[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEVELOPMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 18, 2000
__________
Serial No. 106-195
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/
international--relations
______
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COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DANA ROHRABACHER, California CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California PAT DANNER, Missouri
PETER T. KING, New York EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
Carolina STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
MATT SALMON, Arizona JIM DAVIS, Florida
AMO HOUGHTON, New York EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
TOM CAMPBELL, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
KEVIN BRADY, Texas BARBARA LEE, California
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California [VACANCY]
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff
John Herzberg, Professional Staff Member
Shennel A. Nagia, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Charles Ries, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau for European Affairs, U.S. Department of State.......... 2
APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress
from the State of New York, and Chairman, Committee on
International Relations........................................ 19
Charles Ries..................................................... 19
Additional material submitted for the record:
Response submitted by Mr. Charles Ries in reply to Chairman
Gilman......................................................... 23
DEVELOPMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE
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WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 18, 2000
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m. in Room
2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Chairman Gilman. Committee will come to order.
This morning's hearing on the developments in Western
Europe will provide the Members of our Committee the
opportunity to review our policy toward that region of the
world in which our core national interests are most engaged.
The majority of our allies are there, the bulk of our
international trade and investment is with the countries of
this vital region, and, of course, it is with these countries
that we share our fundamental values and institutions.
Although our overall relations with these nations are
excellent, it would be a mistake to not take stock of them and
stress those areas where we may differ and disagree. This is
particularly true with regard to the members of the European
Union as we continue to work on the European Project, creating
the bonds and institutions that have already led to a single
European currency, as well as efforts to forge a more common
foreign and security policy that are the main attributes of a
single sovereign state. The implications of these developments
may be profound for the citizens of our own Nation, but which,
in this time of unprecedented peace and prosperity, are not
much discussed outside the bounds of policy-making circles and
our institutions of higher learning.
The European Project has not been without its own
difficulties. The dramatic plunge in the value of the euro
since it was launched last year is evidence of these problems
as is the ongoing difficulty in agreeing to enlarge the
European Union to include some of the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe that have long regarded EU membership as a
cementing of their status as independent states sharing in the
free market and democratic traditions embodied in the countries
of the West.
Attitudes among Europe's elite toward America are also
shifting in the aftermath of the Cold War. Comments by
officials of one of our closest allies suggest, for instance,
that Europe should be concerned about tendencies in our country
to pursue neounilateral policies, and that European integration
is necessary to provide a counterweight to curb the exercise of
American power.
How widespread these critical attitudes are among the
countries we look to as partners for cooperative efforts to
meet those challenges that confront all of us is a significant
question which we hope our witness from the State Department
will be able to address this morning.
I would like to welcome Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary Charles Ries of the Bureau for European Affairs, and
I want to thank Mr. Ries for his appearance at this hearing.
Mr. Ries transferred to the Bureau earlier this year from our
embassy in London where he served as the Minister Counselor for
Economic Affairs. Prior to that assignment, he served at our
mission to the European Union and has served in a number of
interesting positions related primarily to our trade and
economic policies.
Mr. Ries, you may proceed with your testimony, which will
be entered in full in the record, and you may abbreviate it as
you deem appropriate, but first, I would like to call on our
Ranking Minority Member, the distinguished gentleman from
Connecticut, Mr. Gejdenson.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gilman is available in the
appendix.]
Mr. Gejdenson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
also welcome our witness here today, and obviously from both a
military and economic perspective, Europe is a critically
important area for the United States. The issues we have dealt
with them on are varied, from Milosevic to missile defense, to
the economic kind of issues, whether it was the battle over
hushkits, where the Europeans tried to use the EU to block
American products, or whether it was our own missteps where
changes in our own export laws has most of the European foreign
ministers saying that they will try to exclude American parts
from their satellites because of our convoluted satellite
export policy.
The Congress itself has been somewhat schizophrenic in
response to the European defense initiative. The Congress
condemns the Europeans on one hand for not being full partners
and pulling full weight, but when the Europeans tried to
coordinate their defense production and resources, the Congress
seems anxious about that as well.
I think that trade issues and the defense issues and issues
like missile defense where America has an instinct to go it
alone complicates not just our relationship with Russia, but
also with Western Europe. So I join the Chairman in looking
forward to hearing your remarks in these areas. It is obviously
a very broad field of interest for the United States.
Thank you.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Ries, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES RIES, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE, BUREAU FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Ries. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have a full
statement that will be entered in the record. I will just make
some introductory comments and look very much forward to a
dialogue with you and the Ranking Minority Member.
Chairman Gilman. Without objection, your full statement
will be made part of the record.
Mr. Ries. I thank the Committee for the invitation to meet
with you today. We see our foreign policy as a partnership
between the executive and the legislative branches in service
to the American people, and this is an opportunity--this
hearing today is an opportunity to have a dialogue, very much a
true dialogue on our goals and objectives in Europe.
Mr. Chairman, the great lesson of 20th century history is
that the destinies of North America and Europe are joined. If
Europe is secure, America is more secure. If Europe prospers,
America does as well.
The U.S. is focusing on three opportunities in our
relationship. Our first opportunity is in Europe itself,
ensuring the continuing integration of the continent so that
conflict in Eastern Europe becomes as inconceivable as conflict
in Western Europe, and hope for a better life is shared across
the continent.
The second opportunity is between Europe and America,
strengthening and deepening the bonds between our societies in
ways that make a positive, tangible difference in our daily
lives.
The third opportunity extends beyond Europe and America,
improving our opportunity to deal with issues in a wider world
that neither of us acting alone will be able to confront
effectively.
When we pull together, the transatlantic community is the
engine in progress on every world-scale issue. When we pull in
different directions, the engine is less efficient.
To benefit from a stronger Europe, we need to work with
Europeans to build a more democratic and stable Europe. In
Brussels, on March 30th, we agreed with our European partners
to launch $2.3 billion of quick start programs for Southeastern
Europe. Of that amount, the U.S. share is $77 million, about
3.2 percent of the total, but real structural change and future
conflict prevention requires long-term engagement.
Mr. Chairman, one area where that engagement will be
critical is Serbia. The election and swearing in of President
Kostunica is an extraordinary victory for the people of
Yugoslavia, who have already chosen democracy and a future in
Europe over dictatorship and repression. A democratic Serbia
committed to the rule of law, the establishment of which
President Kostunica has made one of his primary goals, will be
a welcome addition to Southeast Europe.
President Kostunica has affirmed the adherence of his
government to the Dayton Agreement for Bosnia and to U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1244 on Kosovo. A democratic
Yugoslavia can provide a new basis for strengthening regional
cooperation and advancing democratic and economic development
throughout the region. We expect Yugoslavia to meet the same
standards on human rights, rule of law and cooperation with the
international community as other states.
Key to the success of this effort will be doing our part to
consolidate the democratic changes in Belgrade. We want to show
the people of Serbia there is an immediate democracy dividend.
We are working in close cooperation with our European allies to
this end. One of our first steps has been to lift the oil
embargo and the flight ban, as President Clinton announced on
October 12th. Lifting the sanctions is part of the implicit
promise we made when we imposed them, that a return to
democracy by the people of Serbia would be rewarded.
We should continue and, as appropriate, increase assistance
to humanitarian needs and strengthen democracy in the FRY. We
are consulting with Congress in the context of the
appropriations discussions which are still ongoing and the fact
that the new government is still in the process of forming to
determine appropriate levels of assistance.
