[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DOD CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM: MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
VETERANS AFFAIRS, AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 24, 2000
__________
Serial No. 106-209
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
-----------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
71-624 WASHINGTON : 2001
_______________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
Carolina ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
BOB BARR, Georgia DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas
LEE TERRY, Nebraska THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
GREG WALDEN, Oregon JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California ------
PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho (Independent)
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
David A. Kass, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian
Lisa Smith Arafune, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International
Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida TOM LANTOS, California
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
JOHN L. MICA, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
Carolina BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
LEE TERRY, Nebraska (Independent)
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
R. Nicholas Palarino, Senior Policy Analyst
Jason Chung, Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on May 24, 2000..................................... 1
Statement of:
Chan, Kwai-Cheung, Director, Special Studies and Evaluation
Group, National Security and International Affairs
Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, accompanied by
Sushil K. Sharma, Assistant Director, and Jeffrey K.
Harris, Senior Evaluator................................... 6
Johnson-Winegar, Anna, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for Chemical/Biological Defense, Department of
Defense.................................................... 27
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Chan, Kwai-Cheung, Director, Special Studies and Evaluation
Group, National Security and International Affairs
Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, prepared
statement of............................................... 9
Johnson-Winegar, Anna, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for Chemical/Biological Defense, Department of
Defense:
Information concerning HNSC/SASC sample.................. 45
Prepared statement of.................................... 29
Chenoweth-Hage, Hon. Helen, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Idaho, prepared statement of.................. 5
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............ 3
DOD CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM: MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT
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WEDNESDAY, MAY 24, 2000
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans
Affairs, and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in
room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher
Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Shays, Blagojevich, and Tierney.
Staff present: Lawrence J. Halloran, staff director and
counsel; R. Nicholas Palarino, senior policy advisor; Robert
Newman and Thomas Costa, professional staff member; Jason M.
Chung, clerk; David Rapallo, minority counsel; and Earley
Green, minority clerk.
Mr. Shays. I'd like to call this hearing to order and
welcome our witnesses and guests.
The Persian Gulf war taught many important lessons about
the effective use of our military strength, and about
weaknesses in our chemical and biological--CB--defenses. Poor
detection capability, bulky protective clothing, and limited
supplies of medicines and decontaminants, among other problems,
increased the vulnerability of U.S. forces to unconventional
attack.
Since then, Congress and the Department of Defense [DOD],
have sought to improve the Chemical and Biological Defense
Program by integrating previously disparate research,
development and acquisition efforts into a coordinated, joint
service approach. CBDP spending, $791 million this fiscal year,
has more than doubled since 1996.
In the most recent Annual Report to Congress, the Chemical
and Biological Defense Program claims success in meeting
statutory mandates to consolidate program management, expand
jointness among the service branches, and improve force
protection against immediate and future CB threats.
But according to the General Accounting Office [GAO], the
program may be mistaking motion for progress. CBDP has not yet
fully complied with one important congressional mandate: to
measure program performance in terms of real outcomes rather
than mere activities. The Government Performance and Results
Act [GPRA], requires adherence to an overall strategic plan,
explicit program goals, and measurable performance benchmarks.
Despite an August 1999 GAO recommendation to complete a Results
Act-compliant performance plan, the March 2000 CBDP Annual
Report contains little more than the relabeling of last year's
goals and the promise of a more complete effort next year.
The Results Act is more than an academic or civics
exercise. According to DOD, the chemical and biological threat
to U.S. forces is very real. Those charged to design, procure
and deploy defensive capabilities to meet that threat should
know, and be able to demonstrate, their efforts are working;
yet GAO concludes, ``In the absence of explicit and measurable
goals, it is difficult to assess the impact of the program on
warfighters' ability to survive, fight and win in a chemical
and biological environment.''
Without those performance measures, the program risks
losing sight of its real objectives as jointness gives way to
service-specific demands and the competing priorities of a very
complex management and oversight bureaucracy dilute program
focus. By ignoring, delaying or claiming exemption from Results
Act requirements, the program risks settling for marginal
improvements to existing technologies when those on the
battlefield need much more.
This subcommittee spent the past year looking at one aspect
of current chemical and biological defense strategy, the
Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program. Today we begin an
examination of the broader force protection effort,
encompassing detection, agent identification, warning,
individual protection, collective protection, and
decontamination. On June 21st we plan to look specifically at
current inventory controls, training protocols, and service
life of individual protective clothing and masks.
We appreciate the cooperation of all our witnesses in this
effort, and we look forward to their testimony.
[The prepared statements of Hon. Christopher Shays and Hon.
Helen Chenoweth-Hage follow:]
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Mr. Shays. We have two panels. The first panel is Kwai
Chan, Director, Special Studies and Evaluation Group, National
Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General
Accounting Office, accompanied by Dr. Sushil K. Sharma,
Assistant Director, Special Studies and Evaluation Group, and
Dr. Jeffrey K. Harris, Senior Evaluator at National Security
and International Affairs Division.
I would invite all of our witnesses on the first panel to
come up, and we will swear you in.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. Note for the record that our witnesses have
responded in the affirmative.
We welcome your testimony and welcome you here.
STATEMENT OF KWAI-CHEUNG CHAN, DIRECTOR, SPECIAL STUDIES AND
EVALUATION GROUP, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY SUSHIL
K. SHARMA, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, AND JEFFREY K. HARRIS, SENIOR
EVALUATOR
Mr. Chan. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I
am pleased to be here today to discuss our report on the
Department of Defense application of the Results Act in its
Chemical and Biological Defense Program.
Before I discuss our findings, let me briefly describe the
context.
Subsequent to the Gulf War, concerns were raised about the
adequacy of technologies used to detect and protect troops
against chemical and biological weapons. The growth in
appropriations for the program, from $388 million in fiscal
year 1996 to $791 million in the current fiscal year, reflects
a continuing and increasing Congressional interest in the
protection of our servicemembers.
