    [House Hearing, 106 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

         COMBATING TERRORISM: COORDINATION OF NON-MEDICAL R&D PROGRAMS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
                      VETERANS AFFAIRS, AND INTERNATIONAL
                                   RELATIONS

                                     of the

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                               GOVERNMENT REFORM

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 MARCH 22, 2000

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 106-168

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

      Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
                          http://www.house.gov/reform

                                   __________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
    67-312                     WASHINGTON : 2000

                                     ______
                         COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

                         DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
    BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York         HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
    CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland       TOM LANTOS, California
    CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut       ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
    JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
    STEPHEN HORN, California             PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
    JOHN L. MICA, Florida                PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
    THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia            CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
    DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana           ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
    MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana                  DC
    JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida             CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
    STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
    MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South     DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
        Carolina                         ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
    BOB BARR, Georgia                    DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
    DAN MILLER, Florida                  JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
    ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas             JIM TURNER, Texas
    LEE TERRY, Nebraska                  THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
    JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois               HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
    GREG WALDEN, Oregon                  JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
    DOUG OSE, California                             ------
    PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin                 BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
    HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho              (Independent)
    DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

                          Kevin Binger, Staff Director
                     Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
               David A. Kass, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian
                        Lisa Smith Arafune, Chief Clerk
                     Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
                                     ------

    Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International
                                   Relations

                    CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
    MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana              ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         TOM LANTOS, California
    JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
    JOHN L. MICA, Florida                JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
    DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana           THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
    MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South     EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
        Carolina                         BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
    LEE TERRY, Nebraska                      (Independent)
    JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois               JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
    HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho

                                   Ex Officio

    DAN BURTON, Indiana                  HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
                Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
                  Kristine McElroy, Professional Staff Member
                               Jason Chung, Clerk
                        David Rapallo, Minority Counsel

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on March 22, 2000...................................     1
    Statement of:
        Chan, Kwai-Cheung, Director, Special Studies and Evaluations,
          National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S.
          General Accounting Office, accompanied by Sushil K. Sharma,
          Associate Director, Special Studies and Evaluations,
          National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S.
          General Accounting Office; and Weihsueh Chiu, Evaluator,
          Special Studies and Evaluations, National Security and
          International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting
          Office.....................................................     4
        Spencer, Carmen, Director, Chemical-Biological Defense
          Directorate, Defense Threat Reduction Agency; Page
          Stoutland, Director, Chemical and Biological
          Nonproliferation Program, U.S. Department of Energy; Donald
          M. Kerr, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of
          Investigation Laboratory Division, Federal Bureau of
          Investigation; and Robert M. Burnham, Section Chief,
          Domestic Terrorism-Counterterrorism Planning Section,
          Federal Bureau of Investigation............................    26
    Letters, statements, et cetera, submitted for the record by:
        Chan, Kwai-Cheung, Director, Special Studies and Evaluations,
          National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S.
          General Accounting Office, prepared statement of...........     7
        Kerr, Donald M., Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of
          Investigation Laboratory Division, Federal Bureau of
          Investigation, prepared statement of.......................    60
        Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
          the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............     3
        Spencer, Carmen, Director, Chemical-Biological Defense
          Directorate, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, prepared
          statement of...............................................    29
        Stoutland, Page, Director, Chemical and Biological
          Nonproliferation Program, U.S. Department of Energy,
          prepared statement of......................................    51
        Watson, Dale, Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division,
          Federal Bureau of Investigation, prepared statement of.....    72

        COMBATING TERRORISM: COORDINATION OF NON-MEDICAL R & D PROGRAMS

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, MARCH 22, 2000

                      House of Representatives,
           Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans
                  Affairs, and International Relations,
                                Committee on Government Reform,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:10 a.m., in
    room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher
    Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Present: Representatives Shays and Blagojevich.
        Staff present: Lawrence J. Halloran, staff director and
    counsel; J. Vincent Chase, chief investigator; R. Nicholas
    Palarino, senior policy advisor; Robert Newman, Kristine
    McElroy, and Thomas Costa, professional staff members; Jason M.
    Chung, clerk; David Rapallo, minority counsel; and Earley
    Green, minority staff assistant.
        Mr. Shays. I would like to call this committee meeting to
    order and to say that I have a great job being able to serve in
    this capacity, and I really appreciate the witnesses that are
    going to be participating today. It is a very important issue
    and we appreciate the good work of everyone involved. The
    purpose of this hearing is just to help us sort out where we
    are at and where we need to go and where we can improve, and
    that is ultimately the objective of everyone here.
        This Friday, in Connecticut, municipal, State and Federal
    emergency management officials will conduct a tabletop exercise
    to plan their response to a fictional but all too plausible
    incident of terrorism involving the use of chemical and
    biological weapons.
        Much of the technology they will discuss--detectors,
    protective gear, and decontamination equipment--is the producte
    of research and development [R&D], begun 10 to 15 years ago.
    Today, we ask how effectively today's Federal R&D efforts are
    focused on the needs of local first responders to meet
    tomorrow's terrorism threats.
        According to the General Accounting Office [GAO], research
    and development of non-medical technologies to meet chemical
    and biological threats is being conducted by several military
    and civilian agencies. In looking at four major R&D programs,
    GAO found all four are working on biological agent detectors,
    three are developing chemical detection and identification
    capability, and three are pursuing modeling and dispersal
    simulation. GAO found efforts to avoid duplication in these R&D
    programs informal and inconsistent.
        As we learned in our previous hearings, terrorism may know
    no boundaries, but bureaucratic barriers can be impervious to
    the need for interagency coordination and cooperation. The risk
    of overlap, waste, or missed opportunities to fill
    technological gaps is compounded by faulty or dated threat
    assessments. According to GAO, ``Several programs do not
    formally incorporate existing information on chemical and
    biological threats or needed capabilities in deciding what
    research and development projects to fund.''
        If the threat doesn't drive R&D commitments, what does?
    Critical decisions are being made today that will determine
    whether local police, firefighters, and emergency medical
    personnel will have the technology they need to confront the
    next generation of terrorism. Our witnesses this morning make
    many of those decisions, or are in a position to influence
    those who do. We look to them for assurances that Federal
    research and development programs will be effectively
    coordinated and efficiently run.
        [The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.001

        Mr. Shays. Our first panel is members of the GAO: Kwai-
    Cheung Chan, Director, National Security and International
    Affairs Division; Dr. Sushil K. Sharma, Associate Director,
    National Security and International Affairs Division; and
    Weihsueh Chiu, also from GAO.
        I believe we have just one testimony and that is from you,
    Mr. Chan.
        Mr. Chan. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Shays. We are happy to have you here, as always.
        Mr. Chan. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Shays. Pardon me. I need to administer the oath. I wish
    I could just swear you in at the beginning of the year and just
    call it quits from then on.
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Mr. Shays. Note for the record all three witnesses have
    responded in the affirmative.
        So we welcome your testimony. Thank you.

     STATEMENTS OF KWAI-CHEUNG CHAN, DIRECTOR, SPECIAL STUDIES AND
       EVALUATIONS, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
    DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY SUSHIL
    K. SHARMA, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, SPECIAL STUDIES AND EVALUATIONS,
      NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, U.S.
       GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; AND WEIHSUEH CHIU, EVALUATOR,
        SPECIAL STUDIES AND EVALUATIONS, NATIONAL SECURITY AND
     INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

        Mr. Chan. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the
    subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss our
    report on the coordination of Federal non-medical research and
    development programs addressing chemical and biological
    threats. We examined four programs which conduct non-medical
    R&D. These programs focus on developing systems and
    technologies for detecting, identifying, protecting, and
    decontaminating against chemical and biological agents.
        These programs are, one, DOD's Chemical and Biological
    Defense Program which was established under the National
    Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1994; the Defense
    Advanced Research Projects Agency's Biological Warfare Defense
    Program, established in 1996; three, the Department of Energy's
    Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program, established
    in 1997 in response to the Defense Against Weapons of Mass
    Destruction Act passed by Congress in 1996; and, four, the
    Counterterror Technical Support Program conducted by an
    interagency Technical Support Working Group [TSWG].
        I will discuss the following three issues. First, what
    processes are used to decide how to invest funds in R&D
    activities? Second, what similarities exist among Federal
    programs that conduct R&D in this area? Finally, I will present
    how these programs are coordinated in the activities.
        Before I discuss the results, let me briefly describe the
    context. Subsequent to the gulf war, concerns about the
    possible use of chemical and biological weapons in both
    military and civilian settings led Congress and Federal
    agencies to implement several new or expanded programs. Overall
    funding in this area has increased significantly in recent
    years.
        In addition, today several civilian and military agencies
    are conducting R&D designed to develop equipment to counter
    these threats. Total non-medical R&D funding in this area has
    increased from $76.5 million in fiscal year 1996 to a projected
    amount of nearly $190 million for fiscal year 2001, an increase
    of over 140 percent in 6 years.
        Let me turn to our findings. First, it is important to note
    that developing technology through R&D can be a lengthy
    process, sometimes extending to 10 years or more. Hence, it
    often does not offer a solution to immediate needs. To
    effectively plan and implement chemical and biological defense
    R&D, three key steps are to, one, identify, validate and
    prioritize chemical and biological threats; delineate the
    capabilities needed to address these threats; and allocate
    program resources to activities that develop those
    capabilities.
        Assessing threats may involve multiple dimensions, such as
    which particular chemical or biological agent might be used,
    how they may be delivered, and who might be the perpetrators.
    Delineating capability requires risk-based assessment of what
    specific capabilities are needed to address the threat.
        Before allocating program resources to R&D, one must
    evaluate the extent to which existing technology can address
    immediate needs and then identify gaps. R&D activities that are
    conducted outside this framework can carry the risk of
    developing a system that is technology-driven and not threat-
    driven, or one that users do not want or need. We have
    previously reported that civilian programs to combat terrorism
    do not follow these steps. Specifically, we recommended that a
    national level comprehensive threat and risk assessment to
    combat terrorism be done.
        Second, we found that these programs have several
    similarities. For instance, all of them conduct applied
    research and develop prototype equipment to demonstrate the
    practical utility of proposed technologies. Two of the programs
    focus on threats to the military, and the other two focus on
    threats to civilians.
        However, the military and civilian user communities are
    concerned about many of the same chemical and biological
    agents, such as nerve agents, and possible perpetrators, such
    as terrorists. In addition, we found that these programs are
    seeking to develop many of the same capabilities, such as
    detection and identification of biological agents.
        Furthermore, in some instances the technologies they are
    pursuing are similar. Examples of this include mass
    spectroscopy and flow cytometry for detecting bio agents. We
    also found that in some cases these programs contract with the
    same laboratories to perform the same research and development
    work.
        Finally, I will discuss the extent of coordination among
    these programs. Although the four programs we examined
    currently use both formal and informal mechanisms for
    coordination, we found several problems that may hamper their
    coordination efforts.
        First, participation in coordination meetings is
    inconsistent. For instance, sometimes they do not include
    representatives of the civilian user community. Second, program
    officials cite a lack of comprehensive information on which
    chemical and biological threats to the civilian population are
    most important and what capabilities for responding to these
    threats are most needed.
        Third, programs which are growing rapidly, such as the
    Department of Energy's program, do not formally incorporate
    existing information on chemical and biological threats or
    needed capabilities in deciding which R&D projects to fund.
    Without effective coordination among these agencies, R&D
    efforts might be duplicative, resulting in waste, and important
    capability gaps might not be addressed.
        In summary, basic information is needed to compare the
    goals and objectives of the various program activities to
    better assess whether overlaps, gaps, and opportunities for
    collaboration exist. Much of this basic information, beginning
    with a comprehensive assessment of the threat and the risk,
    does not yet exist.
        This concludes my formal statement, and we will be happy to
    answer any questions you have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Chan follows:]

