[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION: WERE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
SWAYED BY POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS?
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 6 AND 7, 2000
__________
Serial No. 106-257
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
74-430 WASHINGTON : 2001
_______________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
Carolina ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
BOB BARR, Georgia DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas
LEE TERRY, Nebraska THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
GREG WALDEN, Oregon JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California ------
PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho (Independent)
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
Robert A. Briggs, Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on:
December 6, 2000............................................. 1
December 7, 2000............................................. 259
Statement of:
Marshall, Donnie R., Administrator, Drug Enforcement
Administration............................................. 315
Mercado, Julio, Deputy Administrator, Drug Enforcement
Administration; Ernest L. Howard, Special Agent in Charge,
Houston Field Office, Drug Enforcement Administration; and
R.C. Gamble, Chief Inspector, Drug Enforcement
Administration............................................. 53
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Burton, Hon. Dan, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Illinois, e-mail dated March 15, 2000................... 62
LaTourette, Hon. Steven C., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Ohio, letter dated March 16, 2000............. 68
Marshall, Donnie R., Administrator, Drug Enforcement
Administration, memo dated August 20, 1999................. 330
Ose, Hon. Doug, a Representative in Congress from the State
of California:
Letter dated August 20, 1999............................. 38
Letter dated November 2, 2000............................ 51
Waxman, Hon. Henry A., a Representative in Congress from the
State of California:
E-mail dated March 14, 2000.............................. 73
Letter dated December 6, 2000............................ 267
THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION: WERE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
SWAYED BY POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS?
----------
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 6, 2000
House of Representatives,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:40 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dan Burton
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Burton, Gilman, Shays, Horn,
LaTourette, Ose, Waxman, Norton, Cummings, Kucinich, and
Tierney.
Staff present: Kevin Binger, staff director; James C.
Wilson, chief counsel; David A. Kass, deputy counsel and
parliamentarian; Sean Spicer, director of communications; M.
Scott Billingsley and Andre Hollis, counsels; Thomas Bowman and
Kristi Remington, senior counsels; Pablo Carrillo,
investigative counsel; S. Elizabeth Clay and Nicole Petrosino,
professional staff members; Marc Chretien, senior investigative
counsel; Gil Macklin, professional staff member/investigator;
Robert A. Briggs, chief clerk; Robin Butler, office manager;
Michael Canty and Toni Lightle, legislative assistants; Josie
Duckett, deputy communications director; Leneal Scott, computer
systems manager; John Sare, deputy chief clerk; Corinne
Zaccagnini, systems administrator; Phil Schiliro, minority
staff director; Kristin Amerling, minority deputy chief
counsel; Michael Yeager, minority senior oversight counsel;
Ellen Rayner, minority chief clerk; and Jean Gosa and Earley
Green, minority assistant clerks.
Mr. Burton. Good morning. A quorum being present, the
Committee on Government Reform will come to order.
I ask unanimous consent that all Members' and witnesses'
written opening statements be included in the record; and
without objection, so ordered.
I ask unanimous consent that all articles, exhibits and
extraneous or tabular material referred to in the record be
included; and without objection, so ordered.
I ask unanimous consent that a set of exhibits shared with
the minority staff prior to the hearing be included in the
record; and without objection, so ordered.
And I ask unanimous consent that the questioning in the
matter under consideration proceed under clause 2(j)(2) of
House rule 11 and committee rule 14 in which the chairman and
ranking minority member allocate time to committee members as
they deem appropriate for extended questioning not to exceed 60
minutes divided equally between the majority and the minority.
Mr. Waxman. Reserve the right to object, Mr. Chairman, on a
couple of the points you just raised.
One, I would like to ask you to defer the request on the
timing because we would change from the 5-minute rule to a half
an hour each side, and that puts us at quite a long time before
we can get our questions in. But I may not object to it. If you
would just withdraw that for a minute.
And on exhibits I would ask you to amend your unanimous
consent request that the exhibits not go in the record until
our staff has an opportunity to review them.
Mr. Burton. The staff has not had a chance to look at those
exhibits yet?
Mr. Waxman. Could you also withhold that unanimous consent?
Mr. Burton. We will withhold that as well, and hopefully
they can make a decision here relatively soon while I am making
my opening statement.
Mr. Waxman. I hope so.
Mr. Burton. I also ask unanimous consent that questioning
in the matter under consideration proceed under clause 2(j)(2)
of House rule 11 and committee rule 14 in which the chairman
and ranking minority member allocate time to committee counsel
as they deem appropriate. And we will defer action on that
until I make my opening statement.
Today's hearing focuses on the war on drugs. Specifically,
we are focussing on allegations that an important investigation
of drug trafficking was shut down because of political
pressure.
Of all the things that our government does, protecting the
public against drug traffickers has to rank as one of the most
important. Drug abuse has destroyed countless lives in this
country. It's hard to find a family that hasn't felt the pain
of drug addiction. We spend billions of dollars to fight drug
trafficking and prosecute drug dealers. If there is one area
that we do not want to be undermined by partisan politics it's
the enforcement of our drug laws. Unfortunately, that is
exactly what has been alleged by some in this case. We do not
want to make any allegations about anyone or any individuals
before we have all the facts.
Now I am not going to make a long opening statement today
because we do not have all the facts at this point. We have
been trying very hard to get the facts for about a month and a
half, and as usual it's been a frustrating experience. The only
way to make progress was to call a hearing and issue subpoenas.
Maybe the best way to start this hearing is to retrace our
steps.
This summer, we heard about an investigation of drug
trafficking in Houston, TX. There was an investigation
involving a man named James Prince. He owns a record company
called Rap-A-Lot. He and his associates were believed to be
large-scale drug dealers. This investigation produced more than
20 convictions. There were allegations that political pressure
was brought to bear, and the Drug Enforcement Administration
killed the investigation. So we asked the DEA for a briefing.
In July, the staff was briefed by the head of the DEA's
Houston field office, Mr. Earnest Howard. Mr. Howard assured
the staff that the DEA's investigation was active and ongoing.
He was very convincing, so we didn't pursue the matter any
further.
Then, in October, we were told there were e-mails that
contradicted what we were told. We asked the DEA to give us the
e-mails. I had a personal conversation with Mr. Marshall, the
head of the DEA. They were given to us.
The e-mails flatly contradicted what Mr. Howard told us. We
have a March 14 e-mail from Mr. Marshall to DEA headquarters in
Washington. He states, ``I understand that the situation
involving Rap-A-Lot and James Smith, a.k.a. James Prince, has
only gotten worse. To eliminate any further difficulty in this
matter I have decided that the Houston division will curtail
any enforcement against this subject.'' He concludes by saying,
``at any rate, it is over; and we are closing our case on
Prince.''
The next day Mr. Howard sent another e-mail to Washington.
This one states, ``now we bow down to the political pressure
anyway. It is over now. The Houston division will terminate all
active investigation of Rap-A-Lot except for those persons who
have already been arrested or indicted.''
There could not be a starker contrast between what we read
in June and what we read in those e-mails. Naturally, we wanted
an explanation. We've had a hard time getting one.
This isn't the only time that politics may have intruded
into this investigation. Last August, one of our colleagues, a
Congressman, weighed in. She accused the DEA of harassing Mr.
Prince. She asked the Attorney General, General Reno, for an
investigation; and she got one. Within a month, the DEA had
removed the lead agent, Jack Schumacher, from the case and
started an internal investigation of him.
Last month, we interviewed several local Houston City
policemen. They were assigned to a joint investigation of Mr.
Prince with the DEA. They told us that they were removed from
the case about a month after the Congresswoman's letter
arrived. They told us they were called to a meeting with
Special Agent Howard, the head of field office. Mr. Howard told
them that the investigation was over, and he cited the
Congresswoman's letter.
Well, something is terribly wrong here. On one hand, we are
told by the head of the DEA's field office that the
investigation is open and leads are being followed. On the
other hand, we are being told by everyone else that the
investigation has been shut down not once but twice.
I asked to interview all of the DEA officials who were
involved. I received no response. I asked again. I called the
head of the DEA, Mr. Marshall, to ask for his corporation. He
did not return my call, and I was told that he and the DEA were
told not to cooperate with the committee. I was informed that
the Attorney General had ordered Mr. Marshall not to speak to
me. I was also informed that an inspector general investigation
would be done and the committee would not be allowed to speak
to anyone because of that investigation.
That's inexcusable. We're the Congress of the United
States. We have an obligation to conduct oversight. We are
asked to appropriate billions of dollars to fund those
government agencies. We have to conduct oversight to make sure
the money is being wisely spent and the laws are being
followed, and yet I am told the head of a major agency like the
DEA cannot pick up the phone and talk to a committee chairman
here in Congress.
We could not get any explanation whatsoever as to what was
going on. That's tantamount to telling the Congress to just go
home and mind its own business and let the executive branch do
whatever it wants. Well, that's not how it should work.
So I issued subpoenaes and called this hearing. We are not
going to make any assumptions about anyone's guilt or innocence
here. We are not going to make any allegations about any
political influence being exerted until we have all the facts.
But if there was a significant investigation of drug
trafficking and it was shut down for no apparent reason other
than politics then we need to know about that and get the facts
out to the American people.
We have a lot of unanswered questions. I want to get
answers to all of them, so I would like to get started.
Before I yield to my colleague from California, Mr. Waxman,
let me say that appearing on the first panel will be DEA agent
Jack Schumacher and Houston police officers Bill Stephens,
Larry Jean Allen and Ralph G. Chaison.
Appearing on the second panel will be DEA Special Agent in
Charge Earnest Howard, DEA Chief Inspector R.C. Gamble, and DEA
Deputy Administrator Julio Mercado. I hope I pronounced that
correctly. DEA Administrator Donnie Marshall had a scheduling
conflict for today, and so he will appear tomorrow afternoon at
1 o'clock.
I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here, and I
yield to Mr. Waxman for his opening statement.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The chairman discussed the committee's investigation of the
James Prince Rap-A-Lot records matter in the Dallas Morning
News last month. He said that the Department of Justice is
purposefully interfering with the committee's investigation,
charging that, ``Janet Reno is blocking and I believe
obstructing justice for political reasons.''
Discussing Mr. Prince, Mr. Burton further stated, ``he
gives a million to a church, the Vice President goes to that
church, and 2 days later somebody says they are closing the
case. Something is wrong. They're blocking us because I think
they're afraid that this might be an embarrassment to the Vice
President.''
I just want to point out that, based on the information the
committee has gathered, these allegations are wholly
speculative. They are also under active investigation by the
Justice Department's Office of Inspector General. When the
chairman made a passionate plea a few minutes ago that our
committee is not being fully cooperated with in getting all the
information, having people talk to us, I would just point out
that it is not unusual and in fact it's usually the case where
the Department of Justice is pursuing its own inquiry that they
do not want to be interfered with by a committee of the
Congress. They are conducting an investigation, and they do not
want to and in fact I think they have a responsibility not to
be talking to any committee of Congress while that
investigation is going on.
But we simply don't know all the facts. None of us should
draw conclusions before the facts are in. I hope we spend today
making productive use of our time to understand what are
legitimate questions in this case, but as we move forward we
should be mindful of the need not to complicate or undermine
ongoing criminal investigations and especially if we undermined
them for what appears to be casting political aspersions. And
we should also try to avoid naming individuals connected to
this matter who have never been tried for or convicted of any
criminal offense.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony of the
witnesses. I know that you are approaching this as a way for us
to get the facts, and that's what I think we ought to do. So I
will work with you in that regard.
You were going to ask--I do not know if you will have
opening statements from other Members.
Mr. Burton. I will be happy to, if they like.
Mr. Waxman. I have completed my opening statement. I know
you asked we proceed under the 30 minutes for each side. We
will not object to that.
Mr. Burton. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Do other Members have opening statements they would like to
make or comments? Mr. Horn. Mr. Shays. Mr. LaTourette. Mr.
Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This hearing brings to bear interesting issues that do
require some clarification, Mr. Chairman. However, I have
paused in the reviewing of the documents for this hearing
because time after time the majority, no matter what the issue,
seeks to place the blame on President Clinton or Vice President
Gore. Even this week we will have our umpteenth hearing on
missing White House e-mail.
So here we are again. This time, unfortunately, the
integrity of one of our colleagues and a Member of Congress has
been called into question.
As you may know, many African American Members of Congress
serve not only their geographic constituencies but also a
national constituency. We often receive requests to help on
issues that affect African Americans on a national level.
Racial profiling in particular has been a key problem of
concern. I have personally travelled around the country
listening to this constituency tell me over and over again how
they are often subject to harassment and intimidation by a
group that is sworn to serve and protect them. Unfortunately,
despite our best efforts, it will continue. In the last few
weeks, African American voters in Florida have raised similar
concerns.
I have noted a majority of our law enforcement officers
serve their community and do a good job. However, as it is
often said, one bad apple spoils the bunch.
I just wanted to quote from the letter of the
Congressperson who the chairman referred to, just a small part
of the letter, to emphasize what I am talking about. In that
letter the Congressperson says, in talking about Mr. Prince,
says,
Mr. Prince alleges that the DEA has accused him of earning
the profits of his business illegally. In addition, he alleges
that he has been subjected to racial slurs, illegal search of
his automobile and that his customers and workers are stopped
and questioned without provocation by the DEA.
Mr. Prince also has raised concerns about the interference
in his right to travel, and he has been stopped numerous times
on dark stretches of Texas highways. Simply put, Mr. Prince
believes strongly that the Department of Justice must intercede
into the questionable practices of the DEA and provide him with
the necessary protection to ensure that his life and livelihood
are not subject to ongoing harassment and intimidation.
The Congressperson goes on to say,
I am often contacted by African Americans who feel helpless
when confronted with incidents as described by Mr. Prince. The
harrowing details of Mr. Prince's allegations and my reputation
in vigorously pursuing such matters warrant that I assist him
to the best of my capabilities.
She goes on to ask that the DEA--that the Attorney General look
into this matter.
So, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from today's
witnesses to learn more about the investigation, the
implications for the future and how Members of Congress can
intercede on legitimate issues without being muddied in the
process. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Cummings.
The gentlelady from Washington.
Ms. Norton. I am going to try to stay--I am supposed to
speak somewhere in my district--because I need to hear what the
evidence is here. I am concerned that the Vice President's name
would be drawn into this matter since, so far as I know, it
raises his profile considerably to say it was marginal at best.
That is to say, if the Vice President can go someplace, as
public figures do, and thereafter something happens and he then
is drawn into it, to call it circumstantial evidence is to
raise its probity. That's why I would like to hear whether
there is any real evidence about his involvement.
I am concerned that it is alleged that a Member of Congress
called, and I don't believe that the majority means to cast any
aspersion upon this Member of Congress. I note that when they
said it was a Congresswoman, Mr. Chairman, everybody looked at
me. I guess there are few enough of us so if you see one of us
sitting up here this must be she. This is not she. I do know
the Congresswoman in question, and the majority has been
careful here, so I make no accusation whatsoever.
But I do wish to say for the record that there should be no
implication that this Congresswoman would seek to protect
anyone dealing in drugs if she knew he was dealing in drugs and
that this Congresswoman has been an outspoken opponent of, by
now, the well-documented practice of racial profiling.
It also has been my experience that it is very difficult to
get the Department of Justice or the DEA to cease an
investigation that it has started, so I would be quite amazed
if all it took was a phone call from a Member of Congress and
you could then get the investigation called off. In that case,
I think you might expect lots more calls from Members who get
complaints from their constituents.
Mr. Waxman. Would the gentlelady yield to me?
Ms. Norton. I yield to the gentleman.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you for yielding to me.
Representative Maxine Waters' involvement in this matter
appears to be explained by her longstanding efforts to address
racial profiling and other criminal justice issues affecting
African Americans. In addition to serving as a member of the
Judiciary Committee and its Constitution Subcommittee,
Representative Waters served as chair of the Congressional
Black Caucus from 1997 to 1998 and formulated the Agenda for
Black America which included a commitment to civil rights.
Moreover, she has been particularly active in drawing public
attention to the practice of racial profiling by law
enforcement organizations.
I would like to ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, to put
into the record, so there should be no question about
Representative Waters and her involvement in this whole thing,
a transcript of an interview with her in August 1999 by the DEA
Office of Professional Responsibility and a letter that she had
sent to the Attorney General with regard to this issue.
Mr. Burton. Without objection, so ordered.
[Note.--The information referred to may be found at the end
of this hearing.]
Mr. Waxman. Thank you for yielding to me.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Any other comments?
If not, I would like for witnesses to be sworn. But because
we have two undercover agents here who we do not want on
television we will ask you to be seated, which is unusual. We
would like for all of you to raise your right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Burton. Do any of you have opening statements you would
like to make? If not, then we will start with our first 30
minute segments, and I will yield to Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Before my 30 minutes begins, I would like to offer Mr.
Waxman the opening 30 minutes, and I would be happy to follow.
I know he voiced a concern about the opportunity to speak.
Mr. Waxman. I thank you very much. But this is a hearing
called by the majority, so the majority ought to go first.
Mr. Shays. I am happy to do that. I just wanted to make
sure that was acceptable.
I would like to state for the record that--before my 30
minutes--that two of our four witnesses are African Americans.
They happen to be behind the shield doing covert work, but I
would like the record to note that.
Mr. Waxman. I hope that in no way jeopardizes their
security to have identified them in any way. But thank you for
your generous offer.
Please let the majority proceed on their 30 minutes. Then
we'll take ours.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Schumacher, how long have you been a law enforcement
officer?
Mr. Schumacher. Approximately 27 years.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Schumacher, would you pull the mic closer
to you? Not real close. Just put it in the direction so we can
pick up everything you say. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Shays. During those 27 years, approximately how many
arrests have you made? More than you can count?
Mr. Schumacher. Somewhere over 1,000.
Mr. Shays. How much experience do you have with narcotics
investigations?
Mr. Schumacher. About 20 years.
Mr. Shays. How many times have you testified in court?
Mr. Schumacher. Several hundred.
Mr. Shays. Have you received any awards or commedations?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. A number of them or just a handful?
Mr. Schumacher. Five or six.
Mr. Shays. What was your most recent award, recognition?
Mr. Schumacher. Performance award from the DEA.
Mr. Shays. Have you been involved in any disciplinary
action?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. What have been the outcomes of those?
Mr. Schumacher. Unfounded.
Mr. Shays. Are you a rogue DEA agent, as one or two people
have accused you of? In other words, operating outside the
rules and regulations?
Mr. Schumacher. Absolutely not.
Mr. Shays. When you started work on the investigation that
I am going to refer to as Rap-A-Lot, when did you start?
Mr. Schumacher. August 1998.
Mr. Shays. When were you assigned to the joint DEA/Houston
Police Department Task Force?
Mr. Schumacher. Well, actually, shortly after I was
assigned the case I began to recruit HPD officers to
participate in the investigation.
Mr. Shays. I want you to bring the mic closer to you, if
you could. You have a rather mellow voice.
What results had you obtained up until September 1999, what
results in this investigation?
Mr. Schumacher. The investigation resulted in numerous
arrests, grand jury indictments, seizures of crack and powder
cocaine.
Mr. Shays. Do you remember how many arrests, how many
indictments, how many convictions?
Mr. Schumacher. At least 20.
Mr. Shays. Twenty arrests or 20 indictments or 20
convictions?
Mr. Schumacher. Well, some arrests generated more than one
indictment. But if I reflect on it everyone we arrested has
been convicted.
Mr. Shays. Was information developed on illegal activity
that in your opinion warranted further investigative work when
the task force's work was suspended?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Now we're going to get into specifics later, but
do you think sufficient work was done to develop leads that you
were investigating in 1999 and early 2000?
Mr. Schumacher. I'm sorry, would you repeat that?
Mr. Shays. We're going to get into more specifics later,
but do you think sufficient work was done to develop leads that
you were investigating in 1999 or early 2000 or do you think
more work needed to be done?
Mr. Schumacher. More work needed to be done.
Mr. Shays. I would like to ask Mr. Stephens--Mr. Chaison,
is that how you say your name?
Mr. Chaison. That's correct.
Mr. Shays. You both will have to switch the mic back and
forth.
Mr. Burton. You need to point the mic right at your mouth
and have it relatively close.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Stephens, could each of you please provide a
short summary of your law enforcement background and
experience.
Mr. Stephens. I've been a police officer with Houston
Police Department for 20 years and 6 months. I spent a short
time in patrol, made sergeant and went to the homicide division
for 10 years. I've been in the narcotics for 6 years.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Chaison.
Mr. Chaison. Yes. I've been a police officer for 21 years.
I've worked out of the Special Operations Division where we
have provided security for the President, Vice President and
any dignitary that came to the city of Houston. I was assigned
to narcotics in 1993 where I have worked since then.
Mr. Shays. And you are an undercover officer at times.
Mr. Chaison. That's correct.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Allen.
Mr. Allen. Yes I've been a police officer 17 years. I have
worked in narcotics 9 years. I have worked as a polygraph
examiner 4 years.
Mr. Shays. It's my understanding that all three of you have
been involved in the joint task force with the DEA to
investigate the Rap-A-Lot organization, is that correct, Mr.
Stephens?
Mr. Stephens. Yes, sir, it is.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Chaison.
Mr. Chaison. That's correct.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Allen.
Mr. Allen. That's correct.
Mr. Shays. When were you on the task force and what were
your assignments, as best you can tell us? Again, we will go
down. Mr. Stephens.
Mr. Stephens. In October or November 1998 Jack Schumacher
came to the Houston Police Department, to the Narcotics
Division, and requested assistance from a squad to help him
with an investigation which was the Rap-A-Lot case. My captain
at the time then assigned my group and myself to work on that
case with Agent Schumacher, and we stayed on the case until it
was closed.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Chaison--when you say until it was closed,
not that you had finished your work, Mr. Stephens, is that
correct?
Mr. Stephens. That's correct.
Mr. Shays. The work still needed to go on, is that correct?
Mr. Stephens. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Chaison.
Mr. Chaison. Yes, after our group was assigned to assist
the DEA, my primary function was a case agent and UC--UC being
undercover officer.
Mr. Shays. When were you assigned?
Mr. Chaison. In September 1998.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Allen.
Mr. Allen. My role started in September 1998 also. My
primary assignment was case agent and undercover officer.
Mr. Shays. I want each of you to give me the date on which
your work was suspended. Mr. Stephens.
Mr. Stephens. I don't know the exact date, but it was in
the period between September 20 and 25, I believe, 1999.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Chaison.
Mr. Chaison. September 1999.
Mr. Allen. September 1999.
Mr. Shays. In all three cases, gentlemen, you were involved
in investigating the Rap-A-Lot organization, is that correct?
Mr. Stephens.
Mr. Stephens. That's correct.
Mr. Chaison. That's correct.
Mr. Allen. That's correct.
Mr. Shays. At the first meeting of the joint task force,
did Special Agent Ernie Howard make comments about how the task
force was not going to be affected by political influence like
others have been? And I would like to know, what did he say?
Mr. Stephens.
Mr. Stephens. It's my recollection that he gave us his full
support. He wanted the case investigated in the manner that if
there was something there to be done, to do it; if there was
not, to let him know. He was our biggest support during the
period that we investigated the case.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Chaison.
Mr. Chaison. Yes, it was my understanding from Mr. Howard
that he would assist us in anything that we needed. He was 100
percent behind us and that if there was anything there he
wanted it uncovered; if not, accept that.
Mr. Allen. To my knowledge, it was the same thing that Mr.
Chaison said. It started out where we had all the resources we
needed up until the time it was stopped.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Stephens, you worked out of the Houston
office of DEA in October 1998.
Mr. Stephens. We actually moved over there I believe in
December 1998. My squad relocated to the DEA office, yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. I would like to ask each of you, was this the
only time that you worked on a joint task force for the DEA in
Houston?
Mr. Stephens. No, sir.
Mr. Chaison. No.
Mr. Allen. No.
Mr. Shays. Did all of you work under the DEA Special Agent
in Charge Earnest Howard? Mr. Stephens.
Mr. Stephens. We are assigned to the Houston Police
Department, sir. The ultimate person we worked for would be our
chief. But, yes, during that task force, he was our supervisor.
Mr. Shays. And for all three.
Mr. Chaison. That's correct.
Mr. Allen. That's correct.
Mr. Shays. In January 1999 the task force made a
significant arrest in the case. Could you please explain what
happened at that time? And I would open it to up to Mr.
Stephens. And if any of you, Mr. Chaison or Mr. Allen, want to
add to it you can join in afterwards. Mr. Stephens.
Mr. Stephens. It was January 7, 1999. It was a reversal
operation----
Mr. Burton. May I interrupt real quickly here? Just to
clarify this was the arrest of McCarter, Ballard, Russell, et
al, and McCarter was the No. 3 in the Rap-A-Lot organization
and the arrest involved 6 kilos of cocaine, correct?
Mr. Stephens. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Can you add to that?
Mr. Stephens. It was actually Steven McCarter, Edward
Russell, William Ballard and Eric Bradley, in a reversal
operation that took place on January 7 where Mr. McCarter and
Mr. Russell, Mr. Bradley and Mr. Ballard came to a hotel in
Houston, TX, and took 6 kilos of cocaine and the $90,000.
Mr. Shays. Anything that you gentlemen would add?
OK. Note that for the record.
Mr. Schumacher, in August 1999 our colleague, Congresswoman
Maxine Waters, wrote a letter to Attorney General Janet Reno
concerning the Prince investigation or what I call the Rap-A-
Lot investigation by the DEA. The letter alleged that Prince
was the subject of racial harassment by the DEA. The DEA's
Office of Professional Responsibility launched an investigation
into the actions of its agent. Did you all know about this
letter, Mr. Schumacher?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Stephens.
Mr. Stephens. Yes.
Mr. Shays. First off, I would like to know when you knew,
Mr. Schumacher. This was August 1999, that the letter was
written.
Mr. Schumacher. The latter part of August.
Mr. Stephens. The same.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Chaison, did you know of the letter?
Mr. Chaison. Yes, the same.
Mr. Allen. The same.
Mr. Shays. Now I would like to know--first off, no one is
questioning the integrity of our colleague. We might question
the judgment, but that's another issue. But I would like to
know how did the letter affect your work, Mr. Schumacher?
Mr. Schumacher. Well, it was a multi-step process.
Mr. Shays. Are you referring to a multi-step because of the
Office of Professional Responsibility?
Mr. Schumacher. Well, it was a series of events, sir.
Mr. Shays. OK, let's run down them as quick as you can.
Mr. Schumacher. The letter came in. We were told about it.
We were told subsequently that a DEA internal OPR investigation
was launched and that Ms. Waters was actively pursuing--
advocating these allegations.
Mr. Shays. We're kind of running out of time here, but the
bottom line is you were then investigated, is that correct?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir, we were.
Mr. Shays. And what was the result of the investigation?
Mr. Schumacher. Of the OPR investigation?
Mr. Shays. Yes, sir.
Mr. Schumacher. In October 2000, myself and Agent Scott
received clearance letters from OPR.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Chaison and Mr. Allen and Mr. Stephens, do
you want to add anything?
Mr. Stephens. As far as morale for the letter, what I think
hurt us as much as anything was the fact that it alleged racial
profiling of Mr. Smith. And myself, my team members, Agent
Schumacher and the ones on the task force at that time had
never been around Mr. Smith except for in the courtroom where
he was there to see Mr. McCarter and Mr. Russell during the
trial.
Mr. Shays. So just for the record, all four of you, do you
believe this investigation was motivated by race in any way?
Mr. Schumacher.
Mr. Schumacher. Absolutely not.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Stephens.
Mr. Stephens. No.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Chaison and Mr. Allen.
Mr. Chaison. No.
Mr. Allen. No.
Mr. Shays. Just note for the record that, Mr. Chaison and
Mr. Allen, you both are African Americans, is that correct?
Mr. Chaison. That's correct.
Mr. Allen. That is correct.
Mr. Shays. It is our understanding that in September or
October 1999 Special Agent in Charge of the DEA office in
Houston, Mr. Howard, called a meeting of the task force
investigating the Rap-A-Lot matter. Were you called to a
meeting of the whole task force by Agent Howard in September/
October 1999, and what happened at that meeting, Mr. Stephens?
Mr. Stephens. Yes, I was called to a meeting; and Mr.
Howard said that we were shutting down the investigation or
that he was shutting down the investigation.
Mr. Shays. Was it your understanding that as to the exact
date and time of this meeting--when was it, do you remember?
Mr. Stephens. I don't recall the exact date. I think it was
in the range of September 20 through the 25th.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Chaison or Mr. Allen, were you at this
meeting?
Mr. Chaison. Yes.
Mr. Allen. Yes.
Mr. Shays. And you verify that basically you were told it
was being shut down?
Mr. Chaison. Yes.
Mr. Allen. That's correct.
Mr. Shays. What was the reason, what was the explanation,
Mr. Stephens?
Mr. Stephens. Political reasons.
Mr. Shays. That's your interpretation.
Mr. Stephens. Those were his words, political reasons.
Mr. Shays. Would you add to that, Mr. Chaison, Mr. Allen?
Mr. Chaison. We were told the investigation was being
stopped because of political pressure.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Allen.
Mr. Allen. Same response. Because of political pressure.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Schumacher, were you at that meeting?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir, I was.
Mr. Shays. Does your recollection coincide with Mr.
Stephens, Mr. Chaison and Mr. Allen?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, it does.
Mr. Shays. In your own words, what was the reason?
Mr. Schumacher. Mr. Howard said it was headquarters,
politics--or politics and headquarters and that as of 10:21
this morning we're shutting it down.
Mr. Shays. Now it's our understanding that a total of seven
Houston policemen were taken off the case. What was done to
replace them, Mr. Stephens?
Mr. Stephens. There was nothing done to replace them.
Mr. Shays. They were taken off the case?
Mr. Stephens. Yes, sir. We did continue with the judicial
process. Anyone going to court we did follow through with that.
But as far as any proactive investigation they were not
replaced.
Mr. Shays. So those who were indicted, the indictments were
pursued, but there was no further investigation, to the best of
your knowledge.
Mr. Stephens. There was no proactive investigation, no,
sir.
Mr. Shays. Given that all of you had important work to do,
what did Mr. Howard do to ensure that the level of effort did
not drop off? Mr. Stephens.
Mr. Stephens. Nothing that I know of, sir.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Chaison, Mr. Allen.
Mr. Chaison. I am not understanding your question.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Schumacher, let me just ask you that
question.
Mr. Schumacher. I'm sorry, would you repeat that?
Mr. Shays. Given that--all the important work to do, what
did Mr. Howard do to ensure that the level of effort did not
drop off?
Mr. Schumacher. What efforts were made by--in September?
None.
Mr. Shays. Seven policemen are taken off the case.
Mr. Schumacher. Right.
Mr. Shays. So what effort was made by Mr. Howard to make
sure that the effort of investigation did not drop off? Seven
officers were removed. Who took their place?
Mr. Schumacher. None, no one.
Mr. Shays. So it's your testimony that, to the best of your
knowledge, Mr. Howard did nothing to make sure that this
investigation continued.
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. If the gentleman would yield. The investigation
stopped at that point. Mr. Howard put nobody else on the firing
line to go out and continue the investigation, correct?
Mr. Schumacher. That is correct sir.
Mr. Burton. Thank you.
I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Shays. You told the committee staff, Mr. Stephens, that
Mr. Howard had been one of your biggest supporters and he put a
No. 1 priority on the investigation. Do you believe--first off,
what was his demeanor? Can you gentlemen tell me? Was he happy
about ending this case or unhappy or what?
Mr. Stephens. On which part? At the beginning or at the
end?
Mr. Shay. At the end.
Mr. Stephens. At the end it was my opinion he was
uncomfortable when he told us to shut it down. When the group
started asking questions about it, that's when he time stamped
it and gave a date and time. The date I don't remember. The
time I don't. But I know that he did say, it's so and so, it's
this time, this date, I'm telling you it's shut down.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Chaison, Mr. Allen, you want to add to that?
Mr. Chaison. Yes. I think as far as how it affected my
morale it was--being in police work so long and doing many,
many, many investigations and to be assured in this
investigation that we had 100 percent support and then have the
rug snatched from under us, it was like it wasn't worth it all.
What are we out here doing? Are we on the same page as
everybody here, concerned about the war on drugs or just what
is it? Tell me.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Chaison, Mr. Allen, both of you do
undercover work. When you do this kind of work do you fear that
your life is in danger?
Mr. Allen. Yes, I do, especially after the meeting we had
with Mr. Howard. It took a lot out of me because I couldn't
understand, I couldn't get an answer why. We were doing well,
and all of sudden it was stopped. But there was no answer why,
and that bothers me till this day.
Mr. Shays. Let me ask each of you, Mr. Stephens, Mr.
Chaison, Mr. Allen, you are in the process of investigating
this work. It was shut down. Was it shut down because you
basically had run out of leads and it wasn't going anywhere or
were you fairly certain that you were making progress in this
investigation?
Mr. Allen, let's start with you.
Mr. Allen. Based on all the information we had, we were
still continuing with the investigation. There were more leads
that we can follow. There was more undercover work we could
have done, but due to the fact it was shut down we couldn't do
any more because we still had informants out there working the
streets for us.
Mr. Shays. So when it was shut down this was kind of out of
the blue. This wasn't something that you were expecting.
Mr. Allen. That's correct.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Chaison.
Mr. Chaison. That's correct. We had informants that were
still in the picture, and all of a sudden we had to go to them
and explain to them that--don't do anything else. Again, it
was--when you see officers hurt in the line of duty and
especially in narcotics investigations and then you have this
happen to you it's very depressing.
Mr. Shays. Do you feel you have the support of your fellow
officers coming up here or do you they kind of think that you
are making a mistake coming up here? Are they happy to see you
up here do you think or are they disappointed that you're here?
Mr. Chaison. No, I think--when we left, the officers that
know us well, we have 100 percent support of our department and
our co-workers. It's almost like a rooting section we may
receive when we return.
Again, we make many arrests, small people and people with
notoriety; and the Federal Government and the States have
invested a lot of time and money into our investigations. And
then we get someone to come along with money and can halt an
investigation and then can have music done behind it, bragging
about what they have done, it's a slap in the face.
Mr. Shays. You're making reference to the fact that Mr.
Prince, basically, his legitimate business is hard-core gang
rap music. And maybe you could make reference a little more
clearly here. Are you saying that one of rapsters was
mentioning this case or mentioning any of the officers?
Mr. Chaison. That's correct. One of his artists on his
label made a song, composed a song about our investigation and
bragging how he's had DEA agents replaced and jobs terminated,
confidential informants would be killed or killed.
Mr. Shays. Did he mention any law enforcement's names in
this rap music?
Mr. Chaison. Yes, he did he mentioned Jack Schumacher and
Chad Scott. He mentioned the local police which he called--the
local police executing warrants at his house.
Mr. Shays. Now we're going to have Agent Howard testify in
the next panel, but the bottom line of your testimony--how much
time do I have left? I would like each of you to describe to me
whether you felt this investigation should have continued. I
want you to tell me why you think it ended and tell me what you
think if we continued this investigation what we would have
achieved. And I'll start with you, Mr. Schumacher.
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir. I think that the--based on the
results that the investigative team had accomplished I think it
should have continued, it being the investigation. We had three
informants still plugged in to the Rap-A-Lot gang, if you will;
and we were just getting, really, getting to the second phase.
And it started out as a drug investigation. It spread out to
police corruption, murder. We were in the second phase, and I
think it should have continued. We had the investigative leads;
and had the investigative resources continued to go forward, I
believe we would have met with some success.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I'm going to come back to you, and I
will have about 10 questions. I want to go fairly quickly.
Mr. Stephens.
Mr. Stephens. OK. I think we definitely had things to do.
We had people in jail that, in my opinion and without going
into too much detail about the case, hold the key to us being
successful. We started to break a stranglehold that Rap-A-Lot
had on the 5th ward in Houston where everyone was afraid to
talk to us, and we were taking small steps to get big steps,
sometimes bigger than others, but there was much more left to
be done.
Mr. Shays. So Mr. Prince succeeded in stopping the
investigation it appears, and the end result is you even have a
song celebrating the fact that he was able to stop the police
work.
Mr. Chaison.
Mr. Chaison. That's correct. I definitely feel that--let me
relate a hot kitchen to you. When it's hot in the kitchen, when
the heat is turned up and you want to alleviate that heat, you
get out of the kitchen or you turn your heating system off. The
heat was definitely on him and his organization. It was there.
The pressure was on, which started to infiltrate his
organization, and he knew this. And the best way to--I would
assume the best way to stop this investigation was to do it
like he had done it before, which I wasn't privileged to that
investigation but I understand it was stopped due to political
pressure. And if political pressure worked before then it will
work again. And this has happened. This is my opinion.
Mr. Shays. Is your opinion basically that you--sometimes
there's no one to kind of protect the small guy but the big guy
has people to find ways to protect him? Is that kind of what
you're saying to us?
Mr. Chaison. Yes, we have small people, small fish ask us
all the time, why don't you get the big guy? And we had a big
guy and it was evident----
Mr. Shays. And yet he may have been found innocent. Your
investigation may not have led to something, but it's your
testimony that your investigation was stopped in the middle.
Mr. Chaison. That's correct.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Allen.
Mr. Allen. Yes, our goal was to target a person. We
targeted that person, we started making arrests, we got into
the 5th ward, and all of a sudden it was stopped. I feel real
bad about it because we were making headway, we were continuing
to make headway, and then all of a sudden it stopped.
Mr. Shays. I yield back my time.
Mr. Burton. I would like to ask a couple questions if I
might, if the gentleman would yield to me.
How many of the 20 people that were convicted of narcotics
trafficking or murder were associated with Mr. Prince and Rap-
A-Lot? Were there a lot of them?
Mr. Schumacher. I can think of about 10.
Mr. Shays. Were any of them in an executive capacity or in
what capacity in which did they serve?
Mr. Schumacher. Two of them, McCarter and Russell, whom we
arrested on January 7, 1999, occupied what I would characterize
as management-style positions with Prince's Rap-A-Lot company.
They had an office on the same floor as Mr. Prince. And during
our investigation in January we had numerous calls between an
informant and Russell while Russell was at the compound, Rap-A-
Lot compound. He would answer the phone Rap-A-Lot. And then we
had the informant on two different occasions meet with Russell
in his office at the Rap-A-Lot compound.
Mr. Burton. There was one murder conviction. Was there any
association between the person that was convicted of murder and
anybody at Rap-A-Lot?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. Can you give us that connection?
Mr. Schumacher. Lamar Burkes was recently convicted of
murder. And we had been told on several occasions by another
informant that it was the informant's understanding that Prince
had solicited Burkes to murder selected key witnesses in this
case.
Mr. Burton. That Prince had himself, according to your
informant--this was secondhand information--had been involved.
Mr. Schumacher. Yes.
Mr. Burton. This is speculative, but you do believe that
there would have been more convictions had you been able to
continue the investigation and you might have been able to go
right up the food chain and nail the kingpin, is that correct?
Mr. Schumacher. I think there would have been more
convictions, and we would have tried very, very hard to reach
our objective.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Stephens.
Mr. Stephens. Absolutely.
Mr. Chaison. That's correct.
Mr. Allen. That is correct.
Mr. Burton. So all four of you believe that this case was
cutoff in the middle of the stream and that the people who were
the big Kahuna or kingpins were saved by the stopping of the
investigation, correct?
Mr. Schumacher. They received a reprieve, yes, sir.
Mr. Stephens. Yes, sir.
Mr. Chaison. That's correct, sir.
Mr. Allen. Yes.
Mr. Burton. Any more questions from anybody?
Mr. LaTourette. While the yellow light is still on.
Mr. Shays. I want to ask one last thing to Mr. Schumacher.
Were you transferred to a desk job on March 15, 2000?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. What do you believe was the reason for this
transfer?
Mr. Schumacher. I was told that headquarters told our front
office to take me out of--off the Rap-A-Lot case, out of the
group that has the case and preferably out of the Houston
office.
Mr. Shays. Who told you that?
Mr. Schumacher. I was told by--under confidential
circumstances.
Mr. Shays. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Waxman, 30 minutes.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I want to yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from
Maryland, Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Waxman.
First, I want to say to all our officers, we applaud what
you do every day. As one who has addressed the drug issue head
on and lives in a community that's been taken over by drugs to
a large degree, I understand what you do, and we want to thank
you for doing what you do.
But I want to clear up something very quickly. Mr. Shays
said something that tremendously concerns me as a Member of the
U.S. Congress when he spoke of Maxine Waters; and he said, I
don't question her integrity, but I do question her judgment.
And certainly he has that right. But I want to put it on the
record that I could think of no Member of Congress who has
fought this drug war and put her life on the line on many, many
occasions--and I am talking about even from an international
level--than Maxine Waters. And I just want to make sure that
that's very clear because I would not want this moment in
history to pass without that being abundantly clear.
Let me just ask you, Mr. Schumacher, I want to go for a
moment--I am sure Mr. Waxman will go into other issues, but I
want to just go to this discussion that was had with Mr. Howard
with regard to the investigation being stopped. One of my
concerns in sitting on this committee has consistently been is
a lot of times people are brought before this committee,
accusations are made, and these people have to go back to their
communities and live. I want to make sure, just as we would not
accuse you of something that you did not do, because you do
have to go back to Texas, we wouldn't want that to happen to
anyone. I know I wouldn't.
Let me ask you this in that regard in this conversation
that you had with Mr. Howard: did he tell you about--did he
give up any names of people when he talked about being stopped
for--the investigation being halted for political reasons?
Mr. Schumacher. It seems that he mentioned the name Maxine
or Waters. I'm sorry. Can you hear me?
Mr. Cummings. Yeah, I can hear you. Can you tell us what he
said?
Mr. Schumacher. The best I recall, sir, is he walked into
the group, we gathered up--it was not unusual for Mr. Howard to
come over and speak to me directly about the case because he
had demonstrated an intense interest in it. He was our biggest
supporter, our biggest fan; and we cannot have made the
progress we had made without him providing the resources for
us. But on that particular day he came in, said numerous
phrases, etc. What I recall was the words, DEA headquarters or
headquarters, politics, Maxine or Maxine's letter, and I am
shutting it down. I don't want anybody to get hurt here.
Mr. Cummings. Now, this was--you were--I think you said a
little bit earlier that there had been a complaint against you,
is that right, with regard to--you had been investigated with
regard to what kind of charges, can you tell us, with regard to
this case that is?
Mr. Schumacher. Allegations not charges.
Mr. Cummings. Allegations. Were you being investigated?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. What were those investigations? What was that
in regard to?
Mr. Schumacher. Well, I later found out when I was
requested to come and interview up here in Washington, DEA
headquarters, OPR, in February 2000. That was the first time I
saw what the allegations were.
Mr. Cummings. And what were the allegations?
Mr. Schumacher. Racial profiling, civil rights violation,
discrimination, conduct unbecoming of an agent.
Mr. Cummings. During the course of the--I think you
mentioned another person who was also investigated, do you
recall?
Mr. Schumacher. Agent Chad Scott.
Mr. Cummings. Agent Scott. All right. Now when this
discussion was had with Mr. Howard, did he mention at all the
investigation and was the investigation still ongoing at the
time that this conversation took place?
Mr. Schumacher. I am not sure which investigation you're
referring to.
Mr. Cummings. All right.
Mr. Schumacher. There is the criminal investigation
involving Rap-A-Lot, then there's the internal investigation by
DEA.
Mr. Cummings. I'll clear that up for you. Let me clear that
up, and thank you for bringing that to my attention. What I am
asking you is when you had the discussion with Mr. Howard about
the ending of this criminal investigation of Rap-A-Lot, was the
investigation of you, the internal investigation, still going
on?
Mr. Schumacher. I was not aware that it was active or
initiated. I want to say at that time my understanding was that
Ms. Waters--subsequent to a visit by Mr. Prince to her office,
Ms. Waters had sent a letter and followed it up with a phone
call to Attorney General Reno, who in turn forwarded that
letter over to DEA headquarters. And that was my understanding
of where it was at that point.
Now when officially DEA headquarters, OPR initiated that
investigation I don't know to this day. I don't know the date.
Mr. Cummings. Let me ask you this: Your visit to
Washington, did it come subsequent to your meeting with Mr.
Howard about the ending of the criminal investigation? Did it
come after that?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir, it did.
Mr. Cummings. All right. Now, when the discussion was--are
you clear?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. When the discussion was had with the--let me
go to this last discussion you said you had with the
confidential--this confidential discussion that you had. Was
that with a member of the DEA or--can you tell us that--or a
member of the Houston Police Department? Can you tell us that?
Mr. Schumacher. It's a confidential matter.
Mr. Cummings. All right. So you can't tell us.
When Mr. Shays asked you whether you were now--or someone
over here asked you whether you now had a desk job, you have a
desk job now, is that right?
Mr. Schumacher. I did at that time, yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Now I think you said something that--I just
want you to clear this up for us. You said that it had gotten
into the second phase, that you were about to go into the
second phase--what does that mean--of the criminal
investigation.
Mr. Schumacher. Well, that's my characterization of the
situation. As Sergeant Stephens had referred to, we anticipated
either McCarter or Russell cooperating and/or some of the other
folks we had arrested that they would become defendant/
witnesses, if you will. And the second phase would be launched
subsequent to that, along with some other information that
informants we had working----
Mr. Cummings. And are these cases--let's assume the
investigation was started up again, are the cases still viable,
you think?
While you're thinking, let me ask Mr. Stephens, do you
think the cases are still viable?
Mr. Stephens. I think it would take a lot more work now
than it would then, but I'm not going to give up on it. I think
probably we could do something, yes.
Mr. Cummings. What about you, Mr. Allen?
Mr. Allen. I think it would be a hard task to get back to
right where we were before it ended. It would be real hard.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Schumacher.
Mr. Schumacher. The hardest part would be----
Mr. Burton. Excuse me, I believe the other officer would
like to comment.
Mr. Cummings. I will get back to him. I thought Mr.
Schumacher was ready to respond.
Mr. Schumacher. The hardest part would probably be to
reestablish the motivation of our initial informants, because
when we backed off they were just left out there in the cold,
so to speak.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chaison.
Mr. Chaison. Yes, I concur. I think we could probably do
something, but it would be difficult to get back to where we
were. Because not only do we have politics playing a part, but
we have the judicial system we have to look at also as, to me,
causing interference.
Mr. Cummings. Last but not least, Mr. Chaison, you in your
testimony--I listened to you very carefully when you were
talking about the rap songs, and I must admit I think there is
a generation gap with regard to me and the rappers, but I do
listen to what they write about and sing about or speak about.
And I take it that you, when you listened to these, this rap
is--this by this particular fella, Prince, the songs that you
talked about, the one that you talked about where they gave the
lyrics that referred to Schumacher and you all----
Mr. Chaison. I am referring to an artist on the Rap-A-Lot
label, Brad ``Scarface'' Jordan. I don't know if anyone, any
Congressman, Congressladies, have listened to the CD. I would
encourage you to listen. It's very clear. It's not a rap song
that's difficult to understand.
But when you advocate the hostility and the violence that
this individual is talking about, that's a problem. Again, I
say that not only do we have problems politically, when we take
cases to court and they go through the system and the judge
comes--after the jury finds a defendant guilty and then a judge
comes back and reverses the jury's decision, I'm still trying
to understand that.
I don't know how that type of thing happens, and I have
been in court, going to court on court cases for 21 years or
better, and you know, there's just something very blatant. It's
difficult for me to understand.
Mr. Cummings. As a lawyer, I just have to ask you this,
you're not trying to--you're not accusing a judge of
misconduct, are you? I'm just curious. Is that what you're
saying?
Mr. Chaison. No. I'm just trying to understand what
happened, and then you as an attorney may be able to help me
shed some light on to me what happened in Federal cases like
that. I don't know.
Mr. Cummings. OK.
Mr. Chaison. I would definitely not accuse a Federal judge,
a State judge, a municipal court judge of any wrongdoing. I'm
not an attorney, so I don't understand the process. I
understand what I'm supposed to do as an employee of the police
department, and I do that and I do it well, and we're similar
to the judicial system, and I try and understand what the court
is about.
Mr. Cummings. I understand. Let me just ask this one last
thing. When the--when you all were taken off the case--Mr.
Stephens, when you all were taken off the case, how many
officers were left in the task force, do you know?
Mr. Stephens. Well, the joint task force dissolved when we
left.
Mr. Cummings. OK.
Mr. Stephens. We were part of that joint task force, DEA
group four remained, but that was it.
Mr. Cummings. So it was over?
Mr. Stephens. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. How many cases were still pending to go to
court?
Mr. Stephens. I'd be guessing, but I'd say three, four,
five, around in there.
Mr. Cummings. So you all testified--did you testify in
those cases?
Mr. Stephens. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. And were you successful?
Mr. Stephens. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. Now, DEA, did DEA force remain, is that what
you said?
Mr. Stephens. They continued being DEA. The task force
dissolved. They remained in their offices which is where we had
been----
Mr. Cummings. Do you know whether they continued to do any
investigations with regard to any of the things that you all
were looking at?
Mr. Stephens. I don't know of them doing anything. I never
saw anything, never heard anything, and saw no sixes.
Mr. Cummings. Would you have knowledge of that? Would that
knowledge normally come to you?
Mr. Stephens. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. What about you--I'm sorry, Mr. Chaison.
Mr. Chaison. No, I have no knowledge of any continuing
investigations after it was shut down.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Allen.
Mr. Allen. No knowledge of any investigation.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Cummings. Let me pursue some
questions, a few questions of the Houston police officers here
today, to make sure I understand the facts and can separate
them from speculation. All three of you were assigned to an
organized crime drug enforcement task force in the summer and
fall of 1999. Sergeant Stephens, isn't that correct?
Mr. Stephens. 1998 is when we were assigned.
Mr. Waxman. And Officer Allen?
Mr. Allen. 1999, yes, sir.
Mr. Waxman. And Officer Chaison?
Mr. Chaison. That's correct, 1998.
Mr. Waxman. Let's talk about what that means. My
understanding is that this kind of assignment allows different
law enforcement organizations, Federal, State and local, to
cooperate in major drug investigations and to draw on Federal
resources; isn't that correct?
Mr. Stephens. Yes, sir.
Mr. Waxman. So the task force was not a permanent
assignment, was it?
Mr. Stephens. Not for us, it was not, no, sir.
Mr. Waxman. If you disagree, let me know, but otherwise,
whichever one of you answers.
Mr. Waxman. You knew that the assignment would end and you
would eventually return to your duties with the Houston Police
Department; is that correct?
Mr. Stephens. Yes.
Mr. Waxman. I think you have all testified that in
September 1999, you and others working on the task force had a
meeting with Special Agent-in-Charge Ernest Howard?
Mr. Stephens. That's correct.
Mr. Waxman. And he indicated to you at that time that he
was pulling you off the investigation; is that right?
Mr. Stephens. Yes.
Mr. Waxman. My understanding is that you don't recall
exactly what he said, but you recall that he seemed frustrated
and that he made some reference to political pressure. Is that
a correct statement?
Mr. Stephens. That's correct.
Mr. Waxman. Do any of you have a more detailed recollection
of what Mr. Howard said?
Mr. Stephens. Just again, about the time stamping, when
there were questions as to why it was being shut down, because
Agent Schumacher asked him in front of the group and started to
get a little more in depth as to what was going on, that's when
he looked at his watch and gave the date and time and said it's
stopping, and didn't really go into any more detail at all.
Mr. Waxman. Sergeant Stephens, you were the senior Houston
police officer on the task force. Are you aware of any
discussions between Mr. Howard and any of your superiors prior
about pulling you and other Houston police officers back to the
department?
Mr. Stephens. No, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Is it possible that Mr. Howard had discussions
about task force staffing with senior Houston police officials
without your knowledge?
Mr. Stephens. Sure.
Mr. Waxman. You've testified that in August 1999, Mr.
Howard told you that he was, ``shutting down the investigation
and was doing so for political reasons.'' September--but there
are some documents that I want to bring to your attention.
There's a September 27 memo from Special Agent James Nims,
notes that he was instructed not to pursue a new lead until the
Office of Professional Responsibility investigation had
cleared, and there are e-mails were written by Mr. Howard in
March 2000 suggesting that the investigation was ongoing as of
that date. These documents appear to be inconsistent with any
statement by Mr. Howard that he was shutting down the
investigation, doesn't it? And you just know that you were
removed from the investigation. Is that correct or do you have
any other----
Mr. Stephens. No. In September, if you look at the case
file, there was no more dope that was purchased, there were no
more surveillance sixes. There was nothing proactive done on
that investigation following that meeting with Mr. Howard, and
you're not going to find anything because it just wasn't done.
How there's a contradiction there between March and September,
I don't know. I just know what he told us.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Schumacher, I understand you and others in
your enforcement group were investigated and cleared of
wrongdoing by DEA's Office of Professional Responsibility; is
that correct?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Waxman. You're probably aware that your former
supervisor, James Nims, wrote a memo on September 27, 1999, I
just mentioned it, that made its way into the Dallas Morning
News. The memo reportedly said that Mr. Howard had instructed
Mr. Nims not to pursue any new leads on the investigation until
the Office of Professional Responsibility investigation
cleared. Were you taken off the investigation at that time?
Mr. Schumacher. September 27th?
Mr. Waxman. Uh-huh.
Mr. Schumacher. The investigation was shut down. There was
no need to take me off.
Mr. Waxman. Was it your understanding, you and others under
Mr. Nims' supervision were taken off the investigation because
of the Office of Professional Responsibility investigation?
Mr. Schumacher. That wasn't my understanding.
Mr. Waxman. Set aside the question as to whether the Office
of Professional Responsibility investigation was warranted or
not warranted. Do you think it's unusual for a DEA manager to
temporarily reassign an agent a case when that agent's conduct
on the case comes under investigation?
Mr. Schumacher. I'm not qualified to answer that, sir. I
think and work like a street agent, not like a manager.
Mr. Waxman. Would it surprise you to hear from the DEA that
its managers often reassign agents under similar circumstances?
Mr. Schumacher. I personally hadn't seen that happen
before.
Mr. Waxman. On March 15, you were temporarily reassigned
from a position as acting supervisor of an enforcement group to
a position as the acting supervisor of a support group; is that
correct?
Mr. Schumacher. That is correct.
Mr. Waxman. There have been reports in the press suggesting
that there is some connection between this transfer and a visit
by Vice President Gore to Brook Hollow Baptist Church on March
12. Aside from the fact that Vice President Gore visited the
church 3 days before the date of your transfer, are you aware
of any evidence that Vice President Gore discussed the
narcotics investigation during his visit?
Mr. Schumacher. Absolutely not.
Mr. Waxman. Do you have any information that Vice President
Gore discussed campaign contributions with the pastor of this
church or any one of the subjects of the investigation?
Mr. Schumacher. No, I don't.
Mr. Waxman. And do you have any information that the pastor
of this church or one of the subjects of the investigation made
campaign contributions to Vice President Gore or the Democratic
National Committee?
Mr. Schumacher. I have some confidential informant
information relative to that.
Mr. Waxman. And that is information aside from any filing
or disclosure by the campaigns?
Mr. Schumacher. I don't know about that.
Mr. Waxman. You don't know about that. Do you have any
information at all that shows that the Vice President Gore
directly or indirectly interfered with this investigation?
Mr. Schumacher. No, sir.
Mr. Waxman. So what you have is some confidential
information that there might have been contributions to either
Vice President Gore or the Democratic Party from whom?
Mr. Schumacher. Prince.
Mr. Waxman. I see. And you don't know that there's any
connection between that and the events that we're discussing
that related to this investigation?
Mr. Schumacher. No, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Just for the record, there's no record of any
contributions from James Prince or Rap-A-Lot to Vice President
Gore or the Democratic National Committee. I just state that
for the record. Do any of you have any additional information
apart from speculation and rumor showing that politics played a
role in your transfer or management decisions in this
investigation? And I address that to anybody, all of you on the
panel.
Mr. Allen.
Mr. Allen. No, I do not.
Mr. Chaison. No, sir, I do not.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Stephens, sir.
Mr. Schumacher. Other than what I was told in September by
Mr. Howard.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Schumacher, let me go back to you about
this contribution that you heard about from a confidential
source. You are testifying under oath. If what you say is true
and there's no filing, it may involve a criminal violation for
not having disclosed this contribution. Would you share this
information with the committee, your confidential information?
Mr. Schumacher. No, sir.
Mr. Waxman. If not the name of the source, the details that
were related to you.
Mr. Schumacher. It's a confidential matter, sir.
Mr. Waxman. You're testifying before Congress. We're asking
you about some matter that might involve a violation of
criminal law, and it would be, I think, incumbent upon you to
tell us the substance of what report you heard, if not the
source. What did you hear?
Mr. Schumacher. Excuse me for a moment, sir, while I confer
with counsel here.
Mr. Waxman. Yes, Mr. Schumacher.
Mr. Schumacher. OK. It's--it's third-hand information,
hearsay information that has not been corroborated, sir, from a
confidential informant.
Mr. Waxman. So it's not reliable information.
Mr. Schumacher. It has not been corroborated.
Mr. Waxman. I want to tell you something that you may not
know, because I don't think you know our colleague, Maxine
Waters, but I've known her for many, many years, and I do not
believe that she would ever improperly interfere with law
enforcement or an investigation, but I do know that she has had
a very longstanding concern about racial profiling, and we can
read from her letter to the Attorney General that she expressed
her concern about any potential racial profiling, and I don't
think that is in any way inappropriate.