In 1993 Congress enacted the Government Performance and
Results Act. The legislation was designed to have agencies
focus on the results of their programs rather than on program
activities and resources, as they had traditionally done.
Congress drafted this legislation in frustration over vague
agency goals and inadequate program performance information.
The absence of articulated strategic performance goals and
associated performance measures was viewed as a serious
impediment to policymaking, spending decisions, and oversight.
The Results Act requires that agencies at all levels set
multiyear strategic goals and annual performance goals, measure
performance, and report on the degree to which those goals are
met. Specifically, each activity is expected to, one, establish
quantifiable, measurable outcome-oriented goals and related
performance measures; two, develop strategies for achieving
these goals; three, ensure that goals align within each agency;
and finally, identify the resources that will be required to
achieve those goals.
I will now turn to the following four issues, which you
asked us to address, and our findings and recommendations:
First, whether Results Act principles can and should be applied
to the program's R&D activities; second, whether current
Chemical and Biological Defense Program planning and evaluation
practices follow the Results Act framework; third, whether
organizations executing the program's R&D activities have
incorporated Results Act principles in their planning and
evaluation practices; and, finally, I will quote DOD's response
to our recommendation from August of last year, that DOD should
develop a performance plan for the Chemical and Biological
Defense Program.
First, congressional reports and administrative guidance
clearly indicate that programs such as the Chemical and
Biological Defense Program should follow the Results Act's
outcome-oriented principles. We found that research
organizations, such as the Research Roundtable, the National
Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and
the Institute of Medicine have concluded that both applied and
basic research programs could be evaluated meaningfully using
the Results Act's principles.
Second, we found that program managers have not
incorporated key Results Act principles in the planning or in
the execution of the program. The five program goals, as stated
in its 1999 report, are either vague and unmeasurable, or fail
to articulate specific desired impacts. For example, measuring
the first goal, which is to deter chemical and biological
weapon use by denying military advantage, because determining a
deterrent effect is problematic, and attributing the specific
rationale for the deterrent is unrealistic.
Three of the five goals addressed the size, focus, and
coordination of the program, not program outcomes. Together,
these goals direct that the program be sufficiently large to
address the needs resulting from two major theater wars; be
sufficiently focused to address likely validated threats, and
be sufficiently coordinated to capitalize on efficiencies and
other benefits of joint requirement determination, research,
development, and procurement.
The fifth goal, to complete R&D, is measurable, but
addresses program output rather than outcomes.
Third, we found that only one of the three organizations
executing the program's R&D activities has adopted Results Act
planning and evaluation tools. The remaining R&D organizations
cited either the utilization of equivalent planning tools, or
the unique challenges of evaluating R&D activities, as reasons
why they had not or could not adopt the Results Act processes.
Fourth, DOD has yet to implement our recommendation that it
develop a performance plan for the Chemical and Biological
Defense Program. In its response to GAO, DOD stated that it
``would develop a strategic plan more closely aligned with the
tenets of the Results Act,'' and that it ``would publish that
plan in the program's next Annual Report to Congress.''
Nevertheless, its March 2000 report to Congress does not
contain a performance plan.
DOD has instead defined seven new program goals and stated
that ``specific technology and systems goals will be provided''
in its performance plan, under development.
It is important to note that the steps taken and promised
in the March 2000 report to the Congress still reflect only
partial compliance with the first of the four outcome-oriented
principles, by failing even to identify quantifiable,
measurable outcome-oriented performance goals.
DOD has not begun to address the other three principles of
the Results Act. Consequently, in the absence of explicit and
measurable performance goals, a strategy for achieving those
goals, alignment of those goals within each agency, as well as
the resources required, the Congress and the DOD cannot assess
the impact of the Federal funding for this program on
warfighters' ability to survive, fight, and win in a chemical
or biological contaminated environment.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. We will be happy
to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Chan follows:]
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Mr. Shays. When I was first elected to Congress, I was
exposed to a report about our protective gear, and it was
alarming. What was alarming was that test studies would
indicate that the protective gear wasn't doing the job it was
designed to do. At the time, it was a classified document, and
it was very frustrating for me to be aware of this document.
I went to other Members to share it with them, as I could,
which is to say that I am going to see that a good deal of this
committee's energy and time is spent understanding the quality
of our protective gear, and hold the DOD and others accountable
for what is required.
But what I would like to ask you first, Mr. Chan, is this.
I would like to know what is the general attitude of DOD when
you get into these issues. Do they take GPRA seriously? Do they
feel that they are doing important work? Do they take
seriously, in your judgment, the value of the program?
Mr. Chan. Well, our initial experience was when we did our
work, the person in charge of the program was quite vehement in
the sense that he didn't think it was necessary for them to
follow the Results Act.
Mr. Shays. So to start with, they didn't take the view that
they came under GPRA, under the Results Act, or that they felt
they weren't compatible, that the Results Act wouldn't be
helpful to them--besides being a legal requirement, that it
wouldn't be helpful to them?
Mr. Chan. First, the belief was that the QDR itself, the
Quadriennial Report Review, would answer the questions on what
this is all about, but second, I think there was some concern
on how you apply GPRA to the research and development side.
Subsequent to that, I think the next leadership felt that
it is important to apply it, and I think that's why you see
some progress in the March 2000 report.
To me, there is sort of a conflict between what seem to be
good management tools versus the utilization of those tools.
It's sort of good management principles to have these tools so
that one can tell what is the mission of this program, and how
do you go about implementing it, how do you measure it, so that
at the end we understand what the outcome is, and the report
will reflect outcome of the spending of the dollars on.
Mr. Shays. Describe to me in general terms what you think
the role of CBDP is.
