

**RUSSIAN THREATS TO UNITED STATES SECURITY  
IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA**

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**HEARING**

BEFORE THE

**COMMITTEE ON  
GOVERNMENT REFORM**

**HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS**

SECOND SESSION

JANUARY 24, 2000

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## **RUSSIAN THREATS TO UNITED STATES SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA**

**MONDAY, JANUARY 24, 2000**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,  
*Los Angeles, CA.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Authority Boardroom, 3rd floor, One Gateway Plaza, Los Angeles, CA, Hon. Dan Burton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Burton and Scarborough.

Staff present: Daniel R. Moll, deputy staff director; Lisa Smith Arafune, chief clerk; Mildred Webber and Caroline Katzin, professional staff members; and Michael Yeager, minority senior oversight counsel.

Mr. BURTON. Good morning. A quorum being present, the Committee on Government Reform will come to order. I ask unanimous consent that all Members' and witnesses' written opening statements be included in the record. And without objection so ordered. I ask unanimous consent that all articles, exhibits, and extraneous or tabular material referred to be included in the record. Without objection so ordered.

It's been a little more than 10 years since the Berlin Wall came tumbling down. We've been through eras of Glasnost and Perestroika in Russia. We've seen economic reforms come and go and we've watched the Russian economy come close to collapsing.

The conventional wisdom since the end of the cold war has been that the Russian threat to our national security has evaporated. Some people have gone so far as to say that Russia is now our ally. The purpose of this hearing is to examine that question. Is Russia still a threat to United States interests? Is Russia still an adversary?

I'm very glad that we're able to hold this session here in Los Angeles today. We hold a lot of hearings in Washington, DC. Some of them get covered by the news media; some don't. A lot of what we do in the Capital never gets out beyond the Washington beltway. So when we have a recess period, I think it's a good thing to get out of Washington and give people and local media in other parts of the country some exposure to the congressional process and the issues that are important.

Two weeks ago we held a field hearing in Miami about international drug trafficking. We've held field hearings in my home town of Indianapolis. One of our subcommittees held a field hearing in New York on health care not too long ago. So I think it's

good for the committee and good for the people we represent to do this once in a while.

One of the problems with doing field hearings is that not many members of the committee can attend. The 44 members of this committee are from all over the country, and we always have a lot of commitments. So you won't see many members of the committee here today. However, that doesn't take anything away from the importance of this subject at hand. National security and our relationship with Russia are very important issues. By holding this hearing, we're creating a permanent record that every committee member will be able to review. And I want to particularly thank Representative Scarborough who came all the way from Florida to be with us today as well as Congressman Curt Weldon who's from Pennsylvania. Of course Mr. Campbell is here from California, and we appreciate his attendance as well. This is an issue we're going to continue to look at down the road. So I want to thank all of today's witnesses for being here and participating.

Now returning to the question at hand: Is Russia still a threat? One thing we know is that Russia is still conducting espionage against the United States. A lot of people in Washington were shocked when they picked up their newspapers about a month ago and discovered that a Russian spy had bugged the State Department. A spy who is stationed at the Russian Embassy had planted a tiny listening device in a chair in the conference room. It was right down the hall from the Secretary of State's office. The FBI caught him red-handed sitting in his car outside the State Department trying to listen in on a meeting. Nobody has any idea how long that bug was there or what the Russians might have learned. Security is so lax at the State Department that they couldn't tell you today if there are any other listening devices in the building. They're sweeping them right now.

One of our witnesses today is a former Russian intelligence agent, Colonel Stanivlav Lunev. He is the highest ranking GRU officer ever to defect to the United States. The GRU is Russia's premiere military intelligence agency. Colonel Lunev is in the witness protection program and special arrangements have been made to conceal his identity. So I apologize to the media who's here, we'll have to have him come in and be covered up so that his identity is maintained so he won't be in any jeopardy.

Mr. Lunev worked out of the Russian Embassy in Washington for 3½ years. I had a chance to read Colonel Lunev's testimony when he was before Congressman Weldon's subcommittee in 1998. He said, "I can say to you very openly and very firmly that Russian intelligence activity against the United States is much more active than it was in the time of the former Soviet Union's existence. It's more active today than it was then." That was a year and a half before the State Department incident. It looks to me like Colonel Lunev knows what he's talking about. It makes me wonder if there are more bugs in more conference rooms waiting to be discovered.

It's not really surprising that Russia is still actively spying on us. But how does the Russian Government view us? Have their views changed? Do they consider us a friend or an enemy? They just produced a new national security doctrine. It was signed by President Putin this month. According to one scholar it, "adopts a tone far

more aggressively anti-Western than in the 1997 version.” The document blames the United States and NATO for trying to dominate the world and states that this is a grave threat to Russian security. So it’s very clear that the Russian Government at the highest level still sees us, the United States, as a threat and an enemy.

I recently read a quote from former CIA Director John Deutch. He was testifying in 1998. Here’s what he said:

Russia continues to be our top security concern, even without the adversarial relationship of the cold war. Russia still possesses 20,000-plus nuclear weapons. Widespread corruption and the absence of honest and accountable internal governmental administrative functions threatens Russia’s slow and erratic evolution toward democracy.

One of our witnesses today is Dr. Peter Pry. He was a CIA analyst for many years and he recently wrote a book, “War Scare: Russia and America on the Nuclear Brink.” Dr. Pry states that the Russian military and intelligence agencies still take a very hostile view toward the United States. He states that decisionmakers in those agencies still consider us their foremost adversary and that this paranoia is fueled by the growing disparity between our economy and their economy and between our defense capabilities and theirs.

That brings me to one of the issues I’d really like to focus on today. According to Colonel Lunev, a key component of Russia’s strategy against the West for decades has been sabotage and assassination. In his previous testimony, he stated that one of his jobs at the Russia Embassy was to collect information about elected leaders in this country. This information would be used to assassinate them in a time of war or crisis.

Another of Colonel Lunev’s jobs was to scout out sites where weapons or explosives could be prepositioned. From time to time he would travel to the Shenandoah Valley to photograph areas where “dead drops” would be established. Weapons would be placed in these dead drop areas so that in times of crisis Russian agents could come into the country to commit sabotage against power plants, military bases, and communications facilities.

According to Colonel Lunev, part of the Soviet’s plan called for the use of, “portable tactical nuclear devices,” to be used to commit sabotage against highly protected targets. It has now been widely reported that the Soviet Union manufactured portable briefcase-size nuclear devices that cannot all be accounted for.

Were conventional or nuclear weapons prepositioned in the United States? Colonel Lunev doesn’t know if the sites he identified were ever used. However, a second Russian defector says drop sites were established all over the United States and Western Europe. Vasili Mitrokhin was an archivist for the KGB. When he defected to the West he brought with him pages and pages of handwritten notes about KGB activities. He says that for decades the Soviet Union deployed sabotage and intelligence groups whose mission it was to commit assassinations or acts of sabotage in times of crisis or impending war.

In his book, “The Sword and the Shield,” he states that drop sites for explosives were scattered all over Western Europe and the United States. They contained everything from communications equipment to handguns to explosives. At one point in his book, he

states that a standard arms package to be placed in a drop site would include mines, explosive charges, fuses, and detonators.

Mr. Mitrokhin brought information on the exact locations of several sites in Europe, in Belgium, and Switzerland. Local police found these sites exactly where Mitrokhin said they would be. That's significant because a lot of people tried to pooh-pooh what we're talking about here today but several sites have been located in Europe. They were booby-trapped with explosives. The bombs had to be set off with water cannons before the caches could be opened. Mr. Mitrokhin states that many drop sites were established here in the United States. However, he was not able to smuggle out the locations. He knows that one site was established in Brainerd, MN.

In his book, he also mentions the possibility of drop sites in New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas. However, their locations are still a secret. Some people have asked why we're holding this hearing here in Los Angeles, CA. Well, I had a chance to review the hearing transcript from Congressman Weldon's subcommittee on this same subject. It's my understanding that there are many potential targets for Russian sabotage here in California. It's my understanding that Mr. Mitrokhin mentioned California's harbors and naval facilities as primary targets. California is the most populous State in the Nation. If there are hidden caches of explosives in this State, it's very dangerous and very important that we find out where they are. That's something that the people ought to be informed about. That's why we're here.

The key questions before us now are where are these drop sites? Do they still exist? What's in them? Were any of them ever used to store portable nuclear devices as alleged by Colonel Lunev? If there are Russian arms caches hidden around the country with explosives and booby traps, this is a very dangerous situation. One of the things we want to find out today is if the administration has done anything to find out where these sites are or if they still exist.

And I want to say something that's very important. The State Department of the United States was asked by all of the witnesses today, from the Congress, and myself on numerous occasions to testify, to send anybody here to testify. And Madeline Albright and the State Department chose to ignore us. Mr. Campbell, Mr. Weldon, myself, and many others on both the Democrat and Republican sides have written to the administration and to the State Department on numerous occasions. They will not even respond about this subject and I think that's deplorable.

If there's a threat to the United States because of hidden sites, then by golly the State Department ought to be telling us what they're doing to deal with that problem and they're not even answering Members of Congress. And I intend to force them to come before the Congress if they don't start responding very quickly, and I'll do that by subpoenaing them.

My colleagues, Congressman Weldon and Congressman Campbell, also have tried to get answers from the administration. They've written to the Defense Department Secretary Cohen and to Secretary Albright and they've also received no response. We've asked the FBI and the CIA to testify here today so we can try to find out what's being done. I wish they could testify in open session

because I know there is more and more concern here in California and around the country about these possible sites since these books have been published. However, their testimony is secret. It's classified.

After our first two panels, we'll hear from the FBI and CIA in closed session. Right now, the security people are sweeping an adjoining room so we can go in there and make sure what is said is kept confidential. I appreciate that our witnesses from these two agencies are here today, and I look forward to hearing their testimony. I also want to say that I really regret that the State Department isn't here. Once again, my staff and everybody else has tried to get them here; and they just jump through hoops to not have to testify.

Madeleine Albright is going to be testifying before the International Relations Committee in about 2 weeks. And she will answer questions about these issues, or she'll have to duck them in public. Congressman Weldon has worked harder on this issue than anyone in Congress. Congressman Campbell has been working very hard to get answers from the administration on behalf of California and his constituents. And I congratulate both of you for being here and for your hard work.

I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today including Mr. DeSarno from the FBI. Mr. DeSarno testified before our committee back in 1998 when he was working on the campaign fundraising task force. He was very forthright then. I'm sure he'll be forthright today. He's a good man. We welcome him back. So we're glad to have him. And we're welcoming also Dr. William Green from Cal State University in San Bernadino who is an expert on Russia and United States policy. I look forward to hearing from all of you.

I want to say one more thing. Congressman Waxman who represents this area couldn't be with us today. He said he had a previous commitment. Because this issue is important, I'm disappointed that he couldn't be here. I hope that he'll take a hard look at the issues that are going to be raised today because not only do they concern all of California but in particular since Los Angeles is such a huge population area and he represents a large part of that, he should be very concerned about it. And I'm sure once he hears all these issues, he will be more concerned. He does have one of his chief staff lieutenants here, and we appreciate his presence.

And with that, my colleague from Florida, who flew all the way out here, I appreciate him being here.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Dan Burton follows:]

DAN BURTON, INDIANA  
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DAVID WITNER, LOUISIANA

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**House of Representatives**

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**Opening Statement**

**Chairman Dan Burton**  
**"Russian Threats to U.S. Security in the Post-Cold War Era"**  
Committee on Government Reform  
January 24, 2000

HENRY H. WAXMAN, CALIFORNIA  
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ELIANE C. CUMMINGS, MARYLAND  
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ROD R. BLAGOVICH, ILLINOIS  
DANNY R. DAVIS, KENTUCKY  
JOHN F. FERRINEY, MASSACHUSETTS  
JIM TURNER, TEXAS  
THOMAS H. ALLEN, MAINE  
HAROLD E. FORD, JR., TENNESSEE  
JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, ILLINOIS  
BERNARD SANDERS, VERMONT,  
INDEPENDENT

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He worked out of the Russian Embassy in Washington for three-and-a-half years. I had a chance to read Col. Lunev's testimony when he was before Congressman Weldon's Subcommittee in 1998. He said, and I quote:

*"I can say to you very openly and very firmly that Russian intelligence activity against this country is much more active than it was in the time of the former Soviet Union's existence."*

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That brings me to one of the issues I'd really like to focus on today.

According to Col. Lunev, a key component of Russia's strategy against the west for decades has

been sabotage and assassination. In his previous testimony, he stated that one of his jobs at the Russian Embassy was to collect information about elected leaders in this country. This information would be used to assassinate them in a time of war or crisis.

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According to Col. Lunev, part of the Soviets' planning called for the use of "portable tactical nuclear devices" to be used to commit sabotage against highly protected targets. It has now been widely reported that the Soviet Union manufactured portable nuclear devices, and that they cannot all be accounted for.

Were conventional or nuclear weapons pre-positioned in the United States? Col. Lunev doesn't know if the sites he identified were ever used. However, a second Russian defector says drop sites were established all over the United States and Western Europe. Vasili Mitrokin was an archivist for the KGB. When he defected to the West, he brought with him pages and pages of handwritten notes about KGB activities. He says that for decades, the Soviet Union deployed "sabotage and intelligence groups" whose mission it was to commit assassinations or acts of sabotage in times of crisis or impending war.

In his book, "The Sword and the Shield," he states that drop sites for explosives were scattered all over Western Europe and the United States. They contained everything from communications equipment to handguns to explosives. At one point in his book, he states that a standard arms package to be placed in a drop site would include mines, explosive charges, fuses and detonators.

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Mr. Mitrokin states that many drop sites were established in the United States. However, he was not able to smuggle out the locations. He knows that one site was established in Brainard, Minnesota. In his book, he also mentions the possibility of drop sites in New York, Pennsylvania and Texas. However, their locations are still a secret.

Some people have asked why we're holding this hearing in California. Well, I had a chance to review the hearing transcript from Congressman Weldon's Subcommittee on this same subject. It's my understanding that there are many potential targets for Russian sabotage in California. It's my understanding that Mr. Mitrokin mentioned California's harbors and Naval facilities as primary targets. California is the most populous state in the nation. If there are hidden caches of explosives in this state, that's very dangerous. That's something that people ought to be informed about. That's why we're here.

The key questions before us now are 'where are these drop sites?' 'Do they still exist?' 'What's in them?' 'Were any of them ever used to store portable nuclear devices as alleged by Col. Lunev?'

If there are Russian arms caches hidden around the country with explosives and booby traps, this is a very dangerous situation. One of the things we want to find out today is if the Administration has done anything to find out where these sites are, or if they still exist. My colleagues, Congressman Weldon and Congressman Campbell, have tried to get answers from the Administration. They've written to Secretary Cohen. They've written to Secretary Albright. They received no response.

We've asked the FBI and the CIA to testify here today so we can try to find out what's being done. I wish they could testify in open session, because I know there is more and more concern, here in California and around the country, about these sites since these books have been published. However, their testimony is classified. After our first two panels, we will hear from them in closed session. I appreciate that our witnesses from these two agencies are here today, and I look forward to hearing their testimony.

I also want to say that I really regret that the State Department is not here today. My staff has tried for several weeks to get the State Department to provide a witness for this hearing. They haven't done so. The State Department is our lead foreign policy agency. They should be the first in line pushing the Russian government for answers. The Secretary of State should be demanding that Russia reveal the location of every arms cache in this country. She'll be testifying before the International Relations Committee in about two weeks. They aren't here today to answer our questions, but I'm going to ask Secretary Albright when she comes to testify what she's done on this issue.

Congressman Weldon has worked harder on this issue than anyone in Congress. Congressman Campbell has been working very hard to get answers from the Administration on behalf of his constituents. I congratulate both of you for your hard work.

I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today, including Mr. Desarno from the FBI. Mr. Desarno testified before our Committee back in 1998 when he was working on the Campaign Fundraising task force. Welcome back. We're glad to have you. Welcome also to Dr. William Green from Cal State University in San Bernadino, who is an expert on Russia and U.S. policy. I look forward to hearing from all of you.

Mr. BURTON. Do you have an opening statement, Mr. Scarborough?

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. No. I'll just be brief, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this hearing. I certainly thank Congressman Campbell for being here and the leadership he's shown in this very important issue, not only to all Americans but again to California specifically. I think of all the people that have come before our committees and I think of all the people that have come before the Armed Services Committee, of which I'm also a member, I think most everybody understands that the battles of the 21st century will not be fought on battlefields in Europe or in Asia but for Americans, we may find them being fought here at home. And certainly if that's the case, then California, specifically Los Angeles, CA, will be on the front lines in battles that involve terrorism, be it nuclear, chemical, or biological. That's why again I thank you for your leadership.

I've got to echo the sentiments of our chairman that I believe unfortunately we have a President, we have a State Department, and we have a foreign policy apparatus in Washington and on both sides of the United States both Republicans and Democrats that do not understand the scope of the danger facing all Americans. And a great example is again Dr. Pry's book, "War Scare." In it he tells a very, very interesting story.

And I think it's very telling about how the administration right now has been lulled to sleep by the hope that somehow the Russians have changed. It's sort of—it's not the new Nixon; it's the new Russians. And that somehow they've undergone this remarkable transformation. And there's a story in here how in 1996 while NATO was conducting military exercises in the North Sea, the Russians were so alarmed that they got their northern fleet out. It was a very confrontational moment in American history and in Russian history. At the same time, Brothers to the Rescue planes were shot down by Cuba.

And so in the middle of this great international crisis, the White House picked up the red phone to speak to the Russians and to try to defuse this situation. But what were they talking about? They were talking about poultry exports. It seems that the Russians were concerned by the fact that these maneuvers were going on and they did a lot of different things, but the only thing that caught the White House's attention was that poultry exports from Russia to America would be cut and likewise going the other way because of Tyson Foods poultry plants in Arkansas.

So they were focusing on chickens and using the red phone for this chicken crisis instead of understanding that the two countries were really on the brink of some very dangerous, dangerous times. And that continues. But, again, the State Department isn't focused. The White House isn't focused on it. They're only concerned about economic considerations while foreign policy considerations have been thrown out the window.

The cold war as we knew it from 1947 to 1991 may be over, but we are now in a period that's even more volatile and more frightening. And Curt Weldon has been a champion on this issue for some time. I was at a meeting with him earlier this month. I'll tell you after about 20 minutes of talking to him, I became ever increas-

ingly concerned. So I look forward to his testimony. I look forward to the testimony also of all these other witnesses.

Again, I think what's telling is that we have interesting information from Dr. Pry's book and others, a lot of what you're going to be hearing from Curt Weldon and others isn't just from American scholars or American researchers, it actually comes from Russians themselves. As Curt Weldon says, from the mouths of Russians themselves. So we are in a frightening time.

And, Mr. Chairman, again, I thank you for conducting this hearing. I think it's very important. And I hope for the safety of citizens in Los Angeles and California and across this country that our administration and that Democrats and Republicans in Washington, DC, will start to focus on the very real threat that's being posed right now by mere anarchic conditions in Russia.

Thank you. Yield back my time.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Chairman Scarborough. We'll now hear an opening statement from Congressman Weldon of Pennsylvania.

**STATEMENT OF HON. CURT WELDON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN  
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA**

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for holding this hearing, and I want to thank Mr. Scarborough for being here and Mr. Campbell for his untiring efforts to get this administration to come clean with the American people about an issue that I think is vitally important.

Mr. Chairman, at the outset let me state that I think I'm in an unusual position. I am a friend of the Russian people. My undergraduate degree, as you know, is in Russian studies. I speak the language. I've been there almost 20 times. For the past 6 years since I formed the Duma-Congress relationship, I have chaired an ongoing relationship with members of all the Russian political factions. I know over 150 Duma members personally. I have many friends who serve in the Russian Government.

My statements today are not to try to paint Russia into a corner. There are people there who want Russia to continue with reforms. But we need to understand the reality of what has happened in the former Soviet Union and what continues today. Because there are others in that country that don't want good relations with us and that have other intentions.

I think secondarily I would mention that I think what we're going to look at today is what I would call an example of the failed policies of this administration for 8 years. We have been so enamored with a Bill Clinton to Boris Yeltsin relationship, with an Al Gore to Viktor Chernomyrdin relationship that whenever something would appear to surface that would appear to perhaps undermine Yeltsin or Chernomyrdin, he would pretend it didn't happen whether it was a theft of IMF dollars, whether it was abuse and insider trading in Russia, whether it was arms control treaty violations that we saw time and again and never called the Russians on, or whether it was the lasering of the eyes of one of our career Navy intelligence officers Jack Daly. There were consistent efforts to hide reality. The evidence of Vice President Gore being given a brief by the CIA that linked Viktor Chernomyrdin to organized crime within the petrol chemical industry and the Vice President

writing the word “bullshit” across the front of it and sending it back to the CIA.

The administration has had a consistent pattern of not wanting anything to surface that might cause the perception of a problem or a real problem in our relationship with Russia. And I’m convinced that’s what you have in the example. And I’m not going to give you facts from some Republican radical right think tank. I’m not going to give you comments of the far right of my party, our party. I’m not going to give you facts from people who want to attack Russia. I’m going to give you a very logical and methodical outline of what Russians have said on the public record. And I want this issue to be judged on what Russians have said in the public realm, many before our Congress, because that’s the story today. It is what Russians have said that has occurred and what we ought to be concerned with.

Mr. Chairman, in May 1997—and everything I’m going to say, Mr. Chairman, has been witnessed in a bipartisan manner. Nothing that I am going to talk about was witnessed by Republicans alone. And my entire efforts in this area have been totally bipartisan. So for those who would say this is a Republican witch-hunt, I challenge them to come forward. I’ll debate them, and I’ll give them the factual information that will deny that allegation.

May 30, 1997, I led a bipartisan delegation to Moscow. One of meetings we had scheduled was with then General Alexander Lebed, currently the Governor of Krasnoyarsk. General Lebed, as you know, was the top defense advisor to Yeltsin. At the meeting, Lebed for the first time revealed that one of his responsibilities when he worked for Yeltsin was to account for 132 suitcase-size nuclear devices. He said he could not find them. He said he could locate only 48. Now, Democrats and Republicans with me said to him in this private meeting, well, where are the rest, General? He said, I have no idea; they could have been destroyed; they could be secure; or they could have been put on the black market for the highest bidder. Because the General is making a point to us that the instability in the Russian military was causing military officers to sell technology around the world.

Now, Mr. Chairman, we did not have a press conference following that event. So this was not an opportunity for Lebed to toot his own horn. In fact, the only way the media found out about that allegation was that we filed my trip report 2 months later, and we do as a requirement of the Congress. A producer for 20/20 picked up on the story, Leslie Coburn. She called me; and she said, Congressman, did Lebed really say this? I said absolutely. She said do you think he would say it on national TV? I said you will have to ask him. She went to Moscow. 20/20 interviewed Lebed; they interviewed me and both of us with a lead story in September 1997 on the national media where he again said in his own words, that Russia had, in fact, produced these small atomic demolition munitions and could not account for all of them.

What was the response of the Russian Government? They denied they ever produced them. The minister of foreign affairs for Russia publicly said Lebed is crazy; he doesn’t know what he’s talking about; he’s trying to gain popularity. But even worse than that, Mr. Chairman, was that at a press conference in the Pentagon reflect-

ing what I just talked about with this administration the question was asked of Ken Bacon's staff what do you make of the allegations by Lebed. And this was the response of our government: We have no reason to doubt what the Russian Government is saying.

So then, Mr. Chairman, on October 2, 1997, I brought over Dr. Alexei Yablikov. Dr. Yablikov is one of the most reknown environmentalists in all of Russia. He was initially part of Yeltsin's cabinet; was a member of the security council; and is an expert on environmental issues, ecological issues, and atomic energy issues. He heads a think tank. He's a member of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow today.

I had Alexei Yablikov testify before my committee open session in Washington. And this is what he said. He said, I know that General Lebed was correct. These devices were built. He said on the record—and you can check the transcript—he said I know colleagues of mine who worked on these devices. And you need to understand, America, he didn't just build these for the Ministry of Defense, they also built these for the KGB to be used for external operations.

So now I have a retired two star general given the highest award that Russia gives, the Hero of Russia award, supported by Dr. Alexei Yablikov saying publicly that Russia has, in fact, built these devices and that we better work with Russia to find out where they are and if, in fact, they're capable of being sold abroad.

Mr. Chairman, even though our government denied that they should pursue this issue, I traveled to Moscow that December and, as I frequently do, met with the defense ministers of Russia, Defense Minister Sergeyev, also a retired general. For the first half hour of my meeting, I talked about positive proactive things that I was doing to help Russia, to help the people, to help the military with housing, to help the problem of nuclear waste. And then I said, but General, for you to continue to have me help you and be Russia's friend you have to be candid with me. What's the story of the small atomic demolition munitions. This is what the defense minister from Russia said to me: "Congressman, we did build those devices just as you built them during the cold war. We are aware that you destroyed all of yours. And I submit to you that we will have all of our small atomic demolition munitions destroyed by the year 2000."

So here we have a Russian general saying that they were lost or not being able to be accounted for, we have a leading environmental activist from Russia verifying his story, and we have our government publicly going along with the Russian Government's total denial they had ever built them.

And finally the defense ministry of Russia admitted to me publicly, yes we built them and yes, we'll have them all destroyed by this year.

The following year, Mr. Chairman, March 19, 1998, I invited General Alexander Lebed to Washington. He testified before my committee. Again he was under terrible pressure from the Russian Government. Again he said—he stood by his claims that these devices were unaccounted for and that we in America should be troubled because those who want to harm us are the ones that those

generals and admirals who are disgruntled would sell those devices to.

In August of that same year, Mr. Chairman, August the 4th, I invited Stanislav Lunev to come before my committee. As you know, he's in the witness protection program jointly administered by, I believe, the FBI and the CIA. And he's under an assumed name. I had him come in behind a curtain with a ski mask on. I had him testify. And I will not go through what he's going to say today but he's going to tell you as the highest ranking GRU defector in the history of the Soviet Union or Russia, his job when he worked under cover as a TASS correspondent at the Soviet Embassy in Washington was to locate sites where materials could be dropped. And, in fact, that's an issue I know this committee is going to explore with him.

So now we have the highest ranking GRU defector reinforcing the possibility of what both Lebed and Yablikov said and, in fact, saying it was his understanding that these drops could include small atomic demolition munitions as well as the possibility of other September or August of this past year, August 1999, Dr. Christopher Andrew published his book that you referred to called, "The KGB, the Sword and the Shield, the Mitrokhin Files." This book, as you pointed out, is based on the 8 years of collecting Mitrokhin's handwritten notes about secret KGB files.

I met with Dr. Christopher Andrew from Cambridge University at a private dinner in September of last year. I asked him to testify before my committee which he did in October. Dr. Andrew flew over from London and he brought with him Oleg Gordievsky. Gordievsky is the highest ranking ever KGB defector from Russia. He was the station desk chief for the Soviet KGB in London. He currently is in a witness protection program in Great Britain. The two of them testified before my committee, Mr. Chairman. And what did they say? They said in the Mitrokhin files one of the things Mitrokhin documented was a deliberate plan by the KGB to preposition military caches of weapons, hardware, and devices in Europe and in North America. These devices were intended to be used by agents who would be prepositioned in our country to blow up dams, bridges, ports, to cause significant unrest inside of our territory.

When I asked Dr. Andrew whether or not there were specific sites named in the United States, he said Mitrokhin only had time to take notes on a sampling of the kinds of cases the KGB was working on. And he said he wasn't interested in documenting every single location of every single device that the KGB had put forward. Because there are literally hundreds of them all over the world. He did document four sites so that no one could question the authenticity of what he was saying, it just happens that one of those sites was in Switzerland and three were in Belgium.

Last year, Mr. Chairman, the Swiss went to the exact site that he identified, there are photographs of that site in this book and right there at the exact spot with a booby-trapped bomb that could kill a human being and, in fact, caused the Swiss Government to issue a warning to all of its citizens about that type of location, they found exactly what Mitrokhin said would be there. Devices that the Russians had prepositioned during the Soviet era.

In Belgium, at all three sites the Belgium intelligence service found the exact same kinds of capability. Now, were there weapons of mass destruction there? No. Were there military hardware and transmission and communications equipment? Yes. Were they booby trapped? The one in Switzerland, yes.

In the Mitrokhin files, he documents that there are States in the United States where these devices were prepositioned. Specifically mentioned in the files are California, Pennsylvania, New York, Montana, Minnesota, Texas. And he further states that they are near pipelines. They are near ports. They are near major public infrastructure locations. All of this is in the KGB files. Now, this is not the main content of this book. Because the KGB files were expansive. Only a very small portion of this book dealt with the location of these devices. So for those who say come forward and give us one, we can't. But when I had Dr. Andrew who's, by the way, a Russian security and intelligence expert at Cambridge, one of the leading tenured professors at Cambridge University so much so that when Mitrokhin received his ability to live in England by the British intelligence service and the British Government, they went to Cambridge and they went to Dr. Andrew and they said would you work with Mitrokhin and help to prepare these files in an organized way. That's why the book came out.

So the British intelligence trusted Christopher Andrew to work Mitrokhin. When Mitrokhin—or when Christopher Andrew and Gordievsky testified before my committee, again this is in the public record, they said that there is no doubt in their mind that there are locations today, no doubt in their minds, all over the United States, where Soviet military equipment is stored today. No doubt. Now, they didn't say that there is a high degree of probability of a nuclear device, but they left the door open. They left the door open. In fact, I'll submit the transcript which refers to that for the record which people can look at in the words again of a Russian, Mitrokhin—I mean Gordievsky and Mitrokhin and Dr. Christopher Andrew.

[The information referred to follows:]

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October 26, 1999, Tuesday

TYPE: COMMITTEE HEARING

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COMMITTEE: MILITARY RESEARCH SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES

HEADLINE: U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CURT WELDON (R-PA) HOLDS HEARING ON RUSSIA AND THE KGB

LOCATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

BODY:

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE: SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT HOLDS A HEARING ON RUSSIAN THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND PLANS FOR U.S. SABOTAGE

OCTOBER 26, 1999

SPEAKERS: U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CURT WELDON (R-PA), CHAIRMAN

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COLONEL OLEG GORDIEVSKY, FORMER KGB LONDON CHIEF OF STATION

CHRISTOPHER ANDREW, AUTHOR

WELDON: Colonel Gordievsky, given the paranoia among the Soviet leadership that you described, do you think it's -- would be possible or plausible -- I'm not asking (inaudible) knowledge, but in your professional opinion, do you think it was possible, as a GRU defector, what (inaudible) have said when you testified here, that they may have prepositioned nuclear suitcases in the territory or the U.S.? Do you think that has any degree of possibility at all?

GORDIEVSKY: Mr. Chairman, it's a difficult question. From what they -- the KGB and the GRU would have planned to do, it's quite a lot. The plan to use poisons, the plans to use bacteriological weapons, they have plans of using bacteriological, very fine substances to kill people without even traces or making it deniable assassination of the person. So they've got numerous plans.

For example, I'm under sentence of that (ph). Theoretically speaking, they can kill me.

WELDON: You're under sentence of death (inaudible)?

GORDIEVSKY: Yes, for 14 years...

WELDON: Fourteen years.

GORDIEVSKY: ... they could have killed me, because (inaudible) sentence of death expressed by the military tribunal of the Soviet Union in '85, but still (inaudible). But (inaudible) killing me, (inaudible) life. So you see, what they have plans, what they have on their desks, what they've got in their files, it's one thing. What they have practically, it's not the same.

For example, I can tell you that the first time I produced the plan of work of the KGB station in London, and the plan was (inaudible) and passed on to the British security service, (inaudible), our hair went up of terror, what the KGB was planning to do in London.

