[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
GAO ASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES JUDICIAL AND POLICE REFORM ASSISTANCE
IN HAITI
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 19, 2000
__________
Serial No. 106-183
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/
international--relations
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
69-534 CC WASHINGTON : 2001
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DANA ROHRABACHER, California CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California PAT DANNER, Missouri
PETER T. KING, New York EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
Carolina STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
MATT SALMON, Arizona JIM DAVIS, Florida
AMO HOUGHTON, New York EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
TOM CAMPBELL, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
KEVIN BRADY, Texas BARBARA LEE, California
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California [VACANCY]
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff
Caleb McCarry, Professional Staff Member
Liberty Dunn, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
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WITNESS
Page
Jess T. Ford, Associate Director, International Relations and
Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs
Division, U.S. General Accounting Office....................... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress
from New York and Chairman, Committee on International
Relations...................................................... 28
Jess T. Ford..................................................... 30
GAO ASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES JUDICIAL AND POLICE REFORM ASSISTANCE
IN HAITI
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 2000
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:09 a.m. in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A.
Gilman (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Chairman Gilman. The Committee will come to order.
This morning we will hear testimony from the General
Accounting Office regarding the preliminary results of GAO's
review of United States assistance that we have been providing
to Haiti's justice system.
On September 19, 1994, President Clinton ordered 20,000
American troops to go to Haiti to restore the democratically
elected government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. These
men and women from our armed forces were directed into harm's
way to uphold the rule of law. The purpose of this hearing is
to examine just what Haiti's governmental leaders have done
since 1994 to further the rule of law with our assistance.
Between 1995 and 1999, our government has provided $97
million in bilateral assistance to Haiti's justice system. Some
$65 million of that money was directed to training and
equipping the Haitian National Police.
Haiti's judicial system has been exceedingly weak and
subject to manipulation. Drug traffickers and persons
implicated in political killings have been enjoying impunity.
Opponents of Haiti's current government have, from time to
time, been kept in jail despite judicial orders for their
release. Many more Haitians languish behind bars waiting for
trials that may never happen.
United States judicial reform in Haiti has foundered in a
sea of the Haitian Government's indifference. Haiti's leaders
simply do not have the political will to pursue meaningful
judicial reform. Apparently they prefer to manipulate the
justice system and extract wealth from their country's state
owned monopolies.
The recent election process revealed how completely the
Haitian National Police has been politicized by the ruling
Lavalas Family party. In the run up to the May 21 elections,
some 15 persons, principally from opposition political parties,
were murdered. Police have made no progress in resolving those
crimes.
Prior to and after the election, violent street
demonstrations were staged by the governing Lavalas Family
party. On a number of occasions, the police just stood by and
failed to protect peaceful opposition rallies from those pro-
government vigilantes.
After the polls closed on election day, police officers
were seen carting away election returns. Immediately following
the election, a large number of opposition politicians were
arbitrarily arrested by the U.S. trained police.
Last year, the Lavalas Family party led protests seeking
the ouster of police director Pierre Denize and State Security
Secretary Robert Manuel. Mr. Manuel was forced to resign and
fled Haiti in October 1999. Subsequently, the HNP's Inspector
General, Eucher Joseph, was forced to quit his post.
Major narcotics traffickers have been operating freely in
Haiti. The Administration has now decertified Haiti with a
waiver for 2 consecutive years. Drug corruption of Haitian
officials is a serious problem that needs to be dealt with
directly and honestly.
In a rare bit of good news earlier this month, four police
officers implicated in a May 28, 1999 killing of 11 people in a
Port-au-Prince slum were convicted and sentenced to 3 years in
prison. This is an important precedent. Without an independent
police Inspector General and a justice system with integrity,
however, this judgment will likely stand as an isolated
exception.
The creation of the Haitian National Police gave us all
hope that Haitians would be able to count on a professional,
apolitical police force to foster a climate of security that
would allow the Haitian economy to recover and to grow. Sadly,
the initial work that was done by the Administration to recruit
and train a cadre of competent police officers has been
severely undermined.
The Haitian National Police has become a largely
ineffective law enforcement organization. Absent fundamental
changes to reverse corruption and politization, no amount of
United States assistance is going to be able to restore
credibility to the Haitian National Police.
At this time I would like to recognize the Ranking Minority
Member of our Committee, the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr.
Gejdenson.
Mr. Gejdenson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Clearly I think everybody who has been watching Haiti is
disappointed at the electoral process. The sad fact that our
poorest neighbors in this hemisphere have continued to suffer
and be deprived of democratic opportunities, free and fair
elections and a better standard of living is something of great
frustration.
I think that the Congress has not necessarily been the most
helpful in forming a Haiti policy. Clearly the failures within
Haiti are the leading cause, but it is clear to me that America
and other democracies in the hemisphere have to continue to
make every effort to establish a civil order, to establish a
political process and an economy that gives more Haitians an
opportunity to participate.
So while all of us are frustrated by the continued lack of
democratic progress in Haiti, I do think that Congress needs to
play a more positive role in trying to maintain a commitment to
developing those things that we speak of so often.
You know, we spent a half a century with a large military
force in Germany to make sure that it was not overrun, and I
think we do not need a large military force and billions of
dollars to try and help Haiti, but we do have to have a
sustained effort, and hopefully we will see that in a
bipartisan manner.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief
because I am anxious to hear the testimony from these
witnesses.
I think it is really important that we put events in Haiti
in a historical context. Some of what you stated in your
opening remarks I agree with, some of which I disagree with,
but without the benefit of a historical context I think we do a
disservice to those that are interested in this particular
issue.
Prior to 1995, much of what occurred in Haiti was
remarkable in its degree of human rights violations, human
rights abuses, and the reality of an entire population being
terrorized. While there is much to criticize currently in
Haiti, whatever is happening in Haiti today is better than what
it was in the 1980's and during the coup years up to 1994. I
think it is important for us to recognize that.
I share the frustration that has been articulated by many.
I happened to be an observer during the elections that occurred
on May 21. It was obvious to the observers during the course of
that particular weekend that those elections were essentially
valid and legitimate elections.
It was clear that Fanmi Lavalas had in most districts a
significant plurality, but, true to Haiti's history, it is a
zero-sum game, unfortunately, when it comes to democracy, and
all this interested or shall I say objective observers
criticized the tabulation of those particular results. There is
international unanimity when it comes to the conclusion that
the tabulation of the votes that were counted in Haiti violated
the Haitian electoral law.
I consider that one of the most significant tragedies in
the history of Haiti because for one brief moment there was an
opportunity to change Haitian history, to change the history of
a people that are the most impoverished in this hemisphere and
among the most impoverished in this world. Only if. Only if.
It was close, but victory was snatched away by an attitude,
a zero-sum game, the winner take all mentality that has
characterized Haitian politics during the course of its 200
year history. How sad. How sad. To use the football metaphor,
we were in the red zone. We were 2 yards from a touchdown which
would have allowed--which I am absolutely convinced would have
led to an irrefutable conclusion by the international community
that this election would have been fair, free, and sure there
were some administrative foul ups, but it was fundamentally a
fair election.
I think that is truly sad, and unfortunately the leading
figures in Haiti today in terms of Haitian politics failed to
exercise the leadership that was so necessary. It could have
happened, but let's go forward, and I yield back.
[Pause.]
I am just informed that the Chairman left, so we will be in
recess until the Chairman returns unless the gentlelady from
California has a statement.
We will be in recess until Chairman Gilman returns. I am
told it will be 2 minutes, so put on your stopwatch, and we
will see how accurate that is.
[Recess.]
Chairman Gilman. The Committee will resume. I regret the
delay. We had some floor business to take care of.
