[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN: DO TRAFFICKERS USE CUBA AND PUERTO
RICO AS MAJOR TRANSIT LOCATIONS FOR UNITED STATES-BOUND NARCOTICS?
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JANUARY 3 AND 4, 2000
__________
Serial No. 106-178
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
69-521 WASHINGTON : 2001
_______________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250
Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
Carolina ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
BOB BARR, Georgia DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas
LEE TERRY, Nebraska THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
GREG WALDEN, Oregon JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California ------
PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho (Independent)
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
David A. Kass, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian
Lisa Smith Arafune, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on:
January 3, 2000.......................................... 1
January 4, 2000.......................................... 59
Statement of:
Agostini, Jose Fuentes, former attorney general of the
Government of Puerto Rico.................................. 60
De La Guardia, Ileana, daughter of Cuban Colonel Tony De La
Guardia; and Jorge Masetti, former Cuban Ministry of
Interior Official.......................................... 23
Diaz-Balart, Lincoln, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida........................................... 19
Ledwith, William E., Chief of Foreign Operations, Drug
Enforcement Administration; Michael S. Vigil, Chief Agent
in Charge, Caribbean Field Division, Drug Enforcement
Administration; and John C. Varrone, Executive Director,
Operations, East, U.S. Customs Service..................... 85
Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida........................................... 10
Letters, statements, et cetera, submitted for the record by:
Agostini, Jose Fuentes, former attorney general of the
Government of Puerto Rico, prepared statement of........... 66
Burton, Hon. Dan, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Indiana, information concerning 60 dangerous fugitives.. 147
De La Guardia, Ileana, daughter of Cuban Colonel Tony De La
Guardia, prepared statement of............................. 26
Gilman, Hon. Benjamin A., a Representative in Congress from
the State of New York, information concerning a December
21, 1999, GAO report....................................... 54
Ledwith, William E., Chief of Foreign Operations, Drug
Enforcement Administration; and Michael S. Vigil, Chief
Agent in Charge, Caribbean Field Division, Drug Enforcement
Administration, prepared statement of...................... 89
Masetti, Jorge, former Cuban Ministry of Interior Official,
prepared statement of...................................... 31
Mica, Hon. John L., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida, U.S. Customs Service Caribbean staffing
information................................................ 126
Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida, prepared statement of.................... 15
Varrone, John C., Executive Director, Operations, East, U.S.
Customs Service, prepared statement of..................... 109
DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN: DO TRAFFICKERS USE CUBA AND PUERTO
RICO AS MAJOR TRANSIT LOCATIONS FOR UNITED STATES-BOUND NARCOTICS?
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MONDAY, JANUARY 3, 2000
House of Representatives,
Committee on Government Reform,
Miami, FL.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:23 p.m., in the
Commission Chambers, Sweetwater City Hall, 500 S.W. 109th
Avenue, Miami, FL, Hon. Dan Burton (chairman of the committee)
presiding.
Present: Representatives Burton, Gilman, Ros-Lehtinen,
Mica, and Ose.
Also present: Representative Diaz-Balart.
Staff present: James C. Wilson, chief counsel; Kevin Long
and Gil Macklin, professional staff members; Kristi Remington,
senior counsel; Lisa Smith Arafune, chief clerk; Maria
Tamburri, staff assistant; and Michael J. Yeager, minority
counsel.
Mr. Burton. Good afternoon. A quorum being present, the
Committee on Government Reform will now come to order.
I ask unanimous consent that all materials, exhibits or
other extraneous materials referred to in the course of this
hearing be included in the record. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
I also ask unanimous consent that the Congressmen who are
not members of this committee be allowed to participate in this
hearing. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Before I go to my opening statement, I would like to state
that not only is the chairman of the Government Reform
Committee here and other members, but also the chairman of the
International Relations Committee, Mr. Ben Gilman is here. So
this is a very important hearing for southern Florida and for
the United States, because it bears on not only an important
subject, but it also is important enough to have two committees
represented here today.
I want to thank everybody in south Florida for allowing us
to be here. Everyone today will be able to say that they are
part of a historic event. This is the first congressional
hearing of the new millennium and it is being broadcast live
into Cuba on Radio Marti so Fidel Castro and the people of Cuba
will be hearing what we say today and what we find. And if he
blocks it, I hope Radio Marti will rebroadcast it again and
again so that the people of Cuba will hear the facts.
The topic of the hearing is drug trafficking in the
Caribbean; specifically, do traffickers use Cuba and Puerto
Rico as major transit points for United States-bound narcotics?
Fidel Castro's longstanding participation in international drug
trafficking is well-documented, as is Cuba's notorious state
sponsorship of terrorism. Unfortunately for the American
people, President Clinton has chosen to ignore these facts and
proceed down the trail of normalization with a totalitarian
drug-running Castro dictatorship.
In November, the Clinton-Gore administration refused to put
Cuba on the major drug list of countries that substantially
impact the United States. Just last week, the State Department
informed my staff that they are going to send a United States
Coast Guard officer to Cuba to be a liaison with the Castro
government on drug trafficking matters. That's very curious to
me since Castro is deeply involved in the drug trafficking
himself. These decisions were clearly rooted in politics rather
than determined by the facts.
The stained foreign policy legacy of this administration
has never been more evident. The Clinton administration has
turned its back on American children in order to normalize
relations with Fidel Castro, a brutal dictator who is helping
flood American streets and school yards with deadly drugs, all
the while lining his pockets with illicit drug money.
The Clinton-Gore legacy will be an entire generation of
Americans subjected to dramatically increased drug use as well
as record numbers of drug addicts and overdose deaths. This has
already happened in places like Baltimore, MD where 1 out of 17
citizens--1 out of 17--are addicted to heroin, according to the
DEA. In August, our Government Reform colleague, Mr. Cummings,
told us of the devastating impact it has had on his district in
Baltimore and later this month, Chairman John Mica's
subcommittee will hold a field hearing in Baltimore. Just up
the road in Chairman Mica's district in Orlando, over 50 people
died of heroin overdoses last year alone, many of them
teenagers.
It does not take boxes of physical evidence, just common
sense, to see that Fidel Castro's regime has resorted to drug
trafficking to help fund Cuba's sagging economy. It is quite
clear to those who have followed Cuba as closely as I have that
his brutal dictatorship is in dire straits since the collapse
of the Soviet Union and the subsidies that it provided to Cuba.
Further, the Helms-Burton embargo has Castro's dictatorship
strapped for hard currency. This begs the question, where has
Castro turned to subsidize this loss of money. In my opinion,
he has turned in large part to drug trafficking and quite
possibly money laundering to prop up his regime.
There is an abundance of evidence that Castro's regime is
involved in drug trafficking. My staff has conducted nearly a
year-long investigation into one particular shipment of drugs
seized by the Colombian National Police last December. The
International Relations Committee, chaired by Mr. Gilman, has
been doing the same thing. These investigations have shown the
Cuban Government was the primary principal behind this shipment
of drugs destined for Havana before it was seized. We believe
this shipment may have been headed for the United States after
it got to Cuba. 7.2 metric tons of drugs, cocaine, worth $1.5
billion was seized in six containers belonging to the Cuban
Government which were to be transported to Cuba by a Cuban
Government-owned shipping company and were to be opened only in
the presence of the Cuban Government's customs agents. This is
now being called ``the December incident'' in Cuba.
According to an article in the May 27, 1999 government-run
newspaper in Havana, Prensa Latina, Rogelio Sierra, a spokesman
for the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations, said--he is a
government official down there--that 7 tons of Cuba-bound
cocaine seized in Colombia in December was destined for the
United States of America. The only Clinton-Gore administration
response to this statement was they could not explain it. I
think that tells a lot. Why would a Cuban foreign ministry
official have said that the cocaine shipment was going to the
United States through Cuba? I can only imagine there was hell
to pay for Mr. Sierra as a result of his slip of the tongue.
Sierra's statement is important because it directly
contradicts Fidel Castro's earlier assertions in January when
he alleged that two Spanish businessmen, who were minority
partners in the joint venture company, were solely responsible
for this shipment. Since these two were from Spain, the
shipment must have been going to Spain--a perfect setup by a
notorious lying dictator.
In reality, the Cuban Ministry of Interior, which is the
equivalent of our CIA, assigned two agents to run this company
under the Cuban Ministry of Light Industry. It was an operation
that proceeded only under the strict control of the Ministry of
Interior. The two Interior agents were very upset that this
cocaine shipment was twice delayed in Colombia and even phoned
one of the Spanish businessmen to ask when it would be
delivered. After the seizure in Colombia, when the Cuban
authorities could have detained the other Spaniard, they sent
him back to Spain with a gift for his sick wife without
detaining or questioning him about the seizure.
He said that he was not involved in the drug operation, had
no knowledge of it and he was willing to take a lie detector
test administered by the Drug Enforcement Administration of the
United States. So far the DEA has not offered him a lie
detector test.
Surprisingly, the White House chose to take Castro's story
without a shred of evidence and based their assumptions on
Castro's word--nothing else. Now, the Clinton-Gore
administration is sending a U.S. Coast Guard officer--a law
enforcement officer--as a reward to Castro, who no doubt
requested help as a face-saving effort to show the world he is
``serious'' about drug trafficking. Sadly, the Clinton-Gore
administration has chosen to reward Castro rather than question
his complicity with drug traffickers.
This is not the only case that can be made that the Castro
regime is neck-deep in drug trafficking. On April 8, 1993, the
Miami Herald reported that the United States Attorney in Miami
had a draft indictment for drug trafficking and racketeering
against Raul Castro, Fidel's brother, also a high-ranking Cuban
Government official. Under pressure from the Clinton-Gore
Department of Justice in Washington, the indictment was
shelved. Why? Is it because the Clinton administration is so
tilted toward normalizing relations with Cuba that it does not
want to deal with the allegations of drug trafficking by
Castro's Cuba? Unfortunately, this seems like the logical
conclusion.
I hope the television is working and I hope you will all
pay attention to the monitor there. I want to show a portion of
a DEA-edited surveillance videotape that shows a drug
trafficker bragging about faking an emergency landing in Cuba
to drop off a load of dope, then getting the royal treatment
from the Cuban Government. He was even given false repair
documents for his plane, which permitted him to enter the
United States after leaving Cuba. I was provided with this tape
only after threatening to subpoena it from the DEA. The
administration and the DEA would not give it to us. While I
would like to show more of the tape, the vulgar language
prohibits me from doing so. So you are going to see the part
where he is talking about his involvement landing in Cuba and
getting false information about the landing.
So would you please show the video now?
[Videotape shown.]
Mr. Burton. Well, the volume was poor. For those of you in
the media, we will make that available at the conclusion of the
hearing so you can get a more clear picture of what we are
talking about. I apologize for that, but under the
circumstances with the volume problem we had, I think we will
let you see that later.
That portion of the video seems pretty convincing to me,
but not to the administration, which has repeatedly claimed
there is no evidence of Cuban Government involvement in drug
trafficking. I cannot believe this administration is making
those statements. And I think today the witnesses we are going
to have will clearly show that the Cuban Government has been
deeply involved in drug trafficking since the 1970's.
My good friend, Representative Bob Menendez, a New Jersey
Democrat, said, ``In a country where every human rights
activist, political dissident and journalist is followed, that
narco-traffickers can meet without the Cuban secret police
knowing is a tale from Alice in Wonderland.'' This is from one
of the President's own party members.
I agree with my Democrat friend from New Jersey. Castro
knows everything of significance that is going on in Cuba. It
is impossible to believe that anyone could move 7.2 tons of
cocaine through Cuba without Castro's knowledge or at least his
willingness to turn a blind eye to the movement in exchange for
some of the profit.
The Clinton-Gore administration has argued that Cuba does
not have the capacity to respond to drug plane overflights or
boats entering its territorial waters. That claim rings hollow.
Castro has shown his ability to lethally respond to innocent
civilians in the past. For example, Castro scrambled his MiGs
in 1996 to shoot down two Brothers to the Rescue planes in
international airspace, murdering innocent Americans.
Castro has also sent his Navy to murder nearly 100 innocent
women and children when it rammed the 13th of March tugboat,
and then used fire hoses to flood the deck and sink the ship.
These were innocent men, women and children merely fleeing the
oppression of his brutal dictatorship.
What this shows is that Castro has the capacity to respond
to boats and planes if he wants to, even if it involves killing
innocent women and children. Apparently Castro feels more
threatened by innocent women and children telling the world the
truth about his dictatorship than he does by allowing drug
traffickers to use Cuba as a syringe for injecting drugs into
American streets and school yards.
My good friend, Senator Robert Torricelli, who is chairman
of the Democrat Senatorial Committee, recently said, ``The
regular use of Cuban air space and the tracking of drugs
through Cuba make it clear Cuba belongs on the major drug list.
Any decision not to place Cuba on the list would be for purely
political reasons.''
The Clinton-Gore administration is now in the ironic
position of defending Fidel Castro's illicit activities. What
the administration does not realize, or chooses to ignore, is
that by not placing Cuba on the major's list, it became an
accomplice to Castro's activities.
The Clinton-Gore administration's decision will impact an
entire generation of American children. Even worse is that the
Clinton-Gore administration made this decision based on its
desire to normalize relations with Fidel Castro--shameless even
to fellow Democrats like Senator Torricelli and Representative
Menendez.
Today, we will hear first from two very important Members
of Congress from southern Florida--Lincoln Diaz-Balart and
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. Then we will hear from two very important
witnesses. First, Mr. Jorge Masetti, who is a former Cuban
Ministry of Interior official, and then his wife, Ms. Ileana de
la Guardia, whose father, Cuban Colonel Anthony de la Guardia,
was executed by Fidel Castro for drug trafficking in the famous
General Ochoa case. Mr. Masetti will be providing us with his
eyewitness testimony to the drug trafficking and state-
sponsored terrorist activities of the Castro regime. Ms. de la
Guardia will explain how her father acted with the knowledge of
Fidel Castro when he ran the drug trafficking organization out
of the Ministry of the Interior.
Now, I would like to take this opportunity to thank
Congressman Lincoln Diaz-Balart, who is not on our committee,
but is hosting these hearings in his district. My staff has
informed me that Congressman Diaz-Balart's staff, especially
Ana Carbonell, deserves a special thank you for all of her hard
work in putting this event together. Ana, I would like for you
to stand up so everybody can see, because you worked very hard
on this.
[Applause.]
Mr. Burton. She has probably collapsed from all this work--
there she is back there.
I would also like to thank the city of Sweetwater for
permitting the committee to hold this hearing in their lovely
town hall, particularly Mayor Jose Pepe Diaz, and the
Sweetwater Police Department, including Chief Jesus Menocal,
Assistant Chief Ed Fuentes, Lieutenant Roberto Fulgueira,
Sergeant Lawrence Churchman, Corporal Ignacio Menocal and
Officer Eddie Magarino. I hope I got those names pronounced
correctly, so forgive me if I did not.
Finally, I would like to thank Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and
Lincoln Diaz-Balart for their support of our hearings in the
past and for their hard work down here.
I would like to now recognize Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen
and Congressman Diaz-Balart, who will be testifying from up
here, and then we will go to our witnesses who came all the way
from Spain to testify today.
So we will start with--oh, excuse me, pardon me. First, we
go to opening statements. Forgive me, my colleagues. We will
start with my ranking member and the head of the International
Relations Committee, Chairman Gilman.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mayor Diaz and the
Sweetwater officials for hosting this hearing.
And we welcome the opportunity to appear here today in
Miami along with our congressional colleagues to address a very
important issue, an issue of the narcotics trade targeting our
Nation, and in particular Cuba's links to the illicit narcotics
trade targeting both our Nation and the European continent. It
is a subject which is and should be of major importance and
concern not only to our Nation and all of our communities,
especially here in south Florida but many of our towns and
cities throughout our Nation have been ravaged by illicit drugs
trafficking here from abroad through places like Cuba.
On November 10, 1999, President Clinton notified me in my
role as chairman of our International Relations Committee of
his annual determinations on the major drug source, and the
major transit list, as required by law. Regrettably, the
President failed to include Cuba on the major's list, a nation
which is the largest land mass in the Caribbean and only 90
miles from our Florida coastline.
The list of major drug trafficking transit nations included
the nearby Caribbean nations of Haiti, the Dominican Republic
and Jamaica. The Bahamas were also included on the President's
list. The State Department International Narcotics Bureau
[INL], which has the lead on preparing the recommendations for
the President's annual major's list determination was
apparently ignored on the long-overdue inclusion of Cuba as a
major drug transiting nation that significantly impacts our own
Nation.
The fact that the State Department avoided answering
questions at our hearing in our committee last November on what
their own recommendations were with regard to Cuba being
included on that major's list, is some indication that they
have privately disagreed with the President, as some media
accounts have already speculated. After weeks of State
Department lawyer time and extraordinary legal gymnastics on
whether the term ``through'' means drugs over the skies and in
the territorial waters of Cuba, we once again witnessed a
failure of Presidential leadership in our fight against illicit
drugs.
In his November 10 letter to the Congress, President
Clinton stated that our law enforcement community, with regard
to the 7.5 metric tons of deadly cocaine seized in northern
Colombia in December 1998 and clearly consigned to Cuba,
believed that Spain and not the United States was the ultimate
destination of this major shipment.
Irrespective of the ultimate destination of that particular
large shipment of cocaine, it is obvious that massive amounts
of illicit drugs are now transiting Cuba, either to our Nation
or to the European continent and possibly with some Cuban
Government complicity. This is an alarming trend and a new
reality which we ignore at our own risk.
Our administration has sadly become a cheerleader for the
dictatorial communist regime in Havana, and has not adequately
recognized the long-term significance that this massive
shipment of cocaine represents. Our Nation's administration has
not been objective, it has swallowed the Cuban Government's
efforts to spin--hook, line and sinker--on a likely destination
of this massive tonnage of Colombian cocaine seized in December
1998 in northern Colombia and, as we all acknowledge, was
consigned to Cuba.
It has long been my understanding that our Drug Enforcement
Administration [DEA], had no concrete evidence to support the
conclusion that Spain was the ultimate destination of this
major shipment of 7.5 tons of cocaine. There may be conjecture,
there may be hints and speculation, but there is no hard
evidence that Spain was the final destination, as Mr. Castro
and his regime would have us believe, without a thorough
inquiry.
Why should we give this benefit of the doubt to Cuba and to
the Castro regime? We ought to be more than curious in
conducting a serious, no nonsense investigation of that major
shipment, the implications of which are ominous for our Nation
and for Europe.
Once the shipment of 7.5 tons of cocaine was clearly and
effectively determined to be headed for Cuba, could we have
expected Mr. Castro to say it was headed for our Nation?
Never--since he is a master of propaganda and disinformation.
The head of the Spanish National Police told our committee
staff in late October of last year in Colombia, that Cuba is
the only destination they have been able to determine for this
massive load of Colombian cocaine, not Spain, as Mr. Castro and
as our President is so willing to believe at this point.
There are a few significant conclusions that the DEA has
made clear to our Committee on International Relations, however
that are worth noting again for the record concerning Cuba's
rightful inclusion on the major's transiting list. First, the
DEA says a massive shipment of 7.5 metric tons of cocaine such
as this does not represent the first time that Cuba was used to
transit such illicit drugs. This route would have been tried
and tested many times and well before such a massive quantity
of drugs were passed through Cuba.
Second, any organization moving such a large quantity of
illicit drugs is targeting both our Nation and Europe, two of
the major cocaine markets in the world. A recent case in point
was a drug trafficking organization that our DEA encountered
that was moving large quantities of drugs to Europe as well as
to Florida and to Texas.
Until we have a thorough investigation by our
administration of this 7.5 ton narcotic shipment's ultimate
destination, instead of the distortions, speculation and
propaganda from Mr. Castro and from our administration, we
should give the benefit of the doubt to the communities and to
the children of our Nation.
Mr. Chairman, we thank you for keeping the focus on this
important issue and for conducting this field hearing today in
Miami. Today, we look forward to hearing firsthand from those
who are not naive about the illicit drugs and about Cuba's
involvement. We look forward today to hearing from those who
can provide us with the facts which ought to concern each and
every community in America, all those wanting to see our Nation
prevent illicit drugs from coming to our Nation from abroad,
entering our Nation from Cuba or anywhere else around the
globe.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Chairman Gilman.
Mr. Ose.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the interest of time,
I think I will yield my opening statement.
Mr. Burton. Ok, Mr. Ose. Mr. Mica, do you have an opening
statement?
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Today's hearing is a followup of a hearing that I chaired
on November 17, 1999 on the question of Cuban links to
international drug trafficking. That hearing we conducted in
Washington was the first on this subject area and it raised
specifically a number of questions. Unfortunately, we got more
questions out of the hearing than answers. That is why it is
important that we focus at least part of today's full committee
hearing on the subject of Cuba and its involvement.
Why Cuba? Because the scourge of illegal drugs entering our
country remains a national security and an economic threat to
the United States of America. Because American citizens are
dying every day from these drugs and because there are very
large questions to be answered concerning Cuba's role in drug
trafficking.
The chairman talked about the number of deaths in my
district from heroin. We know that a large portion of that
heroin is produced in Colombia then trafficked through the
Caribbean and we have traced some of that, of course, to Cuba
and other areas. The only reason we have not exceeded the
number of deaths last year, my law enforcement folks told me
while I was home this year, is because they have become so good
at providing quick drug antidotes in the treatment of these
folks. Otherwise, our young people would be dying at an even
more rapid rate.
The chairman also opened his remarks with saying that in
Baltimore, 1 out of I think 17 or 18 people of their population
are being addicted to heroin. A recent city council woman in
Baltimore said that it is now one in eight people. That is why
we are taking our subcommittee there in a few more weeks.
Cuba, of course, we know is located just 90 miles south of
Florida and it is the largest of the Caribbean nations. It
provides a direct trafficking route for drugs that are produced
in South America as they move through the Caribbean and into
the southeastern United States, mainly through Florida.
When you draw a straight line from any northern port in
Colombia--and Colombia now produces 80 percent of the cocaine.
When the Clinton administration took over in 1993, there was
almost zero cocaine produced in Colombia, most of the cocaine
came out of Peru and Bolivia. In 7 short years, they have
managed to make Colombia the world's largest producer of
cocaine through their policy.
We also know, due to the latest statistics, that the DEA
can trace through a very accurate analysis of heroin, that 74
percent of the heroin reaching our shores comes from Colombia.
It is also amazing that in 1993, almost zero heroin was
produced in Colombia, there was none produced there. In 6 or 7
years, this administration's policy has turned Colombia into
the major producer of heroin in the world, and 74 percent of
that heroin is coming into the United States.
The illegal drug trade is first and foremost a business,
and drug traffickers always seek the shortest, most direct,
least expensive route and most cooperative route. That is why
Cuba is of great concern to us.
Cuba's role in illegal drug smuggling raises more
questions, as I said, than have been answered in the past.
Compounding the difficulty is the fact that Cuba is a closed
society that has made no effort to assist the United States
anti-drug operations.
Castro's government and his policies have isolated this
island nation from the rest of its neighbors in the western
hemisphere. These same policies have also shrouded the
cooperation or lack of cooperation with international law
enforcement. Castro's Cuba does not publish statistics on anti-
drug enforcement and they do not share information on known
drug trafficking enterprises, which are in fact moving drugs
through Cuba. In short, they are not part of the solution,
helping the United States solve this serious drug trafficking
problem, but in fact and unfortunately, they may be a large
part of the problem.
Recent United States and Colombian law enforcement
operations have found that Colombian drug traffickers have used
Cuba as a meeting place for their criminal business
enterprises. This fact was clearly illustrated in the 1997 case
of Miami cocaine kingpin Jorge Cabrera, whose attorney
described these very such meetings on Cuban soil in his October
7, 1996 letter to Attorney General Janet Reno. This is the same
Jorge Cabrera who contributed large political donations to the
Clinton-Gore campaign and danced some 5 years ago at a
Christmas party at the White House.
Today, there is little doubt that Cuba remains a meeting
place for drug operations as we continue to examine the 7.3
metric tons of cocaine seized in Colombia in December 1998. We
also know from the result of our hearing, that massive amount
of cocaine was destined for a Cuban Government-owned and
operated company. That, in fact, the company was 51 percent
owned by the Cuban Government.
In October 1999, Operation Millennium netted more than over
31 major Colombian drug traffickers and a wealth of information
on well-established drug trafficking routes. The Miami DEA
office confirmed that Colombian and Mexican drug trafficking
organizations met in Cuba. In the past, we have explored the
drug smuggling activity over Cuban air space as well as in
Cuban waters.
In a letter from President Clinton's drug czar, General
Barry McCaffrey, in May of last year, the General stated, ``The
intelligence and law enforcement communities report that
detected drug overflights over Cuba, although still not as
numerous as in other parts of the Caribbean, increased by
almost 50 percent last year.'' That was in 1998--he spoke in
1999. And yet, for reasons unknown, Cuba was not placed on the
major's list, and the major's list again is for transit and
drug trafficking nations, which is designated by the
administration each year.
The Castro government can shoot innocent aircraft out of
the sky, as they demonstrated with the two Brothers to the
Rescue planes in 1994, but they cannot seem to interdict
aircraft carrying illegal drugs in their airspace. Common
sense, coupled with these facts, demand both questions and
answers. These facts are stubborn and they will not go away
because of any diplomatic whitewash or creative explanations
offered by the State Department or this administration, which
we know is both eager and active in trying to normalize
relations with the Castro government.
But first, these questions must be answered. I continue to
be baffled by this administration's seeming unwillingness to
thoroughly explore many of the leads that indicate Cuba's
involvement in illegal drug smuggling activities. Why did this
administration refuse to add Cuba to the list of major drug
transit countries? Doing so would only have served to leverage
the annual certification process in order to ensure that Cuba
is not facilitating illegal drug smuggling, either through
complicity or through direct involvement.
We are here today because the American people deserve to
know the full truth regarding Cuba's links to international
drug trafficking. And I am pleased that we are here today also,
for the first time, give the Cuban people an opportunity to
hear what is going on with their government and their country.
I thank the two members of the Miami congressional
delegation, for calling this hearing and applaud them both
their leadership on this and other issues in Congress and
before my subcommittee and the full committee. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Congressman Mica. Now we will hear
from the two panelists who are up here on the dias with us. One
is a member of the committee and the other is a member of the
very powerful Rules Committee, Mr. Diaz-Balart. We will start
with Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, who has been doing yeoman's service
for the people of south Florida for a long time.
STATEMENT OF ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Chairman Burton. It is
a pleasure to have you in our south Florida community, and
Chairman Gilman as well. I have the unique pleasure of serving
both as a member of the Government Reform Committee under the
able leadership of Dan Burton, as well as in the International
Relations Committee under the wise and talented Ben Gilman. So
it is an honor to be with my leaders here today. And thank you,
Mr. Ose and Mr. Mica for joining Congressman Diaz-Balart and me
and the south Florida community. Thank you so much, Jose Pepe
Diaz, the mayor of Sweetwater, a beautiful municipality that I
had the pleasure of representing for many years and now is very
well represented by our colleague, Lincoln Diaz-Balart. Thank
you to you, Pepe, and your very able Council members and staff
and the police officers and everyone involved.
And as the chairman and Mr. Mica and Mr. Gilman have all
pointed out, we are very pleased that our words today are being
broadcast live through Radio Marti, because this is an
important message and a message of hope that we bring to the
enslaved people of Cuba. Very often we are asked how many
political prisoners there are in our native homeland and our
answer is always 11 million. So we hope that 1 day they will be
free and that they will be able to enjoy the fruits of liberty
and freedom as we have here in the United States.
As all of the previous speakers have pointed out, the
December 1998 seizure by the Colombian police of 7 tons of
cocaine bound for Havana was the catalyst which prompted a
renewed focus on Castro's involvement in the narcotics trade.
This could have been the epitaph of the Castro regime's drug
connection, but unfortunately the reaction of the Clinton
administration to this case and to other information has been
to issue statements of a rhetorical nature claiming the lack of
concrete evidence.
Castro, who is clearly concerned by this committee's
investigation into his regime's participation in the drug
trafficking trade, has used his well-oiled propaganda machine
most recently to try to once again divert the world's attention
from his numerous crimes.
And I refer to the front page of the December 29 edition of
Granma, the Cuban daily that is controlled by the communist
party, and it stated just a few days ago,
``Ros-Lehtinen has participated in the direction of the
most vile crusades against our country, particularly in
Congress. ``What level of credibility could possibly be given
to these attempts to damage what has been built and to
stimulate anything that will complicate bilateral relations?
``The example of this,'' the editorial continues, ``is in the
ongoing investigation about the alleged connection between Cuba
and the international drug trafficking which has been the
subject of Congressional hearings held by Ros-Lehtinen and her
gang, even though high level officials of the U.S. Government
deny such connection.''
So there you go, guys, now you know you are part of a gang.
In the last few weeks, Castro has also referred to me as a
``ferocious wolf disguised as a woman.'' I am extremely proud
to be the subject of his attacks and I assure him that I will
continue to work against his oppressive dictatorship until
freedom and democracy reign in the island.
While the White House does its best to avoid the subject,
some law enforcement officials have a different story to tell.
DEA agents, who have spoken to me or to my staff on condition
of anonymity, have stated that the documentation does exist
detailing the activities of drug runners who go from the
Bahamas and other neighboring Caribbean nations to Cuba for
loading and unloading of drug shipments. They also refer to the
sightings and the logs of air traffic into Cuba, suspected to
be related to the drug trade.
This is but a recent example of what David Perez and Johnny
Crump, both former narcotics traffickers, as well as Mario
Estevez Gonzalez, former member of the Cuban Intelligence
Service, referred to in their Senate testimony in April 1983.
Perez testified that traffickers would leave from Miami
into Bimini, then to Williams Key and then to Guincho Key and
then to Paredon Grande in Cuba.
