[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE: TEST FAILURES AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
VETERANS AFFAIRS, AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 8, 2000
__________
Serial No. 106-255
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
74-374 WASHINGTON : 2001
____________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
Carolina ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
BOB BARR, Georgia DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas
LEE TERRY, Nebraska THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
GREG WALDEN, Oregon JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California ------
PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho (Independent)
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
Robert A. Briggs, Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International
Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida TOM LANTOS, California
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
JOHN L. MICA, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
Carolina BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
LEE TERRY, Nebraska (Independent)
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
R. Nicholas Palarino, Senior Policy Advisor
Jason Chung, Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on September 8, 2000................................ 1
Statement of:
Coyle, Phillip, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
Department of Defense; Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish,
Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Office, accompanied by
Edward Warner, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Strategy and
Threat Reduction, Department of Defense; and Avis Bohlen,
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Department of
State...................................................... 64
Graham, Dr. William, chairman and president National Security
Research, Inc.; Lawrence J. Korb, vice president and
director of studies, Council on Foreign Relations; Dr.
Lisbeth Gronlund, senior staff scientist, arms control
program, Union of Concerned Scientists; and Dr. Kim Holmes,
vice president and director the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom
Davis Institute, the Heritage Foundation, accompanied by
Baker Spring, research fellow, the Heritage Foundation..... 171
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Bohlen, Avis, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control,
Department of State, information concerning Strategic
Stability Cooperation Initiative........................... 125
Chenoweth-Hage, Hon. Helen, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Idaho:
Article entitled, ``Facing the Risks: A Realistic Look at
Missile Defense''...................................... 159
The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder..................... 7
Coyle, Phillip, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
Department of Defense, prepared statement of............... 68
Graham, Dr. William, chairman and president National Security
Research, Inc, prepared statement of....................... 175
Gronlund, Dr. Lisbeth, senior staff scientist, arms control
program, Union of Concerned Scientists, prepared statement
of......................................................... 197
Holmes, Dr. Kim, vice president and director the Kathryn and
Shelby Cullom Davis Institute, the Heritage Foundation,
prepared statement of...................................... 214
Kadish, Lieutenant General Ronald, Director, Ballistic
Missile Defense Office:
Information concerning a closed hearing.................. 153
Information concerning differences in estimates....... 164, 166
Information concerning Modification P00053............... 147
Information concerning NMD RRFs.......................... 131
Prepared statement of.................................... 108
Korb, Lawrence J., vice president and director of studies,
Council on Foreign Relations, prepared statement of........ 186
NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE: TEST FAILURES AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
----------
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 2000
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans
Affairs, and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
room B-372, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher
Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Shays, Chenoweth-Hage, Tierney,
Allen, Schakowsky, and Burton, ex officio.
Also present: Representatives Kucinich and Turner.
Staff present: Lawrence J. Halloran, staff director and
counsel; R. Nicholas Palarino, senior policy advisor; Alex
Moore, fellow; Jason M. Chung, clerk; David Rapallo, minority
counsel; and Earley Green, minority assistant clerk.
Mr. Shays. The House Subcommittee on National Security,
Veterans Affairs, and International Relations is now going to
undertake a hearing entitled, ``National Missile Defense: Test
Failures in Technology Development.''
Under the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, ``It is the
policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is
technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense
system capable of defending the territory of the United States
against limited ballistic missile attack.'' Adopted with broad
bipartisan support and signed by the President, the statute
answered the question whether to deploy a national missile
shield, but could not mandate when a technologically feasible
system would be ready.
When will effective and affordable National Missile Defense
[NMD], technology, be ready? That is the question we pose this
morning as we undertake oversight of a $10 billion technology
development process that has yet to yield a deployable NMD
system.
The Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative
[SDI], hastened the demise of the Soviet Union. Since then,
we've moved away from the global vision dubbed ``Star Wars'' to
merely trying to hit a bullet with a bullet and missing more
often than not.
Without question, NMD program officials, today's stewards
of the SDI legacy, confront complex technical challenges in a
changing strategic, diplomatic and political environment. This
is rocket science, and defending against emerging missile
threats demands an unparalleled degree of technological
precision in launch detection, target discrimination, command
and control coordination, and target interception.
Our oversight of other complex weapons systems, the F-22
Raptor and the multirole Joint Strike Fighter, underscored the
importance of permitting technology readiness to drive design
and deployment decisions. In those programs, we saw a genuine
sense of urgency to overcome test failures, conquer new
technology and meet emerging threats.
Is a similar sense of urgency propelling the NMD technology
program? A 1998 review of the missile defense program found
motion but not progress, a rush to failure caused in part by
poor management and lack of aggressive oversight. The
President's hastily announced decision last week to defer
initial NMD deployment steps, ``until we have absolute
confidence that the system will work,'' holds proven
technologies hostage to an artificial all-or-nothing standard.
Factors other than technical feasibility appear to be
constraining NMD success. One of those factors, Russia's
refusal to discuss necessary changes to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile [ABM], Treaty, could have been ameliorated had the
President authorized construction contracts for that part of
NMD technology we know will work, the X-Band radar facility in
Alaska. Under the pressure of inevitable, if distant, NMD
deployment, the Russians might be more willing to accede to
limited ABM changes rather than face further loss of
international stature in the event the treaty is deemed a legal
nullity or a strategic anachronism.
The ballistic missile threat is real, and it is growing.
China is developing weapons using stolen U.S. warhead designs,
and appears willing to sell missile technology to rogue nations
who may not be tamed by deterrence alone. North Korea could
resume flight tests and acquire intercontinental missile
capability at any time. Development of technology to defend
against that threat should be pursued just as aggressively,
unfettered by timidity over near-term diplomatic or political
fallout.
The next President deserves to choose from a complete menu
of mature NMD technologies in deciding how best to protect our
national security.
Our witnesses this morning represent a wide range of views
on how to implement the national policy on missile defenses. We
welcome them all and look forward to their testimony.
At this time I would like to recognize Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. I would just start this morning,
Mr. Chairman, by thanking you for scheduling and conducting
these hearings. I would also like to extend my appreciation to
the witnesses today for their time, their insights, as well as
their testimony.
I think President Clinton is to be applauded for his
decision last week to defer any decision on deployment of a
National Missile Defense. Those who seek to politicize this
issue do the Nation a disservice, including those who last
December said they would welcome such a decision, but who have
subsequently claimed that deferral somehow evidences a failure
to strengthen America's defenses. As I stated earlier, such
politicization demeans the seriousness of our need to establish
defense priorities based on appropriate nonpolitical criteria.
In addition, such assertions are patently inaccurate. Our
country's defenses would only be substantially weakened should
we move to deployment under current conditions. The President's
decision seems to have been the only reasonable one available
at this time, given the substantial delays in testing
schedules, the severe cost overruns and several high-profile
missile intercept failures.
Moreover, it appears to have at least recognized that
Russia, China and our NATO allies oppose deployment because it
would violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which they
regard as a cornerstone to nuclear nonproliferation.
As testimony submitted in writing for today's hearing by
Professor Burton Richter clearly states, we are now in the
third round of missile defense debates. In rounds one and two
we concluded, after much effort, that the technology was not up
to the job and we opted for arms control. The Nixon
administration wanted to defend our missile force and instead
signed the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The Reagan
administration wanted to defend the entire Nation with what
became known derisively and appropriately as the ``Star Wars''
defense system, but moved instead to decrease the nuclear
threat through a series of treaties to reduce the number of
nuclear warheads deployed on each side.
Now some propose the intercept-in-space, hit-to-kill system
that would be the most technologically challenging of possible
alternatives. Rightfully, criteria for development have been
set out and have been largely accepted. One, we talk of the
changing threat for emerging missile states and the anticipated
need for a national missile defense.
Two, we talk about the cost of deployment. We talk about
the effect of the National Missile Defense deployment on the
United States/Russia nuclear arms reduction process and the
broader strategic environment, including effects on our
relationships with China, NATO allies and others.
Last, we speak of the technological readiness of the system
for deployment.
While these hearings have been directed by the majority and
the chairman mostly at the issue of technological readiness, we
must recognize that none of the elements can be reviewed in a
vacuum. Consideration of any one necessarily implicates some
consideration of others. I should like to add yet another, a
fifth or perhaps a subset of the fourth criteria we must
consider before deployment, and that is the likely operational
effectiveness of the planned National Missile Defense against a
real-world attack, which would include countermeasures.
The intercept tests conducted prior to this date and prior
to the President's decision did not assess operational
effectiveness of the planned National Missile Defense. That
criterion for the deployment should be whether the fully
deployed system would be able to deal with countermeasures, not
the much more narrow criterion of whether the system can
intercept cooperative targets on the test range. If there are
countermeasures that would be available to emerging missile
states that would defeat the full National Missile Defense
system, then it would make no sense for the United States to
begin deploying even the first stage until it demonstrates
first on paper and then on the test range that the full system
could be made effective against such countermeasures.
There is no doubt the countermeasure technology exists in
even rogue nations right now and that the capacity exists for
them to develop other measures. For instance, a September 1999
national intelligence estimate on the ballistic missile threat
to the United States asserts that anti-simulation balloon
decoys for nuclear warheads are readily available technology
that emerging missile states could use to develop
countermeasures to U.S. National Missile Defense systems. It is
only slightly more difficult to implement measures using
numerous balloons which would be much more effective as would
be putting a warhead inside a balloon.
The combination of methods, tactics of overwhelming the
defense and other strategies, will be developed and may already
exist. So before we deploy at any time, we must consider the
four criteria, or the five as I have noted, and satisfy
ourselves that the deployment of a National Missile Defense
will actually be needed, as opposed to reliance on deterrence
and diplomacy; that costs which seem to be spiraling even as
our confidence in the system remains uncertain; that those
costs are in a range warranting deployment of a National
Missile Defense as our best means to answering any threat.
A system that in 1996 was estimated to cost between $9
billion and $11 billion now appears to be nearing $50 billion
and can be expected to increase. As the Union for Concerned
Scientists write, the proposed U.S. National Missile Defense
system may decrease the security of the United States. Russia
and China would respond to the deployment of such a system by
deploying a greater number of warheads than might otherwise
have been planned.
In addition, Russia would likely increase its reliance on
launch-on warnings to ensure that any retaliatory strike would
be large enough to overwhelm the National Missile Defense
system.
A decision to deploy a National Missile Defense system
would also have a generally negative effect on U.S. relations
with Russia and China and would threaten cooperative efforts to
decrease the number of nuclear weapons, improve controls on
weapons and weapons materials, and combat proliferation.
Finally, the National Missile Defense system could prompt
emerging missile states to concentrate on our modes of
delivery. We are a long way from achieving the kind of
technological readiness that would provide confidence in the
system. The number of tests with real-world conditions would
tell if the system would work. A significant number of
additional tests than are currently planned would be necessary
to establish a high enough level of confidence. A National
Missile Defense would need to be tested in many differing
operational environments to take into account different
possible countermeasures, each of which would require its own
set of tests to estimate the system's performance under that
environment.
There must be objective, independent test assessments, with
authority, meaning at least that the Department of Defense
should not be able to disregard the sound advice of the
director of operational tests and evaluation.
As Professor Richter said, while the system proposed now
has a less ambitious goal than Star Wars, the task is still
very difficult and extraordinarily complex and challenging. The
intercept-in-space, hit-to-kill system now in development is
the most technically challenging of all the possible
alternatives. It is the easiest to confuse with relatively
simple decoys. The proposed test program is inadequate to
ensure the necessary reliability before we begin to spend big
money on National Missile Defense. The proposed system is not
ready to graduate from development to deployment, and maybe it
never will be.
Thank you.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
At this time I would recognize the gentlelady Mrs.
Chenoweth-Hage.
Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage. Thank you, Chairman Shays. I would
like to thank the subcommittee for taking the time, as you have
and are doing now, to examine this very, very critical issue of
the feasibility and deployability of the National Missile
Defense system. By holding these hearings, Chairman Shays, you
are opening up an issue that is so vitally important and of
great interest to the American people. I thank you for being
here and holding this hearing after the House has temporarily
recessed.
Mr. Chairman, since the dawn of the space age, we have
often heard the crowing of the pessimists. Statements like ``it
can't be done'' or ``it is simply too expensive'' have been the
norm for the day with many programs where technology was the
central component that existed. Now, people said this about the
development of our military fighters in the 1970's and about
our tanks in the 1980's and our stealth technology in the
1980's and the 1990's, but each time these pessimists have been
proven wrong.
The genius of the American people is such that the
seemingly insurmountable becomes surmountable. Specifically in
the case of the National Missile Defense system, we are
overcoming the failures that have so far been encountered.
Failures to a certain extent are always expected. Now, any
fourth grade student learns in his science lessons that
failures are central to the scientific process, but they are
overcome, just as we are overcoming many of the technical
failures we are now encountering.
Mr. Chairman, when Ronald Reagan originally proposed his
Strategic Defense Initiative, people ridiculed it by calling it
``Star Wars.'' The press accused him of proposing the
impossible and people inflamed the public by saying research in
this area could cause a war. President Reagan refused to take
no for an answer, and as a result, we are now much closer to
defending the American public from ballistic missiles.
One of the arguments that people of goodwill on both sides
of the National Missile Defense debate raise is the Anti-
Ballistic Missile [ABM], Treaty of 1972, in that it prohibits
the deployment of a National Missile Defense shield. However, I
question this. Personally, I do not believe that the ABM Treaty
still constrains us in this way, because with the death of the
Soviet Union, many scholars argue that the ABM Treaty is no
longer binding.
Mr. Chairman, at this point, I would like to ask unanimous
consent to enter into the record three papers that explore the
legal viability and application of the ABM Treaty to national
missile defense and the timely report by Senator Thad Cochran
regarding national missile defense.
Mr. Shays. Without objection, so ordered.
[Note.--The report entitled, ``Stubborn Things, a Decade of
Facts About Ballistic Missile Defense,'' may be found in
subcommittee files.]
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
While I am concerned about the development of National
Missile Defense, I am not one that is overly concerned with
test failures. Tests occur precisely to resolve problems before
deployment of our National Missile Defense system. I have great
faith in the ingenuity of our research scientists, and I rest
easy knowing that America possesses the very best research
scientists and laboratories in the world.
And with ongoing research into National Missile Defense, we
are on the cusp of being able to protect America from rogue
states like North Korea, Iran and Iraq. We cannot fail in our
efforts to protect the American people.
So, Mr. Chairman, again thank you very much for holding
this meeting. By exploring and exploding some of the myths
surrounding the technical feasibility of National Missile
Defense, we are providing an important service for the American
people. Only through effectively addressing these myths will we
ever be able to defend the United States against missile
attacks.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
It would be my intention to recognize Mr. Allen and then
Ms. Schakowsky and then Mr. Turner who is a member of the full
committee and Mr. Kucinich, who is a member of the full
committee. Both of you are equal participants. It just will be,
your order will be after the regular members, but fully
participate.
Mr. Allen.
Mr. Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome all
the panelists here today and begin by thanking our chairman.
When I was elected to Congress, this is what I thought
committee hearings would be like. That is, you would have
people with all different points of view coming before us and
expressing their opinions, and we would have a chance to sort
out the differences. But too often I have found that the panels
are weighted so much to one side or another that we don't have
that opportunity. So I particularly appreciate Chairman Shays'
proceeding as he has with the variety of different panelists
and perspectives that we will hear today.
Second, I do want to begin by saying, let's remember what
this system is: This is a very limited system designed to
protect against a handful of missiles launched by a rogue
nation like--so-called rogue nation like North Korea or Iran or
Iraq. That's it. It is not a shield that protects us from major
nuclear powers like Russia. It is not a shield that would
protect us against what China has or could develop in the
future. It is aimed simply against those ``states of concern,''
as they are now called.
If we are going to make a rational decision about how to
proceed with a national missile defense and at what speed, I
think we have to keep in mind the four factors that should
guide us. They have been stated before, but they bear
repeating.
First, the status of the threat at the time of the decision
to deploy. There is no point in spending $50 billion or $60
billion on a system if there is no obvious threat that needs to
be dealt with.
Second, here as we struggle with our budget on a regular
basis, cost has to be a factor. Just within the last 12 months,
the cost of this system has multiplied significantly.
Third, the state of the technology, and here I would say
there are two technologies. First, there is the technology of
being able to hit a bullet with a bullet, the ability to
intercept a missile that is fired at the United States. But
second, there is the technology of dealing with potential
countermeasures. That subject has been given more attention in
the last few months, but not in my view nearly enough, because
if the countermeasures that are available to so-called ``states
of concern'' are such that they could overwhelm the kinds of
systems that we could develop, then the system will not work as
advertised.
Finally, we have to pay attention to our arms control
agenda, because in the last analysis, diplomacy, if it works,
is always cheaper than an arms race. In this case, diplomacy
should not be ignored or pushed aside as we move ahead.
I happen to believe that if a national missile defense
system works as advertised and strengthens our national
security, we should build it, but if a National Missile Defense
system will not work as advertised or if it will diminish our
national security, we should not deploy it, we should not
proceed. It is the answer to that fundamental choice that I
believe confronts us in Congress, and the American people as
well, that I hope this hearing today will illuminate. And I
again thank Chairman Shays.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
Ms. Schakowsky.
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much for
holding this hearing today to discuss our National Missile
Defense program and its technological feasibility. I also want
to thank Congressman Tierney for all of his work on this
subject and for requesting this hearing today.
Last year, when the House of Representatives debated H.R.
4, a bill making it the policy of the United States to deploy a
national missile defense system when technologically feasible,
I stood on the House floor and warned my colleagues that this
policy would not enhance the security of the United States, but
that it could actually bring this Nation closer to war.
Since then, we have seen our neighbors around the world
express opposition--NATO allies, Russia, China and others.
Russia has warned that it would abandon arms reduction
agreements if we go forward with the National Missile Defense
program. China has warned it may increase offensive production,
and I stand by the declaration I made last year.
Since the Reagan administration, we have been urged by
wishful thinkers to deploy a system for which workable
technology does not exist. Now many years and many billions of
dollars later, we are still pursuing what I view as an
irresponsible, likely unnecessary and unrealistic policy.
Believe me, I am pleased that President Clinton deferred
the decision to deploy to the next administration. Had it not
been for the sound advice of some of today's witnesses and
others, the situation may have been different. To me, NMD is
just another example of the Department of Defense spending
billions of taxpayer dollars on programs that are destined for
failure or are not necessary.
As many of my colleagues know, I strongly believe we need a
comprehensive strategic review of our defense policy, and I am
pleased that today we can start by taking a closer look at
national missile defense.
I would like to end with a quote which is from a document
produced by one of our witnesses today, Mr. Coyle:
``deployment,'' he says, ``means the fielding of an operational
system with some military utility which is effective under
realistic combat conditions against realistic threats and
countermeasures when operated by military personnel at all
times of day or night and in all weather. Such capability is
yet to be shown to be practicable for NMD.''
Mr. Coyle, of course, will have an opportunity to
elaborate, but to me that sums it up. Not only does deployment
risk a whole new arms race and the alienation of our
traditional allies and adversaries, it does not work. I know my
constituents expect better.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to hear
from our witnesses and look forward to a healthy discussion
today.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be
here with the subcommittee today, and I appreciate your
allowing those of us who are not members of the committee to
join with the committee. I, of course, take a great interest in
the work of your subcommittee as a member of the full
Government Reform Committee, as well as because of my work as a
member of the Research and Development Subcommittee and the
Procurement Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee.
I had the opportunity to be an original cosponsor of the
National Missile Defense legislation. I was pleased to do so. I
thought it was the right thing to do. I also enjoyed the
opportunity to go with a delegation of the Armed Services
Committee, under the leadership of subcommittee Chairman Curt
Weldon, prior to the consideration of that legislation by the
House of Representatives, to Moscow to present a report to
members of the Russian Duma that outlined the information that
we had collected that indicated that there was a real threat to
our national security from nations such as Korea and Iran.
That meeting was very productive. Though it did not result
in our counterparts in the Duma concurring with our proceeding
with such a defense system, I think it did represent a good-
faith effort on the part of the Congress to present to the
members of the Duma and their defense committee our thoughts
and our reasoning and to present it prior to the passage of the
legislation in the Congress.
We have, I think, today, a greater military superiority
over any potential foe than we have possessed at any time in
our history. I know there is a lot of discussion, particularly
in the Presidential race, about our military readiness. Though
we always have room for improvement, I am convinced that we do
possess a military that is second to none, for which we should
all be very proud, and we are very grateful to those who serve
in the uniform of the armed services who defend us every day.
It is in our national interest and in the interest of world
peace to maintain that unquestioned superiority.
National missile defense is, in my opinion, an essential
element of achieving that objective. History teaches us that
nations inevitably pursue the development of increasingly
sophisticated weapons, and I think that the old adage,
``Eternal vigilance is the price of peace,'' is one we must
continue to be mindful of.
There is no question that this issue we are discussing
today must be approached with reasoned judgment. There are
legitimate issues that must be addressed, issues such as the
scope and nature of the threat we face; the technological
readiness for deployment and the diplomatic issues, including,
of course, the impact on the ABM Treaty. I have no doubt that
the threat is real, that North Korea is developing the ability
to deliver a nuclear weapon to the continental United States. I
think that threat may also exist from Iran and other nations,
like Iraq.
There are those who desire to achieve military power
through the use of nuclear weapons. That is not to say that the
delivery of a nuclear weapon by a missile is the only method
that may be chosen by a potential foe.
I also understand that it is important to be sure that the
technology is sufficient to successfully deploy a system.
Otherwise, we will pursue a reckless course, spending millions
of dollars we would not otherwise have to spend. But I am
convinced that we have the ability to be in a position to
deploy--that the technology will and can be sufficient to
accomplish the goal.
Finally, I also believe that as we pursue the diplomatic
front, and we certainly should pursue it in every way possible,
that at the end of the day our allies, as well as those who are
potential foes, should be able to understand that this is an
effort that we are making that is in the interest not only of
our own security but in the security of world peace.
At the end of the day, if we do not achieve agreement with
those other nations, I think it will still be in our national
interest to deploy a limited system.
I concur with the President's decision to defer deployment
until the next administration, not because I question the
ability to achieve a system that will work, but because I have
evidenced by the comments of Governor Bush and some of our
Republican colleagues in the Congress that there is a debate
that will take place regarding the type of system that should
be deployed.
The information that I have indicates that the threat
currently is a limited one, and that a system that has the
capability of defending against limited attacks will be
appropriate, but it is clear that there are others who choose a
more, ``robust approach,'' a more ``Star Wars approach,'' as
was advocated in the Reagan administration. I think that
Congress should engage in that debate, and that issue deserves
our attention.
So I am grateful, Mr. Chairman, that you have called this
hearing today to give us all the opportunity to begin the
course of making a reasoned judgment about a very important
issue to the American people, and I appreciate the opportunity
to share in this discussion.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Turner. The committee is grateful
to have your participation, and also Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. Kucinich, you can close up here.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this committee meeting. I certainly want to express my
appreciation to Mr. Tierney and the other members of the
committee for the work that they have done on this issue. As
some of the members know, this is something that I have been
working on for the last year, and I appreciate the fact that
Mr. Shays has called the hearing, which I believe is one of the
first opportunities we have had in this House to get into this
issue.