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        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.012

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.013

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7312.014

        Mr. Shays. I would like to just ask you if the solutions
    are administrative or legislative to improving the
    coordination? And my second followup question is have we
    legislatively kind of reinforced the lack of coordination?
        Mr. Chan. I think over the years, since 1993, beginning
    with the bottom-up review, Secretary Aspin had noted this as
    one of those four major threats that is to be recognized. And
    there are a number of laws that have been passed over the years
    to encourage such activities, not only to provide threat and
    risk assessment as in the case that is directed, I believe, as
    Public Law 105-261, that the FBI does go and demonstrate the
    methodology in assessing threats and risk assessment, as well
    as the formulation of a number of these programs, as I stated
    in my oral statement, that are encouraged by Congress over the
    years to really develop these programs and try to, in fact,
    encourage them to address this threat.
        Mr. Shays. But my sense is that you are not seeing the
    coordination you want to see, correct?
        Mr. Sharma. If I could just expand on to this, I think on
    paper the----
        Mr. Shays. I just wanted to say, Mr. Chan, you sounded to
    me like Alan Greenspan then. I was trying to figure out what
    the answer was to my question there.
        Mr. Chan. I hope I am much younger.
        I believe that, in fact, legislatively there has been a lot
    of action taken. Congress had encouraged them to do that, but
    nevertheless I think we are still finding problems out there.
        Mr. Shays. OK, thank you.
        Yes?
        Mr. Sharma. I think the coordination mechanisms on pieces
    of paper do exist. However, one of the problems we are seeing
    here is that no one is specifically responsible for ensuring
    that duplication would not occur, or in cases where duplication
    has occurred, nobody has the responsibility for saying no, or
    nobody is in charge of ensuring that if there are some specific
    gaps that exist, they do get addressed through the R&D
    programs.
        Mr. Shays. Well, that is a pretty serious comment. It is
    helpful. I think we all experience this, but in my own office
    if three people are responsible for it, no one is responsible.
    So I always in the end say if this doesn't turn out the way it
    should, it is your fault, and I will point to one person. I
    might put it in the positive, but the bottom line is I always
    have one person ultimately responsible.
        Your point is we don't have one person ultimately
    responsible, which begs the next question. Is that because no
    one wants to have to choose who ultimately is responsible or it
    is difficult to decide who should be?
        Mr. Chan. Well, I think in the past they believed there is
    a demarcation between the military needs versus the civilian
    terrorism needs.
        Mr. Shays. Say that again.
        Mr. Chan. There seems to be in the past, I think, that each
    organization pursued their area according to their expertise.
    What I am trying to say is that the military traditionally had
    concentrated on the battlefield threat from nation states.
    However, over time, the concern about terrorism against the
    military are also increasing.
        So while the threat itself is similar and overlap, the
    priority in addressing them might be different. There are
    common threats now.
        Mr. Shays. Is this the concept of the stovepipe view of
    their mission?
        Mr. Chan. Well, that is a good way to put it, yes.
        Mr. Shays. But I still need an answer to that question, and
    then I am going to turn to staff to ask some questions and I
    would like to listen to your responses and then I may jump back
    in. But, ultimately, I am assuming, Mr. Chan, that you agree
    with Dr. Sharma's assessment.
        Given what Dr. Sharma said, do you think one person or one
    agency should be held accountable for the coordination of this
    effort?
        Mr. Chiu. The National Academy of Sciences in looking at
    coordination of R&D has recommended that in cases where
    multiple agencies are conducting R&D, there should be a lead
    agency who is responsible for leading that coordination effort.
        Mr. Shays. And have they suggested who it should be?
        Mr. Chiu. They haven't addressed it in this particular
    arena. They addressed it on a broader level.
        Mr. Shays. That is helpful. Thank you very much.
        I am going to have both Larry Halloran, the majority staff
    counsel, and David Rapallo, the minority staff counsel, as some
    questions.
        Larry.
        Mr. Halloran. In your statement, you mentioned an
    alternative to a threat-driven R&D system was a technology-
    driven one. Did you come across an example of a technology that
    was kind of driving its own development process that had no
    user at the other end, a gizmo nobody asked for?
        Mr. Chan. Well, I I can approach it from the view that in
    the Department of Energy, when the program was in place the
    approach that was taken was looking at ways to maximize the
    utility and capability of the scientists that are there, how
    best to use them. And so in defining what the threat is and
    then see what the needs are, it went in a different direction,
    which is to optimize the utility of the people and their
    expertise.
        Now, it may eventually converge to the same point, but
    nevertheless I think----
        Mr. Halloran. With a lot of luck.
        Mr. Chan [continuing]. Our view is that it should start
    from a threat-driven approach, and then you assess the risk,
    then you prioritize the capability you need to achieve, and
    then ultimately decide where to go. It is a process issue that
    we are raising here.
        Mr. Halloran. Right, and let's stay with the process. I
    know you didn't make formal recommendations in the report, but
    here you can. What would you see as a mechanism that might be
    used to develop requirements on the civilian side? I know DOD
    has a fairly complex requirements iteration process, and the
    civilian R&D side doesn't seem to have that. Is there a
    paradigm out there for coordination and for the requirements
    development process that they might look to?
        Mr. Chan. Well, I think the first observation one would
    make is that in DOD such a process is pretty well in place over
    time. I mean, this is something that they are used to, not only
    in addressing threats, but also developing a strategy by which
    you set requirements and the mission needs, as well as
    examining near-term, mid-term and far-term capability that
    might be needed, and then ultimately come out with so-called
    science and technology objectives, and so on. So the process
    itself within DOD is pretty well established.
        With the civilian side, this is a very different demand to
    really try to figure out where to go. First of all, in the
    national response system under EPA in addressing chemical
    accidents both on the mobile and stationary side--that means
    transportation where you have accidents with chemicals--you do
    have the local emergency planning team there, and first
    responders, and so on.
        Now, there is sort of an infrastructure available
    organizationally. Whether they are well trained to address not
    only chemical accidents, but all the way to the chemical
    agents, which is like warfare, and biological agents, that is
    clearly something new. And it is done in such a way that has
    always been with multiple-agency involvement, from the
    Department of Justice, involving the FBI, to EPA, to the
    cleanup problems, to even national labs doing analysis to
    figure out to what degree the civilian population might be
    affected if this happens. But it is not a very top-down way to
    approach the issue. So I think, you know, they are beginning to
    try to figure out how to do that better.
        Mr. Halloran. One final question. You noted in your
    statement and in the report that you didn't see much success,
    maybe some effort in involving civil users in the coordination
    process. What was the reluctance or what, in your view, caused
    that to not work? They just didn't think of it, or they tried
    and failed?
        Mr. Sharma. One of the things that DOE officials told us
    the reason that, you know--I mean, they gave us two reasons,
    essentially, that nobody has done the threat assessment, and as
    far as the users are concerned they really don't know what they
    want, unlike DOD users.
        I think it is partially true, but not correct in the sense
    that when you think about the civilian and military threats,
    there are artificially created boundaries. You do need some
    common things, such as detectors to detect what agents
    individuals have been exposed to, collective and individual
    protection systems, and decontamination systems. So these are
    sort of generic kinds of things, and DOD has years of
    experience.
        Now, users, are very different. They are coming from
    different States, you know. They are first responders, police,
    firemen, and so on and so forth. But, basically, everybody has
    awareness within those three categories of what do they need.
    What DOE has not done is to make an effort to go beyond what
    their jurisdiction, which is, you know, they are supposed to do
    R&D and, you know, they are independent, instead of making an
    effort to try to reach them and try to do a systematic need
    assessment, as well as recognizing that R&D does not offer any
    immediate solution. So you must do an assessment of the
    available technology and say to the users, look, for specific
    threats for the time being you could use ``x,'' ``y'' and
    ``z,'' and here are some of the gaps that none of these
    currently available technologies could offer. Therefore, we are
    going to do the R&D.
        So what I am saying is that DOE has to do two things. They
    have to do an outreach to the users and do some education at
    the same time in terms of what is available and what is not
    available, what they can use and work on, and go from there.
        Mr. Halloran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you.
        I will turn to Dave Rapallo.
        Mr. Rapallo. With the varied types of end users on the
    civilian side, what are some ways that agencies could solicit
    requirement information and other types of information from the
    end users?
        Mr. Sharma. I think one of the processes is followed by
    TSWG, and they have a process whereby they invite responders
    from each State and it is an open meeting. That is one such
    area where DOE can expand on. I mean, it is not that there are
    no mechanisms available or it is impossible to do.
        Mr. Chan. But I think before you do that, you need to
    provide what are the likely threats to those people so that
    they can understand what they are. And, second, what are the
    priorities which ones are the most important ones. And, three,
    what kind of capability gaps do they have now in addressing
    those possible threats, and the likelihood of these threats and
    the lethality of these threats, and ultimately how best to be
    informed.
        That way, they can say, hey, we don't have anything to do
    this, OK? So either you go out and say, OK, do we have current
    capability to address that or do we need to develop some kind
    of R&D program for a system or develop a technology by doing
    so.
        I think the reason why we keep raising the question about
    the threats assessment is that we are seeing a tremendous
    overlap between the military side and the civilian side. There
    is no way to distinguish pretty soon, particularly in the
    chemical and biological arena. So in that case, the only real
    difference you find is the selection of the agents that might
    be of concern to the domestic side, and the priorities might be
    quite different than the military use of such weapons of mass
    destruction.
        So they are different, except the threats are similar. And
    then I think with the knowledge the users have, that way at
    least they can sort of react to it, because if you go out there
    and ask them now, most likely they would just look at the
    current stuff based on the experience they have with chemical
    accidents.
        Mr. Rapallo. I just have one followup. Do you know the
    status of ongoing efforts for threat assessment at the civilian
    agencies, at FBI and other agencies?
        Mr. Chan. Yes. I think Public Law 105-261 which I commented
    on before directed the FBI to do a risk and threat assessment,
    and do some demonstrations. I think that is sort of the
    beginning of it. What we are looking for is ways to prioritize
    and then ultimately determine the capability and needs, and
    then develop future R&D programs out of that effort.
        Mr. Sharma. But we don't know whether or not they have
    actually done that.
        Mr. Shays. I am sorry. I am not hearing you. Could you
    speak a little more into the mic?
        Mr. Sharma. Although the public act requires them to do it,
    our understanding is that they have not done that, and perhaps
    you can ask the FBI when they come next what their road map is
    with regard to the threat assessment.
        Mr. Rapallo. Thank you.
        Mr. Shays. What will be the effect on chemical and
    biological defense projects if DOD and DOE merge their R&D road
    maps? What will be the effect?
        Mr. Sharma. I think if they do merge, one of the things
    will be that you will identify right away what are some of the
    projects that are duplicative, and you could then minimize or
    eliminate the duplication, especially if it is not planned
    duplication. And you could then curtail waste and use those
    resources to address more important questions that are not
    currently being addressed.
        Mr. Shays. Did any of you look at how civilians view the
    technology, versus the military, the users? Do the civilians,
    for instance, have a lower tolerance for equipment functioning
    a certain way versus the military?
        Mr. Chan. Well, we did a study about 4 years ago. You are
    taxing my memory now. What we found, of course, is that on the
    civilian side they are less aware of the possible agents that
    could be used. And, second, they really have to rely on
    expertise that is in EPA, such as to identify agents. And often
    they are not really trained to know what to do. I am talking
    about, given the incident occurs, what follows. That is where
    it is wanting often.
        Mr. Shays. What would be the most important question I
    could ask each of the next panelists?
        Mr. Chan. The most important question?
        Mr. Shays. Yes. I am trying to get to the bottom line.
        Mr. Chan. I think the most important one is really ask them
    not to look from the agency's perspective what they are doing,
    but rather have them address it from the people's perspective
    in terms of the community; given these kinds of threats, what
    kinds of concerns they may have and what kinds of things they
    might need.
        Instead of looking at it from the agency perspective, I
    think you have to sort of look at it from the user perspective
    because it is affecting the community and I think that needs to
    be represented in some form. But before they can respond to
    that, they need to understand what potential threat there might
    be. So you need to lay that out first and say, hey, this is
    what happens to you if this happens, then what would your needs
    be.
        I think you get a lot of statements about this is my agency
    and this is how we are addressing that issue rather than----
        Mr. Shays. So, in one sense, it is asking each of them who
    their customer is?
        Mr. Chan. Exactly.
        Mr. Shays. And have them define to me who their customer
    is.
        Mr. Chan. That is the quick and short answer.
        Mr. Shays. That is helpful.
        Is there any comment that any of the three of you would
    like to make before we get on to the next panel?
        Mr. Sharma. One of the questions I would ask is how is the
    nature of the threat different between the military and
    civilian. An agent is an agent, and while the magnitude of the
    effect might be different in a battlefield scenario versus in a
    civilian exposure, basically you are dealing with the same
    category of agents. And how that threat would impact the R&D
    efforts--a second question is while DOD has been doing a lot of
    research over the years and has developed many technologies,
    and that expertise ought to be utilized and have some effect,
    positive contribution, on the civilian side. But maybe civilian
    agencies have done some assessment and they find what DOD has
    done is good for nothing. I don't know, but you could ask them.
        Mr. Shays. OK, thank you.
        Mr. Chiu. Following up on the customer issue, how they are
    going to ensure--once some of this threat assessment and risk
    assessment comes out, how will they ensure linkages between the
    various elements, between the threat and developing the
    capabilities and the R&D, because one of the things that we
    found was that there seemed to be some gaps in establishing
    those linkages.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you.
        We have been joined by the ranking member, Mr. Blagojevich,
    who serves on our Armed Services Committee as well.
        I think you wanted me to go on to the next panel.
        Mr. Blagojevich. Yes.
        Mr. Shays. OK, so I thank all of you. As always, you
    provide very helpful information to our committee and a nice
    introduction to the next panel, so I thank you very much.
        Mr. Chan. Thank you.
        Mr. Chiu. Thank you.
        Mr. Shays. Let me just call the next panel and then I am
    just going to take care of some housekeeping.
        We have Mr. Carmen J. Spencer, Director of Chemical and
    Biological Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency. I might
    just point out that I think Mr. Spencer is retiring, and I want
    the record to show he is not retiring because he came before
    this committee.
        Dr. Page Stoutland, Director, Chemical and Biological
    Nonproliferation Program, Department of Energy; Dr. Donald M.
    Kerr, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Laboratory, Federal Bureau of Investigation; and Mr. Robert M.
    Burnham, Section Chief, Domestic Terrorism-Counterterrorism
    Planning Section, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
        Before I ask you to stand up--don't stand up quite yet--I
    will just ask unanimous consent that all members of the
    subcommittee be permitted to place any opening statement in the
    record, and that the record remain open for 3 days for that
    purpose. Without objection, so ordered.
        I ask further unanimous consent that all Members be
    permitted to include their written statement in the record.
    Without objection, so ordered.
        If you gentlemen would stand, I will swear you in, and then
    we will get started here.
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Mr. Shays. Note for the record that all four witnesses
    responded in the affirmative.
        I think you are seated the way I called you, and we will
    just go right down the line. We are going to turn the lock on
    for 5 minutes and then we will roll it over for another 5
    minutes, so you have a sense of where we are at. But your
    testimony is very important, especially in areas that are
    pretty new to us and this is an area that is fairly new to us.
        Mr. Spencer.