Estevez testified that from the period of 1981 to 1982, he
was approximately responsible for $7 million from drugs
returning to the Cuban Government by trafficking back and forth
from the United States. He added, ``It doesn't matter what
moves in Cuba or takes place in Cuba, nothing gets done in Cuba
unless it has the blessings and the price set by Fidel Castro
himself . . .''
If this was the operation 17 or 18 years ago, how much more
profit does the Castro regime reap today? How much more
pervasive and elaborate must the Cuban trafficking network be
today?
Yet, there are those, including some administration
officials, who would turn a blind eye to this reality. They
would question the value of these statements for evaluating the
current scenario and they persist in their recanting of the
regime's assurances that it is not involved. Any such
assumption flies in the face of logic and is negated by
information which has surfaced in recent years.
In February 1999, Cuban defector and former spy for
Castro's Intelligence Service, the DGI, Major Juan Antonio
Rodriguez Menier testified in Paris that the Castro Regime was
involved in money laundering and drug trafficking and further
stated that it had supported the terrorist acts of Carlos ``the
Jackal.''
In January 1999, a complaint filed in France by lawyer
Serge Lewisch on behalf of Ileana de la Guardia, the exiled
daughter of Cuban Colonel Antonio de la Guardia, who was
accused of drug trafficking and sentenced to death by a Castro
court, charged that Cuba had become a major conduit for drugs.
In the complaint and related interviews, Ileana de la Guardia
stated that Cuban drug trafficking was a matter of state,
organized by the highest echelons of power in the country. It
is impossible that Fidel Castro was unaware of this.
In the fall of 1996, the prosecution of Jorge Cabrera,
referred to in previous statements by these panelists,
convicted of transporting almost 6,000 pounds of cocaine into
the United States, gave specific information highlighting
cooperation between Castro officials and the Colombian cartels.
However, the United States Justice Department declined to
appoint a special prosecutor to investigate the allegations of
Cuban Government complicity in the drug traffic to the United
States.
In April 1993, it was reported that the United States
Attorney for the southern district of Florida had drafted an
indictment charging the Castro regime as a racketeering
enterprise and Cuban Defense Minister Raul Castro as the chief
of a 10-year conspiracy to send tons of Colombian cocaine
through Cuba into the United States.
It is difficult to establish a precise date for Cuba's
entry into the hemisphere's trafficking network. Some
knowledgeable on the issue, such as Cuban defector and former
senior intelligence office, Major Juan Antonio Rodriguez
Menier, known as Coqui, claim that the regime's involvement
dates back to the 1970's.
While insufficient data exists documenting a precise 1970's
inception, it can be ascertained from information obtained
during Senate and House congressional hearings held in 1982;
also from the indictment of four senior government officials in
November 1982 by the U.S. Attorney for the southern district of
Florida as a result of the Jaime Guillot-Lara case; and from
numerous reports by the Department of State, Department of
Justice and our intelligence agencies, that the Castro
connection to narcotics trafficking was in place by the early
to mid-1980's.
Former Cuban intelligence officers who defected to Spain
have stated that Fabio Vazquez Castano, a Colombian connected
to insurgent groups in his country, contacted Manuel Pinero
Losada, director of the Americas Department, a specialized
intelligence section of the Castro regime, and proposed an
arrangement whereby Cuba would supply arms and would receive
payment in cocaine.
The Castro leadership endorsed the proposal based on:
(1) the destabilizing effect narcotics trafficking would
have on the United States;
(2) that cocaine is the equivalent of foreign exchange that
Cuba desperately needs; and
(3) the ability to assist the guerrillas in Colombia.
Some of this information surfaced again during the
investigation of Jaime Guillot-Lara.
Interviews of former Castro officials conducted in 1993 for
a study sponsored by the Department of Defense's International
Security Affairs Bureau to address, among other things,
Colombian trafficking, narco-terrorism, and insurgency,
revealed similar data. The information retrieved focused on
Fernando Ravelo-Renedo, a former Cuban ambassador to Colombia,
and Gonzalo Bassols-Suarez, a former minister-counsel of the
Cuban Embassy in Bogota, as the individuals chosen by the
Castro brothers to orchestrate the elaborate and enduring Cuba-
Colombia drug connection.
Despite the data dealing with the Castro regime's
involvement in narcotics trafficking, there are those who
question whether the Castro regime is aware of such activities
and whether it has the capability to patrol its waters and
airspace to prevent them.
Statements of former spies and high-level Castro officials
indicate that drug trafficking activities are a directive from
the Castro brothers, executed by their senior leadership. Thus,
it would seem that the burden of proof can be met by referring
to this testimonial evidence.
However, other factors such as Cuba's intelligence
gathering capabilities should be taken into consideration. Just
last year, the FBI arrested Cuban spies here in south Florida
after they had successfully penetrated or had attempted to
penetrate various United States military installations. Senior
FBI counter-intelligence officers classified the Cuban
espionage ring as ``one of the most sophisticated and
efficient'' they had witnessed.
The presence of Russia's Lourdes espionage facility and
China's listening station in Cuba raise the question of
intelligence sharing and how these significantly augment the
Castro regime's own capacity to monitor activities not just
around Cuba, but indeed throughout the hemisphere.
The Castro regime demonstrated its capacity to interdict
clearly on February 24, 1996. It deployed Cuban MiGs and shot
down two Brothers to the Rescue planes, killing four innocent
civilians, three of them United States citizens.
The dictatorship's capacity to monitor is shown by its
surveillance of attempts by the Cuban people to escape their
island prison in search of freedom in the United States. The
regime was willing and able to attack and sink the 13 de Marzo
tugboat, killing innocent men, women and children who gasped
for air and struggled to stay afloat. They quickly drowned as
the Cuban Coast Guard boats repeatedly rammed them and turned
the water cannons on them. The Castro regime is then obviously
more than capable of preventing the use of its waters for the
drug trade into the United States.
As a Member of Congress who represents a south Florida
district which is directly impacted by the scourge of illicit
drugs and as a member of this committee, I would like to
commend Chairman Burton for holding this hearing. There is much
information detailing that will come out that high-level
government officials have been involved and continue to be
involved in smuggling drugs into the United States by allowing
waters and airspace to become critical ports of call for the
hemisphere's trafficking network.
Our goal should be that which was articulated by former
President Ronald Reagan in May 1983. He said, ``I want the
American people to know what they are faced with, the most
sinister and despicable actions.''
It is up to the Congress to exert our oversight and
investigative capabilities to uncover the truth and take all
necessary steps to ensure that this threat against our national
security is effectively addressed.
And for that, we thank Chairman Burton and Chairman Gilman
for their leadership. Thank you.
Mr. Burton. Thank you very much for that very well thought
out statement, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen. Obviously you have
been doing your homework, as you always do.
We will now hear from a very important member of the Rules
Committee and a great leader from southern Florida, Lincoln
Diaz-Balart.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
follows:]
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9521.004
STATEMENT OF LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you very
much. It is my honor to be able to welcome you, Chairman
Burton, and Chairman Gilman, Mr. Mica, Mr. Ose, along with our
distinguished colleague and friend, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, to the
district that I am honored to be able to represent in south
Florida. I want to thank Mayor Diaz and the entire city for
their hospitality.
I especially would like to send a message of hope, as well
as solidarity, to the people of Cuba who are listening to us
today. They too will soon be able to hold meetings on issues of
their choice and they, more than anyone else, know that nothing
of magnitude, especially activities for profit, can take place
in Cuba without the acquiescence and the complicity of the
totalitarian tyrant.
Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent to include my
entire statement in the record.
Mr. Burton. Without objection.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. I will not read it all. It begins
delineating the substantial evidence in the public domain that
has mounted, showing that the Castro dictatorship is
aggressively involved in narco-trafficking, at least since the
early 1980's; goes into detail with regard to the indictment
that was issued in 1982 here; continues with specific cases,
for example, with direct logistical assistance by the Cuban
armed forces of drug trafficking into the United States; and it
goes on giving specific examples.
Prior members of the committee, their statements have
talked about the April 1993 Miami Herald leak from the U.S.
Attorney's Office. After that investigation was shelved by the
Clinton administration, it was leaked. The grand jury's draft
indictment was leaked to the Miami Herald, and I think it is of
extraordinary importance that we actually read a few parts of
what the Miami Herald was able to make public.
The draft indictment states, ``The Cuban government
facilitated the transportation and distribution of large
quantities of cocaine destined for the United States, including
south Florida.''
The indictment, the Miami Herald stated, is historically
significant because it names the entire Government of Cuba,
including its armed forces and its Interior Ministry, as
criminal organizations. The indictment of the Cuban Government
was the result of months of secret testimony before a Federal
grand jury in Miami.
Now one of the witnesses who testified before that grand
jury spoke to me later and talked to me about another witness'
testimony. And they personally connected Raul Castro and the
other high ranking members of the dictatorship to narco-
trafficking of cocaine into the United States. The indictment
reads, ``In return for substantial sums of money, Raul Castro
exploited his official position by offering narcotic
traffickers the safe use of Cuba, including Cuban airspace, as
a location for the transshipment of multi-hundred kilogram
loads of cocaine destined for the United States.''
Among the other allegations in the indictment, in exchange
for millions of dollars, Raul Castro assured Colombian cartel
leaders that the Cubans would protect their shipments. Special
radio frequencies were provided to make Cuban airspace friendly
to drug pilots, who were also allowed to land on Cuban soil
with their loads of cocaine. With this special frequency,
traffickers could enter and exit Cuban airspace without
molestation.
The draft indictment states Cuban officers used their radio
facilities to warn smugglers of approaching United States Coast
Guard cutters. Drug planes were allowed to drop their cocaine
loads to smuggler vessels waiting in Cuban waters. Colombian
cartel leaders were allowed to live in Cuba, provided with
housing, cars, security, entertainment. That is in the
indictment.
Mention was also made, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members,
of the Cabrera bust in 1996. I think it is important to read
also what was leaked to the Miami Herald when that
investigation was quashed, because Cabrera was arrested--he was
busted in January 1996. He started offering at that time
substantial assistance to the DEA to the United States Attorney
here, to Customs, personally tying Fidel Castro to drug
trafficking and offering to go back into Cuba, arrange another
deal with Fidel Castro and cocaine traffickers in Colombia, and
that that deal could be under surveillance--he offered that.
Now it would be my suggestion to the committee that has
done an extraordinary job on this subject, Mr. Chairman, Mr.
Gilman and members, with regard to the bust by the heroic
Colombian police in December just a year ago of over 7 tons,
that you focus upon the Cabrera bust as well, because the
lawyers for Cabrera and the other drug traffickers, when one
speaks to them, it is very interesting. They were obviously--
they talk about the fact that DEA and Customs and the U.S.
Attorney's Office down here, they were amazed obviously when
this case broke and they started to receive the direct evidence
of Castro's direct participation in drug deals. As a matter of
fact, the substantial assistance was treated obviously in the
highest, most confidential manner, and the investigation
continued. And all of a sudden in July of that year, after 6
months investigation, the investigation was leaked to the Miami
Herald, Mr. Jeff Lein wrote it, front page of the Miami Herald,
``Traffickers tie Castro to Drug Run.'' And at that time then,
the U.S. Attorney's Office told Cabrera's lawyer, sorry, the
investigation is over, your client lied to us. The lawyer said
well, how? Well, we will deal with that at the hearing.
The lawyer was waiting for the hearing so that the evidence
would be put forth as to how Cabrera lied in the substantial
assistance that he was giving the authorities. But the U.S.
Attorney's Office, the day of the hearing, dropped the lying
charge and Cabrera was sent away pursuant to the sentencing
guidelines for 19 years for his plea for smuggling, and was
fined.
Cabrera's lawyer, as I said before, says that his client
had offered to help set up a cocaine shipment from Colombia to
Miami that American authorities could monitor and, quote, that
shipment would come through Cuba in full view, it would go
unnoticed, it would go unseized, Colombian drug traffickers
would be embraced in Cuba. Cabrera's lawyer says, also told
agents and prosecutors that they would be in a position to
catch Miami-based ``mules'' who would collect the cocaine once
it arrived, and the money launderers, who would wash the
profits. The government, however, was not interested.
What we have seen from the government, Mr. Chairman, is
quite interesting. Chairman Gilman and you and others have
pointed out that despite your committee's investigation with
regard to the seizure of over 7 tons of cocaine in December
1998 by the Colombian police in northern Colombia, not only was
the Cuban Government not placed on the major's list, as has
been stated before, but you, Mr. Chairman, received a letter,
along with Ms. Ros-Lehtinen and I, from Mr. McCaffrey, after
the Colombian bust. This letter was dated January 28, 1999, and
it states there is no conclusive evidence to indicate that the
Cuban leadership is involved in criminal activity. This is the
letter. Cuban officials cite lack of resources for the
government's inability to patrol its territorial waters.
Not only, as it has been mentioned, was the Cuban
dictatorship able to shoot down unarmed planes in February
1996, but just this last weekend, again in a small private
airplane leased by a pilot who used to be in the South
Vietnamese Air Force, the Cuban Government immediately
intercepted that pilot as soon as he went over Cuban space and
followed him, the Cuban MiGs followed him until he left Cuban
airspace.
So not only were the Brothers to the Rescue able to be
intercepted in February 1996, but if there is a lack of
resources for the government's inability to patrol its
territorial waters, they sure were able to patrol them a few
days ago when the former South Vietnamese pilot decided to fly
an unarmed civilian plane, and he was immediately intercepted.
So with all due respect, in my opinion, there are two
possible causes or explanations for the Clinton
administration's drug policy as it relates to Castro's Cuba.
The first possibility is that it is a policy of naivete to the
point of ridiculousness. The second possibility is that it is
one of purposeful cover-up. I really cannot believe that those
in leadership positions on this critical issue in the
administration could be so inept as to be responsible for a
policy rooted in the first possible cause. I believe that the
Clinton administration covers up the Castro regime's role in
narco-trafficking because the Clinton administration's policy
of appeasement of Castro at all costs could not be maintained
if the American people learned the truth.
That is why it is so important for Congress to continue
investigating and not simply give up based on the fact that
there is only 1 year left of this administration. It is the
duty of Congress to continue investigating. That is why I
commend you, Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, as the
committee charged with oversight of the Executive under the
law, to proceed, so the American people can realize what the
truth is with regard to Cuba and specifically Castro's regime
in narco-trafficking and the American people can make up their
minds as to how their democratically elected government should
proceed to protect the security of the American people.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Burton. Thank you very much, Mr. Diaz-Balart, for that
very insightful and eloquent statement.
Before we go any further, I would like to show some
posters. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen referred to the March 13 tugboat
incident and I think it is extremely important that once again
we emphasize that tragedy and how Fidel Castro was able to
drown those innocent women, children and men and yet he cannot
intercept, he says, drug traffickers. We will get into that a
little bit later.
Do any of the members of the committee have any questions
of Ileana or Lincoln?
Mr. Gilman. Mr. Chairman, I just want to commend both
Lincoln and Ileana for making such a forthright and extensive
statement that focuses attention on the illegal trafficking
that transits Cuba for an extensive period of time.
Thank you.
Mr. Burton. Thank you. And I would just like to say real
quickly--I will yield to my colleague in just a second--that
Ileana and Lincoln represent a large amount of Cuban-American
citizens who have relatives in Havana and in Cuba and they have
to deal with these problems on a regular basis and they know
first-hand of the problems that they are talking about. So even
though we have some knowledge of it and we have been
researching this, what they have said today is very factual and
I really appreciate the research they have done.
Mr. Ose.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
One of the things that I have been trying to glean from the
reading that was given me for this hearing was in 1989 with the
fall of the Iron Curtain and what-have-you, the substantial
amount of support that had been going to Cuba ceased, either
from the Soviet Union or others. Have we ever quantified--is it
on the nature of $200 million----
Mr. Diaz-Balart. $100 billion.
Mr. Ose. $100 billion annually?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. No, over the 30-year period the Soviets
subsidized.
Mr. Ose. So about $3 billion a year.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Yes.
Mr. Ose. Thank you.
Mr. Burton. $3 billion a year. And that is why they are
trying every avenue to get hard currency, and that is why they
are trying to break the Helms-Burton embargo.
I would like to now have our next panel--Mr. Masetti and
Ms. de la Guardia. Could you come forward and take your place
at the microphone? Is the sound quality all right on the
microphones now?
I would like to have our translator sit between them. Are
you going to be the translator?
Ms. Emedan-Lauten. Yes.
Mr. Burton. Thank you very much for your help.
I would like to have Ms. de la Guardia and Mr. Masetti
stand up to have you sworn in, please.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Burton. Have a seat.
Because we always show deference to the ladies, we will
allow Ms. de la Guardia to make her opening statement.
STATEMENTS OF ILEANA DE LA GUARDIA, DAUGHTER OF CUBAN COLONEL
TONY DE LA GUARDIA; AND JORGE MASETTI, FORMER CUBAN MINISTRY OF
INTERIOR OFFICIAL
Ms. de la Guardia [through interpreter]. Members of the
committee, today is a most important day for me, for you have
granted me the opportunity of bringing my testimony to you. A
testimony that, as a matter of fact, the regime of Fidel Castro
has tried to silence, but they will not be able to hide the
truth in spite of the many efforts at doing this, efforts that
they undertook in 1989 when they killed my father Antonio de la
Guardia, together with the Cuban General Arnaldo Ochoa and his
respective aides Amado Padron and Jorge Martinez.
Mr. Gilman. May I interrupt a moment? Would the translator
bring the microphone closer to her? Thank you.
Ms. de la Guardia [through interpreter]. The process that
found them guilty, known as the Ochoa case or Cause No. 1 of
the year 1989, dictated that 14 officials of the Ministry of
the Interior accused of drug trafficking, amongst which my
uncle Patricio de la Guardia, general of the brigade, was
included.
Mr. Burton. To the translator, if you could pull that mic--
I do not think they are picking up and I want to make sure that
everybody hears everything.
Ms. Emedan-Lauten. Can you hear me now?
Mr. Burton. Just get as close as you can.
Ms. de la Guardia [through interpreter]. As the daughter of
one of the accused, I was present during the process, which I
may add, did not include the minimum legal warranties. And now
I will enumerate some of the most flagrant violations.
The accused did not have the right to choose their defense
attorneys. The attorneys representing the accused were just
attorneys and also officials of the Ministry of the Interior. I
was able to visit with my father, 24 hours before the trial.
Until then, neither my father nor I nor anyone close to the
family members knew that this process would take place and we
found out very late that night through an order not to find an
attorney.
The power of oral summation used by the President of the
court, only applied in times of war, according to the Cuban law
itself in its Article 475 of the law of Penal Military
Procedures, and Cuba at that time had already signed the peace
accords with Angola. And that is why they would have had to
have been tried by the Military Chamber of the Supreme Popular
Court, according to Article 14 of the law of Military Court,
and not as it was by a Special Military Court.
Therefore, the judges should have been elected by the
National Assembly of Popular Power, according to Article 73 of
the Constitution. Instead, the members of the court were
elected by an anonymous power. And in fact, this power was
Fidel Castro himself, which I later learned by a witness,
Gabriel Garcia Marquez, who said that he, Fidel, had remained
during the entire process in a room during the hearing behind a
glass window, from where he was able to direct the attorneys
and the judges.
The accused were condemned and found guilty of drug
trafficking, for which Cuban law sets forth a maximum penalty
of 20 years, according to Article 30.1 of the Penal Code at the
time, and not the death penalty as actually happened.
You may ask yourselves what were the real causes that led
to such amount of irregularity legally, and so many efforts to
bar the defense of these individuals. And last, what reason
made Fidel Castro eliminate them physically and morally, these
people who were already condemned to death. Well, I will tell
you that at that time, many people and myself included, we knew
that the causes were political, as some people that I am not
allowed to mention by name because they have brought this
information out of jail, thus I am unable to mention this
source, believed and still believe that the causes were
political.
This letter which was smuggled out of prison states, and I
quote, with Ochoa and Tony, what happened was that there had
emerged antagonic opinions that were irreconcilable, divergence
of opinions regarding state policies, government rule, the rule
of law, the status of the only--of the sole party, and the
economy. These were criteria regarding the need for a
democratic liberalization, which is to say changes in the
different spheres of the economy, of politics and the rule of
the state and government, which was widely known by everyone
because neither one of them made any efforts to hide them.
I can assure you that what the letter stated is the truth,
because in my house, in my father's house, there was an
atmosphere where things were discussed, where people could talk
about the changes in Eastern Europe with Perestroika and where
the government was criticized. My father mentioned more than
once that he had had enough, that people in Cuba were not able
to freely choose to travel, to set up their own business, to
choose who was going to rule the country. In my house, there
were magazines such as Time, Newsweek, Paris-Match and
literature considered subversive by the regime as well.
Regarding Ochoa himself, he said in my presence that he was
not in agreement with Fidel Castro, and he also typified him as
someone who is crazy. My father's family before the revolution
was considered one of the most aristocratic families in Havana
and they had gone to school here in the United States. My uncle
Patricio de la Guardia and my father Antonio de la Guardia then
became linked to Fidel Castro in the 1960's and supported the
regime in very important military positions.
When they stopped believing in the regime, they made this
known to Fidel Castro and Castro, instead of undertaking a
political process as he had done on several occasions with
other dissidents, he preferred not to recognize that political
dissident within the core of the Army, and imagined that by
accusing these officers of drug trafficking, he would be able
to cleanse his responsibility in a drug traffic that Cuban
authorities were involved in and which the services of the
United States had apparently proof of.
So, with Cause No. 1 of the year 1989, Fidel Castro does
away with two problems in one legal indictment--the emerging
dissidency within the core of the Army, on the one hand, and
his responsibility with drug trafficking on the other.
To conclude, while all the rules of international law were
violated with the Ochoa process, according to the conclusions
of the United Nations in its Decision No. 47 of the year 1994,
Fidel Castro will no longer be able to hide the truth in spite
of the many efforts that he is still undertaking to try to hide
and change the facts. I know that he will not be able to,
thanks to a free world, a free press and free men such as--and
democratic men such as you, that have allowed me to be here
before you to listen to the truth of the killing of my father
in the most obscure Ochoa case.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Ms. de la Guardia. I know it has
been a very difficult time for you.
We will now hear from Mr. Masetti. Can you make sure the
microphones are close to you, so that we can hear both, please.
[The prepared statement of Ms. de la Guardia follows:]
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Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. Dear members of the
committee, I come before you here today to bring my testimony
of being convinced that at the beginning of the year 2000, it
is high time that Cuban citizens are allowed to live in freedom
without the weight of an ideology that represents hate and in
the name of which horrible atrocities are being and have been
committed. This is not a cop-out, but I am convinced that if
the ideology of Castro had not emerged in the Latin American
continent, many of us that were its armed right hand, that grew
up in an ideology of hate, unfortunately only learning to
destroy, would have been very different. We would not have had
so much bloodshed from young people and the true meeting
between our people and our cultures today would not be a dream,
but a reality. Castrism with its load of hate has only served
to bring us apart.
Unfortunately, we cannot speak of this in the past because
it still exists and it is still there, and Cubans are still
suffering from it. Colombians are still being shot down by the
bullets of those trained in Cuba. In Argentina, my country of
origin, there are still mothers dressed in black in mourning
and we could enumerate one by one the countries within the
continent that knew and are still suffering as a result of this
devastating ideology.
And the United States has not been able to escape this
scourge. As a matter of fact, it is the No. 1 goal. And some
are still asking themselves whether Castrism is still a threat
for the interests of this country. I can assure you, according
to my own experience, that while Fidel Castro is still in
power, Cuba will be a constant threat for North Americans.
I remember that once in Havana, I was approached in order
to explore different guerilla organizations to carry out a
kidnapping with strictly financial, not political, goals. In
Panama, I met with a commander of the Colombian organization,
M-19, because according to them, they were far advanced in the
research of a potential target in Barranquilla in that country.
I went back to Havana to relay the information to Manuel
Pineiro, the Director of the Americas Department of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party in Cuba. He raised every
possible objection he could think of--the country, the
organization--he did not like any of it, but as soon as he
found out that the target was a North American executive of
Texaco, his fears disappeared immediately and he authorized the
operation and he gave it all his resources, because if the
target was a North American, in his own words, ``Fidel will
like it.'' Fortunately for me, this operation was finally not
able to be undertaken, but the will of the Cuban officials was
evident.
Regarding also the United States, I can assure you that
during the years 1974 and 1975, tens of dozens of militants of
the Popular Socialist Party of Mari Bras in Puerto Rico
received military instruction in Cuba at the secret unit Punot
Cero.
Likewise, I also witnessed when I was working with the
Department of the Americas in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico, the
support afforded the Puerto Rican organization, Macheteros, for
undertaking the Wells Fargo truck in September 1983, where $7.2
million were stolen and were sent through Mexico--out of which
$4 million were sent through Mexico to Havana. Also, the person
delivering the truck was brought out of the United States with
the support of documents and being masked as personnel of the
Cuban Embassy in Mexico. He was then sent to Cuba. The support
brought to this operation was directly supervised by Jose
Antonio Arbesu, who was then the chief of the United States
Section of the Department of the Americas of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party.
I was also able to witness the efforts undertaken in Mexico
by Cuban officials to try to free the Colombian drug trafficker
Jaime Guillot Lara, held in that country and who was then sent
to Cuba where he died of a heart attack in 1990.
I can even remember--I cannot remember whether it was in
1986 or 1987, but it would be enough to just do research in the
press regarding the exact date that the M-19 of Colombia, in
order to pay back for favors received from the Libyans,
detonated a bomb in the North American school in San Jose,
Costa Rica where a teacher was wounded. The explosive used was
delivered in Managua by an official who was linked to special
troops in Cuba and who operated in that country with the
pseudonym Lucio, and that was in charge of relations with that
organization.
I do not want to go on further for fear of boring you, but
I am at your service for replying to any questions you may
have.
My only goal has been to provide evidence of the will of
the Castro regime toward the United States and toward Latin
America. I also have as a goal, and I find it timely, to let
you all know that I hope my testimony will help bring support
to those who are still fighting inside of Cuba for their
freedom and for democracy, and for making relations with that
country in the future, those framed within brotherly love and
not hate and resentment. Please continue to support them and
help them because they, in spite of all repression and danger,
they are helping you with their struggle and all the countries
of this continent.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Masetti follows:]
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Mr. Burton. Thank you very much, Mr. Masetti and Ms. de la
Guardia. I want to tell you both how much I appreciate you
coming all the way from Spain to testify, and I think the whole
committee is impressed with your candor and your bravery.
We will now go to questioning and each member will have 5
minutes and we will go as long as members have questions of
this panel. I will start off.
Mr. Masetti, when you were a senior member of Fidel
Castro's Ministry of the Interior, did you have any knowledge
of the Interior Ministry's involvement with drug trafficking?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. Let me just make clear
that I was not a member of the Ministry of the Interior, but of
the Americas Department within the Communist Party, an
organization created for broadening subversive activities
throughout the entire continent.
But in reply to your question; yes, I did have knowledge of
the involvement of the Castro regime in drug trafficking.
Mr. Burton. You know, rather than me asking you a whole
series of questions about the drug trafficking, can you tell us
when you became aware of the drug trafficking coming in from
Latin America, from Colombia, and was it frequent and was it
coming in by the shipload and could Castro have known about
it--or could this have happened without Castro's knowledge? And
also, what happened to the money that was paid?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. Well, let me begin with
what I can say, I can say that at the beginning of the 1980's,
I do not remember if it was in mid-1980's or toward the end of
the 1980's, I got information regarding the fact that Jaime
Guillot Lara was detained at the airport in Mexico for the use
of false documents. I do not know for a fact that Mexican
officials knew at all the type of character they had
apprehended.
And I can also say that I know this because I saw it, that
Cuban officials in the embassy as well as the ex-Ambassador
himself, Mr. Fernando Ravelo, were there at the embassy in
Colombia.
All those efforts reaped good results and Guillot Lara was
freed in Mexico. From there, he went to Spain and then on to
Cuba where he died of a heart attack in 1990.
I further learned that the links with Guillot Lara had
begun after a relationship that existed between him and the
organization M-19, because of weapons that were sent to be
taken at a point called El Choco. That is to say that Cuba used
the drug trafficking routes to send weapons to Colombia and in
exchange they paid them with favors, for example, letting them
bring the drugs through Cuba. Of course, they immediately
discovered that drug trafficking was very profitable and they
quickly went into business with Guillot Lara and they let him
come to live in Cuba.
Likewise, I met Carlos Alonzo Lucio, the representative of
the M-19 in Cuba. I even went with him, and I do not remember
if this happened in 1987 or in 1988, but I went with him to
Colombia to meet in El Calco with Desaro, who was the commander
of the M-19 forces.
Mr. Burton. I think you meant 1988 or 1989, did you not?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. No, rather December
1987.
Mr. Burton. OK.
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. In December 1987, he was
already asking me if I knew of any Latin American organization
that would be able to provide pilots for him to transport
cocaine paste from Colombia. Since that was not something that
I did as part of my work, I did not keep any contacts with him.
This person, this character I met once again in Havana
shortly before the killing of Antonio de la Guardia. He went
there trying to set up the following business: Cuba would
falsely purchase a certain paint to justify the wholesale
purchasing of ether that his sister-in-law would need for a
company called Arcos Lucs. This company was so well known in
Colombia that it was called Narco Loose.
This factory was later blown up by the narcos because the
arrangement they had with the Lucio family was that they would
allow them the use of the factory but that they would not go
into distribution or sale, and the minute they started
attempting this, they blew up their factory.
Later, this character dared to become a political advisor
and his political platform was let us try to moralize Bogota.
And he is currently sought by the Colombian authorities for
illicit profits or drug trafficking. And he currently lives in
Cuba at a house that is frequently visited by the pianist Frank
Fernandez and many foreigners have spotted him there as I very
well know.
