    [House Hearing, 106 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

       RUSSIAN THREATS TO UNITED STATES SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                               GOVERNMENT REFORM

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                JANUARY 24, 2000

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 106-158

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

      Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
                          http://www.house.gov/reform

                                   __________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
    66-968                     WASHINGTON : 2000

                                     ______

                         COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

                         DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
    BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York         HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
    CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland       TOM LANTOS, California
    CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut       ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
    JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
    STEPHEN HORN, California             PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
    JOHN L. MICA, Florida                PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
    THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia            CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
    DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana           ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
    MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana                  DC
    JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida             CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
    STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
    MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South     DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
        Carolina                         ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
    BOB BARR, Georgia                    DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
    DAN MILLER, Florida                  JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
    ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas             JIM TURNER, Texas
    LEE TERRY, Nebraska                  THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
    JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois               HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
    GREG WALDEN, Oregon                  JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
    DOUG OSE, California                             ------
    PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin                 BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
    HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho              (Independent)
    DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

                          Kevin Binger, Staff Director
                     Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
               David A. Kass, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian
                        Lisa Smith Arafune, Chief Clerk
                     Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on January 24, 2000.................................     1
    Statement of:
        Campbell, Hon. Tom, a Representative in Congress from the
          State of California........................................    39
        Lunev, Stanislav, former GRU Officer, author of ``Through the
          Eyes of the Enemy''; ; and Peter Vincent Pry, former
          employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, author of
          ``War Scare''..............................................    59
        Weldon, Hon. Curt, a Representative in Congress from the
          State of Pennsylvania......................................    11
    Letters, statements, et cetera, submitted for the record by:
        Burton, Hon. Dan, a Representative in Congress from the State
          of Indiana, prepared statement of..........................     6
        Campbell, Hon. Tom, a Representative in Congress from the
          State of California, series of letters requesting
          investigations.............................................    43
        Green, William, California State University--San Bernadino,
          Naval Reserves Intelligence Officer, prepared statement of.   100
        Lunev, Stanislav, former GRU Officer, author of ``Through the
          Eyes of the Enemy'', prepared statement of.................    61
        Pry, Peter Vincent, former employee of the Central
          Intelligence Agency, author of ``War Scare'', prepared
          statement of...............................................    74
        Weldon, Hon. Curt, a Representative in Congress from the
          State of Pennsylvania:
            Article entitled, ``The Employment of Special Task Forces
              Under Contemproty Conditions''.........................    32
            Partial transcript of October 26, 1999 hearing...........    16
            Partial transcript of September 14, 1999 press conference    20

       RUSSIAN THREATS TO UNITED STATES SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

                                  ----------

                            MONDAY, JANUARY 24, 2000

                              House of Representatives,
                                Committee on Government Reform,
                                                       Los Angeles, CA.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
    the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Authority
    Boardroom, 3rd floor, One Gateway Plaza, Los Angeles, CA, Hon.
    Dan Burton (chairman of the committee) presiding.
        Present: Representatives Burton and Scarborough.
        Staff present: Daniel R. Moll, deputy staff director; Lisa
    Smith Arafune, chief clerk; Mildred Webber and Caroline Katzin,
    professional staff members; and Michael Yeager, minority senior
    oversight counsel.
        Mr. Burton. Good morning. A quorum being present, the
    Committee on Government Reform will come to order. I ask
    unanimous consent that all Members' and witnesses' written
    opening statements be included in the record. And without
    objection so ordered. I ask unanimous consent that all
    articles, exhibits, and extraneous or tabular material referred
    to be included in the record. Without objection so ordered.
        It's been a little more than 10 years since the Berlin Wall
    came tumbling down. We've been through eras of Glasnost and
    Perestroika in Russia. We've seen economic reforms come and go
    and we've watched the Russian economy come close to collapsing.
        The conventional wisdom since the end of the cold war has
    been that the Russian threat to our national security has
    evaporated. Some people have gone so far as to say that Russia
    is now our ally. The purpose of this hearing is to examine that
    question. Is Russia still a threat to United States interests?
    Is Russia still an adversary?
        I'm very glad that we're able to hold this session here in
    Los Angeles today. We hold a lot of hearings in Washington, DC.
    Some of them get covered by the news media; some don't. A lot
    of what we do in the Capital never gets out beyond the
    Washington beltway. So when we have a recess period, I think
    it's a good thing to get out of Washington and give people and
    local media in other parts of the country some exposure to the
    congressional process and the issues that are important.
        Two weeks ago we held a field hearing in Miami about
    international drug trafficking. We've held field hearings in my
    home town of Indianapolis. One of our subcommittees held a
    field hearing in New York on health care not too long ago. So I
    think it's good for the committee and good for the people we
    represent to do this once in a while.
        One of the problems with doing field hearings is that not
    many members of the committee can attend. The 44 members of
    this committee are from all over the country, and we always
    have a lot of commitments. So you won't see many members of the
    committee here today. However, that doesn't take anything away
    from the importance of this subject at hand. National security
    and our relationship with Russia are very important issues. By
    holding this hearing, we're creating a permanent record that
    every committee member will be able to review. And I want to
    particularly thank Representative Scarborough who came all the
    way from Florida to be with us today as well as Congressman
    Curt Weldon who's from Pennsylvania. Of course Mr. Campbell is
    here from California, and we appreciate his attendance as well.
    This is an issue we're going to continue to look at down the
    road. So I want to thank all of today's witnesses for being
    here and participating.
        Now returning to the question at hand: Is Russia still a
    threat? One thing we know is that Russia is still conducting
    espionage against the United States. A lot of people in
    Washington were shocked when they picked up their newspapers
    about a month ago and discovered that a Russian spy had bugged
    the State Department. A spy who is stationed at the Russian
    Embassy had planted a tiny listening device in a chair in the
    conference room. It was right down the hall from the Secretary
    of State's office. The FBI caught him red-handed sitting in his
    car outside the State Department trying to listen in on a
    meeting. Nobody has any idea how long that bug was there or
    what the Russians might have learned. Security is so lax at the
    State Department that they couldn't tell you today if there are
    any other listening devices in the building. They're sweeping
    them right now.
        One of our witnesses today is a former Russian intelligence
    agent, Colonel Stanivlav Lunev. He is the highest ranking GRU
    officer ever to defect to the United States. The GRU is
    Russia's premiere military intelligence agency. Colonel Lunev
    is in the witness protection program and special arrangements
    have been made to conceal his identity. So I apologize to the
    media who's here, we'll have to have him come in and be covered
    up so that his identity is maintained so he won't be in any
    jeopardy.
        Mr. Lunev worked out of the Russian Embassy in Washington
    for 3\1/2\ years. I had a chance to read Colonel Lunev's
    testimony when he was before Congressman Weldon's subcommittee
    in 1998. He said, ``I can say to you very openly and very
    firmly that Russian intelligence activity against the United
    States is much more active than it was in the time of the
    former Soviet Union's existence. It's more active today than it
    was then.'' That was a year and a half before the State
    Department incident. It looks to me like Colonel Lunev knows
    what he's talking about. It makes me wonder if there are more
    bugs in more conference rooms waiting to be discovered.
        It's not really surprising that Russia is still actively
    spying on us. But how does the Russian Government view us? Have
    their views changed? Do they consider us a friend or an enemy?
    They just produced a new national security doctrine. It was
    signed by President Putin this month. According to one scholar
    it, ``adopts a tone far more aggressively anti-Western than in
    the 1997 version.'' The document blames the United States and
    NATO for trying to dominate the world and states that this is a
    grave threat to Russian security. So it's very clear that the
    Russian Government at the highest level still sees us, the
    United States, as a threat and an enemy.
        I recently read a quote from former CIA Director John
    Deutch. He was testifying in 1998. Here's what he said:

        Russia continues to be our top security concern, even
    without the adversarial relationship of the cold war. Russia
    still possesses 20,000-plus nuclear weapons. Wide-spread
    corruption and the absence of honest and accountable internal
    governmental administrative functions threatens Russia's slow
    and erratic evolution toward democracy.

        One of our witnesses today is Dr. Peter Pry. He was a CIA
    analyst for many years and he recently wrote a book, ``War
    Scare: Russia and America on the Nuclear Brink.'' Dr. Pry
    states that the Russian military and intelligence agencies
    still take a very hostile view toward the United States. He
    states that decisionmakers in those agencies still consider us
    their foremost adversary and that this paranoia is fueled by
    the growing disparity between our economy and their economy and
    between our defense capabilities and theirs.
        That brings me to one of the issues I'd really like to
    focus on today. According to Colonel Lunev, a key component of
    Russia's strategy against the West for decades has been
    sabotage and assassination. In his previous testimony, he
    stated that one of his jobs at the Russia Embassy was to
    collect information about elected leaders in this country. This
    information would be used to assassinate them in a time of war
    or crisis.
        Another of Colonel Lunev's jobs was to scout out sites
    where weapons or explosives could be prepositioned. From time
    to time he would travel to the Shenandoah Valley to photograph
    areas where ``dead drops'' would be established. Weapons would
    be placed in these dead drop areas so that in times of crisis
    Russian agents could come into the country to commit sabotage
    against power plants, military bases, and communications
    facilities.
        According to Colonel Lunev, part of the Soviet's plan
    called for the use of, ``portable tactical nuclear devices,''
    to be used to commit sabotage against highly protected targets.
    If has now been widely reported that the Soviet Union
    manufactured portable briefcase-size nuclear devices that
    cannot all be accounted for.
        Were conventional or nuclear weapons prepositioned in the
    United States? Colonel Lunev doesn't know if the sites he
    identified were ever used. However, a second Russian defector
    says drop sites were established all over the United States and
    Western Europe. Vasili Mitrokhin was an archivist for the KGB.
    When he defected to the West he brought with him pages and
    pages of handwritten notes about KGB activities. He says that
    for decades the Soviet Union deployed sabotage and intelligence
    groups whose mission it was to commit assassinations or acts of
    sabotage in times of crisis or impending war.
        In his book, ``The Sword and the Shield,'' he states that
    drop sites for explosives were scattered all over Western
    Europe and the United States. They contained everything from
    communications equipment to handguns to explosives. At one
    point in his book, he states that a standard arms package to be
    placed in a drop site would include mines, explosive charges,
    fuses, and detonators.
        Mr. Mitrokhin brought information on the exact locations of
    several sites in Europe, in Belgium, and Switzerland. Local
    police found these sites exactly where Mitrokhin said they
    would be. That's significant because a lot of people tried to
    pooh-pooh what we're talking about here today but several sites
    have been located in Europe. They were booby-trapped with
    explosives. The bombs had to be set off with water cannons
    before the caches could be opened. Mr. Mitrokhin states that
    many drop sites were established here in the United States.
    However, he was not able to smuggle out the locations. He knows
    that one site was established in Brainerd, MN.
        In his book, he also mentions the possibility of drop sites
    in New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas. However, their locations
    are still a secret. Some people have asked why we're holding
    this hearing here in Los Angeles, CA. Well, I had a chance to
    review the hearing transcript from Congressman Weldon's
    subcommittee on this same subject. It's my understanding that
    there are many potential targets for Russian sabotage here in
    California. It's my understanding that Mr. Mitrokhin mentioned
    California's harbors and naval facilities as primary targets.
    California is the most populous State in the Nation. If there
    are hidden caches of explosives in this State, it's very
    dangerous and very important that we find out where they are.
    That's something that the people ought to be informed about.
    That's why we're here.
        The key questions before us now are where are these drop
    sites? Do they still exist? What's in them? Were any of them
    ever used to store portable nuclear devices as alleged by
    Colonel Lunev? If there are Russian arms caches hidden around
    the country with explosives and booby traps, this is a very
    dangerous situation. One of the things we want to find out
    today is if the administration has done anything to find out
    where these sites are or if they still exist.
        And I want to say something that's very important. The
    State Department of the United States was asked by all of the
    witnesses today, from the Congress, and myself on numerous
    occasions to testify, to send anybody here to testify. And
    Madeline Albright and the State Department chose to ignore us.
    Mr. Campbell, Mr. Weldon, myself, and many others on both the
    Democrat and Republican sides have written to the
    administration and to the State Department on numerous
    occasions. They will not even respond about this subject and I
    think that's deplorable.
        If there's a threat to the United States because of hidden
    sites, then by golly the State Department ought to be telling
    us what they're doing to deal with that problem and they're not
    even answering Members of Congress. And I intend to force them
    to come before the Congress if they don't start responding very
    quickly, and I'll do that by subpoenaing them.
        My colleagues, Congressman Weldon and Congressman Campbell,
    also have tried to get answers from the administration. They've
    written to the Defense Department Secretary Cohen and to
    Secretary Albright and they've also received no response. We've
    asked the FBI and the CIA to testify here today so we can try
    to find out what's being done. I wish they could testify in
    open session because I know there is more and more concern here
    in California and around the country about these possible sites
    since these books have been published. However, their testimony
    is secret. It's classified.
        After our first two panels, we'll hear from the FBI and CIA
    in closed session. Right now, the security people are sweeping
    an adjoining room so we can go in there and make sure what is
    said is kept confidential. I appreciate that our witnesses from
    these two agencies are here today, and I look forward to
    hearing their testimony. I also want to say that I really
    regret that the State Department isn't here. Once again, my
    staff and everybody else has tried to get them here; and they
    just jump through hoops to not have to testify.
        Madeleine Albright is going to be testifying before the
    International Relations Committee in about 2 weeks. And she
    will answer questions about these issues, or she'll have to
    duck them in public. Congressman Weldon has worked harder on
    this issue than anyone in Congress. Congressman Campbell has
    been working very hard to get answers from the administration
    on behalf of California and his constituents. And I
    congratulate both of you for being here and for your hard work.
        I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today
    including Mr. DeSarno from the FBI. Mr. DeSarno testified
    before our committee back in 1998 when he was working on the
    campaign fundraising task force. He was very forthright then.
    I'm sure he'll be forthright today. He's a good man. We welcome
    him back. So we're glad to have him. And we're welcoming also
    Dr. William Green from Cal State University in San Bernadino
    who is an expert on Russia and United States policy. I look
    forward to hearing from all of you.
        I want to say one more thing. Congressman Waxman who
    represents this area couldn't be with us today. He said he had
    a previous commitment. Because this issue is important, I'm
    disappointed that he couldn't be here. I hope that he'll take a
    hard look at the issues that are going to be raised today
    because not only do they concern all of California but in
    particular since Los Angeles is such a huge population area and
    he represents a large part of that, he should be very concerned
    about it. And I'm sure once he hears all these issues, he will
    be more concerned. He does have one of his chief staff
    lieutenants here, and we appreciate his presence.
        And with that, my colleague from Florida, who flew all the
    way out here, I appreciate him being here.
        [The prepared statement of Hon. Dan Burton follows:]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6968.001