Mr. Chan. Well, I think in 1993 and 1994 Congress was
concerned about lack of capability of our soldiers to fight in
a contaminated environment, and had in fact decided to focus on
giving sufficient funding in this program to actually manage
all RD&A--that is, research, development and acquisition--
systems by which it can help in terms of its mission. So it has
a very far-reaching mandate.
Mr. Shays. I know that you stated this in your report, but
I would like to ask you specifically--well, you answered that,
so I don't need to go over it.
What are the difficulties of translating the annual goals
into a performance plan?
Mr. Chan. Mr. Chairman, the issue that is yet unaddressed
to our satisfaction in the presentation of program goals in the
annual report is that it can't be determined from the
information available, whether or not the program goals are
threat-driven, and if they're measurable. We think that we need
an entire packet of information, beginning with strategic
goals, annual performance goals, performance measures for those
annual goals, and a plan to address any deficiencies that may
be identified--to put a package together to identify what is or
is not adequate.
The concept of the Results Act, with its layout of the
steps that the Congress has articulated, I think is quite easy
to understand and conceptualize, but the articulation of
measurable goals is the hurdle that has to be overcome first.
And right now, it cannot be determined if the goals presented
in the plan are simply asking for incremental improvements in
existing capabilities, or is there an ideal capability that the
users require to avoid the chemical and biological threats
where they need to have a goal of a capability versus an
incremental improvement over existing equipment.
Mr. Shays. But the bottom line is that you are not able to
determine whether or not they are meeting goals and certain
strategies because you are not sure, in every instance, what
their goals and strategies are? Is that correct?
Mr. Chan. Correct.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Before welcoming our two members, let me just get two
housekeeping measures out of the way.
I ask unanimous consent that all members of the
subcommittee be permitted to place any opening statement in the
record, and that the record remain open for 3 days for that
purpose. Without objection, so ordered.
I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be
permitted to include their written statements in the record.
Without objection, so ordered.
Let me just say before recognizing both Mr. Blagojevich and
Mr. Tierney, that we view this first hearing as kind of
``putting the ball in play.'' We're not going to get in any
great depth today, but the purpose is just to begin this
process. We don't anticipate that this is going to be a
particularly long hearing, but, Mr. Chan, when you're done, I
hope that you or your staff can stay to hear what is said and
to make some comment on it as well.
Mr. Blagojevich, welcome.
Mr. Blagojevich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just intend to
listen for a little while. I have no questions at this point,
but perhaps later.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Let me just ask the three of you, is there any
question that we should be asking you before sit down? And if
there is, you can tell me what it is and I'll ask it again, so
that you will feel like I've asked you.
Dr. Sharma, I've never known you to be here and not say
something. [Laughter.]
Mr. Sharma. I was going to pass, but now I have to speak.
[Laughter.]
I think I have a comment rather than a question, in
anticipation that you would ask me to answer, so let me sort of
describe to you what our expectations are in terms of the
Results Act.
As we understand, in the CB defense area, threat is the
guiding force, that is validated threats. Based on validated
threats, the users--which are the services and various
commands--may develop some requirements to deal with those
threats, and the funding that you are providing is to make sure
that we have enough capabilities so that our soldiers could
survive in a contaminated environment and accomplish the
mission.
In order for us to evaluate what our money is buying, one
needs to show that the technologies that are coming out, or the
various equipments that we are supplying to our fighters--what
effect, if any, they are having on the threat. And when you
look at the existing plan, it appears that the focus is on
commodity areas, on technologies, on improvements over existing
technologies. Although they have pieces in place that can
answer the question for you, it hasn't really been put together
by the Department at this point so that you could evaluate the
outcome of the funding--that is, what is our money buying? We
have had very detailed discussions with the program level
people, who agreed with us that it should be done this way. We
have let the Department know that we will be available to them
to assist them at various points in time when they feel they
have something to share with us.
It is a new thing for them to do, and we will be very happy
to assist them. However, at this point they have a long way to
go.
Mr. Tierney. That raises the question--I mean, we've asked
this of all Departments, of all units within Departments, and
so on, to do the Results Act, correct? I mean, throughout
Government, it's Government-wide?
Mr. Sharma. That is correct.
Mr. Tierney. Is it GAO's responsibility to assist in that
effort, or is it something that you all have just taken on as
something you think you can do?
Mr. Sharma. I don't think it is our responsibility. We
have, in this particular case, offered assistance to them.
Mr. Tierney. OK.
Mr. Sharma. It is the agency's responsibility to develop
the plan and evaluate it itself, and show it to the Congress,
the results of their efforts in accomplishing the mission.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Chan, maybe I should ask you this, in that
I'm prepared to move on to the next panel.
You're not saying that they are not meeting their goals,
you're saying that in some cases we don't know what their goals
are. It may be that we're doing really great, but if we are,
it's more by accident than by planning--those are my words. In
other words, you can't make an assessment of where we are
because you don't have the measurement tools in place without
them following----
Mr. Chan. Well, I can make an assessment. I think they
haven't done that, unfortunately.
Mr. Shays. They haven't what?
Mr. Chan. They have not done that, because I think what we
have right now is an assessment whereby we are pursuing based
on threat, and what technology we have, and we're putting a lot
of eggs in different baskets, and hopefully something will come
out of there at the end. But I don't think it makes a good
strategy in terms of----
Mr. Shays. Well, that's a different issue. I'm not trying
to get them off the hook; I'm just trying to assess--you're not
claiming that we are unprepared and that we are not doing a
good job; the claim is that without these measuring tools, we
don't know? And it seems to me that your claim is also that
without specific focus on the Results Act, we clearly aren't
maximizing the resources that we have to get there as quickly
as we can, correct?
Mr. Chan. Yes.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Harris, did you have any comments you wanted
to make?
Mr. Harris. I just wanted to add what Dr. Chan and Dr.