Mr. Hilliard.
Mr. Hilliard. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Chairman, I am very interested in what our panel has to say
today, but I would like to echo what Congressman Delahunt has
said about the historical perspective.
I was elected in 1992 to the U.S. Congress, and at that
time Aristide had been disposed. I was one of those that took
part in the negotiations in trying to get Aristide back to
Haiti, and I remember some of the promises that were made by
this country.
One of them that stands out in my mind was one that really
sealed the deal of Aristide returning to Haiti with the
commitment that he would not seek reelection the next term, and
that the United States, I forgot the exact amount of moneys in
terms of millions, would pay that amount of money to rebuild
roads and to hire persons who at that time were unemployed and
were a big factor in the problems that Haiti was experiencing.
That money never came, so the economy was never revived.
Those workers were never employed, so during the final months
of Aristide's Administration the economy never received the
injection that it should have and that we had hoped for to get
Haiti back on the road. Of course, he did not seek reelection.
Since that time, there has been a great deal of problems
with trying to get funds to Haiti, commitments that have been
made by the United States, because of a couple Senators not
allowing funds or legislation to go forward dealing with Haiti.
Haiti has had many problems since then. Some of the
problems are of its own making, but I think that we failed
Haiti and we failed the Haitian people and we failed to seize
upon an opportunity to export democracy to Haiti. No matter
what is said by the panel this morning, there is very little
that the United States can do to reconcile its failings of the
past in relationship to not keeping its commitment to Haiti.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I am interested in
hearing what the panelists have to say.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you very much, Mr. Hilliard.
Do any other Members seek--Ms. Lee.
Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wanted to associate myself with Congressman Hilliard's
remarks, and I also just want to add to that with regard to the
judicial reform. It has disappointed Congress and disappointed
many Haitians, but even with all of the difficulties with the
elections, United States withdrawal from the reform process and
also the United States withdrawal from Haiti, I do not think we
are really helping move forward.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing. I look forward
to listening to the panelists to determine really what is going
on in terms of the judicial reform process and what, if
anything, we can do to make it better.
Chairman Gilman. I thank the gentlelady.
I just want to note that we received a press statement this
morning that the Organization of American States announced
yesterday that it is going to facilitate a dialogue in Haiti
among the country's political forces and civil society. I think
that is encouraging.
However, the full and transparent resolution of the actions
that have de-legitimized the May 21 elections is only part of
what should be on the agenda. A new credible and competent
electoral authority is truly needed. Among other steps, real
action to reverse corruption and politization of the Haitian
National Police should be at the top of the agenda.
Let us now proceed with our hearing. On April 8, a group of
violent protesters, some of whom were reportedly returning from
the government organized funeral of slain journalist Jean
Pierre Dominique, ransacked and burned the headquarters of the
Confederation for Democratic Unity, KID, an opposition
political party that is led by former Port-au-Prince Mayor
Evans Paul.
Opposition leaders, expecting trouble on the day of Mr.
Dominique's funeral, had implored the police chief to provide
protection. When American Embassy officials learned of this
attack, they immediately telephoned the Director General of the
Haitian National Police and asked him to intervene and protect
the opposition. Nevertheless, administration officials
confirmed that although the Haiti National Police were present,
they did not move quickly to intervene to stop this attack on
the opposition headquarters building.
Before proceeding with our panel of witnesses, we will see
the videotape of that incident. Members of the Committee will
be able to see the gates of the opposition headquarters broken
down by the mob. The video shows the police standing idly by.
After the opposition headquarters was already in flames,
the video shows Haitian National Police in riot gear slowly
approaching, but not passing beyond the gates in front of the
burning building. Finally, the video shows the police allowing
persons running away from the building to leave the scene of
the crime.
I am going to ask Mr. Whittaker if he would display the
video.
[Videotape shown.]
Chairman Gilman. We will now proceed with our witness. Mr.
Ford.
STATEMENT OF JESS T. FORD, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND TRADE ISSUES, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Committee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss the
preliminary results of our review of the United States
assistance provided to the Haitian justice system. I am
accompanied today by two of my colleagues, Ms. Virginia Hughes
and Mr. Juan Tapia-Videla, who led our team in this particular
evaluation.
In September 1994, the United States and other countries
intervened militarily into Haiti to restore the democratically
elected government that had been overthrown by the Haitian
military in September 1991. Before this intervention, the
Haitian military controlled the police and the judicial sector.
Military and political cronies dominated these institutions,
and the military influenced the appointments of magistrates and
the decisions made by them. These justice institutions were
widely regarded as ineffective and corrupt.
After the intervention of the United States stepping in to
provide assistance to the Haitian justice system, both the
police and the judicial sector aimed at developing a
professional civilian police force, enhancing the effectiveness
of the existing judicial organizations and improving the
Haitian people's access to justice.
This assistance also aimed at supporting a broad reform of
the judicial sector that the Haitian Government intended to
pursue over time. The objectives of this assistance program
were consistent with United States justice assistance
objectives in other Latin America countries.
As you know, United States assistance to the judicial
sector was suspended in July 2000 because the United States was
not able to negotiate an agreement with the Haitian Government
for continuing this type of effort. As of September 2000, most
of the United States assistance to the Haitian police has
stopped due to congressional concerns about the events
surrounding the May 2000 Haitian parliamentary and local
elections.
The U.S. Department of State is currently reassessing
several aspects of the United States relationship with Haiti
based on concerns about how votes were counted in the Haitian
May 2000 parliamentary elections.
My statement today is based on work we are currently
conducting for this Committee and for the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. First, I will discuss the results of the
United States assistance that has been provided to the Haitian
police and the judicial sector and some of the major problems
that continue to affect these justice institutions. Second, I
will discuss the primary factors that have affected the success
of this assistance.
Our work is based on meetings with officials with the U.S.
Departments of State and Justice, the U.S. Agency for
International Development, U.S. Coast Guard and other U.S.
agencies. To examine the results of this assistance, in June
2000 we sent a team into Haiti to observe firsthand the
conditions on the ground and to meet with government officials,
donor officials and others about the situation in Haiti. We
also performed an extensive review of program documentation
over the last 5 years of this effort. We expect to issue our
report sometime in October 2000.
Over the past 6 fiscal years, the United States has
provided about $97 million in assistance to help Haiti
establish its first civilian controlled police force and
improve aspects of the judicial sector. About $70 million of
the assistance helped Haiti recruit, train, organize and equip
a basic police force, including specialized units such as an
anti-narcotics unit, a special investigation unit and the
Haitian Coast Guard.
During the same period, the United States provided
approximately $27 million in assistance that led to
improvements in the training of magistrates and prosecutors,
the management practices of judicial institutions and access to
the Haitian people to the justice systems. However, despite
these achievements, the police force has not effectively
carried out its basic law enforcement responsibilities, and
recent events suggest that politization has compromised the
force according to U.S. and other donor officials.
The judicial sector has also had serious weaknesses,
according to these officials. The sector has not undergone
major reform and as a result lacks independence from the
executive branch and has outdated legal codes and cumbersome
judicial procedures.
Furthermore, the judicial institutions have personnel
shortages, inadequate infrastructure and equipment, vehicles,
legal texts and other types of supplies. They have an
ineffective internal oversight organization that is unable to
stem corruption. Overall, these institutions provide justice
services to only a small segment of the population because the
institutions rely heavily in judicial proceedings on the use of
French, rather than Creole, which is the majority language of
the population.