I would like, in some brief remarks here, to pose a number
of questions, and I think the first question that has to be
asked is, is this trip necessary? Why are we asking the
American people to even consider forking over an additional $60
billion when we have already gone a great distance since 1983,
when the Reagan administration first proposed Star Wars, to
prove that this concept doesn't work; that it is an idea in
search of an enemy; that it would subvert any effort to be able
to have fiscal responsibility in the Federal Government; that
it would undermine our efforts to maintain nuclear
nonproliferation; that it would violate the ABM Treaty; and
that it would generally be a disaster on a scale that hasn't
been seen in this country with respect to trying to maintain
American leadership for peace in the world?
I would submit that peace through proliferation is an
Orwellian construction which defies credibility; that you
cannot tell the world, as we are in a new millennium, that the
way that we can achieve peace is through an arms buildup.
Let's sweep aside for a moment the debate over whether or
not this is technically possible, because it is not. Let's
sweep aside for a moment the debate over whether or not we want
to commit tens of billions of dollars to this, because I don't
believe the American people do. Let's go right to the crux,
what I think is the crux, of this overarching debate, and that
is, do we really want to get into an era of nuclear
proliferation?
Are we going to go back to the days of duck-and-cover
drills, where our children are going to be told to get under
their desks and get into a crouch and close their eyes and pray
that they don't see the flash and pray that they aren't
incinerated in some nuclear conflagration? Or are we going to
use this opportunity and this debate to come back to the
irreducible conclusion that the only way to peace is through
diplomacy and the way to nuclear arms reduction is through
reducing and eliminating nuclear arms, which was the central
purpose of the Nonproliferation Treaty and of the ABM Treaty.
This hearing today isn't about castigating people who are
serving our country well and who are dedicated to America. We
are all good Americans. We all love our country. You don't run
for Congress unless you love your country. You don't serve in
the military unless you love your country.
This isn't about whether we love our country. We all love
America and we can all love peace in the world, and we have
different views about how to achieve peace in the world. But I
think that when we get away from our titles--Congressman,
General, Colonel--and just get to being people shopping at the
West Side Market in Cleveland, people just want to live, they
want to survive and they don't want their government putting
them in a position where the peace of the world can be at risk.
And that's actually, as Ms. Schakowsky said earlier, that's
actually where we are going with this. Over a whacky idea that
will never work, we are engaging in discussions that can
actually create destabilization on the issue of peace.
Now, when we get into the questions and answers, I am going
to get into the cost discussions, because the American
taxpayers are interested about whether their money is being
wasted or not. But I just appreciated a moment here to just try
to interject a note of just playing straight out from the
shoulder discussion about an idea whose time should have been
long past and about an idea that for some reason, like the
movie ``The Alien,'' just when you think it is gone, it comes
out of some compartment.
So thank you for all being here. I certainly look forward
to the discussion today, and I look forward to this continuing
debate inside the House of Representatives and across the
country.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I appreciate the panel's patience,
and we have just a little housekeeping to take care of and then
we will get right to the witnesses.
I ask unanimous consent that all members of the
subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement in the
record, and that the record remain open for 3 days for that
purpose; and without objection, so ordered.
I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be
permitted to include their written statements in the record and
without objection, so ordered.
I ask unanimous consent that written statements from the
following individuals be included in the record: Ambassador
Henry F. Cooper, board chairman, High Frontier; Dr. Burton
Richter, director emeritus, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center;
and Mr. Joseph Cirincione, director, nonproliferation project,
Carnegie Endowment Diamond for International Peace.
I will just introduce our witnesses and they can begin
their testimony. We have a panel of four individuals, three of
whom will testify and we have two panels: Mr. Phillip Coyle,
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Department of
Defense; testimony from Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish,
Director of Ballistic Missile Defense Office, Department of
Defense, accompanied by the Honorable Edward Warner, Assistant
Secretary of Defense Strategy and Threat Reduction, Department
of Defense; and our third testimony is from the Honorable Avis
Bohlen, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Department
of State.
The way we are going to do this is we are going to have a
5-minute, and we will roll it over for another 5 minutes,
giving you 10 minutes each for your testimony and then we will
get right to questions.
I will be absent for about 25 minutes, and we will give the
floor to Mrs. Chenoweth to start.
Mr. Warner, you may start.
Mr. Warner. I don't have an opening statement, sir.
Mr. Shays. I am sorry. Mr. Coyle, we are starting with you
and then we are going to Mr. Kadish and then we will go to Ms.
Bohlen.
Mr. Coyle. Chairman Shays----
Mr. Shays. I am sorry. I do need to swear you in before I
go, if you would stand.
Is there anyone else who may be testifying that is
accompanying you, who may answer a question? If so, I would
invite them to stand.
It will just be the four of you? OK.
[Witnesses sworn].
Mr. Shays. I note the record that all four plus one have
sworn and affirmed.
Thank you. You may be seated and, Mr. Coyle, you may begin.
STATEMENTS OF PHILLIP COYLE, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND
EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; LIEUTENANT GENERAL RONALD
KADISH, DIRECTOR, BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED
BY EDWARD WARNER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, STRATEGY AND
THREAT REDUCTION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; AND AVIS BOHLEN,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF ARMS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Mr. Coyle. Chairman Shays, Mr. Tierney, members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the testing
of the National Missile Defense system this morning. I have not
had the opportunity to address this committee before, and I
appreciate the opportunity to do so.
You requested that today's testimony focus on the impact of
the test results to date, on technological maturity and
deployment schedules. You also asked that we address the
relationship between the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the
current proposals to design, test and deploy an effective
missile system. First, I would like to briefly discuss the
progress so far. The NMD program has demonstrated considerable
progress toward its defined goals in the last 2 years. The
battle management, command, control and communication systems
have progressed well. The potential X-Band radar performance
looks promising as reflected in the performance of the ground-
based radar prototype.
A beginning systems integration capability has been
demonstrated, although achieving full systems interoperability
will be challenging.
The ability to hit a target reentry vehicle in a direct
hit-to-kill collision was demonstrated in the first flight
intercept test last October. However, in this test,
operationally representative sensors did not provide initial
interceptor targeting instructions, as would be the case in an
operational system. Instead, for test purposes, a Global
Positioning System signal from the target RV served to first
aim the interceptor. We were not able to repeat such a
successful intercept in the two subsequent flight intercept
tests. Also, the root cause of the failure in the most recent
flight intercept test has not been determined.
Because of the nature of strategic ballistic missile
defense, it is impractical to conduct fully operationally
realistic intercept flight testing across the wide spectrum of
scenarios. The program must, therefore, complement its flight
testing with various types of simulations.
Overall, NMD testing is comprised of interrelated ground,
hardware and software in-the-loop testing, intercept and
nonintercept flight testing, computer and laboratory
simulations and man-in-the-loop command and control exercises.
Unfortunately, these simulations have failed to develop as
expected.
This, coupled with flight test delays, has placed a
significant limitation on our ability to assess the technical
feasibility of the NMD system.
The testing program has been designed to learn as much as
possible from each test. Accordingly, the tests so far have all
been planned with backup systems so that if one portion of the
test fails, the rest of the test objectives might still be met.
Developmental tests in a complex program, especially those
conducted very early, contain many limitations and
artificialities, some driven by the need for specific early
design data and some driven by test range safety
considerations.
Additionally, the tests are designed so that they will not
produce debris in orbit that will harm satellites.
Also, the program was never structured to produce
operationally realistic test results this early. Accordingly,
it was not realistic to expect these test results could support
a full deployment decision now, even if all the tests had been
unambiguously successful, which they have not been.
Notwithstanding the limitations in the testing program and
failures of important components in all three of the flight
intercept tests, the program has demonstrated considerable
progress.
Compliance with the ABM Treaty has not had an adverse
impact to date on the developmental testing of the NMD system.
In the future, we desire additional ground-based interceptor
test launches from more operationally representative locations
than the existing Kwajalein Missile Range. Additional target
launch sites which are not restricted by the treaty would
expand the test envelope beyond that currently available, as
recommended by the Welch panel, to validate system simulations
over the rest of the operating regimes.
Furthermore, we need a radar to skin track the incoming RV,
reentry vehicle, rather than tracking a beacon transponder as
has been done with a radar on Oahu. We need this during early,
mid-course flight in order to support creation of the Weapon
Task Plan which first aims the interceptor.
Some of the options for these improvements could raise ABM
Treaty issues. Any NMD test activity must be sufficiently well
defined in order to properly assess the ABM Treaty implications
and determine whether the activity can be conducted under the
existing treaty.
Under the program of record, test results are not likely to
be available in 2003 to support a recommendation then to deploy
a C-1 system in 2005.
This is because the currently planned testing program is
behind, because the test content does not yet address important
operational questions and because ground test facilities for
assessment are considerably behind schedule.
NMD testing needs to be augmented to prepare for realistic
operational situations in the operational test phase and is not
yet aggressive enough to keep pace with the currently proposed
schedules for silo and radar construction and missile
production. The testing schedule, including supporting modeling
and simulation, continues to slip while the construction and
production schedules have not.
Important parts of the test program have slipped a year in
the 19 months since the NMD program was restructured in January
1999. Thus, the program is behind in both the demonstrated
level of technical accomplishment and in schedule.
Additionally, the content of individual tests has been
diminished and is providing less information than originally
planned.
I am especially concerned that the NMD program has not
planned or funded any intercept until IOT&E operational testing
with realistic operational features such as multiple
simultaneous engagements, long-range intercepts, realistic
engagement geometries, and countermeasures other than simple
balloons. While it may not be practical or affordable to do all
of these things in developmental testing, selected stressing
operational requirements should be included in developmental
tests that precede IOT&E to help ensure sufficient capability
for deployment.
For example, the current C-Band transponder tracking and
identification system alluded to earlier, which is justified by
gaps in radar coverage and range safety considerations, is
being used to provide target track information to the system in
current tests. This practice should be phased out prior to
IOT&E; this will ensure that the end-to-end system will support
early target tracking and interceptor launch.
There is nothing wrong with the limited testing program the
Department has been pursuing, so long as the achieved results
match the desired pace of acquisition decisions to support
deployment. However, a more aggressive testing program with
parallel paths and activities will be necessary to achieve an
effective interim operational capability by the latter half of
this decade. This means a test program that is structured to
anticipate and absorb setbacks that inevitably occur.
The NMD program is developing test plans that move in this
direction.
The time and resource demands that would be required for a
program of this type would be substantial, as documented in the
Congressional Budget Office report on the budgetary and
technical implications of the NMD program. The Safeguard
missile program conducted 125 flight tests; the Safeguard
program was an early version of NMD. Similarly, the full
Polaris program conducted 125 flight tests, and the full
Minuteman program conducted 101 flight tests.
Rocket science has progressed in the past 35 years, and I
am not suggesting that 100 or more NMD flight tests will be
necessary. However, the technology in the current NMD program
is more sophisticated than in those early missile programs, and
we should be prepared for inevitable setbacks.
It is apparent that in these early programs an extensive
amount of work was done in parallel from one flight test to
another. Failures that occurred were accepted and the programs
moved forward with parallel activities as flight testing
continued. As in any weapons development program, the NMD
acquisition and construction schedules need to be linked to
capability achievements demonstrated in a robust test program,
not to schedule per se.
This approach supports an aggressive acquisition schedule
if the test program has the capacity to deal with setbacks. On
three separate occasions, independent panels chaired by Larry
Welch--General, Air Force, retired--have recommended an event-
driven not schedule-driven program. In the long run, an event-
driven program might take less time and cost less money than a
program that must be regularly rebaselined due to the realities
of very challenging and technical operational goals.
Aggressive flight testing, coupled with comprehensive
hardware in-the-loop and simulation programs, will be essential
for NMD. Additionally, the program will have to adopt a
parallel fly through-failure approach that can absorb tests
that do not achieve their objectives in order to have any
chance of achieving fiscal 2005 deployment of an operationally
effective system. As noted by the CBO, the Navy's Polaris
program successfully took such an approach 30 years ago.
Deployment means the fielding of an operational system with
some military utility which is effective under realistic combat
conditions against realistic threats and countermeasures,
possibly without adequate prior knowledge of the target cluster
composition, timing, trajectory or direction and when operated
by military personnel at all times of the day or night and in
all weather. Such a capability is yet to be shown practicable
for NMD. These operational considerations will become an
increasingly important part of tests and simulation plans over
the coming years.
In the full statement of my testimony, which has been
provided to the committee, I make a series of recommendations
to enhance the testing program. This includes more realistic
flight engagements, tests with simple countermeasures beyond
those planned, flight intercept tests with simple tumbling RVs
and tests with multiple simultaneous engagements.
Madam Chairman, I would be pleased to answer any questions
you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Coyle follows:]
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Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage [presiding]. Thank you very much, Mr.
Coyle, for your testimony.
The Chair now recognizes General Kadish for his testimony.
General Kadish. Madam Chairman, members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify on the National
Missile Defense program this morning and to discuss the impact
of the test results to date on our technological maturity and
the challenges we face. I have not had the privilege of
appearing before your committee until today, and I am pleased
to be able to do so.
In general, there are basically two ways to look at the
program's progress to date, and they could be termed the
``glass half-full'' and the ``glass half-empty.'' While our
objective is to make the glass completely full, my assessment
at the moment is that it is half full. I say this because we
have made remarkable progress and substantial technical
progress, despite two high profile test failures.
As you know, we have been aggressively pursuing the
development of the NMD system to achieve operational status as
soon as practicable.
Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage. General, excuse my interpretation.
Would you pull your microphone closer?
General Kadish. Our complex goal of fielding a system
within a short timeframe is not unprecedented. Indeed, it has
been compared with the urgent programs to deploy our Nation's
first nuclear ICBM force.
On average, it took 4\3/4\ years for the Poseidon, Polaris,
Trident I and----
Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage. General, would you please start over.
General Kadish. OK.
Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage. Thank you very much.
General Kadish. In general, there are two ways to look at
the program's progress to date, and they could be termed the
``glass half-full'' or the ``glass half-empty.'' While our
objective is to make the glass completely full, my assessment
at the moment is that it is half full. I say this because we
have made remarkable and substantial technical progress despite
two high-profile test failures.
As you know, we have been aggressively pursuing the
development of the NMD system to achieve operational status as
soon as practicable.
Our goal of fielding a complex system within a short
timeframe is not unprecedented. Indeed, it has been compared
with the urgent programs to deploy our Nation's first ICBM
force. On average it took 4\3/4\ years for the Poseidon,
Polaris, Trident I and II sea-launch ballistic missile programs
and a Minuteman I, II and III ICBM programs to field the
capability. That is from the engineering, manufacturing and the
development stage to the achievement of initial operational
capability.
While the proposed NMD system is in some ways a more
complex system than its predecessors, each of these earlier
programs had its own significant managerial, technical,
schedule and political challenges to meet. In other words, our
goal of defending the entire country against an emerging threat
by an NMD system on an aggressive acquisition schedule does not
represent an unprecedented divergence from the way we have
procured some major systems in the past. However, it does
represent a major divergence from the way we have normally
pursued weapon system programs over the past 20 years.
I should also point out that all development programs
experience problems, especially in their early stages and when
pioneering new military capability. The Atlas ICBM program
experienced 12 failures in its 2\1/2\ year flight testing
history and the Minuteman I program suffered 10 failures in a
3\1/2\ year testing program. The Corona program in the early
sixties to deploy our first strategic reconnaissance satellite
survived 12 failures and mishaps before the first satellite
could be successfully orbited. Its engineering challenges
included mating an unproven satellite to a booster, launching a
multistage rocket, separating the payload in space, ensuring
the right orbit, orienting and operating optical sensors and
coordinating the ejection of film capsules, and recovering the
undamaged capsule after reentry.
The point is that birthing a revolutionary technology and
making it useful is a tough engineering job that requires
discipline, patience and vision. To expect all activities to be
successful is unrealistic given the history of such endeavors.
When our Nation faced great need, program support by our
national leadership persisted despite frustrations resulting
from test failures and technical difficulties. As a result,
once troubled programs have made profound contributions to our
national security.
Over the past 11 months the NMD program has had two
failures in the three intercept flight tests conducted so far.
While these were disappointments, we were able to collect
valuable information on the integration of the system and we
have a full schedule still ahead.
Let me briefly discuss a little different perspective on
operational testing. These early integrated flight tests that I
mentioned do not meet the generally accepted definition of
operational realistic testing that Mr. Coyle pointed out. They
were never intended this early in the development phase. Ours
is ``walk before you run'' approach. We have just recently
entered the fully integrated testing phase after which the
tests in our current plan will become progressively more
stressful. The increasing complexity of our tests will involve
among other things greater discrimination challenges, longer
ranges, higher closing speeds and day and nighttime shots. The
way our current testing program is planned, we will do a series
of tests that become increasingly operationally realistic by
the time the final independent operational test assessments
must be made. This occurs years later in the program test
series.
Now I'd like to discuss some other fact of life testing
issues, specifically range limitations.
Range limitations are an inescapable reality and a direct
result of the fact that our test range extends over about 4,000
square miles of the Pacific Ocean. These test restrictions
include safety constraints on missile overflight and impact
areas. I'm sure we'd hear about it if the missile parts came
raining down on Californians or Hawaiians or startled fishermen
in the Pacific Ocean. We also don't want to add to the space
debris, that it might threaten orbital or space launch paths.
The effect of these restrictions is that we are permitted to
flight test in only a limited part of the designed operating
envelope and along different geometries than those from which
potential missile threats might appear. We have to use robust
simulations that are firmly anchored on and updated from data
from earlier ground and flight tests to test the system under
conditions our test ranges cannot permit.
These restrictions were highlighted in both General Welch's
and Mr. Coyle's independent reports and we need to address them
as we proceed with the program. We are doing that. It's not
that we don't want to change the restrictions but the cost,
risk and policy issues must be resolved. These fact of life
constraints, however, do not represent a problem for the near
term, but we can increase our confidence in the system as we
proceed if they are addressed now.
Just to give you an example, let's consider the necessary
role of the so-called C band beacon transponder and the global
positioning system [GPS], equipment attached to the target
warheads. These are necessary outgrowths of our testing
limitations. None, I repeat none, of this equipment in any way
aids the kill vehicle in finding, discriminating or
intercepting the target during the final stages of the flight
test.
The C band beacon is necessary for the surrogate radar in
Hawaii to act as if it were an upgraded early warning radar
since we do not have one down range for the test. The GPS
system allows the manager controlling the test to monitor the
location of the target for range safety. It also provides the
engineers examining post test data a critical source of
validation information. It helps us to know what we saw or
thought we saw at any precise time during the engagement.
These beacons answer two of the most critical needs of any
test program, ensuring the safety of all in the area, in this
case the South Pacific, and ensuring we receive a comprehensive
and adequate set of data. Should our other tracking systems
fail during the test and thus not provide the target's location
adequately, we would as a last resort use the GPS data to
direct the kill vehicle to its sensor acquisition area in order
to salvage the end game aspects of the test. In this case, we
recognize it would no longer be a successful integrated system
test, but it would provide more and useful information on the
autonomous homing and discrimination capability of the kill
vehicle. Again, this is only as a backup in the event of radar
failure in the middle of what is a very expensive flight test.
Finally, I'd like to discuss countermeasures.
Countermeasures and counter-countermeasures are part of the
continuing interaction of offensive and defensive systems
throughout history. They are not new, nor are they unforeseen
or unplanned for. The NMD system is itself a countermeasure
against the threat of ballistic missiles. The United States
understands the challenge of missile countermeasures. We've
been in the missile business for a number of decades now and
we've developed some very sophisticated sensors, computers and
discriminants. We are continuing to refine these capabilities.
But it is fair to say that we have not fully tested the NMD
systems against countermeasure suites we expect. It's too early
in our development effort. Our early test objectives are
focused on accomplishing the basic technology of hit to kill.
We do, however, have great confidence based on the testing and
analysis we have done so far that we will be effective against
the countermeasures we expect, and our future testing will
confirm that confidence.
Still, critics continue to fuel the skepticism surrounding
the issue by using a simple technique, theory and practical
application are the same. In other words, countermeasures may
be easy science on paper, but effective ones are not all that
simple to develop and even less simple to implement. The
engineering challenges are very substantial. Structural issues
can affect range, accuracy and payload, and no nation can place
confidence in the effectiveness of its program without testing.
Those who argue that a system can be defeated by
countermeasures usually base their argument on assumptions that
favor the offense while downplaying the capabilities of our
emerging defensive system.
In my view, credible, sophisticated countermeasures are
costly, tough to develop, and difficult to make effective
against our NMD design. Simple, cheap attempts can be readily
countered by our system. I have made more extensive comments on
this countermeasure issue in my written comments.
In summary, Madam Chairman, I believe our glass is half
full. We have made remarkable progress. We have shown that the
foundation of our system hit to kill is achievable. While the
test failures we've had so far are certainly disappointments,
they are not unprecedented for the program of this scope.
We have major challenges ahead as we work to continue to
fill the glass and my goal is to fill it, but our progress to
date has been solid. The challenges are no longer ones of basic
science or technology. We know our fundamental design can work.
The challenges before us are those of engineering and
integration and building reliability into the system.
Engineering, the schedule challenges and the technology
integration tasks are tough. We are, however, ready to proceed
aggressively.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Kadish follows:]
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Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage. Thank you, General Kadish, for your
testimony. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Bohlen for her
testimony.
Ms. Bohlen. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Madam Chairman, Mr.
Tierney, members of the committee, I thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss our national
missile defense program and how it relates to the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty.
It is this administration's position that we should not
move forward with deployment of an NMD system until we have
full confidence that that system will work and until we have
made every reasonable diplomatic effort to minimize the cost of
deployment and to maximize the benefit. I am obviously not in a
position to speak on the technical or programmatic issues
related to this system. General Kadish and Mr. Coyle have
authoritatively addressed those aspects of the program.
Instead, Madam Chairman, I will focus my brief remarks on the
diplomatic and political context in which we have pursued the
development of an NMD system and the diplomatic and foreign
policy ramifications of deploying such a system.
When the President decided last summer for planning
purposes on an initial NMD architecture, he stated that he
would make a decision on whether to deploy this system based on
four criteria; our assessment of the threat, technological
feasibility, cost and the overall impact on national security.
A week ago today, as you know, the President announced that the
NMD program is sufficiently promising and affordable to justify
continued development and testing but despite impressive
progress, that there is not sufficient information about the
technical and operational effectiveness of the entire NMD
system to move forward with deployment at this time.
In making this decision, the President took into account
the four criteria I just mentioned, and he made clear that we
will continue to work with our allies and with Russia and with
China to strengthen their understanding of and support for our
efforts to meet the emerging ballistic missile threats and to
explore, where appropriate, creative ways we can cooperate to
enhance their security against this threat as well.