Sharma said, a couple points. One is that the way the program
is described right now, it is very easy to say that we are
making progress in achieving our goals because we are producing
a better piece of equipment tomorrow than we had yesterday, and
we can say that we can buy more of that with the moneys
available from Congress than we had yesterday, and say that
this is progress.
But the plan that the Results Act requires should identify
is, what are the pieces of equipment that are needed? What are
the descriptions of the ideal equipment, the ideal capabilities
that warfighters need? And we don't know exactly where we need
to get to, so we don't know exactly how far away from that
ideal we are today.
Another element that should be this, in the spirit of the
Results Act, is that we have goals identified in the report
that are commodity area-specific, to detect, to protect, to
decontaminate. There is no system in place to relate the
relative benefits of competing goals. We don't know, without a
Results Act implementation, if we might better spend our money
for procurement or research and development--or, within
research and development, what area is in the most need of
additional assistance.
So these are things we think will be there when the full
implementation of the Results Act is completed.
Mr. Shays. Yes, Mr. Chan?
Mr. Chan. I would like to say that the Results Act itself
is a management tool by which the Government sort of
``mandates'' the agencies to determine how they are spending
the money, and how well they are spending the money.
In this case here, as we stated, from 1996 to the year
2000, the budget itself had doubled over that period of time.
And without knowing what we're getting out of this money or
this investment, then there's no way to account for--have we,
in fact--where are we in terms of achieving the goals or
providing that the mission of protecting our soldiers in the
contaminated CBW environment? That's really the final outcome
that you want to see.
So as a result, without doing that, there's a lack of
accountability.
Mr. Shays. Why don't you go ahead?
Mr. Halloran. In your testimony you said that you found
that only one of the three organizations was executing the
program's R&D activities as a result of Results Act planning.
May I ask you to name names there, what the other two are?
Mr. Harris. OK. We identified three key Department of
Defense organizations that are executing research and
development on behalf of the Chemical and Biological Defense
Program. Those three organizations are the Soldier Biological
Systems Command, which is an element of the Army Materiel
Command, Department of the Army; the second is the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency [DARPA]; and the third is the
Joint Project Office for Biological Defense.
The Soldier Biological Systems Command is the organization
that has been applying the Results Act in detailed steps for a
number of years, identifying strategic goals, annual goals,
measures, assessing their performance, and writing reports
feeding back on how well they're doing. It is a template that
is--it's the best template we found for a research and
development organization in this area for executing Results Act
principles.
In DARPA, they made the argument that what they do is so
far-reaching and so long-term that an annual assessment is
impractical, and the DOD Management Council agreed with that.
The Joint Program Office is an office that conducts system-
specific development activities, often in the form of Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstrations. And they, again, thought
that what they were doing in terms of developing new equipment
and making equipment better, that would be an inappropriate
application of the Results Act.
Mr. Halloran. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Harris. No. We think it can be done, and it's simply a
change in philosophy and attitude that has to be accepted by
those who are executing the program, that they have to identify
where they're going before they can determine how well they are
achieving those goals.
Mr. Shays. Is that an option, that they are allowed to
ignore the Results Act?
Mr. Harris. The one example that we have, where the
organization argued that it was inappropriate and was exempted
internally within DOD, is DARPA, and they argued that they are
such a unique organization that it wouldn't apply--even though
before that exemption was allowed, they had developed internal
measures that they were going to apply in terms of peer review,
in terms of progress toward meeting milestones, that they
thought might be applicable and in accordance with Results Act
requirements. But in the end, they turned out to be granted an
exemption.
Mr. Shays. I would think, frankly, that DARPA would need it
more than others. What's the budget of DARPA?
Mr. Harris. I don't believe I have those figures. It's a
considerable percent of the entire DOD R&D budget.
Mr. Sharma. If I may add to this, Mr. Chairman, it is our
understanding that there are no exemptions. At the agency
level, at the top level, they have to have a plan; and then
every entity within that organization has to follow and to be
able to account for the money that they are receiving, to be
very precise. However, in this case, DOD has given an exemption
to DARPA.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much, unless there is anything
else any of you want to add. Any other comments?
[No response.]
Mr. Shays. OK, thank you.
I would like to call our second panel, Dr. Anna Johnson-
Winegar, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Chemical/Biological Defense, Department of Defense.
Dr. Winegar, we welcome anyone else; it's not like you have
lawyers next to you, it's not in any way a disadvantage.
I just want to say again, if you think there is someone who
might answer a question, I would love to swear them in. They
can remain in the back, but even if they don't, it would help
us out.
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Not today.
Mr. Shays. OK. If you would raise your right hand, please?
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I welcome you here and am happy to
have you make any statement you want.
STATEMENT OF ANNA JOHNSON-WINEGAR, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and other
members of the subcommittee for this opportunity to speak to
you today.
Just a brief bit of history so that can put into context my
relationship to the Chemical and Biological Defense Program. I
am a career Government servant, having worked for the
Department of Defense for over 30 years, and just moved into my
position in October 1999.
I would like to talk just for a minute about what I think
is an improved management structure in our Chemical and
Biological Defense Program in response to guidance from the
Congress and from within the Department.
As has been pointed out, Public Law 103-160 mandated that
the Secretary of Defense identify a single office that would be
responsible for chem/bio programs, and that is indeed my
office. I would also like to acknowledge, as was pointed out
before, that there has been considerable growth in the funding
for the program, and we think that has been very successful in
helping us to achieve some of our goals.
Before I go any further I would like to clarify what I
think is a misperception on the part of this committee, and
perhaps others, in that the DARPA program is not--I repeat,
not--part of the Chemical and Biological Defense Program, as
defined by the law, as covered in our annual report, and as
covered in the budget figures that you have been quoted.
The DARPA expenditure for fiscal year 2000 is indeed $145
million, and you can compare that to our overall expenditure in
the chem/bio core program, which is approximately $791 million.
