Mr. Leonard. Some will be longer.
Mr. Shays. That's crazy. I'm just telling you, in my
judgment, that's just idiotic.
Will the record note one of the witnesses went like--lifted
a hand up in the air like--translate that for me, General.
General Cunningham. Sir, it is not necessarily idiotic.
Because we have to be very fair to the subject who is being
investigated. We have to be judicious in the leads that we run.
We often learn something during the investigation that requires
other leads.
Mr. Shays. But you're not suggesting to me, as soon as
their case is filed, that they start to investigate. It may
take you 4 months before you even start to investigate. So
that's just bogus.
General Cunningham. Not in that timeframe, it won't, sir.
It will not take us 4 months.
Mr. Shays. Are you telling me everyone will begin their
investigation within a month?
General Cunningham. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. You are?
General Cunningham. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Say it to me.
General Cunningham. Sir, by the beginning of fiscal year
2003, we will be in a position to begin the investigation for
an actionable EPSQ, electronic personal security questionnaire,
within 30 days.
Mr. Shays. And then what happens?
General Cunningham. That's what we call opening the case.
The investigation, the field work begins.
Mr. Shays. I just want to say, General, I don't know if I'm
going to be around in 2 years. But, you know, just as in
February we wanted to hold your feet to the fire, to what was
now--and hold you accountable, you know, I hope whoever is in
my position here does the same thing, because you're making a
pretty strong statement.
General Cunningham. Yes, sir. I intend it to be that.
Mr. Shays. And I don't see the logic of it. I don't see the
logic of why a case is going to take, on the average, 6 months.
I don't see the logic to that. I don't see why that's in our
best national interest. I don't see why anybody would want to
claim that's what should be the case. So that causes me some
concern.
General Cunningham. Sir, your concern is well placed. If I
may, I also said we would be striving to complete them within
100 days; and if you'd like, I could explain more why I say
that.
Mr. Shays. Well, we have a challenge with time. Let me get
two questions on the record right now.
DOD has shifted a considerable volume of investigations and
reinvestigations to the Office of Personnel Management and
outside contract investigators. I'd like to ask both of you,
what are the future projections for continued use of outside
contractors? I'd like to know, is the use of DSS outside
contractors subject to an OMB Circular A-76 public-private cost
comparison? And I want to know, if not, why not?
So those are my questions. So the first is, what are the
future projections for continued use of an outside contractor,
contract investigators?
Mr. Leonard. The plan that I outlined to you, Mr. Chairman,
entailing vectoring the work off to OPM, is a 2-year plan; and
the intent at this point in time is that at the end of the 2
years that type of work would return back to DSS. However, I
have to tell you, Mr. Chairman, that I am enough of a realist
to know that 2 years from now, when we look back in terms of
how we accomplished this, the only thing I can probably be
absolutely certain on is that it will not have been in
accordance with the plan. Because no plan is that omnipresent
and what have you.
So what it will entail is close oversight, close scrutiny,
continued flexibility, and the ability to respond to changes as
appropriate.
With respect to the outsourcing within DSS, I will let
General Cunningham answer that question.
Mr. Shays. The circular A-76.
General Cunningham. Sir, I do not know what will happen
with regard to A-76. I do know that we intend to continue to
use private sector contractors to augment our work, and that
it's essential that, where serious derogatory information is
encountered by contractors, working under DSS contracts----
Mr. Shays. Excuse me 1 second.
I'm sorry.
General Cunningham. I think it's essential that those
investigations that run into serious derogatory information
being conducted by contractors, default back to the Defense
Security Service the way in which we are working with our phase
two augmenting contractors now.
Mr. Shays. Some believe the cost to upgrade CCMS will be
$300 million, not $100 million. It was--the $100 million was--
excuse me, to upgrade it will be $300, and you had to spend
#100 million to acquire.
The OPM system cost $35 million and it seems to be working.
Just there's obviously a reason, but if you--just 1 minute.
General Cunningham. Sir, the OPM system, it's my
understanding, involves some use of paper. Our system handles
an extremely high volume; and I think that's an apples-and-
oranges comparison.
Mr. Shays. Fair enough.
Mr. Leonard. Could I make one point?
Mr. Shays. It's got to be quick. I have 3 minutes to vote.
Mr. Leonard. The only point I want to make, sir, is an
issue of standards. Changes in standards help get us into this
perspective. Overnight it created a backlog of almost 400,000
investigations when we changed the investigative standard for
Secret. What we would ask the Congress for is to be mindful of
that as the Congress considers changing standards as well.
Mr. Shays. I think that's fair. But I think you all should
be asking when Congress does that, to provide all the resources
you need to get the job done.
Mr. Leonard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. I fault the administration, frankly. It's not
meant as a political statement. I fault them for not realizing
this is a big deal and putting all the pressure on Congress and
then Congress has to explain it. But we're not even in that
situation.
And I fault you all for not saying this needs to be done
sooner and we need the resources to do it. I don't fault you
for not getting the job done if you don't have the resources,
but if you don't ask for them, then I have a problem with it.
Sorry to have the last word, but this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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