A key factor affecting the lack of success of United States
assistance has been the Haitian Government's lack of commitment
to addressing the major problems of its police and judicial
institutions. United States assistance to the police has been
impeded because the Haitian Government has not acted to
strengthen the police organization by filling the current
vacancy of the Inspector General, by providing human and
physical resources needed to develop an effective police force,
by supporting vigorously police investigations of serious
crimes and to keep the police force out of politics.
United States assistance to the judicial sector has been
largely undercut because the Haitian Government has not
followed through with many of the broad reforms that are
needed, has not assumed responsibility for adopting many of
these improvements, and has not provided the physical and human
resources needed to operate effectively.
This concludes my opening statement. I would be happy to
answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Ballenger [presiding]. Excuse me. Do you have any
additional statements?
Mr. Ford. That was a summary of my statement.
Mr. Ballenger. I wonder if a copy was available.
Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. Well, Mr. Chairman, out of respect for
yourself I will defer to the Chair to go first.
Mr. Ballenger. Well, having come in late to the discussion,
the one question that comes to my mind is are we still
committing money to the operation, this assistance in Haiti? Do
we still give them financial assistance on these matters?
Mr. Ford. My understanding is we are still providing some
form of assistance primarily to the Haitian Coast Guard. The
DEA still has a presence there and is working with the
Haitians, but most of the police assistance and the judicial
assistance has been stopped.
Mr. Ballenger. Did you say DEA?
Mr. Ford. Yes. The DEA works on counter narcotics
activities, and they do work with the Haitian counterparts and
also with the Haitian Coast Guard.
Mr. Ballenger. From what we hear, though, it is not
terribly effective; at least the amount of drugs that seem to
be coming through Haiti are rather substantial amounts, but to
your understanding----
Mr. Ford. Yes. According to the State Department's most
recent report on drug trafficking activities in Haiti, they
indicated there has been I believe for 1999 the report had a 24
percent increase in drug trafficking activities in Haiti.
Our conversations at the Embassy clearly indicated that
narcotics trafficking is a major problem in Haiti today, and
there is a concern on both the government's part and our
Embassy about where we may be headed in terms of narcotics
problems in Haiti.
Mr. Ballenger. Could you tell me what steps other donors
such as Canada, who we sometimes disagree with, are taking with
regard to the assistance of the Haitian National Police and the
Haiti judiciary?
Mr. Ford. Yes. Canada has also been a major donor to the
Haitian police over the last 5 years. They have worked in
concert with our agency in terms of developing programs there.
Our understanding is that they also have some concerns
regarding the commitment of the Haitian Government to enhancing
their police. We understand that they have an agreement with
the Haitians to continue the police academy, which we had been
helping to fund for the last 5 years. We understand that the
Canadians have reached an agreement with the Haitians to
maintain the police academy, so that is a positive sign.
With regard to the other donors, I believe the French have
a small effort in the judicial sector, and UNDP has also
supported some judicial reform activity in Haiti.
Mr. Ballenger. Does the GAO have any recommendations
stemming from this review that you can share with us?
Mr. Ford. We are currently in the process of finalizing our
report. We currently believe that, if the U.S. Government
determines that it wants to reinvigorate our program in Haiti
with regard to either the police and/or the judiciary, there
ought to be more strict conditionality applied in terms of the
agreement.
We have seen in work we have done in other countries in
Latin America over the years on rule of law activities that
unless you have the political will of the government, it is
very difficult to have any kind of real meaningful major reform
with either the police and/or the judiciary.
Certainly our programs in El Salvador have been generally
successful because the government there has made a conscious
effort to support the police and to make some judicial reforms.
We are currently thinking in terms of perhaps suggesting
that, if we are going to continue there, we need to have more
strict conditions apply to our assistance so that we have an
active partnership with the Haitian Government.
Mr. Ballenger. Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, you refer to this lack of political will, the
lack of commitment. I think it is important at least for me to
understand the intent of or the import rather of that
particular phrase.
Do you mean that it is a resistance to change or simply
inaction in terms of the necessary changes in the law of a
commitment of resources, because I think that is very important
to understand.
Mr. Ford. Yes. Let me see if I can help you out with that.
First of all, as you acknowledged in your opening statement,
Haiti is the poorest country in the western hemisphere. They do
have limited financial resources that they can invoke to many
things on the island, including support for police and judicial
reform, so we recognize that, and we believe that context needs
to be--will be included in our report.
We also think that the Haitians in some respects have
backtracked on some initiatives that we think are important and
that we think are a sign that maybe they have not been fully
committed to the effort.
Mr. Delahunt. Such as?
Mr. Ford. A fine example would be the Inspector General's
office. The Inspector General that had been there up until May
before he left the country had been involved in investigations
which resulted in 1,100 police officers being released from the
force.
There has been no replacement made for the Inspector
General, according to the Embassy officials we talked to on our
trip down there. There are no active investigations underway
currently on the island, so that is a sign to us that perhaps
some of the political commitment that we would like to see on
the part of the government just is not there at this point in
time.
Mr. Delahunt. I would just point out again that Haiti is a
nation that needs everything simultaneously. I think it is very
important for the American people to understand that, and from
May until September hopefully that appointment would have been
made, but I would suggest that it is not egregious.
I was disappointed in the fact that Mr. Josef made a
decision to leave as I had confidence in his integrity, and I
think, as you indicate, his record speaks for itself. At the
same time, I think we have a certain responsibility to
acknowledge, too, that it was the U.S. Congress that put a hold
on so-called MICIUIH funding, which would have allowed
monitoring of exactly the kind of abuses and allegations that
Mr. Josef and the Inspector General's office was responsible
for.
Would you agree with that statement? Are you aware of the
hold on the MICIUIH funding?
Mr. Ford. I guess we are not familiar with that specific
hold, but let me comment on a couple of other things. That was
one example. I think there are other examples where the Haitian
Government just has not stepped to the plate in certain areas.
In the area of judicial reform, there has been no movement
to changing their legal codes, and they are still operating
with----
Mr. Delahunt. Let me interrupt you again, Mr. Ford.
Mr. Ford. Sure.
Mr. Delahunt. Again, I do not want to appear to be an
apologist for the Haitian Government because that is not my
perspective, but at the same time you said you are unaware of
the hold on the MICIUIH. Well, I would suggest that it is very
important that GAO put that into its report and to understand
that context.
At the same time, the lack of a parliament certainly
creates, I would suggest, an overwhelming impediment to the
passage of legislation that we are discussing about that you
are indicating is necessary to effect the kind of judicial
reform that I think we would all embrace.
Again, the linchpin of that was the elections that occurred
in May and subsequently in July, and obviously there is a
Presidential election, so again I think it is important to put
it in that particular context, but again I have read your
preliminary report, and you refer constantly in there, and I
think accurately so, to lack of resources.
I also think it is important to understand that we often
hear in Congress the amount of billions--I think it is $2.5
billion--that the United States has expended in terms of Haiti.
I think it is important to stress that that $2 billion most of
it, was allocated to the invasion, if you will, of some 20,000
American troops back in 1994 to restore democracy and also the
processing of refugees in Guantanemo so that they could return
to their homeland without fear of being assassinated and
murdered and oppressed by the government.
Mr. Ballenger. Mr. Delahunt, I do not know how strict they
run the rules here, but the red light is on.
Mr. Delahunt. They are very loose.
Mr. Ballenger. OK. You can have a little more time then.
Mr. Delahunt. I figured because you are such a dear friend,
I figured I could take advantage of you.
In terms of again let me get back to the political level.
In your conversations with DEA, in your conversations with the
U.S. Coast Guard, what have they prescribed to you in terms of
their relationships with law enforcement officials relevant to
drug investigations?
