    [House Hearing, 106 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                               GLOBAL TERRORISM:
                            SOUTH ASIA--THE NEW LOCUS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                            INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 JULY 12, 2000

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 106-173

                                   __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

            Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/
                      international--relations

                                     ______

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
    68-482 CC                   WASHINGTON : 2000

                      COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

                     BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
    WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania    SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
    JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa                 TOM LANTOS, California
    HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois              HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
    DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska              GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
    DAN BURTON, Indiana                      Samoa
    ELTON GALLEGLY, California           MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
    CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina       ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California         SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
    DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois         CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
    EDWARD R. ROYCE, California          ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
    PETER T. KING, New York              PAT DANNER, Missouri
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
    MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South     BRAD SHERMAN, California
        Carolina                         ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
    MATT SALMON, Arizona                 STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
    AMO HOUGHTON, New York               JIM DAVIS, Florida
    TOM CAMPBELL, California             EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
    JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
    KEVIN BRADY, Texas                   GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    RICHARD BURR, North Carolina         BARBARA LEE, California
    PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio                JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
    GEORGE RADANOVICH, California        JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
    JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
    THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
                        Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
              Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff
                     John P. Mackey, Investigative Counsel
                        Marilyn C. Owen, Staff Associate

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                                   WITNESSES

                                                                       Page

    The Honorable Michael A. Sheehan, Ambassador-at-Large,
      Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State.....    10
    Alan W. Eastham, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South
      Asian Affairs, U.S. Department of State........................    13

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared statements:

    The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress
      from New York and Chairman, Committee on International
      Relations......................................................    46
    The Honorable Peter T. King, Representative in Congress from New
      York...........................................................    48
    The Honorable Joseph R. Pitts, a Representative in Congress from
      Pennsylvania...................................................    49
    The Honorable Jim Saxton, a Representative in Congress from New
      Jersey.........................................................    50
    The Honorable Gary L. Ackerman, a Representative in Congress from
      New York.......................................................    51
    The Honorable Robert Wexler, a Representative in Congress from
      Florida........................................................    54
    The Honorable Michael A. Sheehan.................................    56
    Alan W. Eastham, Jr..............................................    69

    Additional material submitted for the record:

    U.S. Department of State On-the-Record Briefing Release from
      Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, and Michael Sheehan,
      Counterterrorism Coordinator...................................    77
    Newspaper editorial from the Washington Times by Ben Barber on
      ``Afghanistan: Seat of Terrorism Shifts to South Asia,'' dated
      Tuesday, May 2, 2000...........................................    78