Mr. Schumacher. May I answer you--you raised the issue
about racial profiling, sir. Let me explain a little bit to you
about this case. This case involved the Houston 5th ward that
is inner city, known as local impact case. This case does not
involve enforcement activities where uniform cars or unmarked
cars are set up on major thoroughfares to interdict people.
There is no interdiction going on. OK. We have maps that we can
show you just how inner city the 5th ward is. So I've always
been a little confused why one of Ms. Waters complaints or
allegations had to do with racial profiling, but thank you.
Mr. Waxman. Well, the only thing I point out to you is I'm
not accusing you or anyone else of racial profiling. All I'm
saying is that Representative Maxine Waters has had a very
longstanding concern about this issue, and if she raised it as
a concern, I think it's perfectly appropriate for her to raise
it as a concern. I don't know if she made any accusations or
not. Maybe she wanted to raise it as a matter that she thought
ought to be looked at, and I think that's quite appropriate,
and no one should think anything other than that. I have some
time left, and I want to yield to the gentleman from Maryland.
Mr. Cummings. Now, Mr. Schumacher, just out of curiosity,
you have talked about Mr. Howard, is that correct? You know
him?
Mr. Schumacher. I know Mr. Howard very well.
Mr. Cummings. You understand he's going to be on the next
panel, do you understand that?
Mr. Schumacher. I do.
Mr. Cummings. Is he an honorable man? Do you consider him
to be an honorable man?
Mr. Schumacher. Absolutely.
Mr. Cummings. Because we're going to be listening to his
testimony. I don't have a clue as to what he's going to say,
but since there is a question mark that has been left as to
what political reasons are and whatever, the various things
that you've testified to, we're going to probably have to rely
on his testimony, and I was just curious as to your opinion of
him. What is your opinion of him, Mr. Stephens?
Mr. Stephens. He was our biggest supporter in the
beginning. This case was important to him, but he pulled the
plug in September. He shut it down.
Mr. Cummings. Do you still consider him--I mean, what is
his reputation as far as you're concerned?
Mr. Stephens. Like I said to that point and even
afterwards, I consider him an honorable man. I don't know why
he did what he did. I just know he did it.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Allen.
Mr. Allen. I feel the same way as Mr. Stephens.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chaison. I hope I'm pronouncing your name
correctly.
Mr. Chaison. That's fine. I guess I have great admiration
for Mr. Howard. I think he's an honorable man. I have nothing
bad to say about him.
Mr. Cummings. All right. Thank you. I yield back to the
gentleman.
Mr. Waxman. Let me just ask one question of the Houston
police officers. Why didn't you continue to pursue the case on
your own?
Mr. Stephens. You guys have got a bigger tax base than we
do in Houston, TX, and to buy the kind of narcotics and do the
kind of work we need to do in order to infiltrate this
organization, it's very difficult with Houston city tax base.
We don't have the buy money. We can't pay the informants like
the Federal Government can, and I think, in my opinion, that's
what OCDETF is all about, to help us out.
Mr. Waxman. When you were successful in getting these
convictions, we were talking about was it based on the joint
task force work or your own?
Mr. Stephens. Yes, it was.
Mr. Waxman. So you felt if there wasn't this joint task
force, you didn't have the resources, even though you had the
lawful authority to conduct the investigation on your own?
Mr. Stephens. That's correct.
Mr. Cummings. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Waxman. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you, Mr. Waxman. How much time do we
have? About half a minute. Very well. I yield back.
Mr. Burton. We will now go to the 5-minute rounds. Would
you just explain real quickly what the ``buy money'' means?
Mr. Stephens. Buy money means money that we can use to
purchase narcotics where we don't effect an arrest immediately.
Mr. Burton. Set up an arrest.
Mr. Stephens. Correct.
Mr. Burton. And the amount of money sometimes is
substantial and you don't have it in your local tax base the
funds available to do that?
Mr. Stephens. That's correct.
Mr. Burton. And that's why the Federal money was important.
Mr. Stephens. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. I just want to ask two questions, and then I'll
yield to my colleague from California. First of all, I
understand, Mr. Schumacher, that the information you had was
third hand, but we did have a campaign finance investigation
going on. Can you give a little more detail on what you did
hear from your third hand informant--you don't have to give the
name--on what kind of funds were allegedly given?
Mr. Schumacher. Excuse me one moment. Yes, sir. It was an
amount over 200,000, but as I said earlier, it comes from third
hand information and upon----
Mr. Burton. I understand and that's fine. We just wanted to
find out. Is there any way of corroborating that? It'd be hard
now?
Mr. Schumacher. Unknown at this time.
Mr. Burton. OK. One other question and any one of the
officers can answer. I understand that you were detailed, Mr.
Chaison, to guard Presidents and Vice Presidents when they came
to Houston. When Vice President Gore visited the church in
question that Mr. Prince had made a $1 million contribution to,
do you know, or do you have any knowledge that he met with Mr.
Prince or do any of you have any knowledge that during that
meeting he had a chance to talk to Mr. Prince?
Mr. Chaison. No, I do not.
Mr. Burton. Anybody else?
Mr. Stephens. I do.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Stephens.
Mr. Stephens. One of the criminal intelligence division
officers that was there--and I had reason to talk to her
recently because of a case she's investigating involving me and
a threat on my life--she said that she was present when Mr.
Gore visited the church and that James Prince was there. Now,
as far as any private meeting between the two, she did not see
that. I did ask her if he was there when Mr. Gore was there and
she said yes.
Mr. Burton. Thank you.
Mr. Horn.
Mr. Horn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it's been pretty
well gone over what happened on the announcement that we're
done that--and I just want to confirm that in one or two yes or
noes, did any part of the DEA carry on any of the activities or
related activities even though this was being closed down?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Horn. OK. So there was something that still was going.
OK. How about in the case of the city of Houston's operations?
Mr. Stephens. The only thing we did was get ready for
trials that were upcoming.
Mr. Horn. OK. Are any of those fulfilling themselves and do
they have any relationship with what were talking about this
morning here?
Mr. Stephens. I don't understand, sir.
Mr. Horn. Well, after the so called shutdown, the question
is did any little pieces of it, were they salvageable so you
could proceed, based on some information you had on Prince and
his company?
Mr. Stephens. There were still things that we could have
done, yes.
Mr. Horn. Well, let me pursue some of them, Mr. Schumacher.
You were transferred to a desk job on March 15, 2000?
Mr. Schumacher. That's correct.
Mr. Horn. What do you believe was the reason for the
transfer?
Mr. Schumacher. I believe that someone in DEA headquarters
called Mr. Howard and gave him a direct order.
Mr. Horn. Is that third, second or firsthand information?
Mr. Schumacher. Well, it is reality. I was transferred out
of enforcement and went up to special support group, where I
have no really qualification to be assigned.
Mr. Horn. Did you discuss the Rap-A-Lot investigation with
Mr. Howard during that period?
Mr. Schumacher. No, sir.
Mr. Horn. What did he say, nothing? Wouldn't reveal who
told him to shut it down?
Mr. Schumacher. I did not confront Mr. Howard with those
issues.
Mr. Horn. Well, Mr. Schumacher and Mr. Stephens, let me ask
you, in your career dealing with this very difficult drug
situation, did any political power of either the national
level, the State level or the mayor of Houston ever try to get
you to shut down an investigation? Did that ever happen, in
your experience, where the mayor picked up the phone or the
Governor?
Mr. Stephens. No, sir.
Mr. Horn. So, as far as Houston is concerned, you stick
with it when you have got an investigation going and
politicians haven't improved or accessed themselves to the head
of it and told them to shut it down, son, or we won't give you
a budget next year?
Mr. Stephens. That's correct, that has never happened.
Mr. Horn. OK. How about in your Federal experience, was
this the first time that kind of political intrusion seemed to
happen?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Horn. So there has been a previous time or is this the
only time?
Mr. Schumacher. Would you please repeat the question? I
thought you asked me if this is the first time I have ever seen
it happen and I said yes.
Mr. Horn. OK. Then that's the answer, obviously, I think
that's in the record already.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Horn, I'll come back to you. You will have
5 minutes after the Democrats.
Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much. Mr. Schumacher, you said
something that was very interesting. When the chairman, I think
it was the chairman asked you the question--could the--this
alleged contribution of $200,000 to the Vice President from
Prince be corroborated, you said the words, ``unknown at this
time.'' What does that mean?
Mr. Schumacher. That means that other than having received
the information, we haven't had the time to go forward and try
to develop it up to a classified as to its validity and/or to
see if it can go any further. We just haven't had the time to
do it.
Mr. Cummings. Now, this is the second time in your
testimony that you talked about a confidential situation, you
realize that? You talked about it a little bit earlier.
Mr. Schumacher. I haven't been counting, but it seems we
have been talking about confidential informants quite a bunch.
Mr. Cummings. With regard to the Vice President, I think
you said something a little bit earlier about him, but let me
ask you, did you do your own--I mean, say when you got this
information from the third--I think you said third party
hearsay, I think that's what you said, were you doing--did
people just come up to you and tell you this stuff or were you
going out trying to figure out what happened in the
investigation? I mean does this--I mean, how did that come
about?
Mr. Schumacher. Over the years, I've developed, as any of
these career drug officers have, rapport with many, many people
out there, and not all of them are criminals with criminal
records, and I receive phone calls from people with tidbits of
information, might get as many as five a day, OK. So it's not
unusual for folks to call.
Mr. Cummings. And so when--and because the allegations are
serious allegations and because you are sworn and because we
are addressing people's reputations here, as I said when I
first began, I'm just wondering, when you hear these tidbits of
information, again, you've got the press writing, you have got
the cameras rolling, do you--I mean, can you tell us in your
mind whoever this informant was? I mean, have you gotten
information from that person before?
Mr. Schumacher. No.
Mr. Cummings. No.
Mr. Schumacher. No.
Mr. Cummings. So this was somebody that you--did you know
this person?
Mr. Schumacher. In all due respect, sir, the reason I and
other drug agents receive information is because we also have a
reputation of whenever possible protecting their identity.
Mr. Cummings. I'm not asking you the person's name.
Mr. Schumacher. For me to keep going further along this
line of questioning, I think that's where we are heading.
Mr. Cummings. That's not--but see, we have got a situation
here where you have presented to us some information that will
probably be in some stories and be on the news this evening,
and I'm not asking you for the name of somebody. I'm trying to
figure out the reliability of the information and how reliable
you thought it to be. That's all I'm asking you, but you said--
you just told me something that was very interesting. Although
you had just given me this background information about how,
you know, people call you and gotten to know them and all that
kind of thing, but then you said you had never heard from this
person before, is that correct? I'm not asking you who the
person was.
Mr. Schumacher. Let me try to explain to you or articulate
to you my methodology. I receive information. Let us say you
call me and you have never called me before. I'm going to
evaluate your information. I'm going to catalog it. I'm going
to try my best to corroborate it, to see if it helps us develop
reasonable suspicion, and then if we can go further to probable
cause for search or arrest warrants. So receiving information
is really the first step in a multistep process for me.
Mr. Cummings. But, Officer, let me--I have got to ask you
this question if you don't mind. We have a situation here where
you said that you received information and that you receive
information from a lot of people, and I am sure that over the
years as you receive information based upon who you receive it
from and what they say depends--I mean, that has, I guess,
something to how you look into it, and all I'm asking is you
said to us somebody gave you some information, you cannot tell
us, we understand that, but you also said you had never heard
from this person before, and the only thing I was asking you
was how reliable do you think the information was, and if you
can't answer that, that's fine. But I think it's a reasonable
question.
Mr. Shays [presiding]. Mr. Cummings, if we could claim the
floor again. I just want to state for the record that you were
asked this question. You said it's a third source. We accept it
as the third source information. It hasn't been corroborated,
and therefore, I think we can leave it on that basis.
Mr. Waxman. Point of order, Mr. Chairman. He was asking a
question. You don't need to answer it.
Mr. Shays. You tend to ask points of orders a lot. I just
want to point out, I let the gentleman go on. It's a red light.
I don't want to make a big issue. I'm just affirming to my
colleague that this is a third source piece of information. It
hasn't been corroborated, and I think we should accept it as
that, and I on this side of the aisle would verify it hasn't
been a verified source of information.
Mr. Cummings. Would the gentleman yield for 15 seconds?
Mr. Shays. Sure.
Mr. Cummings. The only reason I do that is we have seen
over and over again in my years on this committee how things,
when they get out past here and people begin to be
interviewed--I'm talking about Members of our Congress--the
next thing you know we have got something that is just--I trust
the gentleman, but I don't know whether that's always going to
be the case. And I just wanted to make sure we cleared it up to
the extent that we could.
Mr. Shays. I think the gentleman has made his point and
made it well. I think the witness responded to a question under
oath and said it was a third source of information. It's my
time now. I yield it to Mr. Horn for his 5 minutes--for my 5
minutes.
Mr. Horn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm going to have to go
back a little bit. You got out of the job, Mr. Schumacher, in
March 15th and you didn't know the reason for the transfer and
you did discuss the--or did you discuss the Rap-A-Lot
investigation with Mr. Howard during that time period
immediately when he was saying this is going to shut down, and
did you have a chance to discuss that operation and your
investigation?
Mr. Schumacher. Mr. Horn, are you referring to September
1999 or the March 2000?
Mr. Horn. March 15th. March 15, 2000, when you were
transferred.
Mr. Schumacher. No, I did not have a conversation with Mr.
Howard that I can recall relative to that.
Mr. Horn. So he didn't have anything to say on that?
Mr. Schumacher. I don't recall talking to him about it.
Mr. Horn. Did he communicate to you or others that he was
shutting down the investigation at this point?
Mr. Schumacher. Other than what his comments were in
September 1999, we didn't have any more talk about that.
Mr. Horn. Was there any investigative activity going on at
the time that was--the shutdown occurred.
Mr. Schumacher. Which shutdown?
Mr. Horn. Well, the first one, and also after March 15th,
was there any further things going on----
Mr. Schumacher. In September 1999, we had some pending
judicial matters, OK, reactive in nature as opposed to
proactive investigative tactics that would generate more
arrests, indictments and seizures of drugs and other evidence.
You're always going to have, after you make seizures or
arrests, you're always going to have administrative/judicial
issues to address, and that's what was addressed after
September.
Mr. Horn. So did any of the Houston Department try to pick
up the threads?
Mr. Stephens. No, sir. After September we stopped.
Mr. Horn. So we've got a situation that looked like it was
going to be potentially very lucrative, and it's just stopped
there?
Mr. Stephens. Yes, sir.
Mr. Horn. To what degree could it ever be picked up again
if we didn't have somebody politically stopping it? What would
be--is there enough information there to open up the
investigation if you didn't have political pressure put on you?
Mr. Schumacher. I'd have to look at what's left there and
then try to make an educated decision from there, sir.
Mr. Horn. And you have been aware that Mr. Howard is
briefing--has briefed the committee staff on this case on July
17, 2000, and did Mr. Howard tell you anything about his July
17, 2000, briefing to this committee?
Mr. Schumacher. No, sir.
Mr. Horn. Let me ask you, Mr. Chaison, you stated to the
committee staff during Agent Schumacher's transfer, ``you don't
take experience like that away from enforcement and put it
behind a desk.'' Could you please elaborate on that statement?
Mr. Chaison. Yes. When I came into narcotics, Mr.
Schumacher--I didn't know him at the time--spoke at my
narcotics school or training program, and he told me something
that was very profound and stays with me today. He said,
Remember, whatever you do out there, your supervisors may want
you to do one thing, but remember one thing, nobody can tell
you how to dance with the devil out there when you're out there
in the middle of it. And that was profound to me, and I found
it to be a fact, and so I said with experience, like Jack
Schumacher, he and I, we've had our disagreements of things and
then cooler heads prevail. I admire him a great deal. I think
he has great experience in this line of work, and I'm
constantly learning from him when there are things to learn.
Mr. Horn. That's a very moving statement.
Officer Allen, you told committee staff that you believed a
good case was killed because of political pressure. In fact,
you stated that in your opinion this was the case, ``without a
doubt,'' and that you said, ``cannot see any other reason.'' Is
that an accurate statement?
Mr. Allen. That is correct.
Mr. Horn. Was there anything else you'd like to add to
that?
Mr. Allen. Yes. Based on when we were brought to this task
force together, prior to this there had been investigation
going on that we had no knowledge of. Once we got into the
investigation, we as a group started doing a lot of good work,
OK, and this is before--prior to, I guess, they say they'd been
investigating maybe 12 years or 10 years in the past, and
nothing really concrete had been done. But once we got
involved, we made a dent into the problem that was in the 5th
ward, and all of a sudden now it stopped, and my question to
everyone, why, who did it, and I haven't gotten an answer yet.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Waxman, you have the next 5 minutes.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Look, Vice President
Gore has got his hands full right now. He's got a lot of
concerns. The election is over. We are still trying to decide
who really won this election. Just so there'd be no further
anxiety that somebody is talking about Vice President Gore
having done anything with respect to this investigation, let me
just state clearly what we know and what we don't know.
Anything we have ever heard--the only thing we've ever heard
about Vice President Gore was a statement by Mr. Burton, not by
anyone else, that--and I want to quote it again.
The statement was that he gives a million dollars to a
church, referring to Mr. Prince. The Vice President goes to
that church and 2 days later somebody says they're closing the
case. Something's wrong. They're blocking us because I think
they're afraid that this might be an embarrassment to the Vice
President. That's an allegation made by the chairman of this
committee a month or two ago.
So what do we know now in this period of time? We know that
there's no evidence of any oral or written testimony showing
that the Vice President even discussed this case with anybody.
There's no evidence of a campaign contribution to the Vice
President because none has been on the record, none has been
filed from Mr. Prince. The only evidence we have of that is a
statement Mr. Schumacher made that he heard from an unsolicited
phone call that somebody said that somebody said Vice President
Gore got a contribution from Mr. Prince, and that's all we
know.
Mr. Schumacher, I also understand from your testimony you
never had a chance to corroborate that information; is that
correct?
Mr. Schumacher. That's clear. I mean that's correct, I'm
sorry.
Mr. Waxman. Did you ever report it to the FBI? DEA doesn't
do violations of campaign finance laws. If you thought there
was a criminal problem or any other problem, did you ever
report it to the FBI or Justice Department?
Mr. Schumacher. Mr. Waxman, because it was made against
Vice President Al Gore didn't mean anything special to me. I
investigate, try to solve crimes, OK, not the names of those
folks.
Mr. Waxman. It shouldn't make any difference to you whether
it's the Vice President or any other citizen, but you got an
unsolicited tip from somebody about a campaign contribution.
Did you ever pass it on to the people in law enforcement that
might look into whether there was something improper if it
happened?
Mr. Schumacher. It was passed on.
Mr. Waxman. To?
Mr. Schumacher. The Houston homicide division.
Mr. Waxman. And you don't know whether they passed it on to
the FBI to look into it?
Mr. Schumacher. I have no knowledge of that.
Mr. Waxman. It just seems to me that we ought to examine
what may be the story today of this hearing, Vice President
Gore, based on the allegations that were made a couple of
months ago had something to do with the possible shutting down
of the investigation on drug charges. I think this is pretty
flimsy, and worse than that, there's just no evidence.
I want to yield to Mr. Tierney at this point.
Mr. Tierney. I thank you, Mr. Waxman. I have been listening
to this entire thing. There's very little to say because I
think the point you just made is abundantly clear. As long as
we continue on this discussion, questions back and forth just
seem to drive that point home, and I think it's pretty much
made, no need to continue on. So thank you.
Mr. Waxman. The only thing I say, any statement about
Representative Maxine Waters is also quite flimsy, because all
we know about her is that she's had a longstanding concern
about racial profiling. She raised that issue. If someone said
they were under political pressure, maybe because it was Maxine
Waters' letter, I see no basis for them to make that statement
if it was stated. We'll ask later Mr. Howard whether that, in
fact, was his statement or whether it was his belief, but I
don't know, based on what Representative Waters had expressed
and her concern about this case, from which anyone can reach a
conclusion, that there's anything improper in raising those
points. I'm going to yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. It's Mr. Horn's time, but I'd just
like a minutes of that time if I could.
Mr. Waxman. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Shays. It's Mr. Horn's time and Mr. Horn, if I could
have a minute.
Mr. Horn. Sure.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I just want to say the basis of this
hearing is to understand why an investigation was stopped, and
it is clear the investigation was stopped in part because of a
complaint, however well intended, by a Member of Congress, and
this Member of Congress ended up having the deposition taken by
the person you were investigating in her office, and that's a
matter of public record. And so the question is, did that have
an impact, and Mr. Schumacher, you're telling us, and the
ranking member has made it very clear, trying to imply, that
maybe you were taken off while you were being put under
investigation. The investigation was a complaint by a Member of
Congress, and what followed was this investigation ended, and
that's the challenge, and none of us on this side of the aisle
have brought up the Vice President, and my colleagues on the
other side have tended to bring this up again and again.
Frankly, the Vice President isn't the issue. The issue is
why did this investigation stop? Why did two men, Mr. Allen,
Mr. Chaison and Mr. Stephens, risk their lives every day and
get to a point where you had witnesses, you had people arrested
who possibly could have turned evidence for you, and that
ended. So it's an outrage and we intend to find out why this
happened.
Mr. Horn.
Mr. Horn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Officer Stephens, do you
believe that the Rap-A-Lot organization was finally starting to
lose some of its infallibility and ability to evade law
enforcement when the plug was pulled on this investigation?
Mr. Stephens. Yes, I do.
Mr. Horn. All of the officers, do each of you believe that
the decision to reduce the effort going into Rap-A-Lot
investigation has a chilling effect on law enforcement efforts?
Mr. Allen. Yes, I do, especially after the CD came out that
was mentioned earlier. There are a lot of people out in the 5th
ward area that listen to these rap songs, and they're
specifically saying that this investigation has been stopped
and they have control over all officers and the things that
officers do.
Mr. Horn. Any other comments by any of the officers? Mr.
Stephens, Mr. Schumacher, was morale just taken and going to
the bottom after this shutdown situation?
Mr. Schumacher. I have read the lyrics of the song.
Sergeant Stephens and myself personally arrested Mr. Jordan,
OK. I think that to some folks within my inner circle of family
and friends, it caused them some concern, and they to me were
deemed in a threatening manner.
Mr. Horn. Was the investigative effort reduced in the Rap-
A-Lot matter in late 1999, did that just get--go off in the
latter part of 1999?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Horn. But I think I hear that can be started up if you
have someone that isn't always playing politics.
Mr. Schumacher. We'd have to take a hard look at it.
Mr. Horn. And you're convinced and others are convinced, I
take it, that it was political pressure that was behind there?
Mr. Schumacher. That's my personal opinion, yes, sir.
Mr. Horn. Did Mr. Howard ever say that to you?
Mr. Schumacher. He used the word ``politics,'' yes, sir.
Mr. Horn. And that had never happened before because--from
either the Houston police or the DEA that you know of?
Mr. Schumacher. That I'm aware of, no.
Mr. Horn. The acting chairman recently made a comment on
our friends on the other side of the aisle. You should know
that chairman Burton has said none of us are to even mention
the Vice President in this hearing because we didn't want to
have a political issue here, but my--starting with the ranking
member who quoted something from the chairman several weeks
ago, and then our friends across the aisle keep mentioning it,
I find it rather interesting and wonder if they're maybe all
secret Bradley delegates or something, but it surprised me. I
yield back.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Tierney, I believe the time is yours. You pass. Mr.
LaTourette, do you have other questions?
Mr. LaTourette. I do.
Mr. Chaison, I just have a couple of questions. You
indicated that the artist, an artist I guess we're going to put
in italics, artist is Brad ``Scarface'' Jordan; is that
correct?
Mr. Chaison. That is correct.
Mr. LaTourette. I don't remember seeing any of his hits at
the local music store in Ohio. Is this something that I can buy
on Amazon.com? How would I get ahold of this CD to listen to
what it is he has to say?
Mr. Chaison. I would think that any of the local record
stores would have this CD. It's very possible that you may be
able to go on-line and hear it. I'm sure you can. The
particular cut that I'm referring to is Last of a Dying Breed
and it is cut No. 3 and Look Into My Eyes. That's the other
cut.
Mr. LaTourette. And specifically, those two cuts that you
reference by Mr. ``scarface'' Jordan is sort of bragging that
they beat the Houston Police Department and the DEA, did they,
by applying political pressure and shutting down an
investigation; is that the gist of the song?
Mr. Chaison. That's correct. It talks about the family,
Rap-A-Lot family and it refers to itself as a Mafia, no one can
stop the Rap-A-Lot Mafia. It is going to live forever and ever,
whatever. It's just, again, that we have young kids listening
to these lyrics.
Mr. LaTourette. Right.
Mr. Chaison. And the impression that is made in our
community, this--Mr. Prince has been looked at as, I guess a
role model or icon to young rap groups, rap singers and with
statements like these that the rap artists do and they say that
they have freedom of speech----
Mr. LaTourette. Did you say earlier you had been in the
police business for 21 years?
Mr. Chaison. That's correct.
Mr. LaTourette. And your observation as a 21-year police
veteran, fighting all sorts of crime, laying your life on the
line on a daily basis, is that this artist and the message that
he's communicating to Houston's young people is that basically
you can beat the system and they have been beating the system,
this Rap-A-Lot organization; is that a fair observation?
Mr. Chaison. That's correct. That's what the statement is.
Mr. LaTourette. That's one heck of a message, and that's
why not all art is art, I guess. You mentioned earlier that you
didn't have the opportunity to be a part of another
investigation, but it was your understanding that another
investigation of the Rap-A-Lot organization was stopped before
this event in September 1999 due to political pressure. Did you
make that observation?
Mr. Chaison. That's correct.
Mr. LaTourette. Can you tell us a little bit about that.
Mr. Chaison. We all came together as a unit and we had
several heads there. I don't remember who was--who all was
there, but it is stated that there was investigation prior to
this one that was stopped politically, and then we were assured
that if we were to uncover anything that was relevant or
validate any information regarding Rap-A-Lot, that we were
assured that it would not be stopped politically, that we would
have a full support of the Federal Government.
Mr. LaTourette. Was that other investigation an HPD
investigation or one that involved Federal DEA do you know?
Mr. Chaison. That information we got, if I recollect, was
compiled by the FBI, and so it was a Federal investigation.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Schumacher, one more thing. It was your
opinion that with Mr. McCarter, you had a big guy in this
organization, is that correct?
Mr. Chaison. That's correct.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Schumacher, you made the observation
when asked about what the second phase was, you were then going
to go and receive defendant witnesses. I took that to mean you
had arrested somebody, you were going to try to flip them and
have them testify against somebody higher up in the food chain.
Is that what you were referring to?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. When was Mr. McCarter arrested relative to
the complaint made by the Member of Congress and the closing
down of the investigation in September 1999?
Mr. Schumacher. McCarter was arrested January 7, 1999, and
those other events occurred in late August, mid September, late
September 99.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you. My time has expired. I will come
back later.
Mr. Burton [presiding]. Mr. Tierney. Mr. Ose.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Schumacher, I
apologize for missing the first part of the hearing. How many
years have you been in law enforcement?
Mr. Schumacher. 27.
Mr. Ose. And you have made hundreds of arrests in
narcotics?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ose. You have got quite a few awards and citations for
your success and your bravery and what have you in Houston; am
I correct in understanding that? I mean, you have got a
remarkable record, if I may say so myself.
Mr. Schumacher. Thank you.
Mr. Ose. The question I have is that I'm trying to
understand, we had an individual who was identified as a
potential violator of narcotics laws and was made the subject
of an investigation starting in 1992, that'd be Mr. Prince?
Mr. Schumacher. He might have been mentioned in reports
prior to that.
Mr. Ose. OK. So that investigation has proceeded under the
jurisdiction of the DEA, since then in conjunction with the
Houston PD?
Mr. Schumacher. I may not be following you but we, myself
and HPD, got on them in August 1998. That's when our team was
developed. Prior to that, DEA had an open case file on Prince
since at least 1992.
Mr. Ose. So the DEA came to the Houston PD and asked for
assistance?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ose. The DEA that is serving under the current
Department of Justice and that's the reason--I'm trying to
understand why it is Ms. Waters wrote a letter to the Attorney
General about the DEA's activities in Houston.
The DEA came to you, and DEA works for the Department of
Justice, and so presumably the Department of Justice told the
DEA to go to the Houston PD and ask for assistance?
Mr. Schumacher. When I was directed by Mr. Howard to work
the case, I specifically asked Mr. Howard then for the ability
to deputize State and local officers to assist with this case,
and he concurred.
Mr. Ose. OK. I apologize for my lack of understanding of
that.
Now, the letter that I am looking at from Ms. Waters to
Attorney General Reno, you know, I have to say reading it on
its facial value, it is somewhat innocuous, but it talks
about--makes the allegation of rogue officers.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4430.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4430.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4430.003
Mr. Ose. In terms of the activities that Houston PD
undertook in conjunction with the DEA direction, were those
approved by the DEA?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir. So Houston PD's activities were
basically as the agent of the DEA, which is actually a branch
of the Department of Justice. So I am trying to figure out, how
do you get to the definition of a rogue officer if, in fact,
you are operating at the direction of the DEA?
Mr. Schumacher. I am a DEA agent, and the HPD officers that
worked this case, three of whom are sitting here, were
deputized as task force officers. So in response to your
question, yes. I mean, Ms. Waters is referring to people who
were deputized to be acting as DEA agents.
Mr. Ose. All right. Now, your testimony earlier was that
the scope of the investigation was targeted in Houston's fifth
ward, so we are not out on the freeways and highways doing
random stops and stuff like that. So the reference to having
been stopped numerous times on dark stretches of Texas highways
is not--are there any dark stretches of Texas highways in the
fifth ward of Houston?
Mr. Schumacher. Not that I am aware of, but I personally
had not ever known of Mr. Prince being stopped.
Mr. Ose. At all?
Mr. Schumacher. Not to my personal knowledge.
Mr. Ose. OK. I want to go--I want to ask a second question,
because I don't quite understand something.
There is a suggestion that Mr. Prince's financial success
has been ill gotten. What I am trying to understand is, do we
have any financial records for Rap-A-Lot Records?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir, there are some.
Mr. Ose. We do have some. Are they financial statements,
tax returns?
Mr. Schumacher. There is, in the original case file, some
documents from an investment agency company, I believe it is
Smith Barney, that Mr. Prince had a large amount of money
invested with that firm.
Mr. Ose. I see my red light has come on. I will come back,
Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Chairman, I yield my time to Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Burton. OK.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Tierney. Mr.
Schumacher, do you know somebody named Lemuel Bond?
Mr. Schumacher. I sure do.
Mr. Cummings. Who is he?
Mr. Schumacher. Lemuel Bond III, Lemuel Amon Bond III, also
known as Bucky Bond--before we chat about him, allow me a
moment with my attorneys.
[Discussion off the record.]
Mr. Ose. Mr. Chairman, one of our witnesses on this side of
the screen has indicated a need to use the facilities while we
are sort of taking this brief reprieve.
Mr. Burton. I think we are going to take a break right
after this--the only question is, we are going to have to shut
the cameras down so they can get up. Can you shut the cameras
down?
Mr. Ose. He indicates he can wait now until maybe Mr.
Cummings is finished.
Mr. Burton. Aren't you glad the whole country knows all of
this stuff?
Mr. Shays. But they don't know what you look like.
Mr. Cummings. I must admit, I feel like I am under
tremendous pressure here.
Mr. Schumacher, do you know him?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes. He is a career criminal with an
extensive record and he is currently serving a 27-year sentence
in a correctional institute for trafficking.
Mr. Cummings. The reason why I asked you that is you had
contact with him, is that correct? Did you testify against him?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, I have.
Mr. Cummings. OK. And has he worked with you before on
cases, any cases like as a witness or informant?
Mr. Schumacher. No, sir.
Mr. Cummings. No? You said no?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Did you--now, the reason why I want to ask
you about this, Mr. Ose said he couldn't understand why you
might be--somebody might call you a rogue officer; and Ms.
Waters has based her inquiries with regard to you, with regard
to a letter that was sent to her from Mr. Lemuel Bond where he
made some very strong allegations. One of the allegations that
he made in that letter, and I won't get into them, but was
about you having used your weapon quite a few times.
Can you just tell us about that? I mean in the line of
duty.
Mr. Schumacher. Excuse me one moment, please.
Mr. Cummings. Sure.
[Discussion off the record.]
Mr. Schumacher. What was your question, sir?
Mr. Cummings. How many times have you used your weapon in
the line of duty? Shot, fired at people.
Mr. Schumacher. Numerous.
Mr. Cummings. How many people have you killed?
Mr. Schumacher. I personally have not kept a record of
that, sir.
Mr. Cummings. You don't know how many people you have
killed in the line of duty?
Mr. Schumacher. I have seen that number put in the paper.
Mr. Cummings. Officer, you realize you are under oath. You
are saying to this panel today that you don't have a clue as to
how many people that you have brought their lives to an end by
using your weapon?
Mr. Schumacher. I have been involved in probably 12
gunfights as a police officer. Some of those gunfights have
been involving numerous officers and numerous criminals. As
such, there may have been more than two or three people
shooting at the same person, and vice versa, OK? So I can think
of several occasions where there were three officers firing at
two different suspects. So for me to categorically tell you how
many people I personally caused their death, I am basing that
on the comments I just told you.
Mr. Cummings. You said you have seen a number in the
newspaper. How many was in the number?
Mr. Schumacher. Six.
Mr. Cummings. All right. I don't have anything else.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman yields back the balance of his
time.
Mr. Shays has one or two more questions. Mr. Shays.
Oh, yes. Excuse me. These people need a break. Would you
like to take a break and then we will finish with Mr. Shays?
Would that be all right?
Mr. Waxman. Let me ask Mr. Shays----
Mr. Shays. I have 5 minutes of questions is what I have.
Mr. Waxman. I have a few questions, to wrap up.
Mr. Burton. I think we have about 5 or 6 minutes.
Would you shut the cameras off so that we can let these
gentlemen take some time out, and we will break here for about
5 minutes, and then we will finish with this panel.
Are all of the cameras off? What is this one here? Is this
off? The committee camera is off? Just 1 second. Just make sure
it is off. I don't want them to have any security problems.
Just 1 second. I hate to cause you pain. OK. We are in recess
now for 10 minutes.
[Recess.]
Mr. Burton. The committee will now come to order. Before I
yield to--who is next? Mr. Shays. Before I yield to Mr. Shays,
let me just say that we would like to keep the officers who are
here until tomorrow because we are going to be questioning the
Administrator of the DEA. So I want to tell you, before I
forget it, that we would like you to stay through tomorrow and
of course expenses and everything will be taken care of. But
since you are here under subpoena, we wanted to make that
request.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Chairman, we would like them to I hope stay
and witness the rest of the hearing, and then if we possibly
need to call them back--and you are referring to all four of
them?
Mr. Burton. Yes, that is right. And then either today or
tomorrow, we may want to ask them some additional questions.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Chairman, if they are going to stay
until tomorrow, could we ask them to be so kind to see if they
could get their hands on their timeless classic by Brad
Scarface Jordan so that we could submit it for the record
tomorrow?
Mr. Burton. Yes. Even if you could Fed Ex a copy of this
Rap-A-Lot tape, we would like to have it for the record, OK?
Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Schumacher, in the deposition that was taken in Maxine
Waters' office and included some of her staff and also included
I think her husband, but it also included a confidential
investigative report. I am interested to know if you are aware
that a Houston law firm hired a private investigator to look
into your background and lifestyle?
Mr. Schumacher. I was not aware of that.
Mr. Shays. Well, that is part of the record that was
submitted.
I would like to ask each of you if you have any question
you wish we had asked that you would like to answer, or any
closing statement, and I will start with you, Mr. Allen.
Mr. Allen. Let me say that from the beginning of the
investigation, our target was a specific person. It wasn't a
person that was Black, White, Hispanic or anything; it was a
target, a target that we thought was doing wrong. If someone,
whoever it is, comes up saying it was racially profiling, I
don't necessarily agree with that.
Again, as I said earlier, I would like to find out why a
good investigation has been stopped and for what reason and who
did it.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Allen. I would like to find out
the same information, the answer to the same question, from Mr.
Chaison.
Mr. Chaison. Yes. I would like to address the racial
profiling. First off, I am Black, and I am just as Black as any
Black man. No. 2, I am a police officer. No. 3, I am appalled
that a person would look at me and think that I would let an
injustice such as racial profiling occur in my presence. Not
so. If I--I can state today that if I was to encounter anyone
that I work with doing such a thing, I think Bill Stephens
knows me well enough that I would interject, I would speak to
him concerning this.
So as far as racial profiling, it was not so, and I don't
know how you validate that. If you work in a predominantly
White neighborhood as a police officer, White police or White
people you will be in contact with. If you are in a Black
neighborhood, the majority people you are going to come in
contact with are Black. We do not have a 100 Black police
department or White police department, Hispanic or Asian. We
have a melting pot of ethnic groups in our police department,
and we work hard. And to say that we racial profile is not so.
That may be--I am not as naive to say that there are not bad
people in our walks and works of life. I am not that naive to
say that.
Mr. Shays. But the bottom line is on this case you were
involved in, you know there was no racial profiling; is that
true?
Mr. Chaison. That is correct.
Mr. Shays. Yes, sir. Anything else?
Mr. Chaison. Yes. Since you mentioned the CD by Scarface,
it was interesting when we were on our way here on the plane
and my partner and I were looking at the Jet Magazine, and that
album was, that CD was rated No. 16 1 week. A week later, 1
week later it had moved in the charts to No. 7. Right now I
don't know where it stands, but that is how well it is received
by the paying public out there, and people listen to that, they
listen to it.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Stephens.
Mr. Stephens. Just that when we started the investigation,
we had high hopes and full support. We did some good work, and
in my limited knowledge and view, a Congresswoman wrote a
letter, an investigation was started. We were told for
political reasons the investigation was stopped. We ceased all
activity except for the judicial part of it, and then our
target, the owner of the company, has one of his stars produce
a record where they talk about ruining agents' careers and have
a short scenario of an informant being murdered, and typically
saying in the short scenario that it is a DEA informant. I feel
like we have gotten set back about 10 steps from where we
started. It was said it was shut down for political reasons,
and that is all I can believe.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Stephens.
Mr. Schumacher, any question we should have asked, any
point you would like to make?
Mr. Schumacher. On the issue that I find personal, very
personal to me relative to my number of shootings. For the best
part of the last 27 years, I have worked in greater Houston,
Harris County. Since June 2000 through December 4, 2000, in
Houston, Harris County, there have been three Harris County
Sheriff deputies shot, two of them killed. The third one is
still recovering from a bullet wound sustained to the head. The
last officer that was killed was killed just a few days ago,
December 4th. These officers leave families, friends, all of
which become like the rest of us, victims of crime.
Houston, Harris County, is a growing, booming area and
there is a lot of violence there. I spent a lot of time for the
best part of the last 10 years teaching a class called Agent
Safety and Survival, because I have spent a lot of time
researching the gunfights of other law enforcement officers on
what happened in the hopes that, just maybe, some of my
training or the training we are able to provide can save
somebody's life.
As a footnote, as of yesterday, there are 447 inmates on
death row in the Texas Department of Correction, 447, and 147
of those inmates were convicted of capital murder in Houston,
Harris County, TX. Of that number, 12 of them are on death row
for killing police officers in the line of duty. Of that 12, 7
of them were convicted for capital murder for killing police
officers in Harris County. Harris County has its share of
violence. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Gentlemen, thank you very much.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Ose, I think, had a comment. I am trying to
make sure all of the Members are able to ask the questions they
wanted and I will be happy to help your side as well.
Who had a question, Mr. Ose?
Mr. Ose. I do have a question, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Does my colleague from Ohio have questions as
well?
Mr. LaTourette. Not at the moment.
Mr. Burton. OK. Mr. Ose.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Schumacher, one of the things that I keep just
scratching my head about--well, let me back up. To the two
officers from Houston, are there any dark, unlit, long
stretches of Texas freeways in the fifth ward?
Mr. Chaison. No.
Mr. Allen. No.
Mr. Ose. Both of you said no.
Mr. Chaison. No. In fact, our inner city freeways are
probably the most well-lighted thoroughfares in the city.
Mr. Ose. OK. So we can't find any dark stretches of Texas
highway in the fifth ward, and we know of no instances where
Mr. Prince had been stopped by law enforcement; is that
correct?
Mr. Chaison. That is correct.
Mr. Ose. That has been the testimony today?
Mr. Chaison. That is correct.
Mr. Ose. All right. Thank you.
Mr. Schumacher, one of the things I keep scratching my head
about and I can't quite understand is that in an investigation
of that sort, somehow or another you got to get to the money.
You got to figure out, OK, if we are laundering money, where is
it going and what have you. I have heard no discussion of
financial statements, tax returns, any analysis that might
ordinarily follow on the suggestion of someone laundering
funds.
Did the DEA ever examine the financial dealings of Mr.
Prince or Rap-A-Lot? Did you ask--did the DEA ask the IRS, for
instance, to come in and help on this kind of analysis, and if
so, what happened?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir, we did several times request the
assistance of the IRS CID division. Members of that division
from Houston came over for a few days. One of those agents, we
had that agent conduct a telephonic interview of a former
member of the church that Mr. Prince patronizes, and that
person was interviewed by that IRS agent relative to some
suspicious financial transactions.
We, the DEA-HPD team, requested that IRS CID agents be
assigned to us there, to the endeavor. We had files set up. We
wanted to track every financial transaction Prince had done.
For example, every time he purchased a vehicle or a residence,
what was his methodology, just to see what is there. After a
few weeks, the IRS CID people never came back. I asked Mr.
Howard--Mr. Howard again was trying to assist us. He told me he
had approached a SAC at IRS----
Mr. Ose. The SAC is the Special Agent in Charge?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir; and that the IRS had refused to
participate. I believe, based on what I have seen, and I am
nowhere near trained to be a financial investigator as such,
that Mr. Prince has a large number of money that sometimes he
has trouble accounting for. Based on two interviews that
Sergeant Stephens and myself conducted of a rap artist who
worked for Prince for over 10 years, that rap artist and his
lawyer, we interviewed those folks twice, and during those
interviews, that particular person told us that Prince
typically scams the IRS by just paying out cash money to the
artist on a weekly, biweekly, bimonthly basis, and then at the
end of the year, gives them a 1099 for a tremendous amount of
money that they never received as such. That person also told
us that Prince has established paper companies with paper
employees and managers, etc., again to perpetuate this tax
scam. And I am using the words of this person. All of what I am
talking about is articulated in DEA reports.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Chairman, I see my--I have a yellow light. I
want to come back to this question, because I want to find out
whether or not the IRS initial interest from a time category
corresponded, for instance, with, you know, was it summer of
1999, was it winter of 2000. And I am trying to figure out
whether or not the IRS got the same pressure, if you will, if
that is the right word, that the DEA got. So I see my light is
up.
Mr. Burton. OK. I will be happy to yield my 5 minutes to
the gentleman. I would just like to ask one real quick question
before I yield to Mr. Ose, and that is, did you ask anybody at
the IRS why they did not followup with an indepth investigation
based upon the information that you had been able to acquire?
Mr. Schumacher. I saw that IRS agent that had been assigned
to us for a while several times in the courthouse or courtroom,
and I would ask him, what is going on? When can you come over?
And it was always going to be next week, next week, next week.
And, Mr. Chairman, we became very, very exasperated with that,
because we felt there was really some viable investigative
progress to be made there.
Mr. Burton. Was he the IRS agent in charge of that area?
Mr. Schumacher. No. No, sir.
Mr. Burton. He was just one of the employees.
Mr. Schumacher. One of the Special Agents that we
understood----
Mr. Burton. Did you ever inquire to the head of the IRS
branch down there?
Mr. Schumacher. I did that through Mr. Howard. I asked Mr.
Howard to assist us in that.
Mr. Burton. OK. Mr. Ose.
One second. What was the month and year that you made that
request?
Mr. Schumacher. It may have been not long after, after the
January arrest, because----
Mr. Burton. What year was that January arrest?
Mr. Schumacher. 1999, because when we arrested McCarter and
Russell who worked there, because on the night of his arrest,
Russell had a $10,000 personal check from Prince, or at that
time Smith to Russell, and Russell had that in his possession.
Mr. Burton. So shortly after January 1999.
Mr. Schumacher. I believe so.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Ose.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Schumacher, I would like to go back to that question.
So in January 1999, you arrested an individual based on the
information gleaned from interviewing that person, and you were
able to establish that you had unanswered questions as to the
financial transactions underpinning Rap-A-Lot.
Now, interrupt me if I get off track here. From there you
went to the IRS and asked for assistance. They came over, they
did a telephonic interview with somebody, they looked at
something, and then at some period of time, their interest
waned and they stopped doing it.
How long of a period between the arrest, their initial
interest, and when it waned?
Mr. Schumacher. Six weeks maybe.
Mr. Ose. When did their interest arise?
Mr. Schumacher. I can't recall. I would have to look at the
date of that DEA report on that telephonic interview.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Chairman, is Mr. Schumacher also going to stay
in town under subpoena?
Mr. Burton. Yes. They are all under subpoena. We have asked
all four of them to stay.
Mr. Ose. Perhaps between now and tomorrow you could
followup and submit to the committee that information, if you
could dig it out between now and then. Would that be agreeable?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. The information you are talking about is who at
the IRS they were talking to?
Mr. Ose. I am trying to establish the chronological window
during which time the IRS exhibited interest and then decided
they had no interest.
Mr. Burton. OK.
Mr. Ose. Now, the other question I want to ask is, I want
to examine the corporate structure of Rap-A-Lot Records,
because my basic understanding is that you rarely catch the big
guy, you always catch their underlings. But the issue for me is
that if you see somebody at the top and then you have a whole
layer of management, and I don't know if this is the case, but
a whole layer of management that has been arrested and
convicted and is now incarcerated for illegal activity, it kind
of raises a red flag. So I am curious.
Smith was the head of the company, Rap-A-Lot, and then
there was a second level, a next level, if you will, of vice
presidents or assistants or what have you. Some of those people
were like Thomas Randall, Brad Jordan, Dewey Forker, Steve
McCarter. Could you give us some sense of who these people
were, what they did for the corporation, and their current
whereabouts?
Mr. Schumacher. OK. Let's use January 1999 as a reference
date. Prince--and he uses the name Smith slash Prince, he
changed his name from Smith to Prince about 1998, OK, sometime
in 1998. But in any event, Prince would have been the CEO. We
would have had Bruce Toval as his accountant or he would have
been handling all of the business, book business and things
like that.
Mr. Ose. CFO? Chief financial officer?
Mr. Schumacher. Probably.
Mr. Ose. OK.
Mr. Schumacher. Then you would go to Randall, McCarter,
Russell, Forker. There was a couple of other people. But those
four had various jobs, all of which had offices right there
with Prince in his office--in his building, I am sorry.
Mr. Ose. What are the current whereabouts of these people?
I mean, are they still with Rap-A-Lot?
Mr. Schumacher. Let's see. Russell is in FCI.
Mr. Ose. Russell is where?
Mr. Schumacher. In an FCI, Federal correctional institute,
convicted on a 20-year sentence. McCarter is still in the
greater Houston area, waiting to hear on his appeal for his
conviction. Toval is still working, to the best of my
knowledge, for Prince. Forker is running a record company
called Jammin Records in the middle of the fifth ward. Randall
is now I believe the--I guess has moved up a notch and is the
CEO, or assistant CEO.
Mr. Ose. What about Brad Jordan?
Mr. Schumacher. Brad Jordan is a performer. He was never in
the management, to my understanding. He is a performer. Brad
Jordan, a.k.a. Scarface, was one of the original members of a
rap group known as the Ghetto Boys that blossomed in the early
1990's. Edward Russell is in prison.
Mr. Ose. OK. How about Mike Harris?
Mr. Schumacher. The Michael Harris I know, he is in TDC,
Texas Department of Corrections.
Mr. Ose. So of the--how many vice presidents or assistants
do you think Smith, a.k.a. Prince or Prince a.k.a. Smith, or
whatever his name is, had; 10 close associates?
Mr. Schumacher. You know, it has been so long since I have
looked at the organizational flow chart. I mean he probably had
six or seven, and in that Federal trial of McCarter and
Russell, Toval came in and quickly said on record that there
were only two execs at Rap-A-Lot: himself and Prince.
Mr. Ose. Of these six or seven lieutenants or nonexecutive
assistants, it appears that roughly half of them are
incarcerated on what kind of charges? What were they arrested
for and what were they convicted of?
Mr. Schumacher. Carter and Russell were convicted in
Federal court for violations of 841 and 846.
Mr. Ose. Talk to me in----
Mr. Schumacher. OK. Possession and conspiracy, possession
of cocaine, conspiracy to possess cocaine. Michael Harris was
convicted of possession of cocaine. Let's see, who is left?
Mr. Ose. They were all similar convictions?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes.
Mr. Ose. OK. Mr. Chairman, I see my red light is on.
Mr. Burton. Yes. Unless there is more questions, we would
like to move on to the next panel right now. We may recall some
of these witnesses later.
Does anybody else----
Mr. Cummings. I have one statement, very quickly.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Schumacher, I just got word from Maxine Waters, Congresswoman
Waters, that it is her understanding that Mr. Smith has been
audited several times by the IRS in recent times. Were you
aware of that?
Mr. Schumacher. I personally do not know of any audit that
has been done, particularly since I have been involved, since
August 1998, sir.
Mr. Cummings. OK. The other thing I wanted to just say, and
I am going to be very brief, Mr. Chairman, but I want to clear
up the record on something.
I want you to understand, Mr. Schumacher, I listened to
your statement very carefully about police officers, and we up
here, all of us, are very concerned about every life of a
police officer. We don't want you to get the impression that we
are not. We also are concerned, however, about justice; that
there is a balance in this thing. I don't know about Houston,
but I do know about Baltimore. We have one of the highest
murder rates in the country. And I don't know whether the
implication is that if you are in an African American
community, that racial profiling does not exist. That is a
bunch of baloney, if anybody believes that. I see it every day,
over and over again. I am the victim of it and have been the
victim of it ever since I can remember, almost. So--and I don't
know too many Black men, if they are honest about it, who
haven't been the victims of it.
So I just want you to understand that my concern, when I
was asking you a little bit earlier about people who you, by
firing your gun, had brought their lives to an end, my concern
was that I just thought that would be something that you would
be aware of. You answered the question quite well, and I just
wanted you to be aware that it is not insensitivity with regard
to police officers, because I mourn their deaths, I mourn when
they are harmed, because there truly is a thin blue line and
that thin blue line is very important that we are going to
maintain a society that has any kind of order to it.
I just wanted to say that for the record, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Cummings. I guess Mr. LaTourette
has some questions?
Mr. LaTourette. I do. I want to yield to my good friend
from California, but I do want to make an observation, though.
I was struck, however, when the fellow that wrote the letter
complaining about Mr. Schumacher, I understand who is in prison
for 27 years on a variety of offenses, he is a career criminal.
And if I remembered your testimony correctly, you have been in
law enforcement for 27 years, so I don't think that coincidence
should be lost on anybody, that your credibility has apparently
been impeached to a Member of Congress on the word of somebody
who is doing a 27-year stretch, which equals the time that you
have given to the country.
I want to yield the rest of my time to Mr. Ose.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Chairman, I have but one more question.
I notice in the letter of November 2nd from Robert Raben to
you, the suggestion that the Department of Justice and the DEA
Administrator have assigned a joint team from the DEA and FBI
to investigate the allegations that were made as it relates to
the activities in Houston.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4430.004
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4430.005
Mr. Ose. I am curious, Mr. Schumacher, the two Houston
police officers, have you been contacted by anybody from the
DEA and FBI regarding this investigation that is referenced in
the November 2nd letter from Robert Raben to Dan Burton?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ose. You have. So the team is actually in the field
now?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir. They were in Houston; yes, sir.
Mr. Ose. All right. I look forward to the responses
regarding that timeframe as it relates to the IRS interest in
this case. So I will make myself available when and where you
need me to be.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Thank you. I think everyone has had all of
their questions asked and answered. I want to thank you who
have testified here this morning, and your counsel, for being
so patient with us. And I want to tell you that every one of
us, even though we may have asked you some tough questions,
really admire and respect all of the police officers who are
doing their job in this country and laying their lives on the
lines for all of us and our families and our kids, and you in
particular who are dealing with this horrible tragedy of drug
use and the massive drug sales that are taking place in America
and who are having to deal with some of the scum of the Earth
in risking your lives. I want you to know that we know you are
out there, we know you are risking your lives and we really,
really appreciate it very, very much. With that, we will excuse
you. We will ask the cameras to be turned off so that the two
undercover policemen cannot be revealed. Thank you.
We will ask the next panel to come forward now. The next
panel consists of Mr. Howard--are you going to remain in the
room? Would you like to remain in the room? Would you like to
stay there? I guess you can move into a place where the camera
won't pick you up then. If you like to, you can go into our
lounge and watch this on television, if you like. That way, if
you need to go to the men's room, it is right there.
We will now welcome our second panel of witnesses: Ernest
Howard; I think it is Julio Mercado--did I pronounce your name
right?
Mr. Mercado. That is correct.
Mr. Burton. And Mr. R.C. Gamble.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Burton. Do any of you have an opening statement you
would like to make?
Mr. Mercado. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Mercado. Would you pull the microphone just
a little bit closer and make sure it is on?
STATEMENTS OF JULIO MERCADO, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION; ERNEST L. HOWARD, SPECIAL AGENT IN
CHARGE, HOUSTON FIELD OFFICE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION;
AND R.C. GAMBLE, CHIEF INSPECTOR, DRUG ENFORCEMENT
ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Mercado. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Minority Member and
other members of the committee, I am Julio Mercado, Deputy
Administrator----
Mr. Burton. Your voice is pretty strong, so you can move
the mic back just a little bit.
Mr. Mercado. I am Julio Mercado, Deputy Administrator of
the Drug Enforcement Administration. I am appearing today at
your request, along with Chief Inspector R.C. Gamble to my
right, and the Houston Division Agent in Charge, Ernest Howard
to my left. I appreciate this opportunity to address your
concerns regarding whether any DEA investigation was swayed by
political considerations. Indeed, Administrator Marshall has
invited the Department, Office of the Inspector General [OIG],
to conduct a thorough, independent investigation of this
matter. I applaud Administrator Marshall's decision, and fully
support DEA's total cooperation in the OIG's investigation, as
well as in today's proceeding before the committee.
Given the recent media coverage of this inquiry, it is
public knowledge that DEA has taken interim measures to ensure
appropriate decisions are rendered with respect to the various
aspects of this investigation. These measures include the
deployment of independently supervised agents to the Houston
Division where they can objectively assess the investigative
potential of this case. At the request of Attorney General
Janet Reno, this newly assigned team of DEA agents have been
supplemented by squads of FBI Special Agents in order to
maximize the amount of resources directed toward the
investigative effort. The goal of this assessment process is to
expand the scope of the case and enhance the likelihood of
future criminal prosecution, if appropriate.
That being said, it is my duty to remind the committee that
as an employee of the Department of Justice, DEA personnel are
precluded from commenting on the progress of any ongoing
criminal investigation, on individuals not indicted or
arrested, which are targets of past or present investigations.
I am aware that the central focus of this inquiry calls into
question the very existence of any active investigation on the
part of DEA, and I anticipate that many of the questions posed
during the course of today's hearing will seek to clarify that
issue, or this issue.
Public awareness of this inquiry will make any remaining
investigative approaches more difficult to employ.
Consequently, I respectfully request that the committee refrain
from posing questions that will result in the disclosure of
specific investigation methods, activities which have not been
revealed in previous judicial proceedings. These perimeters are
not intended to impede the factfinding nature of this hearing,
but would instead serve two distinctive purposes. First, it
will maximize the safety of investigative and undercover
personnel that have previously worked or might currently be
working on this investigation; and second, they will prevent
the hearing from having any adverse effect on pending judicial
actions.
With this constraint, I will be happy to attempt to answer
your questions, sir.
Mr. Burton. Do any of the other witnesses wish to make an
opening statement?
Mr. Gamble. No, sir.
Mr. Howard. No, sir.
Mr. Burton. We will follow the current form of 30 minutes
on the majority side and minority side. I will yield to Mr.
LaTourette in just a moment, but let me just start off by
asking a question or two myself.
First of all, the FBI and DEA agents that came in from New
York and elsewhere to assess this case after it had evidently
been stopped, are they still down there?
Mr. Mercado. No, sir. The investigation, the factfinding
has been completed and they have reported to Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Burton. So there is nobody on the scene down there that
is conducting the kind of investigation that was taking place
by the gentlemen who preceded you here today?
Mr. Mercado. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Burton. That is kind of curious, based upon the
information that they gave us. They said that there were a
great many additional individuals that they thought they might
get indictments and convictions for, and they mentioned I think
three or four in particular. They didn't name any names, but
they mentioned three or four, and they said that when their
investigation was terminated, a lot of the people that they
were talking to on the streets were kind of left hanging out to
dry. They felt like their investigation, which bore fruit and
was going to bear more fruit just stopped before they got to
the next level, I think they said. And it seems curious to me,
curious that the DEA and the FBI who bring people in who are
not familiar at all with the situation to review the findings
of the previous panel and the people conducting that
investigation, and coming back and saying that there is no need
to be pursuing this at this time. Otherwise, they would still
be on the ground conducting the investigation. I just find that
very curious. Can you explain that to me?
Mr. Mercado. Yes. Administrator Marshall's instructions
were to go in and review the whole entire file to see exactly
what needed to be done and to come back and report. They just
came back this week and reported to Mr. Marshall on their
finding of the investigation.