Do they describe it as a failure to cooperate or simply the
fact that the Haitian National Police and the Haitian Coast
Guard are totally undermanned, totally lack the necessary
resources and give and confer upon the DEA and the Coast Guard
wide latitude in our own efforts to interdict drugs and to deal
with the issue of Haiti and drug trafficking?
Mr. Ford. Well, I can tell you that based on our
conversations with DEA and the law enforcement establishment at
the Embassy that that is one of the positive areas in Haiti;
that in fact they do have a very good relationship with the
Haitian Coast Guard. The problem is they do not have the assets
and the resources.
Mr. Delahunt. Right. Well, this is the point I am trying to
make, Mr. Ford. In your conversations with the DEA, what do
they describe as the albeit somewhat primitive and close to
futile efforts of the Haitian National Police, the so-called
anti-narcotics squad? It is understaffed. It is undermanned,
but it is trying. Is that a fair statement?
I do not want to put words in your mouth, but I know that I
have spoken in Port-au-Prince to our DEA, and that is the
information they give to me.
Mr. Ford. No. I do not disagree with that. They told us
that, you know, they generally have good cooperation with those
units, but they are undermanned. They do not have equipment.
They cannot get out to where the problem is and so their
effectiveness is limited.
Mr. Delahunt. They do not even in some cases, you know,
have uniforms.
Mr. Ford. Right.
Mr. Delahunt. I mean, that is the reality of Haiti. Is
there much to criticize? Yes, but does it translate into what
you described as political will by just simply a total lack of
resources and ineptitude and, unfortunately, elections that did
not resolve, at least to the satisfaction of the international
community, many of the issues surrounding democratic
institutions in Haiti?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.
Mr. Ballenger. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cooksey.
Mr. Cooksey. You are welcome. I will not say you were
encroaching on my time since you are a good friend.
Mr. Ford, I assume since you are from GAO you are an
accountant?
Mr. Ford. Not by background. I am not an accountant, no.
Mr. Cooksey. What are you by background and education?
Mr. Ford. My expertise is in the area of international
affairs.
Mr. Cooksey. So you went to college and got a degree in
international issues?
Mr. Ford. That is right.
Mr. Cooksey. OK. I was going to ask you some accounting
questions, but I will not. I will ask you some international
issues questions. I will ask you some international issues
questions.
The issue here is rule of law, if I am not mistaken, and I
am not a lawyer. In my review of geography, my memory of
geography, the island there is called Hispaniola. Is that not
correct?
Mr. Ford. That is correct.
Mr. Cooksey. And part of that island is Haiti, and the
other part of the island is the Dominican Republic? Is that
correct?
Mr. Ford. That is correct.
Mr. Cooksey. Where do you have the best rule of law, the
most effective rules of law, in Haiti or the Dominican
Republic? I know it is not very good in either place, but which
is better? Which is better of the two?
Mr. Ford. You know, we did not do an assessment on that
particular assignment. However, I will----
Mr. Cooksey. I can tell you are a politician.
Mr. Ford [continuing]. Tell you that based on work we have
done in the past I would say the Dominican Republic has
generally a better system.
Mr. Cooksey. It is my understanding that they at least
deliver services to the people, electricity, water and so
forth. Haiti has electricity a couple hours a day. What is the
explanation for that? Do you have any, since you have a
background in international relations?
Mr. Ford. Well, OK. I am not an expert on either of these,
but let me tell you what I know a little bit about. Haiti has
not had a democratic form of government for 200 years prior to
I guess you could say 1991, and then we had to invade there to
put President Aristide back in power, so they do not have a
tradition of democracy there. The Dominican Republic does not
have much of a tradition of democracy either.
Different cultures. You know, Haiti, the vast majority of
the population speak Creole. You know, the upper class speaks
French, and they do not have a Hispanic society as in the
Dominican Republic, so you have the different culture,
different mind set there.
Both of these countries are developing countries. Both of
them have major problems economically. They have major problems
with poverty. We have aid programs, have developed aid programs
in both countries, or we had up until recently in Haiti at
least on the justice side. You know, they both have some
similar characteristics.
Mr. Cooksey. Have you put an equal amount of money in both
places? Not you and me, but the taxpayers.
Mr. Ford. I do not have the dollar amount for Dominican
Republic.
Mr. Cooksey. Let me go back and review a little bit more
geography. The Virgin Islands. If my memory is correct, there
is an American Virgin Islands and a British Virgin Islands.
Where do you have the best rule of law there, the British
Virgin Islands or American Virgin Islands?
Mr. Ford. I really cannot answer that. I mean, I know that
the United States----
Mr. Cooksey. Would my friend, Mr. Delahunt, who is an
attorney, like to answer that? Who has the best rule of law?
What I am driving at is where is there rule of law and where
does it work and why does it work?
In the BVI, for example, there was a hurricane that went
through there a few years ago. In the American Virgin Islands
there was total chaos. There were people that were down there
that were on vacation, and they were worried about their
survival because there was total chaos in the streets. Where is
there the better rule of law and why?
He is afraid to answer. He is walking away.
Mr. Ford. I am not in a position to answer that. I can tell
you that the U.S. Virgin Islands is a U.S. territory and is
subject to U.S. laws with some exceptions, so they are under
our system.
I am not familiar with the British Virgin Islands in terms
of what type of system they have.
Mr. Cooksey. I have been to both places and, you know,
things were fine when I was in both places.
Well, my concern is about the man and woman on the street.
As a physician, and I am not an accountant either, I was
trained to take care, and just as I grew up in my household my
parents believed we should take care of the weakest members of
our society. But in some of these societies the weakest members
are the ones that suffer the most, and the strongest are the
politicians, and they end up using and abusing the system. They
use and abuse the people.
That is true in this country. It is true in the American
Virgin Islands and, unfortunately, I am afraid it is true in
Haiti, so what do we do and how do we find a better solution?
I was in Sierra Leone in July. You do not really have time
for me to tell you what I found there. It is the same
situation. Incidentally, I met with some of the children there
that have committed murders. I mean, one guy, a 15-year-old,
admitted killing 85 people. He was a former member of the RUF,
and he switched over. These are kids that are--of course, I am
6,3", and they are about 5,3", but they speak Creole, too, so I
am looking for the common thread.
What is the common thread where there is security, where
there is rule of law, and what is the common thread where there
is no security and where there is no rule of law, and how do we
use American taxpayers' dollars to help the weakest members of
society because I do not really care or give a you know what
about the political leaders, and apparently there is some bad
political leaders in all these places.
Do you want to comment on that, or do you disagree? Do you
have a diplomatic international relations response?
Mr. Ford. I certainly would agree with you, sir.
Mr. Cooksey. It is more fun when you disagree with me.
Mr. Ford. I think that creating a westernized style of
justice in developing countries is an extremely difficult task.
It takes years of effort.
As I have pointed out earlier in my statement, we have done
some work in some other countries where we have been more
successful. In our view, we were more successful because there
would seem to be more commitment on the part of the government
to support the effort.
That seems to be a common thread in what we have seen and
what we have done in the past, but it takes years of effort,
and there has to be a commitment to provide that form of
justice, particularly for the mass of the population. They have
to feel like their government will treat them with some form of
protection and respect and welfare. If they do not have that,
then you do not have rule of law.
Mr. Cooksey. My closing comment, Mr. Chairman, is that in
all these places I go and visit I find that the man and woman
on the street generally are kind, gentle, sensitive people that
want to put a roof over their children's head, their family's
head, educate their children, feed and provide for their
children.
The problem is bullies, and there are bullies in every one
of these areas that I have talked about. If there is one thing
that I hate it is bullies. I do not care whether they are in
Burma or Haiti or the American Virgin Islands or Sierra Leone
or the Congo.