Meanwhile, the (inaudible) work was much more modest, much more modest. Still damaging, of course, still unnecessary and so on, but much less than what they planned. So I again (inaudible) there must have been plans about nuclear small devices to put around in Washington and New York and so on, but whether (inaudible) it has come to bringing them here, is a big, big step. And to put them in -- and to transport them in -- as -- through the countries on the planes, (inaudible) diplomatic bags, it's extremely complicated.

WELDON: I appreciate that.

Dr. Andrew?

ANDREW: Mr. Chairman, if I might make one further comment. First of all, as Oleg Gordievsky said, all we have seen is the Mitrokhin archive. What we now need to see is a Mitrokhin for the GRU. My assessment, which is only an approximate assessment, is that I find it entirely credible that the GRU, indeed the Soviet high command, would have drawn up plans to position nuclear weapons on the soil of the United States. I find it entirely credible that Mr. Lunev would have been asked to reconnoiter likely sites.

I think it very improbable that any actually exist on the soil of the United States. But I would add this rider. Every single one of us in this room, Mr. Chairman, insures our house against risks of, let us say, 100,000 to 1, the risk of the house being burnt down. What we have an absolute right to know, surely, is that anyone who even considered doing these monstrous things, even if the chance that they succeeded in doing so is extremely remote, they have an absolute duty to tell us what it is they planned and how far they got along the process of implementing it.

Mr. WELDON. Mr. Chairman before that hearing, I went to our own agencies. I called Louis Freeh of the FBI who I have the highest respect for. I think he has absolutely impeccable credentials. As you know and I think as you feel, he is the one bright star in this administration who shines above all others. I said, Director Freeh, can you send a team over that I can talk to before I have the hearing; and he did. He sent over three people. One of whom was told—and I told him I was going to say what was discussed at that meeting so they knew that it was not being held in a classified way.

I said I want to ask you the question, one, do you consider the Mitrokhin files to be credible. And they said, absolutely. They are totally credible.

So anyone that would say this is some outlandish claim that's not been verified, I would ask them to talk to the FBI about that and the SIS service in Great Britain.

No. 2, I said, have you attempted to find devices where the States and sites are listed even though it's vague and they said, yes, but we don't have much to go on. You know, there are thousands of miles of pipeline in Texas. There are tons of ports installations in California. We just don't know where to look without the specific locations.

So then I got to the third question: Has our government asked the Russian Government for the specific locations? And the answer was no, our government has not asked the Russian Government.

Now, Mr. Chairman, also for the record I would like to submit a transcript of a press conference held at the Pentagon on September 15, 1999. In this transcript I'm going to quote Admiral Quigley—Rear Admiral Quigley is being asked questions by the media about the Mitrokhin files, about the claims in it. Admiral Quigley is asked if he's aware of the book and the allegations. He says, yes, we're aware of it. They said, do you have any interest in actually going after some of these caches? He says not that I'm aware of, no. Have you approached the Russians on this, about whether or not they've done this? His answer, no, no we have not.

[The information referred to follows:]

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SEPTEMBER 14, 1999, TUESDAY

**SECTION:** DEFENSE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING

**LENGTH:** 5978 words

**HEADLINE:** DEFENSE DEPARTMENT  
REGULAR BRIEFING  
**BRIEFER:** REAR ADMIRAL CRAIG **QUIGLEY**  
THE PENTAGON

**BODY:**

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** Good afternoon. I have a variety of announcements today. First, yesterday the Department of Defense began moving military aircraft and vessels at East Coast locations to protect them from potential Hurricane Floyd damage.

Thirteen Navy vessels from May Port, Florida have left port for the open seas, and more than 400 aircraft from bases in Florida, Georgia and North and South Carolina are flying to in-land locations in Georgia, Texas, Kentucky and Ohio. About 7,000 Marine Corps recruits and drill instructors are evacuating the Marine Corps Recruit Depot at Parris Island, South Carolina, and moving to the Marine Corps Logistics Base in Albany, Georgia. More than 4,000 National Guard soldiers and airmen in Florida, Georgia and South Carolina have been ordered to state active duty to assist law enforcement and local officials with evacuation, general site security, and logistics.

The Army is preparing for a humanitarian response in support of FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, should that be necessary, as the storm moves along the East Coast. The Army Corps of Engineers has three teams enroute to the Southeastern United States, and the teams are designed to provide emergency ice, water and debris clearance, respectively. Fort Gillem, Georgia, has been designated as a mobilization site for additional Reserve assets. Now, there is a great deal of additional detail, specific units that are moving. But rather than read those from the podium today, I would just ask that you get that from the news desk. But we can break down those numbers further if you need additional details.

Q Do you anticipate that there will be many other aircraft that are moving in the next 24 to 48 hours?

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** There are some, not many, I don't think, John, no. And it really does depend also on the storm's track. You'll notice that a lot of the preparations that I've mentioned, some do include North Carolina, but most stop at the North-South Carolina border, and we'll just see where that storm track takes us.

Second, tomorrow afternoon, Secretary of Defense Cohen will present the Joseph J. Kruzel Award for Distinguished Service in the Pursuit of Peace. The award will go to Mr. Jeremy Rosner, former special adviser to the president and secretary of State for NATO enlargement ratification. Following the award presentation, Secretary Cohen will make a few remarks to preview next weeks' NATO defense ministers meeting in Toronto, Canada. And following these remarks, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Frank Kramer, will

make himself available to the media for a discussion of the NATO ministerial, the Defense Capabilities Initiative, and other topics of interest. And details are available, again, in a press advisory that we'll put out this afternoon.

Q What time of day?

ADM. **QUIGLEY**: I don't have the time on that. We'll --

STAFF: Three.

ADM. **QUIGLEY**: Three o'clock. Three o'clock tomorrow.

Next, Secretary Cohen will make remarks and join the Air Force leadership in awarding Silver Star Medals to three Air Force pilots from Operation Allied Force, tomorrow at 4:00 at Andrews Air Force Base. And again, we'll put out more details and a press advisory on that this afternoon.

This Friday, Secretary Cohen, General Shelton and Senator Max Cleland will speak at a National POW/MIA Recognition Day ceremony at Arlington National Cemetery. The ceremony begins at 11:00 a.m. POW/MIA Recognition Day is traditionally held on the third Friday in September. On that day, commemorations are held at many sites throughout the country. The commemoration at Arlington will include formal military honors with assembled troops from all of the military services, and two joint service fly-overs -- one with helicopters and one with jet aircraft. As we announced on June 17th, part of the ceremony Friday will include the formal dedication of a new inscription above the existing dates -- and those are 1958 to 1975 -- on the tomb cover of the Vietnam Unknown in the Tomb of the Unknowns. That inscription reads: Honoring and keeping faith with America's missing servicemen.

And the event is open to the public, of course. And should you wish to attend, please contact Patty Hurd over at the Military District of Washington Public Affairs Office.

Next, the U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century will release its first report tomorrow at 2:00 p.m. at the National Press Club. The commission, formerly known as the National Security Study Group, is co-chaired by former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman. Both co-chairmen and commissioners will be available at the Press Club to discuss the commission's report. For further information on that, please contact Mr. Hank Sharpenberg (sp) of the commission at 703-602-4175.

Next, Egyptian military forces and members of the U.S. Central Command's Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine and Special Operations components will participate in a joint combined coalition computer-aided command post exercise and tactical field training exercise with military forces from nine other coalition nations in Egypt. This exercise is called Bright Star, and it will take place October 10th through November 2nd, and will involve approximately 18,000 U.S. military personnel. I'll have further details on that later on this afternoon as well.

And last, Secretary Cohen announced today that the president has nominated Army Lieutenant General John W. Hendrix (sp) for appointment to the grade of general and assignment as commanding general, U.S. Army Forces Command at Fort McPherson, Georgia. General Hendrix (sp) is currently serving as the commanding general of Fifth Corps, United States Army Europe, and 7th Army in Heidelberg, Germany. Now, along with General Hendrix's (sp) nomination, there are several additional -- I think four or five -- flag officer announcements on the table, and I invite you to pick those copies up before you leave. We broke General Hendrix (sp) out because this is the only four-star appointment that we're announcing this afternoon, but there are several other two- and three-star officers on the table on your way out.

So, with those announcements, I will take your questions.

Q Craig, in regard to East Timor, have we begun to identify any units or specific assets for use in supporting a peacekeeping, humanitarian operation?

ADM. **QUIGLEY**: We're taking this one step at a time, and the next step that must happen, hopefully this afternoon, as soon as possible, is a complete description from the U.N. Security Council to come up with a mandate -- what is the mission of an international peacekeeping force.

When you have that definition in hand, each of the nations, the United States among them, can then go to the next step in planning to determine what forces are needed to carry out that mandate, whatever that might be.

We have committed to being a part of this and to active participation in the overall process, but we need that mandate as the next step in the process before specific planning can take place as to what U.S. forces will be involved.

As we've said before on several occasions, it's pretty clear the areas that will be involved in participation, in the intelligence, communications, logistics and strategic lift. And I would add food support, as well. As President Clinton said yesterday, and today, I believe, we have humanitarian rations. Humanitarian daily rations, 300,000 of them, are being palletized for shipment to Darwin. And from there -- these are at the Tracy (sp) Defense Depot in California right now, and they'll be airlifted to Darwin, turned over to the U.N. for distribution. We're not sure what's the most efficient way of distributing those humanitarian daily rations, but we'll work closely with the U.N. on that as well.

Q Is there any kind of a tentative schedule on getting these rations to Darwin?

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** Well, we anticipate the palletization to be done very soon. I can't give you an exact time frame, but that activity is ongoing right now.

Q Do you anticipate any particular problems flying in and out of greater metropolitan Dili? I mean, is the runway very short? Do you they have aids to navigation, the kind of things you usually need?

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** We're working, again, kind of a two-step process there, continuing to talk very closely with the Indonesian government, Indonesian military, Australians, and also part of the U.N. Security Council discussions going on today for specific access agreements and which airports would be available, and then getting from the Indonesians the specific capabilities of the various airports. Undoubtedly, some will be restricted to certain smaller types of aircraft, some will, hopefully, be able to accommodate larger aircraft. We're very confident that Tindle (sp), which is the military airfield outside Darwin, can accommodate any of the large strategic airlift aircraft. But we've yet to complete the assessment and discussions with the Indonesians on the capabilities and limitations of the various airfields within Timor.

Q If you have a U.N. resolution today, for example, how rapidly do you think the international community can move to have boots on the ground with a peacekeeping force? Days? Weeks? Months?

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** We want to see this happen just as soon as possible, and we would be hopeful that a force could be inserted into East Timor within days.

Q Will U.S. troops be part of peacekeeping or police forces there?

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** We will certainly be participants in the overall effort, although in the traditional sense of providing what you would think of, Bill, in the sense of like infantry or rifle companies in large numbers, as peacekeepers on the ground, that has not been a part of our considerations so far. It's been the four areas that I mentioned before, and now the humanitarian -- to help in some way, shape, or form in the delivery of the Humanitarian Daily Rations as well.

Q Just to clarify that, you're saying you don't envision having infantry troops -- U.S. -- take part in some kind of thing? They're going to be in those four areas? They're going to be limited to those four areas?

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** Well, I need to be specific here, too, because there will be U.S. uniformed personnel on the ground in East Timor. But they'll be operating communications equipment. They'll be providing that intelligence support. They'll be undoubtedly assisting at whichever airports we end up with, if it's airlift, in coordinating the resupply, the maintenance, and what have you of any aircraft that would be used. But again, in large numbers of rifle companies and infantry companies that you think of when you think of large numbers of peacekeeping forces --

that is not under consideration.

Q Do you have a number, a general number, for how many U.S. would be involved?

ADM. **QUIGLEY**: Again, in the hundreds, although that just doesn't have much more clarity to it than that. But that's in the ballpark, I think.  
John?

Q Two questions, Craig. Your qualifier that it won't be infantry or rifle companies in large numbers seems to me to leave open the possibility that there may be some there for security, in terms of perimeter security duties around the other U.S. troops -- (inaudible). Is that an accurate --

ADM. **QUIGLEY**: Well, we are always concerned with force protection, certainly. And again, these are part of discussions, ongoing, with the -- within the U.N. context and with the Indonesian government and military, as to who will provide what. But one way or another, the U.S. forces that do find themselves on the ground in East Timor will be well protected, as good as we can do it.

Q And secondly, there were reports that there was a team of, I think nine is the figure I've seen, U.S. troops, U.S. military personnel of some kind that are working with the Australians already in Australia.

ADM. **QUIGLEY**: Fifteen, actually.

Q Fifteen? Can you elaborate on what they're doing?

ADM. **QUIGLEY**: Yeah. These are planners from Admiral Blair's staff in Hawaii, the commander in chief, Pacific command; were on the ground the ground in Darwin as of last Friday -- I don't know what time of day, but as of last Friday -- to assist the Australian Defense Force in their planning efforts. And our intentions are to keep that force there and assist in that effort indefinitely.

Yeah.

Q My question is basically the same. I mean, are we going to rely on other countries or the U.N. for force protection for our own people that are on the ground?

ADM. **QUIGLEY**: We are going to be able to provide very clear, unambiguous force protection for U.S. troops and U.S. facilities that are on the ground in East Timor. Now, the specifics of how we're accomplishing that, we're not there yet. But there will be no question that those forces will have a solid, rock-solid force protection package in place.

Bill. Go ahead. Are you -- ?

Q What's the role of airlift? Are we going to be sending planes out to various countries to gather up their troops and equipment and fly them into East Timor or to Australia, or -- ?

ADM. **QUIGLEY**: I would envision that we would be doing some of that because that's one of the things that is a great strength of the United States military that many other nations don't have in the numbers that are required to move large numbers of troops and equipment and materiel from one place to another. But we do anticipate that the make-up of the peacekeeping force will be largely Asian, so you're not talking about huge distances here. So that's an advantage. But still, that's a big part of the world. And it'll all depend on which nations eventually agree to provide what forces and perhaps some airlift as well. But that is one of the things we fully expect to be very engaged in, yes.

Q How long do you envision this going on, how many planes, and what -- I mean, like C-17s, C-5s?

ADM. **QUIGLEY**: Well, the aircraft at the nation's disposal, okay, the U.S. Transportation Command's disposal are all fair game for selection. It would depend on what do you need to move over what distance from where to where and what are the airport capabilities and limitations that you're going to be flying into and out of. So, then, that chapter of the book has not yet been written.

Q And the length of time you're talking about?

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** I don't have a good answer for that one.

Yes, sir?

Q The U.S. is saying that Indonesia must agree to the international force, and also at the same time, until yesterday, Indonesians are saying that they don't want U.S., Australian and New Zealand forces. So what is -- where do --

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** Well, I think the Australian (sic/Indonesian) foreign minister yesterday listed that as a concern, although not a precondition. And Secretary-General Annan assured him that the U.N. would continue to work very closely with the Indonesian military and government to assuage any concerns that they may have. But it was a concern, not a condition.

Yes, sir?

Q You're talking about several hundred U.S. personnel assigned to this operation. Is that assigned to the operation or actually on the island of East Timor when you're talking about several hundred?

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** On the island of East Timor, if you count aircraft, air crews. If there are ships involved and those ships' crews, we would not count that as a part of the overall numbers of people that would be part of a peacekeeping force, although you certainly should count them as contributing to the overall effort. But as far as the numbers of people that would be operating these intelligence units, communications units and things of that sort, you're talking about in the hundreds.

Q Would it be fair to say several thousand people will be contributing to this?

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** I hesitate to give you a range on that because we've just not gone to that specific level of planning.

Q Who is going to pay for all the expenses and the cost to involve in the international community?

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** Well, a variety of sources. The humanitarian, daily rations, for instance, the USAID will pay for that. There will be some monies coming from U.N. High Commission on Refugees, I would anticipate. Some would be borne by the Defense Department, U.S. Defense Department, some by State, a variety of other agencies of the federal government. So it would be several different sources of the funding for the U.S. support overall.

John?

Q Are you going to hit the ground with the humanitarian palletized stuff at approximately the same time you do with peacekeepers? Is that your plan? Or to wait until peacekeepers are all ensconced?

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** We're looking at it as two separate things. If they occurred at the same time, we're looking at that as a positive, but that's not necessarily a precondition, John. We're going to move on right now with the provision of the humanitarian daily rations.

And like I said, we hope --

Q Regardless of the peacekeepers.

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** Regardless of peacekeepers, that's right. And we would look to the U.N. to help with the distribution system within East Timor. Now, as the days go by and we have a peacekeeping force within East Timor, and as they start to spread out throughout the area, if we take another look at it at that point and find out that there is a better, more efficient way of distribution, we'll certainly adapt. But we're looking at it as two separate events at this point, and if they can combine and that would be a better way to manage this effort, so be it.

Q Isn't there some kind of a disconnect here? I mean, if it doesn't necessarily dovetail with the arrival of the peacekeepers, then you will rely on the U.N. personnel in East Timor to hand out the supplies. Yet most U.N. personnel in East Timor have left.

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** Very true. Very true.

Q (Off mike) -- left in East Timor. So --

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** You have 12 or 13 -- I'm getting --

Q -- to have your food arrive before your troops seems insane.

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** We want to get the foodstuffs, the 300,000 rations, to Darwin and then put this in the hands of the U.N. distribution authorities. Now, how they feel they can best get that food, then, into East Timor, we would defer to their expertise in this area. Now, in the days ahead when the peacekeeping force goes in and you have peacekeepers on the ground and a larger U.N. presence, probably a presence of private, nongovernmental organizations as well, perhaps that would be a distribution system that might work out. We haven't worked out that detail. But certainly we wouldn't ask for the 12 or the 13 U.N. personnel still on the ground in East Timor to do that now.

Q Is any thought being given to airdropping in stuff as a first --

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** We're looking for the most efficient way to do this, John. We don't think that airdropping is a very efficient way to do it, but if it's the only way, we'll consider it. But it's just -- it's not a very efficient way to do this.

Q Still on those rations, given the staggering numbers that were used in Kosovo in the refugee camps, can you give us any sense -- I don't expect you'll have it now, but can you give us some sense later on on what stocks we have of these rations and whether we have to crank up some more?

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** Yes. I know these are all coming from that depot in California, but I can --

Q (Off mike.)

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** Yeah, a very large number, and I don't have that with me now. We'll get that for you later.

Bill?

Q You mentioned the intelligence end of this a couple of times. What is that? Is that troops on the ground, spy planes, satellites?

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** Well, the ability to provide intelligence products and intelligence information is a potpourri.

It's people, it's equipment, it's communications capabilities, it's reconnaissance assets, it's all of the above taken together as a whole to give you as complete a picture as you can.

Q Well, but for this operation is it people on the ground or planes flying over --

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** Well, since we've not chosen the units that would go in to support this piece of our participation in the force, I can't give you a good answer. But, I mean, in general, you get intelligence support in those areas that I just described. Ultimately you're going to get to the point where you are choosing a specific unit, and that unit has a certain number of people, a certain number of pieces of equipment, and what-have-you.

Q New subject?

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** Yes.

Q Another subject?

Q Well, can we stay on --

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** Are there any other East Timor questions?

Q One other question.

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** Jim?

Q Nancy Pelosi and Barney Frank on the House floor today, they were very critical of the military to military contacts, the IMET, the JCET, all of the activities that were going on. They're saying if the point of these contacts is to get a military that respects human rights more, it seems to be a complete and utter failure. That's a paraphrase of their words, but that's the essence of it. I suspect you have a different take on that.

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** We have a variety of ways to engage between the United States military and the militaries of other nations. The whole purpose is engagement. You are either involved in a dialogue with the militaries of other nations, or you're not. And no one expects that every effort

will be a hundred percent successful. But the alternative is having zero voice, zero chance of success in any sort of a negotiation or a discussion with a U.S. military person's counterpart in another nation. Human beings react well to faces that they have seen before, people with whom they have had a conversation before. The old cliché about an emergency or a crisis is not the best time to place that first phone call to a person with whom you've never had any relationship is absolutely true. So the whole purpose of IMET -- Indonesia is not a good example of a robust IMET program. We have had a very limited IMET program with the military of Indonesia.

In numbers of students, I think it's -- if you compare it with other nations, like the Philippines and Thailand, we've got 10 times as many students engaged in IMET programs with thtions as we do with Indonesia. So don't look to Indonesia, this very limited program of IMET, to be an example of how a robust program ought to work because this one's been very limited. But the engagement on a military-to-military basis at all levels, from students in military colleges to diesel-engine repair training, to very high -- the highest level individuals -- King Abdullah of Jordan attended the U.S. Army's Armor School in 1985 as a captain, and now he is the head of that nation's government. The foreign ministers, prime ministers, defense ministers of many nations around the world attended some number of either IMET or expanded IMET programs during their years as they matured and developed professionally. So these are -- there are many, many examples of positive results from an engagement program, military-to-military, and IMET is just one of them.

Q In light of the military's actions in East Timor, where they -- when they failed to stop the militias or, in some cases apparently, assisted in their outrageous actions, are the taxpayers getting the influence and access that are obviously the goal of this program?

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** I think that taxpayers are getting a tremendous return on their investment through this program. This is not an expensive program; \$50 million, I believe, was the dollar figure in 1998. Don't have '99's completed yet. And that trains literally hundreds of people, very junior to very senior, in a variety of training opportunities both here and abroad. And I think it's of tremendous value, and there are lots of examples of strong successes in this area around the world with many nations.

Q Whhe earliest that you expect U.S. personnel to be on the ground in East Timor?

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** Again, I would hope that we could have a force on the ground within days. Can't be much more precise than that because I'm just not sure, but within days.

Q The last thing on the 300,000 rations, are you anticipating those will begin flying from the United States in the next 24 hours, next 48 hours? ADM. **QUIGLEY:** Yes, John. As soon as we get them palletized.

Q So you'll put them in the air sometime in the next day or two?

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** Yes.

John --

Q Press coverage. Have you given any thought yet to covering either the American airlift operation that's going in or the wider operation within East Timor, which presumably comes out of the U.N., but I'm sure the U.S. would have some significant say in how that's handled?

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** We're starting to do that now, yes. Working again with the Australians and, ultimately, the Indonesians.

Q Yes, I wanted to switch subjects here.

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** Okay, any other questions on East Timor? If I could, just one sec --

Q It was reported by the State Department that there is now a risk of refugees in West Timor being harassed by the same kind of militia gangs. I understand that is another theater of potential trouble. Can you comment?

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** Well, that's certainly a concern, Bill. I've seen the reports that you refer to. We

do not have very good visibility or knowledge of particulars on the ground, both in West and East Timor. So that's yet another reason for, as quickly as we can, to get an international force in there to provide visibility as well as the assistance.

So we're not sure, we're not able to assess well the accuracy of reports that are coming out on either East or West Timor; all the better reason to get in there sooner rather than later.

Q Yeah, a former KGB officer, Vasili **Mitrokhin**, has said, most recently Sunday and in his book, that the KGB smuggled explosives into the United States for sabotage purposes against infrastructure. Is the Pentagon aware of this? Have they tried to find the locations of these explosives? What can you say about that?

ADM. **QUIGLEY**: Well, the book you're referring to, I think, is due to be published next week, Bill, if I remember correctly. Q (Off mike.)

ADM. **QUIGLEY**: I've seen a couple of reviews on it, but I haven't seen it on any shelves. But your point is, and I think there's an example cited in the book of specific directions to an arms cache in Switzerland that was provided in there. The author is much less specific when he refers to any such efforts in the United States and I think he caveats by saying "could" and "might" and "may," so there's not a lot to go on there. If he has any more specifics, we'd love to hear them.

Q Well, presumably, the U.S. intelligence community, the Pentagon, would have access to his information, since he defected in '92. Is this the first that you had heard about anything? You haven't done any kind of interest in actually going after some of these caches?

ADM. **QUIGLEY**: No, not that I'm aware of, Bill, no.

Q Have you approached the Russians on this about whether or not they've done this?

ADM. **QUIGLEY**: No. No, we have not. Not since the reports came out in the last couple of days on the book. And again, he's very much less specific on any sort of similar caches in the United States, and we would welcome any additional information he could provide, but -- need to be a little bit more specific, I think.

Yes, sir?

Q It was reported that the Greek minister of defense, Apostolos Tsokhatzopoulos, is coming to the United States at the invitation of Secretary Cohen.

Do you know what prompted the secretary to invite Tsokhatzopoulos at this time? And may we have something for their agenda?

ADM. **QUIGLEY**: Secretary Cohen makes it a point to maintain the closest possible relationship with his counterparts, ministers of defense, in all of the NATO nations particularly, but as well many other nations around the world. So the Greek minister of defense, as one of his counterparts, part of an ongoing program of discussions, where Secretary Cohen would go to Greece, and the Greek minister of defense would come here -- you see that with each of the nations of NATO particularly.

Now as far as the particulars of their conversation, I don't have that today. I'll see what I could get you, but I don't have it here.

Q And on the Bright Star exercise of October 10th you mentioned earlier, in Egypt, could you please identify the nine nations participating?

ADM. **QUIGLEY**: I think I do have that. Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, France, Italy, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

Q Who initiated this exercise?

ADM. **QUIGLEY**: I'm sorry?

Q Who initiated this exercise?

ADM. **QUIGLEY**: This is a long-standing annual exercise. It's been going on for many years. I don't know the year of its origin. We can get that for you. But it's a long-standing exercise, been in place many years.

Q Admiral **Quigley**?

ADM. **QUIGLEY**: Yes, Elizabeth?

Q Is there any discussion of the United States cooperating with Russia on counterterrorism now, with the apartment buildings exploding in Moscow? Has there been any talk, any ongoing help with those investigations?

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** Yes. I mean, preceding the terrible explosions in Moscow of the past several days, we have had an ongoing exchange of information with the Russian government, as it pertains to counterterrorist activities, and have found that very productive. And the Russians, I think, have found it very useful. And it certainly predates the terrible explosions of the past few days.

Q And when you say "ongoing conversations," what kind of help is being given? And is it military help and so on and so forth --

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** It's an exchange of information. It isn't so much people as it is information and trying to share information that we feel the Russians would find useful and hopefully that would serve them in some way to become aware of some sort of terrorist activity that might be about to take place within their nation, that they could take action to stop before it happens. So it's information exchange, rather than people or things.

Q And particularly about the recent explosions of the apartment buildings, was there any help on that since they've exploded, and has the United States provided any particular specific --

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** Not so far. The Russian authorities are going through the aftermath of the explosions for clues, for any sort of information as to the type of explosive device used, any sort of indications that -- what do I have here, do I have criminal activity, do I have terrorist activity? And when they get that sorted out, if they wish to approach the United States and ask for some help, we'd be very receptive in that regard, I'm sure. It's a common cause. It's an area that we can agree on almost across the board.

Q Officials in Moscow, they believe that Osama bin Laden is behind all these terrorist activities in Russia.

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** I would refer you to the Russians that made those statements.

Q But they are saying they are now ready to work with Washington.

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** On that I would agree.

Q Doesn't this appear -- doesn't this have the signature of the tactics used against the United States, to put enormous amounts of explosives next to or in buildings? Isn't that the Osama bin Laden fingerprint?

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** Well, sadly, it's the fingerprint of a large number of terrorist organizations around the world. It's a pretty efficient way to do damage to large numbers of people and structures, unfortunately. So I don't think he's got sole claim to that.

Q Admiral, during his visit to Moscow, Secretary Cohen pledged U.S. assistance in tracking down those responsible for these specific bombings. Do you know, was he going beyond what has been a traditional relationship as of late in terms of intelligence sharing? Is he talking about anything else besides exchanging information?

ADM. **QUIGLEY:** I think if the Russians would come to us in this particular case, and if they would have some sort of exceptional request, I think that's what Secretary Cohen was referring to when he made that statement when he was in Russia. The exchange of information has been ongoing and long-standing. But if there is a particular request that the Russians would find particularly helpful to solve this, I think we'd be very receptive to saying yes, if it's at all within our power to do so.

Q The CIA last week released an unclassified estimate on missile threats, and one of the statements in that report was that Pakistan has M-11 missiles from China. This statement has been disputed by the State Department in order, apparently, to avoid sanctions on China.

The senior CIA official who briefed reporters referred people to the National Air Intelligence Center study which says that these missiles are, in fact, in Pakistan. Does the Pentagon have a view on whether Chinese M-11 missiles are in Pakistan?

ADM. **QUIGLEY**: Well, I think you're talking two issues. On the one hand, the State Department said that it's not enough to go sanctions because intelligence reports by themselves are not enough to impose sanctions or make a sanctions decision, Bill. But I'm not going to get into --

Q (Off mike) -- it's components versus missiles.

ADM. **QUIGLEY**: Yeah.

Q And the judgment is that the missiles are there. Is it the Pentagon's view that Pakistan has M-11 missiles as opposed to components or related technologies?

ADM. **QUIGLEY**: I'll have to take that question. I'll take that question.

Q A question on the --

ADM. **QUIGLEY**: Dale.

Q Admiral, Secretary Danzig went to the White House a week or so ago to deliver a briefing, as I understand it, on the situation on Vieques. And yesterday, a group, a delegation from Puerto Rico we see met with Secretary De Leon (sp) to discuss Vieques. Is there an attempt underway now to resolve the Vieques situation independent of the Rush panel? What is the Rush panel's status now? Has its report been delivered either in writing, or been any kind of informal briefing? Where are we on this thing?

ADM. **QUIGLEY**: Yesterday -- let me address yesterday's meeting first. That was a specific request by the governor knowing that the Rush panel report had not yet been delivered so that it could be very clear, the members of the governor's working group could make very clear their positions to Undersecretary De Leon (sp) on that issue before the Rush panel was published and it moves on up from Mr. Rush to Secretary Cohen and beyond. So the timing of that was very specific, Dale. I spoke to Mr. Rush yesterday morning. He's still working on it. I would expect it out in the near future, but I don't have a precise time line for you. Q A question on Iraq.

Yesterday the State Department issued a report on Saddam Hussein's Iraq. And he's getting, according to the report, much more stronger day by day, and food for oil is being sold, several shipments have been caught in Kuwait. So what is the future now as far as U.S. is concerned on the -- northern Iraq?

ADM. **QUIGLEY**: I'm not sure I understood your question. I'm sorry.

Q Right now his military and he is getting much more stronger than in the past.

ADM. **QUIGLEY**: This was in that report yesterday. Okay. All right.

Q And oil for food is being misused by him. Rather than feeding the babies, but spending on his military.

ADM. **QUIGLEY**: I don't think I can add anything to yesterday's report.

Q Thank you.

ADM. **QUIGLEY**: Thank you.

END

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Mr. WELDON. So in the public domain now we have two Federal agencies, the Defense Department and the FBI stating that this administration—and I don't think it should be the responsibility of the FBI or the Defense Department to ask the Russians, but both of them saying publicly, this administration hasn't asked the question.

Mr. Chairman, on January—or on October 22, and you have this in your files, I drafted a letter which was signed by myself and Jim Oberstar. Jim Oberstar is not exactly considered a wacko Member of the Congress. He is one of the most stable Democrats in the House. He's the ranking Democrat on the public works committee. Jim Oberstar and I signed this letter to Madeleine Albright saying have you asked the question of the Russians; and if you did, what was the response; and if you haven't asked the question, why haven't you. Today is January, what, the 22nd. No response from the administration, Mr. Chairman. Nothing.

Mr. Chairman, also in October of last year, I introduced legislation. And I just didn't go get Republican sponsors, Mr. Chairman, my bill which is H. Res. 380 which I have before you has 16 Republican sponsors and 16 Democrat sponsors. This is a bipartisan effort. And if any Member of Congress attempts to say this is partisan, or if the media tries to spin this as partisan I will refute it every step of the way. Sixteen Democrats and 16 Republicans cosponsored this bill, demanding that this administration come clean with the American people.