Mr. Chairman, the United States is dedicated to conflict
resolution and management in other parts of Europe as well. We
are working closely with Greece and Turkey in the search for a
solution to the Cyprus problem. In Northern Ireland we support
local leaders and the governments of Ireland and the United
Kingdom to achieve a lasting political settlement. We have also
had enormous success in correcting wrongs of past conflicts in
the area of compensation through forced and enslave laborers in
World War II. We are addressing similarly difficult issues of
property restitution.
The United States is working with our European allies to
strengthen defense capabilities in Europe, as you mentioned.
NATO's open door policy and the Membership Action Plan are key
elements in our work. Kosovo demonstrated the clear gap between
U.S. and European military capabilities. ESDI and NATO's
Defense Capability Initiative are a way for Europe to take more
responsibility for its own defense. A stronger European
military contribution will make the alliance stronger, lift
some of the burden on the U.S. to act in crises, and make the
U.S.-European relationship more of a partnership while in no
way eroding the transatlantic alliance that we have worked so
long to establish.
We have a vibrant multifaceted relationship with the
European Union as well, as embodied in the new transatlantic
agenda of 1995. Mr. Chairman, you make a major contribution to
this effort through your active participation and that of your
colleagues in the transatlantic legislators dialogue. Your
tireless efforts and those of others in Congress help us reach
members of the European Parliament and national
parliamentarians throughout Europe. In this way we can
``design-in'' compatible approaches to common problems right
from the outset.
We are otherwise engaged with the EU across a range of
economic foreign policy and global issues. We hope to resolve
important trade disputes between us. We are acting together to
advance our common foreign policy objectives worldwide, in
Southeast Europe, the Korean Peninsula and Ukraine just to name
a few examples.
With the EU we are tackling new challenges. At the Lisbon
summit last June, we crafted a safe harbor approach to data
privacy protection. We have launched an important effort to
find common ground on biotechnology and to fight HIV/AIDS and
other infectious diseases. Similarly, we are working together
to promote e-commerce and information society links between us
and worldwide.
Cooperation between the United States and Europe also means
working closely to strengthen the OSCE, the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe. The OSCE has dramatically
improved its ability to address emerging crises through rapid
deployment of civilian expertise, using innovative tools such
as the rapid expert assistance and cooperation teams, better
known as REACT. OSCE missions in many countries funded through
peacekeeping funds help alleviate conflict and reinforce human
rights practices, and we are using OSCE as an important tool in
our fight against trafficking in women and children.
The United States encourages regional cooperation in
Europe, not only with the stability pact in Southeast Europe,
but in Northern Europe, in the Baltics, via the Northern Europe
Initiative. I would like to thank the Committee and
particularly you, Representative Gejdenson, for your support of
the Northern Europe Initiative. You recognized that relatively
modest U.S. funding for regional approaches is the key to
leveraging greater support for the Baltics and Russia.
Finally may I note that we are taking great strides to
ensure that management of the European Affairs Bureau here in
Washington contributes to greater policy success in the field.
Reinforcing the security of classified information is at the
top of our priority list. We have had European Eurowide town
hall meetings and are closely reviewing our security
arrangements and updating our standard procedures as part of a
commitment on the part of the bureau leadership to an
absolutely secure environment.
This is just a brief list of EUR Bureau activities set out
more fully in my written statement. Behind these policies are a
great team of dedicated people. However, at this time we don't
have the resources to fully realize our opportunities in
Europe. We lack technology, infrastructure and enough people to
do all that we are called upon to do. If we don't support our
diplomatic readiness, our policies become harder to implement,
and U.S. interests suffer.
The bottom line, though, is that our partnership with
Europe does real things for real people. It generates jobs. It
stimulates investment. It reduces the threats we face from
crime, terrorism, nuclear arms proliferation, drugs and
disease. It increases our security and cuts the cost to the
American taxpayer of achieving that security. When it works, it
enables us to achieve goals we could not achieve alone. When it
does not, stalemate and crisis can result. But making it work
requires resources, personnel, facilities and funding to pursue
expanding U.S. interests.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Secretary Ries, for your
analysis.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ries is available in the
appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. Let me ask, many observers believe the
time line for EU enlargement has slipped with no new entrants
likely before 2003. How long do you expect the current round of
enlargement negotiations to last, and has the EU's decision to
expand membership negotiations through a greater number of
countries led to a general slowing down of the negotiations, or
rather than institutional process problems, is there simply a
growing reluctance to actually take this step of enlargement?
Mr. Ries. It is a difficult series of questions, Mr.
Chairman. I would say that there is widespread recognition in
Europe that enlargement of the European Union is an imperative
for Europe and for the EU's relationship with its neighbors.
Part of the task that the EU faces is that there are so many
countries that have a valid claim on accession into the
European Union. The European Union realizes that in order to
bring in a substantial number of new members, it will have to
make substantial institutional changes in its constitutional
arrangements, number of commissioners, the way they handle the
Presidency, the question of voting, matters that are decided by
unanimity. These are very difficult questions for them and are
the priority topic for the present Presidency of France and
were the subject of a summit meeting last weekend.
Because they are so difficult, though, they are hard to
resolve, and it remains EU's objective to come up with a new
institutional basis for relations among member states that
would allow for accession and to do that at the summit at Nice
in December. We very much hope that they succeed in that.
You asked a question, though, whether the unprecedented
large number of accession candidates--the difference in
development levels between many of these candidates and the EU
15 now--and these institutional problems may cause a further
delay in the timetable. I certainly hope that is not the case.
I think that the Europeans acting collectively in Brussels and
many of our major European partners as a matter of national
policy certainly favor entry as soon as possible with as many
countries as qualify.
It is a very difficult task though. The longer the EU goes
on, the body of legislation that they have adopted over the
years since the 1950's in the initiation of the organization
becomes a bigger and bigger task. Each new entrant faces a
larger legislative task. I would be loath to speculate exactly
when the first tranche would come in, only to say we certainly
hope it would be as soon as they possibly can.
Chairman Gilman. What you are telling us then, is that
there is no general reluctance.
Mr. Ries. I don't think so. There are occasional
politicians who occasionally suggest things. There was a great
deal of attention placed in the comments, apparently offhand
comments, of one commissioner in Germany that maybe there ought
to be a referendum, and there was the suggestion that that
might presage a general change in policy to slow up accession.
I think the reaction to the reporting of that comment both from
the Commission itself and from the German government and other
governments involved indicates no slackening in the political
commitment to enlargement as soon as possible.
Chairman Gilman. Secretary Ries, which countries are up
front on being considered as potential new members?
Mr. Ries. If you ask any of the 12, they would say, ``me''.
Chairman Gilman. Which 12 are there?
Mr. Ries. Is this a trick question, I have to list them
all?
Chairman Gilman. Not at all. If you just tell us who are
the dominant.
Mr. Ries. The Baltic three, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania; the
Visagrad four, which would be Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic
and Slovakia. That is seven. Then we have Bulgaria, Romania,
that is nine; Cyprus, Malta, 10, 11.
Mr. Gejdenson. Slovenia.
Mr. Ries. Slovenia, thank you very much.
Chairman Gilman. So these are all up front for future
consideration?