      STATEMENTS OF CARMEN SPENCER, DIRECTOR, CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL
      DEFENSE DIRECTORATE, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY; PAGE
     STOUTLAND, DIRECTOR, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL NONPROLIFERATION
     PROGRAM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; DONALD M. KERR, ASSISTANT
    DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION LABORATORY DIVISION,
    FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; AND ROBERT M. BURNHAM, SECTION
     CHIEF, DOMESTIC TERRORISM-COUNTERTERRORISM PLANNING SECTION,
                    FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

        Mr. Spencer. Mr. Chairman and distinguished committee
    members, I am honored to appear before your committee today to
    address your questions regarding the Defense Department's
    Chemical and Biological Defense Program.
        I am Mr. Carmen Spencer, the Director of the Chemical and
    Biological Defense Directorate within the Defense Threat
    Reduction Agency. In this capacity, I am responsible for
    managing, directing and executing the armed forces joint NBC
    defense, research, development, and acquisition programs to
    ensure all our armed forces can survive, fight and win on a
    battlefield contaminated with chemical or biological weapons.
        The Department's Chemical and Biological Defense Program is
    threat-driven; it is not technology-driven. The chemical and
    biological weapons threat is potentially increasing in
    diversity and frequency. Currently, there are over 20 countries
    with known or suspected chemical and biological weapons
    programs. Assessing the threat is complicated by several
    interrelated changes, including the proliferation of weapons,
    technological advances, unstable political regimes, shifting
    regional power balances, and the increasing threat of
    terrorism.
        The continued frequent deployment of U.S. forces worldwide
    makes assessing the threat more difficult. Further, because the
    countries which are of the greatest concern to the United
    States are also in regions in which the United States has well-
    defined national security interests, it is of paramount
    importance that we continue to maintain a credible, robust
    capability to protect our forces and provide them capabilities
    to operate effectively in a chemical or a biologically
    contaminated environment.
        The chemical and biological threat drives warfighting
    commanders and CINCs and services requirements. The CINCs and
    services identify the capabilities needed to survive, fight and
    win. These identified capabilities form the basis for all
    requirements for the research and acquisition community. The
    Defense Intelligence Agency provides us with continually
    updated reports and assessments. These reports assess the
    effect of adversaries' weapons systems on how we fight.
        The commanders-in-chief identify their priorities which are
    supported by our joint NBC defense program. Our joint user
    community evaluates materiel, training and doctrinal
    improvements to provide the necessary capabilities for our
    warfighters. If a materiel solution becomes necessary, the
    joint user community generates requirements in the form of
    mission needs statements and joint operational requirements
    documents. The result is that our programs and technologies are
    driven by validated threat assessments and user mission
    requirements, not by technologies.
        Our Chem-Bio Defense Program coordinates with several
    relates efforts, including the Defense Advanced Research
    Projects Agency [DARPA]; the Department of Energy; the
    Department of Health and Human Services. And we have many
    international cooperative efforts.
        DARPA is charged with seeking breakthrough concepts and
    technologies. DARPA's biological warfare defense program is
    intended to complement the DOD Chem-Bio Defense Program by
    anticipating threats and developing novel defenses against
    them. The Chem-Bio Defense Program has programmed funding to
    facilitate the transition to acquisition of any demonstrated
    DARPA technologies that may meet warfighter needs.
        The Department of Energy initiated an effort to develop
    chemical and biological defensive capabilities for first
    responders and protection against terrorism attacks within the
    United States. The Department of Defense program has leveraged
    the Department of Energy program by funding specific DOE
    efforts that may have military applications.
        Additionally, coordination is achieved by the Department of
    Energy participation as a non-voting member of our Joint NBC
    Defense Board, DOE participation in the Chem-Bio Defense
    Program science and technology reviews, and regular meetings
    with the Department of Energy and visits to their national
    laboratories as well.
        The Department of Defense's Chemical and Biological Defense
    Program and DARPA and the Department of Energy's Chemical and
    Biological Nonproliferation Program have worked together to
    provide a report to Congress on our cooperative work in
    chemical and biological defense science and technology. It is
    prepared through an interagency coordination mechanism known as
    the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee Focus Group,
    which involves the Department of Defense, the Department of
    Energy, and the intelligence community.
        The Department of Defense also participates in the National
    Security Council-led Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness
    Group, which coordinates activity in the U.S. Government toward
    preventing, detecting and responding to terrorist release of
    weapons of mass destruction, and toward more effectively
    managing the health, environmental and law enforcement
    consequences of such an incident.
        This body does not address or oversee the DOD Chem-Bio
    Defense Program's mission of providing the warfighter with the
    capability to operate effectively in a chemical and biological-
    contaminated environment. However, technology development
    efforts within the Department of Defense, including the
    Chemical and Biological Defense Program, that can contribute
    directly to the domestic preparedness mission are coordinated
    with other agency programs through this R&D subgroup which is
    chaired by the White House of Science and Technology Policy.
        The Department's fiscal year budget request for the
    Department of Defense Chem-Bio Defense program is approximately
    $836 million. This is an increase of over $100 million from
    fiscal year 2000. $362 million is being applied for research,
    development, test and evaluation, and $474 million will go
    toward providing equipment to our warfighters.
        In summation, the Department of Defense Chem-Bio Defense
    Program responds to the threat-requirements-programs process.
    Programs are in place to respond to user needs and shortfalls.
    Oversight and management of the Department of Defense Chem-Bio
    Defense Program continues to improve and does comply with
    Public Law 103-160. The Department is on the right azimuth for
    fielding needed, improved chem-bio defense equipment to our
    armed forces to meet warfighter needs. The continued support of
    Congress and implementation of current plans will continue to
    improve joint force readiness.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Spencer follows:]