Mr. Chairman, up until this date we have no new information. Nothing. We have the State Department silent with their lips closed. My own hunch is when the FBI was told by the SIS back in 1992 and 1993 about the Mitrokhin files, Yeltsin was on the rise. All of us wanted Yeltsin to succeed. But this administration because of its special focus on Yeltsin and Clinton didn't want anything to surface that would perhaps call into question Yeltsin's leadership or what Soviet and Russia's intents were. So we didn't ask the question. And now 8 years later, they are between a rock and a hard place. In my opinion, my best guess is they didn't ask the question then, they haven't asked the question, and they're embarrassed to come forward and admit that today.

Now one final thought, Mr. Chairman. For those who would say that this is Russia of the past, I think by and large this kind of activity was in the former Soviet Union. But as someone who studies Russia on a daily basis, who travels to Russia frequently, and who knows the intricacies of the people in that country, I want to read to you, Mr. Chairman, from an internal Russian military publication dated July, August 1995.

Now Mr. Chairman, this is 3 years after the reforms of Yeltsin. This is after we became enamored with Russia's success which I'm very happy and support on a regular basis. In an article in a publication that is briefed to the highest leaders in the Russian military today—in fact the names of the people on the editorial board are people like Kokoshin, they're people like Kvashnin, the highest leaders in the Russian military. The article written by Colonel Kadetov is entitled, "The Employment of Special Task Forces Under Contemporary Conditions." In that article, Mr. Chairman, it says, that Russia should look—and this is 1995, mind you, Russia

should look to have reconnaissance, commando, and other special services equipped with compact nuclear ammunition, weapons, mines, explosives, and other special means and equipment which have substantially increased the capabilities of reconnaissance and other special groups and detachments.

Further down in this article, Mr. Chairman, the bottom of the page, 199, please bear with me on this statement.

Special task forces can be used not only in war, but also in peace time during a period of threat. This refers to those instances when armed confrontation between the sides has not taken on the scale of war or when the extent of military preparations by a potential enemy and a corresponding military danger have reached such limits beyond which aggression can be curbed only by taking preventative measures.

Mr. Chairman, this article goes into detail of Russia's current political thought of prepositioning military equipment including the possibility of nuclear devices on our soil. So for anyone who wants to trivialize this, I say come on. Let's have at it. I'm willing to use the words from Russians and from Russian materials to document what's taking place.

[The information referred to follows:]



# MILITARY THOUGHT

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*MILITARY THEORY AND PRACTICE***The Employment of Special Task Forces  
Under Contemporary Conditions***Colonel V.V. KADETOV*

ANALYSIS of military conflicts in recent years in various parts of the world shows that it is no longer possible to master new forms and methods of routing the enemy, or achieving other military and military-political objectives without taking into account the enhanced role and importance of special operations. However the military press has until recently given virtually no attention to matters of providing a theoretical substantiation for the combat employment of special task elements and units, with due consideration to the changes that have occurred in the recent period. And it is not at all secretiveness that is the problem. We believe that the reason for this lies in the underestimation of the capabilities and the role that are played and will continue to be played by special task forces in wars and military conflicts.

It is impossible to resolve this complex problem within the scope of just one article but, while noting its importance, we consider it essential to express our opinion on some basic aspects bearing on the combat employment of special task forces.

The importance of warfare in enemy rear areas, which has been growing in the past few decades, is related to scientific and technological advancement, thanks to which reconnaissance, commando, and other special services began to be equipped with compact nuclear ammunition, weapons, mines, explosives, and other special means and equipment which have substantially increased the capabilities of reconnaissance and other special groups and detachments. As a result, the damage inflicted on sensitive military and economic enemy installations on the theater of military operations not only by hundreds but even by tens of commando groups is comparable to losses from conventional means of warfare.

Actions by special detachments to search and destroy (incapacitate) missile launch pads, troop and weapon command and control points, communication nodes, and theater operational equipment and installations have become considerably more effective. Commando groups and units are also indispensable in fighting guerrilla, insurgent, and rebel formations, in the process of ensuring a state's internal security. Thus, when it was brought into Afghanistan, the 40th Army had only one special task company, but in 1985 it was already organized with two special purpose brigades, each comprising four special task battalions<sup>1</sup>.

The very structure of warfare has strengthened the inter-dependence of its components, increasing decisively the significance of the time factor in combat actions by troops and in ensuring their comprehensive support and logistics. Even outwardly insignificant malfunctioning and drawbacks in the command and control, weapon employment, communications, and supply systems, caused by purposeful subversive or sabotage actions are fraught with serious and sometimes even catastrophic consequences for the entire course of warfare.

With the advent of special task forces, conditions emerged for producing an adequate impact on the opposing side, when the task is to achieve not far-reaching but limited military-political objectives.

Special task forces can be used not only in war but also in peace time, during a period of threat. This refers to those instances when armed confrontation between

<sup>1</sup>Gromov B. V. Ogranichenny kontingent. — M.: AO Progress — Kultura Publishers, 1994. — P. 199.

the sides has not taken on the scale of war or when the extent of military preparations by a potential enemy and a corresponding military danger have reached such limits beyond which aggression can be curbed only by taking preventive measures. A special operation (special action), pursuing limited objectives and tasks but at the same time depriving the enemy of its active offensive and strike potential, can become a factor which, on terms favorable for Russia, will stop a further aggravation of the situation and will not allow combat actions to grow into a war or will put our troops into more favorable conditions for conducting operations with conventional forces and assets. Furthermore, considering the credibility, accuracy, and selectiveness of their effective engagement capabilities and the minimal harm caused to the civilian population, special task forces can be used when it is impossible or inexpedient to use conventional armed forces.

Special task forces, trained and prepared for action in specific geographic and ethnic areas (this includes the knowledge of the language and customs of the local population), can help achieve particular military-political objectives without directly involving Russian Armed Forces into the conflict.

Tactics by special task forces are adapted to changes that have occurred in the character of warfare. It is known, for example, what a problem it is for a commander to obtain reliable intelligence about the location of targets, and to ensure their guaranteed effective engagement. As the experience of local wars shows, under certain conditions, special task forces can play a decisive role in addressing them.

Talking about the character of tactical actions, it is important to stress that the maneuvering capabilities of combined arms units and elements are usually limited by the boundaries of defense or offensive sectors assigned to them. The tactics employed by special task forces, on the other hand, are more flexible, and there is no need to hold installations or sectors of terrain, which makes them more independent and less exposed.

The specifics of action by special task forces allow substantially to increase the effectiveness of conventional weapon systems. Special task forces use them with an element of surprise, on the most vulnerable spots, while procedures for employing them are for the most part predicated on the needs to execute an assigned mission and on some situational parameters, which, in our view, constitutes a substantial advantage compared to the tactics employed by other troops.

The importance of operations by special task forces has visibly grown with the creation of the Mobile Forces as part of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. It appears that their elements and units will, as a rule, be employed on territories that are insufficiently controlled operationally - even in unknown territories and in a hard-to-forecast situation. Therefore at the initial stage a large complex of preparatory measures will apparently need to be taken which should include reconnaissance, raiding and reconnaissance, and commando actions by special task forces. United by a common concept and plan, they are conducted both with the aim to provide support for combat actions by the Mobile Forces and also to carry out independent missions in destroying (incapacitating) key enemy targets.

The employment scale of special task forces is different. The tactical, operational, or even strategic significance of a special task element is determined not by the number of assets committed or by space or time parameters, like in other operations, but mainly by two special features: In the interests of which command and control body these actions are taken; and their result and impact on the situation or the decision-making process.

We believe that the immediate purpose of special task forces - action in enemy rear areas and the employment of special methods of action in accomplishing the combat missions assigned - warrants that these actions should be referred to as special, not specific.

Considering the scope of tasks and missions, the scale and length of action, the substance and methods of the combat employment of special task forces, their actions have assumed the form of an operation, or to be more accurate, a special operation.

Therefore, in view of the above, the following conclusions can be made.

**First.** The combat employment of special task forces should proceed in the form of a special operation which constitutes a combination of actions, coordinated by purpose, task, place, and time, conducted by special task groups or detachments in a strategic or operational sector, in a country of designation or in a particular area, according to a uniform concept and plan, with the aim to accomplish the set tasks.

**Second.** The special task detachments, units and elements that currently exist as part of the Ground Forces have all the hallmarks of a new, distinct combat arm and should be organized as a uniform special task force with their own command.

Special operations, in our opinion, can be directed and conducted by the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff, the special task force command, or the front (district) command according to a separate plan, or be an integral part of an operation by large composite army units. If they are conducted as part of other operations, they should be regarded not as a form of support but as an independent, self-sufficient component.

Special actions organized in the interests of units and elements can be a component part of their combat actions.

While considering special actions as an integral part of special operations, one should bear in mind that in world practice, including in the Russian Armed Forces, the term «operations» is normally applied with reference to all combat actions and activities by special task forces. Henceforth it is used in this double meaning.

We propose that special operations conducted by special task forces should be divided into the following types:

**Reconnaissance special operations**, aimed at obtaining pure reconnaissance information. This includes the procurement of intelligence, its processing, and transfer, usually without the group's location being detected. Intelligence is obtained by observation, monitoring, interception of enemy communications via technical communication means, and the search for a particular installation in a given area.

**Raiding and reconnaissance special operations**, whose main task is to seize prisoners of war, documents, samples of weapons, combat hardware, and other equipment. They are conducted by organizing ambushes, raids, hit and run attacks, and other special actions.

**Raiding special operations**, which envision inflicting damage on the enemy by destroying or incapacitating nuclear attack installations; ground, air, air defense, and navy targets, command and control points, and major industrial installations. Such operations are conducted by organizing ambushes, conducting raids, hit and run attacks, and subversive acts proper: explosive demolition, arson, and the destruction or damage of targets.

**Special operations in the interests of combat arms and services**, including the provision of general and direct support to other combat arms and services (primarily the Air Forces and the Air Defense Forces) in accomplishing their missions. Such operations are conducted in enemy rear areas by using combat hardware and other equipment organic to units and elements of various combat arms, branches, and services of the Armed Forces.

With respect to aviation, this includes traditional actions to ensure radio navigation support, to guide fixed and rotary wing aircraft, and to provide target marking and illumination.

The question of countering air targets over enemy territory jointly with the Air and Air Defense Forces, is approached in a basically new way. This involves not so much the air defense of special task groups or detachments, which is certainly also necessary, as active, purposeful actions by special task forces to search and destroy enemy aircraft and helicopters in the air, especially in areas around the airfields, by

using anti-aircraft means, primarily portable anti-aircraft missile systems. We felt the negative effects of this tactic in Afghanistan. We believe that reconnaissance of air targets can be singled out as a separate, distinct line of interaction with the Air Defense Forces.

Special operations to ensure a state's internal security, aimed at preserving or restoring constitutional order in the state as a whole or in its individual territories (districts). The essence of this type of operation consists of interdicting anti-state, subversive, terrorist, or any other acts by rebel, insurgent, or illegal armed formations aimed at changing the country's political or state structure by violent methods. Such operations are conducted in the form of assistance being rendered to the government and/or the armed forces of a foreign state in searching, blocking, seizing, disarming, or destroying (routing) said formations, bases, and their training camps, or through the direct conduct of such operations by special task forces. If need be, such operations are likewise organized on the territory of the Russian Federation.

Special operations to protect the property and rights of Russia and its citizens outside the Russian Federation, which are aimed at ensuring the actual observance of the status of installations owned by the Russian Federation or its citizens, as legalized under corresponding international treaties or other official documents, as well as ensuring the fulfillment by Russia and a given foreign state of its obligations in defending and observing human rights with respect to Russian Federation citizens.

We believe that such operations should include the following elements: unblocking and intensifying the protection and defense of installations; evacuation of Russian citizens and material values - if need be, in cooperation with other forces and assets; securing the release of citizens taken hostage or held by force for other reasons; and enforcing the implementation of rulings by judicial and other law enforcement bodies. All special means and methods available are used in such operations.

Search and rescue special operations, designed to ensure the return to the disposition of friendly forces or another safe place of Russian military servicemen who have been taken prisoner, reported missing, or for other reasons found themselves in enemy rear areas. In other words, this type of operation consists of discovering the location of camps and other places where war prisoners are held; releasing them from captivity; searching, sheltering, and evacuating flight crews shot down over enemy territory; and searching, in interaction with other state structures, for military servicemen and other citizens of the Russian Federation who were reported missing on the territory of a foreign state as a result of catastrophes or accidents of transport means, or for other reasons. Such operations are conducted via on-the-spot search, questioning of local residents, and other methods conducive to the implementation of the task at hand.

Psychological special operations, which aim to change in the requisite direction the emotional attitudes and behavior patterns of enemy (designated country or area) military servicemen or civilian population on certain military-political and other matters as well as to counter propaganda by the opposing side among own troops and civilians. This type of operation consists of demoralizing and confusing the enemy (armed formations) personnel, persuading it to stop resistance, to desert, surrender, and support opposition political activity; and shaping a favorable attitude toward the Russian army among the local population. The arsenal of means used for this purpose includes the dissemination of printed, audio, video, radio, and TV information, the operation of loudspeaker systems, personal work by psychological operations experts with prisoners of war and civilians, including in enemy rear areas.

Special operations to form, support, and ensure the combat employment of irregular forces, which presupposes the organization of warfare by irregular formations in the interests of addressing missions by the Russian Armed Forces or in the interests of the Russian Federation as a whole. We believe that this type of operations should include search for guerrilla and insurgent groups and

detachments, resistance organizations, and other forces conducting or ready to conduct combat action; rendering them assistance in supplying, training, and operating weapons and combat hardware and in combat and special training, and also conducting other actions in the interests of implementing the missions assigned to special task forces. Such operations are characterized by a broader employment of covert methods, work with secret agents, and liaison and interaction with the newly established power and civil administration bodies.

Auxiliary special operations, designed to ensure the security of such specific operations by the Russian Armed Forces as peacekeeping, the provision of humanitarian assistance to foreign states, fighting and neutralizing the effects of natural calamities, restoring civilian administrations, and conducting quarantine activities in zones of armed conflicts and other danger areas.

In conclusion it needs to be noted that the formation of special task forces is impossible without organizing the interaction of all state power structures that have organic special operations forces and assets. It would be expedient to create a Federal Special Operations Center, which would allow to avoid duplication in R&D projects, to work out uniform approaches toward planning and conducting some special operations, as far as possible to standardize many types of special weapons, hardware, equipment, and so forth. Furthermore, such a center could be used as a base for organizing the specialization, upgrading, and advanced training of special operations personnel.

At the same time a corresponding program needs to be worked out, whose implementation will require substantial efforts and will take up several years. The first organizational step could be the creation of a Special Operations Directorate under the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Apparently, such organizational measures are urgently needed also in other branches of the Armed Forces: the Air Forces and the Navy.

There is no doubt that the implementation of this program should begin with the creation of a legal basis for special operations. The discussion and adoption of corresponding legislative statutory enactments will give this type of army operations the status of state policy, and will contribute to a better preparation of special task forces, capable of executing most diverse missions in enemy rear areas.

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Mr. WELDON. I have two final things. I brought with me devices for those who say can't happen. This is an accelerometer, and this is a gyroscope. These have Russian markings on them. They were clipped off of Russian SSN 19 long-range missiles that were on Russian submarines that could hit the continental United States because of their range. These devices are prohibited from being exported. We caught the Russians transferring these to Iraq not once, not twice, but three times. We have more than one set. In fact, the number is classified but it's well over 100 sets of these devices. These were being transferred by Russia in direct violation of an arms control regime called the missile technology control regime.

When I was in Moscow the month after the Post reported the story, I asked our Ambassador at the time, Tom Pickering, what was the Russian response when you asked them about this transfer, he said, I haven't asked them yet. I said why haven't you asked them? That would be a violation of the MTCR. He said that's got to come from Washington, from the State Department, from the White House.

I wrote to President Clinton, Mr. Chairman. He wrote me back in March. Dear Congressman Weldon, what you're saying is of great concern to us. We read the Post story. And if it's true, you're right, it's a violation of the MTCR and we will take aggressive steps. But he went on to say we don't have any evidence.

Mr. Chairman, I give you the evidence. I know that agencies of this government have had the evidence since before the President wrote that letter. That's the problem that we're currently confronting. We don't have any credibility with the Russians, Mr. Chairman. They don't respect us because of the dishrag policy of this administration which wants to pretend that things aren't what they are. And that doesn't mean we have to back Russia into a corner. It means we have to deal with them from a position of strength, consistency and candor.

One final item if I might approach the Chair. I have a small atomic demolition device I would like to bring up for you.

Mr. BURTON. This is a mock-up, folks. Now, I hope that Congressman Weldon will explain who made this mock-up.

Mr. WELDON. Yes, I will. This device was made by a former CIA agent and it was made to the specifications that are in the public record and available that the Soviet Union would use to design a small atomic demolition munitions I have just documented General Sergeyev has admitted that they built. So these specs are not what our Department of Defense tried to trivialize, these are built to the specs of the former Soviet Union.

This is a device that would be typical of a 1 to 10 kiloton device. To give you a comparison, Hiroshima was about 15 to 16 kilotons. This would wipe out downtown L.A., would wipe out the hotel where I'm staying, where we're all staying, and all the buildings around. If you put this kind of a device in a stadium, it would kill 50,000 to 75,000 people. This device can be carried by one person. This is the device. We're talking about a uranium-fired and uranium-fueled device that would basically be encased inside of the metal pipe that would have the appropriate activation devices along with it. And the design is actually contained in the top of the briefcase.

Now, do we think that these devices are in fact buried in the United States? We have no way of doing that. But this is exactly what the Soviets had in mind. And according to the specs available in the public domain which we can provide for the record, Dr. Pry can assist in that effort, this is what the Soviet Union can't locate.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you for that outstanding presentation.

Now if anybody's hair is not gray, we'll turn to our colleague from California, Mr. Campbell, for an opening statement.

**STATEMENT OF HON. TOM CAMPBELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN  
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for bringing these hearings to California. You are to be complimented for realizing the importance of the issue and bringing it out to the people. So it's not just within the Washington context. My colleague from Pennsylvania, Curt Weldon, has a remarkable record of public service and nothing more important than what he's done in this field. It was because of his work that I became aware of the potential difficulties with the prepositioning of communications or weapons systems, whichever, because the communications systems could be booby trapped. And I, in my effort, have tried to bring the question home to California: Is there a risk? That was my question, which I hope we can get some beginnings of answers to, if not from the administration then possibly from witnesses.

The testimony that has been given in Curt Weldon's subcommittee on October 26 of last year builds the case. And here's the two large routes toward the conclusion that there are—is a high likelihood of prepositioning of communications or weapons in the State of California for two reasons. One because the sources are likely to be coming across the border at least in part by land, which is going to implicate our States that are on the land border; and second, that there are targets that were identified by these witnesses as likely targets which were located in California. And those are the two different streams that flow into this river of doubt as to whether there is a risk to the people of California.

Obviously, and I say this to a chairman from Indiana, all of us are concerned. No matter where it is, that's a given. But I wanted at least in this opening statement to focus a bit as to why it was so important for you to hold these hearings here and hopefully to get some attention to this very realistic and serious risk.

The possibility, by the way, could be simply a booby-trapped communications device. Indeed in my testimony I'm just going to stick with that example. Suppose that's all we were talking about. Mr. Chairman, you know we spend money because you and I serve on the International Relations Committee together, we spend money in Yugoslavia, we spend money in Africa, Zimbabwe where I recently visited, on demining. I'm glad that we do because some child might come across a mine in an area where it had been planted years before. This seems to me the minimum that we should do for our own people, to find out if there is a booby-trapped device.

All right. I mentioned the two streams flowing into the river. On the first Professor Hill's testimony—excuse me, Andrews' testimony on October 26, one method, perhaps the main method of bringing

arms and radio equipment into Western countries was via Soviet diplomatic bags. In the case of the United States, however, there are indications in KGB files that some of the equipment was smuggled across the Mexican and Canadian borders. First reason to worry about California because of our long border with Mexico.

Second, also from Professor Andrews' testimony, among the chief sabotage targets across the United States-Mexican border were military bases, missile sites, radar installations, and the oil pipeline code named Stark which ran from El Paso in Texas to Costa Mesa in California. Three sites in the California coast were selected for DRG landings, that's an acronym for the Russian word for these teams, that were instructed to preposition material of this nature. Together with large capacity caches in which to store mines, explosives, detonators, and other sabotage material. Second stream flowing into this river of doubt.

Third, from Mitrokhin's testimony himself and his quotation in the 60 Minutes presentation, so this is Mitrokhin himself speaking, the KGB plan went from the Mexican border in the south to the 49th parallel, the Canadian border, in the north. Andrew says, quoting Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin's most stunning revelation is that these targets across the United States in a KGB plan to knock out United States power supplies in case of a war. That's from testimony that Andrew gave quoting Mitrokhin, so it was not Mitrokhin himself, and I can correct myself, October 26, 1999.

In Nightline's research, as you know they did a special session on this, they pursued the Brainerd, MN possibility and concluded that other caches do exist. This is testimony on that program from some source they had. And I do not know whom. But a source they had that was able to get into the Mitrokhin files beyond what was disclosed into the Mitrokhin files in this book. And that source, which was revealed on Nightline identified Brainerd, MN.

My point about the danger to civilians is most clearly demonstrated by this description of what happened in Switzerland. From the book on the Mitrokhin files, late in 1998, the Swiss authorities began removing a radio cache in woods near Bern identified by Mitrokhin. So I'll pause just for a moment in the quote to say it's a radio cache. In and of itself one might not think all that dangerous. One might think well not a weapon. However, this radio cache which exploded when fired on by a water cannon, a spokesman for the Federal prosecutors office issued a warning that if any further caches were discovered they should not be touched, "anyone who tried to move the container would have been killed."

And the reference as well earlier is from page 365 of the "Sword and the Shield" and a reference from page 16, the Mitrokhin notes reveal similar KGB arms and radio caches, some of them booby trapped, scattered around much of Europe and North America.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Scarborough, that is the danger that I care about, that all of us care about. And I particularly bring it home to the situation here in California. It is likely because of its source from across the border, and it is likely because of the targets, for example that El Paso Costa Mesa pipeline, the military installations that were referred to in the Mitrokhin files.

Last, what have I done about it? I deserve nothing, no notice at all except to the extent that I am taking what your work and what

Mr. Weldon's work has done and asking a question you would for your own district in Indiana, you would for your district in Florida: Is there a risk here? What can we do? Let's find out. Accordingly, I wrote the Secretary of State after I had convinced myself on the basis of the evidence from the Weldon hearings, from the testimony that I've just read that it was appropriate—that it was appropriate to inquire because the risk to the people in my district or the people in California was not trivial.

I wrote on December 6, Mr. Chairman, and I asked most politely to Secretary Albright that she pursue this vigorously. I received—I also sent a letter to Sandy Berger and I sent a letter to Secretary of Defense Cohen. I received a reply—this is December 6. I received a reply only from Secretary Cohen.

Secretary Cohen said, Thank you for your letter requesting information about the location of Russian weapon caches within the United States. I have asked the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Mr. Walt Slocum, to promptly address this request; and he will get back to you as soon as possible. With best wishes, I am Secretary Bill Cohen.

Knowing of this hearing, Mr. Chairman, I want to emphasize this because fairness is a very important characteristic in anything as important as this. One must be careful in saying this is a concern to all Democrats, Republicans alike.

I wrote again knowing of this hearing, and so I said to Sandy Berger, Madeleine Albright, and Bill Cohen, in a letter of January 13: On January 24, 2000, the House Committee on Government Reform will be holding a field hearing in Los Angeles on exactly this issue. I would be grateful if you would respond to my letter prior to this hearing so that I may submit the administration's possession in this matter to the committee for the record.

Mr. Chairman, I received no response at all.

And I'm going to conclude now with a description of an interchange for which you were present when we were both in the International Relations Committee and Madeleine Albright, Secretary Albright testified in this particular context it was about the war in Yugoslavia. I think you'll remember, Mr. Chairman, that I was very vigorous in trying to assert the role of Congress in that matter that it was a war and that it should not have been prosecuted without the approval of Congress as per our Constitution. I asked Secretary Albright, Mrs. Albright, are we at war with Yugoslavia? She said no. I said, we're not at war? She said no. I said, what is it then? She said it was armed conflict.

The next day she had her Assistant Secretary come up and I asked her are we at war she said no we are in armed conflict. I said, what's the difference between armed conflict or not just armed conflict and war but armed conflict and hostilities because hostilities is in the War Power Act. And she said, wait a minute, I'll get the attorney for the State Department. She then turned around and brought up the attorney for the State Department who testified in essence that it was armed conflict if the President said it was armed conflict; it was hostilities if the President said it was hostilities.

This is circumlocution. This is a disservice to the high Office of Secretary of State. And to fail to reply at all to sincere inquiries relative to the safety of my and your constituents is a disservice to the American public.

I thank you for holding these hearings, Mr. Chairman.

[The information referred to follows:]

TOM CAMPBELL  
15TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA  
COMMITTEE ON BANKING  
AND FINANCIAL SERVICES  
SUBCOMMITTEES  
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS  
AND CONSUMER CREDIT  
HOUSING & COMMUNITY  
OPPORTUNITY  
COMMITTEE ON  
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AND TRADE  
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Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
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The Honorable William S. Cohen  
Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Cohen:

I respectfully request that you pursue vigorously any evidence that arms and high explosives, including nuclear weapons, may have been buried in strategic locations around the country by the Russian or Soviet Governments; and specifically in my state of California.

On November 16, 1999, I joined Congressman Weldon in introducing H.Res. 380, a resolution expressing the sense of Congress that the President be required to certify whether the United States has requested, and the Russian government has provided, information concerning the location and removal of such weapons caches placed in the U.S. by the Russian or Soviet governments. This bill also urges the President to prepare a plan to find and remove any military equipment or bombs placed by the Russian or Soviet governments on U.S. territory.

Our concern stems from findings in the recently published book, *The Sword and the Shield*, by intelligence expert Christopher Andrew and KGB defector Vasilii Mitrokhin. Among the more troubling accounts of KGB operations during the Soviet era and contemporary Russia is the documented plan of pre-deploying arms and high explosives in buried sites throughout Europe and across the United States.

While the exposure of the KGB's plans to pre-position military hardware has led to the unearthing of weapons caches in both Switzerland and Belgium, similar sites in the United States have not been found. At present, it seems that there is inadequate documented information about the exact locations of these sites. It is critical, therefore, that every effort be made to find and remove these potentially dangerous weapons in order to protect our citizens. I formally request that you vigorously pursue answers as to where these weapons caches are located and what steps will be taken to remove them safely.

I look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,

Tom Campbell  
Member of Congress

cc: Honorable Curt Weldon, Member of Congress  
Honorable Dan Burton, Member of Congress



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

DEC 13 1999

The Honorable Tom Campbell  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515-0515

Dear Tom:

Thank you for your letter requesting information about the location of Russian weapon caches within the United States. I have asked the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Mr. Walt Slocombe, to promptly address this request and he will get back to you as soon as possible.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "D. ...".

TOM CAMPBELL  
15TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA  
COMMITTEE ON BANKING  
AND FINANCIAL SERVICES  
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AND CONSUMER CREDIT  
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Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives

January 13, 2000

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The Honorable William S. Cohen  
Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Secretary Cohen,

Thank you for your reply of December 16, 1999, to my written request that you vigorously pursue any evidence that arms and high explosives, including nuclear weapons, may have been buried in strategic locations around the country by the Russian or Soviet Governments, specifically in my state of California. I have attached a copy of my December 6, 1999, letter for your reference.

In your reply, you state that you have referred my inquiry to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Mr. Walt Slocombe. To date, I have not received any response from Mr. Slocombe.

On January 24, 2000, the House Committee on Government Reform will be holding a field hearing in Los Angeles, CA, on exactly this issue. I would be grateful if you would contact Mr. Slocombe to encourage him to respond to my letter prior to this hearing so that I may submit the Department of Defense's position in this matter to the Committee for the record.

I look forward to your response, Mr. Secretary, at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,

Tom Campbell  
Member of Congress

TC:cb  
enclosure  
cc: Honorable Dan Burton  
Honorable Curt Weldon



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

JAN 19 2000

Honorable Tom Campbell  
House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Congressman Campbell:

Thank you very much for your letter concerning the allegation that explosives or nuclear weapons may have been buried in the US by the Soviet or Russian governments.

I have referred your request through my staff to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which has jurisdiction and the lead for investigation of threats of this kind. Although, as you mention in your letter, no evidence of such an occurrence in the US has yet emerged, the Department of Defense remains sensitive to its possibility.

During his September meeting in Moscow with Russian Minister of Defense Sergeyev, Secretary Cohen underscored the importance the United States attaches to the reduction of nuclear arms, the dismantlement of delivery systems and the control of nuclear materials. These remain paramount defense goals with regard to Russia.

Thank you again for your letter and your support of our national security.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Walter B. Slocombe".

Walter B. Slocombe



TOM CAMPBELL  
15TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA  
COMMITTEE ON BANKING  
AND FINANCIAL SERVICES  
SUBCOMMITTEES:  
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS  
AND CONSUMER CREDIT  
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Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
December 6, 1999

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The Honorable Madeleine K. Albright  
Secretary of State  
Department of State  
2201 C Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Secretary Albright:

I respectfully request that you pursue vigorously any evidence that arms and high explosives, including nuclear weapons, may have been buried in strategic locations around the country by the Russian or Soviet Governments; and specifically in my state of California.

On November 16, 1999, I joined Congressman Weldon in introducing H.Res. 380, a resolution expressing the sense of Congress that the President be required to certify whether the United States has requested, and the Russian government has provided, information concerning the location and removal of such weapons caches placed in the U.S. by the Russian or Soviet governments. This bill also urges the President to prepare a plan to find and remove any military equipment or bombs placed by the Russian or Soviet governments on U.S. territory.

Our concern stems from findings in the recently published book, *The Sword and the Shield*, by intelligence expert Christopher Andrew and KGB defector Vasili Mitrokhin. Among the more troubling accounts of KGB operations during the Soviet era and contemporary Russia is the documented plan of pre-deploying arms and high explosives in buried sites throughout Europe and across the United States.

While the exposure of the KGB's plans to pre-position military hardware has led to the unearthing of weapons caches in both Switzerland and Belgium, similar sites in the United States have not been found. At present, it seems that there is inadequate documented information about the exact locations of these sites. It is critical, therefore, that every effort be made to find and remove these potentially dangerous weapons in order to protect our citizens. I formally request that you vigorously pursue answers as to where these weapons caches are located and what steps will be taken to remove them safely.

I look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,

Tom Campbell  
Member of Congress

cc: Honorable Curt Weldon, Member of Congress  
Honorable Dan Burton, Member of Congress

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Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives

January 13, 2000

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The Honorable Madeleine K. Albright  
Secretary of State  
Department Of State  
2201 C Street N.W.  
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Secretary Albright,

I write once again to ask that you vigorously pursue any evidence that arms and high explosives, including nuclear weapons, may have been buried in strategic locations around the country by the Russian or Soviet Governments, specifically in my state of California. I have attached a copy of my December 6, 1999, letter for your reference.

On January 24, 2000, the House Committee on Government Reform will be holding a field hearing in Los Angeles, CA, on exactly this issue. I would be grateful if you would respond to my letter prior to this hearing so that I may submit the Department of State's position in this matter to the Committee for the record.