Let me say just a few words about the diplomatic and
foreign policy context of NMD. At the end of the day, as the
President has repeatedly stated, no country can exercise a veto
over a decision that he or a future President might conclude is
in the best interest of the United States. But as he also noted
in his speech last Friday, while an effective NMD can be an
important part of our national security strategy, it can never
be the sum total of that strategy or of a strategy to deal with
nuclear and missile threats. We cannot fail to take the views
and security requirements of our friends and allies into
account as we move forward on this program. We have an
obligation to do what is necessary to achieve consensus within
the NATO and Pacific alliance which are essential to our own
security and to reassure others of the steadfast commitment of
the United States to preserving the international arms control
regimes that they have come to rely on for their own security.
To quote the President again, ``Over the past 30 years,
Republican and Democratic Presidents have negotiated an array
of arms control treaties with Russia. We and our allies have
relied on these treaties to ensure strategic stability and
predictability with Russia to get on with the job of
dismantling the legacy of the cold war and to further the
transition from confrontation to cooperation with our former
adversary in the most important arena, nuclear weapons.'' We
continue to believe that the ABM Treaty is, ``a key part of the
international security structure we have built with Russia and
therefore a key part of our national security.''
For that reason, we have sought to strengthen and preserve
the treaty even as we pursue our efforts to develop a national
missile defense. We continue to believe that strategic
stability based on mutual deterrence between ourselves and the
Russians is still important in the post cold war period because
we and the Russians still have large nuclear arsenals. The ABM
Treaty provides a framework for ensuring strategic stability
between our two countries, reducing the risk of confrontation
and providing a basis for further strategic reductions.
Clearly, deployment of the NMD system we are developing
would require changes to the ABM Treaty. The deployment of an
ABM radar at Shemya, AK, of 100 ground-based interceptors and 5
upgraded early warning radars for the defense of all 50 States
would violate the obligation contained in article I of the
treaty not to deploy an ABM system to defend national
territory. Such activities would also be inconsistent with the
locational restrictions of article III of the treaty.
We of course do not believe that the proposed system would
violate the core purposes of the treaty and in fact believe
that updating the treaty to permit a limited NMD would
strengthen it. Accordingly, since last summer we have engaged
at the highest levels in extensive discussions with Russia with
the objective of reaching agreement on modifications in the ABM
Treaty which would permit us to move forward with the limited
NMD system proposed by this administration within the ABM
Treaty. We have to this end provided to Russia a draft protocol
to the treaty.
Among U.S. allies, support for NMD is strongly conditioned
on first securing Russia's agreement to cooperatively amend the
ABM Treaty. In the broader international community as well,
support for U.S. non-proliferation objectives on other foreign
policy priorities is also often linked to preservation of the
ABM Treaty.
The degree to which other nations perceive that they have a
stake in preserving the ABM Treaty was clear during this year's
MPT review conference. For our allies and others the ABM Treaty
is a touchstone of U.S.-Russian strategic stability. It is
clearly perceived as an important foundation of the whole
structure of international strategic security.
In the consultations that Under Secretary John Holum has
conducted with his Russian counterparts, as well as discussions
at other levels, we have addressed three broad areas designed
to meet specific Russian concerns. First, we have made clear to
Moscow that in deploying a limited NMD system we are responding
to a new threat from long-range ballistic missiles in the hands
of states that threaten international peace and stability and
we're not seeking to change the core foundation of strategic
stability with Russia. We have told our Russian intelocutors
that we believe the ABM Treaty should be preserved and
strengthened by adapting it to a new strategic environment that
did not exist in 1972, using the amendment procedures that are
established by the terms of the treaty itself. We have proposed
only those treaty changes that we believe are necessary to
allow the United States to address those threats we expect will
emerge in the near term while also establishing the basis for
further adaptations of the treaty in the future should the
emerging threat warrant.
Second, we have sought to demonstrate to the Russians that
a limited NMD system will not threaten their strategic
deterrent and cannot be made to have that capability. Indeed,
criticism by Russian officials of our NMD program has not
focused so much on the impact of our proposed system on their
deterrent but rather on their concerns that these deployments
would establish an infrastructure that would allow future
breakout.
Finally, we have proposed to the Russians a series of
confidence building and transparency measures. To date, as you
know, the Russians have not agreed to our proposals to amend
the ABM Treaty, but we have come considerably closer to
agreement on some key aspects of the problem; for example, on
the nature and reality of the threat. This progress is
reflected in the joint statement on a Strategic Stability and
Cooperation Initiative that was signed by Presidents Clinton
and Putin in New York on Wednesday, and I have copies of that
initiative if the members of the committee have not had a
chance to see that yet and would be happy to submit it for the
record.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Ms. Bohlen. We have also been pursuing close consultations
with our NATO and Pacific allies who have all made clear that
they hope the United States will pursue strategic defense in a
way that preserves the ABM Treaty. Their support is important
to us for a number of reasons. Our European and Asian allies
are crucial to our efforts to counter the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, including ballistic missiles and
missile technology, efforts which continue to be a strong line
of defense against the threat of missile proliferation.
Moreover, an effective NMD will require the consent of two
allies to upgrade the radars that are situated on their
territory.
Our allies have uniformly welcomed the President's decision
to defer a decision on deployment as providing more time for
discussion of the emerging ballistic missile threat and the
role of ballistic missile defense in responding to that threat.
We will continue this dialog with our allies in the months
ahead. We have also made clear to China that our national
missile defense efforts are not directed against them.
In sum, Madam Chairman, the President's decision has given
us more time to work toward narrowing our differences with
Russia and to involving our allies in shaping a coordinated
response to the emerging ballistic missile threat. We continue
to believe that an effective NMD system can be developed and
deployed within the context of resolving the concerns of our
allies and the objections of Russia.
Let me conclude by reiterating a point the President made
in his speech last Friday. He said, ``No nation can have a veto
over American security. Even if the United States and Russia
cannot reach agreement, even if we cannot secure the support of
our allies at first, the next President may nonetheless decide
that it is in America's national interest to go forward with
deployment of NMD. But by the same token, since the actions and
reactions of others in the world bear on our security, clearly
it would be far better to move forward in the context of the
ABM Treaty and allied support. America and the world will be
better off if we explore the frontiers of strategic defenses
while continuing to pursue arms control, to stand with our
allies and to work with Russia and others to stop the spread of
deadly weapons.''
Thank you.
Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage. Thank you, Ms. Bohlen, for your
testimony, and the Chair now first recognizes Mr. Tierney. We
are in a section now where each member will be recognized for 5
minutes for their questions. Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Mr. Coyle, thank
you for your testimony.
As I mentioned during my remarks earlier, I am particularly
concerned about the issue of countermeasures. Let me make sure
that I understand your written testimony. You stated that
targets in flight tests will have at most unsophisticated
countermeasures and that they will employ only simple balloon
decoys. Did I get that right?
Mr. Coyle. That's correct.
Mr. Tierney. Are you talking about just flight test prior
to the deployment readiness review or all flight tests with
test programs?
Mr. Coyle. Both. The tests prior to the Development
Readiness Review only had a simple balloon as the decoy, and
the tests that are projected out into the future, that is, for
the flight intercept test I should say, only use simple
balloons as decoys.
Mr. Tierney. So other countermeasures that are readily
available, cooled shrouds, for example, that reduce the
radiation emitted by warheads, there's no planned tests for
that?
Mr. Coyle. Those would not meet the definition of an
unsophisticated threat. The C1 system is designed only to meet
the so-called unsophisticated threat, and so a countermeasure
like a cooled shroud that you mentioned would have to be dealt
with with future versions of the NMD system called C2 or C3.
Mr. Tierney. Those types of countermeasures do exist, yet
there's no plans made to deal with them, at least in the C1
stage. And now would that also be true for tumbling RVs and
things of that nature, other countermeasures?
Mr. Coyle. A tumbling RV is a different matter that
actually might be the simplest thing for a nation to deploy.
The easiest thing of all is don't even spin up the RV, just let
it plop off the end. It's not as accurate when you do that but
it is simpler, and so that's one of the reasons why I've
recommended, and so has General Welch's panel, that we try some
tests with tumbling RVs along the way.
Mr. Tierney. On the balloon decoys that are scheduled for
tests later in the program, to your knowledge, will they have a
shape or motion similar to the target reentry vehicle?
Mr. Coyle. Some of the balloons will be about the same
size, but they won't have the same motion as the reentry
vehicle.
Mr. Tierney. What about our radar on the ground, has the X-
Band radar been tested during a flight test to determine
whether it can deal with sophisticated or unsophisticated
decoys?
Mr. Coyle. So far the only decoys we have used have been a
single, simple balloon. Later on, there will be tests with
balloons that have radar absorbing material on them but just
balloons.
Mr. Tierney. Just balloons.
General Kadish. Mr. Tierney, can I add to that a little
bit?
Mr. Tierney. Sure.
Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage. General Kadish.
General Kadish. The flight test program we have does not
only consist of intercept flight tests. We have other flight
tests that we call risk reduction flight tests that we fly
against the radar and other sensors separately, and we have
done a number of those tests against a wide range of
countermeasures, including jammers. So although they were not
intercept tests they were against our sensors and we'd be glad
to provide that data to you in the appropriate context.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. Tierney. I assume Mr. Coyle has that data.
Mr. Coyle. Yes, and those are fine tests to do. We
certainly support them, but they're not intercept tests and so
they only go as far as they go.
Mr. Tierney. I guess what I'm talking about here is two
things. One is effectiveness, whether or not you test, see if
it works. One is level of confidence in any of this. If you
test and it works once, that doesn't give us a great deal of
confidence as it might if you tested several times or test all
the different permutations that we could expect to see.
Mr. Coyle, in your testimony you stated there might be
different synergistic effects when multiple missiles are
deployed. What did you mean by that?
Mr. Coyle. Well, we probably should assume that if a so-
called rogue state were to send intercontinental ballistic
missiles toward the United States that they wouldn't just send
a single missile, that they might send two or more, maybe
several, and so part of the challenge would be to see that you
could deal with more than one incoming missile at once.
Mr. Tierney. Does the current flight test plan test against
multiple targets at all?
Mr. Coyle. So far there are no tests like that planned.
Mr. Tierney. Now the Rumsfeld Commission reported that
countries with the technology to develop missiles most likely
have the technology to develop countermeasures. So I am
assuming you would agree that this is not a side issue to be
dealt with somewhere down the road.
Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage. Gentleman's time is up.
Mr. Tierney. May I finish the question?
Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage. Yes, please do.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. You would agree with me, sir, that
this is not a side issue to be dealt with somewhere down the
road, that this is a fairly integral part of our determination
of whether or not this system is going to be effective and
whether or not we'll have a sufficiently high level of
confidence in the system?
Mr. Coyle. Yes. That's why we've been recommending that
these other kinds of tests would need to be done.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. Thank you.
Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage. Thank you, Mr. Tierney.
Ms. Bohlen, I guess I need to have you explain to me like
Vince Lombardi used to, this is a football, because the issue
of the viability of the ABM Treaty still troubles me. The
original ABM Treaty of course was signed with the Soviet Union,
the Union of Soviet States, and that no longer exists, and
while the Confederation of Independent States is who our
administration is working with, a new treaty with a new
signator has not been accomplished that has been ratified by
the U.S. Senate. How is it then that the administration is
relying so heavily on an ABM Treaty that has not been ratified
or the old treaty, that one of the two signators no longer
exists?
Ms. Bohlen. Madam Chairman, I will answer your question in
two parts if I may. First of all, obviously this is a complex
issue with many, many parts to it, and I think the
administration's position is well-known but to have a complete
answer, perhaps the best thing would be to submit a question in
writing.
But I would just add to that I think we have operated on
the general principle that, as a matter of international law,
agreements in force between the United States and the Soviet
Union at the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union are
presumed to continue in force with respect to the Soviet
successor state, and I think there is a long record on this
going back to the Bush administration. So that is the second
part of my answer, but if you would be pleased to submit a
question we would be very happy to answer it.
Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage. Thank you. I will, Ms. Bohlen. I think
it troubles many Americans that we're engaging in a contract or
a treaty where one of the two signators no longer exists, and
it is an assumption on the part of the administration, but the
Senate has a role here, as do the American people, and having
the administration produce a signed treaty that must be
ratified by the Senate. Is there--and I thank you for your
answer and I will submit my question in writing and look
forward to your written answer.
Is there anyone else on the panel who would like to address
this issue?
I want to thank you for your testimony and while I agree
that diplomacy is exceedingly important, I guess I just have to
think that as we move from a nation whose major military policy
was mutual assured destruction to a new vision in the future,
not so new, since the 1980's, of protecting and defending
Americans from foreign attack as our No. 1 priority, I hope in
the future, I think it's a very worthy, worthy goal, and I
guess I just have to echo what my former boss, former Senator
Steve Symms used to say, I'm a dove, I just think we ought to
be the best armed doves on the planet, and I think that--he
said that back in the 1980's and I think it still holds true.
General Kadish, your testimony was very informative, a very
interesting study, but I do want to ask you. As you know, the
President announced, and this has been referred to in testimony
today, that he was deferring to the next administration the
decision on whether to deploy the planned national missile
defense system. Now, neither the President nor the Department
of Defense provided information on the effect that this
decision will have on the near term national missile defense
options for our next President, whomever that might be. General
Kadish, what was your organization's recommendation to the
administration regarding the decision to defer to the next
administration the decision on whether to deploy the planned
NMD system?
General Kadish.
General Kadish. Madam Chairman, we in the program office
and at the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization worked very
hard to provide all the information required for the decision,
and we presented that information as factually as possible up
through the decisionmakers, and we did not provide a specific
recommendation but an integrated assessment of the status of
the program.
Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage. I see. My time is up and I now
recognize Mr. Allen for his questions.
Mr. Allen. Thank you very much.
Let me return quickly to the subject of countermeasures. In
your testimony, General Kadish, you said that this is a system
to defend all 50 States against a limited attack involving
intercontinental ballistic missiles with unsophisticated
countermeasures launched by states of concern such as North
Korea, Iran and Iraq. Well, buried in the word
``unsophisticated'' is an important issue. It seems to me that
we--almost any state--let me back up for a moment.
The Rumsfeld Commission some time ago warned us that North
Korea was proceeding more rapidly than some in our Intelligence
Community had expected with the development of missile
technology. It is easier, so far as I can tell and you can
react to this, to determine how a country is proceeding on its
missile technology than on its countermeasure technology, and
it seems to me that we have limited information, classified,
about the countermeasure technology that states of concern may
have or may acquire in the future and on the other hand our own
sensors, the technology surrounding our own sensors and our
ability to discriminate among countermeasures, such as decoys
of one kind or another, is also classified and yet if an
adversary that can build an ICBM has sophisticated and not
unsophisticated countermeasures, this system may not work at
all. And if you would react to that I'd appreciate it.
General Kadish. Mr. Allen, as I tried to point out, there
is no military system that I'm aware of that is perfect either
on the offense or the defense. So with that as a basic
assumption, some of them, however, are pretty good, and the
basic architecture that we laid out for the national missile
defense program is that we would start with an initial
capability that we termed for purposes of discussions C1, for
unsophisticated countermeasures based on the Intelligence
Community's best estimate of what we would expect to see in the
timeframe that we're talking about, in the 2005 or mid-decade
area. In addition, the system has inherent capability to go
beyond that, even though we would not necessarily design and
test aggressively to some of the more sophisticated
countermeasures in the early phases. But we had always planned
to have followon phases, at one time called capability two, or
capability three as we now refer to it, where the sophisticated
countermeasures would be incorporated into our testing and
design activities.
So you need to look at the National Missile Defense program
not as an end item that is static forever. If you do, we miss
the point here because we will never be successful against the
countermeasure issue. We do not view it that way. We view it as
an ongoing aggressive activity that addresses the
countermeasures in an action response method based on our best
intelligence and the inherent capability of the system.
Mr. Allen. If I can get one more question in, we've had all
this conversation about Shemya, the construction of radar
facilities at Shemya, AK. Let's suppose that through
negotiation or otherwise North Korea abandons its missile
program. Of what use against Iran or Iraq would be a radar
facility at Shemya, AK?
General Kadish. Iran and Iraq, there would be little use.
It's in the wrong spot, and the curvature of the Earth plays a
major activity.
Mr. Allen. Let me make just one--this is not a question but
one comment. One, it's maybe beyond the scope of these hearings
today, but one concern I have is that it seems to me that
advocates of missile defense are not taking account of the
logical and necessary responses that some others in the world
would have to make, and it is not just Russia, it's not just
the ABM Treaty. It is also China, and China now has about 20
ICBMs, a very limited force. It seems to me that an almost
automatic response by the Chinese to the development of this
system would be to increase their missile force. That sets off
potentially a chain reaction with India and Pakistan, causes me
great concern. As I say, maybe, Ms. Bohlen, if that's something
you feel you could address today, I'd appreciate it.
Ms. Bohlen. My first answer to that would be that China is
already, independently of our national missile defense program,
as you know, engaged in a strategic modernization program. This
is unrelated to what we have done so far and this will
considerably increase their force, increase their survivable
force.
China's objections are well-known. They have been very
public. We have had a dialog with them also to try to persuade
them that the system is not in any way directed against them or
against their deterrent.
Obviously in their minds it becomes very much linked with
the whole issue of Taiwan and theater missile defenses in the
region. So we have tried to establish a clear boundary between
those, those two issues and we will continue those efforts at
dialog. But we also anticipate that whatever is decided about
NMD, the Chinese strategic force will be considerably larger in
a few years than it is now. Thank you.
Mr. Warner. If I might comment also, Mr. Allen, just on the
link of India and Pakistan, China has a range of missiles of
varying ranges, ones of a theater character, ones they are
expanding substantially, for instance, and those that are
opposite Taiwan. It is really theater range missiles that pose
the main threat to South Asia as they would see it. So the
growth in their ICBM capability is unlikely to be that directly
relevant.
I believe that growth is underway very much as Ms. Bohlen
just described. The strategic modernization of China's force
has been well underway for well over a decade. We anticipate
expansion and greater technological capability over time, the
South Asia piece, not lessening it at all, but it tends to be
more related to the pattern at which China modernizes its
intermediate range missiles which can easily range into those
countries.
Mr. Shays [presiding]. Thank you. Mr. Kucinich, you have
the floor for 5 minutes. We'll be coming back with a 10-minute
round after Members have gone the first time, and I would like
to note that the chairman of the full committee Mr. Burton is
here and we'll go to you after Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Shays, I'd be happy to yield to Mr.
Burton, at least yield, you know, my place to him if you would
come back to me.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Kucinich. I don't want to be
redundant. I just got here so if I cover some ground that has
not yet, or that has already been covered, please forgive me.
One of the things that's concerned me as the chairman of
the committee and as a Member of Congress, and I think my
colleagues as well, has been the theft of nuclear secrets at
Los Alamos and Livermore, and a lot of people have said that
the theft of those secrets could be analogous to what happened
with the Rosenbergs back in the fifties. I mean, it's a major,
major problem and we've talked to a number of people about
that. As I understand it, the W-88 warhead technology is now in
the possession of the Chinese Communist Government and they
also have other technology through their connections with Loral
and Hughes and other companies regarding their space satellite
technology. They now have the ability to build an ICBM, and
they also have the ability to put multiple warheads on one
missile and they also have the technology to put that on a
mobile launch vehicle that could be hidden in woods or
someplace else which would be very difficult for our spy
satellites to pick up.
And the question I have, and I address this to any one of
you, is that how long will it be before they, and I know this
is an estimate or guesstimate, how long will it be before they
have a mobile launched ICBM or permanently fixed ICBM silos
with multiple warheads such as the W-88 warhead where they can
put 8 to 10 on one missile, how long will it be before they
have one of those operational, and what does it mean for U.S.
security, and do we have any way, do we have any way right now
or in the foreseeable future to intercept and shoot down the
multiple warhead missile if it's launched at the United States?
In other words, how long is it going to take for them to
perfect it, in your estimation? Once it's perfected, if they
launched at the United States do we have any defense for it?
And also because of the MIRVing, because they got as many as 10
warheads on it, once those split apart in the outer atmosphere,
could we shoot down all 10 of those smaller missiles with the
W-88 warhead or would we just lose a bunch of cities in the
United States?
I know it's a pretty big question, but I'd like to have an
answer if I could. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Warner. There has been a recent national intelligence
estimate on these matters, and it's at the classified level. I
could--let me just generally say, the Chinese have been--their
next generation capability, both of intermediate range and long
range, is mobile in character, one of their main efforts. So
they have a mobile missile capability in train. I don't have
the unclassified date so I won't speculate on that, but we can
certainly make an arrangement to make that available to you.
Similarly, we've long believed that the Chinese have the
capability to move toward multiple independent reentry
capability in the years ahead, and I'm virtually positive that
also is examined in that estimate and we would be happy to
bring it to you.
Mr. Burton. How about the last part of the question, let's
say for instance--and I'm not asking you to divulge any
classified information because you don't want to give the exact
timetable--and any one of you can answer this. Let's say, for
instance, that they do in 5 years have an ICBM that is mobile
launched or in a silo that has multiple warheads and they
launch it at the United States. Do we have any defense
capabilities that would shoot down those incoming ICBM
missiles, the MIRV warheads, and if we don't they could hit as
many as what, 8 or 10 cities, and I presume that would amount
to a real devastation of our economy and also cost us maybe 20,
30, 40, 50 million people?
Mr. Warner. Let me turn to General Kadish on the scheduling
and timing but put a couple of things quickly into context.
First, of course the primary objective of the NMD system
being--that has been examined and developed by this
administration has been linked to the question of the so-called
states of concern like North Korea, Iran, Iraq. It is a fact
that it inherently has capability to also intercept missiles
from nations like China or Russia or it would have when it were
available.
On when it is available now will depend, as President
Clinton made the decision last week, now on the next President.
We have a program underway that will provide an option for the
next President to have such a capability in the middle part of
this decade if he chooses to move in that direction, whoever
that may be.
Mr. Burton. So what you're saying is if we--the next
President were to move very expeditiously on this some time
within 5 or 6 years we could have a system that could intercept
and shoot down multiple warhead missiles coming in?
Mr. Warner. The C1 capability is generally aiming at--the
C1 and C1 enhanced is somewhere between a handful to a few tens
of reentry vehicles in flight. So by the time the C1 enhanced
were deployed, which could be in 2006, 2007 timeframe. Now as
to the issue of whether it would include--it would depend on
the degree of the countermeasures that might accompany the
Chinese attack because this one, as we've just talked about, is
against simpler countermeasures.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Be happy to have you respond.
Ms. Bohlen. Could I just add to that? I think it's worth
pointing out that we have no defenses against China's present
strategic system. It's not the addition of a mobile system that
will make us more vulnerable. A more important point is I think
you need to focus on the limited size of the force and of the
modernization. Clearly we are not looking at a modernization
that would in any way or dimension approach the size of the
Russian force which is still arrayed against us or has been
arrayed against us.