As was pointed out by the GAO, we have indicated in our
March 2000 report to Congress that we have taken the first
steps toward implementing GPRA. I believe that it is important
legislation and will help us to make a better assessment of our
programs. We have identified a mission statement and have
outlined goals which we hope will help us to achieve our
program.
I would like to reiterate also that our program is a
threat-driven program and is responsive to requirements that
are developed for us. It is very easy to talk about the
ultimate piece of equipment that would help us be perfect;
however, I think all of us are very well aware that science and
technology does move in small increments, and I think I can
honestly say that we have better equipment in the field today
than we had at the time of the Gulf war. Some of those are,
indeed, incremental improvements. We are, obviously, always on
the lookout for that ``great leap ahead.'' I think in some
cases that's probably unrealistic.
I think that the quality of our program is measured in a
number of different ways. We have outside review panels that
help us to review our science and technology objectives. We
look every year at the strategy of how we invest our funds. We
develop an internal strategy guidance that helps us to shape
our budget for the upcoming year, and we have to make hard
choices in making decisions on how much money will be spent on
procurement--that is, buying equipment for the forces in the
field today--versus our investment in research and development,
the long-term program.
I think all of you are probably aware that the threat is
changing. There are new and emerging threats that demand that
we invest some of our science and technology there, and we have
to balance that with the amount of money that we have, how much
we can spend on procurement, and how much is available for
long-term investment.
I am very proud to be a part of the Chemical and Biological
Defense Program. I think it is one of the shining stars in the
Department of Defense. I think there has been a tremendous
amount of increased interest in our program over the past few
years, and I clearly think that the addition of a
representative from the Joint Staff onto our OSD Steering
Committee has provided that connection that we need with the
warfighters. This year for the first time we had a video
teleconference with representatives from the CINCs so that we
could go over with them exactly what their requirements were
and how our Chemical and Biological Defense Program is working
to meet their requirements.
I would be happy to answer any questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson-Winegar follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Do you have this document in front of you?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Yes, I believe I do.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
I am looking at page 8.
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Yes.
Mr. Shays. Maybe you could just kind of talk to me about
that.
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. OK.
Mr. Shays. And discuss all the entities. I mean, I see
DARPA there. We got it from you; I'm just curious how it fits
in.
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Certainly. I'd be happy to explain
that to you.
The OSD Steering Committee, as shown in the blue box on the
left, is comprised of five members. That's chaired by Hans
Mark, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. The
other members are Jay Davis, the Director of DTRA; Dr. Gary
Resnick, who is Director of the Chemical/Biological Directorate
at DTRA; myself; and Admiral Costello, representing the Joint
Staff. And I think, as I mentioned before, that that's been a
very important addition.
We have a representative from OSD Policy, Strategy and
Threat Reduction as a non-voting member, and this is the group
that annually puts out the guidance for the Chemical and
Biological Defense Program as we develop our budgets and our
programs for the upcoming years.
What this chart is meant to show, with the DARPA
interaction--and you'll see that on the right-hand side of the
chart--is that the DARPA organization also reports to Hans
Mark. They develop their budget entirely separately, and DARPA
has been investing in the area of bio defense for the past few
years, and has had a rapid growth in their program, also.
You will see that the area where the programs meet and
``marry up'' is in sort of a pale oval in the center, where
representatives from DARPA meet with service representatives,
representatives from DTRA, and talk about their investment in
the science and technology part of the program.
We have taken an additional step in that we have identified
specific transition funding. As I know you are aware, DARPA
invests in basic research and a little bit of applied research,
but does not have the mandate nor the wherewithal to carry
programs through. We have set aside special funding so that
when DARPA is finished with their investment, we can continue
the advanced development and further evaluation. For example,
in the area of medical products, DARPA does not have the
resources or the personnel to take things from basic research
into the required kinds of pre-clinical animal studies, and
ultimately into clinical trials. And that's where our programs
are going to marry up.
Mr. Shays. I have a philosophy in my office, that when I
say ``Who's handling this, who's in charge,'' and three hands
go up, I know no one is in charge. So I always, always make
sure one person is in charge.
Now, my sense of your responsibility is that you are
basically in charge of the Chemical and Biological Defense
Program; I mean, that's your responsibility.
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Yes.
Mr. Shays. So for you to tell me that somehow DARPA is not
really involved is not clear to me. I don't understand your
opening statement; in fact, I wasn't even ready to go in that
direction, but you seemed to really want to make that point.
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Yes.
Mr. Shays. You put it on the table.
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Yes, I did, and I did that
deliberately.
The point that I want to make is that DARPA develops their
own budget----
Mr. Shays. I'd like you to restate what you stated in the
beginning. Maybe I misunderstood you. What was your point when
you started?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. That the Chemical and Biological
Defense Program, as defined by Public Law 103-160, and as
reported in our annual report, does not cover the investment
made by DARPA. That is not to say that we don't coordinate our
programs with DARPA----
Mr. Shays. Well, aren't there a lot of things that are done
that don't come directly under you, that are related to
chemical and biological?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. That's correct, but----
Mr. Shays. Isn't your job to coordinate it?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. To the best of my ability, if I do
that, yes.
Mr. Shays. I don't know what you mean by ``to the best of
your abilities.''
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. I think the differentiation that I'm
trying to make is on the money, because it is a significant
investment from DARPA. And these other programs, TSWG program
and some of the other ones, are relatively small and pale in
comparison to the DARPA investment.
Mr. Shays. So what you're telling me is that you're going
to focus on the small stuff, and the big stuff is out of your
reach?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. No, sir, that's not what I'm saying at
all.
I do have responsibility for coordinating the Department's
Chemical and Biological Defense Programs.
Mr. Shays. That's clear to me.
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. That's clear, yes.