Mr. Burton. Well, we will talk to Mr. Marshall tomorrow in
detail about this, because I think it is important that the
American people who have been told today that political
influences was brought to bear to stop a very, very important
investigation of major drug dealing where 20 people have been
convicted, one of murder, many connected with the Rap-A-Lot
organization, and they said that there was going to be more
people that they thought they could convict, that they had some
witnesses that they thought would turn to get the big fish, and
all of that was stopped, and nothing is going on right now. So,
tomorrow we will pursue this with the Administrator.
Mr. LaTourette.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome--and Mr.
Gamble, I am sorry I can't see you because of the screen, but I
know that you are behind there and maybe we can peek at each
other when the chance comes.
Mr. Howard, my questions are primarily for you, if you
could just tell the committee briefly when you became the
Special Agent in Charge of the Houston office.
Mr. Burton. Mr. LaTourette, we will stop the clock. I want
you to be able to see the witnesses. We will remove those
screens very quickly so you can talk to the witnesses, so that
everybody will see them.
Thank you, guys, I really appreciate that. We will see if
you can get some overtime for this.
Mr. LaTourette. Nice to see you. When did you become the
Special Agent in Charge down in Houston, Mr. Howard?
Mr. Howard. In March 1997.
Mr. LaTourette. At the time that you assumed that position,
was there an operation called Smash Cookies ongoing by the DEA
office in Houston?
Mr. Howard. I have heard that term in the last 24 hours;
yes, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. You had not heard it before the last 24
hours?
Mr. Howard. No, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. Was there an investigation ongoing of the
individuals who we have been talking about for the last 3 or 4
hours, Rap-A-Lot, Mr. Smith, that you were aware of upon you
assuming those duties?
Mr. Howard. There was a local impact investigation going
on, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. There was testimony from the previous
panel--and you were in the committee room for the testimony of
the previous panel, were you not?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. And you heard the Houston officers and you
also heard Mr. Schumacher talk about the fact that you were
highly supportive of their efforts, you offered and indicated
that any resource they needed they could have. Was that a fair
observation on their part of the level of support that you had
of this investigation?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. And there came a point in time when the
testimony was that you instructed Mr. Schumacher, or he asked
you if he could go out and recruit Houston Police Department
personnel to form a joint task force and you authorized that;
is that right?
Mr. Howard. I authorized Mr. Schumacher to make the PD
available to work on an OCDETF case. It was an ad hoc task
force, it was not considered a joint task force.
Mr. LaTourette. Is it a fair observation that you had
pretty good confidence in Mr. Schumacher as an agent of the
DEA?
Mr. Howard. That is correct.
Mr. LaTourette. Had you worked with him before?
Mr. Howard. He had worked for me.
Mr. LaTourette. He had worked for you before?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. Is it a fair observation that you had a
high level of confidence in his competence as a law enforcement
officer and trusted him to do whatever task you dispatched him
to do?
Mr. Howard. That is correct.
Mr. LaTourette. I want to turn your attention now to what
has been discussed a lot during the course of this hearing.
There came a time, I believe in August 1999, when a Member of
the U.S. Congress wrote a letter to the Attorney General of the
United States relative to the investigation of the Rap-A-Lot
organization.
Are you aware of that letter?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, I am.
Mr. LaTourette. That letter is dated August 20, 1999. Can I
ask you when it is that you became aware of that letter?
Mr. Howard. The same date that DEA received it.
Mr. LaTourette. Do you remember when that was?
Mr. Howard. I believe that was August 20th also.
Mr. LaTourette. Oh, OK. So the letter that was dated August
20th, as wonderful as the U.S. Postal Service is, I imagine it
didn't go through the Postal Service, it was faxed or some
other method of delivery was achieved?
Mr. Howard. I would assume so.
Mr. LaTourette. Who brought that letter to your attention?
Mr. Howard. I believe initially it was brought to my
attention by Felix Jimenez who is our Chief of Office of
Professional Responsibility--I mean of Inspection; I am sorry.
Mr. LaTourette. Did you have the chance to discuss the
contents of the letter and the allegations made in the letter
with Administrator Marshall?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, I did.
Mr. LaTourette. Would that have been over the telephone or
in person?
Mr. Howard. On the telephone.
Mr. LaTourette. That would have been when, relative to
August 20th?
Mr. Howard. I believe it was also the same day.
Mr. LaTourette. So all of this happened within 24 hours of
this letter apparently being received by the Federal
Government; is that right? All on August 20th?
Mr. Howard. I would assume so.
Mr. LaTourette. Earlier, some of the observations that are
contained in this letter were addressed by members of the
committee and, in particular, at one point it said, I suggest
that he, that Mr. Prince, document his torments at the hands of
the DEA agents and send it to you for perusal. Included in here
are allegations that there was racial profiling, that people
were being stopped on the basis of their race, and without any
legitimate law enforcement purposes.
Was that a fair understanding of your reading of the letter
as to what the complaints were?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. Were you the direct supervisor of this
operation? Did you have direct supervision of Mr. Schumacher?
Mr. Howard. No, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. Were you aware--well, first of all, when
you received the letter--why don't you tell us what your first
reaction was as the Special Agent in Charge of the Houston
office?
Mr. Howard. I was surprised and also appalled at the
allegations.
Mr. LaTourette. Surprised and appalled?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. What surprised you about the allegations?
Mr. Howard. That the allegations occurred in the first
place.
Mr. LaTourette. Why were you appalled?
Mr. Howard. Because I didn't believe them to be true.
Mr. LaTourette. You have already told us that you have
known Mr. Schumacher for a number of years. Was the fact that
you didn't believe them to be true based upon your knowledge of
him?
Mr. Howard. Not particularly.
Mr. LaTourette. Was it based upon your knowledge of the
operation?
Mr. Howard. Not particularly.
Mr. LaTourette. Well, why didn't you believe them to be
true? You had a complaint by a citizen to a Member of Congress,
and you are appalled. Can you tell us why it is you are
appalled? What did you base being appalled on?
Mr. Howard. I believed that at that time, the number of
agents that were involved in the investigation, I did not
believe that they would conduct such activity. I knew racial
profiling had not been done, because I had specifically
assigned that case to that particular group.
Mr. LaTourette. Now, there was an investigation by OPR; is
that right?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir; that is correct.
Mr. LaTourette. Did the OPR investigation commence on
August 20th as well?
Mr. Howard. I don't know.
Mr. LaTourette. And, to your knowledge, the OPR
investigation is concluded; is that right?
Mr. Howard. It is concluded now; yes, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. To your knowledge, did the OPR
investigation discover any truth to the allegations or claims
made in the August 20, 1999 letter?
Mr. Howard. No, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. And so in the jargon of the agency, is it a
fair observation that the agents were cleared of the
allegations of racial profiling, and any other misconduct that
might have been mentioned in that letter?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir; that is correct.
Mr. LaTourette. Now, how long have you been with the
agency, Mr. Howard?
Mr. Howard. Since December 26, 1973.
Mr. LaTourette. I assume during the course of that time,
this probably isn't the first time that an elected official or
public official has contacted an agency that you have been
associated with; is that fair?
Mr. Howard. That is correct.
Mr. LaTourette. It is not unusual that that would occur,
right?
Mr. Howard. It is not unusual, it is not usual. It has
happened before.
Mr. LaTourette. The observation has been made--this letter
was received, written, and apparently things went into action
on August 20, 1999. There was testimony by the Houston police
officers who were here with us earlier and also Mr. Schumacher
that in September there was a meeting of the task force, not a
joint task force, but task force, where you made some
observations relative to whether or not the task force was
going to continue. Did you hear that testimony?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, I did.
Mr. LaTourette. Do you remember when that meeting was?
Mr. Howard. It was within a day or two, if not the same
day, that I received a faxed copy of the letter, which would
have been August 20th, the latter part of August.
Mr. LaTourette. Was that a meeting that you convened, you
asked everybody to get together?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, I did.
Mr. LaTourette. And at that time, again, so we don't have
to go back over all of the testimony of the Houston police
officers and Mr. Schumacher, the observation was made by the
previous panel that at that meeting, you announced that the HPD
officers were going to return to their duties and not be in
this task force anymore.
Did you hear them say that?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir; I heard them say that.
Mr. LaTourette. Did you make that observation at that time?
Mr. Howard. No, sir; I did not.
Mr. LaTourette. Why don't you tell us what you recall then
that you made reference to relative to what the HPD officers
were going to do in this task force?
Mr. Howard. I did not discuss what the HPD officers were
going to do in the task force or the OCDETF investigation. What
I discussed was at that point in time, that particular day, as
I walked out of this meeting, there will be no more proactive
investigation involved in the target, the impact target
investigation. The reason being is because we had allegations
out there, as I indicated to the people in the room, we had a
politician that made allegations that I was concerned about;
whether the allegations were true or false were at that point
irrelevant. I told them that if they went out and did something
and they did everything right and something went wrong on the
street, they would still be held liable as far as perception. I
was not going to allow my agents and the officers to go out and
be ridiculed for doing something right just because of
perception. I was concerned about the agents and the officers.
Mr. LaTourette. And by proactive, their testimony was that
the cases that were in the pipeline, those people that had been
arrested, crimes had been identified, they had been indicted,
those activities were going to continue; is that right?
Mr. Howard. That is correct.
Mr. LaTourette. By proactive, you meant that additional
leads, information that may have been developed by this group
of officers, were not going to be pursued, at least at this
moment in time.
Mr. Howard. Not proactive. I meant that there would be no
more undercover operations, there would be no more constant
surveillances, there would be no more without approval from an
associate SAC or higher.
Mr. LaTourette. Other than the letter that was received
with allegations that were eventually proven to be false by the
OPR investigation, but other than the fact that this letter had
been received on August 20th, was there any other reason for
you taking that action as the SAC in Houston, TX?
Mr. Howard. That is normal protocol whenever we have an
allegation of that level saying that there has been misconduct
by agents and that there is racial profiling; because racial
profiling was very visible in the media at that time, I was
concerned. I was going to take my agents out of that arena
until I----
Mr. LaTourette. Did you say that is the accepted protocol
of the DEA?
Mr. Howard. Did I tell them that? No, I didn't tell them
that.
Mr. LaTourette. No, no. Is that what you are telling me,
that is the protocol?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. So if Chairman Burton or Mr. Cummings or
Mr. Shays wrote you a letter today indicating that agents under
your direction in Houston, TX were engaged in misconduct in an
ongoing criminal investigation, you would suspend the proactive
portions of that investigation, pending an investigation of
those allegations?
Mr. Howard. If a private citizen wrote and made the same
complaints that was written in that communication saying that
there was racial profiling going on, that there was misconduct
by the agents of stopping and beating people unnecessarily,
those officers involved would not be involved in that
investigation, pending the outcome of the OPR investigation.
Mr. LaTourette. No matter who the person was? Any private
citizen could write to you?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir; that is correct.
Mr. Burton. Would the gentleman yield for a minute, please?
Would you yield?
Mr. LaTourette. I would be happy to yield.
Mr. Burton. There were people that were ready to turn,
according to the people in this task force or whatever you call
it, and they were ready to move up the food chain to nail some
of the bigger fish, so to speak, according to their testimony.
And by stopping the investigation, the whole thing just kind of
fell apart, and the ability to nail the bigger fish, the drug
kingpins down there, was stopped.
I find it curious that because of an allegation of racial
profiling, you would stop the investigation and at least not
put somebody else on the case while the investigation of the
allegation was taking place. Why didn't you put some other
agent in charge, and also have the Houston police put other
people into this investigation, instead of letting it stop,
die, and therefore lose a lot of the leads and possible people
who could give you information that would lead to the
conviction of the major drug kingpins?
Mr. Howard. Mr. Chairman, I was led to believe by Mr.
Schumacher that the key to the entire investigation depended on
two people. We were in the judicial process with those two
people. They had not turned, they had not done anything; we
were waiting to see what was going to happen in the judicial
process for them to decide if they were going to cooperate with
the government. Nothing had been done as far as them turning. I
was told repeatedly up until recent weeks that was the key to
the entire investigation.
Mr. Burton. Well, they said--and we will bring them back
tomorrow--but they also said that there were other people on
the street, there were people who were evidently dope dealers
that were giving them information, that were cutoff at the
knees and left standing out there because the investigation was
terminated. So you know, it just seems to me that if you have a
chance to nail some major drug dealers that have been involved
with--and there were 20 convictions, including one more murder,
and many of those people working with Rap-A-Lot to stop that
investigation, just chop it off at the knees, but nobody else
on it because of an accusation of racial profiling makes no
sense. Why didn't you put somebody else on the case?
Mr. Howard. The investigation was not closed down, Mr.
Chairman. The investigation--all proactivity involving the
investigation could go on if I had approval, if they had
approval from the associate SAC.
Mr. Burton. OK. Let's put up on the screen right now e-
mails from you, Mr. Howard, and then I will go back to Mr.
LaTourette.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4430.006
Mr. Burton. Let's read what it says, and you can read it.
This is your e-mail.
``I understand that the situation involving `Rap-A-Lot' and
James Smith aka James Prince has only gotten worse. To
eliminate any further difficulty in this matter, I have decided
that the Houston Division will curtail any enforcement action
against this subject.''
Then it goes on to say, ``At any rate, it is over and we
are closing our case on Prince.''
Then the second e-mail of yours says, ``Now we bow down to
the political pressure anyway. If I had known this, I would
have never brought Jack in this case, nor would I have even
pursued it. But it is over now. The Houston Division will
terminate all active investigation of Rap-A-Lot, except for
those persons who have already been arrested and indicted.''
Now, you just said that the case wasn't closed, that you
didn't terminate it. What does this mean? What do these e-mails
mean?
Mr. Howard. Mr. Chairman, I tried to contact Mr. Mercado
and Mr. Gamble via telephone earlier that day. I was unable to
reach them. They are two of a few people in this agency that I
confide in, that I talk to about various things when I am
upset. I was venting. I knew that by putting those words in
there, they are going to call me immediately upon them reading
that. I did not mean I was going to close the case down. They
didn't take it as I was closing the case down. They knew better
than that. But I knew that by putting those words in that e-
mail, they are going to call me back immediately and get me off
the ceiling.
Mr. Burton. OK. So the case is open now? You haven't closed
it down? You have agents working in the field on it?
Mr. Howard. The target of the investigation is still going
on.
Mr. Burton. To the degree that it was before?
Mr. Howard. The degree that it was back a year and a half
ago?
Mr. Burton. Yeah.
Mr. Howard. I have never been told until today that there
were more leads in the investigation, other than the two
individuals going through the judicial process, everything
hinged on their cooperation.
Mr. Burton. All I can tell you is the frustration I sensed
from Mr. Schumacher and the other people that were here with
the Houston PD, it is very evident. They were very frustrated.
They said nice things about you, but the fact of the matter is
they could not figure out why in the heck they closed down this
investigation when they had a chance to nail big fish down
there. And then they make a record knocking these guys.
I'll yield back to Mr. LaTourette. Go ahead if you have a
comment.
Mr. Howard. Nobody in that city wants this target of
investigation any more than I do, believe me. But if there were
any leads other than what I know about today about, those two
individuals, I have never been told about it before.
As far as the PD goes, they had been requested to go back
to their department prior to August because they had been there
for over a year. They come there for 90 days.
Mr. Burton. Excuse me, Mr. Howard. Did you hear the
testimony of the previous panel?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, I did.
Mr. Burton. You heard them say that there were other leads,
you heard them say there were people in the field, drug
dealers, you heard them say they thought those people might
turn.
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, I heard what they said.
Mr. Burton. Are you telling me you did not know about that
until today?
Mr. Howard. No, sir, I did not.
Mr. Burton. You did not know about that until today?
Mr. Howard. No, sir, I did not.
Mr. Burton. You were their supervisor.
Mr. Howard. No, sir, I am three removed.
Mr. Burton. I don't understand the chain of command. You
came in and told them, we're stopping this case in essence for
political reasons. You came in and said, we're going to stop
this for political reasons. That's what they all said, all of
them.
Mr. Howard. The proactive part of the investigation.
Mr. Burton. The proactive, that's the investigation.
Mr. Howard. There were arrests and seizures made after
August.
Mr. Burton. I understand, but the point is it was pretty
clear that you were talking to them and today you're telling me
you just found out about additional information. I don't
understand the lack of communication between those folks and
you. I mean, if they were under your jurisdiction and you told
them to stop the case, I don't understand why that
communication wasn't there. It doesn't make any sense to me.
Mr. Howard. I don't know why it wasn't there either.
Mr. Burton. Mr. LaTourette.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Howard, I believe you want to see this investigation
successfully concluded, but I think back to where I was and
just to go back where this thing started, my understanding is
part of this investigation started in 1992 when a car was
seized that had a connection with the individuals that we've
been talking to that had 76 kilos which are kilograms I guess
of cocaine. Is that part of your knowledge in the case?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. What's the street value of 76 kilograms of
cocaine?
Mr. Howard. Roughly about that time it was about $13,000 a
key.
Mr. LaTourette. Times 76. I'm not that good at math, but
this is a pretty major moving of cocaine in the Houston area.
This isn't a small time seizure, 76 kilos, is it?
Mr. Howard. That's correct.
Mr. LaTourette. Well, back to the point, are you saying
that if I'm under investigation by the DEA in Houston, TX, and
my mother writes in and says that one of your agents has been
performing badly and makes an allegation of some kind of rights
violation and there is an OPR investigation begun that you will
suspend the investigation into my background until that is
concluded or remove the officers?
Mr. Howard. No, sir. What I said was I would remove that
officer from any proactive part of investigation.
Mr. LaTourette. But in this case everybody was told to stop
being proactive, not just Mr. Schumacher, everybody.
Mr. Howard. The entire group, from being proactive without
approval from upstairs. It did not mean that they could not do
anything at all.
Mr. LaTourette. I understand that. But it's not like you
took Schumacher and the seven guys from HPD and said, you guys
are off because you have this racial profiling, but we're going
to bring in these new eight guys and they're going to pick up
on the proactive stuff while you're being under investigation.
Nobody was doing anything proactive on the basis of an August
20 letter from a Member of Congress. And you're telling me the
fact that she was a Member of Congress isn't a big deal. It
could have been any citizen that wrote in and said there's
racial profiling or something going on. You would have done the
same thing. So not to hang it on our colleague, because
apparently the fact than she's a Member of Congress isn't any
big deal. Anybody could have written in and made this
allegation and you would have pulled these guys off the case,
at least on the proactive part. Is that what you're telling the
committee?
Mr. Howard. This was not the only case that we're working
in Houston----
Mr. LaTourette. I understand that.
Mr. Howard [continuing]. So I didn't have anybody else to
assign to that investigation at that time. That's why I said
any proactive part of the investigation has to be approved. If
they wanted to do something the next day all they had to do was
bring it upstairs to the associate SAC.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. But I think the Houston guys said they
then left wherever they were operating out of and went back to
the HPD. They took it as ``we're done'', and they left.
Mr. Howard. They had been asked by their captain to come
back to the HPD long prior to the August situation. They had
been over there for a year. That's what I was told by the
people downstairs.
Mr. LaTourette. Let me now go--because, obviously, there
are people inside and outside of the Department that brought
this matter to the attention of the committee.
Could I ask how much time I have left, Mr. Chairman, to
sort of budget my time?
Mr. Burton. You have 7--almost 8 minutes.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank you.
Obviously, this came to the attention of the committee
before today's hearing; and did you come up over the course of
the summer, maybe about July 17, and have an interview with
members of the committee staff?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, I did.
Mr. LaTourette. Do you remember who you met with on that
occasion?
Mr. Howard. The gentleman--I think Mr. Wilson.
Mr. LaTourette. Maybe Mr. Binger.
Mr. Howard. And the gentleman to the left of Mr. Waxman.
Mr. LaTourette. Was it the two of them?
Mr. Howard. No, it was three.
Mr. LaTourette. Maybe Mr. Binger, was he there? I don't see
him in the room anymore. How about this fellow over my
shoulder? Was he there, too?
Mr. Howard. Yes.
Mr. LaTourette. Their recollection of that meeting was--and
the substance of that meeting was the substance of the hearing
today, was it not? They were talking about this investigation?
Mr. Howard. That's correct.
Mr. LaTourette. Did they bring up allegations to you at
that time, that in fact this investigation had been concluded,
it was over, it was done with?
Mr. Howard. That's correct.
Mr. LaTourette. At that meeting of July 2000 you indicated
to them, absolutely not, this is an ongoing investigation, it's
not closed?
Mr. Howard. That's correct.
Mr. LaTourette. Has there been anything proactive since you
shut down the proactive part in September 1999 or has it simply
been cleaning up the cases that were in the pipeline?
Mr. Howard. There were arrests and seizures in December
1999.
Mr. LaTourette. But nothing since then, nothing in the year
2000.
Mr. Howard. There were no arrests or seizures, but there
has been activity going on.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. I want to go back then to the e-mails
that the chairman was talking to you about a little earlier and
not those specific e-mails. Let me ask you this: After the
letter of August 20 was received from the Member of Congress,
did your agency have the occasion to brief her on the progress
of the investigation?
Mr. Howard. I don't know.
Mr. Gamble. The answer to that question is yes.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. Was that briefing conducted by you, Mr.
Gamble, now that I can see you and the partition has been
removed?
Mr. Gamble. Yes, it was.
Mr. LaTourette. Is that as a result of something you felt
obligated to do as a followup or was that requested by the
Member?
Mr. Gamble. No, I was directed by the Administrator.
Mr. LaTourette. Administrator?
Mr. Gamble. Marshall.
Mr. LaTourette. Marshall directed you to do----
Mr. Gamble. Give the Congresswoman an update.
Mr. LaTourette. When did that occur?
Mr. Gamble. February 9, 2000.
Mr. LaTourette. Was that the only time that an update was
given after the August 20 letter that you're aware of?
Mr. Gamble. That was the only update. I received a call
from her on September 20.
Mr. LaTourette. Of this year?
Mr. Gamble. Of this year.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. I don't know if the committee can put
up page 6 of the e-mails. It's a letter from Ernest Howard
dated Thursday, March 16, 2000, at 2:40 p.m.; and underneath it
is a message from a fellow by the name of James Nims.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4430.007
Mr. LaTourette. Who is James Nims, Mr. Howard?
Mr. Howard. He is the group supervisor of group four which
was responsible for the investigation.
Mr. LaTourette. And this occurs after--when Mr. Waxman and
others were asking about the Vice President's visit down to
Houston, TX. My understanding is that the Vice President of the
United States went down to the Brookhollow Baptist Church
sometime in March of this year for part of running for the
President of the United States, I would assume. Were you aware
of that visit?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. And it caused this exchange of e-mails. Do
you have that in front of you, sir?
Mr. Howard. Which one is this?
Mr. LaTourette. At the top mine says HQExchange, and the
first message is from you to James Nims at 2:40 p.m. on March
16, and the original message was sent at 1:10 from Nims to you.
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, I have it.
Mr. LaTourette. All right. And this is an exchange of e-
mails relative to the visit by the Vice President to the
church, is it not?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. And specifically Mr. Nims in the original
message makes the observation that the Vice President was in
the town and he was at the church. He asks you a question: ``I
wonder if the Congresswoman was there as well.'' Do you see
that question?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. In response--he's not talking about a
Congresswoman from Texas. Because--and you don't take it to be
that, do you?
Mr. Howard. No, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. And your first sentence is, no, ``the one
from California was not there as far as I know.'' Is that a
reference to the Member of Congress who wrote the letter on
August 20?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. Why is there correspondence as to whether
or not this Member is down at this church with the Vice
President of the United States? Was this of great concern to
you?
Mr. Howard. No, sir. Mr. Nims just wrote me a letter an e-
mail advising me that the Vice President had been in town to
make sure that I knew about it and he was at this church and
that is a church that the subject matter attends, a member of.
Mr. LaTourette. I understand that, but it goes on to talk
about whether or not the author of the letter of August 20 is
there as well, right?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, it does.
Mr. LaTourette. Why is that of interest to anybody in the
DEA in March 2000?
Mr. Howard. It wasn't of interest to me. I guess he was
being facetious. I have no idea. I just answered his question.
Mr. LaTourette. Is it sort of a running joke at the DEA
because of the letter?
Mr. Howard. No, sir, it was not a joke. We were frustrated
about the entire situation.
Mr. LaTourette. Why don't you describe for me what's
frustrating? Were you frustrated because you felt political
pressure either as a result of this communication or from your
superiors or from within yourself?
Mr. Howard. I was frustrated because I was the one who
sought out Mr. Schumacher, who had brought him into this
situation in the first place. I told Mr. Schumacher he had
anywhere from 90 days to 6 months to ensure--to advise me
whether there was a viable investigation or not.
I was briefed originally in the latter parted of 1997 at
the JD on this investigation. This investigation has been
sitting for years without a lot of activity, and I brought that
to a sole DEA group which is where it was placed, and I
personally assigned Mr. Schumacher to that investigation. I
felt frustration because of the allegations, and I felt
responsible for putting Mr. Schumacher and the rest of the
officers in the situation that they were in.
Mr. LaTourette. I have more questions about the e-mails
that I will come back to.
Mr. Burton. If the gentleman would yield real quickly, I
have one clarifying question I would like to ask. You said the
police that were detailed from the Houston Police Department
had already been asked to come back to the Houston Police
Department before you closed down the investigation, is that
correct?
Mr. Howard. That's correct sir.
Mr. Burton. Now, you're sure about that? They were asked to
go back?
Mr. Howard. I was told they had been requested to come back
on several occasions prior to August.
Mr. Burton. And that would indicate that would be the
extent of their activity and involvement in the case?
Mr. Howard. That's correct. I do meet regularly with Chief
Bradford. I meet regularly with Chief Jones. They have never to
this day said anything about them being pulled back, why they
were pulled back or there was further things to be done in this
situation. They have never said anything negative about this
investigation.
Mr. Burton. We'll come back to that in a little bit.
Mr. Waxman.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the three of you for being here to help us in this
hearing.
Mr. Howard, Mr. Schumacher was transferred in March 2000,
from an assignment as acting supervisor of an enforcement group
to acting supervisor of a support group. Why did you reassign
Mr. Schumacher?
Mr. Howard. It was brought to my attention by Mr. Gamble
that the present position Mr. Schumacher was occupying as the
acting group supervisor of group four is not a place he should
be since the OPR investigation was still ongoing, that it might
be better to assign him someplace else.
The morale of the group was already devastated. I did not
want to demoralize Mr. Schumacher any more by moving him from
an acting group supervisor position to a non-acting group
supervisor position since I had one available. I moved him to
another acting group supervisor position in charge of the
special support group.
Mr. Waxman. Did Vice President Gore's visit to the
Brookhollow Baptist Church have any impact whatsoever on your
decision to reassign Mr. Schumacher?
Mr. Howard. No, sir, it did not.
Mr. Waxman. Did anyone from the White House or the Gore
campaign discuss Mr. Schumacher or this investigation with you
after his visit to the church?
Mr. Howard. No, sir.
Mr. Waxman. And I assume no one from the Democratic----
Mr. Howard. I never talked to anybody from anybody's party
telling me to close this case down, never.
Mr. Waxman. Some have suggested that the investigation was
slowed or stopped because of political pressure. You've given
testimony about that, but I would like to ask you about it
again to clarify the record. Mr. Howard, did you ever stop this
investigation at any time?
Mr. Howard. No, sir, I have not.
Mr. Waxman. Did you reduce staffing levels or resources
available to the investigation at any time?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, I did.
Mr. Waxman. You did, however, close one or more case files
that were a part of this investigation, isn't that correct?
Mr. Howard. Case files have been closed, yes, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Were those case files closed for political
reasons?
Mr. Howard. No, sir.
Mr. Waxman. If not, why were they closed?
Mr. Howard. I believe the original case file was closed in
August 1999, but prior to that--it takes about, depending on
the evidence involved in the investigation--this investigation
started in, I think, 1992. There was a lot of evidence in that
investigation. The process doesn't--you just don't go say I'm
closing an investigation today and it's closed. There are
certain procedures you have to follow such as all the evidence
has to be destroyed. All the drug and non-drug evidence has to
be destroyed. All the evidence in that investigation has to be
completely destroyed prior to closing an investigation. That
case started--the closing in the early part of 1999.
Mr. Waxman. You mentioned a case file that was closed in
August 1999. When were actions first taken to close that file?
Mr. Howard. In the winter, late winter, early spring of
1999.
Mr. Waxman. Did anyone in your chain of command instruct
you or suggest to you that the investigation should be shut
down?
Mr. Howard. No, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Did anyone at the Justice Department instruct
you or suggest to you that the investigation should be shut
down?
Mr. Howard. No one has ever told me to close this
investigation.
Mr. Waxman. Did any Member of Congress, including
Representative Maxine Waters or anyone else, tell you to shut
down the investigation?
Mr. Howard. No one has ever told me to close this
investigation.
Mr. Waxman. Did anyone at the White House instruct you or
suggest to you that the investigation should be shut down?
Mr. Howard. No, sir, not at all.
Mr. Waxman. Did anyone associated with the Gore campaign
instruct you or suggest to you that the investigation should be
shut down?
Mr. Howard. No, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Was there any political pressure of any kind
for you to shut down the investigation?
Mr. Howard. Political pressure as far as Washington, no. As
far as political pressure involving the situation, the
allegations, if you want to call that political pressure, then
that caused us to cut the investigation back. I have never shut
this investigation down. Today, as far as I'm concerned, this
investigation is still ongoing.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Gamble, what is the standard for beginning an Office of
Professional Responsibility investigation into conduct by a DEA
agent?
Mr. Gamble. What is the----
Mr. Waxman. What's the standard for beginning an
investigation of professional--Office of Professional
Responsibility into conduct by a DEA agent?
Mr. Gamble. All allegations that come to the attention of
the Office of Professional Responsibility regarding violation
of standard----
Mr. Shays [presiding]. Make sure the mic is on.
Mr. Gamble. OK. All allegations that come to the attention
to the Office of Professional Responsibility concerning
violations of standard of conduct for any DEA employee or task
force officer is investigated by that office to determine the
merits of that allegation.
Mr. Waxman. Did allegations made with respect to Mr.
Schumacher and other agents in group four meet the standard for
commencement of an Office of Professional Responsibility
investigation?
Mr. Gamble. Yes, it did.
Mr. Waxman. Do you think the Office of Professional
Responsibility investigation was appropriate in this situation?
Mr. Gamble. I think it was appropriate, it was fair, and it
was thorough.
Mr. Waxman. Did you feel that improper political pressure
played any role in the commencement or course of the Office of
Professional Responsibility investigation?
Mr. Gamble. No, I do not.
Mr. Waxman. Did you feel any political pressure to find
misconduct by Mr. Schumacher or others in his enforcement
group?
Mr. Gamble. No, I did not.
Mr. Waxman. You made the observation in an e-mail to Mr.
Howard that the Office of Professional Responsibility
investigation had racial and political implications. What did
you mean by that?
Mr. Gamble. Do you have that e-mail? What is the date of
it?
Mr. Waxman. We'll get it to you before you answer the
question.
This is an e-mail dated March 14, 2000. Do you have a copy
of it there?
Mr. Gamble. Yeah. Is the day time 3:45?
Mr. Waxman. Yes.
Mr. Gamble. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4430.008
Mr. Waxman. It says, From: Gamble, R.C.; Sent: Tuesday,
March 14, 2000, 1:52 p.m.; To: Howard, Earnest L. Howard.
It says,
SAC, I need to discuss this matter with you, so please let
me know if you are in office. In view of my meeting with
Congressman and our guy's apparent failure to adhere to some
basis administrative procedures, fact matter was referred to
civil rights division and others, while not necessarily
critical or essential, but of high profile with some possible
political overtones. And as you know, all politics are local
and somewhat sensitive here with racial profiling perceptions
and etc. Call in questions the overall capability to be
effective without an onslaught of allegations and
unsubstantiated speculations on the part of our agent.
Considerations and comments on best options, notice I need some
options with the `S' in the bond.
And then you've got a response to it. But what did you mean
by that?
Mr. Gamble. What I was saying in reference to--I had often
spoken to Mr. Howard as I would normally do during the course
of a week, and I was concerned about his office politics as
well as mine. The Department, we were aware of the
sensitivities concerning the racial profile issue. There were a
series of issues that we were dealing with that he was not
aware of which I had to deal with in my capacity as the Chief
Inspector. So I was just assuring him that there were things
that he needed to take into consideration. He doesn't have all
the things that are influencing that I have to deal with and
neither do I have all the things that he has to deal with. So
the politics are local, both for what he has to deal with as
well as what I have to deal with. I think we needed to talk
about those issues. And the whole genesis behind this was
because it was a safety issue that had come to my attention
from my meeting on the 9th with the Congresswoman. All right.
And I took it very serious, you know, that concern.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you.
Mr. Mercado, did you give or were are you aware of any
instructions to Mr. Howard to close this investigation or any
case file that was part of the investigation?
Mr. Mercado. No, sir, at no time did I instruct Mr. Howard
to close any of the cases.
Mr. Waxman. Are you aware of any improper political
interference in this case by the White House?
Mr. Mercado. No, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Or the Gore campaign?
Mr. Mercado. No, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Or any Member of Congress?
Mr. Mercado. No, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Are you aware of any management decisions made
in this investigation on account of improper political
pressure?
Mr. Waxman. No, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Howard, let me ask you this, because I
think you testified and I just want to make sure this is the
case. You had a complaint from a Member of Congress.
Mr. Howard. That's correct.
Mr. Waxman. If you had a complaint from any other citizen,
would you have treated it the same way?
Mr. Howard. If it would have been a similar complaint, I
would have done the same thing. I have to worry about my agents
who I was very concerned about, the allegation which I did not
believe was true. But I also have to worry about the citizens
of Houston, TX. I was also worried about, if the allegations
are true, then I don't want agents out there doing what they
were alleged to have been doing. So I was wearing two hats.
Mr. Waxman. So the allegation was serious enough and you
took it seriously and whether those allegations had come from a
Member of Congress or another person you would have treated it
the same.
Mr. Howard. I would have treated it the same. The only
difference is because it was a Member of Congress certainly
makes it a higher calling. It's like if my mom tells me to do
something I'll listen to her, but if my grandmother tells me to
do something I'll really listen to her. It's a higher calling.
Mr. Waxman. OK. I appreciate that.
I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you all very
much for your answers.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
Mr. Burton is next, and I guess I'll just take my time.
I would like to just make an observation, Mr. Howard, that
I feel amazed by all your responses to the questions. For you
to say no political pressure and yet you allowed the subject of
an investigation to have a deposition taken in a Member's--
Congressman's office.
Mr. Howard. No, sir.
Mr. Shays. Excuse me. You didn't allow that. The
investigation took place in her office. And you responded by
taking your men off the case. That's what you did. And I don't
believe for a minute that you would do that in other
circumstances. I don't believe for a minute that someone who
has been involved in potential drug dealing and possible
contract murders, that you would allow that person to make a
complaint about racial profiling and then take your men off the
case. I don't believe it. So I just want to state it for the
record. Now, tell me why I should believe it.
Mr. Howard. Mr. Shays, it was not just racial profiling.
They had been accused of beating people. They had been accused
of illegal activity. I had concern for my agents. I had to
remove them not only for the sake of the people in Houston, but
I was concerned about these agents' careers. That was the first
thing that went through my mind.
Mr. Shays. Wait a second. If you're concerned, if you think
they beat someone, why are you concerned about their careers,
wouldn't you want to get them off the force?
Mr. Howard. I felt responsible for these agents being
involved in case. I don't believe the allegations. But whether
I believe them or not is moot right now because there's an OPR
investigation that has to prove them one way or the other.
Mr. Shays. Who made the charge?
Mr. Howard. Who made the allegations?
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Mr. Howard. A Congresswoman.
Mr. Shays. Based on what? That the subject, the person
under investigation made that claim? Did she present to you any
information that would have suggested from other sources that
this was happening?
Mr. Howard. I didn't interview her, no, sir. I was only
read a letter that she wrote. I knew an OPR investigation was
started. I knew my agents were accused of conducting illegal
activity.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Howard, you are under oath.
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. You are under oath. Are you telling me that if
someone else makes a complaint that your agents have been
involved in some activities like this that you would take them
off the case?
Mr. Howard. Of that magnitude----
Mr. Shays. Of that magnitude. Explain magnitude for me.
Mr. Howard. They were alleged to have been involved in
racial profiling. They were alleged to have been involved in
beating citizens.
Mr. Shays. And the allegation were made by the subjects
being investigated through a Congressperson.
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. So the person who is being looked at, who
possibly was involved in drug dealing and possibly contract
murders has made an allegation against your individuals, people
that worked for you, and you're saying to me that that's enough
to take them off the case.
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir. Had they have gone out and done
something else and everything being perfect, they went out and
they were following a subject----
Mr. Shays. Was there any basis for you to believe these
allegations?
Mr. Howard. No, sir.
Mr. Shays. Why didn't you just dismiss them out of hand,
given that they were being by the person who was being
investigated?
Mr. Howard. Can I explain?
Mr. Shays. Sure.
Mr. Howard. Had everything been perfect and they had gone
out the following day after I was made aware of these
allegations, they were following a suspect around that was
involved in this investigation, this individual gets stopped
for a traffic violation, he gets out of his car and has a gun,
the officers return fire and kill this individual, at that
point the media is going to blast DEA and everybody else for
misconduct because we were already made aware----
Mr. Shays. We have a simple solution. The simple solution
is basically to tell the individuals who are under your command
that these allegations have been made and to make sure they
don't stop this guy in the car. I mean, you had lots of
solutions other than taking them off the case.
Now you also said something else that I think is very
inaccurate. You tried to imply to us that the police force in
Houston wanted these three individuals off the case. And that's
simply not true. And I want to know if you are making the
statement that they were being asked to be off this case by the
Houston police.
Mr. Howard. I was told by Jack Schumacher, by Jim Nims, by
the ASAC that the police department had requested their
officers to return back to their parent unit prior to August.
Mr. Shays. To return back to the office but not to drop
this case, isn't that correct? Were they ever asked by the
Houston police to stop investigating this case?
Mr. Howard. I don't know.
Mr. Shays. So you're not making that claim. They just were
moved.
Mr. Howard. That's correct.
Mr. Shays. They were moved, but they were still on the
case.
Mr. Howard. They were not on the case. They were removed.
Mr. Shays. Isn't it a fact that you were the one that took
them off this case?
Mr. Howard. No, sir, that's not true.
Mr. Shays. So the meeting and the description that came
before us was not accurate. You were here earlier. You did not
order them, you did not look at your watch, and you did not
take them off the case.
Mr. Howard. I did not tell the police department officers
that you are off the case. What I said was there would be no
more proactive part of this investigation without approval from
an associate SAC or higher.
Mr. Shays. And that in your judgment is leaving them on the
case.
Mr. Howard. They had been asked to go back previous to
this.
Mr. Shays. No, no.
Mr. Howard. I did not tell them to leave, no, sir. We still
have judicial matters to do in this case. I am led to believe
by Jack Schumacher that the key to this investigation all
hinges on two people cooperating.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Howard, this is painful, but my time has
run.
Mr. Cummings, you have the time.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Mr. Howard, I have been listening to your testimony. I
heard part of it in the other room there, and I have been
watching the monitor. And Mr. Shays has asked some questions
which I got to tell you when I heard your testimony I have to--
I was kind of surprised. You know, you heard all the testimony,
did you not, of the witnesses on the panel that came before
you?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, I did.
Mr. Cummings. And would you agree that there is apparently
some key--there was some major differences in what you're
testifying to and what they testified to?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. I got the impression that these were some
officers who really believe in you, think that you're an
honorable man but believe that it wasn't your doing but you
were frustrated that the investigation--that they had to be
taken off of the case. Would you agree? You heard them. Did you
get that impression that they were frustrated? They thought
that you were frustrated. You may not have agreed with it
completely, but you felt kind of frustrated. That's the
impression that I got up here.
Mr. Howard. That's correct. I was frustrated.
Mr. Cummings. OK. And your frustration I take it did not
come from them having necessarily done anything wrong, that is
the officers, but just I guess--and you tell me if I am wrong--
but just basically from the process, that there were concerns
about what they--allegations about what they had possibly
done--allegations, I emphasize that--and you were just trying
to basically protect your people.
Mr. Howard. That's exactly correct.
Mr. Cummings. Now, one of the things--I think the thing
that kind of got next to me was when I heard the testimony that
we had a murder situation here and that there were very serious
crimes going on. And the question then becomes, and I think
somebody on the other side alluded to this a little earlier,
how do you make sure that you don't lose--don't lose the
momentum you've got?
I take it people have to kind of--you know, when you get
folk in a certain position you want to stay right on it because
you made time and time may cause you to lose something. I am
trying to figure out, how did you get the impression this it
was just depending on two people?
But you heard the testimony of these folks. They're saying
somebody said Schumacher said we were about to go into the
second phase. You heard everything they said. I guess what
would help all of us is for us to understand how that gap
occurs. In other words, with the group of officers who are on
the case saying we're right on the verge of moving into some
big stuff and then we're snatched and you're saying that you
thought--that you had been told that there were two people who
were apparently up for trial, you were waiting for them, you
said waiting for them to turn, is that right?
Mr. Howard. That's correct.
Mr. Cummings. I think that would help all of us.
Mr. Howard. I was told by Mr. Schumacher and Mr. Nims that
our entire investigation into the local impact target hinged on
the two lieutenants as identified by them in the organization.
Those two lieutenants had been arrested. Everything we were
trying to go forward depended upon these individuals
cooperating. I have never been told to this date that there
were additional leads at that time that they had not followed.
Mr. Cummings. I may have missed this, but is there some
type of criteria that is used to determine when you pull
someone off the case? In other words, you mention here in
answering a question a little bit earlier that there was
alleged racial profiling, and you name a number of things. I
think you said somebody had alleged been beaten. Is there some
kind of criteria that is either written or is basically
understood policy as to when you pull people, say, when you do
whatever you did in this case, that is, pull people off the
case? Is there a policy?
Mr. Howard. The seriousness of the allegations.
Mr. Cummings. And----
Mr. Howard. Those allegations were significant enough for
me to believe that if these officers went out and did something
again and everything turned out right as I explained earlier
and for some reason something went wrong, the perception in the
media, the perception on everybody would be that they--we knew
about it ahead of time; we should have stopped it ahead of
time. I was worried about my own people.
Mr. Cummings. Just one other question, Mr. Chairman.
Well, I guess this is what is troubling me, and I am sure
it is probably troubling other members of the committee, in
almost everything we do there has to be some kind of balancing
act, and I am sure you had to do some kind of balancing when
you came to that conclusion. Where does the balance--how do you
strike a balance between what they may allegedly be doing and
the fact that people may be being murdered, more drugs coming
into a community? You following what I am saying? I know you
want to protect your officers. I got that. What about the other
side? That's where our frustration comes from.
Mr. Howard. As I said, again I was told at that time, and
as I have been consistently since that time, that the key to a
successful investigation in the local impact target depended on
two people. When I said we're not going do any more proactive
activity, that meant until the end of the OPR investigation. If
the OPR investigation was terminated in 60 days, whatever they
had going on before, whatever they could do without getting
approval from upstairs could have been done anyway.
Mr. Cummings. Last question, so the information that you
found out today, if you had that information that you heard
would you have done the same thing?
Mr. Howard. As far as those two individuals----
Mr. Cummings. No, listen to me. Listen to my question. I'm
talking about the officers that testified a little bit earlier,
all the frustration they voiced. If they had said, look,
Howard, look, man, we are about to go into the second phase.
We've got--you heard what they said. If they had presented that
to you on that day that this determination was made to pull
them off, would you have done the same thing?
Mr. Howard. It would have been assigned to somebody else.
Mr. Cummings. OK.
Mr. Burton. [presiding.] Let me say to you Mr. Howard, Mr.
Mercado and Mr. Gamble, you're all under subpoena, I believe.
Is that correct? We would like for you to be back here
tomorrow. The reason--and we've asked the police officers and
all of the others on the first panel to be back tomorrow. The
reason for that is because there's some inconsistencies in the
testimony we're hearing from you, Mr. Howard, and what the
policemen have told us. We want to resolve that through further
questioning tomorrow, and we want to make absolutely sure we
get at the truth. And you will remain under oath, and you know
how important that is, that the truth be told.
Mr. Horn. Mr. Chairman, if I might suggest, we need a chart
that goes up the hierarchy. Mr. Waxman has mentioned that. Some
of us believe when you look at a bureaucracy----
Mr. Burton. Chain of command.
Mr. Horn. Who decides? Unity of command or chain of
command? And get it from the group that was working--obviously,
to Mr. Howard and then all those people above him and the same.
I would like to hear from the Office of Professional
Responsibility on your case load and how you do it.
Mr. Burton. We'll see if we can't get that information.
Mr. Gilman.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I want to thank
you for conducting today's hearing to help clear the air about
these serious allegations of possible political influence over
DEA drug-related criminal investigation in Houston.
We welcome the examination of DEA's performance which some
fear may have been influenced by this kind of political
pressure and the case being prematurely concluded. This charge
is serious. It's worthy of a careful, objective examination by
the Congress.
The e-mails we've read from the DEA office in Houston raise
serious questions about just what was going on there as well as
the Washington headquarters when they came in. E-mail messages
cry out for an explanation about any alleged political
pressure.
It's hoped that this case which we're examining today isn't
different from the long outstanding history of the independence
of our outstanding DEA whose men and women all around the globe
daily risk their lives for the benefit of all of our children
and communities.
My staff and I have known and have worked closely with DEA
administrator Donnie Marshall and his predecessor Tom
Constantine in the crucial war against illicit drugs. Mr.
Marshall is the first career DEA agent ever appointed agency
administrator and to our knowledge has always done an
outstanding job and one that's important to the rank and file.
And that's why we've been looking forward to today's testimony
and tomorrow's testimony.
Let me ask Mr. Howard, has the Rap-A-Lot drug case ever
been officially closed?
Mr. Howard. The target impact investigation--there are
multiple cases that are going on a local impact target.
Mr. Gilman. I'm talking about the Rap-A-Lot investigation.
Mr. Howard. There are multiple investigations on that local
impact target.
Mr. Gilman. Have you ever closed that investigation?
Mr. Howard. The one that was originally opened in 1992 has
been closed, yes.
Mr. Gilman. You closed it?
Mr. Howard. It was closed, yes, sir.
Mr. Gilman. Yes, I'm am looking at your March 14 e-mail to
Mr. Mercado. You said, at any rate it's over and we're closing
our case on Prince.
Mr. Howard. That isn't the same--the 1992 case was closed
in August 1999. That was the original case that I had been
briefed on.
Mr. Gilman. I'm looking at March 14, 2000, e-mail to the
headquarters.
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gilman. You're saying in that, ``at any rate it's over.
We're closing our case on Prince.'' Does that end the Prince
investigation?
Mr. Howard. No, sir, it does not. I wrote that e-mail
because I was venting. Mr. Mercado and Mr. Gamble are two of a
few people in this agency that I talk to about my feelings and
about things that are going on. I wanted them to call me
immediately. I had tried to talk to them earlier. I had been on
travel for a couple of weeks before.
Mr. Gilman. From that e-mail are we to believe that the DEA
Special Agent in Charge of Houston is misleading everybody with
a March 1999, e-mail about political influencing closing the
case?
Mr. Howard. I'm not trying to mislead anybody, Mr. Gilman.
All I'm telling you is that I tried to call Mr. Mercado. I had
tried to call Mr. Gamble. They were not in. I wanted to talk to
somebody because I was frustrated about this entire situation.
I was totally frustrated.
Mr. Gilman. And yet you state you're closing out your
investigation?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, I did. And, Mr. Gilman, the reason I
put in there is because I want them to call me. If I just put
in call me, I know they will call me sometime.
Mr. Gilman. Did anyone call you? Did you have a subsequent
conversation?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, they got me off the ceiling.
Mr. Gilman. What occurred after that conversation? Did you
reopen the case or did you leave it closed?
Mr. Howard. It never was closed. These words are not meant
like they're stated in there. These words are me begging out to
Mr. Gamble and Mr. Mercado to call me and get me off the
ceiling because I'm frustrated.
Mr. Gilman. What did you say to reopen the case then once
you stated it was closed?
Mr. Howard. It wasn't closed, Mr. Gilman. The case was not
closed.
Mr. Gilman. But you made a public statement in your e-mail,
you made a statement to your headquarters you're closing the
case. What did you do to reopen the case?
Mr. Howard. The case was not closed, Mr. Gilman. I'm
reaching out, venting. I'm asking Mr. Mercado and Mr. Gamble as
two people that I trust and that I talk to about many, many
things to get me off of the ceiling.
The weekend before Vice President Gore was in town at the
church, and I know from the church that I attend who is like
other sister church to the church that the Vice President
attended that the word in the street and the word in the church
is that a target, the local impact target was at the church
with the Vice President. To me, that was him slapping me in the
face, saying ha-ha. Here I am. You can't touch me.
I was totally frustrated about this entire scenario because
I know that this guy, this individual, this local impact target
is doing everything possible to keep from getting tied up in
the investigation.
Mr. Gilman. Mr. Howard, if I might interrupt you. On March
15 you sent a further e-mail to Mr. Mercado saying,
All that is of concern with me is the fact that Tom
Constantine and Greg Williams were both briefed on this case
and the potential political pressure associated with it because
the major player is a prominent pastor and a major pro tem. Now
we bow down to the political pressure anyway. If I had known
this I would have never brought Jack in this case nor would I
have ever pursued it. But it's over now. The Houston Division
will terminate all active investigation of Rap-A-Lot except for
those persons who've already been arrested and indicted. If any
information comes to the investigation of agents in the Houston
Division regarding Rap-A-Lot or James Smith it will be vetted
through headquarters prior to any action taken here.
Now, what does that tell us? What are you telling us?
Mr. Howard. Mr. Gilman, I am venting with Mr. Gamble and
Mr. Mercado. I am just totally venting. We did not close the
investigation into the impact--local impact target.
Mr. Gilman. Let me interrupt you again, Mr. Howard. Did
anyone at DEA headquarters in Washington ask you what the
political influence was that you were concerned about?
Mr. Howard. No, sir.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman's time has expired.
Let me just admonish the witness, Mr. Howard. I want you to
be very clear. We will send criminal referrals to the Justice
Department, the new Justice Department, after January 1 if we
find out there's been false testimony given to this committee
by anybody. I want you to be very clear about this. And
prosecution can take place if we find out that there is not
accurate statements being made, and I'm talking about anyone
who testifies, and I want you to know that. And we're going to
have you come back tomorrow after we have the policemen come
back and your associate and ask them questions regarding your
testimony today. So I want you to be very clear about that, if
you have any corrections you want to make today or tomorrow.
Who is next?
Mr. LaTourette or Mr. Shays, do you have any questions?
Mr. LaTourette.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, when the other panel was here we were talking
about an artist that is apparently known to some but not to me,
a guy named Scarface; and I've been handed a magazine that I
don't read on a regular basis called Alpha and Omega. And in
that interview Mr. Scarface, I don't know if his name is Mr.
Scarface but Scarface anyway, talks about a song that he has
written and it's now jumped to No. 7 on some billboard chart
that I'm not familiar with. It's ``Look Into My Eyes.''
It has to do with the testimony which was--Mr. Schumacher's
name was mentioned in it, and this investigation is named to
it. And the Houston police officers that testified, one of
the--a 21-year veteran, was indicating that the shame of this
song and the way that this was handled is that it brags about
the fact that, basically, if you're under investigation and you
get people to intervene on your behalf and you beat it, you not
only become somehow invincible but it also talks about knocking
off and killing a confidential informant who helped law
enforcement participate in that investigation.
The officer who testified from Houston said what an awful
message it is to send not only to the young people of Houston
but to the young people across the country who may be thinking
about what path they should follow. Should they steer clear of
drugs as we tell them to do and the money that can be illegally
gotten during drug transactions or should we do something more
productive with our lives?
Thanks to the technology of the committee, the wonderful
staff here has been kind enough to run up to the local music
store and purchase this classic for us, and they've cued it up,
Look In My Face. With the consent of the chairman, it's 3
minutes and 36 seconds, which should take most of my time, but
I'd like to play Look Into My Eyes for the gentlemen from the
DEA here and invite your comments on what message you think
this closing down of the investigation and giving the rap
artist the opportunity to brag about it sends to the young
people of America. Is that all right with you, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Burton. That's fine. Without objection.
Mr. Shays. The transcriber doesn't have to copy this down,
please.
Mr. LaTourette. It's got a good beat, but I don't think we
can dance to it.
[Tape played.]
Mr. Burton. I see some of the people from various official
agencies laughing at this. Do you really find it that funny? I
don't find it funny at all, and that's No. 6 or 7 on the
charts? My God.
Mr. LaTourette.
Mr. LaTourette. If I could just ask a question about it.
Although I didn't catch all the lyrics, I certainly heard Mr.
Schumacher's name. There's also the mention of an individual
who I understand was a confidential informant for the DEA
mentioned in these lyrics. I guess the question I have is the
unintended consequence I guess of the activities that took
place in Houston as a result of an unsubstantiated complaint
lodged with a Member of Congress by the target of an 8-year
investigation has apparently emboldened an artist to produce a
song that's now No. 7 on the charts that specifically names a
DEA officer and encourages the killing of a DEA confidential
informant. And I guess I'd be interested from you gentlemen
just to your reaction to that set of circumstances.
Mr. Mercado. Sir, I've been in law enforcement for 28
years, first as a New York City police officer, now at DEA for
the last 22 years. This is disgraceful. Now, we never told
anyone that the cases were closed. So for him to say that the
cases were closed, if you give me the date--can you tell us
when was that tape--on the back of the tape it should tell you
the date the tape was published.
Mr. Burton. Would the gentleman yield real quickly?
Mr. LaTourette. I will be happy to.
Mr. Burton. The policeman and the DEA agent said that Mr.
Howard came in, looked at his watch and the date and says it
stops as of now. Just a minute, Mr. Mercado. He said it stops
as of now.
Now, I'm going to bring them back in here tomorrow, and
they're going to testify, so don't tell us that the case wasn't
closed. They were very clear. Mr. Howard told them, it stops as
of now. Now they're going to tell us that again tomorrow. So
you're saying that the case wasn't closed. Were those people--
did they have their head in a sack? Were they not paying
attention? This isn't one person, two persons, three persons.
It was three Houston policemen and a DEA agent in charge of
investigation, so come on.
Mr. Mercado. Sir, can I answer you, sir. What I am trying
to say is that at no time did DEA come out public and say that
the case was closed for these individuals to know that the case
is closed.
Mr. Burton. How would--you know they might have been told
by somebody who had inside information.
Mr. LaTourette.
Mr. LaTourette. If I could reclaim my time, I really think
that that question begs the question, and the observation is
that at least this artist who works for the principal subject
of the investigation was under the impression that as a result
of political pressure or something else that this thing had
been deep sixed, Mr. Schumacher was taken off the case, he's
now riding a desk someplace. The seven HPD officers are back
doing whatever they were doing before this; and whether there
was an announcement by DEA or not, they think it's dead, and he
thinks it's dead to the point that he feels confident to
produce a record that basically not only exposes the DEA
officer and makes fun of him, sort of in your face, but
threatens to kill a snitch, a confidential informant for the
DEA, and when Mr. Stephens, Sergeant Stephens was testifying
before, somebody was testifying before, they said what
concerned them was when this thing was closed down, at least in
their understanding, that CIs were left to twist in the wind
and were caused to believe that they had no backup anymore,
that their lives were in jeopardy, even though they tried to
help either for good reasons or bad reasons.
And this guy, this artist, Mr. Whatever-his-name-is, feels
confident making a threat record, threatening the confidential
informant's life, and more than that, and why this issue of
whether it's closed or not, and the date really doesn't make a
spit's worth of difference to me, is the Houston guys said that
this has risen to No. 7 on the charts and kids, teenagers,
young people in Houston are listening to it. And it's now OK
because the stars say it's OK to diss the DEA and threaten the
lives of confidential informants. And I want to know what you
think about that. You think it's disgusting. How do you feel
about it, Mr. Gamble?
Mr. Gamble. I agree. I think it's also disgusting. I have a
20-year-old son who listens to rap music, and of course I don't
appreciate it. I don't appreciate a lot of the lyrics when you
listen to a lot of the rap songs, and one of the things he has
often said, it's not the lyrics that they're listening to, it's
the music, it's the beat, and that's what they dance to and
that may be an explanation as to why the chart is moving the
way it is. I heard it had a nice beat. I'm not saying that is
the reason. I really don't know but I would agree that the
lyrics and the special--the specific reference to our agent and
to our sources of information is distasteful, very distasteful.
Mr. LaTourette. How about you, Mr. Howard, and the question
is, do you see any responsibility here on the part of your
agency that created this set of circumstances that has led to
what you now call disgusting, distasteful, horrendous,
horrible, I mean, any responsibility at all for creating this
mess?
Mr. Howard. I don't know why that was written. I don't know
why they did what they did, but I did find it very, very
disturbing. I find it extremely disturbing in that it mentions
Jack Schumacher and Chad Scott by name, and they were the case
agents on this investigation.
Mr. LaTourette. I agree with you and I--well, I don't know,
you know, there was a movie, Apollo 13, we have a problem,
Houston; I think we have a problem, Houston, and I yield back
my time.
Mr. Burton. Gentleman yields back his time.
Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Howard, would you tell me how taking your
people off the case improved your opportunity to get those so-
called two lieutenants to talk? In other words, it's known on
the street that the very people doing the investigation have
been removed and you're saying that somehow hope lies in
getting these two lieutenants of the subject person under
investigation to turn against their own employer. Tell me the
logic of that one.
Mr. Howard. I don't know anything about it being on the
street that these officers were no longer working on this
investigation, but I was led--I was told----
Mr. Shays. Excuse me, sir. The person being investigated,
Mr. Prince, was aware they were taken off the investigation.
Mr. Howard. I don't know that, no, sir, I don't know.
Mr. Shays. You under oath are going to testify that you
believe that would not be known?
Mr. Howard. I don't know if Mr. Prince knew that or not. I
have no way of knowing what Mr. Prince knew.
Mr. Shays. The rap singer knew.
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, I guess he did.
Mr. Shays. I guess he did. I mean there's a point where
being honest and candid crosses a line, and you ask us to see
that the lights are off when I know the lights are on, and so I
react the way I do. You said to Mr. Waxman, there was no
political pressure, but we know for a fact there was, and it
was Maxine Waters, and we know that she was so powerful that
she could get the subject of the investigation to come to her
office and get your people, Mr. Gamble, to come to her office,
the very person we're investigating, and it's Stephen Delgado,
William Dodge and Felix Jimenez. Is he a chief inspector under
you, Mr. Gamble?
Mr. Gamble. I preceded him in that capacity.
Mr. Shays. So is he under you?
Mr. Gamble. Oh, no. He moved to become the Special Agent in
Charge of the Philadelphia office.
Mr. Shays. And you fulfilled his office?
Mr. Gamble. Yes, I do.
Mr. Shays. And Veroniique Pluviose-Fenton, legislative
assistant for Congresswoman Waters; Bruce Toble, general
manager, Rap-A-Lot Records, very person who puts this music on;
Honorable Maxine Waters; Ambassador Sydney Ramsey, who I
believe is Ms. Waters' husband; Cheryl Ziegler, lawyers
committee for civil rights under law.
Now we start out, this deposition, excuse me, the words are
coming from Mr. Delgado, this interview is being conducted in
reference to the letter from Maxine Waters, U.S. Congresswoman,
35th District, California, to Janet Reno, Attorney General of
the United States, Department of Justice dated August 20, 1999.
On page 39, Chief Inspector Jimenez says, ``fine, we will
take a look at the situation. I just want to put it on the
record that we feel that the information provided by Mr.
Prince, it's insufficient at this point for us to, you know, we
will take a look at it, but it has not pinpointed any civil
rights violation. It's not identifying specific acts of
wrongdoing of DEA agents and so on.''
Now the date of this was when, Mr. Gamble?
Mr. Gamble. I believe it was August.
Mr. Shays. 24th, correct, 1999. Would you tell me when this
investigation of your agents was ended?
Mr. Gamble. May 29, 2000 we concluded it and sent our
facts----
Mr. Shays. In October?
Mr. Gamble. In March, on March 29th.
Mr. Shays. It ended?
Mr. Gamble. We completed our factfinding, yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. And then what happened?
Mr. Gamble. And then it goes to a board of review, which is
a Board of Professional Conduct.
Mr. Shays. So this mindless investigation without substance
goes from August 1999 basically to October 19, 2000, and you,
Mr. Howard, during this time, have not allowed these agents to
basically be involved in this case.
Mr. Howard. That's not true, no, sir. I said that they
could not conduct any more proactive part of the investigation
without approval from the associate SAC or the SAC.
Mr. Shays. Right. So that means what to you? It means
something to me. What does it mean to you?
Mr. Howard. That means if they had any substantial leads,
they had to go through the chain of command and get appropriate
instructions back.
Mr. Shays. How did they get leads if you're not allowing
them to investigate?
Mr. Howard. They get leads from cooperating witnesses.
Mr. Shays. But they have been taken off the case. You know
that and I know that. And isn't it true that Mr. Schumacher was
actually assigned an administrative job.
Mr. Howard. In March he was assigned as the acting group
supervisor of the special support group.
Mr. Shays. Right, he was taken off the case.
Mr. Howard. In March he was still involved in the judicial
process.
Mr. Shays. No. He's involved in maybe some court cases.
He's taken off the case. I know that there are people who do
investigative work who are watching now and laughing at you,
laughing because they see through it. Now I may not be an
investigator, but I at least have enough common sense to know
they had been taken off the case, they have told us they have
been taken off the case. They have told us that. We have e-
mails from you that say it ended because of political reasons.
They say it's political reasons. Why should we believe you?
Mr. Howard. Because I'm telling the truth. Mr. Schumacher
was still----
Mr. Shays. Telling the truth when you met them, telling the
truth when you wrote the e-mail, or telling the truth now
because they don't agree? They don't agree. You can even
acknowledge they don't agree.
Mr. Howard. That's correct, they do not agree.
Mr. Shays. So you lied to them and you lied in your e-
mails, but you're telling the truth now?
Mr. Howard. I lied to who, sir, I'm sorry?
Mr. Shays. Well, you said they don't tell the truth,
they're in conflict.
Mr. Howard. I didn't say that they lied. I told them during
the meeting in August there will be no more proactive
investigation going on.
Mr. Shays. We read your e-mails. We heard about their
comments that they said it was for political reasons. Their
statement to us corresponds with your e-mails. There's nothing
different to them. They're the same, and now you're telling me
that this e-mail is not the truth. Isn't that correct?
Mr. Howard. That's correct, Mr. Shays.
Mr. Burton. Gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Gilman.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Gamble, what
communications did you have, if any, with Congresswoman Waters
with regard to this case?
Mr. Gamble. Nothing with regard to the Rap-A-Lot case but
with regards to the OPR investigation, I did--I did speak to
her on that.
Mr. Gilman. And what communication did you have with her
with regard to that?
Mr. Gamble. I provided her a status of the investigation
since--that was in February.
Mr. Gilman. And did you have any communication from Ms.
Waters with regard to the case.
Mr. Gamble. Any?
Mr. Gilman. Any letter, any communication.
Mr. Gamble. No letter, no, sir.
Mr. Gilman. Was there any inquiry made by Ms. Waters with
regard to this case to your office or to the DEA headquarters?
Mr. Gamble. Following my meeting with her on the ninth.
Mr. Gamble. Yes.
Mr. Gilman. What was your substance of your meeting on the
ninth?
Mr. Gamble. To update her on the investigation that was
ongoing.
Mr. Gilman. What did you tell her?
Mr. Gamble. I told her that we were still conducting the
investigative phase. There were several witnesses that had not
yet been interviewed, had yet to be interviewed and until such
time we will continue to move forward.
Mr. Gilman. And what was the necessity of your keeping her
up to date on that case?
Mr. Gamble. Administrator Marshall had asked that I update
her on the status of the OPR matter.
Mr. Gilman. And is that OPR matter concluded?
Mr. Gamble. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gilman. What did you tell Mr. Howard about Ms. Waters,
and what did you suggest that he do?
Mr. Gamble. I did have a conversation relative to my
meeting with her and some of the comments that she had made
during that meeting.
Mr. Gilman. What comments are you referring to?
Mr. Gamble. Well, one was a joking one. Of course, Mr.
Jimenez is Hispanic, and when I appeared there and she saw me
for the first time, she just jokingly said, now, they have a
brother on the case and she talked about the necklace that had
been taken from one of the subjects, I believe it was a Mr.
Simon.
Mr. Gilman. What kind of a necklace?
Mr. Gamble. It was a gold medallion that he was wearing at
the time.
Mr. Gilman. Which indicated what?
Mr. Gamble. It indicated that it may have some evidentiary
value.
Mr. Gilman. What evidentiary value?
Mr. Gamble. It turned up to have none, or it wasn't
processed as any.
Mr. Gilman. Was the necklace indicative that he was a
member of a gang?
Mr. Gamble. I do not know that.
Mr. Gilman. Was that ever told to you?
Mr. Gamble. No, sir.
Mr. Gilman. Were you ever informed of that?
Mr. Gamble. There was some conversation that it was, the
reason it was taken because they thought it may have been some
indication.
Mr. Gilman. Of what?
Mr. Gamble. Of some gang association.
Mr. Gilman. And do you know whether it was or was not----
Mr. Gamble. No, I do not.
Mr. Gilman [continuing]. An indication of any gang
association?
Mr. Gamble. No.
Mr. Gilman. Did anyone ever indicate that to you?
Mr. Gamble. No, sir.
Mr. Gilman. What other information did you discuss with
her?
Mr. Gamble. She wanted to know if it would be feasible to
explore, if it had no evidentiary value, would--to show good
faith on the part of the government and the service to the
public to return that necklace.
Mr. Gilman. What did you tell her?
Mr. Gamble. I told her I didn't know whether it had any
evidentiary value, but if it did not, I would explore that.
Mr. Gilman. Was that necklace ever returned to her?
Mr. Gamble. Yes, it was.
Mr. Gilman. When was that?
Mr. Gamble. It was returned on March 8th of this year.
Mr. Gilman. Who made that decision?
Mr. Gamble. I told Mr. Howard that if it had--to us, as far
as OPR matter, it had no evidentiary matter. It had been taken
inconsistent with administrative procedures for taking and
safeguarding personal property and had not been processed
accordingly, and consequently, it should be returned.
Mr. Gilman. You instructed Mr. Howard to return the
necklace?
Mr. Gamble. Yes, I did.
Mr. Gilman. Did he do that?
Mr. Gamble. It was returned I believe by Mr. Joura.
Mr. Gilman. To Congresswoman Waters?
Mr. Gamble. No, no. It was to--I believe it was to Mr.
Simon, the rightful owner.
Mr. Gilman. Mr. Mercado, is it standard practice to
interview an alleged target in a congressperson's office?
Mr. Mercado. It's hard to say, sir. Normally----
Mr. Gilman. Not whether it's hard to say. Is that standard
practice by the DEA?
Mr. Mercado. It's not standard practice, sir.
Mr. Gilman. Has that ever been allowed before?
Mr. Mercado. Not to my knowledge no, sir.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you. No further questions.
Mr. Waxman. Would the gentleman yield to me on that point?
Mr. Gilman. I'd be please to yield.
Mr. Waxman. Whose idea was it to have the deposition there?
Was it DEA's, if you know?
Mr. Gamble. I do not know.
Mr. Waxman. That is what I understood, that she was asking
for--that she wanted to be present and they scheduled it there.
It wasn't, as far as I know, at her request.
Mr. Gilman. What I'm seeking, is that a permissible
practice? Mr. Gamble, does your office set forth any standards
with regard to that kind of an interview?
Mr. Gamble. We have not since I've been the Chief
Inspector, and to my knowledge, it has not happened before.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Cummings, did you have more questions?
Mr. Cummings. Yeah. Mr. Howard, first of all, I want you to
understand that when I listened to the chairman, I'm--sometimes
he gives me chills because I know he's very serious about this
referring matters for criminal investigations, and so I want to
see if I can't just ask you all a few questions. By the way, a
lot of them are very frivolous if I might add in my opinion,
and also in the Justice Department's opinion, but let me ask
you this: Mr. Mercado, what impression did you have? You had
the impression that the investigation was ongoing?
Mr. Mercado. Yes, sir. First time I got involved in the
investigation was back in February, beginning of February when
I was called into Donnie Marshall's office. Present was Mr.
Gamble. At the time, Mr. Marshall directed Mr. Gamble to go
meet with Ms. Waters, and at no time discuss any of the current
investigation, just advise her on the OPR process. That gave me
the impression that the cases were open. That's the first time
I got involved in this investigation.
Mr. Cummings. Now, Mr. Gamble, you--it was your impression
that it was ongoing also?
Mr. Gamble. Yes, sir. I was only--I'm the Chief Inspector,
so I was only concerned about the Standard of Conduct
violations, and I was not really concerned that much about
operationally what was going on, just from the safety and the
welfare of the public as well as our agent, our employees.
Mr. Cummings. Now, it seems to me that the officers--
clearly they came to a conclusion that there was nothing to
be--that their tenure with regard to this investigation was
over. Now, if they, Mr. Howard, you said that if they found
some other evidence, that you kept the door open for them to
take some action; is that right?
Mr. Howard. If there was additional leads or other
evidence, they had means to bring them forward, yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. And in the discussion that you all had, that
discussion that you all had when they claimed investigation was
brought to an end, were there any protests by the officers, do
you remember, saying why are you doing this to us, we're really
in good shape? And I mean, was there any kind of, you know,
expressions of frustration?
Mr. Howard. Everybody was frustrated, yes, sir. Everybody
was demoralized.
Mr. Cummings. And all of you all were having this
discussion? How many of you all were in that meeting, do you
know? Was Mr. Schumacher there?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir. Probably 10 or 12 people.
Mr. Cummings. And all you said was what, political reasons?
Mr. Howard. What I said was that we had an allegation from
a politician that indicated that there was misconduct,
inappropriate conduct, racial profiling, beatings and so forth,
and that we could not continue any more proactive part of the
investigation. I was suspending as of, I looked at my watch,
and I gave them a time what was on my watch, as of that time,
no more proactive part of the investigation would be done
without approval from upstairs.
Mr. Cummings. What was the response to that that you can
recall?
Mr. Howard. They weren't happy, but they weren't happy with
the allegations because they knew they were unfounded, untrue,
or they believed they were untrue and unfounded.
Mr. Cummings. You said in answer to somebody's question
over on the other side that one of the reasons why you were
upset about the allegations is because you were the one who
assigned this to Schumacher.
Mr. Howard. That's correct.
Mr. Cummings. And were you aware of any past allegations
against Mr. Schumacher with regard to racial profiling and
things of that nature?
Mr. Howard. No, sir.
Mr. Cummings. So you felt--and why did you select him for
this assignment?
Mr. Howard. He had just finished an assignment in east
Texas on an investigation, and I wanted a senior competent
investigator involved in this. It had been in the hands of
another senior agent for several years and nothing had been
done. I wanted to find out if we had an--if we could do
anything with an investigation.
Mr. Cummings. Does it bother you that there is such a
difference in what they perceived and what you perceived to
have been said in that meeting or what their impression was?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, it bothers me because they perceived
that the investigation was closed down forever. What I said was
the proactive part of the investigation is closed down pending
the outcome of the OPR investigation.
Mr. Cummings. And so just so we're clear, what you wrote in
the e-mail, you're saying that's not a lie.
Mr. Howard. What I wrote in the e-mail in March?
Mr. Cummings. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howard. The March e-mail is me talking about closing
the case down and so forth. Everything in that e-mail was for
two purposes. One, I was venting. No. 2 was, I wanted Mr.
Mercado and Mr. Gamble to call me back to get me out of my
frustration.
Mr. Gilman. Will the gentleman yield a moment?
Mr. Cummings. Certainly.
Mr. Gilman. Did they ever call you back?
Mr. Howard. Yes, they did.
Mr. Gilman. And what was said?
Mr. Howard. They got me off the ceiling, asked me why I was
upset, what's going on, calm down, everything will be OK, let's
continue on, we're not closing anything down.
Mr. Gilman. Did they talk about any political influence at
all or did you raise it with them?
Mr. Howard. No, sir.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you for yielding.
Mr. Cummings. Is that your recollection, Mr. Mercado?
Mr. Mercado. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Is that yours?
Mr. Gamble. Yes, it is.
Mr. Cummings. All right. Thank you very much.
Mr. Burton. Yes, Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Howard, I think that you and I have a big
disagreement, but I would never want to call a witness a liar.
And so for that implication, I would apologize, but we have two
conflicting statements. You seemed to modify your statement in
responding to Mr. Cummings, and I'm going to ask that that be
read back tomorrow, and I'm going to get it, but you described
your meeting with your investigators saying that the proactive
investigation had concluded pending decisions from higher-ups,
and the reason why I think I heard you say was because a
political problem with the Congressperson. That's what I heard.
Am I hearing you correct?
Mr. Howard. What happened was I had a meeting with the
people in that group. I told them that we had received a letter
or complaint from a Congressperson. I think I even named the
Congressperson and that there were allegations of a substantial
nature against people in the group, and I think I went over a
couple of the allegations. I said we will suspend any proactive
part of this investigation pending the outcome of the OPR
investigation.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. So were you monitoring that
investigation, eager to get these men back on to a proactive
effort?
Mr. Howard. Excuse me, am I monitoring?
Mr. Shays. Were you monitoring the investigation? You were
telling me it had to wait until it was concluded.
Mr. Howard. I was talking to Jack Schumacher almost every
day I was in the office.
Mr. Shays. No. They weren't the people--I'm talking about
monitoring the investigation, the OP, the issue--OPR
investigation. That's what--the proactive part of your
investigation was being suspended.
Mr. Howard. Correct.
Mr. Shays. Pending the OPR, the conclusion of the OPR case
that had been initiated by Ms. Waters.
Mr. Howard. That's correct.
Mr. Shays. Were you monitoring that case, eager to see it
conclude and eager to put your men back on the case in a
proactive way?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, I was advised periodically by OPR as
the case progressed.
Mr. Shays. And who would you be in contact with?
Mr. Howard. Usually Bill Brown.
Mr. Howard. Now Mr. Gamble wasn't involved in this part of
it?
Mr. Howard. Not at that time, not until this year, sir.
Mr. Shays. What I'm trying to understand is in August 1999,
you had the deposition taken of the very person who's the
subject of the investigation in which in that deposition, the
investigator says we don't see much here, but Mr. Gamble, I've
not seen it concluded until October. What happened from March
when the decision was made to October?
Mr. Gamble. It goes to the Board of Professional Conduct
who review all the facts. I believe it was six volumes, I could
be wrong, but I believe it was six volumes that they had to go
through that five people that sit there, and this is just one
of many cases that come to them, and I guess when it got its
turn, they reviewed it and they made their recommendations to
the deciding official as to what those actions were, one of
which was a clearance and one of which was a reprimand.
Mr. Shays. And they were totally cleared.
Mr. Gamble. One was a reprimand. That's not totally clear.
Mr. Shays. And that was the medallion issue?
Mr. Gamble. I believe that was the medallion issue yes,
sir.
Mr. Shays. So I'd like to have you explain, Mr. Howard, if
there was no proactive effort in this case from the time they
were taken out until I don't know when, because now they have
been cleared, what do you mean the case is open? Define to me a
case being open if it's not proactive.
Mr. Howard. I had repeatedly been told by the group
supervisor and Mr. Schumacher that the whole case--that our
target, the local impact target hinged on two individuals
cooperating.
Mr. Shays. That's a different issue. You know that they had
not concluded their investigation. You had taken them off the
investigation because of the OPR case?
Mr. Howard. That's correct.
Mr. Shays. So there was more to be done, you know that,
because they weren't allowed to be proactive. That's your
testimony?
Mr. Howard. No, sir.
Mr. Shays. So you think they had concluded their proactive
part?
Mr. Howard. I had not been told of any other leads in
August. I had never been told of any other leads. I was led to
believe that this entire investigation hinges on two people.
Mr. Shays. Who told you that?
Mr. Howard. Mr. Schumacher and Mr. Nims.
Mr. Shays. It is your testimony that they said and that's
it, and they didn't need to do any more proactive effort? Are
you saying to us in addition, that they had gotten all the
information they needed from their informants? Are you claiming
that they said they had completed the proactive part of their
investigation?
Mr. Howard. What I'm saying is, it was never brought to my
attention about any other leads.
Mr. Shays. That's not what I ask, because you make an
assumption without being able to back it up, and I don't want
you to mislead us and that's where I kind of feel----
Mr. Howard. I'm not trying to mislead you, Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Well, I feel you are. I feel that you are
playing a word game with me here.
Mr. Howard. No, sir, I'm not.
Mr. Shays. The reason I feel you're playing a word game is
you said the case is open, but in response to Mr. Cummings, you
said the proactive part of the case had been closed. OK. That's
what you said, true?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, the proactive part of the
investigation had to be approved upstairs, that's correct.
Mr. Shays. Why did it have to be approved upstairs?
Mr. Howard. It's just a further check and balance to ensure
that whatever they're trying to do is not going to cause any
additional allegations.
Mr. Shays. And who's ``they,'' because now it seems to me
we're talking politics?
Mr. Howard. The public, whoever's out there. If something
goes wrong, as I explained before----
Mr. Shays. Who's ``they?''
Mr. Howard. The agents are going to do a reverse
operation----
Mr. Shays. Who has to give you permission to do the
proactive part of the case?
Mr. Howard. Give me permission?
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Mr. Howard. Nobody.
Mr. Shays. I thought you said they couldn't get involved
because----
Mr. Howard. The agents and officers, the street agents have
to get approval from an associate SAC or higher.
Mr. Shays. Why?
Mr. Howard. Because of the original allegations. I did not
want them put in a situation to where management would not know
what was going on.
Mr. Shays. Tell me who is higher. I want to know who they
are. What person are you waiting to hear from that would allow
this case, which basically, in my judgment, is put on hold----
Mr. Howard. I wasn't waiting to hear from anybody. They had
to get approval.
Mr. Shays. Who's ``they?''
Mr. Howard. The agents, the street agents, the police
officers, Jack Schumacher, that entire group.
Mr. Shays. They needed to jump over you to get approval?
Mr. Howard. No, sir. No, sir. They report to a group
supervisor. The group supervisor reports to an Assistant
Special Agent in Charge.
Mr. Shays. But you're the one that took them off the case?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. OK. So you're the one who took them off the
case, so why wouldn't they go to you to put them on the case?
Mr. Howard. I'm not in the office every day Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. That's irrelevant because you took them off the
case.
Mr. Howard. I didn't.
Mr. Shays. So I mean, the fact you weren't in the office
didn't prevent you from taking them off the case. What wouldn't
have prevented you from putting them on the case?
Mr. Howard. To do an operation--all I am saying is to do an
operation, whatever that operation may be, I wanted them to
have approval from an associate SAC or from myself.
Mr. Shays. Or from yourself. So now they could get it from
you?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. OK. That's important because we were getting
this word game where you were implying that you weren't really
involved--hear me out. You said you weren't in the office, so
therefore it sounded like you weren't relevant, but you are
relevant. You could have put them back on the case, correct?
Mr. Howard. If they had a proactive part of the
investigation to do, they could have come to me. They could
have come to an associate SAC.
Mr. Shays. No, you took them off the case. If you took them
off the case how could they be proactive?
Mr. Howard. The group still, as I explained to them that
day, the proactive part of the investigation is put at a halt
unless--pending the outcome of the OPR investigation.
Proactive, you come forward to us and ask for permission to do
an operation.
Mr. Shays. So I'll just conclude. The bottom line is that
basically while that investigation was going on, there really
was no proactive--while the OPR case was going on and it
dragged on a long, long time, there really wasn't any proactive
effort, and that fits my definition of a case, kind of being
maybe not closed but being put on hold, and it seems to me, and
this is my observation, that if you want to turn people against
someone, they need to know the case is hot, but since they knew
it was on hold, you took away the incentive for those two
lieutenants.
Mr. Howard. Mr. Shays, there were five arrests made in
December of last year and seizures that are part of the
umbrella case.
Mr. Shays. Did those two lieutenants turn against their
employer?
Mr. Howard. They're still in the judicial process.
Mr. Shays. They didn't, did they?
Mr. Howard. I was led to believe that right now they're not
found guilty of anything and everything pends--there's no
hammer on them.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Howard, this has been painful for you but
it's been painful for us, too.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman's time has expired. Do we have
more questions?
Mr. LaTourette. I guess I have the time now. I think
Chairman Gilman has one question. Let me get--and I'll yield to
him then I'll yield to Mr. LaTourette, and hopefully we can
wrap this up.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Howard, you stated that the proactive part of the
investigation was stopped pending the OPR investigation; is
that correct?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, it is.
Mr. Gilman. So from August 1999 to October of this year,
this one letter shut down this case; is that correct?
Mr. Howard. Is what correct, sir?
Mr. Gilman. Well, is it correct that there was no action?
Mr. Howard. No, sir, it's not.
Mr. Gilman. Listen to me. From August 1999 to October 2000
while the OPR investigation was going forward, was there any
proactive investigation in this case?
Mr. Howard. There were arrests made in December 1999 and
seizures. There's also another investigation I believe that was
opened up in----
Mr. Gilman. With regard to this case?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gilman. Go ahead. When else?
Mr. Howard. There was another investigation with a source
that's being developed I think 2 months ago.
Mr. Gilman. Is that still in the process of being
developed?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, it's an active investigation.
Mr. Gilman. In this case?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir. There are multiple cases. It's not
just one case.
Mr. Gilman. Well, coming out of these allegations, it
involved the whole Prince organization?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gilman. So there has been some ongoing activity?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gilman. Despite the OPR investigation?
Mr. Howard. That activity was approved by the associate SAC
for December, I would assume, because it happened in December
of last year. The case that just was initiated in the last
couple of months, yes, sir, we knew about that case also.
Mr. Gilman. Were you involved in these further
investigations?
Mr. Howard. I was made aware of it yes, sir.
Mr. Gilman. Were you involved in them, directly involved,
not just made aware?
Mr. Howard. Did I say go down and say open this case, no,
sir, I don't do that on cases.
Mr. Gilman. Well, how were you made aware of the cases that
were ongoing? Is that in the Houston area?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, it's all in Houston.
Mr. Gilman. And how were you made aware of those ongoing
investigations then?
Mr. Howard. I go down to the group--to the enforcement base
on a regular basis when I'm in town and I talk to people. I'm
also briefed by my associate SAC and the ASAC.
Mr. Gilman. And did anyone say to you well, how come we're
doing this despite the fact you closed down this investigation?
Mr. Howard. No, sir.
Mr. Gilman. There was no----
Mr. Howard. The case was not closed.
Mr. Gilman. Never any objection?
Mr. Howard. Mr. Gilman, in my opinion, the case has not
been closed. What I say is closed is not what the committee
understands as being closed. When I say not closed, the
committee doesn't understand that terminology.
Mr. Gilman. Well, we don't--I for one do not fully
understand when you say the case is closed, and yet in your
mind it's still active. I have trouble understanding that, Mr.
Howard.
Mr. Burton. Let me reclaim my time.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Let me just say, we'll try to get all this
ironed out tomorrow. We would like for this panel to be back
here at 11, as well as the other panel. We'll start at 11.
Mr. LaTourette, you have the balance of my time.
Mr. LaTourette. Would it be all right with the chairman if
I claimed 5 minutes in my own right since I don't know how much
time you have left? Would that be a big problem?
Mr. Burton. I have 2 minutes, but if you'd like, I yield
back the balance of my time and yield to you so we can expedite
this. So I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. LaTourette.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
courtesy. Mr. Howard, just a couple of housecleaning matters if
I may. The meeting that has been the subject of extensive
testimony, the September meeting, when you called the task
force together to give them instructions and basically,
according to you, the instructions were that stop the proactive
part, you guys are going to go do something else while this
complaint gets ironed out. Do you specifically recall telling
the Houston police officers and the DEA agents that were
present at that meeting, but that doesn't mean if you have an
active lead, you shouldn't come to the SAC or ASAC to get
permission to pursue it?
Mr. Howard. No, sir. The GS was unsure of what--I don't
think he participated in the entire meeting. He came to my
office at a later time and asked for a clarification, and I
clarified that with him.
Mr. LaTourette. The GS is who?
Mr. Howard. Jim Nims.
Mr. LaTourette. I want to, in the 5 minutes that I have,
talk a little bit about the Vice President's visit on March
12th, and ask you again a question about the e-mails and
whether or not--maybe you can explain, you can't see me over
the court reporter's head, so I'll lean this way--what
happened. When the complaint is registered from the Member of
Congress, you take the guys off the case, and I would hope that
the agency would at least go back and look at the policy that,
I mean, if you have a great agent, and I think you said Mr.
Schumacher was a really good agent, and you selected and
handpicked him for this assignment, that somebody could write
in and make your complaint against him, and you pull the best
guy off the team while you iron out what proves to be a
worthless allegation, but be that as it may, he's pulled off
the team, but he's still part of this enforcement group four,
is he not, in September?
Mr. Howard. In September, yes, sir, he was still a part of
group four.
Mr. LaTourette. Then we go on, and the investigation goes
on and they are looking into whether or not Mr. Schumacher is
engaged in racial profiling, and the other guys from Houston
have done such a thing, and eventually we find out that they
haven't, but then there comes a time in March, and if we fast
forward to March 12th, the Vice President of the United States
is visiting the church without walls. I think you indicated
that you got intelligence that Mr. Prince was there and you
thought that was in your face, that here's this drug dealer
showing up, or who you believe is a drug dealer, showing up
with the second most powerful guy in the country, and you say,
boy, that's in your face.
And then there's a flurry of--ceiling flurry of e-mails.
You describe yourself as being on the wall or in the ceiling.
There's a flurry of e-mails in the days following the Vice
President's visit between you and Mr. Gamble where you're on
the ceiling, you want him to call you, you say the thing's
closed; it's really not closed, it's just to sort of juice a
telephone call which later takes place. But even though Mr.
Schumacher has been part of enforcement group four, since that
complaint was lodged by Congresswoman Waters on March 15th,
he's shipped out, he's taken out of enforcement group four and
he's put behind a desk someplace in a position that he says he
doesn't have any experience in or doesn't have the
qualifications to handle.
What happened from September when you make the decision
that he needs to be pulled from the case because of this
worthless complaint to March when now he not only needs to be
pulled off, but now he needs to be reassigned? What happened?
Mr. Howard. In January, Mr. Schumacher was made the acting
group supervisor of that enforcement group because I had
vacancy at the ASAC level and I moved Mr. Nims up as the acting
ASAC. It was brought to my attention by Mr. Gamble in February
that perhaps Mr. Schumacher should not be the acting group
supervisor of that group while the OPR investigation was
ongoing. I thought that was reasonable, and I said rather than
to even further demoralize Mr. Schumacher since everybody knew
he was an acting GS at that time, to put him in the acting GS
position that I had vacant, which was special support group.
As far as qualifications go, it's an 18-11 position.
Whether it be an enforcement group or whether it be a special
support group supervisor, he was still in an 18-11 position.
Mr. LaTourette. In that flurry of e-mails back and forth
following the Vice President's visit, and then if you had been
asked about this while I was out of the room, I apologize, but
I understand that the investigation concerning this fellow has
gotten worse. Have you been asked about that sentence during
the course of this hearing?
Mr. Howard. No, sir, I have not.
Mr. LaTourette. What got worse?
Mr. Howard. Just the idea, the whole thing was getting
frustrating with the target of the investigation with the Vice
President at the church that weekend, that the investigation,
the OPR investigation was dragging out. It was just the
totality of the entire situation. Nothing in particular.
Mr. LaTourette. And in that e-mail, you also talk about
this bow-down to political pressure. What political pressure
were you referring to?
Mr. Howard. Political pressure of the whole circumstances
involved in the whole mess, everything. It wasn't any one
particular thing. Just the local political pressure from the
media, from what was going on worldwide with racial profiling,
with me bringing Jack in the case. I felt responsible.
Mr. LaTourette. And going back to the reprimand that was
issued for the fellow that improperly handled the medallion
case, I understand that was the one substantive finding of this
OPR investigation that started on August 20th. This van was
originally stopped because your agency had information that the
driver of the van had issued a threat and was going to kill a
confidential informant of the DEA; is that right?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. And we're having a problem with that? I
mean, did you have any difficulty with protecting your
confidential informants or stopping individuals who were going
to kill your confidential informants?
Mr. Howard. I don't have any problem with that, no, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Gamble, you got a phone call basically
from a Member of Congress saying I thought I straightened this
out in September, but now you guys are taking the medallion off
a guy's neck, why don't you give it back? Did that happen? How
did you become aware of this medallion thing?
Mr. Gamble. From reviewing the OPR investigation at the
stage that it was before I went to brief the Congressperson.
Mr. LaTourette. I don't have anything further. Thank you so
much.
Mr. Shays [presiding]. Going to Mr. Cummings and come back
to you.
Mr. Gilman. I just wanted a clarification of that last
question, if I could.
Mr. Shays. Go ahead.
Mr. Gilman. Just on that necklace there had been an
allegation that these people were in the process of affecting a
confidant of the DEA, of wiping him out; is that correct? Was
there a threat to the informant by this group?
Mr. Gamble. That I do not have any personal knowledge of.
Mr. Gilman. Well, who did you check with before you
released the necklace? Did you check with any of the
prosecutors or any of the legal staff?
Mr. Gamble. No.
Mr. Gilman. Or did you just do it at Ms. Waters' request?
Mr. Gamble. No, I didn't do it at her request. One of the
things when the item was taken from the individual, there are
certain administrative requirements that we have to follow. One
is that we safeguard personal property. We put it in evidence,
chain of custody. These rules were violated. These procedures
were violated.
Mr. Gilman. Was that necklace taken in the course of an
investigation of a possible hit?
Mr. Gamble. Now that I don't know.
Mr. Gilman. Did you look into that to find out if that was
the case?
Mr. Gamble. No, because I was looking into the conduct of
the agent relative to the taking of that necklace.
Mr. Gilman. What about the substance of the investigation?
Did you review whether there was any substantive allegations
with regard to the taking of that necklace?
Mr. Gamble. No, I did not.
Mr. Gilman. No further questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Thank you.
Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much. Mr. Howard, I was
looking over a document that the majority, I guess--I know it's
in the record and it's dated September 27, 1999, and it's a
memorandum and it looks like it's to Donnie Marshall, and I
guess it's from Mr. Nims. Are you familiar with that document
at all?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Well, I will tell you, I have been asking you
a lot of questions, but I think I finally found some additional
corroboration for what you have been saying. First of all,
certainly there's a corroboration of the two witnesses who are
sitting beside you. Now, who is Mr. Nims?
Mr. Howard. He's the group supervisor of group four, the
group that had the responsibilities for this investigation.
Mr. Cummings. Who pays him? I mean does he work for
Houston----
Mr. Howard. He's a DEA supervisor.
Mr. Cummings. DEA supervisor?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. So he was in charge with regard to this
investigation?
Mr. Howard. He was a supervisor that everybody in that
group reported to, including Mr. Schumacher and the police
officers.
Mr. Cummings. And so he would have--so you would be in
close contact with him; is that right?
Mr. Howard. Occasionally, yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. In other words, he was in charge of
Schumacher's group?
Mr. Howard. That's correct.
Mr. Cummings. And you were over him or was there somebody
between you and Mr. Nims?
Mr. Howard. Two people between me and Mr. Nims.
Mr. Cummings. OK. Now, it's interesting that in this memo,
and it's a very interesting piece and it's also--it says here--
and now this is from Mr. Nims. It's dated September 27, 1999.
It says, I have recently been instructed by Houston field
division Special Agent in Charge Ernest Howard not to pursue
any new leads regarding, and it's blacked out, et al., and I
guess that's somebody's name, until the OPR investigation is
cleared. And it clearly says until the OPR investigation is
cleared. However, we are clear to talk to any witnesses and
participate in any judicial proceedings. So he seems to be
saying what you said.
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. That you did not want them to pursue any new
leads. Then it says the word ``until.'' So it sounds like
there's something that is still ongoing, but you're kind of
suspending it for a moment until you can--until the
investigation, OPR investigation is cleared, and that's what
you've been saying?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Did you tell anybody else other than these
two gentlemen--I know that they were sort of your sounding
boards--other than Mr. Nims, I'm probably not giving him his
right title, is it officer, sergeant, major?
Mr. Howard. Group supervisor.
Mr. Cummings. Group Supervisor Nims. Anybody else you told
that to?
Mr. Howard. The ASAC at the time was Keith Bodine, he was
aware of it. Bob Jurab was aware of it. I'm sure I discussed it
with Felix Jimenez when he was a chief inspector.
Mr. Cummings. Why was this memo written, do you know?
Mr. Howard. Out of frustration by Mr. Nims on the
allegations. He wanted to make sure that everybody up the chain
of command knew that nothing had been done.
Mr. Cummings. And the way it's written, it seems as if he
was having an issue with you stopping the investigation. I
guess--he seems to be very straightforward here. I think he
would have said it, with you personally.
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. All right. That's all. I yield back.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
Mr. Cummings. I think it's part of the record, but I
think----
Mr. Shays. If not, we will make sure it's part of the
record without objection.
Mr. LaTourette, are you done or should we go to Mr. Ose.
Mr. Ose. We're going to go to both you and then we're going
to go to counsel. Without objection, we're going to do counsel.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Howard, I just wanted to followup on the
memorandum that Representative Cummings was just reading from.
First, I wanted to fully understand what you had said earlier.
Congressman Shays asked you a question about whether you knew
of any other leads in August 1999 when you had the meeting with
the Houston Police Department officials and the DEA agents and
you said, ``I had not been told of any other leads in August;''
is that correct?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wilson. OK. And Congressman Shays, when he further
mentioned the name Schumacher and Nims, and you agreed that
they had not told you of any other leads, correct?
Mr. Howard. That's correct.
Mr. Wilson. Now in the section that Congressman Cummings
just read, the very next sentence is of some interest because
maybe we can go through it slowly. It says I have recently been
instructed by HFD SAC Ernest Howard not to pursue any new leads
regarding, there's a name that's redacted, Rap-A-Lot et al.,
until the OPR investigation is cleared. However, we are clear
to talk to any witnesses and participate in any judicial
proceedings. And the next sentence is the most important one,
perhaps because it says this is unfortunate because there are
still many investigative leads and enforcement operations to
carry out. Now, there's a direct conflict between--you're
telling us that you didn't know of any leads and the fact that
you just told Congressman Cummings that you'd seen this
memorandum. So if you can try and reconcile----
Mr. Howard. I saw this memo and I asked about the leads.
The only leads that were left out are the two individuals that
we discussed before as I've been told repeatedly. They're not
leads. The whole investigation hinges on those two guys.
Mr. Wilson. So we have heard testimony today from the
Houston Police Department personnel and the agents that they
thought there were other avenues to investigate, but from your
perspective--did you talk to them, did you ask them----
Mr. Howard. The police officers?
Mr. Wilson. Yeah.
Mr. Howard. No, sir, I did not talk to the police officers.
Mr. Wilson. And what was Mr. Nims talking about when he
wrote this sentence in the memorandum?
Mr. Howard. I don't know.
Mr. Wilson. Because he's talking about how it's
unfortunate.
Mr. Howard. He never brought it to my attention that there
were any other leads other than the judicial process and those
people cooperating.
Mr. LaTourette. Would counsel yield to me for just a
second?
Mr. Wilson. Yes.
Mr. LaTourette. On further reading, and Mr. Howard, this
memo causes me some concern, too, and I'm glad Mr. Cummings put
it into the record, because I think it gives us a hand, because
the next sentences, I think, spell out exactly what the leads
are. They say that there's a possibility that we could obtain
grand jury, not grand July, subpoenas to obtain financial
records. They were informed by a reliable source that Mr. Smith
either participated or directed a physical beating of one of
their main--it happens to be our friend ``Scarface,'' the
fellow that wrote that stirring tune that we listened to
before.
Another defendant also gave a statement that Mr. Smith
directed him to receive a beating because of disrespect. There
are a number of witnesses who have provided valuable
information and intelligence, and it's my belief that he can
and will be a viable candidate for a rico charge, which is, of
course, an organized crime charge.
So I think we not only have Mr. Nims, and maybe he's
frustrated as you were, you testified, indicated that he's
instructed by you not to pursue any new leads except to take
care of the judicial proceedings. He says it's unfortunate. But
then he goes on to say what the leads are, and the conclusion,
I guess, because this is written to the director who, I guess--
the administrator who we're going to see tomorrow, he's asking
Administrator Marshall, please look at this case because it
appears to him that this guy is using his manipulative tactics
to influence our decisions, and he's obviously using his
influential power to further insulate himself and continue his
illegal operations.
So maybe you and I read this differently and--but it seems
to me that he not only says you gave him some instructions to
just finish up the court stuff, he thinks that's a mistake, and
here's why it's a mistake, because here's all these great leads
where this guy is having people beat up. Do you not read that
that way, sir?
Mr. Howard. Again, I asked Mr. Nims about these leads.
These leads were uncorroborated. Everything in the
investigation from what I was being told and had been told
repeatedly is it hinged on two individuals.
Mr. LaTourette. And it hinged on them rolling and turning
State's evidence and otherwise nothing to do?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. That answers my questions and I thank
counsel for yielding.
Mr. Shays. Counsel has the floor.
Mr. Wilson. Just following Congressman LaTourette's
question, you just stated then that these leads were
uncorroborated, the ones that Congressman LaTourette was just
talking about.
Mr. Howard. I would assume that they are, counsel.
Mr. Wilson. But by cutting off people from proactive
investigation, they could not ever be corroborated; is that not
correct?
Mr. Howard. No, sir, that's not true.
Mr. Wilson. How could they be corroborated if you'd taken
off the seven Houston police officer employees, the two DEA
agents and prevented any proactive investigation, because it
would be the proactive investigation that would lead to the
corroboration?
Mr. Howard. They are not the only agents in that office.
There have consistently been attempts to get informants, to get
witnesses to work on this local impact target consistently over
the last 10 years. It is not just one, a one-time shot. In my
experience, 28 years of experience, a conspiracy is not sought
today and not available tomorrow. Conspiracy investigations
take a long time to make and to prove. The investigation, the
proactive part of the investigation was put on suspense pending
the OPR investigation. If there was a conspiracy investigation
to be made, it still could be made at the end of the OPR
investigation.
Mr. Wilson. Well, I think perhaps people can followup on
that later. I have two short questions. One is, the e-mails
that we read earlier and that were put up on the screen were a
product you have said of your venting.
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wilson. We've never fully understood what you were
venting over. The whole September 1999 meeting was in response
to a congressional letter, but we have fast-forwarded about
half a year to March 2000. Why were you venting in March 2000
with such force?
Mr. Howard. Because at that time, I realized that I had put
Mr. Schumacher in even more danger, as far as his career goes,
by leaving him in the acting GS position for that enforcement.
Mr. Wilson. What was the triggering event that led to your
venting though? What was----
Mr. Howard. You mean in that position in January or in
March?
Mr. Wilson. Why did it happen in March? I mean suddenly----
Mr. Howard. In March, Mr. Gamble had brought to my
attention that I should not have had Mr. Schumacher in the
acting GS position for group four because there was an OPR
investigation going on naming Mr. Schumacher, and particularly
allegations against the group. Rather than demoralize Mr.
Schumacher anymore, I removed him from that position and put
him in an acting GS position. I was frustrated about the entire
situation.
Mr. Wilson. If I could interrupt for a moment, the OPR
investigation had been ongoing for many months at that point;
is that correct?
Mr. Howard. That's correct.
Mr. Wilson. Why would you not have vented in that way when
the OPR--I mean, we're just trying to get at what was the
triggering event in March 2000 that caused you to write these
two very severe e-mails.
Mr. Howard. Mr. Counsel, I cannot tell you any one
particular thing that caused me or that triggered anything.
Here I had been--we had had--I had been out of the office for a
couple of weeks on vacation and on business. I come back into
the office that week. That's the same week that the impact
target, local impact target had been with the Vice President.
He's slapping that in my face. The OPR investigation is still
ongoing. I'm tired of that situation. I'm tired of being
handcuffed because of the OPR investigation. I want to get on
with whatever we're going to get on with.
The two guys that I'm being told that we're dependent to
further the investigation, a lot has not progressed to push
them to cooperate with us. I'm just tired of the entire
situation, and I just--one of those days to where you just had
had enough, but I'm reaching out for my colleagues and they
weren't available and I'm just crying out, please come and just
calm me down, tell me we are going to get through this, it's--
you know, get me off the roof.
Mr. Wilson. But there was no specific trigger?
Mr. Howard. No, sir, not just one thing, no, sir, just
totality of everything.
Mr. Wilson. We can followup on that tomorrow. Just very
last question. In August 1999, there were a number of Houston
Police Department personnel, there were two DEA agents that
were prevented from going forward with proactive investigation.
Had they been productive employees up until that time?
Mr. Howard. Had the agents been productive?
Mr. Wilson. Had they been achieving?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, they had been achieving. Can I go
back to your question once?
Mr. Wilson. If they were achieving in August 1999,
notwithstanding the OPR allegation, why not simply replace
them? Because if they were producing work product for you and
suddenly you didn't have people producing work product, you
would have a problem. So why not simply replace them?
Mr. Howard. I had been told from January when we first
approved the reverse operation on the two individuals in
January 1999, I had been told from about that time that the key
to everything, to any furtherance of this investigation to the
local impact target, these individuals were the key to that.
That's why we approved the reverse operation. That was in
January. I had been told repeatedly, regardless of anything
else that went on, that they're the key. The reason we
continued on some other venues is because there was some
allegations of corruption on the police department. We were
trying also to investigate that part of it. But as far as
August came, I knew of no----
Mr. Wilson. It just sounds like you're saying that as of
August, you don't think they are really performing a function.
Is that a correct characterization?
Mr. Howard. They were doing their job, sir.
Mr. Wilson. Right, and if they were doing their jobs, that
implies they were doing something.
Mr. Howard. That's correct.
Mr. Wilson. And that something, according to them, was a
valuable thing to do?
Mr. Howard. That's correct.
Mr. Wilson. And after they were removed, there was nobody
doing whatever that thing was.
Mr. Howard. As far as what was supposed to be done, they
were still doing what they should be doing from what I was
told. I was told repeatedly, the key for us to getting to the
local impact target was getting to----
Mr. Shays. Mr. Howard, could I interrupt a second here?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. This is where I think we're getting
disingenuous. You did take them off the case. It was no longer
proactive and they were producing. So please don't dig a deeper
hole.
I mean, that is the fact. And you said it earlier; isn't
that true?
Mr. Howard. Mr. Shays, I am not trying to dig a hole; I am
just telling you how I felt at the time and why I did what I
did.
Mr. Shays [presiding]. I know, but your testimony is
conflicting even in this hearing, and it is getting a little
frustrating. These men had been moved from--they had changed
their location, but they were actively pursuing a case, and you
were frustrated when you met with them because you were taking
them off an active case, and you were suspending the case. It
is still open, but it is suspended. That is the fact; isn't
that true?
Mr. Howard. The case was suspended pending the outcome of
the OPR investigation.
Mr. Shays. Right. And it is suspended, and that is the
fact; that is true, and that is what your testimony is. And you
still may have had hopes that in spite of the suspension, that
two people might talk, but it was a suspended case. That is
true, isn't it?
Mr. Howard. The way that you are viewing it, yes, sir, I
guess so.
Mr. Shays. And the way you told it.
Mr. Ose.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Acting Chairman. I am trying to
figure out, who is it that has jurisdiction amongst the three
of you over internal investigations?
Mr. Gamble. I do.
Mr. Ose. Such as the one involving Rap-A-Lot or Mr. Prince
or Mr. Smith, or whatever his name is, how many such
investigations generate allegations of misconduct?
Mr. Gamble. I can only tell you that in the first quarter
of this year, we have 121 allegations that have come in
concerning agent conduct, or violations of conduct.
Mr. Ose. So you have full-time work.
Mr. Gamble. It is gainful employment, yes, sir.
Mr. Ose. How long does it typically take to resolve the
allegations?
Mr. Gamble. Depending on the witnesses, the availability of
the witnesses--and that was one of the problems in this case,
getting in touch with them and getting the appropriate
interviews scheduled and conducted, and then compiling all of
the data, so it was quite involved.
Mr. Ose. Well, as I recall the deposition here, I mean we
had a letter from a Member of Congress dated such-and-such, and
4 days later we had a deposition being taken of the person
making the allegation, so I am not so sure that someone is
unavailable.
In terms of the investigation, the 121 that you have
pending, for instance, do such investigations typically merit
the attention of a Member of Congress?
Mr. Gamble. From time to time we get congressional
inquiries by letter concerning ongoing matters. It all depends
on the constituencies and what they choose to write about. So
it does from time to time.
Mr. Ose. Besides this one, have you ever taken a deposition
in the office of a Member of Congress regarding----
Mr. Gamble. No, I have not.
Mr. Ose. So this is a singular event, so to speak?
Mr. Gamble. To my knowledge, it is.
Mr. Ose. OK. Were there followup calls from any
congressional offices regarding the status of your
investigation?
Mr. Gamble. There was a meeting that I had with the
Congressperson in February.
Mr. Ose. February of?
Mr. Gamble. February 9 of this year.
Mr. Ose. 2000.
Mr. Gamble. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ose. OK. So we have the letter in August, we have the
deposition in August, we have the investigation that commences
afterward. You had an actual meeting in February 2000.
Mr. Gamble. Yes, I did.
Mr. Ose. Did you have phone calls?
Mr. Gamble. I had a phone call on September 20th of this
year.
Mr. Ose. OK. Anything else?
Mr. Gamble. That was my only contact with the office.
Mr. Ose. So you have a singular event from your career
history in terms of the deposition, and then you have an
ongoing interest in the resolution of the case, which is not
atypical for a Member of Congress to maintain an interest in
casework for people who live in their district, but it occurs
to me that Mr. Prince doesn't live--Mr. Prince lives in
Houston.
Mr. Gamble. I believe that is correct.
Mr. Ose. Is that correct?
Mr. Gamble. I believe that is, yes.
Mr. Ose. If I might, if I might ask Mr. Howard, we had some
interesting testimony earlier, in terms of the suggestion or
the thought that Rap-A-Lot might be laundering funds from
illegal activity. It seemed pretty basic to me that you would
investigate the financial underpinnings of Rap-A-Lot and the
like, asking assistance, I think the phrase was from IRS CID.
And yet the testimony we had earlier this morning was that
interest was at best nominal and shortly thereafter terminated.
Can you give me some sense of why IRS didn't followup on that
interest?
Mr. Howard. I was told by the IRS SAC that they had looked
into the investigation, that the local impact target they
looked into several times, and there were no IRS violations
there.
Mr. Ose. OK. Maybe we can followup with a written inquiry
to the committee on that.
I want to go back to Mr. Gamble for a moment.
You have 121 pending cases.
Mr. Gamble. No. That was just in the first quarter of this
year that came in. I was asked to bring tomorrow what my total
caseload is, and I can get that and give you some more
definitive numbers.
Mr. Ose. So this would have been from January through----
Mr. Gamble. Through March 31st of this year.
Mr. Ose. So of those 121 allegations, did any of them
result in an investigation being halted?
Mr. Gamble. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Ose. Did any of them result in the agent involved in
the allegation being taken off a case?
Mr. Gamble. Yes.
Mr. Ose. How many?
Mr. Gamble. I will have to get that information for you,
sir.
Mr. Ose. Well, roughly, 10 percent, 100 percent?
Mr. Gamble. I can't give you an accurate number.
Mr. Ose. OK. You can get back to us on that?
Mr. Gamble. I will have that information for you tomorrow.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. We are in the process of recessing
this hearing until 11 tomorrow, but the request that was made
about you having that tomorrow, that will be our expectation.
And I know it has been a long day for everyone. I thank you for
being here, and we will see you all tomorrow. Thank you. We are
recessing until 11 o'clock tomorrow.
[Whereupon, at 4:07 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[Additional information submitted for the hearing record
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THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION: WERE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
SWAYED BY POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS?
----------
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 7, 2000
House of Representatives,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:20 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dan Burton
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Burton, Gilman, Shays, Horn,
LaTourette, Ose, Waxman, Norton, Cummings, and Kucinich.
Also present: Representative Jackson-Lee.
Staff present: Kevin Binger, staff director; James C.
Wilson, chief counsel; David A. Kass, deputy counsel and
parliamentarian; Sean Spicer, director of communications; M.
Scott Billingsley and Andre Hollis, counsels; Thomas Bowman and
Kristi Remington, senior counsels; Pablo Carrillo,
investigative counsel; S. Elizabeth Clay and Nicole Petrosino,
professional staff members; Marc Chretien, senior investigative
counsel; Gil Macklin, professional staff member/investigator;
Robert A. Briggs, chief clerk; Robin Butler, office manager;
Michael Canty and Toni Lightle, legislative assistants; Josie
Duckett, deputy communications director; Leneal Scott, computer
systems manager; John Sare, deputy chief clerk; Corinne
Zaccagnini, systems administrator; Phil Schiliro, minority
staff director; Kristin Amerling, minority deputy chief
counsel; Michael Yeager, minority senior oversight counsel;
Ellen Rayner, minority chief clerk; and Jean Gosa and Earley
Green, minority assistant clerks.
Mr. Burton. OK. Is everybody in? Good morning. A quorum
being present, the Committee on Government Reform will come to
order. And you're welcome to turn your cameras back on now if
you would like. We're continuing our hearing from yesterday on
the DEA Rap-A-Lot investigation. First we'll be recalling our
two panels from yesterday, and then we'll hear testimony from
DEA Administrator Donnie Marshall.
Yesterday--I'm not going to make an opening statement. My
colleague Mr. Waxman can if he likes. I'd like to get to the
questioning as quickly as possible. But yesterday we heard
answers from the Houston PD and Mr. Schumacher, who was in
charge of the investigation, as well as Mr. Stephens and the
other gentlemen from the Houston PD. And then we heard from Mr.
Howard. And there were--appeared to be some inconsistencies.
And so today what we want to do is get all that cleared up as
much as possible, and that's the purpose of bringing the two
panels back and then of course we'll get into Mr. Marshall and
ask him questions about his role in this whole thing.
Mr. Waxman.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased we're
going to have the two panels back again to see if we can
reconcile apparent inconsistencies. But I just want to point
out that sometimes people have different understandings of what
might have been said in a conversation. It's not unusual. And I
know Mr. LaTourette, as an experienced lawyer, knows that
people can be very sincere and feel they're telling the truth
but they have different recollections of the same conversation.
A good example of that from our committee is when we had
the Bruce Babbitt hearing and we had Bruce Babbitt talking
about a conversation he had with a man by the name of Eckstein
and they had different versions of the conversation. Now
because people have different versions of the conversation
doesn't mean one is lying and the other is telling the truth.
And I mention that situation because when this committee looked
at the issue the majority of the committee felt that Mr.
Babbitt was not being truthful, and that ended up becoming the
basis for an independent counsel's review of the whole thing,
which went on and on and on, spent a lot of taxpayers' dollars.
And the end result was that the independent counsel decided
that there was no offense, that nobody had done anything wrong.
The issue that was before the independent counsel was
exclusively whether Mr. Babbitt had committed perjury.
I say this because it's really troubling to us on the
minority side if witnesses say something and if Members don't
like what they say because it's not consistent with what they
think might have happened, to think that maybe they're telling
us a lie and in fact committing perjury, because that's such a
serious matter. I don't think it ought to be frivolously ever--
anybody ever ought to be accused of that. I know this
committee--sometimes members of the committee think that maybe
someone is committing perjury, but I just want to point out
that inconsistencies don't mean that.
We want to work together, Mr. Chairman, my colleagues, and
I'm not addressing this to C-SPAN because this is not a C-SPAN
audience. I am really addressing this to my Republican
colleagues. We on the minority side do want to work together in
this new Congress and it's already in my mind starting in,
because the election is over, in a nonconfrontational way as
best we can to minimize what partisanship that we've seen. I
would--I think we have legitimate questions to explore. But I'm
trying to portray to you so you will understand that sometimes
we on this side of the aisle get really infuriated if we think
that people are being accused of lying because what they have
to say doesn't fit in with some preconceived notion of what the
truth may be.
So having said that, Mr. Chairman, I think you've done the
right thing in bringing these two panels together back. Let's
question them again, see if we can--sometimes inconsistencies
can be reconciled and if they can, they can, and if they can't,
they can't. But let's dig a little bit more. And if there are
different versions it's doesn't mean one is telling the truth
and the other is not telling the truth. Sometimes it may just
be different versions as people understand it.
So I am looking forward to the testimony, and I want to
thank you for letting me express myself.
Mr. Burton. Just for the record though, the independent
counsel did conclude that Mr. Babbitt misled the committee. He
decided not to prosecute but they did conclude that he was not
truthful when he testified. And of course that's one of the
concerns we have. Because you and I, all of us, want to make
sure we get the facts so that we can make decisions that are
accurate and direct. If necessary, and I think I said that to
Mr. Howard and others yesterday, if necessary, if we find that
there has been deliberate misrepresentations to the committee,
then we have no alternative but to pursue that.
Mr. Waxman. Could you let me say, I disagree with your
conclusion as to what the independent counsel said about Mr.
Babbitt because that's neither here nor there. But if someone
has a version of what they think happened, it doesn't mean
they're lying if that version doesn't fit in with a theory that
you may think really happened or I may think really happened.
Every time someone says a different statement doesn't mean
they're lying and it certainly doesn't mean it's perjury,
because that's a very serious criminal matter. Thank you.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Waxman.
Mr. LaTourette.
Mr. LaTourette. If I can just briefly, Mr. Chairman, I want
to agree with Mr. Waxman. We used to have an expression in my
practice, if five people could see the same car collision and
come up with five different versions of how that collision
occurred, that doesn't mean that any one of them was not
relating their perceptions appropriately. I do want to make the
comment, yesterday I think Mr. Horn mentioned in our hearing
yesterday in terms of getting along and trying to lower some of
the rhetoric of the last or the waning days of this Congress.
We had a meeting on our side where we specifically indicated we
weren't going to mention the Vice President's appearance down
in Houston and we weren't going to mention the Member of
Congress who sent the letter. It wasn't until those comments
became apparent in questioning by the minority that went into
the record. And I think beyond truth telling or anything else,
yesterday's hearing is personally disturbing to me because the
unintended consequence--I don't care who's telling the truth or
not or is relating a different remembrance, the unintended
consequence of a complaint, an unfounded and unjustified
complaint in the end of racial profiling by a group of officers
who testified--they're back here today with over 150 years of
experience in law enforcement, unblemished service--was the
pulling of those officers from an investigation that started in
1992 with the seizure of about $1 million of cocaine off the
streets of Houston and investigation that's had 20 indictments
and arrests and convictions, the beating of confidential
informants, murders and drug trafficking to the young people of
Houston.