If we are going to start doing something, if we are truly
interested in human rights and truly interested in helping the
weakest members of society, why do we not have the courage as a
country to go in and just take out the bullies with whatever we
have to do, but take out the bullies because they are the ones
that are creating the problems. They are the ones that are
killing people, maiming people, using and abusing them.
Mr. Ballenger. Ms. Lee. Sorry to keep you waiting.
Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to go back to the video that we saw earlier
and just ask a question with regard to what is your assessment
or our government's assessment of why the riot control police
did not step in? What is our analysis of that? Was it they did
not want to? They did not want to use excessive force? They
just wanted to see the destruction occur? Is there an official
kind of position on that?
Mr. Ford. I really do not know the answer to that. I can
tell you that one of the things we were told when we were down
in Haiti was that command and control of the police from the--
it is a highly centralized command and control structure and
that the police in the field generally are reacting to
problems. They do not normally do anything unless they are
directed by some higher authority to take action.
Now, I do not know in this particular case what the
situation is. We were not privy to what exactly transpired in
terms of who decided what they would do. Our understanding is
that that was basically the riot control police, and we do not
know what direction they had at that time.
Ms. Lee. So this was actually the first time you had seen
the video?
Mr. Ford. No. I had seen that video before.
Ms. Lee. Had you?
Mr. Ford. Yes.
Ms. Lee. Let me just ask you just a general question with
regard to the Haitian people. Are they becoming more central?
More desperate? What has been their response to the current
state of affairs, and then what do you see as the ramifications
of the total withdrawal of United States support from Haiti?
Mr. Ford. Again, I can give you some anecdotal responses. I
can say that our team that went to Haiti met with a number of
Haitian officials who are magistrates, judges working at medium
to lower levels of the bureaucracy over there and that many of
them had a deep concern about what was happening in Haiti and
that many of them wanted to do their job, but they felt for a
variety of reasons, in some cases threats to their lives, in
some cases lack of resources. They just were not able to really
do what they thought they could do to help the country.
Now, that is anecdotal. Whether that represents everybody
in Haiti I cannot really comment on. There have been some polls
taken that we have seen in our research that showed that the
Haitian population in general does not have a high regard say
for the police force in general, but there is a clear sense at
least from the people we talked to who were actually on the
ground working there that they want to do it.
They want to do what they were trained to do, but they
either do not have the resources, or they operate under
constraints that do not always exist in this country.
Ms. Lee. So complete U.S. withdrawal of support means fewer
resources?
Mr. Ford. Well, currently as I mentioned earlier, we do not
have an active program with the exception of some support we
are providing to the Coast Guard, so we do not have an active
program there.
What is going to happen with the efforts that we paid for
earlier in terms of whether they will be sustained, there are
some signs that they are lost, particularly on the judicial
side. There are some positive things we saw; the magistrate
school. Apparently the Haitian Government is still supporting
that, although at a lower level. The police academy. The
Canadians are supporting some of that program, but everything
else that we paid for, who knows whether it will be sustained.
At this point it is not clear whether or not those
institutions and those things we paid for in the past will
still be there say a year from now.
Ms. Lee. So do we then have any concern for the sustainment
of these institutions and for some of these reforms to be----
Mr. Ford. Absolutely.
Ms. Lee [continuing]. Institutionalized, and then how do we
ensure that if we are withdrawing it or if we have withdrawn
it?
Mr. Ford. Well, I think again from where we sit, our view
is that when we decide--if we decide to continue or develop a
new program, we need to have more of a partnership with the
Haitian Government to make sure that whatever we end up paying
for, that investment is not lost. I think that that is the
critical point.
We are not in a position to say whether or not we ought to
have a new program there or not, but certainly if we do have
one we think that we ought to have a partnership that makes
sure that the investment pays off and is not lost.
Ms. Lee. Well, in many areas of the world we do have those
kind of partnerships, and I do not know why we did not insist
on that with Haiti. Is there a reason, or is there just----
Mr. Ford. I cannot speak for the Administration. I mean,
you will have to ask them that. There is certainly a concern--
there is no doubt about that--that we need to do something in
Haiti.
Mr. Ballenger. Mr. Houghton.
Mr. Houghton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, ladies
and gentlemen, for being here, Mr. Ford, Ms. Hughes and Mr.
Tapia-Videla.
Mr. Ford, all the questions have gone to you. Maybe you
want to try to answer this, or maybe you would like to pass it
on. You know there are certain issues here. One that is
probably the most important is the attitude of the Haitian
Government. The second, obviously, is the effect of the police,
and the third is in terms of the judicial system itself.
I see on the next to the last page here in this Appendix
No. 1 on page 12, the aid to administration of the justice
program went from 1993 to 2000, and out of a total of $93
million that $11 million or actually let's say roughly $14
million was given to the former administration, the one called
Chechi. What did Chechi actually do?
It seems to me in reading over the information that a lot
of this was directed toward the judicial system, and only $11
million out of this $93 million, or actually you can take a
look at the figures on page 65, was devoted to them. What did
they do?
Mr. Ford. In the case of the Chechi program, which operated
I believe from 1996 to 1999, you can almost tell what they did
by reading the captions, but they implemented----
Mr. Houghton. No. I see that.
Mr. Ford [continuing]. A case registration system.
Mr. Houghton. And anybody can read that.
Mr. Ford. Right.
Mr. Houghton. Case registering and----
Mr. Ford. Right.
Mr. Houghton [continuing]. Case monitoring. I mean, what
did they do?
Mr. Ford. OK. What they basically did was they tried to get
the judicial system in Haiti, and there are four tiers of it to
help them to develop the basic tools for a justice system where
you could track, for example, its prisoners to make sure that
you know where they are. They monitor what they are doing.
Mr. Houghton. Did they put that in place?
Mr. Ford. Yes, they did.
Mr. Houghton. So all those things they did in terms of
education, case registering, entering other technical equipment
systems, have been done?
Mr. Ford. Yes.
Mr. Houghton. I see. Did they have a sign off report at the
end? Did they say, you know, you asked us to do this; it has
cost us $11.5 million, here is what we think ought to be done?
Mr. Ford. After this program was over, and this program was
funded by the Department of Justice, they wanted to continue
the effort.
Our understanding is that last summer negotiations were
underway between our government and the Haitian Government to
extend this effort so that the effort would be sustained. What
we were told was that they could not reach agreement on how to
move forward, and as a result of that----
Mr. Houghton. Is it because of conditions down there or
negotiations with our funding agencies?
Mr. Ford. I believe it was negotiations with our people and
the Haitian Government and the Minister of Justice.
Mr. Houghton. So that the people down in Haiti did not want
them to come in and do the things they were suggesting to do?
Mr. Ford. We understand that there were differences in
views about what the direction of the program should be.
Mr. Houghton. Well, you know, this gets to the core
question--you are damned if you do, you are damned if you do
not. You are damned if you pull out. You are damned if you
stay.
Of course, the overall umbrella issue is really the
attitude of the Haitian Government. Even if you essentially
came back and specific things, in terms of case registering and
court management, were approved, why would you want to spend
more money on this? Granted, it is needed, but if the attitude
of the government is such that it is the back of your hand.
Mr. Ford. Well, I think that is a fair question. That is
our point. Our point is you need to have an active partner that
is going to sustain the effort, and I think that is what we
need to see with regard to any type of program.
Mr. Houghton. So all these things, whether it is police
management, whether it is training, whether it is the
corruption, whether it is the specifics in terms of the legal
program, it all depends upon the governmental support.
Now, did you make any suggestions in your overview of what
we ought to do in terms of that overall broader issue?