Mr. Burton. If the chairman would just give me just a
second, I know, but that begs the issue. One missile launched
at the United States, hitting New York City or Chicago or Los
Angeles, would be devastating as far as loss of population and
what it would do to our economy, just one, and so whether or
not they have the capability to launch 30, 40, 50 or 60
missiles at one time really isn't the issue. Do we have the
ability to shoot down or stop a missile of that type from
hitting the United States? We do not have at the present time
and, according to what was just said, we're looking at the
middle of the decade at the very earliest, the next decade.
That is if the President, the new President, gets on the stick
and gets the daggone thing underway.
So the big concern that I have is, you know, we don't
anticipate conflict with anybody in the future, but you don't
know what might happen, and so it seems to me that the
responsible thing to do would be to get on with it as quickly
as possible, and unfortunately, that's not what's happening
right now.
Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'd like
to direct my first question to Mr. Coyle. In your testimony on
page 27 under observations and conclusions, you come up with--
you say, additionally the program will have to adopt a
parallel, quote, fly through failure approach that can absorb
tests that do not achieve their objectives in order to have any
chance of achieving a fiscal year 2005 deployment of an
operationally effective system. I want everybody to think about
this for a moment.
Now, where I come from, Cleveland, OH, if something fails,
it doesn't fly or if something doesn't fly, it fails. You can't
keep flying if you keep failing. Now, right here in your
comment, you talk about a fly through failure approach which
implies that it fails but it keeps flying. Do you want to help
me with that?
Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir. The only point I was trying to make
there was that there will be failures in the test program, and
if everything is in series, every time you have a failure, it
sets back the whole program and the whole program will take
longer and longer and longer. If the country expects to be able
to achieve the kind of capabilities we're talking about on a
2005, 2006, 2007 time scale, we'll have to do things in
parallel, such that if you have a failure in one test you can
in parallel go ahead with the second one.
Mr. Kucinich. I understand what you're saying now, except
what it implies is that, well, General Kadish was saying we are
going to walk first, then we are going to try to run. What
you're saying is even if we haven't learned how to walk, we're
getting ready to become an Olympic sprinter. It's kind of an
interesting construction that you have there because I think
through all of this we need to explore the illogic that is
laden heavily throughout all of these propositions advancing
this system.
Now, I wonder, Mr. Coyle, is there any maximum monetary
threshold above which you would recommend that the NMD is not a
cost effective weapons system?
Mr. Coyle. I think that's a question for somebody else. I'm
just a test person.
Mr. Kucinich. OK. Well, let me ask it to someone else.
General Kadish, is there any maximum monetary threshold above
which you would recommend that the NMD is not a cost effective
weapons system?
General Kadish. In the program management business and
development business, Congressman, there's a balance between
cost, schedule, risk and deploying and making weapons systems
work, and that's an integrated process. Basically, what I can
do is provide you our best estimates.
Mr. Kucinich. What's the maximum? Just give me a maximum
number? Is it $60 billion, $100 billion, $200 billion? What
would it be?
General Kadish. I think, again, I could provide estimates
of what we think a particular program----
Mr. Kucinich. We're just here among friends. Give me a
number.
General Kadish. I agree wholeheartedly with Mr. Coyle.
Mr. Kucinich. Well, is there anyone here that has any
numbers at all, anyone? I have a document that was handed here,
national missile defense cost estimate increases 1996 to the
year 2000. It started off, I think Mr. Tierney was the one that
was able to come up with this. It started out with an amount of
$9 to $11 billion and it's now at $50.5 billion. Now, you all
remember that Star Wars took us into the stratosphere of
spending on R&D of over $60 billion. We're now including all
the estimated costs into the troposphere fiscally of over $100
billion and more. I just wonder, General, is there any level of
spending on NMD technology that could cause the Department of
Defense to sacrifice procurement of other weapons, paying for
operations and maintenance of the aging and increasingly
expensive arsenal of planes, ships, etc?
General Kadish. As a taxpayer, we're all concerned,
certainly I am, about what things cost and work hard every day
to do that and make sure that we are proper stewards. Our
current estimates for the program which are under a major
revision now because of the President's decision was in the
neighborhood of a $20 billion acquisition cost of which $5.7
has already been spent and about a $32 billion life cycle cost
for 20 years. Now, the CBO has done estimates and included more
of the system elements than we would have included, but it's of
that magnitude that we currently have as an estimate, and as we
go through the congressional appropriations process and the way
we do our budgeting, it's for the Congress and the
administration to decide whether that's adequate.
Mr. Kucinich. I appreciate that. I would like to submit for
the record this attachment. How much time do I have? Do I have
another minute?
Mr. Shays. Your time is over now, but you will have a
significant amount of time in your followup.
Mr. Kucinich. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. I'm told that the decisions I make today will
have impact 10 years from now and that what we have today were
made by Members of Congress, Senate, the President 10 years
earlier, and so it's hard for me to kind of visualize that.
We're in a world 10 years from now, but I sure want to make
sure I'm making the right decisions now.
I had voted against deployment of SDI and GPALS. I had
voted for research. I represent, I guess, kind of in the middle
here. My colleagues to my right didn't vote for the National
Missile Defense Act of 1999, and my colleagues on--to my left,
my other Republicans probably voted for deployment earlier, but
this is the law. It is the policy of the United States to
deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective
national missile defense capable of defending the territory of
the United States against limited missile, ballistic missile
attack. Mr. Warner, I want to know if you believe that this is
in fact the law.
Mr. Warner. Yes, sir. It was signed by the President.
Mr. Shays. Does it have your total support?
Mr. Warner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. General Kadish.
General Kadish. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Coyle.
Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Ms. Bohlen.
Ms. Bohlen. Yes, sir. I would only add that the President
issued a statement at the time that made clear this was to be
taken in a context of arms control developments and
appropriations--I'm sorry, I don't have the exact language, but
I think the two things have to be seen together. That
represents administration policy.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Warner, is it your view that now it is not
technically possible but it will be?
Mr. Warner. We have a program underway that we believe has
made great progress that has demonstrated the fundamental
technologies that in light of the recent testing difficulties
and some other issues has greater schedule risk than we would
have hoped; that is, the date at which it would be available,
but certainly it is our belief that we should, as the President
directed, continue the development to in fact see if we can
meet the test that--remember, we talked about the four tests
that the President has laid out. One of them is the one
directly related to this law, and that is, is it
technologically feasible. I believe for limited national
missile defense we as a Nation can develop that capability and
will be able to do so within the next several years.
Mr. Shays. General Kadish.
General Kadish. I would agree with that assessment, Mr.
Chairman. We--at this point in time we've been aggressively
testing the system that we have put together over the last 24
to 36 months, and we continue to do so and, as we continue to
test it, will get more confidence in it. But we do have
confidence we can move this system along within a very short
period of time.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Coyle.
Mr. Coyle. Mr. Chairman, my job is to make sure that
military equipment is adequately tested in realistic,
operational situations. It's not unusual for new military
systems to do quite well in early technical testing, early
developmental testing and then have great difficulty when they
get to more realistic operational testing.
Mr. Shays. I hear you there, but it's not a question of
whether we're going to deploy, it's when, and the when depends
in part on whether the technology is there. My question is, you
don't believe the technology is present but do you believe it
will be?
Mr. Coyle. As I said in my testimony, that's yet to be
shown to be practicable. By that I meant able to be reduced to
practice so that you could depend on it in a realistic
operational situation, and that's why I said it the way I did,
and so my view is it's too early to tell and we won't know the
answer to your question until we get to operational testing.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I am going to come back for a
followup. Ms. Bohlen, I would guess I'd still like to ask your
opinion, whether you think it will be technologically possible.
Ms. Bohlen. Mr. Chairman, with due respect I don't feel I'm
the most competent person to address that question. I defer to
my colleagues. I would note that the President said in his
speech last Friday that there is not sufficient information
about the technical and operational effectiveness of an NMD
system to move forward at this time.
Mr. Shays. Let me just say, Mr. Burton, I don't need to
yield you time because I'll give you full time to start as
chairman, then we'll go to Mr. Tierney. So you have time to ask
your questions.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I won't take much
time. First of all, I appreciate very much your--and Mr.
Tierney, I will be through here in just about 1 minute but I
really appreciate you yielding to me.
One of the things that staff has just brought to my
attention which really concerns me is there is opposition by
some people in the Congress and in the country for us building
a missile defense system, but as I understand it, China in 1993
purchased from the Russians the S-300, which is a missile
defense system, and they're currently negotiating to buy the
Russian S-400 system, and our question is, why would it be
logical for us to expect the Chinese, who could potentially be
a problem for us down the road, to build a missile defense
system around Beijing when we in the United States can't or
won't build a missile system? Does that seem logical to you?
Ms. Bohlen. Mr. Chairman, I will defer to my colleague, Mr.
Warner, but I would just note that we have a theater missile
defense system. I think the systems you were talking about fall
in that general range.
Mr. Burton. I'm not talking about----
Ms. Bohlen. And we are permitted under the ABM Treaty to
have a site which we have chosen not to exercise.
Mr. Burton. I'm not talking about a theater missile defense
system. I'm talking about a fully launched missile defense
system that would protect the United States, the continental
United States.
Mr. Warner. The point--the illustrations that you cite of
the S-300 and S-400 are Russian theater missile defense
systems. The Chinese--the Russians are enthusiastically seeking
to merchandise those systems and have been for the last
decades.
Mr. Burton. But we have none around American cities or
around any part of the continental United States?
Mr. Warner. We have theater missile defense systems under
development. Our general purpose, our explicit purpose for them
is to deploy them to protect our troops in the field.
Mr. Burton. But none around the United States or planned
around the United States or anything?
So what we could do is Beijing, around Beijing and around
major cities in China, they can deploy a theater missile
defense system like the S-300 or the S-400. But around
Washington, DC, Los Angeles, Chicago, New York we cannot deploy
a theater missile defense system or any kind of a missile
defense system so they protect Beijing. Washington, DC, is fair
game.
Mr. Warner. They protect Beijing against theater missile
threats, shorter-range missiles from somewhere near their
territory.
Mr. Burton. Would those theater defense missile systems be
effective in any way against an ICBM?
Mr. Warner. They would not.
Mr. Burton. You are sure?
Mr. Warner. We have looked at that very carefully.
Mr. Burton. OK. Thank you very much.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Tierney, you have 5 minutes. We will roll it
over for another 5 minutes.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me get back to one issue that you brought up, Mr.
Chairman, a little while ago about what the policy is in this
country. We talked about the policy of deploying a system as
soon as technologically possible. But I think it also goes on
to talk about an effective system. The fact of the matter is if
the system cannot be shown to be effective, then perhaps we
shouldn't deploy it, and, again, I go back to the issue of
having confidence in the effectiveness. It's not enough to show
that it works once or it works twice. In order to have it do us
any good at all, it's going to have to be shown that it works
to such a degree that we can have confidence to employ it and
to deal with it as if it was going to work sufficiently,
regularly to be effective. Also the whole policy is subject to
the annual authorization of appropriations, so the Congress
very much has something to say about where we go on this.
In section 3, the third section of the legislation that
also we mention, which talks about the need to seek continued
negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces, the idea being
that now we have a conflict, it doesn't say how we are going to
resolve the conflict, if there is one, between deploying the
system and negotiating reductions, and we have to work and
decide that.
I think there are circumstances that we can see that would
serve to actually encourage proliferation and undercut the
effectiveness of the national missile defense system if we're
not careful in how we proceed on this. So I think we have to be
on record in discussing and considering all of those aspects in
determination of whether or not we go forward.
Mr. Coyle, maybe it would be helpful if you briefly
discussed or described what your office does and what your
responsibilities are as the primary advisor to the Secretary of
Defense on testing and evaluation issues.
Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir. My responsibility and the
responsibility of my office is to oversee the testing programs
that are conducted of military equipment, and in particular to
be sure, as I said earlier, that they're adequately tested in
realistic operational situations, which can mean, you know, in
the mud and the rain and the dirt or against countermeasures,
all of the things that can arise in real combat. I approve the
test and evaluation master plans that are submitted by the
military departments for each of these testing programs. I
approve the operational test plans when we get to that phase,
when we get to operational tests--we're not there yet with
national missile defense--and I report to the Secretary and to
others, to the Congress as well, on the results of such tests.
Mr. Tierney. So I think it would be fair to say that
Congress created your position outside the weapons program
offices to ensure that their testing and evaluation are up to
par?
Mr. Coyle. That's correct.
Mr. Tierney. How would you rate the technological
difficulty of this program in relation to other defense
acquisition programs?
Mr. Coyle. I think this is probably the hardest thing we've
ever tried to do. This is more difficult than the F-22 fighter
aircraft; more difficult than the Comanche helicopter; more
difficult than any aircraft carrier or submarine or tank or
truck that we've ever tried to build.
Mr. Tierney. With respect to the President's four criteria
in deciding whether or not there is going to be deployment, how
would you say the program is faring to date?
Mr. Coyle. I would say the progress to date is about what I
would have expected. What was difficult was that we faced a
deployment readiness review, with implications there in the
word ``deployment,'' when we were still very early and are
still very early in the developmental test program.
Mr. Tierney. Well, you have raised concerns, I think, in
your role as director of IOT&E. In 1999, your report, for
example, stated that ``undue pressure has been placed on the
program and that test conditions do not suitably stress the
system in a realistic enough manner to support acquisition
decisions.''
Did you also make a formal report during the deployment
readiness review?
Mr. Coyle. I did, yes, sir.
Mr. Tierney. What was your recommendation in that report?
Mr. Coyle. That report pointed out the limitations in the
tests that have occurred so far. Much of that discussion is in
my long statement for this hearing. So that report pointed out
the limitations in the tests so far, and also pointed out the
ways in which the tests were not realistic, the ways in which
the testing program had slipped and other matters that I
alluded to in my short statement.
Mr. Tierney. Can you provide the subcommittee with that
report?
Mr. Coyle. Certainly.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that it be accepted
on the record.
Mr. Shays. Without objection.
Mr. Tierney. In the context of the deployment readiness
review, I have a hard time seeing how anyone examining the
information could possibly make a decision to deploy at this
particular point in time, especially when nowhere in the
testing program are there flight tests against some very basic
countermeasures of multiple warheads. And I think our
intelligence agencies tell us that those will be the norm. Why
isn't the Department of Defense listening? Having read your
report, why are they still going forward recommending
deployment at this stage while it seems, to me at least, that
your report was very well-founded on some logical information?
Mr. Coyle. It might be better if General Kadish or Mr.
Warner answered that question.
Mr. Tierney. General Kadish, can you tell me--assuming that
you've read Mr. Coyle's report, and assuming that all that he
says in there is accurate, why it is that the Department of
Defense still made a recommendation to deploy when it seems
fairly clear that it's very, very premature at this point?
General Kadish. I think it's helpful to understand how the
program is structured and the confusion that surrounds this
word ``deployment.'' What we have done and offered to the
Congress and the President was to say that we have a
development program that's aggressively ongoing even today that
it is trying to bring this technology into the field. In order
to meet a date early in this mid-decade, we have to back up
from 2005, the date we establish as the earliest we could do
this program, at the same time that we're developing it and
build the system at the same time we're testing it and
designing it. That's the way national programs of importance in
a very short time have to be done, so that you make decisions
to move to the next build cycle on an incremental basis based
on the results of your test, and that's the program we
constructed.
And this thought of deployment is that--is the decision to
build the system. That could be done incrementally, or it could
be done all at once, but you take a risk in any military
program when you design and build it at the same time. You need
to do that, unfortunately, because of the way the world works
in order to meet a shorter time horizon for a program of this
nature. If you want to do as Mr. Coyle suggests and wait until
you're all finished with the development, do operational
testing with real soldiers under realistic conditions, which we
intend to do, and then build the system, then you have an
automatic delay of at least 4 to 5 years before you can have a
useful capability in the field. So that's the problem.
Mr. Tierney. Or under your plan, General, we can build
something that doesn't work, and then we're really up the
river, huh?
General Kadish. In the plan that we have put forth, there
were event-based milestones that checked our progress, and we
just passed one of those, the DRR if you will, that would check
our progress, and the country could make the decision whether
it was worthwhile to proceed.
Mr. Tierney. And we decided in this instance at least it's
not yet?
General Kadish. The President made his decision based on
the information we provided.
Mr. Tierney. Based on the failures to date and the other
considerations that were there.
I think there's some concern about the significant delay in
various aspects of the program, General, but let's talk first
about the booster.
As I understand it, the flight test was supposed to be
integrated, right?
General Kadish. [Nodding in the affirmative.]
Mr. Tierney. They haven't yet used the launch vehicle that
was intended for this system, right?
General Kadish. That's correct. We never planned to use
that launch vehicle because we started the program very
aggressively, and we used a surrogate booster for our first
test.
Mr. Tierney. So it's not integrated to that extent?
General Kadish. It is not integrated to that extent. And
that was the way it was planned.
Mr. Tierney. But even the surrogate booster failed, is that
right, in the IFT-5?
General Kadish. That's correct.
Mr. Tierney. Now, the new booster is supposed to undergo
its first boost vehicle test in February of this year, so the
results could be factored into the deployment readiness review,
but that test was delayed at least originally until July,
right?
General Kadish. That's right.
Mr. Tierney. And now subsequently it's been scheduled for
when?
General Kadish. Right now early next year in the January/
February timeframe. We haven't really scheduled a test at this
point in time.
Mr. Tierney. So this first booster was--has not occurred,
it's been delayed over a year, it's not available for
deployment readiness review at this point?
General Kadish. Right. And never planned to be so.
Mr. Tierney. Well, then, it wasn't very integrated I guess
is my point.
Mr. Coyle, why is it important that the actual booster be
tested with the system rather than a surrogate?
Mr. Coyle. The actual booster will subject the kill vehicle
on top of it to faster speeds, higher speeds and greater
accelerations, and so you would want to make sure that this
very energetic new booster doesn't, in effect, hurt the kill
vehicle when it's launched.
Mr. Tierney. The third booster test, the one where you
actually combine the booster and the kill vehicle, how far has
that been delayed now?
Mr. Coyle. My recollection is over a year.
Mr. Tierney. And I think, Mr. Coyle, that you mentioned
that even a greater impact might be felt with delays in the
simulation and ground test facilities. Can you tell us what the
LIDS system is and what it's supposed to do?
Mr. Coyle. It's a, if you will, computer simulation system
which allows various aspects to of the overall system to be
played, to be tried out in simulation.
Mr. Tierney. And the use of this system, at least
initially, was supposed to be available for the deployment
readiness review?
Mr. Coyle. That's correct.
Mr. Tierney. And how long has the development of that
system been delayed now?
Mr. Coyle. Again, my recollection is at least a year.
Mr. Tierney. Now, I think both of those were being
developed by Boeing; is that right?
Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tierney. General, is it true that you recently withheld
part of Boeing's bonus because of delays in the booster in the
LIDS program?
General Kadish. Among other things, yes.
Mr. Tierney. How much in dollar numbers were they docked
for that?
General Kadish. I would have to get back to you with the
specific dollar amount if I take that for the record, but it
was about a 50 percent reduction.
Mr. Tierney. So about $20 million?
General Kadish. I believe that's the range.
[The information referred to follows:]
Modication P00053, which incorporates the award fee amount
awarded for the 4th Award Fee Period, reduced the total amount
awarded for the 4th Award Fee Period by $21,058,307.
Mr. Tierney. I'll get back to this.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage.
Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Kadish, I am impressed with your testimony because
as we move in this Nation from a policy of mutual assured
destruction to a policy of mutual assured survivability, there
is nothing more important that the military and the Congress
can engage in in accomplishing that vision. And very often the
military, like Members of Congress, catch an awful lot of
flack, but I appreciate the perseverance that you have
demonstrated. Perseverance is the key to America's
survivability and to America being able to achieve peace
through strength. And I appreciate your testimony very much.
I did want to ask Mrs. Bohlen, the administration, as you
have testified to, has been negotiating with the Russians to
amend the ABM Treaty. These attempts, as we know, have been
unsuccessful, and the Secretary of Defense also said that
development and deployment of the boost-phase intercept systems
for the national defense would not obviate the need to amend
the ABM Treaty.
I would like to direct this question to both you, Ms.
Bohlen, and Mr. Warner. My question is, what specific changes
need to be made to the ABM Treaty to deploy the limited ground-
based national missile defense system now planned; and that is
to say, after it's been ratified by the U.S. Senate?
Ms. Bohlen.
Ms. Bohlen. Thank you. Clearly at some point or another,
deployment of the national missile defense system, which has
been under development and testing in this administration,
would require changes to the ABM Treaty. Just to recall what I
said in my statement, the deployment of an ABM radar at Shemya,
of 100 ground-based interceptors and 5 upgraded early warning
radars for the defense of all 50 States--this is just the C-1
program--would violate the obligations contained in article I
of the treaty not to deploy an ABM system to defend national
territory. These activities would also be inconsistent with the
locational restrictions of article III.
What we have proposed to the Russians is a draft protocol
to the treaty which would in effect amend the treaty in such a
way as to permit these activities, to render them not contrary
to the treaty, while at the same time retaining the provisions
of the treaty that underpin the relationship between us of
strategic stability.
I think if I could take that a little bit farther, and I
would be happy to talk with you further about the specifics, I
think what we're trying to do with the ABM Treaty is to
preserve those elements which we continue to think are
valuable, which are those that define our strategic
relationship with the Russians. I don't think that even those
who support a more robust national missile defense want to
really take issue with that relationship of strategic
stability. It is very important in this post-cold war world. We
continue to have large nuclear arsenals, and we do not want to
send a signal that we are trying to undercut the effectiveness
of the other country's offense. So that is the core of the ABM
Treaty that we're trying to preserve.
At the same time it is clear that we have moved into a new
strategic environment with the threat that is coming from the
ballistic missile potential of the countries of concern that we
have talked about this morning, and we need to be in a position
to respond to that threat. And it is by the way, a threat that
threatens not only the United States, but the Russians and our
European allies as well.
So our problem is not to throw the baby out with the bath
water. We think that the core of strategic stability, which is
at the heart of the ABM Treaty, is something good and something
we want to preserve, but it needs to be adapted to new
conditions, and that is the essence of the task that we've been
trying to do in our discussions with the Russians over the last
year.
Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage. Thank you, Ms. Bohlen.
Mr. Warner.
Mr. Warner. I would like to reinforce the last issue that
Ms. Bohlen was just speaking about. We believe that mutual
deterrence with Russia is still a very important dimension of
our relationship in the world, and we want to sustain it. What
we're really saying is that these are not mutually exclusive.
We can sustain mutual deterrence with Russia because the
limited national missile defense system we would deploy even in
its two phases is one that would not threaten the Russian
retaliatory deterrent. And that is different, and I am just
being clear, that's quite different than the vision that, for
instance, President Reagan had in the 1980's.
On the question of changes to the ABM Treaty, there was one
additional element that came up as well. One of them was the
question of covering the whole 50 States or national territory.