This is regarding what I personally know. There are other
facts, which are the last days that I was in Cuba, I worked
with my wife's father in the MC Department, Mr. Antonio de la
Guardia. And I was able to see bags, diplomatic pouches, filled
with dollars in low denominations.
Mr. Gilman. Where was that you saw these diplomatic bags?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. In the offices of the
Department.
Mr. Gilman. In Cuba?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. In Cuba, in the Siboney
development. These valises were then delivered, half of them to
the Minister of the Interior, Jose Abrantes, and half of them
to Mr. Naranjo, an aide to Fidel.
Mr. Gilman. And these valises contained currency?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. Money, dollars, in cash.
The other question I asked myself, knowing from the inside
the repressive interworkings of Castro's regime, when the legal
proceedings were undertaken against General Ochoa and against
my father-in-law, they made a very detailed description of all
the drug trafficking activities. So the small Colombian planes
would come very close to Cuban shores, they would drop the
drugs and then fast boats from Cuba would go pick up the drugs
and bring them to shore. So that then boat owners from Miami
would go to Cuba to pick them up, where they sometimes went to
pick them up and they stayed for a few days. This was described
in public throughout the hearings or the proceedings.
So the questions that I asked myself are the following:
There is a participation or involvement of the following
forces--the Coast Guard that sent the quick boats to pick up
the drugs; the forces--the armed forces that have to give the
authorization to do these pickups from the planes; the
immigration forces, so that these traffickers could go through
Cuba freely, they had to have false documents.
And Fidel Castro, who in his own words, knew even how many
cookies were sent to the soldiers in Angola, how could it be
possible that he not know about this? This is all regarding
drug trafficking.
Ms. de la Guardia [through interpreter]. What I wanted to
say was that his rank as a Colonel did not allow him or did not
grant him authority to open up the air corridors for these
planes to be able to come through Cuban space. In other words,
this authorization had to come from a higher level of authority
and only Raul Castro, in other words.
Mr. Gilman. And all of this information was part of the
court proceedings in the trial of your father?
Ms. de la Guardia [through interpreter]. This that we are
discussing right now were all the operations for the drug
trafficking that came up during the trial, but of course, the
responsibility as far as the higher ups could not be mentioned
during the proceedings, nor the final destination of the money,
the amount of money from all these operations.
Mr. Gilman. And what was the date of that trial?
Ms. de la Guardia [through interpreter]. They were detained
June 13 and the trial began June 30.
Mr. Gilman. Of what year?
Ms. de la Guardia [through interpreter]. By July 7, 1989--
this is the year. OK, by July 7, 1989, the attorneys found
these four people guilty and condemned them to death. But in
the time period of 15 to 20 days, this all took place. The
other 10 accused were sentenced to 20 or 30 year terms in
prison and shortly thereafter my father was shot. So the whole
time period we are discussing was about a month.
Mr. Gilman. Jorge, you hadn't finished your testimony,
would you want to complete your testimony?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. Yes, but regarding drug
trafficking, that is the information that I possess regarding
Cuba's involvement.
Mr. Burton. Before I yield to my colleagues--I think we
will go to Mr. Mica next--there are two things that I wish you
would elaborate on for the members to help them with further
questions. Is it possible for shiploads of drugs to come into
Cuba without Fidel Castro knowing about it? And do you have any
knowledge of moneys being given to Fidel Castro or his
subordinates from drug trafficking?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. The second question, I
have no information regarding that subordinates handed money
over to Fidel Castro; but, of course, the moneys resulting from
drug traffic from the department directed by Manuel Pineiro,
that money had to go to Fidel Castro.
Regarding your first question, I think that this is obvious
to anyone who has ever been in Cuba. The level of control and
repression makes it impossible for any type of higher level
drug trafficking activity to take place without the knowledge
of Fidel Castro. For example, in December 1998, in Cartagena, a
7-ton container full of drugs was found.
And Fidel Castro did then the same thing he did in the
Ochoa case; knowing full well that the Colombian authorities
had the information, he took steps before anything else
happened, accusing two Spaniards of the drug trafficking in
that case. It is truly impossible, unthinkable, for two
foreigners to ever be in Cuba bringing in that load of drugs
illegally, to then send to Europe or to the United States.
And supposing that these two foreigners were truly drug
traffickers, it is impossible for Castro not to have known
about this because he does in-depth research of any foreign
businessman investing in Cuba. The two Spaniards have even said
that they had nothing to do with the drug part of the
operation, but that they did know that the Cuban Government
used them to create fronts or ghost type companies that would
get credit then from the United States, thus allowing them to
launder the money.
So Fidel Castro is not looking for businessmen, but rather
laundry--people in charge of laundering.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Gilman.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ileana de la Guardia, did you meet with your father Colonel
de la Guardia in jail just before his death? And where did that
take place?
Ms. de la Guardia [through interpreter]. Yes, I was able to
visit him three times. The first time, the process was already
underway and as a family member during this time, I was able to
realize that he was trying to assume responsibility for
everything and not defending himself any more. So due to the
fact that the night before, Fidel Castro visited him in prison
and asked him please to assume all responsibility, that in the
end, everything will be handled internally.
During the last visit just before he was executed and
having realized that Fidel Castro was not going to make good on
his promise, he asked me to please not let any of my brothers
go into the military. And he also then made some comments on
politics and the route he thought the government would be
taking and he makes reference to the China Wall. My
interpretation of what he said is that he once had believed
that Cuba would open itself up, that changes would ensue, and
that with this he was saying that to the country, it would
become more isolated.
Mr. Gilman. What did you learn from your father about the
complicity of the Cuban Government in the narcotics
trafficking?
Ms. de la Guardia [through interpreter]. What I was able to
learn, of course, was indirectly learned, because my father,
being the professional that he was, never spoke to his children
about the operations that were undertaken in his department.
The indirect knowledge, for example, would be the result of
conversations that he would have with other people and that I
may at times overhear, or through phone calls that he would
have through which, for example, I learned of Mr. Vesco's visit
to Cuba.
Also, I know from this that Mr. Vesco received protection
from Fidel Castro during the 1980's, that is at the beginning
of the 1980's, because Fidel Castro asked my father to take
care of him, to take care of Vesco. In other words, Vesco would
be able to broaden his illegal activities through a house that
was built in Cara Lago Leceur and that he would be able to do
this because of the house that would have all the sophisticated
means of communication available at that time.
And then just 3 years before 1989, that is when my father
started cutting any type of link he would have with Robert
Vesco, because it was his understanding that Mr. Vesco was a
lowly illegal person, that he wanted nothing else to do with
him, and he would pass whatever activities regarding Vesco
needed to be done to somebody else.
Mr. Gilman. Ileana, were you jailed after your father's
death?
Ms. de la Guardia [through interpreter]. Well, they did not
hold a trial against me, they were not able to do that. But the
entire year during which we were going about receiving a permit
to leave Cuba, we encountered a very difficult situation with
the regime because they tried to accuse us of disorderly
conduct in a public place and an attempt to disarm the police.
This is something that I believe they set up by themselves
in an attempt to frame us. They set this up in the street and
so they detained us and had us at the police overnight. They
had some policemen beat us up.
Mr. Gilman. One last question, Ileana. Where you have been
living, did you file a lawsuit against the Castro regime for
the illegal prosecution and the irregularities in the judicial
proceeding against your father?
Ms. de la Guardia [through interpreter]. Yes, by 1989, I
had already done this, by January. I brought a complaint in
France versus Fidel Castro for killing, torturing, kidnapping
and drug trafficking. The complaint has gone through several
stages and is currently going through the stage known as
casaseone in Spanish.
Mr. Gilman. And that complaint is still pending, is that
right?
Ms. de la Guardia [through interpreter]. It is still open
and it is still pending.
Mr. Gilman. One last question of Mr. Masetti. What is the
role of Cuban Government officials in those Cuban-owned
companies that are used as a front for drug trafficking? Is it
business or an intelligence function, or both?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. I am convinced that
these new Cuban businessmen have a more Mafia-related culture
than business culture. It is very hard to come to understand
that these new businessmen turn out to be ex-intelligence
officials dedicated to illegal activities abroad, that they
have only changed their dress and their GMT Rolex watches for
true gold Rolex watches, but their activities are and remain
the same.
But the question is an interesting one, and that is just
where I believe that the North American Government, the
American Government, is responsible.
And perhaps I am diverting a bit from the main topic, but I
think it is important. If the United States Government should
lift the embargo against Cuba, what Cuba seeks is not
consumables. That, they can seek anywhere and they do. But
rather, lines of credit and money that is used for these
businesses that only people authorized by Fidel Castro can own,
because in Cuba, Cubans cannot have their own business. So
lifting the embargo on Cuba would serve only to consolidate
Mafia that we already know exists in other latitudes, to carry
out this type of activity in Cuba and that could perpetuate
themselves in power and be in control even after the death of
Fidel Castro.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Mica.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Masetti, you described in your testimony the beginning
of some of your involvement. I believe that you said that
weapons were going from Cuba to Colombia, is that correct?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. Correct.
Mr. Mica. And were these given by the Castro regime in the
beginning or was there money coming back for the weapons?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. No, there was no
exchange of money for these weapons, no money paid for these
weapons. And a lot of those weapons were not only sent to
Colombia, they were delivered to many other countries in Latin
America. Generally speaking, they were not Soviet weapons,
because this could burn out the Cuban cover, this could make it
known that Cuba had been involved. A lot of the weapons came,
for example, from Vietnam. The Vietnamese Government would give
it to Cuba and then Cuba would send it to guerilla movements
throughout Latin America.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. American weapons.
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. American weapons. And a
lot of the weapons sent to Colombia were weapons that were
already in Cuba before Cuba was armed by the Soviets. For
example, a lot of FAL weapons, F-A-L.
Mr. Mica. Right. You also went on to describe very briefly
the evolution of drug trafficking and the beginning of some
relationships between Cuban officials or Cuban individuals and
Colombians. Could you elaborate for the committee how drug
trafficking evolved from these contacts?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. I really do not have the
details of that evolution, but what I have stated is what I
know first-hand, and I would rather not talk about things that
I may have learned through other ways, because it could be not
totally reliable information.
Mr. Mica. I am interested in your description--and I would
have to go back and get your exact testimony--of a situation
where there were some legitimate exchanges or activities
between Cuba and Colombia, whereby they saw some profits and
then that evolved into drug trafficking. It appears that this
case with the 7.3 metric tons patterned some of what you
described before. It would appear also, given the fact that in
Cuba, I guess the government owns 51 percent of any business
enterprise, that someone in government would be involved in the
business and if that business turns into drug trafficking, then
you have got the government as a majority partner.
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. The first type of
activity that you are referring to was not a legal type of
activity that later became illegal. But rather that the
Department of the Americas was forced to arm the M-19 that
was----
Mr. Mica. Right. Well, there are two parts to this. First,
I was asking if any of the arms trafficking turned into drug
trafficking, if he had knowledge of that.
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. Yes, that is exactly
what I was coming to.
Mr. Mica. OK. And then the second part, there are some
legitimate activities of business between Colombia and Cuba,
even though in Cuba, 51 percent of any business must be owned
by the government, I believe. I am trying to find out if, in
the first part, was there drug activity evolved from the arms
shipment? The second part would be legitimate commercial
activity that is transformed into drug activity.
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. I would not be in the
least surprised, but I have no information.
Mr. Mica. Direct knowledge?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. No.
Mr. Burton. If the gentleman would yield real briefly.
Mr. Mica. Yes.
Mr. Burton. You said that initially the M-19 were getting
guns from Cuba and they were giving drugs to Castro in exchange
for those and Castro saw profit in those and that is how he got
into the drug trafficking.
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. Exactly, then they kept
on.
Mr. Burton. And then they kept on because they could make
money.
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. They--in other words,
the Cuban Government takes those weapons routes directly and in
this specific case, the link with the drug traffickers
directly. In the case of Jaime Guillot Lara, he even then came
later to live in Cuba.
Mr. Burton. OK.
Mr. Mica. This is a part of the question I was trying to
get back to. Does he have direct knowledge of that or is this
something he heard?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. No.
Mr. Mica. It is something you heard?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. No. Of this I do have
direct knowledge. I am talking about the things that I am not
replying to. But of this, I do have direct knowledge because I
did have contact with a lot of the people from M-19 and I know
them. And the presence of Guillot Lara in Cuba is something
that I personally know, as I personally know of the efforts of
Cuban diplomats in Mexico and of Ravelo himself. And that is
why I would rather not talk about things that somebody else may
have told me because we may be indulging in speculation.
Mr. Mica. Right.
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. That is why I prefer to
give witness of the things that I lived through or I went
through myself.
Mr. Mica. Well, do you have any knowledge of that going on
today through your contacts, continuing today?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. I think the presence of
Carlos Lucio in Havana is very illuminating. I do not think
Fidel Castro is providing humanitarian protection to this
character in Havana.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
I think we have heard powerful testimony today from people
who have inside knowledge about how the regime worked and they
have testified that they do not think that a shipment that all
of us have alluded to, the 7 tons of cocaine that were headed
from Colombia to Havana and then ultimately to the United
States could have gone on without the participation and the
involvement, directly or indirectly, of Fidel Castro. We have
heard today that these witnesses believe that more and more
Cuba is becoming a money laundering bank, that it is becoming a
refuge for international lawbreakers. They mentioned the
presence of Mr. Vesco and many others who have been involved in
money laundering and others who have been involved in
international drug transactions, and that Cuba is being used as
a transit point for the shipment of drugs and they find many
ways of trying to disguise this involvement. And I think this
is something that is meritorious for the Department of Justice
of our U.S. Government to look into and to get eye-witness
accounts and to followup with testimony of people who know how
this system has worked and how it has manipulated the drug
problem in our hemisphere.
And I wanted to ask Ileana, if I could, to tell us more
about the trial of her father, the procedures that were used,
the rights that were abused, the questions asked, the
atmosphere related to the trial, and about her father's role
and if he did confess his culpability, why or why not. Why do
you think that Castro tried her father and what was Castro
ultimately afraid would come out.
Ms. de la Guardia [through interpreter]. Well, I think that
the real goal of the Ochoa case, a process with so many
irregularities where, for example, the person orchestrating or
directing the process is not the justice department or those in
charge of justice, but rather one man, Fidel Castro, who is
trying also to cover up his responsibility in drug trafficking.
I believe that he was trying to cover up his responsibility
by making the accused responsible for these activities, but
there is a second goal, a goal that I have repeated over and
over again, which seems to me quite obvious. It was a political
goal. Why? Because Arnaldo Ochoa, accused of drug trafficking,
was at the time in Angola and he had nothing to do with the
operations of the MC, the department that my father directed.
There is also a process which we see where the accused seem
to be implicating themselves. We see no offering of proof of
evidence, there is no material evidence during the entire
process. The attorneys were attorneys that were brought to the
trial and they were also officers of the Ministry of the
Interior at the same time, members of military intelligence
gathering institutions and military counter-intelligence
institutions.
They are judged by a special military tribunal or court,
which is only used in times of war. But Cuba was not at war on
any military front at the time. The peace agreements had
already been signed in Angola. So they would have had to have
been judged by a supreme popular court.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And Ileana, your father did admit
culpability in the drug trade. If you could tell us why he did
that in the trial.
Ms. de la Guardia [through interpreter]. My dad not only
admitted his blame, but he also, from the onset, said that
there was no other higher authority responsible for these acts.
And I knew for a fact that this was not true, because he
depended--or the intelligence department of the Ministry of the
Interior gave him reports on things that happened. He could
delegate on them as well as Pepe Naranjo, who was Fidel
Castro's aide.
He did this as a staged show, because the night before,
Fidel Castro went to visit him in jail and told him to assume
all responsibility and that later on, nothing would happen. But
above all, that he would not be executed. This I found out
through my father himself. And I believe that the reason why he
told me that last time that I was able to visit him not to let
my brothers go into the military was because he knew that he
had been betrayed, that the promise would not be fulfilled and
that he was going to be executed.
I believe that the process is a mixture of two things and
is a result of two causes: No. 1, the political opinions my
father was beginning to espouse, which were counter to the
mainstream government opinion; and No. 2, these illicit
operations involving the Cuban Government. I believe that
Castro uses one to do away with the other. In other words, he
uses the drug trafficking of the MC, that department, in order
to eliminate my father and these officials physically as well
as morally in front of the Cuban people.
And last, I think that he thought that having served the
government for such a long time, my father believed that Castro
would then forgive him and spare him finally for this sort of
dissidence, quote-unquote, that he was beginning to have. So he
would spare his life in the end.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Diaz-Balart.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I want
to thank Mr. Masetti and Ms. de la Guardia for their very
important testimony today and for having spent so much careful
and deliberate time with us.
The questions that I had have been asked. I have one more
that has come to mind as a consequence of the last answer and
that is, do you have any knowledge of whether or not a similar
situation developed with General Ochoa that may have prompted
him in his case to also assume responsibility for the charges
that Castro brought against him? In other words, do you have
any contact with his family, for example, have you had any
conversations with his survivors or is that not the case?
Ms. de la Guardia [through interpreter]. I believe,
regarding General Ochoa, that after 1989 when I left Cuba, I no
longer had any contact with his family since then. But before
he was detained; that is, in January 1989, Arnaldo Ochoa at my
uncle's own house openly said quite naturally that he was
opposed to Castro's policies. It is my believe that Arnaldo
Ochoa believed that the fact that he was a hero in his country
and because of his political relations with generals,
officials, military as well as political personalities in the
former Soviet Union, that all of this would afford him
protection; that is, that he I believe met with Gorbachev
himself, he was somehow involved in discussing Perestroika, and
he believed that he would be protected.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Yes, because you talked about your opinion
of why your father accepted the responsibility for the charges
that Castro brought publicly against him. So I was wondering if
you had any knowledge or opinion with regard to the same
subject of why General Ochoa would have accepted public
responsibility for what, without any doubt, contained
falsehoods publicly charged against him by Castro.
Ms. de la Guardia [through interpreter]. Regarding Ochoa
himself, regarding his specific case, I do have some
information regarding an argument he had with Raul Castro 1
weekend before he was detained, as a result of which, Raul
Castro I believe was going to have him arrested. And his
attitude throughout the entire process was an attitude of
someone that believed that to a point, regardless of whatever
attitude he may have during the process, he also will be spared
because of his connections. Though at the same time, his
attitude during the process was the attitude of someone who
knows that the die had been cast and nothing can be done any
more about the situation.
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. I would also like to add
something that we have missed here. The French press described
the Ochoa trial as the last trial of Moscow, the last process
of Moscow, referring to the set of trials or proceedings during
the 1950's in Moscow. And this symbol was not just used as what
it may seem, a symbol of something that reminds us of those
proceedings in the 1950's, but also to remind us that the same
methods were used legally and the same types of tortures were
used as in the 1950's. These means were described in Soviet
manuals, they were accepted by Cuban officials and they were
used by Cuban officials.
The type of torture, summarizing in a very few words,
entails changing the rhythm of human beings in 24 hour periods.
That is, denying them sleep, providing them with a light that
is never turned off, with extreme cold, taking them breakfast
at 10 at night, then 15 minutes later lunch, and dinner 15
hours later. That makes the pineal glands stop secreting
melatonin. And in 3 days, this makes the person tortured in
this fashion become a total idiot. This type of torture does
not seek to obtain any information from the individual but
rather to provide an extra or added assurance for perpetrating
the lie or perpetuating the lie; that is, the individual
becomes convinced of what he is being told to confess and he
will confess.
And that, added to the fact that they are now being accused
by their brothers in arms, who were their brothers in arms
until 24 hours before. We have seen these spontaneous
confessions in the Soviet Union before and we did see them in
the Ochoa case. I believe that is the case of the same type.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Ose.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. de la Guardia, my questions really devolve to trying to
establish what was the typical standard of living in Cuba as
compared say with the standard of living that your family
enjoyed. And then I want to go through a number of questions
that arise from the information I have.
As it relates to your upbringing, did you live a normal
Cuban life?
Ms. de la Guardia [through interpreter]. I can say
regarding my own case that it was a question of having two
different lives paralleling--one outside the house, one inside
the house. I classify it as a type of schizophrenia.
I would say that it was very contradictory, because for
example, outside the house, my life would be characterized as
the typical life that any student would have and that I had for
most of the 24 years that I was there. Most students, quote-
unquote, would have to join the discipline that most students
go through in education, they would have to go to political
activities, they would have to undertake voluntary work, which
they say is voluntary, but it is actually compulsory or
obligatory. And you know, I oftentimes would repeat slogans
that were slogans that were given to us by the government, and
that sort of thing.
Then I say that it is a contradictory life because inside
the house, we would enter a totally different world, a world
where my grandparents on my father's side were bringing me up
and I was raised under their influence, in an atmosphere where
politics were not discussed, where the regime was not
discussed; an entirely other life, the life that my family had
known before the 1960's, and where you had to fulfill certain
roles, the roles within a family that, how can I say, was not
the typical family currently in Cuba where everybody is
separated. This other type of life where most importantly we
had a lot of information from abroad, from France, from the
United States and, as I have already mentioned before,
magazines like Newsweek, Time, Paris-Match and also literature,
literature that was disallowed elsewhere in Cuba that nobody
else would be allowed to read and that you could not find. We
even could find movies there. This created a lot of
difficulties for me because I was not able to bring home other
people, other students lest they accuse me of being bourgeois
or other such accusations.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Chairman, if I may ask two more questions.
Your house was in a rather well-to-do neighborhood that was
normally reserved for diplomatic corps?
Ms. de la Guardia [through interpreter]. The house where I
was brought up was the house that my grandfather had had built.
And it was one of the well-to-do select neighborhoods in
Havana.
For example, my family already had a house and they had,
for example, cars, cars that were no longer seen circulating in
Cuba. To give you an example, when I finished my studies at the
University, my father had saved, stored away, an MG, a sports
car, and of course, his dad had given him this car and he
wanted to give it to me as a present. And this was the topic of
many family arguments because I could not be seen with that car
outside, I could not circulate with the car in the streets of
Cuba.
And what I can say is that my family, before the
revolution, had a social standing that was, how can I say,
well-to-do, and that with the revolution, they lost many of
these material things. So the things that they kept because
they, well, wanted to keep them somehow, they later could not
have and could not use because they would be the target of
other people who were ever vigilant of people who could be
influenced by society before the revolution.
Mr. Ose. Was the ability of your family to retain these
privileges a function of your father's closeness to Fidel
Castro?
Ms. de la Guardia [through interpreter]. I believe that in
part, yes. I think that with the regime they lost some things,
but at the same time, the power that they acquired with the
revolution, and I can say that this was like political or
military power, allowed them to preserve some of the things
that they had as a family before the revolution.
But at the same time, he was not able to pass on to me a
lot of these material things, even though sometimes they could
be sentimental presents, because of the risk they could pose to
me politically, as far as me being integrated into Cuban
society at that time.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. May I be allowed to say
something?
Mr. Burton. Sure, go ahead.
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. Perhaps Ileana, because
she experienced this at a very early age and because she lived
within it, cannot appreciate these things in themselves, but we
are also democratic as a couple. Undoubtedly there was a
bourgeois that remained in Cuba that did not become integrated
politically. There were even people who decided to stay but not
participate politically in the government.
Let us not lose sight of the fact that that group lost
absolutely everything and they were forced by the regime to
leave Cuba. Perhaps the type of privilege that Ileana's family
was able to preserve was ridiculous as compared to the type of
privilege they would have had before the revolution. But it was
just the same ridiculous situation that other people then were
able to enjoy, other people coming in and being able to live in
the houses of those bourgeois who had not become politically
integrated and had been forced to flee the country.
I just wanted to make that clear.
Mr. Burton. Very good. I am going to yield to Mr. Diaz-
Balart, but I want to nail down a couple of things because the
purpose of the hearing is to talk about drug trafficking.
So Mr. Masetti, I would like to ask you some questions and
if you could keep your answers brief so we could get through
this, I would really appreciate it.
Do you recognize the name Carlos Lage Davila?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. No.
Mr. Burton. You do not recognize that?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. No. Can you repeat the
name, please?
Mr. Burton. Carlos Lage Davila, D-a-v-i-l-a.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Carlos Lage.
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. Yes.
Mr. Burton. Do you know him?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. Yes, Vice President.
Mr. Burton. Yes, he is one of the Council of Ministers. He
was the one responsible for this company that got the 7.2
metric tons of cocaine. Would it be possible for him to be in
charge of that company and have the Ministry of the Interior
have two people there without them knowing about the 7.2 metric
tons of cocaine coming in?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. It is possible that
Carlos Lage may not have had information regarding that, but it
is certain that the person in charge of operations, in charge
of coordinating all those transactions for any business in Cuba
had to have known. And when I say that he may not have been
aware, I mean that he may not have been aware of the specific
details, but he, like many others, must know that there are
people within his company in charge of operations that are not
fully legal.
Mr. Burton. The Minister of the Interior had two people
there all the time that were watching what was going on in the
company. Now that's the intelligence service in Cuba.
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. I would say that what
those two people were doing was taking care of the cocaine.
Mr. Burton. OK.
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. Overseeing that nothing
happened to it.
Mr. Burton. And so the Minister of the Interior knew about
the cocaine, it was impossible for the government not to know
that 7.2 metric tons came in.
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. Impossible.
Mr. Burton. So I guess the point I wanted to get from you,
Mr. Masetti, as a former official of the government and your
wife, her father, it would have been impossible for this
cocaine to be coming into Cuba without Castro knowing about it
and cocaine had been coming into Cuba for a long time with the
administration's support.
Ms. de la Guardia [through interpreter]. Of course, it is
impossible for that amount of cocaine to come into Cuba
systematically without the government knowing of it.
Mr. Burton. And that kind of transactions have been going
on for a long time.
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. The Colombian Police at
the time the 7.2 tons were discovered, they made public that
that year 10 other such shipments had already been sent.
Mr. Burton. Ten other shipments.
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. They confirmed exactly
7, but they say there may have been 10.
Mr. Burton. But in addition to that year, to your knowledge
when you were there, were there cocaine shipments coming into
Cuba even back then?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. I could not know that
personally, because I had left Cuba 10 years before.
Mr. Burton. But you said that the M-19, in exchange for
weapons, were sending drugs through Cuba.
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. In the year 1979 and
1980.
Mr. Burton. But I want to nail this down. But you said that
they learned that they could make a lot of money from drugs and
that became a mode of operation.
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. Yes, exactly, and I can
say that first-hand in the 1980's, but I am not in Cuba
presently to be able to say. But I am surprised at Mr. Carlos
Lage and also Lucio's presence currently in Cuba.
Mr. Burton. OK. Do you have a comment?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. I think your testimony has been very
helpful.
Even though the limit of time, the statute of limitations,
even though it has not passed, has not run with regard to drug
trafficking by the Castro regime, the Clinton administration is
getting by publicly with the attitude of well, things have
changed. To your knowledge, based on your experience and your
contacts, have things changed? What would you say to people in
the U.S. administration who have that attitude of we need not
be worried about Castro because things have changed with regard
to drug trafficking.
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. Things have not changed,
not only with regard to drug trafficking but also Fidel Castro
is still the same. He is still the same military strongman,
only that his situation is more adverse because his main ally,
the socialist world, has crumbled. But to think that Fidel
Castro would not use any means at his disposal to attack
democracy anywhere in the world at any time is not to know him.
How could we otherwise understand that a government such as
Fidel Castro, that is a subsidized government, may have been
involved in kidnapping for money of businessmen for up to $2 or
$3 million. Undoubtedly he likes money just like any other
member of the Mafia. But that amount of money does not mean
anything to a country in particular, the main goal is to
destabilize a situation. And that is why I said in the words I
brought here today that I had prepared, as long as Fidel Castro
is in Cuba, the threat to democracy in the United States and
elsewhere will always exist.
And for a man who is so obsessed with the role he will play
in history, I would not be surprised at all if before he dies,
because of course physically death is nearing, that he would be
capable of anything crazy, to attack the United States or to
attack any other democracy in the world.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Would there not be, in your opinion, more
of a need for hard currency by Castro after the collapse of the
Soviet bloc than before? A need that would be filled in part by
drug trafficking?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. Of course. I would not
be surprised at all, and though I have no hard proof, no hard
evidence, I am convinced and I would not be surprised that he
would continue in drug trafficking operations.
I would propose that an investigation be brought of those
businessmen in Cuba and I am sure that we would be surprised as
to the results of that investigation.
Ms. de la Guardia [through interpreter]. I have evidence--
now regarding this, I can say that yes, as a result of no
longer having subsidies from the Soviet Union, Fidel Castro has
stepped up his involvement in this type of operation, to seek
money and from my dad, I have personal knowledge that he has
personal accounts and that a lot of transactions that walked a
fine line between what is legal and what is not, were
undertaken.
And we all know that in Cuba there is no type of
organization or institution of control that is not linked to
Fidel Castro, that is independent of Fidel Castro's power.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Ileana, did your father ever mention to
you any of the countries where Castro has personal accounts?
Ms. de la Guardia [through interpreter]. He directly did
not tell me of this, but I learned of this through others that
traveled with my dad. For example, that in Switzerland, Castro
had accounts where he had money deposited for different
amounts, and that in Europe there was a certain amount of arms
traffic and other monetary transactions that took place.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Mica, you said you had another question?
Mr. Mica. Just a quick question about the money. You said
you saw bags of money in the Ministry. Usually if you follow
the money, you can find out who is really involved. Where was
the money going that you saw in the Ministry?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. In the offices of the MC
Department, which was a part of the Department of the Interior
and it was a special section of Cuban intelligence within the
Department of the Interior.
Mr. Mica. And where was that money being deposited? You
said you thought that money was in dollars?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. As I said before, that
money was split 50/50, 50 would go to Pepe Naranjo, who was
Castro's aide, and 50 percent would go Jose Abrantes himself.