I look forward to your response, Madame Secretary, at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,

Tom Campbell  
Member of Congress

TC:cb  
enclosure  
cc: Honorable Dan Burton  
Honorable Curt Weldon

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Mr. Samuel R. Berger  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Berger:

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Congress of the United States  
 House of Representatives

January 13, 2000

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Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Campbell, Mr. Weldon. With the consent of my colleague, Mr. Scarborough, we'll go with 10 minute rounds of questions. I'll give you 10 minutes. Let me—can you set this for 10 minutes so that we—and we may go more than one round depending on whether we cover everything.

I read the large part of the book, and one of the things that struck me in addition to the nuclear devices being in briefcases weighing about 60 pounds was that it was said that they also made those devices in different forms. They could make them in forms that looked like bricks or rocks or something else. Did anybody ever express that to you that it might just be a briefcase-type weapon?

Mr. WELDON. Yes, Mr. Chairman, that was expressed. And I think if you ask that question of Mr. Lunev, you'll get his personal response as to what he thought it could perhaps look like. I think he'll elaborate on that. But there in fact were "Spetsnaz" training manuals that identify these kinds of devices in a number of forms, not just the kind of formal briefcase that I brought today, but that they could be placed and be hidden and not known to be in fact what they were. So your answer is yes, that there were other types of devices, some larger, some smaller. And you know, the other added dimension here is we talk about reducing arms repeatedly between us and Russia. Russia has an overwhelming advantage to us on tactical nuclear weapons. Tactical nukes. And they admit that. And we admit that publicly. I mean, they have a huge advantage over America on the number of tactical nukes none of which are regulated by treaty by the way. Tactical nukes are not very far away from what we're talking about with small atomic demolition munitions, which you're saying and has been said by Russian experts could, in fact, have been camouflaged.

Mr. BURTON. I would like to followup on one thing that you said in your opening statement you said that was it Yablikov?

Mr. WELDON. Alexei Yablikov.

Mr. BURTON. Forgive me if I don't pronounce these names correctly. He said, as I recall, that many of these devices were for external use.

Mr. WELDON. He said that his colleagues and his peers who were academic scientists and researchers told him they were working on these devices in the Soviet era, that they were being built not just for the Ministry of Defense but also for the KGB. And the design of these devices was to be used wherever Russia needed them both internally and externally.

Mr. BURTON. So when they built these 132 nuclear devices, the briefcase-like device that you showed me, they intended for them to be used for internal civil disorders, I presume, as well as external threats to the Soviet Union?

Mr. WELDON. Absolutely. In fact, there was an allegation made by Dudayev in the first Chechen conflict that he had, in fact, a small atomic demolition device, and if you read the book *One Point Safe* by Andrew and Leslie Cockburn, which I have asked the CIA to refute and they have not done that publicly, there is a chapter dedicated to the United States taking that charge so seriously that we sent agents to work with the Russians to find out whether or

not Dudayev did in fact have a small atomic demolition device. That's how seriously we took that allegation.

Mr. BURTON. Now, they said that they were going to destroy all of these 132 nuclear devices by the year 2000, but only 48 can be accounted for. That means, according to my mathematics, about 84 are still unaccounted for.

Mr. WELDON. Well, again, Lebed was the top security adviser to Yeltsin. So he had the full weight of the Presidency to go out and find these devices. And he said—I mean, he gave us the exact number, and he said they can only locate 48 and had no idea where the rest were. It was the defense minister who told me in the subsequent meeting in December after his government had denied they ever built them that, yes, they would have them all destroyed.

Mr. Chairman, I want to add one comment for the record about Lebed's credibility. For those who might say, well, you can't really trust what Lebed's saying; for those who study Russia they know that when Yeltsin appointed Putin, he interviewed three people for that position. Just 2 months ago, one of the three people he interviewed was Aleksandr Lebed. So for those who are going to try to take apart Lebed's credibility, the Russian President just before he appointed Putin as his successor interviewed Lebed, and I think that was because the Chechen war went sour and Putin's credibility went down, Lebed would be a credible alternative who had a strong figure image in Russia.

Mr. BURTON. We don't know how many sites there are or could be in North America or Canada, but as the chief potential adversary of the Soviet Union time conflict, it is logical to assume that there would be numerous sites in the United States and that there's a real possibility that if they were going to export these nuclear devices for external use that they would be placed here in the United States someplace.

Mr. WELDON. I would say scores and scores, if not hundreds and hundreds, all over this country. They named a number of States in the files that Mitrokhin was able to get documented. Unfortunately, he didn't take the time to get the specific locations.

You know—and I asked that question of Dr. Andrew, why didn't Mitrokhin get the specific locations. He said, Congressman, you have to understand. Mitrokhin's hatred of the KGB was primarily because of what the KGB was doing to Russian people, and that's where he went to extensive documentation and the vast web of sympathizers that the Communist party had outside of Russia, and that's what the bulk of this is about. The location of these devices wasn't one of Mitrokhin's top priorities. That wasn't what was of interest to him, but he did copy down some of those files, but only in four of them went down to the specific detail. Unfortunately, all of those four sites were in Europe.

Mr. BURTON. It also mentioned—in the book it was mentioned that the Spetsnaz troops which are the premier, I guess it would be equivalent to our Delta force troops or I don't know what would be another analogy, but our top elite troops who are capable of using all kinds of methods to kill people—that they were getting dossiers on American leaders and politicians so that in time of conflict they could eradicate them more or kill them.

Mr. WELDON. Again, Lunev will testify to that. He testified before my committee on that issue. In addition, Gordievsky, the highest ranking KGB officer whoever defected, who was the bureau chief in London, said the same thing. I think it's important you keep reiterating, as you've been doing, as we've been following through, these statements are from the mouths of Russians. These are not—

Mr. BURTON. They're not just low level. High level.

Mr. WELDON. These are the highest level officials in the Russian intelligence service and the Russian military, some of whom are still in Russia today, Mr. Chairman. Lebed is the Governor of Krasnoyarsk, who was just interviewed for the top job in the Russian Government.

Mr. BURTON. Let me ask you one final question, and that is—and I think this is extremely important for anybody who's paying attention to this issue, as everybody ought to be. We ought to have all 235 or 240 million Americans paying attention to this issue, and that is, that you talked to the FBI and other agencies of the government, you talked to Louis Freeh; and they told you that nobody has asked the former Soviet Union and the now Russian leadership any questions about these possible sites in the United States. Nobody to your knowledge has asked any questions about if these sites exist and where they exist.

Mr. WELDON. Two Federal agencies—it wasn't Louis Freeh himself. The FBI said to me personally and the Defense Department said publicly in a press conference that we have not yet asked the Russians the questions. I don't blame either of those agencies. I don't think it's their responsibility to ask the Russians. I think it's the State Department's responsibility or President Clinton in his relationship with Boris Yeltsin, and why they haven't done that—I've given you my own best estimate as to why—but I think this country should demand and hopefully through your committee will demand this administration come clean with the American people. If they're so worried about land mines, as my colleague Mr. Campbell so eloquently stated, you hear people talking about land mines. We've got, according to what's happened in Switzerland, land mines over America.

Mr. BURTON. And possibly 84 nuclear weapons.

Mr. WELDON. And possibly.

Mr. BURTON. Let me ask Mr. Campbell a few questions.

What sites in California—I don't know if you've done any research on this—but what sites in California other than those that you enumerated do you think would be of great concern if there were devices of this type planted here in California?

Mr. CAMPBELL. My source is going to be as described in the testimony of the—from the Mitrokhin files, and that indicated strategic targets for civil disturbance to create havoc in the event of a war, in the event of a war, and the particular subjects were military bases, gas and petroleum pipeline as likely, and then naturally those closer to the border because the possibility of bringing them across and then repositioning once they're across was suggested. So those would be the most likely. But I repeat that the key here is somebody knows. This is remarkable. Somebody does know; and therefore, why don't we use our diplomatic efforts to find out?

Mr. BURTON. One of the things that concerns me every time I come to California—I love this State. It's a beautiful State. You have great recreational facilities. When I land at LAX, I'm always afraid there's going to be a terrible earthquake and the San Andreas Fault is going to split, and we're all going to go into the ocean. Kidding of course, but the fact of the matter is, if a major nuclear device of the 10 kiloton range was set off in close proximity to one of the major fault areas, I wonder how that would affect not only that particular area but also the entire possibility of an earthquake that would go further.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I don't have the expertise to answer that question. I'm nowhere near a seismologist, but every Californian is an amateur seismologist, Mr. Chairman; but I don't have the expertise to answer it. I'll take your question and look at it through the microscope as opposed to the telescope end, and I would say that the fact that we do have shifting geology means that it's a distinct possibility that some of these locations might never be identified. That was in the Mitrokhin—that was in the Hill book—excuse me, the Andrew book regarding one of the European sites in Belgium, that they were not able to find it because there had been road work and reconstruction and change in the topography, so all the more so.

So I won't answer your first question because I just lack the expertise, but I would say being able to identify where a place was is not—10, 15 years ago may not get you all that you need to be when the ground shifts.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Scarborough.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, might I offer one last thought?

Mr. BURTON. Sure.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Then I'd love to hear from my colleague from Florida. We have in the Congress a mechanism for solving and dealing with these problems. We do. If there are high-level, highly confidential communications between our Government and another, it can be shared with the Intelligence Committee, and you know how this works. I think it's important to emphasize that, that no one here is saying to our administration do anything which would jeopardize secure communications, but to give no answer at all, just to present almost an arrogant refusal to answer the question that a Congressman might ask on behalf of his constituents is unacceptable; and if instead the letter I'd gotten back was to say this is a matter we need to take up with the Intelligence Committee where it will stay in camera, where there is representation of both parties, I would have been absolutely satisfied.

Mr. WELDON. And so would I, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Scarborough.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Thank you. But moving beyond that though, if in fact there are possibly nuclear devices in the State of California, do not Californians also have a right to know where those devices were planted?

Mr. CAMPBELL. I do understand a public security, public safety concern that if the matter becomes so grave as that that it be handled with delicacy, but it has to be handled by someone. It's not acceptable, not even to make an inquiry and then not even to give an answer to a Congress Member who asks.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. And Congressman Campbell, you spoke of the possibility of these devices being used in the event of war, but Congressman Weldon, didn't you talk about the possibility of these devices even being used outside of war by again quoting that 1995 document?

Mr. WELDON. Absolutely, Mr. Scarborough.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. And if you could again highlight that because it sounds as if Russian military officials in 1995 were advocating nothing less than nuclear blackmail to prevent results on the international scale that could be negative to the country.

Mr. WELDON. Mr. Scarborough, you're absolutely correct. The document says the importance of warfare in enemy rear areas is what it talks about; and it goes through, and it mentions compact nuclear ammunition, weapons, mines, explosives and other special means, and it goes down to the other paragraph, as I said before, special task forces as stated above can be used not only in war but also in peacetime during a period of threat. And who determines the period of threat?

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Right. And when you talk about these special op forces, again what are you talking about? Are you talking about them possibly placing these nuclear devices throughout California? Somebody said Shenandoah Valley, also.

Mr. WELDON. Weapons of mass destruction. It could be some kind of biological agent. When we had—it was either Lunev or Gordoyevski talk about the use of chemical and biological, because we also had another witness come in who ran the Russian biological weapons program for about 10 years, and Peter, his name—the book, Biohazard, I can't think of his name.

Ms. KATZIN. It was Ken Alibeck.

Mr. WELDON. Ken Alibeck. Ken Alibeck, who was again here under an assumed name in America, testified as the person who ran the Soviet biological weapons program that they used these weapons against their own people—he was part of it—and he said it was no doubt in his mind that there were intents to use those same materials in this country. Now, we didn't cover that as part of this hearing, but that's another Russian. That's not an American saying that. It's Dr. Ken Alibeck saying it, and his book basically documents that. His book is called "Biohazard."

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. You all have both studied I would guess in the intelligence arena and in the armed service arena, you've studied these areas also, haven't you, as far as the impact of biological warfare on American cities?

Mr. WELDON. Mr. Scarborough, my committee's assignment is to chair the Resource and Development Committee for national security which means my subcommittee oversees about \$36 billion a year of defense spending, a significant portion of which is used to develop research programs and new capability to detect and deal with weapons of mass destruction: biological, chemical, and nuclear.

Mr. CAMPBELL. And my responsibility is on the International Relations Committee, not the Intelligence Committee, but in the IR Committee, we have held hearings on precisely the question you raised.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. And could you simplify for somebody that's not looked into the biological weapons—I mean, we hear this anecdotal evidence. We hear of an airplane flying at 1,000 feet over a city or 3,000 feet over the city dropping particles that could kill everybody in Washington, DC, or Los Angeles, CA. Is there the possibility of doing that also on the ground by these devices, and could you briefly explain?

Mr. WELDON. Absolutely. In fact, it's happened. There was a terrorist group in Japan a few years ago that used Sarin and wiped out the whole first responder group coming into a subway because they didn't know what they were facing. When Aliback testified again before the Congress in an open hearing, he said that was his job. As the head of the Soviet biological weapons program, his job was to develop—and they developed over 150 strains of biological agents that could be used against adversaries or even used against Soviet citizens which he and Gordoyevski both have testified has been done in the past.

So now we're talking about probably one of the three gravest threats we face in this century, that along with missile proliferation and cyber-terrorism and the need for us to establish information dominance. They are the three biggest threats we face because weapons of mass destruction are here. I mean, we know that at the World Trade Center bombing, there were actually two devices there. The first device destroyed the garage area. Thank goodness the second device didn't go off because it would have penetrated the HVAC system in that complex.

I mean, there are those who want to cause havoc in America, and biological and chemical agents are a weapon of choice today because they're relatively easy to make and the technology has been worked on for years by the Russians. In fact, their stockpiles are overwhelming. When Alexi Yablokov testified, he said for arms control purposes, we estimate the amount of chemical weapons that Russia has to be 40,000 metric tons, and Yablokov said he's personally aware that they produced over 100,000 metric tons. So where's the rest? We just don't know.

Mr. CAMPBELL. And I would only add to that that the enclosed space is the danger which obviously made the Japanese subway the target that it was for that particular terrorist group. The problem is enclosed space also describes almost every high rise built in the last 20 years. As you go more and more to sealed windows, the possibility of a biological agent spreading through an enclosed space, subway or high rise, makes it a very—an exceptionally dangerous possibility for a weapon of mass destruction.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Congressman Campbell, you are without a doubt considered one of the most thoughtful Members of Congress, and sometimes it's maddening to some people in leadership who would like you to grab a torch and follow the crowd into battle, but you've remained remarkably independent in Washington and you just don't demagogue, and so with that as a preface, I'm going to ask you a pretty tough question that I would expect the answer a certain way from other Members, but I know, again, you're a straight shooter.

Let me ask you, as somebody who represents the people of California, do you believe that Californian citizens are in danger of

coming in contact with weapons of mass destruction because of the information that Mr. Weldon and you and others have brought to this committee?

Mr. CAMPBELL. I want to thank you for your kind words in the premise of your question. I want to say that my duty is to the people I represent, and the evidence that I've seen is what led me to ask for this hearing, to go to Chairman Burton, to study the material that Curt Weldon had prepared. It's no different than you'd do for the people of Florida or people in your district.

It is, in my judgment, distinctly possible that there are prepositioned communications devices at a minimum. It is, in my judgment, highly likely that those prepositioned communications devices are booby-trapped because they were, the ones that we checked, that were checked out were, and aging booby traps, as we know from our knowledge of land mines, are unstable, and people can innocently run across them. So I'm going to be cautious. I'm going to be very cautious and say that what I have just described is, in my view, a realistic risk. The possibility of danger to innocent people who come across a booby-trapped communications cache or cache of whatever or the simple aging and deterioration thereof creates an important matter of potential risk to alleviate which the administration ought to at least answer a polite question.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. And Congressman Weldon, this will be my last question. I'll ask you the same question I asked Congressman Campbell. Are the people of Los Angeles and the people of the State of California in danger because of the information that's been brought before this committee?

Mr. WELDON. Absolutely, and that's according to General Alexander Lebed who told me that. It's according to Alexi Yablokov who told me that. It's according to Stanislav Lunev who told me that. It's according to Dr. Christopher Andrew who told me that. It's according to Oleg Gordievsky who told me that, and it's according to people that I worked with in Russia who say that we need to understand there are those in the past of the Soviet history who had very unbelievable intents against America and its people. Now, that being said, do I think all Russia's our enemy? Absolutely not. And do I work at developing strong relations? Absolutely.

Just in closing, I'd like to add one final thought if I might to both Mr. Scarborough's comment, and Mr. Chairman, your leadership. This does not have to be a case where it's us backing Russia into a corner. We give Russia—the American people give Russia \$1 billion a year through the cooperative threat reduction program, through the laboratory to lab cooperation program, through programs involving agricultural assistance, through help for their nuclear waste, through programs involving economic development, all of which, by the way, I support. I'm an active supporter of all of them, but we give them \$1 billion a year. It's a simple thing of the administration asking the tough questions, and I think that's why I said at the beginning I think this is an example of this administration's policy failures.

They have never wanted to ask the tough questions. They've never wanted to ask about the IMF funds that the oligarchs stole. They never wondered that the Russians lost respect because we supported Yeltsin, even though that they knew that Yeltsin's cro-

nies and his daughter were stealing money. It's a question of the arms control treaty violations, 17 of them, that we never called Russia on. In each case it's been the same. We don't want to ask the question as a Nation, and now we are paying a price for that.

And in this case I agree with Mr. Campbell's assessment. He is always—and I agree with you, he's the most thoughtful Member we have in the Congress in both parties, and I think all of our colleagues would agree with that, that Tom is taking the conservative threat that we're so enamored with this idea of land mines. Well, what are we talking about? A land mine to the extent that the Swiss Government had to put out an alert for all their people. That's reality. This is not some made up idea or some movie. This is what really occurred; and therefore, this administration owes the American people and the Congress a response. And I thank you two for leading the effort to demand that response.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. I thank you, and Mr. Chairman, I thank you. And I certainly believe that if Californians are in danger, as well as people in Indiana and Florida, then the administration should step forward and ask the difficult questions. I'd like to yield back.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much, Congressman Scarborough. What I'd like to do now is take about a 5 to 10 minute break so Mr. Lunev can be brought into the room in a secure situation. We have to put up a panel around him. I'd like to also ask Mr. Campbell and Mr. Weldon, without objection, to join us on the dais because of their expertise, so they can help us ask questions of Mr. Lunev. We also will have Dr. William Green and Dr. Peter Pry come forward as well so they can be part of that panel. So we'll take a recess here for about 5 to 10 minutes to get the security in place.

[Recess.]

Mr. BURTON. Would Dr. William Green and Dr. Peter Pry also come forward, please, and Dr. Pry, your seat is over to my left, and Dr. Green, there you are. I won't ask Mr. Lunev to stand up because his head is going to be above the partition. Would the other two please rise and raise your right hands please, and would you raise your right hand?

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. BURTON. Thank you. You may be seated.

Let me just say before we start the statements by the witnesses that some people of the media have indicated that we might be trying to create paranoia and a new cold war. That could not be further from the truth. Congressman Weldon stated very clearly that it is extremely important that we try to have a good relationship with the Russian people and the Russian Government.

At the same time that that is important, it's also important for us to know whether or not there's any threat to American citizens on American soil, and that's why we're holding these hearings. It's incumbent upon Members of Congress to try to protect—in fact, we have a constitutional obligation to try to protect the security of American citizens, and so it's important that we have these hearings to try to make sure the American people know what's going on.

Abraham Lincoln said—and he was a pretty good President—let the people know the facts and the country will be saved. It's just

as true today as it was back then. So I'm distressed that some members of the media are thinking we're trying to scare everybody to death. We're not trying to do that. We're trying to get the facts out so that we know that if there's nothing to fear, there's nothing to fear; and if there is, that we get it cleaned up.

OK. I think we'll start with Colonel Lunev, and I'd like to say before Colonel Lunev starts to speak that this is not his real name. He is in the witness protection program with the—you say the FBI and CIA together. In fact, I'll ask him that question in a minute and—but he is, as I said, a very high official, the highest GRU official that's defected to the United States. So we'll start with you, Mr. Lunev.

**STATEMENTS OF STANISLAV LUNEV, FORMER GRU OFFICER, AUTHOR OF "THROUGH THE EYES OF THE ENEMY;" WILLIAM GREEN, CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY—SAN BERNADINO, NAVAL RESERVES INTELLIGENCE OFFICER; AND PETER VINCENT PRY, FORMER EMPLOYEE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, AUTHOR OF "WAR SCARE"**

Mr. LUNEV. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

Mr. BURTON. Would you speak—pull the microphone as close to you as you can.

Mr. LUNEV. First of all, thank you for inviting me for so beautiful place like Los Angeles. Of course, weather is a little bit different from East Coast now which is under ice and snow, you know, and, of course, I would like to spend few of your minutes, especially to explain you my position about all this—actually, very dangerous stuff which unfortunately is in place now in time when former Soviet Union doesn't exist about one decade.

For me, it was really surprise that after I wrote my book, actually after publishing of this book, that American people know so little about possible danger for the national security of this country. Last year when I began to work for one of the Internet companies, its name is newsmag.com, I had a chance to give a lot of radio and TV interviews to different people, and it's one more to underscore my point about shortage of knowledge of American people about national security of this country.

First of all, I need to return back to history because in time of former Soviet Union existence, Soviet General staff designed special plan for the future war against America and American friends and allies worldwide. According to this plan, Soviet special operation forces commanders need to come to this country and other NATO countries in few days, maybe hours, before real war would be in place, like students, tourists, visitors, businessmen, by regular airlines, and before real war would be in place, they need to pick up weapons systems which are already located in this country, including technical nuclear devices. This is—official name is technical portable atomic demolition devices, containers with chemical and biological weapons, conventional weapons system, communication devices, actual money, credit cards, documentation, which are already storage in this country, and in few hours or minutes before regular nuclear missile strike will hit American soil, this special operation forces commanders will pick up this weapons system,

move this weapons system to their area of operational use, and we will destroy economical and military political infrastructure of this country; first of all, targets which could not be destroyed by regular missile nuclear strike.

And in fulfillment of these duties they have to destroy power stations, communications system of this country, physically eliminate American leaders who are involved in military chain of command. It means President, Vice President, Speaker of the House, chairman of the leading committees of the U.S. Congress, joint chief of staff members and other people, and especially not to provide them possibility to escape from the ground in time when real war would be in place. After this, regular missile nuclear strike and ground operation, ground invasion in European countries against NATO and final stage amphibious operation and invasion to the United States.

Of course, you understand that this is history, but I need to tell you that history is history, but unfortunately, just now a situation is not very good, and these military plans are still existent in Russian General staff, and these military plans in time of possible war would be fulfilled by special operation forces commanders, by strategic forces or Russian Federation exclude only one last part of this plan, because in time after this plan was designed by Soviet General staff, nuclear weapons systems have developed so much that actually nobody will need to invade on the territory or foreign countries because NATO countries' territory and American territory could be totally destroyed by nuclear weapons system, and if something could not be destroyed by nuclear weapons, you know how many millions of looters will come to this country and they will finish actually all this destruction process.

And just now what we are talking about, location of technical nuclear devices, containers with chemical biological weapons, conventional weapons system and others, these places we have selected extremely carefully for a long, long period of time, and to believe that it is possible to find this places just like that without using extremely, extremely large resources of this country, I don't think that it would be realistic until Russian Government, which still have keys for these locations will not disclose this location.

And it was one of my major points when I wrote book that by publication of my book I would keep informed Russian military leaders that it is not secret anymore about this weapons existence and location outside of Russian Federation, and I hope that after this book publication, these devices could be removed from America and other territories of American friends and allies and returned to Russia. Unfortunately, until now, I do not have any real news that it's happened, and just now I can only to think about that these weapons systems are still existent on American soil and on the territory of American friends and allies.

Thank you for your time, ladies and gentlemen.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Lunev.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lunev follows:]

Testimony for the Government Reform Committee  
January 24, 2000

Stanislav Lunev

Good morning and thank you Chairman and Committee members for inviting me. It is a privilege to testify before this Committee today on existing threats to the national security of the United States. I am grateful for the opportunity to educate you as best I can, based on my lifelong experience working for the GRU, the Russian Military Intelligence Agency. I am submitting a written record of my testimony; however, I anticipate going beyond my written testimony in response to your questions.

I decided to share my concerns about Russia and the United States by writing a book entitled *Through the Eyes of the Enemy*. I made the decision to write the book when I discovered that I had cancer. I wrote this book to inform the United States about what the criminals have done to the country I loved, the former USSR, and, quite frankly, to earn money to care for my family. Additionally, I know this book and the information I have provided the American government place my life in jeopardy from the Russian intelligence. However, if I am to be killed, it will only be in advance of the cancer. In other words, I have nothing to lose.

First let me tell you a bit about myself.

For five years I was a colonel in the GRU, the Russian Military Intelligence Agency, until 1992 when, shortly before I was to receive the highest military award given, I defected to the United States. At that time, I was one of the top Russian intelligence operatives in the United States. While working under the guise of being a foreign correspondent for a Russian news agency, I sent my reports about the American government to the highest levels of Russian government. My specific reason for defecting was I could no longer support corrupt politicians and the criminals who now run this government. They have destroyed my former homeland.

Allow me to explain how this happened. When the Communist government fell, the communists obviously lost power. This left only one other group who had any money or power, the Russian Mafia. So, when the new government was formed, the Mafia supported its own candidates. Thus, the Russian Mafia took control of the government. In addition, the Mafia added to its legitimacy by getting involved in legitimate businesses to enable it to get on the inside workings of government.

Once the Mafia had "friends" in the government that were disguised as legitimate businesses, it could freely operate its "illegal" businesses without fear. These businesses have become more and

more profitable. In essence, the Russian Mafia runs a government that has been in the past, and now remains, corrupt and accountable to no one. As an intelligence officer for the USSR, I served the country I loved. However, in 1992, I realized that my intelligence services were just being exploited to benefit the Mafia, and not the Russian people. I defected, wrote *Through the Eyes of the Enemy*, and debriefed the American special services to assist the U.S. in understanding what is really happening in Russia. I have done this to help the people of both the U.S. and Russia. I debriefed the United States government, to the best of my ability, on covert operations by the GRU in the U.S. Some of the details of the information discussed in my book were classified, and unfortunately that limits my ability to provide the American public with specific details. However, please be assured that the American government has those details.

One of the reasons I am here is that I do not feel the United States regards Russia as a current military threat, despite the fact that the Russian military still considers the United States and NATO its main military adversaries. This military threat is closely tied to Russia's economic crisis and the pervasiveness of criminal enterprises. As I stated above, the Russian Mafia controls the government, and the Mafia is motivated by money. The Russian Mafia is still funding operatives against the U.S.

To make money, Russia has been the primary supporter of Iranian weapon development, and it aids Libya as well as other nations unfriendly to the United States. The GRU continues to train terrorists worldwide. As you can see, even though Russia no longer seems to be the direct enemy, because of its desire for profit it remains the major threat to the U.S. through weapons proliferation and training.

Russian Mafia members are businessmen, who will do anything for money, including selling sophisticated weaponry and even nuclear missile technology, to any country around the world. The recent terrorist attack that released poison gas in Japan is a good example of how serious the GRU is about spreading its knowledge and profiting at the same time. The United States must not "look the other way" and must be more aware of potential threats.

I know that this Committee is concerned with IMF funding for Russia. Remember, the government is controlled by the Mafia. The money you send will never get to the Russian people. It will go to the government, which will essentially write checks to the people who put it in power—again, the Mafia. Contrary to popular opinion, IMF funding will support the Mafia, and will thus prolong the lack of any true economic reform in Russia.

Russia is not just an indirect threat; it still operates a pervasive intelligence community here in the U.S. While working as an operative, one of my main directives was to find drop sites for mass destruction weapons. I describe this in more detail in my book. In short, these drop sites were in or near the most densely populated areas so that they could be retrieved or detonated at any time by GRU operatives or special forces soldiers. These are examples of the most serious threats to the U.S., and admittedly do not occur every day. However, every day, in fact every hour, serious breaches in U.S. security occur.

During my career as a GRU spy stationed in the U.S., I grew to admire the FBI's and other U.S. agencies' efforts to thwart foreign espionage. Despite the tireless work of the men and women of these agencies, I must honestly report to you that obtaining highly sensitive and classified information was not very difficult. For example, while I was reporter for TASS, I was invited to see the Stealth weapons. While I had the chance, I took pictures of the most sensitive parts of the bombers and fighters and sent them to Russia for analysis by military intelligence.

Frankly, this was not the ordinary way I did business. When people think of a "spy," they think of James Bond. A good spy, however, is neither the loner nor the serious man in the corner of a

room. A good spy is everyone's best friend. The most important part of my job as a "spy" was to recruit. As a spy for Russia in the U.S. I was to recruit information operatives. It was rather easy to recruit Americans just by being friends with them; many people gave me sensitive and classified information. Of course, a few of these people were paid for their information. Quite frankly, there were always individuals who were willing to sell secrets for money.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today. I could go on for hours, but I believe it will be more helpful for you to talk on specific topics about which you are concerned. With that, I will end my formal remarks now and respond to your questions.

Mr. BURTON. I'd like to go to Dr. Pry next for his opening statement.

Dr. PRY. Mr. Chairman, thank you for having me here today to testify before your committee on Russian threats to United States security in the post-cold war world.

The administration claims its Russia policy is a spectacular success when in fact it is a spectacular failure. We've been told that capitalism and democracy are basically on track in Russia when they're not. We've been told by the administration that America's children are safe from Russian nuclear weapons because of the detargeting of their missiles when, in fact, America's children are not safe from the Russian nuclear threat.

The administration's Russia policy has been more of a public relations campaign to persuade the American people that all is well rather than a hard-headed, well-attended program to really advance free enterprise and democracy in Russia and to protect United States vital national interests. Despite administration claims that our Russia policy is a success, many of us have watched and worried and warned for years that our Russia policy is careening toward failure.

Now, the media and the American people have recently been shocked awake by a new brutal Russian leadership that has manipulated the electoral process to, in effect, thwart the free and fair elections in Russia. We have been shocked awake by the war in Chechnya where the Russian military is using missiles, flame throwers, and fuel air explosives—classified in their own military doctrine as weapons of mass destruction—to subdue their own people. We have been shocked awake by Russian military and foreign officials who have officially blamed the United States for provoking the Chechen crisis as part of a larger conspiracy to have NATO penetrate the Caucasuses and gain control of the oil wealth of the Caspian Sea.

We've been shocked awake by President Putin and others brazenly making nuclear threats against the United States, including Putin on December 14 attending the launch of SS-X-27 ICBM, where he made a direct nuclear threat against the United States not to interfere in Russian internal affairs: And we have been shocked awake by President Putin's recent embrace of a new national security concept that describes the West as a threat to Russia, and relies on nuclear weapons and a nuclear first strike as the primary cornerstone of Russia's national security policy.

None of this comes as a surprise to those of us who have been skeptical of the administration's claims that its Russia policy is basically on track and successful and who have independently followed and thought about what's been happening in Russia over the years. Indeed, everything discussed today about Russian military caches prepositioned on NATO territory, about nuclear suitcases, and other aspects of the Russian threat are part of a larger pattern, manifestations of a "war scare" mentally among the Russian General staff and national security elite described in my recently published book, "War Scare: Russia and America on the Nuclear Brink."

War scare is a term of art used in the intelligence community to describe one-sided nuclear crises where Moscow mistakenly be-

lieved it faced the possibility of an imminent nuclear attack from the West, and prepared to preempt that threat.