Mr. Ries. That is right. And the Turks are also, after the
Helsinki summit, considered to be an accession candidate. They
do not have accession programs under way.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Secretary, how can the inefficient,
protectionist common agricultural policy which presently
consumes half of EU's budget be sustained if EU membership is
offered to poor, agrarian states in Eastern Europe.
Mr. Ries. Well, the Europeans themselves recognize that the
common agricultural policy requires further and substantial
reform. They agreed to this a couple of years ago at Berlin.
They understand that the current agricultural policy in its
present form is unsustainable with the accession of many of the
states, in particular Poland, which has a very large
agricultural sector.
Fortunately, this is something that would be good for the
world anyway. We are just finishing the period of
implementation of the Uruguay Round, which required the
Europeans to make a substantial cutback in the export subsidies
that they gave that supported the high-price common
agricultural policy, and we are hoping that we will have very
soon a new round of multilateral trade negotiations. In any
case, it was agreed during the Uruguay Round that we would
start, and we have started agricultural negotiations in the WTO
to take on the next phase. In our view, the common agricultural
policy disadvantage particularly the poorer countries around
the world, because the Europeans--because they have this high-
price, high-production policy, have to export their surpluses
at rock bottom prices, and that harms other producers of
agricultural commodities it is particularly onerous for the
Third World as well as our own agricultural exporters.
So in sum they need to reform the common agricultural
policy to meet their international trade objectives, and they
need to reform the common agricultural policy in order to
handle enlargement, and fortunately they recognize the need to
do both.
Chairman Gilman. So as part of their reforms, is there any
real prospect of European liberalization of agricultural policy
in the forthcoming trade negotiations?
Mr. Ries. We think so.
Chairman Gilman. It has been reported that some EU members
are pressuring EU aspirant countries to sign contracts with
European firms or give preferential treatment to European-based
businesses at the expense of our own companies by hinting that
it will enhance the prospects of their becoming EU members.
Even more seriously, there have been reports that aspirants are
being pressured to take diplomatic positions, including within
NATO, that support certain EU members against the United
States. Are those allegations accurate to some degree, and if
so, what are we doing about that kind of blackmailing of
Central and Eastern European countries to the detriment of our
own interests?
Mr. Ries. Well, we have heard reports of that nature, Mr.
Chairman, and let me assure you we take them very seriously. I
have since May, since actually arriving in my present job, led
a dialogue with the European Commission in Brussels about
enlargement, just give us a forum to take up these very
matters, and I have raised a number of cases in which we had
the indication or the concern that the European Union
institutions or individual member countries were using their
leverage, real or potential, over the aspirant countries for
either commercial advantage or for policy advantage in terms of
crafting European legislation. And we have really been quite
clear with the Commission that we did not consider that to be a
responsible way to proceed, and they have agreed with us, and
they have agreed to look into any particular instances that
raise concern with us, and they have done so.
We don't, though, leave it there. We also, of course, have
very important bilateral relationships with all of these
countries. Many of the aspirant countries are themselves--some
of them are members of NATO, and all of them have close
relations with us, and those are relations that they value,
they themselves value. And so when we hear tales of this sort,
we also stand up and are counted in the capitals.
Chairman Gilman. With regard to our good relations with
them, despite U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan's recent
statements that words can inflame or soothe, that everyone
needs a restoration of calm or quiet so as to create the best
possible atmosphere for resumption of talks, according to
Secretary General Kofi Annan, in the Middle East, the U.N.
General Assembly plan s an emergency session today, as a matter
of fact they are meeting now, in which a resolution will be
considered which once again condemns Israel. It almost sounds
to us like the U.N.'s racism resolutions of the past. And I
have been calling on our colleagues to join with me in
condemning the latest active incitement, but I wanted to ask
you, Mr. Secretary, what is our Nation doing to build
opposition to that kind of a measure to ensure that it will be
defeated?
Mr. Ries. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am sure that we are making
an all-points effort to deal with this, as well as other
aspects of the Middle East crisis that we have been within the
last 2 weeks, and as we did with the last resolution. We will
talk to our European allies that are permanent members of the
U.N. Security Council--France and the UK--and our other major
European allies, to make sure that they understand the
implications of anything that is being considered and make sure
that our views are clearly known there. We do this normally
here, in New York and in capitals, and the Secretary, as you
know, speaks to her European foreign minister colleagues
several times a week, and she will and does raise these issues
with them.
Chairman Gilman. Well, I would hope that when you return to
the office after this hearing, you will engage in that process
before the resolution is adopted, and we would enjoin our
Secretary of State to participate in that effort. I met
yesterday with Mr. Holbrooke, and I know he is hard at work on
this, but he needs some help from all of us in appealing to the
European Union representatives to work along with us rather
than at opposite poles.
Mr. Ries. We will do so.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Ries.
Mr. Gejdenson.
Mr. Gejdenson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
How does the creation of a distinct European defense
identity play into Russia's present sense of unease about NATO
expansion? Does it actually mitigate because it gives the
appearance of multiple fields of interests, or does it enforce
the anxious state of the Russian Government in seeing the West
ever moving eastward and giving them a greater feeling of
insecurity?
Mr. Ries. That is an interesting question, Congressman. I
am thinking about it. I would think that the development of the
European Security and Defense Identity per se would not be
considered to be an additional or grievous threat to Russia's
security interests. It is taking place in the framework of
NATO. After all, the European Security and Defense Identity is
in a way the development of a European capability that would
take place, be separable but not separate from NATO, and it is
not changing, if you will, the boundaries of the NATO area of
interest and operation. And in a sense, because it is in the
context of NATO, the NATO Permanent Joint Council relationship
with Russia gives Russia an ability to have a dialogue with the
Europeans with respect to European defense. I have seen no
indications that the Europeans are concerned to reassure
Russia. I think that they are confident that the Russians
understand that this capability is designed to deal with a
variety of largely international tasks. Short of war, it is not
an offensive capability. So I would be surprised if it was a
major concern for the Russians.
Mr. Gejdenson. There is apparently a recent agreement among
six Western European countries to work toward a common export
control regime. The impact on the United States seems to me to
be, you know, one more step in isolating America's somewhat
convoluted export policies in that there will be even more
pressure within the EU not to do business with the United
States.
And I have referenced the actions taken by Daimler-Benz.
Following the United States moving satellite export licensing
from Commerce to State, I think almost every one of the NATO
foreign ministers sent us a letter saying they would, where
possible, now buy components from outside the United States
because they see us as an unreliable supplier, and where there
are no alternative suppliers, they will seek to create
alternative supplies.
And that ties into my next question, which I would like to
combine here, and that is that the EU has been protectionist in
places like agriculture and hushkits and jet airframes and
things. I believe in a good economy. If the economy stalls, it
seems to me the United States has to confront an EU that will
be more focused on protectionism than it has been during that
time of economic expansion.
So in a combination of America's own stupidity in how we
formulated our export laws, partly due to Congress and partly
to European protectionism, I think we could have some serious
problems in the critical fields where the growth of the
American economy is at stake. They are not going to do this
across the board. So, in a sense, it doesn't galvanize American
public opinion. It will be in high technology and computers and
jet engines and airframes and critical areas where the future
is. Do you see that as a problem?
Mr. Ries. Well there are a number of points in your
questions, and let me see if I can address, them in this way.
First of all, I think that we share an interest with the
Europeans, a fundamental national security interest, in making
sure that technology that assists adversaries or potential
adversaries is adequately controlled. Obviously, there is the
potential of countries around the world developing missile
systems and weapons of mass destruction and other high-tech
instruments that could threaten our security, and they also
threaten the security of the Europeans. Both of us, therefore,
have export control regimes, and through the Wassenaar
Arrangement we actually coordinate our export control efforts.