Mr. Shays. OK. And so that does not include DARPA, as a
coordinating effort?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. It does include DARPA as a
coordinating effort. It does not mean that I provide any direct
management of the DARPA programs. So perhaps I'm making a----
Mr. Shays. But that's true for all the other things you
coordinate, isn't it? There are other parts within DOD that you
don't have their budget, and it's not part of your $791
million, but your job is to bring all these disparate groups
together so that we have a coordinated effort?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Yes.
Mr. Shays. OK. So, I'm sorry, I don't get your point.
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Well, the point, as was made by the
GAO, is that there are three organizations that are primarily
conducting the work of the Chemical and Biological Defense
Program----
Mr. Shays. Right.
Ms. Johnson-Winegar [continuing]. And they identified
SBCCOM, DARPA, and the JPO for Biological Defense, and made a
very distinct point of saying that DARPA was excluded from
having GPRA apply to them, and had been granted an exception by
the Defense Executive Management Council.
Mr. Shays. Right. I heard them say that.
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. And that's the point I was trying to
make. While DARPA may have been excluded from GPRA, I do not
feel that the rest of the Chemical and Biological Defense
Program falls under that same analysis, and we certainly do
intend to comply. I just want to make it perfectly clear that
if DARPA has already been excluded, I don't know if I can then
enforce a GPRA evaluation on top of them.
Mr. Shays. OK. That's a different--if that were true--I
don't know if I would agree with that, but let me let my
colleagues--let me think about what you said so that I don't
come to a rash judgment here, and then we'll go on.
Mr. Blagojevich.
Mr. Blagojevich. No questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Nothing, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. What I really want to have is a sense of what
you think the GAO report was saying, and how you respond to
what GAO was saying. And I don't mean to rush you, but I don't
want to dig other holes; I'd just like to know in general what
your view is.
I'll tell you my view, to start with. My view is that you
have a very important task, that chemical and biological
threats are serious, and that DOD has not done it in an
effective and coordinated way, and that we end up wasting
extraordinary resources and we don't get the job done in the
way that it needs to get done. And I think, as a result, our
men and women in the armed forces are vulnerable.
I will tell you that I come with some anger about this
aspect, and that is that I have been aware of the vulnerability
of our military and could share it with no one because it was
classified at the time. And I took some comfort in knowing that
your office had been established to start to begin to do a
better job.
It may be that we have a hearing on DARPA and we get a
better sense of that element, the sense that somehow they
didn't come under the Results Act, because if anyone needs it,
they need it. And I will say further that I don't think any of
what we're talking about is all that technical; it's just
basic, common-sense kind of approach to know what we want to do
and how we're going to do it. We want to know why we want to do
it.
So I'd like to ask you how you react to what the GAO report
has said, and I will say to you as well that I think they were
rather gentle. I don't think that they tore your agency apart;
they may have been tempted to, but I think they were rather
gentle in their assessment, rather matter-of-fact. They were
just saying that ``you're not doing it, and I'd like to help
you do it,'' and I want to know what you want to do.
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Well, first of all let me say that I
absolutely agree with you. I, too, am concerned about the
vulnerability of our forces. As I said in my opening comments,
I've been involved in the Chemical and Biological Defense
Program for essentially my entire career, and have made an
effort to do what I can and to make what contributions I can to
getting us past that hurdle of our forces being vulnerable.
So I do take very seriously the mission and the mandate of
our program.
I appreciate the comments that you've provided and having
had the opportunity to review the GAO report, I certainly think
there will be some additional value added to our program if we
can apply metrics so that we can come up with quantitative
measures of how we're doing.
I think we do have some good examples. I know you don't
want to go into a lot of detail today about these types of
things, but we can look at improvements in the program in a
number of different ways, and you have those briefing charts in
front of you that we have provided before that show where we
were in 1990, at the time of the Gulf war, where we are today,
and where we plan to go in the future.
While some of those things at the present may be
subjective--for example, we need detectors that can identify
more agents, or we need to be able to detect things at a lower
level of sensitivity, or we need to be able to do it faster--
these are all driven by the requirements, as was mentioned
before. The requirements address the threat; as the threat
changes, we need to be able to respond to that; and as the
requirements documents are written, we need to develop a
material solution to fix that requirement. It may not always be
the perfect requirement, and sometimes that is an iterative
process, and sometimes we field interim pieces of equipment.
When the BIDS was first deployed, it could detect four
biological agents. Then it was eight, and the goals continue to
increase.
So if those are some of the types of measures and metrics
on how well our program is performing and how valuable our
investment is going to be, I certainly welcome and look forward
to those types of evaluations and assessments.
Mr. Shays. Who is in charge of CBDP? Is it Dr. Gansler, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics? Dr. Mark, the Director of Defense Research and
Engineering? The Steering Committee? Or you?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. On a day-to-day basis, my office is
the office that is responsible for the Chemical and Biological
Defense Program. I do, of course, have bosses in the Pentagon,
and report up the chain to both Dr. Mark and Dr. Gansler, and
ultimately to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary.
Mr. Shays. What authority do you have as the focal point of
the program?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. My authority is to provide the
oversight and management to the elements of the program that
are executing the various phases of the program, and to serve
as the senior staff to the Secretary and to Dr. Gansler for all
issues related to Chemical and Biological Defense Programs.
Mr. Shays. OK. Agents, you said?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Agencies.
Mr. Shays. All agencies. Is DARPA one of them?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Yes, it is.
Mr. Shays. OK. And do they know that?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. I believe they do.
Mr. Shays. What additional authority do you need?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. I'm not sure I understand exactly what
you mean.
Mr. Shays. In other words, in my work I find that some
people are responsive and some aren't. When, for instance, we
were looking at--my previous committee was looking at the Gulf
war illnesses, I found the Department of Veterans Affairs very
responsive, because I had direct oversight over them. I found
DOD not as responsive, and it is the very reason why I changed
committee assignments. So I now chair this committee, and have
DOD responsive to me.