Mr. Ford. Our primary suggestion really is going to be
geared toward establishing a more specific quid pro quo for the
type of aid that we provide. That is basically where we are
going.
Mr. Houghton. So if that condition exists and this is not
something you want to get into, if you had your druthers, if
you had the money, would you still go ahead and do some of
these things?
Mr. Ford. I think these things are--I think that there is
no doubt in our minds and on the part of the people at the
Embassy that all of these are useful things that ought to be
done in Haiti. I do not think there is any disagreement about
whether these things were beneficial to society there. They
would be, but they need to be maintained and sustained.
Mr. Houghton. So you would go ahead and make sure the
procedures from the judicial standpoint were there, that the
language has now been translated to Creole and all those
things? You think that it is still building the base so when
the attitude of the government changes you will have something
to work on? Is that right?
Mr. Ford. I think you have to have--when you say the
attitude of the government, I think you need to have a
commitment on the part of the government's part to support it.
If you have that commitment, we can make progress.
Mr. Houghton. How do you explain that to the American
people? I mean, these are huge dollars. You know, that is a lot
of money. How do you explain that?
Mr. Ford. Well, again, we began these programs. In the
first 2 or 3 years the government of Haiti supported the
effort, and then for reasons that are not known to me anyway
that level of commitment seems to have dissipated to some
extent, so I think, we have to have an agreement with the
government that they are going to support the efforts.
They did in the beginning, and there was a lot of success.
We trained 6,500 police officers. There were a lot of things
that we did that were useful, but they need to be sustained.
The government has to support them.
Mr. Houghton. Can I just ask one final question, and then I
will stop here?
Mr. Cooksey [presiding]. Sure. You can have----
Mr. Houghton. No, no, no. I just want to ask----
Mr. Cooksey. OK.
Mr. Houghton [continuing]. One more question.
Mr. Cooksey. We always defer to those of you from the
northeast.
Mr. Houghton. If you were to ask the Canadians, for
example, what are we going to do, what are we going to do
together, would their answer be your answer, or would there be
a difference?
Mr. Ford. We talked to the Canadians, and my personal view
is I think they would agree with what we have had to say here.
They want their investment, their assistance, to be effective
just like we do, and I believe that they also feel that there
has to be some commitment on the part of the government for
their programs to work.
They were in a partnership with us in terms of helping to
develop the police, so we had similar ambitions in terms of
what we wanted to achieve.
Mr. Houghton. Thank you very much.
Mr. Cooksey. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. I am sorry that I was
not here to listen to your testimony. I was looking through the
written testimony.
As you know, because I am from South Florida what happens
in Haiti has an immediate and profound effect on all of us in
our communities, so the reforms and the democracy and the
infrastructure and all the positive changes that we all want to
make in Haiti have a really almost domestic concerns for us in
South Florida.
How optimistic are you, based on your GAO assessment of the
assistance that has already gone into Haiti for judicial and
police reform, that things can get turned around; that the
funds will be used in a better way; and that with all of the
changes taking place in Haiti now that they have turned the
corner and are on the right route, because what we hear are
nothing but negative news about the latest developments?
How optimistic or pessimistic are you that our U.S. dollars
that we have funneled over there will have laid the proper
groundwork for a true democracy and true reforms to take place
on that troubled island?
Mr. Ford. Well, all I can do is mirror what we were told by
our U.S. officials down there. There is a deep concern about
the direction of Haiti in terms of the government.
I think you have a Presidential election coming up. Until
the political situation in Haiti is sorted out, it is difficult
to determine where we go from here. I think that is the view of
the Administration at this point.
I think there is a deep concern on everyone's part. I think
that at least the people we have talked to want Haiti to
succeed. They want there to be progress there, but right now
everything is kind of up in the air, frankly.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Anyone else want to speak to that?
Thank you.
Mr. Cooksey. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen?
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Cooksey.
Mr. Cooksey. Can I ask you a question? If my memory is
correct, have we not had some testimony that there is a
listening station in Cuba that can listen to all the
conversations in the southeast United States and maybe a lot of
the United States, say our telephone calls, our military
transmissions? Is that correct?
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Yes. It is targeted to the United States,
and it deals with mostly economic and military espionage. It is
in Louvdes, Cuba, and there is a minor one more close by as
well. It is a Russian intelligence facility, one of the most
sophisticated listening stations in the world.
Mr. Cooksey. OK. My question to you then is if there is an
entity like that that listens to our radio transmissions and
telephone transmissions and your telephone transmissions,
should there not be a comparable source of information, and we
may not get it from the Cubans, but I bet there is someone in
our government that could be listed as indeed listening to the
phone conversations and the transmission of the people in
Haiti. Would you think that is a safe assumption, Mr. Ford?
Mr. Ford. I really cannot comment on that, sir. I do not
have the expertise on that question.
Mr. Cooksey. Well, let's just assume there is. OK. Next
question. If there is a way to listen to what is going on in
the Aristide government, the Lavalas Family party, and we learn
that some of the people in that government, in that party that
only has one candidate for president this November, is involved
with the drug trade should we have some additional concerns in
the United States about how effectively our money is being
spent down there, or should we just ignore it? Should we blow
it off? That is an easy question.
Mr. Ford. Well, yes. If we have evidence that there is
something of that nature going on, obviously we need to take
action against it, but, you know, I do not know anything about
that.
Mr. Cooksey. OK. Do you think that we were justified in
taking Noriega out in Panama when we had evidence that he was
involved in the drug trade?
Mr. Ford. Well, GAO does not have a view on that, sir. I
can tell you that, you know, if we did.
Mr. Cooksey. You were probably a student in international
relations when that occurred.
Mr. Ford. I have my own views on that, sir, but they do not
represent necessarily GAO's views so it probably would be
better for me not to answer that.
Mr. Cooksey. Well, the question I am driving at is if we
have intelligence that indicates that people in this government
have a reason, more reason, to hold onto the reins of
government other than just oppressing their people, other than
just raping and pillaging that country, other than taking our
tax dollars and probably not using them very effectively, the
other reason can be that they are involved in the drug trade.
Would that be reason for us to take action or for the GAO
to take action? Do you think the GAO would have a
recommendation or opinion on that?
Mr. Ford. Well, I think that specific instance I believe is
already covered by law, as I recall. I think there is a
provision in the Foreign Assistance Act that basically requires
us to cutoff aid.
Mr. Cooksey. Good. Let's say we can get information from
the Cubans. We can get it from our intelligence agency. It is
my understanding there was a report in one of our local
newspapers that documented that the members of the Aristide
government are involved in drug trade. Do you think the
newspaper is a good source of information?
Mr. Ford. Do I think the newspaper is a good source of
information? Not necessarily, no.
Mr. Cooksey. So you think the radio intercepts or some
other type of intelligence activity to get that? Do you think
that information is out there?
Mr. Ford. I really do not know, sir.
Mr. Cooksey. What if I told you that that information is
out there and has been provided to the leadership of the
Democratic party and the leadership of the Republican party,
and it has been suppressed or ignored, information that indeed
the leadership of this government is up to their ears in drug
trade, and that is probably one reason they are trying to hang
onto power because they are making money?
This is just a question. I am not making an assertion. I am
not up here with a newspaper, sir. I am just asking the
question. It is a hypothetical question,----
Mr. Ford. OK. Well, let me----
Mr. Cooksey [continuing]. So you can give me a hypothetical
answer.
Mr. Ford. Let me say something here, sir. I have a little
information on this, but I cannot comment on it in an open
setting so let me just say that right now. The information I
have available I cannot talk about in an open setting.
Mr. Cooksey. OK. Well, I am concerned again about what is
going on down there. I am concerned about the people, and I
think that the Americans truly have a desire to help the people
out in Haiti, but I just do not see any reason that we should
continue to help out the bad guys.