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        Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
        We are going to have two votes, so we might as well go
    until we have to leave because then we have to wait for the
    next vote.
        So we are probably going to interrupt you, Dr. Stoutland,
    but why don't you start?
        Mr. Stoutland. I would like to thank the chairman and the
    members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to appear
    before you and describe our efforts to counter the use of
    weapons of mass destruction.
        My name is Page Stoutland and I am the Director of the
    Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration's
    Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program. Today, I will
    concentrate on the important topic of equipment and operational
    requirements and coordination as they relate to chemical and
    biological research and development programs.
        The Department's Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation
    Program [CBNP] as we refer to it, was initiated in response to
    the fiscal year 1997 Defense Against Weapons of Mass
    Destruction Act. The mission of the program is to develop,
    demonstrate and deliver systems and the supporting technologies
    that will lead to major improvements in the U.S. capability to
    prepare for and respond to chemical or biological attacks.
        Technology plays a critical role in defending the U.S.
    population against attacks with chemical and biological
    weapons. These emerging threats, whether of domestic or foreign
    origin, are rooted in science and technology, and any effective
    response must draw on similar expertise.
        Our program has three principal elements: analytical
    studies, technology development, and domestic demonstration
    application programs. Analytical studies are used to help guide
    the overall program direction, as well as individual technical
    areas. One overarching study was initiated last year to examine
    alternative system concepts for defending cities against
    chemical or biological attack. This was done jointly with the
    Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
        Technology development is the core program element. The
    program targets not incremental improvements, but major
    capability enhancements that can be achieved in the 3 to 5-year
    timeframe. There are currently four areas of specific focus:
    detection, biological foundations, modeling, and
    decontamination.
        The third program element consists of domestic
    demonstration application programs which bring together
    individual technologies into more capable systems in the 2 to
    3-year timeframe. This integration is important, since it is
    usually only at the system level that problems are solved. The
    goal of these programs is to integrate current technology into
    prototype operational systems directed at specific
    applications.
        I now turn to the issues central to this hearing: assessing
    the chemical and biological threats, defining non-medical R&D
    requirements, and more generally determining what we do within
    the CBNP.
        In a general sense, our R&D investments are guided by a
    process that considers the threat and related vulnerabilities,
    and the benefit that a particular technology or system would
    have were it to be developed. Within this context, we have
    undertaken a number of specific activities to identify the
    highest impact areas for R&D.
        First, characterizing the threat environment is important
    for guiding our R&D activities. DOE does not conduct threat
    assessments in the chemical and biological areas. Instead, we
    rely on the FBI, the defense and intelligence communities, and
    public health assessments as appropriate.
        These assessments which, for example, consider the agents
    most likely to be used, are then used to guide our R&D
    activities. Implicit in this process is the recognition of the
    uncertainties inherent in estimating the nature and magnitude
    of the threat, and that these uncertainties must be factored
    into our planning.
        Threat assessments as well as other factors are necessary
    for the formulation of equipment and operational needs. These
    needs will ultimately be the result of a complex process that
    involves policymakers, technologists, first responders, the
    medical community, and others. As discussed in the GAO report,
    today there are no formal requirements for countering the
    domestic chemical and biological threat. This is not because we
    or others haven't considered the issue, but it is rather
    representative of the challenges implicit in arriving at a set
    of needs or requirements that would serve a diverse set of
    users and act as meaningful targets for R&D programs.
        In this environment, one must consider new mechanisms to
    identify user needs and to guide R&D programs. Within the CBNP,
    we sponsor two sets of activities that, in our view, contribute
    to the overall U.S. chemical and biological defense strategy
    and identify the corresponding needs or requirements.
        These activities buildupon our extensive interactions with
    potential technology users, and participation in the numerous
    processes designed to more clearly understand their needs. For
    example, we participate in the NSC-led Weapons of Mass
    Destruction Preparedness Group. Within this group exists an R&D
    subgroup chaired by the White House Office of Science and
    Technology.
        We fully support these processes, but in our view more is
    required. Specifically, we use analytical studies to aid in the
    development of an overall U.S. strategy to counter the CB
    threat. Our Defense of Cities Study aims to develop an
    analytical framework by which we can compare the various
    chemical and biological defense options available to
    policymakers. This will help to identify at a high level which
    components--for example, technologies--would have the highest
    value in terms of a response system and where further R&D might
    be most valuable.
        The most important component of our program for
    understanding user needs is our demonstration programs, or
    DDAPs as we call them. These programs, as I mentioned earlier,
    are designed to field and demonstrate complete prototype
    systems that use technology developed within the CBNP or
    elsewhere. In doing this, we work closely with users who host
    the demonstration and in an iterative way determine their
    needs.
        It is important to emphasize here the important difference
    between a stated need for a particular piece of hardware and
    the requirement for a system with particular performance
    specifications.
        Mr. Shays. Dr. Stoutland, I am going to let you summarize
    when we get back. I am very sorry, but we are going to go vote.
    I am sorry that we have to wait for another vote, so if you
    want to get a Coke or something, you probably have 15 minutes
    to do it.
        So we will stand adjourned.
        [Recess.]
        Mr. Shays. In 20 minutes, we are going to have another
    vote, so we will see how that unfolds.
        Dr. Stoutland, please feel free to conclude.
        Mr. Stoutland. OK, I will continue and summarize.
        The most important component of our program, as I was
    saying, are our demonstration programs. These are designed to
    field and demonstrate complete prototype systems that use
    technology developed within our program or elsewhere. In doing
    so, we work closely with users who host a demonstration and in
    an iterative way understand their needs.
        In order to provide you with some more insight into one of
    these programs, I would like to briefly describe one of our
    demonstration programs, PROTECT. With PROTECT, we are working
    closely with the Department of Transportation and a number of
    major U.S. subway systems to examine systematically and
    rigorously the vulnerability of subway systems to chemical or
    biological attack. Using computer models, we can estimate not
    only what the effects from an attack might be, but how to most
    effectively respond by, for example, changing the air flow in a
    subway system.
        We are now aggressively moving forward both in testing
    chemical detectors and improving the computer models and
    information systems necessary to realize these goals. Next
    year, a demonstration of the complete system will take place
    involving one subway station, and the following year a network
    of five stations will be demonstrated. This demonstration will
    result in the transit authorities being able to assess in their
    subway the value of such a system, and provides important
    guidance to our R&D program about where further technology
    improvements are needed.
        Finally, let me address the issue of coordination. The DOE
    program is designed to complement other U.S. Government
    programs, while relying on the unique capabilities of the DOE
    laboratories. We either participate directly or follow the
    status of a number of interagency coordination mechanisms.
        In addition to these groups, we participate in a number of
    formal coordination mechanisms with the defense and
    intelligence communities, such as the Counterproliferation
    Program Review Committee. Within the last year, the
    Counterproliferation Program Review Committee has formed a
    chemical and biological defense focus group to specifically
    help coordination in the chemical and biological area. Informal
    coordination occurs routinely via information exchanges between
    our program and other agencies, and we sponsor an annual
    meeting typically attended by over 200 people to review the
    status of our program.
        Let me conclude by saying that the DOE program if focused
    on addressing the high-leverage areas, particularly detection,
    that have been identified as being central to an effective
    response to chemical and biological attacks. Our program builds
    upon existing capabilities of the DOE laboratories and has
    begun to reach out to the industrial and academic communities.
        The chemical and biological threat presents enormous
    challenges. We are committed to fully utilizing the
    capabilities of the DOE and its laboratories in order to meet
    these challenges. In carrying out this commitment, we will
    continue to work closely with others to understand the evolving
    threat, to better appreciate the needs of technology users, and
    to coordinate our program with those in other agencies.
        Thank you. I would be happy to answer any questions you may
    have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Stoutland follows:]

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        Mr. Shays. Thank you very much, Dr. Stoutland.
        Dr. Kerr.
        Mr. Kerr. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you
    for the opportunity to speak to you on behalf of the FBI.
        I am Assistant Director in charge of the FBI Laboratory
    Division, and while we have the word ``laboratory'' in our
    name, we are a little different from what you might expect, in
    that while we do forensic examinations of evidence, we also
    provide a great deal of operational support, particularly in
    the counterterrorism area.
        We work for the FBI field offices, of whom there are 56, so
    they are a principal customer, if you will. We work for other
    law enforcement agencies in providing training and equipment,
    which I will come to, particularly again in the
    counterterrorism area. And we work with those who manage our
    investigative programs in the FBI, of whom Bob Burnham, to my
    left, is one.
        The kind of support that we provide and where our needs are
    made clear can be exemplified by what happened over the
    millennium weekend, where all eight of the sections of our
    division were involved, and some 1,100 people in those
    sections. Of our 43 units, 20 were directly involved, including
    those in electronic and physical surveillance, people doing
    chemistry, explosives examination and latent prints on Mr.
    Rassam's car and what came across the border in it. And we also
    deployed our explosives render safe teams here in the national
    capital area, the hazardous materials response capability, and
    our crisis communications people. So we are, if you will, a
    tactical technology organization.
        Most recently, we have been operating in Irvine, CA, where
    the mayor had to declare an emergency because of a biological
    threat. But the biological threat was overlain by explosives
    and weapons. You may have read about that case where, in fact,
    the doctor who had all those materials was killed. We ran the
    crime scenes at the embassy bombings in Africa two summers ago,
    and of particular moment for this committee the Larry Wayne
    Harris case with the anthrax samples in Las Vegas was one that
    we had to respond to. So we learn by our casework.
        The counterterrorism activities and the support today
    underlie the five rapid deployment teams that the FBI has stood
    up around the country. They are based on our largest field
    offices; two of them are here in Washington. And there is a
    technical component now to each of those teams, with the
    equipment to go with it. We also have the disaster squad
    responsibility that deals with aircraft crashes, investigations
    like TWA 800, more recently Egyptair and the Alaska Airlines
    crash.
        The kinds of capabilities we offer more broadly are things
    like the EXPRESS data base, which is the explosive Reference
    search system, and that is funded by the Technical Support
    Working Group in conjunction with the FBI, and it is to provide
    data to all that might confront an explosive device in order to
    deal with it properly.
        We operate the Hazardous Device School in Huntsville, AL.
    That is the school that trains all of the State and local bomb
    techs today across the country, as well as the FBI's own.
        Mr. Shays. That is a very popular school, I might add.
        Mr. Kerr. Thank you.
        Mr. Shays. I mean, there is a long waiting list, as I
    understand it.
        Mr. Kerr. Yes, sir, and we are hoping that, in fact, we are
    going to be able to increase the capacity of it in the next few
    years. That school now includes a module of training on weapons
    of mass destruction threats, and so all of the people going
    through that school or recertified by it are being exposed to
    the current generation of capability that there is.
        In terms of R&D highlights, I should point out that we
    don't have the resources or the ambition to replicate what
    other agencies of the Government have in place. So through
    memoranda of understanding with the Department of Energy, with
    the Army Fort Dietrick people, with Edgewood Arsenal and others
    across the country, we have the opportunity to use their
    specialized facilities and people in many of our programs. So,
    for example, in the Larry Wayne Harris case we brought the
    suspected anthrax samples back here to Fort Dietrick for
    analysis because they have the containment facilities and the
    expertise to do that quickly.
        SBCCOM at Edgewood has developed a fly away laboratory for
    us. It was deployed, for example, to the World Trade
    Organization meeting in Seattle. It will be here in Washington
    for the IMF meeting. But, in fact, it is a replica of the
    treaty lab that that command had developed for treaty
    monitoring purposes, with modifications to make it suitable for
    law enforcement.
        The Department of Energy interaction, starting in 1998, has
    led to 10 projects at the national labs and a number of other
    more specialized tasks that we fund out of counterterrorism
    budget. In 1999, we took advantage of expertise at MIT's
    Lincoln Lab, which is a Department of Defense laboratory where
    they are developing a simplified DNA extraction capability for
    field use.
        This current year, the large vehicle bomb disablement
    project is underway jointly with the Department of Defense and
    Department of Energy. The improvised explosive device data base
    is being put together this year, and the advanced render safe
    capabilities that we are doing jointly with the Department of
    Defense and DOE are well underway, including foreign
    participation from the United Kingdom.
        We, in fact, should point out, in the statement I have
    given you for the record there is a table that displays some of
    the specific projects we work on. And for those who serve on
    the Armed Service Committee or others like them, I should point
    out that the letter after the number is ``k,'' not ``m.'' It is
    a way of making a point to you.
        Law enforcement and the Justice Department have not had a
    history of sustained R&D programs. We have tended, to support
    our casework, to buy off the shelf when we can to support
    current needs. So these relationships with the Department of
    Defense and the Department of Energy are particularly valuable
    to us because they are, in fact, in a mode of sustaining R&D
    programs over a number of years. They have stability in their
    technical staffing to provide it, and they don't have to go out
    and do casework everyday as we do, which takes people away from
    the R&D projects.
        To further support our relationships with the other
    agencies, one of my Deputies is presently seconded to the
    Defense Threat Reduction Agency and heads the Advanced System
    Concepts Office there, providing us real glue in terms of joint
    planning and thinking about some of the BW and CW problems.
        One of my unit chiefs is stationed at the Lawrence
    Livermore National Laboratory to tie very closely into the work
    they do in dealing with weapons of mass destruction detection,
    planning, and other things that Dr. Stoutland briefed you on.
    We have four or five people exchanged with counterparts in the
    intelligence community, not for liaison, but, in fact, to fill
    real responsible operating jobs. It is a way of cross-
    pollinating the tools and techniques that we have.
        Last, we think while the funding for it is small, the
    Technical Support Working Group plays a very significant role
    in bringing the agencies to the table to talk about their joint
    requirements. It is led, of course, at the executive level by
    State, Defense, Energy, and now the FBI. But it reaches across
    the entire law enforcement and national security communities,
    and it has been an excellent place to fund projects that deal,
    for example, with explosives detection, some of the biological
    detection programs. And I think it is a good model for
    Government cooperation.
        We are going to continue to expand these relationships with
    the other agencies, but the most important thing is that we
    exercise them almost every month. One of the ways we have had
    to exercise them is that anthrax threat letters have become, of
    course, a favorite thing for some people. They come to the
    Congress, they come to the hospitals, they are everywhere
    around the country.
        We couldn't put people in the position of saying we are
    going to fly out and pick it up and in 48 hours we will tell
    you whether you were exposed to a pathogen. That is not
    satisfactory for the public that we protect. So with the help
    of the Centers for Disease Control and the public health
    laboratories across the country, there is now a network in
    place.
        So if we get a call from Cincinnati about a threat letter,
    we can advise them, first of all, how to package it
    successfully for their own safety and those around them, and
    who to take it to so that they can get an answer in a few hours
    rather than wait for the time it takes to transport it back
    here to Washington and analyze it. So it is a notable success.
    I think it is the kind of thing that clearly we benefit from,
    and hence want to encourage. Congressional interest helps a
    great deal in that area as well.
        Last, with respect to the State and local first responders,
    I mentioned the HDS school. We also in the past year have been
    buying and equipping State and local responders with sort of
    first-level capability, and that has, I think, been a good
    program. It has not put the most sophisticated equipment in
    their hands, and there is a reason for that.
        One of the things that we have to do is not take the best
    laboratory equipment to the field; we have to worry about shelf
    life, maintenance, calibration. We don't want to inflict an
    added overhead burden on the first responders if we can design
    around it.
        Mr. Chairman, I will be happy to answer your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Kerr follows:]