Beginning in the early 1980's, Soviet elites feared that they were losing the cold war and understood that the strains of the cold war competition were worsening the Soviet economy and encouraging the disintegrative internal conditions that eventually led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. They feared that the United States, sensing this growing weakness, might try to exploit the situation by launching a surprise nuclear attack. Disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and disintegration of the Soviet Union itself was and is still viewed in Moscow as not merely an internal crisis, but as a profound international crisis that has upset global order and the balance of power and may tempt the West to aggression against a weakened Russia.

Fear and insecurity in Russia's General staff and in its national security elite has worsened as Russia's political fortunes, economy, and military capabilities have continued to decline over the years. Thus, while the West has tended to think of relations with Russia as steadily improving over the last decade, the Russian General staff and security services have viewed those relations as in a deep systemic crisis, akin to the protracted 20 years crisis that preceded World War II. They live in constant fear that the United States and NATO might at any moment move to finish Russia off and thereby remove any possible future challenge to the West's complete domination of the world order.

All of this may seem hard to believe given the popular tendency to think of Russia exclusively in terms of the benign personality that was Boris Yeltsin, and given vociferous assurances by the administration, rarely challenged by the media, that Russia is now a strategic partner and no longer a threat to the United States. But there are some cold, hard facts about Russia that the American people and policymakers need to know in order to accurately appraise United States-Russian relations, in order to understand that there is still a serious threat from that quarter.

Russian offensive strategic forces programs, for example. Despite an economy where they can barely feed and house their own people, Russia is continuing to produce intercontinental ballistic missiles, cranking out SS-25s, deploying a new SS-27 ICBM which is the most technologically advanced ICBM in the world, building new ballistic missile submarines, trying to develop new sub-launched ballistic missiles, attempting to modernize its strategic bomber force and building two new classes of strategic cruise missiles.

Russian defensive strategic programs. They are attempting to modernize the Moscow ABM system which is basically a de facto national missile defense. The world's only existing national missile defense; but more important than this, they're putting vast resources into constructing hundreds of deep underground facilities, modernizing some facilities that already exist but building new ones, too, including some like Yamantau Mountain, which is a deep underground facility as large as Washington, DC, inside the beltway that has only one purpose: to survive a nuclear conflict. What its purpose is beyond that we actually don't know and have been attempting to find out, but the Russians have gone to great lengths to conceal the purpose of Yamantau Mountain. Kosvinsky Moun-

tain is another example. We know what that is. It's a new general staff command post vastly harder and more capable than our own deep underground facility at NORAD headquarters. Its purpose is to manage a thermonuclear conflict, and these facilities are undergoing construction 24 hours a day in a country where they can't even provide housing for their own people.

There is evidence that Congressman Weldon alluded to, actually showed you very specifically—the gyroscopes and the accelerometers. There's evidence of deliberate Russian proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction technology to countries that are hostile to the United States. This apparently fits into a strategy that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”

There is a new anti-Western strategic partnership with China that is emerging between the two where China supports Russian interests against NATO expansion and Russia is supporting Chinese interests via Taiwan. Russia is giving its high-tech support to China to modernize its military, building things like SU-27 factories in China so that they can have new fighter aircraft that are several generations more advanced than what the Chinese had before.

We have talked at length about the military caches in NATO already and the possibility of nuclear suitcases. Obviously a country that engages in such activities does not regard us as a strategic partner or regard the prospects for future peace as very likely. There's evidence that operation VRYAN continues. Operation VRYAN was the largest cold war intelligence program ever launched by Russia. It's an acronym that stands for “surprise nuclear missile attack.” Beginning in the early 1980's, the political military elite told the KGB and the GRU and their other intelligence services to be on the lookout for the possibility that the United States might imminently launch a surprise nuclear attack. This was because of the strains and stresses that I described earlier, when they realized they were losing the cold war and they were fearful that the West might actually be moving to finish them off.

So they started looking for evidence that the United States was preparing to launch a nuclear surprise attack. Every 2 weeks a VRYAN report was sent to their top political-military leadership on the possibility that nuclear war was right around the corner. This program is known, begun in the early 1980's, is known to have continued at least into the 1990's, and there's evidence that it continues still.

In connection with this—I will mention as an aside—that part of it was not just intelligence collection. There was also a computer program that was part of the VRYAN project because of the belief that they would be able to, by calculating the correlation of forces, the balance of military and economic and political power and looking at particular strategic warning indicators, use a very sophisticated computer program to predict when the United States might actually launch this nuclear attack. This was to inform the General staff so that they could beat us to the punch and strike us first.

Most disturbingly, the American people and policymakers need to know most of all about the nuclear war scare crises of the 1980's and 1990's when on several occasions the Russian General staff

mistakenly believed that the United States might be preparing to attack, and Russian nuclear forces were placed on alert in readiness to launch a first strike just in case. War scares occurred during ABLE ARCHER-83. This was a NATO theater nuclear exercise in November 1983; in May 1992, during the Armenian/Azerbaijan crisis; in October 1993 during the parliamentary crisis in Moscow that resulted in fighting in the streets in Moscow between Yeltsin forces and that of the national Communist parliament; during January 1995 in response to, of all things, the launch of a meteorological rocket by Norway; probably during Battle-Griffin in 1996 which was a NATO exercise held up near Norway; possibly during Central-Asian Battalion-97, a Partnership for Peace exercise held in the fall of 1997; and most recently, during Desert Fox in December 1999.

Some of these—the Russian nuclear alerts in response to ABLE ARCHER 83 and the January 1995 event were more dangerous than the Cuban missile crisis, and yet remain unknown or virtually unknown to the American public and to policymakers. I will describe quickly just one of these events, the January 1995 event.

In this case Norway and NASA were jointly developing a meteorological rocket to study the aurora borealis. It was a missile of unusual size. Norway had never launched a missile of this size before. It was a multistage missile, launched from Andoya Island out in the Norwegian Sea. They sent their ballistic missile launch notification to the Russian foreign ministry just as they were supposed to, but due to a clerical error by an inexperienced staffer in the foreign ministry, the message never got to the Russian General staff and the Strategic Rocket Forces that the launch was going to occur.

As a consequence, when the General staff picked up this missile being launched on their radars, initially they didn't realize that it was coming from Andoya Island which is located in the Norwegian Sea. Radars can't precisely geolocate a missile in the initial minutes it's launched, and it could have been coming from nearby ballistic missile patrol areas that our Trident Ohio-class submarines patrol. In their doctrine, this is one of the things they feared most in terms of a Western surprise nuclear attack; that a single missile would be launched from this location which has the shortest flight-time to Moscow so that an electromagnetic pulse attack could be done. This is an exoatmospheric nuclear detonation that creates a very powerful radio wave that would fry their electronics, their radars, their command and control so they couldn't retaliate. And then, just behind that, there would be this massive attack.

The General staff took so seriously this threat that it actually activated all three chegets. These are the nuclear "footballs" that are carried by the Russian military-political leadership. Yeltsin, the defense minister, and the chief of the General staff. The chegets have only one purpose when they're activated. You're under a surprise nuclear attack: push the button to retaliate. That was basically the General's staff implicit advice when it activated the chegets. Fortunately for us, Boris Yeltsin was at the helm; and he didn't believe it. He couldn't believe the West was going to attack and waited, waited long enough to see that missile was actually going away from Russia and not toward it. But during that moment, it only lasted 20 minutes, but it was the single most dangerous moment

of the nuclear missile age. And we were literally one decision away from a global thermonuclear conflict, one decision away. Boris Yeltsin was being asked to push the button, and that was January 1995, not that long ago.

If we look at this question quantitatively, are we safer now? Are we safer now, now that the cold war is over? Let's just look at some of these numbers on these nuclear alerts. During the cold war, we averaged about one nuclear alert by the Soviet Union per decade. You know, the Cuban missile crisis in the sixties. There was the Berlin crisis before that in the fifties where there was a nuclear alert. Then the Cuban missile crisis. Then the 1973 Middle East war. All of those had nuclear alerts, about one per decade. Then in the 1980's, when they saw themselves starting to lose the cold war competition, there were two. In the 1990's, counting these lists that I rattled off, we have had the Russians engaging in a nuclear alert on average about once every 2 years to 18 months. Just looking at the numbers, the frequency of war scare incidents has actually increased in the post-cold war period.

So why haven't people heard about these events and the facts of Russia's ongoing preparation for war? Knowing these things is at least as important in evaluating the true state of United States-Russian relations, as knowing that Russia does occasionally hold something like free elections. In fairness, some of the information I have been describing here hasn't been all that available to the public and the media. My book draws on recently declassified National Intelligence Estimates and materials that are still Top Secret in Russia and that have been provided to us by various sources, including by several heroic defectors who must now live under witness protection programs because they are under threat of death from their security services that they used to work for.

Also, and this is primarily the main reason people are unaware of these things: we in the West tend to be strategic optimists, and we don't want to hear bad news about Russia. Some of these things actually did make the newspapers and blurbs back on page 24, but they didn't fit into the overall paradigm we've had from the administration of improving relations with Russia. And so people don't know what to do with the data; it gets filed away; it gets forgotten.

The administration, for its part, has played a role in this because it's, of course, eager to encourage our optimism about our relations with Russia. It doesn't want to be blamed for losing Russia, especially in an election year.

Nonetheless, Russia's public statements, behavior and the copious unclassified writings from the Russian General staff and security elite have provided enough evidence of their "war scare" mentality that we in the West shouldn't now be surprised to discover that Russia regards the United States as an evil empire. Indeed, given Russia's bloody history of victimization at the hands of numerous invaders, including as recently as World War II which killed 30 million Russians, it is entirely logical and predictable that Moscow would now feel threatened. If not a tendency toward paranoia, there's also a certain logical inevitability that Moscow would now think it entirely plausible that there could be a nuclear war with the United States.

Let us try to stand for a minute in the Russian General staff's shoes and do an experiment of the imagination. Let's try to see things from Moscow's point of view. Suppose history worked out differently and we had lost the cold war competition because capitalism turned out to be an inefficient way of organizing your economy and society and that communism was really the way to go and that that provided for a productive economy and society. Suppose as a consequence of the failures of capitalism our economy and the Western economy was a disaster so that we could no longer provide food and housing for our people and that this drew out internal strains in our society that were so severe that our country actually fragmented geographically, so that the southern confederate States broke away and we lost them, and lost states in the West, as happened with the Soviet Union and is now threatening to happen with Russia. Suppose that the economy is so bad that we couldn't even sustain our general purpose forces anymore. The Army and Navy and Marines are all neglected and rusting away, and the only thing left to us are our nuclear forces. That's the only thing left that works.

Suppose further that our former allies and NATO basically want to join the winning side and the NATO alliance disintegrates, just as the Warsaw Pact disintegrated and former NATO member states, Britain, Italy, Germany, the Benelux countries are clamoring to join the Warsaw Pact, and the Soviet Union, strong and robust, decides to bring them in and that next year Germany and Britain and Italy are going to join the Warsaw Pact and so will Canada. So we will now have the Warsaw Pact pressing against our northern border. Suppose in preparation for joining the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union with its new allies decides to conduct major military exercises off our Atlantic and Pacific coasts, drops paratroopers opposite Minot Air Force Base, not a threat to us mind you, just to demonstrate that these guys are ready to join NATO. It's a part of the Partnership for Peace, and to show they are ready to join the Warsaw Pact.

Suppose they—the Soviet Union—announces that it is establishing a new world order and is leading these new allies, leads multinational coalitions to set things straight on peacekeeping operations to Nicaragua to empower the Sandinistas, and to Mexico because they disapprove of Mexican policies, and after demonstrating high-tech conventional weapons that we are decades away from being able to copy they approach within a few hundred kilometers of the Texas border and then withdraw.

Even if they were giving us a billion rubles a year to help our economy out and even if they called us strategic partners, would we feel safe? I think not. I think that we would be terrified and that we would be thinking—we would be very concerned about these exercises and peacekeeping operations, and we would think that—we would be very fearful of the possibility that the Soviet Union might want to finally finish the cold war, bring it to a complete conclusion by eliminating the United States so that we could never possibly threaten their attempt to completely dominate the global order and establish a new order. I think that our fingers would hover near the nuclear button every time there was a big exercise or big peacekeeping operation because we would be wonder-

ing, is this it? Are they really going to come after us this time, under the guise of peacekeeping operation or exercise?

And, indeed, we can see that in our own history there was a time when our fingers hovered near the button. During the Eisenhower administration, when the Red Army stood poised to roll over Western Europe and we could not match the Red Army in terms of general purpose forces, we relied very heavily on our nuclear forces and planned, in fact, for a nuclear first strike against Russia to cope with their conventional superiority. And this from a society that's a democratic society and a society of strategic optimists. How much more worried would you be if you were the Russian General staff, the product of a ferocious totalitarian order and of a very bloody, unpeaceful history?

Well, I have described the problem. So what should we do? First, we should keep our nuclear deterrent strong, nor should we hesitate to acquire defenses to protect ourselves from missiles. U.S. military strength is probably what deterred the General staff and prevented the war scares of the past from becoming actual nuclear wars. But we should redouble efforts to prove that we are not a threat through exchange programs with the Congress and Russian Duma, as Congressman Weldon is doing, through military officers and students. We should continue to provide economic aid. Maybe we should increase our economic aid but change the way we're doing it, not the way the administration has been doing it. Try to provide aid that directly reaches the grassroots, the Russian people themselves, not giving billions to the Russian elite and the former nomenklatura who then deposit it into Swiss bank accounts.

But most of all, we should be aware that Russia is a threat and is still a nuclear super power, the only Nation on Earth that can end Western civilization in 30 minutes. This all-important fact should form all of our decisions on NATO expansion, on peacekeeping, on whether or not we conduct various kinds of exercises. I do not say that we should not expand NATO or engage in peacekeeping, but let us stop pretending that these are virtually risk-free activities. A good case can be made for NATO expansion and peacekeeping, but let us do so with our eyes open to the very real risks so that we may intelligently weigh the risks and benefits to the American people in foreign and defense policy decisions that affect our relations with Russia.

This concludes my substantive remarks, and gentlemen, I thank you for allowing me here today to speak.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Dr. Pry.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Pry follows:]

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STATEMENT

BY

PETER VINCENT PRY

Excerpt from his book, **“War Scare: Russia and  
America on the Nuclear Brink”**

Committee on Government Reform  
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**CHAPTER 34**

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**Flashpoints**

Tomorrow the General Staff may well be more suspicious of potential adversaries, and more fearful of war, than it has been at any time since the war scare began in the early 1980s. In addition to traditional threats from the United States, NATO, and China, General Staff officers have expressed concern about what they see as new potential threats from a reunited Germany, a bolder Japan, new nuclear states emerging in the Middle East and Asia, from Russia's newly independent neighbors, and from within Russia itself.

The desperation and paranoia of the General Staff will only deepen as Russia continues to weaken militarily and internally, perhaps crumbling toward anarchy and civil war. The tempo of crisis in Russia and the former Soviet Union—and the threat to global security—seems to be increasing, as reflected by the occurrence in the 1990s of nuclear “close calls” during the August 1991 coup, the May 1992 Armenian crisis, the October 1993 coup, the January 1995 Norwegian missile crisis, and several more ambiguous incidents examined here. In contrast, during the Cold War decades, from 1945 through the 1970s, nuclear crises between the superpowers occurred on average about once every decade: the Berlin crisis (1948), the Suez crisis (1956), the Cuban missile crisis (1962), and the 1973 Middle East war. The frequency of nuclear crises increased in the 1980s, the last full decade of the USSR's existence, to about one war scare every five years (the 1981 Polish crisis and ABLE ARCHER-83), or one every three years, if you count as part of the previous decade the Warsaw Pact crisis of 1989–1990. Since 1991, nuclear war scares have occurred about once every two years to eighteen months.

The trend is troubling.

Can we learn anything from the history of Russia's war scares to identify circumstances that may again raise Russia's nuclear sensitivities? Future nuclear war scares are likely to arise from the same general conditions as in the past: Russian internal crises; troubles in the Baltics, Ukraine, the Caucasus, or other former Soviet republics; Western civilian or scientific aerospace activities near Russia; and Western military exercises, war and peacekeeping in the Balkans, the Middle East, or elsewhere on the periphery of Russia. The expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization into Eastern Europe is a new source of tension between the United States and Russia, one that may well overshadow previous points of nuclear risk.

Russian internal troubles—such as a leadership crisis, coup, or civil war—could aggravate Russia's fears of foreign aggression and lead to a miscalculation of U.S. intentions and to nuclear overreaction. While this may sound like a complicated and improbable chain of events, Russia's story in the 1990s is one long series of domestic crises that have all too often been the source of nuclear close calls. The war scares of August 1991 and October 1993 arose out of coup attempts. The civil war in Chechnya caused a leadership crisis in Moscow, which contributed to the nuclear false alarm during Norway's launch of a meteorological rocket in January 1995. Nuclear war arising from Russian domestic crises is a threat the West did not face, or at least faced to a much lesser extent, during the Cold War.

The Russian military's continued fixation on surprise-attack scenarios into the 1990s, combined with Russia's deepening internal problems, has created a situation in which the United States might find itself the victim of a preemptive strike for no other reason than a war scare born of Russian domestic troubles. At least in nuclear confrontations of the 1950s–1970s—during the Berlin crisis, Cuban missile crisis, and 1973 Middle East war—both sides knew they were on the nuclear brink. There was opportunity to avoid conflict through negotiation or deescalation. The nuclear war scares of the 1980s and 1990s have been one-sided Russian affairs, with the West ignorant that it was in grave peril.

Russian and Western threat perceptions are likely to remain poles apart, if only because their internal realities are as different as night and day. The West takes peace and prosperity for granted; Russia knows neither of these, and is highly unstable. Russia's propensity toward aging leaders in poor health means Moscow is perpetually but a heartbeat away from another leadership crisis, with all its implications for Russian nuclear instability. For example, President Yeltsin's heart operation in 1996 became an occasion for another Kremlin wrestling match over the nuclear arsenal. Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin thought he, instead of the military, should get temporary custody of Yeltsin's "nuclear briefcase," as emergency successor to the president. He did, for twenty-three hours. In 1997 and 1998, Yeltsin was again hospitalized with serious health problems that impeded his ability to govern. On March 19, 1998, Aleksandr Lebed, former secretary of the Russian Security Council, testified to the U.S. Congress that Yeltsin was mentally incompetent and that the world is endangered by a senile and delusional Yeltsin in possession of the "nuclear button." The keys to the kingdom of nuclear Armageddon seem never to be far from the minds of Russia's leaders.

Future Kremlin coup attempts may yet rock Moscow and the West. An anonymous spokesman for the defense ministry had the temerity to tell the press officially in February 1996 that if another coup happened, "Let Yeltsin not expect that the armed forces will, in a critical situation, once again

step on the Constitution, as was the case in 1993." In April and May 1998, General Viktor Kulikov, who had headed the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its legions of troops, and General Lev Rohklin were accused in separate instances of plotting a military coup against the government. Some Russian journalists speculate that the reason the entire cabinet was suddenly dismissed in March 1998 was to thwart a coup by Kulikov.

President Yeltsin himself conceded another coup could be in the cards. In an August 1996 interview, when asked if another coup as in August 1991 could happen, he replied, "I do not rule out that under certain circumstances such attempts are possible." But Yeltsin also cautioned of a greater peril: "Danger rather lies elsewhere. There is still a visible trend toward the search for an enemy and an uncompromising all-out struggle in Russia. . . . These are the consequences of many years of life under the conditions of a totalitarian state. And they will not disappear overnight."

Western policy in the Baltics, the Caucasus, Ukraine, and other former Soviet republics can spark a nuclear war scare. Moscow sees the former Soviet republics as something less than sovereign nations. At best, the Kremlin views them as falling within a special Russian sphere of influence. Moscow's formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, a military alliance comprising most of the former Soviet republics, is an attempt to institutionalize such a sphere. At worst, Russia plans eventually to reabsorb the former republics into a new Russian empire. As a 1995 study by the hard-line INOBIS think tank, a study that was "tentatively approved" by the defense ministry, according to the Russian press, concluded: "On the whole, it appears that if a judicious policy is followed, there are all grounds to count on restoration of a renewed Union state in 5–10 years made up of Russia, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, the greater part of Ukraine, as well as the Dneister region, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. And Russia's relations with the Transcaucasus and Central Asia could develop according to the model of relations which existed earlier . . . with Moldavia, the Baltic, and Western Ukraine according to the model of Soviet-Finnish relations of 1944–1991 times." In 1997 and again in 1998, a senior official of the Russian embassy in Washington, speaking to me unofficially, endorsed the INOBIS study and predicted the restoration of Russia's lost empire within a decade. On March 17, 1998, the Russian press published a Foreign Ministry outline of the essential goals of Russian foreign policy, that included "resistance to international efforts aimed at thwarting CIS integration." One Western press report accurately observes that the plan envisions "the territory of the former Soviet Union as a Russian sphere of influence. In that context, Moscow has protested plans to integrate former Soviet states into NATO. It has also bemoaned the growing influence of the West—and especially the United States—around Russia's periphery."

Western challenges, or perceived challenges, to Russian dominance in the

former Soviet republics could inadvertently provoke a Russian nuclear response. For example, Turkey's threat to intervene in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict resulted in the nuclear war scare of May 1992.

Russian sensitivities have not mellowed. In September 1995, maneuvers of Russia's Black Sea Fleet were justified by Admiral N. Mikhalchenko, the fleet deputy commander in chief, on the grounds of "the increased activity of NATO ships in the Black Sea region and with attempts to draw a number of coastal states into its zone of influence." In July 1996, President Yeltsin warned the West against encroaching on Ukraine and the Caucasus: "Russia will sternly react to all attempts to change the status of the Black Sea straits and to transform the Black Sea into one more springboard for navies of NATO and non-Black Sea countries." Moreover, "Russia opposes even a hypothetical possibility to extend the sphere of NATO influence to the Baltic countries." In April 1998, Russian press reports noted with alarm that the president of Azerbaijan and Turkey's chief of the general staff met to discuss the still unresolved territorial dispute with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, and that Turkey's military chief voiced support for restoring "the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan." In January 1999, Russia moved additional military forces into Armenia. Azerbaijan's foreign ministry protested that "the buildup of the Russian military presence in Armenia can lead to unpredictable consequences in the region and beyond" and asked Turkey, NATO, and the United States for protection.

Relations between Russia and Ukraine remain strained, although Ukraine has surrendered all of its nuclear weapons. An unintended consequence of complex machinations of the United States to achieve a nonnuclear Ukraine could be U.S. involvement in a future Russo-Ukrainian war.

By 1994, pressure from Russia, U.S. diplomacy, and fresh financial inducements had brought a desperate and nearly bankrupt Ukraine to its knees. In January 1994, Ukraine, Russia, and the United States signed an accord giving Ukraine security guarantees and financial aid in exchange for Ukrainian agreement to return all nuclear weapons to Russia. In 1996, after delays and backpedaling by Ukraine, Kiev gave up the last of its missile warheads. However, Ukraine retains the capability to manufacture missiles and nuclear weapons, and Moscow fears Kiev might join NATO. In 1998, the Russian press accused Ukraine of conspiring with NATO against Russia: "The Ukrainian side went behind Russia's back and conspired with NATO to take at any moment the problem of the Black Sea Fleet out of the realm of Ukrainian-Russian bilateral relations and to blackmail Russia with the possibility of the . . . Fleet's presence on Ukrainian territory being examined in the UN Security Council. It is well known that the United States and the Western countries have unquestionably seized the initiative here." In 1998 Ukraine, for its part, accused Moscow of planning to sneak

tactical nuclear weapons back aboard the Black Sea Fleet. "Ukraine may become the object of a tactical nuclear strike by NATO if plans for locating Russian nuclear arms on our territory are implemented. . . . This was announced yesterday by People's Deputy Sergey Terekhyn. Having analyzed [a] still classified text . . . from Moscow . . . there is a real possibility of the positioning of tactical nuclear missiles on ships in the Black Sea Fleet."

Russo-Ukrainian tensions are dangerous for the United States, because they contribute to an overall sense of growing international crisis among an already suspicious and fearful Russian military. Perhaps more importantly, U.S. efforts to help resolve the Russo-Ukrainian crisis have created the impression that Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons in exchange for substantial security guarantees from the United States. In fact, under the Tri-lateral Statement of January 14, 1994, the U.S. security guarantees to Ukraine were largely symbolic and probably would not legally bind the United States to side with Ukraine militarily in a war against Russia. But it is not clear that Moscow or Kiev understands the ethereal nature of the U.S. commitment to Ukrainian defense.

The potentially deadly illusion that the United States is committed by treaty to defend Ukraine could convince the Russian military that a future Russo-Ukrainian conflict, or Russian war of imperial reconquest, will inevitably involve war with the United States. This misapprehension might well lead the Russian General Staff to plan, out of mistaken military necessity, for a knockout nuclear blow against the United States at the very beginning of a war in which the United States, in reality, has no vital interest or real intention of participating.

There are other "wars of the imagination" between Russia and the United States for control of Russian or neighboring territory that Russian defense analysts are seriously preparing to fight. Anton Surikov, director of the INOBIS think tank, and General Valeriy Dementyev contend that the West is planning for war and that "three possible areas of aggression pose the greatest danger":

First, in connection with the recent decision of Norway to extend NATO military activity to the north of the country, the Northern Axis, i.e., a NATO operation against bases of the [Russian] North Fleet on the Kolsk [Kola] Peninsula. Second, in connection with the discussed plans to create a 60,000-man Baltic Corps consisting of subunits from the FRG, Denmark, and Poland, a Northwest Axis, i.e., NATO military potential in the event of a war between Russia and the Baltic states. Third, in light of these calls to give countries of the Caspian basin NATO security guarantees similar to those which were given at one time to the countries of the Persian Gulf, a Southern Axis. Here the key role is assigned to NATO member Turkey. . . . Turkey has . . . repeatedly addressed military threats to a Russian ally, Armenia, in connection with the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. There is an evident

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political line aimed at drawing Turkish-language and Muslim regions of the former U.S.S.R. into the sphere of Turkish influence.

In Surikov's and General Dementyev's view "the United States and the NATO countries remain the main probable adversaries of Russia" and pose an increasing nuclear threat:

The U.S. possesses great nuclear missile potential which if used could destroy Russia as a state. It was created for the purpose of nuclear blackmail of the U.S.S.R. and was oriented chiefly toward delivery of a first nuclear strike. At present, despite ongoing reductions within the framework of [START I], not only does the first-strike orientation continue, but it is increasing.

Russian nuclear commanders may overreact to Western intelligence gathering or to Western civilian or scientific air or space activities near Russia's borders. For example, as noted, Norway's launch of a scientific research rocket in January 1995 sent Moscow into a panic over a possible U.S. nuclear surprise attack, resulting in the closest brush with Armageddon so far. When Korean Air Lines Flight 007 strayed into Soviet airspace in 1983, Moscow suspected it was a U.S. spy plane conducting reconnaissance, possibly prior to an impending surprise attack, and shot the tourists down. The KAL 007 affair contributed to the Russian war scare during the NATO nuclear exercise ABLE ARCHER-83.

The attitudes that resulted in the January 1995 war scare and the KAL 007 tragedy persist in the Russian military. Officers of the border troops told journalist Zhanna Shanurova that the "enemy," NATO, is preparing for aggression, and "with each passing year the enemy is getting bolder." They claimed that a Norwegian scientific research vessel, the *Sverdrug-2*, was recently found to be engaged in spying "although for the last ten years [Norway] had always said that it was scientific work."

Shanurova relates that in another instance Russian troops seized a Swedish research balloon that drifted over Russian territory: "The Swedes persistently requested that the container with equipment for scientific studies be returned to them. But here too, the border troops do not have a shadow of a doubt: This was a spy. It was trying to find our weak spots." The military's "hair-trigger" mentality was well-illustrated again in September 1995 when CIS air defenses shot down and killed two U.S. sports balloonists who unwittingly drifted toward an SS-25 ICBM base.

A March 23, 1998, item titled "Cold War in Cold Waters" (*U.S. News and World Report*) relates that after Russian submarines in the Barents Sea "launched a fusillade of missiles . . . Russian officials . . . complained to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow that an American submarine was nearby gathering intelligence about the performance of the Russian subs. In response,

the Russian Navy gave chase, an operation said to have lasted for hours." Russian helicopters actually dropped depth charges, driving the sub away. Russian suspicions were excited again in April 1998 when Washington and Oslo announced that the United States would soon deploy in Norway, near Russian military bases on the Kola Peninsula, an allegedly harmless scientific radar intended merely "to track and catalog space junk." But even U.S. officials and scientists concede, in the words of one U.S. analyst, the radar "would be in perfect position to observe missile tests within Russia" and would "be able to warn of missiles that might be aimed outside the country" to support a future U.S. national missile defense. In January 1999, Defense Minister Sergeyev in a TV interview angrily pointed to the radar as evidence that the Cold War is still on.

Western military exercises, war and peacekeeping in the Balkans, the Middle East, and elsewhere on the periphery of Russia could be misconstrued by Moscow as preparations for aggression. For example, the NATO theater nuclear exercise ABLE ARCHER-83 sparked the Russian nuclear alert of November 1983. Routine U.S. Air Force training in Turkey contributed to Russian apprehensions about NATO intentions in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict amid the war scare of May 1992. U.S. air strikes in Bosnia probably contributed to Russian nervousness prior to the January 1995 missile crisis. In March 1999, General Vladimir Dworkin of the Strategic Rocket Forces said Russia would be "much less likely to retaliate for false alarms caused by the so-called 'millennium bug' if the United States and NATO heed Moscow's demands and called off the bombings of Iraq and the threat of air strikes against Yugoslavia."

Zhanna Shanurova's conversations with officers of the border guards produced quite frank accounts of how NATO's military exercises posed a constant threat:

The enemy is not sleeping, and is always preparing in every conceivable way to seize the northern Russian territories. He is constantly performing maneuvers to adapt himself to our climatic conditions and terrain. The unified armed forces of NATO this year have already conducted eleven training exercises in the Sea of Norway. At the present moment, there are submarines from the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden "training" there. . . . The foreigners have no other goal but espionage. . . . It is true, already three times U.S. atomic submarines have managed to collide with Russian ones.

Another war scare may have occurred in February-March 1996, when Moscow overreacted to a NATO land-sea exercise in Norway called BATTLE GRIFFIN-96. General Vladimir Semenov, commander in chief of the Ground Forces, stated on February 26 that NATO's training event might conceal a real threat: "NATO war exercises, which started in Norway on

Monday, jeopardize Russia's security," he said. "Up to 7,000 soldiers and officers are taking part in the land force games, including 1,900 German servicemen. The troops are part of NATO's rapid reaction force. . . . NATO is simultaneously staging naval exercises with more than forty warships, as well as landing units, in Norway's Arctic Circle." General Semenov was "puzzled by both the type and location of the games. Western military circles keep on thinking the way they did during the 'Cold War,' which is damaging to European security."

BATTLE GRIFFIN-96 moved Semenov to put Russia's northern forces on alert: "Because of the war games on the territory of an adjacent state, part of Russian troops will be put on alert and instructed to have a close watch on the situation." Russia must be prepared "in case of further tensions in the Russian zone of the Arctic Circle." General Semenov told Russian reporters, "The maneuvers in Norway may pose a threat to Russian national security and force it to seek suitable responses."

General Valeriy Dementyev of the Institute of Defense Studies agreed with General Semenov that BATTLE GRIFFIN-96 was a possible threat, coming as it did from one of "three possible directions of an aggression" that "are especially dangerous." In response to NATO's maneuvers, General Dementyev proposed readying missiles and aircraft: "In the interests of national security and for the sake of keeping a possible enemy away from such actions, Russia has to form an operational-tactical deterrence force. . . . The deterrence force may include missile and strike air force units, fitted with highly accurate weapons. In case of danger, it may be moved to the area of a possible conflict and targeted at the most important facilities."