That's banned by the treaty in article 1. We would have to
amend that. Another one was location not in Grand Forks, which
is currently what we've declared as our ABM area. There's also
a technicality that the location of the X-Band ABM radar was
going to be a lot more widely separated from the interceptors.
Even when we went to Alaska, we put the radar in Shemya, and we
would plan to put the interceptors in central Alaska. So we
needed relief not only being in Alaska, but in the separation
between radar and interceptors.
There was a third element, and that is we would upgrade the
five early warning radars, the three that were the classical
ballistic missile early warning radars in Alaska, Greenland and
the United Kingdom, and two that are in the United States, one
in California, one in Massachusetts.
We understand our plans would make those radars capable of
helping effect an ABM intercept. That's different than the role
they play today when they are just warning. So we also had to
propose, and did in the proposed protocol, changes to article 6
and article 9 that would anticipate that these early warning
radars could, in fact, play a role in ABM intercept
engagements.
Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage. Thank you, Mr. Warner.
Mr. Chairman, I guess our major concern as I hear across
America is we don't--we're nervous. The American people are
nervous about an ABM Treaty with Russia constraining us from
protecting the American people from a missile defense attack
from rogue nations. And so that's why I've really zeroed in on
this particular issue. And I don't want to get particularly
political on you, Mr. Chairman, but I know as a woman that the
No. 1 issue that women are concerned about in America today is
this issue. I can tell you it's not a health issue. It is where
will America be in 10 years. And is our military providing for
the defense of America?
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance
of my time.
Mr. Shays. I thought you were going to bawl me out for
calling you Hage-Chenoweth instead of Chenoweth-Hage.
Mr. Allen.
Mr. Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Coyle, General Kadish said a few moments ago that in
light of the President's decision, there would have to be some
reassessment of the projected cost of this program. And in your
testimony--I may have heard him wrong, but I can come back to
that. In your testimony you said you had some recommendations
for additional testing to deal with some of the complexities
that we're talking about, and just to run through them quickly,
in your testimony you said there should be--you said the target
suites used in integrated flight tests need to incorporate
challenging, unsophisticated countermeasures that have the
potential to be used against the NMD C-1 system; for example,
tumbling RVs and nonspherical balloons. And you recommend use
of the large balloon be discontinued because it doesn't mimic
in any way the current test RV, the reentry vehicle.
The second, you said engagement times of day and solar
position need to be planned to stress the acquisition and
discrimination process by all the sensor bands, and you have to
look at the effects of weather.
Then you said, third, when an interceptor is launched
against a target cluster before the RV is actually identified,
it is resolved and discriminated against, you have to do some
testing there. And then you said at least--since it's not
likely that only one missile would be fired by a state of
concern that somehow believed its cause, its interest would be
advanced by firing missiles at the United States, that you
ought to do at least some engagement with two, at least two,
incoming missiles.
My question to you--and you had another example as well--
have--does this mean some additional time and some additional
cost in the program if your recommendations are accepted? I am
not asking you how much, but--Mr. Coyle's office is looking at
the costs for these proposals, both the proposals that I've
made and that General Welch's panel made, and he perhaps should
be the best to comment about that, whether or not it would take
additional time will depend on how you do it. And as I said
earlier, if you do everything in series, certainly it will take
longer, which is why if the country intends to achieve dates on
the order of 2005 or 2006 or 2007, I would recommend that the
testing program be done with more things happening in parallel.
Mr. Allen, General Kadish, do you have a comment?
General Kadish. We have taken Mr. Coyle's as well as
General Welch's and other recommendations internal to the
program to enhance our ability to test the system, and we've
taken those very seriously. They do cost money, and in some
cases a lot of money. And we are now in the process of trying
to balance the schedule, the cost and the technical risks
associated with those. But I can assure you we're taking every
one of those seriously and will continue, because as this
program is in development phase, as long as we are allowed to
continue, there will be more discoveries of things we ought to
do that would make sense. So we are proceeding along those
lines.
Mr. Allen. Do you foresee at some future time, weeks or
months in the future, that you would come back and say, we've
rethought the system, here's a new schedule, here's a new
estimate of cost? Is that something you're planning to do?
General Kadish. Yes, Congressman. We do that as a matter of
course. And I insist on us always trying to improve what we're
doing. And we're looking very carefully at the way we're doing
business now and where we will make the required adjustments
based on what we see so far to make it as effective as we can.
Mr. Allen. Do you have any date in mind in which you
might----
General Kadish. Yesterday was good for me, but the process
is a comprehensive one, so it's going to take some weeks. And
as we go, we will be talking to Mr. Coyle, Dr. Gansler and all
the leadership at OSD.
Mr. Allen. Thank you.
I have one other question. And in looking at some of the
press--this is more for you, Ms. Bohlen, than anyone else.
In looking at some of the press reflecting the debate in
the administration over what it takes, what would be--what work
at Shemya would be a violation of the ABM Treaty?
It sounded as if there were three interpretations depending
in part on which agency, but also maybe crossing agencies. One
interpretation that Mr. Cohen advanced was that the United
States would not violate the treaty until workers had laid
rails to support the Shemya radar. That's a move that wouldn't
happen until 2002. I gather that another legal interpretation
was that the United States would be in violation at the point
when workers begin pouring concrete, which was previously
scheduled to occur in May. And a third interpretation was that
the violation would not occur until the concrete foundation for
the radar site is complete, somewhere in between the two times.
You know, if you look back at history, in 1983 we, the U.S.
Government, objected to the Soviets' construction of a large-
phased array radar near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia. And the Reagan
administration argued that the radar was a violation of the ABM
Treaty. They said Krasnoyarsk was a symbol of Soviet duplicity.
And in 1989, the Soviets admitted that that radar had been
built at a location not permitted under the ABM and was a
technical violation of the treaty, and they subsequently
dismantled it.
Is the Department of State and the Pentagon as well taking
a look at--let me rephrase that. Has this dispute within the
administration lawyers been resolved, to your knowledge, or are
there still these three interpretations of what would
constitute a violation of the ABM Treaty?
Ms. Bohlen. Mr. Allen, at this point I would say the point
is moot because the President has decided not to proceed with
construction of the Shemya radar at this time.
There were a number of options which are under review, but
there was no decision made with respect to any of them, and at
this moment, as I say, the question is moot. When Secretary
Cohen spoke, he was expressing his views on this. It was not--
there is no administration position on this.
Mr. Allen. Would you agree with me that the question will
no longer be moot when another administration is confronted
with the same issue? Of course, I think your response is going
to be, that will depend on the state of our negotiations with
the Russians, and I wouldn't accept that as an answer.
Ms. Bohlen. I think the question will certainly arise
again, and if the next administration decides to go forward
with the present plans which include the construction of the
Shemya radar, it will certainly arise.
Mr. Warner. The point on timing and options is exactly as
she said. We made clear, of course, whatever the Rubicon you
cross, where you have, in fact, begun construction, we made
no--we made clear to the Russians we understand putting an ABM
radar on Shemya is a violation of the treaty. So I mean, unlike
Krasnoyarsk, we are not going through any charade as they did
for quite a time and sort of claimed that the radar that was
coming in at Krasnoyarsk is not relevant. Whatever the point is
at which it might violate the treaty, we understand that a
treaty violation will occur when you finally have this radar.
Mr. Allen. Thank you all very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Kucinich, you have 5 minutes, and then it will roll
over for another 5 minutes.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, to General Kadish, do you believe that a
nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all
mankind?
General Kadish. I believe any war has devastating
consequences.
Mr. Kucinich. What about a nuclear war?
General Kadish. Of course.
Mr. Kucinich. And do you think that effective measures to
limit antiballistic missile systems would be a substantial
factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and
would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war
involving nuclear weapons?
General Kadish. Congressman, I am a developer of weapons
systems, and I feel a little out of my lane to answer that type
of question. Perhaps Mr. Warner would tell you. Those are
serious policy questions that are out of my responsibility at
this point in time.
Mr. Kucinich. So what you're saying then is that all you do
is build the weapons whether there's a war or not?
General Kadish. What I am saying is I might have personal
opinions about those issues, but in my official
responsibilities, my primary responsibility is to develop the
missile defenses for this country as directed.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you.
The reason why I asked that question, I actually developed
those two questions from the preface of the ABM Treaty. And so
if we look at where all this started years ago in 1972, an ABM
Treaty--the purpose of the ABM Treaty was specifically to limit
antiballistic missile systems that would be a factor in curbing
the race of strategic offensive arms and to lead to a decrease
in the outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons. Now, I would
like to ask the administration's representative here, how does
the administration's position square with article 5 of the
treaty which says that each party undertakes not to develop
tests or deploy ABM systems, etc. Haven't you already violated
the treaty?
Ms. Bohlen. No, it is not our view that we've already
violated the treaty. I think all the development and testing
activities we've conducted--but I would defer to General Kadish
and Mr. Coyle on that.
Mr. Kucinich. You haven't answered my question, and I want
to go to Mr. Warner.
Mr. Warner.
Mr. Warner. Article 5----
Mr. Kucinich. I want to go to Mr. Warner with a question
here.
You said that according to the work on this treaty you're
doing with the Russians, that you can have a shield that would
not threaten Russia's retaliatory deterrence. Did you say that?
Mr. Warner. I did.
Mr. Kucinich. OK. I just want to follow the logic of this.
So we're asking American taxpayers to pay for a missile shield
that can be by definition penetrated by Russia?
Mr. Warner. That is, in fact, the proposal; a limited
national missile defense, not a comprehensive defense.
Mr. Kucinich. OK. I just want to make sure that I
understand what's being advanced here.
Mr. Warner. Could we answer your article 5 question?
Mr. Kucinich. I have just 5 minutes, and we will have more
time. I want to ask General Kadish a question.
As you know, it's illegal to misuse the classification
system, to hide allegations of fraud or to reclassify
previously unclassified information. That's Executive Order
12958 at subsection 1.8(a) and 1.8(c). Now, as you know,
someone at the Department of Defense classified documents
produced by Professor Postal of MIT that alleged that every NMD
test has failed and that--secondly, that there was considerable
evidence that NMD contractor TRW had defrauded the government.
Why has the Department of Defense classified Professor
Postal's allegations of fraud, and do you consider Department
of Defense's classification of these allegations of fraud to be
proper?
General Kadish. We take all allegations of fraud very
seriously. And we have aggressively, in my view, investigated
them across--not only within our purview, but also with outside
agencies including the Department of Justice. So--and that
applies to beyond Dr. Postal's particular allegations.
In that particular case I would prefer to talk to you
offline a little bit about the details, but I will say in
general the classification of Dr. Postal's information was not
to the allegations he made, but some of the information upon
which it was based. So we need to discuss that further in
closed session, but I'll be glad to do that with you,
Congressman.
[The information referred to follows:]
If a closed hearing were to be held the Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization would have participants representing the
legal, security, and technical perspectives. In addition,
representatives from OSD Policy and TRW corporate should be
invited. However, as there is currently a General Accounting
Office (GAO) investigation underway, we believe that it will
provide all desired insight into this issue, eliminating the
need for a closed hearing or other meeting.
Mr. Kucinich. Well, actually, General, with all due
respect, it's been my experience that it's better to have these
discussions in public.
General Kadish. My only--excuse me for interrupting you. My
only comment along that line is not to--it gets into classified
information. That's the reason why.
Mr. Kucinich. Of course. But knowing there's an Executive
order against classifying allegations of fraud, what steps are
you taking to investigate whether the Executive order was
violated by Department of Defense employees?
General Kadish. The Department is taking steps to look at
those issues across a broad front.
Mr. Kucinich. It's been--it's my understanding that the
Department of Defense's inspector general is not investigating,
that he's waiting for a GAO report. Do you know anything
contrary to that?
General Kadish. As far as the DOD IG, I am not specifically
aware of any activity they are doing, but GAO is looking at it
as well as other looks, as far as I know.
Mr. Kucinich. So if there's reasonable grounds to conclude
that there has been a violation of law regarding classification
of allegations of fraud, would you refer--if you found that
out--the case to the Attorney General?
General Kadish. To the proper authorities immediately.
Mr. Kucinich. I would like to go to this issue of states of
concerns, which a few months ago were rogue nations, which a
few months before that were terrorist states, which a few
months before that may have been countries getting money from
the United States. Which of the rogue nations are you getting
ready to defend against, General? Who are the rogue nations?
General Kadish. The direction we have is North----
Mr. Kucinich. States of concern.
General Kadish. The direction we have in terms of the
capability of the system is for North Korea and the Middle
East, Iran, Iraq and possibly Libya.
Mr. Kucinich. So if any of these nations become our friends
in the next few years, will you disband the program?
General Kadish. The responsibility that I have is to
continue a development program unless directed otherwise and
possibly deploy. So I would defer that to a national decision.
Mr. Kucinich. Sure.
Now, if a state of concern or a rogue nation or previously
unfriendly nation intended to harm the United States, which
mode of weapons delivery is most likely? For example, smuggling
a suitcase of radioactive material and explosive detonator in a
commercial freighter to a U.S. port, using the--or using the
most advanced and expensive weapons technology to launch and
successfully target a U.S. city with an intercontinental
ballistic missile, which is most likely?
General Kadish. I think the Intelligence Community as well
as the President stated that the most likely would be other
means of delivery.
Mr. Kucinich. So you would say the less expensive, less
complex delivery method would be most likely?
General Kadish. If the question is most likely. I would
point out, however, that there is a reason why countries
develop ballistic missiles, and it's not to threaten only their
neighbors.
Mr. Kucinich. And how would NMD protect against less
complex, less expensive threats?
General Kadish. I may defer to Mr. Warner, but from my
point of view, in the development phase there are other means
of protection this country has that even exist today for the
terrorist threat. You can argue about how good those means are,
but they do exist.
In the case of ballistic missiles, there is no defense if
one should be launched, so the country has to decide whether
that is a worthwhile, even though unlikely, event to protect
ourselves against.
Mr. Kucinich. And according to what Mr. Warner said
previously, if Russia--we would look to a treaty where Russia
would be able to have a retaliatory ability against our shield.
I would just like to conclude with this thought until we
get to the next round. When I sit in these hearings, I get a
sense of--with all due respect, because I know you're trying to
serve the country as best you can, and you're not making the
policy. Somebody is making the policy though. If they're not in
this room, someday they ought to be hauled before a
congressional committee and made to account. But I get a
feeling that I'm seeing the development for a trailer for the
second version of Dr. Strangelove, because what we're doing
here is we're really trying to condition the American people to
accept a new climate of fear. And I have to say, just as one
American, one Member of Congress from Cleveland, OH, I don't
like that. I think that we can do better as a country in
creating a world that believes that peace is possible, not that
war is inevitable. And this idea that somehow that we will
prepare for peace through spending tens of billions of dollars,
Mr. Chairman, for preparation for war is hard to take. I just
have to mention that until I get my next opportunity to speak.
Mr. Shays. Let me just say that I am going to exercise my
10 minutes, and then Mr. Tierney has some questions he wants to
ask, and then we do want to get on to the next panel. I
appreciate the patience of the next panel.
I would like to touch on a number of issues. I'm sorry
we're jumping around a bit, but hopefully there will be a sense
of completeness to this. It's my sense that we've moved from
SDI to GPALS--Global Protection Against Limited Strikes--to now
a system of national missile defense that is somewhat limited
attempting to deal with rogue nations and maybe an errant
missile from China or the Soviet Union.
It's also my understanding that the ABM Treaty under
article 14 allows each party may propose amendments to this
treaty, and agreed amendments shall enter into force in
accordance with the procedures governing the entry into the
force of this treaty. So, I mean, we wrote into the ABM the
fact that we may someday want to amend it. It also allows each
party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the
right to withdraw from this treaty if it decides that
extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this
treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. This is article
15.
So this is not--while it is a significant untaking, it is
certainly within the agreement of the ABM. And it is logical
that Members would be concerned about a national missile
defense system because the concept of ABM is deterrence, that
logically one group would say, after your first strike, we can
obliterate you, so you're not going to want to do the first
strike. But there is obviously a concern with rogue nations.
I, like my colleague from Cleveland, fear the possibility
of a nuclear weapon being literally brought in the trunk of a
car or the back of a truck or put on a ship and brought to port
in the United States and detonated, or chemical weapons. I
mean, those are possibilities. But I also fear that 10 years
from now I would have voted against a limited national defense,
and a missile is on its way, and I think to myself what kind of
decision did I make today?
And obviously costs are a factor in destabilization, but I
would love to just understand what it takes to get the Russians
to sit down. And it would seem to me that one of things it
might take to get them to sit down, to realize they have a
benefit in this since it is a limited national missile defense,
is for us to have moved forward with the radar in Alaska. And I
would like to know why did the President decide not to move
forward with the radar since the technology is clearly, I
think, there to move forward? And maybe I'll just throw it open
to the floor. I would like that explained to me.
Mr. Warner. Well, as he announced it in his speech a week
ago at Georgetown, the main factor was, to him, that there were
now questions about the technical feasibility. He wanted the
development program to go ahead.
Mr. Shays. Not of the radar.
Mr. Warner. No, but of the overall system; that those
tended to, in his view, shove the initial operating capability
out a year--he spoke of how it was capable of now being fielded
in 2006 or 2007--and given the fact that now that this
deployment would probably be a year later, there was not the
same pressure to get the radar construction under way that
there would have been if you were trying to make 2005.
Mr. Shays. I'll follow that up, but, General Kadish, do you
have a comment, Mr. Coyle, about the radar itself? Is the radar
technologically there?
General Kadish. I think you have to look at this as an
entire system, and we've tried to evaluate it as an entire
system.
Mr. Shays. We will do that after you answer my question, if
you would.
General Kadish. The radar has progressed very well in the
overall testing. It is probably one of the better elements in
terms of our expectations.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Coyle.
Mr. Coyle. I would agree with that.
Mr. Shays. So there was really no technological reason why
we needed to wait on the radar.
Now, you wanted to make your point that we need to look at
this as a whole, but, Ms. Bohlen, isn't it true that if we
moved forward, we would be calling the question, which the
Russians seem to be forcing us to do? Are they sitting down
with us?
Ms. Bohlen. They were sitting down with us, Mr. Chairman.
And as I indicated earlier, I think we have made some progress,
not as much, obviously, as we hoped. But in the sense that they
now accept that there is a threat, this was stated clearly in
the joint statement of the two Presidents at the Moscow summit
in June, there was absolutely explicit recognition that there
is a threat out there of missile proliferation, and that it
poses a threat to international stability.
The Russians are seized with the issue. I think they will
certainly look at the totality of the system, and they will
look at what the next administration does on this.
Mr. Shays. By a vote of 317 for it, Congress and the
President signed into law the fact that we will have a national
missile defense system. That's going forward. Now, it is
subject, obviously, to annual appropriations of Congress, but I
thought we got beyond the issue of whether, and the question is
when. And so it would strike me that we had a viable part of
the system that we could begin to implement, and that there
would be a positive side effect to that, and that would simply
be to force the Russians to know we're serious. I don't think
they think we're serious. I think they think that we're going
to back off.
And as far as our allies not being for the system, I don't
think they fear what we fear, and I think they may have reason
not to fear it, but we have a reason to fear it. We think those
missiles will be directed at us, not them.
Ms. Bohlen. Well, I would say that for the allies certainly
the threat in time is more immediate for them, the threat from
the Middle East, and I think we have gotten their attention on
this issue. There are many concerns out there, as you know.
They are concerned about what happens if we can't get the
Russians to agree to amend the ABM Treaty. They are concerned
about what this does to strategic stability. They are concerned
about decoupling. They are concerned about what steps they
should take to protect themselves.
So I think this gives us more time to pursue that dialog,
and I think it's very important that we have allied support.
Mr. Shays. My fear is that it will convince them that we're
not serious. I mean, we had one part of the program we could
begin to implement that we know works, and we decided not to,
and I still am wondering why. Maybe one of you could tell me
why we needed to stop there when we could have begun to build
it?
Ms. Bohlen. I think as Mr. Warner just said, we would not--
the delay in the radar----
Mr. Shays. Let Mr. Warner say. I am not hearing it right
now.
Ms. Bohlen. We won't have a system.
Mr. Warner. If the overall system is not going to be
available until 2006, and we think that there is a challenging
but achievable path to build the radar in Shemya, operationally
test it and have it ready in about 4 years, then you can delay
the beginning of that whole construction until the summer, the
spring/summer of 2002 instead of the spring/summer of 2001.
Mr. Shays. I know you can do that. I'm just wondering why
we're----
Mr. Warner. I am saying the context was that if there was
no pressure to get started, why take that step now? The
Russians are clearly waiting for the new President. There is no
doubt about that. They began to signal that, in my view, to us
in our talks with them certainly by the spring of this year, if
not earlier. I mean, they know there's an election coming. They
know that this, the legacy of whatever this President had done,
would be subject to review by the next President. So, in a
sense, we could never escape from the fact that there was going
to be a new occupant of the White House. And the Russians in a
sense said, once we've looked at the balance of all of this,
we'll wait and see who that is and what he wants to do. And
that, to my view, is where we stand on the question.
And the Russians were willing to do some things in the
interim. They did, in fact, acknowledge the threat. They've
joined us in a series of cooperative activities, an agreement
signed in New York just 2 days ago, but on the whole they're
saying, we'll wait and deal with the next administration.
Mr. Shays. Right. But your testimony still stands that the
technology exists now that we could have moved forward?
Mr. Warner. I want to clarify that. My personal judgment is
that overall we will be successful, but it will have to be
demonstrated. In that sense, I mean, I completely agree with
Mr. Coyle. I think we have the fundamentals to do the job, but
I can't say we've yet fully demonstrated it.
Mr. Shays. I'm talking about the radar.
Mr. Warner. I'm sorry. About the radar? The radar is in. We
believe it has come along very well to do the task we have
asked of it.
Mr. Shays. I just want the record to show that there is no
technological reason not to move forward with the radar.
Mr. Warner. That was not cited by the President as one of
the issues that he took into consideration, any difficulty with
the radar.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I will yield to the ranking--not
yield, but give the ranking member--excuse me. Would the
gentleman mind if I just yield?
Do you have a question?
Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage. I do. I have a comment, Mr. Chairman,
that I would like to make for the record, in response to Mr.
Kucinich's question. I think it was a very interesting and
probing question about terrorism versus realistic attack of an
ICBM.
In making my statement I would like to enter into the
record officially an article entitled, ``Facing The Risks. A
Realistic Look at Missile Defense,'' by John Train, who has
been appointed as a contributing editor of Strategic Review and
has received appointments from Presidents Reagan, Bush and
Clinton. And to sum up his testimony, he answers Mr. Kucinich's
question. He said, ``The administration may settle for a
shallow and vulnerable missile defense that might not bother
the Russians or some of the potential aggressors it's supposed
to protect us from. An fanatic can attack the U.S. using other
weapons, notably biological and chemical, against which we must
defend ourselves. But many unstable countries are also at great
expense building missiles that can hit the U.S. in coming
years. One reason to erect defenses is to reduce the temptation
for their use.''