                  GLOBAL TERRORISM: SOUTH ASIA--THE NEW LOCUS

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, JULY 12, 2000

                              House of Representatives,
                          Committee on International Relations,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in
    room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A.
    Gilman (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Chairman Gilman. I am pleased to call to order today's
    hearing on global terrorism. In particular, we will focus on
    the most recent shift in the patterns of international
    terrorism to South Asia. This move away from the more
    traditional Middle East-based terrorist activity clearly
    deserves our attention and careful policy analysis.
        Earlier this year, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
    noted that the shift of the center of gravity for international
    terrorism has been eastward, toward Afghanistan in Southwest
    Asia.
        Each spring, under congressional mandate since the mid-
    1980's, the Administration publishes a report called Patterns
    of Global Terrorism. This report provides the Congress and the
    public with the latest trends and developments in international
    terrorism.
        The report for 1999 establishes that South Asia is the new
    locus of international terrorism, presenting both a regional
    threat and a growing threat to our nation. We will examine what
    this new trend means for our nation.
        Afghanistan has emerged as a safe haven for master
    terrorists like Usama bin Laden and his radical supporters. We
    have on display today the State Department's wanted posters for
    bin Laden, offering a $5 million reward for his capture.
        Neighboring Pakistan, which has long supported the Taliban
    to its west and those bent on violence in Kashmir to its east,
    also contributes to the emergence of South Asia as the new
    locus of international terrorism.
        Recent press reports indicate that the Russian intelligence
    services believed that the Taliban in Afghanistan promised to
    help Chechen rebels with weapons, training, and possibly even
    with trained fighters from Taliban camps in Afghanistan. The
    Taliban vehemently denied those serious Russian charges. We
    will examine that issue today as well.
        Through a coordinated law enforcement approach, many
    terrorist threats emanating from South Asia were thwarted last
    year. As a result, American deaths from terrorism were down to
    five in 1999, one of the lowest levels in several years, and
    for that we are grateful. It is a sad but undeniable fact that
    Americans are often the most frequent terrorist targets around
    the globe.
        The 1999 annual terrorism report notes that we have
    repeatedly asked Pakistan to end their support to elements that
    conduct terrorist training in nearby Afghanistan. We also asked
    that Pakistan interdict travel of all militants to and from
    camps in Afghanistan, to prevent militant groups from acquiring
    weapons and to block financial and logistical support for the
    camps.
        In addition, the State Department's latest terrorism report
    notes that Pakistan officially supports Kashmiri militant
    groups that engage in terrorism.
        The recent report from the congressionally mandated
    National Commission on Terrorism noted Pakistan's occasionally
    excellent cooperation with the United States in fighting
    terrorism. However, the Commission also pointed out the
    consistent Pakistani support for terrorism in Kashmir. The
    Commission's report also called for naming Afghanistan as a
    state sponsor of terrorism so that all the sanctions against
    such a terrorist nation could be applied.
        The new threat of radical Islamic terrorism emanating from
    the region can often be found in a loosely knit group of
    terrorists once trained and hardened in the war against the
    former Soviet Union in Afghanistan.
        Today on the new battlefields in Chechnya and Kosovo, where
    war-making and fighting skills are honed and perfected, some of
    these radical Islamic elements have been learning skills that
    later can be used against our nation and others in radical
    terrorist acts.
        South Asian also presents new concerns for the war on
    drugs. By taxing rather than fighting the drug trade, the
    Taliban has effectively sided with the heroin producers and
    against innocent people, particularly our young people. The
    drug trade is also proving to be a lucrative resource for bin
    Laden's terrorist network.
        We are fortunate to have with us today the Coordinator for
    Counterterrorism in the Secretary of State's Office, who helps
    prepare the annual report on global terrorism and can help us
    sort out what this new shift means.
        We are also joined by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
    State for South Asian Affairs. Both of these witnesses will
    bring their expertise to our inquiry today.
        Ambassador Sheehan, who, of course, oversees the
    preparation of the global terrorism report, is prepared to
    answer any questions on terrorism, and of course, no member is
    limited on what area of the globe he would like to address.
        Before we start with our witnesses, I welcome any comment
    from our Ranking Democratic Member, Mr. Gejdenson.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Gilman appears in the
    appendix.]
        Mr. Gejdenson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I commend you for calling this hearing. Both the State
    Department report and the Bremmer Commission report point out
    what we have suspected for some time, that global terrorism is
    increasingly a collaboration and a coordinated effort.
        As you have indicated, it has moved from its home in the
    Middle East and North Africa now into South Asia, and certain
    factors, the disintegration of Afghanistan in the post-Soviet
    era, the situation in Pakistan, a country that is now once
    again in military rule with a weakened civil society, and
    increased influence of religious clerics and their schools
    makes for a dangerous situation.
        Usama bin Laden, seen often as the primary enemy of the
    United States or one who has chosen the United States as his
    primary enemy, seems to make his home in that region.
        We in this country need to work with our allies globally.
    We have had some cooperation from Pakistan through the years,
    but reading this last June 25 New York Times magazine article
    on the education at religious schools leaves one with a very
    uneasy feeling. The authors go on to talk about these jihad
    factories where young men are educated in a way that seems to
    direct them to take on the West.
        We have had cooperation from Pakistan, but we also have
    challenges coming from there, and we certainly feel that the
    reestablishment of democracy and a civil society is critical to
    make progress in that country.
        The Afghanistan situation is much more complicated. A
    country that has seen war for so long, its political situation
    has disintegrated. The economic situation has left many in
    despair, and it now seems to be a country that processes drugs
    and terrorists more than almost any other activity.
        We need to pull and work with our allies and friends to
    contain and end this threat, which as you pointed out, often
    targets Americans first.
        Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.
        Any other Member seeking recognition?
        Mr. Rohrabacher.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and
    thank you very much for holding this hearing.
        As we discuss terrorism in South Asia, I think it is
    important to renew the Members of this Committee and the
    public's acquaintance with the request that I have made for the
    last 3 years concerning American policy toward the Taliban
    because, as we examine terrorism in South Asia, one cannot help
    but recognize that if it were not for the fact that the Taliban
    are in power, there would be a different equation going on.
    There would be a whole different situation in South Asia.
        After a year of requesting to see State Department
    documents on Afghan policy, and I would remind the Committee
    that I have stated that I believe there is a covert policy by
    this Administration, a shameful covert policy of supporting the
    Taliban, the State Department after many, many months--actually
    years of prodding--finally began giving me documents, Mr.
    Chairman. In the assessment of those documents, I have found
    nothing to persuade me that I was wrong in my criticism.
        I might add, however, that there have been no documents
    provided to me even after all of these years of requesting it.
    There have been no documents concerning the time period of the
    formation of the Taliban. Again, I would hope the State
    Department gets the message that I expect to see all of those
    documents.
        The documents that I have read, Mr. Chairman, indicate that
    the State Department time and again has had as its position
    that they have no quarrel or that it would give them no
    heartburn to have the Taliban in power, this during the time
    period when the Taliban was struggling to take over
    Afghanistan.
        Although the Administration has denied supporting the
    Taliban, it is clear that they discouraged all of the anti-
    Taliban supporters from supporting the efforts in Afghanistan
    to defeat the Taliban, even so much as when the Taliban was
    ripe for being defeated on the ground in Afghanistan. Bill
    Richardson and Karl Inderfurth, high ranking members of this
    Administration, personally visited the region in order to
    discourage the Taliban's opposition from attacking the Taliban
    when they were vulnerable, and then going to neighboring
    countries to cutoff any type of military assistance to the
    Taliban, this at a time when Pakistan was heavily resupplying
    and rearming the Taliban.
        What did this lead to? It led to the defeat of all the
    Taliban's major enemies except for one, Commander Masood in the
    north, and left the Taliban the supreme power in Afghanistan.
        So when we hear today about terrorism and crocodile tears
    from this Administration, let us remember this Administration
    is responsible for the Taliban. This Administration has acted
    in a way that has kept the Taliban in power.
        One last note. Many people here understand that I have been
    in Afghanistan on numerous occasions and have close ties to
    people there, and let me just say that some of my sources of
    information inform me of where bin Laden was. They told me they
    knew and could tell people where bin Laden could be located,
    and it took me three tries before this Administration responded
    to someone who obviously has personal contacts in Afghanistan
    to even investigate that there might be someone who could give
    them the information.
        And when my informant was actually contacted, he said that
    the people who contacted him were half hearted and did not
    follow through, did not appear to be all that interested,
    appeared to be forced to be talking to him.
        Mr. Chairman, we are concerned about terrorism. We are
    concerned about the Taliban because we believe in human life
    and human dignity. The worst terrorist acts of the Taliban are
    committed against the women of their own society, and let us
    not forget that.
        But none of the terrorism which we will hear about today by
    Mr. bin Laden or others would be taking place with Afghanistan
    as their home base if it were not for the policies of this
    Administration. This Administration has had a policy concerning
    the Taliban which has created this terrorist mess, which I
    predicted in this body on numerous occasions 3 and 4 years ago.
        So I think I am pleased that you have called this hearing
    today, but let's keep this testimony in perspective.
        Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
        I am pleased to recognize the Minority Whip, the gentleman
    from Michigan, Mr. Bonior.
        Mr. Bonior. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for your
    indulgence and your courtesies for letting me say a few words
    this morning.
        I want to thank you and all the Members of the Committee
    for the opportunity to be with you today. I look forward to the
    testimony that Ambassador Sheehan and Deputy Assistant
    Secretary Eastham will be presenting.
        On earlier occasions, the Administration has expressed the
    importance of working with Pakistan in addressing terrorism in
    South Asia. I also believe that cooperation with Pakistan
    continues to be very much in our national interest.
        Combating and preventing global terrorism is one of the
    most serious challenges facing America's foreign policy in this
    new era. It is my belief, Mr. Chairman, that Pakistan, as a
    longstanding ally of the United States, is committed to
    cooperating with the United States on terrorism. Its record
    shows that.
        Sanctioning Pakistan would serve no purpose other than to
    isolate them and aggravate the social and economic and
    political challenges in the region.
        I also strongly believe that the Taliban support for
    terrorism and its harboring of Usama bin Laden must be
    condemned in the strongest possible terms.
        We must also respond to the threat, and I believe that is
    where Pakistan plays a very critical role. We must remember
    that it is not in Pakistan's interest to have the Taliban on
    its border. It is also not in Pakistan's interest to have
    terrorist groups operating within its borders, and it is
    clearly not in India's interest to have Pakistan isolated,
    thereby producing a greater threat to peace and stability in
    South Asia.
        While it is undeniable that some terrorist groups operate
    in Pakistan, Pakistanis themselves are often the victim of
    terrorism.
        Moreover, Pakistan has been cooperating with the
    international community and the United States in
    counterterrorism efforts. In 1995, Pakistan turned over Ramzi
    Yousef, involved in the World Trade Center bombing, to the
    United States. In 1997, Pakistan helped apprehend Miur Amal
    Kanzi, who shot several people outside the CIA headquarters,
    and in 1998 and 1998, Pakistan handed over two suspects
    involved in the bombing of our embassies in Africa.
        I know from my talks with General Musharraf when I visited
    Pakistan and India in April that he is committed to dealing
    with the Taliban. He has met with one leader of the Taliban and
    is prepared to meet with others in Afghanistan.
        Throughout my trip I gained a new appreciation of the
    unique challenges facing the region. I also came away more
    convinced than ever that the United States must play a
    proactive role in helping to meet those challenges. There are
    serious challenges and threats which exist in Pakistan, but I
    also know that General Musharraf and General Aziz in Pakistan
    are well aware of what needs to be done.
        Pakistan has a responsibility to address terrorism in South
    Asia, but I believe we do, as well. The United States bears
    special responsibility in South Asia. During the war in
    Afghanistan, the United States armed Pakistan's neighbors and
    militants. Then, in my view, we callously abandoned the region.
        The result of that neglect has been disturbing: the
    Taliban, taking control in Afghanistan; the critical economic
    conditions in India and Pakistan, not to mention the nuclear
    weapons development that has taken place.
        Now we have an obligation to do our part to help establish
    stability in South Asia, and it is in our interest to do so.
    The threat of nuclear conflict and terrorism in South Asia is
    very real. We must reduce this threat and halt the arms race in
    South Asia, but I believe that unless Kashmir is addressed, Mr.
    Chairman, no real progress can be made.
        If we turn our attention away from the region as we did
    after the war in Afghanistan, we risk further erosion,
    violence, and disillusionment.
        We are uniquely positioned as a longstanding ally of
    Pakistan and as an emerging friend of India to bring the
    parties together. Given the stake in South Asia, punitive
    economic sanctions are clearly counterproductive. Democracy
    will be strengthened not by economic sanctions, but by economic
    aid.
        Funds for cooperative counterterrorism efforts, economic
    development, civil society building, and respect for the rule
    of law are needed. The answer is not to further sanction
    Pakistan or India, but to open up possibilities for
    cooperation.
        I look forward to working with the Members of this
    Committee and the Administration as we respond to this serious
    issue and develop an approach to South Asia that recognizes our
    responsibilities in the region and strengthens our cooperation
    with our friends and allies.
        I thank you for your time.
        Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Bonior.
        I am going to ask our Members to please be brief so that we
    can get on with the hearing.
        Mr. Faleomavaega.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Chairman, I want to fully associate
    myself with the statements made previously by the gentleman
    from Michigan. I think the statement was cogent, precise, and
    right to the point.
        It is really a sad commentary, at least in my experience
    serving as a Member of this Committee, how we have applied such
    a double standard toward our relationship with Pakistan.
        I think this country has been a friend of ours, through
    thick or thin, and it seems that we have been kicking this
    country. Every time we always need a whipping boy, we seem to
    always have Pakistan, which is where we always do this. I thank
    the gentleman from Michigan for the statement to that effect.
    We should not limit whatever seems to be the support for
    friends who support the issues affecting India, but we also
    have to be mindful of the fact that Pakistan is just as much a
    friend of ours as is India, and I want to commend the gentleman
    from Michigan for that statement.
        Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Faleomavaega.
         Mr. Royce.
        Mr. Royce. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for
    calling this hearing.
        As my colleague from Southern California, Mr. Rohrabacher,
    who I know has worked with you in the past and myself on his
    request for documentation, I share his frustration with the
    Administration's lack of cooperation in providing this
    documentation.
        Let me also say that I think that there has been a lack of
    purpose on the mayhem and anarchy coming out of Afghanistan.
    For many years now, we have held hearings to try to get the
    Administration to focus on the lack of policy, the lack of a
    strategy to try to bring resolution to what has happened there
    in Afghanistan.
        It seems to me that we are not dealing with the terror that
    is coming out of the region, given the fact that there has been
    a great call for a policy to try to do something about
    resolving the underlying problems that have given rise now to
    Afghanistan offering Usama bin Laden and others a place to do
    business, a place to prepare for the next round of terrorist
    activity.
        But this is a result of a lack of focus in our foreign
    policy in South Asia, and I hope that we can muster some
    attention and resolve in the future to develop a strategy to
    deal with Afghanistan.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Royce.
        I am going to have to ask unanimous consent that the
    statements by Congressman Peter King, Congressman Joseph Pitts,
    and Congressman Jim Saxton, in charge of the special oversight
    panel on terrorism of the Armed Services Committee, be included
    at this point in the record.
        [The prepared statements of Representatives King, Pitts,
    and Saxton appear in the appendix.]
        Chairman Gilman. Without further delay we will proceed with
    the witnesses. Our first witness today is the Honorable----
        Ms. McKinney. Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Gilman. Ms. McKinney.
        Ms. McKinney. I would like to make an opening statement.
        Chairman Gilman. Please make it brief so that we can get on
    with our witnesses.
        Ms. McKinney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I appreciate any attempt to understand and thwart the
    presence of terrorism anywhere it appears in the world. But I
    hope this hearing provides the critical analysis that is much
    required.
        Last October I wanted to take a family who are my
    constituents to the White House to observe the arrival ceremony
    of the then leader of Italy. Because I have had such a
    miserable experience with White House security, I phoned ahead
    of time and told them what gate I was arriving at and, of
    course, reporting the requirement of name, Social Security
    number, etc., for myself and informed the White House that we
    would be arriving in separate cars. We were told fine and
    everything would be OK.
        I was driven to the White House by a young, 20-year-old
    white staffer of mine, and my guests were driven in a separate
    car by another staffer of mine, a young woman of color. Before
    I could get into the White House, I was insulted at the White
    House gates because the Secret Service representatives mistook
    my young black staffer for the Congresswoman of 6 years and
    asked me to prove my identity. After getting inside the White
    House, I was challenged at every checkpoint by the Secret
    Service yet again.
        That was nothing compared to the experience of my guests
    who had been invited by me and who were being escorted by my
    staffer. They had been vetted by the Secret Service and by
    White House protocol, but when they showed up, I guess all of
    the Secret Service anti-profiling lessons just flew out the
    window as they had with me earlier. The family consisted of a
    16-year-old child in her silk Pakistani cultural dress and her
    father, whose hair is beautiful, thick, black, and curly. He
    also sports a beard.
        And so despite all of the correct procedure of
    communicating with White House protocol, despite the added
    precaution of calling the White House to let them know the
    specific gate that we would be arriving at, none of the
    precaution and preparation on our part worked. I almost did not
    get inside, and unfortunately my guests did not get inside.
        I have to admit that I was angry. I was angry that my
    guests were denied admission for an event that their
    Congresswoman had invited them to. I was angry that they had
    been ordered by Secret Service to get out of the car being
    driven by my staff person of color who had never ever been
    treated before in such a manner.
        They were dog sniffed at the White House gates as if they
    were common criminals, and then they were never admitted to the
    event to which they had been invited, and I was tired. I was
    tired of being humiliated every time I tried to exercise my
    very existence as a Congresswoman, tired of people who looked
    like me and who think like me being persecuted just because we
    exist.
        I have to admit that I shed a tear on that day for the
    humiliation of my constituents and of myself. But the 16-year-
    old girl put her arms around me, and she said, ``That's OK. I'm
    used to it.''
        After much publicity, the First Lady graciously invited the
    entire family back and gave them a personal apology.
        Now, I am sure you are wondering what does this have to do
    with the subject at hand. I think it has everything to do with
    the subject matter of today.
        Unintended consequences of our own policies and hasty
    disengagement from those consequences. It is far easier to
    blame the victim than to solve the problem.
        A few months after my White House experience with my
    guests, the country awoke to news that the Secret Service was
    being sued by a few courageous black Secret Service agents who
    had the guts to say that something was rotten inside the Secret
    Service, and immediately it became clear how that grotesque
    mistreatment of me and my guests on that day flowed logically
    from the systemic mistreatment of minorities within the very
    organization itself and, indeed, our American community at
    large.
        Mr. Chairman, I hope that today this Congress is not going
    to do to Pakistan what the Secret Service did to my Pakistani
    American constituents. We need a comprehensive approach to the
    problem of terrorism, and I will support that. But we also need
    to be balanced, and we need to get to the root problem and not
    deal with just the symptoms.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Ms. McKinney.
        Mr. Meeks.
        Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        This hearing on global terrorism addresses a subject of
    great concern not only to the people of this nation, but to
    people from nations all over the world. We have been the
    unfortunate witnesses of numerous terrorist attacks all over
    the world that have destroyed or altered the lives of
    individuals on nearly every continent.
        Whether it is in embassy bombings in Africa, government and
    commercial office buildings in Oklahoma and New York, car bombs
    in Ireland, mosque shootings and school bus bombings in Israel,
    kidnappings in South America, or plane hijackings in Asia,
    terrorism is a misguided and hateful method of addressing
    discontent with governments and other groups by targeting
    random, innocent people.
        It is essential that the United States and all nations of
    good conscience work together on the best methods of combating
    global terrorism.
        The U.S. Government, beginning with this Congress, has a
    special responsibility as the world's only super power to set
    an example of even handedness and just dealings when it comes
    to fighting terrorism. Too often this nation's government and
    its peoples have chosen to unfairly target ethnic, racial, and
    religious groups, domestically or overseas, who are different
    from the majority of Americans when trying to address a social
    ill or increase our national security.
        Throughout American history, these scapegoat groups have
    included Native Americans, African Americans, Italian and
    Japanese Americans, Jews, and most recently Arabs and Muslims.
    Policies based on the misguided targeting of ethnic groups when
    trying to address our domestic or national security has led to
    unconstitutional practices, such as indicated by my colleague
    Cynthia McKinney, racial profiling and the use of secret
    evidence.
        Our focus on terrorism in Southeast Asia should not be for
    the purpose of condemning or casting aspersions on a particular
    nation or people because their predominant religion or form of
    government is different from ours. Congress must additionally
    resist playing favorites between one nation over another, no
    matter what political forces pressure us to do so.
        In one of the background documents prepared by the
    Committee, Afghanistan and Pakistan were the two countries
    singled out as concerns in a region where incidents of
    government and organizational terrorism exist in many nations.
    Both nations have experienced major government upheavals and
    instability in their recent past, and certainly the legitimacy
    of the Afghan Government is in question.
        However, the government of Pakistan has demonstrated
    continued cooperation with the United States in combating
    terrorism despite certain internal pressures that question U.S.
    cooperation. Pakistan has arrested and extradited suspects in
    the murder of CIA agents and in the bombing of the World Trade
    Center in New York and our embassies in Africa.
        According to the U.S. Government, Pakistan is considered a
    friendly nation to the United States and has done a good job in
    providing security for our embassy and has, overall, been an
    ally of the United States in our counter-terrorist efforts.
        While there may be room for improvement, and certainly
    there is, in Pakistan's counterterrorism efforts, that
    improvement will come from a continued close relationship with
    the United States, where information and methodologies are
    shared for the benefit of both nations and the rest of the
    world.
        Undue criticism will only drive a wedge between us and
    benefit no one. The United States has a responsibility to be a
    facilitator in Southeast Asia to additionally help reduce
    terrorist acts between nations, just as we have been doing in
    the Middle East.
        In closing, let me just remind my colleagues that this
    hearing focuses on Southeast Asian-centered terrorism.
    Terrorist acts are a worldwide issue targeted toward people of
    all backgrounds by terrorists of all backgrounds.
        The recent report of the National Commission on Terrorism
    noted that today's terrorists are less dependent on state
    sponsorship and are, instead, forming loose, transnational
    affiliations.
        So I would just say, let's make sure that we are fair and
    even handed as we look at this issue and not take sides,
    because we cannot help if it appears as though we are on one
    side as opposed to the other. If we are going to be the
    facilitators, we need to have an even hand so that we can make
    sure that we can continue communication with all nations, and
    then we can combat this terrorism that is going on around the
    world.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Meeks.
        We will be continuing our testimony right through the vote
    on the journal. I have asked one of our Members to go over and
    return quickly.
        We will now call our first witness today, the Honorable
    Michael Sheehan, Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for
    Counterterrorism at the Department of State, where he has
    primary responsibility for developing, coordinating, and
    implementing U.S. counterterrorism policy.
        Ambassador Sheehan was confirmed by the Senate in August
    1999. His office chairs the Working Group for Counter-
    Terrorism, which develops and coordinates policy, manages the
    State Department Task Force that responds to international
    incidents, and coordinates government efforts to improve
    cooperation with foreign governments, including the
    Administration of the anti-terrorism training assistance
    program.
        Ambassador Sheehan's background includes serving as Deputy
    Assistant Secretary in the State Department's Bureau of
    International Organization Affairs and as a Special Advisor to
    the representative of the Secretary General of the U.S. mission
    to the United Nations.
        Ambassador Sheehan retired as a lieutenant colonel in the
    United States Army after a career that included two tours on
    the National Security Council's staff. He is a graduate of the
    United States Military Academy at West Point, adjoining my
    congressional district.
        Ambassador Sheehan.

     STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN, AMBASSADOR-AT-
     LARGE, COORDINATOR FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
                                 STATE

        Ambassador Sheehan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of
    the Committee, and thank you for this opportunity to address
    the shift of the locus of terrorism to South Asia.
        In our annual report to Congress this year, Patterns of
    Global Terrorism, 1999, we describe the shift in some detail.
    This was one of the two trends we identified as the most
    important recent developments in terrorism, the other being the
    shift from well organized and hierarchical groups supported by
    state sponsors of terrorism to the loosely organized
    international networks of terrorism that are often able to
    raise funds and sustain themselves by smuggling narcotics
    trafficking, kidnapping, extortion and other types of fund
    raising.
        Mr. Chairman, I just returned from the Philippines and
    before that Colombia, where this new type of terrorism is
    manifesting itself in a very dangerous way. It was very
    troubling for American interests in both of those countries of
    longstanding importance to the United States.
        I purposely addressed the trends that I alluded to earlier
    on the very first page of my introduction in this report to
    show the importance of these trends, and the increased
    willingness and ability of terrorists to seek refuge in South
    Asia are disturbing developments. They require us to refocus
    our diplomatic energies and policy tools as well.
        I have a fairly lengthy written statement that I will
    submit to the record, Mr. Chairman, and I will briefly cover
    some of the main points of that statement in my oral remarks
    this morning.
        Chairman Gilman. So ordered without objection.
        Ambassador Sheehan. Mr. Chairman, I will talk about three
    areas this morning in my oral remarks. No. 1 is why South Asia.
    What is important about South Asia?
        Second, what we are doing right now.
        And, third, what we will do next to deal with this evolving
    threat.
        Why has South Asia become the locus for terrorism around
    the world? Primarily the reason is Afghanistan, and the
    complete collapse of the state of Afghanistan starting in 1979
    with the invasion of the Soviet army. The long and ongoing
    conflict in Afghanistan attracted fighters from around the
    world, many of them at our bequest, in the mid-1980's.
        The proximity of Afghanistan to other conflicts, such as
    Kashmir and others in Central Asia, also contributes to making
    it a hub of this type of activity. In addition, the welcome mat
    provided by the Taliban to these fighters that are often
    supporting the Taliban's fight against the Northern Alliance
    often also find refuge in Afghanistan for other agendas that
    they have in different parts of the world.
        In Afghanistan, the situation is exacerbated by an
    explosion of narcotics trafficking and finances involved with
    that, a virtual arms bazaar throughout the country, and
    religious extremism that is fostered in many of the Madrases in
    Afghanistan and nearby Pakistan.
        Afghanistan came to the forefront of attention of the
    United States, although we had known about it. The increasing
    support for terrorism in the region came to the forefront after
    the bombings of our embassy in East Africa in August 1988.
    Also, last year, as Congressman Gilman mentioned in his opening
    remarks, we had a good year, only five deaths of Americans from
    international terrorism, the lowest in many, many years, three
    in Colombia and two in Central Africa.
        We did have continuing threats coming from South Asia,
    including the terrorist threat around the millennial period
    that manifested itself in Jordan, that wound its way back into
    Afghanistan; the hijacking of an aircraft from India that wound
    up on a runway in Kandahar; and various other threats that
    manifest themselves around the globe and often have tentacles
    leading back to the leadership in the camps in Afghanistan.
        Why is Afghanistan important? Why is South Asia? Let me
    mention three reasons.
        First, the most immediate are the threats that directly
    affect us around the world today, and as many of you know,
    recently the State Department has put out an additional
    warning, a public announcement of warnings as terrorist threats
    have increased around the world recently, many of those, again,
    winding their way back to Afghanistan.
        Second, the terrorism that emanates out of this part of the
    world threatens regional stability. As mentioned by some of the
    Members here in Pakistan itself, Kashmir conflict, other
    conflicts in Central Asia, reaching into the Caucasus and the
    Middle East and beyond.
        And finally, over the longer term, as the Coordinator for
    Counterterrorism, I am concerned about the caldron of terrorism
    that is bubbling out of Afghanistan and will continue to
    threaten American interests in the longer term.
         What are we doing to confront this threat? We are moving
    on a lot of different fronts. I will, again, break those into
    three areas.
        First, on the immediate front, we are working 24 hours a
    day times 7 days a week to disrupt any cells that threaten
    Americans around the world. Working with our liaisons with law
    enforcement and intelligence organizations around the world, we
    are actively involved in disrupting any activities that
    threaten American interests. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman,
    this is ongoing continuously, both the threat our count-
    threats.
        Second, we are working very actively to isolate and contain
    this threat with pressure on the sanctuary of these groups.
        Over the longer term, third, is what I refer to in the
    report and often in many of my remarks. We want to drain the
    swamp, which is a term I use to deny sanctuary to terrorist
    organizations that need space in order to organize its
    leadership, plan its activities, train its fighters, assemble
    its equipment and arms in order to conduct attacks. And the
    primary swamp that I am concerned about right now, Mr.
    Chairman, is in Afghanistan, although there are many others
    around the world as well.
        Let me say a word about resources while I have the
    opportunity. I thank this Committee particularly, many of the
    Members of this Committee and the staff, for the support they
    have given my office over the years. I would like to emphasize
    we have two important funding requirements in front of the
    Congress right now, a funding for the anti-terrorism assistance
    program and for a center for anti-terrorism security training,
    CAST, that are being requested by the Administration.
        Right now, in particular, the funding for the CAST seems to
    be in great jeopardy. This center will help us train not only
    our diplomatic security personnel, but primarily, it will train
    those law enforcement and security people that work with us on
    a day-to-day basis around the world to disrupt those cells I
    referred to earlier.
        We need, in the 21st century, a 21st century terrorist
    training facility in order to confront the 21st century
    terrorist threats. I appreciate your support, Mr. Chairman, and
    others on the Committee as we work forward on this requirement.
        In conclusion, I would like to remind that our efforts to
    combat terrorism in South Asia and around the world start with
    our support from Capitol Hill and often from this Committee.
    Carefully calibrated counterterrorism legislation, such as
    those regarding state sponsorship, the foreign terrorist
    organizations, and others are very key to our efforts.
        Sufficient resources and the public discourse such as the
    hearings are also key. Your support coupled with the force of
    our sustained diplomatic and political efforts will help us
    drain the swamp in Afghanistan and in other states that are not
    mustering the political will to confront terrorists.
        We have had a great deal of success in the past 20 years,
    Mr. Chairman. This success can be attributed to our commitment
    to stay the course in a tough counterterrorism policy and to
    rally international support. Applying diplomatic pressure,
    raising political will and levying sanctions, these actions
    have made many corners of the world intolerable for terrorists.
        We must continue to stay the course while adjusting to new
    geographic threats and a changing face of terrorism. We must
    maintain strong political will within the Administration and in
    the Congress to be tough on terrorism and push our allies to do
    the same.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear
    before your Committee today. I look forward to answering any of
    your questions or Members of the Committee.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ambassador Sheehan appears in
    the appendix.]
        Chairman Gilman. Thank you very much, Mr. Sheehan.
        We have with us Alan Eastham, who has a long record of
    service in the State Department and in the service of his
    country. He is now a Special Assistant and Under Secretary for
    Political Affairs. He was involved with the Near East and South
    East in his responsibilities for a number of years, including
    Sri Lanka and as the India Desk Officer.
        He has been a staff officer in the Office of Combating
    Terrorism, and he has had a wide range of experience overseas,
    in South Asia.
        You may proceed, Mr. Eastham.

    STATEMENT OF ALAN W. EASTHAM, JR., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
        BUREAU OF SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