Do you have any feeling that when you do your work, you
aren't getting a quick response from the various agencies
within DOD? Or do you feel you are getting all the response you
need? Is there anyone out of the loop?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. I would certainly say that in the
approximately 6 months or so that I have been in the job, I
certainly see a tremendous improvement in responsiveness and
cooperation among the various agencies. I am not attributing
that to me personally, but I think it is to the general----
Mr. Shays. Which agency is the least responsive?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Well, it varies on a given issue, what
the particular problem might be.
Mr. Shays. Would you describe your coordinating effort as
``herding cattle'' or ``herding cats?''
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Probably somewhere in between.
Mr. Shays. OK. Well, we'd like it to be cattle.
Would you like to get to the chart?
Mr. Halloran. Before I get to the chart, what does the JPO,
the Joint Program Office, do that SBCCOM doesn't?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. The Joint Program Office has
responsibility for the 6-4, 6-5, advanced development, and the
procurement aspects. They work very closely with SBCCOM; as a
matter of fact, some of the particular program managers for
specific items reside at SBCCOM and are essentially matrix-
managed to the Joint Program Manager.
Mr. Halloran. So does that suggest some redundancy? Must
they be unique?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. The JPO?
Mr. Halloran. Yes.
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. They were specifically created, as you
know, to bring focus and attention to bio defense only. They
don't do any work on the chemical side. But bio defense, again,
in the areas of advanced development and procurement, so that
they could bring about a synergism between the medical and the
nonmedical aspects of bio defense, and provide a focal point,
again, for the attention needed to bring many of these bio
systems to full fielding.
Mr. Halloran. I understand what the chart says, but is
there a unique bio threat? My understanding was that the
battlefield threat was both, or a combination, that we need to
prepare for both. Well, the JPO may have been a nice idea; is
it still relevant?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Well, it's certainly my assessment,
and I'm not an intelligence analyst or threat assessor by
trade, but it's certainly my assessment that the bio threat is
a much larger threat for us today than it has been in the past,
for a number of reasons: the diversity of the number of agents
there; the relative ease in producing them; and the fact that I
think we have better defenses against the chemical threat,
certainly the traditional chemical threat, than we do for the
bio threat.
Mr. Halloran. Turning to page 14 of your briefing slide
presentation, you see the defense deficiencies identified in
Operation Desert Storm. I would like to address an issue raised
by Dr. Harris, which is that you identify goals, near-term and
long-term goals, in each commodity area, each of these areas.
I wonder if you could give us a sense of, given those
goals, the tradeoffs that are involved here, or the impacts
that one might have on the other. That is, for example, if you
made a breakthrough in standoff detection and you had the
capability to identify specifically agents at some specific and
tactically significant distance, would that change your goals
in terms of protection or medical intervention or some other
element down the line? Or would they all just proceed apace
without impacting each other?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Well, clearly they are interrelated,
and as we make improvements and advances in one area, that will
allow us, hopefully, to decrease our investment or focus our
energies elsewhere. If we had the one universal solution to the
problem, we could collapse our various investment areas.
These are not just arbitrary commodity areas or
investments. They are things that are well thought-out. And I
think you can find examples of interaction between the groups
as we go forward now. So you are absolutely right; if we
improve our capability for standoff detection, then that makes
an impact on what we would need for some of the other aspects
of the program. That's why it is an iterative process and
evaluated on an annual basis, both from the science and
technology side of things, where we are investing in what new
programs and products are coming along that will be ready for
transition, and we balance that with what we have in the field
today.
Mr. Halloran. Again, in the absence of any specific goals,
how would you know when to make a tradeoff? How would you know
you had achieved sufficient capacity--in detection, for
example--to allow you to back off a requirement in either
individual or collective protection?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Well, again, those are program
management decisions that are impacted by all the traditional
factors that program managers use, cost schedule and
performance. And as we see one particular approach either being
very successful or not being very successful, we can make
adjustments to our investment accordingly.
Mr. Halloran. I notice in your report you describe DARPA as
focused particularly on broad-range or multiagent defense
capabilities. Where do I find that focus in here? As you know,
coming out of the Anthrax vaccine, there is an agent-specific
intervention.
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Yes.
Mr. Halloran. Is that a priority goal in here someplace, in
your program----
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Yes.
Mr. Halloran [continuing]. General protection versus
specific?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Yes. You will see a couple of Defense
technology objectives that look at a multivalent vaccine, for
one, and also in the area of detectors, they are what I would
call not agent-specific, but more generic, and we are investing
in technologies that will help us identify classes of agents
rather than specific agents.
So you will find that primarily in the R&D section of the
program. We don't have anything fielded right now that I would
call a generic detector or a generic solution, other than that
you could apply that type of logic to things like the masks and
the suits which protect, presumably, against all the known
threats.
Mr. Halloran. That we know now?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Right.
Mr. Halloran. Where in the organizational charts provided
here--you mentioned technology objectives. Where are they
developed, and what is your role in that?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. The Defense technology objectives are
developed by the performers, the people that are doing the
science and technology work in the laboratories. They propose
them on an annual basis.
Mr. Halloran. Who are they?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Who are the laboratories?
Mr. Halloran. Yes.
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Well, for example, SBCCOM is one. The
Navy, the Marines, the Army Medical Command. Any of them can
propose a certain segment of their work to have it identified
as a Defense technology objective, and with that comes a
certain set of criteria. And they do have measurable goals. And
I think that's one area in which our program is attempting to
comply with GPRA, in that when we identify something as a
Defense technology objective, we have a timeline--this work
will be completed by a certain time; we have identified the
budget--this is how much money we are going to invest in that;
and we have what are called ``exit criteria.'' At the end of
this particular piece of work we will have enough science and
technology to be able to say that it will do thus-and-such, it
will identify things, it will neutralize things, it will stop
things, whatever the specific criteria might be.