He concludes by saying, ``We are likely to be attacked at
our weakest point and should leave no inviting apertures.''
I think that sums it up, especially in view of the fact
that we know North Korea is spending far more money on building
a missile defense system than they are feeding their starving
people.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Without objection, we will put that in the
record.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, let me just pick up a little bit on the cost, if I
can, for a second. As I understand it, this program started
with an estimate of around $9 to $11 billion. I have a CRS
report that tells us the estimate in January 1999 was $10.6
billion, but yet CRS said by February 2000, about a year later,
this estimate rose to $26.6 billion. What caused that sharp
increase?
General Kadish. When you're dealing with cost estimates,
you have to define the time period and the elements that are
included in the cost.
Mr. Tierney. Well, this was from 1999, when it was $10.6
billion, to February 2000, when it was $26.6 billion. So I
think we're asking what elements changed to get that increase?
General Kadish. I would probably be better off if we did
this in response to the record, but just in general what I
would say is that the $20 billion figure, that includes $5.7
billion from 1991 to the present as well as what our best
estimate at the time of what the ground-based system, the NMD
system, was going to take to build. That gets you to about a
$20 billion figure. Now, those elements are, of course, under
review right now based on the decisions that have been taken.
But that--and I would like to be more specific for the record
to make sure that we line up what the CBO and the CRS say
versus what our estimate is, because the time horizons as well
as the elements are very important.
[The information referred to follows:]
The difference between the estimates is attributable
primarily to a difference in the number of fiscal years
included and the number of missiles fielded by the program.
The FY00O President's Budget submission (dated Feb 99) included
$10.5B (cumulative total for FY1999-FY2005). $26.2 billion can
be derived from the estimate that supported the FY01
President's Budget submission (dated Feb 00) and is the
cumulative total for FY1991-FY2015. Additionally, the $26.2
billion included funding for: an additional 80 interceptors
which expanded the number of interceptors in the missile site
from 20 to 100, upgrades for X-band radar in Alaska that was
added as part of the C1 expanded program, and for implementing
the Welch Panel (Independent Review Team) recommendations.
Mr. Tierney. Well, it jumped up that much by February 2000.
But the CPO in April 2000 said it was going to be $29.5
billion. And then the CPO--the JOA--GAO, rather, in May 2000
said it was going to be $36.2 billion. So, I mean, all these
figures keep jumping.
General Kadish. Right. And a large part of the reason for
what is implied as massive changes in the cost estimate,
significant changes, is because we added missiles. The original
cost estimate, as I recall, that we did was for 20 missiles in
2005, and that was it, our so-called C-1 capability. But when
we went to the expanded C-1 where there were 100 missiles by
2007 under the old program, then the cost estimates, of course,
had to be included for those new missiles that we added to the
program.
Mr. Tierney. GAO says that added about $2 billion. Would
that be about right?
General Kadish. About $2 billion is about the number I
remember for a large part of the missiles, right.
Mr. Tierney. So that still leaves a significant jump from
$10.6 billion to $26.6 billion on that. Do you have some idea
what the rest of that was all about?
General Kadish. Again, I would like to be able to line
those up in a more disciplined manner to show you comparisons
than I can here in testimony.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. Tierney. More recently as you went into the deployment
readiness review, your office was charged with evaluating the
program as it stood in July or perhaps August of this year. I
think you came up with a new cost estimate for the DRR of $40.3
billion, right?
General Kadish. There were a range of cost estimates done
not only by us, but by independent estimators within the
Department.
Mr. Tierney. But yours was $40.3 billion, right?
General Kadish. The actual number, I can't remember exactly
what it is, but it was around the $36--life cycle cost, it was
about $36, as I recall.
Mr. Tierney. If I give you a copy of your National Defense
Review Agenda, your internal document, would that help you,
because that has it at $40.3 billion.
General Kadish. All right. If you take the cost comparison
that we did, the FYDP or the future years defense program, the
acquisition costs, total acquisition costs, and put it from
2001 to 2028, from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2028, and
then your dollars, which means fully inflation-adjusted, if you
add an additional $5.7 from the earlier timeframe, from 1991,
which then gets you from 1991 to 2028, it's $40.3.
Mr. Tierney. And that's the number you came up with on your
internal review?
General Kadish. That's right.
Mr. Tierney. But the cost analysis improvement group, can
you tell us who they are?
General Kadish. They are an independent cost estimating
agency within the Department of Defense.
Mr. Tierney. They came up with $43.2 billion, right?
General Kadish. They came up with about $1 billion more
than what we did.
Mr. Tierney. We came to $43.2 billion. That's a little more
than $1 billion more.
General Kadish. Well, I guess I'm talking about the
acquisition costs.
Mr. Tierney. So if we were to take their number, we are at
$43 billion, and I understand there are other costs that aren't
included in those estimates, one of them being the operational
requirements document interoperability requirements. Those
aren't in your numbers, am I right?
General Kadish. We did a full cost----
Mr. Tierney. As much as I would like to get an explanation,
either it was or it wasn't. Was that in your number, the
interoperability?
General Kadish. Yes, it was.
Mr. Tierney. So that's in your $40.3 billion?
General Kadish. Yes.
Mr. Tierney. OK. As I read your internal document, it does
not reflect that it is but that's fine. How much were Mr.
Welch's adjustments?
General Kadish. We did our best estimate of what those
elements would cost, and those are in our estimates as of this
time. But all these estimates are under review, based on what
the President's decision is, and we need to do an awful lot of
work to make sure that we get the best estimate we can on the
program.
Mr. Tierney. Does your figure also include the alternative
booster program costs?
General Kadish. No.
Mr. Tierney. That's another billion dollars or so.
General Kadish. Should we decide to do that, that decision
has not been taken.
Mr. Tierney. Does it include restructuring of the program
to remedy any testing delays?
General Kadish. No, it does not.
Mr. Tierney. It does not, all right. OK.
General Kadish. Well, let me make sure I get that question
right. For the test delays, yes. OK? For the additional time
required in the extension of the program, no.
Mr. Tierney. Well, with regard to the extension of the
program, Mr. Coyle, you provided on page 5 of your testimony a
figure too that shows graphically I think the slips in the
flight test, the booster test and the LIDS that you identified
earlier in that development. You also provided a general
estimate of the range of slippage. I think basically the
program is losing ground at the rate of 20 months every 3
years; is that correct?
Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Mr. Tierney. If you extend that out, by what date would the
program be able to field all 100 intercepters?
Mr. Coyle. If the program were to continue to slip at the
current rate, it would extend the date another couple 2\1/2\
years.
Mr. Tierney. So 100 interceptors due 2007, and that's 7
years; 20 months for every 3 years would be 47 months. So a 4-
year delay, right?
Mr. Coyle. Yes.
Mr. Tierney. So actually, 2007 becomes 2011?
Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tierney. OK. Now GAO reported that the program cost
increased by $124 million every month the program slips. So by
your calculation, that would add about another $5.8 billion?
Mr. Coyle. The arithmetic sounds right to me.
Mr. Tierney. Well, I did it in advance just to make sure.
That's not my strong suit.
OK. Let me just finish up here then. Ms. Bohlen, the State
Department has obviously been conducting negotiations on the
system and if we just disregarded the concerns of our NATO
allies as some people have proposed, and that would abrogate
the ABM treaty, is it likely that England and Denmark would
allow us a place to forward deploy our radar sites?
Ms. Bohlen. I think that's a very real question, Mr.
Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. In all likelihood, they wouldn't if we just
went against their wishes?
Ms. Bohlen. I think we can't absolutely say because you
can't predict the circumstances under which this might happen.
Mr. Tierney. But it is a pretty good bet?
Ms. Bohlen. But we cannot take it for granted that we would
have their permission, either to upgrade the early warning
radars that we are talking about for the present system or
building the X-band radars that we want for the later phase.
Mr. Tierney. Without them, certainly that prevents us from
being able to field the kind of proposed missile defense system
that we are envisioning?
Ms. Bohlen. Well, I would defer to General Kadish and Mr.
Coyle on whether there are alternatives.
Mr. Tierney. Well, Mr. Coyle, if we didn't have the support
and England and Denmark didn't allow us to place our forward
deployed radar sites on their territory, would that pretty much
do away with our ability to field the system as it is currently
envisioned?
Mr. Coyle. Perhaps there would be some other alternative. I
don't know.
Mr. Tierney. Ms. Bohlen, I have seen a copy of an article
from Jane's Intelligence Review that quotes several top level
Russian officials. One is Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, who
declares that Russia must develop new weapons capable of
neutralizing any U.S. ABM system. Another, Major General
Vladimir Dvorkin, director of the Russian Defense Ministry's
Central Research Institute suggests that Russia could redeploy
its real mobile ICBMs if our defense system goes ahead. So I
think that people argue a little simplistically that while
Russia shouldn't have a veto over U.S. defense policy--I think
we would all agree on that--but don't you think that those
statements or statements like that should at least let us know
that our actions have potential repercussions and we should at
least take them into account? I assume your department would
say that.
Ms. Bohlen. I would certainly agree that our actions will
have potential repercussions. What the Russians might do in
reality if a future President decided to withdraw from the ABM
treaty, again, it would depend very much on the circumstances.
I hark back to what was said earlier, what Mr. Warner said.
I think the Russians realize that they will have to face up to
the problem, and I think they are waiting for a new
administration to see exactly what the dimensions of the issue
will be and what they will have to negotiate on.
I think we would certainly not want to minimize the
consequences if we were to withdraw from the ABM treaty, and I
think that was certainly a factor that weighed in the
President's decision.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. General, let me just say, isn't it
fairly accurate--the 1999 National Intelligence Estimate said
that one potential effect of our deploying a National Missile
Defense system in violation of the ABM treaty would be for
Russia or China to actually sell sophisticated countermeasures
to other countries. Isn't that a real potential, that even
though some of these so-called rogue nations may not have
sophisticated countermeasures at present, that they could be
purchased on the market from a ready seller at some point?
General Kadish. That would be part of a proliferation
regime, obviously. The challenge, however, even if
countermeasures are sold, we have the ability to go through our
C-3, our upgrade of the system, to handle that, and I would
assert that just getting countermeasures is not enough. They
have to integrate them into the total weapons system that they
have and that is not a trivial challenge.
Mr. Tierney. I will let you go on that because the chairman
wants to move along, but I have a problem with the idea that we
always assume that it's going to be too difficult for the rogue
nations to have a missile system--to have countermeasures, but
not too difficult for them to have missiles.
General Kadish. We don't assume it would be too difficult.
We assume that we could handle them based on our system design.
Mr. Tierney. Which we don't provide the testing on, but
thank you.
Mr. Shays. I thank all four of you. I would welcome you
each to make a closing remark if you would like to, if you have
any comments to make. You have been very patient with this
committee and we appreciate it, and we look forward to getting
to the next panel. Thank you very much.
Our next panel is the Honorable Lawrence J. Korb, vice
president and director of studies, Council on Foreign
Relations; Dr. Lisbeth Gronlund, senior staff scientist arms
control program, Union of Concerned Scientists; Dr. William
Graham, chairman and president National Security Research,
Inc.; and Dr. Kim Holmes, vice president and director the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute, the Heritage
Foundation.
I welcome you all to stand so I can swear you in.
Mr. Korb. Mr. Chairman, I have a statement for the record.
Mr. Shays. No, we are going to swear you in, Mr. Korb.
Mr. Korb. You have to swear us?
Mr. Shays. You took my hand signal. You don't have to put
your hand up yet. You are like me here. You are eager.
I hope we have four witnesses. If you would raise your
right hands. Thank you.
[Witnesses sworn].
Mr. Shays. I note for the record that all of our witnesses
have responded in the affirmative.
Have I left out a witness here? I am sorry. I should have
pointed out, Mr. Baker Spring, research fellow is with the
Heritage Foundation.
Mr. Spring, you are welcome to respond to questions as
well.
Maybe we could slide in a little bit to get you into this
group just a speck. Here. We are set. Thank you.
Mr. Korb, you are going to start out. I think we realize
that you have waited a while and I appreciate you being here.
Yes, Dr. Graham?
Mr. Graham. Mr. Chairman, I have a concern with my
schedule. I had originally been told I would be able to leave
by noon.
Mr. Shays. Let me ask you this.
Mr. Graham. I deferred my schedule to 12:45, but I have a
hard cutoff.
Mr. Shays. We are going to accommodate you. Dr. Korb will
be happy to accommodate you. Correct? Or do you have a problem,
too?
Mr. Korb. I do, too, but I was told we would be out by
noon.
Mr. Shays. That's what we thought.
Let me ask you, do you have a flight or do we have a flight
here? Do you want to negotiate between the two of you?
Dr. Graham will go, and if you could keep it to 5, maybe
and we will go from there.
Mr. Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will go as quickly
as I can and then I must excuse myself.
Mr. Shays. I understand. I apologize.
STATEMENTS OF DR. WILLIAM GRAHAM, CHAIRMAN AND PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH, INC.; LAWRENCE J. KORB, VICE
PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS; DR. LISBETH GRONLUND, SENIOR STAFF SCIENTIST, ARMS
CONTROL PROGRAM, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS; AND DR. KIM
HOLMES, VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR THE KATHRYN AND SHELBY
CULLOM DAVIS INSTITUTE, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, ACCOMPANIED BY
BAKER SPRING, RESEARCH FELLOW, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Mr. Graham. I have been asked to testify on test failures,
technology development and ABM treaty provisions.
Let me state by way of background that I believe both
General Kadish and Dr. Coyle are exceptionally able
individuals. On the other hand, I am not here to defend the
current program. I believe that based on an assertion by Dr.
William Perry when he was Secretary of Defense, that if the
United States ever needed a national ballistic missile defense
system the country could take 3 years to develop it and 3 years
to deploy it, the infamous three-plus-three system. I could
find no substance to that plan when it was proposed by Dr.
Perry and none now. I believe it was probably designed to
respond to congressional critics of the lack of any NMD program
by the administration in the mid-1990's, and they are now
struggling with a three-plus-five variant of that program, and
their testimony is evidence to that struggle.
Is there a need for ballistic missile defense? I served as
a commissioner on the Commission to Assess the Ballistic
Missile Threat to the United States, the Rumsfeld Commission.
Its findings were very different from those put forward by the
intelligence community at that time, and I believe they are
well enough known that I won't go into those, although I
believe the testimony did show, for example, that China is
building new land-based and submarine-based ballistic missiles;
Iran is building ballistic missiles; North Korea, Syria, Libya,
and probably Iraq as well.
Some believe that these ballistic missile developments by
countries potentially hostile to the United States can best be
handled by nuclear deterrence, arms control and diplomatic
means. The problem with this approach is that it has been
practiced for decades and has led to a current world situation
where both missile and weapons of mass destruction, nuclear,
chemical, biological threats continue to grow and proliferate.
This, in turn, gives rise to potential situations where
deterrence, as we traditionally understand it, may no longer be
effective.
The answer to a failing policy is not more of the same but
the formulation of a new policy.
While nuclear deterrence and diplomacy will continue to
play an important role in U.S. counter proliferation policy,
missile defenses and other military measures will strengthen
U.S. counter proliferation policy, providing substance and
therefore diplomatic leverage. Arguments to the effect that
U.S. development and deployment of ballistic missile defense
systems will trigger a new arms race are specious in view of
the fact that the proliferating nations are already racing at
full speed. What we must now do is try to counter that growing
threat.
Let me address technical feasibility for a moment. Many
have questioned the feasibility and the testing methodology of
the ballistic missile defense systems. This is especially the
case with the national defense rather than the theater defense
systems, since I believe as a result of U.S. coalition and
Israeli experience of being attacked by ballistic missiles
during the Gulf war, the need for theater missile defenses is
now widely understood and accepted.
The technical feasibility can be addressed from the vantage
points of both U.S. experience and technology. And I will
summarize this very quickly, but I will say that the purpose of
testing, such as Dr. Coyle accurately described, is several
fold, but the earliest part, the developmental testing, is to
try to validate and improve the models that are used in the
development of the system and to detect and compensate for any
items or characteristics that were overlooked in the
development of the models.
You would expect and look for failures of the models and,
to some degree, failures in the tests during that time. In
fact, in insistence on low risk early successes in the
developmental testing, I believe poses severe threat to U.S.
leadership in the development of advanced technology in
general, and cutting edge technology weapons systems in
particular.
This was a matter of direct concern to me when I was a
science advertiser to the President and one I have had a
continuing interest in. Systems that are required to be low
risk from the outset must avoid the introduction of new and
frequently untested technologies. Since the development and
introduction of new technologies is, in fact, America's strong
suit and one we have invested a great deal of money in,
insisting on low risk complete early test success is tantamount
to giving up much of the strong, unique advantage that the
United States has acquired through its enormous investment in
science and technology.
The time to hold weapons systems to a high standard of test
success is in the late phases of engineering development and
especially in operational test and evaluation. By this time,
the problems encountered in system development should have been
worked out. A system should be ready for deployment.
I believe Dr. Coyle's testimony, in fact, in reality, has
pointed out that the administration has substantially
underfunded operational tests and evaluation assets and
capability for national missile defense systems, and that
underfunding and under support should be rectified.
On the other hand, while it isn't surprising there have
been failures to date, there is an unusual disturbing aspect to
the failures encountered so far. In most cases, they have not
occurred in the new cutting edge technology aspects of systems
tested, but rather in technologies that were developed decades
ago and are now well understood features of rocket and missile
design. The failures to date are typical of those caused by a
lack of systems integration experience, rather than a lack of
knowledge of missile and rocket design, and may be related to
several characteristics of the defense industrial base today.
These include rapid downsizing of the defense industry over the
last decade; a small number of new systems that have been
developed during that time period; the absence of new systems
being produced, deployed and operated for several decades in
the ballistic missile defense area, particularly national
missile defense; and the inability of the defense industry to
attract new technical talent and mentor its technical work
force in the face of strong economic competition from the high
technology commercial sector.
The United States is learning once again that engineering,
programmatic and operational experience is a difficult and
expensive capability to acquire and an easy capability to lose.
Nonetheless, as I summarize in the----
Mr. Shays. How much more do you have? I am conscious of Dr.
Korb as well.
Mr. Graham. About 2 or 3 minutes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. And I am just going to let you get on your way
afterwards.
Mr. Graham. Thank you. I have given in my paper a table of
15 different programs, such experiences which are typical of
high tech missile and rocket-based programs that experienced a
great deal of difficulty in the first stage and since then,
have become some of our most successful systems.
I would also like to point out that the hardest part of the
way we do ballistic missile defense is the hit-to-kill aspect,
one the Russians don't deal with because they use nuclear
warheads on their interceptors and their Moscow defense system
and also on their S-300 and S-400 systems that they have
deployed around other parts of their country.
However, something like 80 percent of the time that we have
gotten our hit-to-kill technology in the terminal homing phase,
it has actually proved to be successful. I think that's
actually a remarkably good record.
I give in my paper several--a whole list, in fact, of
places where the ABM treaty is interfering with or compromising
the development of our ballistic missile defense system.
I would point out that in addition to the treaty now having
been substantially violated by the Soviet Union, as was
discussed earlier, and being a unilateral constraint on the
United States, it is, in fact, playing a major role in limiting
what we can do. Many of the criticisms of the current system's
performance can be traced back to ABM treaty limitations. I
give those in my paper, but I won't take the time to go over
them in the testimony.
Finally, I would like to say that a system design that
would be effective would be different from the current system
design. It would be a multilayer ballistic missile system
design. It would involve ground-based components, sea-based,
air-based and in the foreseeable future, space-based
components. Virtually all of those are ruled out by the ABM
treaty.
But, in fact, with the ability to develop the full range of
ballistic missile defense aspects and take advantage of the
fact that we have the world's best instrumentation for
observing foreign missile tests, and therefore, know today and
will know in the future much more about the real world
performance of their countermeasures than they will know, and
be able to adapt to those when they test their countermeasures,
if not before. I have no concern with our ability to overcome
their countermeasures program, but I believe a foreign country
deploying a countermeasure against us should have a real worry
that we will know more about his countermeasure and its actual
performance based on our ground, sea, air and space-based
sensors, than he will have about the performance. This doesn't
often come up in the discussion, but it is a very real worry to
any potentially hostile country.
So I don't believe the countermeasures is a limiting factor
on what we can deal with. I believe it is a serious concern. I
always have. I believe we should deal with it. We are dealing
with it. We had an extensive experiment called MSX in which we
put a satellite on orbit with a large array of sensors, fielded
a large number of countermeasures against it, not just a few
but a large number; not just simple but very sophisticated. We
have the data on that. No one else does.
So I would like to say, in conclusion, that if the United
States were to carry forward a national program, drawing on our
best capability from all of industry, not just from one
contractor or a contractor and a few subcontractors but all of
our capability, and had the constraint of the ABM treaty lifted
from us, I have no doubt that we could develop an effective
ballistic missile defense system and it would tend to
discourage and deter other countries from building ballistic
missiles rather than encouraging them to build them.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize for having to
excuse myself.
Mr. Shays. Well, I understand. You told the committee staff
that you did have to leave. It just didn't get relayed to me.
Thank you.
Mr. Graham. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Thank you for staying.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Graham follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Dr. Korb, thank you for your patience.
Mr. Korb. I have a statement I would like to be made a part
of the record.
Mr. Shays. Put the mic in front of you. Is it on?
Mr. Korb. I will make a few comments. First of all, I would
like to commend you for holding this hearing and I think the
testimony, particularly of Mr. Coyle earlier, demonstrates the
wisdom of Congress in setting up that separate Office of Test
and Evaluation.
My testimony was prepared before President Clinton's
decision, but I do support that decision as a victory for
common sense, given the technological and diplomatic problems
that we were having with the system.
I point out in my testimony that the system we are talking
about today has five components. All, to a certain extent, are
pushing the technological frontiers and all must work all of
the time in order for this system to be effective. I would also
like to point out that in this system, two of the five phased
array radars, as was pointed out by Congressman Tierney, are in
other countries, and they are not going to let us use their
nations unless they support the deployment. Ms. Bohlen, I think
was quite diplomatic, but the fact of the matter is Denmark and
Britain have said they will not let the United States do it,
that is increase the power of the phased array radars if you
violate ABM.
In terms of technological challenge, as people always point
out, we did the Manhattan project, we built the ICBM, we went
to the moon. But the fact of the matter is nobody was defending
the moon when we went there. This is a much greater
technological challenge.
I am sure with enough time and money, we could get an NMD
system that's 85 percent effective with a 95 percent confidence
rate, which as my colleague Dick Garwin, who worked on the
hydrogen bomb and was a member of the Rumsfeld Commission,
points out, is what you need with this system. This is not just
any weapons system. NMD has to work and it has to work well
when you use it.
I am sure that with enough time and money we could hit a
high speed warhead in outer space under controlled
circumstances, but that's not what the Pentagon is doing. NMD
is a concurrent weapons development program, and the last one I
was involved in was called B-1, it happened when I was in
government, in the early 80's and that darn thing still doesn't
work because we rushed it into production. NMD has not yet
really been tested, in my view, in a realistic battle
environment.