        Mr. Eastham. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, to you and
    the Members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to
    come here today to talk about an issue of great importance to
    the United States and its interests in South Asia.
        Let me also express the regrets of Assistant Secretary Karl
    Inderfurth, who was originally invited to attend this hearing.
    He is presently on his way back from a visit to China where he
    consulted on South Asian issues with the Chinese Government,
    coincidentally on the same day as Ambassador Holbrooke was
    there to talk about other issues relating to South Asia and
    other parts of the world.
        I would like to begin by talking about some of the events,
    actions we have taken since the last time we had an opportunity
    to testify before Congress regarding terrorism in South Asia. I
    would remind the Committee that in October 1999, the Security
    Council of the United Nations unanimously passed U.N.
    Resolution 1267, which calls on the Taliban to hand over Usama
    bin Laden to a country where he can be brought to justice.
        Since October of last year, we have been diligently
    monitoring the application of the sanctions which were applied
    in that resolution, which include effects on financial
    transactions affecting the Taliban and a ban on flights by the
    Afghan National Airline, which is controlled by the Taliban,
    outside Afghanistan.
        With Russia and other countries we have been talking in
    recent weeks about the situation in Afghanistan, including
    terrorism. With India this year we have established a joint
    working group on counterterrorism which first met in February
    of this year.
         India has also agreed to accept and work closely with a
    legal attache at the U.S. embassy in New Delhi, and a country
    which has not yet been mentioned in this morning's proceedings.
    With Sri Lanka, a friendly country which has been fighting an
    insurgent group that employs the weapon of terrorism, we have
    enjoyed excellent cooperation in a number of areas related to
    counterterrorism.
        I have a lengthy statement, Mr. Chairman, which I will at
    this point summarize if that would be agreeable to you.
        Chairman Gilman. With unanimous consent, so ordered.
        Mr. Eastham. Thank you.
        Ambassador Sheehan and his colleagues have rightly stressed
    the shifting locus of international terrorism to South Asia.
    Though several South Asian countries face terrorist threats of
    one kind or another, terrorists in Afghanistan pose the
    greatest threat to U.S. interests, lives, and property in the
    region, and it will be that country which is largely the
    subject of my testimony today.
        I would also like to take this opportunity to remind the
    Committee of a number of tragic incidents which have occurred
    over the past several years in the region for which I bear some
    responsibility.
        Beginning in March 1995, members of the Consulate General
    staff in Karachi were murdered in transit between their homes
    and the office. That case remains under active investigation to
    this day.
        A similar incident occurred in late 1997 in which four
    American businessmen were shot to death, and that case also is
    under investigation.
        In Kashmir in July 1995, several foreign tourists were
    abducted while hiking in the mountains of that region. I have
    to say that we have devoted a great deal of time and attention
    to the case of Mr. Donald Hutchings, the American citizen who
    is still missing from the incident, and with whose family we
    are still in touch. We are still very actively pursuing that
    case.
        Ambassador Sheehan has mentioned the hijacking of the
    Indian Airlines flight last December, which had a profound
    effect and some relation to the earlier kidnapping in Kashmir
    by the fact that one of the Indian prisoners who was released
    as a result of the demands of the hijackers was also the
    subject of demands of the kidnappers of the Americans from
    1995.
        At present the hijackers were last seen at the airport in
    Kandahar, Afghanistan. The gentleman who was released from
    Indian custody is presently in Pakistan. There have been no
    arrests in that case.
        And I would also draw your attention to November 12, 1999,
    when the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan was the subject of
    a rocket attack from parked vehicles.
        The reason I bring these cases up, Mr. Chairman, is to
    remind you that there is still a clear and present threat from
    terrorism in the South Asia region. It affects U.S. interests.
    It affects U.S. personnel. It affects U.S. property, and it is
    certainly worthy of this Committee's attention and the
    attention of the Congress.
        There have been many other such incidents against Indian
    interests in Kashmir, bombings in cities in India and Pakistan
    and attacks, as I mentioned, against the government of Sri
    Lanka by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam, which we have
    designated as a foreign terrorist organization.
        These include an assassination attempt in December against
    Sri Lankan President Kumaratunga, which injured her and killed
    several other people. It is clear that the trend is toward more
    and more deadly attacks against targets in South Asia.
        We have strongly condemned these attacks in the region, as
    we do everywhere in the world. It is not acceptable and,
    indeed, reprehensible for individuals and groups to adopt this
    tactic as a means of achieving political goals.
        With respect to Kashmir, Mr. Chairman, the President, when
    he visited South Asia in March, set out a number of principles
    which call for restraint, rejection of violence, respect for
    the line of control in Kashmir, and for India and Pakistan to
    renew their dialogue. We believe those principles are eminently
    practical and that they would, if pursued actively by the
    parties in South Asia, lead to a reduction in U.S. violence
    and, indeed, considerable U.S. support in that regard.
        It is Afghanistan, however, where the shifting locus of
    terrorism is most pronounced. I have in my written statement
    for the record addressed the historical factors in some detail.
    I know that Mr. Rohrabacher has also addressed more recent
    history.
        I would just note, however, the immense suffering of the
    Afghan people over the last 20 years since the invasion by the
    Soviet army of that country in December 1979. One major factor
    to which Ambassador Sheehan has already alluded is the fact
    that over the past 20 years an entire generation of young men
    has grown up who know nothing but war.
        There is also an entire generation of young women who have
    come into mature life during that period who have known nothing
    but suffering, and it is toward peace in Afghanistan that our
    efforts are directed.
        Sadly for the Afghans, the brutality and ruthlessness that
    they learned in fighting the Soviets has carried over into
    fighting other Afghans as the Afghan civil war continued for
    the past 10 years.
        The breakdown of central authority in Afghanistan, the all
    too easy access to the tools of terrorism in the form of
    weapons and explosives, and the rise of ideologies in which
    violence against innocents is considered a legitimate tool,
    have contributed to an increase in international terrorism
    emanating from that region.
        The rise of the Taliban has also been a contributing
    factor. The Taliban had no previous experience when they took
    power in Afghanistan in administering a government. They had
    little experience with the outside world. They had a strong
    ideological motivation based in Islam and in the Pushtu-based
    society from which they derive, and they had a strong need for
    support from any quarter.
        This led them to depend on extremely questionable outside
    sources of support, including those who advocate violence from
    outside Afghanistan, and increasingly the financial benefits of
    the narcotics trade.
        They have since demonstrated that they support and
    sympathize with goals from outside the region, which include
    the removal of U.S. forces from the region of the Gulf, and
    they have taken no significant steps to curtail the pursuit of
    terrorist means to achieve goals emanating from Afghanistan.
        Ambassador Sheehan has outlined the steps we are taking to
    defend ourselves and to push back international terrorism. We
    have repeatedly demonstrated this over the past several years.
        One factor I would also like to note, Mr. Chairman, is the
    need for governments to realize that support for their groups
    will backfire. These groups always, and I stress always, pose a
    threat to the stability, security, and other real national
    interests of their hosts and patrons, no matter the short term
    political advantage which might be seen from activities against
    national adversaries.
        The Taliban in Afghanistan have yet to learn this lesson.
        At the same time that we have been pressing the Taliban to
    take action to prevent the use of their territory for
    international terrorism, we have been careful to continue
    contributing to humanitarian programs in Afghanistan. We have
    provided support for schools. We are the major donor of food
    assistance to Afghans. We provide medical supplies and most
    recently have just announced a new $4 million donation for
    drought relief in Afghanistan, a country which is suffering
    from a significant drought which may lead to significant
    suffering and starvation in that country.
        We have had, we think, a positive impact on the lives of
    ordinary Afghans because it is not their fault, and they should
    not suffer because the people who control that country support
    international terrorism.
        With respect to Pakistan, several members have noted the
    close relationship we have had over the years with that
    country. We have also worked together against terrorism.
    Pakistan has offered its cooperation, as has been noted
    previously during this hearing.
        Pakistan wants to see peace and stability in Afghanistan.
    After all, Afghanistan is next door to Pakistan. It has
    considerable influence in Afghanistan and with the Taliban.
        Pakistan has made known its view that the presence of Usama
    bin Laden in Afghanistan is an obstacle to stability, and
    Pakistan makes the point that it does not control the Taliban.
        We will continue and have urged Pakistan to use every
    aspect of its influence with the Taliban to convince them to
    deal with this issue in the manner called for in U.N. Security
    Council Resolution 1267.
        We are also very concerned at the problem of terrorism in
    Pakistan. The country has taken some recent, very welcome steps
    to address this problem and has arrested a number of persons
    wanted for terrorist crimes, as has already been noted, and has
    announced it's taking a close look at foreigners living in
    Pakistan to insure they're there for lawful and peaceful
    purposes.
        I would note that the Pakistan press today, Mr. Chairman,
    reports that a senior delegation from the Pakistan Interior
    Ministry will be going to Afghanistan later this month to talk
    to the Taliban authorities about matters pertaining to
    terrorism and narcotics, and we welcome that as a manifestation
    of Pakistan's intent to deal with this problem as it affects
    that country.
        We are also concerned, as I noted, because both Pakistani
    and U.S. interests have been attacked in that country. Some
    terrorists and their supporters certainly continue to live in
    and move through Pakistan. This includes the organization
    formally known as Harakat-ul-Ansar, which was designated as a
    foreign terrorist organization by the United States.
        We will continue to urge Pakistan to take action against
    such groups and to take all steps necessary to see that it does
    not become a safe haven or a safe transit point.
        I hope, Mr. Chairman, we can take as the example the
    counter-narcotics cooperation we have enjoyed with Pakistan for
    the past 20 years. We have come to the point where it is
    possible to see the end of the road for opium production in
    Pakistan. We have had exemplary cooperation with that country
    in this area, and we hope that we can take that as a model for
    cooperation on counterterrorism.
        I thank you very much for the opportunity. I will be happy
    to take your questions, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Eastham appears in the
    appendix.]
        Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Eastham and Secretary
    Sheehan.
        Let me first address Ambassador-at-Large Michael Sheehan.
    At your recent Central Asia terrorism meeting here in
    Washington, sponsored by the State Department, several of the
    government representatives from nations in the region impacted
    by radical Islamic terrorism talked about terrorist camps
    within Pakistan, as well as Afghanistan.
        Are you aware of any terrorist training camps inside of
    Pakistan?
        Ambassador Sheehan. Mr. Chairman, our primary concern
    regarding camps is in Afghanistan, and I talked to those
    members of all five countries from Central Asia that came to
    our conference. We had very productive discussions with them.
    They were all concerned primarily about Afghanistan and the
    camps there.
        The situation in Pakistan is complicated. I may need a
    closed session to go into some more details on some of the
    aspects of it. In our annual report, we do mention the movement
    of terrorist groups through Pakistan. Primarily my concern is
    the camps are in Afghanistan. Often in order to leave
    Afghanistan, many terrorists move through Pakistan,
    particularly through Peshawar and out through the region, but
    they also move north through the Central Asian states as well.
        But I think any other details regarding some activity of
    those camps we might do in closed session; but I would
    underscore to you, Mr. Chairman, the major source of camps for
    the training of those types of groups reside in Afghanistan.
        Chairman Gilman. But my question is: specifically, are
    there any training camps in Pakistan?
        Ambassador Sheehan. Mr. Chairman, I reviewed that question
    carefully with my analysts before coming up here. I think I
    need, based on their advice, to talk to you about that in a
    closed session.
        Chairman Gilman. A number of the Central Asian countries
    indicated that there was information of terrorist camps in
    Pakistan. Are they accurate? Are those statements accurate?
        Ambassador Sheehan. Again, Mr. Chairman, I think I would
    have to discuss that in a closed session.
        Chairman Gilman. All right. With regard to both panelists,
    what is your candid view of the level of cooperation that we've
    received from Pakistan in recent years in the fight against
    international terrorism in the region?
        Ambassador Sheehan. Mr. Chairman, the Pakistani Government
    has cooperated with the U.S. Government in counter-terrorist
    actions over the past many years, and it continues to do so
    actively as we speak right now regarding helping us deal with
    specific threats to our security, both those threats that
    affect us within Pakistan, our embassy, and other points of
    interest, but also regarding individuals that may be within
    Pakistan or transiting through Pakistan.
        So in that regard, they get fairly good grades on
    cooperation on specific cases. The other side of the ledger, I
    must say, is their policies in Afghanistan and to a lesser
    degree in Kashmir that contribute to the problem of terrorism
    that emanates out of Afghanistan. So it's a mixed record. They
    cooperate, but they also have policies that are very troubling
    to us, and we have had very frank discussions with them on
    those policies and urge them to address those issues.
        We remain closely engaged at a very high level with the
    Pakistanis on these issues, and my particular concern is their
    relationship to the Taliban and how that affects our interest
    in counterterrorism.
        Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Ambassador Sheehan.
        Secretary Eastham, did you want to comment on that?
        Mr. Eastham. I would just add that I would second
    Ambassador Sheehan's remark regarding cooperation on specific
    cases. The threats to U.S. installations----
        Chairman Gilman. Would you put the mic a little closer to
    you?
        Mr. Eastham. Sure. The threats to U.S. installations,
    facilities, personnel, and interests in Pakistan receive the
    highest level of cooperation from the Pakistan Government. As
    Ambassador Sheehan has noted, the question of the Taliban and
    on the pursuit of longer term interests with respect to
    Afghanistan has an effect on Pakistani attitudes with respect
    to that country.
        It would not be inappropriate to mention that policies
    toward Kashmir also have an effect, but I think that I would
    endorse Ambassador Sheehan's remarks.
        Chairman Gilman. To both panelists, why has the State
    Department failed in not designating the Pakistani based LET
    group [LASHKAR-e TAYYABA], a foreign terrorist organization,
    especially since the legal threshold is not very high?
        Ambassador Sheehan. Mr. Chairman, every 2 years, actually