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        Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Burnham, my understanding is you are going to be coming
    up to Connecticut.
        Mr. Burnham. Sir, I will be coming up on Friday for the
    tabletop, as well as on Monday for the hearing.
        Mr. Shays. It will be great to have you there. Why don't
    you give us your testimony and we will try to get your
    testimony done before I go and vote.
        Mr. Burnham. OK, I think we can get it done, Mr. Chairman.
        Again, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a
    pleasure to be here. I will be brief because, in the first
    place, I am a last-minute replacement here. Mr. Watson, my
    boss, the Assistant Director of the Counterterrorism Division,
    was unable to make it. His written statement has been
    submitted.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Watson follows:]

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        Mr. Burnham. I do work for Mr. Watson. I have got one of
    the section; I have got the Domestic Terrorism Section, which
    is part of the Counterterrorism Division. And most of what is
    in Mr. Watson's statement are areas that are under my
    responsibility.
        Mr. Shays. So feel free to talk about them.
        Mr. Burnham. OK, so I am going to talk about a couple of
    things. Again, he regrets he couldn't be here.
        I guess the overriding theme here is probably defining a
    threat and risk, and I am going to touch upon a couple of
    things on that, particularly because it was brought up in the
    first panel here.
        Mention was made of the FBI's--and this is also material
    that is in Mr. Watson's statement--mention was made by the
    first panel of a threat and risk assessment that is being done
    by the FBI. Specifically, that is being done now and it is
    being done as part of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass
    Destruction Act of 1998. In that, the FBI was tasked with doing
    a threat and risk assessment for chem-bio or radiological,
    whatever the threat may be in the WMD area.
        After we started that, pursuant to the fiscal year 1999
    State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Support Program, which is
    administered by OJP, that was rolled then into an overall grant
    package which is being administered by OJP. We finished the
    actual threat and risk package, gave that OJP, worked with to
    OJP. And by the way, the actual threat package itself, the
    threat and risk package, was also piloted in two cities.
        After completing that, we did give that to OJP. OJP has
    since rolled that into their entire grant package. And starting
    on March 28, next week, there are five particular locations,
    and I don't have the locations now, where they are actually
    going to start--five localities around the country where they
    will actually start to demonstrate that and get that working.
        Now, there are some limitations in that threat and risk
    package that we did with the locals, in that it was not your
    typical FBI crime survey; it was not like a lot of intelligence
    estimates we did. There were inherent limitations on that
    because of the fact that it was going to be going out to
    individuals who may not be in law enforcement or the
    intelligence community. So it did have certain limitations on
    it and I can discuss that more later.
        The other area that was mentioned by the first panel was
    the General Accounting Office last fall did a study in which
    they pointed out, and Mr. Spencer has also pointed out, that
    there are intelligence estimates done for State actors and
    possible overseas development in the area of WMD or chem-bio.
    What GAO's assessment or study pointed out was there is nothing
    really that is done domestically as far as what is out there in
    the area of chem-bio.
        One of the tasks that they did recommend, although we
    haven't been tasked with it yet, was that there should be a
    study or a threat and risk assessment done domestically as to
    what is specifically out there. The GAO report did note that
    over the last several years a lot of money has been spent in
    the area of R&D, and a lot of money in first responder
    training. But what were they training for? Are they training
    for any particular element? And that hasn't been done and we
    haven't been tasked with it yet, although on a daily basis we
    are dealing with what I would say would be the domestic threat.
        Now, we rely heavily, as Mr. Kerr has stated, on the
    laboratory. I have got an operational section, most of whom are
    not scientists, most of whom don't have the technical
    expertise. So we do have to rely heavily on our laboratory. And
    if I can give you just an example of how we work not only with
    our Laboratory Division but with our Federal partners, the
    Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, CDC, typically
    what we would do on our threat assessment process--and Dr. Kerr
    had mentioned the fact of an anthrax threat. We could get an
    anthrax threat in from one of our field offices. Our weapons of
    mass destruction coordinator may call in and say a particular
    hospital or doctor's office had received an anthrax threat that
    day.
        Part of the threat assessment process on what we do is we
    analyze the threat from three viewpoints. We analyze it from a
    behavioral, a technical, and an operational standpoint. What we
    will do is we will contact first our National Center for the
    Analysis of Violent Crime, our behavioral science people, and
    get them involved. This is all on a conference call. We will
    also get possibly HMRU and NBDC involved. We will also get the
    Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta and do a behavioral, a
    technical and an operational assessment for the local field
    office.
        In most instances, it is done for the first responder
    because for all intents and purposes, it is going to be the
    local police department or fire department that is going to
    receive the message. And if we have been doing our job over the
    last couple of years, they will contact us. We will do that, we
    will d a threat assessment, and we do this two to three times a
    week. So I think from all these threat assessments we are
    doing, get back to the field office.
        Dr. Kerr had mentioned we did just recently have a case out
    in California where we did exactly that. The call came in on
    Friday night, indicating possible biological agents. HMRU, the
    Hazardous Materials Response Unit, for Dr. Kerr, were
    dispatched out there. We worked with the Office of Emergency
    Management and the local public health officials out in
    California. That is typically how we respond. We have been
    doing it in the local community, and from these I think we have
    a sense of exactly what is out there now, at least
    domestically.
        I can go through figures and the actual number of cases
    that we have had in the last year. Predominantly, most of them
    have been anthrax and most of them have been hoaxes.
        Mr. Shays. Most or all?
        Mr. Burnham. I would say about 80 percent of our cases have
    been anthrax threats, hoaxes.
        Mr. Shays. Right, and of the 80 percent that are anthrax,
    have all of them been hoaxes?
        Mr. Burnham. Yes. We haven't actually--we have not had an
    actual case, right.
        Mr. Shays. I just didn't want to misread your statement.
        Mr. Burnham. No.
        Mr. Shays. Otherwise, you have got my attention.
        Mr. Burnham. No, no. I am sorry, no. Let me just spell out
    we have not had actual cases of anthrax.
        Mr. Shays. Yet.
        Mr. Burnham. But, again, that is part of the process and we
    are going through it on a daily basis, fully expecting that in
    the next couple of months the FBI, my section, will be tasked
    with doing an actual threat and risk assessment.
        Those are the highlights of Mr. Watson's statement. Again,
    I would entertain any questions that you may have.
        Mr. Shays. It is kind of embarrassing to have you gentlemen
    have to wait around. I apologize for that, but I only have one
    vote so I can vote and come right back and then we will do the
    questions. It is very important that we have this hearing, so I
    really appreciate you being here.
        So we will adjourn for a bit and I will be back.
        [Recess.]
        Mr. Shays. I would like to call this hearing to order.
        I have a number of questions I want to ask, but I think the
    first question is I just want to talk about what kinds of
    equipment we are talking about. I want each of you to describe
    one or two pieces of equipment that you would be dealing with.
        Let's start with you, Mr. Spencer.
        Mr. Spencer. OK, I will lead off. Of course, DOD is
    concentrating on warfighting, and our No. 1----
        Mr. Shays. Concentrating on?
        Mr. Spencer. On warfighting requirements, meaning
    warfighting needs for the commanders-in-chief.
        Our No. 1 priority is in the area of detection,
    identification and early warning. So when we talk detection, we
    are talking a detection capability that provides us early
    warning. We need to be able to detect and identify chemical
    agents, toxic industrial materials, biological agents, prior to
    them having an impact on exposed personnel so that exposed
    personnel can then take adequate individual protective
    measures.
        And that leads us into the next area, which is individual
    protection--clothes, boots, gloves, masks. The detectors
    themselves range from everything from airborne platform
    systems, which are basically lidar technology in nature that
    can send out a beam and scan the horizon to determine if there
    is a cloud that is not naturally occurring in nature.
        We have biological detention devices, something like our
    portal shield device that is deployed in southwest Asia and the
    Korean peninsula. Those are point biological detection devices
    that are for fixed sites that, should they be exposed to a
    biological aerosol, they will alarm, they will provide an early
    detection capability.
        In collective protection, collective protection is
    required--and most of us speak the same language when it comes
    to equipment. For example, a mash unit, emergency medical
    procedures. You do not want surgeons wearing protective masks,
    suits and gloves. They need to be in a clean environment, so
    you have a filtered environmental system that is self-contained
    so that surgeons can perform those types of operations. And
    that is also a valuable tool for command and control
    facilities, maintenance facilities, anywhere you have long-
    duration facilities. A good example also is the Army. All of
    their Abrahms armored systems have collective protection. We
    have collective protection on citadels, on ships. Some aircraft
    have collective protection as well.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you.
        Mr. Spencer. The last thing was decontamination, and
    obviously those are chemical substances that will decontaminate
    all known chemical and biological agents.
        Mr. Shays. So you basically mentioned three: the detection
    and identification, the protective gear, and the
    decontamination.
        Mr. Spencer. Correct, and collective protection.
        Mr. Shays. And what?
        Mr. Spencer. Collective protection, which are the shelters
    for the mash units, for example.
        Mr. Shays. OK, so individual protection gear and collective
    protection gear?
        Mr. Spencer. Correct.
        Mr. Shays. And I am going to come back to you because of
    the emphasis on the military. I would love to know what the
    implications are for civilians of what you do.
        Mr. Spencer. Certainly.
        Mr. Shays. Dr. Stoutland.
        Mr. Stoutland. Let me give you two specific examples, one
    being equipment and the other being a capability. With respect
    to equipment, one of our detector projects is one that we call
    micro chem lab CB, short for chem-bio. This will be a handheld
    unit able to detect many chemical agents, as well as biological
    toxins, including industrial chemicals as well.
        Mr. Shays. Will it be a sophisticated, calibrated piece of
    equipment or is it going to be--we had the problem when we did
    the gulf war illnesses where we had the military people in the
    field hearing alarms going off all the time, and then finally
    they just discounted it because they were being told to
    discount it. And then the more sensitive equipment would come
    in and discount most of the readings.
        So my point, I guess, is that in the end the handheld
    stuff, the stuff on the trucks, the jeeps, and so on, were
    almost useless because if they detected something, we ignored
    it.
        Mr. Stoutland. Our goal is to overcome those shortfalls by
    using a variety of techniques. I can go into them if you want.
    Basically, what we are doing is we are putting the power of an
    analytical laboratory, for example, a gas chromatograph which
    is the size of a microwave oven, into a chip format. So we are
    moving things literally to micro chips. So something that used
    to be a meter in length can now be put into a 1-centimeter-
    squared chip. So you can then put the power on to a chip and
    you can do things in redundant fashion so that you can
    eliminate the false alarm problem.
        Our goal for this particular device is one false alarm in
    every 10,000 measurements. Obviously, it is an R&D program.
    This year, we have the first prototype that will be tested this
    summer with live agents to see how close we are to that
    performance goal.
        Mr. Shays. You wouldn't ignore an alarm like that then,
    would you?
        Mr. Stoutland. That is the hope. And, again, getting back
    to the domestic use, what we hear from the first response
    personnel and others is that false alarms really are not
    tolerated domestically. In the military, of course, you have
    got some flexibility. You can bring in other units, you can don
    masks while you are trying to figure out whether the alarm was