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6968.002

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6968.003

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6968.004

        Mr. Burton. Do you have an opening statement, Mr.
    Scarborough?
        Mr. Scarborough. No. I'll just be brief, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you for holding this hearing. I certainly thank
    Congressman Campbell for being here and the leadership he's
    shown in this very important issue, not only to all Americans
    but again to California specifically. I think of all the people
    that have come before our committees and I think of all the
    people that have come before the Armed Services Committee, of
    which I'm also a member, I think most everybody understands
    that the battles of the 21st century will not be fought on
    battlefields in Europe or in Asia but for Americans, we may
    find them being fought here at home. And certainly if that's
    the case, then California, specifically Los Angeles, CA, will
    be on the front lines in battles that involve terrorism, be it
    nuclear, chemical, or biological. That's why again I thank you
    for your leadership.
        I've got to echo the sentiments of our chairman that I
    believe unfortunately we have a President, we have a State
    Department, and we have a foreign policy apparatus in
    Washington and on both sides of the United States both
    Republicans and Democrats that do not understand the scope of
    the danger facing all Americans. And a great example is again
    Dr. Pry's book, ``War Scare.'' In it he tells a very, very
    interesting story.
        And I think it's very telling about how the administration
    right now has been lulled to sleep by the hope that somehow the
    Russians have changed. It's sort of--it's not the new Nixon;
    it's the new Russians. And that somehow they've undergone this
    remarkable transformation. And there's a story in here how in
    1996 while NATO was conducting military exercises in the North
    Sea, the Russians were so alarmed that they got their northern
    fleet out. It was a very confrontational moment in American
    history and in Russian history. At the same time, Brothers to
    the Rescue planes were shot down by Cuba.
        And so in the middle of this great international crisis,
    the White House picked up the red phone to speak to the
    Russians and to try to defuse this situation. But what were
    they talking about? They were talking about poultry exports. It
    seems that the Russians were concerned by the fact that these
    maneuvers were going on and they did a lot of different things,
    but the only thing that caught the White House's attention was
    that poultry exports from Russia to America would be cut and
    likewise going the other way because of Tyson Foods poultry
    plants in Arkansas.
        So they were focusing on chickens and using the red phone
    for this chicken crisis instead of understanding that the two
    countries were really on the brink of some very dangerous,
    dangerous times. And that continues. But, again, the State
    Department isn't focused. The White House isn't focused on it.
    They're only concerned about economic considerations while
    foreign policy considerations have been thrown out the window.
        The cold war as we knew it from 1947 to 1991 may be over,
    but we are now in a period that's even more volatile and more
    frightening. And Curt Weldon has been a champion on this issue
    for some time. I was at a meeting with him earlier this month.
    I'll tell you after about 20 minutes of talking to him, I
    became ever increasingly concerned. So I look forward to his
    testimony. I look forward to the testimony also of all these
    other witnesses.
        Again, I think what's telling is that we have interesting
    information from Dr. Pry's book and others, a lot of what
    you're going to be hearing from Curt Weldon and others isn't
    just from American scholars or American researchers, it
    actually comes from Russians themselves. As Curt Weldon says,
    from the mouths of Russians themselves. So we are in a
    frightening time.
        And, Mr. Chairman, again, I thank you for conducting this
    hearing. I think it's very important. And I hope for the safety
    of citizens in Los Angeles and California and across this
    country that our administration and that Democrats and
    Republicans in Washington, DC, will start to focus on the very
    real threat that's being posed right now by mere anarchic
    conditions in Russia.
        Thank you. Yield back my time.
        Mr. Burton. Thank you, Chairman Scarborough. We'll now hear
    an opening statement from Congressman Weldon of Pennsylvania.

      STATEMENT OF HON. CURT WELDON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
                     FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

        Mr. Weldon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
    for holding this hearing, and I want to thank Mr. Scarborough
    for being here and Mr. Campbell for his untiring efforts to get
    this administration to come clean with the American people
    about an issue that I think is vitally important.
        Mr. Chairman, at the outset let me state that I think I'm
    in an unusual position. I am a friend of the Russian people. My
    undergraduate degree, as you know, is in Russian studies. I
    speak the language. I've been there almost 20 times. For the
    past 6 years since I formed the Duma-Congress relationship, I
    have chaired an ongoing relationship with members of all the
    Russian political factions. I know over 150 Duma members
    personally. I have many friends who serve in the Russian
    Government.
        My statements today are not to try to paint Russia into a
    corner. There are people there who want Russia to continue with
    reforms. But we need to understand the reality of what has
    happened in the former Soviet Union and what continues today.
    Because there are others in that country that don't want good
    relations with us and that have other intentions.
        I think secondarily I would mention that I think what we're
    going to look at today is what I would call an example of the
    failed policies of this administration for 8 years. We have
    been so enamored with a Bill Clinton to Boris Yeltsin
    relationship, with an Al Gore to Viktor Chernomyrdin
    relationship that whenever something would appear to surface
    that would appear to perhaps undermine Yeltsin or Chernomyrdin,
    he would pretend it didn't happen whether it was a theft of IMF
    dollars, whether it was abuse and insider trading in Russia,
    whether it was arms control treaty violations that we saw time
    and again and never called the Russians on, or whether it was
    the lasering of the eyes of one of our career Navy intelligence
    officers Jack Daly. There were consistent efforts to hide
    reality. The evidence of Vice President Gore being given a
    brief by the CIA that linked Viktor Chernomyrdin to organized
    crime within the petrol chemical industry and the Vice
    President writing the word ``bullshit'' across the front of it
    and sending it back to the CIA.
        The administration has had a consistent pattern of not
    wanting anything to surface that might cause the perception of
    a problem or a real problem in our relationship with Russia.
    And I'm convinced that's what you have in the example. And I'm
    not going to give you facts from some Republican radical right
    think tank. I'm not going to give you comments of the far right
    of my party, our party. I'm not going to give you facts from
    people who want to attack Russia. I'm going to give you a very
    logical and methodical outline of what Russians have said on
    the public record. And I want this issue to be judged on what
    Russians have said in the public realm, many before our
    Congress, because that's the story today. It is what Russians
    have said that has occurred and what we ought to be concerned
    with.
        Mr. Chairman, in May 1997--and everything I'm going to say,
    Mr. Chairman, has been witnessed in a bipartisan manner.
    Nothing that I am going to talk about was witnessed by
    Republicans alone. And my entire efforts in this area have been
    totally bipartisan. So for those who would say this is a
    Republican witch-hunt, I challenge them to come forward. I'll
    debate them, and I'll give them the factual information that
    will deny that allegation.
        May 30, 1997, I led a bipartisan delegation to Moscow. One
    of meetings we had scheduled was with then General Alexander
    Lebed, currently the Governor of Krasnoyarsk. General Lebed, as
    you know, was the top defense advisor to Yeltsin. At the
    meeting, Lebed for the first time revealed that one of his
    responsibilities when he worked for Yeltsin was to account for
    132 suitcase-size nuclear devices. He said he could not find
    them. He said he could locate only 48. Now, Democrats and
    Republicans with me said to him in this private meeting, well,
    where are the rest, General? He said, I have no idea; they
    could have been destroyed; they could be secure; or they could
    have been put on the black market for the highest bidder.
    Because the General is making a point to us that the
    instability in the Russian military was causing military
    officers to sell technology around the world.
        Now, Mr. Chairman, we did not have a press conference
    following that event. So this was not an opportunity for Lebed
    to toot his own horn. In fact, the only way the media found out
    about that allegation was that we filed my trip report 2 months
    later, and we do as a requirement of the Congress. A producer
    for 20/20 picked up on the story, Leslie Coburn. She called me;
    and she said, Congressman, did Lebed really say this? I said
    absolutely. She said do you think he would say it on national
    TV? I said you will have to ask him. She went to Moscow. 20/20
    interviewed Lebed; they interviewed me and both of us with a
    lead story in September 1997 on the national media where he
    again said in his own words, that Russia had, in fact, produced
    these small atomic demolition munitions and could not account
    for all of them.
        What was the response of the Russian Government? They
    denied they ever produced them. The minister of foreign affairs
    for Russia publicly said Lebed is crazy; he doesn't know what
    he's talking about; he's trying to gain popularity. But even
    worse than that, Mr. Chairman, was that at a press conference
    in the Pentagon reflecting what I just talked about with this
    administration the question was asked of Ken Bacon's staff what
    do you make of the allegations by Lebed. And this was the
    response of our government: We have no reason to doubt what the
    Russian Government is saying.
        So then, Mr. Chairman, on October 2, 1997, I brought over
    Dr. Alexei Yablikov. Dr. Yablikov is one of the most reknown
    environmentalists in all of Russia. He was initially part of
    Yeltsin's cabinet; was a member of the security council; and is
    an expert on environmental issues, ecological issues, and
    atomic energy issues. He heads a think tank. He's a member of
    the Academy of Sciences in Moscow today.
        I had Alexei Yablikov testify before my committee open
    session in Washington. And this is what he said. He said, I
    know that General Lebed was correct. These devices were built.
    He said on the record--and you can check the transcript--he
    said I know colleagues of mine who worked on these devices. And
    you need to understand, America, he didn't just build these for
    the Ministry of Defense, they also built these for the KGB to
    be used for external operations.
        So now I have a retired two star general given the highest
    award that Russia gives, the Hero of Russia award, supported by
    Dr. Alexei Yablikov saying publicly that Russia has, in fact,
    built these devices and that we better work with Russia to find
    out where they are and if, in fact, they're capable of being
    sold abroad.
        Mr. Chairman, even though our government denied that they
    should pursue this issue, I traveled to Moscow that December
    and, as I frequently do, met with the defense ministers of
    Russia, Defense Minister Sergeyev, also a retired general. For
    the first half hour of my meeting, I talked about positive
    proactive things that I was doing to help Russia, to help the
    people, to help the military with housing, to help the problem
    of nuclear waste. And then I said, but General, for you to
    continue to have me help you and be Russia's friend you have to
    be candid with me. What's the story of the small atomic
    demolition munitions. This is what the defense minister from
    Russia said to me: ``Congressman, we did build those devices
    just as you built them during the cold war. We are aware that
    you destroyed all of yours. And I submit to you that we will
    have all of our small atomic demolition munitions destroyed by
    the year 2000.''
        So here we have a Russian general saying that they were
    lost or not being able to be accounted for, we have a leading
    environmental activist from Russia verifying his story, and we
    have our government publicly going along with the Russian
    Government's total denial they had ever built them.
        And finally the defense ministry of Russia admitted to me
    publicly, yes we built them and yes, we'll have them all
    destroyed by this year.
        The following year, Mr. Chairman, March 19, 1998, I invited
    General Alexander Lebed to Washington. He testified before my
    committee. Again he was under terrible pressure from the
    Russian Government. Again he said--he stood by his claims that
    these devices were unaccounted for and that we in America
    should be troubled because those who want to harm us are the
    ones that those generals and admirals who are disgruntled would
    sell those devices to.
        In August of that same year, Mr. Chairman, August the 4th,
    I invited Stanislav Lunev to come before my committee. As you
    know, he's in the witness protection program jointly
    administered by, I believe, the FBI and the CIA. And he's under
    an assumed name. I had him come in behind a curtain with a ski
    mask on. I had him testify. And I will not go through what he's
    going to say today but he's going to tell you as the highest
    ranking GRU defector in the history of the Soviet Union or
    Russia, his job when he worked under cover as a TASS
    correspondent at the Soviet Embassy in Washington was to locate
    sites where materials could be dropped. And, in fact, that's an
    issue I know this committee is going to explore with him.
        So now we have the highest ranking GRU defector reinforcing
    the possibility of what both Lebed and Yablikov said and, in
    fact, saying it was his understanding that these drops could
    include small atomic demolition munitions as well as the
    possibility of other September or August of this past year,
    August 1999, Dr. Christopher Andrew published his book that you
    referred to called, ``The KGB, the Sword and the Shield, the
    Mitrokhin Files.'' This book, as you pointed out, is based on
    the 8 years of collecting Mitrokhin's handwritten notes about
    secret KGB files.
        I met with Dr. Christopher Andrew from Cambridge University
    at a private dinner in September of last year. I asked him to
    testify before my committee which he did in October. Dr. Andrew
    flew over from London and he brought with him Oleg Gordievsky.
    Gordievsky is the highest ranking ever KGB defector from
    Russia. He was the station desk chief for the Soviet KGB in
    London. He currently is in a witness protection program in
    Great Britain. The two of them testified before my committee,
    Mr. Chairman. And what did they say? They said in the Mitrokhin
    files one of the things Mitrokhin documented was a deliberate
    plan by the KGB to preposition military caches of weapons,
    hardware, and devices in Europe and in North America. These
    devices were intended to be used by agents who would be
    prepositioned in our country to blow up dams, bridges, ports,
    to cause significant unrest inside of our territory.
        When I asked Dr. Andrew whether or not there were specific
    sites named in the United States, he said Mitrokhin only had
    time to take notes on a sampling of the kinds of cases the KGB
    was working on. And he said he wasn't interested in documenting
    every single location of every single device that the KGB had
    put forward. Because there are literally hundreds of them all
    over the world. He did document four sites so that no one could
    question the authenticity of what he was saying, it just
    happens that one of those sites was in Switzerland and three
    were in Belgium.
        Last year, Mr. Chairman, the Swiss went to the exact site
    that he identified, there are photographs of that site in this
    book and right there at the exact spot with a booby-trapped
    bomb that could kill a human being and, in fact, caused the
    Swiss Government to issue a warning to all of its citizens
    about that type of location, they found exactly what Mitrokhin
    said would be there. Devices that the Russians had
    prepositioned during the Soviet era.
        In Belgium, at all three sites the Belgium intelligence
    service found the exact same kinds of capability. Now, were
    there weapons of mass destruction there? No. Were there
    military hardware and transmission and communications
    equipment? Yes. Were they booby trapped? The one in
    Switzerland, yes.
        In the Mitrokhin files, he documents that there are States
    in the United States where these devices were prepositioned.
    Specifically mentioned in the files are California,
    Pennsylvania, New York, Montana, Minnesota, Texas. And he
    further states that they are near pipelines. They are near
    ports. They are near major public infrastructure locations. All
    of this is in the KGB files. Now, this is not the main content
    of this book. Because the KGB files were expansive. Only a very
    small portion of this book dealt with the location of these
    devices. So for those who say come forward and give us one, we
    can't. But when I had Dr. Andrew who's, by the way, a Russian
    security and intelligence expert at Cambridge, one of the
    leading tenured professors at Cambridge University so much so
    that when Mitrokhin received his ability to live in England by
    the British intelligence service and the British Government,
    they went to Cambridge and they went to Dr. Andrew and they
    said would you work with Mitrokhin and help to prepare these
    files in an organized way. That's why the book came out.
        So the British intelligence trusted Christopher Andrew to
    work Mitrokhin. When Mitrokhin--or when Christopher Andrew and
    Gordievsky testified before my committee, again this is in the
    public record, they said that there is no doubt in their mind
    that there are locations today, no doubt in their minds, all
    over the United States, where Soviet military equipment is
    stored today. No doubt. Now, they didn't say that there is a
    high degree of probability of a nuclear device, but they left
    the door open. They left the door open. In fact, I'll submit
    the transcript which refers to that for the record which people
    can look at in the words again of a Russian, Mitrokhin--I mean
    Gordievsky and Mitrokhin and Dr. Christopher Andrew.
        [The information referred to follows:]