    by legislation, the Congress requires us to review foreign
    terrorist organizations. However, this year I have also
    decided, within the limited resources in my office, to review
    other groups during the year because we can designate them as
    terrorist organizations at any time during the year.
        We are currently reviewing the LET, the LASHKAR-e TAYYABA,
    actively for its designation as a foreign terrorist
    organization. The work has been done at the analytical level
    within the State Department. It is a very complicated and legal
    process, the designation of a foreign terrorist organization,
    and right now we are working with the Department of Justice and
    Department of Treasury to complete that legal analysis.
        We have been challenged twice in the past on our
    designation of FTOs in the U.S. court system, and we have won
    both times. So it is incumbent on us to be very well prepared
    before we designate a group for terrorism, and right now the
    LET or the LASHKAR-e TAYYABA, I think you are referring to, is
    under close review right now, and I expect, Mr. Chairman, to
    have an answer as to whether they will be designated within the
    next weeks, perhaps months, depending on that legal process.
        Chairman Gilman. We would hope you would keep this
    Committee informed of your progress in that direction.
        Mr. Gejdenson.
        Mr. Gejdenson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I think one of the things that we want to make sure people
    see clearly is that our concerns here are isolated to terrorist
    activities and threats directed at the United States and our
    allies, and that what we want to make sure does not happen is
    that we do not want to create the appearance in any way that
    there is a conflict here between the West and Islam or, you
    know, people of the Muslim faith.
        These are isolated incidents, and certainly most of Islam,
    like most religions, focus on peaceful relations with their
    neighbors. So I just want to make sure that the fact that we
    happen to focus on this region today does not leave people with
    any other impression.
        My first question is that I am getting the sense, more and
    more, that it is hard to figure out what comes first, but there
    is an economic aspect to all of this. You look at Colombia, and
    you find the drug lords and the terrorists there. You go to
    Lebanon and you find in the Bekaa Valley they are growing
    poppies. You come to this area, and again, the drug trade, you
    can look at it and see that the drug trade is an easy way to
    make lots of money.
        The relationship here seems to be very tightly woven. So
    this is my first question. How much of the activity here is
    profit motivated, trying to make money off drugs with a little
    bit of fervor on the side for your terrorist organization, and
    how much is terrorism with its own goals associated with that?
        The second question is: What are the countries that have
    relationships and provide assistance to the Taliban and the
    government in Afghanistan?
        Ambassador Sheehan. I am sorry. What was the second
    question, again?
        Mr. Gejdenson. The second question is: Which countries have
    relations with the government in Afghanistan and provide
    assistance, military, other than humanitarian, of course?
        Ambassador Sheehan. All right, Mr. Gejdenson. On the first
    question regarding your question about terrorism and its
    economic roots, etc., you are absolutely right that most of the
    terrorism that I see, as the Coordinator when I look around the
    world, emanates from places where there is a breakdown of state
    control. The old days of state sponsorship have really waned
    considerably, although there are a few that I have great
    concern with, but those are less of my immediate concern.
        When you have a complete breakdown of lawlessness in a
    place like Afghanistan, where you have the confluence of
    narcotics trafficking, arms smuggling, other types of illicit
    activity, coupled with these other terrorist groups, you find
    this phenomenon at a high rate.
        In Afghanistan there are both types of terrorists, those
    that seem to be just in the profit business and others that are
    politically motivated. Some of them are just politically
    motivated, and those are some of the ones, frankly, that are
    more troubling.
        The ones that get caught up in narcotics trafficking and
    other elicit activities sort of lose interest in their
    terrorist goals. They're still of major concern, but not as
    threatening as the ones that are very focused on their
    political agenda. So there is a little bit of both in
    Afghanistan.
        Regarding your second question on support for the Taliban,
    the Taliban finds itself extraordinarily isolated around the
    world today. Initially they were recognized only by three
    governments: by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab
    Emirates. The Saudis and the UAE both have an extraordinarily
    strange relationship with the Taliban right now, and I have
    discussed that issue with both of them at very senior levels.
        They have put a lot of pressure on the Taliban on a lot of
    issues regarding terrorism, narcotics traffic, and others, and
    have been cooperating with us on bringing pressure to bear on
    the Taliban.
        The other country is Pakistan. Its relationship with the
    Taliban is also longstanding and complicated, and I would not
    exactly describe it as very warm at this point. I will let Al
    Eastham respond to this in more detail, but I know that the
    Pakistani Government is engaging the Taliban right now
    regarding all of the issues that we are concerned about in
    trying to get them to turn around their policies. Whether those
    efforts will bear fruit remains to be seen, but those are the
    main countries with relations with the Taliban.
        Mr. Eastham. I would just add that, on your first question
    regarding the nexus between drugs and terrorism, the Taliban
    have an ambiguous position on this. They say that the drug
    trade is un-Islamic, but they seem to permit it to occur and,
    indeed, to tax it along the way as a source of revenue; and
    this is a dichotomy in their policy, which is a little bit
    difficult to deal with because the two policies are completely
    opposite.
        We have been doing a great deal to focus on the problem of
    interdicting narcotics flowing out of Afghanistan. We have been
    working with all of Afghanistan's neighbors in this direction
    and also with the U.N. drug control program.
        There is a dilemma in trying to suppress the narcotics
    traffic in Afghanistan. You have to provide assistance to the
    country to be able to do that, and that is very hard for us to
    do with the Taliban.
        Mr. Gejdenson. Under the present restrictions, are we able
    to do democracy building in, for instance, Pakistan with the
    present sanctions? The present leadership in Pakistan is
    arguing it is trying to establish democracy at the grassroots
    level. Can we participate in that or are we blocked from doing
    that with our sanctions?
        Ambassador Sheehan. We can, Mr. Gejdenson, and we do.
        Mr. Gejdenson. And if I could indulge my colleagues, one
    last thing. Are there any countries supplying weapons to the
    Taliban at this point?
        Ambassador Sheehan. I think I will have to go in closed
    session on that as well, Mr. Gejdenson. What I know about that
    is from classified sources. I will be glad to talk to you about
    it after this.
        Mr. Gejdenson. Thank you.
        You might check with Mr. Rohrabacher for any other
    information you need on Afghanistan. He seems to be very
    knowledgeable about the military situation there.
        Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.
        Mr. Rohrabacher.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. This is a joke. I mean, you have to go to
    closed session to tell us where the weapons are coming from?
        Well, how about let's make a choice. There is Pakistan or
    Pakistan or Pakistan. Where do you think the Taliban--right as
    we speak--are getting their weapons. I have not read any
    classified documents. Everybody in the region knows that
    Pakistan is involved with a massive supply of military weapons
    and has been since the very beginning of the Taliban.
        Let me just state for the record here before I get into my
    questions that I think there is a--and it is not just you, Mr.
    Ambassador, but it is this Administration and perhaps other
    Administrations as well. I do not believe that terrorism flows
    from a lack of state control. A breakdown of state control, and
    all of a sudden you have terrorism.
        That is not what causes terrorism. What causes terrorism is
    a lack of freedom and democracy, a lack of a means to solve
    one's problems through a democratic process.
        Afghanistan from the very beginning, when the Reagan
    Administration was involved with helping the Afghans fight the
    Russians, which were engaged in trying to put a totalitarian
    government there; because of Pakistan's insistence, a lion's
    share of our support went to a guy named Hek Makti Argulbadin,
    who had no democratic tendencies whatsoever.
        And since the Russians left, the United States has not been
    supporting any type of somewhat free, somewhat democratic
    alternatives in Afghanistan, and there are such alternatives,
    and those of us who have been involved know that.
        So there is no democracy or freedom in Afghanistan where
    people who are good and decent and courageous have a chance to
    cleanse their society of the drug dealers and the fanatics that
    torture and repress especially the women of Afghanistan. The
    men of Afghanistan are not fanatics like the Taliban either.
    They would like to have a different regime.
        Only the United States has given--and I again make this
    charge--the United States has been part and parcel to
    supporting the Taliban all along and still is, let me add. You
    do not have any type of democracy in Afghanistan. You have a
    military government in Pakistan now that is arming the Taliban
    to the teeth.
        And in Kashmir, what have you got? You have got an Indian
    Government that supposedly is democratic, steadfastly refusing
    to permit those people to have an election to solve the
    problems there democratically. You have got Christians; you
    have got Seeks throughout India and Pakistan and Jamou where
    the people's rights are being denied them. It is a breakdown of
    democracy on the subcontinent, not a breakdown in state control
    that is causing the violence that threatens the world right
    now.
        Let me note that 3 years ago I tried to arrange support,
    aid, humanitarian aid to a non-Taliban controlled section of
    Afghanistan, the Bamiyan area. Mr. Chairman, the State
    Department did everything they could to thwart these
    humanitarian medical supplies from going into Bamiyan.
        And we have heard today that we are very proud that we are
    still giving aid to Afghanistan. Let me note that aid has
    always gone to Taliban areas. So what message does that send
    the people of Afghanistan? We have been supporting the Taliban
    because all of our aid goes to the Taliban areas, and when
    people from the outside try to put aid into areas not
    controlled by the Taliban, they are thwarted by our own State
    Department.
        Let me just note that that same area, Bamiyan, where I
    tried to help those people who were opposed to the Taliban,
    Bamiyan now is the headquarters of Mr. bin Laden. Surprise,
    surprise.
        Everyone in this Committee has heard me time and again over
    the years say unless we did something Afghanistan was going to
    become a base for terrorism and drug dealing. Mr. Chairman, how
    many times did you hear me say that?
        This Administration either ignored that or are part of the
    problem rather than part of the solution. Again, I am sorry Mr.
    Inderfurth is not here to defend himself, but let me state for
    the record at a time when the Taliban were vulnerable, the top
    person in this Administration, Mr. Inderfurth, and Bill
    Richardson personally went to Afghanistan and convinced the
    anti-Taliban forces not to go on the offensive. Furthermore,
    they convinced all of the anti-Taliban forces and their
    supporters, to disarm and to cease their flow of support for
    the anti-Taliban forces.
        At that same moment, Pakistan initiated a major resupply
    effort, which eventually caused the defeat of almost all of the
    anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan.
        Now, with a history like that, it is very hard, Mr.
    Ambassador, for me to sit here and listen to someone say our
    main goal is to drain the swamp--and the swamp is Afghanistan--
    because the United States created that swamp in Afghanistan,
    and the United States policies have undercut those efforts to
    create a freer and more open society in Afghanistan which was
    consistent with the beliefs of the Afghan people.
        Mr. Gejdenson. Will the gentleman yield for one statement?
        Mr. Rohrabacher. I certainly will.
        Mr. Gejdenson. I was wondering. During the time that the
    Administration supported the Taliban and created this policy,
    who was President during those years?
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, there were several Presidents, and I
    would say that George Bush has to accept some of the blame, but
    I think the current Administration--no, the Taliban did not
    exist before that, Mr. Gejdenson.
        Mr. Gejdenson, one of the other myths is that the Taliban
    were part and parcel of the Mujahadin. The Taliban, as both of
    you know, were not part of the Mujahadin. The Taliban basically
    sat out the war and came on the scene afterward. Mu Omar was
    not a renowned commander in the Mujahadin.
        Chairman Gilman. Mr. Rohrabacher, did you want the
    witnesses to respond?
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes, one last note. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        The Muslims are the victims of terrorism just as much as
    anyone else. In fact, Muslims are suffering more than anyone
    else, and I agree with my colleagues that we have to be very
    careful. Mr. Gejdenson was absolutely right in making sure that
    as we look at this Taliban drug-related terrorism that is now
    affecting all of us, that we do not do something to send a
    message that this is something to do with the Islamic faith
    because it does not. They are victims as well.
        And if you have any comments, please feel free. Thank you
    for giving me 5 minutes.
        Chairman Gilman. Did the panelists want to respond at all?
        Ambassador Sheehan. I would, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Gilman. Ambassador Sheehan.
        Ambassador Sheehan. First of all, Mr. Rohrabacher, I am
    sorry that you think that it is a joke that I will not respond
    on the issue of support for the arms for the Taliban. The
    information that I have, which I cannot respond by public
    sources, is based on intelligence methods, and I do not have
    the authority to speak about that in this session, but I will
    be glad to talk to you or other Members afterward.
        Second, regarding the responsibility the U.S. Government
    has for Afghanistan in the situation there, I do not accept
    that conclusion at all. The United States did participate in
    helping the Mujahadin reject the Soviet occupation in the mid-
    1980's, and that was a policy that I think was a correct one at
    that time.
        The situation in Afghanistan, the deterioration of that
    state since 1979, has primarily to do with the situation in
    Afghanistan. Certainly there were those responsible, whether it
    was the Soviet occupiers or those who were involved in the
    civil war that has waged there for 20 years, but the idea that
    the U.S. Government is responsible for everything in
    Afghanistan is not true.
        The idea that we support the Taliban I also reject, as
    well, completely. I have spent 18 months in this job leading
    the effort within the U.S. Government and around the world to
    bring pressure on the Taliban. After the bombing of the
    embassies in East Africa, when I got hired for this job, I have
    made it my sole effort, my primary effort in this job to bring
    pressure on that regime.
        The U.S. Government leads that effort in providing pressure
    on that regime. My office leads that effort within the U.S.
    Government. We started with an executive order in August 1999
    that brought sanctions to bear on the Taliban. We led the
    effort in the United Nations to bring international sanctions
    against them.
        We are also leading the effort internationally right now to
    look at further measures against the Taliban. It is the U.S.
    Government that is leading that effort. We are ahead of
    everybody else to bring pressure on the Taliban, and the
    Taliban knows it. Those other member states within the United
    Nations and the other communities know our efforts to bring
    pressure to bear on that organization because of its support
    for terrorism.
        Chairman Gilman. Thank you.
        Mr. Eastham, did you want to comment?
        Mr. Eastham. Yes, sir, I would.
        I would be happy to defend Mr. Inderfurth if you would
    like, Mr. Rohrabacher, even if he is not here in person.
        I would just note that I have spent nearly 15 years of my
    life working on this part of the world. I was with the