President Boris Yeltsin was "Perturbed by NATO Maneuvers in Norway," according to a *Segodnya* headline. On March 1, 1996, Sergey Medvedev, Yeltsin's press secretary, announced that the Russian president "is following with anxiety developments near Russia on the territory of Norway." *Segodnya* reminded the reader, "It is not the first time that President Yeltsin has been worried over 'developments' near the Norwegian border. . . . When in Lipetsk last January, he became worried to such a degree that, for the first time ever, he unpacked his 'nuclear suitcase.'"

On March 14, the Northern Fleet mobilized for "large-scale maneuvers . . . timed to coincide with major NATO exercises in Norway," according to the Russian press, as "a suitable response to NATO's increased military presence near our northern borders and polar shores." On the day the Northern Fleet set sail toward the BATTLE GRIFFIN-96 task force, the Plesetsk cosmodrome in northern Russia launched a reconnaissance satellite.

At sea, the Red Banner Northern Fleet, opposite NATO's BATTLE GRIFFIN-96 forces, claimed to have chased NATO submarines intruding on the Russian zone of operations: "The ships detected foreign submarines

in the course of the exercises and were able to shadow them for a lengthy period, but not remove them from the exercise zone." Russian press accurately described the situation "as close to real combat conditions as possible."

Tensions on the Russian side that may have contributed to their jitters over NATO's exercise included concerns that the United States might attack Cuba for shooting down a private U.S. aircraft. On February 28, President Yeltsin told journalists, "I am concerned over the situation around the recent incident between the United States and Cuba." Yeltsin "quite politely made it clear to the United States that war was not an answer to incidents of this type." On March 14, as the Northern Fleet set sail, the Duma condemned U.S. sanctions against Cuba as "dangerous for the world community." The foreign ministry announced Russia would "expand mutually advantageous cooperation with Cuba."

The Clinton administration seemed unaware of—or indifferent to—a potential crisis with Russia over BATTLE GRIFFIN-96. Amazingly, the focus of presidential concerns in February–March 1996 appeared to be with the Russian agriculture ministry's plans to suspend imports of U.S. poultry, which would hurt Arkansas's Tyson Foods chicken industry, an important Clinton constituent. Vice President Al Gore unsuccessfully demarched Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, in a letter on the chicken issue, which a Chernomyrdin spokesman described as having an "extremely sharp tone." Chernomyrdin refused Gore's request to hold a hotline conversation on the poultry controversy.

The United States and NATO have continued to conduct literally dozens of military exercises on the periphery of Russia, seemingly indifferent to or ignorant of the possibility of a dangerous Russian reaction.

CENTRASBAT-97 (CENTral ASian BATtalion 1997), another NATO military exercise—largely a U.S. show, with token allied participation—troubled Moscow in September 1997. In CENTRASBAT, the United States conducted the longest airborne operation in history, flying elements of the 82d Airborne Division from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, directly to the other side of the world, all the way to Kazakhstan.

Half of Russia's SS-18 ICBMs used to be deployed in Kazakhstan. The remaining half of the SS-18s are still deployed in Russia, just across the Kazakh border, where they still constitute the heart of Russia's strategic deterrent, carrying the lion's share of warheads. These missiles, in fixed silos, are zealously guarded from commando raids that the General Staff believes might come across the Kazakh border in the opening round of World War III.

After a nineteen-hour nonstop flight, U.S. paratroopers jumped and "seized" a Kazakh airport as part of a "peacekeeping" exercise. Marine Corps general John Sheehan, commander in chief of the U.S. Atlantic Com-

mand, personally led the paratroop raid and was the first to jump. Afterward, General Sheehan stated that CENTRASBAT-97 highlighted "the U.S. interest that Central Asian states live in stability" and that "there is no nation on the face of the Earth where we cannot go." Among the official goals of the exercise was to demonstrate to "neighboring countries" (a clear reference to Russia) U.S. support for the independence of the Central Asian states. Following the U.S. paratroop operation that opened the exercise, CENTRASBAT-97 involved maneuvers in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan that lasted six days (September 15-20, 1997).

None of this was lost on Moscow.

Although there was grudging Russian participation in CENTRASBAT-97 (Russia contributed forty of the 1,400 troops that took part), the Kremlin and Duma both frowned on the event. Defense ministry official Leonid Ivashov, chief of the directorate for military international cooperation, in a televised statement on September 21 condemned CENTRASBAT-97 and all similar exercises: "Russia views very negatively even exercises held within the framework of the Partnership for Peace. . . . They facilitate the [NATO] alliance's expansion in our direction [and] to put it bluntly, the military might of NATO groups." Russian GRU (military intelligence) officials warned the press that "the scenarios of the CENTRASBAT-97 exercises, just like the SEABREEZE-97 naval exercise that was conducted in Ukraine within the NATO framework, has a nuclear . . . hidden agenda. In Ukraine, the main stage in the Ukrainian-U.S. exercises was held . . . close to the sites where launch silos of the RS-22 heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles are situated." Sergei Baburin, deputy speaker of the Duma, on September 19 complained to the press, "Under cover of statements of 'peacekeeping' nature of such maneuvers, U.S. troops are intensely studying new potential military theaters in the immediate vicinity of the borders of the Russian Federation." Baburin pointed to "SEABREEZE-97 exercises on the Black Sea, NATO games in the Baltic region, and the CENTRAL ASIAN BATTALION-97 games in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan" as recent training events that were particularly worrisome.

Shortly after the U.S. paratroop drop, the Duma, on a virtually unanimous vote, approved a statement condemning CENTRASBAT-97 as training for war against Russia, and threatened to treat future such activities as warranting a possible Russian military response: "The State Duma was especially worried by the recent maneuvers in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which involved the units of the Army of the United States of America . . . who made a non-stop flight from Fort Bragg, USA [and] landed on the territory of Kazakhstan. It is obvious that statements on the peacemaking nature of such maneuvers are camouflaging an intensive development of new potential war theaters in direct proximity to the borders of the Russian Federation by the Army of the United States of America. We cannot exclude the possibility that such super-long air-lifting operations are used to train

in delivering the Army of the United States of America to the territory of the Russian Federation. . . . Intensive military activity in the form of such joint maneuvers will be inevitably regarded by the Russian Federation as a sign of hostility and engender a corresponding reaction." While CENTRASBAT-97 unfolded, on September 17-18, Duma members of the "Anti-NATO Group" advertised their departure from Moscow to reconvene in session at Kostroma, an ICBM base of the Strategic Rocket Forces.

None of this, largely unreported in the Western press, made any impression on Washington or the NATO allies, who have continued to conduct major military exercises near Russia, oblivious to Moscow's reaction and to the possibility of nuclear overreaction.

On March 9, 1998, according to a blurb on the back pages of the *Washington Times*, "NATO kicked off its largest field exercise since the Cold War . . . with 90 ships and 50,000 servicemen dealing with fictitious crises in Spain, Portugal, and Norway." STRONG RESOLVE 98, followed with great interest on the front pages of the Russian press, also involved military forces of ten Central and Eastern European countries that were former members of the Warsaw Pact and now wish to join NATO. The Russian press noted that STRONG RESOLVE 98's scenario included a conflict between Norway and the fictitious "Limonia," clearly Russia: "NATO allies are coming to [Norway's] assistance. They are transferring armed forces to the expected conflict zone and landing on disputed territories." Russian Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov, commander in chief of the Navy, tersely commented to the press, "Such measures, involving so many men and resources, make one ponder what is going on."

In January 1999, Defense Minister Sergeyev lodged an official protest with the Norwegian defense minister over the conduct of NATO military exercises in Norway: "You probably would not like this region to become famous for intensive military actions. We think that there are no reasons for carrying out military exercises there."

Western military operations in Bosnia, the Middle East, or elsewhere on the periphery of Russia could spark another war scare. The General Staff's first reaction to foreign military operations near its borders is to question whether these might really be aimed at Russia, even if overtly aimed at another party. From Moscow's perspective, Western mobilization for operations in Bosnia or against Iraq could conceal a surprise attack against Russia.

The Clinton administration in September 1995 displayed indifference to possible Russian overreaction by authorizing cruise missile strikes in Bosnia without warning Moscow in advance. U.S. cruise missiles were launched despite Moscow's nuclear saber rattling and threats of a new world war just a few months earlier. At the time, Russian journalist S. Kurginyan portrayed the sides as "A Micron Away from Apocalypse," the title of his article, which described the United States and Russia as on the verge of

war over Bosnia and NATO expansion. On September 8, President Yeltsin claimed U.S. air strikes in Bosnia proved that NATO is indifferent to life. "NATO is already showing what it is capable of. . . . It can bomb and then count how many civilians it has killed." The Russian president pointed to Bosnia as evidence of what could happen "when NATO comes right up to the Russian Federation border."

Bosnia has been relatively quiescent since the introduction of a multinational, including Russian, peacekeeping force in December 1995. But Bosnia and the Balkans remain a hotbed of unrest, ready to explode. Albania disintegrated into criminal anarchy in 1997. In 1998 and 1999, fighting in Kosovo between Serbs and ethnic Albanians threatened a wider Balkan war that could draw in Russia and the United States on opposite sides. On October 13, 1998, General Leonid Ivashov, a Russian defense ministry spokesman, reiterated Moscow's longstanding fear that NATO's presence in the Balkans is ultimately aimed at Russia. General Ivashov, speaking in "near-to-apocalyptic terms" according to press, said NATO air strikes in Kosovo would "create an absolutely new military-geostrategic situation in Europe. . . . [The] operation against Yugoslavia is also projecting the use of the Alliance's military force toward Russia. . . . Other European countries, the CIS, including Russia, can become targets of NATO intervention."

U.S. and NATO air strikes on Kosovo proceeded amid threats from Russian military officers, including Chief of the General Staff Anatoliy Kvashnin, that Russia might intervene on the side of the Serbs. Sabre rattling from the Russian military over Kosovo became so worrisome to President Yeltsin that he ordered his senior officers to desist, only to be ignored. Questions were raised about Yeltsin's control over the military—and Russian-NATO friction over NATO were further highlighted—when in June 1999 Russian troops based in Bosnia broke an understanding with NATO about how peacekeeping was to proceed in Kosovo by entering Kosovo first and racing ahead of NATO forces to occupy the airport at Pristina, the regional capitol. The Russian military planned to airlift several thousand troops into Kosovo via the Pristina airport, but could not get permission to cross Hungarian or Romanian airspace. President Yeltsin and other high Russian officials denied knowledge of this operation and claimed it was all a mistake. As of this writing, it is still unclear if Yeltsin authorized the operation and lied to the U.S. and NATO, or if the Russian military acted on its own.

Yeltsin himself, not just the Russian military, was alarmed by NATO air strikes on Kosovo and Yugoslavia despite the loud protests of Russia, a nuclear superpower. Matters were not helped when in March 1999 the United States—oblivious to the Russian reaction—after giving Moscow the standard 24-hours notice, flight-tested four SLBMs, fired off the patrolling nuclear submarine *Henry M. Jackson*. The event was widely interpreted in the Russian press as "nuclear diplomacy" over Kosovo. In April 1999,

Yeltsin cautioned "NATO, the Americans and the Germans" not to push Russia into military action in Yugoslavia as "there will be a European war for sure and possibly a world war." At a meeting of the Russian Security Council, a frustrated Yeltsin reportedly cried to his generals, "Why are they not afraid of us? We have not stopped anything!" The Kosovo crisis moved Yeltsin on April 29, 1999, to sign secret orders authorizing, according to Russian press, "the development of the nuclear weapons complex and a concept for developing and using non-strategic nuclear weapons." NATO air strikes in the Balkans moved the Russian Security Council, Russian press reported, to consider "enshrining . . . a provision" in military doctrine and operational planning "regarding a preventive nuclear strike." In May 1999, Duma Defense Committee Chairman, Roman Popkovich, declared, "We must definitely include a provision in our doctrine to the effect that Russia reserves the right to deliver a first or preemptive strike." Since Russian military doctrine already explicitly allows preemptive first use, the references to "preventive" and "first" strikes appear to endorse an additional mode of nuclear first use that may be more aggressive than preemption. In Vienna on April 30, 1999, a Duma delegation headed by Vladimir Lukin met with a U.S. Congressional delegation led by Congressman Curt Weldon to discuss the Kosovo crisis. The Duma delegation leveled a thinly veiled nuclear threat, warning that a "future" Russian government might well react to Kosovo by making a nuclear EMP attack against the United States:

There has never been such anti-Americanism in Russia since the days of the Korean War. The situation in Russia is unstable. . . . Imagine what an anti-American dictatorship in Russia would be like. Imagine if an SSBN fired off a missile from somewhere in the Atlantic. You would not have communications. . . . You would have no internet, nothing.

On May 28, 1999, former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, an envoy to negotiations with NATO over the Kosovo crisis, told the *Washington Post*, "The world has never in this decade been so close as now to the brink of nuclear war."

Moscow is still unreconciled to the NATO presence in the Balkans. If fighting resumes in Bosnia or Kosovo, as seems likely, or if violence elsewhere in the Balkans spreads, once again requiring the West to intervene with air strikes or large-scale occupation, the potential for Russian miscalculation will again escalate. Given the war-scare mentality of Russian political and military leaders, it may be legitimate to ask whether enough was done to forewarn President Yeltsin and the General Staff that U.S. strategic platforms would shortly attack targets a few hundred kilometers south of Commonwealth borders. If the circumstances of the nuclear superpowers were reversed, how would the Pentagon react if Russia, on twenty-four hours' notice, launched cruise missile and strategic bomber attacks on Mexico?

Ongoing Western military activities around the world provide plenty of opportunity for Russian nuclear hypertension. A particularly striking example of Moscow's tendency to misunderstand and overreact to U.S. military operations occurred in February and December 1998 and during operation DESERT FOX in 1999. In February, the United States and Iraq were in an escalating political crisis over Baghdad's obstruction and expulsion of UN inspectors seeking Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. President Clinton surged U.S. air and naval forces into the Persian Gulf to prepare for a massive cruise missile campaign to destroy suspected nuclear, chemical, and biological storage sites and to smash the Republican Guard, the loyalist military forces that maintain Saddam Hussein's dictatorship. U.S. B-1B strategic bombers, originally designed for nuclear conflict with Russia, flew into the region, ready to receive their baptism of fire.

Moscow assumed the United States was on the verge of launching a nuclear first strike on Iraq. On February 4, 1998, President Yeltsin warned in televised remarks from the Kremlin that "Clinton's actions could lead to a world war. He is acting too loudly, too loudly." Kremlin officials explained later that day that Yeltsin's warning about World War III "was referring to unnamed reports that the U.S. might use nuclear weapons to incinerate [Iraq's] chemical and biological weapons sites." On February 5, Yeltsin declared, "We must not in any event permit an American strike. I told Bill Clinton this: 'No, we won't allow it.' . . . The main thing is that we stand strong on this position, that there is no option of force. It is impossible—it would mean a world war." On February 6, President Yeltsin repeated his warning about "a new world war" a third time in as many days.

Although some initially dismissed Yeltsin's remarks as another symptom of his mental deterioration, his concern that the United States might be on the verge of starting a nuclear war in Iraq—one that could somehow escalate out of control and involve Russia—was widely shared by Russian political and military elites. At the same time Yeltsin issued his first war warning, on February 4, Foreign Minister Primakov confronted U.S. ambassador James Collins, while the Russian Foreign Ministry in Washington simultaneously demarched the White House, demanding to know if the United States was about to initiate a nuclear war against Iraq. The Russians further demanded a guarantee that the United States would not employ nuclear weapons. The Duma, according to Russian press reports, was "concerned by the possibility of the U.S. use of nuclear weapons." By a near-unanimous vote of 329 to 19, the Duma issued on February 4 a statement on the Iraq crisis condemning U.S. military preparations as "dangerous and totally unjustified actions" and announcing that "the State Duma resolutely denounces any attempts at blackmailing Iraq with the threat of the use of nuclear weapons."

Despite U.S. assurances that there were no intentions or plans to wage nuclear war on Iraq, Russia remained unconvinced.

Russian press reports speculated that the impending U.S. strike against Iraq was part of a master plan to subvert Russian interests and dominate the world. One article, typical of mainstream thinking in the Russian press, claimed that a U.S. attack on Iraq would in reality be a "Dash to the Caspian," as its title declared, part of a conspiracy with NATO to capture the oil wealth of the Caspian Sea: "Turkey and Britain are supporting the anti-Iraq, and, essentially, anti-Russian policy in the Persian Gulf. . . . The U.S. Administration is discussing different ways of 'including' the Caspian region in the European or Central Command of the U.S. Armed Forces. . . . U.S. companies are taking the lead in development of Caspian oil, and oil resources here are . . . almost 13 billion tons in the Caspian regions of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. . . . And for geographical reasons alone the Persian Gulf must be a secure bridgehead for Washington's possible intervention in inter-Caspian contradictions. . . . Iraq and Iran are hindering the planned U.S. 'dash to the Caspian.'" Some Duma members proposed putting Russian military forces in the Caucasus, near the Caspian Sea, on alert. On February 6, the commander of Russian border troops in Armenia had to issue a public statement to quash rumors that the Turkish army was advancing on Armenia, presumably to take over Azerbaijan and the spout for Caspian oil at Baku.

On February 10, Russian General Leonid Gulev, described as "one of Russia's leading military specialists on the U.S.," told the newspaper *Ros-siskaya gazeta* that one probable reason for the U.S. attack on Iraq was to rest nuclear weapons on real targets "inhabited by people." During a summit in Moscow between the U.S. and Russian military chiefs on February 12, according to the *Washington Post*, "Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev forcefully lectured Defense Secretary William Cohen . . . about America's 'tough and uncompromising' stand on Iraq, warning against hasty judgments and short-lived military victories and expressing 'deep concern' about future U.S.-Russian relations if the United States takes military action against Iraq. . . . the Russian's action marked a sharp departure from usual diplomatic courtesies." Press reports described Cohen as "shocked" and "stunned" when Sergeev asked threateningly, "Is America ready for all the possible consequences?"

The next day, Russian press carried unconfirmed reports of a Russian nuclear test at Novaya Zemlya—a mysterious seismic event was detected by Norwegian scientists. Two days after his confrontation with Secretary Cohen, on February 14, Valentine's Day, Defense Minister Sergeev in a televised statement pledged that if the United States attacked Iraq, "we will be taking some appropriate action." That same afternoon Sergeev told the world, in remarks immediately disseminated internationally in English, "The Russian Strategic Rocket Forces are capable of retaliating within 8 minutes after a hypothetical aggressor makes a nuclear strike . . . even if the missiles are completely untargeted." Moreover, the recent merger of the

“Strategic Rocket Forces, Space Military Force, and the missile defense forces is from seven to ten times more effective than before,” Sergeyev said.

On February 17, Russia launched a military satellite, KOSMOS-2349, of unknown type, possibly a reconnaissance satellite for monitoring U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf. On February 19, a Russian nuclear submarine launched two strategic missiles from the Barents Sea and struck targets in the Kamchatka Peninsula, a “training event” that, given U.S.-Russian tensions over Iraq, seemed timed as a show of Russian nuclear strength. U.S. intelligence agencies discovered, according to Western press reports, that Russia had—in a breakthrough in biological warfare—apparently genetically engineered a new form of anthrax virus against which U.S. vaccines were useless. UN inspectors looking for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq uncovered evidence indicating that Russia may have given the new super-anthrax weapon to Saddam Hussein. Or was this “discovery” a deliberate leak by Moscow and Baghdad to deter a U.S. attack?

This time, the symptoms of a Russian nuclear war scare did not entirely escape notice of the Western press. A *New York Times* editorial on February 13 noted, “That Mr. Yeltsin . . . would prove less cooperative about opposing Iraq than [former Soviet Premier] Mikhail Gorbachev is a troubling sign. . . . The differences over Iraq reflect a broader deterioration in relations. NATO’s eastward expansion into Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic angers many Russians, and talk of planting the NATO flag still closer to Russia in the future is even more alarming. . . . Russia’s increasing reliance on nuclear weapons to defend itself, fueled in part by NATO expansion, is a dangerous development. . . . All of this is complicated by a sense that Mr. Yeltsin, after his heart problems and surgery, acts erratically at times.”

As quickly as the rising tensions between the United States and Russia over Iraq arose, the crisis ended. At the end of February, the United States blinked. Unable to rally international support for air and missile strikes on Iraq, opposed by a majority of the UN Security Council, led by Russia, the United States reluctantly canceled operation DESERT THUNDER. President Clinton decided to give a new inspections agreement, brokered by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and briefed to the United Nations on February 24, a chance to preserve peace and achieve dismantlement of clandestine Iraqi programs for weapons of mass destruction.

Almost a year later, the crisis over Iraq was back on again. In December 1998, the Clinton Administration, frustrated with Iraq’s continuing obstruction of UN inspections, launched operation DESERT FOX, making large-scale air and missile strikes on Iraqi military facilities. One day after the U.S. strikes began, on December 18, Russian press reported that, according to defense ministry officials, Moscow placed its strategic nuclear forces on alert: “In view of the Iraqi crisis, the Russian Defense Ministry is taking additional steps to heighten the combat readiness of troops, in-

cluding Russia's strategic nuclear forces." On the same day, presidential spokesman Dmitriy Yakushkin "confirmed that the Russian Army was put on increased military alert." Russian press justified the alert by citing former Prime Minister Primakov's denunciation of the U.S. bombing of Iraq because it "violates the entire world order established after the Second World War. . . . This action was conducted unilaterally. It cannot be tolerated."

Publicly acknowledging a nuclear alert would be highly unusual—the military prefers to keep such matters secret. Later on December 18, Defense Minister Sergeyev denied that Russian conventional military or nuclear forces were on alert. On December 25, Russia launched KOSMOS-2361, a satellite designed to provide Russian strategic forces with improved early warning of an incoming nuclear attack. On January 17, 1999, while U.S. air strikes were still going on, a Russian television news show, equivalent to *60 Minutes*, claimed Moscow had, in fact, placed nuclear forces on alert. General Anatoliy Kornukov, commander-in-chief of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces, appeared to confirm this claim:

**MOSCOW TV:** In the past few days the world came close to a third world war. In accordance with a secret directive, the Russian Armed Forces were placed on heightened combat alert . . . connected with the exacerbation of the situation around Iraq.

**KORNUKOV:** Combat alert crews at command posts were reinforced to some degree, and training sessions in arming aircraft were carried out, just in case.

According to the broadcast, "The General Staff worked with an intensity characteristic of wartime."

Russia almost certainly would not have gone to war to protect Iraq, as it in fact did not in December 1998. Behind President Yeltsin's warnings about U.S. nuclear strikes on Iraq escalating into a world war may have been unspoken concerns in the Kremlin that the United States might use Iraq as a pretext for wider aggression, or that the General Staff or lower-level nuclear commanders might overreact and launch an unauthorized nuclear attack. Yeltsin could hardly publicly admit the latter possibility. He had repeatedly assured the international community that Russia's nuclear forces are "under control" and can make no mistakes. Nonetheless, Moscow's assumption that the United States was prepared to act so precipitously with nuclear weapons betrays a suspiciousness or ignorance of the character of the United States that is profoundly dangerous in a nuclear superpower.

The United States should not assume that large-scale military operations against Iraq, or anywhere on Russia's periphery, will in every case be accurately evaluated in Moscow and perceived as nonthreatening. Moscow has made abundantly clear that mere preparations for aggression against Russia could invite a nuclear first strike.

NATO expansion to include former members of the Warsaw Pact, or of the Soviet Union, could spark another war scare. In the West, NATO expansion is not now widely seen as a dangerous proposition. During the Cold War, less than a decade ago, violation of Austrian neutrality, a minor transgression compared to the eastward expansion of NATO, was considered by most analysts to be a potential *casus belli* for the Soviet Union. Accordingly, NATO fastidiously respected the neutrality of Austria, to avoid provoking World War III. Virtually all Western analysts agreed that Moscow would go to war rather than lose Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact, and certainly to prevent the disintegration of the USSR itself. Yet these things happened, and no war came.

Today, the West thinks Moscow will suffer anything. The West's sanguine attitude toward NATO expansion, supported in the United States by both major political parties, is uninformed that the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union were, in fact, extremely perilous events involving grave nuclear risk for the West. That these crises ended happily for the United States and NATO was largely a matter of luck.

Somewhere to the east, an expanding NATO may well finally cross Russia's nuclear tripwire, perhaps in Bulgaria, perhaps in the Baltic states. Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the Duma's International Affairs committee, cautioned that NATO expansion eastward "is liable not to strengthen peace . . . but, on the contrary, to blow it apart." He threatened that Russia might meet NATO expansion with nuclear weapons: "Will it be better for the West to have a traumatized but still nuclear Russia again forced to withdraw into the steppes? . . . If the blind egoism of the shortsighted politicians to the west of our borders prevails, we will resort to the means we still have in our hands. These are means of some kind of desperation, but effective nonetheless."

INOBIS, Russia's Institute of Defense Studies, a think tank affiliated with the Defense Ministry, has proposed in a study a number of nuclear countermeasures to meet NATO expansion. INOBIS would target Poland and the Czech Republic with ICBMs and deploy nuclear weapons in Iran, opposite the Strait of Hormuz, to exert countervailing pressure against a Western vulnerability. The INOBIS study also proposed responding to NATO expansion by invading the Baltic states while, according to Western and Russian accounts of the proposed Russian plan, regarding "any attempt to obstruct the Russian action by NATO . . . as a prelude to nuclear war." Russian press reports claim the INOBIS plan was tentatively approved by the defense ministry.

NATO expansion could conceivably replay the Cuban missile crisis. During a high-profile visit to Cuba in October 1995, Oleg Soskovets, Russia's first deputy premier, stated that a Russian nuclear countermeasure to NATO expansion could include the deployment of "Russian missile-carrying and strike-force nuclear powered submarines in Cienfuegos." INOBIS analyst Anton Surikov, in an April 1997 article, claims the expansion

of NATO to the Baltic states would constitute a provocation as dangerous as the 1962 Cuban missile confrontation.

Even pro-Western Russian leaders vehemently oppose NATO expansion. In April 1996, President Yeltsin characterized NATO's move eastward as "an attempt to keep the foreign policy and the mentality of Cold War times." In January 1997, Yeltsin again loudly protested NATO expansion and ordered his ministers to find a way to stop or counter it. In a television interview just before Christmas 1996, then Defense Minister Rodionov said that NATO plans for expansion proved that "the Cold War is not yet over." Moreover: "Russia and the United States [have] powerful nuclear potentials capable of destroying the globe and turning each other into dust. Is there a 100 percent guarantee that a possible conflict can be avoided?" More pointedly, General Lev Rohklin, chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, warned simply, "If NATO comes closer to Russian borders, both strategic and operational-tactical missiles could be used."

The very pointed nuclear threats cited here from Lukin, Soskovets, and Rohklin never appeared in the Western press, even though Moscow Interfax made them available in English.

The Clinton administration has attempted to allay Moscow's fear of NATO expansion, making concessions at the 1997 Helsinki summit in strategic arms control and allowing Russia an observer status in NATO under the "NATO Founding Act." Moscow accepted the concessions, but it still dreads NATO. On January 14, 1998, the Duma issued a formal declaration that "an analysis of the military and political situation in the world allows the State Duma to state that potential threats and challenges to Russian security have not decreased. Despite Russia's sincere desire to ease tension . . . between the West and East, NATO countries have forgotten their promise, made at the time when the Warsaw Treaty Organization was dissolved, not to . . . expand the [NATO] Alliance to the East." On January 25, 1998, Defense Minister Sergeyev announced that to counter NATO expansion, Moscow might deploy troops in western Belarus on the Polish border, a circumstance that he acknowledged "may lead to confrontation between two military alliances." In April 1998, Foreign Minister Primakov and Security Council Secretary Kokoshin met with the foreign minister of Belarus to, as the two Russian officials put it, "draw a red line against NATO's eastward enlargement, meaning that the new states which emerged on the territory of the former Soviet Union are not to join NATO." Responding after a week of silence to the U.S. Senate's April 30, 1998, vote favoring NATO membership for Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, the Russian defense ministry declared simply that the Senate had committed "a fatal mistake."

Moscow is already using economic pressure on the Baltics and political support of violence in the Balkans to oppose NATO expansion. A May 1998 article, "Russia Raises Stakes against NATO" (*Washington Times*) concludes, "From the Baltic states to the Balkans, Russia and its allies are

confronting new and prospective NATO members in a series of small but ugly crises. Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the Brookings Institution, formerly the State Department's chief analyst on Eastern Europe, told the *Washington Times*, "The Russian government is following a general approach of seeking to find areas where it can define itself in opposition to perceived interests of the United States and where it can find other countries that share its concern." In February 1999, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Gusev gave an international gathering at Munich a "Cold War Flashback," in the words of the press, turning "a sleepy two-day conference on NATO's future into a controversial exchange reminiscent of the East-West conflict during the Cold War" when he said that an expanding NATO would threaten Russia and warned NATO not to cross Russia's "red line." In April, Duma Speaker Gennadiy Seleznev told the press that, "Russian nuclear arsenals prevent World War III" because "Europe's comfortable life may have made it forget World War II. . . . Nevertheless, Europe knows full well what it would be like to make war on Russia." In June 1999, in the aftermath of NATO air strikes on Yugoslavia, Strategic Rocket Forces chief Yakovlev reassured the Russian public, in a statement also published in English, that, "There is no doubt about the reliable functioning of the troops and their ability to warn about a missile attack. . . . the Strategic Nuclear Forces [shall] destroy missiles of the enemy, the attacking objects and troops."

I have personally been on the receiving end of Russian nuclear threats over NATO expansion. In 1997 and again in 1998, a high-ranking Russian official, who has requested anonymity, warned me that NATO enlargement could trigger a nuclear war. The Russian official, claiming knowledge of military contingency plans to deal with certain scenarios of NATO expansion, said it was his personal view that these plans would be implemented if the scenarios become reality. If NATO's military forces expand into the Baltic states, he said, Russia would go to war to prevent this, and would even resort to nuclear weapons. He said Russia would go to war to preserve the Kaliningrad enclave. He said Ukraine is "part of Russia" and will be reincorporated "in 10 or 20 years" and that therefore "there is no question Russia would wage war to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO." He said Russia would wage war to prevent the former Soviet republics in the south—Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan—and the former Central Asia republics from joining NATO. The high-ranking official said that the "weakness of Russian conventional forces would, in the event of a war with NATO, under any of these scenarios, leave Moscow with no alternative but to launch a nuclear first strike."

The high-ranking Russian official indicated that NATO enlargement to include Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia would be reluctantly accepted by Russia and would not trigger a military response, providing tactical nuclear weapons or advanced conven-

tional weapons and strike platforms are not forward-deployed to these states. If NATO moves tactical nuclear weapons or advanced conventional air power into these states, according to the Russian official, Russia would respond with military countermeasures—deploying Russian tactical nuclear weapons, returning Russian missile submarines to Cuba, moving Russian nuclear weapons into North Korea to threaten U.S. troops and allies, or basing Russian nuclear weapons in Iran to threaten the Strait of Hormuz and the global oil supply, for example. Or, the official said, Russia might “initiate a preventive nuclear war.”

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, approved for NATO membership by the U.S. Senate in 1998, were admitted formally into NATO in 1999. Still more nations are in line to join NATO after 1999, pressing the alliance ever closer to Russia’s borders. From the Russian General Staff’s perspective, the clock is ticking, and time is running out to do something about “the NATO threat.”