So I'm not really interested in, you know, somebody wants
to give their version of the truth. I'm very concerned,
however, that we find ourselves in this position with this set
of facts. I thank you.
Mr. Burton. Any other comments? Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman, first I wasn't going to have an
opening statement, but the more I've heard from Mr. Waxman, Mr.
LaTourette, I must say this: That I agree with Mr. Waxman, Mr.
Chairman. One of the reasons, I had a lot of things I had to do
yesterday, but I stayed here for this entire hearing and I
wanted to make sure that I was back here today. Because one of
the things that I've discovered is that a lot of times I feel
the witnesses that come before this committee--I don't know
whether they are unaware of it before they get here, but I get
the distinct feeling that some of them are placed in a position
of serious jeopardy of being referred for some type of criminal
investigation. And as a lawyer I know what that means. I
understand the significance of it. I understand what it means
to have to hire an attorney. Even if you--I know what it's like
too because I have represented so many people who have their
reputations tarnished. And that's why I try to be very careful
and reiterate to our witnesses to be careful in what they say.
I think that I agree with Mr. LaTourette that we are
hopefully here for the truth and trying to get to some matters,
because this is the Government Reform Committee. And sometimes,
to be frank, with us over the 4\1/2\ years that I've been on
this committee I really don't know how much reforming we've
done, but I do believe that it is important that we get
testimony and that testimony be truthful.
But going back to Mr. Waxman, as we went through the
hearing yesterday I could see where the differences could arise
in how one person may have interpreted things and another may
have interpreted them differently. And I understand now that we
are going to--I think this is probably good, Mr. Chairman, that
we are having the witnesses back. Because I don't want one
single person to be unfairly and unjustifiably tarnished when
they are doing the public's work, trying to protect the public,
and then to come here and to have to undergo scrutiny that
could lead to investigations and whatever. You know, if
something is warranted, that's one thing, but if it's not,
that's a whole another thing.
So I am looking forward to this new term when hopefully the
rhetoric will be toned down, that we will get to the business
of government reform and making this government the very best
it can be. And I yield to Mr. Waxman.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you for yielding. I want to address this
to Mr. LaTourette because I think we're now talking to each
other for the future. One of the things that we were told on
this side of the aisle is that this committee would investigate
the Clinton administration, the Democratic Party, and the
campaign finance issue, but if it ever came to a Member of
Congress we wouldn't be going into hearings on a Member of
Congress. If I had thought any of our colleagues had done
anything wrong, we would send it to the Ethics Committee.
Now, this hearing had to involve the accusation by Vice
President Gore because that was already in the press. It also
had to involve the fact that our colleague Maxine Waters had
registered a concern about racial profiling. And she has strong
feelings about it. And she raised the concern and it was enough
of a concern to have it investigated, and then it turned out
after that investigation that it was found that there was no
racial profiling involved. But if the issue of in hearing is
whether she acted improperly in asking for that investigation,
well, that's a very strange notion to me. And it also is
selectively deciding we'll investigate some Members of Congress
but not others. From our point of view we see a Democrat being
singled out when the Republican we had raised over and over
again the last year we thought had been involved in some of
these things was not even a subject for our consideration.
I don't say that really for debate. I say that really to
express the way we're looking at things from their side of the
aisle.
Mr. LaTourette. Could I ask Mr. Cummings to yield to me on
that point? I didn't take yesterday's hearing to be an
investigation into Congresswoman Waters' activities. I think
what I said I find troubling is that in response to that letter
the Federal agency has taken experienced officers, brought a
case to a stop, whether it's officially closed, partially
closed, kind of closed. That's what's disturbing to me, not her
activities.
I think I used the word ``unintended consequence.'' I don't
think she would have wanted such a thing to occur. She wanted
her complaint investigated but I don't think she wanted an
investigation into a drug dealership done. So I didn't consider
yesterday's hearing to focus on her activities but more on the
activities that the agency undertook once they received their
complaint.
Mr. Cummings. Yes.
Mr. Waxman. I thank you very much for that clarification. I
think it's a good one. There are other unintended consequences.
For example, Secretary Babbitt had to go through the turmoil of
an independent counsel investigating him, hiring lawyers,
others had to go through the same thing. They're eventually
cleared. And sometimes they're cleared because there wasn't
enough evidence to do anything even though they might have done
something wrong, and sometimes they're cleared because they
never did anything wrong.
Again I started with if one of our witnesses tells us a
version of his understanding of what happened, to tell him he's
got to then possibly face perjury charges is to again repeat
the same process again because he's going to have to go out and
fight a legal fight.
In my mind there's no question that he didn't do anything
illegal or even, quite frankly, anything wrong unless he's in
fact misleading the committee. But if he just had a different
version, that is not perjury, that is not falsehood. It's just
the way things are. But thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I want to express my appreciation for your
tolerance for those of us on this side to express our feelings
because it has been a sore subject with us, among others, for
this last couple years. And perhaps if you're listening to us
and I see that you are, maybe we won't run into these problems
again.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Waxman. Mr. Cummings, Mr.
LaTourette, any more questions? If not, we'll start our
questioning of witnesses now. We'll be under the 5-minute rule
for this panel and the next panel. Let me start off by saying
to the officers that are here today, or asked this question, in
addition to the four officers that are here today, the three
from the Houston Police Department and the agency, were there
other officers present at the September 1999 meeting with Mr.
Howard?
Mr. Stephens. Yes, sir, there were.
Mr. Burton. Can you give us a number of how many were
there?
Mr. Stephens. At least 9 or 10, maybe 12 or 13.
Mr. Burton. To your knowledge would they all agree with
your statements concerning the shutdown of the case by Mr.
Howard?
Mr. Stephens. Yes, I believe they would.
Mr. Burton. At this September 1999 meeting Mr. Howard said
he never told the group the investigation was closed. He
testified that he told the group that proactive steps could
only be taken if they were approved by the associate special
agent in charge. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Stephens. No, sir, I don't.
Mr. Chaison. No, sir, I don't.
Mr. Allen. No, sir, I do not.
Mr. Schumacher. No, sir, I don't.
Mr. Burton. Did he suggest at any time that new leads could
be followed?
Mr. Schumacher. I don't recall him saying that, sir.
Mr. Stephens. No, sir.
Mr. Chaison. No, sir.
Mr. Allen. No, he did not.
Mr. Burton. Did Mr. Howard sound receptive at this meeting
for any new leads to be followed or did he give you a sense of
finality? Did he say this is the end of it, this is it?
Mr. Schumacher. I perceived it as a sense of finality, sir.
Mr. Stephens. The same.
Mr. Chaison. I understood it to be over.
Mr. Allen. The end.
Mr. Burton. Do you take issue with anything else that you
heard about that meeting yesterday? Can you go into any details
about the meeting that you think you have a differing opinion
of what happened?
Mr. Schumacher. I don't recall ever hearing the word
``proactive,'' Mr. Howard using that word.
Mr. Burton. So what he said, he looked at his watch and
said as of this time and date this is it, it's over. You all
agree with that?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes.
Mr. Stephens. Yes.
Mr. Burton. There was no indication that there would be any
other avenues followed to go after anybody in this case?
Mr. Allen. That's correct.
Mr. Chaison. That's correct.
Mr. Burton. Following your testimony on this matter
yesterday, Mr. Schumacher, did you listen to the testimony
given on panel two which featured Mr. Howard and Deputy
Administrator Mercado and Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Schumacher. Some of it, yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. Yesterday--and I think you all listened to it
as I recall, is that correct?
Mr. Allen. That's correct.
Mr. Chaison. That's correct.
Mr. Burton. Yesterday you testified there was no new
investigative activity concerning Rap-A-Lot after September
1999. However, Mr. Howard stated there were arrests made in
this case in December. Are you familiar with those arrests?
Mr. Schumacher. I now am, yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. I believe it involved Cedric Rogers and
McCarter on a crime committee in November 1998 with all the
work in the case done prior to the letter that we heard before
that was sent on August 20th by the Congresslady.
Mr. Schumacher. Probably for the most part what happened to
McCarter and Cedric Rogers in December 1999 is that they were
finally federally indicted for offenses they committed in
November 1998.
Mr. Burton. So as far as--so as far as you know, no other
persons were arrested or indicted or convicted in this case
after that time other than those who had already been indicted
or convicted?
Mr. Schumacher. There was some individuals--yes, sir. But
there were some other individuals that I later learned were
arrested that on a separate file had been opened but at some
time somehow it was covered under the Rap-A-Lot OCDETF
umbrella. But to my knowledge they had no direct links to Rap-
A-Lot.
Mr. Burton. Is that what you gentlemen understand as well?
Mr. Allen. That's correct.
Mr. Chaison. That's correct.
Mr. Stephens. We did no more Rap-A-Lot investigation
following September 1999.
Mr. Burton. Were there any other arrests or indictments--
well, I already asked that question. I guess Mr. Singleton was
arrested but you said that was a separate case not immediately
related to the Rap-A-Lot case, correct?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. Do you still contend that no investigative work
was done on this case after September 1999? I want to make that
clear.
Mr. Schumacher. No active investigation that I'm aware of.
Mr. Stephens. Only judicial going to court testifying, but
no active investigation.
Mr. Burton. Is that the same with you gentlemen?
Mr. Allen. No active investigation.
Mr. Chaison. That's correct.
Mr. Burton. Would you have been aware if any investigative
work were being done?
Mr. Schumacher. I think so.
Mr. Stephens. I think so.
Mr. Chaison. Yes.
Mr. Allen. Yes.
Mr. Burton. Now, the Houston police were removed from the
task force. This is--oh, my time has expired. Mr. Waxman, do
you have questions at this time? Mr. Waxman, we'll yield to
you. Then we'll go down the line here.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Howard testified yesterday that prior to
temporarily pulling off Houston police officers and DEA agents
from proactive investigation he had learned from Mr. Schumacher
that the Houston Police Department wanted to put back its
officers for regular assignment. That's what he told us. And we
received an unsolicited letter last night from James Nims, who
is Mr. Schumacher's supervisor. And his letter says the same
things. He writes,
I can honestly say, however, that when Mr. Howard came to
address the group, the HPD members had already physically
relocated back to their own headquarters. We were still working
together, however, at this time. It was mainly regarding
judicial proceedings. And I know that Sergeant Stephens had
been under pressure for some time for him and his squad to
return to HPD headquarters as his captain wanted them back
there. I am quite sure of this; however, I have checked with
two other members of Group 4 who corroborate this time line. At
no time was it my understanding that Mr. Howard pressured nor
implied the HPD squad to leave or terminate this investigation.
Now, I would ask unanimous consent that this letter be
entered into the record.
Mr. Burton. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4430.163
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4430.164
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Schumacher, do you recall telling Mr.
Howard about the Houston Police Department's interest in
pulling its officers back for regular duty?
Mr. Schumacher. No, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Do you think Mr. Howard is lying when he says
that he recalls that the Houston Police Department wanted to
pull its officers back for regular duty?
Mr. Schumacher. Sir, I think he may be referring to some
information he was privy to and I wasn't. OK. I remember--and
Sergeant Stephens can better address more accurately the
details concerning his conversations with his superior at HPD.
But it was never about--it was about relocation physical, but
it was always HPD always wanted to make sure that Bill and his
team were being productive. That's what I recall.
Mr. Waxman. Sergeant Stephens, you were the senior Houston
police working on the task force. Have you ever heard directly
or indirectly that your captain or anyone else in the Houston
Police Department had discussed pulling you back to the Houston
Police Department prior to the meeting with Mr. Howard in late
August or September 1999.
Mr. Stephens. On moving our offices, yes. On terminating
the investigation or anything to do with the criminal aspect of
the case, how my UC is working it informants wise, no. Our
actual logistical location of being at DEA was a temporary
thing and I wanted us to office back at HPD. That's what
happened. And I believe we went back, actually moved our
offices back to our main headquarters in Houston prior to
September. But I'm not positive on that, but I think it was
prior to that meeting in September.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Howard has testified that he closed down
the proactive portion of the investigation pending completion
of the Office of Professional Responsibility investigation and
would only allow it to proceed if he or one of his associate
special agents in charge gave permission for it to proceed. Mr.
Nims, Mr. Nims has that same recollection. Mr. Schumacher, did
you ever ask Mr. Howard or one of his associate special agents
in charge for permission to conduct any proactive
investigation?
Mr. Schumacher. No, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Are you aware of anyone else asking for such
permission?
Mr. Schumacher. I don't recall--no, sir. And I never recall
that statement being made.
Mr. Waxman. It may not have been made to you then.
Mr. Schumacher. I'm sorry, I didn't hear you, sir.
Mr. Waxman. It may not have been made to you. Mr. Nims
seems to corroborate what Mr. Howard said yesterday.
That's all I have to ask, Mr. Chairman, and yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Gilman.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
for continuing this important review of what occurred at
Houston. I'd like to address my question to the Houston
officers. Did you know you have been recalled from the joint
task force, as Mr. Howard stated yesterday, because your chief
wanted you to come back? Were you informed of that?
Mr. Allen. That was never provided for us. We were told
that we were going back to our home location.
Mr. Gilman. But no explanation.
Mr. Allen. No.
Mr. Burton. Would the gentleman yield? But when you went
back, you relocated, as I understand it, they did not say you
were going to be taken off this case in any way. I mean, the
continuing of the case was going on. I mean you weren't going
to terminate that until you heard from Mr. Howard?
Mr. Allen. That's correct.
Mr. Chaison. That's correct. Our--as I remember, our going
back to our office was logistical purposes. We had just
received a new captain. Our old captain was gone to another
division. And being a new captain that he wanted all his people
in his office, which is understandable. And I remember our
concern was that we would have to go to our office and report
and then go to the DEA office, and we just thought it wasn't
feasible because of the traffic problem that we would incur
because of where the DEA administration office is based.
But as far as the investigation, that was never terminated.
It was obvious that we did not want to relocate, the DEA had
put us up in their building, we were assigned phones, cubicles
to work, and it was more of an inconvenience for us to go back
and forth. Again, the investigation was never terminated. That
was never a factor in that.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Did you know you had
been recalled from the joint task force for any reason at all?
Mr. Allen. Could you repeat that, please?
Mr. Gilman. When you were withdrawn from the task force,
did anyone state any reason to you why you had been withdrawn
from the task force?
Mr. Chaison. No, sir. The only time that we knew that we
were--we actually were never taken from the task force. The
investigation was halted.
Mr. Gilman. Well, when you returned to your police
department, were you told you were no longer needed for the
task force?
Mr. Chaison. No. I don't remember that, no, sir.
Mr. Allen. We were told that we weren't going to be
investigating the Rap-A-Lot.
Mr. Gilman. Mr. Howard indicated there weren't many leads
to follow, just the need to wait and see if some indicted
individual might cooperate. Was that where you left the case?
Was that your understanding where the case was at when you
left?
Mr. Allen. No, we were still doing the investigations.
Again, like I said yesterday, we had a couple of informants
that were out there still beating the bushes. So it was still
ongoing.
Mr. Gilman. Were you following up those leads then when you
were withdrawn from the task force and asked to return to your
headquarters?
Mr. Allen. No. Mr. Howard--it was stopped. It was stopped.
Mr. Gilman. When did he tell you to stop?
Mr. Allen. In the meeting that we all were discussing.
Mr. Gilman. What meeting was that?
Mr. Allen. On----
Mr. Gilman. September?
Mr. Allen. Yes.
Mr. Gilman. Where did that meeting take place?
Mr. Allen. In the DEA building.
Mr. Gilman. What did Mr. Howard tell you?
Mr. Allen. Basically that the investigation was going to
stop. And, again, we were all sitting around talking and kind
of inquiring why. That's when the times that was given as of
this time there will be no more investigation.
Mr. Gilman. Did you ask why and what was the response?
Mr. Allen. Well, basically, myself and my partner, that's
not our jurisdiction. We're just officers. It's up to the
supervisor to discuss that.
Mr. Gilman. Were you asked why it was stopped?
Mr. Allen. Among ourselves we were asking each other, yes.
Mr. Gilman. Did you get any response?
Mr. Allen. We didn't know. Again, it comes from--that type
of answer would probably come from our supervisor, our
immediate supervisor, Mr. Stephens.
Mr. Gilman. Did the supervisor inform you why it was
stopped?
Mr. Chaison. Let me say this: During that particular
meeting in September, let me try and paint you a picture. If
you're all sitting in chambers here, and your boss, the head
boss comes in and say you're no longer going to investigate
this complaint that we're doing today, then you start to murmur
between one another like what happened, what brought this
about? This is the type of discussion. That brought the time
check. Because I felt at that point that Mr. Howard did not
want to entertain any questions concerning what caused him to
close the----
Mr. Gilman. Was Mr. Howard present at that meeting?
Mr. Chaison. Yes, he was.
Mr. Gilman. Who was your head boss at that time?
Mr. Chaison. Sergeant Stephens is my boss.
Mr. Gilman. He didn't make any explanation, is that
correct?
Mr. Chaison. Again someone inquired and that brought about
the time check to see that no more questions. Once that was
made, I mean it was just understood if I told you I'm not going
to ask any more questions as of this date and time and I walk
out that door, that's it. It's finished. And that's how it was.
Mr. Gilman. So neither Mr. Stephens nor Mr. Howard told you
why the investigation was stopped at that point in September
1999, is that right?
Mr. Chaison. Mr. Howard stated that for political reasons
this case was being closed and the time checks signified I
don't want to hear anything else.
Mr. Gilman. Mr. Howard said for political reasons this case
was being closed?
Mr. Chaison. That's correct.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Gilman, your time has expired.
Mr. Gilman. Could I have one more question, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Burton. Yes. Go ahead.
Mr. Gilman. Mr. Schumacher, it's alleged that your March
transfer to a desk job was for your benefit and security. Were
you ever told that's why DEA leadership wanted you moved?
Mr. Schumacher. No, sir.
Mr. Gilman. Why do you believe you were transferred then?
Mr. Schumacher. I believe personally that DEA headquarters
succumbed to political pressure and notified the front office
management, DEA Houston, to have me taken as far away from the
Rap-A-Lot investigation as humanly possible.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Schumacher, yesterday the----
Mr. Burton. Excuse me just 1 second. We have in the past
allowed Members who are not on the committee to participate by
unanimous consent. And today we have a Member of the minority,
Ms. Sheila Jackson-Lee, who would like to ask some questions.
So without objection we will allow that to take place. Thank
you.
Mr. Cummings. Yesterday Mr. Howard said that he selected
you for this job and he felt very confident about you and he
seemed to have a tremendous amount of respect for you. And then
you heard--I think you were in the room most of his testimony I
think, yesterday, and I guess we're still back to this
difference of what was--what his interpretation was and what
all your interpretation was. And I'm saying this to all of you.
It seemed like I got the impression that all of you are very
concerned about making sure that we address this drug problem
in Houston. And anywhere else. But the question still remains,
I mean you all said yesterday Mr. Howard is an honorable
person. And you really believe in him. And I'm just wondering
what do you think accounts for this difference? I think you
just said that you think there was some politics, but you also
said he was an honorable man. And we're in a situation where it
appears that somebody may have a different recollection or is
not being truthful with us. So the question is, is how do you--
what do you think the difference is here? I mean, is there room
for misinterpretation, do you think? Do you understand my
question?
Mr. Schumacher. I'll try, Mr. Cummings. And I am sure it's
quite obvious to yourself and to other members of this panel
this is rather agonizing and tough on all of us here.
Mr. Cummings. I can imagine.
Mr. Schumacher. As I've expressed to Mr. Howard, not many
weeks ago, I thanked him for his support privately, publicly,
inside and out of DEA. And I do respect him and do believe that
he delivered a message he was told to deliver. He didn't like
it, he was uncomfortable with it. And I told him when we talked
that there would never ever be any bad blood between he and I.
But it was going to be a long time before I could forgive DEA
headquarters for what they did. And it's tough on all of us.
Because I believe everybody here carrying a badge and the ID
really wants to do the right thing.
Mr. Cummings. What about you, Mr. Stephens?
Mr. Stephens. I think everybody wants to do the right
thing. Like I said yesterday, he was our biggest supporter up
to September. But after September he told us to stop. And I
don't remember anything about proactive, I don't remember
anything about a chain. I just remember stop. And prior to that
we didn't have a bigger fan or a bigger supporter. That's why
it surprised us so much.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chaison.
Mr. Chaison. Again I will just reiterate the sentiment of
Mr. Schumacher and my sergeant. Mr. Howard was very supportive.
And I think he wants to be supportive today. I can't get into
his mind and tell you what's going through his head or why he's
taking a stance that he's taken. My integrity has been
questioned. I have children. I teach Sunday school, Bible
study, I have people that look up to me as well. I'm sitting
here today to convey to you that the truth is the truth. And
that's the bottom line.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Allen, I'm going to have to come back to
you but--I'm running out of time but I got to ask Mr. Stephens
this question: One of the things--and I'm trying to find things
that are consistent, OK. One of the things that Mr. Howard said
yesterday was something about that there were two cases. Do you
remember that? He talked about that there were two cases, two
defendants that needed to turn? You remember that?
Mr. Stephens. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Then there was testimony a few minutes ago
that McCarter and Rogers were apparently indicted. Is that in
December? I mean that's what you all learned?
Mr. Stephens. From what Jack said and I'll have to go off
of him for the date, McCarter and--Cedric Rogers was the
Houston police officer indicted for civil rights violation.
That came up in the Rap-A-Lot investigation. And McCarter was
indicted with him.
Mr. Cummings. With your indulgence, Mr. Chairman, maybe Mr.
Schumacher, do you know--I don't know who would be better to
answer this question--do you remember any discussions with Mr.
Howard going back to what he said now, that they were waiting,
that it was his understanding that you all were waiting for
somebody to possibly turn of two people? And I'm assuming--I'm
assuming that he's talking about these same two people--I may
be wrong, I don't know, but it's just interesting that we had
two people that were indicted allegedly in December 1999. I'm
just wondering did you ever have any discussions with him or
any of you saying something to the effect that you know, we
need to see what happens in these cases and if these guys turn,
then we have some things that we can accomplish with regard to
possibly pulling in other people to be arrested and indicted
and arrested? Do you remember that?
Mr. Schumacher. Mr. Cummings, Steven McCarter was first
arrested along with Everett Russell, along with two others,
Ballard and Bradley, by the team here January 7, 1999. McCarter
was subsequently, as the others, indicted federally for that
offense. In December 1999 McCarter was again indicted on a
separate charge of conspiring with Houston police officer
Cedric Rogers, acting under cover of law, civil rights
violation, to steal drugs and drug money from drug traffickers.
That was two separate indictments.
Reference your question about comments to Mr. Howard, I had
numerous, many conversations with Mr. Howard because he was
constantly asking us about the progress of the case. And
numerous times I told him we really need McCarter to roll over
because McCarter is close and based on the support that Prince
had demonstrated inside and outside the courtroom for McCarter,
we believed, the team believed, that Prince had a lot of
exposure behind McCarter. And what also reinforced that theory
to us was back in 1988, when Anthony Price went down with 76
kilos of cocaine and he was driving a vehicle that was licensed
under Mr. Smith's auto sales at that time, Prince was going by
the name of Smith then, that then Prince had demonstrated the
willingness to really support those that take a fall for him
both financially and otherwise. But at no time did I ever say
that unless McCarter or Russell roll over the case is dead.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you. I would hope at some point--it
looks like Mr. Stephens wanted to answer that but maybe it will
come up later.
Mr. Burton. Would you care to elaborate real quickly, Mr.
Stephens?
Mr. Stephens. Real quickly, I was present for discussions
about McCarter. We do feel like he held a key to the case, not
the only one. But the only way we could continue investigating
him and possibly our having leverage on him in it was to keep
working like we were prior to September.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your indulgence.
Mr. Burton. You're welcome.
Mr. Horn.
Mr. Horn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Some of this will be
repetitive but we're trying to get at it from various points of
view. This is for Mr. Schumacher. Did you recall that Special
Agent in Charge Howard saying yesterday that he was told that
there were just two key people to get in order to make a case
against Prince?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Horn. So that two people and no more is what you
needed, is that it?
Mr. Schumacher. Are you asking me what I believe or what I
heard yesterday?
Mr. Horn. Saying yesterday that he was told, yeah, that
there was just two key people to get in order to make a case
against Prince. And you're saying yes, that you could make the
case on those two or were there other people? And was Mr.
Howard knowledgeable of that or wasn't he?
Mr. Schumacher. I believe Mr. Howard was talking about
McCarter and Russell. And I would call it--style it as Sergeant
Stephens did. They were a means, not the only means of pursuing
or going forward with this investigation.
Mr. Horn. In your talk with Mr. Howard you didn't say it's
just two, or did you?
Mr. Schumacher. I don't recall ever saying that unless
McCarter rolls over this case is dead. No, sir. I don't recall
ever using those words or something to that effect.
Mr. Horn. What else occurred in that conversation? What
else occurred in that conversation besides those two witnesses
that he's talking about? Was there anything else in that
particular conversation?
Mr. Schumacher. Mr. Horn, myself and SAC Howard had
numerous conversations concerning ongoing enforcement
activities, projected enforcement activities recommended to
this case. So for me to sit here and articulate the actual
words and details, I'm sorry, that's beyond my capacity.
Mr. Horn. During that conversation were there others
present when you told him that and could there be anybody with
you today that was standing there when you and Mr. Howard were
talking about this? Was there anybody around?
Mr. Schumacher. Mr. Howard and I spoke numerous times,
sometimes Sergeant Stephens was there, sometimes other agents
were there. I mean we spoke weekly.
Mr. Horn. Were they always personally or were they over the
phones or what?
Mr. Schumacher. Speaking with Mr. Howard?
Mr. Horn. Yeah.
Mr. Schumacher. Usually he would come down from the 6th
floor to the 4th floor where the enforcement groups are, and
walk down and we would chat.
Mr. Horn. Well, I think we've had this from various angles.
And I want to now go with the visit of Vice President Gore and
Gore's meeting with Prince. That was on March 12, 2000. And for
all of the Houston police officers, we'd be curious, were you
aware that Vice President Al Gore visited Houston in March of
that year?
Mr. Stephens. Yes, I am.
Mr. Horn. Yes.
Mr. Chaison. Yes.
Mr. Allen. Yes.
Mr. Horn. All of you have. You mentioned to the committee
staff you heard that when the Vice President was in Houston he
traveled to the, ``Church Without Walls,'' a church which had
received large sums of money from the head of the Rap-A-Lot
organization. Is that accurate?
Mr. Allen. Yes.
Mr. Chaison. That's correct.
Mr. Stephens. Yes.
Mr. Horn. All three of you are saying that. You also
mention that you heard that the Vice President had a private
meeting with the minister of the church and the head of Rap-A-
Lot. Is that correct?
Mr. Stephens. I heard that he was present in the church,
yes, at the time that Mr. Gore was there.
Mr. Horn. Was that from Houston police officers or----
Mr. Stephens. Yes.
Mr. Horn [continuing]. The papers or what?
Mr. Stephens. Recently it was a Houston police officer
assigned to security detail there.
Mr. Horn. Two or 3 days after the Vice President's visit,
Agent Schumacher was transferred from a law enforcement
position to a desk job. Did you consider this move of Agent
Schumacher to be the final nail in the coffin of the Rap-A-Lot
investigation?
Mr. Stephens. The final nail? We had been shut down in
September. It was very curious to me, personally, that it came
so shortly after Mr. Gore visited the church, but I have no
substantial facts to back up that there was any influence. It's
just because of the timing was very curious.
Mr. Horn. Mr. Schumacher, did you discuss the Rap-A-Lot
investigation with Mr. Howard during the March 2000 time
period?
Mr. Schumacher. I think Mr. Howard and I talked briefly
about the fact that Vice President Gore had visited Mr.
Prince's church and anything we would have talked about
probably had to do with the visit there to the church.
Mr. Horn. Did Mr. Howard communicate to you or others that
he was shutting down the investigation at this point? We're now
talking about the March 2000 time period.
Mr. Schumacher. No, sir.
Mr. Horn. Did he communicate to you and others that he was
shutting down the investigation at this point?
Mr. Schumacher. Are you talking about March?
Mr. Horn. March, yeah.
Mr. Schumacher. No, sir.
Mr. Horn. Was there any investigative activity at this time
to shut down?
Mr. Schumacher. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Horn. Were you aware that Ernie Howard briefed
committee staff on this case on July 17, 2000.
Mr. Schumacher. I was subsequently told that, yes, sir.
Mr. Horn. Did Mr. Howard tell you anything about his July
17, 2000 briefing to this committee?
Mr. Schumacher. No, sir.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman's time has expired. We have our
guest with us now, Ms. Sheila Jackson-Lee. Do you have some
questions you would like to ask?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, if there is another round I
would like to wait for a moment.
Mr. Burton. That's fine.
Mr. LaTourette.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Schumacher, we
learned yesterday from Mr. Howard that he received or there was
a discussion between he and Mr. Gamble that perhaps while the
OPR investigation was going on it was not appropriate for you
to be a GS. That's a group supervisor in enforcement division
four. Is that what GS is?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. You were transferred from that, as Mr. Horn
just indicated, on or about March 14 or 15, 2000. When were you
made the group supervisor of that organization?
Mr. Schumacher. I was designated as an acting group
supervisor, as I have been in the past several times, but for
that particular timeframe around January 5th, maybe, 2000.
Mr. LaTourette. So just so we have our chronologies
correct, there's this meeting in September where we have some
disputed testimony or testimony that doesn't fit that this
investigation is going to be closed down, the Houston officers
go back to their postings in January, you're elevated to acting
group supervisor. And during that entire time the OPR
investigation is going on it was apparently open on August 20,
1999, and it was still pending apparently in March 2000. So it
took about 14 months, is that right?
Mr. Schumacher. That's my understanding, yes, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. So you served as the acting group
supervisor from January to March 15th without any difficulty; I
mean nobody said this isn't appropriate because of the OPR
until March 15th? Is that a fair statement of where we were
then?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir, it is.
Mr. LaTourette. Let me ask all of you, I would assume an
investigation of this sort you need to use confidential
informants, snitches, people who provide information to you,
some of those people do it for patriotic reasons, some people
do it for money, some people do it to get out of mischief. But
somebody made the observation yesterday that when the
investigation was effectively stopped, that all of the people
that had served as confidential informants were sort of left
twisting and without backup and support. Is that a fair
observation of what happened to your confidential informants?
Mr. Allen. I would think that when we first started it was
a close knit group in the 5th ward area. It was somewhat hard
to get into them. Once we got into them things started
loosening up. But once the investigation was shut down it was
more like they started excluding themselves again because they
were afraid they were back to the way it first started.
Mr. LaTourette. What's the life expectancy of a
confidential informant or a snitch in the major narcotics
information when the law enforcement agency pulls out?
Sergeant, do you have an opinion on that?
Mr. Stephens. We hope as long as possible. I don't know
that there's a time where I could say that they would become in
grave danger. It's always better when we're involved with the
case.
Mr. LaTourette. Yet when Mr. Howard was testifying he was
talking about the visit by the Vice President, the fact that
this Prince fellow showed up at the church. I'll come back to
you, Mr. Chaison, because this question goes exactly to you. He
indicated when he got that report this fellow that was under
investigation for a variety of things was with again the second
most powerful political figure in the country. Do you consider
that to be a stick in the eye, a slap in the face that he was
laughing at him?
Mr. Chaison, when you were informed that your investigation
was being closed down for political reasons, as a 21-year
veteran of the Houston police department can you tell me how
that made you feel? Did you have similar feelings to the one
that Mr. Howard expressed yesterday?
Mr. Chaison. Yes, I did. I made the statement that it was a
slap in the face. And it still is. Because it's unresolved. I
also made the statement concerning confidential informants that
we had confidential informants that were out there doing things
for us. Again this investigation was in full swing. And we had
confidential informants that were doing things and making
themselves--you know getting close to certain people. We had an
agenda at that point. So we could--whatever resources we needed
to assist them in getting close was pulled away. So now you
have people playing roles, getting next to people, and then all
of a sudden it's yanked.
Now the question comes, well, in the beginning from the bad
guys, we're talking about doing deals, you know, what has
changed your mind, what has happened. And that's what I'm
talking about. We had informants that were doing things. By no
means was this investigation near any closure.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you. My time has expired.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Ose.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I asked yesterday, Mr.
Schumacher, the timeframe during which the IRS assistance was
initially provided and then rescinded. Were you able to dig
that information out?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir. Reference that telephonic
interview we were referring to, it seems it occurred on about
September 9, 1998. And the report wasn't written until about 4
weeks later. So now we would be in obviously October 1998. And
somewhere in that timeframe, that was the last involvement to
my recollection.
Mr. Ose. So the IRS, the lack of interest by the IRS, the
interest and then the loss thereof from the IRS actually
precedes any letter from any Member of Congress or anything
like that? I mean, so you can't--it's awful hard to draw a
connection in that regard, if there is any connection at all.
If I recall, the letter that went to the Attorney General was
dated in August 1999.
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir. But I do remember now that you
said that it seems like in February 1999 or January 1999 that
an IRS agent was at our office going through some documents
that we had seized via a search warrant we had done on Mr.
McCarter's residence. But in any event, prior to our--the IRS--
to my knowledge IRS involvement was over probably prior to the
Federal trial starting in July 1999.
Mr. Ose. Let me just develop into something here a little
bit I was interested in. Mr. Gamble yesterday talked about the
121 referrals in the first quarter of this year to OPR. You've
been in law enforcement 27 years. Has an instance similar to
this ever--have you ever been involved in an instance similar
to this where you're in the middle of an investigation, a
referral gets made, an investigation gets stopped and you get
put on a different desk?
Mr. Schumacher. Not under these circumstances, no, sir.
Mr. Ose. OK. Sergeant Stephens, how about you?
Mr. Stephens. No, sir, not that I can remember, not like
this.
Mr. Ose. Officers?
Mr. Chaison. No, sir.
Mr. Allen. No.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Would the gentleman yield to me because I may
need more than the 5 minutes I have coming.
Mr. Ose. I would be pleased to yield.
Mr. Burton. I want to make sure we have everything clear
because in the course of questioning we get yes and no answers
instead of elaboration. What I want to make sure is that I
understand clearly what transpired at the meeting when the
investigation was shut down. Mr. Howard said that he does not
indicate the investigation was shut down completely but it was
not going to be proactive anymore. You said that you--I think
all of you said that you don't recall the word ``proactive''
ever being used. And the only thing that you remember was that
Mr. Howard said the investigation was over, that there was
political pressure, and he looked at his watch after some
discussion took place and said it's over as of this time and
this date. Now, am I incorrect or is that correct? I don't want
to put words in your mouth.
Mr. Schumacher. That's correct, sir.
Mr. Stephens. That's correct, sir.
Mr. Chaison. That's correct.
Mr. Allen. It is correct.
Mr. Burton. And there was no further discussion, as I
understand it. Mr. Howard then in a short period of time left
the room, is that correct?
Mr. Allen. That's correct.
Mr. Schumacher. That's correct.
Mr. Chaison. Yes.
Mr. Stephens. Yes.
Mr. Burton. I want to make sure because we're going to have
Mr. Howard up here in a moment and I want to make sure we've
got this correct. All four of you agree and you said I believe
earlier, Sergeant Stephens, that there were other people in the
room that we could call forward who would agree with what you
were saying----
Mr. Stephens. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton [continuing]. That No. 1, political pressure was
brought to bear; No. 2, that the investigation was being shut
down as of a certain time and date?
Mr. Stephens. That's correct.
Mr. Burton. And No. 3, there was no discussion to your
knowledge of any further investigation taking place or any
mention of proactive. Is that correct?
Mr. Stephens. That's correct.
Mr. Burton. You all agree with that?
Mr. Chaison. Yes.
Mr. Allen. Yes.
Mr. Burton. I want to make sure I've got that clear because
we're going to be asking Mr. Howard about that and we're going
to be getting very specific.
Now I want to talk about threats on your lives. As I
understand it, Sergeant Stephens, there have been some
contracts allegedly put out on Mr. Schumacher and some of the
other officers, is that correct?
Mr. Stephens. That's correct.
Mr. Burton. Start the clock. I'll take my 5 minutes now.
Start the clock. I understand that contracts from some reliable
sources have been put out on Mr. Schumacher and others to kill
him. Is that correct?
Mr. Stephens. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. And the Rap-A-Lot music that we heard yesterday
talked specifically about that kind of activity?
Mr. Stephens. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. So their lives have been in jeopardy since this
investigation or at least some time during the investigation,
according to an informant?
Mr. Stephens. Yes, sir, the informant came forward
recently, but yes.
Mr. Burton. OK. I want to go to this IRS thing real
quickly. The IRS, according to you, Mr. Schumacher, did a
cursory investigation, gave you some kind of a report and then
they did not followup any further, is that correct?
Mr. Schumacher. The report they gave us was we by design,
we being the investigative team, had the IRS agent speak with
this source of information who was providing information
relative to the church. And we felt that because it was a
financial nature, that the IRS agent might be better equipped
and better trained to conduct this telephonic interview. As
such, the agent made notes and subsequently wrote a DEA--a
report on DEA letterhead or report. So it was a DEA report that
was submitted. And after that, I seem to remember, February for
some reason sticks in my mind, that agent had come back and was
looking through some of the items we had seized and then slowly
thereafter just--there was not any more feedback, any more
presence, any more assistance.
Mr. Burton. Did you pursue this with this IRS agent? I
think you indicated yesterday that you had run into him at
court and elsewhere. And you said are you doing anything on
this or what did you say?
Mr. Schumacher. Well, it was--it appeared to me that he was
preoccupied with other matters and did not want to take the
time or did not have the time to discuss it with me. As I said
yesterday, I did appeal to Mr. Howard to please contact someone
in management at the IRS because we were in dire need, I felt,
in some sort of assistance from him.
Mr. Burton. If it's possible--you don't need to give us
preferably right now--we would like to know who you talked to
at the IRS. We would like to know the reasons why they didn't
followup on that investigation.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Chairman, would you yield for just 30
seconds?
Mr. Burton. I will be happy to yield to my colleague.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Waxman earlier put into the record, and
I'm glad he did, the letter from Mr. Nims, who is the group
supervisor down at section four. I would point to page 2 where
he says the same thing, and that is, we would have needed the
support and commitment of the U.S. attorney's office and the
Internal Revenue Service. During the course of the substantive
stage of this investigation, it was apparent to me that neither
of these two agencies were anxious to assist us. And he
indicates he spoke to his counterpart at the IRS without
success. I just wanted to point that out.
Mr. Burton. I'm glad you pointed that out for the record.
I guess the main thing we wanted to find out today, and I
appreciate you're staying over to come back to us, is that
after that specific date when you met with Mr. Howard and a
number of other people, there was no further action, to your
knowledge, taken on the Rap-A-Lot investigation. It was
completely stopped. Now, Mr. Howard said there were two
convictions, but those were already in process, those
indictments, as I understand it, or they were unrelated to the
Rap-A-Lot case. So as far as you know, there was no further
action taken after he pointed into his watch and said, this is
it, this time and date it's over with; is that correct?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes.
Mr. Burton. You all agree with that?
Mr. Chaison. That's correct.
Mr. Allen. Yes.
Mr. Burton. I wanted to be clear on that. I just wanted to
make sure. And there were other individuals in the room from
the DEA and the police department that heard this statement; is
that correct.
Mr. Stephens. That's correct.
Mr. Chaison. That's correct.
Mr. Allen. Yes.
Mr. Burton. They all agree with that.
I think that pretty much covers my questioning. Do any of
the other colleagues have questioning? If not, I was going to
yield my time to either one of you if you needed it. No.
Well, I'll yield back the balance of my time. Mr. Cummings,
I think you're next, and then we'll go to Ms. Jackson Lee.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Schumacher, where does Mr. Nims fit in
the chain of command?
Mr. Schumacher. Mr. Nims is a group supervisor and up until
my transfer out of group four was my supervisor.
Mr. Cummings. If an investigation were going to be called
off, would he--I mean, is it pretty logical that he would know
that?
Mr. Schumacher. In my mind?
Mr. Cummings. Yes, sir. I mean, just from the way your
operation and the things you've done in the past, your
experience with the police department. I mean, if he's your
supervisor, he's your immediate supervisor, and he seems to
recollect that the investigation wasn't called off--I guess
what I'm trying to figure out is how reliable would you think
his--I mean, wouldn't he be a logical person to know that it
was being called off?
Mr. Schumacher. Yes, sir, you would think so.
Mr. Cummings. So he had the impression, based upon his
letter, that it was--his letter is pretty much consistent with
what Mr. Howard said as far as it not being completely called
off, but sort of ongoing. What do you account for that
difference? Here's your immediate supervisor. He has one
opinion, and you have another. Did you ever discuss it with
him?
Mr. Schumacher. Can you allow me a minute?
Mr. Cummings. Sure.
Mr. Schumacher. Some of the comments that Mr. Nims made in
this letter, that's the first I've ever heard, if indeed he
wrote that letter. I have no reason to doubt that he did. But
he has never made those comments to me.
Mr. Cummings. And you had talked a little bit earlier about
how often you would talk to Mr. Howard. Would you talk to Mr.
Nims often, too?
Mr. Schumacher. Frequently Mr. Nims would come up after Mr.
Howard departed and say, what did the SAC say.
Mr. Cummings. So you would, would you have more
conversations with Mr. Howard than you would have with Mr.
Nims?
Mr. Schumacher. No, I would have more with Nims.
Mr. Cummings. OK. So in other words, the instructions
coming down, it doesn't have to necessarily flow through Nims
to you? There was a lot of direct contact with you?
Mr. Schumacher. Between?
Mr. Cummings. I'm sorry. Between you and Howard.
Mr. Schumacher. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. OK. To Mr. Chaison and Allen, Officer, to all
of you, I want to thank you all for being with us today and for
staying over. I'm particularly concerned about your safety, and
I was wondering if you're concerned about it. It seems as if
it's my understanding that there was an article this morning in
the local newspaper, and I'm sure--and we've had a lot of
discussion here about money flowing, big money flowing, and I
was just wondering did you all request more anonymity than what
you have here today? I'm just curious.
Mr. Chaison. We've asked questions; however, we understand
that's a matter of public record. As for me, God is my
provider. He's my protector, so I'm not concerned about what
man can do to me.
Mr. Cummings. Well, I am.
What about you, Mr. Allen? I understand. I got you. Mr.
Allen.
Mr. Allen. Again, God is my provider, and basically when
I'm here, I believe in the people I'm with. And when I get back
home, I believe in the people I work with. So I focus on that
and just pray and hope that nothing ever happens to any one of
us.
Mr. Cummings. I just want to, again, thank you all, all of
you, for your testimony. I think it has left all of us a bit
concerned about you because we seem to have two--as I said a
little bit earlier, we have very dedicated folk, people who are
trying to make a difference and putting your lives on the line
every day, and that certainly includes Mr. Howard and the other
witnesses, and these differences of recollection certainly
concern us. We'll hear from Mr. Howard again in a moment.
But, again, I want to thank you, and I wish you all the
best. Thank you.
Mr. Chaison. Thank you.
Mr. Allen. Thank you.
Mr. Cummings. I yield back.
Mr. Burton. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Connecticut has 5 minutes.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Chairman, given that I wasn't here for the
questions, I think it probably would be a little inappropriate
for me to get into territory that may have already been
covered. I would just once again thank our DEA official Mr.
Schumacher and Mr. Stephens and Mr. Chaison and Mr.----
Mr. Allen. Allen.
Mr. Shays. Allen. I'm sorry, I was about to say it.
I was particularly moved yesterday, Mr. Chaison, when you
described to me--all of you have moved me, but after the
hearing you reminded me of the fact that one of people that you
served with, a fellow officer, I believe a woman who was
serving with you, maybe you could just tell me and tell this
organization the circumstance.
Mr. Chaison. Yes. I'm sure all of you heard the situation
with a female HPD officer. She and I were working undercover,
and she and I was engaged in a shoot-out with a drug dealer,
and she's paralyzed today. Of course, she never has the
opportunity to marry or bear children, which she'll never have
now. I mean, she has the opportunity to marry, but she'll never
be like some of the ladies here that's mothers. She'll never be
a mother in that sense.
So we take our job very serious, very seriously. Of course,
I've been involved in several shooting incidents again. In our
work you have to have a head. God has to be the head of your
life. He has just has to, because we're in--as undercover
officers we're in situations where supervisors aren't. We're
the ones in the dope house with the dope man and has to come up
with the correct answer at the right time. An error on our part
could be our demise. So we take it very seriously.
Mr. Shays. When you described that, the officer shooting
before, I didn't realize it was someone you had actually been
serving with and involved in that same fight. But I am in awe
of individuals who can go undercover and risk their lives every
day and say goodbye to their families in the morning. I'm sure
you give them an extra hug. I'm sure they give you an extra
hug. But all of you are heroes, in my mind, and I hope we
ultimately resolve this and get all the answers we need. So I
thank you. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Horn. [presiding]. I thank the gentleman from
Connecticut. I think the views of Mr. Cummings and the
gentleman from Connecticut, we all agree on that. Whether
you're undercover or working back on the DEA or the police
departments around the country, you're brave people, and we
probably ought to be getting a few medals out of Congress for
those who are on the firing line all across America because the
scum that they have to deal with and the hurt of our families
are just unbelievable.
We now yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms.
Sheila Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Horn. Let me
thank the chairman and the Members.
Mr. Shays. Is your mic on?
Ms. Jackson Lee. I'm not close enough to it. I also have a
cold.
I am not a member of this committee, as I said. I'm a
member of the Judiciary Committee, which has oversight on the
DEA, and I started out by saying I thank the ranking member and
the chairman for their courtesies, and I will likewise be
courteous.
Let me ask Mr. Schumaker or Schumacher?
Mr. Schumacher. That's close enough. Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
What is it in what we're doing here today that you like to
see come out of these 2 days of hearings?
Mr. Schumacher. Ms. Lee, I've been subpoenaed here as a
witness to give testimony. That's what I have done. And I'm
trying to fulfill my obligation.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you have no goals or desires for what
may ultimately come out of this hearing, what results or
actions?
Mr. Schumacher. No personal goals or desires whatsoever.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Stephens.
Mr. Stephens. No personal goals. I would like to have
definitive answers as to why the case was stopped when it was.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So informal responses to providing you
back with at least an explanation. Would that be capturing what
you're saying?
Mr. Stephens. That we understand why the case was stopped,
yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I do want to acknowledge that I have had a
longstanding relationship with the Houston Police Department.
I'm from Houston. I have served as an associate judge. I am
very much a supporter of the officers that I worked with on a
regular basis. I know the officers that are here, and I have a
great deal of respect for them. I would add my interest and
concern on your safety. So I want to acknowledge that as much
as I want to acknowledge that I know the Prince family. I have
a great deal of respect for the contributions that many of them
are still making in the fifth ward area. It's important to give
balance here.
And then I'd like to pose a question to you, Mr. Stephens.
You commented on the visit of the Vice President to the Brook
Hollow Church family. Were there wired officers present during
that service?
Mr. Stephens. Not to my knowledge.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So do you have any wire evidence of
meetings of Mr. Prince and the Vice President?
Mr. Stephens. No, ma'am, not to my knowledge, I don't.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you have any direct evidence that there
was a meeting between Mr. Prince and the Vice President?
Mr. Stephens. No, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you have any direct evidence for the
reason for the Vice President to have visited that church?
Mr. Stephens. No, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So any suggestion of any actions being
taken on the basis of the Vice President's visit to the church,
is there any direct information you have on that?
Mr. Stephens. No, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I note the name of a Brad Jordan in a
letter, a.k.a. Scarface. Is that person living in our area?
Mr. Stephens. He was. He may still be. He did have a house
in the west part of Houston.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You don't have any reason to believe that
any actions not taken against him or taken against him had--was
there any knowledge of political influence, any actions not
being taken against him; do you have any knowledge of that?
Mr. Stephens. No, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. There is a letter that we have that
suggests that some actions were not taken against him by the
U.S. attorney's office, and I was wondering whether you might
be familiar as to why that had not occurred?
Mr. Stephens. I do not know why it did not occur.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So we can't, through you at least,
attribute any political actions that kept him from being
pursued?
Mr. Stephens. That's correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think it's important, and I think you
have answered very forthrightly that you are subpoenaed here,
and you are providing information. I, too, have respect for the
responsibilities of Members of Congress to get to the bottom of
issues. I abhor drug use and the sales of drugs. I'm trying to
protect our children. But I also think you are also sensitive
to the concept of representative government. We elect
individuals, and they work on our behalf. Is that something
that you at least adhere or are familiar with?
Mr. Stephens. I hope so, yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You support and are familiar with the idea
that when Members of Congress or others are asked about issues
of racial profiling, do you think it's worthy of them to
inquire of such?
Mr. Stephens. I'm not following you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you think it's worthy when Members of
Congress or elected officials are approached on issues by their
constituents or others about, say, something like racial
profiling, do you think it's important to have them look into
it?
Mr. Stephens. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I see the light is on, and I simply want
to say to the two, Mr. Allen, Mr. Chaison, you know that I have
known you and seen you. I want you to continue to do your work
in safety and in honesty. My position is let us get all the
information out on the table.
And I want to close with the indulgence of the Chair by
simply saying that I know the Brook Hollow Church family, and I
also know the concept of redemption and baptism. So that church
offers membership to anyone who will come, and it offers its
pulpit to anyone who will come and offer words. And I will
offer to say to you that was the only role the Vice President
had on March 12 was visiting with those constituents in a
church service and worshipping with them.
But, again, I thank all of you for the information
provided, and I will certainly be persistent in following this
matter and working as I can work on my committee. And I again
thank the chairman. I'm not sure if we're ending on this line
of questioning, but I thank the chairman for his very kind
indulgence.
Mr. Burton [presiding]. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee.
I think unless there's any more questions, we will excuse
this panel and have the other panel brought forward. I want to
thank you very much for your perseverance and your patience.
You've been very, very helpful.
Mr. Shays. Turn off the cameras.
Mr. Burton. Can you shut the cameras off so we can let the
police officers leave?
According to the rules that we agreed to yesterday, we will
now go back to the half-hour questioning on each side, and then
we'll go to the 5-minute rule. And we will now--excuse me. On
this panel it is the 5-minute rounds. We will go to the half-
hour when Mr. Marshall comes in.
Mr. Shays, would you like to proceed.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Howard, do you still contend that this case
was not shut down by any common understanding of that term?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, I do.
Mr. Shays. Yesterday you said there were several arrests in
December 1999. Were these arrests or indictments?
Mr. Howard. They were arrests.
Mr. Shays. Were the indictments you mentioned in
yesterday's testimony the results of work that had been done
prior to your receipt of Congresswoman Waters' letter of August
20, 1999?
Mr. Howard. Which indictments?
Mr. Shays. I'm sorry. These would have been arrests, I'm
sorry.
Mr. Howard. Were there arrests preceding that letter?
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Mr. Howard. No, sir.
Mr. Shays. Let me read it again. Were the arrests you
mentioned in yesterday's testimony the result of work that had
been done prior to receipt of Congressman Waters' letter of
August 20, 1999?
Mr. Howard. These arrests were the result of a case that
started after October 1, 1999.
Mr. Shays. And who was this work done by?
Mr. Howard. I received the information from a memorandum
that Chad Scott had given to me in March 2000.
Mr. Shays. Do you recall how many individuals were present
at your September 1999 meeting?
Mr. Howard. In the August meeting? The latter part of
August?
Mr. Shays. Was it August or September? Yeah, you've
maintained it was August, but it was a September meeting.
Mr. Howard. It was approximately 9 to--9 to 12, 15. It was
most of the people that were assigned to group four.
Mr. Shays. Could you give us some of the names of the
people present there, the ones that you remember?
Mr. Howard. I'm sure the gentlemen that were here.
Mr. Shays. So it would have been the four of them?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir. I couldn't tell you. It was the
majority of the people in that group.
Mr. Shays. If there were 9 or 12, you would know there were
others. Let's do this. Let's ask you to submit the names of the
other people present.
Mr. Howard. I'll have to go back and find out who was in
that group at that particular time, yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. If we were to issue a subpoena to every last one
of them, and every one of them contradicted your account, would
you concede that perhaps you have been mischaracterized in your
account?
Mr. Howard. What I recall, sir, is what I said yesterday,
that I said to them at that meeting that we will do no more
proactive investigation at this time, because I was concerned
about the issues, the allegations.
Mr. Shays. In light of the testimony concerning the Houston
Police Department officers returning to the Houston Police
Department at your insistence, would you like to revise your
statement?
Mr. Howard. No, sir, I would not. I did not ask them to go
back to their department.
Mr. Shays. If you still believe their removal of this case
was at the insistence of the HPD, who exactly told you this
from the HPD?
Mr. Howard. I didn't talk to anyone from the HPD about them
being removed. I was told they were going back to their parent
department by the ASAC, which was Keith Boden and Mr. Nims and
Mr. Schumacher. This had been ongoing for some time as of
September.
Mr. Burton. Would the gentleman yield on that point?
Mr. Shays. Sure.
Mr. Burton. The Houston Police Department officers who were
here said that they went back only because the new captain that
took over that division wanted to have all of his officers in
one location, but there was no way, any indication whatsoever,
that they wanted them to curtail their activities as far as the
investigations were concerned in the Rap-A-Lot case. Did you
know that?
Mr. Howard. I had not talked to the captain. I didn't know
what their status was.
Mr. Burton. You knew they were continuing on with the case;
did you not?
Mr. Howard. I thought they were, yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. Thank you.
I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Shays. Is it possible in light of the testimony today
that you never uttered the phrase ``proactive'' at this
meeting, but instead ordered all work to cease except for the
cases currently in the court system?
Mr. Howard. I recall what I said. Anything is possible,
yes, sir. But I do recall also that Mr. Nims came to my office
shortly thereafter and asked for clarification on what I said.
Mr. Shays. And you believe what you said was what?
Mr. Howard. I believe what I said was there are
allegations, and that the proactive part of this investigation
has to stop pending the outcome of the OPR investigation.
Mr. Shays. Was Mr. Nims one of the people who had attended
the meeting in September?
Mr. Howard. No, sir. I believe he was in his office.
Mr. Shays. Why do you believe he was in his office?
Mr. Howard. I just believe he was in his office. I had my
back toward his door. I don't recall seeing him at all, and I
know he came up for clarification, so I would assume that he
must not have understood what I said earlier.
Mr. Shays. He wanted clarification for a meeting----
Mr. Howard. He wanted clarification on what I said at the
meeting, so either he was there and he didn't understand----
Mr. Shays. So he was either there and he didn't understand,
or he wasn't there and he didn't understand?
Mr. Howard. I said either he was there or he wasn't there.
I don't recall exactly who was there. I walked down into the
bay area, and I simply said, would everybody gather around.
Mr. Shays. Who were the people at that meeting that spoke
with you?
Mr. Howard. That spoke directly with me?
Mr. Shays. Who were the people that responded to what you
said?
Mr. Howard. Probably everybody in the bay area that was
there. They all were frustrated as was I. They were asking,
why, why. I could not go into a lot of detail at that time. I
said, we have to suspend this pending an OPR investigation.
Mr. Shays. It's hard for me to imagine a meeting of some
consequence that the only people you would remember there are
the people who happened to be here.
Mr. Howard. No, sir, I didn't say that the only people
there were the only people here. We've had numerous changes in
that group in the last 2 years of personnel as we have
throughout the entire office. There are people in that group
that may not be in that group now. I don't recall the exact
names. I have several hundred people that work for me. On any
given date I can't tell you except for certain positions who
was in which group. I can go back and look at the roster and
see who was in the group.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Waxman.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Howard, let's go back to March 2000. As of that time,
the OPR investigation was still ongoing, wasn't it?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Mr. Waxman. And the status of the agents working on the
case had not changed? They were off proactive investigation
unless they got permission to go forward from you or one of
your associate special agents in charge; is that correct?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Mr. Waxman. But something did happen in March that made you
angry. On March 9 and 10, 2000, there was a Houston management
conference; isn't that correct?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Mr. Waxman. And Mr. Gamble and Mr. Mercado, whom you've
known for many years, were at that conference; is that correct?
Mr. Howard. That's correct.
Mr. Waxman. Some of us here have quibbled with you about--
excuse me. During that conference you all got to talking about
the OPR investigation; is that right?
Mr. Howard. Mr. Gamble and I have talked about the OPR
investigation along with Mr. Peiro and Mr. Adura.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Gamble was relatively new on the matter and
was not aware that Mr. Schumacher was still assigned to the
same enforcement group and still technically supervised the
agents working on this investigation; is that correct?
Mr. Howard. That's correct.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Gamble didn't think it was appropriate for
Mr. Schumacher to occupy that position during the pendency of
the investigation; is that right?
Mr. Howard. That's correct.
Mr. Waxman. And he suggested that you move Mr. Schumacher
to another group, one that did not have the enforcement
activities; is that right?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Gamble did not believe that Mr. Schumacher
should still be supervising members of that group while they
were subject to an ongoing investigation?
Mr. Howard. That's correct. Can I reiterate, sir?
Mr. Waxman. Yes.