Mr. Gejdensen. You are not seriously arguing that Wassenaar
is a real coordination? I mean, we didn't have real
coordination during the Soviet era and COCOM where basically
the Germans, the French and others had, you know, one of those
things you go through on the subway without a coin, though,
just a spinning rotation, whereas American export licenses
could get bogged down for months here? You are not arguing that
the Europeans take export controls with equal seriousness to
which the Administration or Congress does?
Mr. Ries. I am arguing that we both have similar
objectives, and the Europeans in doing this six-nation
agreement are doing it for similar objectives. The purpose is
to try and focus controls and to keep technologies out of the
hands of countries of concern. I am not a great expert,
obviously would not want to speak to the actual effectiveness
in specific cases, but what I would say is that we share this
goal of protecting sensitive technologies, which is why we have
the export control laws and regulations that we have and why
they have the ones that they have, and we do have a forum for
coordinating.
We also, though, both sides, are interested in promoting
transatlantic defense collaboration. The United States this
spring announced a defense trade security initiative designed
to simplify the parts of U.S. export control regulations that
inhibit or seem to inhibit defense collaboration and trade
between the United States and our European allies, and
implementation of that defense trade security initiative is
proceeding.
I know that various participants in the satellite and other
high-tech markets are concerned that the export control rules
that we have and the way that we proceed to implement those
rules inhibit their commercial flexibility, and that is, I
suppose, to be expected when national security objectives have
to interact with the rapidly changing largely commercial
market.
Your question, though, also turned to the point about
whether the EU is turning more or would turn more protectionist
in the context of an economic slowdown. There is always that
risk, and obviously a good part of our trade policy is to
confront any hint or aspect of such a turn that we should see.
I think it is fair to say that with respect to Europe, as
well as the rest of the developed countries, we have actually
seen a gradual, if not dramatic, liberalization in trade
barriers in the last decade. We feared very much that the
creation of the single market in Europe would lead to Fortress
Europe and raising of barriers toward our exports in high-tech
areas as well as others, and, in fact, that really hasn't
happened.
The hypothesis that if the economy goes down, protectionism
will increase has been one that we have seen many times and I
have experienced several times in my professional career. I
actually think that there is an alternative explanation that
could also apply in that we have had such a period of rapid
growth. Many of our industries and many European industries in
the high-tech area have had trouble with keeping up with
domestic demand. If there actually is a slowdown in domestic
demand, it is more likely that high-tech industries are going
to be looking more intensively at international markets, and
that might actually add to the steam for further liberalization
of international trade.
Mr. Gejdenson. Thank you.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Secretary, does the present
Administration view with alarm the French rhetoric articulated
by both President Chirac and Foreign Minister Vedrine that
implies that a motivating factor for European integration is a
desire to challenge America's global preeminence? I know the
French have never been very helpful in these areas.
Mr. Ries. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think that we don't in
general greet any ordinary sort of political rhetoric with
alarm in Europe. We have a very mature relationship very much
based on close cooperation and understanding, and the President
has that kind of a relationship with President Chirac and Prime
Minister Jospin, and we understand that occasionally in
politics the rhetoric gets away from the reality, and so alarm
is probably too strong a word.
I think it is true that some European elites have concern
about a world structure in which the United States has
disproportionate power relative to other players in the
international community, and we have done polling in Europe to
try and understand this phenomenon. From what we can tell, the
fundamental ties that unite us and the fundamental interest and
support for America, American values and American positions in
the world really remains quite widespread. There are ups and
downs in attitudes that are often tied to short-term,
transitory events and that we do not think that they presage
some sort of serious undermining of the transatlantic
relationship.
Chairman Gilman. Well, Mr. Secretary, how widespread is the
anti-Americanism feeling among the European elite, the policy-
makers?
Mr. Ries. I think it varies by country. In no place is it
fundamental or even dominant.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Secretary, Secretary of Defense Cohen
told a recent meeting of NATO defense ministers that the U.S.
viewed the creation of a separate EU defense capability outside
of NATO as natural and inevitable. Why has the Administration
apparently abandoned our concern that the European Union was
developing military structures separate and apart from NATO and
while many of us are concerned that that kind of a structure
could eventually erode NATO?
Mr. Ries. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, we think that the
European security and defense structure that is being developed
is being developed within the context of NATO, and we have long
supported the idea of a European Security and Defense Identity
that strengthens the alliance and contributes to our own
security.
The Europeans are developing a rapid reaction force of
about a corps size that they could maintain in the field for a
year or more, and this gives them the capability to act when
the alliance is not engaged. That is the fundamental
arrangement that was reached last year here in Washington at
the 50th summit of NATO, and we think that the implementation
and the development of this capability will strengthen NATO
rather than weaken it. These forces will be--there is one pool
of forces that could be drawn upon by NATO members for NATO
contingencies as well as others.
The Kosovo conflict demonstrates quite vividly the
asymmetry in the forces available to NATO members and brought
out quite obviously the need to build a bigger European
capability. And the European security and defense proposals
help make a case for that strength and capability, and we are
very much engaged with the EU now in common planning, using of
our planning assets to figure out what kind of force they need,
how that force can be developed in such a way that it can be
compatible with NATO standards and forces and use NATO
contingencies as well as times that NATO, the alliance as a
whole, is not engaged and Europeans choose to act alone.
The long and short of it is we expect that the development
of this force will strengthen the alliance.
Chairman Gilman. Well, essentially won't they be calling on
NATO for the military forces that they plan to utilize under
this new structure?
Mr. Ries. Well, they will have their own military forces.
They may well call on some NATO assets, intelligence and
communications assets, in specific contingencies, and that is
part of what we are working out, the ways that they can have
access to NATO assets. And the whole package is--there are a
variety of different interfaces between the EU's effort and
NATO. We are talking between the NATO 19 and the EU 15. We are
having discussions. There are discussions being held between
the EU, and its non-EU European allies in the so-called ``15
plus 6'' format. The planners are talking. There is really a
great effort being made by both sides to make sure that the
development of the European Security and Defense Identity
strengthens the alliance as a whole.
Chairman Gilman. Will this new EU rapid reaction force need
some aircraft or carriers, as some in the European Parliament
have suggested?
Mr. Ries. Well, it will certainly need aircraft, and part
of the project is to get individual member states to pledge
assets that can be used by this new rapid reaction force.
Chairman Gilman. Well, some of it--there is question
whether some of these European countries who have been cutting
back on their military budgets are going to be able to manage
this kind of an arrangement financially.
Mr. Ries. And that is a fair question, and there are those
in Europe who also question that. The Europeans are aware that
they need to build political support for that, and they need to
bring along their publics to support increased effectiveness in
their military forces. The French are hosting a capabilities
conference in November at which countries will come forward and
talk about what specific kinds of forces they would make
available for this European security and defense program. In
many cases the Europeans use their military forces for a
variety of different things, and they have a lot of men under
arms, some of which are not trained or usable in a contingency.
Some of the increased capability can be accomplished by
spending smarter rather than spending more, but it is likely
that some additional spending and certainly new weapons systems
will need to be procured.
Chairman Gilman. Well, Mr. Secretary, what do aircraft
carriers have to do with the Petersburg test? Why aircraft
carriers?