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        Mr. Weldon. Mr. Chairman before that hearing, I went to our
    own agencies. I called Louis Freeh of the FBI who I have the
    highest respect for. I think he has absolutely impeccable
    credentials. As you know and I think as you feel, he is the one
    bright star in this administration who shines above all others.
    I said, Director Freeh, can you send a team over that I can
    talk to before I have the hearing; and he did. He sent over
    three people. One of whom was told--and I told him I was going
    to say what was discussed at that meeting so they knew that it
    was not being held in a classified way.
        I said I want to ask you the question, one, do you consider
    the Mitrokhin files to be credible. And they said, absolutely.
    They are totally credible.
        So anyone that would say this is some outlandish claim
    that's not been verified, I would ask them to talk to the FBI
    about that and the SIS service in Great Britain.
        No. 2, I said, have you attempted to find devices where the
    States and sites are listed even though it's vague and they
    said, yes, but we don't have much to go on. You know, there are
    thousands of miles of pipeline in Texas. There are tons of
    ports installations in California. We just don't know where to
    look without the specific locations.
        So then I got to the third question: Has our government
    asked the Russian Government for the specific locations? And
    the answer was no, our government has not asked the Russian
    Government.
        Now, Mr. Chairman, also for the record I would like to
    submit a transcript of a press conference held at the Pentagon
    on September 15, 1999. In this transcript I'm going to quote
    Admiral Quigley--Rear Admiral Quigley is being asked questions
    by the media about the Mitrokhin files, about the claims in it.
    Admiral Quigley is asked if he's aware of the book and the
    allegations. He says, yes, we're aware of it. They said, do you
    have any interest in actually going after some of these caches?
    He says not that I'm aware of, no. Have you approached the
    Russians on this, about whether or not they've done this? His
    answer, no, no we have not.
        [The information referred to follows:]

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        Mr. Weldon. So in the public domain now we have two Federal
    agencies, the Defense Department and the FBI stating that this
    administration--and I don't think it should be the
    responsibility of the FBI or the Defense Department to ask the
    Russians, but both of them saying publicly, this administration
    hasn't asked the question.
        Mr. Chairman, on January--or on October 22, and you have
    this in your files, I drafted a letter which was signed by
    myself and Jim Oberstar. Jim Oberstar is not exactly considered
    a wacko Member of the Congress. He is one of the most stable
    Democrats in the House. He's the ranking Democrat on the public
    works committee. Jim Oberstar and I signed this letter to
    Madeleine Albright saying have you asked the question of the
    Russians; and if you did, what was the response; and if you
    haven't asked the question, why haven't you. Today is January,
    what, the 22nd. No response from the administration, Mr.
    Chairman. Nothing.
        Mr. Chairman, also in October of last year, I introduced
    legislation. And I just didn't go get Republican sponsors, Mr.
    Chairman, my bill which is H. Res. 380 which I have before you
    has 16 Republican sponsors and 16 Democrat sponsors. This is a
    bipartisan effort. And if any Member of Congress attempts to
    say this is partisan, or if the media tries to spin this as
    partisan I will refute it every step of the way. Sixteen
    Democrats and 16 Republicans cosponsored this bill, demanding
    that this administration come clean with the American people.
        Mr. Chairman, up until this date we have no new
    information. Nothing. We have the State Department silent with
    their lips closed. My own hunch is when the FBI was told by the
    SIS back in 1992 and 1993 about the Mitrokhin files, Yeltsin
    was on the rise. All of us wanted Yeltsin to succeed. But this
    administration because of its special focus on Yeltsin and
    Clinton didn't want anything to surface that would perhaps call
    into question Yeltsin's leadership or what Soviet and Russia's
    intents were. So we didn't ask the question. And now 8 years
    later, they are between a rock and a hard place. In my opinion,
    my best guess is they didn't ask the question then, they
    haven't asked the question, and they're embarrassed to come
    forward and admit that today.
        Now one final thought, Mr. Chairman. For those who would
    say that this is Russia of the past, I think by and large this
    kind of activity was in the former Soviet Union. But as someone
    who studies Russia on a daily basis, who travels to Russia
    frequently, and who knows the intricacies of the people in that
    country, I want to read to you, Mr. Chairman, from an internal
    Russian military publication dated July, August 1995.
        Now Mr. Chairman, this is 3 years after the reforms of
    Yeltsin. This is after we became enamored with Russia's success
    which I'm very happy and support on a regular basis. In an
    article in a publication that is briefed to the highest leaders
    in the Russian military today--in fact the names of the people
    on the editorial board are people like Kokoshin, they're people
    like Kvashnin, the highest leaders in the Russian military. The
    article written by Colonel Kadetov is entitled, ``The
    Employment of Special Task Forces Under Contemporary
    Conditions.'' In that article, Mr. Chairman, it says, that
    Russia should look--and this is 1995, mind you, Russia should
    look to have reconnaissance, commando, and other special
    services equipped with compact nuclear ammunition, weapons,
    mines, explosives, and other special means and equipment which
    have substantially increased the capabilities of reconnaissance
    and other special groups and detachments.
        Further down in this article, Mr. Chairman, the bottom of
    the page, 199, please bear with me on this statement.

        Special task forces can be used not only in war, but also
    in peace time during a period of threat. This refers to those
    instances when armed confrontation between the sides has not
    taken on the scale of war or when the extent of military
    preparations by a potential enemy and a corresponding military
    danger have reached such limits beyond which aggression can be
    curbed only by taking preventative measures.

        Mr. Chairman, this article goes into detail of Russia's
    current political thought of prepositioning military equipment
    including the possibility of nuclear devices on our soil. So
    for anyone who wants to trivialize this, I say come on. Let's
    have at it. I'm willing to use the words from Russians and from
    Russian materials to document what's taking place.
        [The information referred to follows:]

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        Mr. Weldon. I have two final things. I brought with me
    devices for those who say can't happen. This is an
    accelerometer, and this is a gyroscope. These have Russian
    markings on them. They were clipped off of Russian SSN 19 long-
    range missiles that were on Russian submarines that could hit
    the continental United States because of their range. These
    devices are prohibited from being exported. We caught the
    Russians transferring these to Iraq not once, not twice, but
    three times. We have more than one set. In fact, the number is
    classified but it's well over 100 sets of these devices. These
    were being transferred by Russia in direct violation of an arms
    control regime called the missile technology control regime.
        When I was in Moscow the month after the Post reported the
    story, I asked our Ambassador at the time, Tom Pickering, what
    was the Russian response when you asked them about this
    transfer, he said, I haven't asked them yet. I said why haven't
    you asked them? That would be a violation of the MTCR. He said
    that's got to come from Washington, from the State Department,
    from the White House.
        I wrote to President Clinton, Mr. Chairman. He wrote me
    back in March. Dear Congressman Weldon, what you're saying is
    of great concern to us. We read the Post story. And if it's
    true, you're right, it's a violation of the MTCR and we will
    take aggressive steps. But he went on to say we don't have any
    evidence.
        Mr. Chairman, I give you the evidence. I know that agencies
    of this government have had the evidence since before the
    President wrote that letter. That's the problem that we're
    currently confronting. We don't have any credibility with the
    Russians, Mr. Chairman. They don't respect us because of the
    dishrag policy of this administration which wants to pretend
    that things aren't what they are. And that doesn't mean we have
    to back Russia into a corner. It means we have to deal with
    them from a position of strength, consistency and candor.
        One final item if I might approach the Chair. I have a
    small atomic demolition device I would like to bring up for
    you.
        Mr. Burton. This is a mock-up, folks. Now, I hope that
    Congressman Weldon will explain who made this mock-up.
        Mr. Weldon. Yes, I will. This device was made by a former
    CIA agent and it was made to the specifications that are in the
    public record and available that the Soviet Union would use to
    design a small atomic demolition munitions I have just
    documented General Sergeyev has admitted that they built. So
    these specs are not what our Department of Defense tried to
    trivialize, these are built to the specs of the former Soviet
    Union.
        This is a device that would be typical of a 1 to 10 kiloton
    device. To give you a comparison, Hiroshima was about 15 to 16
    kilotons. This would wipe out downtown L.A., would wipe out the
    hotel where I'm staying, where we're all staying, and all the
    buildings around. If you put this kind of a device in a
    stadium, it would kill 50,000 to 75,000 people. This device can
    be carried by one person. This is the device. We're talking
    about a uranium-fired and uranium-fueled device that would
    basically be encased inside of the metal pipe that would have
    the appropriate activation devices along with it. And the
    design is actually contained in the top of the briefcase.
        Now, do we think that these devices are in fact buried in
    the United States? We have no way of doing that. But this is
    exactly what the Soviets had in mind. And according to the
    specs available in the public domain which we can provide for
    the record, Dr. Pry can assist in that effort, this is what the
    Soviet Union can't locate.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Burton. Thank you for that outstanding presentation.
        Now if anybody's hair is not gray, we'll turn to our
    colleague from California, Mr. Campbell, for an opening
    statement.

     STATEMENT OF HON. TOM CAMPBELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
                      FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