Mr. Howard. In January 2000, when I made Mr. Schumacher the
acting GS of group four, I had three ASAC vacancies in my
division, I had nine GS vacancies in my division. At that
particular time I had severe manpower shortages. I determined
at that time improperly that Mr. Schumacher should be the
action supervisor of that group because he is one of the senior
agents.
Mr. Gamble at a later time in March advised me that I was
wrong in assigning Mr. Schumacher as the acting group
supervisor of group four. At that time I did not want to
demoralize Mr. Schumacher or anybody else in that group. I
moved him to be the acting group supervisor of a nonsupport
group. Also at that time I still had nine group supervisor
vacancies and three ASAC vacancies in the entire division.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Gamble, the line of questioning, is that
consistent with your recollection?
Mr. Gamble. Yes, it is.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Howard, did it make you angry?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, I was very angry. I was angry about
several things. I had just come back off extended travel for
the prior 2 weeks. For the last month, ever since the articles
came out with my name being blasted every day in the paper
about this situation, I have been trying to figure out what
triggered me to send the e-mails.
At 3 a.m., I woke up thinking about HIDTA. I got my diary
out and I looked back at the dates preceding the March issues.
A lot of things were on my mind at that time; a lot of things
came to surface in 24 hours beginning on that Monday, whatever
Monday would have been prior to the 14th and 15th. I was on a
panel on a committee to restructure the southwest border HIDTA.
We had some problems with that. We were trying to restructure
that. That was meeting resistance. I had been told that upon my
return from extended travel.
I had also been told that I was losing in excess of 20 task
force officers from my Laredo office. They were going to be
involved in money-smuggling and money-laundering. I am severely
short of manpower.
I am also concerned that I have been trying to get Mr.
Schumacher promoted. I had been told by Mr. Mercado that I
cannot promote Mr. Schumacher or get him promoted at that time
because of the OPR investigation. I am trying to get another
individual in my division promoted, but I can't.
Mr. Waxman. My time is running out.
Did you feel strongly that Mr. Schumacher was taking a hit
because of an investigation that you believed had no merit?
Mr. Howard. That's correct.
Mr. Waxman. When you sent your e-mail saying that you were
bowing down to political pressure, you were referring to this
whole situation?
Mr. Howard. I was referring to everything I was going
through at that time.
Mr. Waxman. Is it still your testimony that it was
appropriate for the Office of Professional Responsibility to
conduct an investigation?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir. They had to.
Mr. Waxman. And it's still your testimony that it was
appropriate to take Mr. Schumacher off the case and off the
group to which he was then assigned?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Mercado or Mr. Gamble, do either of you
have different recollection of events or anything else to add?
Mr. Mercado. No, sir.
Mr. Gamble. No, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Some of us here have quibbled with you about
how much you knew about the details of this investigation.
You're the special agent in charge of Houston field division;
isn't that correct?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, I am.
Mr. Waxman. And how many DEA agents are part of that field
division?
Mr. Howard. Approximately 300 DEA agents, but a total task
force officers and everybody, it's over 400.
Mr. Waxman. If the chairman--I just have one more.
Mr. Burton. Sure.
Mr. Waxman. Just looking at the task force investigation,
for example, Officer Allen who testified here earlier reported
to Sergeant Stephens. Sergeant Stephens, while he was deputized
on this investigation, reported to Special Agent Schumacher.
Special Agent Schumacher reported to his group supervisor, and
that group supervisor reported to an assistant special agent in
charge. That assistant special agent in charge reported to an
associate special agent, and that associate special agent in
charge then reported to you. Is that the way it was?
Mr. Howard. Yes, it was.
Mr. Waxman. With this many levels of bureaucracy separating
you from the people on the ground, it's not particularly
shocking that you and they had different information or
different impressions about this investigation; isn't that
correct?
Mr. Howard. That is correct.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Howard, for the second day in a row now
we've had the policemen and Mr. Schumacher testify very vividly
and very clearly that you pointed to your watch and said, this
case is shut down as of now. They also very vividly remember
you saying it was because of political pressure. And none of
them recall you saying anything like proactive, or if you're
going to do anything further with this investigation, you have
to get permission.
Now, you said that Mr. Nims came over and talked to you
later to get more clarification, and you may have told him, but
as far as those officers who were the mainstays of the
investigation of Mr. Schumacher, they didn't know, they weren't
told. And the only thing they got from you was that you were
shutting down the investigation.
Now, as a matter of fact, there was nothing more done by
them. They testified here just a minute ago that there were no
more investigations taking place, no more street contacts
taking place. The informants were left twisting in the wind,
and then there were death threats on Mr. Schumacher and some of
the other Houston policemen. In addition to that, your e-mail
is very clear saying that there was political pressure; not one
e-mail, but two. And so everything in the e-mails and what you
told those officers indicated you were closing down the case as
of a specific time and date, and then there was nothing else
that took place.
Now, you said that the Houston police officers were going
to be sent back. And Mr. Nims's letter to Mr. Waxman said they
were being sent back to the police department. That was only
for location purposes. It had nothing to do with the
investigation because they continued on after that, and they
were told by their officers in charge and the new captain that
they could go ahead and do the investigating as part of that
task force, or whatever you call it.
Now, what I don't understand is there's this divergence
between what you're saying and what those officers said, and
they said all the other officers that were in the room at the
same time would verify what they said, and then the e-mails
verify what they said. And yet you're telling us today and
yesterday that there was proactive and get permission. Nobody
remembers that except possibly when you went and talked to Mr.
Nims. Now, how do you explain that?
Mr. Howard. Mr. Chairman, I can only tell you what I
thought that I said, and then I clarified it with Mr. Nims at a
later time.
Mr. Burton. Well, you said the investigation was ongoing,
that it went on after that. But as far as they're concerned,
and as far as the records that they have access to, there was
no further investigation. And the convictions that you talked
about, as I understand it, and correct me if I'm wrong, one of
those was from an investigation that had been going on, and the
other was from another indictment that took place after that on
an unrelated subject. Now, is that correct?
Mr. Howard. Mr. Chairman, that's not true.
Mr. Burton. Explain it.
Mr. Howard. I asked for a status on the entire umbrella
investigation on the local impact target in March 2000. Mr.
Chad Scott, who was also the co-case agent along with Mr.
Schumacher, sent me a memo indicating all the arrests that had
occurred in the umbrella investigation of the local impact
target. There was a case taken out under the name of Mr.
Singleton where he was arrested along with four or five other
people, and seizures were made in December. I don't have all
the details of that investigation. I only know what was in the
memo that was given to me in March 2000.
Mr. Burton. According to them--and we'll check further and
find out if there were any more arrests or convictions or what
else transpired as far as the continuing investigation of the
Rap-A-Lot--to their knowledge and to the records they have,
there was nothing further done.
Mr. Howard. Mr. Chairman, the police department doesn't
have access to our records. They would not know.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Schumacher does, doesn't he?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, he does.
Mr. Burton. OK. Now, the other thing that you said was that
you were told by Schumacher, that the case against Rap-A-Lot
and Mr. Prince in all probability would turn on two witnesses.
Now, they just testified here that there were a lot of other
avenues; that those two were important to their case, but that
wasn't the only thing that they were concerned about, that
there was a lot of other avenues they could pursue through
their snitches on the street, but that you chopped them off at
the knees.
Mr. Howard. Mr. Chairman, I was not told about any other
leads. If there were any informants utilized in this
investigation, they had to be used under DEA guidelines.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Schumacher was your man in charge?
Mr. Howard. Mr. Schumacher was not my man in charge. Mr.
Schumacher was the case agent.
Mr. Burton. He was the case agent.
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, he was the case agent.
Mr. Burton. The thing is I don't understand how you can say
to them, as they understand it, we're going to shut down this
investigation as of this time. They don't remember proactive.
They don't remember getting permission. They don't remember
anything else. They were all upset because they were being
chopped off, they thought, at the knees, and then you said that
the case was going to turn on two witnesses that they thought
would turn on Mr. Prince. And yet they--you had told them to
shut down the case, according to them, and they had other
avenues to investigate through snitches and other people out
there in the district, and you didn't know about it. If you
didn't know about it, did you ask them? Did you talk to them
about it at all?
Mr. Howard. I had discussed this with Mr. Nims. Mr. Nims
never told me about any other leads. Neither did Mr.
Schumacher, never told me about any other leads. There are no
other leads put on paper. I don't know where they are.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Schumacher said he talked to you on a
weekly basis, and what he said, according to the testimony here
today, as I understand it, those two were important, and they
were going to try to turn them; that those weren't the only
leads and those weren't the only avenues they were going to
pursue to try to get more convictions and indictments.
The thing that brothers me is 20 people were convicted of
drug trafficking or murder, and yet this case was stopped. And
you say it wasn't stopped, but we have no indication that it
didn't go forward, and your e-mails are pretty clear.
Mr. Howard. Mr. Chairman, I said the case would be put on a
hold. No proactive part of the investigation would be done
pending the OPR investigation. The only way we were going to
get the target of this investigation, the local impact target,
was through conspiracy. Conspiracy can be done today, it can be
done next month, it can be done 6 months from now. You need
witnesses, you need people that are close to it. I was led to
believe by everybody that knew about the investigation that the
key to getting to the local impact target was these two
individuals.
Mr. Burton. That's not what we heard from them today, and I
find that very unfortunate, and they say that a lot of people
who could turn and be witness and who were snitches out on the
street, who were drug dealers that could give them some
additional information, many of them are no longer available as
far as a possible conviction at this time.
Mr. Howard. Mr. Chairman, can I say something else? We
talked about the contract on Mr. Schumacher. The contract is
also on me.
Mr. Burton. Yes, I knew that. I knew that. I didn't want to
mention more than I had to in this public hearing. I understand
it's a very volatile situation that you're faced with. But the
main thing that concerns us is what we saw in these e-mails,
the investigation apparently being closed down at least during
the duration of that investigation. And they're writing rap
songs that are No. 6 or 7 on the hit list about killing police
and how they can get away with bloody murder. I think it's
really tragic.
Mr. Howard. I agree.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Howard, let me just ask you a few questions. Mr. Nims
seems to--as I said yesterday, seemed to have devised some
corroboration to your recall of the--of that meeting when the
officers alleged that you terminated this investigation. Mr.
Nims was Mr. Howard's immediate supervisor.
Mr. Howard. Mr. Nims is? Mr. Schumacher.
Mr. Cummings. I'm sorry. I apologize.
Mr. Howard. OK.
Mr. Cummings. And did you--you said he came to you and
asked for clarification; is that right?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Mr. Cummings. Now, would you normally tell him--I mean, if
he's the supervisor of the group, would you normally go to the
supervisor first, or would you go to the group first?
Mr. Howard. Under normal circumstances I would not have
been involved directly in this case in the first place. I'm the
one that brought this case to that group because it had been
stagnant since--well, 1992 to 1997. I wanted to see what could
be done with this investigation. I don't normally get involved
with cases at this level.
Mr. Cummings. So, but in this instance, go back to my
question now with regard to Mr. Nims, although you may not get
involved on this level, you were involved here.
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. And this was an ongoing investigation; is
that correct?
Mr. Howard. That's correct.
Mr. Cummings. Did you have conversations off and on with
Mr. Nims?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, I did.
Mr. Cummings. And here we were at a point, a very critical
point of the investigation, where you had apparently received
some news that you weren't too happy about, and I'm just asking
you do you recall going to Mr. Nims first before going to the
group?
Mr. Howard. No, sir, I did not. I went down to the bay
area, and everybody that was in there, I just said, I need to
talk to you all right now.
Mr. Cummings. All right. And you don't recall Mr. Nims
being in that meeting; is that right?
Mr. Howard. I don't recall. I don't know whether he was
there or that he wasn't there.
Mr. Cummings. You do recall, however, that there came a
time when he came up to you, or you all met; is that right?
Mr. Howard. That's correct.
Mr. Cummings. Do you know whether that was the same day of
the so-called termination meeting?
Mr. Howard. I believe it was the same day.
Mr. Cummings. Do you remember what his demeanor was? Was he
upset? Was he saying, what the hell are you doing this for? Do
you recall what he said?
Mr. Howard. He was frustrated like everybody involved in
the situation was. He asked me what was going on and what did I
mean by what I had said in the meeting, and I clarified it.
Mr. Cummings. And what did you say to him?
Mr. Howard. I told him that no proactive part of the
investigation could be done without approval from an associate
SAC or myself.
Mr. Cummings. So you're telling us that conversation took
place somewhere not too long after your conversation with the
officers; is that correct?
Mr. Howard. That's correct.
Mr. Cummings. Now, is it possible--and I've been trying to
figure this out over the last 24 hours--is it possible that you
would have told the officers a limited amount of information
and would have told Nims more detailed information? Is that----
Mr. Howard. Not only possible, it is probable.
Mr. Cummings. It's probable.
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Why do you say that?
Mr. Howard. Because Mr. Nims is a supervisor, I probably
would have gone into a little more detail and asked him some
questions more so than I would have the officers and agents
involved, because the officers and agents involved were the
ones that were accused of allegations.
Mr. Cummings. So I take it that you--would you have felt
more comfortable going into more detail with Mr. Nims?
Mr. Howard. It's not a matter of comfort. It's just a
matter of he's the supervisor, and I need to know--I'm
concerned about what had happened about the allegations.
Mr. Cummings. The reason I asked you that is that you would
be talking to some officers. Nims wasn't accused of anything;
is that right?
Mr. Howard. It was the group; no, sir, it wasn't Nims.
Mr. Cummings. The reason why I asked you about the comfort
level is that you were talking to some officers, at least some
in the bunch who had been accused of something that you didn't
think they had done, but you certainly, I take it, didn't want
to necessarily go into a lot of detail there.
Mr. Howard. I'm not permitted to, that's correct, sir.
Mr. Cummings. That's why I asked you about the comfort
level. I know you may not be able to recall exactly how you
felt at the moment, but do you think you would have felt more
comfortable telling more detail to Mr. Nims than you would have
to the officers?
Mr. Howard. Definitely.
Mr. Cummings. Was this a very unpleasant experience when
you went to the officers?
Mr. Howard. It was very unpleasant. I was frustrated
because I was responsible for the officers having gotten in the
situation whether or not it was true or false. I did not
believe the allegations, but I felt responsible because I'm the
one that put them in that situation.
Mr. Cummings. Just two more questions. How long did that
meeting take place, the one with the officers; do you remember?
Mr. Howard. It was very short. It was very, very short.
Mr. Cummings. That doesn't tell me anything. What does that
mean? Does that mean a minute, 2 minutes, 3?
Mr. Howard. Not more than 2 minutes. I went down there. I
said what I had to say in very short sentences. They wanted to
ask questions. They wanted to know why. I told them--I looked
at my watch. I said as of this time, this date, that's it.
Mr. Cummings. So you wanted to get it over with as fast as
you could?
Mr. Howard. I didn't want them to have to ask questions. I
knew they were frustrated and totally demoralized. I did not
want to have to answer questions regarding why I took the
action that I took.
Mr. Cummings. Do you know how long the conversation took
with Mr. Nims?
Mr. Howard. It was probably about 15, 20 minutes.
Mr. Cummings. All right. I see. Thank you very much.
Mr. Shays. [presiding]. Thank you very much.
Mr. Horn, you have the floor.
Mr. Horn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
You said in answer to one question that nothing was
happening between 1992 and 1997 on this particular case, and
that you had assigned it to Mr. Schumacher and his group after
1997.
Mr. Howard. By that I didn't mean entirely nothing was
going on. There was not a lot of progress in the investigation
from 1992 to 1997. In 1997, it was assigned to group four. This
is before Mr. Schumacher was in the group. They were working on
this investigation on the local impact target for a period over
several months prior to me assigning it to Mr. Schumacher. The
original case agent from 1992 to 1997 was assigned also to
group four when I initially assigned it to group four. The case
still was not making a lot of progress.
At that time Mr. Schumacher had just finished a project I
had him involved in earlier in east Texas. I wanted to know
whether this local impact target investigation could proceed. I
assigned it to Mr. Schumacher, I think, in the summer or early
fall of 1998.
Mr. Horn. You mentioned in the course of a response to
another question about 20 people being taken away from the
Laredo station?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Horn. That certainly upset you.
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir, it most certainly did.
Mr. Horn. I can understand that. I wondered how many people
were cut in the Drug Enforcement Agency in your region.
Mr. Howard. These weren't DEA agents. They were task force
officers from local departments.
Mr. Horn. I see. But the Laredo 20 were what? What were
they doing?
Mr. Howard. They were all task force people. They were task
force officers from the local departments assigned to my
enforcement groups in Laredo. There were several--I have four
enforcement groups down there. With 20 people leaving, that
really hampers or restricts the number of investigations we
could conduct.
Mr. Horn. Well, those individuals are dealing with border
matters, aren't they?
Mr. Howard. No, sir, they're not.
Mr. Horn. What is the range of geography that they would be
looking at big drug deals then?
Mr. Howard. We have investigations that are not only local
impact cases, but they're national cases and international
cases. Without going into specific cases, we have an
investigation going on there now that is an international case
involving several countries and many, many cities in the United
States.
Mr. Horn. Well, getting back to this particular situation,
you mentioned that they gave approval of leads and so forth to
the assistant special agent in charge.
Mr. Howard. Associate SAC, yes, sir.
Mr. Horn. Is it called associate?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Horn. Did they ever go to them and say, we want to
lead--we want to follow it up?
Mr. Howard. I don't know.
Mr. Horn. So, then, the realistic thing of this is
everything stopped once you came in and said, we're out of it,
or whatever. And it just seems to me did the Houston police
pick that up?
Mr. Howard. Did they pick up the investigation?
Mr. Horn. Yeah, the investigation.
Mr. Howard. I don't know.
Mr. Horn. So it's just sitting out there.
Mr. Howard. Mr. Horn, I don't know what the Houston Police
Department Narcotic Unit--I don't know what they're
investigating. I have no way of knowing.
Mr. Horn. Well, we've poured millions into DEA.
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Horn. So I'm really upset when I hear 20 agents are
pulled out of a very hot situation in Laredo and things like
this with one letter from a Member of Congress. I was in a
Cabinet office for years, and I would be curious if the
Attorney General personally read that and then referred it Mr.
Gamble, to your organization. Is that what happened?
Mr. Gamble. That is what happened. That's what I understand
happened.
Mr. Horn. How long did it take from the August 20--isn't it
on the thing? How long did it take that to get down to your
office?
Mr. Gamble. I don't know the exact time, but I know----
Mr. Horn. I will tell you in a bureaucracy there is a date
stamp on everything, and I would think your office has a date
stamp. And I would be curious how long did it take to go from
the Attorney General of the United States down to you. And did
you--did they have any directions to give you with that,
whether this was a friend of the Attorney General or whoever;
did you get any directions from the Attorney General's Office?
Do you even know she saw it, or was it one of her 11 political
appointees up there?
Mr. Gamble. I don't have any information about that. I was
not the chief inspector during that time.
Mr. Horn. Well, I would like to have, Mr. Chairman, the
trail of where that letter went and what time was it. I don't
think most agencies really work very fast when a congressional
letter comes. Now, I would be--if I was in that situation as
assistant to the Cabinet officer, I would be very irked when a
letter from Congress did make certain particular things----
Mr. Shays. Mr. Horn, if I could point out, 4 days
afterwards, though, an investigation was commenced in that
Congressman's office with an OPR interrogating the very
individual who was being investigated for potential crimes.
Ms. Jackson Lee, let me just defer to our member of the
committee, and then we will come to you. You will get equal
time, it's just in terms of order.
Mr. Horn. I will finish my minutes. How many minutes do I
have there?
Mr. Shays. Your red light was on, unfortunately.
Mr. Horn. OK.
Mr. Shays. You will be able to come back for another 5
minutes.
Mr. LaTourette.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Horn, would you like a couple minutes?
Mr. Horn. No, go ahead. I just want to pick up on the
routine here, and I'm assuming that you would do that.
Mr. LaTourette. I did have in my notes, gentlemen, the time
indications that Mr. Horn was just talking about, and I think
when we were talking to Mr. Howard yesterday, he indicated that
you received the letter on August 20--I mean, the letter dated
August 20 came to your attention August 20; isn't that what you
told me yesterday?
Mr. Howard. I believe that was the date, yes, sir. I have
not gone back and looked, but I believe that was the same date
that I was notified.
Mr. LaTourette. And so we have a letter, thanks to Mr.
Horn's question, that comes in to the Attorney General, makes
it to somebody else, and makes it to you all in the same day.
We also indicated that the letter is dated the 20th, and it
didn't go through the mail, so it was faxed. So this letter not
only had a pretty direct route through our government, but
then, as Mr. Horn indicated, on August 24th there is an
interview in a Member of Congress' office with a fellow who is
the subject of a Federal drug investigation for 8 years.
Anybody in your lengthy careers ever experience anything like
that fact pattern before? You ever seen anything like that
before?
Mr. Mercado, you ever see anything like that before?
Mr. Mercado. Sir, I receive requests from Congress which we
respond immediately on several occasions.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. Well, let me ask you now about the fact
that this complaint turned out to be baseless except for the
reprimand on the basis of mishandling of a piece of evidence or
a piece of private property, the medallion, where there was a
reprimand. But at the end of the day, this complaint by this
individual in Houston was found to be without merit. It took 14
months to reach that conclusion. Can anybody tell me why, if
you move so expeditiously to consider the complaint including
interviewing the fellow making the complaint 4 days after it
was received, what the heck took 14 months to sort it out?
Mr. Gamble. What I understand is there were 37 witnesses to
be interviewed, some of which were not readily available, some
of which we never got to interview and we just made a
determination they were not going to make themselves available.
And it was not all people within DEA that we would have access
to that we could have compelled to come and have an interview.
So it's just the investigative process, it just took a long
time.
Mr. Howard. Mr. LaTourette, one additional comment that you
might need to know, too. Also during the process of the OPR
investigation, there was a member of that group, group four,
who also said that the allegations did happen, so that did
occur, which resulted in him----
Mr. LaTourette. Let me bounce this off you. You're all
experienced law enforcement officers. Here you have an
investigation that was laying dormant since 1995. Mr. Howard
comes into Houston and he says, we really ought to take a look
at this because anybody who is able to move $1 million in the
trunk--of cocaine--in the trunk of a car is someone worthy of
our Federal attention, and thanks to your good work, Mr.
Howard, and the good work of Mr. Schumacher and the HPD
officers, 20 arrests are occasioned, indictments up,
convictions go, and you work your way up to the No. 3 man, as I
understand, in this organization. That's how Mr. McCarter has
been described; is that right?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir. But can I explain how this
investigation is in chronological order or really in order of
what we do in Houston?
Mr. LaTourette. I also understand your observation that the
RICO case or a conspiracy case can be brought today tomorrow or
anything else.
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. But what you have after you get to the No.
3 man--maybe you can explain it to me. If I'm the No. 1 man, I
see you worked your way up my organization, you come to No. 3,
and if I can convince somebody--and you said it didn't have to
be a Member of Congress, it can be any citizen--to send you a
letter or apparently the Attorney General a letter saying there
is racial going on or some other violation of the law, as
alleged that for 14 months, which is the effect of the
suspension, and if I read Mr. Nims's letter and we don't get
into this thing called--Mr. Nims said you suspended it.
Well, that simple filing of a complaint when you're this
close you're nipping at the heels of Mr. Big, you can cause the
suspension of a Federal drug investigation of someone who has,
at least according to your information, a pretty big sway down
in the Houston area of poisoning their children at least with
cocaine, but for 14 months--so while you're right that you can
come back and do a RICO case any time you want, the
confidential informants and others who have helped you get
information on this organization, they've not only seen one
investigation called off for political pressure, as was the
quotation, but Officer Chaison testified this was the second
time that this fellow went to his friends and said, they're
being mean to me, or they're violating something, and it was
the second time. So how many times are these confidential
informants going to have faith in you all that you're going to
stand up for them and not take a walk the next time a complaint
is made? And I welcome any comments you have.
Mr. Howard. First of all, this local impact case is not Mr.
Big. It is a local impact target. It is not a major case that
we get involved in in Houston. We are a target-rich
environment. We had reached--as far as what I was told, we had
reached a stalemate on going any further pending the
cooperation of two people. That's what I was repeatedly told. I
know at that time nothing can be done with these two
individuals. We can go back at any time and go to grand jury,
as Mr. Nims had said. This is not a major investigation. It's a
local impact case.
Mr. LaTourette. Well, with the indulgence of the Chair, in
Ohio where I'm from, a guy that can move $1 million of cocaine
in a trunk is an amazing case.
Mr. Howard. We seize 1,000 kilos or 1,000 pounds of cocaine
or marijuana every month in my division. That's a lot more than
76.
Mr. LaTourette. How many kilos of cocaine was Rap-A-Lot
moving, according to the information that you've received?
Mr. Howard. I don't know. I couldn't tell you off the top
of my head.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee, you have 5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Shays.
Again, coming to the microphone, let me thank again the
ranking member and the chairman. I think it's important here,
as I indicated, as a member of the House Judiciary Committee
and in the oversight of the DEA, Mr. Howard, to thank you very
much for the leadership you have given, the danger that you
have put yourself in place or in front of along with your
agents in our area and across the country. I think it's
important. The knowledge and respect that I have for the
Houston Police Department, I frankly believe that our community
is safer for some of the excellent work that has been done by
DEA agents.
I am particularly glad that you clarified my colleague's
question about the fact that you have a lot of big fish that
you have caught and still are looking toward. Is that my
understanding? You have major operations that are going on?
Mr. Howard. That's correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And in the scheme of things, though I am
ready to get rid of any that were threatening our lives as it
relates to drug usage, that in the scheme of things this does
not--or this series of investigations at least, I understand
your words, is not one of those major targets, but it is a
target. Is that my understanding?
Mr. Howard. That's very correct.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. My legal knowledge suggests that
conspiracy has no statute of limitations?
Mr. Howard. That is correct.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. And today, tomorrow, you can bring an
action?
Mr. Howard. That's correct.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. I want to acknowledge Mr. Nims's point of
view that he understood that Sergeant Stephens had been under
pressure for some time for he and his squad to return to the
HPD, so they were headed back, their resources were needed?
Mr. Howard. Yes.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. You indicated that you had been on 3 weeks
of travel, and I know--being a manager and having to worry
about people being pulled from investigations, would you have
considered yourself under office pressure to make sure that
things were balanced?
Mr. Howard. When I came back on that Monday, I had the
normal 2 weeks of inbox. There are a lot of things that you
have to do in a short period of time.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. A lot of decisions?
Mr. Howard. A lot of decisions.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Let me refer you to some conversations, so
I can see whether--maybe you were talking to one group when you
thought you were talking to another.
You think you and Mr. Nims talked shortly after you talked
to the officers in the bay. I am wondering, given the
discrepancies in your recollection and the other officers', if
you might be mixing the conversations. You need to think about
it.
Is it possible, for instance, that you used the phrase
``proactive'' with Mr. Nims and maybe not the officers? Is it
possible that you used shorthand phrases when talking with the
officers that might account for differences in interpretation?
Mr. Howard. I can't tell you word for word what I said. I
was trying to make it as short, but still get the meaning out
to the officers because I was frustrated, as well; I knew that
they were totally demoralized at that point.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. How long have you been a DEA agent?
Mr. Howard. Since December 26, 1973. I have had 12
transfers.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Have real commitment to your work?
Mr. Howard. I took a cut in pay to come on this job. I was
a Vietnam vet. I wanted to work in a problem area or with kids.
I certainly consider this a problem area. I have been
transferred because I have had my life threatened in the past.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Wouldn't be part of any cover up?
Mr. Howard. No, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Don't consider yourself weak-kneed?
Mr. Howard. This is my last year on this job, and I am
disturbed about my name being in the press. Everything that I
say, it is like I am being told I am a liar.
I know what the truth is. My integrity has been out there
in these papers almost weekly since October. I know what the
truth is here and I know what I did and what I didn't do.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. So, as I said, I am concerned about that
as well, Mr. Howard. So this term that you could have used, the
phrase ``proactive'' with Mr. Nims and not the officers, you
may have used it with Mr. Nims and not the officers?
Mr. Howard. That is very possible.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Did you get a direct call from the
Attorney General of the United States to tell you to stop this
case?
Mr. Howard. No, ma'am, I did not.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Did you get a direct call from anyone to
stop this case?
Mr. Howard. I have never been told to stop this case by
anyone.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Do you have a concept of what you meant by
``political?''
Mr. Howard. I was talking about the total environment, the
press, the OPR investigation, just everything going on.
Everything is political. Everything involving our job is
political. It has ramifications on the community. It has
ramifications on the agents and officers who work these cases.
It has ramifications on the laws and throughout our society.
That is all political as far as I am concerned.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Mr. Howard, I assume, Mr. Gamble and Mr.
Mercado and Mr. Howard, you are under oath?
Mr. Howard. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. And as you have indicated when you
explained the word ``political,'' you have given us the truth?
Mr. Howard. I have given you the truth.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Do you know Dr. Ralph Douglas West
personally?
Mr. Howard. Yes.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Do you have any cause to have invited him
in for any questioning about any involvement in any activities
that would have been illegal or untoward.
Mr. Howard. No, ma'am, I have not.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Is he a respected person in our community?
Mr. Howard. Very much so.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Is his church a well-known church?
Mr. Howard. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Would you presume it unlikely that people
of stature would want to come and worship at his church?
Mr. Howard. I believe anybody in the community would go to
his church.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Did you get any calls from the Vice
President or his assistants talking about this particular case?
Mr. Howard. No, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Do you have any knowledge that the Vice
President had any influence about your decision?
Mr. Howard. No, ma'am, he did not.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Mr. Howard, knowing the outstanding
leadership of Pastor West and his church, do you have any
reason to know why he is in the press or being speculated to be
involved in any way in these activities?
Mr. Howard. Only because somebody goes to his church. That
is the only reason. There is no other reason.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. You saw no reason to pursue him or his
church members?
Mr. Howard. No, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. And you believe in God?
Mr. Howard. Yes.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. And you believe in rebirth and the right
for people to attend church?
Mr. Howard. I go to Brentwood.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. I am quite aware of the leadership of that
church.
Mr. Chairman, you have been so kind again with the emphasis
for the work that these individuals do; and whatever we can do
to add to the protection of their lives, let us do so, and
conclude as well that we as Members of Congress have our
responsibilities. And I would hope, Mr. Howard and others that
you know, that whatever we do, we do not do it in the intent to
do anything but represent the constituents and issues that we
have the responsibility for.
We thank you for your service.
Mr. Howard. Yes, ma'am, thank you.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Ms. Jackson-Lee for your presence
here. It has been very helpful. I am going to yield myself time
and try to cover a few different points.
First, Mr. Howard, I believe you to be a very honorable man
and have a distinguished service, and any time someone can
point out that they served in Vietnam they should--and they
should be congratulated for that.
But we are here for things that you did that frustrate you,
but also frustrate the committee. We didn't write the e-mails;
you did. We didn't say, ``I understand that the situation
involving Rap-A-Lot, a.k.a. James Prince, has gotten worse. To
eliminate any further difficulty in this matter, I have decided
that the Eastern Division will curtail any enforcement action
against this subject. At any rate, it is over, and we are
closing our case on Mr. Prince.''
I didn't write that; you did. I didn't write, nor anybody
up here or any of the people before, ``Now we bow down to the
political pressure anyway. If I had known this, I would never
have brought Jack in the case, nor would I have even pursued
it. But it is over now. The Houston Division will terminate all
active investigation of Rap-A-Lot except for those persons who
have already been arrested and indicted.''
That is what you did. So be frustrated and we understand
your frustrations; but you wrote this, and because you wrote
it, we are here today. Had you not written it we might not be
here today.
Mr. Howard. I agree.
Mr. Shays. Had you put other officers on active
investigation instead of putting this on a stall for 14 months,
we might not have been here. I mean, so those are the realities
of it.
Yesterday was not a good day for the DEA. It was not a good
day for a whole host of reasons. It wasn't a good day in part,
Mr. Gamble, because it is clear that someone can put political
pressure on the DEA, and that someone can be the subject of an
investigation and then you will allow it, the DEA will allow
it, to be suspended, and good men and women for 14 months are
under a cloud. Why the hell it should take 14 months is beyond
me, especially when the discovery and the determination was
made in March, and from March until October, incidentally, only
when people started to focus on it, did we then learn that the
March clearing was going to be valid.
Yesterday, Mr. Waxman began these hearings asking that we
not complicate or undermine the Inspector General's
investigation of this case. I don't think that we have. What
has become clear to me over the past 2 days is how easy it is
for the target of a DEA investigation to complicate and
undermine that investigation.
All a criminal target needs to do is lodge a complaint or
ask a Member of Congress to lodge a complaint against a DEA
agent; isn't that correct, Mr. Howard?
Mr. Howard. No, sir, that is not true. If I had known there
were additional leads, other agents would have been put on that
case. I didn't know that there were additional leads.
Mr. Shays. Well, shame on you for that.
Mr. Howard. I was never told by the GS that there were
additional leads.
Mr. Shays. If it was your testimony that the Rap-A-Lot case
was stalled, or suspended anyway, pending the two key witnesses
in custody helping, why were you so frustrated in September and
in the March vetting e-mails about having to suspend the
proactive aspect of the case if you have just said what you
said? Why be frustrated? There were leads.
Mr. Howard. Why was I frustrated in March?
Mr. Shays. September you were frustrated.
Mr. Howard. I was frustrated in September about the
allegations.
Mr. Shays. But not frustrated that you had to suspend the
investigation?
Mr. Howard. I was the one that brought Jack Schumacher into
this situation. I solely, nobody else, brought Jack Schumacher
into the situation. He is being named as doing improper----
Mr. Shays. Mr. Howard, if the target of an investigation
had not successfully gotten DEA to do an investigation, an OPR
investigation, would you have suspended this case?
Mr. Howard. No, sir, I would not have done anything.
Mr. Shays. You wouldn't have, so the case would have
continued. Right?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. It would have continued and been an active case,
a proactive case?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. So let's not get into these mindless games of
saying that there was no reason to continue. There was every
reason to continue. The only reason you suspended it was the
criminal in the case, the target in the case, succeeded in
getting DEA to do an OPR investigation. That is the only reason
why you suspended this case; isn't that correct?
Mr. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Now give me your explanation.
Mr. Howard. As far as what I was being told by Mr.
Schumacher and also by the group supervisor, Mr. Nims, the only
leads, everything hinged on the cooperation of two individuals.
That is all I can go on is what I was told.
Mr. Shays. Why not followup with the IRS?
Mr. Howard. I asked the IRS SAC to get involved in the
investigation. He told me that they had already looked at this
case several times. There was nothing there.
Mr. Shays. Who is he?
Mr. Howard. The SAC of IRS.
Mr. Shays. Special Agent----
Mr. Howard. His first name is Jack, Special Agent in
Charge.
Mr. Shays. So you thought there were some leads?
Mr. Howard. No, sir. I was asked by the supervisor, Jim
Nims, to ask the SAC of IRS, would he have his people come over
and look.
Mr. Shays. So you were asked to ask the IRS to come over?
Mr. Howard. I didn't review the case file.
Mr. Shays. How persuasive could you be to IRS if you hadn't
read the case, to ask the IRS to come get involved?
Mr. Howard. Mr. Shays, I do not review case files. I have
hundreds of cases open.
Mr. Shays. A gigantic interest in this case would occur to
me if I were in your shoes if the subject of the investigation
was the one that succeeded in getting the investigation
suspended. I would drop everything else and I would go into it
overtime because once you let the subject of an investigation
suspend a case, you are dead.
Mr. Ose, you have 5 minutes.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Shays.
Mr. Gamble, we talked yesterday about the 121 cases in the
first quarter of this year that OPR is dealing with, and I
asked how many have resulted in the stoppage of an inquiry or
removal of agents from active investigation; and I think you
were going to get back to us with that information today.
Mr. Gamble. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ose. Do you have that information?
Mr. Gamble. Yes.
In 1998, we had a total of 248 investigations that we
conducted; 37 mandated that people be removed from the job,
taken off, out of the office and not able to perform any
duties, two of which were put on limited duty, meaning put in
another assignment other than the job that they were in. Six
resulted in indefinite suspensions and 13 terminations.
Then we go to 1999 and we had 314 investigations that were
conducted, 37 of which again individuals were placed on
administrative leave, which means that they were not able to
come to work and perform any of their official duties. Seven
were placed in limited duty status, 10 were indefinite
suspensions and 17 were terminations.
And then fiscal year 2000, 366 investigations were
conducted, 31 of which were placed on administrative leave, 9
in limited duty status, 6 were placed on indefinite suspension
and 33 were terminations.
If I can just--Mr. Shays pointed out the 14 months. It took
us 7 months to conduct our phase of the investigation, which
ran from August 24 through March 29. Once we conduct our fact-
finding, it then goes to another board of review which all of
these cases go to, in which all of them have to be reviewed;
and they look at them in terms of priority. Some are more
serious than others, and that is something not under my
purview. I don't know how they do their workload.
From there it goes to a deciding official who supports the
action that is being proposed.
Mr. Ose. Is it my understanding--I want to make sure that I
have this correct--that the allegation that was made by Mr.
Prince was judged at the end of this process to be without
merit?
Mr. Gamble. It was in the case of Mr. Schumacher, yes. And
in the case of Mr. Chad Scott, there was a letter of reprimand.
Mr. Ose. So Schumacher, there was no letter of reprimand,
nothing?
Mr. Gamble. He got a letter of clearance.
Mr. Ose. And Chad Scott got a reprimand?
Mr. Shays. A letter of reprimand, not on racial profiling?
Mr. Gamble. The initial allegation was harassment, civil
rights violation, illegal seizure and conduct unbecoming an
agent. Those were the allegations.
Mr. Shays. Made by the subject of the investigation?
Mr. Gamble. Some of them were. The subject didn't say
``conduct unbecoming''; that is something that we determined
when we looked at the merits of the allegation. They wouldn't
know what that is. So that was a phrase that we put in there. I
mean, that's----
Mr. Shays. Mr. Gamble, Mr. Jimenez at the deposition said,
``I just want to put it on the record that we feel that the
information provided by Mr. Prince is insufficient at this
point for us to--you know, we will take a look at it, but it
does not pinpoint any civil rights violation. It is not
identified, specific acts of wrongdoing of DEA agents and so
on.'' That was the deposition taken by the person who brought
the charge.
So tell me how you get from there to there?
Mr. Gamble. From?
Mr. Shays. Tell me, how do you pursue a case when the
initial deposition of the person making the charge has no
validity?
Mr. Gamble. I don't know what all--here again, I was not
the chief inspector at that time. The only thing I know is the
information that----
Mr. Shays. I just was trying to clarify one point. The
letter of reprimand happened to be a medallion?
Mr. Gamble. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Taking a medallion and not reporting it. That
was the extent of the reprimand, correct?
Mr. Gamble. To my knowledge, yes.
Mr. Ose. Reclaiming my time, given the OPR investigations,
how many of these cases in these respective years ended up in
the termination of an active investigation?
Mr. Gamble. None, to my knowledge.
Mr. Ose. Zero?
Mr. Gamble. None.
Mr. Ose. Except for this one? This one with Mr. Prince was
the only one where you could conceivably draw a line which led
to the termination of an investigation?
Mr. Gamble. Here again there are two separate things. There
is the OPR matter and the operation matter. I am responsible
for conducting the allegations against employees for violations
of our standards of conduct. That is all I know. That is all we
do.
The consequences of that, an individual being removed or
other disciplinary action being taken against an individual, I
don't know how to translate into----
Mr. Ose. As it relates to Mr. Smith.
Mr. Gamble. As it relates to any ongoing investigation.
Mr. Ose. In terms of the ones that you cited here, am I
correct in understanding your testimony that none of these
investigations resulted in the ending of an active
investigation?
Mr. Gamble. I wouldn't have that knowledge. I wouldn't know
that. I don't think they would have. This is about the
individual, it is not about--and it is about the individual and
the individual's conduct in the performance of his duties. I
wouldn't know and I wouldn't think that translated into the
termination of an investigation.
Mr. Ose. My time is up.
Mr. Burton. You are saying, no investigation of an agent,
to your knowledge, had terminated an active, ongoing
investigation of a subject out there in the field?
Mr. Gamble. That's true.
Mr. Burton. Is that what you wanted to know, Mr. Ose?
Mr. Ose. Would you chairman repeat his comment.
Mr. Burton. What I said was, no investigation of an active
agent for misconduct, to his knowledge, ever resulted in the
termination of an active ongoing investigation in the field.
Mr. Ose. You are far more eloquent than I.
Mr. Burton. I know. Doesn't it scare you sometimes?
Mr. Ose. I do have one question of Mr. Mercado.
Mr. Mercado, you are No. 2 at DEA. Can you recall any other
case where an active inquiry was ended in this fashion?
Mr. Mercado. No, sir. We have had allegations, but we have
had to hold an investigation pending an outcome. We have one in
progress that is pending the end of the OPR investigation
before we can continue.
Mr. Ose. Where the agent has been removed, but the
investigation is continuing?
Mr. Mercado. Because of the nature of the investigation,
the investigation is on hold and both agents have been put on
leave pending the investigation.
Mr. Ose. But you know of none that have been terminated?
Mr. Mercado. None have been terminated.
Mr. Ose. And you have been with DEA----
Mr. Mercado. Over 22 years.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Horn.
Mr. Horn. Is a Member of Congress the agitator for this
particular case or is it like this one?
Mr. Mercado. No, this was an internal investigation, sir.
Mr. Burton. I believe we have a few more questions of this
panel, and I would like to wrap this up as quickly as possible
because of time constraints.
We want to bring Mr. Marshall out, the DEA administrator.
Mr. Horn. Just to wind it up, Mr. Gamble, you mentioned
local politics in regard to your response yesterday to a
question. You said that you told Mr. Howard that he had to deal
with his local politics and you had to deal with yours. What
were the local politics that you had to deal with at the Drug
Enforcement Agency?
Mr. Gamble. Office politics. There are a lot of competing--
we are asked to do a lot of things with limited resources. We
have--you know, as I indicated, the total number of OPR
investigations going on, we only have 52 agents to do these.
How do they get done? So there are a lot of things----
Mr. Horn. How it gets done is when the powers that be in
your agency talk to the budget people at the Department of
Justice to get the resources you need.
Mr. Gamble. Yes, sir.
Mr. Horn. Well, I mean, you know, when you talk about local
politics, you are using Speaker O'Neill's great quote.
Mr. Gamble. That's true.
Mr. Horn. That is the most overworked phrase we have in
this building.
You heard about the 20 people from Laredo; that was
upsetting Mr. Howard. I don't blame him. He mentioned also that
this case, I think germs of it, Mr. Howard, between 1992 and
1997, wasn't going anywhere; isn't that correct, what you said?
And then you put Mr. Schumacher in charge, and things started
to happen?
Mr. Howard. There were very little things going on prior to
1998, yes, sir.
Mr. Horn. But it started in 1992; is that not right?
Mr. Howard. That's correct.
Mr. Horn. Was that because they didn't have the resources
or the leadership?
Mr. Howard. I wasn't there in 1992. I didn't go there until
1995, so I don't know.
Mr. Horn. What made you then recommend that we need to
focus on this issue?
Mr. Howard. Because the investigation was open since 1992.
When I got briefed it was 1997. I got briefed with the Houston
Police Department and various other agencies. The investigation
was assigned at that time to my HIDTA task force, and no
progress had been made over the past 5 or 6 years. I wanted to
see, should the investigation be closed or pursue the
investigation. That is when I brought it up to group four.
Mr. Horn. When you talked to the team that was working on
it and said it was going to shut down, who was ahead of you in
the hierarchy? To whom did you report at that time?
Mr. Howard. In Houston I don't report to anybody.
Mr. Horn. Never?
Mr. Howard. In Houston?
Mr. Horn. In Houston, who is the person that signs your
paycheck?
Mr. Howard. Operational, at that time it was Richard Fiano,
chief of operations.
Mr. Horn. He is positioned where, in Houston?
Mr. Howard. In Washington.
Mr. Horn. What would his title be?
Mr. Howard. Chief of operations.
Mr. Horn. Did he tell you to close it down?
Mr. Howard. No, sir.
Mr. Horn. Who told you? Is there a little tooth fairy up
there that says, close it down?
Mr. Howard. Nobody told me to close this investigation
down, Mr. Horn. Nobody has ever told me to close this
investigation down.
Mr. Horn. Well, either it was going to evaporate or the
personnel were going to go somewhere else, but what else could
it be when you've had five members discuss this with you and--
on the staffing and all. They had staff at that time. They were
ready to do something, and then you said, close it down, and if
there is something to be done, talk to the Associate Special
Agent in Charge; is that right?
Mr. Howard. That's correct.
Mr. Horn. So you are the one and you are taking the heat
for all of these people, is what frankly a lot of us----
Mr. Howard. I am not taking any heat. I am telling the
truth. Nobody ever told me to close this investigation down. I
closed the private part of the investigation down because I was
concerned about my people. I was concerned about the
allegations that were going on involving my people. Further, I
was concerned about if the allegations were true, they were
true against minority people in my city.
I know what police brutality is. I know what driving while
Black is. I have had it happen to me before. I am sensitive to
that, and I am sensitive to the idea that I brought Jack
Schumacher in this investigation. I feel responsible to him for
having put him in this situation.
Mr. Horn. Is it your knowledge of Ms. Waters' letter to the
Attorney General?
Mr. Howard. Excuse me?
Mr. Horn. When you closed this operation down, was it based
strictly on Representative Waters' letter to the Attorney
General?
Mr. Howard. It was on the allegations, sir.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman's time has expired.
Let me make one comment. If there was an allegation of
racial profiling, if there was an indication of illegal
activities, beatings or whatever, you knew that this was a very
important investigation.
Why did you not put somebody else on the case? Why did you
not replace Mr. Schumacher and replace the Houston Police
Department? Nothing was done.
Mr. Howard. Mr. Chairman, I have never been told there were
any more leads. First of all, this is a local impact
investigation. This is not a major investigation in the scheme
of things in Houston, TX.
Mr. Burton. Thank you. We have heard that before. We heard
just the opposite from the law enforcement officers from
Houston and Mr. Schumacher. Thank you.
Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Someone asked you to close down the case or at
least not make it proactive; and the person who asked you,
using the instrument of a Member of Congress, was Mr. Prince,
who was the target of the investigation. That is the fact.
And the fact is yesterday you gentlemen left me with the
impression if there is OPR, we take them off the case. That is
the fact. You said that was standard practice.
And, Mr. Gamble, you have given us statistics today that
show us that isn't standard practice. You have given us
statistics today that show us 20 percent of the people who are
going to have an OPR are taken off the case. That is what you
have done. So what I learned yesterday is different from what I
learned today.
Mr. Gamble. These are all employees of DEA, not agents
necessarily. They are all employees of DEA. And I--if that is
what you understood yesterday, that is not what I was
indicating.
Mr. Shays. So it isn't the practice to take someone off the
case if there is an OPR.
Mr. Gamble. That is not the practice.
Let me indicate----
Mr. Shays. That is not the practice?
Mr. Gamble. That is not.
Mr. Shays. If it is not the practice which we thought it
was yesterday and accepted it and now we learn that it is not
the practice, that is why we want to know why they in
particular were taken off the case. Particularly when your
predecessor said there really is nothing substantial, Mr.
Prince, that we have heard about your complaint? He said it in
front of a Member of Congress.
Tell me these statistics. Tell me how many times when the
person making the complaint is the target of the investigation
that you all have mindlessly acquiesced and taken them off the
case? Tell me who?
Tell me another example of someone who is the target of an
investigation who can go to a Member of Congress and get a
Member of Congress to ask for an investigation, or even not go
to a Member of Congress, because as you pointed out it is
irrelevant whether it is a Member of Congress? Tell me?
Mr. Gamble. I can't recall.
Mr. Shays. No. This might be the first time.
Mr. Mercado, tell me? Tell me an example of when a target
of an investigation has gotten you to take the agents off and
stop the proactive investigation of the case?
Mr. Mercado. I don't recall one, sir.
Mr. Gamble. Mr. Shays, if I can say why in my conversation
with Mr. Howard, why I thought that Jack Schumacher should be
taken out of the enforcement arena pending completion of the
OPR investigation, and it was based on the fact that there
was--in light of some of the things that----
Mr. Shays. Finish the sentence. There was a what?
Mr. Gamble. He had 19 allegations when he was with the
Houston PD and disciplinary actions over a 6-year period of
time. Since coming with DEA in 1994, there were several
allegations that were reported, conduct unbecoming.
Mr. Shays. And how were they resolved?
Mr. Gamble. Most of them were in a letter of caution. But
there was--unjustified or a letter of caution.
Mr. Shays. Let's put it on the record.
Mr. Gamble. So my concern----
Mr. Shays. No, no, no. Tell me exactly. Tell me why you
decided to take him off specifically?
Mr. Gamble. Yes. I am specifically looking at what was
going--the ongoing OPR matter, looking at his prior history of
conduct, and the issues that were raised about civil rights
violations that had gone to the Department. We had not heard
whether it was----
Mr. Shays. Had he had any other case before the complaint
about a civil rights violation?
Mr. Gamble. Since coming to DEA, no.
Mr. Shays. How many years has he been at DEA?
Mr. Gamble. Thirteen years.
Mr. Shays. For 13 years. Was this not a civil rights
complaint?
Mr. Gamble. We reported to the----
Mr. Shays. Was it a civil rights complaint?
Mr. Gamble. Was it?
Mr. Shays. What was Mr. Prince alleging, a civil rights
complaint, isn't that true?
Mr. Gamble. In the letter, yes.
Mr. Shays. That was his charge. He went to the head of the
Black Caucus who then contacted the Attorney General. Is there
any case against Mr. Schumacher preceding this that involves
civil rights?
Mr. Gamble. Not to my knowledge, no.
Mr. Shays. Right. So tell me why, if that was the complaint
and he had no previous one, why you would have taken him off?
Mr. Gamble. Because I was concerned, one, about safety.
There were a lot of issues there about threats, and we have
heard a lot of testimony about threats. I was concerned about
his safety and whether or not someone would seek an opportunity
to put him in a situation where he could be hurt or hurt----
Mr. Shays. Because the person making the charge--who made
the charge, Mr. Gamble?
Mr. Gamble. The initial allegation came from Mr. Prince.
Mr. Shays. Was Mr. Prince the target of the investigation?
Mr. Gamble. I have learned that he is a local impact----
Mr. Shays. You knew he was the target of the investigation.
Stop saying local impact. He was the target of the
investigation, is that not true? Mr. Gamble, is it not true
that he was the target of the investigation?
Mr. Gamble. That's what I know. That is what I have now
learned.
Mr. Shays. You didn't know it until now?
Mr. Gamble. I was not in this job until February. We are
only dealing with the conduct of our agent. I am not concerned
about----
Mr. Shays. Mr. Gamble, you do not have to tell me it is
your fault, but stop giving me excuses for your organization.
You told me that you took him off the case. I didn't invent
that, so I think you are involved. If you didn't take him off
the case, I wouldn't be asking the question. Did you take him
off the case?
Mr. Gamble. No, I did not.
Mr. Shays. Did you recommend that he be taken off?
Mr. Gamble. I talked about placing him in----
Mr. Shays. You are involved. So don't wash your hands of
it. The question that I just want to know is, you recognize the
person who made the charge was Mr. Prince who was the target of
an investigation. You have acknowledged that in most cases you
don't take someone off a case because of an OPR, isn't that
true?
Mr. Gamble. That's true.
Mr. Shays. So we have a lot more questions. I hope, Mr.
Burton, that it doesn't end today.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Shays, you can rest assured that we are
going to follow this diligently as far and as long as it takes.
I am going to yield to my colleague, but we want to bring
Administrator Marshall--and some of the members have time
constraints, as does Mr. Marshall. So, briefly, we would like
to yield to you.
Mr. Ose. My question is, having done the OPR investigation
and clearing Mr. Schumacher, once the investigation was done,
having cleared Mr. Schumacher, why was he not put back on the
case? Why was the investigation--excuse me, that is two
questions. Why was the investigation not continued? I guess
that would fall to Mr. Howard.
Mr. Howard. The investigation is still in group four. There
are leads being investigated as we speak. We started the case 3
or 4 weeks ago. A new case has been initiated by another member
of that group.
Mr. Burton. I think we have pretty much exhausted the
questions of Mr. Howard.
Ms. Jackson-Lee, I understand that you have one or two
questions.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. I do. Thank you very much.
As I understand the process and your understanding of it,
when a Member of Congress wrote a letter to the AG--I asked you
before, did the AG call you directly?
Mr. Howard. No, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. And it is your understanding that the AG
referred it to OPR?
Mr. Howard. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. As I read the Member of Congress's letter,
there is no request in the letter--did you see the letter?
Mr. Howard. Yes.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. And there is no request in the letter to
shut the investigation down?
Mr. Howard. You are correct.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Does it simply ask for an inquiry and
investigation?
Mr. Howard. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. It is important for us who are African
American or come from the minority community to insist that
people don't take lightly this concept of racial profiling,
although we want the truth as well and I appreciate your
passion on it.
Has the DEA Administrator indicated to you that you acted
improperly in this matter?
Mr. Howard. No, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Wrongly?
Mr. Howard. No, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Have you had that said to you?
Mr. Howard. I have never been told that I acted improperly.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. And the Administrator is a pretty straight
fellow?
Mr. Howard. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Have you heard anything--and I think you
have been in this hearing room for 2 days?
Mr. Howard. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Have you seen any documentation that there
has been a $200,000 donation to Mr. Gore from Mr. Prince?
Mr. Howard. No, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. You have heard nothing in this room today?
Mr. Howard. I heard it yesterday.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Seen any documentation on it?
Mr. Burton. It was made clear yesterday that was secondhand
information and it was unsubstantiated. That was given to one
agent, but it was unsubstantiated.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you for your indulgence, and again
thank you for your service.
Mr. Howard. Yes, ma'am.
Mr. Burton. I understand that we are going to have a vote
at 2:30; and I would like to get on to the next panel, Mr.
Marshall. I would like to thank the witnesses. You have been
very patient.
I recognize Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have been sitting here and something is missing. Let me
ask you a few questions, Mr. Gamble.
Did you have an opportunity to look into Mr. Schumacher's
background?
Mr. Gamble. Yes, I did.
Mr. Cummings. What did you find?
Mr. Gamble. Disciplinary actions, that would be the only
thing that I would be concerned with. While he was with the
Houston Police Department, there were 19 allegations,
complaints filed against him, and four since he has been at
DEA.
Mr. Cummings. What about shootings? He seemed to be unclear
about shootings and killing people.
Mr. Gamble. There were a total of about eight--just 1
second and I can tell you.
There were a total of nine shootings--two, four, six, eight
with the PD and one with DEA.
Mr. Cummings. Did they occur in the Houston area?
Mr. Gamble. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. Did there a time when you shared the
information that you just shared with us with Mr. Howard?
Mr. Gamble. I talked in general. I didn't go into great
deal. I just said I had a lot of concerns about his safety. I
did share this with him.
Mr. Cummings. About whose safety?
Mr. Gamble. Mr. Schumacher's safety.
Mr. Cummings. Why?
Mr. Gamble. And also I was concerned from the agency
liability standpoint. We have an officer that is out there,
there is an allegation about harassment, about inappropriate
conduct at his behest, and I was concerned until this OPR
matter is resolved that we should safeguard his safety as well
as that of the agency.
Mr. Cummings. I knew something was missing. It is becoming
a little clearer to me----
Mr. Burton. Mr. Shays, and that will be it.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Gamble, in March they concluded the
investigation.
Mr. Gamble. Yes.
Mr. Shays. So you knew in March that these were fallacious?
You had access to the investigative report. The OPR had not
cleared him.
Mr. Gamble. To the investigative report.
Mr. Shays. You had access to the investigative report. It
was completed by March----
Mr. Gamble. March 29.
Mr. Shays. At the point that they clear him in the
investigation, not the board, cleared him, you decided to
remove him. I find that very curious.
Mr. Gamble. No, sir, I think your dates are wrong.
Mr. Shays. By a few days?
Mr. Gamble. The OPR investigation concluded March 29. It
then went to the board of review. We just sent the facts over.
We just gathered the facts and sent it to the board. We don't
make a determination on guilt or innocence.
Mr. Shays. But you know that the facts--if you saw the
investigative report, would that have substantiated the
charges?
Mr. Gamble. That is not for me to say.
Mr. Shays. Did you look at the report?
Mr. Gamble. I did.
Mr. Shays. Did it encourage the board to find him guilty of
the charges or clear him? Was that information substantiating
his clearance, his innocence or his guilt? The answer is
obvious, isn't it?
Mr. Gamble. No, it is not to me because I am not part of
that review process. They look at a series of factors that
determine whether or not----
Mr. Shays. Is there anything in the investigative report at
the end that made you disagree with the decision of OPR? The
review board?
Mr. Gamble. The review board does issue decisions that I
disagree with.
Mr. Shays. That is not what I asked. When you looked at the
investigative report, was there anything in the investigative
report that made you disagree with the decision of the review
board in October which cleared Mr. Schumacher?
Mr. Gamble. My personal opinion is that I think he should
have gotten a letter of reprimand at the least.
Mr. Shays. For what?
Mr. Gamble. Because he was the case agent that was
responsible for the matter that we were investigating relative
to taking the medallion from the officers, taking them back to
our office, knowing full well that there are certain
processes----
Mr. Shays. So there was nothing at all involving the racial
charge?
Mr. Gamble. That wasn't a racial charge.