Mr. Ries. It is news to me they would build an aircraft
carrier.
Chairman Gilman. Well some of the EP members have been
talking about that.
Mr. Ries. I see. The French and British, of course, have
their own national aircraft carriers. I had not heard of any.
There may be speculation of that nature, but I don't think that
that is necessarily a part of the ESDI program.
Chairman Gilman. Let me talk for a moment about the
national missile defense. The Administration contends it has
consulted with our allies on the ABM Treaty, beginning at a
high level with Deputy Secretary of State Talbott's meeting
with the North Atlantic Council back in 1999 and continuing
with the sharing of intelligence estimates about the potential
missile threat from North Korea, from Iran and Iraq. Our
European allies have criticized this consultative process as
having been neither sufficient nor timely. Would you be able to
comment on that for us?
Mr. Ries. I haven't heard such criticism lately. The U.S.
actually undertook a very active program of consultations with
the alliance on national missile defense. We sent not only
Deputy Secretary Talbott, but a series of briefing teams to
Brussels to brief, in NATO, on the threat and to talk about our
analysis of the implications of building on deterrence and a
variety of other--the arms control implications, why we see the
ABM Treaty affected. We talked to them. We gave them several,
numerous briefings on the substance of our conversations with
the Russians.
So it is probably true that there were some comments at the
outset, 1998, early 1999, of the kind you mention, but I think
more recently during the course of the past 12 months or so,
they have been really quite pleased with the degree and the
kind of consultations we have engaged in.
I think it is fair to say that the Europeans share our
analysis, the President's analysis, underlying his decision to
postpone a deployment decision because they, on the basis of
the briefings we have given them and otherwise, feel that the
technology wasn't in the position where he could make a
judgment, and so there certainly is no divergence between us on
the question of deferral of deployment for the time being.
Chairman Gilman. Well, Secretary Ries, is there a uniform
position on NMD among our European allies, and if not, what are
their different points of view on this proposal?
Mr. Ries. We could get that for you, Mr. Chairman. I am an
economist, so I would rather stay out of characterizing
individual countries.
Chairman Gilman. If you could submit a response for the
record.
[The response by Mr. Ries is available in the appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. Can you tell us, how does a recent
decision by our Nation to intervene and support the euro
comport with Secretary of Treasury Summer's statement that a
strong dollar is an important national interest?
Mr. Ries. I believe the Secretary reaffirmed that as he--we
have a firm and consistent policy of not commenting on exchange
rate values, and if anyone says anything, it is the Secretary
of the Treasury, and so consistent with that, I would stay away
from characterizing our views. I think that the Secretary's
statement on the occasion of the intervention along with other
G-7 countries stands on its own, and I would rather keep it
there.
Chairman Gilman. With regard to the euro being now at low
levels relative to the dollar that it was before the joint
American, European and Japanese intervention, was our decision
to participate in the intervention ill-considered?
Mr. Ries. Mr. Chairman, I refer you to the Treasury for
details on what it is we did and why, but clearly I would not
think that it was ill-considered.
Chairman Gilman. If the value of the euro continues to
collapse, will we continue to intervene and support it?
Mr. Ries. I am really not able to comment on any plans we
might have for intervention or--at the State Department we
leave all such matters to the Treasury Department.
Chairman Gilman. Is there any discussion between State and
Treasury on this since it is an important policy matter?
Mr. Ries. Well, clearly the Treasury is in touch with the
White House.
Chairman Gilman. Have they been in touch with your office?
Mr. Ries. Not my office specifically, sir.
Chairman Gilman. With the State Department?
Mr. Ries. I can't say.
Chairman Gilman. Would you have any recommendations to
make?
Mr. Ries. On the matter of currency intervention?
Chairman Gilman. Yes, with regard to the Euro.
Mr. Ries. We do not comment on currency values.
Chairman Gilman. Who in the State Department would comment
on that?
Mr. Ries. I don't think you would find anyone. Even the
Secretary would be loath to comment on that.
Chairman Gilman. You mean to say that no one in the State
Department would comment on the Euro and maintaining its
ability to finance the European community?
Mr. Ries. I will be glad to comment on the Euro itself. It
is the question of intervention and exchange rate values. The
exchange rate, the exchange rates themselves are what we do not
comment on.
Chairman Gilman. Would it be left separate and apart from
any policy consideration with regard to the Euro? It would seem
to me that the State Department would want to be and should be
involved in that kind of consideration. Do you feel that there
is no role for the State Department in that kind of a policy
decision?
Mr. Ries. No. Obviously, the role of the State Department
is in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy and
to the extent that a policy or the implementation of a policy
by the Treasury Department involves foreign policy, yes,
clearly we should be involved.
Chairman Gilman. Well, I would hope your department would
be involved as we look to what is happening to the Euro and
what we should be doing and whether we should intervene or not
intervene. It would seem to me that when the State Department
engages in trade discussions or any concessions that there
should be some consideration with regard to the Euro, and I
would hope that you would encourage the Department to become
more actively involved.
Let me turn a moment to northern Ireland. In legislation
now being moved in the British Parliament, the British
government has watered down the most important recommendations
of the Patton Commission on policing in northern Ireland and
that is a very key consideration in the continued peace
process. What position is the State Department taking on how
that legislation fits in with the Good Friday Accord's
requirements that the British government should advocate
complete implementation of the Patton Commission's
recommendations?
We even sent over the former head of DEA and a former head
of our New York State Police, Mr. Constantine, to assist the
British government in implementing the Patton Commission
report. It then went to the House of Commons and not too much
was done. As a matter of fact, it eroded some of the Patton
Commission's recommendations and had it shipped over to the
House of Lords. Could you tell us where that stands, what the
State Department is trying to do to make certain the Patton
Commission report is going to be properly implemented?
Mr. Ries. We--as you know, Mr. Chairman, we have long
supported the process of developing peace and reconciliation in
northern Ireland. The President has been second to none in his
efforts to find the solution and support the Good Friday
Accords. We have--as you allude to, we made available expertise
from the United States to help Chris Patton in his work.
The peace process in northern Ireland is at a delicate
stage. It is important that the involved institutions function,
and it is important that all the parties stay in the government
of the province and we support the British and Irish
governments in their efforts. In order that they have the
flexibility to bring all parties to the table, we are not and
have not specified a position on the individual issues before--
on the table between the parties.
I note that the legislation has not been passed. It is
still under discussion. There is no final resolution of a
policing bill. My understanding is that Parliament is expecting
to pass it sometime in November. So it is really at a delicate
stage.
Chairman Gilman. It is delicate to the entire peace
process; and I would hope that your department, particularly
your office, would weigh in with the British government to see
what can be done to implement the Patton Commission report. We
met with Mr. Patton not too long ago, and he was very much
concerned about the implementation of the report which we
considered to be a very substantial and very important report
to reform the policing mechanism, the RUC in Northern Ireland.
We would welcome your review of all of that.
Mr. Ries. Thank you very much.
Chairman Gilman. Just one or two more questions. Have we
received any indication as to whether the EU or any of the
European countries plan to contribute to Plan Colombia to help
combat the serious narcotics problem there as we move ahead to
authorizing funding for Plan Colombia to help President
Pastrana and meet these threats to his country.
Mr. Ries. I am not sure we have the specific numbers here.