    real or not.
        Mr. Shays. So are you mostly focused on civilian use
    protection?
        Mr. Stoutland. Yes. Well, I will give you two examples. Our
    program targets civilian use. The first example is detection.
    The second example is a computer modeling capability. For
    example, we have developed extensively models to be able to
    predict the flow or the transport of chemical or biological
    agents within buildings and within subway structures.
        So, for example, it lets us predict what the impact would
    be of a release at a given subway station, how far away will it
    travel, how quickly will it get there, which then aids in
    determining what sorts of mitigative measures you might think
    of.
        Mr. Shays. So you are doing detection and identification.
    You are not doing protective gear.
        Mr. Stoutland. That is correct.
        Mr. Shays. You are not doing collective protection.
        Mr. Stoutland. That is correct.
        Mr. Shays. And decontamination?
        Mr. Stoutland. We do have a decontamination effort.
        Mr. Shays. So you are doing both of those, OK.
        Mr. Spencer. May I comment on that, please?
        Mr. Shays. Sure.
        Mr. Spencer. Dr. Stoutland used an excellent example of
    micro chem lab. That is a technology that we are following
    very, very closely. In fact, we have contributed a significant
    amount of money and are working collaboratively with the
    Department of Energy because we at the Department of Defense
    see that as very promising technology for warfighting
    application as well.
        In the area of modeling and simulation, although we are not
    first responders, we realize the Department of Defense will be
    called upon in the event of a national emergency involving
    chem-bio terrorism to provide assistance to State and local
    authorities. In that role, we are looking at modeling and
    simulation as well to ensure that the work the Department of
    Energy is doing in the domestic arena aligns with the work that
    we are doing, as well as we provide support. And we are working
    together on modeling and simulation as well.
        Mr. Shays. Dr. Kerr.
        Mr. Kerr. First of all, I think it is important to
    recognize there are three things that the FBI has to be
    concerned with in its management of a crisis. The first
    responsibility is public safety, which leads to the issue of
    where is the same perimeter, do you evacuate, do you not
    evacuate, and can you get information quickly to inform those
    who might take prophylactic action.
        The second thing that we are concerned with is the safety
    of our own investigators as they move into this crime scene or
    incident scene. So personal protective equipment is, in fact, a
    very important component of what we need for our people.
        And the third thing, of course, is once on the scene we are
    concerned with attribution; that is, the forensics of the
    situation, and so more sophisticated and specific
    identification capabilities that might lead you back to the
    perpetrator.
        That being said, we live on the results of the programs in
    the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy and what
    we can buy off the shelf. We are not, in fact, ourselves
    developing new techniques or new equipment. So it is very
    important for us that there is, in fact, this set of
    developments in the other agencies that we can work with.
        Mr. Shays. Mr. Burnham.
        Mr. Burnham. Yes, to follow one step further on what Dr.
    Kerr----
        Mr. Shays. I am sorry. So you are not into detection and
    you are not into decontamination and you are not--of the three
    outlined by Mr. Spencer----
        Mr. Kerr. We are very much into detection and
    identification, but the kits that we are now using in the field
    were developed, for example, by the Naval Medical Research
    Institute, in Bethesda.
        Mr. Shays. Are you DOD's customer?
        Mr. Kerr. What happens is that DOD will in many cases
    develop a capability and we will go to the same vendor either
    as part of their procurement or as a separate procurement.
    There may be a little bit of specialization for us, but in
    general we try to use the same capability.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you.
        Mr. Burnham. To carry one step further what Dr. Kerr was
    talking about as far as on the crime scene what they came
    across, what the element is, I think the most important thing
    that we can do, the FBI, through our WMD coordinators, is
    impart that information to State and local responders. I can
    give you several examples.
        In the last year, we had dispersions of some type of
    chemical in a number of movie theaters throughout the Midwest.
    Once we saw a pattern where there were three or four of them,
    we deemed it to be important enough to get out Bureau-wide
    through all of our field offices--to get that information out
    to the local responders. As it turned out, it was more of a
    labor relations matter, but I think it is important.
        We see this in nationwide cases. Be they anthrax threats,
    or other patterns, I think it is important that we get that
    information out, and we are. From that I think the local
    responders as well as the FBI can then gauge what kind of
    equipment they need. Again, we would have to rely on Dr. Kerr
    and HMRU, but I think the important thing is to get the
    information out, which I believe we have successfully through
    our WMD coordinators, as well as through the National Domestic
    Preparedness Office [NDPO].
        Mr. Shays. I am just deciding which level to go. This is a
    digression, but I do want to ask now, Dr. Stoutland, I don't
    know if you made reference the Europeans or if it was you, Dr.
    Kerr.
        Mr. Kerr. I did, yes.
        Mr. Shays. Is Great Britain ahead of us, is France ahead of
    us? I will tell you why I ask this question. When we went to
    view how they respond to the whole issue of dealing with gulf
    war illnesses and protective gear, and so on, I had a sense
    that the Brits and the French believe this kind of attack is
    likely to happen, and I think they are more sensitive to it
    than I think our general population is. I mean, that is just my
    own view.
        I am just curious. Are they ahead of us, behind us,
    parallel to us?
        Mr. Spencer. Dr. Kerr, can I address that? I think Dr.
    Stoutland and I can probably do a better job of addressing that
    question.
        I have a requirement for the Department of Defense to
    monitor all the chem-bio science and technology development
    programs internationally as well. As part of that
    responsibility, we have over 50 data exchange agreements in
    science and technology for chem-bio defense throughout the
    world. We also have a number of cooperative R&D programs, and
    we watch very, very closely and work very, very closely
    especially with the Brits and especially with the French, and
    the Canadians as well, as part of a memorandum of understanding
    that is a formal agreement between us.
        I can give you my professional and my personal opinion on
    the status of their R&D programs. Generally speaking, the rest
    of the world is following the U.S. lead. They are looking at
    where we are going, they are looking at the technologies that
    we are developing in the basic sciences as well as in the
    advanced sciences.
        In the area of biological detection, identification and
    early warning, and addressing the entire biological threat, I
    personally feel we are 3 to 5 years ahead of them. In the
    chemical technology arenas and chemical protection arenas, they
    are pretty close in some areas.
        Mr. Shays. Well, in some ways they are ahead of us. I mean,
    the fact is our masks don't work as well as some of theirs. The
    fact is they have protective gear that is two-ply, and it
    doesn't have charcoal and can be worn as a general uniform. I
    am speaking of the French.
        Mr. Spencer. Correct. They are very, very proud of their
    technology developments. They have been very generous and have
    provided us much of their newly developed equipment and the
    equipment that they currently have in advanced development. We
    have performed similar tests as well.
        Mr. Shays. Dr. Stoutland.
        Mr. Stoutland. I have been personally both to the UK and to
    France over the last year to look at the exact issue that you
    have addressed. With respect to R&D in particular, I would not
    disagree with Carmen. I think there are some things that the
    British in particular do very well, and we are in the midst of
    signing a memorandum of understanding with them so that we can
    more closely share information and proceed jointly.
        With respect to public awareness, my observation has been
    that they are a bit behind us, in fact.
        Mr. Shays. On what?
        Mr. Stoutland. With respect to public awareness and concern
    over the threat, my personal observation has been that we are a
    couple of years ahead of them, if you will. For example, in
    France there is a new commission called the Haute Commission
    Francais de la Defense Civile, which is sort of the high French
    commission for civil defense, and they have just now stood up
    and are really starting to move forward. So I think they are a
    couple of years behind in terms of awareness of the threat, but
    they certainly have some capabilities that we are aware of and
    we will be making use of.
        Mr. Shays. But when you go through Paris and you see their
    police carrying assault weapons, it is not like they are going
    after the common criminal.
        Mr. Stoutland. Well, I will defer to the FBI for sort of
    broad terrorist awareness. But with respect to chemical and
    biological threats in particular, my observation has been that
    on a national level they are now taking it much more seriously
    than they did 2 or 3 years ago.
        Mr. Kerr. Let me speak briefly to the question you
    initially asked, which is areas----
        Mr. Shays. And candidly.
        Mr. Kerr. Yes, right. With respect to the United Kingdom,
    we work very closely with them in bombing matters because they
    have more experience with terrorist bombings than anyone that
    we know of. We send U.S. bomb techs to their schools. We adopt
    some of their equipment and adapt it to our use. Similarly, in
    some of the detection areas they have had activity that for us
    has been quite useful.
        The partners that work most closely, of course, are the UK,
    Canada, Australia, and the United States. And there are, in
    fact, working agreements----
        Mr. Shays. Say that again. You left out France?
        Mr. Kerr. Correct. France is not part of what I will call
    the inner close working group. Maybe it is an Anglo-Saxon bias,
    maybe it is a harmonization of the legal systems, but there is,
    by tradition and past agreements, more of an open interchange
    there than with the French.
        Mr. Shays. When I was in France talking with personnel who
    deal with both chemical and biological and the nuclear threat,
    one of their warnings to us was that we can win the traditional
    war, but then be exposed to the terrorist threat out of
    frustration by our success militarily and just getting us to
    have a perception that it only takes a few people.
        And so I just found it interesting how sensitive they were
    to the reality that there will be a nuclear, biological, or
    chemical attack on some Western country sometime. I am also
    struck by the fact that when I went to a base in Mississippi, I
    saw the finest firefighting equipment for our planes, and I saw
    a crew of just outstanding firemen at this airport. And I
    thought they may never, ever have to use their equipment, but
    they prepare everyday as if they do.
        I was thinking as you were talking that if there were such
    an attack, you all would be right up there on the firing line
    and then there would be people writing articles about who are
    these people and what have they been doing for the last so many
    years.
        I want a handle on what we are spending in this area. I
    mean, this isn't classified information, so give me a sense of
    what we are devoting in each of your units.
        Mr. Spencer. What I will share with you is the fiscal year
    2001 President's budget submission for the Department of
    Defense in this area.
        Mr. Shays. OK.
        Mr. Spencer. For the joint NBC defense program, which is
    the program that I manage, in the area of very basic research--
    this is laboratory-level research for chem-bio--about $33.2
    million for fiscal year 2001; in the area of applied research,
    $73.6 million; for advanced development programs, $46.6
    million; for what we call demonstration validation of the
    technologies, $83.8 million; for engineering management
    development, which is actually putting the technologies into
    the widgets and doing the final operational and developmental
    testing, $100.8 million; and for overall management of the
    program, publication of doctrine, training requirements and the
    training base for chem-bio defense, about $23.9 million, for a
    total of $361.9 million for research and development.
        But probably more importantly, we are going to be spending
    $473.9 million to physically procure new equipment and putting
    it into the hands of the warfighters in all of those areas I
    discussed--detection, identification, early warning.
        Mr. Shays. In next year's budget or this year's budget?
        Mr. Spencer. I am sorry. This is for fiscal year 2001.
        Mr. Shays. 2001, OK.
        Mr. Spencer. This is the President's budget, and that total
    is $835.8 million.
        Mr. Shays. So a little more than half is for procurement?
        Mr. Spencer. Correct.
        Mr. Shays. And is any of that procurement for non-defense
    personnel or is it all for defense?
        Mr. Spencer. It is all for defense, but it does include,
    for example, procurement for our civil support teams, formerly
    known as raid teams, for the domestic mission.
        Mr. Shays. These are the National Guard units?