For example, part of that money was used to build a luxury type
of clinic in the Siboney development that was officially and
exclusively for the use of the members of the Department of the
Interior and others. It is a clinic that is still in existence,
but aside from sharing it with members of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party, it is also a clinic where people come
from abroad to undertake different procedures, medical
procedures, they call it medical tourism.
Mr. Mica. Did you see this happen just once or was this----
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. The handling of the
money? No, that was constant. The coming in and going out of
moneys and the handling of contrabands of all types. We have to
understand that this was a department that was created for the
sole purpose of getting foreign exchange illicitly, illegally.
Mr. Burton. Would the gentleman yield?
When you say contraband, you are talking about drugs and
other things?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. All types of
merchandise, including weapons.
Mr. Burton. And was this in the millions of dollars?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. I suppose so. I only saw
the bags, I did not count it personally, but I suppose so. It
is important to mention that this office was not clandestine or
something hidden away from the rest of the upper echelons of
government. Since this was a department that was in charge of
violating the embargo from the United States, that is through
the use of speed boats bringing in contraband, they sometimes
brought merchandise that was used for technological purposes.
But they also brought consumables coming from Miami and other
parts of the United States to supply the houses of the higher
ups. And there was a constant parade of government officials
and staff from Raul's office daily at that office.
Mr. Burton. If the gentleman would yield for one more
question. The money that was split, half went to Fidel Castro's
chief aide; do you know where that money went?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. It is impossible for
Castro's chief aide to keep that money for himself.
Mr. Burton. It went to Castro. Any more questions?
Mr. Mica. One more question. You described a scenario of
drugs being dropped off the Cuban coast, being picked up by
boats and brought to Cuba, and then being transshipped to the
United States. You said some people came and stayed, some for
several days on vacation and then picked the drugs up and took
them back to the United States. Who approved that transiting
and how high up was it known?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. That type of operation
could not, as I said before, have been authorized by Antonio de
la Guardia, who did not have the rank to authorize such things.
He only had the authority to handle operations within the MC.
He had the possibility of having a coordinating capability with
other services, but for this type of permission, the Minister,
this would have to come from the Minister himself, and of
course the Minister would never act alone in the case of
something as serious as this, so he would have to have
authority from even higher up than the Minister.
Mr. Mica. A final question, Mr. Chairman. To your
knowledge, does the department or agency that you were a part
of still exist and is it active?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. Well, I do not have
exact proof of that, but I am sure that presently under another
name, with another acronym, well, you know, they are doing that
currently with the businessmen. The officials are living even
better off than before, so where are they getting the
merchandise, it comes directly from Miami.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Thank you. Mr. Ose.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I may followup on
other questions, because I do want to get to the money that my
colleagues brought up earlier.
I want to make sure I understand the degree of trust that
was placed in Colonel de la Guardia in one case and General
Ochoa in another, by the Cuban regime. In the first instance,
Colonel de la Guardia had served with Castro since 1961; had
been sent to New York in 1962 for some reason; 1971, had gone
to Chile to work with the new administration of President
Allende; in 1973, had been sent to Spain and a possible
kidnapping attempt of former Cuban dictator Batista; in 1975,
Colonel de la Guardia was in Switzerland laundering money from
Argentina's Montonero guerrillas; in 1976, he was in Jamaica as
head of the Cuban special troops contingent helping Prime
Minister Michael Manley; in 1978, he was in Nicaragua; in 1979,
he was made in charge of relations with Cuba's exile community;
in 1986, he was asked by the Cuban Government to set up a
special import/export business, which is the MC Department.
This was a gentleman who enjoyed substantial trust within the
government and access to Fidel Castro himself.
General Ochoa, on the other hand, a member of the military,
was asked by Castro in the late 1970's I believe, to go to
Angola to clean up the mess that the Soviets had created in the
combat going on with Joseph Savimbi as it related to the
freedom that would subsequently come to the southern portion of
Angola with its war with South Africa.
Ochoa had been awarded--Ochoa was so respected by the Cuban
regime that in 1984, he had been given honorary--the highest
honorary titles the Cuban military had ever granted, those
being the Orders of the Hero of the Cuban Republic and the
Maximo Gomez Order, First Degree.
General Ochoa lived a very spartan life, he did not live in
a special area. From the information I have, he was very well
respected amongst the military. He in fact had the liberty when
he was in Angola to engage in commercial transactions, the
purpose of which were to make up the shortfall in funding that
his troops needed to survive in Angola, that was not
forthcoming from the Cuban military.
There are any number of situations of that nature that lead
me to believe that these gentlemen enjoyed the trust and
respect of Fidel Castro personally. In fact, Ochoa was one of
the few people who could use the familiar ``tu'', t-u, in
referring in the first person to Fidel Castro himself. And that
was a privilege extended to virtually no other individuals in
the country.
To suggest that individuals in Colonel de la Guardia's
case, 26 year relationship with Fidel Castro, much as Lincoln
and I are sitting here next to each other; or in General
Ochoa's case, with a long history of serving the Cuban military
in foreign posts--to suggest that they operated unilaterally
challenges my--even my naivete, if you will, about this kind of
thing.
Now as far as the money itself, in the late 1980's, General
Ochoa had returned from Angola, he had been given these various
awards. Colonel de la Guardia, who worked for Jose Abrantes in
the Ministry of Interior, had done, from the Cuban perspective,
excellent work in acquiring hard currency to ameliorate Cuba's
deficiencies otherwise. My question of, in particular, Mr.
Masetti, would be whether there was a significant political
competition perceived by Raul Castro, originating in the
Ministry of Interior, that threatened the Castro regime. That
is a long question and I apologize.
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. The last part, could you
repeat it?
Mr. Ose. Was there a political competition perceived by
Raul Castro between the Ministry of Interior, as run by Jose
Abrantes, and the regime itself?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. The wars, quote-unquote,
and that is how we could describe them, between the armed
forces and the Ministry of Interior date as far back as the
1960's. We have to understand that an officer of the Ministry
of the Interior has a different level of life, of traveling,
that causes or makes for a lot of jealousy.
Fidel would always act as a referee between both of
consolidating his power in the Ministry of the Interior,
leaving--he does not allow anybody to sort of emerge with any
amount of power, he always creates a balance, and even his
brother, he leaves the armed forces to him to direct and
consolidates his power in the Ministry of the Interior.
But we must keep in mind what was happening during the mid-
1980's in the east and in the former Soviet Union. The
officials from the Ministry of the Interior had information
then that the armed forces would not have. If we look at all
the desertions that occurred during the 1980's, we can see that
most of them came from the Ministry of the Interior and not
from the armed forces.
Mr. Ose. Desertions or defections?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. Defections. In the
publication Monquero from the Ministry of the Interior,
Abrantes has a discussion which was made public where he openly
describes himself in favor of Perestroika. So that is why I
think that what you mentioned is true, within the Ministry of
the Interior, Fidel Castro was able to see the germ of
Perestroika and it was actually there.
The Ministry of the Interior was occupied by the armed
forces after the Ochoa case. And they had to pay a price for
this type of operation.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Chairman, if I may, prior to the trials that
Colonel de la Guardia and General Ochoa were involved in, as
Chief Minister Abrantes, if I recall correctly, half of the
money from the proceeds of these sales were going to the
Ministry of the Interior and half were going to Castro. After
the trials, Castro's people worked at the Ministry of the
Interior and they were still getting the first half, so instead
of only getting half, they were now getting it all.
So following up on Mr. Mica's comment about following the
money, Castro now had all the money as a result of these trials
that we are talking about.
Mr. Burton. Do you have a comment?
Ms. de la Guardia [through interpreter]. Yes, it is
possible that he now, before 1989, he tried to control both,
but above all, the Ministry of the Interior through Abrantes,
but now after this, it is possible that he had total control.
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. But we must keep in mind
that he has always had full control of everything. The Ministry
of the Interior special troops were his main toys. You know, we
have to keep in mind that even the uniforms were purchased in
the United States. They dressed like American troops, Ray Bans
and, you know, this is how they were. But then he discovered
that there are men there that he must destroy when he learns
that they have begun to think with their own heads.
We must not lose sight of the fact and at the risk of
sounding cynical, although a very high cost was paid for the
proceeding and for the trial, he compared to the profits
derived from it, paid very little because he was able to occupy
the Ministry of the Interior, he was able to do away with these
officials and then he was also able to consolidate all the
power and keep all the situation under control.
Mr. Burton. Let me--we are about to end now and Chairman
Gilman has some closing comments and we will make some comments
about--excuse me 1 second.
[Pause.]
Mr. Burton. We have just a few more questions that we would
like to ask about the FALN in Puerto Rico and if you can keep
your answers concise, we can adjourn relatively soon.
You had a relationship with Juan Segare Palma and I would
like to ask you a few questions about where and how you met
him. His code name was Junior.
You were told to meet him, correct?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. I know Junior, I had to
make contact with him in Mexico by the end of 1983. Orlando
Gomez was the resident of the department and they received a
directive indicating--he repeat the directive and tells me that
I have to meet with Junior. He does not tell me that his name
is Junior but he tells me that he is the leader of the
Macheteros. To place him in a secure department in Mexico. And
that he was going to teach him a course on how to make a small
box to interfere with TV broadcasting. And that further, he was
to remain in Mexico for a few days because they were going to
be sending $50,000 over to him from Havana and so we had to
create a situation where he would be able to transport the
money back to Puerto Rico.
Mr. Burton. Let me interrupt here.
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. Provide a way for him to
hide the money and bring it back to Puerto Rico.
Mr. Burton. He asked you questions about armored cars?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. More than a meeting, we
were at a dinner, and at this dinner, Mr. Komas was present and
also the person who brought the money, who was the chief of the
Department of the Americas, who used a code name. Also was
Antonio Arbesu, the section chief, was present.
They said that they had had previous success with armored
trucks but they said that they had a new operation now because
someone was going to hand over the truck. I do not know who, I
was not exactly clear on whether it would be the chauffeur or
somebody else. They did not specify which city but he did ask
if we knew of any substance we could put in his coffee to sort
of drug him a little bit.
Mr. Burton. So he was asking about narcotics to
incapacitate people. Did you help him out?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. I have no evidence of
that. At that time, we gave him no reply.
Mr. Burton. There came a time when he did get the money,
the $40,000.
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. $50,000.
Mr. Burton. $50,000. Who gave it to him?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. Well, I prepared the bag
with the $50,000. The exchange was made at the airport in
Mexico. Once he went through immigration, it was done in a
quick way, exchanging identical suitcases and the suitcase was
given to him by Mr. Agajes, who was a diplomat, and that is why
his suitcase was not searched.
Mr. Burton. Now this money was for what purpose?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. What they made known to
us through Junior was that they had run out of money, that they
had this new operation ongoing with this truck, they did not
say where, but that they had to support themselves with this
money until they were able to successfully make the operation.
Mr. Burton. Now the robbery that took place after the
$50,000 was given to Segare Palma, was there any other contact
between Cuba and those people planning the robbery?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. Junior was in Mexico.
They sent me to pick up a person whom they said to be the main
leader of the Macheteros. I was not given his name, I simply
had to pick him up at a certain place and take him to another
place where he was to meet with an official from the Cuban
Embassy. But due to the importance and priority of this person,
we had to guarantee that he would not be followed and that was
my mission.
Mr. Burton. OK.
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. When I showed surprise
as to the entire interworkings of everything that was being
done for this person, they mentioned that he was a very high
leader and that Cuba owed him very many favors for previous
operations.
Mr. Burton. Did he know that the robbery was going to take
place?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. Yes, because when I was
taking him to meet with the other contact from the Cuban
Embassy, I asked him on the way if they had solved the little
problem they had with the coffee and he showed himself to be a
little bit upset and said that Junior should not have been so
outspoken regarding that, showing thusly that he knew what I
was talking about. And I am sure--I cannot say for sure because
I was not there, but I am sure that that meeting after Junior's
meeting was a meeting whose goal was to make the exchange with
the money.
Mr. Burton. Now the Wells Fargo robbery happened on
September 12, 1983. Afterwards, the man who took the $7.2
million from Wells Fargo was smuggled out of the United States
into Mexico. He then ended up in Havana, is that right?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. This person, this
leader?
Mr. Burton. No, the man who took the $7.2 million.
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. The person who delivered
the truck was swept from the United States, was taken quickly,
swiftly to Mexico where, with the help of Cuban Embassy
officials, he was given a change, dyed his hair, given a
mustache, et cetera. He was given a fake Argentine passport.
The stamps for entering Mexico, Arbesu himself took there
personally. And then he went to Havana and was living there.
Mr. Burton. Victor Jerena?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. I found out the name
much later, but right there at that time, I did not know it. So
if Victor Jerena was the person who delivered the truck, then
yes. Undoubtedly it must be him, but at that time I did not
know that.
Mr. Burton. How much money, of the Wells Fargo robbery
ended up in Cuba? $4 million.
Now Alberto Ojito Rejos--I hope I am pronouncing his name
correctly--was convicted in 1992 in Connecticut for his part in
the Wells Fargo robbery and sentenced to 55 years. Did you ever
meet Mr. Rejos?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. I later found out that
this leader of the Macheteros that I had encountered in Mexico
was this Mr. Rejos, but right then, I did not know.
Mr. Burton. Do you know what ties he had to Castro and
Cuba?
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. They explained to me
later when I found out who he was that it was someone that Cuba
owed a lot of favors to for previous operations. And they told
me that he was a man of a lot of experience and that he had
undertaken a lot of clandestine operations in the United States
before.
Mr. Burton. So they owed him.
Mr. Masetti [through interpreter]. Exactly.
Mr. Burton. OK. Now let me change to another subject and I
apologize to my colleagues but we did not get through all this,
so it is very important. I would like to talk to you about--I
think that is it, I was in error.
I will now ask Mr. Gilman to make his closing statement and
then we will wrap this up. I appreciate very much your help.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Chairman Burton. I want to commend
you for bringing this very significant hearing to Florida and
bringing our witnesses all the way from Spain to appear before
us. It was very enlightening and I think we have established
some very substantial and significant information for our
committees in the Congress.
Before closing, I want to commend Jorge Masetti and Ileana
de la Guardia for your courageous willingness to testify
extensively for our committee.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the results in
brief, the recent excellent December 21, 1999 GAO report to
Congress entitled, ``Assets DOD contributes to reducing illegal
drug supply have declined.'' I ask that that statement be
included in the full record of these proceedings.
Mr. Burton. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. Gilman. As we examine the problems, Mr. Chairman, of
fighting drugs transiting the Caribbean, this GAO report at
page 4 informs us why we have problems and so very little
knowledge of what is actually transacting in this area. The GAO
notes that for the years 1992 through 1999, that the number of
Department of Defense flight hours dedicated to detecting and
monitoring drug shipments have declined from 46,000 to 15,000
hours, a 68 percent decrease. Moreover, the GAO report says
that the number of ship days declined from 4,800 to 1,800, a 62
percent decline over that same period of time.
The Department of Defense admits that coverage of the high
threat drug trafficking areas in the Caribbean and in the
cocaine producing countries is limited, so it is clear that
part of the problem here is a lack of commitment by the
administration to prevent drugs from ever reaching our
shoreline. And the American people are the ultimate losers from
this gross neglect and I hope these hearings can help turn
around that sad neglect. And I thank you again, Mr. Chairman,
for conducting these hearings.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Gilman, Chairman Gilman.
And Ileana, did you have a closing comment?
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Burton. I wanted to
congratulate you, Dan, and Chairman Gilman as well for your
leadership that you have shown on this important issue of
examining the role of Fidel Castro to international drug
trafficking, the use of Cuba as a transit point for the
shipment and the movement of drugs, the use of Cuba as a refuge
for international criminals and the use of Cuba as a bank for
money laundering.
I think that what we need to do is to capture the attention
of the Clinton administration Justice Department that has been
reluctant to pursue these serious allegations and testimony
such as the ones presented today, because they are so hell-bent
on normalizing relations between the countries, that they are
willing to overlook and indeed hide much of the evidence that
exists. So I hope that sooner or later, we can get an
administration that pays attention to these unfolding facts and
will act in a deliberative manner and overlook the political
consequences in making sure that we can eliminate the scourge
of drugs in our community.
We have to understand the implicit role and complicit role
of Fidel Castro in the shipment of drugs in our hemisphere.
So I thank you, Mr. Burton and Mr. Gilman as well.
Mr. Burton. Well, thank you, Ileana.
Ms. de la Guardia and Mr. Masetti, you are very courageous
people. Thank you very much for coming all the way from Spain
to be with us. What you have said today and what you have given
us today will be very, very helpful in letting the American
people and the world know what Fidel Castro is all about.
We stand in recess until tomorrow morning at 9:30.
[Whereupon, at 5:16 p.m., the committee was recessed.]
DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN: DO TRAFFICKERS USE CUBA AND PUERTO
RICO AS MAJOR TRANSIT LOCATIONS FOR UNITED STATES-BOUND NARCOTICS?
----------
TUESDAY, JANUARY 4, 2000
House of Representatives,
Committee on Government Reform,
Miami, FL.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in the
Commission Chambers, Sweetwater City Hall, 500 S.W. 109th
Avenue, Miami, FL, Hon. Dan Burton (chairman of the committee)
presiding.
Present: Representatives Burton, Mica, Barr, Ose, and Ros-
Lehtinen.
Also present: Representative Romero-Barcelo.
Staff present: James C. Wilson, chief counsel; Kevin Long
and Gil Macklin, professional staff members; Kristi Remington,
senior counsel; Lisa Smith Arafune, chief clerk; Maria
Tamburri, staff assistant; and Michael Yeager, minority
counsel.
Mr. Burton. I want to welcome everybody back to our second
day of this Miami field hearing. Today we are going to be
continuing our discussion of the drug trafficking in the
Caribbean.
Today we are going to hear from four witnesses. The first
is my good friend, Jose Fuentes Agostini, the former Attorney
General of Puerto Rico. He is going to give us his perspective
on the problems that they faced in Puerto Rico and first-hand
information about the Government of Puerto Rico's efforts to
combat drug trafficking. He also is going to let us know how he
feels about the Federal Government's assistance or lack
thereof. Mr. Agostini recently left the position to return to
private practice, but he feels so strongly about the drug
problem he is here with us today.
Our second panel of witnesses will be from the
administration. We will hear from Bill Ledwith, the Chief of
Foreign Operations for the United States Drug Enforcement
Administration about United States drug cooperation--United
States-Cuba cooperation on the drug trafficking through Cuba.
Mr. Ledwith recently testified before Mr. Mica's subcommittee
on November 17th in Washington. His testimony there left many
of us with a large number of unanswered questions and we look
forward to hearing from him today and asking more questions.
Hopefully he will have more answers than he did last November.
And then we will hear from the U.S. Customs Service. I want
to say just a couple of things about the Customs Service. They
did yeoman's service for the country recently--just before
Christmas--when they intercepted a terrorist bringing
explosives across the border from Canada. He had enough
explosives, I understand, to blow up four or five city blocks,
and he was targeting, they think, either Seattle or Las Vegas.
A few days later they made another arrest at a remote Vermont
border. So, I would just like to say to all of those with the
Customs Service that is a job well done and we all appreciate
that very much.
We will have Mr. Varrone from the Customs Service testify
later. I guess he has with him Mr. Quinn and Ms. Cody and other
Customs officers to help him out. Thank you all for the good
job you are doing.
Our final witness will be Special Agent in Charge Mike
Vigil of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. Mr. Vigil is
in charge of the Caribbean Division and is based out of Puerto
Rico, and we look forward to his insights on drug trafficking
as well, and what can be done to strengthen our efforts in the
Caribbean and in Puerto Rico.
With that, we will start off with our good friend, the
former Attorney General of Puerto Rico for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF JOSE FUENTES AGOSTINI, FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE GOVERNMENT OF PUERTO RICO
Mr. Agostini. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very
much for inviting me today. I would like to thank also Resident
Commissioner Carlos Romero Barcelo and the other members of
this Committee on Government Reform.
For the record, my name is Jose Fuentes Agostini, and I
have spent the last 3 years of my life as Attorney General of
Puerto Rico and chairman of the Puerto Rico-United States-
Virgin Islands High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area [HIDTA].
I come here today to represent the 3.8 million Puerto
Rican-American citizens who reside in the island of Puerto
Rico. Mr. Chairman, we profoundly appreciate your personal
help, just as we profoundly appreciate the shoulder-to-shoulder
collaboration of dedicated public servants like other witnesses
on today's personal agenda.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Federal
Government for all the help it gives us in Puerto Rico in
fighting this tremendous problem with drug trafficking that we
have in the Caribbean. The truth of the matter is, the
relationship between the State law enforcement agencies and the
Federal law enforcement agencies in Puerto Rico is second to
none. I have not seen anywhere else in the United States such a
level of joint effort as I see in Puerto Rico because of the
way that the law enforcement agencies--the Federal law
enforcement agencies interact with each other. There is always
frictions created amongst them, but in Puerto Rico because of
the limited resources we have, probably, we see how they are
able to work not only together but very closely with the Puerto
Rico Government, and we have seen some very impressive results.
I filed a statement for the record which I request be
incorporated into the Congressional Record.
Mr. Burton. Without objection.
Mr. Agostini. I have had the opportunity to work with a lot
of the staff that the Members of Congress have. I know they are
very competent. So I am sure that my statement and the
information that is in there will get to you. So instead of
wasting your time with that, I would like to go into some other
areas that are not in my statement which specifically go into
what it is we need to continue the change that we are seeing in
the northern Caribbean and actually in the southeast border.
We are seeing a lot of changes--a lot of resources going to
the southwest border. None of those resources are going to the
southeast border. What happens is, when you squeeze a balloon
at one end the balloon is not going to pop, it is just going to
grow bigger at the other end, and that is what we are seeing,
at least in the northern Caribbean and probably in Florida,
also.
My statement covers what the local law enforcement agencies
are doing to fight drugs and crime and the impressive results
we are obtaining, one of which is a 50 percent reduction in
violent crimes in the last 7 years in Puerto Rico. We have
provided a breakdown of the crimes reported for your use, and
you can see how across the board in the last 7 years we have
been able to cut in half violent crime on the island of Puerto
Rico. This has come at great sacrifice and great expense from
the people of Puerto Rico. A huge amount of our budget goes
into this war because it is directly related to drug use and
drug interdiction. Some 8 or 10 years ago 8 out of every--
sorry, 3 out of every 10 murders in Puerto Rico were drug
related, nowadays, we know for a fact that even though we have
a 35 percent reduction in murders in Puerto Rico, 8 out of
every 10 is directly related to drugs. So actually we have had
a huge success in this area. If it were not for the drug
problem, we would probably have the murder rate in Puerto Rico
down 80 percent.
My report, which was filed today, also covers the joint
operations which the Puerto Rico and Federal law enforcement
agencies are conducting under the auspices of our HIDTA
Program, which I personally chaired for a year and a half, and
the equally impressive results that we have achieved having
cocaine seizures to the tune of 30,000 pounds during the first
11 months of 1999. But today, like I said, I would like to
concentrate on what we need to improve on this impressive
record.
First of all, I would like to bring to your attention the
situation of our Federal court system. Puerto Rico has seven
Federal judges, but for the last 7 years only six of those
seven positions have been filled. President Clinton has failed
to submit an adequate nominee for that position in 7 years. The
result of that is a huge backlog in Federal cases. The civil
docket in Puerto Rico has been paralyzed for the last 5 years.
No civil cases can be tried in Puerto Rico because criminal
cases have precedence over civil cases creating tremendous
problems. But we now are confronted with a situation that we
have a huge backlog in criminal cases, mostly drug-related
criminal cases.
Why is this happening? Well unfortunately, the Puerto Rico
Constitution prohibits the use of the single most effective
investigative tool that exists nowadays, wire taps. So we use
the resources of Federal law to use this tool, very effectively
I might add, but all those cases need to be filed in Federal
court. So what we are finding is that all the large criminal
drug-related cases, basically 30,000 pounds worth of cocaine
cases go to Federal court, and with the resources that the
Federal court has in the District of Puerto Rico, it is simply
impossible to attend that backlog. So I am going to petition
this committee today for at least two more Federal judges and
at least two more Federal magistrates so that we can attend all
criminal cases and start attending the backlog in civil
litigation that we have in Puerto Rico. And if at all possible,
to fill that vacant position on the court.
Additionally, I think there are various areas in which
resources need to be considered for Puerto Rico. And when I
mention Puerto Rico, I need to be clear on something. Sending
resources to Puerto Rico alone is not enough, because we need
to be out there gathering information in the rest of the
Caribbean if we are to be effective in Puerto Rico. I will give
you an example. DEA--for example, DEA does not cover Puerto
Rico. The Puerto Rico DEA has to cover all the way down to
Guyana. We are talking 20 different nations out there that we
need to gather intelligence from if we are going to be
effective in Puerto Rico in closing down our United States
border to avoid drugs from coming in.
So we need to continue to build on a mobile response
capability that is effective. What I mean by this is, we need
helicopters. We need Blackhawk helicopters, to be specific. Why
Blackhawk helicopters? Because these helicopters have to be
over the ocean for extended periods of time and the Blackhawk
is the only helicopter that has two engines. They can stay out
there for hours surveiling and watching these go-fast boats and
aircraft that are getting all these drugs into our shores.
We also need money to keep them in the air. Keeping a
Blackhawk in the air is an expensive proposition to the tune of
$2,200 an hour. We need money to maintain them. The truth of
the matter is, there's eight of them in Puerto Rico right now.
There are eight Blackhawks in Puerto Rico that the United
States National Guard has, and these eight Blackhawks cannot be
used for drug interdiction because the money is not there to
keep them in the air and they are used only for training. So it
behooves me to understand why if we have the equipment down
there, we cannot find the money to keep them in the air to help
us with this war. I personally met with powers to be at the
Pentagon, I have met with Anna Maria Salazar on no less than
four occasions personally. She has tried--I must say she has
tried very hard to help us find the money but the money is not
there to be found. So here we are sending Blackhawks to Costa
Rica to pull marijuana plants and sending Blackhawks to
Colombia, that the Colombian Government cannot keep in the air,
and we have got them setting on the ground in Puerto Rico and
we cannot use them either. There's something wrong there that
we need to fix real quick.
We need more go-fast boats for Customs and the U.S. Coast
Guard. United States Customs does have a lot of equipment in
Puerto Rico. They are now in the process of reorganizing their
air and marine assets. The Coast Guard does have equipment. Let
me give you an example. When the Coast Guard has a cutter out
in the middle of the Caribbean Ocean--Caribbean Sea and they
spot a go-fast boat moving, they cannot really do anything
because a cutter cannot do 50 or 60 miles an hour to stay with
that go-fast boat. There is the technology now where inflatable
go-fast boats can be put on the Coast Guard carriers and they
could then follow those go-fast boats. Then we need at night
helicopters to spot them and follow them. That is what I mean
by mobile response capabilities. We need to be able--because we
are spotting them, we just cannot do much about it once we spot
them.
There needs to be a continued development of our regional
strategy. We need more agents for that. We need to have more
manpower and all these islands, Central and South America
feeding us information. Puerto Rico's HIDTA--Puerto Rico-United
States-Virgin Islands HIDTA just won a prize from ONDCP for
having the best intelligence center in the nation. We have the
best intelligence center in the whole U.S.A. in Puerto Rico, so
we can manage that information, and we can put it to good use,
but we need the capabilities to get out there hands on and make
it happen.
DEA, FBI and Customs, plus INS, all need more agents--it is
that simple. They need more manpower because, believe me, it
is, by any stretch of the imagination, a duck shoot down there.
It is incredible how much more we could do if we had the
resources. And as far as DEA, FBI and Customs, they do an
excellent job with what they have. I sometimes am so impressed
with how much they can do with the amount of resources they
have. It is really incredible. I mean, these are dedicated
public servants that are really making a change. INS is a
different story, and I will get to INS in detail in a little
while.
Our HIDTA budget, we get $9 million a year. We have gotten
$9 million every year for 4 years now. It is great. It has
helped us put together this super program that is very
effective, but for some reason the budget is the same every
year, and we now have three times more HIDTAs than we had 4
years ago.
Mr. Burton. HIDTAs, what is that?
Mr. Agostini. High intensity drug trafficking area. It is
the ONDCP program----
Mr. Burton. OK.
Mr. Agostini [continuing]. That brings together all the
Federal and local law enforcement agencies under one roof. It
gives them money to attack drugs.
The U.S. Congress keeps getting petitioned for more money
for prevention, more money for treatment, more money for the
Federal Bureau of Prisons, all these are drug-related issues.
Huge amounts, billions of dollars, are being spent in these
areas, but in the last 4 years no more money is going to
interdiction.
We need to strengthen the counter drug efforts by INS on
our southeast border. The Caribbean corridor is the name of the
area where one-third of the drugs that come to the United
States mainland come through. That includes Jamaica, Cuba. It
includes Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico and the
rest of the Caribbean. We now have less INS Border Patrol
agents and investigative agents--we have less than what we had
8 years ago. We have something like 40 for what is one of the
largest entry points into the United States, Puerto Rico.
Puerto Rico is a United States border. The west end of Puerto
Rico is only 90 miles away from the eastern end of the
Dominican Republic, 90 miles. What is happening is, because of
the pressure that is being put by law enforcement agencies in
Puerto Rico, they have adapted, and they adapt to Haiti in this
instance where there is very little law enforcement, if any at
all.