        Mr. Campbell. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for bringing these
    hearings to California. You are to be complimented for
    realizing the importance of the issue and bringing it out to
    the people. So it's not just within the Washington context. My
    colleague from Pennsylvania, Curt Weldon, has a remarkable
    record of public service and nothing more important than what
    he's done in this field. It was because of his work that I
    became aware of the potential difficulties with the
    prepositioning of communications or weapons systems, whichever,
    because the communications systems could be booby trapped. And
    I, in my effort, have tried to bring the question home to
    California: Is there a risk? That was my question, which I hope
    we can get some beginnings of answers to, if not from the
    administration then possibly from witnesses.
        The testimony that has been given in Curt Weldon's
    subcommittee on October 26 of last year builds the case. And
    here's the two large routes toward the conclusion that there
    are--is a high likelihood of prepositioning of communications
    or weapons in the State of California for two reasons. One
    because the sources are likely to be coming across the border
    at least in part by land, which is going to implicate our
    States that are on the land border; and second, that there are
    targets that were identified by these witnesses as likely
    targets which were located in California. And those are the two
    different streams that flow into this river of doubt as to
    whether there is a risk to the people of California.
        Obviously, and I say this to a chairman from Indiana, all
    of us are concerned. No matter where it is, that's a given. But
    I wanted at least in this opening statement to focus a bit as
    to why it was so important for you to hold these hearings here
    and hopefully to get some attention to this very realistic and
    serious risk.
        The possibility, by the way, could be simply a booby-
    trapped communications device. Indeed in my testimony I'm just
    going to stick with that example. Suppose that's all we were
    talking about. Mr. Chairman, you know we spend money because
    you and I serve on the International Relations Committee
    together, we spend money in Yugoslavia, we spend money in
    Africa, Zimbabwe where I recently visited, on demining. I'm
    glad that we do because some child might come across a mine in
    an area where it had been planted years before. This seems to
    me the minimum that we should do for our own people, to find
    out if there is a booby-trapped device.
        All right. I mentioned the two streams flowing into the
    river. On the first Professor Hill's testimony--excuse me,
    Andrews' testimony on October 26, one method, perhaps the main
    method of bringing arms and radio equipment into Western
    countries was via Soviet diplomatic bags. In the case of the
    United States, however, there are indications in KGB files that
    some of the equipment was smuggled across the Mexican and
    Canadian borders. First reason to worry about California
    because of our long border with Mexico.
        Second, also from Professor Andrews' testimony, among the
    chief sabotage targets across the United States-Mexican border
    were military bases, missile sites, radar installations, and
    the oil pipeline code named Stark which ran from El Paso in
    Texas to Costa Mesa in California. Three sites in the
    California coast were selected for DRG landings, that's an
    acronym for the Russian word for these teams, that were
    instructed to preposition material of this nature. Together
    with large capacity caches in which to store mines, explosives,
    detonators, and other sabotage material. Second stream flowing
    into this river of doubt.
        Third, from Mitrokhin's testimony himself and his quotation
    in the 60 Minutes presentation, so this is Mitrokhin himself
    speaking, the KGB plan went from the Mexican border in the
    south to the 49th parallel, the Canadian border, in the north.
    Andrew says, quoting Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin's most stunning
    revelation is that these targets across the United States in a
    KGB plan to knock out United States power supplies in case of a
    war. That's from testimony that Andrew gave quoting Mitrokhin,
    so it was not Mitrokhin himself, and I can correct myself,
    October 26, 1999.
        In Nightline's research, as you know they did a special
    session on this, they pursued the Brainerd, MN possibility and
    concluded that other caches do exist. This is testimony on that
    program from some source they had. And I do not know whom. But
    a source they had that was able to get into the Mitrokhin files
    beyond what was disclosed into the Mitrokhin files in this
    book. And that source, which was revealed on Nightline
    identified Brainerd, MN.
        My point about the danger to civilians is most clearly
    demonstrated by this description of what happened in
    Switzerland. From the book on the Mitrokhin files, late in
    1998, the Swiss authorities began removing a radio cache in
    woods near Bern identified by Mitrokhin. So I'll pause just for
    a moment in the quote to say it's a radio cache. In and of
    itself one might not think all that dangerous. One might think
    well not a weapon. However, this radio cache which exploded
    when fired on by a water cannon, a spokesman for the Federal
    prosecutors office issued a warning that if any further caches
    were discovered they should not be touched, ``anyone who tried
    to move the container would have been killed.''
        And the reference as well earlier is from page 365 of the
    ``Sword and the Shield'' and a reference from page 16, the
    Mitrokhin notes reveal similar KGB arms and radio caches, some
    of them booby trapped, scattered around much of Europe and
    North America.
        Mr. Chairman, Mr. Scarborough, that is the danger that I
    care about, that all of us care about. And I particularly bring
    it home to the situation here in California. It is likely
    because of its source from across the border, and it is likely
    because of the targets, for example that El Paso Costa Mesa
    pipeline, the military installations that were referred to in
    the Mitrokhin files.
        Last, what have I done about it? I deserve nothing, no
    notice at all except to the extent that I am taking what your
    work and what Mr. Weldon's work has done and asking a question
    you would for your own district in Indiana, you would for your
    district in Florida: Is there a risk here? What can we do?
    Let's find out. Accordingly, I wrote the Secretary of State
    after I had convinced myself on the basis of the evidence from
    the Weldon hearings, from the testimony that I've just read
    that it was appropriate--that it was appropriate to inquire
    because the risk to the people in my district or the people in
    California was not trivial.
        I wrote on December 6, Mr. Chairman, and I asked most
    politely to Secretary Albright that she pursue this vigorously.
    I received--I also sent a letter to Sandy Berger and I sent a
    letter to Secretary of Defense Cohen. I received a reply--this
    is December 6. I received a reply only from Secretary Cohen.
        Secretary Cohen said, Thank you for your letter requesting
    information about the location of Russian weapon caches within
    the United States. I have asked the Undersecretary of Defense
    for Policy, Mr. Walt Slocum, to promptly address this request;
    and he will get back to you as soon as possible. With best
    wishes, I am Secretary Bill Cohen.
        Knowing of this hearing, Mr. Chairman, I want to emphasize
    this because fairness is a very important characteristic in
    anything as important as this. One must be careful in saying
    this is a concern to all Democrats, Republicans alike.
        I wrote again knowing of this hearing, and so I said to
    Sandy Berger, Madeleine Albright, and Bill Cohen, in a letter
    of January 13: On January 24, 2000, the House Committee on
    Government Reform will be holding a field hearing in Los
    Angeles on exactly this issue. I would be grateful if you would
    respond to my letter prior to this hearing so that I may submit
    the administration's possession in this matter to the committee
    for the record.
        Mr. Chairman, I received no response at all.
        And I'm going to conclude now with a description of an
    interchange for which you were present when we were both in the
    International Relations Committee and Madeleine Albright,
    Secretary Albright testified in this particular context it was
    about the war in Yugoslavia. I think you'll remember, Mr.
    Chairman, that I was very vigorous in trying to assert the role
    of Congress in that matter that it was a war and that it should
    not have been prosecuted without the approval of Congress as
    per our Constitution. I asked Secretary Albright, Mrs.
    Albright, are we at war with Yugoslavia? She said no. I said,
    we're not at war? She said no. I said, what is it then? She
    said it was armed conflict.
        The next day she had her Assistant Secretary come up and I
    asked her are we at war she said no we are in armed conflict. I
    said, what's the difference between armed conflict or not just
    armed conflict and war but armed conflict and hostilities
    because hostilities is in the War Power Act. And she said, wait
    a minute, I'll get the attorney for the State Department. She
    then turned around and brought up the attorney for the State
    Department who testified in essence that it was armed conflict
    if the President said it was armed conflict; it was hostilities
    if the President said it was hostilities.
        This is circumlocution. This is a disservice to the high
    Office of Secretary of State. And to fail to reply at all to
    sincere inquiries relative to the safety of my and your
    constituents is a disservice to the American public.
        I thank you for holding these hearings, Mr. Chairman.
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        Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Campbell, Mr. Weldon. With the
    consent of my colleague, Mr. Scarborough, we'll go with 10
    minute rounds of questions. I'll give you 10 minutes. Let me--
    can you set this for 10 minutes so that we--and we may go more
    than one round depending on whether we cover everything.
        I read the large part of the book, and one of the things
    that struck me in addition to the nuclear devices being in
    briefcases weighing about 60 pounds was that it was said that
    they also made those devices in different forms. They could
    make them in forms that looked like bricks or rocks or
    something else. Did anybody ever express that to you that it
    might just be a briefcase-type weapon?
        Mr. Weldon. Yes, Mr. Chairman, that was expressed. And I
    think if you ask that question of Mr. Lunev, you'll get his
    personal response as to what he thought it could perhaps look
    like. I think he'll elaborate on that. But there in fact were
    ``Spetsnaz'' training manuals that identify these kinds of
    devices in a number of forms, not just the kind of formal
    briefcase that I brought today, but that they could be placed
    and be hidden and not known to be in fact what they were. So
    your answer is yes, that there were other types of devices,
    some larger, some smaller. And you know, the other added
    dimension here is we talk about reducing arms repeatedly
    between us and Russia. Russia has an overwhelming advantage to
    us on tactical nuclear weapons. Tactical nukes. And they admit
    that. And we admit that publicly. I mean, they have a huge
    advantage over America on the number of tactical nukes none of
    which are regulated by treaty by the way. Tactical nukes are
    not very far away from what we're talking about with small
    atomic demolition munitions, which you're saying and has been
    said by Russian experts could, in fact, have been camouflaged.
        Mr. Burton. I would like to followup on one thing that you
    said in your opening statement you said that was it Yablikov?
        Mr. Weldon. Alexei Yablikov.
        Mr. Burton. Forgive me if I don't pronounce these names
    correctly. He said, as I recall, that many of these devices
    were for external use.
        Mr. Weldon. He said that his colleagues and his peers who
    were academic scientists and researchers told him they were
    working on these devices in the Soviet era, that they were
    being built not just for the Ministry of Defense but also for
    the KGB. And the design of these devices was to be used
    wherever Russia needed them both internally and externally.
        Mr. Burton. So when they built these 132 nuclear devices,
    the briefcase-like device that you showed me, they intended for
    them to be used for internal civil disorders, I presume, as
    well as external threats to the Soviet Union?
        Mr. Weldon. Absolutely. In fact, there was an allegation
    made by Dudayev in the first Chechen conflict that he had, in
    fact, a small atomic demolition device, and if you read the
    book One Point Safe by Andrew and Leslie Cockburn, which I have
    asked the CIA to refute and they have not done that publicly,
    there is a chapter dedicated to the United States taking that
    charge so seriously that we sent agents to work with the
    Russians to find out whether or not Dudayev did in fact have a
    small atomic demolition device. That's how seriously we took
    that allegation.
        Mr. Burton. Now, they said that they were going to destroy
    all of these 132 nuclear devices by the year 2000, but only 48
    can be accounted for. That means, according to my mathematics,
    about 84 are still unaccounted for.
        Mr. Weldon. Well, again, Lebed was the top security adviser
    to Yeltsin. So he had the full weight of the Presidency to go
    out and find these devices. And he said--I mean, he gave us the
    exact number, and he said they can only locate 48 and had no
    idea where the rest were. It was the defense minister who told
    me in the subsequent meeting in December after his government
    had denied they ever built them that, yes, they would have them
    all destroyed.
        Mr. Chairman, I want to add one comment for the record
    about Lebed's credibility. For those who might say, well, you
    can't really trust what Lebed's saying; for those who study
    Russia they know that when Yeltsin appointed Putin, he
    interviewed three people for that position. Just 2 months ago,
    one of the three people he interviewed was Aleksandr Lebed. So
    for those who are going to try to take apart Lebed's
    credibility, the Russian President just before he appointed
    Putin as his successor interviewed Lebed, and I think that was
    because the Chechen war went sour and Putin's credibility went
    down, Lebed would be a credible alternative who had a strong
    figure image in Russia.
        Mr. Burton. We don't know how many sites there are or could
    be in North America or Canada, but as the chief potential
    adversary of the Soviet Union time conflict, it is logical to
    assume that there would be numerous sites in the United States
    and that there's a real possibility that if they were going to
    export these nuclear devices for external use that they would
    be placed here in the United States someplace.
        Mr. Weldon. I would say scores and scores, if not hundreds
    and hundreds, all over this country. They named a number of
    States in the files that Mitrokhin was able to get documented.
    Unfortunately, he didn't take the time to get the specific
    locations.
        You know--and I asked that question of Dr. Andrew, why
    didn't Mitrokhin get the specific locations. He said,
    Congressman, you have to understand. Mitrokhin's hatred of the
    KGB was primarily because of what the KGB was doing to Russian
    people, and that's where he went to extensive documentation and
    the vast web of sympathizers that the Communist party had
    outside of Russia, and that's what the bulk of this is about.
    The location of these devices wasn't one of Mitrokhin's top
    priorities. That wasn't what was of interest to him, but he did
    copy down some of those files, but only in four of them went
    down to the specific detail. Unfortunately, all of those four
    sites were in Europe.
        Mr. Burton. It also mentioned--in the book it was mentioned
    that the Spetsnaz troops which are the premier, I guess it
    would be equivalent to our Delta force troops or I don't know
    what would be another analogy, but our top elite troops who are
    capable of using all kinds of methods to kill people--that they
    were getting dossiers on American leaders and politicians so
    that in time of conflict they could eradicate them more or kill
    them.
        Mr. Weldon. Again, Lunev will testify to that. He testified
    before my committee on that issue. In addition, Gordievsky, the
    highest ranking KGB officer whoever defected, who was the
    bureau chief in London, said the same thing. I think it's
    important you keep reiterating, as you've been doing, as we've
    been following through, these statements are from the mouths of
    Russians. These are not----
        Mr. Burton. They're not just low level. High level.
        Mr. Weldon. These are the highest level officials in the
    Russian intelligence service and the Russian military, some of
    whom are still in Russia today, Mr. Chairman. Lebed is the
    Governor of Krasnoyarsk, who was just interviewed for the top
    job in the Russian Government.
        Mr. Burton. Let me ask you one final question, and that
    is--and I think this is extremely important for anybody who's
    paying attention to this issue, as everybody ought to be. We
    ought to have all 235 or 240 million Americans paying attention
    to this issue, and that is, that you talked to the FBI and
    other agencies of the government, you talked to Louis Freeh;
    and they told you that nobody has asked the former Soviet Union
    and the now Russian leadership any questions about these
    possible sites in the United States. Nobody to your knowledge
    has asked any questions about if these sites exist and where
    they exist.
        Mr. Weldon. Two Federal agencies--it wasn't Louis Freeh
    himself. The FBI said to me personally and the Defense
    Department said publicly in a press conference that we have not
    yet asked the Russians the questions. I don't blame either of
    those agencies. I don't think it's their responsibility to ask
    the Russians. I think it's the State Department's
    responsibility or President Clinton in his relationship with
    Boris Yeltsin, and why they haven't done that--I've given you
    my own best estimate as to why--but I think this country should
    demand and hopefully through your committee will demand this
    administration come clean with the American people. If they're
    so worried about land mines, as my colleague Mr. Campbell so
    eloquently stated, you hear people talking about land mines.
    We've got, according to what's happened in Switzerland, land
    mines over America.
        Mr. Burton. And possibly 84 nuclear weapons.
        Mr. Weldon. And possibly.
        Mr. Burton. Let me ask Mr. Campbell a few questions.
        What sites in California--I don't know if you've done any
    research on this--but what sites in California other than those
    that you enumerated do you think would be of great concern if
    there were devices of this type planted here in California?
        Mr. Campbell. My source is going to be as described in the
    testimony of the--from the Mitrokhin files, and that indicated
    strategic targets for civil disturbance to create havoc in the
    event of a war, in the event of a war, and the particular
    subjects were military bases, gas and petroleum pipeline as
    likely, and then naturally those closer to the border because
    the possibility of bringing them across and then repositioning
    once they're across was suggested. So those would be the most
    likely. But I repeat that the key here is somebody knows. This
    is remarkable. Somebody does know; and therefore, why don't we
    use our diplomatic efforts to find out?
        Mr. Burton. One of the things that concerns me every time I
    come to California--I love this State. It's a beautiful State.
    You have great recreational facilities. When I land at LAX, I'm
    always afraid there's going to be a terrible earthquake and the
    San Andreas Fault is going to split, and we're all going to go
    into the ocean. Kidding of course, but the fact of the matter
    is, if a major nuclear device of the 10 kiloton range was set
    off in close proximity to one of the major fault areas, I
    wonder how that would affect not only that particular area but
    also the entire possibility of an earthquake that would go
    further.
        Mr. Campbell. I don't have the expertise to answer that
    question. I'm nowhere near a seismologist, but every
    Californian is an amateur seismologist, Mr. Chairman; but I
    don't have the expertise to answer it. I'll take your question
    and look at it through the microscope as opposed to the
    telescope end, and I would say that the fact that we do have
    shifting geology means that it's a distinct possibility that
    some of these locations might never be identified. That was in
    the Mitrokhin--that was in the Hill book--excuse me, the Andrew
    book regarding one of the European sites in Belgium, that they
    were not able to find it because there had been road work and
    reconstruction and change in the topography, so all the more
    so.
        So I won't answer your first question because I just lack
    the expertise, but I would say being able to identify where a
    place was is not--10, 15 years ago may not get you all that you
    need to be when the ground shifts.
        Mr. Burton. Mr. Scarborough.
        Mr. Campbell. Mr. Chairman, might I offer one last thought?
        Mr. Burton. Sure.
        Mr. Campbell. Then I'd love to hear from my colleague from
    Florida. We have in the Congress a mechanism for solving and
    dealing with these problems. We do. If there are high-level,
    highly confidential communications between our Government and
    another, it can be shared with the Intelligence Committee, and
    you know how this works. I think it's important to emphasize
    that, that no one here is saying to our administration do
    anything which would jeopardize secure communications, but to
    give no answer at all, just to present almost an arrogant
    refusal to answer the question that a Congressman might ask on
    behalf of his constituents is unacceptable; and if instead the
    letter I'd gotten back was to say this is a matter we need to
    take up with the Intelligence Committee where it will stay in
    camera, where there is representation of both parties, I would
    have been absolutely satisfied.
        Mr. Weldon. And so would I, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Burton. Mr. Scarborough.
        Mr. Scarborough. Thank you. But moving beyond that though,
    if in fact there are possibly nuclear devices in the State of
    California, do not Californians also have a right to know where
    those devices were planted?
        Mr. Campbell. I do understand a public security, public
    safety concern that if the matter becomes so grave as that that
    it be handled with delicacy, but it has to be handled by
    someone. It's not acceptable, not even to make an inquiry and
    then not even to give an answer to a Congress Member who asks.
        Mr. Scarborough. And Congressman Campbell, you spoke of the
    possibility of these devices being used in the event of war,
    but Congressman Weldon, didn't you talk about the possibility
    of these devices even being used outside of war by again
    quoting that 1995 document?
        Mr. Weldon. Absolutely, Mr. Scarborough.
        Mr. Scarborough. And if you could again highlight that
    because it sounds as if Russian military officials in 1995 were
    advocating nothing less than nuclear blackmail to prevent
    results on the international scale that could be negative to
    the country.
        Mr. Weldon. Mr. Scarborough, you're absolutely correct. The
    document says the importance of warfare in enemy rear areas is
    what it talks about; and it goes through, and it mentions
    compact nuclear ammunition, weapons, mines, explosives and
    other special means, and it goes down to the other paragraph,
    as I said before, special task forces as stated above can be
    used not only in war but also in peacetime during a period of
    threat. And who determines the period of threat?
        Mr. Scarborough. Right. And when you talk about these
    special op forces, again what are you talking about? Are you
    talking about them possibly placing these nuclear devices
    throughout California? Somebody said Shenandoah Valley, also.
        Mr. Weldon. Weapons of mass destruction. It could be some
    kind of biological agent. When we had--it was either Lunev or
    Gordoyevski talk about the use of chemical and biological,
    because we also had another witness come in who ran the Russian
    biological weapons program for about 10 years, and Peter, his
    name--the book, Biohazard, I can't think of his name.
        Ms. Katzin. It was Ken Alibeck.
        Mr. Weldon. Ken Alibeck. Ken Alibeck, who was again here
    under an assumed name in America, testified as the person who
    ran the Soviet biological weapons program that they used these
    weapons against their own people--he was part of it--and he
    said it was no doubt in his mind that there were intents to use
    those same materials in this country. Now, we didn't cover that
    as part of this hearing, but that's another Russian. That's not
    an American saying that. It's Dr. Ken Alibeck saying it, and
    his book basically documents that. His book is called
    ``Biohazard.''
        Mr. Scarborough. You all have both studied I would guess in
    the intelligence arena and in the armed service arena, you've
    studied these areas also, haven't you, as far as the impact of
    biological warfare on American cities?
        Mr. Weldon. Mr. Scarborough, my committee's assignment is
    to chair the Resource and Development Committee for national
    security which means my subcommittee oversees about $36 billion
    a year of defense spending, a significant portion of which is
    used to develop research programs and new capability to detect
    and deal with weapons of mass destruction: biological,
    chemical, and nuclear.
        Mr. Campbell. And my responsibility is on the International
    Relations Committee, not the Intelligence Committee, but in the
    IR Committee, we have held hearings on precisely the question
    you raised.
        Mr. Scarborough. And could you simplify for somebody that's
    not looked into the biological weapons--I mean, we hear this
    anecdotal evidence. We hear of an airplane flying at 1,000 feet
    over a city or 3,000 feet over the city dropping particles that
    could kill everybody in Washington, DC, or Los Angeles, CA. Is
    there the possibility of doing that also on the ground by these
    devices, and could you briefly explain?
        Mr. Weldon. Absolutely. In fact, it's happened. There was a
    terrorist group in Japan a few years ago that used Sarin and
    wiped out the whole first responder group coming into a subway
    because they didn't know what they were facing. When Aliback
    testified again before the Congress in an open hearing, he said
    that was his job. As the head of the Soviet biological weapons
    program, his job was to develop--and they developed over 150
    strains of biological agents that could be used against
    adversaries or even used against Soviet citizens which he and
    Gordoyevski both have testified has been done in the past.
        So now we're talking about probably one of the three
    gravest threats we face in this century, that along with
    missile proliferation and cyber-terrorism and the need for us
    to establish information dominance. They are the three biggest
    threats we face because weapons of mass destruction are here. I
    mean, we know that at the World Trade Center bombing, there
    were actually two devices there. The first device destroyed the
    garage area. Thank goodness the second device didn't go off
    because it would have penetrated the HVAC system in that
    complex.
        I mean, there are those who want to cause havoc in America,
    and biological and chemical agents are a weapon of choice today
    because they're relatively easy to make and the technology has
    been worked on for years by the Russians. In fact, their
    stockpiles are overwhelming. When Alexi Yablokov testified, he
    said for arms control purposes, we estimate the amount of
    chemical weapons that Russia has to be 40,000 metric tons, and
    Yablokov said he's personally aware that they produced over
    100,000 metric tons. So where's the rest? We just don't know.
        Mr. Campbell. And I would only add to that that the
    enclosed space is the danger which obviously made the Japanese
    subway the target that it was for that particular terrorist
    group. The problem is enclosed space also describes almost
    every high rise built in the last 20 years. As you go more and
    more to sealed windows, the possibility of a biological agent
    spreading through an enclosed space, subway or high rise, makes
    it a very--an exceptionally dangerous possibility for a weapon
    of mass destruction.
        Mr. Scarborough. Congressman Campbell, you are without a
    doubt considered one of the most thoughtful Members of
    Congress, and sometimes it's maddening to some people in
    leadership who would like you to grab a torch and follow the
    crowd into battle, but you've remained remarkably independent
    in Washington and you just don't demagogue, and so with that as
    a preface, I'm going to ask you a pretty tough question that I
    would expect the answer a certain way from other Members, but I
    know, again, you're a straight shooter.
        Let me ask you, as somebody who represents the people of
    California, do you believe that Californian citizens are in
    danger of coming in contact with weapons of mass destruction
    because of the information that Mr. Weldon and you and others
    have brought to this committee?
        Mr. Campbell. I want to thank you for your kind words in
    the premise of your question. I want to say that my duty is to
    the people I represent, and the evidence that I've seen is what
    led me to ask for this hearing, to go to Chairman Burton, to
    study the material that Curt Weldon had prepared. It's no
    different than you'd do for the people of Florida or people in
    your district.
        It is, in my judgment, distinctly possible that there are
    prepositioned communications devices at a minimum. It is, in my
    judgment, highly likely that those prepositioned communications
    devices are booby-trapped because they were, the ones that we
    checked, that were checked out were, and aging booby traps, as
    we know from our knowledge of land mines, are unstable, and
    people can innocently run across them. So I'm going to be
    cautious. I'm going to be very cautious and say that what I
    have just described is, in my view, a realistic risk. The
    possibility of danger to innocent people who come across a
    booby-trapped communications cache or cache of whatever or the
    simple aging and deterioration thereof creates an important
    matter of potential risk to alleviate which the administration
    ought to at least answer a polite question.
        Mr. Scarborough. And Congressman Weldon, this will be my
    last question. I'll ask you the same question I asked
    Congressman Campbell. Are the people of Los Angeles and the
    people of the State of California in danger because of the
    information that's been brought before this committee?
        Mr. Weldon. Absolutely, and that's according to General
    Alexander Lebed who told me that. It's according to Alexi
    Yablokov who told me that. It's according to Stanislav Lunev
    who told me that. It's according to Dr. Christopher Andrew who
    told me that. It's according to Oleg Gordievsky who told me
    that, and it's according to people that I worked with in Russia
    who say that we need to understand there are those in the past
    of the Soviet history who had very unbelievable intents against
    America and its people. Now, that being said, do I think all
    Russia's our enemy? Absolutely not. And do I work at developing
    strong relations? Absolutely.
        Just in closing, I'd like to add one final thought if I
    might to both Mr. Scarborough's comment, and Mr. Chairman, your
    leadership. This does not have to be a case where it's us
    backing Russia into a corner. We give Russia--the American
    people give Russia $1 billion a year through the cooperative
    threat reduction program, through the laboratory to lab
    cooperation program, through programs involving agricultural
    assistance, through help for their nuclear waste, through
    programs involving economic development, all of which, by the
    way, I support. I'm an active supporter of all of them, but we
    give them $1 billion a year. It's a simple thing of the
    administration asking the tough questions, and I think that's
    why I said at the beginning I think this is an example of this
    administration's policy failures.
        They have never wanted to ask the tough questions. They've
    never wanted to ask about the IMF funds that the oligarchs
    stole. They never wondered that the Russians lost respect
    because we supported Yeltsin, even though that they knew that
    Yeltsin's cronies and his daughter were stealing money. It's a
    question of the arms control treaty violations, 17 of them,
    that we never called Russia on. In each case it's been the
    same. We don't want to ask the question as a Nation, and now we
    are paying a price for that.
        And in this case I agree with Mr. Campbell's assessment. He
    is always--and I agree with you, he's the most thoughtful
    Member we have in the Congress in both parties, and I think all
    of our colleagues would agree with that, that Tom is taking the
    conservative threat that we're so enamored with this idea of
    land mines. Well, what are we talking about? A land mine to the
    extent that the Swiss Government had to put out an alert for
    all their people. That's reality. This is not some made up idea
    or some movie. This is what really occurred; and therefore,
    this administration owes the American people and the Congress a
    response. And I thank you two for leading the effort to demand
    that response.
        Mr. Scarborough. I thank you, and Mr. Chairman, I thank
    you. And I certainly believe that if Californians are in
    danger, as well as people in Indiana and Florida, then the
    administration should step forward and ask the difficult
    questions. I'd like to yield back.
        Mr. Burton. Thank you very much, Congressman Scarborough.
    What I'd like to do now is take about a 5 to 10 minute break so
    Mr. Lunev can be brought into the room in a secure situation.
    We have to put up a panel around him. I'd like to also ask Mr.
    Campbell and Mr. Weldon, without objection, to join us on the
    dais because of their expertise, so they can help us ask
    questions of Mr. Lunev. We also will have Dr. William Green and
    Dr. Peter Pry come forward as well so they can be part of that
    panel. So we'll take a recess here for about 5 to 10 minutes to
    get the security in place.
        [Recess.]
        Mr. Burton. Would Dr. William Green and Dr. Peter Pry also
    come forward, please, and Dr. Pry, your seat is over to my
    left, and Dr. Green, there you are. I won't ask Mr. Lunev to
    stand up because his head is going to be above the partition.
    Would the other two please rise and raise your right hands
    please, and would you raise your right hand?
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Mr. Burton. Thank you. You may be seated.
        Let me just say before we start the statements by the
    witnesses that some people of the media have indicated that we
    might be trying to create paranoia and a new cold war. That
    could not be further from the truth. Congressman Weldon stated
    very clearly that it is extremely important that we try to have
    a good relationship with the Russian people and the Russian
    Government.
        At the same time that that is important, it's also
    important for us to know whether or not there's any threat to
    American citizens on American soil, and that's why we're
    holding these hearings. It's incumbent upon Members of Congress
    to try to protect--in fact, we have a constitutional obligation
    to try to protect the security of American citizens, and so
    it's important that we have these hearings to try to make sure
    the American people know what's going on.
        Abraham Lincoln said--and he was a pretty good President--
    let the people know the facts and the country will be saved.
    It's just as true today as it was back then. So I'm distressed
    that some members of the media are thinking we're trying to
    scare everybody to death. We're not trying to do that. We're
    trying to get the facts out so that we know that if there's
    nothing to fear, there's nothing to fear; and if there is, that
    we get it cleaned up.
        OK. I think we'll start with Colonel Lunev, and I'd like to
    say before Colonel Lunev starts to speak that this is not his
    real name. He is in the witness protection program with the--
    you say the FBI and CIA together. In fact, I'll ask him that
    question in a minute and--but he is, as I said, a very high
    official, the highest GRU official that's defected to the
    United States. So we'll start with you, Mr. Lunev.