        Mr. Spencer. Correct.
        Mr. Shays. Yes.
        Mr. Spencer. It also includes some procurement for some of
    our specialty units like the Marine Corps CBIRF units, Chemical
    and Biological Incident Response Force. It includes procurement
    for the Army's technical escort unit which has worldwide
    deployment capability in the area of chem-bio defense, and also
    for USAMRIID, the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for
    Infectious Diseases, which responds around the world to
    biological incidents as well.
        Mr. Shays. Dr. Stoutland, can you talk about your budget at
    all?
        Mr. Stoutland. Our budget request for the area that I
    described, that being R&D and the demonstration programs, is
    $42 million in fiscal year 2001.
        Mr. Shays. And that is the extent of your budget?
        Mr. Stoutland. Right.
        Mr. Shays. Dr. Kerr, you have a little more amorphous area
    of activity.
        Mr. Kerr. It is more amorphous, but it also pales in
    comparison to the numbers that you just heard. The identified
    increment for counterterrorism R&D is about $5 million in the
    Bureau. That is not the extent of all that we put into the
    capabilities that we field because we use some of our base
    funding that is accounted for quite differently.
        But, you know, one way to think about the FBI is that about
    65 percent of our budget pays for agent and support personnel.
    The consumables go for the rest, and so we are not an R&D
    organization and it is an apples and oranges comparison here.
        Mr. Burnham. Sir, I can get you the budget for the
    Counterterrorism Division. As Dr. Kerr indicated, some of that
    bleeds over from the laboratory. I am going through the process
    now for the 2002 budget and the cross-cutting. To give you an
    example, in the Counterterrorism Division I have had to meet
    with the Investigative Support Division, which is intelligence;
    with our Critical Incident Review Group, which is CIRG; with
    the laboratory, all of which would go into our counterterrorism
    efforts. But we do have that broken out. We are going through
    that now and I can get you 2001 budget and it is broken out by
    different divisions that contribute to the counterterrorism
    effort.
        Mr. Shays. We don't have the Technical Support Working
    Group here today, a representative from it. How do you all
    interface with that Group?
        Mr. Spencer. The Department of Defense interfaces with
    them. They have a chemical and biological, radiological and
    nuclear countermeasures subgroup. We are a member of that
    subgroup and work in this arena with them. That includes the
    Department of Energy, the FBI, the Department of State, the
    Department of Agriculture, EPA, Customs, the Postal Service,
    FDA, the Centers for Disease Control, and FEMA.
        Mr. Shays. Agriculture because of----
        Mr. Spencer. Domestic biological terrorism.
        Mr. Shays. Right, OK.
        Mr. Stoutland. That is basically true for us as well. We
    have a representative. In fact, DOE is one of the co-chairs of
    the TSWG, at the working level we have representatives on the
    appropriate subgroups, including the chemical and biological,
    radiological subgroup.
        Mr. Shays. Dr. Kerr.
        Mr. Kerr. The FBI is also one of the four executive members
    of TSWG, and then our people have served as co-chairs of things
    like the chemical and biological, radiological subgroup.
        Mr. Burnham. From the Counterterrorism Division, our
    representative is the laboratory, Dr. Kerr.
        Mr. Shays. How is the nature of the threat, which gets me
    to your point--you focused primarily on defense. I am not clear
    yet, and maybe we don't have a panelist here that--maybe I
    don't have a complete panel to answer this question, but I want
    to know the difference between the civilian customer and the
    military customer.
        Mr. Spencer. My customer is obviously the military
    customer, and my threat is basically a compilation from the
    intelligence community. The intelligence community--DIA, CIA,
    NSA--postulate a threat. That threat then receives what we call
    a validated--becomes a validated threat list after review by
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        That validated threat list is a prioritized threat list,
    and that is the master threat-based list that we use to develop
    our research and development programs to counter. And that is
    both for chemical threats as well as for biological threats.
        Mr. Shays. I guess what I am asking then would be, before I
    go on, the need of your customer, the military, is on the
    battlefield.
        Mr. Spencer. Correct.
        Mr. Shays. It is not in the basement of the World Trade
    Center.
        Mr. Spencer. That is correct. The Department of Defense
    does have some units that we know will be responding to a
    domestic emergency in the chemical and biological arena, if
    requested. We also look to provide them the capability to
    provide that desired response. Those are the units like the
    TEU, the Technical Escort Unit, the CBIRF, the USAMRIID, and we
    look for specialized equipment to enable them to do that. The
    basic threat, though, domestically, as well as for worldwide,
    although not regionally focused, is primarily the same.
        Mr. Shays. I am not sure I agree with that. I mean, it is
    the same because?
        Mr. Spencer. The same types of toxic chemical substances
    and biological pathogens.
        Mr. Shays. Right, OK. I just see them being delivered in
    different forms and I see them----
        Mr. Spencer. Absolutely.
        Mr. Shays. I would think the exposure would be greater on
    the military. I have no way of knowing, but it would strike me
    that way.
        Dr. Stoutland.
        Mr. Stoutland. First of all, there are many obvious
    similarities, but I think there are some important differences
    and I will just describe those.
        Mr. Shays. First off, who is your customer?
        Mr. Stoutland. We perceive our customers to be the broad
    domestic preparedness community who would be involved in
    protecting a city, and within that it would include some
    Federal agencies. For example, we consider the FBI to be a
    customer, but also local entities, and that changes depending
    on what the city looks like.
        For example, in the city of Washington it would involve a
    mixture of people who own facilities that need to be prepared;
    for example, subway systems. It would involve first responders,
    be they firemen in some cities or policemen in other cities. So
    it is a mix, but broadly it is those type of people who would
    either be involved in preparing for, meaning continually
    monitoring because they have a building or a facility they
    consider to be at risk, or people who would rush to the scene
    should there be an incident.
        Mr. Shays. Well, before you go on, given that, you said
    your budget was basically 42?
        Mr. Stoutland. That is correct.
        Mr. Shays. But that is basically research and development?
        Mr. Stoutland. That is correct.
        Mr. Shays. OK. Someone else is procuring from you? This
    isn't procurement. You didn't give me any figure on
    procurement.
        Mr. Stoutland. Our budget does not have procurement.
        Mr. Shays. So is that kind of like with the anti-missile
    defense system? I mean, we are still in research and
    development, not into procurement?
        Mr. Stoutland. No. I think there are two issues here. There
    certainly is procurement going on, and within cities it goes on
    in a number of different ways. It goes on in local budgets, be
    they local fire departments having money to procure items.
        Mr. Shays. But they are not buying from you?
        Mr. Stoutland. They are not buying from us, no. Our model
    is to first of all do development until it gets to a stage
    where we think it is ready for use, and then to move these
    things into what we call the demonstration phase. So, for
    example, our demonstration program that I highlighted which
    looks at subways will put in place chemical detectors, computer
    models, and so on. Some of those things will be from our
    program, some of them will be whatever is required to fill out
    the entire system.
        Mr. Shays. But we haven't yet perfected those models, have
    we?
        Mr. Stoutland. Sorry?
        Mr. Shays. Have we perfected the equipment that you are
    researching yet? Are we in a stage to develop them?
        Mr. Stoutland. There are things in different stages. Let me
    give you two examples. Some things will never be fielded
    operationally with a first responder. For example, computer
    models will be run that will then result in guidance that they
    will use on a day-to-day basis. Those things are ready.
        In other cases we have built, for example, a handheld
    biological detector where we have built several units, and this
    year we will be giving those to responders and various people
    around the country as a beta test. If that beta test pans out
    and people perceive this to be a valuable piece of equipment,
    then it will be transferred to the commercial sector and they
    will produce them. DOE is not in the business of producing many
    copies.
        Mr. Shays. I am getting the sense, before I go to the FBI,
    that we are at a stage where DOD has developed some equipment
    and is starting to procure, obviously. So it is still going to
    be in the hands of DOD. You are in the process of researching
    and testing and getting out in the field some test.
        But it leads me to believe that right now the only groups
    that would really have this equipment at any level would be
    responders from the Federal Government, not necessarily from
    the local and State. That is kind of the sense I am getting.
        Mr. Stoutland. That is not entirely true. The examples I
    gave you, both the subway, where we are working not with the
    Federal Government but with transit agencies, which I would
    consider to be local people--our capabilities are getting into
    their hands, first, in the form of improving their preparedness
    plans. The second example, the handheld bio detector, will
    involve some Federal people, but the majority of people
    receiving that will be State or primarily local responders.
        Mr. Shays. But it is ``will be.''
        Mr. Stoutland. Excuse me?
        Mr. Shays. It is a ``will be,'' it is not ``already have.''
        Mr. Stoutland. That is correct. The bio detector, in
    particular, will be----
        Mr. Shays. That is my point. Right now, I feel like we are
    kind of vulnerable, that we have not yet reached the point
    where we are out there yet.
        Dr. Kerr, is that accurate? Particularly with a $5 million
    budget, that is pretty pathetic.
        Mr. Kerr. Well, our model is a little different. As you
    know, we have 56 field offices around the country, and so the
    first thing we have been doing as we have gained new equipment
    and capability is push it into our field offices because that
    way it gets tested on the street.
        Mr. Shays. Yes, but you don't have that equipment yet.
        Mr. Kerr. Oh, yes, we have first-generation equipment. We
    have, in fact, trained up full HAZMAT teams at the 15 largest
    field offices. They have a first-generation biological
    detection capability that is what the Navy had developed some
    years ago. They have radiation detectors of two different types
    and they have personal protective gear.
        In turn, those people then are training their counterparts
    in the State and local agencies, and for them we have been
    procuring personal protective gear, a simpler form of radiation
    detection. We do not yet have a biological detection capability
    to share with them.
        Mr. Shays. Yes, and I would just emphasize it is first
    generation.
        Mr. Kerr. Correct.
        Mr. Shays. And you all are working on what generation?
        Mr. Spencer. We are in the process of fielding an improved
    first-generation bio detector now, and we will be fielding in
    about 2 years our next generation.
        Mr. Stoutland. Our program, I would say, is a combination
    of first and second generation. We are seeing some of the
    first-generation things now coming out. We have given a number
    of things to response personnel, first responders rules of
    thumb for what they should do based on extensive calculations,
    and so on. But really the bulk of our program is going to be
    delivering things in the next couple of years. The program is 3
    years old. We have set our program targets for programs or
    projects that are 3 to 5 years out that will make major
    capability enhancements, and so things are now just beginning
    to get out of the R&D pipeline.
        Mr. Shays. So let me ask you and Dr. Kerr again, because I
    didn't really pursue it enough, how is the nature of the threat
    different to the civilian versus the military?
        Mr. Stoutland. I would divide it into three areas and maybe
    give a couple of specific examples. One is ``what?'' I mean, I
    think the list of agents--particularly in the chemical area,
    one can imagine a much broader set of agents that could have
    very dramatic effects in confined urban spaces. Obviously
    included in those would be industrial chemicals, and so the
    detection capabilities, for example, need to not only do the
    conventional CW threat agents, but a broader set of agents.
        The other point would be where things are going to be used.
    If they are going to be used in confined urban areas, be they
    inside of buildings or inside of subways, that requires a
    different set of capabilities both in terms of detection,
    because false alarms is a problem inside of buildings with
    outgasing of materials, and so on, as well as with the various
    modeling calculations that would help you to characterize the
    threat.
        And, finally, the differences with who is going to use the
    capability. First responders and others have very different
    training in many cases than those in the military, and we must
    develop equipment that is suitable for their level of training