Once they are in Haiti where I would say about 18 percent
of the drugs are going nowadays, a huge stash house. Some of it
goes through Cuba--a very small percentage I would say. The
largest amount of it is going over land--which is very easy--to
the Dominican Republic. When it hits the eastern end of the
Dominican Republic it is only 90 miles away from the United
States coast. So they are using illegal alien runners to run
drugs from the Dominican Republic to Puerto Rico every night
and INS catches one boat load and they are tied up for 3 or 4
days processing this boat load, so it is open season. We need
to change this. You cannot send 1,000 new Border Patrol agents
to the southwest border and not expect that to have an impact
in Puerto Rico and Florida because it is going to have an
impact. They are going to readapt and they are going to start
bringing in their drugs through Puerto Rico and Florida. That
is what is going to happen. You do not have to be a brain
surgeon to figure that one out. We just need more resources in
Florida and Puerto Rico to counter this problem.
INS simply does not understand the issue, and I have
personally met with Doris Meissner to try to explain this to
them, but they insist that the drug problem and the illegal
alien problem are two separate problems and they are to be
treated separately. Well let me tell you something, 95 percent
of all the drugs coming through Puerto Rico are being brought
in by illegal aliens, Colombians and Dominicans. And Dominicans
are using Puerto Rico as the entry point to get into the
eastern border of the United States to run the drug laundering
operations of the Colombian cartels. If we do not wake up that
reality and start closing down that border they will continue
to operate on the mainland of the United States because the
effect of not sending resources down to Puerto Rico--besides
the tremendous social problems it creates in Puerto Rico--is
that all the drugs wind up in our mainland continental States.
And that is the effect of not giving Puerto Rico the Federal
resources it needs to fight this war.
I feel that the armed forces need to play a bigger role in
this war. I mean, when during 1999 alone, we were able to seize
1,200 pounds of cocaine within the territorial area of the
largest naval base outside the continental United States, there
is something wrong. 1,200 pounds of cocaine we seized in 1999
alone in Roosevelt Roads. Not inside the base, but inside their
buffer zone, inside the area that protects their base. That to
me is a clear sign that we need to talk to the armed forces
about how they are going to help us in this specific war.
ONDCP is going to report to you next month that they have
been extremely successful--and they have--in reducing coca
plantations in Peru and Bolivia by 50 percent--very important.
That is very impacting, a 50 percent drop in coca cultivation
in Bolivia and Peru--very impressive. What they may not tell
you is that they are now growing it in Colombia, simply moving
to Colombia. By the end of March 2000, we will have the ROTHR
radar, Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar, on line from Puerto
Rico. That radar is going to give us the ability to know
exactly where in Colombia the cartels are performing their
operations, their cultivations, their cooking as it is better
known. What are we going to do with that information? We do not
have the resources to do anything with it. It seems the
Colombian Government, which is trying very hard to help, does
not have the resources. We need to start thinking about what we
are going to do with that information. It is going to be very
valuable information. We are going to be able to know every
aircraft that takes off from the jungle in Colombia to make a
drop off outside Puerto Rico or any Caribbean island. How are
we going to address that information? How are we going to get
down there and respond to that information? The capabilities
are not there right now.
Like I said, if we get these resources, we will turn this
thing around--we will, for the good of the people of Puerto
Rico, for the good of the people in Florida, for the good of
the continental United States where these drugs are winding up
and killing our youth. We continue to spend a huge amount of
our State budget in this war. Our next step, this month we are
going to put out a request for proposal for $20 million worth
of x-ray machines to be able to close down the use of our
marine cargo container facilities, which is a huge gap that we
have in closing down that border. The Government of Puerto Rico
is going to put up the money to have the equipment to x ray
those containers. I need to say that the help of the U.S.
Customs Service has been invaluable in helping us put together
the technical aspects of what we need in equipment to close
this problem down. We are going to put up the money, we are
going to do it. We are going to start x raying containers and
you are going to see what a huge difference that is going to
make, because the amount of cocaine that fits in a container--
every time we catch one it is thousands of kilos of cocaine. So
we need to close that down. We are going to put up the money
and with the help of U.S. Customs we are going to get it done.
If we are going to be at war, then by God, give us the
equipment, give us the resources and we will make you proud
like we have done in so many other conflicts that we have
participated. Just give us what we need and we will close it
down.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Agostini follows:]
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Mr. Burton. Thank you very much, Mr. Attorney General, for
that very thorough analysis of the problem.
I would like to introduce all the members of the committee
who are here. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen just came in a minute ago. Mr.
Mica is here. He chairs a subcommittee that deals with this
problem on a regular basis. Mr. Barr who has been very active
in this area. Mr. Barcelo who represents Puerto Rico, and Mr.
Ose, and, of course, our counsel is here as well, Jim Wilson.
Let me start off the questioning. Jim, we need to start the
machine. You said that you have seven Federal courts down there
and only six judges, and you said there is a huge backlog and
the administration for 7 years has not filled that seventh
court. You also said you need two more Federal judges and two
more magistrates. Now those two more Federal judges, are those
in addition to the seven?
Mr. Agostini. Yes.
Mr. Burton. So you would need nine. So there should be
three more--three vacancies still, if we give you--if we get
two more?
Mr. Agostini. We have one Federal court and in that Federal
court----
Mr. Burton. But you have seven----
Mr. Agostini. We have seven positions----
Mr. Burton. Right.
Mr. Agostini [continuing]. Of which six have been filled,
but one has not been filled.
Mr. Burton. But you need two more?
Mr. Agostini. We need two more in addition. We would like
to have nine. If we had nine, we could manage the criminal and
the civil docket.
Mr. Burton. OK. Now you said that they have eight
Blackhawks down there in the National Guard. If those were
activated for drug interdiction and the resources were there to
keep them flying over the borders of Puerto Rico and the sea
around Puerto Rico, would that be a sufficient number?
Mr. Agostini. Yes, that would be. We would need to get at
least four FLIR equipment. To properly use them----
Mr. Burton. For looking down, heat sensitive?
Mr. Agostini. Right. But eight would be more than enough.
But we would need the capability also for those helicopters to
be able to be stationed in other countries where we'll be
gathering intelligence if we really want to be effective in
shutting down the borders.
Mr. Burton. So you're talking about taking some of the
helicopters and placing them in strategic points around the
Caribbean besides in Puerto Rico?
Mr. Agostini. Yes.
Mr. Burton. OK. You said you needed more go-fast boats. Are
those--I don't know much about those inflatable boats. Do you
know the cost of those? Do you have any idea? Maybe the DEA can
tell us.
Mr. Agostini. A go-fast inflatable boat is about $150,000
to $175,000.
Mr. Burton. And how many of those would you need?
Mr. Agostini. I believe the Coast Guard now has nine active
cutters in the Caribbean. They need one for each.
Mr. Burton. So they need about nine of those?
Mr. Agostini. Yes.
Mr. Burton. OK. And you said that you need more INS agents.
You said there's 40 down there now. How many do you need?
Mr. Agostini. About 160 I would say.
Mr. Burton. About four times that many?
Mr. Agostini. At least.
Mr. Burton. That figure that you gave that 95 percent of
the drugs coming into Puerto Rico is through illegal aliens,
that seems like an extraordinarily high number, but you are
certain that is the case?
Mr. Agostini. Yes, because when you find United States
citizens being caught bringing in drugs they are normally very
small amounts, and normally it is from the mainland United
States bringing marijuana into Puerto Rico.
Mr. Burton. So it is coming from the United States back
into Puerto Rico?
Mr. Agostini. That is why it is such a small amount. The
large amount, where the money is, is the huge loads of cocaine
and heroin coming into Puerto Rico and then making it to the
mainland United States, and that is being done by aliens.
Mr. Burton. Once an illegal alien gets into Puerto Rico and
gets a ticket on an airplane, there is no way to catch them
really, is there?
Mr. Agostini. There is not.
Mr. Burton. I mean, our Customs people do not pay any
attention to the airports----
Mr. Agostini. They do not really have any jurisdiction. But
what we are doing is, there is an agent now right after you go
through the metal detector machines, and if a person fits a
profile they ask a couple of questions. And through that, the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has said that we
are able to--if they fit a certain profile--ask questions and
if they do not answer the right questions, then investigate
whether they are in the country legally. So we are having some
success there, but that is not close enough because a lot of
them get through.
Mr. Burton. OK. Could you explain for the committee the
pattern of smuggling that is used by the cartels through Puerto
Rico and the Caribbean corridor.
Mr. Agostini. Yes, I can. There are probably people here
that are better qualified than I am to do that, but I will try
that. There are basically four routes of the Caribbean
corridor. There is the Jamaica-Cuba-Bahamas corridor; there is
the Haiti-Dominican Republic; there is the Puerto Rico-United
States-Virgin Islands and then there is the eastern Caribbean
corridor. That makes up, up until 1997, one-third of the drugs
coming to the mainland United States. The largest one being
Haiti-Dominican Republic. That was 15 percent. I suspect that
is up now tremendously. The problem is that when the numbers
are analyzed, only 6 percent is really going directly from
Colombia to Puerto Rico-United States-Virgin Islands. But the
truth of the matter is, a very large amount of the drugs being
brought into Haiti and the Dominican Republic are also making
it into the United States through Puerto Rico, and that's where
the numbers may be a little deceiving. We need to take a hard
look at that. That is why we need to close down harder on the
Puerto Rican border.
Mr. Burton. I will have some more questions later.
Mr. Mica.
Mr. Mica. I was interested in the pattern of drug movements
and also those involved. You said you had many illegals,
accounting, I guess, for 95 percent of the drug trafficking.
How are they getting in? You said at night they are coming in?
They are not coming into your ports and airports, they are
coming into other locations, is that correct?
Mr. Agostini. Yes. There is a very large illegal alien
trade from the Dominican Republic to Puerto Rico. They use
these 30-foot wooden boats, which do not reflect on our radars,
with a large outboard engine. They are very difficult to
detect. They run at night without lights, and a stretch of 90
miles, they can do in 5 or 6 hours, even less if the ocean is
not rough. So they will run from the eastern end of the
Dominican Republic to the western end of Puerto Rico, that 90-
mile stretch. Or there are a few islands--uninhabited islands
off the coast of Puerto Rico where they will drop off aliens.
Now what the illegal alien runners discovered was that it was
more profitable to run drugs. So on these small vessels,
besides putting people to bring them over, they put in drugs,
and they are using the same mechanism to bring them in.
Mr. Mica. Well, I participated with Mr. Hastert when he
chaired the subcommittee that dealt with drug policy. We held
hearings--in fact, one was on a Coast Guard cutter, I think, in
the bay in----
Mr. Agostini. In San Juan Bay, yes.
Mr. Mica [continuing]. San Juan. Trying to put back the war
on drugs, most people do not realize it was basically closed
down by the Clinton administration. In 1993 they cut the Coast
Guard by, I think, about 50 percent of their funding and
staffing in your area. Most people do not realize the Coast
Guard is also responsible for the area around Puerto Rico. We
are basically approaching 1992 levels if you translate dollars
from 1992 to 1999.
You talked about the military. They took the military out
of most of the interdiction. You also described the Colombian
situation. Mr. Hastert--in fact, some of us trounced through
the jungle with him in trying to start with a few small bucks,
the eradication campaign which is now somewhat successful. But
as you said, the traffic did move to Colombia. Again, we have a
failed policy there where we never allowed the resources to get
through, even the most recent $300 million that Congress
appropriated. I understand your frustration. You have to
understand some of our frustration, because we have tried to
put Humpty Dumpty back together again and it is very difficult
once it has been knocked off the wall.
With INS you said you may need as many as three times the
resources. Mr. Barr asked us to hold a hearing in his district
and he had 40,000 illegal aliens in the Dalton-Atlanta area,
just north of Atlanta, I believe it is. And we found that we
have almost doubled the budget for INS from about $1.8 million
to--I think it is about $3.2 billion--$1.8 billion to $3.2--and
we have gone from about 18,000 to I think over 30,000 some
employees in INS. We heard the same statistics in Atlanta that
there were, I think, the same number or a couple fewer in the
Atlanta area in INS.
Mr. Agostini. INS has the largest budget of the four law
enforcement agencies that are dealing with this problem, by far
the largest budget. Do not get me wrong, the people from INS
that are in Puerto Rico work very closely with us and they are
very committed. It is just that they are not getting the
resources from their central office. It is a problem of
resources not going down there.
Mr. Mica. I think maybe our subcommittee will do a hearing
just on where the allocation of the personnel are, because it
is astounding. We have appropriated vast sums of money, we have
almost a 50 percent increase in personnel and I cannot find
them.
Mr. Barr. They are not in Georgia.
Mr. Mica. They are not in Georgia. They are not in Florida
either. I just met with our HIDTA folks in central Florida and
they had exactly the same complaint. So we will pursue that. I
appreciate you bringing that to our attention.
And of course, bringing the military back into the effort I
think is also very important. Our military are on patrol and
active in any event protecting the country, but they did play
an important part under the Reagan-Bush administration and we
need to get them back. The latest statistics just handed me
from the December 1999 GAO report, says the DOD's level of
support to international drug control efforts has declined
significantly since 1992. The number of flight hours has
declined from 46,000 to 15,000 or down 68 percent from 1992 to
1998. So this confirms what you are saying. We have additional
information the number of ship days declined from 4,800 to
1,800, a 62 percent decline over the same period.
Our committee and subcommittee are committed to getting the
military back in and we think they can play an important role
as they have done in the past. We appreciate you calling that
to our attention.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Mica, before I yield to Mr. Barr, let me
just say that perhaps we could get members of the committee to
send a letter and publicize it to the administration, pointing
out these deficiencies and maybe force the issue a little bit.
Mr. Barr.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
leadership and that of Mr. Mica on these issues and I
appreciate you calling this hearing and allowing me to
participate.
Mr. Attorney General, while you were giving us your oral
testimony, I was cheating a little bit and reading your written
testimony, which is every bit as eloquent, if not more so, than
your oral testimony. I was particularly impressed with some of
the steps that Puerto Rico took under your leadership, and your
colleagues in the government, to do what you could to really
seriously address the drug problem, as you have indicated
today. It strikes me that it is very similar to what some other
public officials have done, such as Mayor Guiliani in New York;
he starts with the basics and concentrates on the basic, sort
of grassroots policing. You focused on education and local
policing and manpower and training.
Is there anything that you could, just very quickly tell
us, based on your experience and some of the procedures and
policies you implemented in Puerto Rico that helped turn--that
have helped start turning the problem around, that could
perhaps be applied federally in terms of looking at resource
allocation? I know you have indicated a couple of them and you
have also indicated--I think you alluded to this and you
address it very specifically in your written testimony, that
the enemy out there, whether it is Fidel Castro, whether it is
the Colombian cartel, they watch what is going on, the same as
criminals here in the mainland watch what is going on with
local police and DEA. They see where they are putting their
resources and they react to it.
Are there any lessons that we could perhaps apply at the
Federal level that have been successful under your leadership
in Puerto Rico?
Mr. Agostini. Well, I am very impressed with the level of
training that the Federal Government provides to its agents and
law enforcement people at the Federal level. I think that makes
a huge difference and we have taken that at the local level and
really capitalized on it. Puerto Rico now has the only law
enforcement college accredited by the middle states. So when a
policeman graduates from that academy in Puerto Rico, he has a
college associate degree. So we are professionalizing the
police force. And that is something that under the HIDTA
program happens a lot. Every week we get lists of training
capabilities available, not only for the Federal law
enforcement agencies, but for the State law enforcement
agencies. And if the Federal Government could take the lead in
providing these training resources to the State police, and
paying for them, because right now it comes out of our HIDTA
budget so we are limited in the amount of training that we can
give, and then again only to the people involved in HIDTA, in
our HIDTA operation. If you could expand that to all the police
force, all law enforcement at the State level, that would make
a huge difference, I think, in the capabilities of allocating
the limited resources we have.
Now the drug dealers have a very big advantage over us.
They get on the Internet and they know every penny that we are
going to spend fighting them and where we are going to spend
it. We have limited budgets, they have unlimited budgets, they
have all our information. So it is really hard allocating
resources, especially when you do not have all the resources
you need.
Mr. Barr. As we have touched on here, it is particularly
troubling under the current administration in a couple of
areas. One such area is the INS, even though we in Congress
have appropriated--authorized and appropriated huge increases
in INS moneys, they are not getting out to where they are
needed, and that was the subject, as Mr. Mica said, of some
field hearings we had in my district in Georgia.
I am also concerned, as is Mr. Mica and as was reflected in
a December 1999 GAO study entitled ``Assets DOD Contributes to
Reducing the Illegal Drug Supply Have Declined Since 1992.'' It
is not just a small decline in several areas that they
indicate. In one case, in terms of the number of flight hours,
it declined 68 percent, the number of ship days 62 percent. So
these are not just minor blips or adjustments, these are major
decreases.
If I could, Mr. Chairman, just ask one question. You
mentioned, and I was particularly interested in the fact that
under Puerto Rico law electronic surveillance is not lawful,
contrary to Federal law, that within the bounds of, for
example, Title 3 intercepts and court supervision and so forth,
electronic surveillance is a tool that is available to Federal
law enforcement. Therefore, what you are saying, I think, is
those cases that rely to any extent whatsoever on evidence
gathered through electronic surveillance have to be
investigated, prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney and the Assistant
U.S. Attorneys. Has that, in light of a Federal law that I
opposed, yet not withstanding that it went into effect in 1998,
that seems to make Federal prosecutors possibly liable for
involving themselves in legitimate Federal cases involving
electronic surveillance if that electronic surveillance would
be unlawful under State law--has that presented any problems
that you are aware of?
Mr. Agostini. No, it has not so far in Puerto Rico that I
am aware of. The truth of the matter is that in the
investigative side, the State law enforcement agencies are very
active and what we do is we get PIN registers and Title 3s
through the Federal prosecutors and we help investigate and
monitor, put the case together and then it needs to be
prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney's Office. The U.S. Attorney's
Office in Puerto Rico has grown tremendously in the last 5
years, but the Federal judges remain the same. So there is just
no way they can keep up with the amount of cases. Now it is
not--if it were a law in Puerto Rico that prohibited electronic
monitoring, we would have changed it a long time ago, but it is
the Constitution. It is the Constitution that in 1952 was
approved by this U.S. Congress that prohibits that kind of
surveillance.
Mr. Barr. Thank you very much. If you do notice any
problems in that area, let us know, as a result of this 1998
law.
Mr. Agostini. Absolutely, sure.
Mr. Burton. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and I
thank the committee again for coming down to south Florida.
I was interested in the explanation you gave of the
different drug patterns, the flow, and I know you have been
discussing that in the questions as well. You had mentioned
several different access or several different patterns of drug
flow. Were there four that you had mentioned, or how many?
Mr. Agostini. Yes, four.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. If you could go through those again, and
I am interested in the one that also mentions Cuba as one of
the--I do not know if that was in relation to Jamaica.
Mr. Agostini. Yes, the Jamaica-Cuba-Bahamas is one
corridor.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. How do those flow from those islands to
Puerto Rico?
Mr. Agostini. I believe the representatives from Customs
and DEA that are here today are probably better positioned to
answer those questions as I am only directly involved with the
Puerto Rico and eastern Caribbean.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. What are the other corridors that you had
quickly gone over?
Mr. Agostini. The Haiti-Dominican Republic corridor; the
Puerto Rico-United States-Virgin Island corridor and the
eastern Caribbean corridor.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And do you suppose that 10 years ago,
Puerto Rico would not have been listed as one of the corridors?
Has this been a problem that has really become a crisis in the
last 10 years? If so, when do you think that change took place?
Also, what factors do you think have contributed to the role
that Puerto Rico unfortunately enjoys now of being one of the
transit points of these corridors that you mentioned? Is it
that our enforcement has increased elsewhere and then they know
that they have this open border that they can exploit? Is it
that you lack the financial resources and the drug traffickers
know that? What factors do you think have gone into putting
Puerto Rico in the prominent place that it is now?
Mr. Agostini. I think we need to go into a little
historical fact finding to properly answer your question.
Initially, drug trafficking was a trade conducted through a
southwest border with Mexico. That is the way drug trafficking
was conducted in the late 1950's, 1960's, early 1970's. And
then resources--this Congress started sending resources to the
southwest border and they started closing down that border. So
they started using water equipment to get into the Texas, New
Orleans area and little by little moving to the Florida
peninsula.
Using the Florida peninsula developed the Caribbean
corridor, the Bahamas, Florida, Cuba. And then resources
started late 1970's and 1980's into Florida and the Bahamas,
huge amounts of resources. That started closing down that
corridor. So they adapted again and they moved to the
Caribbean. That was in the late--that was actually early
1980's, mid-1980's.
What they discovered in Puerto Rico was that Puerto Rico
was better than they ever thought because Puerto Rico had no
representation in Congress, none to say that would be seeking
funds to fight this problem. And then again, even if they were,
there was no vote, there was just a voice. Once they were
inside Puerto Rico, they were inside the Customs territory of
the United States, so they could use commercial means to
transport their drugs into the mainland United States. And
third, the Government of Puerto Rico back then was totally
unprepared to confront this problem and did not do much to
attack it. It was not until 1993 when the tide turned, when
Governor Rossello and Carlos Romero Barcelo were able to call
the Federal Government's attention to this problem. Resources
commenced to flow, HIDTA, Puerto Rico was named to HIDTA. The
Governor induced huge amounts of money into our local law
enforcement agencies, he doubled the police force, doubled
their salaries, gave them resources, established the Police
Academy which is now a college, professionalized the police
force. All these things came together in about 1995 and then we
saw this turnaround. I mean 30,000 pounds of cocaine in 1 year
by our HIDTA only is quite impressive.
So we are seeing the change. And we are on the road to
change, but if we keep sending resources to the southwest
border alone and we do not help Puerto Rico and Florida, they
are just going to re-adapt and come our way again. I mean not
that they are gone by any stretch of the imagination, it is
very active. But that is what we need to do.
These people adapt very, very easily and very quickly and
we need to stay with them.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And just one more question. You would say
then that the problem became worse 10 years ago, you had
mentioned the 1980's, mid-1980's?
Mr. Agostini. Fifteen years ago.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Fifteen years ago. And if you could say
three things that you would most desperately need--you
mentioned Blackhawk helicopters, you mentioned more agents,
more judges. What three items, if you had to prioritize?
Mr. Agostini. Agents, air and marine assets and Federal
judges.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, it is a pleasure to
have you here.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Ose.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Attorney General, I want to make sure I understand
something. When you talk about these corridors, the four which
you identified; one of them just kind of peaks my interest and
that is the Haiti-Dominican Republic corridor that at the east
end of the Dominican Republic puts the drugs 90 miles from
Puerto Rico.
Now my recollection serves that we spent over the past 5
years somewhere on the order of $3 or $4 billion in Haiti in
this nation-building exercise and yet, I do not see a--you
would think that given that kind of investment in Haiti on the
part of the United States, you would see a correlative or
corroborative connection to some reduction over that period of
time in the drug flow from west to east, ultimately into Puerto
Rico and yet you told me that is not happening.
Mr. Agostini. It is not happening.
Mr. Ose. Why?
Mr. Agostini. My impression is that it has actually grown
and there are people here that are going to be testifying
before you who are probably better qualified than I am to
answer that question. But my impression is that the development
of a civil Government in Haiti has not addressed the law
enforcement problems that exist there, that the Colombians have
the ability of spending huge amounts of money also in Haiti,
buying their way into huge stash houses down there where they
then redistribute their drugs. And that problem is not being
addressed the way it should.
Now you are talking--addressing that problem in Haiti is a
very expensive, very labor-intensive proposition. I suspect
that doing it ourselves is probably getting in over our heads.
Mr. Ose. You are suggesting that the policy of our
involvement in Haiti has been a failure as to the drug problem.
Mr. Agostini. Absolutely.
Mr. Ose. Has there actually been any focus within our
policy on Haiti as put forth by the administration and State
Department on the drug problem?
Mr. Agostini. I would imagine that there is, but then
again, U.S. Customs and DEA are probably better qualified to
answer than question than I am.
Mr. Ose. Well, then we may well go over this subject again.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman yields back his time. Mr.
Barcelo, welcome.
Mr. Romero-Barcelo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate
and thank you for the invitation to allow me to participate
with the panel. And I just want to congratulate you for holding
this hearing, I think it is very, very important and definitely
the most important issue in Puerto Rico is the crime issue.
Although we have accomplished many things, we are still not
happy with what we have and we want to improve it a lot more.
I want to congratulate the Attorney General for his
extraordinary presentation today. I think it was very, very
eloquent and very informative. We are sorry to see that you are
not going to be with us any more, we really are.
I wanted to touch base on a couple of things and I wanted
to just briefly go through history to make sure that people
also know how long we have been dealing with this. I was
elected mayor back in 1968 and in 1969 and 1970 I became aware
of the drug problem that we had in Puerto Rico. Since then, I
started coming to the FBI in Washington, to the United States
Attorney's Office, the Attorney General, trying to get a task
force put together in Puerto Rico. I was not able to do that
for my 8 years in office, and I visited both the FBI and the
Department of Justice many, many times.
Then finally, when we had the Pan American Games in Puerto
Rico, we did such a good job on the security of those games,
that then the President sent--Ambassador Carter was his name--
and he said what would you like, the President wants me to
offer you something that we can do for you, you were so
successful with the security. I said let us have a task force
in Puerto Rico for the drug interdiction and for organized
crime and for terrorism.
Finally, a task force was put together but it was not
adequately funded. Then after--at that time, I was already
Governor. Then when I lost the elections, the communication
between the local Puerto Rican agencies and the Federal
agencies was disrupted. They were not trusting each other any
more, particularly the Federal agencies were not trusting the
people in the Justice Department in Puerto Rico, nor the Police
Department because leaks were coming out. So the whole task
force fell apart. After 1993, the High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Area efforts have come about and they have done a
tremendous job. I have been asking for something like this for
many, many, many years and people were overlooking the
situation in Puerto Rico. It was starting to get more and more
serious all the time.
So I am happy that a lot is being done, but as you say, a
lot still needs to be done.
I have some figures that were given to me by your office
that says that in the Mexican corridor last year, 1998, 44
percent of the cocaine that was transported was seized, whereas
in the Caribbean corridor, only 11 percent of the cocaine that
was transported was seized. I think those are very, very
telling data. Am I correct on that information?
Mr. Agostini. Yes, you are, and these, I need to make
clear, are estimates, our best estimates that we can come up
with, but those numbers are correct, yes.
Mr. Romero-Barcelo. And then the other thing that you
mentioned was that now, there used to be--3 out of 10 murders
used to be drug-related and now even though we have reduced
murders substantially, but now 8 out of 10 murders are drug-
related.
Mr. Agostini. That is a very precise statistic, yes.
Mr. Romero-Barcelo. Since a lot of the drugs are coming in,
and as you mentioned there is the Dominican cartel and the
Colombian cartels are controlling the drug traffic, how many of
those murders do you know, what percentage of those murders
were committed by illegal or undocumented aliens?
Mr. Agostini. It is a significant percentage but the truth
of the matter is that the largest percentage is by Puerto Rican
organizations. Because of our effectiveness in taking out
complete organizations, drug organizations, and creating
vacuums, that vacuum will try to be filled by various other
organizations, so what happens is that they start shooting each
other out to fill that vacuum. And that is what is happening,
that is why it is drug-related murders that we are seeing, 80
percent of the murders.
Mr. Romero-Barcelo. Another problem that we have, we have
strict gun control laws in Puerto Rico, but there are a lot of
illegal guns. I have not heard you discussing that and
obviously the illegal gun traffic also affects--the drug
groups, the cartels and the gangs are heavily armed and we see
them when the police go in to do something, sometimes they have
superior arms to the police.
Mr. Agostini. Yes, that is a huge problem. We are finding--
and this is an ATF statistic--that 80 percent of the illegal
weapons that are being brought to Puerto Rico are being brought
from Florida.
Mr. Romero-Barcelo. So there is a two-way connection.
Mr. Agostini. It is so easy to purchase weapons in some of
the States that anybody--they buy 20-30 weapons in different
places and then they put them altogether and bring them to
Puerto Rico and sell them off.
Mr. Romero-Barcelo. They probably send them through
containers.
Mr. Agostini. Containers or they are using Federal Express
to get them down here or they are using other commercial means
to get them to Puerto Rico.
Mr. Romero-Barcelo. So as you leave us now as the Secretary
of Justice in Puerto Rico, what would be your recommendations
as to what should be emphasized on in the next years?
Mr. Agostini. Well, I think I have expressed already the
three areas that I think are the most important. We need to
have response capabilities. If we put all these resources out
there to gather the intelligence and we cannot respond to that,
it is as good as not having it. And we are spending huge
amounts of money in radar and I am asking for the armed forces
to give us more intel and we are asking for helicopters to
gather more intel and if we cannot respond after we have all
that intelligence, then we are not doing anything. And another
thing is we need to be able to prosecute all these cases.
Mr. Mica asked a question a little while ago and I
expressed to him one of the things I think the Federal
Government should be doing. There is a second thing that comes
to mind. One of the successes we have seen in Puerto Rico in
having the Federal law enforcement agencies work together is
because of the limited resources and because we can maximize
that through the funds of the HIDTA. And what I have become
perceptively inclined to think is that the way in which the
Federal law enforcement agencies are measured every year to
provide them with their budgets creates a situation where they
try to not share information with one another. Customs does not
want to give information to DEA, DEA does not want to give it
to FBI because then what happens is that FBI claims that they
broke this case and that is the way they are measured.
So what is happening is that because they are fighting each
other to get their fair share of the budget, they are trying to
keep their information so that they can be measured through
that information. And I think it is a very unfair system,
because I think they are all being very effective, they are all
working very hard and until they start sharing all their
information, they are not going to be all as effective as they
can be. That sharing of information is occurring in Puerto
Rico, that is why we have the best intelligence center in the
whole nation and that needs to be exported somehow to the rest
of the nation.
Mr. Romero-Barcelo. Thank you very much.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Barcelo.
Mr. Attorney General, I want to thank you very much for
coming up here. We will take the information that you have
given us and we will try to draft a letter to the parties that
ought to be addressed, the President and the Secretary of State
and the head of DEA and others, and ask them why there has been
cuts in the funding for these various areas and why there is
not more appropriations being made for the things that you have
mentioned. And we will go through those and enumerate those and
I will send you a copy of that letter.