Mr. Shays. That was the whole argument. Your complaint was
with the medallion and how he handled the medallion?
Mr. Gamble. How he handled the DEA evidence, yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Horn.
Mr. Horn. I am curious, Mr. Gamble, when did you first see
the Waters' letter? What date did you see that?
Mr. Gamble. I can't say because I came to this job----
Mr. Horn. How many months before March 29?
Mr. Gamble. Several months. Probably in January-February.
Mr. Horn. And you must have known that Mr. Prince was the
target of the investigation because the final page of Ms.
Waters' letter is, ``After listening to Mr. Prince's concerns
and that of his customers, I suggested that he document his
torments at the hand of DEA agents and send it to you for your
perusal.'' Usually when we get a letter like this when we try
to help someone we would say ``alleged'' torments. It just
seems to me that it should have been very open that there is a
game being played here and that individual won the battle.
Now you are a staff officer, not a line officer, right?
Mr. Gamble. Yes.
Mr. Horn. In DEA. And you went to Mr. Howard and gave him
some of your views on the subject, is that correct?
Mr. Gamble. On the OPR matter, yes.
Mr. Horn. He doesn't have to follow your recommendation
because it hadn't gone to that point yet, you just were
briefing him, is that correct?
Mr. Gamble. That's correct.
Mr. Horn. Mr. Howard, why do you let a staff officer, a
line officer and a darn good one and a tough one, why do you
even listen to them? I have had personnel people in my
organization, I say, gee, that is an interesting thing. Why
didn't you write up a nice memo on that or something? But you
don't let them tell you what to do. Would you say that Mr.
Gamble's information to you led you to this and that is why you
don't have anybody above you that you checked with?
Mr. Howard. Mr. Gamble is the chief of inspection. I
respect his opinion as far as those matters go. His suggestion,
because he made that recommendation, I took it very highly. I
thought that it was a reasonable suggestion.
I was concerned also about Mr. Schumacher. Mr. Schumacher
could have gone out and been at the grocery store and just so
happened to run across somebody in this thing and the guy was
robbing the grocery store. I was worried about Mr. Schumacher.
I wanted him promoted and put in the safest possible place. It
sounded like a reasonable request at that time, sir.
Mr. Horn. It seems to me you should ask Mr. Schumacher if
he wants to be taken off this; and given the professional that
he is, I believe he would say, don't tell me, I will take my
own chances on this. He wasn't doing anything out of order. All
of the things that she says on racial profiling, not one bit of
truth is in it.
Mr. Howard. I did not know that at that time, Mr. Horn.
Mr. Horn. It just seems to me most line officers call in
somebody when the personnel types come through the door and say
tell me about it.
Mr. Howard. Mr. Gamble is not a personnel type.
Mr. Horn. I am saying that is the personnel group. They
don't have line authority at that point in the case. It is
stringently one staff member's view, and I am amazed you
wouldn't talk to Mr. Schumacher before making that decision.
Mr. Howard. No, sir, I would not talk to Mr. Schumacher
before making that decision.
Mr. Mercado. Mr. Horn, may I answer?
Mr. Horn. Sure.
Mr. Mercado. Mr. Horn, as Deputy Administrator, the staff
reports to me, and Mr. Gamble and I had discussed it at the
time. And we felt to protect Mr. Schumacher, protect the
agency, the best thing was to put him in a nonenforcement group
until the investigation was completed.
Mr. Horn. That sounds like a punishment to me. The heat is
on the important people above, so you stop.
Mr. Mercado. Sir, I have been doing this for 22 years.
Sometimes you have to protect your team. At the time we were
concerned if Mr. Schumacher did get into another shootout, we
would be here today saying that Mr. Schumacher had shot someone
or killed someone and we knew about it and we left him in the
investigation. We were protecting Mr. Schumacher.
Mr. Burton. Let me just say this is regarding racial
profiling and a possible civil rights violation. It had nothing
to do with shooting or anything else, so I don't think that
argument washes.
I would like to bring out the head of the DEA, Mr.
Marshall.
Mr. Marshall, would you stand and raise your right hand.
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Burton. Do you have an opening statement?
Mr. Marshall. I have some opening comments.
Mr. Burton. Make sure your mic is on, please, sir.
STATEMENT OF DONNIE R. MARSHALL, ADMINISTRATOR, DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Marshall. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I
appreciate the opportunity to appear here today. I wish that I
could say that it is a pleasure to be here, which most of the
time it is a pleasure to testify in front of this committee,
but this has been a difficult time for DEA. It has been a
difficult time for me, and I am very troubled by this entire
matter. I want you to know that I am committed to full
cooperation with the committee, and I have been committed to
that type of cooperation all along.
I haven't submitted a prepared formal statement for the
record, but I do want to just summarize my own personal
knowledge of these events and my personal involvement in these
events and then try to answer any questions that the committee
might have.
I do want you to know that I am committed to ensuring that
DEA fights the drug trafficking and drug abuse with all of the
tools that we have available to us, and some of the most
important tools that we have are 9,000 courageous and dedicated
DEA employees and the integrity of those employees and the
integrity of my agency. In order to preserve the integrity of
that agency and the public confidence in the agency, we have to
be objective as an agency and we have to be free of political
influence.
I have read a lot of the news accounts of this matter. I
have seen many of the documents, probably most of the documents
which have been provided to the committee, and I share many of
the same concerns that the committee has. That is why I
requested an inspector general investigation a few weeks ago.
That is, I sent an independent team to review certain
investigative issues and to make recommendations to me on those
matters.
My overriding goal here is probably not too much unlike the
committee's. I want to determine whether anybody within DEA
succumbed to outside pressure in connection with an official
investigation; and, if so, I want to take appropriate action.
If not, I want to ensure that the record is correct and
accurate. Either way, I want to preserve the integrity of DEA
and our employees.
Now I would like to summarize my personal involvement in
the matter.
I first became aware of the investigation around May or
June 1999. I am not sure exactly what time it was because I
don't have notes of that, but it was around the May or June
1999, timeframe.
I was briefed on an upcoming trial that was going to be
taking place in Houston, and that was the investigation in
which there were 20 or so people arrested and, ultimately,
there were court cases. I know that there was at least one
trial in July 1999. It is my recollection that some of those
defendants were convicted and at least one, my recollection is,
acquitted.
I knew that there were some prominent local people who were
associates of some of those defendants and showed up at at
least one of those trials. At least one prominent person showed
up at one of those trials.
After that timeframe I next heard about this investigation
on or shortly before August 20, 1999. That day I got a call
from the Attorney General saying that there was an inquiry
about this case, that there were allegations that DEA was
harassing a particular person and that particular person was in
fear of his life at the hands of DEA.
Later that day, or later August 20th at least, I saw a
letter that made those same allegations. That letter was short
on details, but there was one allegation in there that was
potentially serious, and I will quote from the letter that the
individual referred to, quote, believes his life is in danger
from rogue agents.
Now, I advised the Attorney General of some of the details
of that investigation. I wrote the Attorney General a memo
dated August 20. I believe the committee has a copy of that
memo. I recommended against briefing that person making the
inquiry. I recommended against briefing that person on the
details of that criminal investigation. Rather, I advised for
us to tell that person that it was simply a legitimate
investigation supported by credible information.
I then referred the matter to DEA OPR because of the
allegations contained in the letter. I have to tell you frankly
that I did not put much stock in the allegations at that time,
and there were very few details in that letter. But I will say
that a referral to OPR is standard procedure in DEA. When we
receive allegations against our employees, we need to prove or
disprove those allegations in order to maintain the integrity
of the agency. The majority of our allegations that we receive,
approximately 60 to 75 percent depending on which fiscal year
you are looking at, are cleared as unsubstantiated, but we
investigate all of the allegations.
I was briefed periodically on that OPR investigation. I
discussed--in the early weeks of that investigation, I
discussed that investigation with my then Chief Inspector Felix
Jimenez. I discussed it with the SAC of the Houston office,
Ernie Howard.
In the early stages of that investigation there appeared to
be some corroboration of some of the allegations that were
ultimately given--corroboration of stolen items, some early
corroboration that there may have been some defendants that
were beaten up. We determined that there was no paperwork on
some of the arrests that had taken place; and at that time,
because of that partial corroboration, we didn't know what the
facts were.
Ultimately, I will say that we conducted that OPR
investigation; and it led to a letter of reprimand for one
employee and a letter of clearance for another employee.
Now, while I was talking about that OPR investigation, and
kind of gathering facts about the criminal investigation, I had
a number of conversations with Ernie Howard. And during one of
those conversations he became very frustrated with the
allegations and all of the activity surrounding this, the need
to answer a lot of questions. And at one point Ernie became
very frustrated. It was clear he was very frustrated. And he
told me it was, ``not worth the hassle, maybe I should shut
this investigation down.''
I advised that no, you can't do that. It's a viable
investigation, it has to continue. We cannot let something like
this derail a legitimate investigation. I advised Mr. Howard to
put up with what he termed the hassle, let the OPR
investigation run its course and continue the criminal
investigation. I remember one of my sentences was, ``There's no
way you can close down a legitimate investigation.''
Mr. Howard at one point in that conversation took a deep
breath, he sighed, and he agreed. And he said, ``Look, I am
just frustrated. I'm just blowing off steam. Of course you're
right; we cannot do this.''
Now, in some of those conversations we also discussed a
range of options for the duty status of the agents that the
allegations were made against. And that's pretty standard
procedure during these types of OPR investigations. We
discussed possibility of limited duty, paid leave, unpaid
leave. We discussed temporarily assigning this case to a
different case agent in the same group under the same
supervisor until that OPR investigation was completed. We
discussed that, I think, for the protection of the agent who
the major allegation was made against.
Now, I didn't dictate that course of action to Mr. Howard
but we did talk about it. And our concern there was that this
was perceived to be a very violent criminal organization. We
felt that there was a very real possibility of officers or
agents becoming involved in some of that violence and we were
afraid that if the particular agent that the allegation was
made against did become involved in such an incident, that he
would automatically be assumed guilty and even that the agency
would be accused of negligence in action. And I really did
believe that the possibility of violence was there.
Now, I was under the impression that Mr. Howard had made
that change in case agents and was continuing the investigation
and I was under the impression that he had done that around the
late August or early September 1999 timeframe.
Now, over the next several weeks, I had several general
conversations with Mr. Howard. I got routine briefings from the
chief inspector, Felix Jimenez, and later on briefings from
Chief Inspector R.C. Gamble on the status of that OPR
investigation. And that was in the routine course of business.
It was not only this investigation, but other OPR
investigations that I was being briefed on.
Now, following that initial few weeks after the initial
allegation came through, I didn't really place any special
focus on this matter after September, October, possibly as late
as November 1999, because I knew that the OPR investigation was
proceeding and I believed that the criminal investigation was
proceeding with the new case agent in the same group under the
same supervisor. So it kind of dropped off of my radar screen.
The matter came to my attention next on January 13, 2000
during a meeting with the Attorney General. I have periodic
meetings, the Deputy Attorney General biweekly meeting, the DAG
Biweekly they're called. And during the meeting on January 13,
2000, the Attorney General asked me the status of that OPR
investigation. She asked me if the person making--writing the
original letter had been given a status report and, if not,
would I please give that person a status report. I told the
Attorney General I would check on the details of the
investigation and that I would give that person a status
report, if not already done.
Now, when I checked, I was told by Mr. Gamble that there
had been no recent contact with the complainant. I asked R.C.
Gamble to give her a status report. And in preparation for that
status report, I advised Mr. Gamble that he was to give no
details on any ongoing criminal investigation, that he was to
describe the OPR process and procedures and where in that
process we were, but no factual details, even regarding the OPR
investigation, and certainly no details regarding the criminal
investigation. Now, Mr. Gamble later on advised me that he had
done that.
Now, he told me also in the process that there was a
suggestion from that person that the agent be transferred out
of Texas. Mr. Gamble advised that that was not possible. He
told me that there was an inquiry on the status of an item
taken from one of the defendants. It was a necklace, gold
necklace. Mr. Gamble later on determined that that necklace--we
had already determined that it was in our possession. Mr.
Gamble determined that it was not evidence in either the OPR
investigation nor the criminal investigation, and he arranged
for that property to be returned to its owner.
Now, I want to assure the committee that at no time did I--
did anybody tell me that the criminal investigation was closed
down, and at no time did I have any reason to believe that
criminal investigation had been closed down.
Now, my next involvement in this whole matter was when I
got your letter, Mr. Chairman, dated June 29th, I believe it
was. And when I got that letter, as I recall, that letter
requested a briefing on this matter and you named a couple of
the defendants in that letter. And I advised Mr. Howard to come
up from Houston and brief the staff fully on everything that
was already public record in this case. And that would be the
trials that had already arrived at disposition, the criminal
action, anything that was public record in the court I advised
him to brief the committee staff fully on.
I advised Mr. Howard to avoid any details of any ongoing
investigation. And then later on I was told that he did that
and that his briefing clarified the matters that were in
question by the committee staff.
My next involvement with this matter was in October 2000
and, as you know, we received further communication from the
committee, and you requested additional documents in that
letter. It was at that time when we were gathering material to
respond to that letter that I saw for the first time some e-
mails and a memorandum from a group supervisor in Houston, none
of which I had ever seen before. I directed at that time full
compliance with the committee request. I directed that my staff
give up all the documents that we found. I discussed our
cooperation with you, Mr. Chairman. I assured that we would
cooperate.
Now, by then, I want to tell the committee, it was apparent
to me that there were some discrepancies between what I had
been told and the apparent content of some of those e-mails and
memos. And it was confusing to me exactly what was going on
here. So for that reason, I refrained from discussing this
matter with any of the individuals involved. And I requested
very shortly thereafter that Inspector General investigation.
And as you know, there is an Inspector General investigation
going on.
Now, going further, the committee subsequently requested
more interviews with--or, not more interviews, but interviews
with many, many of the people involved, DEA employees, and more
documents. I did recommend in Department discussions that we
cooperate with those requests. I believed that we could
cooperate with the committee and have the Inspector General
investigation go on a parallel track. But the subsequent
decision was to defer the cooperation with the committee to the
Inspector General investigation because of concerns of some
other DOJ components.
Now, that pretty much from a very broad brush perspective
summarizes what my involvement has been and what I knew about
this investigation pretty much up until this moment. And again,
it's a broad-brush, just to sort of put things in perspective
here. It's my hope and I think it's my belief that the
Inspector General investigation and perhaps this hearing will
help answer a lot of the remaining questions, because I still
have a lot of questions. Once I know the full details of what
happened here, I assure the committee that I will act
appropriately. And I will--my actions will be with a view
toward protecting the integrity of DEA, the public confidence
in DEA, and I assure the committee that I will try to do that.
I want to close by just commenting to the committee, I'm
sure you're aware of this, but all of the people, the witnesses
that have appeared here, DEA employees, Houston police
officers, all of them, have in fact put their lives on the line
for the American people. They have difficult jobs, all of them.
They do many things day to day which requires judgment calls
and they have a very difficult job, all of these people. If we
have made mistakes in the agency, I assure you that those
mistakes will be corrected. And I hope that the members
appreciate how difficult this is for DEA and for all of the
people here that are involved. I will be happy to try to answer
any questions that you might have.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Administrator. We have 30
minutes on each side for initial questioning. We probably will
have a vote, Mr. Shays, here pretty quickly. If we do, what
I'll do is I'll continue, then let you come back and pick up
where I leave off.
First of all, this was a major investigation. As I
understand it, 20 people were convicted, one of murder, many
for drug trafficking and related crimes. And an allegation was
made by the principal target of the investigation, Mr. Prince,
that there was racial profiling and civil rights violations. Do
you know of any investigation that has been closed down because
a target of the investigation made some kind of charge like
this?
Mr. Marshall. No I don't, Mr. Chairman. I would be very
upset if we closed down investigations in response to issues
like this. I will also comment that my concern in this, in the
allegations, was not so much the racial profiling issue,
although that is an issue with DEA and it's an issue that I
have to be concerned about, it's an issue in the police
profession now days in our country, and I am concerned about
that. But my overriding concern here was the fact that we had
an allegation that a person was in fear for his life at the
hands of rogue DEA agents, again quoting from the letter. And
there were certain things in the early stages of our OPR
investigation that corroborated other allegations here.
Mr. Burton. But they were later found to not be accurate;
is that correct?
Mr. Marshall. One agent received a letter of reprimand and
the other received a letter of clearance. The more serious
allegations were unfounded.
Mr. Burton. They were unfounded. You talked to Mr. Howard
about the allegations and about the letter from Ms. Waters,
Congresswoman Waters. And you told him he should not close down
an investigation, as long as it was legitimate, because of
political pressure. That's correct, is it not?
Mr. Marshall. That's correct, yes.
Mr. Burton. I don't know if you heard or not, but the
Houston police and Mr. Schumacher when they testified, they
said that--and there were about 10 other people, 9 other people
in the room at the time who will verify if we want to subpoena
them and bring them up. What was said, according to them, Mr.
Howard said because of political pressure--and I'm paraphrasing
it but--which is the--just because of political pressure this
investigation is being shut down, and there were some questions
and murmuring about it, and he said it's being shut down now
and he gave the time and this date. And those people who
testified said that there was no further investigating going
on. It was shut down. The e-mails to which you referred are
very clear, and I think, Mr. Shays, when quite a bit of
detail--when he said the e-mails said, you know, we're closing
this down. It's over, it's over. And the investigation was
closed down.
Now, when you talked to Mr. Howard and you said it
shouldn't be shut down because of political pressure, you
followed up on the OPR investigation. But did you followup on
the investigation itself into Mr. Prince? Because it seems to
me that the political pressure was brought to bear, or it
appeared to be brought to bear, and the investigation,
according to Mr. Howard, was shut down for that reason as of
that time and date. And you, as the DEA Administrator, went
ahead and pursued the investigation, as did the AG, the
Attorney General, regarding Mr. Schumacher and the possible
violations that may have occurred by the employees, but you
didn't followup on the actual investigation of the target of
the investigation, Mr. Prince. Why?
Mr. Marshall. Well, Mr. Chairman, there are about--at any
given time, about 14,000 DEA investigations that are active.
Mr. Burton. Let me interrupt.
Mr. Marshall. If I might, please.
Mr. Burton. This is very important. I don't want you to
miss what I'm pointing at. I mean, if it was so important to
followup on allegation of improprieties on the part of an
official of the DEA, brought by the target of an investigation,
Mr. Prince, then why wouldn't you make that a cause celebre? I
mean, you paid attention and the AG paid attention to Mr.
Schumacher. But Mr. Prince is over here writing rap songs
that's No. 6 or 7 on the rap chart, and talking about killing
police and how political influence can get the DEA off their
back. And I don't understand, if you're talking about the
morale of the DEA and the credibility of the DEA, how you can
say we were looking at Mr. Schumacher, and the AG was asking
questions about Mr. Schumacher, yet the target of the
investigation that brought the charges is running around on the
street, bragging about getting the investigation stopped, which
was stopped and you didn't followup on that. Why?
Mr. Marshall. If I may, sir, we have a system for handling
both criminal investigations and OPR investigations. I directed
a certain course of action with regard to the criminal
investigation. I assumed that was being followed. The OPR
investigation was in the normal process. And I did not pay any
particular special attention to that OPR process. I believed
that process to be working. And I got periodic briefings on
that. And I had every reason to assume that my direction had
been carried out with regard to the criminal investigation as
well as the OPR investigation.
Mr. Burton. This was not just 1 of 14,000 investigations.
You had a murder conviction, you had 19 drug convictions or
related drug convictions. This wasn't just some small case of
one drug dealer. This was a major drug operation. It wasn't 1
of 14,000. This was a major one. The target of the
investigation, Mr. Prince, brings a charge through a
Congresswoman and the investigation is shut down, and DEA pays
attention to going after the agent that was involved in the
alleged wrongdoing, but they let the guy off and don't even
investigate him who committed--who allegedly was in charge of
the drug empire. I just don't understand it. You've answered
the question.
Mr. Marshall. If I might comment further, Mr. Chairman,
with all due respect, there are many of our investigations that
have drug-related violence, drug-related homicides. As you
know, we have a program that focuses a lot on the drug-related
violence. And this is not an unusual case in the grand scheme
of things. And actually, this case in terms of the amount of
drugs that were being moved and the importance of this
particular violator in the national and global scheme, frankly,
was not a major investigation in terms of the drug
investigations that we conduct.
I understand your point, I understand your confusion, but
again I would just reiterate I had every reason to believe that
this investigation was continuing and saw no reason to give any
special followup on it.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Schumacher and the police and the entire,
probably, Houston Police Department have been demoralized
because they had people out there who were snitches that were
willing to give them additional information, and they had a
couple witnesses that might turn, and all of them were left
hanging out to dry, and there were contracts put out on Mr.
Schumacher and Mr. Howard and others. And the investigation was
stopped. I just cannot figure that out. And not only that, Mr.
Prince was going around bragging about it and even has a rap
song out about it. I don't understand it.
Mr. Marshall. I agree. I think that's despicable and I
think it shows what a vicious bunch of thugs that we were
dealing with here. I hope that--I wish that those kind of
lyrics were a crime that we could deal with.
Mr. Burton. Who asked you to transfer Mr. Schumacher out of
the State of Texas?
Mr. Marshall. It is my understanding that--nobody asked me
to do that. It's my understanding in a meeting that
Congresswoman Waters made that request of Mr. Gamble.
Mr. Burton. So we had a Congressperson requesting that a
DEA agent be transferred out of Texas before the investigation
had been completed. Was that the reason he was given a desk job
and taken completely off the case?
Mr. Marshall. I didn't know that he was given a desk job.
By the time I found that out--as I've said, I refrained from
talking to my staff so I don't know why he was given a desk
job.
Mr. Burton. Is it routine procedure for DEA to take the
requests of Congresspersons about transferring people who work
at DEA to different jobs in different States?
Mr. Marshall. No, it's not. We didn't transfer him and we
told her it wouldn't be possible to do that.
Mr. Burton. But you did put him on a desk--but somebody
did.
Mr. Marshall. That's what I'm told. I didn't know about
that until October this year.
Mr. Burton. There was a sign on Harry Truman's desk. It
says, the buck stops here. You're the head of DEA. And you keep
saying ``not to my knowledge,'' again. And I know you've done a
lot of good things and I hope to work with you in the future,
but the fact of the matter is, you were concerned about and the
AG, Janet Reno, was concerned about this case regarding Mr.
Schumacher and alleged civil rights violations. But the target
of the investigation and the Congressperson who brought this
information to your attention, the target of the investigation
walked around scot-free knowing that he was no longer being
under surveillance, was not being investigated for criminal
activity, and he was bragging about it and you weren't even
following up on that.
You say you weren't aware of it. You talked to Mr. Howard
about it. You told him you knew he was upset. He said that he
wanted to do the whole thing. You said, ``Oh, no you can't do
that.'' He said, ``I guess you're right,'' and you didn't
followup on it. I think something of this significance should
have been followed up on.
I have a couple more questions then I'll be happy to yield
to my colleagues for some of my time. I did talk to you early
on and you were cooperative. I want to make that clear because
you were trying to cooperate with us. And then I called you
about additional information and you were not able to call me
back. And I was told that you had been told by the Attorney
General not to talk to me or anybody on the committee. I'd like
to know about that.
Mr. Marshall. When that came about, I believe that was
around the end of October, first of November, this year. There
was a long series of events there. If I can just look at my
notes here. We discussed your request in a meeting at DOJ. I
recommended that we should go ahead and provide the material
that you had requested. Because of concerns of other elements
of the DOJ, it was determined that we would defer that
cooperation in deference to the Inspector General
investigation.
Now, with regard to your call, I was told--we had a series
of conversations between myself and Justice Department, and I
was ultimately told that the Attorney General would return your
call.
Mr. Burton. She didn't. Let me just say this. It seems
curious to me that a charge is brought by the target of an
investigation, a man who is associated with and works with and
has in his employ many people who were convicted and went to
jail. He's an associate, knows the man who was convicted of
murder, a contract hit, and he stops--he's able to stop an
investigation. And the Congresswoman who was very--is a very
important Congresswoman, who does a lot of good things, she
makes a request that he be transferred out of State. The
Attorney General of the United States tells her people and you
not to cooperate with our committee and our investigation. And
then the Attorney General starts asking the progress of an
investigation into the alleged violations by Mr. Schumacher,
because she's paying attention to that particular case. How
many cases that involve agents does the AG ask you about? I
mean, whenever there's a question about an AG doing something
they shouldn't, does she take all that into consideration and
ask you about them?
Mr. Marshall. Yeah, we cover a lot of topics in these
biweekly meetings and informal conversations. And, she asks a
lot of questions about a lot of issues, ongoing cases, OPR
matters that sort of stuff.
Mr. Burton. Does she ask about specific cases, about Mr.
Schumacher's?
Mr. Marshall. When there are serious issues, yes, she did.
Mr. Burton. This was that one she considered serious.
Mr. Marshall. Apparently so.
Mr. Burton. Did she ask about the target of the
investigation, Mr. Prince, and how that investigation was
going?
Mr. Marshall. She did, and I gave her a status of that.
Mr. Burton. You did. Did you tell her that the
investigation was shut down by Mr. Howard?
Mr. Marshall. No, sir, because I didn't know it at that
time.
Mr. Burton. How could you tell her how the case was
progressing if you didn't know?
Mr. Marshall. Because I was told in the August-September
1999 timeframe that the investigation was continuing and----
Mr. Burton. Who told you that?
Mr. Marshall. Mr. Howard.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Howard told you it was continuing?
Mr. Marshall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. Do you think he lied to you?
Mr. Marshall. I have not talked to him about it. I have
only looked at his e-mails and the memo from Mr. Nims. And I
have the same questions that you have. And I hope that the
hearing and the Inspector General investigation will help us
get to the bottom of that.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Marshall, I find it very difficult for you
to be able to respond to the Attorney General about a personnel
matter involving an alleged rogue policeman or DEA agent which
was not substantiated, and at the same time she asks you about
an ongoing case and you say it's ongoing and you really don't
know, and Mr. Howard is out there saying, saying in e-mails
that the whole world knows about now that we're shutting this
thing down and we're not going to go back to it. It's over.
It's over. It's over. And you're telling the AG it's going on.
I just don't understand it.
Let me go to one other subject then I'll yield to my
colleagues. You know I like you, Mr. Marshall, I talk to you
privately, I think you're a good manager. I think you're well-
intentioned. But I really feel bad about this case. I think the
ball has been dropped and a lot of information that could have
led to some convictions and put people who are really risking--
the lives of people in this country have been--the ball has
just been dropped. It really bothers me.
Did you or any of your agents pursue the IRS to have Mr.
Prince really investigated as far as Internal Revenue
violations, tax evasion and so forth?
Mr. Marshall. Mr. Chairman, if I might suggest, I am
reluctant to comment on the investigation past, present, or
future because I am considering what actions we need to take to
ensure that that investigation is appropriately done.
If we want to get into that aspect of it, I would request
an executive session.
Mr. Burton. We might ask you to come back for an executive
session another time. I understand the sensitivity of that kind
of information being in the public domain so I will not pursue
it. But that is one thing I'm sure many members of the
committee--you have heard other questions that have been asked
today--would like to ask. I mean, if we have a major drug ring
going on in Texas or anyplace else, it seems to me that one of
the ways to nail them is to take a look at their bank records
and tax returns.
Mr. Marshall. I understand that, sir. That's why I sent the
team to see what happened on it and what future actions could
be done. And I would be happy to share that with you in
executive session.
Mr. Burton. Who told you at the meeting over at DOJ that
they would defer cooperating with the committee until after the
IG investigation? Who told you that?
Mr. Marshall. That was at a staff meeting on November 1st
and that was ultimately the Attorney General's decision.
Mr. Burton. So the Attorney General said to defer or don't
cooperate with this committee that has legitimate oversight and
investigative powers, to not cooperate with us until after the
IG investigation.
Mr. Marshall. It's my recollection that it was articulated
that it was DEA policy or practice not to cooperate and give
information like this to a committee as long as an Inspector
General investigation was ongoing.
Mr. Burton. You told us about a memo from you to the
Attorney General, Janet Reno. Do you know why the Justice
Department has withheld this memo from us?
Mr. Marshall. Memo from me to the Attorney General?
Mr. Burton. Yeah. You mentioned a memo from you to the
Attorney General. And we've asked for it and have not received
it.
Mr. Marshall. I was under the impression that we had given
you that memorandum. If I could consult with staff, please.
Mr. Burton. Sure.
Mr. Marshall. Mr. Chairman, I was told that the request for
that memo was not part of the request from your committee, and
it's my mistake. I thought that had been provided.
Mr. Burton. OK. Well, I thought our request from Justice
and DEA was all inclusive, was it not? Well, we will officially
request that right now. If you need a subpoena or anything for
that, we'll be glad to give it to you. But we'd like to have
that information.
Now, DEA and DOJ said they did not want to cooperate with
this committee of Congress during this investigation. But you
had somebody on staff giving a briefing to a Member of
Congress, I believe, Ms. Waters. Can you explain that
discrepancy to us? Why is a legitimate committee of the
Congress that has requested information couldn't get the
cooperation of DEA and Justice, but a Member who brought these
charges against Mr. Schumacher and others to your attention
does get a briefing? Why is that?
Mr. Marshall. We did not brief Congresswoman Waters on the
criminal investigation. I specifically ordered that we not do
that. I have been told that we did not do that. I also gave
instructions that we not brief the Congresswoman on the details
of the OPR investigation; rather, described how the process
works, where we are in the process, but with no details about
what we had found.
Mr. Burton. Just 1 second.
The OPR investigation, they at least did talk to her and
gave her some kind of a briefing. And the investigation that's
going on right now, they said, you know, the AG--or the IG's
investigation, they said that you weren't to cooperate with us.
I mean, you are now and we appreciate that. But they initially
said you weren't to cooperate with us. I just don't understand
that discrepancy. Can you explain that?
Mr. Marshall. I was told that there was a precedent that
when we had an ongoing investigation that we waited until that
investigation was completed and then moved into the
congressional phase of it. That's what I was told. I'm not
familiar with those policies.
Mr. Burton. I understand. But at the same time that's going
on, the investigation into Mr. Schumacher and the other
allegations of racial profiling and so forth, there was a
meeting with the DOJ employee, with Ms. Waters, wasn't there,
to at least give her an update as much as you could?
Mr. Marshall. On the process and where we were in the
process, but not the details of the investigation.
Mr. Burton. Is an OPR investigation different than the IG
investigation as far as your ability to cooperate with?
Mr. Marshall. No, we would not normally differentiate in
terms of giving details of an investigation.
Mr. Burton. Well, it seems like, and I may be incorrect,
but it seems like there's an inconsistency here. What I would
like to do is stop the clock now. Oh, Mr. Shays is back. Mr.
Shays, would you take the chair so I can go vote? I'll let Mr.
Shays continue with questioning on my time.
Mr. Shays [presiding]. Mr. Marshall, just give me a second.
Mr. Marshall. If I may clarify my previous answer, I am
told that that briefing to Congresswoman Waters, while it was a
process briefing, as I've said, and it was not details of the
actual investigation, it did take place before the Inspector
General investigation was initiated.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Marshall, my name is Christopher Shays. I'm
from Connecticut. And I'm very interested in this case. And I
did hear your statement and I would describe it as allowing
you, frankly, to take whatever happens and roll with the
punches.
I am intrigued by the fact that--let me just preface it by
saying I visited your agency over the past 14 years, I've gone
to sites overseas where I've had contact with your agents,
particularly Columbia. I was given a DEA hat. I wore it a few
times until a law enforcement officer said, are you crazy,
wearing a hat like that around in public? And I didn't take it
off because of the challenges that are facing DEA now. Your
agency doesn't look good. I'm not saying that Congress looks
good, but your agency doesn't look good at all. And it doesn't
look good because it looks like a very viable investigation was
suspended, not closed, but suspended; not an active case,
proactive case, in other words, because the subject of the
investigation was able to go to a Member of Congress, and when
the Member of Congress issued this complaint and concern to the
Justice Department, you all jumped overboard to accommodate.
And I want to first ask you how many times have you allowed an
OPR investigation to be done in a Congressman's office?
Mr. Marshall. This is the only time that I know of, sir.
Mr. Shays. Did that have your approval?
Mr. Marshall. I believe I knew it was going to be done that
way, yes.
Mr. Shays. Why did you think it was important to have Mr.
Prince, who was the subject of the investigation, appear with a
legislative assistant, appear with a Member of Congress, appear
with a Congressman's spouse, appear with another member of Mr.
Prince, a staff person of Mr. Prince, and a lawyer for the
committee of civil rights and the law. Why did you think it was
important that that happen that way?
Mr. Marshall. I didn't think it was important that happen
that way. In fact, I had concerns about it happening that way.
I thought it--I didn't think that was the proper way to do it.
It is my understanding, my belief, I was told by Mr.
Jimenez that we tried several other arrangements for that
interview and that we requested that interview be done in DEA
headquarters. We offered to go to Houston for that interview.
It is my understanding that the subject, the complainant
himself said that he would only meet with us under those terms.
And rather than forego the opportunity to hear what his actual
allegations were, so that we could prove or disprove, and
because that was the only conditions under which he was willing
to talk to our OPR people, we very, reluctantly accepted those
conditions.
Mr. Shays. Do you think you would do that again in the
future?
Mr. Marshall. If that was the only choice that I had, yes,
I would.
Mr. Shays. I'm sorry to hear you answer that way.
Chief Inspector Jimenez said on page 39--first off, looking
at the transcript of this deposition, Mr.--Inspector Delgado
said this interview is being conducted in reference to the
letter from Maxine Waters, U.S. Congresswoman of the 35th
District of California, to Janet Reno, Attorney General of the
U.S. Department of Justice, dated August 20th.
So the letter was on August 20th and 4 days later the
deposition begins. On page 39 Chief Inspector Jimenez says in
response to some comments made by--well, basically in response
to the deposition, and we're already on page 39, he says:
``Fine. We will take a look at the situation. I just want to
put it on the record that we feel that the information provided
by Mr. Prince, it's insufficient at this point for us to--you
know, we will look at it, but it has not pinpointed any civil
rights violation. It's not identified specific acts of
wrongdoing of DEA agents and so on.''
Then Ms. Waters makes some comments. Then Chief Inspector
Jimenez says, ``Well, we will take a look and we will interview
the investigator.''
Congressman Waters: OK.
And then this is what Chief Inspector Jimenez says. ``But
with all honesty, I thought that I was going to hear a more
formal complaint of facts. You know, this is what happened,
this date, I was here, DEA did this, A, B, C, D, so you know,
we will have more facts. Right now, the information that I am
hearing is very general. We will investigate, but unfortunately
it's not as specific as I thought. You know, when you initially
told me civil rights violations, suspending agent so-and-so
from employment, all that, I mean, you've been sitting here and
we haven't heard any wrongdoing of these agents. I mean, we've
been sitting here and we haven't heard any wrongdoing of these
agents.''
So you basically decided to allow a deposition to be taken
in a Congresswoman's office, not in your office, first time.
And you're now telling me that if a subject of an investigation
demands that it be somewhere like in a Member's office, you are
going to allow that to happen. But given that your chief
inspector says, ``I mean, we've been sitting here and we
haven't heard any wrongdoing of these agents,'' what was your
reaction to that?
Mr. Marshall. When Mr. Jimenez came back and characterized
that meeting, that interview, to me after that, I agreed
totally with his characterizations.
Mr. Shays. What was his characterizations?
Mr. Marshall. Pretty much what I've said there.
Mr. Shays. I want you to tell me what he said to you.
Mr. Marshall. He said that Mr. Prince--there were no
specific allegations of wrongdoing. However, he also returned
from that meeting--or within a very short time after that,
received a report from a private investigator that had been
hired by Mr. Prince. And in that report there were a couple of
very specific allegations that we could prove or disprove, and
we felt obligated to investigate those allegations. Those two
allegations were that DEA agents had stolen a gold chain with a
medallion. The other allegation was that Special Agent
Schumacher had beaten up several of the defendants during one
arrest. Those were concrete things that we could investigate
and prove or disprove.
Mr. Shays. How----
Mr. Marshall. Frankly, I thought that we could disprove
those. Because the rest of that, I thought, had so little
substance, that I thought we would very quickly disprove those
and they would be over with. Instead what happened was that we
learned that the gold necklace had in fact been taken and was
in the possession of an agent in the Houston office. We had
another agent who corroborated that Special Agent Schumacher
had--I believe the words, in his words, ``had slapped around
some of the defendants one night.'' And we felt like with that
partial corroboration, we were obligated to go further and
continue the investigation.
We did that. Ultimately, the beating up the defendants was
disproven. It was not substantiated. And Special Agent
Schumacher received a letter of clearance. The other agent who
took the gold chain without properly processing it, we
determined that there was no proof, no substantiation that he
intended to steal it. Nonetheless, he mishandled evidence, he
received a letter of reprimand. We have a process for
investigating these things. That process worked. And the agents
were dealt with accordingly.
Mr. Shays. Where was the gold chain in the possession of
the agent?
Mr. Marshall. It was my recollection it was in the desk
drawer of an agent by the name of Chad Scott.
Mr. Shays. Was he the gentleman who was reprimanded?
Mr. Marshall. Yes, sir, he was.
Mr. Shays. Was that a chain medallion that actually was the
identification of a gang? Was it just a gold chain or was it a
medallion that identified gang members?
Mr. Marshall. I am not sure I understand--all I know, it
was a chain with a gold medallion on it.
Mr. Shays. Now, what interests me is--were you up for
confirmation during this time?
Mr. Marshall. I was up for confirmation in the timeframe of
May or June 2000. I would have to refer to my records back at
the office to figure out exactly when those hearings were.
Spring of 2000.
Mr. Shays. So, in other words, you were up for
reconfirmation.
Mr. Marshall. I was up for initial confirmation.
Mr. Shays. So you were acting--you were in acting capacity
for how long?
Mr. Marshall. I was acting from July 1999 until I was
confirmed in May 2000.
Mr. Shays. Does that process in any way compromise your
position to stand up to Members of Congress?
Mr. Marshall. I don't think it did, no.
Mr. Shays. Did you at any time contact any one in your
bureaus to ask if there was anything of a political nature or a
particular hot spot or something that you needed to know before
your confirmation?
Mr. Marshall. I worked on and had my staff work on a wide
variety of issues that might come up during my confirmation
process; yes, I did. And I was prepared a briefing book, two
briefing books actually, a stack of material about this high.
This issue was not among those issues that I prepared myself
for, because by that time it was off of my radar screen. I
assumed that the criminal investigation was continuing, the OPR
investigation was running its course, and it was not an issue
with me at that time.
Mr. Shays. Well, first off, I would think that it would be
very logical to know where you have your trouble areas. And in
your judgment, this was not an issue that might present a
problem for you?
Mr. Marshall. I didn't think that this would present a
particular problem for me. And the reason I didn't think that,
as I said, was because I had been assured back in the
September-October timeframe that this investigation was to
continue. It's--you know, that's a course of action. I have
special agents in charge, field commanders that do that. I knew
that the OPR investigation was proceeding according to our
established process. And no, I didn't believe at that time that
it would be an issue.
Mr. Shays. I'd like to request at this time you provide--I
just want to interrupt to say I request that you provide a copy
of your August 20 memo to the Attorney General that you
mentioned in your statement. If you would provide a copy of
that statement. If you have it now, we would like to see that.
Also the briefing books as well, I would like you to submit to
the committee as well.
Mr. Marshall. I'm sorry, the briefing books?
Mr. Shays. Yes, sir.
Mr. Marshall. If they are still intact, I will do so.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4430.166
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4430.165
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4430.167
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4430.168
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4430.169
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Now we'll make copies of that. Thank
you.
Mr. Marshall. Please, if we're going to discuss that I
would like to have a copy.
Mr. Shays. I will not ask you questions about it until we
have a chance to look at it. Tell me, who is Marty Fanning?
Mr. Marshall. I'm sorry?
Mr. Shays. Who is Marty Fanning?
Mr. Marshall. He's an agent that was in Houston, assigned I
believe to this group. I believe that he probably worked, in
fact I know he worked this investigation. He was the agent who
initially provided the corroboration that Special Agent
Schumacher had ``slapped around''--his words--some of the
defendants. That was later discredited.
Mr. Shays. He was the agent who--I'm sorry?
Mr. Marshall. He was the agent who initially provided
corroboration that that event had happened. That was later
disproven because his credibility--basically he was not
credible because he himself was under OPR investigation, I
believe for theft of some property from a defendant and he was
dismissed. He was terminated from his job as a special agent.
And for that reason, his testimony was not considered credible.
And on that basis, the letter of clearance was ultimately
issued to Special Agent Schumacher.
Mr. Shays. How long did it take for Mr. Fanning's OPR
investigation to be initiated and concluded?
Mr. Marshall. I don't know. I don't have those dates with
me.
Mr. Shays. OK. Did you in the past year and a half give Mr.
Ernest Howard any so-called merit pay? Did you make a decision
that Mr. Howard receive a merit pay?
Mr. Marshall. I'm not sure if it was in the last year and a
half, but if I could stretch that out to the last 2 years, yes,
I did.
Mr. Shays. Was that a significant----
Mr. Marshall. It was, yes; it was a Presidential Rank
Award.
Mr. Shays. How much would that be?
Mr. Marshall. I don't recall if that was the Distinguished
Award or the Meritorious Award. I don't know. I could look that
up for you.
Mr. Shays. You don't know when that happened?
Mr. Marshall. It would have been 2 years ago perhaps.
Perhaps a bit less.
Mr. Shays. OK. Did you have any conversations with Mr.
Howard about this case, the Rap-A-Lot case?
Mr. Marshall. Oh, yes.
Mr. Shays. How many conversations have you had with him?
Mr. Marshall. I had several conversations in the August,
late August and then September-October 1999 timeframe, possibly
into November. Since that time, I to the best of my
recollection haven't had any conversations with him on the
case.
Mr. Shays. I'm just going to ask another question. Mr.
Cummings, I'll give you time to prepare. I'll just keep going.
Mr. Cummings, you tell me when you're ready and then I'll stop.
I'd like to ask you about the OPR review board. Is it a
coincidence that their decision took place, that the
investigation took place before you were confirmed and not
rendered until after you had been confirmed?
Mr. Marshall. Is it a coincidence? I guess it's a
coincidence. We have a process that it goes through. The OPR
investigators investigate the allegations. They provide a
report to what is called a Board of Professional Conduct. That
Board of Professional Conduct reviews the case and either makes
disciplinary recommendations or clears the employee. If they
make disciplinary recommendations, it goes to a deciding
official who reviews the case again, gives the employee an
opportunity to respond and then makes a final decision. And
that's pretty much a set process. I do not interfere in that
process.
And so, yeah, that process was working independently of all
the rest of this.
Mr. Shays. What initiates an investigation? Who decides
that there's going to be an investigation? In other words, you
just don't take every frivolous complaint.
Mr. Marshall. If we have an allegation of misconduct, that
triggers an OPR investigation.
Mr. Shays. It has to go to the boards, no matter what?
Mr. Marshall. No. There can be a process by which, if the
allegations are just disproven right off the bat and there is
no credibility to them, the OPR office itself, the initial
investigators can administratively close that and say there are
simply no facts to support this.
Mr. Shays. Right. You had that option after Mr. Jimenez
came back and said there's just no substance here.
Mr. Marshall. I had that option? No, I didn't have that
option. Mr. Jimenez may have had that option.
Mr. Shays. Right. But then he decided, based on an
investigative report requested by the law firm of Mr. Prince,
that you would look into those allegations and that
investigator----
Mr. Marshall. Yes, because there were specific allegations
in that report that we felt could be proven or disproven.
Mr. Shays. But at what point when you start that
investigation does someone have the ability internally to just
close it because they think there's no substance, and at what
point does it then have to go to the Board to resolve?
Mr. Marshall. Well, I think that Mr. Jimenez, or now Mr.
Gamble, if I'm remembering the process correctly, I believe
that they have the opportunity to administratively close that
if there is no corroboration and the allegations are shown on
the face to have no credibility. In this case, that didn't
exactly happen. There was certain corroboration. There was
certain facts that basically led them to take the investigation
further. And then I'm not sure in the process exactly when the
chief inspector loses his ability and it has to go to the
Board. But this one obviously they thought should go to the
Board.
Mr. Shays. But, see, the irony is that the work was
completed in March and the decision wasn't rendered, made
public until October.
Mr. Marshall. It is my understanding on that, there were
several things that were going on. At some point in there, this
was sent to either the DOJ Civil Rights Division or the Public
Integrity Section for review, which is standard procedure. Mr.
Gamble could explain that, I hope, better than I. There was
also in that timeframe in the Board of Professional Conduct,
they had a pretty high workload at that time. We had in that
fiscal year, in this general timeframe, 6, 8 months, either
side of this, there were some 30 cases that resulted in the
dismissal of DEA employees. They have a way of prioritizing
what they look at first. And some of the first things they look
at are serious cases where the employee is on limited duty,
paid leave, or unpaid leave. And they prioritize those. And
that wasn't the case in either of these. And it simply didn't
float to the top of their priority list. And I'm told that it
took that long largely because of that, because of high
workload and because of there were--was a member or two of that
Board that was missing during part of that time.
Mr. Shays. I will jump back, talking to the Board. I want
Mr. Cummings to go and then Ms. Jackson Lee, but I would ask
you this last question. You keep saying the OPR process works.
Do you really think it worked in this case, or might it have
been manipulated to the detriment of a DEA investigation, a DEA
agent, and the agency's reputation?
Mr. Marshall. Well, I believe that the process worked. We
received allegations, we investigated those allegations. One
employee was cleared, one employee received minor disciplinary
action. I believe that we discovered the facts about those
allegations, and I believe that we properly dealt with him. So
I believe it worked.
Mr. Shays. You left out one gigantic part. During this
whole 14 months, the proactive nature of the investigation was
suspended, wasn't it?
Mr. Marshall. I cannot say because I have not heard Mr.
Howard's testimony. It appears from his e-mails and it appears
from Mr. Nims' memo that it was. I understand that Mr. Howard
contends that it wasn't. If it was shut down----
Mr. Shays. Mr. Howard is on record as saying it was an open
case, but it was not a proactive case.
Mr. Marshall. If it was shut down, it shouldn't have been.
And if it was shut down, it was done counter to my orders.
Mr. Shays. It was suspended. The proactive nature of the
investigation was suspended. We get these little fine
differences. It was not proactive. The case was suspended; it
was not closed.
Mr. Cummings, you have a generous 5 minutes.
Mr. Marshall. My order to Mr. Howard was to continue the
investigation, the active investigation. I thought that was
being done.
Mr. Shays. You have 30 minutes, I'm sorry, without
question. If you want to share it, you may.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Administrator
Marshall, I want to thank you for being with us. And I know
these must not be the most pleasant circumstances but we do
appreciate what you do every day. You have a very important
job.
Let me just go back for a moment to the beginning of your
contact with this matter. You said you got notice of it on,
what, August 20th.
Mr. Marshall. It was August 20th to the best of my
recollection. It's possible it was August 19th, but within a
day or so.
Mr. Cummings. Now, when you got--you got a memo at some
point, you got Ms. Waters' memo, letter; is that right?
Mr. Marshall. I first got a letter from the Attorney
General telling me that she had talked to Congresswoman Waters
and she had these complaints; that a letter was to follow. And
then either later that same day or the next day, the letter did
follow and I saw the letter.
Mr. Cummings. Now, how soon after that did you have
conversation with Mr. Howard?
Mr. Marshall. That same day.
Mr. Cummings. Same day.
Mr. Marshall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. And would you have--to your knowledge, would
you have been the first one to bring to his attention that
there was an issue here with regard to this case?
Mr. Marshall. To the best of my knowledge, probably so,
yeah. I have no indication otherwise.
Mr. Cummings. And during that discussion, you had him brief
you on what he knew about the case?
Mr. Marshall. That's correct.
Mr. Cummings. And was a decision made at that moment as to
what should be done with regard to the case in light of Ms.
Waters' letter?
Mr. Marshall. No. I was simply gathering facts.
Mr. Cummings. All right. Now, did you have occasion to talk
to him again that day?
Mr. Marshall. I talked to him probably several times that
day and I talked to him several times over the ensuing days and
weeks after that initial----
Mr. Cummings. Can you tell us what day it was that you had
the conversation where he--you said he was a bit upset and that
he wanted to end the investigation, I think you said, but you
said that would be going a bit too far. Can you tell us what
day that was?
Mr. Marshall. No, I can't, Congressman. I don't have notes
of that conversation. But that would have been--for sure, it
would have been after the August 24th interview with Mr.
Prince, because that was a part of his frustration was the
allegations that Mr. Prince was making.
Mr. Cummings. Now, did you--do you know whether your
conversation took place--I don't know if you know, there came a
time--I understand that you haven't heard the testimony from
Mr. Howard, but there came a time when he allegedly made--when
he had a conversation with the agents in Houston, telling them
the status of the investigation and what he wanted done. That's
where all the controversy is, whether it was ending or not. You
know about that, right?
Mr. Marshall. I know about that, but I don't know the dates
of that.
Mr. Cummings. Which is what I'm trying to get to. I'm
trying to figure out your conversation where you gave the
instructions to not end it but--the criminal investigation--but
to allow it to go on. I'm trying to figure out whether you knew
that came before he had that meeting with the Houston officers
or after?
Mr. Marshall. I don't know.
Mr. Cummings. Now, when you had your conversation with him
where you had instructed him as to continuing the
investigation, did he tell you anything about any conversation
that he may have had, and did it sound like he had already made
a decision with regard to the criminal investigation?
Mr. Marshall. No, he didn't tell me about any
conversations. And he said, ``You're right, I can't close it
down, we'll keep going with it.''
Mr. Cummings. So you were--were you of the impression that
he had not announced that to the Houston officers, that the
investigation had been closed down?
Mr. Marshall. That's correct. I had no reason to believe
that that announcement had taken place. I had no reason to
believe these e-mails existed. I had no reason to believe that
the Nims' memo existed. None of that came to my attention until
October of this year.
Mr. Cummings. Now, so all of this time since back there in
August, August 20, 1999, you were thinking that this was an
ongoing investigation; is that not correct?
Mr. Marshall. That's absolutely correct, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Now, in answer to the chairman's question,
one of the chairman's questions I think you said that you did
not figure this to be a major investigation. Is that what you
said, that is, a criminal investigation?
Mr. Marshall. No, I said when you look at this organization
in the context of the large national and global organizations
that we consider to be the cartels, as it were, this was not
one of those types of investigations. This was certainly an
important, very important investigation in Houston, TX.
Mr. Cummings. Now, when you found out about Ms. Waters's
inquiry, I think you said when you looked at the allegations,
you said, ``I didn't put much stock in the allegations,'' is
that right?
Mr. Marshall. That's correct.
Mr. Cummings. What did you base that opinion on?
Mr. Marshall. Well, basically I--if I can get a copy of Ms.
Waters' letter here, I looked in the letter and there was
really no details in here about specific allegations. There
were things about long stretches of highway, there were things
about the Department of Justice must intercede into the
questionable practices of DEA. There was nothing really
specific here in terms of allegations, so I didn't really think
that there was enough detail here to tell whether there was
really something here. The one thing that grabbed my attention
here was the quote, ``believes his life to be in danger at the
hands of rogue officers.''
Now, I looked at that as something that we have to look at
and find out if Congresswoman Waters has specific information
regarding that or if she has specific allegations regarding the
harassment and intimidation, if she has specific details about
the racial slurs, the illegal search of his automobile. None of
those details were contained in this letter. And that's what I
felt like we had to get at in terms of further interviews and
get from Ms. Waters why is it you think this. So at this point,
no, I didn't have enough details to put much stock in this.
Mr. Cummings. So is there a, I take it that you could get,
it's possible that a congressperson or citizen could write you
a letter, make certain allegations that would not bring it to
the level of you even having a discussion with an agent in
charge with regard to whether to shut down an investigation. In
other words, I'm trying to get to where do you draw the line.
You just named several things. You said ``life threatening.''
You went on and said what you just said, but is there a point,
either in writing or is there a point where just from the
common practice within the agency where you then refer
something for further investigation, whether it would cause you
to have this kind of discussion, or making you feel as if there
is a major problem.
Mr. Marshall. Well, you--at the seriousness of each
allegation, and if it is--if it's a mistake that somebody has
made on the job that's a violation of procedures or rules or
something like that, you treat that one way. If it's an
integrity violation or a criminal violation, I certainly treat
that much more seriously. Now, the words in here, the
descriptions in here of the conduct would have indicated that
these would have serious integrity, if not criminal violations.
And yet those were generalized words that were here with no
details to back them up. So because the general allegations
were so serious but there were no details, I mean, the next
logical step is what are the details, Congresswoman Waters,
that you have to substantiate these allegations, and that's
what we set out to do.
Mr. Cummings. Now as I listened to some of the questions
that were asked by the other side, it seems to be an
implication as to your believing that when a congressperson
makes a call or whatever, that an investigation should be shut
down, you don't believe that, do you?
Mr. Marshall. Absolutely not. I never believed that. I
think it's clear from the memo that I sent to the Attorney
General that my mindset here was that basically we shouldn't
even brief Congresswoman Waters on this investigation. And I
told the Attorney General on August 20 in this memo, this is a
legitimate investigation and we shouldn't even brief her on it.
Mr. Cummings. So we're real clear, when you told Mr.
Howard, Officer Howard, about what you wanted him to do in the
case, did he express any objections to that? That is, when you
said ``I want this case to continue'' and you may--I think you
said ``you may have to pull the officers off, but I want it to
continue.'' Did he express any objection to that?
Mr. Marshall. No, no. In that conversation he was clearly
frustrated with all of this. He used the words, ``it's too big
a hassle, I think I'll just close their investigation, it's not
worth it.'' When I said no, you can't do that, you need to
continue. As I said he took a deep breath, he audibly sighed,
he said, ``you're right. I'm just blowing off steam. Obviously,
I just can't discontinue the investigation.''
Mr. Cummings. How long have you been working with Officer
Howard, Agent Howard?
Mr. Marshall. Gosh, I have probably--I've known him for 20
years, worked closely with him for 10, 12 years, just a guess,
but quite a while.
Mr. Cummings. So you've had many conversations with him and
worked with him?
Mr. Marshall. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. And you find him to be a truthful and honest
man?
Mr. Marshall. Yes, I always have.
Mr. Cummings. Now, you said something that was very
interesting. You said one of the reasons why you wanted the
agents pulled off, the Houston folks pulled off and Schumacher,
is that you were----
Mr. Marshall. If I may, sir, I hate to interrupt you. I did
not say I wanted the Houston agents pulled off.
Mr. Cummings. I'm sorry. One of the things you did say that
you were concerned about, negligent action. Does that sound
familiar?
Mr. Marshall. That's correct.
Mr. Cummings. What does that mean?
Mr. Marshall. Our concern, the concern that Mr. Howard and
I discussed were that, they were in the context of we have
allegations from Mr. Prince, and we have a report from this
private investigator that gives us specific acts that were
committed by Chad Scott and Jack Schumacher alleged to have
been committed, I'm sorry. We, by that time, had gotten far
enough in the investigation that we knew that the gold
medallion was in DEA's possession. We knew that there was one
person that corroborated the mistreatment of, the alleged
mistreatment subsequently not substantiated. We knew that was
there. We knew that these people had been taken into custody,
taken to the DEA office, no reports had been done. There were
procedural violations there.
At that point, we simply didn't know what we had from a
standpoint of an OPR investigation. We looked also at the
serious nature of this and the fact that Maxine Waters had
characterized Jack Schumacher as a killer cop, as a rogue cop.
He did, in fact, have several shootings that he had been
involved in, and I hasten to add all were ruled as justified,
but we simply looked at it at that time and not knowing the
full extent of what we did or did not have here, and we felt
for Mr. Schumacher's own protection that he should not be the
point agent, the lead agent, the case agent on this, because if
he goes out into of the 5th ward now and gets into a life-
threatening situation and has to kill Mr. Prince or some of the
other defendants in here, he's going to be automatically
assumed guilty.
We're going to be perceived as not having taken action, and
I'm going to be sitting in front of this committee or some
other committee explaining those actions. And we felt it was
prudent for the agency and for Mr. Schumacher's own protection
for him to take him off as the case agent and reassign another
agent in the same group with the same supervisor until OPR
investigation was completed.
Mr. Cummings. Now, you take it, you aren't aware of any
improper political interference, are you, with regard to this
case?
Mr. Marshall. No, I'm not.
Mr. Cummings. Are you aware of any improper political
interference by Vice President Gore?
Mr. Marshall. No, I'm not.
Mr. Cummings. Are you aware of any improper political
interference by any Member of Congress?
Mr. Marshall. Well, you've got to get a definition of
``interference.'' I think it's obvious that some Members here
consider the mere writing of this letter was interference. It's
obvious that Ms. Waters wrote this letter. But as far as
interference or pressure on me to shut down this investigation,
there was none.
Mr. Cummings. Are you aware of any management decisions
made in this investigation on account of improper political
pressure, any?
Mr. Marshall. I am aware that there are allegations of
that, and I am still very confused in the light of what I
thought was going on juxtaposed against the e-mails and the
Nims memo. I am still confused as to whether or not you know
exactly what action was or was not taken with regard to
shutting down the investigation. And I want to get to the
bottom of that through these hearings and the inspector general
investigation. I'm still unsure about that, Congressman.