    Mujahadin at Peshawar from 1984 to 1987. I was in the consulate
    at Peshawar at that time, and I have been back on this account
    now. I began my 6th year on the South Asia account this time
    around this week.
        I was in Pakistan when you were trying your effort to put
    airdrop assistance into Bamiyan. So I am quite familiar with
    the history of the whole episode.
        And I can say that at no point, at no point in the last 6
    years has the United States of America offered its support to
    the Taliban. This is why I think that despite the fact we have
    provided you nearly 1,000 documents in response to the requests
    of the Chairman that you have not been able to find the support
    for the Taliban, because it is not there.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. That is incorrect, by the way, and I will
    state that for the record. That is incorrect. I have found
    several references and documents that have been kept from me
    indicating what our policy formation about the Taliban has
    been. So that it not accurate.
        Mr. Eastham. Well, we have a fundamental difference of
    opinion then about the record of what this Administration has
    done with respect to the Taliban.
        But I will say that our goals with respect to the Taliban
    have shifted over the past 2 years almost since the East Africa
    bombings. When the Taliban first came into power in
    Afghanistan, we had an agenda which addressed terrorism,
    narcotics, human rights including the rights of women, and
    bringing peace to Afghanistan. We tried to address all of those
    at the same time.
        After the East Africa bombing, the terrorism problem became
    much more acute and a much higher priority in terms of what we
    were doing, but we have been addressing all of these issues
    since the first day the Taliban came into being, and
    particularly since they came to power in Kabul.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Faleomavaega.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I just had a couple of questions I wanted to ask Mr.
    Eastham.
         Is Afghanistan currently a full fledged member of the
    United Nations?
        Mr. Eastham. Yes, it is.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. And by all standards, 187 members of the
    United Nations recognized the sovereignty of Afghanistan
    through the Taliban?
        Mr. Eastham. I am not an expert on this, but I think I can
    address it in terms general enough that I do not make a major
    mistake.
        Afghanistan's credentials as a member of the United Nations
    have never been rejected by the credentials committee, and the
    Northern Alliance delegation, the delegation representing the
    entity headed by Burhannudin Rabbani still occupies the seat of
    Afghanistan at the United Nations.
        At the same time the Taliban has a presence in New York as
    a group, but they do not sit in United Nations councils.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. The Taliban group does not sit in the
    United Nations council?
        Mr. Eastham. That is correct.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. But by all legitimacy, all other nations
    do recognize the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan in
    its bilateral as well as multilateral relations?
        Mr. Eastham. No, that is not correct. There are only three
    countries that have formally recognized the Taliban as the
    governing entity in Afghanistan. Those three are, as Ambassador
    Sheehan mentioned, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Pakistan. No
    other country has, to my knowledge, established formal
    diplomatic relations or recognized the Taliban as the
    legitimate government of Afghanistan.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. When the Soviet Union invaded
    Afghanistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan are our closest allies
    and we committed a tremendous amount of arms and assistance to
    these two countries to fight Soviet invasion; is that correct?
        Mr. Eastham. That's correct.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. And what was the approximate amount in
    value of what we gave in terms of armaments and everything to
    these two countries to fight Soviet invasion?
        Mr. Eastham. I cannot characterize any amounts which might
    have been provided under programs other than the assistance
    provided Pakistan. With respect to Pakistan, we provided
    something in the neighborhood of $3 billion, $3.2 billion in
    official assistance from 1982 until the imposition of sanctions
    in 1990.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. I wanted to ask Secretary Sheehan. You
    mentioned that you still have concerns about the policies that
    the Pakistani Government has concerning terrorism, and I want
    to know what specific policies does the Pakistani Government
    have that is of concern to the Administration.
        Ambassador Sheehan. We have concerns on both fronts, the
    east and the west. In the east, starting with Kashmir, we have
    concerns about the Pakistani Government, particularly their
    intelligence service support to groups that we have designated
    as foreign terrorist organizations and support for those groups
    that are operating in Kashmir in that situation there.
        Second, and of more immediate concern to me, is Pakistan's
    long relationship with the Taliban, which started in late 1994
    when the Taliban emerged in Afghanistan and continues to this
    day. They are the primary relationship, the Taliban, that
    Pakistan has.
        But as I mentioned in my remarks, it is a complicated one.
    The Pakistanis increasingly understand, I believe, they
    increasingly understand the threat that the Taliban and its
    policies have and the backwash back into Pakistan itself.
        So we have concerns with the Pakistanis on both of those
    issues that we have talked to them about at the highest levels.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. As you know, the political situation in
    Pakistan has also been very serious. We have a military general
    who felt very strongly that he had to take control of the
    government because of the problems. Do you think that maybe it
    is not because that they are not anti-terrorist but because
    they just do not have the proper resources to properly control
    their borders when these terrorists go through its territories?
        What are we doing to give assistance to the Pakistani
    Government to alleviate this problem perhaps? Are we assisting
    them accordingly?
        Ambassador Sheehan. I think the chief executive, Mucharev,
    definitely has his hands full, and as he has said many times
    before, his primary concern is turning around the economy in
    Pakistan, which is truly in tough shape.
        We do support Pakistan in a variety of different ways, and
    perhaps Al Eastham is better equipped to answer that question.
    We have had long ranging consultations with them on how to help
    them move in the proper directions in terms of democratic
    reform, in terms of economic reform, which will give them the
    strength politically to make some of the tough decisions they
    have to make regarding terrorism.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. You know, there is a sense of hesitancy.
    If I were a Pakistani leader, I remember a couple of years ago,
    and my good friend from California will recall, Pakistan paid
    $600 million up front for the aircraft that we were supposed to
    deliver, and we never did.
        How are we to deal with other countries if we do not keep
    our promises in that respect?
        Mr. Eastham. Well, we reached an understanding with the
    Pakistan Government which settled that claim a year ago, and we
    are in the process of implementing a settlement which is
    satisfactory to both sides regarding the question of the
    aircraft.
        The aircraft delivery was denied, however, I would note,
    because of legislation which required a Presidential
    certification relating to the possession of nuclear weapons by
    Pakistan. We were constrained by the legislative factor.
        We also have a considerable burden of sanctions relating to
    Pakistan in the nuclear field, potentially in the terrorism,
    religious freedom, and narcotics fields, and the ultimate
    sanction which exists now, which is the sanction against U.S.
    assistance----
        Mr. Faleomavaega. My point----
        Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. My time has, but I just want to make my
    point here, which the fact that this government or this country
    paid $600 million, and all of a sudden we have all kinds of
    restrictions, and then we hung onto their money for years until
    just now we made this settlement, and to me that is very
    unfair. It is one sided.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Royce.
        Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Gilman. We will be continuing right through the
    vote.
        Mr. Royce. Mr. Chairman, I am particularly concerned about
    the social stability of Pakistan. Regional security is at risk
    of being seriously undermined if the troubling social trends we
    have seen continue. I am especially concerned about the Madras
    schools whose curriculum encourages radicalism, and as you
    recognized, Ambassador Sheehan, in your testimony, you
    mentioned anti-Americanism as well.
        This is the same style education which gave rise to the
    Taliban and its militarism and the Taliban's horrible human
    rights practices, especially with respect to women. I think
    there's a direct cause and effect between this type of
    propaganda that occurs in the schools.
        Now, Pakistan, in my view, is on dangerous ground with the
    operations of these schools, and I believe that the
    continuation of this education threatens the very foundation of
    the Pakistani state, and I think it threatens India, and I
    think it threatens the entire region.
        I have spoken with Pakistani Government officials and have
    been told that General Musharraf is working very hard to
    emphasize the teaching of science and the teaching of
    technology in these schools and trying to develop a different
    curriculum, one that would contribute to economic development
    and lift Pakistanis out of poverty.
        I also wanted to recognize your statement in your report,
    Ambassador, where you say terrorism is a perversion of the
    teachings of Islam, and I want to commend you for making that
    observation in your report.
        My question, though, is to what extent is the central
    government of Pakistan having success in modifying what these
    schools are teaching Pakistan's young people. You discuss in
    your testimony their intentions. Have there been effective
    actions that are occurring there?
        As I say, I think this is cause and effect, and I would
    like to know your observation.
        Ambassador Sheehan. Let me take a first crack, Mr.
    Congressman. I am sure Mr. Eastham will have some comment as
    well.
        Mr. Royce. Sure.
        Ambassador Sheehan. I am glad you asked the question about
    Madrases. It is an important one, and one that has to be
    carefully reviewed. This is an issue that has been of concern
    with me from the first day on the job.
        Madrases are nothing more than schools that have filled a
    vacuum in Pakistan where there are very often no schools or bad
    schools, and many Madrases are good schools run by legitimate
    people with the proper purpose in mind, to educate their
    children.
        There is a small percentage of them that are of concern to
    us. Those are ones that have a radical or extreme underpinning,
    that promote ideologies that are threatening. In fact, some of
    the Madrases along the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan
    contributed to the radicalization of many of the fighters that
    now are of great concern to us.
        The issue of education in Pakistan is a fundamental one,
    and the issue of Madrases is a careful one for the Pakistani
    Administration to deal with. They have talked to us about
    wanting to gain control of the small number of those extreme
    Madrases and shutting them down, and also to have better
    control of the curriculum of some of the other Madrases that
    are trying to do the right thing educating the youth of
    Pakistan.
        So it is a complicated question, one that I think the
    Pakistani Government understands. They understand also the
    sensitivity of the issue and are working to address it.
        The progress will not be measured in the short term, Mr.
    Congressman. It will take time, and we will have to see what
    success they have in addressing that issue.
        Mr. Royce. Well, I commend you for your focus on education
    and propaganda because that question and which direction that
    takes is going to have a very real consequence in terms of
    terrorism in very short order.
        Let me also make the observation to the extent that we can
    de-escalate tensions between Pakistan and India and reduce the
    overall budget dedicated to armaments, those are funds in South
    Asia that instead can go into public education so that there is
    not the need for the development, the creation of these
    alternative sources of education.
        Part of the problem in South Asia is the degree of the
    budgets in these countries that goes toward military armaments.
        Now, I would like just for a second to bring up another
    issue that is a little bit outside the scope of this hearing;
    but I serve as Chairman of the Africa Subcommittee, and in
    reading your report, it mentions the Revolutionary United Front
    and Sierra Leone. This is a Libyan trained and Liberian backed
    organization whose practice has been cutting off the arms and
    legs of little children in Sierra Leone.
        If you go into Freetown, there are several thousand
    amputees, many of them as young as 2 years old. That
    organization, known as the RUF, has made war on a
    democratically-elected government and should be listed as a
    terrorist organization. I would hope you would consider in your
    next report doing so.
        I say that because many Members of this Committee,
    including the Ranking Member, including the Chairman of this
    Committee, have spent considerable time on this issue of Sierra
    Leone, and this report should reflect the reality of what is
    happening on the ground. I do not feel that was reflected by
    the fact that RUF is not mentioned as one of these
    organizations.
        Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Ms. McKinney.
        Mr. Royce. Could I have a response to that though, Mr.
    Chairman, if I could, on the RUF especially?
        Ambassador Sheehan. We will review the RUF during this
    year, as well as before the end of our 2-year period. I am
    familiar with that organization. Much of the activity they are
    involved with falls more in the box of war criminality, which
    is a heinous crime in either case. Whether they fit into the
    box of foreign terrorist organization is under review, Mr.
    Congressman, and I will stay in touch with you on that.
        Mr. Royce. Thank you, Ambassador.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Gilman. Ms. McKinney.
        Ms. McKinney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would just like to say to Mr. Sheehan that I think that
    that is a totally inadequate and insufficient response to that
    question. I would like Chairman Royce to know that on May 6,
    1999, I wrote a letter to the President, to the Secretary of
    State, and I presume it got down to you as well, asking for the
    designation of RUF as a terrorist organization, and I can tell
    you that I got not a single straight answer from this
    Administration in response to that.
        Now, it appears to me that this Administration has cleaved
    itself, in its policy, to rapists of 12-year-old little girls
    and of hand choppers. So that response is totally inadequate.
    You have had it under review for far too long, and you still
    have not done anything about it, and you are still supporting
    the RUF.
        I would also like to associate myself with the remarks of
    Congressman Faleomavaega and Congressman Rohrabacher, too. It
    appears to me that the State Department is excellent at writing
    revisionist history. In Mr. Sheehan's testimony, you state that
    this instability can be started with the Soviet invasion of
    Afghanistan and the decade-long civil war which followed.
        That kind of passive language reminds me about what has
    been said about Mozambique by the opponents of Frelimo and that
    civil war that was visited upon Mozambique most unnecessarily;
    by the opponents of MPLA and the civil war that was visited
    upon Angola by those who opposed MPLA; about the civil war that
    was visited upon South Africa by the opponents of the ANC, and
    in each of those instances it was U.S. policy to support the
    other guys.
        And so now we get to hear these testimonies that include
    the lack of information in terms of the U.S. role. Congressman
    Faleomavaega and Congressman Rohrabacher are absolutely right
    that the United States did have a role to play in the current
    situation in Afghanistan. We provided weapons there, and we
    left those weapons there. And so if there is any instability,
    we do not need to just point the finger and say that the
    problem is Afghanistan's, as you have said earlier. The problem
    is also ours, and we need to deal with that.