I really appreciate you being here, we appreciate the fine
job you have done as Attorney General, we are going to miss you
down there, but I am sure we will see you again in the future.
Mr. Agostini. I am sure you will.
Mr. Burton. Thank you very much.
We will now go to our second panel of Mr. Ledwith, the
Chief of Foreign Operations for DEA; Mr. Vigil, Special Agent
in Charge of the Caribbean Division of DEA; Mr. Varrone, who is
the Executive Director of Customs.
That is all the panelists we have, the three? OK, very
good.
Because we want to get your sworn testimony, would you all
rise and raise your right hands, please?
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Burton. Thank you very much, be seated.
I presume you each have an opening statement. If not, we
will go to questions, but we will start with Mr. Ledwith and we
will go right down the line.
STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM E. LEDWITH, CHIEF OF FOREIGN OPERATIONS,
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION; MICHAEL S. VIGIL, CHIEF AGENT
IN CHARGE, CARIBBEAN FIELD DIVISION, DRUG ENFORCEMENT
ADMINISTRATION; AND JOHN C. VARRONE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
OPERATIONS, EAST, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE
Mr. Ledwith. Mr. Chairman and members of the full
committee, thank you for this opportunity to speak on behalf of
the Drug Enforcement Administration concerning drug trafficking
in the Caribbean.
I will provide a general overview, with particular focus on
Cuba. Special Agent in Charge of our San Juan office, Michael
Vigil, who follows me, will concentrate on Puerto Rico.
I have a written statement and with your permission, I wish
to submit it for the record, sir.
Mr. Burton. Without objection.
Mr. Ledwith. The Caribbean has long been an important zone
for drugs entering the United States and Europe from South
America. The drugs are transported through the region of both
the United States and Europe via a wide variety of routes and
methods. Maritime vessels are the primary means used by
traffickers to smuggle large quantities of cocaine through the
Caribbean to the United States. Small launches with powerful
motors, known as go-fast boats, bulk cargo freighters and
containerized cargo vessels are the most common conveyances for
moving large quantities of cocaine through the region. Drug
traffickers also routinely transport smaller quantities of
cocaine from Colombia to clandestine landing strips in the
Caribbean via single or twin engine aircraft and air drop
cocaine loads to waiting land vehicles and/or maritime vessels.
Compared to cocaine, heroin movement through the Caribbean
is limited. Almost all of the heroin transitting the Caribbean
originates in Colombia. Couriers generally transport kilogram
quantities of Colombian heroin on commercial flights from South
American to Puerto Rico or the continental United States. They
sometimes make one or two stops at various Caribbean islands in
an effort to mask their original point of departure from law
enforcement.
The Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement [IACM], in
which the DEA participates, provides estimates on the cocaine
tonnage transitting through various countries including
Jamaica, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas and Cuba.
From July 1998 through June 1999, the IACM estimated that
approximately 110 metric tons transitted through these
countries. Of this amount, approximately 54 metric tons or 49
percent of the total that is estimated, transitted Haiti and 32
metric tons or 29 percent of the total transitted the Bahamas.
During this period the IACM estimated that 1.85 metric tons or
1.7 of the total transitted Cuba.
The Caribbean region continues to play an important role in
the transportation of cocaine from South America to Europe
also. Cocaine is transported to Europe through the Caribbean
primarily in commercial container cargo or concealed in medium
to large merchant vessels. Spain is the primary original
destination of this cocaine. Colombian drug traffickers prefer
forming alliances with drug traffickers in Spain, where there
is no language barrier and Colombian drug traffickers can move
about with more anonymity than in other European countries. The
Netherlands and Belgium are other focal points currently used
by Colombian drug trafficking organizations to distribute
cocaine in Europe.
Containers are loaded with cocaine in South American ports.
The cocaine is sometimes concealed in the merchandise itself
but, more often, in false compartments constructed within the
containers. The containers are often transshipped through
various ports in South America, Central America and the
Caribbean while en route to these European ports. While Spain
has remained the primary initial destination of the cocaine,
recent seizures indicate large cocaine shipments were destined
for ports in the Mediterranean and northern Europe as well.
Large quantities of cocaine also are clandestinely loaded
aboard medium to large merchant vessels in the Caribbean.
Countries in Europe are experiencing an increase in drug
above and a concomitant increase in the flow of cocaine from
South America. Over the past 10 years, cocaine seizures in
Europe have increased dramatically, indicating an increase in
demand. In 1988, a total of 5.7 metric tons of cocaine
hydrochloride was seized in Europe. By 1997, the total had
risen to over 40 metric tons. Demand has driven the price of
cocaine in Europe to levels even above those found in the
United States today. In 1998 the price range for 1 kilogram of
cocaine sold in the United States was between $10,000 and
$36,000. During 1998, the average price of a kilogram of
cocaine in Spain was $41,000. The price disparity between
Europe and the United States has provided a significant
incentive for Colombian drug traffickers to expand their
marketing efforts to Europe as well as the United States.
The island of Cuba lies in a direct air and maritime path
from South America to Florida. While the Government of Cuba's
performance in interdicting narcotics has been mixed, the Cuban
Government has recently strengthened agreements with several
other governments. Cuban authorities occasionally have arrested
individual drug traffickers. Historically, however, the Cuban
Government has not responded aggressively to incursions by
these traffickers in the Cuban territorial waters or air space.
Cuba has argued that it lacks ``the naval means'' and other
resources to patrol all of its air space and territorial
waters. At the same time, it does not routinely permit U.S.
interdiction assets to enter its territory.
Drug traffickers continue to use Cuban waters and air space
to evade United States interdiction assets. Go-fast boats from
Jamaica routinely travel just inside Cuban waters to avoid
contact with United States enforcement vessels. Traffickers
also use small aircraft to transport cocaine from clandestine
airfields in the Guajira Peninsula in Colombia through Cuban
air space. Cocaine may then be air dropped and later retrieved
by go-fasts that take the drugs to the Bahamas for further
transshipment to the United States. It should be noted that in
1999, the number of these suspected drug flights over Cuban
territory has declined, compared to the increase that was noted
in 1998.
According to Cuban police reporting provided to the
Colombian Government, Cuban law enforcement has made occasional
arrests of drug couriers. The majority of these couriers were
transporting kilogram quantities of cocaine to European
countries, although occasional deliveries were made to
traffickers operating in Cuba. Cuban authorities have reported
to the Colombian authorities only limited instances of heroin
couriers traveling through Cuba.
Commercial vessels, which transport cocaine from South
America to Europe also may load legitimate cargo in Cuban
ports. These vessels transit other Caribbean, Central American
or South American ports.
In addressing the role of Cuba in the international drug
trade, DEA must rely on international media sources, as well as
other foreign law enforcement agencies, for much of our
information regarding drug arrests and seizures by Cuban
authorities. Since DEA does not have a presence in Cuba, we
cannot independently corroborate much of the reporting on
alleged Cuban involvement in drug trafficking.
The December 1998 seizure of 7.254 metric tons of cocaine
in the Colombian port of Cartagena is one example of drugs
apparently destined to transit Cuba which has received a great
deal of attention. The Colombian National Police found the
cocaine sophisticatedly concealed in compartments within
maritime shipping containers. The containers were manifested
for shipment to Cuba. DEA and other U.S. counterdrug agencies
have been aggressively and meticulously pursuing the
investigation of this cocaine shipment. At this point in our
investigation, we have no information that suggests that this
particular shipment was destined for the United States. The
information we do have, which we are attempting to
independently corroborate, indicates that this shipment was
destined for Spain.
Investigations by the Colombian National Police, the DEA
Bogota Country Office, the DEA Madrid Country Office, the
Spanish National Police and the Cuban Federal Police to date
have not developed direct evidence of the ultimate destination
of the cocaine.
Drug trafficking organizations generally do not ship multi-
ton cocaine shipments by a specific route or method without
first testing the pipeline. Information provided by the Cuban
Police to the Colombian National Police indicated that the same
companies involved with the shipment seized in Cartagena made
at least four previous shipments of containers with hidden
compartments. In each of these four shipments, containers that
originated in Cartagena were shipped from Cuba to Spain.
Information also provided by the Cuban Police to the
Colombian National Police indicated the Cuban Police searched
the premises in Havana of businesses associated with the
Cartagena seizure. Cuban Police reports to the Colombian Police
the discovery of four containers that appeared to have been
outfitted with false compartments. The four containers bore the
serial numbers of containers previously shipped from Cartagena
through Cuba to Spain. None of the agencies investigating the
seizure have been able to obtain direct evidence that any of
the containers in the four shipments contained cocaine.
DEA is vigorously engaged in a comprehensive investigation
of all aspects of this seizure. We are cooperating extensively
with authorities in Colombia and Spain. Special agents from DEA
headquarters are assigned to the Cartagena seizure
investigation. A senior supervisory special agent is assigned
the oversight of the investigation and is coordinating the
compilation of all information involving Cuba.
My office is also working closely with our offices in
Colombia and Spain to review all existing documents, assist in
ensuring all previous leads are followed, and in developing any
new leads. I want to thank the committee for the information
you provided, including audio tapes and transcripts. I assure
the committee that all information derived from these sources
will be factored into our investigation.
A priority of DEA is to obtain independent corroboration of
all information and evidence acquired in this investigation.
This will include working to corroborate all foreign police
reports to the greatest extent possible. All of the reports are
being reviewed by the headquarters intelligence research
specialists assigned to this investigation.
Last month, DEA coordinated a visit to Colombia and Spanish
authorities. Spanish authorities, Colombian authorities and
special agents from DEA met to review evidence and to discuss
sources and methods for developing new information and evidence
regarding the alleged drug trafficking between Colombia and
Spain.
In any investigation, the DEA does not rule out any
possibility until the investigation is concluded. As new
information is developed, the investigative direction is always
subject to change.
The primary focus, after the information is obtained, is to
develop evidence that can be used in criminal prosecutions and
corroborate evidence of meet evidentiary standards.
While I cannot comment on the details of an ongoing
investigation in a public forum, I assure you that DEA
continues to expend every effort on the investigation of the
Cartagena shipment.
I will gladly answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Vigil.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ledwith and Mr. Vigil
follows:]
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Mr. Vigil. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the
full committee, thank you for this opportunity to speak on
behalf of the Drug Enforcement Administration regarding Puerto
Rico. With your permission, I wish to submit my written
statement for the record.
Mr. Burton. Without objection.
Mr. Vigil. As you have heard from Mr. Ledwith, the
Caribbean ia a major transit zone for drugs entering the United
States from South America. Within that area, Puerto Rico
provides a particularly significant link between South America
and the continental United States. The island is singular in
the opportunities it provides for traffickers as well as the
challenges it creates for law enforcement.
More than ever, international drug trafficking
organizations utilize Puerto Rico as a major point of entry for
the transshipment of multi-tons of cocaine being smuggled into
the United States. Puerto Rico has become known as a gateway
for drugs destined for cities on the east coast of the United
States. Puerto Rico's 300 mile coastline, the vast number of
isolated cays, and 6 million square miles of open water between
the United States and Colombia, make the region difficult to
patrol and ideal for a variety of smuggling methods.
Puerto Rico is an active Caribbean sea and air
transportation thoroughfare. The island boasts the third
busiest seaport in North America and 14th busiest in the world,
as well as approximately 75 daily commercial airline flights to
the continental United States. This presents an attractive
logistical opportunity for drug trafficking organizations. The
sheer volume of commercial activity is the traffickers'
greatest asset. Criminal organizations have utilized their
financial capabilities to corrupt mechanics, longshoremen,
airline employees, ticket counter agents as well as government
officials and others whose corrupt practices broaden the scope
of the trafficking.
Only 360 miles from Colombia's north coast and 80 miles
from the east coast of the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico is
easily reachable by twin engine aircraft hauling payloads of
500 to 700 kilograms of cocaine. The go-fast boats make their
round trip cocaine runs to the southern coast of Puerto Rico in
less than a day. Today, cocaine and heroin traffickers from
Colombia have transformed Puerto Rico into the largest staging
area in the Caribbean for illicit drugs destined for the United
States market.
The open use of the Caribbean as a narcotics transshipment
center has created a public safety crisis in Puerto Rico and
DEA must assign resources to the island to address this threat.
Although this is necessary, we have had continuing difficulties
retaining Federal law enforcement personnel in the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico. Few personnel from the continental United
States are willing to accept a transfer to Puerto Rico, and
those who do often want to leave soon after arrival. Such
quality of life problems as the high cost of living, limited
availability of appropriate schools for dependent children and
the high incidence of crime have contributed to early turnover
and family separations.
As a result, DEA has in place a variety of incentive
packages for special agents, diversion investigators and
intelligence analysts relocating to Puerto Rico.
While these have proven to be a partial solution, DEA has
developed the following proposal to address the retention
issue:
No. 1, a tax exempt educational allowance to assist DEA
employees in sending dependent children to DOD or private
schools.
No. 2, a housing allowance or significant stipend for both
special agents and support personnel to allow for the purchase
of housing in safe areas or guarded, enclosed communities.
No. 3, an extended assignment bonus for remaining in place
after completion of the initial period of service.
No. 4, home leave of 5 days annually, not tied to tour
renewal.
The next one is salary tax relief with taxes to be based
upon the home of record rather than the current requirement
that they pay both Federal and Puerto Rico hacienda taxes.
And finally, an amendment to the Soldier and Sailor's
Relief Act to allow voting via absentee ballot.
Since fiscal year 1997, DEA has increased the special agent
resources to the Caribbean. In that timeframe, a total of 48
agents have been added to the Caribbean field division, 43 of
which are currently assigned to Puerto Rico. The remaining
agents have been assigned to regional offices within the
Caribbean field division, including Jamaica, Haiti, Trinidad
and also Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic. In our fiscal
year 2000 appropriations, DEA received an additional 17
positions, which includes 11 special agents and $2.4 million
for drug enforcement operations in Puerto Rico as well as funds
to enhance quality of life issues as noted above.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I would thank you very much for
your effort in obtaining those resources for Puerto Rico,
because they are sorely needed and we can use those in
expanding our operational parameters.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Vigil, we understand that there
have been some real problems with the agents in Puerto Rico
because of safety as well as the other issues that you
mentioned.
Mr. Vigil. That is correct.
Mr. Burton. We will try to see if we cannot have the
subcommittee correspond with the appropriate agencies to see if
we can solve some of those problems for you because we do need
to keep good agents down there.
Mr. Vigil. Thank you.
There are----
Mr. Burton. Oh, go ahead, do you have more of your
statement?
Mr. Vigil. Yes, I have a couple more pages.
Mr. Burton. Oh, I am sorry, I thought you were finished.
Mr. Vigil. There are presently 94 special agents
constituting six enforcement groups assigned to the Caribbean
Field Division. Five groups are earmarked for specialized
enforcement initiatives. They are as follows: one high
intensity drug tafficking area task force; two additional task
forces; a money laundering group and an airport group. Each
group possesses expertise in a specific domain and fully
exploits it to thwart the traffickers. This combination results
in highly effective drug enforcement investigations and
prosecutions. These investigations have led to the initiation
of several enforcement operations, such as Operation Columbus
and Genesis which have culminated in numerous arrests and
significant seizures which resulted in the dismantling of
several drug trafficking organizations operating in the
Caribbean.
The transit of illegal drugs through Puerto Rico creates
unique challenges to law enforcement. DEA is aggressively
pursuing the drug trafficking threat to Puerto Rico and working
to improve the ability of DEA personnel assigned to the island
in confronting this threat.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before this committee. I appreciate the interest you and the
subcommittee have shown in DEA's drug enforcement efforts in
Puerto Rico. At this time, I would be happy to answer any
questions you or the subcommittee members may have.
Mr. Mica. Thank you for your testimony. We are going to
withhold questions until we have heard from everyone. I will
now recognize John C. Varrone who is Executive Director of
Operations at Eastern U.S. Customs Service. Welcome, sir, and
you are recognized.
Mr. Varrone. Good morning, Mr. Mica.
I would first like to start by thanking the chairman, Mr.
Burton, for his kind comments.
Mr. Ose. Would you move that closer, please?
Mr. Mica. As close as you can get it.
Mr. Ose. Eat that thing. [Laughter.]
Mr. Mica. They do not want to miss a word. [Laughter.]
Mr. Varrone. Good morning, Mr. Mica.
I would first like to thank Mr. Burton, the chairman, for
his kind comments about the men and women of the Customs
Service in their anti-terrorist activities up in Port Angeles,
Washington and in Vermont. The recognition on behalf of the
committee is important and I will carry that back to Washington
and pass it on to the commissioner that you did recognize those
individuals.
Mr. Chairman and other members of the committee, it is my
pleasure to have the opportunity to be with you here today to
talk to you about the important issue of drug smuggling, and in
particular smuggling in the Caribbean, and the overall
enforcement mission of the Customs Service.
I currently serve as the Executive Director of Operations,
East, within the U.S. Customs Service's Office of
Investigations. In this capacity I am responsible for the
investigative operations of seven Special Agent in Charge
offices on the East Coast of the United States, including our
operations in the Caribbean.
The Customs Service is the primary law enforcement agency
with responsibility for the interdiction of drugs in the
arrival zone. In addition to our responsibilities in the
arrival zone, the Customs Service through our air and marine
interdiction assets also provides significant assistance to
other domestic and international law enforcement agencies who
have responsibilities in both the source and transit zones.
I realize that this committee is primarily interested in
Cuba today, but I would like to briefly describe the border
threat that we face in the entire Caribbean.
As the committee is aware, it is estimated that
approximately 40 percent of the cocaine destined to the United
States enters our country through the Caribbean. In fiscal
years 1998 and 1999 respectively, the Customs Service seized
20,673 and 20,492 pounds of cocaine in and around Puerto Rico
and the Caribbean. Our intelligence analysis and enforcement
operations now indicate that private aircraft are used to
conduct air drops in the transit zone to a variety of vessels.
The areas where we have seen this activity most frequently have
been in the waters off Haiti, Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico
and the Bahamas.
One of the current areas of increasing threat for Customs
is Haiti, where the smuggling by coastal freighters presents
both an inspectional and investigative challenge. The political
instability in Haiti combined with their lack of marine law
enforcement capabilities has meant that drug smuggling
organizations have been able to exploit the absence of law
enforcement and have been able to operate there with relative
impunity.
I have two charts that will illustrate the current threat
we face in the non-commercial maritime arena in the Caribbean.
These charts are a summary of the confirmed and suspected non-
commercial maritime smuggling events which were detected during
calendar years 1998 and 1999 in three areas of particular
interest to the committee--Jamaica-Bahamas, Puerto Rico-Virgin
Islands and Haiti-Dominican Republic. The noticeable difference
between these two charts is that the flow of cocaine in the
non-commercial maritime environment has increased by
approximately 15 percent.
I would like to present to you how the Customs Service
views the threat presented by Cuba in the area of drug
smuggling. With limited anecdotal evidence, our intelligence
analysis and enforcement experience has led us to believe that
Cuba plays a minimal role, if any, in non-commercial smuggling.
Smugglers on occasion use Cuban waters and air space to thwart
end game drug interdiction operations. We believe drug
smugglers are acutely aware of the lack of operational
coordination and law enforcement exchange between the United
States and Cuban Governments and accordingly exploit the
situation by circumventing our interdiction efforts.
As you have heard in previous testimony on this subject,
radar track data indicates that in 1999, there was a decrease
in air tracks transitting Cuban air space. I have brought with
me four additional charts that will illustrate that change.
As you can see from the first chart, in 1998, there were 34
confirmed or suspect tracks that that transitted Cuban air
space. I would like to pause here and just briefly describe
what we consider confirmed or suspected. We consider that not
just our radar tracking, but a secondary source that confirms
that there was an asset there or that was a smuggling attempt
there. Whether we were successful at interdicting that or not,
we consider that a smuggling attempt.
In 1999, the number of confirmed or suspected tracks that
transitted Cuban air space declined to 11. The last of these
tracks occurred just last week. On December 29, a plane was
tracked as it flew over Cuban air space to an air track
location outside Cuban territorial waters. The go-fast vessel
that received the drugs was tracked to the Bahamas where the
crew was arrested after they ditched what was believed to be
approximately 500 pounds of cocaine.
Returning to the charts, the third and fourth chart
illustrate the air track data for Haiti during that period.
These charts show a 25 percent increase in tracks over Haiti.
Our overall assessment is that drug smugglings are using
Cuban waters and air space when it is in their interest,
particularly in situations where it enables smugglers to avoid
drug interdiction efforts.
As you are aware, Customs agents have debriefed cooperating
defendants who have given us some insight into the role that
Cuba has played in their drug smuggling operations. The
information provided by cooperating defendants largely supports
our characterization of Cuban waters and air space as a place
used by smugglers as a safe haven from drug interdiction
forces. One example of this type of cooperating information is
that which was provided to Customs debriefers in 1999 by a
Colombian transportation coordinator who we arrested in 1998.
I believe that the report of this debriefing has already
been provided to the committee. The general description of this
cooperator's information is that smugglers use Cuban waters and
air space to conduct air drop operations because they believe
they are safe from United States drug interdiction operations.
The source further stated the air drops are completed--excuse
me--that after air drops are completed, smugglers stage in
Cuban waters until they are sure law enforcement assets are not
in the area before they depart for their final destination.
This particular cooperator indicated that while drug smugglers
may transit Cuban air space, it is not necessary to coordinate
with or seek permission from Cuban authorities.
It should be noted that this cooperator's description of
air drop operations inside Cuba has been corroborated by
surveillance operations conducted by our Customs P-3 aircraft.
I would like to take a few moments to describe for the
committee how the Customs Service has tried to respond to the
Caribbean threat and some of the successes that we have
achieved. Customs has committed a significant law enforcement
presence in the Caribbean. Our Office of Field Operations has
209 Customs inspectors and canine officers assigned to the
islands of Puerto Rico, St. Thomas and St. Croix. The Office of
Investigations has 82 special agents assigned to the island of
Puerto Rico and 8 more special agents assigned to St. Thomas.
The Customs Service has dedicated nine aircraft to the
Caribbean air branch; three tracking aircraft, three
helicopters and three twin engine fixed wing aircraft. We have
also dedicated a total of 41 vessels to the Caribbean. I should
note that this represents 30 percent of all the vessels
operated by the Customs Service. These vessels include 22
interceptors, 7 patrol craft, 11 utility craft and 1 blue water
craft. Using all of these resources, Customs interdiction
operations have been responsible for numerous successes.
In March 1996, the Customs Service initiated Operation
Gateway in an effort to insulate Puerto Rico and the United
States Virgin Islands and the surrounding waters and air space
from drug smugglers. This multi-year operation was a natural
extension and expansion of Operation Hardline, which had
focused on the southern land border and southern tier of the
United States.
More recently, the Customs Service and other law
enforcement agencies have undertaken several operations to
address both the air and maritime threats in the region. One of
these, Operation Two Dozen, was a pulse and surge type
operation whereby the Customs Service, Coast Guard, DEA, U.S.
Army and Bahamian Police coordinated all source intelligence
and responded with enforcement operations accordingly. The
focus of this operation was to interdict vessels and aircraft
smuggling into the Bahamas and south Florida. It was in effect
during February and March 1999.
During the four phases of the operation, drug interdiction
patrols were conducted for a total of 13 days. These patrols
resulted in the seizure of 2,060 pounds of cocaine, 850 pounds
of marijuana, the seizure of 3 vessels, 1 aircraft and arrest
of 40 individuals.
Last, I would like to briefly describe three recent
enforcement examples which I believe will provide you with a
sense of the enormous challenge facing the U.S. Customs
Service.
To give you a sense of the physical threat confronting our
officers, I will briefly describe a smuggling example which
occurred on March 26, 1999 when a vessel attempted to elude
Customs agents by colliding with our vessel. Agents were forced
to fire rounds at the suspect vessel to disable the engine.
When the five crew members were arrested, they were all wearing
face masks and bulletproof vests. No weapons were recovered.
The Coast Guard did recover 1,900 pounds of cocaine that the
crew had jettisoned during the pursuit.
In specific response to the increasing threat from Haiti,
the Customs Service has led a multi-agency enforcement
operation called River Sweep, which focuses on Haitian coastal
freighters attempting to smuggle drugs, principally cocaine,
into the United States. Since its inception in 1998, this
operation has resulted in the seizure of 8,256 pounds of
cocaine, 129 arrests, the seizure of 12 Haitian coastal
freighters, $1.5 million in currency, and the recovery of 19
stolen vehicles.
In just the last 90 days, Customs has seized 1,740 pounds
of cocaine from Haitian coastal freighters on the Miami River
and $1 million suspected drug proceeds from our outbound
interdiction program.
On November 14, 1999, in our most recent cooperative
effort, Customs, FBI and DEA agents in St. Thomas seized 4,672
pounds of cocaine discovered aboard the motor vessel Adriatik
which was stopped and searched by the Coast Guard based upon a
successful lookout.
I should also note that this past Saturday, Customs
aviation assets participated in a tracking and later detention
of Ly Tong, who overflew Cuba after departing from the United
States in a rented plane. The Customs Service air and marine
interdiction and coordination center in Riverside, California
was able to track Mr. Tong from the time he departed Miami
until he returned.
I would like to thank the committee for the opportunity to
provide the Customs Service's perspective on this important
issue. I have tried to present to you a brief overview of the
operational environment which our front line employees confront
every day. We are always proud to share the experience,
expertise and accomplishments of our dedicated officers who
make many sacrifices and frequently place themselves in harm's
way on behalf of the citizens of the United States.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to testify before
you and the committee today. I will be glad to answer any
questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Varrone follows:]
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Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Varrone. We do appreciate very
much your candor and your dedication. I think all of the
agencies that are dealing with the drug trafficking deserve
accolades because there is a great deal of risk involved and
you lay your lives on the line on a regular basis, and we do
appreciate that.
One of the things that concerns me is the politicization of
the drug problem. The Cuba issue, Mr. Ledwith, that you talked
about, the information, much of the information that you
received came from Cuban authorities as I understand it.
Mr. Ledwith. Yes, sir, some of it came to us from Cuban
authorities.
Mr. Burton. Well, the Cuban authorities, we had a tape that
I was going to subpoena from DEA that we showed yesterday. That
tape showed a man who landed his plane in Cuba and he said he
had engine troubles, he got false documents from the Cuban
Government saying that there were engine problems and that is
why he force landed there. He was carrying drugs, cocaine. And
the Cuban Government was complicitous because they were lying
about why he landed in Cuba. Mr. Sierra, in the Prensa Latina
said that the 7.2 metric tons, or 7.25 metric tons that was
coming out of Colombia was destined for the United States.
Now some people in DEA and others have said well, the Cuban
official was saying that the drugs were coming but were going
to Spain and not to the United States. Then we heard that that
was not even going to go to Cuba, it was going to go to another
location and then go to Spain. You hear all kinds of things
like that. But the fact of the matter is from government
officials, our government officials, we have been told that
what Mr. Sierra said was an accurate statement that he made. He
made that statement and the only shipment of that size that was
going to Cuba during that time period or through the Caribbean
during that time period was this particular shipment. This did
not come from DEA, it came from another government agency that
is very reliable.
I hate to see political statements made by any official of
our government, DEA or any others, that is not really accurate,
when we put members of the various agencies under oath like we
did you today, and I fully presume that you did tell the truth
to the best of your knowledge. But the fact of the matter is
the information that we have from other agencies is that that
7.2 metric tons definitely was the only one of that size going
through the Caribbean at that time or scheduled to go through
the Caribbean at that time. There had been several other
shipments of that type to Cuba, not just 4 but as many as 7 or
8, and if you add all that up, it could amount to as much as 50
or 60 metric tons of cocaine going into Cuba.
You said I believe in your opening statement that the
amount going to Europe was 40 metric tons. If the information
we received is correct, more than that was going into Cuba from
Colombia on seven ships that transitted it. We have been told
by DEA that usually when somebody is sending a shipment of that
magnitude, that they have planned that and done that before,
they just do not send seven metric tons of cocaine in unless
they have a pretty good idea it is going to get to its
destination.
But let us assume the worst or the best, let us say that it
was not going to the United States, that it was going to Spain.
The fact of the matter is, Cuba is a major drug transit point
in the Caribbean. You said 49 percent of the drugs goes through
Haiti, the cocaine goes through Haiti; you said 29 percent goes
through the Bahamas--49 percent of the total 110 metric tons
goes through Haiti, 29 percent you estimate goes through the
Bahamas and only 1.7 metric tons goes through Cuba. This one
load was 7.2 metric tons. And from other sources, we believe
there were at least seven shipments like that, that is 49
metric tons. So I do not know where you came up with this 1.7
metric tons, but I would like for you to tell us.
Mr. Ledwith. This is the estimate provided by the
Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movements, which DEA is a
participant. We are not the author necessarily of these
figures. These are the figures that the interagency community
produces for their assessment of cocaine shipments, sir.
Mr. Burton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ledwith. It is not solely derived from DEA figures.
Mr. Burton. No, I understand. But when you make a statement
like that, you are speaking for a very important agency, one
that does great work and I am not here to criticize you because
I think you guys risk your lives, like I said to Customs
agents, I do not think I would like to do that.
But the fact of the matter is there is multiple shipments
going out of Colombia, according to our sources, many of those
sources in our government, not through DEA, other sources. I am
not at liberty to tell you those because they have given us
information they do not want us to talk about. They were
talking about the jealously between agencies, I suppose this is
part of it. But they told us that this 7.2 metric tons was
definitely going to Cuba and that that was the only ship with
that amount or shipment of that amount that was going through
at that particular time, it had to be going to Cuba and Mr.
Sierra said it was going to be destined for the United States.