Again, as my colleague Dick Garwin notes in order to be
confident that the system would work, you would need 20
successes. If you have three failures, then you need 47
successes, and we are nowhere near meeting those cirteria.
Every time one system doesn't work supporters turn to
another system. I have lived through Excaliber, Brilliant Eyes,
Brilliant Pebbles and now I hear people talking about new, more
robust systems. I recently debated former CIA Director Jim
Woolsey on boost-phase. If the Pentagon is going to go to that
system, it will need a new, more advanced intercepter as well
as more sophisticated radar and command systems. In order to
develop and test that system precisely; as we should, it will
take 5 to 7 years. When supporters talk about a more robust and
layered system, they should know the devil is in the details. I
think it is important to find out what specifically they are
talking about.
Supporters of NMD are arguing that it doesn't have to be
that reliable. But, this is not just any weapons system. Don't
forget that we have spent $100 billion already and we have
nothing, we have no guarantee that spending another $100
billion will produce something that is technologically
acceptable.
The ABM treaty is still valid. President Bush was the one
who wanted to make the Russians the Soviet successor state. In
fact, Secretary Baker demanded that they do and the President
made the statement. So if you want to go against it, you are
going to have to modify it. It still is in effect and, in fact,
Congress, in 1996 basically, by talking about modifications to
ABM, implicitly recognized that the Russians were the Soviet--
were the successor state.
And then finally, I would like to quote a man who I had the
privilege of serving for 5 years, President Reagan. When he
came up with this, he dictated no timetable and did not
prejudge any specific technology.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Korb follows:]
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Mr. Shays. I have just come to the conclusion that if you
want to change a bland statement to one that's quite forceful,
just keep the person waiting awhile. Your statement is said
almost tongues compared to the way you spoke just this past few
minutes.
What kind of schedule do you have, Dr. Korb?
Mr. Korb. Well, I am OK now, thanks to one of your
crackerjack assistants here.
Mr. Shays. OK. I know that you had another meeting. I
appreciate you adjusting that. Thank you.
I think we now go to Dr. Graham. Oh, Dr. Graham has left.
He went.
Dr. Gronlund. I am sorry. You were to be No. 2 and now you
are No. 3. Thank you.
Ms. Gronlund. That's fine. So do I need to do anything or
am I live?
Mr. Shays. You are live.
Ms. Gronlund. I am live. OK. Thank you very much. I
appreciate the opportunity to appear here. I am very impressed
that you were able to continue to work without lunch.
I have been asked to comment on two issues, the National
Missile Defense testing program and the compliance of various
proposed NMD systems with the ABM treaty. In light of President
Clinton's recent announcement that his administration will not
authorize deployment of its planned NMD system, I have focused
my comments to be relevant to the decisions the next President
might make about this or any other National Missile Defense
system.
If the next President does decide to proceed with
deployment of an NMD system, it may differ somewhat from the
one that is currently under development. For example, the
United States could take a totally different approach by
developing a boost-phased defense. However, if the United
States continues to develop an NMD system designed to intercept
missiles in the mid-course of their trajectory, it will
necessarily operate in the same basic way as the one the
Clinton administration has been developing. Any mid-course
system, regardless of whether the interceptors are ground-based
or sea-based or air-based, would use infrared homing hit-to-
kill interceptors guided by ground-based radars and space-based
infrared sensors, as would the system currently under
development.
So let me now turn to the issue of the NMD test program. I
will focus on several questions. What would the next
administration need to know about the effectiveness of the NMD
system before it could make a well-informed deployment
decision? Based on the tests conducted so far, what do we know?
Based on the planned test program, what will we know and when
will we know it? And finally, what would a test program look
like that was adequate to provide the next administration with
the information it needs to make a deployment decision?
What should the United States know about any NMD system
before it could make a well-informed deployment decision? As
noted in the 1998 report of the Welch panel, the first Welch
report, three steps are needed to demonstrate that an NMD
technology is viable. So the test program must demonstrate,
first, reliable hit-to-kill; second, reliable hit-to-kill at a
weapons system level and; third, reliable hit-to-kill against
real world targets.
I note that there is a significant difference between
demonstrating the ability to do something--which may require
only one test, and demonstrating the ability to do so
reliably--which requires many tests.
Now the NMD test program, as we heard previously from Dr.
Coyle, has demonstrated hit-to-kill but not reliable hit-to-
kill nor reliable hit-to-kill at a weapons systems level.
However, there is no fundamental reason to doubt that the
United States can do so, perhaps by the end of the 19 tests
scheduled so far through the next 4 to 5 years.
So I will focus on the third and the most demanding
criteria laid out by the Welch panel, demonstrating reliable
hit-to-kill against real world targets; namely those that
incorporate countermeasures.
In his September 1st announcement that he would not
authorize deployment, President Clinton stated that there,
quote, remained questions to be resolved about the ability of
the system to deal with countermeasures. Unfortunately, this is
likely to remain the case unless major changes are made to the
planned test program. At a fundamental level, the current test
program is not configured to provide the next President with
any information about whether the proposed NMD system could
reliably intercept real world targets with realistic
countermeasures. Although the current NMD program assumes that
the countermeasure threat will continue to evolve and that the
full system that might be deployed after 2010 will be able to
deal with complex countermeasures, all the tests conducted so
far and all those scheduled through at least the first term of
the next administration will be only of the system against the,
quote, defined C-1 threat.
What is the defined C-1 threat? How does it correspond to
the real world threat? The detailed definition of the C-1
threat is classified, but there is some public information that
allows us to understand something about how it has been
defined. The most detailed publicly available official document
that discusses countermeasures that would be available to
emerging missile states is the September 1999 National
Intelligence Estimate. It states that emerging missile states
probably would rely on, ``readily available technology to
develop countermeasures,'' and that they could do so, quote, by
the time they flight test their missiles.
Moreover, the NIE lists several of these technologies that
emerging missile states could use. However, in response to
questions during his testimony before a Senate Armed Services
Committee hearing on June 29th, earlier this summer, Lieutenant
General Kadish stated that the defined C-1 threat does not
include many of the countermeasure technologies identified in
the NIE as being readily available to emerging missile states.
Thus, the targets the NMD system would be tested against
exclude the very countermeasures that the U.S. intelligence
community has stated would be available by the time the missile
threat exists.
Another fundamental limitation of the testing program is
that the defense has known in advance what the expected
characteristics of the decoy and the warhead would be, and
there is no reason to assume that in the real world, the United
States would know what the characteristics of an emerging
missile state warhead would be.
So unless the definition of the C-1 threat is changed, the
test program continued by the next administration will tell us
nothing about the ability of the proposed NMD system to
intercept real world targets.
So what would an adequate test program look like? The
report, the Rumsfeld Commission report, called attention to two
important issues relevant to countermeasure threat and
analysis. First, the failure to detect direct evidence does not
mean that no such development is occurring.
Second, given the possibility of emerging missile states
hiding their development programs, a threat analysis must
assess what weapons or what countermeasures a country is
capable of developing. This has been dubbed THINK-INT, or think
intelligence.
I was on a panel of 11 independent physicists and engineers
that applied this THINK-INT methodology to understanding what
countermeasures would be available to a country able to develop
and deploy a long-range ballistic missile. Our premise was that
missile and countermeasure capabilities would be consistent
with each other.
The panel produced a very detailed report, which I have
here, which was published in April of this year by the Union of
Concerned Scientists and the MIT Security Studies program. In
our analysis, we assumed that the NMD system had all of the
sensors and interceptors planned for the full system that would
be deployed by 2010 or later. This is the system the Pentagon
says will be effective against missile attacks using complex
countermeasures.
We, in the report, surveyed the types of countermeasures
that would be available to an emerging missile state and then
go into considerable detail on three of those. First, are
biological weapons deployed on submunitions? The second, are
nuclear weapons deployed with anti-simulation balloon decoys?
And the third, are nuclear weapons covered with liquid
nitrogen-cooled shroud?
There is more detail about this in my prepared testimony
and I will skip over that here, but say that we found that each
of these three countermeasures would defeat the fully deployed
NMD system.
Now, none of the technical analysis in our report has been
publicly disputed, and I believe in his testimony today,
Lieutenant General Kadish acknowledges that.
The main criticism levied at our report is that we
underestimated how difficult it would be for emerging missile
states to actually build and deploy the countermeasures we
describe.
We believe that this criticism is incorrect because a
country capable of building both an intercontinental range
ballistic missile and either a nuclear warhead or biological
warhead to arm such a missile would clearly be able to build
simple countermeasures. But there is a time-honored way to
answer questions like this, which is: do the experiment. As we
recommend in the countermeasures report, the United States
should establish an independent countermeasures red team whose
job it would be to develop, build and test countermeasures
using technology available to emerging missile states. Because
a red team would try to build countermeasures, this type of
intelligence gathering has been referred to as TRY-INT. And I
believe it was Dr. Graham who initially dubbed it TRY-INT.
Then the planned NMD system should be tested against the
countermeasures the red team determines would be available to
potential attackers. So regardless of what NMD system the next
administration pursues, it is essential that independent THINK-
INT and TRY-INT programs be established to analyze and build
countermeasures to the planned NMD.
Once these programs determined which countermeasures were
feasible, the United States must then assess how effective they
would be against the planned NMD system through analysis and
flight testing. And it should only decide to deploy a system
once it has met all three of the Welch panel's criteria. In
particular, and I will end with this, no NMD system should be
deployed until it is demonstrated that it can reliably
intercept real world targets using countermeasures.
Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gronlund follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Dr. Holmes, thank you.
Mr. Holmes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I feel like
the last of the Mohicans here.
Mr. Shays. Well, there is a little edge to this panel. I
think it is maybe lunch or something.
Mr. Holmes. Well, thank you very much for giving me the
opportunity to be here today. I have with me, as mentioned
earlier, Baker Spring, who is the Heritage Foundation's senior
analyst on missile defense matters, to help answer any of your
questions.
I would like to take the opportunity this afternoon, if I
could, to provide you with some of my conclusions regarding the
implications not only of the July 7 missile defense test, but
also how the entire missile defense testing program is going.
My first conclusion is that weak missile defense technology
was not the cause of the failed intercept test on July 7th. The
primary reason the test interceptor did not destroy its target
was because of the problem with a rocket technology that is 20
years old and that was built 10 years ago. It is therefore
factually incorrect to conclude that the failure of the July 7
test proves that missile defenses are not technologically
feasible. If anything, the results of other tests in the past
suggest the opposite.
During the first flight test of the kill vehicle in October
of last year, the system found and destroyed its target without
the benefit of many of the advanced tracking command, control,
and communication technologies now being tested. And over the
last year, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization can claim
six successful test intercepts of theater and National Missile
Defense technology compared with only three significant
failures. I think no fair assessment of the facts could lead
anyone to conclude that a 66 percent success rate suggests that
missile defenses are not technologically feasible and therefore
should not be deployed. As a matter of fact, that is basically
the conclusion that Secretary of Defense Cohen has reached.
My second conclusion is that even if the July 7 test were a
failure and can be blamed on new missile defense technologies,
it would make no difference as far as the decision to deploy is
concerned. A decision to deploy a National Missile Defense has
already been made. The National Missile Defense Act of 1999
requires the fielding of a national missile defense system as
soon as is technologically possible. Signed by President
Clinton on July 22, 1999, this act is the law of the land. It
is therefore a legal requirement that the Federal Government
continue to develop and test a variety of systems to find the
most effective and near-term alternative. The Congress and the
President have spoken. We must now find out how best to
proceed, not whether to proceed.
My third conclusion is that removing testing restraints
will reduce technical risk in the program. The administration's
National Missile Defense testing program is focused exclusively
on the option of deploying interceptors at a fixed land-based
site. This rules out other approaches that may prove to be more
technologically feasible and more militarily effective. For
example, despite the wealth of recommendations that the United
States pursue a sea-based option, the administration policy
bars even the development and testing, let alone the
deployment, of sea-based systems.
The Clinton administration's refusal to test sea-based
systems is all the more puzzling because they appear to be so
promising. For example, recent press reports indicate that a
Pentagon study requested by Congress, but which the Congress
has not yet received, states that a sea-based system would add
significant capabilities to the land-based interceptors of the
sort that was tested on July 7.
Furthermore, the Chief of Naval Operations on February 18th
stated in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense that
foreclosing the sea-based option would, ``not be in the best
long-term interests of our country.''
I agree with the CNO that foreclosing the sea-based option
would be shortsighted, which raises a question: If testing is
required to discern the feasibility of land-based technologies,
why is it ruled out to discern the feasibility of sea-based
systems?
The answer appears to be in the administration's adherence
to the ABM Treaty. The constraints that the ABM Treaty is
imposing on the testing program are having serious effects, as
Dr. Graham has said, both on the quality and the timetable of
the entire missile defense program, as they have had on a
number of missile defense programs over the last decades.
For example, the Patriot missiles of Gulf war fame were
deliberately downgraded during the 1970's and the 1980's to
comply with the ABM Treaty. As a result, the United States had
to deploy systems less capable than they could have during
Desert Storm.
Like the Patriot, the Navy's Aegis tracking systems and
interceptors have been repeatedly downgraded to comply with the
ABM treaty. The system was constrained in the 1980's to avoid a
violation of the treaty, but the Bush administration later
initiated a substantial upgrade to the system that would allow
it to track and intercept ballistic missiles. Unfortunately,
because of the ABM treaty, the Clinton administration severely
cut and delayed this program.
The Clinton administration imposed restrictions on the
testing of theater defense systems which prevent external
sensors from providing early warning tracking and targeting
data about possible launches to the interceptor; likewise, a
system of space-based, low altitude sensors, which could have
allowed the Navy theater-wide system to provide a limited
protection from attacks on American soil, also have been
delayed.
And as Chairman Shays mentioned this morning, I can find no
other reason than the ABM treaty to understand why the Alaska
radar was not being constructed. If there was, in fact, no
technological reason, although we did not hear from the panel
this morning, I would venture to say that the main reason was
because they consider it to be a violation of the ABM treaty,
and that was the main reason why they decided not to proceed.
Despite the outcome of the July 7 test, the Pentagon, I
think, must move forward quickly with the development and
deployment of missile defenses for America. And to that end,
Congress and the executive branch should make every effort to
field missile defenses as soon as technologically possible, as
the law requires. We should be abandoning the policy of trying
to revive the defunct ABM treaty and lift all restrictions on
testing of missile defense systems. We have been talking all
morning about testing. The assumption apparently behind testing
is to try to get the best system you can get. The ABM treaty is
restricting the way we do that job.
I also recommend that a sea-based element be included in
all missile defense deployment plans and that Congress be
holding more hearings at the earliest possible time about
alternative technical options like the sea-based system that I
mentioned before.
Mr. Chairman, the Clinton administration has chosen to
impose restraints on the testing of missile defense systems. If
missile defense testing continues to be managed in this way,
the testing restraints will produce the self-fulfilling
prophecy of ineffective systems. By intentionally foregoing
promising avenues of development such as the sea-based systems,
the administration has chosen a course that will inevitably
result in a system that will not be optimally effective. Our
goal should be instead to develop and deploy the most effective
missile defense system possible.
Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Holmes follows:]
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Mr. Shays. This ought to be a very interesting panel to
hear your answers to the questions, and we will start with
Helen Chenoweth-Hage.
Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage. You did that right, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much. It confuses me sometimes, too.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. You are very gracious.
Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wanted to direct some of my comments or questions to Mr.
Korb.
Mr. Korb, you commented on the Patriot missile, anti-
missile missile. But wasn't the Patriot anti-missile missile
designed originally as an anti-aircraft?
Mr. Korb. That's how it started. As a matter of fact, it
was former Vice President Quayle that got the Congress to put
money into Patriot give it an anti-missile capability. That
plan was not put forward by either the Reagan or Bush
administrations, that is correct. Patriot was originally built
as an anti-aircraft system.
Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage. And a very courageous Army colonel in
Huntsville, AL, actually directed the startup of the production
lines on his own authority, recently retired but he upgraded
the software and deployment system in the Patriot.
You know, it's my understanding, Mr. Korb, that the U.S.
aerospace community has repeatedly met more daunting and
challenging engineering challenges than that posed by finishing
up what we have already started. And it would seem to me that
our biggest concerns, as a Congress, should be looking at
better management practices. I mean, in your testimony you
stated that we need to be involved in at least 7 more years of
vigorous research before we can make an informed choice on
deployment, but if we could concentrate on some of the
management practices and removal of the political constraints,
I think that we would be miles ahead.
Mr. Korb, this is the reason I make this statement. We have
had a number of successes that we are not talking about, and we
muddle around in the ABM treaty and we forget the successes
that have been instituted and have actually occurred since 1955
when we first started this.
Now, using pre-SDI technology in 1984, the Army's HOE
experiment launched from an island in the Pacific, South
Pacific, of a Volkswagen-sized kill vehicle to intercept a
Minuteman missile, launch from Vandenberg Air Force base in
southern California, that was a success, wasn't it?
Mr. Korb. Are you talking about the homing overlay
experiment?
Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage. I am talking about the homing overlay
experiment.
Mr. Korb. Well, as it turned out, the Congress found out
some years later that that test was rigged, this came to light
after the Reagan administration left office. In fact, I believe
there was a GAO investigation and a congressional.
Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage. Well, I----
Mr. Korb. I don't disagree with your point that we could
eventually get the technology to work. I think that to the
extent that you do concurrent research development, you are
increasing the chances that you are going to have what General
Welch called a rush to failure.
I would also point out that not every system works. We have
had spectacular failures. The division air defense (DIVAD) gun
was a system that we tried to rush and it never worked, and in
fact, it was because of the testing DIVAD there that Congress
passed a law that set up Mr. Coyle's office.
Secretary Cheney had to cancel the A-12 because it just
wasn't working.
So it may work, but my point is to the extent that you
rush, you increase the chances that it won't.
Another point, this is not just another system. This, if it
doesn't work, then you are going to have what Chairman Burton
talked about before, that is missiles raining down on the
country. Then all the money you have spent will have gone in
vain. It is not like flying a plane, where you get to go make a
second pass.
Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage. Well, you know, because there have
been allegations of tests being rigged, I am not convinced that
they were. What I am convinced of is this, that we learned a
lot from that launch, that whole launch, and in addition to
that the Air Force successfully intercepted a dying low
altitude satellite with its miniature homing vehicle launched
from an F-15, also using pre-SDI technology.
The SDI program instituted a major technology demonstration
program that placed priority on dramatically reducing the size
and weight of critical compulsion and sensor and data
processing and other electronic systems, we have already done
that, and to enable an effective hit-to-kill interceptor
system. Why are we continuing to drape crepe? Most notable
among these demonstration systems was the delta series or what
would has become familiar to us as the delta star series, in
1989, which over a 9-month period gathered very important
information. That's all been done.
Also in 1989 the Army's E-risk program repeated the HOE
experience with a much lighter interceptor kill vehicle, using
mid-1980's technology. There have been numerous other
experiments that demonstrate the maturity of the basic
technology.
So I don't want to see us just mull around in the ABM
treaty while other countries are advancing their systems and we
are muddled down trying to reinvent the wheel.
The SDI program has produced the technology that was
demonstrated in the award winning 1994 Clementine mission,
which returned to the moon for the first time in 25 years and
provided over a million frames of optical data. That's all in
our history of what we have produced. But, unfortunately,
President Clinton, in his short-lived veto, line item veto
authority, killed the Clementine, an award-winning program that
all of aerospace looked at.
So, Mr. Korb, my concern is, as former President John
Kennedy was noted as saying regarding the space program, one
can always make the perfect the enemy of the good, and this
seems to me to be exactly what we are trying to do, by not
recognizing the accomplishments but focusing on our test
setbacks.
So I thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Korb. Thank you.
Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage. I wanted to ask Mr. Spring about the
ABM treaty. You know, it seems to me that this treaty has
succeeded in its purpose of blocking the development, testing
and deployment of an effective defense anti-ballistic missile
system, at least for the United States; and that last
parenthetical phrase is what concerns us all.
Mr. Spring. Sure.
Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage. This seems to meet the objectives of
those who wish to preserve the cold war mutual assured
destruction policy that I have referred to earlier, a doctrine
which may benefit some but certainly doesn't move us to mutual
assured survivability.
I wonder if you would like to comment on that?
Mr. Spring. Well, certainly the treaty does--and it was
designed to, from the outset--impose limitations on development
and testing as well as deployment. Those restrictions are found
in articles 5 and 6 of the treaty. They affect sea-based,
space-based, mobile, ground-based and air-based systems. In my
judgment, in terms of development and testing, to put it in the
context of, say, for example, the moon mission, we would say
that well, we are going to go to the moon, but we have a
restriction that we can't use liquid-fueled rockets, or that we
can't use advanced computer technology. That, in other words,
all of the options that would otherwise be put on the table are
now being taken off as a matter of political constraint and
diplomatic constraint.
The other restriction in article 6 says we can't take
theater missile defense systems and upgrade them to give them a
long-range or strategic ballistic missile defense capability.
Well, the fact of the matter is that our most advanced
technologies, because they have been proceeding in relative
terms to the NMD system now in a relatively unconstrained
fashion, are among the most advanced; and, therefore, some of
the best avenues to providing, in my judgment, the most
effective missile defense system that we can obtain as soon as
possible, according to law, would be to upgrade our missile
defense systems that are now categorized as theater defenses.
Those include most particularly the Navy theater-wide
program. So in my judgment, we are proceeding in this program
essentially with one hand tied behind our backs, as a result of
the diplomatic and political constraints that are imposed on it
through what I view to be unilateral observance of ABM
restrictions as a matter of policy by the Clinton
administration.
It is not, in my judgment, a free and fair exploration of
all the technological options that would be available to the
defense community.
Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage. Thank you, Mr. Spring.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much. Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. Dr. Holmes, Mr. Spring, I am a
little struck by what I think is a rather extreme argument in
your statement that the ABM treaty should no longer be
considered binding based on an argument, I guess, that since
the Soviet Union dissolved Russia is not bound by the same
agreements, and I see that you cited a couple of prominent
individuals who share that view but I would like to ask you a
question about the implications of that.
Do you believe on that basis that no treaties currently
exist between Russia and the United States other than the few
that we might have signed since the break-up of the Soviet
Union? So I guess that would mean that no previous arms
treaties, no status of force agreements, no trade pacts, none
of these continue to exist in your mind?
Mr. Holmes. Well, many of the treaties that existed with
the Soviet Union have been handled on an individual basis, and
so has, actually, the ABM treaty. There was a multilaterization
treaty, a successor agreement that was signed with four
countries, Ukraine, Belarus, Khazakhstan and Russia, that the
Clinton administration signed and must be sent up to the Senate
for its advice and consent before it becomes the law of the
land. So even the administration believes that something must
be done to have a legally binding treaty. Otherwise, they would
not have negotiated that agreement.