    and expertise.
        Mr. Shays. So one of your points would be that the
    civilians will not have the same capability of training?
        Mr. Stoutland. No, no. It could be better. My only point is
    that it is different.
        Mr. Shays. OK, fair enough.
        Mr. Kerr. Having participated in the Defense Science Board
    for a number of years before I came back to Government, I was
    involved with many studies of urban warfare and what the
    military has called operations other than war. And I would
    argue that their thinking about the role of chemical and
    biological threats in that environment is virtually identical
    to the civilian issue that you are asking about.
        The difference in detail is that they are thinking about it
    in terms of a conflict situation. In law enforcement, we have
    to think about it in terms of it being embedded within the
    larger civilian population whose safety we have to assure
    first. So there is some difference in the amount of equipment
    you would need for, if you will, the first crude detection in
    order to set up a perimeter for safe access. But the specific
    threats, the so-called threat list, whether it be biological or
    chemical, is virtually the same, augmented in the chemical area
    by some of the industrial chemicals like chlorine. With respect
    to radiological dispersal, the ability to detect radioactive
    materials on the battlefield or in a city is no different. The
    same laws of physics apply.
        And the other thing I should point out is that we also have
    to deal with some of these things in conjunction with one
    another. We have had threats where we have responded which have
    been a combination of explosives and suspected biological
    material. We do have some 2,500 bombings a year in the United
    States, which is part of our backdrop in the counterterrorism
    program.
        So one way we look at this problem of high consequence and
    so far low probability event is that we ought to be
    incrementally adding capability, but we should not be
    withdrawing capability from the threats that we are facing
    everyday.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
        Let me ask this question, and we are getting to a close
    here. Who in the U.S. Government is in charge of ensuring the
    coordination of R&D efforts for the military and the civilian
    requirements?
        We will start again with you, Mr. Spencer.
        Mr. Spencer. Under the National Security Council----
        Mr. Shays. Let me just say the pregnant pause is very
    telling. It is, it is, and it is not a criticism of anyone; it
    is just telling.
        Mr. Spencer. If you are looking for one individual to be in
    charge to ensure that the Department of Defense, the Department
    of Energy, and the Department of Justice are all working toward
    the same common goal, and that common goal is domestic
    preparedness, I believe that would come under the National
    Security Council. And they have established seven working
    groups that are looking at all aspects of this particular
    issue. But, again, that is one body. They have visibility. They
    do not have decisionmaking authority, nor do they probably have
    the resources to do what is actually required.
        Mr. Shays. It sounds to me like you are just saying the
    President has the responsibility.
        Mr. Spencer. No. There is an individual that has been
    designated, and that is Mr. Dick Clark.
        Mr. Shays. Right, but does Mr. Clark have this
    responsibility?
        Mr. Spencer. Yes.
        Mr. Shays. Do you think he knows he has the responsibility?
        Mr. Spencer. Yes, I do. I think if you take a good external
    look at the programs, I think at the scientific level when you
    talk about the science and technology, the scientists working
    for the Department of Defense are working very closely with the
    scientists in the Department of Energy, and the FBI is a
    customer for both of us.
        As you work your way up in the bureaucracies, there are
    bureaucratic mechanisms that are in place that physically look
    and attempt to assure that the proper coordination is taking
    place. But the bottom line to really the whole effort is--and a
    good example of this and probably the best example occurred in
    the last 30 days.
        In the last 30 days, we had what we call a technical area
    review and assessment, where I had my principal scientists for
    every one of our programs brief a scientific panel of non-DOD,
    non-Government personnel. And the panel also had a
    representative from the Department of Energy on it, from
    academia, as well as from industry.
        The scientists briefed, are we going in the right
    direction? They briefed their program and they looked for
    opportunities to improve leveraging what is going on in
    academia and industry and internationally. Also presenting at
    that week-long effort was the TSWG. The Department of Energy
    briefed their programs, and at the scientific level that
    exchange is taking place and it is a very positive exchange.
    Redundancy in all cases is not bad, especially when you look at
    high-risk technologies, and there are high-risk technologies
    involved in biological defense.
        That is an excellent example, but if you look above that
    level within the Federal Government, I think there is probably
    a void.
        Mr. Shays. Probably what?
        Mr. Spencer. Probably a void.
        Mr. Shays. And that void again is where? I know you used
    the word ``probably.''
        Mr. Spencer. I am going to qualify my statement.
        Mr. Shays. Sure.
        Mr. Spencer. We have the Counterproliferation Review
    Committee with the senior executive levels of the Department of
    Energy and the Department of Defense that they participate on,
    and that coordination is working well.
        What is really lacking, and I think what you are really
    looking for is what we are all striving toward, and that is
    there is no national architecture. What is the national
    capability for domestic preparedness that is desired by this
    Nation for chemical and biological antiterrorism and
    counterterrorism activities? To what capability should the
    Department of Energy, under Presidential Decision Directives 39
    and 63, be developing a defensive capability for the United
    States? That national architecture does not exist.
        Mr. Shays. Fair enough. That is very helpful.
        Dr. Stoutland, do you want to respond in any way?
        Mr. Stoutland. I will agree, first of all, with what Mr.
    Spencer said and maybe add just a couple of things. My
    observation is that at the working level coordination is
    working very well. People are not duplicating projects.
    Scientists talk regularly, whether they be from Justice,
    Energy, or Defense-sponsored programs.
        What we are lacking, as was pointed out, is a high-level
    architecture for where we are going so that we know what the
    targets are, and that is exactly the purpose of the study that
    is now being jointly funded within my program and within the
    Defense Threat Reduction Agency, a study that call the Defense
    of Cities Study, to try to develop a framework so that we can
    compare in a rigorous analytical manner various high-level
    policy options to present to policymakers to then make
    decisions as to what our level of preparedness should be, which
    then feeds back into my R&D program and others so that we know
    where we are going.
        In addition to that, the Counterproliferation Review
    Committee group was mentioned. This year, at the urging of my
    Under Secretary Moniz and Under Secretary Gansler, of the
    Department of Defense, we formed a chemical and biological
    defense focus group. The purpose of this group is really to
    focus specifically on chemical and biological areas, with the
    goal over the next year of developing integrated R&D road maps
    in a number of areas where we both have programs going on with
    different missions, different technologies, but to look, in
    fact, at where there are intersection points where we can
    benefit to a greater extent from the other agency's programs.
        So I think that is a very positive step that has now been
    approved at the highest levels of Defense and Energy. And, of
    course, we will be vetting that with the NSC-led Weapons of
    Mass Destruction Preparedness Group, including the Office of
    Science and Technology Policy which chairs the R&D subgroup.
        Mr. Shays. Dr. Kerr or Mr. Burnham, either one of you?
        Mr. Kerr. I think I will take it and I will do it on a
    slightly different tack, not to disagree with those who
    preceded me, but there are a couple of people who have made a
    difference in this area. One is the present Deputy Secretary of
    Defense John Hamre. Another, working with him, has been the
    Attorney General, and they have had now two Saturdays this past
    month a major WMD exercise bringing Justice and Defense and
    other agencies together, thinking about not just technology and
    R&D, but thinking perhaps beyond that, how will it be used,
    what are the operational and policy implications of what is
    being discussed.
        They have been meeting regularly about every 6 weeks for
    the past year in order to try to harmonize the needs of the law
    enforcement community and the tremendous capabilities resident
    in the Department of Defense.
        Mr. Shays. Yes. I read that, though, differently. I read
    that as a very sensible thing to do because there is somewhat
    of a void.
        Mr. Kerr. Right, and what I was trying to do was point out
    that some individuals, by name, have tried to fill that void.
        Mr. Shays. I have got you, I have got you.
        Mr. Kerr. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Shays. Then let me ask you who should do it. That will
    probably be my last question, but the issue is who should be
    doing that? It is not going to be the Technical Support Working
    Group. It is not going to be that. Who should it be, in your
    judgment?
        Mr. Kerr. I think the voice that has been missing in the
    discussions that have gone on between the Department of Energy
    and the Department of Defense has been, in fact, the voice of
    those charged with the crisis management responsibility. We
    have to find a way to bring the Department of Justice into that
    discussion, recognizing that unlike the other two, it is not an
    acquisition agency, it is not an R&D agency. Yet it is, in
    fact, desperately dependent on what can be produced by those
    who do it so well. And we have to get that coupling not just at
    the working level, which is the TSWG, but at the policy level
    where people like the DOE and DOD Under Secretaries have an
    effective relationship today.
        Mr. Shays. Dr. Stoutland, who do you think it should be?
        Mr. Stoutland. I am sorry. Who should coordinate this?
        Mr. Shays. Yes.
        Mr. Stoutland. I think it needs to be led at the level that
    it is being led at, that is the President's coordinator for
    counterterrorism, Richard Clark.
        Mr. Shays. And let me just say I realize that Mr. Clark is
    working hard, but chooses to have a low profile. He is not
    looking to be called the terrorist czar, but it may make sense
    for our committee to ask him this same question and really get
    a sense of how he weighs in on this.
        This is a question that I would love answered ultimately,
    and it is too serious a question and too important a question
    not to feel certain about it. But I just think this is a very
    telling conversation, in a way, because you are all kind of
    wrestling with it, but nothing comes quickly to mind.
        Mr. Stoutland. Well, that is right, and what I won't do is
    suggest maybe a particular mechanism that would solve all of
    our problems because if we knew that, obviously we would be
    more than willing to put it forward.
        Mr. Shays. And I realize that you all work for bosses who
    may have a different opinion.
        Mr. Stoutland. I think what this is more telling of is the
    complexity of this problem. We have presently got a number of
    coordinating groups, some of which are quite effective. I think
    the Counterproliferation Review Committee is an effective
    group, but focused not on the domestic problem. I think the
    Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness R&D Subgroup is also
    an effective group which builds upon the CPRC.
        But I think ultimately the fundamental challenge and one
    that we have not grappled with as well as we could have is
    trying to figure out how to make the lash-up between those
    organizations with scientific and technical capabilities,
    represented to the most extent here by DOE and DOD, with those
    organizations with operational responsibility, which would
    include the FBI as well as State and local responders. That is
    hard thing to do. I think we are working toward it and we are
    making progress, but we are going to continue to struggle with
    that.
        Mr. Shays. This is a nice lead-in to what I will see on
    Friday and Monday when we have our hearing. We are going to be
    seeing how the fire departments and the police departments all
    interact in this effort to deal with a terrorist threat.
        What is helpful for me is to know that if I were on the
    outside looking in and saying, well, the Technical Support
    Working Group, there is someone in charge and they should be
    doing that, I think there is consensus that it is not that
    organization that I should be looking at. So this is something
    the committee will do, and I think we will have further dialog.
        I am prepared to close the hearing, but as is my practice,
    I am very happy to have you make any closing comments, if there
    is any question that we should have asked that you were primed
    to answer or just feel you need to answer. Is there anything?
        [No response.]
        Mr. Shays. Well, I thank you very much. I think we are all
    hungry, and you were a wonderful panel. Thank you for your
    patience.
        [Whereupon, at 1:42 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]