Mr. Halloran. Who makes that determination? Is it TSWG, or
where is that?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. On the DTOs?
Mr. Halloran. Yes.
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. That's done across the Department of
Defense, and chem-bio is just 1 of 12 science and technology
areas. Those are cumulatively found in a separate document
called ``Defense Technology Objectives'' of which there are
over 300 now. We have approximately 20 or so in the chem-bio
defense area. And there is a separate document that addresses
all those; I would be happy to provide you either a copy of
that, or information where it is available on the Web.
Mr. Halloran. OK. I'd like to see just your 20.
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. OK.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. Halloran. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Blagojevich.
Mr. Blagojevich. Yes. Hi. I have been listening. We voted
for legislation that requires your agency to conform to the
Results Act. Can you tell us when you expect you will be
conforming with the Results Act?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Well, I think it is an evolving
process. Obviously, it will be something that we come to
agreement on within the Department as to when we have reached
what we consider compliance. I think we have taken the first
steps toward that in identifying our mission and our goals, and
we are now in the process of refining that a little bit
further. We hope to have most of that work completed this year.
Mr. Blagojevich. Good. So that next year, when you come
back before this committee, it is reasonable to think that we
can expect that you will be conforming to the Results Act?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Well, certainly that will be your
interpretation, as to whether we're conforming, but we
certainly hope to be well along the way, if not completely
there.
Mr. Blagojevich. OK. All right. So of course, the objective
ultimately would be that a year from now, you can come back
before this subcommittee and say, ``We've conformed?''
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. I would certainly like to be able to
say that, in my opinion, we're conforming. Of course, other
people could always develop their own opinions, although I
would hesitate to presuppose that because I think I'm
conforming, that everyone else would naturally agree with me.
Mr. Blagojevich. OK. Well, your interpretation of
conforming next year would certainly be a first step, I would
think?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Yes. Certainly. [Laughter.]
Mr. Blagojevich. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Let me put it a different way.
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. OK.
Mr. Shays. It may be that Rod is the chairman of this
committee, or it may be that I am, but whoever it is, you have
to comply----
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Yes.
Mr. Shays [continuing]. And when I chaired the Human
Resources Committee and we had the tainted blood supply that
had resulted in the death of individuals from AIDS and the
contamination because of Hepatitis-C, we could have really
nailed HHS, but that wasn't our motive. Our motive was to see
bad practice become good practice.
I have that same feeling here. You have to conform, and
it's not just for the $791 million that you're spending, but
it's what DARPA spends, it's what all DOD spends. And you are
our hope that it will be spent well. And it's not going to be
your opinion; it's going to be whether or not you conform to
the law.
I would feel a lot better about this if your answer to Mr.
Blagojevich had been simply, ``We know we have areas where we
have to improve, and we're going to do it; and next year, when
we come here, we will have done it.'' The Results Act doesn't
mean that all the results are good; it means that now we have a
system to know what our goals and objectives are, and we have a
way to evaluate it. And we don't feel we have that.
There is really not much more that we need to say today
about that. You have a wonderful reputation. You've worked
there for years. But we have wanted to get DOD to change
practices that have existed for years. It's not really a
debatable issue, I don't think. And in terms of DARPA, this
will be something this committee will look at. You clearly have
oversight over DARPA as it relates to chemical and biological
responsibilities, and this committee, Mr. Blagojevich and
myself and our staff, we stand ready to help you, and so does
GAO. GAO is not there throwing darts; they are there to point
out what needs to be done, and they will help you. And I would
say to you that being the focal point does not mean that you
aren't in charge. You are in charge of this responsibility, and
I have the confidence that you will be able to make sure that
it is done, I really do.
I don't have anything else to add. Do you have anything you
would like to say?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Well, I would just like to clarify--
perhaps I was a little too negative when I said we would be in
compliance, and I perhaps implied that we wouldn't. I certainly
commit to you and to everyone that is involved in the program
that I am certainly committed to making our program as
compliant as I can, with the understanding, of course, that it
is an evolving process----
Mr. Shays. No, that's not acceptable. It's not an evolving
process. I'm not saying that we're going to see chemical and
biological success in all those areas, that you are going to
have met all your goals. But the process needs to be in place
now, tomorrow, the next day. You need to sit down with your
people and say, ``Where are we conforming with the Results Act
and where aren't we? And where we're not, we're going to do
it.'' And if you need help from GAO or anyone else, you need to
get it. That's the bottom line. There really is a bottom line.
It can't be an evolving process.
If I let you get away with that statement, that basically
is like saying that no one is in charge. No, you are in charge;
the law is clear; and I would like to hear you say that you
will make sure it's done. With all the experience that you
have--and I sound like I'm lecturing; I don't mean to be, I
just have to say, please say that. When we had the Secretary of
HHS here and she came--she could have had someone else come to
describe and defend the failure to protect the blood supply--
she came and said, ``We haven't done it correctly, that's
obvious; it will get done.'' Now, I admit that she happens to
be the Secretary, so she carries a lot more authority.
I will say this to you: you are in charge of this program.
If you do not think you can do it, I would like to know,
because then we will ask whoever is not enabling you to do that
to come before the committee.
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Oh, I certainly can do it, and I
commit to you that I will do it----
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Ms. Johnson-Winegar [continuing]. And I guess my evaluation
of the evolution and the evolving process was meant to say that
we will set very high goals for our program, and we may have to
compromise and accept interim goals, but we will have
measurable goals so that we are in compliance.
I take your comment that maybe we won't make all our goals
as a personal challenge because I would certainly like to see
us----
Mr. Shays. I understand that, if that's the context in
which you meant it. But the bottom line question is, does your
agency intend to follow the Results Act?
Ms. Johnson-Winegar. Certainly. For the Chemical and
Biological Defense Program, I make that commitment to you, yes.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
With that, we will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]