So, therefore, to answer that question you have to handle
each one of these agreements separately. The ABM treaty has
been handled separately. It is now a successor agreement that
has to be sent up to the Senate. If the Senate approves that
and ratifies it, then it will be binding. If it doesn't----
Mr. Tierney. What about the status of forces agreement and
trade pacts, do you think they are all out the window?
Mr. Spring. Let me answer that question. The finding that
we had done for us by the law firm of Hunton and Williams was
that the ABM treaty is null and void by reason of impossibility
of performance. That is, there was no state in existence today
that could have fulfilled the obligations the treaty imposed on
the Soviet Union, primarily for reasons of geographic scope.
The ABM treaty imposed restrictions with regard to the
territory of the Soviet Union which Russia does not control. As
a result of the impossibility of performance on obligations
that are unique to the ABM treaty, the treaty is null and void
by force of international law.
That does not speak to the obligations of the United States
relative to other treaty obligations with the Soviet Union and
the succession issues that would surround them.
Mr. Tierney. Thanks.
Mr. Holmes. Could I add one thing to that, if I may?
Mr. Tierney. Sure. Sure.
Mr. Holmes. This is also the view, by the way, not only of
the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but
also the Senate Majority Leader, who have, in many
communications with the White House, made the same point that
we have made here; primarily, that the successor agreement must
be sent up to the Senate for ratification before it becomes the
law of the land.
Mr. Tierney. Terrific.
Dr. Gronlund, let me ask you about the latest intercept
flight test, the IFT-5. The Department of Defense provided a
briefing and gave us some slides, and one of them listed all
the mission objectives that were supposedly accomplished by
that IFT-5 test. When you look at it--well, first you know what
countermeasures were included in that target sweep?
Ms. Gronlund. There was one large spherical balloon decoy.
Mr. Tierney. What happened to the deployment of that
particular countermeasure?
Ms. Gronlund. It didn't inflate. It didn't deploy properly.
Mr. Tierney. My problem is anyway, that would be an
unsuccessful interceptor, wouldn't you think so?
Ms. Gronlund. Well, they never got to the point of testing
the intercept because the killr vehicle did not release from
the booster properly.
Mr. Tierney. Can you explain to me then how the Department
of Defense indicates that for discrimination, the full
objective of their plan was met? How would they get to that
conclusion given that scenario?
Ms. Gronlund. No, I don't know that, actually. I don't.
Mr. Tierney. All right. Let me discuss with you a little
bit, you mentioned three different countermeasures that you
thought were--that you actually went into in further depth in
your report.
Ms. Gronlund. Yes.
Mr. Tierney. One of them was submunitions.
Ms. Gronlund. Yes.
Mr. Tierney. As I understand it, you are not only talking
about submunitions with nuclear warheads, you are talking about
submunitions with biological or chemical warheads?
Ms. Gronlund. Particularly biological warheads.
Mr. Tierney. The premise being that any country like North
Korea, Iran or Iraq, if they were to have the capacity to send
up an anti-ballistic missile, they probably also have the
capacity to use submunitions on those?
Ms. Gronlund. Right. A country that had an ICBM and had a
biological weapon would also be able to simply separate that
agent into 100 or more bomblets. This was something that I
believe the Rumsfeld Commission first noted would be an option
for an emerging missile state, and people have raised various
concerns about reentry heating, about disposal, and those are
the things that we looked into in great detail in our report.
Mr. Tierney. And your report indicated that submunitions--
--
Ms. Gronlund. That if the country could already have a
biological weapon that it could deliver by long-range missile,
it could just as readily put them on submunitions.
Mr. Tierney. Now, if you had as few as five missiles.
Ms. Gronlund. Yes.
Mr. Tierney. Could you put 100 submunitions on each one?
Ms. Gronlund. Yes.
Mr. Tierney. You'd have 500 submunitions of biological
agent coming over, disbursing--in fact, that probably would be
preferable if you were a rogue country and you really wanted to
disburse that agent. It'd be better to have 100 different
places of release than it would be just one, right?
Ms. Gronlund. It probably would, yes.
Mr. Tierney. So if you had 500 coming over, even after we
go to C-3 on this stage, what are the total number of
interceptors that the system currently envisions?
Ms. Gronlund. Which is 250 interceptors. Even if they were
perfectly effective, fewer than half of the bomblets would be
destroyed.
Mr. Tierney. So we should probably be real honest with the
American people and tell them that in terms of biological
weapons at least----
Ms. Gronlund. Yes.
Mr. Tierney [continuing]. This system doesn't cut it.
Ms. Gronlund. Right, right.
Mr. Tierney. And I would guess you might even make the
argument that if I were a rogue nation, I would be encouraged
to go that path as opposed to nuclear, since I knew you might
be trying to provide some sort of a nuclear deterrent.
Ms. Gronlund. That is a possibility. I mean, the other
reason biological agents might be more attractive than nuclear
weapons to an emerging missile state is that it's hard to get
the fissile material that you need to make a nuclear weapon.
And, for example, North Korea reportedly has enough material to
make one or two nuclear weapons, but there's no, de facto limit
to how many biological weapons it could make.
Mr. Tierney. Can you talk to us for a bit about the
difference between effectiveness and competence?
Ms. Gronlund. Oh, boy. OK. Let's say that you want to have
a system that is 95 percent effective but you also need to know
with some amount of certainty what the effectiveness is. For
example, if I gave you a coin, I said this coin is weighted and
I want you to tell me what the weighting is, and I let you flip
it once and it lands on heads, would you then say I am 100
percent certain that this coin is weighted so it will always
come up heads? No.
OK. So there's both a certain confidence level of what the
effectiveness is, or if you're looking at the coin example, how
the coin is weighted, and the only way you can become highly
confident of what the weighting of the coin actually is is by
flipping it a lot of times. Or the analogy with missile defense
testing, the only way you can know with high confidence how
effective the system would be is to test it a lot of times.
Mr. Tierney. Now, if we had--and I won't go into all of
those of when we talked earlier--but a fairly significant
number of relatively simple countermeasures that were available
now to rogue nations, it wouldn't be enough to test against
each one of those countermeasures individually. Wouldn't we
have to test about them in different combinations?
Ms. Gronlund. Ideally, to have confidence the system would
work against an attack using countermeasures, you would want to
consider a lot of different possibilities, a lot of different
real world conditions, yes.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Korb, maybe if I just ask you to answer
this: If we didn't have great confidence in the system, what
good does it do us?
Mr. Korb. Could you speak a little louder?
Mr. Tierney. Sure. If we don't have a high level of
confidence in the effectiveness of this type of national
missile defense system, would it still be an important element,
or what sort of an element would it be in our entire defense?
Mr. Korb. Well, it obviously would be much more important
than any other system because the purpose of this is to detect
an attack by a rogue nation using a weapon of mass destruction,
and if it doesn't work, all of the money the Nation spent on
NMD is wasted. It is not just another weapons system. We have
lots of weapons systems. If an airplane goes in and it misses
its target, you can come back again and hit it, but you get one
shot at this, and if you miss, then in fact you've wasted all
your money. So that's why you have to have a higher degree of
confidence that it will be effective.
Mr. Tierney. So, therefore, the more importance of
testing----
Mr. Korb. It's much more important to test it more, say,
than the B-1 bomber. The B-1 bomber was rushed into production;
it hasn't worked well yet, but it didn't mean as much as NMD,
because we then came with the B-2 we had other ways to deliver
bombs on target.
Mr. Tierney. One of the supposed purposes for this system
is to avoid accidental launchings or to at least protect
against accidental launchings from Russia or some other
country. They already have sophisticated countermeasures, don't
they?
Mr. Korb. The Soviets have not only countermeasures, they
have missiles with multiple warheads on them. Remember, that's
why they first developed the multiple warheads was to be
decoys. And then somebody said, gee, why do you want to just
have decoys, let's make them real. And so in effect it spreads
apart and you then have to--several of them even if you hit 1,
the other 3, 4 or 10 get through.
Mr. Tierney. So it's not really effective against a
biological submunitions scenario and it has limited effect
against an accidental launch from Russians with multiple
warheads----
Mr. Korb. If it's a multiple warhead, that's correct.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. First, I would like to ask if any of you would
like to comment to any question that wasn't asked of you by
Helen or John. Yes.
Mr. Holmes. I'd like to comment on this idea that the
missile defense system has to be perfect or near perfect before
it can justify actually building it. First of all, I know of no
weapons system that demands perfection before you actually
begin deployment. But the idea that somehow we would have more
or less permanently, after we made a decision to deploy, a
national missile defense system that would forever be static or
stays the way it is--it will not improve over time--seems to me
to underestimate not only what we have learned from the history
of the development of weapons systems, but also the
technological capacity of this country. Because the fact of the
matter is, it's hard for me to imagine if we made--if we
actually deploy a missile defense system, that it will be a 100
percent failure. It might have failure at the margins. Perhaps
sometimes it would catch some missile; maybe it won't catch all
of them. But it would at least catch some of them. And so,
therefore, there would be some effect on the saving of lives of
Americans even if it is only partially successful. So the idea
that it has to be 100 percent successful before we even make
the decision to deploy seems to me to be a false assumption.
Mr. Spring. Maybe if I could just say something quickly
with regard to biological threat, and that is that, first, the
argument that is put forward with regard to the biological
threat in my judgment is a perfect argument for why we need a
boost-phase capability which we are currently prohibited from
even testing and developing, let alone deploying.
The second is that, at least with regard to biological
attack by missile or any other means, there's at least some
reasonable options for civil defense, and I certainly advocate
that we move forward with regard to those capabilities for
homeland defense. But with a nuclear weapon, I think that the
options for that are limited indeed. So I think that you have
some options with regard to biological attack that you wouldn't
have in the case of nuclear attack.
Mr. Korb. Let me make one comment on something that was
said earlier about the National Missile Defense Act of 1999. I
think an important point in the legislative history of that act
is Senator Levin's amendment to it which talks about the fact,
not just technologically feasible, but of the arms control
implications of a deployment. I think you cannot just say just
because it's technologically feasible, that's the end of the
situation. As I read the legislative history and the Levin
amendment, I think that also is a factor in the decision.
Mr. Spring. Let me comment on that.
Mr. Korb. Wait, we're going to be here forever. We all get
one shot here because I've got----
Ms. Gronlund. And I haven't gotten mine yet.
Mr. Shays. I thought I was in charge.
Ms. Gronlund. I'd like to comment on the notion of the need
for a 100 percent perfection. There is a difference--this is
the question Mr. Tierney asked me--between the effectiveness
and the confidence level. At a fundamental level, aside from
how effective the system would actually be, the United States
will not know how effective it will be, which will make it very
difficult to plan for using it.
Now one of the things that Secretary of Defense Cohen
says--in fact, he says the real reason we need this system is
to preserve U.S. freedom of action so the United States can
continue to use its conventional forces around the world
without fear of threat of being hit by a ballistic missile. And
he says if we have a national missile defense we don't need to
worry about that; but in fact, if we have a national missile
defense, the President and the policy planners will not know
how effective it would be.
So if we're now postulating that we're going to go around
the world preserving our freedom of action to intervene and yet
we don't know how effective our NMD system is, that could put
us in a situation we're actually encouraging attacks that
otherwise wouldn't have happened, and we still don't know how
effective the system is. And, feelings aside, you know, whether
or not people feel that the system would be somewhat effective
is irrelevant. It hasn't been proven. We have no basis--we have
no basis for knowing what the effectiveness is.
Mr. Shays. Let me--you know, I don't know why I need to say
this, but for anyone in my staff to suggest when a hearing ends
is more difficult than developing a national missile defense
system, and all of you have come before committees before. So I
don't know how many Members attend a hearing, and they get the
right to ask questions. Mr. Spring, I want to just hear what
your comment is.
Mr. Spring. On the----
Mr. Shays. What did you want to say?
Mr. Spring. I was going to say with regard to the National
Missile Defense Act, what was very clear in my judgment from
that legislative record is that there are dual goals of
deploying the national missile defense system, or requirement
in that case, and the goal of offensive reductions. Those also
mentioned in the act are not dependent on each other. In other
words, it is not a case that the search for offensive
reductions is indeed a requisite for the deployment of a
national missile defense system under the act.
Mr. Shays. Let me just ask----
Mr. Korb. I disagree respectfully on that, and I think the
legislative history will support my position. I didn't comment
on some of the things they said. If we're going to keep this
hearing going, I think we ought to adjourn for lunch and come
back. I thought you told us each to mention one thing we wish
we were asked, but I have strong disagreements----
Mr. Shays. I'd love to hear them and we'll get out of here
at five of--I'll hit the gavel--but I'd like to hear them. The
whole purpose of this is to have some issue of where the battle
is. And so do you want to--let's hear where you disagree.
Mr. Korb. I am not saying this has to be a perfect system
but it has to be better than your average weapons system. In
fact many weapons systems never do work. There is a history of
weapons systems, even after the lot of money, you not, being
able to function properly. And I think we have to recognize
that as we go into this debate.
Mr. Shays. You have 435 Members of Congress, 100 Senators,
and we have been somewhat over the lot on this issue, but I
have always believed in my heart of hearts that someday we will
want a missile defense system. I didn't want nuclear weapons in
space, but I didn't mind that we had sensors there, and I
basically have come to believe that we need to have a limited
national defense system. I'd just love to know in very short
terms whether you, Doctor, would feel we need that or we
shouldn't even consider it.
Ms. Gronlund. I think that it is something the United
States should continue R&D on, but I don't think it helps the
cause to deploy something that can't do the job.
Mr. Shays. Fair enough. But you are willing to say that we
should continue to see if we can develop a system?
Ms. Gronlund. Sure.
Mr. Korb. I think we ought to continue research and
development until we have a reasonable prospect that it will do
what it's supposed to do. But like any other weapons system,
you have to do a cost-effectiveness analysis in terms of what
it will cost, what you will get, and what you will give up to
get it.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Holmes.
Mr. Holmes. Well, yes, I think it's a strategic
requirement. It's the law of the land. I think that the
disagreements and problems of the Russians can be worked out.
We were very near doing that in the early 1990's in the Bush
administration. And I think that from what I have seen from
talking to technical experts, that you can have a reasonable
assurance that over time you will have an effective system.
Mr. Shays. Now, is it true that ABM, some of you have
suggested this, prevent us from developing a system--Dr.
Gronlund, maybe you would respond--that gives us all the
options for developing a system?
Ms. Gronlund. Well, I'm not quite sure what you mean, but
one charge that has been made is that the United States is
prevented from developing a sea-based system by the ABM Treaty
and that this would be much more effective. In fact, it would
have the very same limitations that the land-based system would
have. So I don't think the ABM Treaty is standing in the way--I
mean, there are problems well before that in terms of
developing an effective system.
Mr. Shays. Let me just hear Dr. Korb.
Mr. Korb. I agree that at some point the ABM Treaty will
prevent you from doing what you want, but I don't think we're
there yet.
Mr. Shays. But doing what you want in terms of deployment
or doing what you want in terms of even developing the maximum
and best system?
Mr. Korb. Well, I agree with, what Dr. Gronlund who said
that we are not there yet; that in other words, I see no
evidence that the program that has been started really since
the mid-1980's has ever gotten to the point where you'd have to
say, well, gee, if there wasn't an ABM Treaty, then I could
start now, today, to go ahead and move to the--into the next
step.
Mr. Shays. Maybe, Mr. Spring, I should have--you're the one
who introduced it, in your concept of liquid fuel versus----
Mr. Spring. Yes, exactly. My concern more generally--and
I'll come back to the sea-based system--is that if what we do
is at the outset say that we're going to limit ourselves to
R&D, and in fact limit ourselves to only a narrow scope of R&D,
you will never be in the position to get to saying at the level
of assurance that my colleagues on the panel want to obtain the
level of confidence for deployment.
Mr. Shays. But let me just specifically--is there any type
of testing that we are prevented to be able to do because of
the ABM Treaty?
Mr. Spring. Absolutely, and let me just use a specific
example. We cannot, under the administration's policy as it
interprets the ABM Treaty and applies it today, test a sea-
based ballistic missile for ascent-phase intercept capability
against a ballistic missile that flies faster than 5 kilometers
per second.
Mr. Shays. And that's a significant example. Any others?
Mr. Spring. The same thing would obtain to range; 3,500
kilometers, against a target ballistic missile with a range in
excess of 3,500 kilometers.
Mr. Tierney. I want Dr. Gronlund to respond to that.
Ms. Gronlund. But we're not at the point where that is an
issue. We don't have a sea-based system that is capable of
intercepting long-range missiles; and if we did, it would have
the same technical issues associated with it as the ground-
based system. The basing mode is irrelevant if it's a mid-
course hit-to-kill interceptor. Where it's launched from is
irrelevant to whether it will work and whether it can deal with
countermeasures.
Mr. Shays. If we could just divide up the next 10 minutes,
and then we'll call it quits.
Mr. Tierney. Fine. Thanks. I actually have less than that.
I think early on when Mr. Allen was making his remarks, he was
pretty salient when he said that if we had a system that
actually could work to a high degree of effectiveness that we
had confidence in and that wasn't going to end up with less
security for this country in terms of our relations with other
countries and the effect that it would have overall, that we
all should look at trying to implement it. And the fact is
we're not anywhere near that yet. We're not anywhere near that
in terms of the technical capability of this program. I think
the evidence has shown that very clearly today, and I think
there's still some larger questions as to how we relate to our
former adversaries, now friends hopefully, as well as our
allies, in all the other considerations and the further
considerations of whether or not this is the best priority for
us to be attending to, when in fact there are any number of
other dangers, not the least of which are biological weapons
and chemical weapons and other ways of delivery that we ought
to be considering.
So all of those things said, I think the President's
decision was right where it should have been, that it was much
too premature to deploy. And I think that the plan of the
national missile defense at the current time does not allow for
the degree of testing that would warrant us to feel real
confident that this is the direction we want to go in.
We should have a plan that has a lot more testing, that
would give us a lot more confidence in the effectiveness of
this particular system before we move forward. And then it
should have a system or a regime where those tests are analyzed
by a relatively independent agency, by an absolutely
independent agency. And if it is going to be Mr. Coyle's
group--and I think he's done a marvelous job on a lot of things
that he's done--that people ought to have to listen to him.
The legislation that we have now setting up his branch
merely gives him advisory capacity. Although he was right on
the money with the status, the current status of our situation
and the fact that we shouldn't deploy, the Department of
Defense was fully ready to ignore his advice on this particular
occasion. I don't think that's a healthy thing for us.
So I think the witnesses today have done us a considerable
service, both panels. I want to thank this panel very much for
taking your time and extending later into the afternoon than
certainly you anticipated, but I think it's been extremely
helpful, and want to thank you.
Mr. Shays. I did want to ask another question before I said
where I come down. So thank you for interrupting. I am not
clear as to why I should care what Europe feels about ABM, when
this was an agreement negotiated with the Russians, and in my
judgment is somewhat outdated. And, Mr. Korb, you can respond
to that and I'll throw it out to the others.
Mr. Korb. Well, you've got one practical reason. If you
want an effective system and one that's under development,
you're going to need consent of Denmark and England to put
the--enhance the radars in their country. That's one.
I think, No. 2, you do have a whole set of relationships
with Europe that go into lots of areas, not the least of which
is the future of NATO. And if in fact you create a situation
where there's a break between the United States and Europe in
terms of the way that they approach problems, this will
undermine us.
Mr. Shays. But they didn't negotiate the ABM Treaty with
us.
Mr. Korb. No, I understand, I understand, and I am not
arguing that you have to give them a veto. But your question
is, should we be concerned? I think you need to be concerned
with how they feel because we have a whole web of relationships
with them that could be affected.
Now, in the final analysis, I don't think anybody would
argue that the United States should let other nations have a
veto over its security. Nobody is arguing that. But what you're
talking about here is you're not at a stage where you want to
force that issue and the consequences, given what's happened
with the technology. Even Dr. Kissinger, who supports that in
the piece he wrote in the Washington Post, said, you know,
before you go ahead with, you know, abrogating the ABM Treaty
and causing all these things, you better decide what system you
have and, you know, that you're ready to go ahead with it.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Dr. Gronlund, and then I'll come to you. Dr. Gronlund,
comment about that question I asked in regards to paying
attention to the Europeans. I think you----
Ms. Gronlund. Yes, I guess--I think U.S. security is more
than just the sum of the weapons systems that we deploy, and in
part it relies on our alliance relationship and our
relationship to countries that aren't our allies yet; in
particular, Russia and China. So what we are trying to do, I
hope, is to maximize our security overall, and it may well be
that going forward with something that has marginal security
benefits in terms of being able to defend against emerging
missile states and upsets our allies in Europe and upsets
Russia and China would be a net negative. So I think that's a
valid question. That really is the big picture that we all
should be looking at.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Holmes.
Mr. Holmes. I certainly wouldn't advocate ignoring our
allies in Europe, but I think one of the reasons why they are
so hesitant--it's not the only reason--but one of reasons why
is they sense the administration is not fully committed to the
program, and it's therefore sensing that they're not getting
any leadership from the United States; say, for example the
kind of leadership that you got from Ronald Reagan during the
Euromissile crisis when there was also a tremendous debate
about the deployment of SS-20 missiles in Europe. That kind of
leadership shows the allies will come along when the United
States leads. The United States is not leading on this issue.
They sense weakness, they sense uncertainty, so therefore
they're hesitating and holding back.
The President said last week, when he announced his
decision to delay deployment, that no nation has a veto over
deployment. If you look at the speech the way that came, he had
spoken for almost 6 or 7 minutes about why because of China,
because of Russia, because of NATO allies, etc., he was making
the decision because of their objections, he was not going to
proceed; and then he proceeds to say that no nation has a veto.
Is that a theoretical possibility or is in fact that always
going to be the case because of the uncertainty that Russia and
China have?
Mr. Shays. Thank you. My observation is simply to say that
our national missile defense system is, in fact, the law of the
land. I'm not convinced, frankly, and I'm happy to have you
comment, but I'm not convinced that the administration was an
eager participant, and so it leaves me a little uneasy. I would
have thought that we would have had an opportunity to force the
question with our allies with the ability to move forward with
the missile defense detection in Alaska and that we still would
have left open tremendous options. But if I were our allies, I
wouldn't be convinced that we're supporting this program, even
though it is in fact the law of the land. But I recognize that
it makes no sense to deploy it until we know, one, it works,
and two, that we can actually afford it. Just a last comment
from you or anyone else?
Mr. Tierney. Just before we leave the impression that--the
law of the land is as it was stated a couple of times here--Mr.
Korb I think certainly hit on this--the law of the land is that
we'll go forward if there's an effective national missile
defense system that is technologically feasible and ready to be
deployed, and keeping mindful of our relationships with our
allies and the nonproliferation regime and things that we've
been working on. So that all has to be taken together. I think
the administration was fully aware of all of those different
factors, and this system clearly wasn't ready to go to
deployment when those things were considered and that's why the
decision was properly made.
Mr. Shays. With that, you get to go to your meeting that
was 2 hours ago, and we will adjourn this hearing. Thank you
all for participating. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]