Yes, several European countries are planning to make
contributions in support of Plan Colombia. I know the Spanish
have pledged a substantial sum of money and several others
have. The Spanish hosted a pledging conference in July; and my
understanding is that they are hosting another one, I believe,
this month or next on Plan Colombia. And several other European
countries are interested in financing various aspects.
Europeans may actually take up buttressing programs that
support the objectives of Plan Colombia while not necessarily
Plan Colombia itself. That seems to be the attitude of some
countries. I do know that the Spanish have been steadfast in
their interest in supporting Plan Colombia.
Chairman Gilman. What about the EU itself? Does the EU plan
to support Plan Colombia?
Mr. Ries. The EU Commission, the European Commission, which
is sort of the executive arm of the EU, has buttressing
assistance programs in Colombia as I suggested.
Chairman Gilman. And they will be providing funding to
assist?
Mr. Ries. They do provide funding, and presumably they will
be doing more. That is an issue for the next pledging
conference.
Chairman Gilman. I have about one last question, Mr.
Secretary.
I understand that the Deutsche Telekom recently took
concrete action to block the deployment of U.S. developed
wireless technology in Europe. That technology is called Code
Division Multiple Access, or CDMA. Specifically, Deutsche
Telekom recently ordered Westel, which is a Hungarian wireless
operator that was planning a trial U.S. technology to, and I
quote, terminate any act, actions and measures regarding the
utilization of CDMA, including testing, close quote.
The Westel trial is the first major step of CDMA in Europe.
Deutsche Telekom is a majority owner of Westel. Were you aware
of that situation, Mr. Secretary, and what will the State
Department do to ensure that American technologies have access
to the European wireless marketplace?
Mr. Ries. The specific situation in Hungary I have only
recently been aware of. Let me come back to that via the
overall policy.
Mr. Chairman, in my period of time in London we worked very
hard to make sure that the rules for so-called third generation
wireless were technology neutral. Our view has been that there
are various technologies including CDMA, as you mentioned, and
TDMA and other kinds of technologies to increase the bandwidth
and speed with which data is put over mobile networks and we
thought that we should not be in a position of choosing a
winner technology. So we fought in the international
telecommunications union to get a technology neutral
specification for third generation wireless.
We are now in the phase of implementation of third
generation wireless, and it is our feeling equally that the
implementation should be technology neutral on the part of
governments. We will follow up in this case that you mention to
ensure that there is no improper influence brought to bear by
the German government or others to prejudge a technology
which--where the marketplace should really be the judge.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Secretary, we have been reading some
comments in the press over the last few days regarding a secret
agreement between Vice President Gore and Russian Prime
Minister Victor Chernomyrdin regarding arms sales; and, if
true, we would be dismayed to think that the Vice President
accepted without protest a letter from Russian Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin instructing him to keep their agreement secret
from third parties including the Congress. If that be the case,
it would indicate a disturbingly casual disregard by the
Administration for Congress as an integral branch of government
under our constitutional system.
I don't expect the Vice President to be responsible for
something a Russian official may have written in a letter, but
I think the Congress and the American people have a right to
expect their Administration to clarify that Congress is not a
third party that can be kept in the dark and, if that is the
case, it is the U.S. Constitution that should be the
controlling legal authority. Are you familiar with this
situation at all?
Mr. Ries. I am afraid not, sir. As you recall, Russia and
things Russian have been hived off of the area that we are
responsible for.
Chairman Gilman. Have been what?
Mr. Ries. The European Bureau, the bureau that I work in,
is not directly responsible for Russian affairs.
Chairman Gilman. Which bureau is responsible for Russian
affairs?
Mr. Ries. Well, there is an organization that is associated
with the Secretary's office that handles Russian affairs.
Chairman Gilman. What organization is that, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Ries. It is the Office of the Special Representative
for Russia and Newly Independent States.
Chairman Gilman. Who is in charge of that organization?
Mr. Ries. Operationally Steve Sestanovich.
Chairman Gilman. And they consult with you with regard to
any Russian problems?
Mr. Ries. Well, surely if they involve the Europeans, yes.
Chairman Gilman. Would this, do you think, involve
Europeans, this recent contention with regard to a secret arms
deal with Russia?
Mr. Ries. I am not familiar with it in detail. It is--as
you described it, it is not self-evident that it would.
Chairman Gilman. I would hope you would familiarize
yourself with it. It appeared in the Washington Times, it
appeared in the New York Post within the last few days, and it
is something that we are very much concerned about.
Mr. Ries. I will take that back, sir.
Chairman Gilman. I would hope you would take a look at it
and get back to your Committee with regard to any information
you may be able to provide.
Mr. Ries. We will do that.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you very much.
Unless there are some further discussions from our staff,
the hearing is adjourned; and I thank you for the appearance.
Mr. Ries. Thank you, sir.
[Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Prepared Statement of The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a
Representative in Congress from the State of New York, and Chairman,
Committee on International Relations
This morning's hearing on Developments in Western Europe will
provide the members of this Committee the opportunity to review our
policy toward that region of the world in which our core national
interests are most engaged. The majority of our allies are there, the
bulk of our international trade and investment is with the countries of
this vital region, and, of course, it is with these countries that we
share our fundamental values and institutions.
Although our overall relations with these nations are excellent, it
would be a mistake to not take stock of them and assess those areas
where we differ and disagree. This is particularly true as the members
of the European Union continue to work on the ``European Project''
creating the bonds and institutions that have already led to a single
European Currency, as well as efforts to forge a common foreign and
security policy that are the main attributes of a single sovereign
state. The implications of these developments may be profound for the
citizens of our own country, but in this time of unprecedented peace
and prosperity, are not much discussed outside the bounds of policy
making circles and our institutions of higher learning.
The European Project has not been without its own difficulties. The
dramatic plunge in the value of the euro since it was launched last
year is evidence of these problems, as is the ongoing difficulty in
agreeing to enlarge the European Union to include some of the countries
of central and eastern Europe that have long regarded EU membership as
a cementing of their status as independent states sharing in the free-
market and democratic traditions embodied in the countries of the West.
Attitudes among Europe's elite toward America are also shifting in
the aftermath of the Cold War. Comments by officials of one of our
closest allies suggest for instance that Europe should be concerned
about tendencies in this country to pursue ``neo-unilateral'' policies,
and that European integration is necessary to provide a counter-weight
to curb the exercise of American power. How widespread these critical
attitudes are among the countries we look to as partners for
cooperative efforts to meet those challenges that confront all of us is
a significant question which we hope our witness from the State
Department will be able to address this morning.
I would like to welcome Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
Charles Ries (REESE) of the Bureau for European Affairs, and thank him
for his appearance at this hearing. Mr. Ries transferred to the Bureau
earlier this year from our Embassy in London where he served as the
Minister Counselor for Economic Affairs. Prior to that assignment, he
served at our Mission to the European Union and has served in a number
of interesting positions related primarily to our trade and economic
policies.
Mr. Ries you may proceed with your testimony which will be entered
in full in our record.
__________
Prepared Statement of Charles Ries, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State, Bureau for European Affairs, U.S. Department of
State
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have this opportunity to meet with
you today to review US objectives and challenges in Europe. The policy
landscape shifted dramatically during the 90's, as the fall of the
Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the break-up of
Yugoslavia and a new phase in European integration created a very
different set of problems and opportunities. We believe that we are
well positioned now, at the beginning of this new American century, to
protect American interests in Europe, and in partnership with Europeans
around the world, through the changes we have put in place: an enlarged
NATO; a deeper US-EU relationship; and a strengthened OSCE.