The Chairman is here. Do you have any comments or
questions, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Gilman [presiding]. I thank the gentleman for
taking on the Chair while I was on the floor on some other
legislation.
Has the Administration conditioned its aid to the Haitian
judicial system or the Haitian National Police on any areas?
Have the Haitians met any such conditionality if there have
been such conditions?
Mr. Ford. In terms of the previous programs, the
information we have indicates that we did not have any real
formal type of conditionality.
We did have a--signed an agreement with regard to the
narcotics unit having to do with personnel levels, but that is
the only instance we are aware of programmatically of any
conditions being put on the Haitian Government.
Chairman Gilman. Your opening statement refers to signs of
politization in the police during the recent election process.
Can you specify the incidents that you were referring to?
Mr. Ford. Again based on information provided to us by the
Embassy and the State Department, there were some incidents
where the police either were passive in terms of taking action
against demonstrators, and there also are reports that after
the election there were some arrests of opposition leaders on
the part of the police.
Chairman Gilman. Do you have any recommendations of what we
can or should be doing to beef up the police process in Haiti?
Mr. Ford. Again as I noted earlier, we believe that there
should be stronger conditionality put on any future assistance
to try to ensure that the government of Haiti not only supports
the assistance we provide, but also there will be some
semblance of sustainability.
Chairman Gilman. What sort of conditionality would you
suggest?
Mr. Ford. Well, again I am not a program person so, you
know, I am not the best person to answer that. I think it is
basically an agreement that if we are going to provide training
for the police and we are going to support the police academy
that there be a quid pro quo on the part of the Haitian
Government to support that effort; if we want to have an
Inspector General that that office be maintained and that they
have a credible individual in that office. Things of that
nature I think ought to be included in these types of
agreements.
Chairman Gilman. Director Ford, have the Canadians
curtailed their assistance to the police?
Mr. Ford. The information we have is that the Canadians
have reduced their overall assistance to Haiti to the police
and to the judicial system. However, they are still supporting
the police academy. They have apparently reached agreement with
the Haitian Government to continue to fund the training academy
there, so there is some ongoing activity.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you.
Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
By quid pro quo, Mr. Ford, are you suggesting--let me see
if I understand it because we have been discussing sustaining
these programs. I concur. I think what we are seeing is an
attrition, first of all, in the number of police personnel. I
think the numbers were initially 6,500. Now, according to
Embassy personnel, it is anywhere between 3,000 and 4,000.
So I think what you are talking about is a commitment that
the necessary funding during the course of the budgetary
process of the Haitian Government reflect a resources
commitment to increase the numbers back to 7,500, along with
appropriate training as was initially done several years ago.
Is that what you are talking about as a quid pro quo?
Mr. Ford. Yes.
Mr. Delahunt. A financial commitment----
Mr. Ford. Yes.
Mr. Delahunt [continuing]. As well as the training
component?
Mr. Ford. Yes. I think there needs to be those two things.
I also think that we should try to get the Haitian Government
to also make some major political reforms. We mentioned earlier
the legal codes. These kinds of things are considered to be
essential to have.
Mr. Delahunt. Right. As you said, I think you said just
several minutes ago once the political issues are resolved,
once there is a government in place, that is when these
particular issues have to be addressed.
You would acknowledge, presumably, that we have had no
government for almost 2 years now, and clearly there is a
question as to the legitimacy of the May election. I find
myself more in agreement than in disagreement with the Chairman
and others who have raised the issue, but I think it is
important to understand in the larger context that there is no
government.
I think it is important to understand, too, that in the
aftermath of the coup years everything was starting from
scratch. You would acknowledge that.
Mr. Ford. Yes, we do.
Mr. Delahunt. I mean, absolutely from scratch.
I think it was Mr. Cooksey that raised the issue on the
videotape we saw. What conclusions do you reach after observing
the videotape?
Mr. Ford. That tape?
Mr. Delahunt. That tape.
Mr. Ford. I am not a police officer. To me, you would
expect normal police to go in and not allow somebody to go in
and burn a house down, so I find that troubling.
Mr. Delahunt. Right, but, you know, what I found--let me
tell you what I noticed is that there were five or six police
and a crowd of several hundred. I cannot reach a particular
conclusion. I do not know whether they were waiting for
reinforcements. I do not know whether they felt threatened or
intimidated by the crowd. I do not know their level of
training.
A statement was made about rioters exiting the grounds and
not being arrested by the police. I do not have any evidence to
indicate whether those were the rioters or those were the
individuals that were in that residence. They may or may not
have been inquired upon upon exiting. I do not know that. I
find it difficult to reach any particular conclusion.
Again, I think that we have to be careful in reaching
conclusions. The Department of Justice recently was embarrassed
because of a case involving our national security with Dr. Wen
Ho Lee when he was charged with 60 particular indictments after
presumably a professional, thorough investigation and 59 of
them were dismissed.
I would suggest you be very, very careful in reaching
conclusions. Accept the facts and the data. Let's not just draw
inferences that prove to be false and mislead us into drafting
or embracing a policy that maybe does a disservice to American
national interests.
I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Cooksey. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Yes.
Mr. Cooksey. I would like to ask the people over in the
video area if it would be possible to replay that video as we
are having this discussion and project it maybe on the screen--
--
Chairman Gilman. Before we do that----
Mr. Cooksey [continuing]. And then continue our discussion.
Chairman Gilman. Before we do that, if you will take just a
moment? I have just a few more questions.
Mr. Ford, with regard to the judicial system, I understand
there is a contracting agency that is supposed to help improve
Haiti's judicial system. Is that correct?
Mr. Ford. I believe there were several different efforts on
the way. Yes.
Chairman Gilman. How much did we expend in trying to
improve the judicial system?
Mr. Ford. Well, Congressman Gilman, if you have our report
there and turn to page 12 of the appendix, it has an outline
there.
Chairman Gilman. Just tell us how much it is.
Mr. Ford. It is $26.7 million.
Chairman Gilman. And what were the accomplishments of that
expenditure?
Mr. Ford. At the beginning there were several
accomplishments. We established the magistrate school, which is
still there. It is still being funded by the Haitian
Government. We also provided a significant amount of training
to prosecutors and other judges. We established case
registration systems.
Unfortunately, the information we had when we visited Haiti
is that many of those efforts have not been sustained, so the
only thing that appears to be still up and running at this
point in time is the magistrate school.
Chairman Gilman. Can you give me an assessment then of the
judicial system? Is it effective? Are there problems present?
Mr. Ford. Yes. There are significant problems, which we
outline in our statement.
Again, we need to point out that our assistance was meant
to attack certain problems there. It was not going to resolve
the overall judicial problems in Haiti. Some major problems
with legal reform need to be dealt with.
I think the assistance we provided attempted to put in
place more trained judges, more trained prosecutors so that
better investigations could occur and that they could track
cases and that type of thing. It is the first step of what
needs to be done. A lot more needs to be done in Haiti.
Chairman Gilman. So has any of that been adopted? Has there
been any success at all in our initiatives of trying to improve
the judicial system?
Mr. Ford. Well, the people that got trained are still
there. Some of them are still there. I mean, as I mentioned
earlier, anecdotally many of them want to do their job better,
but they face a lot of restraints. A lot of them do not have
the supplies. They do not have equipment.
It is a very difficult environment for them to operate
there, but those people are still there, and they still have
the school in place. They are still training some magistrates,
so there are some things that are still happening.
Chairman Gilman. You earlier mentioned a provision in the
Foreign Assistance Act that prohibits U.S. assistance to
persons corrupted by narcotics trafficking. Could you spell out
what provision that is?