Shortly after an interview with then Chief of the General Staff Mikhail Kolesnikov, Russian journalist Pavel Felgengauer, who has rare regular access to senior Russian military circles, wrote in August 1995 an article entitled “The Russian Army and the East-West Military Balance: Self-Deception and Mutual Misunderstanding Did Not End with the Cold War.” He concluded that during the Cold War, the West, ignorant of the Russian war scare, underestimated the threat of nuclear conflict. “Now in the mid-90s, we can conclude that the military threat in the Cold War years was fundamentally wrong. The actual conventional military threat to the NATO countries was considerably less than supposed, whereas the nuclear threat was considerably greater. . . . There was in reality a panic fear in Moscow of NATO and a possible war. . . . What is more, it was fear and the panic caused by it at the top that could have been the main cause of a nuclear war.”

More importantly, Felgengauer believes, the failure to understand the erroneous nuclear threat perceptions of the past endangers the future: “The strategic errors of both parties, which could have provoked a nuclear war in Europe, have yet to be a subject of serious public analysis. And this is a bad sign. The end of the Cold War does not preclude new strategic errors—a mistaken assessment of states’ intentions both in East and in West Europe.” Indeed, Pavel Felgengauer offers the chilling judgment that the Russian nuclear war scare is more dangerous than ever. “Russia is still a nuclear superpower,” he writes, “and the weaker its conventional possibilities, the more Moscow will be forced to rely on nuclear deterrence. . . . The West’s strategic assessment of Russia’s possibilities and intentions is not distinguished today, just as in the times of the Cold War, by particular accuracy. Today Russia is weaker than ever, and for this reason the likelihood of panic in Moscow is greater than in the 1970s or 1980s.”

We ignore these facts at our peril.

Mr. BURTON. Dr. Green.

Mr. GREEN. Mr. Chairman, I appear before you with a certain disadvantage. As a college professor, I'm used to speaking in 90 minute blocks but in the interest—

Mr. BURTON. Ninety minutes is too long.

Mr. GREEN. Yes, sir, but in the interest of leaving as much time as possible for questions, I'll try to be terse.

I welcome the opportunity to testify before this committee on the potential security threats presented by the Russian Federation's nuclear weapons policy. My generation was born and grew up under the Soviet nuclear threat. The end of the cold war and the emergence of a democratic system in Russia filled me, as it did most of the world, with jubilation, and it wasn't—and the big reason for this is because the threat of nuclear war between the super powers seemed to have faded away, and so I've been watching the slow erosion of Russia's young democracy and the rebirth of tensions between Russia and the United States with deep concern.

Now, a number of recent developments have come together to bring this concern into the public eye. Some Americans have taken note that Russian words and actions are much more belligerent in the wake of NATO's decision last spring to conduct its first out of area operation to prevent Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. This new concern about Russia was reinforced last month when then President Boris Yeltsin publicly reminded President Clinton that Russia remains a nuclear power. Most recently, just 10 days ago and within 2 weeks of taking office, Russian Acting-President Vladimir Putin has issued a revised national security concept that not only identifies the United States as a serious threat to Russia's security but appears to lower the nuclear threshold in dealing with threats from the United States.

This national security concept is a revised version of a previous issue that came out in December 1997 of the national security concept. Both are policy statements or frameworks meant to integrate the most important state initiatives of the Russian Federation. Russia views its national security, and I put that in quotes, much more broadly than does the United States for these two 20 page, 20 plus page reports include threats to any aspect of life and security, and I am quoting there as well, in defining the term. They summarize not only foreign and defense issues but also matters that we would view as pertaining to our domestic policy, including the economic well-being of the Nation, crime and corruption, ecological hazards and even, I quote again, the adverse impact of foreign religious organizations and missionaries.

One question that should be dismissed immediately is whether this changes the personal initiative of Vladimir Putin, acting Russian President and current front runner in the March Presidential campaign. He is in many ways an unattractive character given his KGB background and his austere, even his harsh personality. Although Putin's tactic of tying renewed war in Chechnya to his drive for national leadership has attracted much criticism abroad, at home it may very well be the factor that propels him into the Presidency. So, therefore, there's a natural tendency to see this new national security concept as Putin's attempt to put his mark on security policy in the brief run up to the next election, plain politics.

Indeed, I have read one analytic report that labels this flat out the Putin doctrine.

It's also a natural view, I'm afraid, for those who may be more willing to blame worsening United States-Russian relations on Russia's adventuristic new President rather than on more long-term developments for which the United States Government is at least partially responsible. In fact, there's been a lengthy buildup to this particular formulation of Russia's interest in strategies, and undoubtedly it will continue to be revised and modified.

The national security concept was published in draft last October; and since, they have only made minor changes in wording in the final draft. At the same time, they published a new draft military doctrine that shares all the same assumptions about the West and about Russia's security position. For the past year, most of these issues have been discussed very openly by Russian military and political figures. Russian and international press reports indicate that the nuclear weapons provisions of the new national security concept were adopted by Russia's security council as far back as the end of April.

Moreover, you can draw a steady and long-standing departure between the rhetoric of our post-communism, post-cold war American and Russian strategic partnership and the actual state of relations as defined in many key official Russian documents. This departure begins as early as 1992 when Russia came out with its foreign policy concept, and it goes to the 1993 version of its military doctrine and so on to the 1997 National Security Council and now the document that we've had placed before us.

I think that it's particularly important to compare the 1997 and the January 2000 drafts of Russia's National Security Council. They are similar in structure, but their differences are an important indicator of recent movement in the Russian consensus over international and strategic policy. A difference that has attracted much attention, of course, are the new version's much looser terms for describing the conditions under which nuclear weapons might be used.

In 1997, the national security concept stated, and I quote, the most important mission of Russian Federation's Armed Forces is to support nuclear deterrence. The version released earlier this month states the Russian Federation should possess nuclear forces capable of guaranteeing the infliction of the desired extent of damage against any aggressor state or coalition of states in any conditions and circumstances. It goes on to state that the Russian Federation will consider the use of all available forces and assets, including nuclear, in the event of need to repulse armed aggression if all other measures of resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted and have proved ineffective. No indication of deterring nuclear attacks. This is they've tried their conventional forces; they don't work; so they're using nuclear weapons.

Mr. Chairman, I don't believe this change of wording signals an immediate shift in Russia to planning for preemptive or offensive use of nuclear weapons, but I think that we should draw two maybe less apocalyptic but still very disturbing conclusions. I think, first of all, that Russia is warning this country that while they may be weaker than we are, they're willing to play by much

rougher rules. Russia is willing to both take and inflict greater losses should a confrontation turn into an armed conflict.

And Russia has nuclear weapons. In future disputes with Russia, our growing awareness of this threat may very well dissuade us from taking forceful action. And I think we do have to take it seriously.

Second, this lowering of the nuclear threshold should be viewed in conjunction with an even more important shift in the national security concept, one that a colleague of mine says essentially repudiates the 1997 draft. This is a dramatic shift in the focus and emphasis of the principal threats to Russia. The current version identifies the United States and NATO in strong terms as hostile to Russia and to the international order. The term "strategic partnership" that the 1997 version used to characterize Russia's relations with us and with the other Western nations has disappeared. Instead, the new version describes, "the developed Western nations under U.S. leadership as attempting to circumvent the fundamental rules of international law to dominate the world by unilateral means including military force."

It alarms me to note that Russian military and political leaders now use the term "strategic partnership" not to describe us, but to describe their relationship with China; that Russia is selling some of its most advanced weapons technology to China; and that the high-level visits and exchanges between Russia and China appear to be on the increase. Our relations with both these nations individually are at a low point. We can ill afford to have the two coordinate their efforts in an anti-U.S. coalition of sorts.

I don't blame the current administration for the worsened state of United States-Russian relations that I described. And in fact, given the unrealistic expectations that we had in the early 1990's, I think that seeing them deteriorate was almost inevitable. Both nations were almost certain to take actions the other would find objectionable.

Just to begin with, Americans working in Russia, Americans working with Russians abroad are always expressing their frustration with the degree to which Russian institutions and Russians individually have been damaged by the Communist experience. Leaders, organizations and even the national mind set often seem tainted by the distorted views and values that the Communist party took pains to inculcate. Decades may pass before the trauma of those years fades from the Russian consciousness.

By the same token the realities of the post cold war world are such that no United States Government, regardless of party or administration, would have been able to avoid triggering Russian suspicions and hostilities.

I do hold the current administration responsible for what I regard as unrealistic and even reckless behavior in the face of this worsening relationship. To begin with, the United States Government should have been able to predict worsening ties, or if not, to track them as Russian antagonism began to grow. Instead, we have gotten a relentless stream of optimistic pronouncements and interpretations from administration spokespersons even as the heat of Russian anger and rhetoric aimed at us has risen.

Closely tied to this Pollyanna-ish approach is the administration's failure to establish significant ties with Russian political and social leaders outside of a narrow circle of so-called reformers surrounding the Yeltsin Presidency. While the United States' Government praised their commitment to democracy and the free market system, these individuals led Russia through a corrupt privatization program that has impoverished many Russians and discredited the very concept of democracy. Indeed, much Russian popular bitterness at the United States comes from its unconditional backing of a leadership associated with crime and corrupt rule.

Second, the administration has pursued a number of initiatives that have alienated Russians regardless of their political orientation. These include the expansion of NATO, recent support for research on ballistic missile defense, its policy of double containment against Iraq and Iran, the development of close ties with the former Soviet oil producing nations in the Caspian region, and most recently participation in NATO's air war against Yugoslavia over Kosovo.

I want to emphasize I'm not opposing these initiatives on their own merits; in fact, many of them I support enthusiastically. But it is unrealistic to expect Russia to remain passive in the face of United States policies that touch its interests so closely. Russian opposition should have been taken for granted. The possibility should have been entertained that Russia would interpret them taken together as evidence of a grand strategy aimed against it.

The new national security concept identifies one of the,

Fundamental threats in the international sphere as attempts by other states to oppose a strengthening of Russia as one of the influential centers of the multipolar world, to hinder the exercise of its national interest, and to weaken its position in Europe, the Middle East, Transcaucasia, Central Asia and the Asia Pacific region.

Finally, I want to express my dismay that current United States foreign and military policies seem built on the assumption that good relations with Russia can be taken for granted. If I'm correct in this interpretation, it is an assumption built upon sand. We cannot get U.N. Security Council approval for the numerous overseas interventions and peacekeeping missions current policy seems to regard as essential if Russia vetoes them. We cannot project our values and influence into regions they have never known, such as the Balkans and Central Asia, if Russia stands ready to combine with regional tyrannies to keep us out. And we cannot depend on our shrunken peacetime military and naval forces to defend our interests abroad if, as a generation ago, a nuclear-armed Russia adversary backs radical regimes when they find themselves in confrontation with the United States.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I stand ready to respond to any questions the committee might raise, following adjournment of this hearing to augment the issues we have discussed here with additional materials.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Green follows:]

**Testimony of Dr. William C. Green, Associate Professor of  
Political Science and Acting Director of the National Security  
Studies Program, California State University San Bernardino**

**Before the Committee on Government Reform,  
House of Representatives.  
Congress of the United States**

**Regarding Potential Security Threats Posed by the  
Russian Government's Nuclear Weapons Policy**

**Field Hearing  
Los Angeles, California  
January 24, 2000**

I welcome the opportunity to testify before this committee on the potential security threats presented by the Russian Federation's nuclear weapons policy. My generation was born and grew up under the threat of Soviet nuclear attack. The end of the Cold War and the emergence of a democratic system in Russia filled me – as it did much of the world – with jubilation, not least because the threat of nuclear war between the superpowers seemed to have vanished. Therefore, the slow erosion of Russia's young democracy and the rebirth of tensions between Russia and the United States is a development I regard with deep concern.

A number of recent developments have come together to bring this concern into the public eye. Some Americans have taken note that Russian words and actions are much more belligerent in the wake of NATO's decision last spring to conduct its first "out-of-area" campaign to prevent Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. This new concern about Russia was reinforced last month when then-President Boris Yeltsin publicly reminded President Clinton that Russia remained a nuclear power. Most recently, just ten days ago and within two weeks of taking office, Russian Acting President Vladimir Putin has issued a revised "National Security Concept" that not only identifies the United States as a serious threat to Russia's security, but appears to lower the nuclear threshold in dealing with such threats.

This "National Security Concept" is a revised version of a previous (December 1997) National Security Concept. Both are policy statements or frameworks meant to integrate the most important state initiatives of the Russian Federation. Russia views "national security" much more broadly than does the United States, for these successive 20-plus page reports includes threats to "any aspect of life and security" in defining the term. They summarize not only foreign and defense issues, but also matters we would view as pertaining to domestic policy, including the economic wellbeing of the nation, crime and corruption, ecological hazards, and even "the adverse impact of foreign religious organizations and missionaries."

One question that should be dismissed immediately is whether this change is the personal initiative of Vladimir Putin, acting Russian President and current front-runner in the March presidential campaign. He is in many ways an unattractive character, given his KGB background and his austere, even harsh, personality. Although Putin's tactic of tying renewed war in Chechnya to his drive for national leadership has attracted much criticism abroad, at home it may well propel him into the presidency. There is a natural tendency to see the new National Security Concept as Putin's attempt to put his mark on security policy in the brief run-up to the next election – indeed, one analytical report has labeled it the "Putin Doctrine." It is also a natural view for those who may more willing to blame the worsening U.S.-Russian ties on Russia's adventurist new President, rather than on more long-term developments for which the U.S. government is at least partially responsible.

In fact, there has been a lengthy build-up to this particular formulation of Russia's interests and strategies, and undoubtedly it will continue to be revised and modified. The National Security Policy was published in draft last October, and underwent only minor

changes in wording as finally adopted. A draft revision of military doctrine published at the same time and not yet finally adopted shows most of the same assumptions about Russia's security position and its relations with the West. For the past year most of these issues were discussed publicly by various Russian military and political representatives. Russian and international press reports indicate that the nuclear weapons provisions of the new National Security Concept were adopted by the Security Council as far back as the end of April.

Moreover, a steady and long-standing departure can be traced between the rhetoric of post-Communist, post-Cold War Russian and American "strategic partnership" and the actual state of relations as defined in many key formulations of the Russian strategic position. This departure begins with the 1992 Foreign Policy Concept, through the 1993 version of Russia's Military Doctrine, and so on to the 1997 National Security Concept and its recent revision.

I believe that it is especially important to compare the 1997 and 2000 drafts of Russia's National Security Concept, for while similar in structure, their differences are an important indicator of recent movement in the Russian consensus over international and strategic policy. A difference that has attracted much attention, of course, are the new version's much looser terms for describing the conditions under which nuclear weapons might be used.

In 1997 the National Security Concept stated that "the most important mission of the Russian Federation's armed forces is to support nuclear deterrence." The version released earlier this month states: "The Russian Federation should possess nuclear forces capable of guaranteeing the infliction of the desired extent of damage against any aggressor state or coalition of states in any conditions and circumstances." It goes on to state that the Russian Federation will consider the "use of all available forces and assets, including nuclear, in the event of need to repulse armed aggression, if all other measures of resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted and have provide ineffective."

Mr. Chairman, I do not believe this change of wording signals an immediate shift in Russia to planning for the preemptive or offensive use of nuclear weapons. Rather, two less apocalyptic but still disturbing conclusions should be made. I think, first of all, that Russia is warning this country that while it may be weaker than the United States, it is willing to play by much rougher rules. It is willing both to take and inflict greater losses should a confrontation turn into an armed conflict – and it has nuclear weapons. In future disputes with Russia, this threat may well dissuade us from forceful action, should we take it seriously.

Second, this lowering of the nuclear threshold should be viewed in conjunction with an even more important shift in the National Security Concept, one that a colleague of mine says "essentially repudiates" the earlier version of the Concept. This is a dramatic shift in the focus and emphasis of the principle threats to Russia. The current version identifies the United States and NATO in strong terms as hostile to Russia and to the international order. The term "strategic partnership" that the 1997 version used to

characterize relations with the United States and the other Western nations has disappeared. Instead, the new version describes the “developed Western countries ... under U.S. leadership” as attempting to circumvent the fundamental rules of international law to dominate the world by unilateral means including military force. It alarms me to note that Russian military and political figures now use the term “strategic partnership” to describe their relationship with China, that Russia is selling some of its most advanced weapons technology to China, and that high-level visits and exchanges between Russia and China appear to be on the increase. Our relations with both nations individually are at a low point; we can ill afford to have the two coordinate their efforts in an anti-US coalition of sorts.

I do not blame the current Administration for the worsened state of U.S.-Russian relations I describe; indeed, given the unrealistic expectations of the early 1990s, to see them deteriorate was almost inevitable. Both nations were almost certainly bound to take actions the other would find objectionable under any circumstances. Americans working in Russia and with Russians abroad often express their frustration with the degree to which Russian institutions and characteristics have been damaged by the Communist experience. Leaders, organizations, and the national mind-set often seem tainted by the distorted views and values the Party took such pains to instill. Decades may well pass before the trauma of those years fades from the Russian consciousness. By the same token, the realities of the post-Cold War world are such that no U.S. government would have been able to avoid triggering Russian suspicions and hostility.

I do hold the current Administration responsible for what I regard as unrealistic and even reckless behavior in the face of this worsening relationship. To begin with, the U.S. government should have been able to predict deteriorating ties, or if not, to track them as Russian antagonism began to grow. Instead, we have gotten a relentless stream of optimistic pronouncements and interpretations from Administration spokesmen even as the heat of Russian anger and rhetoric has risen.

Closely tied to this Pollyanna-ish approach is the Administration's failure to establish significant ties with Russian political and social leaders outside of a narrow circle of so-called “reformers” surrounding the Yeltsin presidency. While the United States government praised their commitment to democracy and the free-market system, these individuals led Russia through a corrupt “privatization” program that has impoverished most Russians and discredited the very concept of democracy. Indeed, much popular Russian bitterness at our country comes from its unconditional backing of a leadership associated with crime and corrupt rule.

Second, the Administration has pursued a number of initiatives that have alienated Russians of all political orientations. These include the expansion of NATO, recent support for research on ballistic missile defenses, its policy of “double containment” against Iraq and Iran, the development of close ties with the former Soviet oil-producing nations of the Caspian region, and most recently, participation in NATO's air war against Yugoslavia over Kosovo.

I want to emphasize that I am not opposing these initiatives on their own – indeed, many of them I support enthusiastically. But it is unrealistic to expect Russia to remain passive in the face of U.S. policies that touch its own interests so closely. Russian opposition should have been taken for granted. The possibility should have been entertained that Russia would interpret them, taken together, as evidence of a grand strategy aimed against it. The new National Security Concept identifies one of the “fundamental threats in the international sphere” as “attempts by other states to oppose a strengthening of Russia as one of the influential centers of a multipolar world, to hinder the exercise of its national interests, and to weaken its position in Europe, the Middle East, Transcaucasus, Central Asia, and the Asia-Pacific region.”

Finally, I want to express my dismay that current U.S. foreign and military policies seem built on the assumption that good relations with Russia can be taken for granted. It is an assumption built upon sand. We cannot get U.N. Security Council approval for the numerous overseas interventions and “peacekeeping missions” current policy seems to regard as essential if Russia chooses to veto them. We cannot project our values and influence into regions they have never known, such as the Balkans and Central Asia, if Russia stands ready to combine with regional tyrannies to keep us out. And we cannot depend on our shrunken peacetime military and naval forces to defend our interests abroad if, as a generation ago, a nuclear-armed Russian adversary backs radical regimes when they find themselves in confrontation with the United States.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I stand ready to respond to any questions the committee might raise, or, following adjournment of this hearing, to augment the issues we have discussed here with additional material.

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Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Doctor. Let me say for the record that Dr. Pry is a member of the Armed Services Committee staff and that he represents the majority on that staff. And I want to make sure that's clear so that people know that he may, according to some members and some people, have a bias toward a different position. I don't believe that to be the case, but I wanted to make sure that that was stated for the record.

Mr. WELDON. Represents both sides.

Mr. BURTON. Excuse me. Oh, he represents both sides on the Armed Services Committee. So forgive me, Dr. Pry. Appreciate that.

Let me just start the questioning. And I don't think I'll question too long because I want to make sure my colleagues have plenty of time.

Mr. Lunev, there's a lot of people that are going to be skeptical about what you have said. You were a member of the GRU. You were the highest ranking official of the intelligence community in the Soviet Union to defect. Would you elaborate briefly and tell us why you believe that there is a continued threat and why you believe that there are weapons of one type or another and communications equipment of one type or another that are buried here in the United States for possible use in the future and why you and others believe that they have created dossiers on American officials, government officials, in the event that there's some kind of a potential conflict that they can target for assassination.

Mr. LUNEV. Mr. Chairman, Dr. Pry actually make very good account of last development connected with Russian military and Russian military preparations. Including myself, I can spend very short, very small time I think especially to explain that, unfortunately, in time when America and American people spent huge amount of money trying to assist Russia in transition, transaction to free market economy and to the real democracy, unfortunately nothing happened in Russia. And American people, which spent so big money, of course, have all rights to expect something in return back from Russia. But it's not going point of view of Russian Government. Because Russian Government which actually totally destroyed Russian economy—and you know how Russian people ordinary people just now living in Russian federation—in this situation Russian Government using very old traditional or history methods and trying to explain to Russian people that Russian people are living so bad not because of its own corrupted government but because of foreign enemy.

And Peter Pry and Dr. Green, they provided us real views of Russian leaders just now who are in charge of Russia who openly talking, speaking to Russian people that this situation with Russia is so bad because of America, because of America which already destroyed former Soviet Union, destroy Yugoslavia, occupied Kosovo, just now America which tried to destabilize the region in northern Caucasus especially, to establish control over this strategically important area, this America which like to destroy mother Russia itself.

And in this situation, they built up Russian military machine not to nowhere but especially against the United States and American friends and allies worldwide. You know what's going on just now

in Chechnya. It's very small area. It's actually—I don't know how to compare it, but maybe it's only fifth spot of California State. But these people, Chechnyan people who fighting for independence from Russia more than 200 years just now fighting against the same Russian domination which was historically in this area. And Russian Government using Chechnyan area, area of Chechnyans living like some kind of test field for future war, for real war. Because they using huge number of Russian military personnel for combat training. They using new weapons system which are in stage of design only. First time, if I understand rightly, it was first time in history when Russian military few weeks ago used bombs against Chechnyan militants.

And in this situation when Russian Government, which actually just now are considering only one strategic partner in the world, it's not America, but China, Russian Government, which continues its military buildup and development of Russian military machine, they do not change their mind. And they still consider United States like main potential military adversary.

Mr. BURTON. Let me interrupt you. I guess I didn't make my point quite clear. Why should Americans be concerned about the book and the statements that have been made that there are—there's a strong possibility that there are sites across the United States and North America where military equipment and communications equipment, and telecommunications equipment might be buried and also the possibility that there might be some nuclear weapons buried? Why should Americans be concerned about that? I mean, could you and the others that we've quoted here today be incorrect?

Mr. LUNEV. American people need to be concerned about this location because this weapon system which storage in this country could be used by Russian special operation forces commanders against American people in time when Russian Government will order them for action. This is very big danger.

Mr. BURTON. I don't want to belabor the point, but there will be people who will say this is all bologna, that it's not factual even though several Russian leaders have said that these things have occurred or could occur. How would you answer them?

Mr. LUNEV. I would like to answer to people who is really concerned about national security of this country that location of this weapon system of foreign region in the territory of independent country like United States of America, it's violation, violation of American rights, traditions and sovereignty. And it's direct danger to the national security of this country.

Mr. BURTON. But you believe that that really occurs?

Mr. LUNEV. I believe, yes.

Dr. PRY. Could I offer a short answer to that question, sir, could I have the temerity?

Mr. BURTON. Sure.

Dr. PRY. Caches have been found in Europe. That is a fact. It is a fact. They have been found in Belgium and Switzerland. So we know the caches are real. It would be—we are a Nation of strategic optimists; but it's a real stretch, it seems to me, to think that when their doctrine calls for putting these caches in NATO and the

United States, and then we find caches in NATO, that we then conclude that well, they wouldn't have done it in the United States.

I think the burden of proof at this point is on those who want to argue that we don't have to worry about these caches to answer that argument. Why should they be in NATO and not the United States?

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much.

Mr. Scarborough.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. I wanted to ask a question about the new administration. You know, we've heard often that in the post-cold war era how nuclear weapons were not controlled, how some had been smuggled or lost or sold to rogue states. And I want to ask you all obviously when we had the Yeltsin administration many considered the administration to be weak, corrupt, and had devolved power where somebody said Russian Mafia has as much control as any other institutions there, let me ask you about the new administration. Even though Putin is more nationalistic and more militaristic and more hostile to the West, do you all believe that there may be a silver lining in that he may gain more control over nuclear weapons? Because obviously if on one side we've been seeing military and political and economic anarchy in Russia over the past 8 or 9 years, if he is a stronger leader, is there a chance to believe that maybe some of the nuclear proliferation, at least on the black market, may be brought under control?

Because right now how many weapons—85 of these suitcases can't even be accounted for. I know that's sort of throwing a curve ball, but many Americans have said for some time that one of the most dangerous things with the Russian Government is that they don't have control over nuclear weapons because they're so weak.

Any taker's on that?

Dr. PRY. I'll—go on.

Mr. GREEN. There's, I think, a widespread impression that authoritarian or totalitarian governments are in control from top to bottom. But experience shows that even a government that can be very forceful and very brutal in keeping its population down can suffer from massive corruption and turmoil. It's not so much that it doesn't exist as that the press is unable to report about it. There is no freedom to talk about it. I don't think that the sort of opportunities for proliferation you've been discussing would go away if Russia went back under an authoritarian form of government.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. How would you compare it, though? The lack of control over nuclear weapons under the Soviet Union, the 80—listen, I'm not here preaching the joys of communism or totalitarianism, I'm just asking a question. How would you compare, though, the control of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union in the 1970's and 1980's compared to the 1990's?

Mr. GREEN. Well, in the Soviet period, control of nuclear weapons was part of a very rigid control of all of society. That has broken down. Even if it were reassembled, the horse is already out of the door. We've had 10 to 15 years of a very high level of disorder in Russia. And if there has been significant leakage of nuclear terms or weapons out of Russia, merely re-establishing authoritarian controls isn't going to bring them back.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Colonel.

Mr. LUNEV. I absolutely agree with Dr. Green that in time of former Soviet Union existence it was very strong control over nuclear materials and weapons systems, but after the USSR disintegration, control became weaker; but nonproliferation question is not connected with this protection of nuclear materials and weapons because all proliferation and nuclear technology is delivery to rogue countries made under direct permission from Russian government of Boris Yeltsin.

But you ask very excellent question because what could be happened in future in time when administration and Russian Government actually was changed. And Mr. Putin just now Acting President and leading candidate for Russian federation next President, he doesn't have nothing, absolutely in his back, exclude only war in Chechnya. And he depends from Russian military much more than Yeltsin depend from his military machine. At the same time, Mr. Putin depends from Russian security services much more than Yeltsin who in his past had a lot of problem with KGB and he hated KGB to the last days when he was in power.

So if Mr. Putin who just now promising reforms to reformers, pensions to pensioners, high salary to military personnel, security services, and if this person who open, actually open and just now carrying on war against his own people in Northern Caucasus would become next Russian President, it would be much more stronger person than internationally and domestically. He is young. He's not drunk. He is not out of his mind. And of course he would like maybe to do something for Russian people, maybe to do something for reforms which never occur in Russia. Maybe he will do something for Russian people. But internationally he would be much more militant and much more aggressive than his predecessor.

And in time, of course, when he would be in charge of Russian military machine as a commander in chief of Russian federation military, of course he will use all his power including huge nuclear arsenal to press foreign countries, especially for his own gains and benefits.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. And I think, by the way, you've just helped him define his campaign slogan: I'm not drunk. I'm not crazy. As you said of his predecessor.

Dr. PRY, could you just conclude on this same question. Because, again, it seems to me if he's going to have an iron fist and if he's going to do a lot of things that Americans might be repulsed by even if he's more militaristic and aggressive against the West, is there a possibility that this might bring some stability at home in Russia over control of nuclear weapons that have not been controlled over the past 8 years?

Dr. PRY. Yeah. You see the question presumes that the reason we have proliferation of missile technology and weapons of mass destruction technology from Russia is because of a lack of central control, and that this is being done by the Russian Mafia criminal elements and independent enterprisers. This is the majority view in the West. But I submit this is a case of our strategic optimism. If you look at many of the specific examples of proliferation that have occurred, they are a matter of deliberate government policy. They are not being done by the Mafia. It is not the Mafia that is

building a nuclear reactor for Iran. It is not the Mafia that helped them develop the—

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. If I can interrupt here. And I want you to get into that briefly; but, again, there's a big difference between purposely selling nuclear technology to Iran and other rogue states and not knowing where 84 nuclear devices are. I mean, I certainly understand he may want to sell to Syria, he may want to sell to Iran, he may want to sell to other rogue states. That's very different, though, than losing 84 nuclear devices, is it not?

Dr. PRY. Sure. General Lebed could not account for the 84 nuclear devices. That does not mean that the GRU does not know where they are.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Right.

Dr. PRY. That was part of Mr. Lunev's testimony that maybe they're here and part of the government doesn't want to tell another part of the government. But I guess here you could say, well, if he has an iron hand, is more Stalin-like, maybe he could get these guys to tell the General Lebeds where they are. And that's possible. I don't deny that there could be some—I think the benefits would be marginal in terms of the tradeoff, in terms of getting control. Because frankly when I think—when you get down to specifics about cases of proliferation and you look at all the cases of proliferation, one is hard pressed to actually come up with a hard example of where the Russian Mafia really proliferated anything. Those accelerometers and gyroscopes, over 100 of them, hard to believe that organized crime could manage that, you know. It looks like this was in collusion.

Also, organized crime and the government are often one in the same. Defense Minister Grachev was a major boss of an organized crime family in Russia according to research done by many Russian journalists. I think the bottom line is you have a more authoritarian or totalitarian government that is even more hostile to the West than the past government was, it will provide even more of an incentive for these guys to want to strengthen our adversaries in the world by arming them with weapons of mass destruction and highly effective conventional weapons to cause as much trouble for the United States as they can. That is going to by far outweigh the increased police actions that you might get, you know, from having an authoritarian government. I believe it will be a net loss for us in security.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Lunev, did you want to respond to that?

Mr. LUNEV. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Only few years according to these devices, looks like yes. Because these devices are designed for a special operation forces commanders and actually time when design of this weapon system was in place, it was only GRU which handle special operation forces commanders which need to operate worldwide.

And, according General Lebed's statements that some of these devices are not located in Russia, later he made one more statement because there were a lot of questions, is it possible that these devices could find way in the hands of international terrorists or other countries or countries without nuclear weapons. And General Lebed said openly that according checking process he made trying

to find these devices he found that these nuclear weapons systems are in right hands. So GRU—

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. In right hands.

Mr. LUNEV. In right hands, not in wrong hands.

Mr. BURTON. If the gentleman will yield. What he was saying then is that the government did have control of those some place, but he was not telling where they were.

Mr. LUNEV. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Thanks.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Scarborough.

Mr. Weldon.

Mr. WELDON. Mr. Lunev, I have known you for some time, but I think for the purpose of the media here we should go through exactly who you are and what you were doing. You are currently in a witness protection program in this country administered by two of our intelligence agencies; is that correct? The CIA and the FBI.

Mr. LUNEV. It's interagency.

Mr. WELDON. So Stanislav Lunev is not your correct name.

Mr. LUNEV. It's my original name.

Mr. WELDON. Mr. Lunev, when you were active in the GRU, which is the intelligence arm of the Soviet military, you were stationed for a while in the Soviet Embassy in Washington; is that correct?