     STATEMENTS OF STANISLAV LUNEV, FORMER GRU OFFICER, AUTHOR OF
     ``THROUGH THE EYES OF THE ENEMY;'' WILLIAM GREEN, CALIFORNIA
     STATE UNIVERSITY--SAN BERNADINO, NAVAL RESERVES INTELLIGENCE
    OFFICER; AND PETER VINCENT PRY, FORMER EMPLOYEE OF THE CENTRAL
              INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, AUTHOR OF ``WAR SCARE''

        Mr. Lunev. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, ladies
    and gentlemen.
        Mr. Burton. Would you speak--pull the microphone as close
    to you as you can.
        Mr. Lunev. First of all, thank you for inviting me for so
    beautiful place like Los Angeles. Of course, weather is a
    little bit different from East Coast now which is under ice and
    snow, you know, and, of course, I would like to spend few of
    your minutes, especially to explain you my position about all
    this--actually, very dangerous stuff which unfortunately is in
    place now in time when former Soviet Union doesn't exist about
    one decade.
        For me, it was really surprise that after I wrote my book,
    actually after publishing of this book, that American people
    know so little about possible danger for the national security
    of this country. Last year when I began to work for one of the
    Internet companies, its name is newsmag.com, I had a chance to
    give a lot of radio and TV interviews to different people, and
    it's one more to underscore my point about shortage of
    knowledge of American people about national security of this
    country.
        First of all, I need to return back to history because in
    time of former Soviet Union existence, Soviet General staff
    designed special plan for the future war against America and
    American friends and allies worldwide. According to this plan,
    Soviet special operation forces commanders need to come to this
    country and other NATO countries in few days, maybe hours,
    before real war would be in place, like students, tourists,
    visitors, businessmen, by regular airlines, and before real war
    would be in place, they need to pick up weapons systems which
    are already located in this country, including technical
    nuclear devices. This is--official name is technical portable
    atomic demolition devices, containers with chemical and
    biological weapons, conventional weapons system, communication
    devices, actual money, credit cards, documentation, which are
    already storage in this country, and in few hours or minutes
    before regular nuclear missile strike will hit American soil,
    this special operation forces commanders will pick up this
    weapons system, move this weapons system to their area of
    operational use, and we will destroy economical and military
    political infrastructure of this country; first of all, targets
    which could not be destroyed by regular missile nuclear strike.
        And in fulfillment of these duties they have to destroy
    power stations, communications system of this country,
    physically eliminate American leaders who are involved in
    military chain of command. It means President, Vice President,
    Speaker of the House, chairman of the leading committees of the
    U.S. Congress, joint chief of staff members and other people,
    and especially not to provide them possibility to escape from
    the ground in time when real war would be in place. After this,
    regular missile nuclear strike and ground operation, ground
    invasion in European countries against NATO and final stage
    amphibious operation and invasion to the United States.
        Of course, you understand that this is history, but I need
    to tell you that history is history, but unfortunately, just
    now a situation is not very good, and these military plans are
    still existent in Russian General staff, and these military
    plans in time of possible war would be fulfilled by special
    operation forces commanders, by strategic forces or Russian
    Federation exclude only one last part of this plan, because in
    time after this plan was designed by Soviet General staff,
    nuclear weapons systems have developed so much that actually
    nobody will need to invade on the territory or foreign
    countries because NATO countries' territory and American
    territory could be totally destroyed by nuclear weapons system,
    and if something could not be destroyed by nuclear weapons, you
    know how many millions of looters will come to this country and
    they will finish actually all this destruction process.
        And just now what we are talking about, location of
    technical nuclear devices, containers with chemical biological
    weapons, conventional weapons system and others, these places
    we have selected extremely carefully for a long, long period of
    time, and to believe that it is possible to find this places
    just like that without using extremely, extremely large
    resources of this country, I don't think that it would be
    realistic until Russian Government, which still have keys for
    these locations will not disclose this location.
        And it was one of my major points when I wrote book that by
    publication of my book I would keep informed Russian military
    leaders that it is not secret anymore about this weapons
    existence and location outside of Russian Federation, and I
    hope that after this book publication, these devices could be
    removed from America and other territories of American friends
    and allies and returned to Russia. Unfortunately, until now, I
    do not have any real news that it's happened, and just now I
    can only to think about that these weapons systems are still
    existent on American soil and on the territory of American
    friends and allies.
        Thank you for your time, ladies and gentlemen.
        Mr. Burton. Thank you very much, Mr. Lunev.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Lunev follows:]