The great lesson of the 20th century is that the destinies of North
America and Europe are joined. If Europe is at peace, America is more
secure. If Europe prospers, America does so as well. In an increasingly
integrated and globalized world, our security, prosperity and democracy
depend on each other, so our work in Europe is not complete. Old lines
of division have given way, but we still must complete new networks of
cooperation. And, although no power today menaces Europe or the US,
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and environmental degradation
are just some of the critical challenges that must be addressed, and
are best addressed by Europe and the US together. Thus, our goal is to
build an enhanced relationship with Europe that is:
La relationship with Europe as a whole, not just the
western half.
La relationship in which defense and security remain
priorities, but in which economic prosperity and addressing
global threats receive increased attention.
La relationship that considers conflict prevention and
crisis management as priorities for cooperation.
La relationship where the US and Europe share, risks
and burdens, but also the responsibility to find solutions to
threats and crises beyond Europe, and
La relationship that recognizes the realities of the
new global economy.
Three Opportunities
Building this new relationship means addressing three
opportunities. Our first opportunity is in Europe itself--ensuring the
continuing integration of the continent, so that conflict in Eastern
Europe becomes as inconceivable as conflict in Western Europe and hope
for a better life is shared across the continent. This means working
with our partners to complete the integration of Europe's democracies
into NATO and the EU, strengthen our partnerships with Russia and
Ukraine, and transform southeastern Europe--including Serbia--from a
primary source of instability to a fully integrated part of the
transatlantic community, and improve relations between Greece and
Turkey--the key to lowering tensions and increasing cooperation in the
Aegean.
The second opportunity is between Europe and America--strengthening
and deepening the bonds between our societies in ways that make a
positive, tangible difference in the daily lives of our citizens. Our
societies are more integrated than at any time in our respective
histories. More than 14 million workers on both sides of the Atlantic
owe their livelihoods to our $1 trillion trade and investment
relationship, the largest and freest in the world. European companies
are the largest foreign investors in 41 of the 50 states, and American
companies continue to invest about as much in Europe as they do in the
rest of the world combined. This is why we view the Euro not as a
threat but as a sign of our continuing partnership with Europe.
But the bonds are not just economic. The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) is as vibrant as ever, and more countries ate
clamoring to join. We have an interest in more balanced burden- and
responsibility-sharing. That is why we actively support the Partnership
for Peace and the candidate countries' efforts to reform and modernize
their military forces. And that is why we support a European Security
and Defense Identity that strengthens the trans-Atlantic relationship
and enhances Europe's defense capabilities.
Our third opportunity extends beyond Europe and America improving
our ability to deal with issues in the wider world that neither of us,
acting alone, will be able to confront effectively. When we pull
together, the !transatlantic community is the engine of progress on
every world-scale issue. When we pull in different directions, the
engine is less efficient.
The Challenges Ahead
How do we pursue this relationship with Europe? First and foremost,
we need to work in Europe's southeast comer. Our immediate challenge
there is to help build democracy, which is the key to our strategy for
the;,region. Open, integrated democracies built on the rule of law
don't occur overnight, but when democratic governments emerge, the
international community needs to nurture them.
The swearing-in of Vojislav Kostunica as the democratically-elected
president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is an extraordinary
victory for the people of Yugoslavia, who have clearly chosen democracy
and a future in Europe over dictatorship and repression. Along with our
European Allies, we look forward to engaging President Kostunica's
government and to bringing Belgrade into the international community. A
democratic Serbia committed to the rule of law--the establishment of
which President Kostunica has made one of his primary goals--will be a
welcome addition to Southeast Europe. President Kostunica has affirmed
adherence to the Dayton agreement for Bosnia and to UNSCR 1244 on
Kosovo. A democratic Yugoslavia can provide a new basis for
strengthening regional cooperation and advancing democratic and
economic development throughout the region. We expect Yugoslavia to
meet the same standards on human rights, rule of law and cooperation
with the international community, as applied to others.
Key to the success of this effort will be doing our part to
consolidate the democratic changes in Belgrade. We want to show the
people of Serbia there is an immediate democracy dividend. We are
working in close cooperation with our European Allies to this end. One
of our first steps has been to take steps to lift the oil embargo and
the flight ban, as President Clinton announced on October 12. Lifting
sanctions accords with the implicit promise we made when we imposed
them--that a return to democracy by the people of Serbia would be
rewarded. Moreover, sanctions-lifting is a promise we have made
explicitly over the past weeks, as we sought to strengthen the
opposition during the FRY electoral campaign. We will also ensure that
such measures do not allow Milosevic supporters to continue the
systematic theft of resources that have marked the last thirteen years.
In that vein, we will continue to enforce a ban on travel to the US by
top members of the Milosevic regime, and keep in place measures that
help the new government deter a looting of the national patrimony.
We will also review our restrictions on Serbia's participation in
international financial institutions as Serbia makes its democratic
transition and meets its international obligations. Our positive
engagement with Croatia, which led to that country's turnaround in
cooperation with The Hague, will serve as a valuable model.
We should continue and, as appropriate, increase assistance to meet
humanitarian needs and strengthen democracy in the FRY. We are
consulting with Congress in the context of the appropriations
discussions, which are still ongoing, and the fact that the new
government is still in the process of forming to determine appropriate
levels of assistance. We welcome the initiative of the European Union
to invite the European Commission and the World Bank to lead in
evaluation of needs and coordination of economic and financial
assistance to the FRY.
Europe is leading the partnership to reconstruct Kosovo. Europe and
Canada have 82 percent of the troops on the ground there. According to
the World Bank, Europe has contributed 63% of total donor assistance--
excluding humanitarian assistance--to Kosovo in 2000. The US has
pledged 14%. In Kosovo--and through the Stability Pact for Southeastern
Europe--we and our partners have acted decisively on our conviction
that Europe's future will be shaped by the democratic integration to
which most people in the region aspire rather than by the demagogic
exploitation of ethnic and other differences that have brought untold
tragedy to this region over the past decade. On March 30 in Brussels,
we agreed with our European partners to launch $2.3 billion-worth of
``quick-start'' programs to get these countries back on their feet: to
rebuild transportation, water and energy infrastructure; to reopen
borders; and disarm local militias. Out of that $2.3 billion, the US
share is $77.65 million--only about 3.2 percent. The United States has
also nurtured the growth of regional cooperation among the frontline
states through the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative to combat
cross-border crime, facilitate regional trade and transportation and
lower barriers to commerce and investment.
While we have accomplished a great deal in the region, we face very
real risks and tensions at present. Ethnic hatred remains very much
alive in Kosovo, and Albania and Bosnia are fragile. Important
elections in the region will be held in the next 60 days. They must
succeed. We are committed to working with our European partners to
transform this region from a primary source of instability to a fully
integrated part of the transatlantic community. We welcome their
contribution as part of a more balanced partnership, where the US does
not always carry the biggest burden. But, we must have the resources
available in the future to continue to make our contribution, to
respond flexibly and swiftly to changing circumstances, and to continue
our SEED programs to stabilize, transform and integrate Bosnia and the
remainder of Southeast Europe into the European and transatlantic
mainstream.