Mr. LUNEV. Yes, sir.

Mr. WELDON. When you were stationed at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, was your cover that of being a TASS correspondent?

Mr. LUNEV. Yes, sir.

Mr. WELDON. And so people who came across you in Washington really thought you were working for the Soviet media; is that correct?

Mr. LUNEV. Of course.

Mr. WELDON. But what were your real assignments? What kinds of things were you expected to do while you were working there supposedly as a TASS correspondent? What kinds of things did the GRU expect you to accomplish?

Mr. LUNEV. Let's say that the journalist cover is very good for intelligence officers because the same targets to penetrate through secrets to open secrets and publish something about this. So it was very good for my intelligence job. And in time of my operational business in Washington, DC, area, I was assigned for special tasking to penetrate through American national security system and recruit people with access to the secrets of American national security.

Mr. WELDON. Were you also asked to locate sites where caches of weapons could be deposited in our country?

Mr. LUNEV. Yes, sir, but it was some kind of support job I made for my field office additionally to my major targets. And in time of this support job, I spend many, many hours, many hundreds of hours run around big Washington, DC, area trying to find places for—we named them dead drops. Dead drops. Dead drops which could be used for storage of money, documents, microfilms, weapons systems, different types of weapons systems, and report about our dead drops proposal to Moscow.

Mr. WELDON. How many such locations do you think that you uncovered while you were on station in Washington approximately?

Mr. LUNEV. It's very easy to say because I stay in Washington, DC, about 3½ years. And every 6 months I need to find one, two places for different size dead drops. To keep in mind the GRU field office in Washington, DC, it's about 40 person. There's hundreds going every 6 months.

Mr. WELDON. So hundreds of sites were identified.

Mr. LUNEV. Yes.

Mr. WELDON. Were there other GRU agents in other offices throughout the United States that were doing the same thing?

Mr. LUNEV. Yes, sir.

Mr. WELDON. So how many—

Mr. LUNEV. And some of them much more were involved in this kind of job because they didn't have so hard targets as I had.

Mr. WELDON. So how many sites do you think were identified overall during the course of, say, a year nationwide in America?

Mr. LUNEV. Thousands.

Mr. WELDON. Thousands.

Mr. LUNEV. Thousands. It's only in big Washington, DC, operational area, in New York, San Francisco, where we had field offices were located, but in every trip outside of this area, you know it was 25-mile zone.

Mr. WELDON. Right. Right.

Mr. LUNEV. Everybody was assigned especially to find some places of dead drop and sent description of this location to Moscow after return back to Washington.

Mr. WELDON. And what was your understanding of the kinds of drops that would occur there? Was it just communications and telemetry equipment, money and small arms, or was there the possibility of weapons of mass destruction?

Mr. LUNEV. Sir, from this business nobody from intelligence offices in the field doesn't know how this place like they found the dead drop would be used. And all the description is going to Moscow. And Moscow headquarter deciding how to use concrete dead drop position.

Mr. WELDON. Did you ever have any indication of the possibility of a weapon of mass destruction being brought to the United States?

Mr. LUNEV. Sir, in time when I had my instructions before operational tour to Washington, DC, like the same that was before I fly to China, I had very clear instruction. These dead drop positions need to be found for all types of weapons including nuclear weapons.

Mr. WELDON. Mr. Lunev, how many sites do you think there are today in the United States where caches of weapons and military material are still buried? Just an approximate.

Mr. LUNEV. I think hundreds.

Mr. WELDON. Hundreds.

Mr. LUNEV. Hundreds, yes.

Mr. WELDON. Are you confident that even though Mitrokhin didn't copy down every exact location, that in the KGB files those sites are in fact documented down to the exact location?

Mr. LUNEV. I think that much more real information could be found in the GRU headquarter, not so much KGB. Because KGB traditionally they were active in Europe. It's very close countries. But GRU as a strategic intelligence agency was much more active if the United States.

Mr. WELDON. Good point. I agree with you. I think you're probably correct. It probably needs to be as to the GRU.

So therefore is it your assessment as someone who was a senior expert and was involved in these kinds of activities that there are people in America who are at risk today because of the possibility of what happened in Switzerland happening throughout the United States in perhaps public park lands or in open space that may have been the site where these materials were located?

Mr. LUNEV. I hope that it's never happened, but I cannot exclude.

Mr. WELDON. Do you think it's true that we have sites such as Switzerland where there are booby-trapped devices that could harm American people, do you think that in fact is a very real possibility in America today?

Mr. LUNEV. Yes, sir. And I need to tell a few words additionally. Because please keep in mind that the United States intelligence and counterintelligence services are best in the world. And the people who planned the same operation in Switzerland and the United States, they keep in mind difference in intelligence and counterintelligence services. And, of course, everything which was done in the United States was done many, many, many times much more carefully and safety for its participants than it was done in European countries.

Mr. WELDON. Thank you.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Campbell.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. LUNEV, describe please for me the kind of boobytrap that might be connected with one of these dead drops or weapons caches or communications caches.

Mr. LUNEV. What does this mean, "boobytrap"?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Boobytrap is a device that would explode if somebody who happened upon this by accident or happened upon this by counterintelligence without having information or key or a key to defuse it.

Mr. LUNEV. Yes, sir, I understand. I understand your question. The devices which would explode this weapons system if somebody from strangers will try to open it to approach, usually use in combat area in time of warfare, but connected with the same devices like portable technical nuclear briefcase or containers with chemical and biological weapons using different types of devices, so-called self-liquidation devices. And if somebody would like to approach this device, it will be self-liquidation, first of all. But I cannot exclude possibility that for more than 100 percent guarantee second level of security would be the same devices for the explosion.

Mr. CAMPBELL. In the example given in the book to which reference has been made from the Mitrokhin files, we have a boobytrapped device in Switzerland which was used to protect communications devices apparently. My question is whether this would be typical of the kind of protection that you would have placed

around a communications cache, a communications dead drop in the United States.

Mr. LUNEV. Yes, sir, it's typical. It's typical and in the traditions.

Mr. CAMPBELL. And if you have an estimate, I would like to know it whether this was true for all dead drops and locations of this nature or some. And if only some, what was the distinction.

Mr. LUNEV. Thank you, sir. No. It's very big difference because for dead drops, for communication with agents, for exchange of microfilms, information, money, to provide them communication devices, it's—I think it's only in few cases they could be equipped by this special destruction devices. But in general, when you have agent with elementary school education to explain him how to switch off this explosion device, it's impossible. But for dead drops which could be used by special operation forces commanders, yes, it is necessary.

Mr. CAMPBELL. And those would include dead drops that you are aware of within the United States.

Mr. LUNEV. This is dead drops for the future war. It means places where weapons system could be storage, communication devices not for peace time, not for spy games, but for war time and all reserves which would be necessary to command this for the war time.

Mr. CAMPBELL. You mentioned San Francisco field office of the GRU. Are you aware of any locations of devices, communications, or weapons that would have been the responsibility of GRU agents working out of the San Francisco office?

Mr. LUNEV. Sure. I didn't have time to tell you all story about this. But it's not only GRU operational offices who are working in this country under civilian cover or in military uniform are involved in this business. Because they, yes, they are responsible for finding dead drops and the operations according dead drops. But please keep in mind that a lot of GRU offices are coming here like businessmen, like students, teachers, most popular computer specialists, and all other cover they can use. And they will do one of the major part of their job is to find these dead drop positions. Plus illegals in this country, there is a lot of illegals, not only for GRU but for KGB. And all of them are looking around especially to fulfill their tasking.

And San Francisco is extremely important. San Francisco and Los Angeles it's strategically important targets for the future war operational use. And, of course, I am sure that they are in lots of places where these weapons systems are located of course not inside but somewhere around, especially to be delivered in very short time to the place of the operational use. So it's not only San Francisco, Los Angeles, Washington, DC, New York City. It's in this country there are a lot of targets for these weapons.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I ask about San Francisco only because you brought it up as a field office of the GRU.

Mr. LUNEV. Yes. And it's very important strategically. You know what Navy, Army, Air Force facilities you do have, and how San Francisco military area is important for the future war operations. It's extremely important.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I'm tempted to ask one additional question if I might, Mr. Chairman. Silicon Valley, would that have an equal interest to your operations?

Mr. LUNEV. Yes, sir. Because to believe that in this country it's very difficult to find location of nuclear weapons, American nuclear weapons or military units, no, it's very clear from space satellites. But the major secrets of the United States are in up-to-date technologies development, first of all connected with military. And Silicon Valley is a recognized leader in this technologies, research, development and production. And of course Silicon Valley is one of the targets for penetration by GRU; but it's not by nuclear briefcases, it's by recruitment of people.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Very well.

Mr. Chairman, I have one final question and that is to ask Colonel Lunev why he defected.

Mr. BURTON. Why did you defect?

Mr. LUNEV. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Campbell, it's very long story. But very briefly I can tell you if you have couple minutes of course because I cannot do it in shorter period of time.

For me, as a graduate of law school of Moscow Military Political Academy, I had access to secret archives of Communist party in time when I get this advanced military education. When I saw papers and documents signed by Lenin, Stalin, and other leaders of Soviet international communists, after I saw these papers, communism ideology never play any role in my life. I keep my membership in Communist party only like some kind of ordinary or regular staff I need to have, but I do it for my country, I believe in my country, not communist ideology.

And all my life I believe that Soviet propaganda which tell me and other Soviet people that way of life in Soviet Union is fair and equal for all people, I believe in this way of life maybe because I didn't see any other. I believe in this when I worked in Singapore, in China and Soviet Union, until I came to the United States. When I came to this country, I found that it's different story. Because, please, turn back the Soviet Union 10 years ago what was it in America. Evil empire, leader of international imperialism, country where only small number of people are living very good, this is millionaires, and all other population living very bad and working for these rich people to become more and more rich.

When I came to this country, I found that's wrong. I found that, yes, in this country there is limited number of very wealthy or rich people, limited number of very poor people who are living very bad. But between in this country there is huge, huge middle class which lives in this country, I cannot say very good, not bad. Not bad.

And when I found that, that it's absolutely different society, different—the polar different types of living, of course I reduce my hostile activity against this country dramatically if not to zero and try to do minimum what I could do against this country in my operational stay here.

And, of course, I didn't want to fight against America. And I didn't want to damage America. And it's happen 1991, 1992, after your society's integration, the society's integration, I found that unfortunately information I receive from my sources with risk of myself and people who believed me is going to wrong hands. And I

found that some of my information is going through the hands of Russian, just now it's name of criminals or people who are conducted with organized crime activity against the United States.

It was some kind of last drop in my decision to cancel my hostile activity against the United States. But last drop, real last drop, it was in my conversations with my friends and associates—maybe you remember the beginning of 1992, wintertime, and American Air Force cargo plans deliver humanitarian aid to Russian people. In time when America tried to assist my own country and my own people, in time when Russian Government didn't do nothing but requested new credits and loans from the United States, I with my friends and associates we discussed very actively problem what to do in this country. Because America, if to believe Yeltsin, it was not anymore enemy but became friend or partner.

And in this situation we need to cancel our hostile activity against America. And if it's necessary to continue our spy business, but by other ways like friendly countries, you know what foreign intelligence services are working in this country, but most of them are friendly intelligence services. And when we requested Moscow what to do in this situation, we received direct order from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to activate our spy business against America and to make it more dangerous for the United States than before. It was last drop. After this I made my decision.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Let me just ask two questions then I'll yield to my colleagues again for a second round if they choose to ask questions. No. 1, do you know anything about these nuclear devices that we were talking about? Do you have any knowledge of those nuclear devices?

Mr. LUNEV. No, sir, because I was assigned to strategic intelligence.

Mr. BURTON. So you wouldn't know if it took more than one person to detonate one of those.

Mr. LUNEV. I know only one that special operation forces commanders, they had special groups of people, specially trained how to use these devices.

Mr. BURTON. Can one person set the devices off?

Mr. LUNEV. Maybe this is only one person in group who can handle this problem.

Mr. BURTON. So one person could detonate a device like that.

Mr. LUNEV. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. OK. That's what I thought. The other thing is in the event that it was boobytrapped if we had a nuclear device like that here in the United States buried, in the event that it was boobytrapped, do you know if the boobytrap went off if the nuclear device also would be exploded?

Mr. LUNEV. It's very difficult to expect that this nuclear device would be destroyed by this explosion.

Mr. BURTON. Would it explode?

Mr. LUNEV. Yes. If it would be exploded, it would be a lot of evidences that it was nuclear device. So it's much more easy to have special self-liquidation device.

Mr. BURTON. What I meant is let's say there's a boobytrap on a site where they have a nuclear device. If the boobytrap went off, would that also explode the nuclear device?

Mr. LUNEV. Very good question, but I think it's for more specialist than me in this area.

Mr. BURTON. OK.

Mr. LUNEV. But I can tell you that if somebody in his design would like to destroy this device, he would like to make it much more chemically than by regular explosions.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you.

Mr. WELDON, do you have any more questions?

Mr. WELDON. Colonel Lunev, several decades ago there was what we call a sleeper agent of the Soviet government who turned himself into the Royal Canadian Mounted Police who was living in Canada. And as a part of his turning himself in, he said that he was—his job was to wait for a coded signal from the GRU which he would then use to detonate a bomb that would eliminate a main oil pumping station north of Edmonton and destroy it.

Now, that individual was known; and in fact I have talked to the people who interviewed him and I'm trying to get to him now. Are the use of these so-called sleeper agents, were they common among the GRU to have people prepositioned; and do you still think that that type of a person could exist today in both the United States and perhaps Canada?

Mr. LUNEV. It sounds very familiar for me because it's regular practice to use as you said sleeping agent, especially for using of these devices in time of war after receiving special authorization from radio or by other devices. So it's very regular practice, sounds very typical for this. And just now—it's just now it's very difficult to say how to use these people now. But we name these people illegals or illegal intelligence agents or officers. Illegal intelligence was not canceled, is in place, and would be in place until the time when country could be existing. So I think that this methods of operational use of people would be in place for unlimited time.

Mr. WELDON. One final question, Mr. Lunev. I referred today to a document from the Russian military publication Military Thought. I believe it's called Voennaya. Is that correct?

Mr. LUNEV. Yes.

Mr. WELDON. It says this has been published every year since June 1918. Are you familiar with this document?

Mr. LUNEV. No, sir.

Mr. WELDON. The internal Russian Military Thought?

Mr. LUNEV. No, sir.

Mr. WELDON. In the document in July 1995 I referred to the article that talks about the employment of special task forces. And I referred to the one sentence that says special task forces can be used not only in war but also in peacetime during a period of threat.

Do you believe that there is the possibility that there are some in Russia today that would want to use these kinds of weapons and these kind of special forces in peacetime as well as in time of perhaps conflict if they believed that perhaps a war was about to begin?

Mr. LUNEV. Sir, in military plans everything is possible. And it could be look like that just now it's peacetime, but for people who are in decisionmaking process it looks like preliminary time for the future war. So we cannot operate by the same time which these people. And yes, it's possible for using of this weapons system during so-called peacetime for different purposes, but decision could be made by supreme commander in chief only.

Mr. WELDON. One final if you don't mind, Mr. Chairman. Colonel Lunev, the \$64,000 question today and has been for the past 3 months, the major question is why wouldn't our administration ask the Russians to give us the exact locations of these sites? Now, I've given my own speculation. What's your speculation as a former GRU official now living in the United States? We've had two agencies tell us that we haven't asked the question. Why in the world wouldn't our administration ask that question of the Russians to tell us where those sites are?

Mr. LUNEV. Sir, why are you asking me about this?

Mr. WELDON. Because I had to give my own speculation and I gave that earlier today. I think it's a part of our policy of we didn't want to embarrass Yeltsin in 1992 and 1993 when we found out about the Mitrokhin files so we didn't want to ask the question. So now we're between a rock and a hard place because if we ask the question now people are going to criticize the administration for waiting 8 years or 7 years to ask it. I'm just asking you to speculate. What do you think would be the reason?

Mr. LUNEV. Sir, I can give you my thoughts very briefly because you know that in this country as I already said you have very good and professional intelligence and counterintelligence. And I am sure that these people are—I very highly respect these people. By the way you have some of them behind me now. I saw them in Washington. I am sure that they inform politicians about what's really going on, what could be happening with these devices. But why politicians didn't do it, it's not question for me. How to do it, I think it's very easy. You know how many billions of dollars America already sent to Russian Government and this money disappeared. Russian people didn't get one penny from this billions and billions of dollars.

Mr. WELDON. Exactly.

Mr. LUNEV. Why not to ask before sending this money for this information. It's very easy to say. Russian Government existing on money from America. Why not to ask for favor.

Mr. WELDON. I agree with you absolutely 1,000 percent. That's the question for the administration. Why haven't they asked.

Mr. BURTON. I think that's a good question to end this part of the hearing on. Before we dismiss our panel, I want to thank very much the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority for allowing us to use this facility. I also want to thank all of the MTA staff that's worked so hard and so closely with my staff to make sure this hearing was possible.

I also want to thank the panel. You've been very, very informative to us. We really appreciate it. We appreciate your coming all the way to Los Angeles. And hopefully we'll be able to pick your brains in the future for more information as this process goes forward.

And, Mr. Lunev, thank you for helping America by giving us this information. Thank you very much.

Mr. LUNEV. Thank you, sir.

Mr. BURTON. We're going to let you leave first. So we'll let you put your sack over your head.

Mr. LUNEV. May I say a few words only? Few words.

Mr. BURTON. Yeah, sure.

Mr. LUNEV. Because just now I told you that I am working for an information company. And I found that in my conversations with my readers, with listeners that just now America, situation is in America is not bad, not bad. Economy is growing. People are living not bad. And I think that just now maybe it's very good time to think about American national security a little bit more than usual. Because maybe later it could be too late.

And thank you for you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for you, ladies and gentlemen, for inviting us, for listening to us. And I am really respect what are you doing for this country.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much. We'll meet you outside. I would like to shake your hand.

Would you escort him out.

And the other panelists, thank you very much.

We will go into executive session, the Members of Congress with the intelligence agencies. It's for the classified briefing. And we'll do that in about 10 minutes in the adjoining room.

Thank you all very much. And thanks to the media for being here. We appreciate your attendance.

[Whereupon, at 1:28 p.m., the committee was recessed.]

[Additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]

# 'Suitcase' weapons exist, built for 'terrorist purposes'

By Bill Gertz  
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

A former adviser to Russian President Boris Yeltsin told a House subcommittee yesterday that Moscow has developed compact nuclear devices that he described as "terrorist" weapons.

Mr. Yablokov said he is "absolutely sure that they have been made to use only for terrorist purposes."

The testimony contradicts recent statements by the Russian government that no "suitcase" nuclear weapons exist.

Moscow was "exporting to the KGB" nuclear weapons, he said. Alexander Lebed, Mr. Yeltsin's former national security chief, that up to 100 of the 250 compact nuclear munitions have not been accounted for properly and were at

risk of being sold abroad or stolen. The small nuclear devices were made to use only for terrorist purposes, he said.

The munitions are more like "stammer-trunk" nuclear bombs, he said. Yablokov, a prominent scientist, said he obtained information about the weapons from some of the scientists who developed them.

"It was the KGB, not the Ministry of Defense, that ordered it."

## Parents are charged in starvation of son

PADUCAH, Ky. (AP) — Police investigating the death of 2-year-old Jeffrey Mitchell walked through a cluttered room of the family's home, Niles Furniture, V.C.R. Stereo, Gold clubs.


Then they looked in the kitchen and found little more than a bottle of cooking oil, a spice rack and trays of ice cubes.

They had died of starvation, and his body was covered with murder and wanton endangerment.

"You saw his distended stomach and bones and that was it," said Tim Kallenbach, the county prosecutor. "It was the something out of the Third World."

Susan Mitchell  
Billy Mitchell

"You saw his distended stomach and bones and that was it. It was the something out of the Third World."



## Herb set for test on depression

REUTERS NEWS AGENCY  
Three U.S. health research agencies said yesterday they were launching a clinical trial to look at whether a popular herb, St. John's wort, is useful against depression.

European studies have indicated the plant can be useful, but no U.S. studies have been done.

Three agencies of the U.S. National Institutes of Health — the Office of Alternative Medicine, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) and the Office of

CNN WORLD VIEW CNN TV

6:00 PM OCTOBER 26, 1999

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Soviet Saboteurs Planted Weapons Caches in U.S.

JUDY WOODRUFF: New details are coming out about a Cold War legacy. Soviet weapons buried in several Western countries. A congressional committee in Washington is hearing testimony from a former KGB official. CNN's David Ensor joins us now with the latest. David?

DAVID ENSOR: Well, Judy, in a new book, KGB defector Vassiliy Metrokhin and his co-author, British historian Christopher Andrew, say that during the Cold War the KGB planted caches of high explosives and arms in the U.S. intended for the use of Soviet saboteurs in the event of war between the Soviet Union and the United States or even in time of confrontation.

Metrokhin and Andrews specified the exact location of explosives in Switzerland and Belgium. Some of those have been found. One cache in Switzerland exploded in December of last year. Professor Andrew told a House subcommittee that based on the KGB files information smuggled out by Metrokhin, he believes explosives still may be buried in various locations around the United States.

CHRISTOPHER ANDREW [Author/Historian]: Among the chief sabotage targets across the U.S.-Mexican border were military bases, missile sites, radar installations and the oil pipeline code-named START which ran from El Paso in Texas to Costa Mesa in California.

ENSOR: Andrew said the KGB also had plans to sabotage the power grid serving New York City in the event of war.

The subcommittee chairman, Curt Weldon of Pennsylvania, said he considered finding out whether there really are such arms caches a matter of national security.

REP. CURT WELDON [R-PA]: We owe it to the American people to find out the status of these sites, these caches. The American people could be subjected to possible harm if they're booby-trapped. And our government has the responsibility to at least ask the question of the Russians about where these specific sites are.

ENSOR: FBI officials say they have been looking for the arms caches since they first got word of the Metrokhin information some years back. Since the Russian defector had no specific locations in the U.S., they've not found any to date. Chairman Weldon says he was told the FBI has not yet asked the Russians for help in the matter. Now, it's worth noting, Judy, that some years ago the U.S. admitted placing secret arms caches in Austria itself, to be used by U.S. forces or by Austrians in the event of a take-over of Austria by Soviet forces.

WOODRUFF: So this is a game both sides were playing.

ENSOR: That's right.

WOODRUFF: David Ensor, thank you very much.



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Agence France-Presse  
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Wednesday, September 15, 1999

KGB caches discovered in Belgium

BRUSSELS, Sept. 15 (AFP) - Three secret depots used by the Soviet intelligence service, the KGB, have been discovered in Belgium, national papers reported Wednesday.

The caches were found in forests in the centre of the country, and contained radio sets dating from the late 1960s, according to Jos Colpin, spokesman for the Brussels prosecutor's office.

The location of the hiding-places was revealed in documents passed over to Britain in 1992 by the former KGB archivist Vasily Mitrokhin.

These documents form the basis of a new book -- the Mitrokhin Archives, by British academic Christopher Andrew, to be published shortly.

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---- INDEX REFERENCES ----

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Tuesday, September 14, 1999

Action on dumps deferred

POLICE in the North and North-east are waiting for more information before acting on reports that a senior KGB agent set up secret arms and explosives dumps in Scotland.

The caches were revealed in the files brought out of Russia by defector Vasili Mitrokhin.

According to these documents, KGB operative Vitali Voyetsky was sent to Scotland in 1963, at the height of the Cold War, to prepare for drops of arms and explosives to be used to sabotage pipelines, bridges and railways.

The dumps, protected by booby traps, could now be highly unstable due to decay and exposure to damp.

A spokesman for the Northern Constabulary said: "I don't doubt that there are caches hidden away, just as Nato hid dumps in Germany. We have nothing to go on at the moment but if we were to be advised of it, we would certainly take action." A spokeswoman for Grampian Police said they had received no information from London.

---- INDEX REFERENCES ----

KEY WORDS: GENERAL NEWS; RUSSIA, COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATESRU;  
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Associated Press Newswires  
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Tuesday, September 14, 1999

Dam security specialist says report of K3B explosives cache will be checked

KALISPELL (AP) - A Bureau of Reclamation security specialist says allegations by a former Soviet intelligence agent that explosives were buried near Hungry Horse Dam during the Cold War will be investigated.

The dam was cited as an espionage target by Christopher Andrew, a British historian who has written a book based on documents smuggled out of the Soviet Union by defector Vasili Mitrokhin in 1992. Mitrokhin was an archivist with the KGB, the Russian intelligence service.

Mark Albl, security coordinator for the Bureau of Reclamation's Pacific Northwest Region, said he was unaware of the report or Andrew's book, but said "we're definitely going to look into it."

"It's too early to say if it even merits a response," he added. "We're not even sure about the accuracy of the information. But we will look into it."

Albl said the Bureau of Reclamation and all other federal agencies conducted security assessments shortly after the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City.

"For the last three years, we have undergone a program of assessing the security for our facilities," he said. "In general terms, everything looked real good. It definitely is safe, and it is watched very carefully."

Dianna Cross, a public information officer with the Bureau of Reclamation, said no such caches have been found near Hungry Horse Dam.

"If there are, in fact, unexploded ordnances at the site, we're not going to send our employees out looking for them," Cross said.

Any investigation will be left up to Albl and other security officers, she said.

The espionage allegations were the subject of a report on the CBS television magazine "60 Minutes" Sunday night.

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"Mitrokhin's most stunning revelation is that during the '60s and the '70s Soviet spies surveyed hundreds of potential ... targets across the United States in a KGB plan to knock out U.S. power supplies in case of war or a crisis close to it," said 60 Minutes' Mike Wallace. "As part of that they buried boobytrapped caches of arms and radio gear near some of the targets, explosives that remain buried today."

"The KGB plan went from the Mexican border in the south to the 49th Parallel, the Canadian border, in the north," Andrew said in the interview. "... They had targeted, amongst other things - and there are detailed accounts of this in Mitrokhin's notes - ... the Flathead Dam, the Hungry Horse Dam, in Montana, and went right across to the eastern coast."

It was not clear whether Andrew was talking about two dams or one. There is no "Flathead Dam" in Montana, but Kerr Dam near Polson helps form Flathead Lake. Hungry Horse Dam is northeast of Kalispell, on the South Fork of the Flathead River.

The report said that in Europe, officials followed directions in Mitrokhin's documents, and discovered some boobytrapped caches arms, explosives and radio gear.

---- INDEX REFERENCES ----

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The Daily Telegraph  
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Tuesday, September 14, 1999

KGB files: Peril of 'lost' arms dumps  
 David Graves

ONE of the most sinister and potentially lethal remnants of the Cold War disclosed by Vasili Mitrokhin was the existence of hundreds of arms caches buried by the KGB throughout Europe and North America for use during a war with the West.

Records of the location of some of the booby-trapped caches of arms, explosives and radio equipment have vanished since the demise of the Soviet Union. Some, buried more than 30 years ago, could explode without warning if disturbed.

The arms dump, which was hidden in 1966, was found by Swiss police last year. It was so unstable that it exploded when fired on by a water cannon. Rain had seeped into the cache, making most of the hidden weapons rusty and useless.

None of Mitrokhin's papers indicated that there were any arms caches in Britain, but they disclosed that Moscow had sent a senior agent to Northern Ireland and Scotland in 1963 to seek out potential sabotage targets.

Vitali Voytetsky, codenamed Paul, was also ordered to select potential sites for airborne and maritime landings by Soviet sabotage and intelligence groups.

Mitrokhin's papers disclosed that thousands of weapons were wrapped and sealed in waterproof containers and buried in woods and fields throughout North America, Western and Central Europe, Israel, Japan and other potential enemies of the Soviets.

They were to be used in the event of war by Soviet agents to sabotage Western pipelines, bridges, railways, electricity sub-stations and oil refineries.

Mitrokhin said that throughout the Sixties and Seventies the KGB spent considerable sums of money preparing for campaigns of sabotage in the West. Senior agents believed that only by destroying vital Western

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infrastructures could Soviet forces win any war.

In America during the early Sixties, migrant workers were used to smuggle arms into the country and caches were buried in strategic locations near dams, pylons and railways.

KGB agents in Nato countries and in some neutral states - Austria, Sweden and Switzerland - were expected to make detailed plans for the sabotage of up to six significant targets a year.

A file was also prepared by the KGB on wartime members of the Italian resistance who fought the Nazis.

It was hoped that they could assist Soviet sabotage operations.

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Scottish Daily Record  
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Tuesday, September 14, 1999

News

KGB agent sent to Scotland in arms smuggling plot  
 STEVE MARTIN

KGB spies plotted to smuggle arms and troops into Scotland as part of a Europe-wide sabotage scheme.

Secret arms caches were set up across central Europe as part of Soviet plans to undermine NATO.

The existence of the dumps is revealed in archives brought to the west by KGB defector Vasili Mitrokhin.

They reveal how a KGB agent was spirited into Scotland in 1963 at the height of the Cold War.

Vitali Voytetsky, codenamed Paul, was sent to identify military targets and possible locations for arms dumps.

At the same time, KGB agents across Europe were carrying out similar missions.

Thousands of weapons were wrapped and sealed in waterproof containers and buried in woods and fields.

They were booby-trapped to explode if touched by anyone without specific instructions on how to disable them.

Maps in the Mitrokhin archive show the weapons were scattered across Switzerland, Germany, Austria and Italy.

They were to be used by Russian spies to sabotage pipelines, bridges, railways and power supplies if war broke out.

Huge sums of money were spent on the sabotage scheme by the Kremlin in the 1960s and 1970s.

Moscow believed that Warsaw Pact forces would lose a European

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conflict if they did not strike first at western infrastructure.

Agent Paul was sent to Scotland the year after the Cuban missile crisis took the superpowers to the brink of World War III.

As well as identifying possible arms dump locations, he selected sites for air and sea landings by secret service forces.

Last night historians said the KGB activity was in keeping with Scotland's military importance during the Cold War.

Professor John Erickson, of the Centre for Defence Studies at Edinburgh University, said: "I have always maintained Scotland was so important strategically that had it not existed, it would have had to have been invented."

By 1963, America's 12-strong Polaris nuclear submarine fleet had already arrived at Holy Loch on the Clyde.

Five years later, Britain's Polaris fleet had been brought into service at nearby Faslane.

The British V-8 nuclear bombers which Polaris replaced had been based at Machrihanish Bay on the Kintyre peninsula.

Meanwhile, the Edzell listening centre near Arbroath had become a vital part of the Western intelligence network.

The centre, set up in the 1950s, intercepted radio messages between Russian navy vessels and submarines across Europe.

Most analysts believe it would have been an even more important target for the Eastern Bloc than the submarine bases.

Scotland was also home to vital radar centres at Buchan, Banffshire, and on Benbecula in the Western Isles.

Professor Erickson said: "There is absolutely no doubt Scotland was essential to the strategic interests of the West.

"The KGB would have been negligent if it had not taken a close interest in what was happening here.

"What they would have been wanting to do is to disable communications.

"With the information they had, they would have been able to wreak a considerable degree of havoc."

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Defence expert David Greenwood, of Aberdeen University, said: "It has always been assumed Soviet agents were permanently present around the Firth of Clyde to monitor Polaris movements.

"Scotland had a clutch of targets to which one would have expected foreign intelligence services to have paid an interest.

"It is important to remember it was just a year on from the Cuban missile crisis."

It is unlikely Soviet arms ever arrived in Scotland but the loss of many KGB maps detailing the exact location of arms dumps means the full truth may never be known.

Those arms whose locations are revealed in the Mitrokhin papers have now been dug up.

---- INDEX REFERENCES ----

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