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        Mr. Burton. I'd like to go to Dr. Pry next for his opening
    statement.
        Dr. Pry. Mr. Chairman, thank you for having me here today
    to testify before your committee on Russian threats to United
    States security in the post-cold war world.
        The administration claims its Russia policy is a
    spectacular success when in fact it is a spectacular failure.
    We've been told that capitalism and democracy are basically on
    track in Russia when they're not. We've been told by the
    administration that America's children are safe from Russian
    nuclear weapons because of the detargeting of their missiles
    when, in fact, America's children are not safe from the Russian
    nuclear threat.
        The administration's Russia policy has been more of a
    public relations campaign to persuade the American people that
    all is well rather than a hard-headed, well-attended program to
    really advance free enterprise and democracy in Russia and to
    protect United States vital national interests. Despite
    administration claims that our Russia policy is a success, many
    of us have watched and worried and warned for years that our
    Russia policy is careening toward failure.
        Now, the media and the American people have recently been
    shocked awake by a new brutal Russian leadership that has
    manipulated the electoral process to, in effect, thwart the
    free and fair elections in Russia. We have been shocked awake
    by the war in Chechnya where the Russian military is using
    missiles, flame throwers, and fuel air explosives--classified
    in their own military doctrine as weapons of mass destruction--
    to subdue their own people. We have been shocked awake by
    Russian military and foreign officials who have officially
    blamed the United States for provoking the Chechen crisis as
    part of a larger conspiracy to have NATO penetrate the
    Caucasuses and gain control of the oil wealth of the Caspian
    Sea.
        We've been shocked awake by President Putin and others
    brazenly making nuclear threats against the United States,
    including Putin on December 14 attending the launch of SS-X-27
    ICBM, where he made a direct nuclear threat against the United
    States not to interfere in Russian internal affairs: And we
    have been shocked awake by President Putin's recent embrace of
    a new national security concept that describes the West as a
    threat to Russia, and relies on nuclear weapons and a nuclear
    first strike as the primary cornerstone of Russia's national
    security policy.
        None of this comes as a surprise to those of us who have
    been skeptical of the administration's claims that its Russia
    policy is basically on track and successful and who have
    independently followed and thought about what's been happening
    in Russia over the years. Indeed, everything discussed today
    about Russian military caches prepositioned on NATO territory,
    about nuclear suitcases, and other aspects of the Russian
    threat are part of a larger pattern, manifestations of a ``war
    scare'' mentally among the Russian General staff and national
    security elite described in my recently published book, ``War
    Scare: Russia and America on the Nuclear Brink.''
        War scare is a term of art used in the intelligence
    community to describe one-sided nuclear crises where Moscow
    mistakenly believed it faced the possibility of an imminent
    nuclear attack from the West, and prepared to preempt that
    threat.
        Beginning in the early 1980's, Soviet elites feared that
    they were losing the cold war and understood that the strains
    of the cold war competition were worsening the Soviet economy
    and encouraging the disintegrative internal conditions that
    eventually led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. They feared
    that the United States, sensing this growing weakness, might
    try to exploit the situation by launching a surprise nuclear
    attack. Disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and disintegration of
    the Soviet Union itself was and is still viewed in Moscow as
    not merely an internal crisis, but as a profound international
    crisis that has upset global order and the balance of power and
    may tempt the West to aggression against a weakened Russia.
        Fear and insecurity in Russia's General staff and in its
    national security elite has worsened as Russia's political
    fortunes, economy, and military capabilities have continued to
    decline over the years. Thus, while the West has tended to
    think of relations with Russia as steadily improving over the
    last decade, the Russian General staff and security services
    have viewed those relations as in a deep systemic crisis, akin
    to the protracted 20 years crisis that preceded World War II.
    They live in constant fear that the United States and NATO
    might at any moment move to finish Russia off and thereby
    remove any possible future challenge to the West's complete
    domination of the world order.
        All of this may seem hard to believe given the popular
    tendency to think of Russia exclusively in terms of the benign
    personality that was Boris Yeltsin, and given vociferous
    assurances by the administration, rarely challenged by the
    media, that Russia is now a strategic partner and no longer a
    threat to the United States. But there are some cold, hard
    facts about Russia that the American people and policymakers
    need to know in order to accurately appraise United States-
    Russian relations, in order to understand that there is still a
    serious threat from that quarter.
        Russian offensive strategic forces programs, for example.
    Despite an economy where they can barely feed and house their
    own people, Russia is continuing to produce intercontinental
    ballistic missiles, cranking out SS-25s, deploying a new SS-27
    ICBM which is the most technologically advanced ICBM in the
    world, building new ballistic missile submarines, trying to
    develop new sub-launched ballistic missiles, attempting to
    modernize its strategic bomber force and building two new
    classes of strategic cruise missiles.
        Russian defensive strategic programs. They are attempting
    to modernize the Moscow ABM system which is basically a de
    facto national missile defense. The world's only existing
    national missile defense; but more important than this, they're
    putting vast resources into constructing hundreds of deep
    underground facilities, modernizing some facilities that
    already exist but building new ones, too, including some like
    Yamantau Mountain, which is a deep underground facility as
    large as Washington, DC, inside the beltway that has only one
    purpose: to survive a nuclear conflict. What its purpose is
    beyond that we actually don't know and have been attempting to
    find out, but the Russians have gone to great lengths to
    conceal the purpose of Yamantau Mountain. Kosvinsky Mountain is
    another example. We know what that is. It's a new general staff
    command post vastly harder and more capable than our own deep
    underground facility at NORAD headquarters. Its purpose is to
    manage a thermonuclear conflict, and these facilities are
    undergoing construction 24 hours a day in a country where they
    can't even provide housing for their own people.
        There is evidence that Congressman Weldon alluded to,
    actually showed you very specifically--the gyroscopes and the
    accelerometers. There's evidence of deliberate Russian
    proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction
    technology to countries that are hostile to the United States.
    This apparently fits into a strategy that ``the enemy of my
    enemy is my friend.''
        There is a new anti-Western strategic partnership with
    China that is emerging between the two where China supports
    Russian interests against NATO expansion and Russia is
    supporting Chinese interests via Taiwan. Russia is giving its
    high-tech support to China to modernize its military, building
    things like SU-27 factories in China so that they can have new
    fighter aircraft that are several generations more advanced
    than what the Chinese had before.
        We have talked at length about the military caches in NATO
    already and the possibility of nuclear suitcases. Obviously a
    country that engages in such activities does not regard us as a
    strategic partner or regard the prospects for future peace as
    very likely. There's evidence that operation VRYAN continues.
    Operation VRYAN was the largest cold war intelligence program
    ever launched by Russia. It's an acronym that stands for
    ``surprise nuclear missile attack.'' Beginning in the early
    1980's, the political military elite told the KGB and the GRU
    and their other intelligence services to be on the lookout for
    the possibility that the United States might imminently launch
    a surprise nuclear attack. This was because of the strains and
    stresses that I described earlier, when they realized they were
    losing the cold war and they were fearful that the West might
    actually be moving to finish them off.
        So they started looking for evidence that the United States
    was preparing to launch a nuclear surprise attack. Every 2
    weeks a VRYAN report was sent to their top political-military
    leadership on the possibility that nuclear war was right around
    the corner. This program is known, begun in the early 1980's,
    is known to have continued at least into the 1990's, and
    there's evidence that it continues still.
        In connection with this--I will mention as an aside--that
    part of it was not just intelligence collection. There was also
    a computer program that was part of the VRYAN project because
    of the belief that they would be able to, by calculating the
    correlation of forces, the balance of military and economic and
    political power and looking at particular strategic warning
    indicators, use a very sophisticated computer program to
    predict when the United States might actually launch this
    nuclear attack. This was to inform the General staff so that
    they could beat us to the punch and strike us first.
        Most disturbingly, the American people and policymakers
    need to know most of all about the nuclear war scare crises of
    the 1980's and 1990's when on several occasions the Russian
    General staff mistakenly believed that the United States might
    be preparing to attack, and Russian nuclear forces were placed
    on alert in readiness to launch a first strike just in case.
    War scares occurred during ABLE ARCHER-83. This was a NATO
    theater nuclear exercise in November 1983; in May 1992, during
    the Armenian/Azerbaijan crisis; in October 1993 during the
    parliamentary crisis in Moscow that resulted in fighting in the
    streets in Moscow between Yeltsin forces and that of the
    national Communist parliament; during January 1995 in response
    to, of all things, the launch of a meteorological rocket by
    Norway; probably during Battle-Griffin in 1996 which was a NATO
    exercise held up near Norway; possibly during Central-Asian
    Battalion-97, a Partnership for Peace exercise held in the fall
    of 1997; and most recently, during Desert Fox in December 1999.
        Some of these--the Russian nuclear alerts in response to
    ABLE ARCHER 83 and the January 1995 event were more dangerous
    than the Cuban missile crisis, and yet remain unknown or
    virtually unknown to the American public and to policymakers. I
    will describe quickly just one of these events, the January
    1995 event.
        In this case Norway and NASA were jointly developing a
    meteorological rocket to study the aurora borealis. It was a
    missile of unusual size. Norway had never launched a missile of
    this size before. It was a multistage missile, launched from
    Andoya Island out in the Norwegian Sea. They sent their
    ballistic missile launch notification to the Russian foreign
    ministry just as they were supposed to, but due to a clerical
    error by an inexperienced staffer in the foreign ministry, the
    message never got to the Russian General staff and the
    Strategic Rocket Forces that the launch was going to occur.
        As a consequence, when the General staff picked up this
    missile being launched on their radars, initially they didn't
    realize that it was coming from Andoya Island which is located
    in the Norwegian Sea. Radars can't precisely geolocate a
    missile in the initial minutes it's launched, and it could have
    been coming from nearby ballistic missile patrol areas that our
    Trident Ohio-class submarines patrol. In their doctrine, this
    is one of the things they feared most in terms of a Western
    surprise nuclear attack; that a single missile would be
    launched from this location which has the shortest flight-time
    to Moscow so that an electromagnetic pulse attack could be
    done. This is an exoatmospheric nuclear detonation that creates
    a very powerful radio wave that would fry their electronics,
    their radars, their command and control so they couldn't
    retaliate. And then, just behind that, there would be this
    massive attack.
        The General staff took so seriously this threat that it
    actually activated all three chegets. These are the nuclear
    ``footballs'' that are carried by the Russian military-
    political leadership. Yeltsin, the defense minister, and the
    chief of the General staff. The chegets have only one purpose
    when they're activated. You're under a surprise nuclear attack:
    push the button to retaliate. That was basically the General's
    staff implicit advice when it activated the chegets.
    Fortunately for us, Boris Yeltsin was at the helm; and he
    didn't believe it. He couldn't believe the West was going to
    attack and waited, waited long enough to see that missile was
    actually going away from Russia and not toward it. But during
    that moment, it only lasted 20 minutes, but it was the single
    most dangerous moment of the nuclear missile age. And we were
    literally one decision away from a global thermonuclear
    conflict, one decision away. Boris Yeltsin was being asked to
    push the button, and that was January 1995, not that long ago.
        If we look at this question quantitatively, are we safer
    now? Are we safer now, now that the cold war is over? Let's
    just look at some of these numbers on these nuclear alerts.
    During the cold war, we averaged about one nuclear alert by the
    Soviet Union per decade. You know, the Cuban missile crisis in
    the sixties. There was the Berlin crisis before that in the
    fifties where there was a nuclear alert. Then the Cuban missile
    crisis. Then the 1973 Middle East war. All of those had nuclear
    alerts, about one per decade. Then in the 1980's, when they saw
    themselves starting to lose the cold war competition, there
    were two. In the 1990's, counting these lists that I rattled
    off, we have had the Russians engaging in a nuclear alert on
    average about once every 2 years to 18 months. Just looking at
    the numbers, the frequency of war scare incidents has actually
    increased in the post-cold war period.
        So why haven't people heard about these events and the
    facts of Russia's ongoing preparation for war? Knowing these
    things is at least as important in evaluating the true state of
    United States-Russian relations, as knowing that Russia does
    occasionally hold something like free elections. In fairness,
    some of the information I have been describing here hasn't been
    all that available to the public and the media. My book draws
    on recently declassified National Intelligence Estimates and
    materials that are still Top Secret in Russia and that have
    been provided to us by various sources, including by several
    heroic defectors who must now live under witness protection
    programs because they are under threat of death from their
    security services that they used to work for.
        Also, and this is primarily the main reason people are
    unaware of these things: we in the West tend to be strategic
    optimists, and we don't want to hear bad news about Russia.
    Some of these things actually did make the newspapers and
    blurbs back on page 24, but they didn't fit into the overall
    paradigm we've had from the administration of improving
    relations with Russia. And so people don't know what to do with
    the data; it gets filed away; it gets forgotten.
        The administration, for its part, has played a role in this
    because it's, of course, eager to encourage our optimism about
    our relations with Russia. It doesn't want to be blamed for
    losing Russia, especially in an election year.
        Nonetheless, Russia's public statements, behavior and the
    copious unclassified writings from the Russian General staff
    and security elite have provided enough evidence of their ``war
    scare'' mentality that we in the West shouldn't now be
    surprised to discover that Russia regards the United States as
    an evil empire. Indeed, given Russia's bloody history of
    victimization at the hands of numerous invaders, including as
    recently as World War II which killed 30 million Russians, it
    is entirely logical and predictable that Moscow would now feel
    threatened. If not a tendency toward paranoia, there's also a
    certain logical inevitability that Moscow would now think it
    entirely plausible that there could be a nuclear war with the
    United States.
        Let us try to stand for a minute in the Russian General
    staff's shoes and do an experiment of the imagination. Let's
    try to see things from Moscow's point of view. Suppose history
    worked out differently and we had lost the cold war competition
    because capitalism turned out to be an inefficient way of
    organizing your economy and society and that communism was
    really the way to go and that that provided for a productive
    economy and society. Suppose as a consequence of the failures
    of capitalism our economy and the Western economy was a
    disaster so that we could no longer provide food and housing
    for our people and that this drew out internal strains in our
    society that were so severe that our country actually
    fragmented geographically, so that the southern confederate
    States broke away and we lost them, and lost states in the
    West, as happened with the Soviet Union and is now threatening
    to happen with Russia. Suppose that the economy is so bad that
    we couldn't even sustain our general purpose forces anymore.
    The Army and Navy and Marines are all neglected and rusting
    away, and the only thing left to us are our nuclear forces.
    That's the only thing left that works.
        Suppose further that our former allies and NATO basically
    want to join the winning side and the NATO alliance
    disintegrates, just as the Warsaw Pact disintegrated and former
    NATO member states, Britain, Italy, Germany, the Benelux
    countries are clamoring to join the Warsaw Pact, and the Soviet
    Union, strong and robust, decides to bring them in and that
    next year Germany and Britain and Italy are going to join the
    Warsaw Pact and so will Canada. So we will now have the Warsaw
    Pact pressing against our northern border. Suppose in
    preparation for joining the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union with
    its new allies decides to conduct major military exercises off
    our Atlantic and Pacific coasts, drops paratroopers opposite
    Minot Air Force Base, not a threat to us mind you, just to
    demonstrate that these guys are ready to join NATO. It's a part
    of the Partnership for Peace, and to show they are ready to
    join the Warsaw Pact.
        Suppose they--the Soviet Union--announces that it is
    establishing a new world order and is leading these new allies,
    leads multinational coalitions to set things straight on
    peacekeeping operations to Nicaragua to empower the
    Sandinistas, and to Mexico because they disapprove of Mexican
    policies, and after demonstrating high-tech conventional
    weapons that we are decades away from being able to copy they
    approach within a few hundred kilometers of the Texas border
    and then withdraw.
        Even if they were giving us a billion rubles a year to help
    our economy out and even if they called us strategic partners,
    would we feel safe? I think not. I think that we would be
    terrified and that we would be thinking--we would be very
    concerned about these exercises and peacekeeping operations,
    and we would think that--we would be very fearful of the
    possibility that the Soviet Union might want to finally finish
    the cold war, bring it to a complete conclusion by eliminating
    the United States so that we could never possibly threaten
    their attempt to completely dominate the global order and
    establish a new order. I think that our fingers would hover
    near the nuclear button every time there was a big exercise or
    big peacekeeping operation because we would be wondering, is
    this it? Are they really going to come after us this time,
    under the guise of peacekeeping operation or exercise?
        And, indeed, we can see that in our own history there was a
    time when our fingers hovered near the button. During the
    Eisenhower administration, when the Red Army stood poised to
    roll over Western Europe and we could not match the Red Army in
    terms of general purpose forces, we relied very heavily on our
    nuclear forces and planned, in fact, for a nuclear first strike
    against Russia to cope with their conventional superiority. And
    this from a society that's a democratic society and a society
    of strategic optimists. How much more worried would you be if
    you were the Russian General staff, the product of a ferocious
    totalitarian order and of a very bloody, unpeaceful history?
        Well, I have described the problem. So what should we do?
    First, we should keep our nuclear deterrent strong, nor should
    we hesitate to acquire defenses to protect ourselves from
    missiles. U.S. military strength is probably what deterred the
    General staff and prevented the war scares of the past from
    becoming actual nuclear wars. But we should redouble efforts to
    prove that we are not a threat through exchange programs with
    the Congress and Russian Duma, as Congressman Weldon is doing,
    through military officers and students. We should continue to
    provide economic aid. Maybe we should increase our economic aid
    but change the way we're doing it, not the way the
    administration has been doing it. Try to provide aid that
    directly reaches the grassroots, the Russian people themselves,
    not giving billions to the Russian elite and the former
    nomenklatura who then deposit it into Swiss bank accounts.
        But most of all, we should be aware that Russia is a threat
    and is still a nuclear super power, the only Nation on Earth
    that can end Western civilization in 30 minutes. This all-
    important fact should form all of our decisions on NATO
    expansion, on peacekeeping, on whether or not we conduct
    various kinds of exercises. I do not say that we should not
    expand NATO or engage in peacekeeping, but let us stop
    pretending that these are virtually risk-free activities. A
    good case can be made for NATO expansion and peacekeeping, but
    let us do so with our eyes open to the very real risks so that
    we may intelligently weigh the risks and benefits to the
    American people in foreign and defense policy decisions that
    affect our relations with Russia.
        This concludes my substantive remarks, and gentlemen, I
    thank you for allowing me here today to speak.
        Mr. Burton. Thank you, Dr. Pry.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Pry follows:]