Mr. Cummings. But you never--I just want to correct one
thing. I made a mistake a minute ago and I had asked you about
taking folks off of the investigation, a criminal
investigation. When you talked to Agent Howard, did you have
any discussions about personnel and personnel on who would be
either left on the case, taken off the case? Did you discuss it
at all? The Houston police officers? The DEA?
Mr. Marshall. No, we have only talked about agent
Schumacher.
Mr. Cummings. All right. Why is that, because you didn't--
--
Mr. Marshall. Because Agent Schumacher was the one that
these most serious allegations were being made against, and we
were concerned that he would be assumed guilty if there was an
incident there. That was the sole reason. It was for the
protection of Agent Schumacher and DEA, it was never intended,
in my mind, that you take all the agents off.
Mr. Cummings. So there was never any discussion with regard
to the Houston police officers, none whatsoever. Is that right?
When you left that conversation you were under the impression
that Schumacher would be taken off of this criminal
investigation, and that the investigation would continue. That
was your impression; is that right?
Mr. Marshall. Absolutely, yes.
Mr. Cummings. That was your impression up until this
committee contacted you and you began to look into the matter?
Mr. Marshall. That's correct.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you. I'll yield to Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. I thank Mr. Cummings very much and again,
as I proceed to ask questions, I do want to acknowledge the
kindness of the chairman and ranking member, and now Mr. Shays.
I am a member of the Judiciary Committee and not a member of
this committee.
Mr. Marshall, as you well know, the judiciary has oversight
over the DEA and its capacity of its responsibilities
differently from this present committee, so I appreciate very
much your presence. And let me say what I have said in the
past, that this hearing, my appreciation and respect for the
day-to-day front line action that the DEA takes. You are aware,
Mr. Marshall, that your officers who were here previously were
under oath; is that correct?
Mr. Marshall. Since I was sworn in, I assume they were too.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. And being law enforcement officers, you
are quite aware that in being sworn, you're sworn obviously
under oath to tell the truth?
Mr. Marshall. Absolutely.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. And aware as well of the penalties of the
subject to do?
Mr. Marshall. Correct.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Do you have any recollection of the
Attorney General speaking to you and asking for a transfer of
Mr. Schumacher?
Mr. Marshall. No.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Anyone in OPR asking for a transfer of Mr.
Schumacher.
Mr. Marshall. No.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. So therefore, you gave an earlier
explanation to my colleague, Mr. Cummings, I believe, and any
movement, it seemed to be, as I understand your conversation,
was based upon safety issues. Is that my understanding?
Mr. Marshall. Yes, that's correct. And I want to go back.
That was in the August-September 1999 timeframe.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. All right. I appreciate that very much. In
receiving letters from Members of Congress, I assume you
received quite a bit?
Mr. Marshall. That's correct.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Do you accept that as a role and
responsibility, that members at varying times will make
inquiries and make various comments in their letters or
inquiries?
Mr. Marshall. Yes, we do. We actually have a congressional
affairs office that deals with those matters and they stay
pretty busy.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. The letter that you have before you from
the Congresswoman, is there anything in that letter that says
to transfer or cease and desist, transfer any officer or cease
and desist of any investigation?
Mr. Marshall. There is nothing in here that says to
transfer the officer. There is something in here, and if I may
find it. It is my recollection, and I can't really find it
right now. It's my recollection that there is something in here
that asks the AG to halt the questionable practices of the DEA.
Is that this letter?
Ms. Jackson-Lee. No, I don't think so. If you're talking
August 20, 1999, you might peruse it yourself. There is, will
you please give this matter your immediate attention, I await
your response. I have not seen anything here that says anything
about halting. You might peruse it, point out to me if you see
something. I think you'd find that, the August 20 letter.
Mr. Marshall. Yeah, here it is. ``Simply put,'' and this is
quoting from the August 20 letter. ``Simply put, Mr. Prince
believes strongly that the Department of Justice must intercede
into the questionable practices of the DEA and provide him with
the necessary protection to ensure that his life and livelihood
are not subject to the ongoing harassment and intimidation.''
That is the sentence I was referring to.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. But that is not a request of the
Department of Justice to stop to cause a cessation. It refers
to the suggestions in the letter about the points made by Mr.
Price.
Mr. Marshall. It talks about questionable practices and
providing necessary protection to end harassment and
intimidation.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Right, but not a stopping of the--stopping
of an investigation, eliminate.
Mr. Marshall. It doesn't say that in this letter.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Let me also acknowledge, there seems to be
some coordination--not coordination, but suggestion of
collaboration between the March 12 visit to the Brook Hollow
Church, and then I think the March 15 action that I believe Mr.
Howard may have taken. You have indicated, or you indicate,
again, for my sake, that you are not making a correlation or
suggesting that the Vice President or his staff or anyone by
his visit asked the DEA or Attorney General to do anything to
your knowledge.
Mr. Marshall. No, that's correct.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. And Mr. Howard, having been under oath, I
know there is an OPR investigation still going on; is that my
understanding?
Mr. Marshall. No, the OPR investigation has been completed.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. The IG is still going on?
Mr. Marshall. The Inspector General is still going on, yes.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. So the case is still open to the degree of
trying to find out the facts in this matter?
Mr. Marshall. That's correct.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Mr. Howard, being under oath in this
committee, would you have the impression that Mr. Howard would
be telling the truth?
Mr. Marshall. Would I what?
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Have the impression that Mr. Howard would
tell the truth being under oath in this committee?
Mr. Marshall. I have not heard his testimony. I would have
the assumption and the expectation that he would tell the
truth.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Is he of such a person that you have known
him and worked with him for 12 years that you would expect him
to tell the truth.
Mr. Marshall. I have always known him to tell the truth,
and that would be my expectation.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. If that is the case, then at this
juncture, would you be able to say that Mr. Howard has not done
anything improper or you've not told him that he's done
anything improper?
Mr. Marshall. Well, I think that that, and I want to be
very cautious here, because I think that's part of the purpose
of the Inspector General's investigation.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. If, in fact----
Mr. Marshall. If I may continue, please. What I believed
was happening here, and what personal conversations I had with
Mr. Howard on the surface, do not correlate with the e-mails
and the memo from Mr. Nims. So that's one of the reasons that I
requested the Inspector General investigation was to clarify
that for me.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Excellent. And I think that is an
appropriate responsibility of an administrator, but today, and
during the time you had your conversation, you did not indicate
to Mr. Howard that you thought he was acting inappropriately.
Mr. Marshall. When I had the conversations with Mr. Howard?
Ms. Jackson-Lee. That's correct.
Mr. Marshall. That's correct. I had every reason to believe
that he was following my instructions and that the criminal
investigation was continuing and while the OPR investigation
was going on.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. And I believe that was clarified, as I
understand it here on the record, that that was occurring as we
understand it. I am personally--I think that we should all be
committed to finding out the truth, and I hope that this
hearing will result in that. As I was sitting in this hearing,
I had the opportunity to peruse some of the articles that
recount some of the lyrics that I think are abhorrent.
I abhor improper, out of order, and clearly we all have a
first amendment, but I have gone on record before for speaking
against such lyrics, regardless of whether we're talking about
artistic rights and privacy and first amendment. So I have hope
that we can separate out those accusations as not those of any
of us who are here today. And hopefully, they are not words
that our children and young people will find with any
credibility and are not spoken with courage, as far as I'm
concerned. But I do believe that we have lives in question
here, people's reputations, people's long years of service, and
I think it's very important that we tread lightly as we pursue
this as it relates to what may be people caught up in a set of
circumstances who are not involved.
Do you have any knowledge of any involvement in any of
these matters of the Brook Hollow Baptist Church or the Brook
Hollow Church without walls that you may have heard of in your
review of matters that you've heard of?
Mr. Marshall. Well, you've set quite a background there
with the lyrics and freedom of speech, and our children and I
share all of those. I respect certainly your viewpoints. I
appreciate your support and I respect the difference. I will
say with regard to those lyrics, I think that those very lyrics
indicate that the people that wrote them, the people that
participated in them, even the people that produce, perform
them, that sell them, I think that--I think that those people
are vicious thugs, and I think there is really no place for
that in our society.
I recognize I respect free speech, but to me, those lyrics
amount to inciting violence against police officers. I'm
concerned for Jack Schumacher's safety as a result of that. I
think that may very well encourage people to kill Jack
Schumacher or try that, in fact, there are direct threats
against Mr. Schumacher. With regard to the church, I have no
reason to believe that the church participated, supported,
condoned that in any way, shape, form or fashion. The only
connection that I know of is that Mr. Prince, I understand it,
is the owner, president, executive or some direct connection
with the record company that produced that CD, and that he is
also a member of that church.
Now, I can't say that, in fact, I would assume that that
does not mean that the church, that the church was involved. So
no, other than that, I don't know of any connection between the
church and those lyrics. I would hope that the church condemns
those lyrics.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. I think it's very important as we try to
protect everyone's life integrity and reputation that we
clarify when we have definitive information versus not. So as I
take your testimony, you have nothing to associate this church
and this pastor with anything that has gone on here today in
this proceeding?
Mr. Marshall. Well, other than the connection that Mr.
Prince, I understand is a member of that church. Now that
doesn't mean that the church is involved, it certainly doesn't
mean that the pastor--but when you say the word ``connection,''
there is a connection between the people.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. I disagree with you. Church----
Mr. Marshall. There is an association.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. But churches don't reject membership or
members. In fact, churches are places where people of need go
for whatever reasons, and I hope that is what you're saying
here today.
Mr. Marshall. I think we're talking semantics here. I have
no reason to believe the church or the pastor is involved in
this type of activity.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. I'm grateful for your clarification on
that issue.
Let me finish in the 20 seconds of their graciousness. We
have had a myriad of statements being made here today, a
myriad, a number of witnesses that are testifying and under
oath. I would hope that you, as a DEA administrator, will leave
here, and we will leave here as members of this committee, and
those who have been guests of the committee with the bottom
line idea is to get to the truth and to be--free ourselves from
innuendo and rumor. Is that the direction that you hope the IG
is going and your office will be going?
Mr. Marshall. I made comments similar to that in my opening
statement, yes.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Would you summarize them for me, please.
Mr. Marshall. Yes, my goal here, my underriding goal here
is to find the truth of what happened here, to find whether DEA
employees succumbed to political pressure, to close this
investigation, and if so, to take the proper action to correct
that, and if not, to see that the record is clarified. And I
feel I have to do that to protect the integrity of DEA and its
employees. So yes, absolutely I want the truth. I hope this
hearing, together with the Inspector General's investigation,
will get us to the truth, and that will allow me to take
whatever action I need to take.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Nothing but the truth. I thank you. I hope
we all stay focused. Thank you very much.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Marshall. We think you've been
very cooperative. I am going to recognize Ben Gilman, but I
would also request at this time that we have the attachment to
the August 20 memo, if you would give us the attachment to
that, to get at the truth would be helpful. And I would then
make unanimous consent to put the memo redacted into the
record, and we have checked with counsel on the other side, and
there is no objection to that. But we would like the attachment
to this piece, please.
Mr. Marshall. Mr. Chairman I am told that the Prosecutors
Office, the U.S. Attorneys Office in Houston, has some concerns
about the information that is in the memo, that they are in the
process of making some redactions on that memo. When that is
done, we will provide it to you.
Mr. Shays. Let me be really clear on this. You have pledged
that once that is redacted, it is presented to this committee.
I would like to know when that will happen.
Mr. Marshall. I'm told that can be done before close of
business today.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
Mr. Gilman, thank you for your patience.
We'll be coming back. We'll be coming back. Mr. Cummings,
you'll be recognized next.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator Marshall, we need your help to clear up these
serious allegations with regard to political influence over
major drug-related criminal investigation in Houston, TX; and I
hope today's hearing and our DEA leader's appearance can help
restore the public confidence in our DEA, something we have a
high regard for.
Yesterday was not particularly a good day for the DEA
before the Congress. Whatever one can say about the
uncertainties surrounding political influence that we witnessed
yesterday and today, some degree of certainty did emerge from
our hearing and that's the unmistakable fact that the DEA
Office of Public Responsibility [OPR], procedures are badly in
need of repair.
From August 1999 to October 2000, a period of more than a
year, a major drug investigation was shelved, no proactive
investigation conducted, along with a DEA agent put out to
pasture, all generated by the target of the investigation
itself sidetracked by the inquiry. I think that's totally
unacceptable. To me, this current OPR investigation--allegation
investigation process looks like a road map for the bad guys to
sidetrack DEA investigations when the heat is turned up outside
the DEA.
No one wants to see allegations of abuse of authority by
DEA ignored or not thoroughly examined. However, I would urge
you, Mr. Marshall, to totally evaluate and create a better
system than shutting down an inquiry for more than a year and
putting the lead DEA and his local police counterparts out to
pasture based solely upon the unsubstantiated and self-serving
allegations by the target himself.
DEA appears to have over-reacted to a letter from the
Member of Congress. The DEA gave the target of this
investigation the benefit of the doubt over its own DEA agents
and Houston police officers who are out there trying to do
their job. When all of these fine police officers and agents
were of course eventually vindicated and no wrong being found,
the only beneficiary, however, was the target of a major drug
trafficking inquiry.
I hope that this case before us and the target's efforts
being successful and the inquiry may never get back on track--I
hope it will get back on track; and I hope, Mr. Marshall, you
consider ordering a full review of the current OPR procedures
so we may never again find ourselves in this kind of a
situation.
Mr. Marshall, on August----
Mr. Marshall. May I comment, sir?
Mr. Gilman. Yes, please, Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Marshall. Congressman, I agree with you that if this
investigation was shut down and there are serious questions on
that, that shouldn't have been done. There is no reason for an
OPR investigation to derail a criminal investigation,
absolutely no reason. If it was done, it shouldn't have been
done. It was done counter to my direction and my belief.
With regard to the OPR process, we need to find ways to
expedite that process. But when we receive allegations
against--of misconduct I think we're obligated to investigate
those allegations to prove them or to disprove them; and I will
look for ways to expedite the process, but I will never
compromise the integrity of the agency.
I have recently asked for a review of that whole process to
see if we can expedite the entire process from the
investigation up through the decision process. It is my
understanding that the Deputy Administrator has recently made
some changes in there. I will review that for--to see if there
is further progress that we can make.
But I have recently articulated my philosophy of
discipline, and it's a little bit of a change from what we have
had in the past perhaps. The way I articulate that publically
for all of our employees is that I want a speedy and
compassionate discipline process for mistakes, honest mistakes
that are made in the course of conducting our business. Because
we all make mistakes. But, at the same time, violations which
are integrity related which impact the effectiveness of my
agency, the ability to do its job that are criminal in nature,
they will be dealt with hopefully again swiftly but harshly.
Because there is no place for that type of activity in DEA.
That's my disciplinary process and the two sides of it. I
am doing my best to see that we move in that direction. We
must, however, investigate serious allegations and either prove
them or disprove them and in either case protect our integrity
and the public confidence in the agency.
Congressman, I will look further at that process. Thank you
for your comments.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Marshall. I think it's
encouraging you to hear you say that.
Mr. Marshall, on August 24, 1999, despite your serious
reservations as outlined in your memo of August 20 to the AG in
which you say we would not normally brief a Member of Congress
on an ongoing investigation except perhaps to acknowledge in
the most general terms that an investigation exists, the
circumstances of inquiry might also dictate how far we might
go. I understand the sensitivity of the inquiry but really
question the propriety of the inquiry, especially in light of
the report. Mr. Marshall, who overrode your concerns?
Mr. Marshall. I----
Mr. Gilman. You recommended not doing this.
Mr. Marshall. No, I don't believe the concern was
overridden, Congressman. I made a recommendation----
Mr. Gilman. If I might interrupt. You made a recommendation
to the Attorney General saying that you question the propriety
of this kind of an inquiry, and your reaction was that you
should consider telling the Member we cannot give a brief on
that matter.
Mr. Marshall. That is correct. And that recommendation was
not overridden. In fact, there was a letter that went back to
Congresswoman Waters, if I can find it in my notebook.
Mr. Gilman. Just briefly tell me.
Mr. Shays. Excuse me. Let me interrupt for a second. I want
to respect the time that Mr. Cummings has coming back, and we
have gone over the 5 minutes. I just need an answer to this,
and then we need to go to Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Gilman. Mr. Chairman, I understand our side had 30
minutes.
Mr. Shays. We already used our 30 minutes. In fact, we used
slightly more. Mr. Cummings was very generous in letting us go
over time about 10 minutes, and then he had just 30 minutes,
and I closed him right down. So I am determined to give him his
5 minutes.
Mr. Marshall. If I may just give an answer to the question.
A letter went back from the Office of Legislative Affairs,
Department of Justice, telling Congresswoman Waters that we
cannot acknowledge even the existence of an investigation; and
that was signed by Mr. Raben, I believe. I have it somewhere in
this book. I will provide it to you because it was an official
correspondence, and I'm surprised the committee doesn't already
have it because it was a correspondence that was written, and I
thought it had been provided already.
Mr. Gilman. Mr. Chairman, will there be another round?
Mr. Shays. Definitely, and I will even yield you my time. I
want you to have more time. Your questions are very important,
and you need more than 5 minutes. But I want Mr. Cummings to
have his time.
Mr. Gilman. I will go to a meeting, and I will come back.
Mr. Shays. We hopefully will still be here or maybe not,
hopefully. Mr. Cummings, you have a generous 5 minutes.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Mr. Administrator, I want to direct my questions at
something that I don't think anybody here has dealt with too
much, but I want to make sure that we address the reputation
not only of the agents that we have been talking about but I
want to make sure we address your reputation and that of Ms.
Reno, Attorney General Reno. And you will see where I'm going
in a minute.
When you had your discussions with the Attorney General--
and I know that some information may be privileged, I mean,
confidential, that you need to keep, but there was no pressure
placed on you to try to stop this investigation or anything of
that nature, was there?
Mr. Marshall. No, there wasn't.
Mr. Cummings. And her--she basically brought to your
attention the information--I mean the fact that she had gotten
this memo, gotten a telephone call; and basically she was
passing on information to you. And I take it that you felt
confident that what she was saying is that she trusts your
judgment, ``go forward with it and I'll check with you later to
see how things are going.'' Is that a fair----
Mr. Marshall. Essentially, yes, that's a fair
representation.
Mr. Cummings. But you didn't feel any pressure to do
anything in particular.
Mr. Marshall. No, I didn't.
Mr. Cummings. Now, you never got a call from the Vice
President of the United States or the President or Ms. Waters,
did you? Have you ever talked to them about this case?
Mr. Marshall. I have never talked to the President or the
Vice President about this or anything else. My only encounter
with Congresswoman Waters was in the context of a congressional
hearing. I believe it was a subcommittee of the Judiciary. I
have never had a private conversation with Ms. Waters.
Mr. Cummings. But was the subject matter this issue here?
Mr. Marshall. No, I have never talked to any of those three
individuals about this issue.
Mr. Cummings. Very well. Did you have--get any other
pressure from any other government official in regard to
saying, ``Mr. Administrator, you've got to do something to shut
this down or bring it to a halt,'' or whatever? Anything like
that?
Mr. Marshall. I never had any conversation with either the
President or Vice President or Ms. Waters. The only
communication that I believe I saw was the letter from Ms.
Waters.
Mr. Cummings. All right. Now, when you--your conversations
with Mr. Howard, when you spoke to him, what were your
paramount concerns when you initially talked to Mr. Howard--
Officer Howard? When I don't say Officer Howard, it's not any
disrespect. What were your major concerns? In other words, you
were not trying to pressure him to do anything in particular,
is that right?
Mr. Marshall. No, that's correct. In fact, as I represented
that conversation, it was my clear expectation that the
criminal investigation was to continue. It was my--it was my
goal really to do two things: No. 1, that we needed to get to
the bottom of allegations that had been made. That was one
objective. The other objective was to continue the criminal
investigation on a parallel track as the OPR investigation was
going forward.
Mr. Cummings. Did there--was there any discussion about the
backgrounds of the DEA officers involved in this investigation
when you talked to Mr. Howard?
Mr. Marshall. We only discussed one officer, that being
Special Agent Schumacher; and, yes, we did talk about his
background.
Mr. Cummings. Did you have any concerns--you did have some
concerns about his background, didn't you?
Mr. Marshall. Well, I have already articulated my concerns
in that conversation. And the concerns were that we have an
allegation, an allegation that he is out to kill an individual.
Our concern was--and he had been involved in several fatal
shootings, all of which I hasten to add had been found to be
justifiable.
But, yeah, with that background and with this complaint on
record we were concerned that if he got into a violent
situation and had to use deadly force, a very real possibility
with these violent drug organizations, that then he would be
assumed guilty. And for his own protection and to ensure that
there was no chance of that happening we discussed reassigning
him, not as the point on this, rather giving the case agent
duties to another agent in the same group under the same
supervisor for Mr. Schumacher's own protection. That was the
discussion.
Mr. Cummings. Now if you were--before you were contacted by
this committee, if one were to tell you--if Mr. Howard had
said, I had followed your instructions, Mr. Administrator--keep
in mind what I said, before you were contacted by this
committee--you would have had no reason to doubt his word,
would you?
Mr. Marshall. No, I wouldn't, that's correct.
Mr. Cummings. I don't have anything--I don't have anything
further. Thank you.
Well, I have one other thing. Mr. Administrator, I will be
very brief because I know our committee member's time is
running. Did you have something you wanted to add?
Mr. Marshall. Well, this is in response to Congressman
Gilman's request for the letter that went back to Congresswoman
Waters. I'm told that the committee has that document. It is
DEA/TX-0073. That's the Robert Raben memo back to Congresswoman
Waters answering her August 20 letter.
Mr. Cummings. With regard to cooperation, one of the things
we're most concerned about on this committee is cooperation
from the agencies. And I looked at your memo of August 20, 1999
to Ms. Reno, and without even getting into it, because I think
I can see how it can be a very sensitive document, I take it
that there are some concerns that she might have and you might
have with regard to making sure that the IG investigation does
not prejudice anyone and that it's a fair investigation. And I
take it that you also are concerned about making sure that
there is an ongoing criminal investigation or if there is an
investigation that is to be reopened that you do not--you want
to make sure that nothing is prejudiced either on a possible
defendant's side or your side. Is that a fair statement?
Mr. Marshall. That's a fair statement. I'm a little bit
confused if you're talking about the IG or the OPR
investigation. But, yeah, that's a fair statement.
Mr. Cummings. Yeah, I'm talking about--there were questions
that you were asked a little bit earlier about your cooperation
when a call was made to the chairman. The chairman said he
called you, and he said--I don't know whether he talked to you
directly or talked to someone in your office, but a statement
was made that--based upon words from the Attorney General, and
then you mentioned something about a meeting where you had
gotten word from the Attorney General that you were supposed to
either have limited cooperation with this committee or no
cooperation. And I guess I was just trying to get to the bottom
of why that was, what was that based upon. You follow me?
Mr. Marshall. OK, those are two separate timeframes.
Mr. Cummings. Fine, let's deal with both of them.
Mr. Marshall. My recollection is that in October there was
an initial request from Chairman Burton for documents and a
request to interview DEA employees, and the documents he asked
for were communications to and from Ernie Howard, myself--and
I'm sure that subpoena is in here. There was a subpoena that
was issued that was faxed over to my office asking for those
things.
I did in fact call the chairman and said, ``Mr. Chairman,
you don't have to subpoena these things. I will cooperate
voluntarily.'' He later wrote me a letter saying he will
withdraw his subpoena based on my assurance that I would
cooperate. We have provided those documents to the chairman.
Now, fast forward to the November timeframe, and that's
when we had the discussions at the Department of Justice about
continued cooperation, and that is on the day or the day
after--it was on the day that the Attorney General ordered the
special investigation--and that was at my request by the way--
and it was at that meeting that it was determined that we would
not continue to provide documents or interviews because the
inspector general investigation was ongoing and that we would
basically defer cooperation with the committee until that IG
investigation was completed.
Mr. Cummings. And I take it that now you are looking into
or have looked into the possibility of taking a look at this
criminal investigation because all of us have concerns about
the criminal investigations. We heard the officers. It doesn't
make too much difference who you believe, but we do know and I
think it was pretty consistent the information that we have got
is that there is a lot more to be done with regards to that
criminal investigation. I take it that you're looking into
that.
Mr. Marshall. Yes, I am looking into that and particularly
in light of the allegations that were pulled that we shut the
investigation down, that sort of stuff. I know that we've been
investigating this general trafficking group, either us or
other law enforcement agencies, for probably 7, 8, 10 years in
Houston and have not made the kind of progress during that
entire time that anybody would like to see made.
In light of that and in light of all of these allegations I
did in fact send a team down to take really a new fresh look at
that whole investigation to see what had been done, to see
where we are now, to see if there are any approaches that have
been missed, if there is any future way that we can go. And I
have a preliminary report from that team. I don't want to
discuss that in open session, but I do want to assess that.
Mr. Cummings. I would hope that, Mr. Chairman, at some
point we can have a private discussion, because I really would
be interested--I think our entire committee needs to feel some
kind of confidentiality. Because I think the pain that comes to
us--there are a lot of things that we have concerns about, but
I think on both sides of the aisle our greatest pain comes from
just a thought that an investigation that should go forward,
that should be addressing this whole drug situation, that it
was--it may not have gone the distance.
And I appreciate your comments.
Mr. Marshall. I agree. If this investigation was shut down,
it shouldn't have been. We need to not only find ways to
reverse that, but we need to find ways to prevent that from
happening in the future.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much. Thank you for your
indulgence.
Mr. Shay. Mr. Cummings, I appreciate your questions.
I just want to, before I recognize Mr. Ose, and he will be
next, I just want to say, in the reference to shut down,
suspend is almost as equal to shut down. I just hope we are not
going to get semantics later that we have a technical file that
is open but not active. We already have testimony that there is
not a proactive investigation.
Mr. Marshall. I will try to clarify that from my point of
view.
Mr. Shay. I am just making the point to you, and I don't
want to take Mr. Ose's time.
Mr. Marshall. I just want to clarify. I never intended--
and, in fact, when I gave the order, I intended for this
investigation to continue on its present pace. I didn't draw
the distinction at that time between shut down and suspension.
I intended for it to go forward, and I was very clear about
that.
Mr. Shays. To be proactive.
Mr. Marshall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Ose.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Shays.
Mr. Marshall, I've been sitting up here just thinking; and
I'm aware of Ms. Waters' letter to the Attorney General dated
August 20 or something like that to which you responded with a
memo. How did the issue of Mr. Prince's/Smith's allegation
surface with Ms. Waters?
Mr. Marshall. Well, it was articulated in her original
letter of August 20.
Mr. Ose. Did Mr. Smith/Prince call Ms. Waters? Did he send
her a letter an e-mail? Any idea?
Mr. Marshall. I don't know if that's explained in Ms.
Waters' letter or not, and I don't recollect that I ever knew
exactly how he got that word to her.
Mr. Ose. I want to--clearly, you have an excellent
reputation; and I applaud you for it. Clearly, you've had to
delve into this probably more than you've ever wished you had
to. Have you read the deposition of August 24 that Mr. Smith/
Prince provided in Ms. Waters' office?
Mr. Marshall. I read portions of it a few days after it was
transcribed. It was over a year since I've read it. I didn't
read the whole thing, but I've read portions of it.
Mr. Ose. I've just read it again, and the reason I have
read it again was that it was my memory that Mr. Prince could
not in the course of that deposition ever cite a single
incidence of Mr. Schumacher ever perpetuating harassment or
intimidation on him whatsoever. Is that your recollection?
Mr. Marshall. Yeah, that's my recollection. And that's the
way it was characterized to me when Mr. Jimenez told me about
the interview. That's the impression I had when I read the
transcript. However, at the same time, we walked out of that
meeting or Mr. Jimenez walked out of that meeting and got a
report from a private investigator. And in that report there
were some allegations, some of them, most of them, frankly,
unsubstantiated but two specific allegations that he made that
we felt like could be either verified or disproven; and we set
about to do that.
Mr. Ose. I want to get to the private investigator report,
but I want to go back to the deposition because it's
interesting to me. I've had the indubitable pleasure, Mr.
Shays, of actually having been deposed on a number of times.
And I provide--when I have been deposed I had to provide my
statement under oath. So we have Mr. Prince/Smith in the course
of a deposition under oath saying that he has never been
identified, harassed, what have you, by Mr. Schumacher,
whatsoever. I mean, that just seems like very clear evidence
that it doesn't--I mean, I'm stunned that we would--I mean,
here's the guy that actually asked for the investigation saying
he's never been harassed or intimidated, saying it under oath
and that the OPR thing goes forward.
Mr. Marshall. If I might, please. I agree with that with
regard to that deposition. The private investigator report was
now a completely separate thing which said that Special Agent
Schumacher had beaten up a couple of defendants and that a gold
piece of jewelry was stolen from one of those defendants. Those
are specific allegations. Those are fairly easily, with a
little bit of investigative work, either negated or
corroborated. Those are the investigations that we set out to
look at, not anything that was in Mr. Prince's deposition
because there was nothing there.
Mr. Ose. As I understand--let's address both of those
incidents. The gold necklace was from an individual named Chad
Scott, according to the PI report, if I recall. It was Chad
Scott who wore the gold necklace.
Mr. Marshall. Who took the gold necklace.
Mr. Ose. Correct, it wasn't Mr. Schumacher.
Mr. Marshall. I believe that is correct. The allegation
against Mr. Schumacher was that he had beaten up a couple of
defendants, as I recall.
Mr. Ose. Now the private investigator--I have seen the
report. It's a very, very copious report. Who is this--for
whom--who is this private investigator? What's his background?
Who does he work for; etc.
Mr. Marshall. It's my understanding that he was retained by
Mr. Prince, Mr. Smith, I don't know what his background is.
Mr. Ose. Is he an employee of Mr. Smith/Prince?
Mr. Marshall. Well, if you consider an employee to be
somebody that he is paying to do that piece of investigative
work, I guess he was. He was clearly being paid by Mr. Smith to
compile that report.
Mr. Ose. Does he have any past or present or ongoing
relationship to any other parties in this whole entire ugly
episode?
Mr. Marshall. I don't know the answer to that, sir.
Mr. Ose. OK. Your memo references--in the body of the third
paragraph references that the report says I understand the
sensitivity of the inquiry but really question the propriety of
the inquiry, especially in light of the report that blank may
be a relative of the Member making the inquiry. Could you tell
me what that means?
Mr. Marshall. Yeah. When this all came about I believe it
was Mr. Howard that told me that Mr. Prince was a cousin of Ms.
Waters, and that's the reason I questioned that. And then I
questioned the motivation in my mind.
Mr. Ose. Has that ever been substantiated or refuted?
Mr. Marshall. It's my understanding--and I would have to
defer to someone else to confirm this, but it's my
understanding that he may be--he's either a relative or
childhood friend of Ms. Waters' husband is what I've been told.
Mr. Shays. Let us say for the record--and clearly I will be
very delinquent if I didn't establish this--there is no
relationship, family relationship, there may be another kind of
relationship, but there is no family relationship to Mr. Prince
I think is the fact. You're not----
Mr. Marshall. If you know that, sir, I'll defer to that. I
don't know of my own personal knowledge if there is or isn't.
Mr. Shays. The point is, though, that this memo is the memo
that we requested from you; and it was intended to be internal
as far as you know.
Mr. Ose. Actually, this memo is from Mr. Marshall to the
Attorney General that I'm talking about, dated August 20, 1999.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Ose. I have another round, but I see my light's red.
Mr. Shays. I just want to establish for the record there is
no substantiation in any way of a blood relationship between
anyone in Congressman Waters' family and this--and the subject
of the investigation.
Mr. Marshall. I'm not sure whether we established that or
not. Could I research that and get an answer back to you?
Mr. Shays. I'm just going to say it hasn't been established
and in all of our research we haven't found that to be the
case. There may be a relationship of living in the area, family
relationship--not family relationship, maybe another
relationship that goes back a long way but not a blood
relationship.
Mr. Marshall. Then I'll defer to your knowledge on that.
Mr. Shays. That's what I'm most comfortable saying for the
public record.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Shays, I think you're asking the question, are
you not, and that's exactly the question I ask, is whether
there is any evidence to corroborate or refute the suggestion
in Mr. Marshall's memo to the Attorney General of a familial
relationship.
Mr. Shays. Can we do this? Can you check with your parties
to understand what kind of relationship existed just so we have
it on the record accurately before you leave today.
Mr. Marshall. I will do so.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Horn.
Mr. Horn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have just a few
questions, Mr. Chairman. I had to be out of the room earlier.
I am curious, Administrator Marshall, when did you first
know Mr. Howard? When did he first come to your attention?
Mr. Marshall. I have known him for quite a number of years
now, perhaps as long as 20 years; and I have worked with him
fairly closely for 10 or 12 years.
Mr. Horn. If I knew somebody for 20 years and you are the
boss, and I was given an order dealing in something very
carefully that could blow up one way or the other, I would pick
up the phone, if I were Ernie Howard, to ask you ``what are we
supposed to be doing here?'' Or if I were you and you knew him
for 20 years, and your people around you might say, ``we are
going to let this one go, it is going to be a suspension, we
have this letter, you should pick up the phone.''
Did you get a call from Mr. Howard that relates to anything
around this particular issue, but primarily this issue?
Mr. Marshall. On August 20 I picked up the phone and called
Mr. Howard to get an orientation for my own benefit and as a
result of the letter from Ms. Waters. I initiated that
conversation, and I got a brief on the case. I already knew a
few details about the case, but not any great depth. He gave me
some more information.
Over the course of several weeks, I had a number of
conversations with Mr. Howard. Sometimes I called him and
sometimes he called me. I did give very specific instructions
to Mr. Howard that the investigation continue.
Mr. Horn. So in dealing with this, you didn't leave it to
your deputy administrator or if there is a regional
administrator, or were they clued in at the time that this was
a hot potato?
In other words, you personally dealt with Mr. Howard?
Mr. Marshall. For the first few conversations, I personally
dealt with Mr. Howard. I personally dealt with Mr. Jimenez, but
I know that Mr. Howard and Mr. Jimenez were dealing on a
parallel track. Once I got the lay of the land and felt like we
were progressing on a satisfactory track with both the OPR
investigation, and the criminal investigation was continuing
per my directions, then I backed away from it and assumed that
Mr. Howard and Mr. Jimenez were handling their respective
tracks. That is their job.
Mr. Horn. How much contact did you have with Chief
Inspector Gamble on this case?
Mr. Marshall. Since he became chief inspector, he briefs me
periodically on all of the OPR, significant OPR activities, and
I got periodic briefs from him, once a month perhaps, where he
would brief me on this and other matters.
I talked to him specifically about this investigation
probably--let me think to be sure about this answer, probably
on just a couple of occasions. And those couple of occasions
would have been first following my January 13 meeting with the
Attorney General where she asked me to give Maxine Waters a
status report on the OPR investigation.
I discussed that with Mr. Gamble. I gave him some
parameters for what he was and was not to tell Ms. Waters.
Basically I told him not to discuss the ongoing criminal
investigation. I told him to discuss the process of the OPR
investigation and where we were within that process without
giving the details of what we had found in that investigation.
And then I believe I had another conversation with Mr.
Gamble after that meeting where he related to me that he had
done so. He also related to me at that time that Ms. Waters
requested that Agent Schumacher be transferred out of Texas and
that we look into the issue of the gold--the piece of gold
jewelry.
As far as I know, these were the only two conversations
that I had with Mr. Gamble specifically regarding these
matters.
Mr. Horn. I remember that J. Edgar Hoover, when he had a
person in the FBI that he didn't want around, they sent them to
Montana or Idaho or some place, and that became a very large
FBI office.
Is it appropriate and is it used very much to put an agent
from one State dealing in a number of things to another State,
and is it for the good of the agency rather than not
necessarily the good of the agent?
Mr. Marshall. OK, I will have to give you an explanation on
this.
I don't believe in punitive transfers. We do make transfers
for the good of the agency. I believe if a person has a
performance problem, that the management of that office should
deal with that performance problem.
On the other hand, where an agent is ineffective in
whatever locale he is in for whatever reason and that happens
from time to time, then I think for the good of the agency they
need to be moved to a location where they can be effective. But
punitive disciplinary transfers, per se, I do not believe in
them and I do not use them.
Mr. Horn. The briefer for Ms. Waters was Mr. Gamble. You
didn't go see her, or did you see her?
Mr. Marshall. No, I have never had a private conversation
with Ms. Waters.
Mr. Horn. Because often agency heads come up and talk to
committee chairmen.
You are saying that Mr. Gamble could brief her on the
matter?
Mr. Marshall. That's correct. Certainly, like any agency
head, I have visited personally with Members of Congress and
Senators, but not Ms. Waters.
Mr. Horn. I wonder if the people that advised Ms. Waters
and the people that advised Mr. Gamble, were there any other
suggestions made relevant to this unit, not just Mr.
Schumacher, but the unit and to what degree did there seem to
be a knowledge of what the unit was doing?
What other great ideas came out of Capitol Hill?
Mr. Marshall. I am not sure that I understand your
reference to the unit. But with regard to Mr. Gamble's
representation of that conversation to me, the two issues
were--the transfer of Schumacher out of Texas and the gold
piece of jewelry. I don't recall any other issues that he
reported back to me on.
Mr. Horn. Well, in other words, did she object to that? Did
the Representative object to that or did it just die after
that?
Mr. Marshall. Object to what?
Mr. Horn. Object to dealing with Mr. Schumacher. And one
suggestion was, move him out of Texas. And then did that
satisfy her, or who told her that he wasn't going to be moved
out of Texas?
Mr. Marshall. Mr. Gamble told her on the spot that is not
going to happen, that is not the way that we operate, we will
conduct the OPR investigation. I suppose she accepted that.
Mr. Horn. So you did not hear any more from her on that
issue?
Mr. Marshall. I didn't hear any more on that issue, or from
him.
Mr. Horn. I have had those sessions with the State
legislature, so I understand what you have to go through. Just
tell the truth is the best way to handle it.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Marshall, I think we are kind of getting to
the end, and you have been a very cooperative witness and
helpful witness. I am going to ask counsel----
Mr. Marshall. At some point, I have two items that I would
like to clarify.
First, I have just been handed a note that the document
number that I gave you--I'm sorry. The attachment to my August
20th memo, it looks like we are not going to have that by close
of business today. We can get it tomorrow.
Mr. Shays. Tomorrow will be acceptable. Before the close of
business tomorrow will be very nice.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you.
The second item, I have a note here that says Ambassador
Williams, who is Ms. Waters' husband, grew up with Mr. Prince
in the fifth ward of Houston, and there is no mention of a
blood relationship.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Cummings, I was going to have counsel ask questions.
Then you can ask your questions.
Mr. Wilson. I have just a very few questions.
I have in my hand the August 20, 1999, memo from yourself
to the Attorney General. Who wrote the memo?
Mr. Marshall. I wrote the memo.
Mr. Wilson. You just mentioned a few moments ago that you
at some point on August 20 got an orientation from Mr. Howard;
is that correct?
Mr. Marshall. That's correct.
Mr. Wilson. Prior to writing this memo, did you speak to
Mr. Howard?
Mr. Marshall. Yes, I would have gotten that orientation
from Mr. Howard before I wrote the memo.
Mr. Wilson. Is it fair to say that what you wrote is a
product of your conversations with Mr. Howard on August 20?
Mr. Marshall. That is fair to say, yes.
Mr. Wilson. We had some discussion about differing
recollections, but one of the principal issues that we have to
reconcile amongst ourselves is Mr. Howard's testimony that he
thought in August 1999 that there were no leads to be followed
up on; and we have to reconcile that with all of the other
testimony we have received, the Houston policeman that
testified thought that there were leads, the special agent from
the DEA, Mr. Schumacher, thought that there were leads to
followup on. And it appears in your memo to the Attorney
General, which is a fairly significant thing if you write a
memo to the Attorney General, you said and I will quote from
your memo, ``My questions and comments notwithstanding, it
appears to me that this is a significant criminal investigation
with''--and the document we released has a name redacted, ``and
others are legitimate suspects. There are multiple sources of
information reporting his involvement in the drug trade. There
is physical evidence which appears to tie him to the drug
trade, and it is an active, ongoing investigation.''
So it appears that there is a continuum of employees here--
Houston policemen, DEA special agents, Mr. Howard, then
yourself, then the Attorney General of the United States. The
only person in this continuum, it seems, that thinks there are
no leads to be followed up on appears to be Mr. Howard.
Did you have any discussions on August 20 with Mr. Howard
where he indicated to you that there was nothing else to be
done at that point?
Mr. Marshall. Well, no. I have to tell you that is one of
the confusions that I have in this whole issue, and it is one
of the reasons that I requested the inspector general
investigation.
This memo was written following a conversation with Mr.
Howard, and it was my clear impression from Mr. Howard that
this is an accurate characterization of that investigation,
that we had a viable investigation here that we should
continue. And then it was a few days later, I guess, or perhaps
a week later, that he became frustrated and said, ``it is too
much hassle, I will close it down.'' And I said, ``no, you
can't; you told me it is a viable investigation and we have to
go with it.''
Mr. Wilson. This was just provided to us today, it had not
been provided to us by DOJ, and this has a dramatic bearing on
what Mr. Howard told us yesterday and today because it provides
some contemporaneous evidence that at least Mr. Howard told you
that there is an active, ongoing investigation. Is it fair for
me to conclude that you would have no other way to conclude
that there was an active, ongoing investigation unless Mr.
Howard told you it was?
Mr. Marshall. That's correct.
Mr. Wilson. Because you didn't talk to anybody else on
August 20 about this case?
Mr. Marshall. Not about this case, no.
Mr. Wilson. You asked Mr. Gamble to brief a Congressman
about the OPR investigation, correct?
Mr. Marshall. Correct. Well, let me clarify that again.
I asked Mr. Gamble to give her a status report on the OPR
investigation. I was very careful that I told him not to brief
on the criminal investigation and not to give any of the
factual details on the OPR investigation, to describe status
and the process. That is what I told him to brief the
Congresswoman on.
Mr. Wilson. There was at least some direction to speak
under the terms that you have outlined. From what we have heard
during the briefing, the Congressperson at issue here asked Mr.
Gamble to pull Special Agent Schumacher out of the case and
take him out of Texas?
Mr. Marshall. That is what Mr. Gamble reported to me after
the conversation, yes.
Mr. Wilson. And from what we have heard today, shortly
thereafter, Mr. Gamble told Mr. Howard to take Mr. Schumacher
off of the enforcement action?
Mr. Marshall. I don't know what Mr. Gamble told Mr. Howard.
Mr. Wilson. You are not aware of how that process played
out?
Mr. Marshall. No, I am not.
Mr. Wilson. My final question: Is it fair to say that Mr.
Gamble's recommendation was made as a result of his interaction
with a Congressperson, but it sounds as if you would not be
able to make that connection?
Mr. Marshall. I don't know what recommendation that you are
talking about that Mr. Gamble would have made.
Mr. Wilson. To take Mr. Schumacher off enforcement.
Mr. Marshall. I just don't know that Mr. Gamble made that
recommendation to Mr. Howard.
Mr. Wilson. Just a couple of last things.
Earlier this year a member of committee staff interviewed
Houston police officers and encountered some difficulties at
the last moment. Are you aware of any efforts by the DEA to
slow down the committee's efforts to talk to Houston police
officers?
Mr. Marshall. No, I am not. In fact, I heard that story,
and I asked my Congressional Affairs staff to ask about that.
They told me that they did inquire about that, and I believe
they talked to Mr. Howard about that. Mr. Howard denied that he
made any such efforts.
Mr. Wilson. Did those inquiries establish whether anybody
from the DEA was in contact with the Houston Police Department
on the day that we conducted our interviews?
Mr. Marshall. Well, I don't know that they established that
nobody did that. But they didn't uncover affirmatively anyone
who did that. Does that make sense?
Mr. Wilson. That does make sense. That is something that we
wouldn't mind following up on because when we tried to
interview Houston Police Department personnel, we were held up,
apparently because of DEA. Our concern is that there was an
attempt to----
Mr. Marshall. I recall that incident, and at least some of
my staff asked Mr. Howard about that, and Mr. Howard told the
staff member that didn't happen.
Mr. Wilson. At least he didn't know that it happened?
Mr. Marshall. Right. That he didn't know that it happened.
Mr. Wilson. On July 17 of this year we did interview Mr.
Howard actually in this room, and we appreciate your efforts to
facilitate that. Did you talk to Mr. Howard before the
interview?
Mr. Marshall. Yes, I did.
Mr. Wilson. Mindful of the question what did you discuss,
if you could tell us what you discussed that is germane to the
issues we have been discussing in the last day-and-a-half?
Mr. Marshall. My recollection of your letter that came to
me was that it was a very general request, that you wanted--and
I believe I am thinking about the same letter here--that you
wanted to interview Mr. Howard, or DEA staff, and you named a
couple of subjects in that letter, a couple of names that you
wanted to talk about.
I didn't know before they came over here exactly what it
was that you wanted to learn about that. I don't think that my
staff knew. I don't think that Ernie Howard knew. I told Ernie
Howard in a meeting in my office, prior to his coming over
here, to come over and fully brief the committee staff on any
of the activities with regard to those two people that had
already been adjudicated in court and was a matter of public
record; and for that matter, any other defendants that you ask
about or people that you ask about, if there was a problem to
fully discuss, disclose, talk about, whatever, with the
committee staff.
I cautioned him not to discuss with committee staff any
aspect of the ongoing investigation, and I was very clear about
that. And it was reported back to me later, not by Mr. Howard,
but I believe by a staff member of mine, that those guidelines
had been followed in the discussions.
Mr. Wilson. I think we have already established that at
that point you did not have the e-mails and you had not read
the e-mails that Mr. Howard had sent to some of his colleagues?
Mr. Marshall. That's correct. Nor was it mentioned to me,
nor at any time during that conversation was I given any reason
to believe that the investigation had been shut down.
I specifically said, ``do not brief on active, ongoing
investigations.'' There was no comment to me, ``well, there are
no active, ongoing investigations,'' so I still, even at that
point, assumed that these were active, ongoing investigations.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Ose, you have the floor.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Marshall, do you need a break?
Mr. Marshall. No, sir. Thank you.
Mr. Ose. On page 8 of the private investigator's report,
the second paragraph cites the instance having to do with the
gold necklace and the other incident that Mr. Schumacher was
accused of hitting someone in the stomach. Now we have
ascertained that the gold necklace incident did not involve Mr.
Schumacher, that in fact Mr. Chad Scott received a letter of
reprimand for that.
Mr. Marshall. That's correct.
Mr. Ose. I am just trying to make sure that I understand
whose reputation is being impugned here. As it relates to the
allegation against Mr. Schumacher, certainly you investigated
that much as you did the gold necklace allegation; is that
correct?
Mr. Marshall. I'm sorry?
Mr. Ose. The allegation that Mr. Schumacher hit somebody in
the stomach during the course of an investigation, did you
investigate that?
Mr. Marshall. Our OPR investigated that.
Mr. Ose. Did they find substance or lack thereof?
Mr. Marshall. They initially found an agent by, I believe,
the name Fanning that said, yes, that happened. He was there
when it happened. He described how it happened. He described
that the defendant, or two, were up against the wall and that
Mr. Schumacher, I believe the words were, ``slapped them
around, kicked their feet out from under them,'' and initially
there was that corroboration.
Later on, however, we determined that Mr. Fanning himself
had a credibility problem because he was under OPR
investigation and subsequently was terminated from our
employment. So his credibility then washed out, and the charges
against Mr. Schumacher were unsubstantiated and he received a
letter of clearance.
I share your frustrations.
Mr. Ose. We have a guy who registered serious allegations
against a DEA agent on, like, August 19, and then came in under
oath in a deposition and said, no, ``I have never had any
contact with the guy.''
Then we had an OPR investigation to followup on an
additional allegation from a private investigator of who knows
what origin, none of which was found to have any substance, and
yet it seems to me somebody--I am trying to figure out, for
what purpose are we continually trying to impugn this
gentleman's character?
Mr. Marshall. It is clear to me. We have allegations of
theft and brutality that were specific allegations, specific
names, times and places attached to them, and those were
allegations that we simply have to investigate; and we did, and
the process resulted in minor discipline for one, a clearance
for the other. That is our process and that is what we have to
do.
Can you imagine if I turned my back on those allegations
and then they subsequently turned out to be true?
Mr. Ose. I am not questioning that.
In terms of the clearance given to Mr. Schumacher regarding
the alleged incident with the individual, I think it was
January 27, 1999, how long did it take OPR to investigate and
come to the conclusion that the allegations had no merit--6
months, a year?
Mr. Marshall. I believe that the OPR investigation--and I
discussed this earlier--it is my recollection that the OPR
investigation took a number of months. There were some reasons
for that, one of those reasons being that some of the witnesses
that the OPR investigators felt that they needed to talk to did
not want to talk to them. It took a while to get them to talk.
At some point I believe that investigation was sent to the
Department of Justice, either the Civil Rights Division or the
Public Integrity Section, to review.
That aspect of it took, as I recall, from November to
February or March. It was sometime in that March timeframe, and
if you'll allow me to get the exact dates, I will do so, but my
recollection is sometime in that March timeframe it was sent to
the Board of Professional Conduct.
Mr. Ose. So the investigation was finished in November and
the paperwork basically took 5 or 6 months?
Mr. Marshall. No, the investigation was not finished in
November. In fact, I recall a notation on one of my notes at a
biweekly DAG meeting at the Department of Justice that they
still had to interview Special Agent Schumacher, and I believe
that was in February. So I think that perhaps the OPR wasn't
completed until March. Now, at any rate, it was sent to the
Board of Professional Conduct, and that board--and I looked
into this, and the explanation I got was that that board was
operating at least one person short because one of the members
was on sick leave for about 2 months. Sometime in that
timeframe I was told that they were dealing with some other
serious allegations, some 30-odd people were removed. I am told
that they prioritize their cases, first dealing with the ones
where employees are on limited duty or leave without pay or
even leave with pay. That was not the case in here, and they
simply didn't prioritize it as high as some of the other cases
in their heavy workload.
Mr. Ose. If I may go back, the deposition that was taken on
August 20, who paid for that? Did the DEA pay?
Mr. Marshall. You mean the court reporter?
Mr. Ose. Yes.
Mr. Marshall. DEA paid for that.
Mr. Ose. Who paid for the private investigator's report?
Mr. Marshall. Mr. Prince, I believe.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Prince, the same guy that was deposed and
testified that he had no knowledge of ever interacting with Mr.
Schumacher in a manner that would be characterized as
harassment or intimidation?
Mr. Marshall. Correct.
Mr. Ose. Submitted a report that said there was
intimidation and harassment--Mr. Chairman, I'm sorry----
Mr. Marshall. You've said that a couple of times, and the
only thing I know is to repeat in the private investigator
report, regardless of what we thought about it or what we
thought about the person or regardless of what we thought about
Mr. Prince, regardless of what we thought about Ms. Waters,
that report contained some specific allegations that were
either verifiable or refutable. Those allegations were serious.
Now, we deal with the criminal element all of the time. The
criminal element makes allegations against other agents very
frequently. It is not unusual. But just because we don't think
that it is true doesn't mean that we shouldn't investigate. I
once again ask rhetorically, what if we turned our back on
those allegations and they turned out to be some substance to
them? So for those reasons and to protect the integrity of the
agency and frankly to protect the integrity of the employees,
we feel that we have to investigate those allegations where
there is a specific allegation and either prove it or disprove
it. In this case, one of those allegations was substantiated,
and one was not. We acted accordingly. That is the way that our
process works.
Mr. Ose. I'm done.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Gilman, you have the floor.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Marshall, first of all, I want to commend you and the
men and women of our DEA who are--each and every day are out
there fighting illicit drugs for the benefit of our youngsters
and our communities.
Your August 20, 1999, memo for not permitting information
about any pending criminal case to any public official and to
the target to the agency's investigation is quite appropriate
and on the mark, and we commend you for that.
With that said, let me ask you a few more questions.
Mr. Marshall, you told your SAC agent in Houston, Ernie
Howard, not to shut down this Rap-A-Lot case; is that correct?
Mr. Marshall. Yes, that's correct.
Mr. Gilman. So was it your belief that this case was
continuing and being pursued?
Mr. Marshall. That was my belief, yes, it was, until
October of this year.
Mr. Gilman. How did we get to this point of lack of
adequate communication to your office that it actually was not
being pursued?
Mr. Marshall. That is one of the issues that I can discover
in the inspector general investigation that is the result of
these hearings.
Mr. Gilman. To this date, have you found out why it was not
being properly pursued?
Mr. Marshall. No. If I had received any indication of that,
I would have taken action. Had I seen the memo from Mr. Nims, I
would have taken action and I would have corrected that
situation.
Mr. Gilman. To your knowledge, Mr. Marshall, has any
allegation lodged against a DEA agent previously shut down an
active DEA drug investigation?
Mr. Marshall. To the best of my knowledge, no.
Mr. Gilman. And can we assure the American public, that is
not a normal DEA operating procedure and will not be so in the
future?
Mr. Marshall. I can assure you, that is not our procedure.
It should not have happened if it happened.
Mr. Gilman. Can we be assured that the investigation into
the Prince case is not going to lie on the shelf and gather
dust?
Mr. Marshall. Mr. Chairman, I want to reserve any comment
about the future of the investigation for a closed session.
That seems like a simple enough question that you ask. I can
assure you that I will see that all aspects--all appropriate
measures have been taken.
If I may, please just ask for that in an executive session.
I think the more we talk about the future of this publicly, the
more damage it might cause.
Mr. Gilman. I am pleased to observe your discretion.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wanted to thank you, Mr. Marshall, for coming before this
committee.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Horn.
Mr. Horn. I am very impressed by the Administrator's
testimony. I think we have learned a lot, in both the majority
and the minority.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. It has come to my attention that Sidney
Williams, Congresswoman Waters' husband, is 25 years older than
Fred Smith. It is my understanding from Ms. Waters that he did
not grow up with him. They did, however, come from the same
neighborhood. So for whatever that is worth, I wanted to make
sure that the record is clear on that.
I wanted to comment on one thing that really bothered me
during this hearing, and that is when--you weren't here, but
yesterday we had an opportunity to hear the lyrics to this song
by the artist known as ``Scarface.'' And I tell you when you
have lyrics in a song that talk about harming police officers
and things of that nature, while I believe very strongly in the
first amendment, I am also very concerned about what we often
call this ``thin blue line.''
In Maryland you may--I am sure you are aware of this
because I think your agency may have been involved--we had an
officer, undercover officer, who was murdered during an
undercover operation, one of our State troopers whom I knew
well. It is so painful to think that men and women who are
putting their lives on the line to make life better for all of
us could be subjected to that kind of--those kinds of threats
and that kind of reality.
I have often said that we are all bounded by the reality of
our mortality, and I will tell you--I say all of that to say, I
think we have got to really, as a Congress and as a nation,
begin to look at some of these lyrics, because I am going to
tell you, when I heard that--and to think that police officers
who were sitting here in front of me could possibly suffer
while doing their jobs and trying to protect us, I tell you, it
bothers me to no end.
While we know that this has been a painful process for the
DEA and for the Houston police, too, we want to make it clear
that all of us are supportive of our police and supportive of
the DEA.
I appreciate everything that you have said because I can
tell that this whole matter is something that concerns you, I
can tell just from the things that you have said. But I want to
also make it clear that we fully understand that you were under
the impression that you had an ongoing investigation.
We are still not clear on all of that, and the IG, I am
sure, will get to the bottom of all of that. But I just wanted
to leave that message with you.
I know that you personally have personnel that may hear
this or get it on the Internet or whatever, but I want to make
it very clear that we support the Drug Enforcement
Administration, and we support all of our law enforcement
officers who are trying to uplift our lives.
I wanted to leave you with that, and I want to thank you
for your testimony.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you for your comments, sir. I commented
on this earlier, but I think it bears repeating.
With regard to the lyrics on the song, I think the people
that write those lyrics, perform them, sell them, promote them,
the people that buy them, those are really vicious thugs; and I
think things like that endanger the lives of our officers,
these courageous--Special Agent Schumacher, Ernie Howard, they
all have had threats against them. And I think those--I don't
think that is freedom of speech; I think that is inciting
violence against police officers. And I hope that we as a
country, the next Congress, the next administration, somehow
can do something to prevent that kind of stuff in the future.
And thank you for your comments, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Cummings. You shared exactly what
the rest of us think. I appreciate your making that point.
We have one last issue and it deals with a memo of
September 27, 1999, regarding Mr. James A. Smith, a.k.a.
Prince, and related OPR investigations. It is from Mr. Nims to
you, but it says through Ernest Howard, Robert Joura is crossed
out and Keith Baudoin, and in there it says, ``I have recently
been instructed by HFD SAC Ernest Howard not to pursue any new
leads regarding Rap-A-Lot until OPR investigation is cleared.
However, we are cleared to talk about any witnesses and
participate in any judicial proceedings. This is unfortunate,
because there are still many investigative leads and
enforcement operations to carry out.''
My question is, is it your testimony that you did not see
this memo?
Mr. Marshall. That's correct.
Mr. Shays. Is it a standard practice if it goes through
someone, they can stop it before it gets to you?
Mr. Marshall. I am not sure that we have a standard written
rule on that. I wish I had seen that memo. If I had, we
wouldn't be here today.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Marshall, it is very clear--it is very clear
that you expected this investigation to be ongoing and active.
You have been very cooperative with both of us on both sides of
the aisle. We thank you for your cooperation. We look forward
to seeing the results of this investigation. If no one else as
any other comments, we are going to adjourn this hearing. You
are free to leave and you have been very helpful.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]