Seven of those shipments we believe were made during that time,
that year, which is 49 metric tons. And I cannot believe that
one agency of our government would indicate that kind of a
quantity is going through Cuba and this consortium of this
agencies that you are talking about says that only 1.7 metric
tons goes through there.
One of the concerns that we have--and I hope my colleagues
will bear with me for just a second--one of the concerns that
we have is that we passed what was called the Helms-Burton law.
I was one of the authors of that bill. It was to create a very
strong embargo against Castro to end the last Communist
dictatorship in our hemisphere. All the other countries have
been democratized. The administration did not want to sign that
law, but because two airplanes were shot down by Russian MiGs
that were owned by the Cubans, the President then negotiated
with me and Senator Helms and others and he did sign the bill.
Now they are trying to weaken the embargo and they are trying
to normalize relations with Cuba and one of the things that
flies in the ointment is Cuba being a major transit point of
drugs. And so information we are getting about Cuba, we
believe, not because of you, may be tainted because of
political goals of the administration. And I think that is very
unfortunate because the drugs are coming into Cuba. We believe
a large part of those are destined for the United States and
kids are dying, people are being addicted for life.
The heroin, I do not know how much heroin is going through
Cuba, if any, but in Baltimore, MD right now, 1 out of 17
people in Baltimore, MD are addicted to heroin and one of the
council members there says he believes it is as high as 1 out
of 8. It is an absolute epidemic. And so I believe the
administration and our agencies ought to be very forthright
with us and tell us where the conduits are.
So I believe that you are accurate with Haiti, I think that
is a major conduit, I believe the Bahamas are a major conduit,
and I believe our Attorney General from Puerto Rico was
accurate when he said that we need to put more resources into
places like the Caribbean and Puerto Rico.
But to say that Cuba only had 1.7 metric tons of cocaine
going through there when one shipment was 7.2 metric tons and
another agency of our government says it definitely was going
to Cuba is a misrepresentation. And I am not saying it is
because you are misrepresenting it, maybe the information you
got was not accurate.
But I believe that as much as 50 metric tons are going
through Cuba and for some political reason, maybe to normalize
relations with Cuba, that is being kept under cover.
If you have a comment, I will let you comment and then I
will yield to Mr. Mica.
Mr. Ledwith. Sir, I can only presume that the agency that
you referred to that provided you with that information is a
participant in the Interagency Cocaine Movement Assessment and
I would be very happy to work with you or members of your staff
to make sure that those figures are incorporated.
I can only provide you what--this is not DEA's paper, as I
say, this is the IACM's paper. It is an interagency effort, it
is not based solely on DEA's statistics, it is agreed to by the
interagency community before publication.
Mr. Burton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ledwith. So I can only tell you I would be out of place
to provide you with any other statistic.
Mr. Burton. Well, what we will do is I will try to find out
if I can provide you with the information we have and perhaps
that can be put into the mix.
Mr. Ledwith. And we will be very happy to incorporate that,
sir.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Ledwith.
Mr. Mica.
Mr. Mica. Let me just followup, if I may, Mr. Ledwith, with
some questions on the same seizure that the chairman was
referring to, the 7.3 metric tons. I thought I read in your
report the Cuban Police gave to the Colombian National Police
indicated a search of the premises and they also found four
containers that appeared to have been outfitted with false
compartments. This is in addition to the 7.3 metric tons.
Mr. Ledwith. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Mr. Mica. So again, I think the chairman was raising a very
valid point. Now whether this is headed for Spain or the United
States, you are still talking about an incredible volume of
cocaine transitting through Cuba; is that correct?
Mr. Ledwith. If these facts as reported to us by the Cuban
Police are accurate, sir; yes.
Mr. Burton. It says none of the agencies investigating this
have been able to obtain direct evidence that any of the
containers in the four shipments described above contained
cocaine; is that correct? But I was told at the hearing that we
conducted in November that there was residue, whether it was
planted or--do we know whether there was residue in those?
Mr. Ledwith. There was a dog, cocaine sniffing dog that
alerted on one of the containers and that gave rise to the
residue remark. There was not actual cocaine recovered in the
sense that it could be used in an evidentiary manner. A cocaine
alerting dog alerted to it.
Clearly we are concerned, sir, DEA is extremely concerned
with any utilization of Cuba for trafficking. Our concern also
is for Europe. One of our concerns would be the incredible
strength that can be generated both economically and corruptive
potential to gangs in Colombia by sale of cocaine to Europe
either.
Mr. Mica. If the chairman is correct--and excuse me for
interrupting, I do not have a lot of time on this--but if the
chairman is correct and we had a 7.3 metric ton and we had
three or four containers that may have also been used in
shipment, we are talking--again, the chairman has got to be
close to correct, simple math would bring you up in the 40-50
metric ton range. The entire amount of shipment for Europe was
somewhere around 40 metric tons.
Mr. Ledwith. That was what was seized, sir.
Mr. Mica. Yes, seized, exactly. This is a phenomenal
amount.
Mr. Ledwith. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. I was somewhat skeptical before I held the first
hearing until we started getting evidence on this, and it
appears that Cuba, is in fact, a major transit route. Now,
whether it is coming to the United States, we cannot confirm,
but we know it is a transit route.
The second thing is, did DEA recommend to the
administration--now the President and the administration put a
list out of major trafficking countries and identifies them.
Did DEA, to your knowledge, recommend to the President that
Cuba be placed on this list? The hearing we held was right
after the President did not put Cuba on this list. What was the
DEA's recommendation, to your knowledge?
Mr. Ledwith. Sir, I do not have immediate knowledge of it.
We make recommendations to the Department of Justice, which are
incorporated in a deliberative process.
Mr. Mica. Well, based on the information you have, would
you not think it would be a candidate to be placed on that
list?
Mr. Ledwith. It is not a recommendation that I am able to
make, sir, at my level. Quite honestly, it is not something for
me to do. Based on the information that we are developing, it
is certainly something that should warrant a close look.
Mr. Mica. Is this case closed?
Mr. Ledwith. No, sir, it is not, as to the 7.254 tons, sir,
it is being actively and aggressively pursued. You can take my
word for it, I am not going to mislead anyone on this issue.
And it will be, with a certain element of luck as is involved
in any investigation, will be successfully concluded in the
foreseeable future.
Mr. Mica. If I may, let me shift over to Customs for a
second. I went down to the southern Caribbean, the area
actually around the Cuban coast and flew in one of the Customs
planes, the military planes. We witnessed ships, old container
ships and commercial vessels, zig-zagging in and out of the
Cuban waters. Is that still pretty much the pattern of activity
using Cuban waters as a refuge for people who may have illicit
cargo.
Mr. Varrone. As indicated by the air tracks; yes, sir, the
air tracks and our marine operations, we believe that they use
Cuban waters as a staging area.
Mr. Mica. We also looked at the go-fast boats, some of
those were being produced in Jamaica on the coast. Has that
operation been closed down or are they still producing the go-
fast boats there?
Mr. Varrone. I do not know if that particular operation has
been closed down.
Mr. Mica. Where are they producing the go-fast boats?
Mr. Varrone. I do not know.
Mr. Mica. You do not know. Well, I was briefed on that and
they told me it was on the northern coast, they even told me
that the engines for the go-fast were being purchased in the
United States, and we are tracing that back, and being
purchased by a Bahamian who was involved in organizing some of
the traffic through the Caribbean area. Is that--does anyone
have knowledge of where we might be on that?
Mr. Vigil. I might be able to answer that. You know, there
is still production being conducted of Yolas, what they call
Yolas. They are somewhat go-fast boats. However, it is very
difficult to shut down the entire operation, quite simply
because a lot of people use that as fishing boats and they use
that in terms of livelihood. They are not only used for drug
smuggling operations. We do have several ongoing investigations
in Jamaica in terms of individuals, drug trafficking
organizations that do use go-fast boats, but again, they are
not entirely used for drug trafficking activities or
enterprises.
Mr. Mica. Last thing, Mr. Chairman, and I would like an
update on that whole situation and also whether the individual
who was identified, who was the Bahamian ring leader, if he has
been brought to justice and whether they are still producing
most of them in Jamaica.
Mr. Chairman, we heard numbers of personnel here, 209 in
1982 I guess. Can we get some historical perspective on the
number of Customs personnel? I do not know whether you have
those figures available, what we had 4, 5, 6, 7 years ago
versus what we have now. We heard a little bit about INS, but I
want to know about Customs personnel in Puerto Rico and also
the Virgin Islands area that you discussed.
Mr. Varrone. Can we submit those to you, sir? I do not have
those numbers with me.
Mr. Mica. Are we up, down or what?
Mr. Varrone. The numbers are static right now.
Mr. Mica. Static to what, a year ago, 2 years ago?
Mr. Varrone. It has been between on board and what the
table of organization states, anywhere between 66 and 80
special agents, 82 is what I think the number is. It
fluctuates. We have similar problems as DEA and our other
Federal agencies do with retaining staffing because of
conditions transferring people to Puerto Rico, with incentive
packages. We are actually working on a package right now in
Washington that will try to parallel some of the incentives
that DEA and other Federal agencies have.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Chairman, if we could insert in the record at
this point a historical description of the personnel for
Customs, I would appreciate that.
Mr. Burton. Without objection, we will do that. And I would
like to have maybe that from DEA and the other agencies as
well. If you could give us some perspective over the last say
10 years, it would help us a great deal.
Mr. Barr.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9521.045
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ledwith, what we consider artificially low estimated
cocaine flow through Cuba that the chairman was discussing with
you and I think Mr. Mica also previously, you have indicated
that in your view that reflects a consensus opinion, I suppose,
of the IACM. DEA does not agree with those artificially low
assessments, does it?
Mr. Ledwith. We were a participant in establishing those,
sir, but clearly we are in the process of re-assessing those
based on information----
Mr. Barr. Did DEA file a dissent to those low figures?
Mr. Ledwith. I could not answer that, sir. I do not believe
DEA filed a dissent to these figures as published. I believe
these are a year or two old, as is the general nature of making
these assessments also, sir. So I would have to make a
determination as to today's DEA opinion, if you will, sir, on
the reliability of those numbers.
Mr. Barr. If you carry some weight with Mr. Marshall, who
will have confirmation hearings hopefully early in the year,
would you urge him to be a little more forceful in these
meetings?
Mr. Ledwith. Yes, sir.
Mr. Barr. I would appreciate that.
You indicate in your testimony that, quote, to date--well,
let me not put in quotes what ought not to be. On page 5 of
your testimony, you indicate that there are a number of
agencies, including DEA that continues to investigate very
thoroughly the 7.3 ton cocaine seizure in Cartagena and you
state that ``to date, have not developed direct evidence of the
ultimate destination of the cocaine.'' Does that mean that it
may have been destined for the United States, you just do not
have any evidence yet to say conclusively one way or the other
that it was or it was not?
Mr. Ledwith. That would be correct, sir, we do not have
direct evidence that would indicate a definitive location that
that was going to.
Mr. Barr. So DEA cannot, based on all of the evidence thus
far, rule out the United States as being the ultimate source?
Mr. Ledwith. Based on direct evidence, that would be
correct, sir.
Mr. Barr. Where then did the President get his evidence
that he stated publicly on November 10, ``their judgment
remains that Spain and not the United States was the intended
final destination.'' And the ``their judgment'' that he is
referring to is our intelligence agencies. Where did he get
that information?
Mr. Ledwith. It is DEA's position to this point, sir, that
we do not have direct evidence. We have indications that it was
headed to Spain but we do not have direct evidence at this
point.
Mr. Barr. So the statement of the President is not
supported by DEA.
Mr. Ledwith. I would not be able to say that, sir. I would
only be able to answer--I certainly cannot----
Mr. Barr. If I said is the following statement, Mr.
Ledwith, consistent with evidence of DEA, ``their judgment
remains that Spain and not the United States was the intended
final destination.'' You could not agree with that, could you?
Mr. Ledwith. No, sir, I would not say that. I would say
that at this point, that is an accurate representation. Our
indications were that it was headed to Spain. Clearly, we do
not yet have direct evidence, but there is a significant
difference between indications the way the investigation is
developing at this point, and direct evidence.
Mr. Barr. Like we were saying a little bit earlier, you are
sort of backtracking now. Maybe that is my fault for trying to
pin you down. Heaven forbid that we should try and pin people
down.
I do not think the problem is yours, but I think what you
are trying to do is support a political judgment that the
President has made that is a wrong judgment, that is not
supported by the facts. I understand the predicament that you
are in. You are not a policymaker.
Mr. Ledwith. No, sir, I am an operator, I have 31 years as
an operator, not a policymaker.
Mr. Barr. The one thing that I have always respected
tremendously in DEA is your law enforcement. You operate on the
law and on the evidence and the investigations and you take
them where they lead you. What we have been witnessing and I
think this is what the chairman was referring to a little bit
earlier, what we are witnessing is sort of a bastardization of
that process now for apparent political reasons, the judgments
being made at the White House, at the top policy levels, that
are not supported by the best interests and the best evidence
of law enforcement, and that is disturbing to us.
We see reports such as the one in October 20, 1999 in the
Miami Herald of meetings between--meetings in Cuba of top level
drug traffickers. We have reports that--and I would appreciate
your view on this--what is the status of the draft 1993
indictment of Raul Castro and others, including the institution
of the Cuban Government itself for drug trafficking?
Mr. Ledwith. I have limited knowledge of that. My
understanding of it, it was referred back to the Department of
Justice in Washington and not acted upon. I would not be the
expert person that could speak to that particular issue. That
is my understanding.
Mr. Barr. Have you ever seen a copy of that draft
indictment?
Mr. Ledwith. I have not, sir, no.
Mr. Barr. Does it exist? One would presume that it does.
Mr. Ledwith. It would be a presumption on my part, sir, but
I would presume it exists.
Mr. Barr. On my part too.
Mr. Chairman, I think we might want to take some steps,
either through subpoena or other means, to obtain a copy of
that because it is another indication--U.S. Attorneys, Mr.
Martinez having been a very distinguished U.S. Attorney, do not
draft indictments based on will of the wisp information. Even
though it is a draft, a draft indictment prepared by a U.S.
Attorney's office, including one with such a distinguished
record of drug prosecutions as the Miami U.S. Attorney's
office, draft an indictment based on very substantial evidence,
and I think the fact that this indictment was drafted indicates
that there is very substantial evidence, even as far back here
as prior to 1993 when these reports of this draft indictment
surfaced, that Cuba has been intimately and very vigorously
involved in drug trafficking in and of itself as well as as a
transshipment point. So I would appreciate it if we could make
some efforts to obtain a copy of that draft indictment.
Mr. Burton. We will. I think with your acquiescence, we
will send a letter to Attorney General Reno asking for this
draft indictment. If they are not forthcoming, I will be happy
to issue a subpoena to try to get that for us.
Mr. Ledwith. Mr. Chairman, might I respond for a moment to
one of Mr. Barr's questions, please?
Mr. Burton. Sure.
Mr. Ledwith. I would just like to say for the record that
DEA is an apolitical agency and if we had evidence, direct
evidence or if we had indications that that load was headed to
the United States, the 7.2 ton issue that we are speaking of, I
would be standing before you here saying that that is the case.
Irregardless----
Mr. Barr. I have no doubt that that is the case.
Mr. Ledwith. I would come here before you and say, despite
what anybody else may be saying, it is our position that if we
had those indications or evidence that it was headed to the
United States, as to that particular 7.24 or 5 ton seizure. We
are not a political agency and quite honestly, sir, I am not a
very political person. I am here to tell you the truth as best
we can see it, and that is what we are doing.
Mr. Barr. I appreciate that and I know that is the case
from my personal experience as a U.S. Attorney with DEA, and
since then as a Member of Congress. The problem I think is
where you have an administration that does not take that view.
They may not ask the questions because they do not want to hear
the answer that you might give them. The President I think--I
do not know, Mr. Chairman, did he ever meet with Mr.
Constantine on these matters? I think there has been testimony
that he just never even asked for briefings, so that therefore,
they can make statements like this one in November that have no
basis in legitimate evidence or fact, and DEA is not often
given the opportunity to participate and provide that objective
evidence that you and your colleagues would. But that is not
your problem, that is a problem at a higher level that we have
to face.
Mr. Burton. Let me just say to my good friend, Mr. Ledwith
from DEA before I yield to Mr. Ose, that I had some of the
officials from DEA into my office along with one of the people
that was involved in DEA's activities in Latin America and
Colombia and there was some discussion between DEA and the
White House about this shipment and one of the individuals--I
think there was some misrepresentation of it. I am not sure
whether it was because there was pressure put on them or what,
but I think there was some misrepresentation, and so I think
that one of the things that everybody ought to ask is why would
Rogelio Sierra, who is a spokesman for the Cuban Ministry of
Foreign Relations, say that 7 tons of Cuban-bound cocaine
seized in Colombia was destined for the United States? He says
or they are now saying that that was a mistake, he was talking
about another shipment that was going through the Caribbean
that was destined for Spain. But the other agency I talked
about said there was no other shipment close to that size
during that time period. So it appears as though Mr. Sierra and
the Cuban Ministry down there was trying to cover their
derrieres after he had a slip of the tongue that got in the
paper, Prensa Latina.
But I do not want to belabor the point, you are going on
with your investigation and I hope you will keep us informed
and I appreciate--I know we have put you on the spot today and
I apologize for that, I think that you have handled yourself
very well.
Mr. Ledwith. Thank you.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Ose.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I want to express my appreciation to Mr.
Varrone and his many colleagues at the Miami International
Airport. I had a very interesting 3 hour visit with them when I
came in on Sunday night. We actually----
Mr. Barr. You were not detained for 3 hours, were you?
Mr. Ose. I was not detained--thank you, Mr. Barr----
Mr. Barr. You might want to clarify that for the record.
Mr. Ose. I was actually invited to witness or watch their
operations and in the course of that 3 hour period, they were
able to detain one person on a wants and warrants check for
stalking, another person for a nominal amount of marijuana they
were bringing in on their person and then one of the rovers on
the Customs floor, by sight, picked out a guy that was packing
8,000 pills of Ecstacy headed to the South Beach area for
retailing. Mr. Varrone's colleagues, man, they just picked him
out and it was just a thing of beauty to watch. [Laughter.]
Mr. Barr. Based on tangible, articulable evidence.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Ose. Listen, you are the attorney, I am just sitting
here telling you what I saw. They just nailed the guy and it
was a thing of pleasure to watch. So my compliments to you and
your colleagues.
I want to go back and clarify something, Mr. Ledwith. On
your testimony here, if I understand the dilemma we are facing
here, it is that this chart on page 2 refers to estimates of
cocaine headed to the United States and the dilemma that we
have as it relates to this 7.2 metric tons is that DEA judged
that to be going to Spain, so it was not included in this
chart.
Mr. Ledwith. And I appreciate you pointing that out, sir,
that is accurate.
Mr. Ose. Is that accurate? We heard testimony yesterday and
I have heard it here a little bit today about that not being--
that 7.2 metric ton container being not the only--I cannot even
talk right now. Not the only container that was considered to
have been shipped, just on the basis that being that that
volume or amount of cocaine would not be shipped through a
channel that had not been tested, for instance.
Mr. Ledwith. That is a very accurate assessment. The
traffickers would not risk a quantity of that size and
magnitude until they had tested the pipeline with smaller
shipments. They would build to that size shipment, because the
risks are enormous.
Mr. Ose. I was doing some math up here and I have lost the
numbers, but it is somewhere on the order of half a billion
dollars worth of cocaine. I may be off by an order of
magnitude, but that number----
Mr. Burton. The 7.2 metric tons?
Mr. Ose. Yes.
Mr. Burton. It is $1\1/2\ billion.
Mr. Ose. $1\1/2\ billion. Well $500 million or $1\1/2\
billion, that is a heck of a lot of cocaine. I want to make
sure I understand, that while that 7.2 metric ton shipment, in
DEA's opinion, was destined for Europe, there is evidence,
logical or otherwise, to suggest that other shipments had gone
down that delivery channel, if you will, previous to that,
headed for both Europe and possibly the United States?
Mr. Ledwith. You could say that, sir. We cannot say with
any kind of definitive answer exactly where those other
shipments went. We can say that there were certainly, in our
opinion, other shipments, because they would not risk that
amount of drugs without testing that system. There is evidence
that there had been at the very least four prior shipments.
And Mr. Chairman, as Mr. Ose points out, I apologize, but
the 1.7 reference was to drugs that could be definitively said
were going through Cuba toward the United States and I believe
that thus this 7 ton shipment might not have been part of those
numbers and that is the mathematical problem that you mentioned
earlier. But yes, sir, there would have been other shipments.
Mr. Ose. Through Cuba, destined somewhere.
Mr. Ledwith. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ose. In the opinion of DEA.
Mr. Ledwith. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ose. All right. Do the organizations that push that
kind of volume traffick in both Europe and the United States?
Mr. Ledwith. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Ose. All right. Have you run into any drug trafficking
organizations recently moving that kind of volume to both
Europe and the United States?
Mr. Ledwith. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ose. OK. Through Cuba?
Mr. Ledwith. No, I cannot say through Cuba. When you asked
me have we run into organizations shipping those kind of
volumes----
Mr. Ose. I understand. Let me rephrase my question. Have
you run into any--have you recently run into any drug
trafficking organizations shipping that quantity of drugs
through Cuba to either Europe or the United States?
Mr. Ledwith. No, sir.
Mr. Ose. You have in December 1998, the 7.2 metric tons
came from an organization headed toward Europe.
Mr. Ledwith. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ose. In the DEA's opinion. But there has been no
similar conclusive position on DEA's part of a similar shipment
headed through Cuba to the United States?
Mr. Ledwith. To this point, no, sir, we do not have any.
Mr. Ose. And you have a number of ongoing investigations, I
am confident of. Do you have a number of ongoing investigations
in this regard?
Mr. Ledwith. We do, sir. We are constantly examining those
issues from our respective offices in the Caribbean and South
America and the United States. To this point, I can say that we
do not have evidence of organizations shipping enormous loads
of cocaine both to Europe and the United States through Cuba. I
do not have that at this time.
Mr. Ose. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. If you need more time for questioning, we will
come back for another round.
Mr. Barcelo.
Mr. Romero-Barcelo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank Mr. Ledwith and Mr. Vigil and Mr.
Varrone for the job that you are doing in Puerto Rico and I
think everyone is very impressed and very happy with it.
I would like to ask Mr. Vigil something about when you
discussed the problems in the security of the agents in Puerto
Rico. What were you referring to because I would like to know
and see how I could be helpful, if any, in helping that issue.
Mr. Vigil. I appreciate the question. I was feeling kind of
abandoned here, Mr. Romero-Barcelo.
Mr. Ose. Just wait, Mr. Vigil, we will get to you.
Mr. Vigil. The security issues are, as you know, there is a
high crime rate in Puerto Rico. Obviously it has gone down
significantly as a result of the efforts not only at the
Federal level but at the State level. One of those, you know,
deals with street crime. We recently had an individual that was
at a business and there was an armed robbery attempt that
occurred and the individuals that conducted the assault put a
gun to his head.
Several months ago, we had an individual that was on his
way home, his vehicle broke down and he had to walk about a
mile to his residence, came back with his wife, told his wife,
look, stay in the car, if anything happens, drive away from the
area. He starts to work with the vehicle's battery and sure
enough not more than 5 minutes had elapsed when a vehicle
pulled up and an individual exited the vehicle and approached
him carrying a hand gun and he demanded money. At that time,
his wife started to move away from the area and the individual
points the weapon at her and he happened to be armed, pulled
out his weapon and fired two shots. One of the bullets struck
the vehicle that he was in and the other one struck him on the
left side of his chest. Later, the suspect reported to a
hospital in the immediate vicinity and he was given emergency
treatment. He died a few minutes later.
The same individual some time back was at an ATM machine
and there was an attempted robbery.
Mr. Romero-Barcelo. The same agent?
Mr. Vigil. Same agent. There was an attempted robbery, he
fired several rounds and struck the suspect. Did not kill him,
but I think there were about three bullet impacts.
I have had a group supervisor whose home was invaded by
several individuals carrying weapons, his entire family was put
on the floor and held at gunpoint and eventually he was able to
wrestle one of them and they fled the area.
So those are the type of things that are encountered. As
Mr. Attorney General Fuentes Agostini stated, we do estimate
that about 80 percent of the homicides that occur in Puerto
Rico are drug-related. Obviously we are undertaking measures at
the Federal level with other agencies and also in cooperation
with the Puerto Rico Police Department and the Attorney General
to address a lot of these violent organizations. As you are
well aware, we assisted you in the Agalateo project, we
eliminated a very significant drug-trafficking organization
that engaged in wholesale violence and had complete control of
that area.
So there are security and safety issues that we are
concerned with. Obviously, we are working in a combined effort
to try and address those, not only with the agencies
themselves, the law enforcement agencies, but also with the
local prosecutors as well as with Federal prosecutors.
Mr. Romero-Barcelo. Are you doing any recruiting, active
recruiting in Puerto Rico for agents?
Mr. Vigil. We do a tremendous amount of recruiting in
Puerto Rico. Obviously the Spanish language is very important,
so we focus very heavily in terms of minority recruiting. I
would venture to say that the vast majority, you know, we have
gotten a tremendous amount of excellent recruits out of Puerto
Rico.
Mr. Romero-Barcelo. Because I was going to suggest that if
you need any help on organizing any kind of special programs in
the colleges or universities, I would be very glad to sit down
with you and sit down with the president of the Higher
Education Council and the secretary of education and discuss
that and see any special courses that could be prepared so that
the students would feel that they would have an opportunity at
least to try for positions in the DEA or Customs or the Coast
Guard or whatever.
Mr. Vigil. I appreciate that and we will sit down and
discuss that. We do actively engage in recruitment, the
recruitment process, at the universities. We attend job fairs
and obviously we do a lot of recruiting from the Puerto Rico
Police Department and other agencies. You know, at the same
time, they are engaged as task force officers in our task
forces.
Mr. Romero-Barcelo. Thank you very much. My time is up.
Mr. Burton. Let me just make a couple more comments and ask
a couple more questions of Mr. Ledwith.
Mr. Ledwith. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. Told the Miami Herald that the Colombian drug
traffickers had held a meeting in Havana on at least one
occasion. And you said that Cuba's counter-narcotics efforts
have been mixed. It seems to me--we had testimony yesterday
from two people who used to be involved with the Cuban
Government. One of the fellows was in the Department of the
Americas, his wife was the daughter of one of the people that
were executed, a Colonel that was executed with General Ochoa.
So they were very, very high up in the government and they went
into great detail about Castro's activities with narcotics and
how they gave bags of money, splitting it up in the Interior
Ministry, which is their intelligence agency, giving half to
Castro and half to the others. And when he eliminated these
people, then Castro could get all of it, and much of this was
drug-related.
So we have a lot of evidence that shows that Castro has
been involved in the drug trafficking. This meeting, which has
been talked about by Mr. Mazelli with leaders of the drug
cartel meeting in Havana on at least one or two occasions would
indicate that Castro was giving his stamp of approval or
getting something for that meeting. He knows everything that is
going on in Cuba, according to every source we have talked to.
They have block captains watching people who are dissidents,
who get upset with the Castro government, in almost every block
or every other block, just like the Communist set up in the
Soviet Union years ago to watch people who were potential
problems for the government. And many of those people have been
incarcerated and thrown into prison for indeterminate periods
of time. So Castro knows what is going on. He is involved,
deeply involved, in watching everything to protect his regime.
Now Mr. Mazelli says that on two separate occasions, or at
least one occasion, the leaders of the cartel have been in
Havana. How can we say that the Cuban Government's cooperation
is mixed, if they are actually having drug cartel members there
for meetings, and we know that drugs are transitting Cuba? And
how can we believe them when they say that drugs were going to
a different area or that the dogs were sniffing--the police
there said that dogs were sniffing canisters and finding
Spanish money in them and remnants of cocaine--how can we
believe them?
Mr. Ledwith. Sir, we cannot.
Mr. Burton. Well, then how do you verify that and how do
you say that there is mixed----
Mr. Ledwith. When I say that there is mixed reviews, I am
in the very awkward position of defending Cuba's actions in the
drug war, which I do not believe that Cuba has done everything
that they possibly can in any fashion and I have so testified.
If we look at the diminished tracks coming across Cuba that my
colleague from Customs pointed out this morning in his
testimony, I do not for a minute feel that that is a result of
their fear of Cuban interdiction efforts. I feel that it is
solely a result of a logistical change and it is easier to go
someplace else. The Cubans have not effectively patrolled their
waters, their air, nor have they assisted us in the methods
that I feel they should assist us. It is a closed community. It
is, as you mentioned earlier, sir, a very restrictive
environment. We do not have anybody stationed there, nor are we
able to go there and effectively operate. And if we went there,
I am not sure we could believe what they told us.
Mr. Burton. Well, let me just say regarding them patrolling
their waters, and I am just saying this for the record because
I think it is important to be in the record of this hearing,
the March 13th tugboat containing women, children, they washed
them off the decks, they drowned them all, they killed them
all. If they can patrol and watch people leaving Cuba trying to
get to freedom in the United States, if they can shoot down two
unarmed aircraft and send up MiGs to intercept people that are
flying into Cuban air space, they sure as the dickens can watch
people going in and out of Cuban waters, participating in the
drug trade.
Mr. Mazelli also described a situation where the Cuban
Government was facilitating--in his opinion, facilitating drug
shipments by not arresting these men when they were there. So I
think during that time period when he was talking to the Miami
Herald, he was saying very clearly that he thought Cuba was
very complicitous and involved.
Mr. Varrone--oh, excuse me, did you have something?
Mr. Ledwith. We have on many occasions heard from
undercover contacts that the crooks feel very comfortable
meeting in Cuba, they feel that they will be completely free of
United States surveillance, intervention, T-3s or any varieties
of technical interceptions because of the very nature of Cuba.