Mr. Ford. I am told that that is Section 487 and 481 of the
Foreign Assistance Act.
Chairman Gilman. Has our government invoked that provision
at all?
Mr. Ford. One of those provisions is the drug certification
provision, which has been waived the last 2 years by the
President.
The other provision, on section 487, I am not familiar as
to whether or not that has ever been applied. We do not think
it has, but I am not positive on that.
Chairman Gilman. All right. At this time we will comply
with the request by Dr. Cooksey, and I will ask our assistants
to replay the video we played earlier that showed the attack on
the political----
[Videotape shown.]
Mr. Cooksey. Do you feel having an independent and strong
judiciary--do you feel that having a strong judiciary would do
more to solve these problems and bring about rule of law than
anything else?
Mr. Delahunt. I think that it is absolutely critical. I
think that the problem that the Haitian Government has to deal
with is budget priorities and limited resources.
I mean, when we talk about what happens within the
judiciary, do not visualize a picture where computers are
available because the problem is one of are pencils and paper
available. I mean, this is a society that is best described as
primitive, lacking in any resources. Is there corruption? Sure,
there is corruption. Are there overwhelming problems? Yes.
Like I mentioned in my opening remarks, I am profoundly
disappointed with what occurred in the aftermath of the May
election in terms of the tabulation because I believe there was
an historic opportunity to transform the direction that this
nation could take into the new millennium.
I really, genuinely believe that, and the leadership of
Haiti failed to meet this historic responsibility, an historic
responsibility.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt.
One last question, Mr. Ford, and then I will turn to Dr.
Cooksey.
What were the circumstances surrounding the departure of
the Inspector General of the Haitian National Police, the
deciding factor on why the Inspector General left the Haitian
National Police?
Mr. Ford. Well, I can only tell you what we were told by
the people at the Embassy. I think in late 1999 the Secretary
of State for Public Safety, Mr. Manuel, left his position, and
we were told that he had been threatened.
Chairman Gilman. Who threatened him?
Mr. Ford. That I do not know. He had received threats is
what we were told. We were also told that a similar situation
may have led to the IG resigning.
Chairman Gilman. Dr. Cooksey.
Mr. Cooksey. Mr. Delahunt, our colleague, who I really like
and I think is one of the real gentlemen on your side,
Congressman Conyers, had asked me earlier this year to go down
to the elections, and I agreed to go. Then I got the message we
were not going because indeed the elections were going to be on
the up and up.
Do you think that we should consider going down for the
next elections?
Mr. Delahunt. Well, I did go down with Mr. Conyers, and, as
I have indicated to colleagues privately, I, along with Mr.
Conyers, had an opportunity to visit some 19 voting areas.
What we saw was remarkable, particularly for Haiti. There
was incredible enthusiasm. The turnout was approximately 60
percent. The police were there acting appropriately and
professionally. People were excited. There were foul ups,
administrative delays. People were not being paid, but by and
large we felt very positive about the elections themselves.
That sentiment was echoed by observers from all over the
world, from Canada, from the Organization of American States.
The problem occurred in the aftermath of the election.
Let me just make a footnote at this point. It was clear to
me that Fanmi Lavalas would have secured a plurality in almost
all of the Senatorial districts. Unfortunately, in the
aftermath of the election--we were there for the counting of
the ballots, by the way, and again it was done I believe in a
fair and appropriate way. It was in the aftermath of the
election that the government I think inappropriately and
illegally tabulated those ballots in a way that secured a
majority rather than a plurality for Fanmi Lavalas.
My point about going almost to the point where it could be
considered a historical watershed in Haitian history was lost,
but as we look forward we are going to deal with this
particular government. I would not opine as to whether we
should attend the election in November, which is for the
executive, which is the election for president, but I would
point out, and I think we have to reflect on this.
I know that you and I and Chairman Gilman support
approximately $3 billion, in excess of $3 billion of foreign
assistance every year to Egypt. The Egyptian Parliament is
controlled by the party of President Mubarak with 97 percent.
Now, there has been over the course of time considerable
debate as to whether elections in Egypt are fair and free, and
people whom I know you and I both respect would indicate that
no, they are not free and fair, so I think that we have to be
careful in singling out a particular country and beginning the
process of disengagement that I think would have negative
implications for the national interest of the United States.
Mr. Cooksey. One followup question. This is a rhetorical
question/comment. Do you think the attendance at this hearing
of the entire International Relations Committee is a reflection
of the interest in Haiti? I am afraid to hear an answer.
Chairman Gilman. Well, let me respond. Today is a very busy
day with Members on the floor, Members in other areas, so I do
not think it is a fair indication because there is a great deal
of interest in Haiti's future. A number of us have joined
together from time to time to go to Haiti to try to assess what
is there.
Mr. Delahunt and yourself are indications of some of the
people taking the time, but there are a number of Members who
have expressed a strong desire to see Haiti find a way to pull
itself up by its bootstraps.
One last question. Mr. Delahunt raised the question about
the police not detaining anyone, but is it not a rule pretty
much among police that you detain potential witnesses, even
possible defendants leaving the scene of an attack, to get some
information? Here we see no one being interrogated or
questioned. They are running away from the scene of the fire.
Mr. Delahunt, you may want to comment.
Mr. Delahunt. I do not know if you are directing that
question to Mr. Ford.
Chairman Gilman. Well, I am asking both Mr. Ford and
yourself. What should be the role with regard to police in that
kind of a situation?
Mr. Delahunt. Well, I think the first priority, of course,
would be the personal safety of the police officers involved.
Chairman Gilman. Again, I did not see anyone attacking any
of the police.
Mr. Delahunt. No. I understand, but, of course, we also saw
that police were far outnumbered by those that were rioting.
Clearly the situation was chaotic.
I am sure--I have absolutely no doubt--that the police were
concerned about their personal safety. I also have no doubt
that their training is inadequate, and I also have no doubt
that they probably were very, very scared about what was
occurring.
They were aware that some of those rioters--we had heard
gunshots. Now, we do not know where those gunshots came from,
but given the numbers that I saw I cannot reach a conclusion. I
just simply cannot reach any fair conclusion.
You know, I think reasonable people can draw inferences
that contradict each other, but I do not think we have hard
evidence here that we can reach proper conclusions.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Ford, do you want to comment on the
action by the police under these circumstances?
Mr. Ford. Again, my colleague, who is a former police
officer, has told me that basic police practice would be to
stop and interview people in a situation like that.
Again, we are not privy to the entire circumstances of what
was shown on that video, so, we do not know overall whether or
not the police were told not to do anything or whatever.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Ford, let me interrupt you a moment.
Was there a full investigation of the destruction of the police
headquarters by the police? Does anyone know that?
Mr. Ford. To our knowledge, there was not.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Ford, the president of the Electoral
Council in Haiti was forced to leave Haiti in fear of his life
in conditions similar to the Inspector General leaving. He had
stated that when it was made clear to him what could happen if
he did not make the improper report on the election, he asked
for asylum in an Embassy and to protect him as he left the
country.
Can you tell us? Have you talked to him, or have you
reviewed that situation at all?
Mr. Ford. Mr. Chairman, we did not talk to that individual,
so we do not have any information about that particular
incident.
Chairman Gilman. Did you look into the question of why he
left Haiti under protection by the Embassy?
Mr. Ford. In his case, no.
Chairman Gilman. All right. If there are no other
questions, I want to thank our panelists for being here today
and for helping us to shed some light on the situation. We hope
that as a result of your review we can help make a better life
for those in Haiti who are struggling to find a way.
Thank you very much. The Committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m. the Committee was adjourned.]
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