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        Mr. Burton. Dr. Green.
        Mr. Green. Mr. Chairman, I appear before you with a certain
    disadvantage. As a college professor, I'm used to speaking in
    90 minute blocks but in the interest----
        Mr. Burton. Ninety minutes is too long.
        Mr. Green. Yes, sir, but in the interest of leaving as much
    time as possible for questions, I'll try to be terse.
        I welcome the opportunity to testify before this committee
    on the potential security threats presented by the Russian
    Federation's nuclear weapons policy. My generation was born and
    grew up under the Soviet nuclear threat. The end of the cold
    war and the emergence of a democratic system in Russia filled
    me, as it did most of the world, with jubilation, and it
    wasn't--and the big reason for this is because the threat of
    nuclear war between the super powers seemed to have faded away,
    and so I've been watching the slow erosion of Russia's young
    democracy and the rebirth of tensions between Russia and the
    United States with deep concern.
        Now, a number of recent developments have come together to
    bring this concern into the public eye. Some Americans have
    taken note that Russian words and actions are much more
    belligerent in the wake of NATO's decision last spring to
    conduct its first out of area operation to prevent Serbian
    ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. This new concern about Russia was
    reinforced last month when then President Boris Yeltsin
    publicly reminded President Clinton that Russia remains a
    nuclear power. Most recently, just 10 days ago and within 2
    weeks of taking office, Russian Acting-President Vladimir Putin
    has issued a revised national security concept that not only
    identifies the United States as a serious threat to Russia's
    security but appears to lower the nuclear threshold in dealing
    with threats from the United States.
        This national security concept is a revised version of a
    previous issue that came out in December 1997 of the national
    security concept. Both are policy statements or frameworks
    meant to integrate the most important state initiatives of the
    Russian Federation. Russia views its national security, and I
    put that in quotes, much more broadly than does the United
    States for these two 20 page, 20 plus page reports include
    threats to any aspect of life and security, and I am quoting
    there as well, in defining the term. They summarize not only
    foreign and defense issues but also matters that we would view
    as pertaining to our domestic policy, including the economic
    well-being of the Nation, crime and corruption, ecological
    hazards and even, I quote again, the adverse impact of foreign
    religious organizations and missionaries.
        One question that should be dismissed immediately is
    whether this changes the personal initiative of Vladimir Putin,
    acting Russian President and current front runner in the March
    Presidential campaign. He is in many ways an unattractive
    character given his KGB background and his austere, even his
    harsh personality. Although Putin's tactic of tying renewed war
    in Chechnya to his drive for national leadership has attracted
    much criticism abroad, at home it may very well be the factor
    that propels him into the Presidency. So, therefore, there's a
    natural tendency to see this new national security concept as
    Putin's attempt to put his mark on security policy in the brief
    run up to the next election, plain politics. Indeed, I have
    read one analytic report that labels this flat out the Putin
    doctrine.
        It's also a natural view, I'm afraid, for those who may be
    more willing to blame worsening United States-Russian relations
    on Russia's adventuristic new President rather than on more
    long-term developments for which the United States Government
    is at least partially responsible. In fact, there's been a
    lengthy buildup to this particular formulation of Russia's
    interest in strategies, and undoubtedly it will continue to be
    revised and modified.
        The national security concept was published in draft last
    October; and since, they have only made minor changes in
    wording in the final draft. At the same time, they published a
    new draft military doctrine that shares all the same
    assumptions about the West and about Russia's security
    position. For the past year, most of these issues have been
    discussed very openly by Russian military and political
    figures. Russian and international press reports indicates that
    the nuclear weapons provisions of the new national security
    concept were adopted by Russia's security council as far back
    as the end of April.
        Moreover, you can draw a steady and long-standing departure
    between the rhetoric of our post-communism, post-cold war
    American and Russian strategic partnership and the actual state
    of relations as defined in many key official Russian documents.
    This departure begins as early as 1992 when Russia came out
    with its foreign policy concept, and it goes to the 1993
    version of its military doctrine and so on to the 1997 National
    Security Council and now the document that we've had placed
    before us.
        I think that it's particularly important to compare the
    1997 and the January 2000 drafts of Russia's National Security
    Council. They are similar in structure, but their differences
    are an important indicator of recent movement in the Russian
    consensus over international and strategic policy. A difference
    that has attracted much attention, of course, are the new
    version's much looser terms for describing the conditions under
    which nuclear weapons might be used.
        In 1997, the national security concept stated, and I quote,
    the most important mission of Russian Federation's Armed Forces
    is to support nuclear deterrence. The version released earlier
    this month states the Russian Federation should possess nuclear
    forces capable of guaranteeing the infliction of the desired
    extent of damage against any aggressor state or coalition of
    states in any conditions and circumstances. It goes on to state
    that the Russian Federation will consider the use of all
    available forces and assets, including nuclear, in the event of
    need to repulse armed aggression if all other measures of
    resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted and have
    proved ineffective. No indication of deterring nuclear attacks.
    This is they've tried their conventional forces; they don't
    work; so they're using nuclear weapons.
        Mr. Chairman, I don't believe this change of wording
    signals an immediate shift in Russia to planning for preemptive
    or offensive use of nuclear weapons, but I think that we should
    draw two maybe less apocalyptic but still very disturbing
    conclusions. I think, first of all, that Russia is warning this
    country that while they may be weaker than we are, they're
    willing to play by much rougher rules. Russia is willing to
    both take and inflict greater losses should a confrontation
    turn into an armed conflict.
        And Russia has nuclear weapons. In future disputes with
    Russia, our growing awareness of this threat may very well
    dissuade us from taking forceful action. And I think we do have
    to take it seriously.
        Second, this lowering of the nuclear threshold should be
    viewed in conjunction with an even more important shift in the
    national security concept, one that a colleague of mine says
    essentially repudiates the 1997 draft. This is a dramatic shift
    in the focus and emphasis of the principal threats to Russia.
    The current version identifies the United States and NATO in
    strong terms as hostile to Russia and to the international
    order. The term ``strategic partnership'' that the 1997 version
    used to characterize Russia's relations with us and with the
    other Western nations has disappeared. Instead, the new version
    describes, ``the developed Western nations under U.S.
    leadership as attempting to circumvent the fundamental rules of
    international law to dominate the world by unilateral means
    including military force.''
        It alarms me to note that Russian military and political
    leaders now use the term ``strategic partnership'' not to
    describe us, but to describe their relationship with China;
    that Russia is selling some of its most advanced weapons
    technology to China; and that the high-level visits and
    exchanges between Russia and China appear to be on the
    increase. Our relations with both these nations individually
    are at a low point. We can ill afford to have the two
    coordinate their efforts in an anti-U.S. coalition of sorts.
        I don't blame the current administration for the worsened
    state of United States-Russian relations that I described. And
    in fact, given the unrealistic expectations that we had in the
    early 1990's, I think that seeing them deteriorate was almost
    inevitable. Both nations were almost certain to take actions
    the other would find objectionable.
        Just to begin with, Americans working in Russia, Americans
    working with Russians abroad are always expressing their
    frustration with the degree to which Russian institutions and
    Russians individually have been damaged by the Communist
    experience. Leaders, organizations and even the national mind
    set often seem tainted by the distorted views and values that
    the Communist party took pains to inculcate. Decades may pass
    before the trauma of those years fades from the Russian
    consciousness.
        By the same token the realities of the post cold war world
    are such that no United States Government, regardless of party
    or administration, would have been able to avoid triggering
    Russian suspicions and hostilities.
        I do hold the current administration responsible for what I
    regard as unrealistic and even reckless behavior in the face of
    this worsening relationship. To begin with, the United States
    Government should have been able to predict worsening ties, or
    if not, to track them as Russian antagonism began to grow.
    Instead, we have gotten a relentless stream of optimistic
    pronouncements and interpretations from administration
    spokespersons even as the heat of Russian anger and rhetoric
    aimed at us has risen.
        Closely tied to this Pollyanna-ish approach is the
    administration's failure to establish significant ties with
    Russian political and social leaders outside of a narrow circle
    of so-called reformers surrounding the Yeltsin Presidency.
    While the United States' Government praised their commitment to
    democracy and the free market system, these individuals led
    Russia through a corrupt privatization program that has
    impoverished many Russians and discredited the very concept of
    democracy. Indeed, much Russian popular bitterness at the
    United States comes from its unconditional backing of a
    leadership associated with crime and corrupt rule.
        Second, the administration has pursued a number of
    initiatives that have alienated Russians regardless of their
    political orientation. These include the expansion of NATO,
    recent support for research on ballistic missile defense, its
    policy of double containment against Iraq and Iran, the
    development of close ties with the former Soviet oil producing
    nations in the Caspian region, and most recently participation
    in NATO's air war against Yugoslavia over Kosovo.
        I want to emphasize I'm not opposing these initiatives on
    their own merits; in fact, many of them I support
    enthusiastically. But it is unrealistic to expect Russia to
    remain passive in the face of United States policies that touch
    its interests so closely. Russian opposition should have been
    taken for granted. The possibility should have been entertained
    that Russia would interpret them taken together as evidence of
    a grand strategy aimed against it.
        The new national security concept identifies one of the,

        Fundamental threats in the international sphere as attempts
    by other states to oppose a strengthening of Russia as one of
    the influential centers of the multipolar world, to hinder the
    exercise of its national interest, and to weaken its position
    in Europe, the Middle East, Transcaucasia, Central Asia and the
    Asia Pacific region.