        Additionally, and I guess finally, on page 6, Mr. Sheehan,
    of your written testimony you say if there is a criminal in
    your basement and you aware that he has been conducting
    criminal activities from your house, even if you are not
    involved in the crimes you are responsible for them. In fact,
    your willingness to give him refuge makes you complicit in his
    actions, past and present.
        I would just suggest that that message that you delivered
    to the Taliban's Foreign Minister is also applicable to the
    United States itself, and it certainly ought to be applicable
    to the policies that we have formulated and pursued with
    respect to Africa. We have supported criminals on that
    continent, continue to support criminals on that continent, and
    for some reason seem incapable of making people pay for the
    crimes that they commit, and of course, we are complicit in
    those crimes.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Rohrabacher [presiding]. Thank you very much.
        Would you like to respond, Ambassador?
        Ms. McKinney. No need for a response because you will not
    get anything of any substance.
        Ambassador Sheehan. I will respond, Mr. Congressman.
        First of all, on the RUF: Murder, rape, cutting off of arms
    are heinous crimes. They are not necessarily terrorism. They
    can be terrorism, but not necessarily international terrorism
    by the definition that we are required to respond to by the
    legislation that we are given.
        My office reviews the designation of foreign terrorist
    organizations, and I receive no pressure. If I got pressure
    from anywhere else in the building, it would have no effect on
    me. If I determine, if our office determines that the RUF meets
    the criteria to be designated as a foreign terrorist
    organization by the criteria of the legislation that is clearly
    spelled out, we will do so.
        Second, regarding our role in Afghanistan, I have
    repeatedly said many times and before we have played a role in
    Afghanistan in the 1980's, one I thought was an appropriate one
    at that time, and contributed to the situation there. I think
    we should acknowledge that and be part of the solution in
    Afghanistan.
        But I do not think the U.S. Government is responsible in
    the entirety for the situation, for the chaos and suffering in
    Afghanistan, or for the rise of terrorism from that region.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
        Well, I am the Chairman. So I have a little prerogative.
    What a miracle this is. I actually have more than 5 minutes.
        Before I go on, this Committee will recess as we get into
    the next vote, and Chairman Gilman will be back. In the
    meantime I will do my mischief.
        First of all, let's talk a little bit about terrorism.
    Terrorism is not just when someone who is outside government
    commits an act of violence against unarmed opponents, whether
    civilians, noncombatants, etc. Terrorism can also be conducted
    by a government, and there are lots of terrorist examples of
    what government does at times, for example, in the Kashmir, and
    let us not forget that when we are discussing South Asia.
        To make matters worse, you have terrorism, as I stated
    before, when there is a lack of democracy, and in the Kashmir
    and Dramu and other places where not as much, but other
    terrorist acts against Christians and Seeks and others
    throughout India, but at least in the Kashmir there has been a
    denial of the democratic process.
        Now, wouldn't the democratic process help solve this
    situation in Kashmir?
        Ambassador Sheehan. Mr. Chairman, I believe that in all
    parts of the world where I face the threat of terrorism that
    democratic processes, the strengthening of state institutions,
    and particularly democratic state institutions in the long term
    is the remedy.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Right. Because in Afghanistan if they had
    a more democratic type government--and I have been pushing as
    you know for the king to come back and serve as a transition
    toward a more democratic society--people would have a chance to
    vote and express themselves and to weed out these evil people
    who are involved in drug dealing and repressing of their own
    people, the repressing of the women population in Afghanistan.
    So that would actually help if we had a more democratically
    oriented government there as well, wouldn't it?
        Ambassador Sheehan. That is correct.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. Let me just say that in your
    denials to the charges that I made, you were very good at
    general denials, but there was no denial of some specific
    charges. So I would like to address you about them now.
        I charged that the aid that the United States has been
    giving has been going to the Taliban controlled territories,
    especially during that time period when one-third of
    Afghanistan was being controlled by non and anti-Taliban
    forces. Specifically I used the example of the Bamiyan effort
    in which we tried to help the folks down there who my sources
    said were in great deprivation and starving, and the State
    Department undermined that effort.
        And we mentioned earlier there is an aid program going on
    to Afghanistan. Ten percent of Afghanistan is still controlled
    by anti-Taliban forces. Is any of the aid that we are giving
    going to this anti-Taliban area?
        Ambassador Sheehan. Mr. Chairman, I think I will defer to
    Mr. Eastham. I know that since my tenure in this job in the
    last 18 months or so that I have seen no evidence of that type
    of policy, but for previous time I will let Al answer.
        Mr. Eastham. The answer to the question is, yes, there is
    aid flowing to all areas in Afghanistan. That is a function,
    however, of accessibility, of how you get it to them. There is
    assistance which flows through the United Nations, which is the
    implementers of the program, into the north via Tajikistan and
    also through the Chitral area of Pakistan, as well as to the 80
    percent of the country that----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. OK. So your answer is, yes, that currently
    that one area in the Panjsher Valley now controlled by
    Commander Masood, they do receive humanitarian supplies.
        Mr. Eastham. I cannot take you specifically to the Panjsher
    Valley because access to the Panjsher Valley is blocked from
    the south by the Taliban.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. But, of course----
        Mr. Eastham. In order to get----
        Mr. Rohrabacher [continuing]. It is not blocked from
    Tajikistan, right.
        Mr. Eastham. Yes, but there is assistance which flows into
    all areas of Afghanistan through these U.N. programs that we
    support.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. OK. You're on the record. Thank you very
    much. That is not what my source is saying.
        Mr. Eastham. Now, with respect to Bamiyan, I want to take
    you back to the period 2 or 3 years ago that you are referring
    to. In fact, at around that same time I made a trip from
    Pakistan to Kandahar to talk to the Taliban about the blockade
    which they had imposed at the time upon assistance to Bamiyan
    because at the time Bamiyan was controlled by non-Taliban
    forces from the Hazara people there.
        One of the main effects of the trip by Mr. Richardson and
    Mr. Inderfurth that you have so criticized was to attempt to
    persuade the Taliban, in fact, to lift that very blockade of
    Bamiyan, which we followed up with discussion in Islamabad in
    which the Taliban did, in fact, agree to a partial lifting to
    enable foodstuffs to go into Bamiyan.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. I see. So we traded it off for the
    Taliban. They were going to lift their blockade, and we were
    going to disarm all of their opponents.
        Mr. Eastham. No, sir, that is not the case.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. OK. Well, go to disarming the Taliban's
    opponents, and by the way, this has been reconfirmed in
    everything that I have read, both official and unofficial.
        Are you trying to tell us now that the State Department was
    not at that crucial moment, when the Taliban was vulnerable,
    disarming the Taliban's opponents? Did not Mr. Inderfurth and
    the State Department contact all of the support groups that
    were helping the anti-Taliban forces and ask them to cease
    their flow of military supplies to the anti-Taliban forces?
        Mr. Eastham. At that time we were trying to construct a
    coalition which would cutoff support for all forces in
    Afghanistan from the outside.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. And I take it that is a yes to my
    question----
        Mr. Eastham. No, sir, you have left out----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. But the Taliban----
        Mr. Eastham [continuing]. The cutting off the Taliban part.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. But the Taliban were not included. What
    happened right after all of those other support systems to the
    resistance groups had been dismantled because of Mr.
    Inderfurth's and Mr. Richardson's appeal and the State
    Department's appeal? What happened not only immediately after?
    Even while you were making that appeal, what happened in
    Pakistan?
        Was there an airlift of supplies, military supplies between
    Pakistan and Kabul and the forward elements of the Taliban
    forces?
        The answer is yes. I know.
        Mr. Eastham. The answer is----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. You told me because----
        Mr. Eastham. The answer is----
        Mr. Rohrabacher [continuing]. It is secret information.
        Mr. Eastham. The answer is closed session if you would like
    to dredge up that record.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. OK.
        Mr. Eastham. That would be fine.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. I do not have to go into closed session
    because I did not get that information from any classified
    document. That information is available to anybody watching the
    scene up there. They know exactly what happened.
        Mr. Inderfurth; Mr. Bill Richardson, a good friend of mine,
    doing the bidding of this Administration, basically convinced
    the anti-Taliban's mentors to quit providing them the weapons
    they needed with some scheme that the Taliban were then going
    to lay down their arms, and immediately thereafter Pakistan
    started a massive shift of military supplies which resulted in
    the total defeat of the anti-Taliban forces.
        Now, this is either collusion or incompetence on the part
    of the State Department as far as this Congressman is
    concerned. The people will have to look at the record and
    determine that for themselves, and when this Congressman says
    this Administration has a covert policy of supporting the
    Taliban, I see examples of what I just described over and over
    and over again.
        I have read the documents you have given me, and the
    documents over and over again to me indicate that the State
    Department has been telling the Taliban, ``Hand this over, bin
    Laden, and we can deal with you.''
        Now, I am not going to quote because it is secret
    information. None of the documents I have seen, by the way,
    should have been classified, and let's get to those documents.
        Why haven't I been provided any documents about State
    Department analysis during the formation period of the Taliban
    and about whether or not the Taliban was a good force or a bad
    force? Why have none of those documents reached my desk after 2
    years?
        Mr. Eastham. Congressman, we were responding to a specific
    request dealing with a specific time period, which I believe
    the commencing period of the request for documents was after
    the time period you are talking about. We were asked to provide
    documents by the Chairman of this Committee from 1996 to 1999.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Ah, I see. You found a loophole in the
    Chairman's wording.
        Mr. Eastham. No, sir. We were responding to the Chairman's
    request.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. You found a loophole in the Chairman's
    wording of his request so as not to provide me those documents.
    You know, I am the only one here. I am not the Chairman of the
    Committee. I would never get the opportunity to have a back-
    and-forth with you except in times like this.
        The State Department has taken full advantage of its use of
    words in order not to get this information out. I am looking
    forward to more documents.
        I will say this. I have spent hours overlooking those
    documents, and there has been nothing in those documents to
    persuade me that my charges that this Administration has been
    covertly supporting the Taliban is not accurate.
        Feel free to respond to that.
        Mr. Eastham. It is not true. I have to negate the whole
    thesis that you are operating under.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. OK. Then the other option is
    the State Department is so incompetent that we have done things
    that helped the Taliban and put them in a position of having
    hundreds of millions of dollars of drug money and power in
    Afghanistan and undercutting the anti-Taliban forces. This is
    not intent. This is just incompetence.
        Mr. Eastham. That is a judgment you can make.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. All right.
        Mr. Eastham. And if you want to make that judgment, that is
    up to you, Congressman.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. OK.
        Mr. Eastham. I would just observe that it is considerably
    more complex than that to deal with people over whom we have so
    little influence as the Taliban.
        I have been myself, by my count six times, into Afghanistan
    on both the northern side and the southern side, and I have met
    innumerable times with Taliban officials to attempt to achieve
    U.S. objectives, and I have to tell you that it is a tough job.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. I believe it is.
        Mr. Eastham. I would like to introduce you to some of them
    some time.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Oh, I have met many Taliban. Thank you.
    And as you are aware, I have met many Taliban and have talked
    to them, especially when you disarm their opponents and you
    participate in an effort to disarm their opponents at a time
    when they are being resupplied militarily. I guess it is very
    hard for them to take us seriously when we say we are going to
    get tough with them.
        Mr. Eastham. You keep saying that, but it is not true. The
    effort----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. You are just saying----
        Mr. Eastham [continuing]. The effort was to stop the
    support for all the factions in----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. That is correct. You did not deny that we
    disarmed their opponents. You just said we were doing it with
    the Taliban as well. But as I pointed out, which you did not
    deny, the Taliban were immediately resupplied, which means that
    we were part and parcel to disarming a victim against this
    hostile, totalitarian, anti-Western, drug dealing force in
    their society. We were part and parcel of disarming the victim,
    thinking that the aggressor was going to be disarmed as well,
    but it just did not work out, at the moment when Pakistan was
    arming them, I might add.
        I have got just a couple of minutes, and then we are going
    to have to recess this. There is a 5-minute vote on. Could I
    have this on the screen, please? Can we put the vote on the
    screen?
        Two minutes. The Administration is saved again. All right.
    Let me just say I think that the Administration--Bill
    Richardson is a wonderful guy, and I think Rick Inderfurth is
    sincere. I think the record here is abysmal, and again, it is
    not state power we are talking about.
        We abandoned these people in Afghanistan, the wonderful
    people. The Taliban did not defeat the Russians. You know that.
    You were there at the time. The Taliban were not even in the
    field at that time. They did not exist. They were kept back,
    and we abandoned those wonderful, courageous people in
    Afghanistan who were not fanatics when they were fighting for
    their homeland.
        We could have come back with an Afghan policy, and this
    Congressman supports an Afghan policy that would provide a real
    commitment, $100 million for de-mining, $100 million to help
    set up a democratic process, $100 million so that we can help
    them plant other things rather than poppies for narcotics.
    Let's have a real commitment by this Administration.
        We have seen no such policy initiatives from this
    Administration, just excuses and word games, but I thank you
    both because you do a good job, and you are both patriots, and
    I appreciate that.
        This Committee is in recess.
        [Recess.]
        Mr. Gilman [presiding]. The Committee will come to order.
        Mr. Delahunt.
        Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Chairman, I would like to take a
    different line and get off of South Asia for a moment.
        On page IV of the State Department's April 2000 Report on
    Patterns of Global Terrorism, there is a paragraph. Let me read
    the paragraph into the record.