I think that would be an accurate statement.
Mr. Burton. Let me end my questioning here real quickly to
Mr. Varrone. Has the Customs Service received any reliable
intelligence from drug traffickers in recent months that Cuban
authorities do not bother you when you are moving drugs through
the island?
Mr. Varrone. Yes, sir, we have heard that from a variety of
sources. The credibility of sources are always in question, the
sources that we have heard it from are cooperating defendants
who are pending sentencing and the amount of credibility that
you can give to that is always----
Mr. Burton. But it is not one source, there are a number of
sources?
Mr. Varrone. We have heard it from more than one source;
correct, sir.
Mr. Burton. OK. My staff has been told by Customs agents in
Miami that as much as 98 percent of the drugs coming into the
Port of Miami get through undetected, is that correct?
Mr. Varrone. I do not believe that is accurate, sir.
Mr. Burton. You think it is much less than that?
Mr. Varrone. I think we are more effective than that; yes,
sir.
Mr. Burton. OK. All right, I guess the only other thing is
what does the Customs Service need to do to be more effective
in stopping the drugs at the Port of Miami and in Puerto Rico?
If you can give me a generic answer to that, is it more money,
more agents, what?
Mr. Varrone. Well, we have H.R. I think it is 1833 that
Senator Mica has--I am sorry, Congressman Mica has sponsored.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Ose. I will vote for that.
Mr. Burton. Did he pay you to say that? [Laughter.]
Mr. Varrone. Which is a resource request for the service.
Our resources have been static and I know particularly in the
Miami area that they have been static and I believe that they
could use more people and the production that we get from our
people is very high. So I think that would be very helpful.
Mr. Burton. I will co-sponsor the bill and see if we cannot
help you out.
Mr. Mica.
Mr. Mica. Thank you. I have a couple of questions as we
start this second round here. Mr. Ledwith, how long have you
been in your position?
Mr. Ledwith. I have been the Chief of International
Operations with DEA since May of last year, sir.
Mr. Mica. Are you familiar with any of the DEA operations
in Haiti?
Mr. Ledwith. Somewhat, sir.
Mr. Mica. I am absolutely baffled by the situation that has
developed here. It looks like Haiti is becoming a major conduit
in drug trafficking. Is that a correct assumption?
Mr. Ledwith. I think that would be an accurate statement,
sir.
Mr. Mica. Because we have spent $3 to $4 billion in nation-
building. We have spent an incredible amount of resources in
trying to build the judicial system there and the governmental
system. Is the DEA working with their officials? Do we have a
specific drug program in Haiti working with their officials
that you can relate?
Mr. Ledwith. From the headquarters perspective, sir, we are
currently involved in a series of meetings at the Washington
level to try and replicate Operation Bat which is a helicopter
interdiction program that has been quite productive and
successful in the Bahamas, and we are attempting to put
together the resources to bring such a mechanism to Haiti.
But I would like to defer to Mr. Vigil if I may, sir, who
has the responsibility of immediate oversight of Haiti and I
would ask Mike, if he would----
Mr. Mica. I would really like to hear that because I cannot
think of any nation in the western hemisphere in which we have
put more resources and more U.S. attention and had a bigger
failure, and now to find out that it is the major conduit. And
the description that we had from the former Puerto Rican
Attorney General of drugs coming into Haiti, being transported
across to the Dominican Republic. And when you get through with
Haiti, can you tell us what is going on with the Dominican
Republic, a supposed ally, a good friend. We have also assisted
that country, but could you describe what is going on, what the
problems are?
Mr. Vigil. Let me begin by saying that there are
significant problems, as we are all aware of, in terms of
Haiti, the lack of political and economic infrastructure plays
a very important role in the fact that a lot of Colombian and
Dominican drug trafficking organizations have moved into the
area and are using Haiti as a major transshipment point.
Mr. Mica. OK, we know that. What are our programs?
Mr. Vigil. Well, we have several programs.
Mr. Mica. What are we doing, why are they not working?
Mr. Vigil. Well, the thing is that right now we have a
program at the Port-au-Prince airport and we work very closely
with the BLTS. The BLTS is the counter-drug arm of the Haitian
National Police. They have had some success there.
Mr. Mica. What about maritime?
Mr. Vigil. And then we also have a maritime task force also
at Port-au-Prince.
Some of the other programs that we have developed there
along with the Customs Service, we initiated a binational
operation between Haiti and the Dominican Republic,
approximately 1 year ago. I thought it was a tremendous success
in the fact that we were able to bring two countries together
that have had so much conflict and strife during the past
several decades. The operation was a tremendous success, we
garnered a lot of arrests and seizures, but the arrests and
seizures were not the predominant focus or operational
objective. What we were trying to do is get them to exchange
information and work with one another.
Subsequent to Operation Genesis, the Haitians arrested the
wife, son and brother-in-law of Heriberto Coneo, who was a
major drug trafficker. They did not have venue in Haiti, so
they worked out an agreement with the Dominican authorities and
they drove these individuals to the border near Malpas and
turned them over to the Dominican authorities.
Later, the Haitians requested assistance from the Dominican
Government in terms of an individual that was responsible for
several homicides and the Dominicans responded, arrested this
individual boarding an American Airlines flight in Santo
Domingo headed for New York. They again drove him over to
Malpas and turned him over to the Haitians.
Recently, we conducted Operation Columbus, which was a
multi-national operation involving 15 countries, to include
Venezuela, Colombia and Panama, which are to me the countries
that greatly impact on what we do in the Caribbean. Haiti
participated in that operation and they arrested what I
consider to be a very significant Haitian trafficker by the
name of Edmond Noel, who owns several businesses in Haiti. They
also executed a search warrant at a residence belonging to two
individuals that are the subject of an investigation here in
the United States and they seized 275 kilograms of cocaine,
seized the residence which is estimated to be valued at over $2
million and several thousands of dollars of weapons, luxury
vehicles and what-have-you.
What they are doing now are what I consider to be embryonic
steps, but they are undertaking what I consider to be
significant strides in comparison to what they did in the past.
We have opened the doors to the international arena in terms of
this country and I think that they have responded rather well.
I think that they lack the resources, they lack the training
and unfortunately we have a police force that up to a year ago
was about 6,000 strong and now probably has dwindled down to
about 5,000.
We have also implemented a program which we call Unicorn,
it is the Unified Caribbean Online Regional Network and this is
a computer data base system that links over 20 some odd
countries and allows them to exchange information with one
another. So I look at these types of initiatives as very
significant in terms of the implementation of a comprehensive
regional strategy and Haiti is, you know, playing a strong role
in this implementation.
Mr. Mica. Thank you. I would like to get more information
from the agencies and we will have additional questions after
the hearing. Just one final thing, if I may, if my colleagues
will indulge me.
This report that we have from the GAO just within the last
couple of weeks here says according to the Southern Command,
the command can only detect and monitor 15 percent of the key
routes in the overall drug trafficking area about 15 percent of
the time. That is pretty low coverage of the huge Caribbean
area.
Then while I was home, some of the headlines in the central
Florida papers announced the closing of the Aerostat program,
which is located off of our Gulf coast and they said that other
Aerostats are being closed down.
I do know that we have some, what is it, over the horizon
radar coming in place. Can Customs tell me, or DEA, what kind
of coverage we anticipate; one, with the close down of
Aerostats, and also with the information given us by the
commander of Southern Command here.
Mr. Ledwith. We will defer to our Customs colleague I
believe regarding air tracks.
Mr. Varrone. Mr. Mica, I have not seen that report. Those
are all DOD assets and as you know, we only operate one
Aerostat, we only have one Aerostat left.
Mr. Mica. Are you going to keep that one?
Mr. Varrone. I believe so, at least in the short term. I
cannot describe the technological presentation of the radar and
what areas we cover and what we cannot cover. I have with me
Bill Daley from our aviation unit, who may be able to give you
some insight if you would like to hear from him, or we could
submit some answer to you.
Mr. Mica. I do not think he has been sworn, has he?
Mr. Varrone. No, sir.
Mr. Mica. We do not want to get into that then. But what I
would like to do is get an assessment from Customs and DEA
about this entire matter of coverage and how we should approach
it, maybe your recommendations, and then what is going to
happen. I think these Aerostats are under the Air Force's
jurisdiction, but they are coming down and there is a great
concern in Florida and some of the other areas where they have
had coverage in the past. So I would like your perspective on
that, if you would submit that for the record.
Mr. Varrone. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. Did you want to comment before I yield?
Mr. Vigil. I would like to make a comment, not necessarily
on the Aerostats, but I think more importantly is the fact that
on occasion we do have adequate detection and monitoring assets
in the Caribbean, and I am talking about ROTHR, P-3, and what-
have-you. But I think more important is the fact that we need
to address response capability and I think Mr. Fuentes Agostini
very appropriately brought up the fact that we need some
Blackhawk helicopters, we need that response capability because
otherwise, we are going to be able to detect, but we are not
going to be able to interdict those drug loads. And that is a
major problem that we have.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Chairman, they opened themselves up to a
question here on the Blackhawks. Why can you not have an
interagency agreement to utilize the National Guard
helicopters? Do you lack the O&M funds or has that been
discussed? Someone said we had half a dozen or so National
Guard helicopters sitting in Puerto Rico----
Mr. Burton. Eight, I think.
Mr. Mica. OK. Not being utilized. What is the problem with
that?
Mr. Vigil. Well, the thing is that we are working on
developing this type of response capability as we speak. The
problem with the helicopters belonging to the National Guard--
and we have conducted several meetings, with a multitude of
agencies, to include the National Guard there--the funding that
they are being provided is strictly for military readiness.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Chairman, maybe we could do a letter from the
committee. They have eight of these Blackhawk helicopters
sitting down there, they have had discussions and nothing seems
to be getting done, and then we have a request from Puerto
Rico, maybe the delegate could join us in this----
Mr. Romero-Barcelo. Sure.
Mr. Mica [continuing]. To get those things done.
Mr. Burton. Well, the Attorney General, I think when he
spoke, I think we did talk about that and you may have been out
of the room. We ought to do that.
Mr. Mica. But I think the committee should do something
immediately and we will bring in the National Guard Commander
or whoever it takes, and others, and I am certain we could find
the resources to get those things activated.
Mr. Romero-Barcelo. I will be happy to join in the efforts.
Mr. Burton. Why do we not have the staff give us all of the
agencies that ought to be contacted and we will write a joint
letter from Mr. Barcelo and the committee.
Mr. Mica. And maybe conduct a meeting as soon as we get
back, to bring them together. I would like to request that, if
I could.
Mr. Burton. Why do we not see if we can do that.
Mr. Vigil. Thank you.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Ose has to catch a plane and so I hope you
will all bear with us while we let one of our newer members go,
because I do not want him to have his wife all angry with him
by not being home tonight.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, you are very kind.
Mr. Burton. Of course.
Mr. Ose. I want to followup on an earlier question that I
asked and that is, it was directed to Mr. Ledwith regarding
these containers. It would seem to me that based on what we
have heard today, that containers for volume transactions--I
mean I cannot even stand talking about this in normal business
language--for this kind of drug poison to get shipped over in
this kind of volume, some of the producers have gone to
containerized shipments. We have established that they sent one
container at least to Cuba. Have they sent other containers to
other countries? Have other containers been sent under similar
circumstances to other countries, for instance, Mexico.
Mr. Ledwith. By this particular organization, sir?
Mr. Ose. Or any similar one.
Mr. Ledwith. Certainly containerized cargo is probably the
best method of shipping drugs, if that is what you are asking.
This particular organization, we have found records that
indicate at least four prior containers were shipped through
Cuba to Spain, if you are speaking to the particular
organization involved in the 7.2 ton shipment.
Mr. Ose. E.I. Carib.
Mr. Ledwith. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ose. OK.
Mr. Ledwith. That organization had definitely utilized
containers previously and in fact, four of the containers
allegedly found by the Cuban National Police with hidden
compartments, those serial numbers, backtracking of the
shipping documents regarding the serial numbers, indicated that
those very containers had previously been shipped from Colombia
to Cuba to Spain.
Now if we are speaking of in general, are other
containerized cargo methods being utilized to ship drugs,
absolutely.
Mr. Ose. Did E.I. Carib engage in shipment of containers to
other countries besides Cuba?
Mr. Ledwith. It does not--our records at this point do not
indicate that; no, sir, their particular shipment of containers
that we have found already--now I may be incorrect at this
point and I will find out for you and report to the committee,
my immediate information is that as to the shipments involving
the company are in Cuba and in Spain.
Mr. Ose. So E.I. Carib, what we have is evidence that E.I.
Carib sent a container from Colombia to Cuba and at that point
the container was in effect arrested.
Mr. Ledwith. Actually, sir, the containers never left
Cartagena with the drugs in them.
Mr. Ose. OK, so the Colombian National Police seized it.
Mr. Ledwith. The 7.2 ton seizure took place in Cartagena,
Colombia.
Mr. Ose. OK.
Mr. Ledwith. And the documents indicated that they were to
be shipped to Cuba.
Mr. Ose. Do the lading numbers on the various containers
indicate that once containers went to Cuba, did they go in a
variety of directions or only on to say Spain? Did they go from
Cuba to Mexico or Cuba back to wherever? Was it just a singular
destination point on these containers?
Mr. Ledwith. With the E.I. Carib, one container--our record
check indicates one container went on to Mexico. The other
containers in question went from Cartagena to Kingston, Jamaica
to Cuba to Spain. That is the shipping route they utilized.
Mr. Ose. And that was the lading that was indicated on the
7.2 metric tons?
Mr. Ledwith. That is correct.
Mr. Ose. On this other container that went to Mexico----
Mr. Ledwith. It went from Cartagena to Kingston, Jamaica to
Cuba to Mexico.
Mr. Ose. Now we have heard testimony today about Mexico
being one of those countries through which a significant amount
of these narcotics are shipped into the United States. Is it
possible that one of these prior runs, for instance this
container from Cartagena to Jamaica to Cuba to Mexico contained
drugs?
Mr. Ledwith. It is certainly possible.
Mr. Ose. The four containers that were identified as having
false compartments, was one of those four the container that
went from Cartagena to Kingston to Cuba to Mexico?
Mr. Ledwith. No, it was not. The four containers with the
hidden compartments were alleged to have continued on to Spain.
Mr. Ose. OK, and they were the property of E.I. Carib?
Mr. Ledwith. Yes.
Mr. Ose. Now is E.I. Carib still in business?
Mr. Ledwith. I think it closed as a result of this
investigation.
Mr. Ose. And E.I. Carib was engaged in shipping
transactions with a company called Plastico Royal based in
Havana?
Mr. Ledwith. Yes.
Mr. Ose. Who owned Plastico Royal?
Mr. Ledwith. Herrera and Royal.
Mr. Ose. Herrera and Royal were individuals?
Mr. Ledwith. They were individuals who had the company in
Havana.
Mr. Ose. They were the corporate agent?
Mr. Ledwith. They were part owners, if you will with the
Government of Cuba.
Mr. Ose. What part of ownership did they hold?
Mr. Ledwith. I believe they held 49 percent while the Cuban
Government held 51 percent.
Mr. Ose. So the Cuban Government held 51 percent ownership
in a shipping company--excuse me, a receiving company, Plastico
Royal, that was receiving containers that according to evidence
that the Colombian National Police provided contained 7.2
metric tons of cocaine destined, in this case, for Europe,
according to the DEA analysis.
Mr. Ledwith. That would be correct.
Mr. Burton. If the gentleman would yield briefly. We
covered this a little bit yesterday. There were two Ministry of
the Interior officials that pretty much ran the company, they
watched everything that went in. They made--the lady in charge
in the Ministry of the Interior made a call to Cartagena saying
where is that shipment. She did not find out about it. She made
a call to one of the people who was also a minority stockholder
in Spain saying where is that shipment. So they were very, very
concerned about that shipment because they knew it contained
the cocaine, I believe. I mean I do not know why else they
would be so anxious to get a shipment that contained 7.2 metric
tons of cocaine. And the Ministry of the Interior's past
history shows clearly that they were involved in getting bags
of money from various sources and splitting it up between
Castro and other agencies, and ultimately when General Ochoa
was killed, Castro could get it all.
And they even went into detail yesterday as to how the
money was spent. One was for a health facility for the upper
crust in Cuba.
So just to flesh out what the gentleman was pointing out,
the Ministry of the Interior down there, they were the ones
pulling the strings on those drug shipments.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you being so much more
eloquent and briefer than I could have been, so I appreciate
you doing that.
I do want to emphasize one point. I did not come to
politics 5 years ago or 10 years ago, I came to politics last
January and I came to politics from business. And I can
guarantee you, I held 51 percent of every partnership I ever
held because I was going to control the checkbook. And the
concept is no different in Cuba for those who seek to line
their own pockets than it is in the United States amongst those
who seek to engage in legal business. If you control 51
percent, as the Cuban Government did in this instance, you
control what happens in that company.
Mr. Chairman, I regret I have to go. This is by far the
most interesting field hearing I have been involved in and I
appreciate the opportunity to participate.
Mr. Burton. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Ose. We will
miss your eloquence and I hope you make your plane. Tell you
what, give your wife our regards.
Mr. Ose. Thank you.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Barr.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The evidence that you all have just been talking about, Mr.
Ledwith, when was this developed, when was this information
known? It was known to DEA quite awhile ago, was it not?
Mr. Ledwith. Yes, sir.
Mr. Barr. Prior to November 10 of last year?
Mr. Ledwith. Yes. He is in charge of the investigation, so
pardon me----
Mr. Barr. Who is he?
Mr. Ledwith. Toby Van Breesen, he is the senior supervisory
agent who is handling this from the headquarters perspective,
so I just want to make sure that I am accurate in my
representations to you.
Mr. Barr. Thank you.
Has this information been given to the White House?
Mr. Ledwith. I would not know. I have never even been to
the White House.
Mr. Barr. You would hope that it would have been.
Mr. Ledwith. Through channels, I would have to say yes,
sir.
Mr. Barr. The reason I asked on November 10 is that is the
date on which the administration makes this big public
pronouncement that, you know, there is essentially no evidence
linking Cuba to any of this, it all has to do with Spain or
something.
Mr. Vigil, you lost me a little bit ago and I wanted to
make sure that I understood what you said. You were talking
about Haiti.
Mr. Vigil. Correct.
Mr. Barr. And I think you said, and I jotted this down,
that Haiti is playing a strong role in the implementation of a
regional strategy.
Mr. Vigil. Regional strategy, right.
Mr. Barr. I presume you mean a strong negative role?
Mr. Vigil. No, a strong positive role.
Mr. Barr. Well, then I am confused. I mean we have seen
Customs information here today which I presume you do not
dispute, that Haiti has been--and we have heard other testimony
that Haiti is becoming a significant, a very significant
player, in transshipment of drugs from South America into the
United States, there is rampant corruption in Haiti. I think
there is something like 8,000 supposed law enforcement officers
that U.S. taxpayers have paid for training down there. It is my
understanding that few, if any, of those have ever performed
any real law enforcement activities, they are just padding
payroll. Yet a significant number have been, over the last 4
years since we have been involved down there, have been
dismissed for corruption.
What is there positive? I do not see anything positive in
all this. What is there that you see is so positive about this
situation?
Mr. Vigil. Well, let me say this. I do not dispute the fact
that there is endemic corruption, the fact that they need
additional training, the fact that Haiti----
Mr. Barr. Do you think the U.S. taxpayers ought to put more
money into training? I mean we have seen no positive results at
all so far.
Mr. Vigil. Well, let me continue, if you will.
Mr. Barr. Well, answer that question first though, I mean
do you think we ought to throw good money after bad?
Mr. Vigil. Well, I think that we need to structure the way
that we do training, I think that we need to structure a lot of
the resources that we provide to Haiti. Again, you know, I do
not question the fact that Haiti is the hot spot in terms of
the Caribbean in terms of drug trafficking activities going
through that country. What I am alluding to is the fact that in
the past, there was nothing done in Haiti in terms of counter-
drug efforts. Now we are seeing what I consider to be positive
steps, an embryonic state, if you will, in terms of enforcement
activity, the fact that they are willing to participate and
coordinate drug trafficking investigations and operations with
other countries I think is a positive note.
Obviously we are not there yet in terms of 100 percent
readiness, 100 percent response, 100 percent in terms of their
operations and what-have-you. But the things that I am seeing
there are much more positive than what I saw, let us say, even
5 years ago. So I take those things in a positive light and
hopefully we can buildupon those to further operations in Haiti
and other areas.
What I look at in terms of the Caribbean is I do not look
at, one particular country, I look at regional strategies, I
look at cooperation, I look at building institutions where we
can attack a lot of these significant organizations that do not
only operate in Haiti, but they operate in a multitude of other
countries. Unless we get these countries to work with one
another, we are pounding sand.
Mr. Barr. We are. When you look at Mexico and the former
head of DEA, Mr. Constantine, who I have tremendous regard for,
was very blunt about it, probably the only top level
policymaker in the administration who was honest about this, we
are pounding sand. We are not getting cooperation, there is
endemic corruption in Mexico, we know it is in Haiti, other
countries as well. So there is no strategy, I do not think, for
dealing with this.
While I salute your optimism in saying that after 4 years
or 5 years and billions of dollars, we finally have an
embryonic effort and that is tremendous. You know, as stewards
of the public money, we do have to look at it perhaps a little
more realistically and question, you know, why should we want
to throw more money at this when several billion dollars and
several years of so-called nation building has yielded at best
an embryonic effort. That is what troubles us, as Members of
Congress with responsibility for the taxpayer money.
And here again, I know that it is not DEA that is the
problem here, the problem is a policy that just throws money at
these situations for political gain. You know, invading Haiti,
of all places, invading Kosovo, and so forth. Lord knows how
many billions of dollars and years we are going to be involved
over there and maybe 5 years from now we will have an embryonic
effort over there.
And I think this is one reason why over the last 10 years
or so, and I think it was if memory serves me properly exactly
10 years ago that General Noriega was arrested and
unfortunately that may have been sort of, you know, the real
high point of our international effort. And since then,
although we were able to get the Escobar organization partially
as a direct result of Noriega demise and information that we
get, we had Operation Polar Cap and several in the late 1980's,
very, very successful efforts. Since then, I do not think we
can say that. Yes, maybe we see embryonic successes in a couple
of these places, but when you look at the problems that we see
in Mexico and the lack of willingness of this administration to
take any steps to really rectify that, I think we have an
overall very serious problem with drug policy on the
international side. And part of that is reflected, as I know
you all are aware, in the budgets of this administration.
It is my information--I think these figures are correct--
that of the total $5.4 billion for interdiction, treatment and
prevention programs, over 85 percent of that goes to treatment
and prevention. And, you know, while that may be very
important, one I think really has to question the amount of
money, because that is being taken out of source country
efforts, efforts that you all could be using I think to much
greater advantage. I just think that you all are not getting
the resources that you need. I think Mr. Vigil and Mr. Varrone
and Mr. Ledwith, if you were making policy, we would see a lot
better results than with the folks that are, we would see more
than an embryonic effort. Because I do not think the DEA, if
they were in charge, they would stand for these sort of results
that we are seeing, billions of dollars, you know, just thrown
down the drain. I wish all that money had--well, we do not need
to get into that. I just think you all are doing a tremendous
job, but it is the policy of this administration in particular
that really is holding you all back, and that is why for the
last 10 years on the source country effort, we have seen such
problems. And we are all aware of the problems with Colombia in
terms of this administration just refusing to abide by even our
laws in getting them the money and the equipment that the
Congress has mandated. It is very distressing. But this hearing
today, as Mr. Ose said before he left, is very enlightening and
I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Barr.
Do you have any concluding questions or comments?
Mr. Romero-Barcelo. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I have a couple of
questions.
I just heard the Secretary of Justice of Puerto Rico
telling me that the helicopters, Blackhawk helicopters that are
in Puerto Rico, eight of them, that they need the night vision
equipment. I do not know how you call that, it has a special
name.
Mr. Vigil. Yes, the FLIR, forward looking infrared.
Mr. Romero-Barcelo. FLIR, forward looking infrared
equipment, that they need four of them, right?
Mr. Vigil. It is for nocturnal operations.
Mr. Romero-Barcelo. It is only that there have been
arrangements made to get the equipment and now all of a sudden
the equipment that was all set to be sent to Puerto Rico is
going to be sent to the Bahamas. Do you know anything about
that?
Mr. Vigil. [Shakes head.]
Mr. Burton. When we send that letter, Representative
Barcelo, what we will do is we will include in there the
question and the request for the night vision equipment, so
that the helicopters will have that. If we can get them
operational.
Mr. Romero-Barcelo. OK, thank you, that is what I wanted to
mention.
Mr. Burton. We really appreciate you coming in from Puerto
Rico, along with the Attorney General.
I had one last question. Mr. Ledwith, you had indicated
that there was a shipment that went to Mexico, do you have the
dates on that?
Mr. Ledwith. I can provide them to you, sir, I do not have
them.
Mr. Burton. Would you provide that for the record? We
really would like to have that.
You do not know, was that before the Spanish transmission
of drugs or was it after that? The gentleman back there may
know.
Mr. Ledwith. It was before.
Mr. Burton. It was before. If you could give us the dates
on that, we would really appreciate it.
I wish we had time, we had former Chairman Larry Smith, a
former Member of Congress back there, who headed the
International Narcotics and Terrorism Task Force for what, 6
years, Larry?
Mr. Smith. Yes.
Mr. Burton. And he has given us some information which we
will put in the record regarding some of the problems that we
have had at State Department in getting to the bottom of this,
and Larry, we really appreciate you bringing that to our
attention.
Mr. Smith. I appreciate you coming down to my former
district. I have had many hearings right here in this room too,
and we appreciate you being here and taking up this very
important subject, especially to Florida.
Mr. Burton. Well, thank you, buddy, and time has been good
to you, you look good.
I would like to now make a couple of closing remarks for
the record.
We have heard a lot of testimony over the last 2 days and I
think we have all come away with a better understanding of the
issues surrounding drug trafficking in the Caribbean. What I
have heard has only increased my belief that Fidel Castro is
neck deep in drug trafficking in the United States and Europe.
I would like to insert into the record the first section of
this book, which is factual, it is called ``Castro's Final
Hour'' written by Andres Oppenheimer. Mr. Oppenheimer's
description of the Ochoa case is very enlightening and is
directly relevant to what we have been talking about here
yesterday and today.
[Note.--The information referred to, ``Castro's Final Hour,
The Secret Story Behind the Coming Downfall of Communist
Cuba,'' may be found in committee files.]
Mr. Burton. We have seen on video from the DEA that
Castro's government was involved in drug trafficking throughout
the 1980's. We have also heard from a variety of sources that
Castro's government, including his own brother, Raul Castro--
and we are going to subpoena that draft indictment, as you
requested--were also involved in drug trafficking throughout
the 1990's.
The Customs Service currently has a very reliable witness
and maybe more than one--I think you said more than one--who
says the Cuban Government is not an obstacle to transporting
drugs to the United States.
My staff has conducted a year long investigation into the
7.3 metric tons of cocaine shipment which everyone agrees was
going to Cuba. Unfortunately, the Clinton-Gore administration
has used the DEA as well as every other agency in this
government to prove this shipment was headed to Europe instead
of working from the assumption it was coming to the United
States, a decision clearly rooted in politics rather than based
on facts.
The bottom line is Castro was involved in drug trafficking
in the 1980's, and as we have shown over the last 2 days, his
government remains deeply involved today. This is a well-
established pattern of drug trafficking, a pattern that the
Clinton-Gore administration should not, but chooses to ignore.
In their effort to normalize relations with Castro, the
administration has ignored many relevant facts.
I would like to insert into the record--and this came from
the FBI--a current list of 60 dangerous fugitives who have
sought and received refuge from Castro. They run all the way
from Robert Vesco to murders and drug traffickers and every
other kind of ilk you can think of--60 of them that they are
hiding out in Cuba today.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. Burton. Remember, Cuba is on the State Department's
list of nations who sponsor terrorism. This FBI list contains,
as I said, murders, drug traffickers, hijackers and others. The
old phrase ``birds of a feather flock together'' was never more
fitting. Curiously, the Clinton-Gore administration continues
to make every attempt to normalize relations with Castro,
despite his well-documented egregious human rights abuses,
Cuba's inclusion on the terrorist list, Castro's harboring
FBI's most wanted fugitives and the Castro government's
involvement in running drugs. These normalization efforts are
confusing and in my opinion, shameless, even to fellow
Democrats like Senator Robert Torricelli and Representative Bob
Menendez, both very prominent Democrats.
While the Clinton-Gore administration is always easy to
jump at a moment's notice into a conflict that does not
directly impact American national security such as Bosnia,
Kosovo, Haiti or East Timor, it is clearly unwilling to protect
our American school children from a direct assault by drug
traffickers coming through Cuba. Lacking a balanced and
coherent counter drug strategy, the administration has chosen
to fight the war on drugs by treating the wounded. They have
taken a great amount of the money that was used for drug
interdiction and eradication and are using it for education and
treatment of those who are already wounded by drugs. They
prefer to allocate its scarce counter narcotics budget
resources on treating the addicted rather than a balanced
approach which includes fighting drugs at their source before
they reach American streets and school yards, along with these
treatment programs. This is a policy debate we will continue to
raise during the budget process this next year.
With that--and I know you have had a tough time today,
fellows--I want to thank all of you for coming out and
testifying. I think you did a good job.
I also want to thank Mayor Diaz and the Sweetwater Police
Department. You have all been very, very helpful. I want to
thank our staff, you did a great job in putting all this
together. Had a few glitches, but nothing significant. And I
want to thank my colleague, Congressman Diaz-Balart and his
staff for hosting us in his district.
And with that, no further business being on the docket, we
stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, the hearing was concluded at 12:36 p.m.]