There is much work to be done at NATO and on European security
issues. We will continue to work with the members of the European Union
to implement this year's decisions on the European Security and Defense
Identity (ESDI). Kosovo demonstrated the clear gap between US and
European military capabilities. ESDI and NATO's Defense Capabilities
Initiative are the way for Europe to take more responsibility for its
own defense. A stronger European military contribution will make the
Alliance stronger, lift some of the burden on the US to act in crises,
and make the US-European relationship more of a partnership, while in
no way eroding the transatlantic Alliance.
We need to keep NATO's door open to new members, perhaps as early
as the Summit in 2002, through the Membership Action Plan and our
bilateral security assistance programs (FMF and IMET). We should help
the nine candidates--Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria,
Slovenia, Slovakia, Macedonia, and Albania--become the best candidates
they can be, Furthering NATO enlargement continues the process of
developing a Europe that is whole and free, and consistent with our
security interests. At the same time, membership of new candidates will
be decided on the basis of their contributions to the Alliance.
We must continue to deal with threats posed by weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and the means of their delivery with our European
allies and partners. The Allies recognized that proliferation can pose
a direct military threat to Allied territory, populations and forces.
This was the starting point of the NATO summit's WMD initiative. On
that basis, we have consulted closely with our Allies on development of
a national missile defense system. The President's decision in
September to defer deployment reflected these consultations as well as
the three other key issues of the threat, technology, and cost
effectiveness. The consultations with Allies confirmed that WMD and
missile proliferation remains a serious concern to the Alliance and a
threat to which Allies must respond militarily.
At the same time, Allies want to preserve deterrence and arms
control as a means of responding to the WMD threat. We have made clear
to our Allies that we need to continue to deal with the issue of
missile defense. We will need to continue to consult with them about
how to cooperate on common missile defense efforts which meet our and
their security needs and maintain the unity of the Alliance in this
critical area.
We want to strengthen the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) by working closely with the Chairman-in-Office, the
Secretary General and member.states and improve its ability to address
emerging crises through rapid deployment of civilian expertise using
innovative tools such as REACT. OSCE missions in many countries, funded
through PKO funds, help alleviate conflict and reinforce human rights
practices. And we are using OSCE as, an important tool in our fight
against trafficking in women and children.
Our relationship with the European Union is a multifaceted one. We
strive for ways to work effectively with the EU on common challenges
worldwide and to reduce barriers against us. Two-way trade between the
US and EU is robust and we are each other's largest foreign investors.
Yet significant trade disputes between us remain stubbornly unresolved.
We will be making strenuous diplomatic--and public diplomacy--efforts
to find a basis for opening European markets consistent with world
trade rules. We also will use the early warning and problem prevention
principles agreed upon at the Bonn US-EU Summit to prevent regulatory
and other minor differences from becoming major disputes. Our ultimate
goal remains building a barrier-free, simple, transatlantic marketplace
that sets world standards for protection of consumers, the environment
and labor.
But our relationship with the European Union reaches far beyond
trade and economics, just as the Union itself extends beyond its
origins as the European Coal and Steel Community. Together, we continue
to knock down global economic barriers and advance peace in
Southeastern Europe, the Korean Peninsula, and the Middle East.
Together, we promote nuclear safety in Ukraine and Russia, respond to
natural disasters, attack trafficking in women in Eastern Europe, and
defend human rights. We fight infectious diseases--including AIDS--in
Africa, arrest child pornography on the Internet, and develop a global
early warning network against communicable diseases. And together, we
prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and fight
criminals, terrorists and drug traffickers wherever they may be.
We continue to advance US interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.
We are working with the parties toward a bicommunal, bizonal settlement
on Cyprus. We will continue to encourage Greece and Turkey, two allies,
to develop closer ties between them. We will work with Turkey to put it
in the strongest possible position to attain its European aspirations
in the economic and security spheres. But our tasks are made more
difficult, not just in the eastern Mediterranean, but in the Caucasus
and Middle East as well, by actions that alienate a key regional ally,
the Republic of Turkey.
In Northern Ireland, we support the efforts of local leaders and
the governments of Ireland and the United Kingdom to achieve a lasting
political settlement. The US contribution to the International Fund for
Ireland promotes private investment and free enterprise, while the
Walsh Visa Program provides needed vocational training and
multicultural experience to disadvantaged youth that might otherwise
turn to violence.
We have also made enormous progress in correcting the wrongs of the
past. The Department worked closely with Deputy Secretary of the
Treasury Stuart Eizenstat in reaching an international agreement to
provide payments to individuals who served as slave laborers for German
firms during World War II. We are on the verge of completing a similar
agreement with Austria. We estimate that over a million people,
including several thousand Americans, are eligible for payments under
these arrangements. In addition, we played an important role earlier
this month at the Vilnius Forum which furthered international efforts
to assure the return of Nazi-looted art works to their rightful owners.
Through the Northern Europe Initiative, we seek a Baltic Sea region
in which its countries have developed a vibrant and multifaceted
culture of cooperation in key areas of political, economic, and social
development, characterized by positive, constructive Baltic-Russian
relations, greater Russian engagement with its Baltic Sea neighbors,
and continued regional engagement by the Nordic countries and Germany.
Small amounts of SEED, FSA, and D&CP funding leverage support from our
Nordic partners to pursue an increased number of NEI projects and
greater involvement of Russia. Here I'd like to acknowledge the support
that this committee, and particularly Rep. Gejdensen, has given to our
initiative with the passage this summer of H.R. 4249, the ``Cross-
Border Cooperation. and Environmental Safety in Northern Europe Act of
2000.'' This Act recognizes the importance of promoting regional
cooperation in the Baltic Sea region and, most importantly, the need
for continued funding to do this important work. We appreciate this
support.
The bottom line: our partnership with Europe does real things for
real people. It generates jobs. It stimulates investment. It reduces
the threats we face from crime, terrorism, nuclear arms proliferation,
drugs, and disease. It increases our security and cuts the cost to the
American taxpayer of achieving that security. When it works, it enables
us to achieve goals we could not achieve alone. When it does not,
stalemate and crisis can result. But making it work requires the
resources--the personnel, facilities, and funding--to pursue expanding
US interests.
Question for the Record for Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs Charles Ries from Representative Benjamin Gilman,
Chairman, House International Relations Committee
Question:
Is there a uniform policy among our European allies on the U.S. NMD
effort?
Answer:
Although many of our European Allies expressed initial skepticism
and even opposition to NMD1, there is no ``uniform'' view among them.
We also believe that their final views on this issue are far from set.
Starting last fall, we initiated a regular pattern of briefing the
Allies on NMD, the threat posed by missile proliferation, and our
discussions with the Russians on ABM Treaty issues and further
strategic arms reductions. These consultations have been useful in
building greater appreciation among the Allies about the extent and
nature of the threat and the need to respond to it. This has already
led to more openness among Allies to consider the issue of missile
defense.
At the same time, many European Allies want to preserve deterrence
and arms control as means of responding to the WMD threat. They
continue to be concerned about the implications of abrogating the ABM
Treaty, believing:that doing so could undermine what they see as a
major pillar of global strategic stability. Allies also continue to
stress the importance of our maintaining a dialogue with Russia on this
subject.
We have made clear to our Allies that we will have to continue to
deal with missile defense. We plan to continue our pattern of briefing
European Allies and partners on this issue, as well as maintaining
dialogue with the Russians. We also intend to consult with them about
how to cooperate on common missile defense efforts which meet our and
their security needs and maintain the unity of the Alliance in this
critical area.
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