        As direct state sponsorship has declined, terrorists
    increasingly have sought refuge wherever they can. Some
    countries on the list have reduced dramatically their direct
    support of terrorism over the past years, and this is an
    encouraging sign. They still are on the list, however, usually
    for activity in two categories: harboring of past terrorists,
    some for more than 20 years, and continuing their linkages to
    designated foreign terrorist organizations. Cuba is one of the
    state sponsors that falls in this category.

        Could you amplify on that? Am I to conclude that there is
    evidence that the Castro regime is no longer in the business of
    exporting terrorism and revolution in this hemisphere? Mr.
    Sheehan, Ambassador?
        Ambassador Sheehan. Yes, Congressman. I would say regarding
    Cuba that their support for terrorism has declined dramatically
    over the years, and right now its active support for terrorism
    is scant.
        Mr. Delahunt. Is scant? You said there were some linkages
    to foreign terrorist organizations. Could you enumerate those
    organizations?
        Ambassador Sheehan. Yes, sir. The main ones we are
    concerned with are the two Colombian groups, the FARC and the
    ELN.
        Mr. Delahunt. I thought that might be the case, and I have
    a problem with that, and let me tell you what it is. Recently,
    in fact, there was a story in the Colombian press, and the
    headline is ``Cuba to play a role in Colombia peace talks.''
        You are not suggesting that we should leave Cuba on this
    list because of their involvement in the Colombian peace
    process, which I understand has been done at the behest of the
    Colombian Government.
        For the record, I think it is important to note that there
    are four other countries that are involved in this multilateral
    effort to move the peace process along. Those countries are
    France, Spain, Norway, and Switzerland, and they are described
    as the friends of the process with the ELN, and I am aware
    obviously of the history of the ELN and its historical
    relationship with the Castro regime.
        But I would suggest that this is an occasion where we would
    welcome, if you will, Cuban involvement in terms of moving a
    peace process along that I would suggest is the ultimate answer
    if we are going to do what we hope to do in terms of staunching
    the flow of cocaine and heroin into the United States.
        I would be interested in your response, Mr. Ambassador.
        Ambassador Sheehan. Yes, sir. I think the issue of Cuban
    involvement with the FARC and the ELN is not really the
    principal one. I do not think that alone would keep them on the
    sponsorship list if they were able to assure us that no
    terrorists of those organizations are there, because those are
    very violent organizations that threaten American lives in
    Colombia every day and are responsible for the deaths of many
    Americans and damage of a lot of material and property.
        So their relationship, those groups, is a little different
    than the Europeans, but I think that one of the----
        Mr. Delahunt. Can I interrupt, Ambassador?
        Ambassador Sheehan. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Delahunt. I think it is important to note that the FARC
    has a physical presence and an office in Mexico, and the ELN
    has a physical presence in Germany, and you know, both the FARC
    and ELN have a presence in Spain.
        You know, these distinctions are very, very subtle that you
    are making here.
        Ambassador Sheehan. Right.
        Mr. Delahunt. And, you know, these nuances are almost
    imperceptible to my eye.
        Ambassador Sheehan. Right. The other reason Cuba is on the
    list of state sponsorship, because it provides safe haven to
    numerous terrorists that we are interested in from the past,
    and that is why I mention in here many of them go way back.
        Some of them are the Machiteros that were involved in the
    killings of Americans in Puerto Rico and other places and
    providing safe haven to those former terrorists. I did, Mr.
    Delahunt, personally write this introduction, and what I was
    saying in here, I was signaling to countries like Cuba that
    there is a difference, their support for terrorism between now
    and before, and that their record for support for terrorism is
    very small, but they do have issues.
        If they want to address those issues and want to move
    forward on those issues, we would welcome that, as we would
    with all seven of the state sponsors. What I was trying to do
    in my report is signal to them that, yes, their issues are
    relatively small, dramatically different from the Cold War Era.
    That era has passed us, and they could take steps to address
    these issues and be considered for the list in the future.
        Mr. Delahunt. If I could indulge the Chair for one more
    question.
        Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt.
        Mr. Delahunt. Just one more question, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Gilman. Without objection.
        Mr. Delahunt. That brings to mind a recommendation that was
    put forth by Ambassador Bremmer and his bipartisan commission
    when he suggested that there be an intermediate level or
    designation in terms of a government as a state sponsor of
    terrorism.
        I am sure you are aware of that. Something less than an
    officially designated state sponsor or terrorism, but something
    that would, I believe, give the American people and Members of
    this institution, as well as Members of the Senate, a more
    realistic and accurate appraisal of where these particular
    states are in terms of the hierarchy of supporting terrorism.
        Does the Administration have a position? Have you reflected
    on the recommendation by the commission?
        Ambassador Sheehan. Congressman, I have been aware of this
    issue since I took this job, and that the perception among some
    around the world is that once you get on the list of state
    sponsorship, you never get off, and that list is deemed as
    political by some.
        In that regard, I have looked to try to very clearly
    articulate why countries are on the list and what it would take
    to get them off of the list.
        I studied carefully Jerry Bremmer's proposal. I have
    discussed it primarily at the staff level here in the Congress,
    to find more flexible approaches to find another step on or off
    the list, what might more accurately reflect the real situation
    of support for terrorism by different states, and we have not
    come up with a formal position on that yet.
        There are some drawbacks that I have heard from Members,
    staff members of this Committee, as well as on the Senate side,
    also some concerns within the Administration, but I think we
    are carefully reviewing it.
        I understand the desirability of that, what benefits it
    could have to us, and we should have a response hopefully soon
    on whether we have a proposal for you.
        Mr. Delahunt. I would urge that because I really think it
    is very important to recognize that in this particular area
    there are varying shades of gray, and it is very difficult, as
    you well know, to describe things in black and white terms
    without creating a distorted picture.
        Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time is expired.
        Mr. Delahunt. Thank you.
        Chairman Gilman. Dr. Cooksey.
        Mr. Cooksey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And we thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for being here.
        I am concerned about terrorism for a lot of reasons.
    Personally I feel that all terrorists are like all dictators.
    They are all cowards, and this is their way of overcoming the
    fact that they are usually not too well educated, and they are
    misguided, and they try to inflict some of their misery on
    other people.
        I know that in the past Pakistan has been a friend and an
    ally, but I am concerned that they perhaps are not ferreting
    out as many of the terrorist as they should, and I feel like
    they could really do a lot more to get rid of the terrorists
    within the limits of their country.
        Do you feel the fact that Pakistan is spending so much on
    their nuclear weapons program could diminish the amount of
    resources they have to run an effective anti-terrorism program?
    Could there be a correlation there?
        Ambassador Sheehan. Congressman, I am not sure, but I would
    say this in answering your question, that Pakistan, in order to
    develop the political space to take on some of these terrorist
    issues--because it is a political issue for them to take on
    some of these groups--in order to have the political space in
    order to do that, they need to take certain steps to reform
    themselves politically, economically, and socially. Clearly a
    smaller defense budget would help them, enable them to take on
    some of this reform.
        So if there is a relationship in terms of defense spending
    and their ability to reform, their defense budget takes a huge
    chunk of their public sector funding. If they were able to put
    more of those resources in some of those other issues, it might
    give the Pakistani Government more space to move in the
    direction we would like them to go on counterterrorism.
        Mr. Cooksey. Good. Thank you.
        At times I feel that too many Americans and maybe even some
    Americans in Congress become complacent about the threat of
    terrorism and will not be concerned about it again until we
    have some more acts of terrorism like we had a few years ago,
    both from Americans and from some people from this South Asia
    area.
        Do you feel that today the State Department has adequate
    resources to conduct surveillance and anti-terrorism
    activities, and if so, why, and if not, what additional
    resources would it take to get the State Department up to the
    level that we would consider a top notch, top drawer type level
    of anti-terrorism activity?
        Ambassador Sheehan. Thank you, Congressman. I appreciate
    that question.
        There are two parts of it. The first part is do we have the
    security funding to do the protection of our embassies.
    Actually Dave Carpenter, my colleague who does diplomatic
    security, is best prepared to answer that. I am sure he has
    laid that out up to Congress, what resources he needs.
        But I would say this on the parts that I manage, which
    overlap with Dave's in a lot of areas. The anti-terrorism
    assistance program, we have asked for $38 million this year. We
    have got the Administration's request. We are hoping to get
    full funding for that when the appropriations committees come
    together in conference later on in the year. Right now I
    believe the House side has given us full funding, but the
    Senate has not.
        We also asked for $40 million to fund a counterterrorism
    training center which would help train diplomatic security
    personnel, as well as provide training for those security
    officials that we work with overseas. That is really the key.
    They are the front line of defense for Americans in our battle
    against counterterrorism. They help protect our embassies. They
    help protect airports that American people travel through, the
    borders. There are a lot of Americans overseas. These are the
    front line of defense. They are our counterparts on the
    intelligence and law enforcement.
        We need a first class facility in order to train those
    people to build the type of relationships we need. The
    Administration has asked for funding for that, and we are
    having treat difficulty in the appropriations process, and we
    certainly could use your support on that, sir.
        Mr. Cooksey. You say you want to build a facility to do
    this anti-terrorism training?
        Ambassador Sheehan. That is correct. Right now we train in
    seven different locations around the country on a catch-can
    basis, sort of standing room only types of arrangements with
    different facilities. It is just not a way to run a railroad.
        We would like to create our own training facility where we
    can bring in these people and establish the long term
    relationships that are really going to pay dividends for the
    security not only of our embassies, but for Americans that
    travel, live, and work abroad.
        Mr. Cooksey. Well, I bend over backward not to bring up
    parochial issues into my discussion, but since you raise the
    issue, the U.S. Marshal's training site is within my district,
    and I visited it several times. It is at Camp Beauregard. It
    used to be Fort Beauregard, and they have really a top
    facility. Do you use that at all?
        If I am not mistaken, they do some State Department things.
        Ambassador Sheehan. We do some stuff there, yes,
    Congressman, a great facility.
        Mr. Cooksey. Well, I would like to formally invite you to
    do all of your training there, and I guarantee you we will work
    to get what you need.
        Mr. Delahunt. If the gentleman would yield for just a
    moment.
        Mr. Cooksey. Sure, I will yield to my friend from
    Massachusetts.
        Mr. Delahunt. Well, I just wanted to point out that there
    is a military base on Cape Cod, no swamps, no bugs, the sounds
    of waves and sands that is 5,000 acres there, Ambassador, and I
    am sure that you would be warmly welcomed there.
        Mr. Cooksey. I would tell my friend from Massachusetts that
    after I got out of the Air Force I was in the Guard for a
    while, and we trained up there one summer. It is a nice
    facility. That was in the summer of 1970 or 1971, but they had
    some narrow bridges up there, and it is just not an ideal place
    to go.
        Mr. Burton [presiding]. 1970 to 1971.
        Let me, I guess, conclude this hearing by asking a few
    questions. Mr. Delahunt talked about the connection, I believe,
    between Cuba and the FARC guerrillas and the ELN. The other
    committee on which I serve is the Government Reform and
    Oversight Committee, and we have a subcommittee that deals with
    national security and terrorism, and we have done some work in
    that area. There is no question from the information that we
    have and pictures that we have seen that the Cuban Government
    has been working with the FARC guerrillas and the ELN.
        As a matter of fact, the leaders of the FARC guerrillas, if
    you look at pictures of them, they are wearing Che Guevara type
    berets. They use the same basic techniques that he used, and we
    believe there is a connection there, and I wonder why you folks
    are not aware of that.
        Are you aware of that?
        Ambassador Sheehan. Congressman, we are aware of the
    connections, the long connections of the FARC and the ELN to
    Cuba.
        Let me say this about the FARC and the ELN. The FARC is one
    of the more violent foreign terrorist organizations that I deal
    with, responsible for 10 Americans dead and 3 missing since
    1980.
        Mr. Burton. Right.
        Ambassador Sheehan. It is high on my list. They are
    involved in kidnapping, extortion in Colombia that is of
    enormous concern to us.
        The ELN, although not as deadly in terms of numbers,
    wreaked tremendous amount of damage to American interests in
    oil pipelines in Colombia. These are two very serious and
    dangerous terrorist organizations.
        Primarily though I would say this, Congressman, that they
    do not depend on support from Cuba. They do have links from
    Cuba, but quite frankly, as you know very well, they are able
    to generate funding and weapons right there at home.
        Mr. Burton. No, I understand. They are getting as much as
    $100 million a month from the drug cartels.
        Ambassador Sheehan. Exactly.
        Mr. Burton. And from kidnappings and everything else, but
    they do go to Cuba. They do do some training with the Cubans,
    and they are in concert with one another.
        The reason I am concerned about that, and probably Mr.
    Delahunt and others, is Venezuela is right there. We have got
    the entire Central American and the Panama Canal and everything
    that is right in that area, and if that is not handled
    properly, then that whole area could be in jeopardy.
        Cuba has always had an eye toward revolution in South
    America and Central America. That is why they supported the
    Sandinistas, the FMLN, and why Che Guevara went into South
    America in the first place. So there is a connection there, and
    I hope the State Department pays particular attention to that.
        One other thing that I would like to talk about, and I am
    sorry that I was absent. I had to go to the floor, but there
    has been a lot of talk about Pakistan, and Pakistan has been an
    ally of ours for 50 years. They helped us during the problems
    that we had in Afghanistan. They were a conduit for military
    equipment and weapons going in there to stop the Russians--the
    Soviet Union. They worked with us in Somalia. They worked with
    us during the entire Cold War. They have always been an ally of
    ours.
        Whenever we talk about terrorism involving Pakistan, it
    seems that there is always a reluctance to talk about the
    problems right across the border in India. In India, we have
    half a million troops in Kashmir gang-raping women, going in
    the middle of the night, taking people out of the houses and
    killing them and torturing them, and people just disappear.
        In Punjab we have had a similar problem over the years. It
    has gone on for a long time. I have got the statistical data,
    which I will not go into, but I will submit it for the record.
        And I do not understand why we pay so much attention to our
    friend who has been with us through thick and thin, and we do
    not say anything about India who was an opponent of ours during
    the entire Cold War. They were a nonaligned nation that built
    Soviet MIG's. They built Soviet tanks. They were on the Soviet
    side when [Flight] 007 was shot down by the Soviets. They were
    the only nation in the world that did not condemn them.
        Yet we continue to kick our friend for 50 years, Pakistan,
    in the teeth, and we do not pay any attention to the problems
    that we see in India.
        In Pakistan, when you talk about the terrorist activities,
    they worked with us on Amil Kanzi. He killed a CIA officer in
    Virginia. He was arrested by the Pakistanis and extradited to
    the United States. Ramzi Yousef was accused and convicted of
    involvement in the terrorist attack on New York's World Trade
    Center. He was arrested by Pakistani officials in Pakistan and
    extradited to the United States.
        I am not pronouncing these names right, but I think you
    know who they are.
        Sidque Odey was involved in the bombing of a U.S. embassy
    in East Africa, was apprehended by Pakistan and turned over to
    Kenyan authorities. Khalid Deek was implicated in the 1998
    bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa, was arrested by
    Pakistan and extradited to Jordan.
        You know, Pakistan was picked as a vital area in December
    1999. The National Commission on Terrorism report, which was
    released on June 5, said Pakistan's cooperation was vital in
    warding off terrorist attacks planned for the millennium.
        You know, I just hate to see us have a hearing and attack
    somebody who does have problems. Do not misunderstand. They
    have problems, and I would like to see those resolved. I would
    like to see free and fair elections once again returned. I am
    sure you would as well.
        But the thing that concerns me is we ought to give a little
    bit of leeway and deference to those who are always there when
    we need them. They are always there when we need them.
        And then, right across the border, you look at India whom
    we show a great deal of deference to, who has not always been
    there when we need them, and I just do not understand that
    double standard, and it bothers me.
        If you would care to comment, you can.
        Ambassador Sheehan. Congressman, Pakistan is a great friend
    to the United States for a long time. I served on active duty
    in Somalia and again in Haiti. In Somalia, I served with the
    Pakistanis, and they did a great job there, and they were with
    us. I was on the phone when President Bush called the
    government of Pakistan to ask for their participation in 1992.
    I was on the NSC staff. They immediately responded and sent
    troops into Somalia. They were actually already there before we
    led the coalition in December 1992.
        Again, in 1994, I served on active duty again with the
    Pakistanis. The Deputy Force Commander in the operation in
    Haiti was a Pakistani general who was outstanding and a good
    friend and a professional officer.
        These are good friends, and it is difficult for me when I
    deal with the Pakistani counterparts on some of the tough
    issues that we have with them.
        You mentioned some of the people they have helped arrest
    over the years, and that is absolutely true, and all of those
    people are very important. The problem is that too often the
    terrorists, after they conduct an act, are heading back to
    Pakistan. Ramzi Yousef, who blew up the World Trade Center, was
    arrested in Pakistan. Odey, the other guy you mentioned who
    blew up our embassy in East Africa, hightailed back to
    Pakistan.
        That is a problem. The problem is, and, yes, they helped
    arrest them, but their policies in Afghanistan and in Kashmir
    and at home are helping to promote an environment where these
    folks are being generated out of there and coming back there
    after they conduct attacks. So it is a mixed record.
        They understand the threat. We talk to them about it
    frankly. I want to stay engaged with Pakistan and help them
    through this. They are friends.
        The threat actually, Congressman, as you know, not only
    affects us. It affects them as well, and that is why we have to
    stay working with them to address the problem.
        Mr. Burton. Let's talk about this double standard again,
    and then I will summarize and we can get on with this and let
    somebody else have the last question or two.
        You know, we have penalized Pakistan because of their
    nuclear development program, and yet India has not been
    penalized. India has a nuclear program, and we put severe
    limitations on military exports to Pakistan because they
    decided to do something that they thought was necessary to
    protect themselves in the event that there was an attack by
    India, and there have been a number of wars, as you know,
    between the two.
        And so, this double standard does exist, and I think it is
    something that the State Department and other agencies of our
    government ought to take a real hard look at. I will not
    belabor the point because my time has run out and I am going to
    yield to Mr. Delahunt, or whoever wants to finalize because you
    have to leave in about 3 minutes, and that is that Kashmir and
    Punjab continue to be real terrible tragedies in human rights
    violations. We just do not talk about that enough.
        There are 500,000 troops in Kashmir, a like number in
    Punjab. The atrocities continue. We do not do anything to put
    pressure on India to stop that, and we should because they go
    on year after year after year, and people are suffering and
    they are being tortured. Women are being gang-raped by Indian
    troops, and Amnesty International has reported on that.
        I mean it is reported on, but our State Department and our
    government seems to want to keep this on a low profile basis.
    Why, I do not understand, because we jump all over Pakistan,
    but we do not say anything about India, and when we do it is
    very, very low key.
        Mr. Eastham. I think you can take as your guide, Mr.
    Chairman, what the President of the United States did in going
    out to South Asia. We have been very clear that the desire to
    buildup a relationship with a country that has a billion people
    and that will represent a significant force in world affairs in
    the coming century is not at the expense of our old friend and
    ally Pakistan.
        I have personally lived for 5 years of my life in Pakistan,
    have significantly pleasant memories of that time. I have also
    spent a couple of years in India, and I can tell you that it is
    possible to pursue a good relationship with each of these
    countries at the same time and simultaneously. I am convinced
    of that.
        With respect to the Punjab and Kashmir situations that you
    mentioned, I had the opportunity to accompany your colleague,
    Mr. Ackerman, up to Kashmir on his trip there several years
    ago, if you will recall that. I have been working on the
    problem of Kashmir. I know the leadership both of the
    government in Kashmir as well as the opposition in the form of
    the All Parties Conference; I can tell you that we do not sweep
    that under the rug or ignore it, while at the same time pushing
    on Pakistan for different reasons.
        We are trying to address all of them at once, and I hope
    you will take that as a sincere commitment.
        Thank you very much.
        Mr. Burton. Well, I will take you at your word, but I hope
    you will make it a little higher profile because we have some
    of our Seek friends here. We have friends from Kashmir who are
    in the audience and from Pakistan, and they know very well
    first hand the problems that are existing over there, and year
    after year after year we listen to them. Our heart bleeds for
    them, and yet the conditions continue.
        We are the greatest power on earth supposedly right now,
    and we ought to be doing everything we can to end that tragedy
    over there.
        With that, Mr. Delahunt, do you have any more comments?
        Mr. Delahunt. I understand they must leave.
        Mr. Burton. If not, well, then we appreciate your being
    here, and the Committee stands adjourned.
        [At 12:38 p.m., the Committee was adjourned, subject to the
    call of the Chair.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                 July 12, 2000

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