        Finally, I want to express my dismay that current United
    States foreign and military policies seem built on the
    assumption that good relations with Russia can be taken for
    granted. If I'm correct in this interpretation, it is an
    assumption built upon sand. We cannot get U.N. Security Council
    approval for the numerous overseas interventions and
    peacekeeping missions current policy seems to regard as
    essential if Russia vetoes them. We cannot project our values
    and influence into regions they have never known, such as the
    Balkans and Central Asia, if Russia stands ready to combine
    with regional tyrannies to keep us out. And we cannot depend on
    our shrunken peacetime military and naval forces to defend our
    interests abroad if, as a generation ago, a nuclear-armed
    Russia adversary backs radical regimes when they find
    themselves in confrontation with the United States.
        Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I stand
    ready to respond to any questions the committee might raise,
    following adjournment of this hearing to augment the issues we
    have discussed here with additional materials.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Green follows:]

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        Mr. Burton. Thank you, Doctor. Let me say for the record
    that Dr. Pry is a member of the Armed Services Committee staff
    and that he represents the majority on that staff. And I want
    to make sure that's clear so that people know that he may,
    according to some members and some people, have a bias toward a
    different position. I don't believe that to be the case, but I
    wanted to make sure that that was stated for the record.
        Mr. Weldon. Represents both sides.
        Mr. Burton. Excuse me. Oh, he represents both sides on the
    Armed Services Committee. So forgive me, Dr. Pry. Appreciate
    that.
        Let me just start the questioning. And I don't think I'll
    question too long because I want to make sure my colleagues
    have plenty of time.
        Mr. Lunev, there's a lot of people that are going to be
    skeptical about what you have said. You were a member of the
    GRU. You were the highest ranking official of the intelligence
    community in the Soviet Union to defect. Would you elaborate
    briefly and tell us why you believe that there is a continued
    threat and why you believe that there are weapons of one type
    or another and communications equipment of one type or another
    that are buried here in the United States for possible use in
    the future and why you and others believe that they have
    created dossiers on American officials, government officials,
    in the event that there's some kind of a potential conflict
    that they can target for assassination.
        Mr. Lunev. Mr. Chairman, Dr. Pry actually make very good
    account of last development connected with Russian military and
    Russian military preparations. Including myself, I can spend
    very short, very small time I think especially to explain that,
    unfortunately, in time when America and American people spent
    huge amount of money trying to assist Russia in transition,
    transaction to free market economy and to the real democracy,
    unfortunately nothing happened in Russia. And American people,
    which spent so big money, of course, have all rights to expect
    something in return back from Russia. But it's not going point
    of view of Russian Government. Because Russian Government which
    actually totally destroyed Russian economy--and you know how
    Russian people ordinary people just now living in Russian
    federation--in this situation Russian Government using very old
    traditional or history methods and trying to explain to Russian
    people that Russian people are living so bad not because of its
    own corrupted government but because of foreign enemy.
        And Peter Pry and Dr. Green, they provided us real views of
    Russian leaders just now who are in charge of Russia who openly
    talking, speaking to Russian people that this situation with
    Russia is so bad because of America, because of America which
    already destroyed former Soviet Union, destroy Yugoslavia,
    occupied Kosovo, just now America which tried to destabilize
    the region in northern Caucasus especially, to establish
    control over this strategically important area, this America
    which like to destroy mother Russia itself.
        And in this situation, they built up Russian military
    machine not to nowhere but especially against the United States
    and American friends and allies worldwide. You know what's
    going on just now in Chechnya. It's very small area. It's
    actually--I don't know how to compare it, but maybe it's only
    fifth spot of California State. But these people, Chechnyan
    people who fighting for independence from Russia more than 200
    years just now fighting against the same Russian domination
    which was historically in this area. And Russian Government
    using Chechnyan area, area of Chechnyans living like some kind
    of test field for future war, for real war. Because they using
    huge number of Russian military personnel for combat training.
    They using new weapons system which are in stage of design
    only. First time, if I understand rightly, it was first time in
    history when Russian military few weeks ago used bombs against
    Chechnyan militants.
        And in this situation when Russian Government, which
    actually just now are considering only one strategic partner in
    the world, it's not America, but China, Russian Government,
    which continues its military buildup and development of Russian
    military machine, they do not change their mind. And they still
    consider United States like main potential military adversity.
        Mr. Burton. Let me interrupt you. I guess I didn't make my
    point quite clear. Why should Americans be concerned about the
    book and the statements that have been made that there are--
    there's a strong possibility that there are sites across the
    United States and North America where military equipment and
    communications equipment, and telecommunications equipment
    might be buried and also the possibility that there might be
    some nuclear weapons buried? Why should Americans be concerned
    about that? I mean, could you and the others that we've quoted
    here today be incorrect?
        Mr. Lunev. American people need to be concerned about this
    location because this weapon system which storage in this
    country could be used by Russian special operation forces
    commanders against American people in time when Russian
    Government will order them for action. This is very big danger.
        Mr. Burton. I don't want to belabor the point, but there
    will be people who will say this is all bologna, that it's not
    factual even though several Russian leaders have said that
    these things have occurred or could occur. How would you answer
    them?
        Mr. Lunev. I would like to answer to people who is really
    concerned about national security of this country that location
    of this weapon system of foreign region in the territory of
    independent country like United States of America, it's
    violation, violation of American rights, traditions and
    sovereignty. And it's direct danger to the national security of
    this country.
        Mr. Burton. But you believe that that really occurs?
        Mr. Lunev. I believe, yes.
        Dr. Pry. Could I offer a short answer to that question,
    sir, could I have the temerity?
        Mr. Burton. Sure.
        Dr. Pry. Caches have been found in Europe. That is a fact.
    It is a fact. They have been found in Belgium and Switzerland.
    So we know the caches are real. It would be--we are a Nation of
    strategic optimists; but it's a real stretch, it seems to me,
    to think that when their doctrine calls for putting these
    caches in NATO and the United States, and then we find caches
    in NATO, that we then conclude that well, they wouldn't have
    done it in the United States.
        I think the burden of proof at this point is on those who
    want to argue that we don't have to worry about these caches to
    answer that argument. Why should they be in NATO and not the
    United States?
        Mr. Burton. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Scarborough.
        Mr. Scarborough. I wanted to ask a question about the new
    administration. You know, we've heard often that in the post-
    cold war era how nuclear weapons were not controlled, how some
    had been smuggled or lost or sold to rogue states. And I want
    to ask you all obviously when we had the Yeltsin administration
    many considered the administration to be weak, corrupt, and had
    devolved power where somebody said Russian Mafia has as much
    control as any other institutions there, let me ask you about
    the new administration. Even though Putin is more nationalistic
    and more militaristic and more hostile to the West, do you all
    believe that there may be a silver lining in that he may gain
    more control over nuclear weapons? Because obviously if on one
    side we've been seeing military and political and economic
    anarchy in Russia over the past 8 or 9 years, if he is a
    stronger leader, is there a chance to believe that maybe some
    of the nuclear proliferation, at least on the black market, may
    be brought under control?
        Because right now how many weapons--85 of these suitcases
    can't even be accounted for. I know that's sort of throwing a
    curve ball, but many Americans have said for some time that one
    of the most dangerous things with the Russian Government is
    that they don't have control over nuclear weapons because
    they're so weak.
        Any taker's on that?
        Dr. Pry. I'll--go on.
        Mr. Green. There's, I think, a widespread impression that
    authoritarian or totalitarian governments are in control from
    top to bottom. But experience shows that even a government that
    can be very forceful and very brutal in keeping its population
    down can suffer from massive corruption and turmoil. It's not
    so much that it doesn't exist as that the press is unable to
    report about it. There is no freedom to talk about it. I don't
    think that the sort of opportunities for proliferation you've
    been discussing would go away if Russia went back under an
    authoritarian form of government.
        Mr. Scarborough. How would you compare it, though? The lack
    of control over nuclear weapons under the Soviet Union, the
    80--listen, I'm not here preaching the joys of communism or
    totalitarianism, I'm just asking a question. How would you
    compare, though, the control of nuclear weapons by the Soviet
    Union in the 1970's and 1980's compared to the 1990's?
        Mr. Green. Well, in the Soviet period, control of nuclear
    weapons was part of a very rigid control of all of society.
    That has broken down. Even if it were reassembled, the horse is
    already out of the door. We've had 10 to 15 years of a very
    high level of disorder in Russia. And if there has been
    significant leakage of nuclear terms or weapons out of Russia,
    merely re-establishing authoritarian controls isn't going to
    bring them back.
        Mr. Scarborough. Colonel.
        Mr. Lunev. I absolutely agree with Dr. Green that in time
    of former Soviet Union existence it was very strong control
    over nuclear materials and weapons systems, but after the USSR
    disintegration, control became weaker; but nonproliferation
    question is not connected with this protection of nuclear
    materials and weapons because all proliferation and nuclear
    technology is delivery to rogue countries made under direct
    permission from Russian government of Boris Yeltsin.
        But you ask very excellent question because what could be
    happened in future in time when administration and Russian
    Government actually was changed. And Mr. Putin just now Acting
    President and leading candidate for Russian federation next
    President, he doesn't have nothing, absolutely in his back,
    exclude only war in Chechnya. And he depends from Russian
    military much more than Yeltsin depend from his military
    machine. At the same time, Mr. Putin depends from Russian
    security services much more than Yeltsin who in his past had a
    lot of problem with KGB and he hated KGB to the last days when
    he was in power.
        So if Mr. Putin who just now promising reforms to
    reformers, pensions to pensioners, high salary to military
    personnel, security services, and if this person who open,
    actually open and just now carrying on war against his own
    people in Northern Caucasus would become next Russian
    President, it would be much more stronger person than
    internationally and domestically. He is young. He's not drunk.
    He is not out of his mind. And of course he would like maybe to
    do something for Russian people, maybe to do something for
    reforms which never occur in Russia. Maybe he will do something
    for Russian people. But internationally he would be much more
    militant and much more aggressive than his predecessor.
        And in time, of course, when he would be in charge of
    Russian military machine as a commander in chief of Russian
    federation military, of course he will use all his power
    including huge nuclear arsenal to press foreign countries,
    especially for his own gains and benefits.
        Mr. Scarborough. And I think, by the way, you've just
    helped him define his campaign slogan: I'm not drunk. I'm not
    crazy. As you said of his predecessor.
        Dr. Pry, could you just conclude on this same question.
    Because, again, it seems to me if he's going to have an iron
    fist and if he's going to do a lot of things that Americans
    might be repulsed by even if he's more militaristic and
    aggressive against the West, is there a possibility that this
    might bring some stability at home in Russia over control of
    nuclear weapons that have not been controlled over the past 8
    years?
        Dr. Pry. Yeah. You see the question presumes that the
    reason we have proliferation of missile technology and weapons
    of mass destruction technology from Russia is because of a lack
    of central control, and that this is being done by the Russian
    Mafia criminal elements and independent enterprisers. This is
    the majority view in the West. But I submit this is a case of
    our strategic optimism. If you look at many of the specific
    examples of proliferation that have occurred, they are a matter
    of deliberate government policy. They are not being done by the
    Mafia. It is not the Mafia that is building a nuclear reactor
    for Iran. It is not the Mafia that helped them develop the----
        Mr. Scarborough. If I can interrupt here. And I want you to
    get into that briefly; but, again, there's a big difference
    between purposely selling nuclear technology to Iran and other
    rogue states and not knowing where 84 nuclear devices are. I
    mean, I certainly understand he may want to sell to Syria, he
    may want to sell to Iran, he may want to sell to other rogue
    states. That's very different, though, than losing 84 nuclear
    devices, is it not?
        Dr. Pry. Sure. General Lebed could not account for the 84
    nuclear devices. That does not mean that the GRU does not know
    where they are.
        Mr. Scarborough. Right.
        Dr. Pry. That was part of Mr. Lunev's testimony that maybe
    they're here and part of the government doesn't want to tell
    another part of the government. But I guess here you could say,
    well, if he has an iron hand, is more Stalin-like, maybe he
    could get these guys to tell the General Lebeds where they are.
    And that's possible. I don't deny that there could be some--I
    think the benefits would be marginal in terms of the tradeoff,
    in terms of getting control. Because frankly when I think--when
    you get down to specifics about cases of proliferation and you
    look at all the cases of proliferation, one is hard pressed to
    actually come up with a hard example of where the Russian Mafia
    really proliferated anything. Those accelerometers and
    gyroscopes, over 100 of them, hard to believe that organized
    crime could manage that, you know. It looks like this was in
    collusion.
        Also, organized crime and the government are often one in
    the same. Defense Minister Grachev was a major boss of an
    organized crime family in Russia according to research done by
    many Russian journalists. I think the bottom line is you have a
    more authoritarian or totalitarian government that is even more
    hostile to the West than the past government was, it will
    provide even more of an incentive for these guys to want to
    strengthen our adversaries in the world by arming them with
    weapons of mass destruction and highly effective conventional
    weapons to cause as much trouble for the United States as they
    can. That is going to by far outweigh the increased police
    actions that you might get, you know, from having an
    authoritarian government. I believe it will be a net loss for
    us in security.
        Mr. Burton. Mr. Lunev, did you want to respond to that?
        Mr. Lunev. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Only few years
    according to these devices, looks like yes. Because these
    devices are designed for a special operation forces commanders
    and actually time when design of this weapon system was in
    place, it was only GRU which handle special operation forces
    commanders which need to operate worldwide.
        And, according General Lebed's statements that some of
    these devices are not located in Russia, later he made one more
    statement because there were a lot of questions, is it possible
    that these devices could find way in the hands of international
    terrorists or other countries or countries without nuclear
    weapons. And General Lebed said openly that according checking
    process he made trying to find these devices he found that
    these nuclear weapons systems are in right hands. So GRU----
        Mr. Scarborough. In right hands.
        Mr. Lunev. In right hands, not in wrong hands.
        Mr. Burton. If the gentleman will yield. What he was saying
    then is that the government did have control of those some
    place, but he was not telling where they were.
        Mr. Lunev. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Scarborough. Thanks.
        Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Scarborough.
        Mr. Weldon.
        Mr. Weldon. Mr. Lunev, I have known you for some time, but
    I think for the purpose of the media here we should go through
    exactly who you are and what you were doing. You are currently
    in a witness protection program in this country administered by
    two of our intelligence agencies; is that correct? The CIA and
    the FBI.
        Mr. Lunev. It's interagency.
        Mr. Weldon. So Stanislav Lunev is not your correct name.
        Mr. Lunev. It's my original name.
        Mr. Weldon. Mr. Lunev, when you were active in the GRU,
    which is the intelligence arm of the Soviet military, you were
    stationed for a while in the Soviet Embassy in Washington; is
    that correct?
        Mr. Lunev. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Weldon. When you were stationed at the Soviet Embassy
    in Washington, was your cover that of being a TASS
    correspondent?
        Mr. Lunev. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Weldon. And so people who came across you in Washington
    really thought you were working for the Soviet media; is that
    correct?
        Mr. Lunev. Of course.
        Mr. Weldon. But what were your real assignments? What kinds
    of things were you expected to do while you were working there
    supposedly as a TASS correspondent? What kinds of things did
    the GRU expect you to accomplish?
        Mr. Lunev. Let's say that the journalist cover is very good
    for intelligence officers because the same targets to penetrate
    through secrets to open secrets and publish something about
    this. So it was very good for my intelligence job. And in time
    of my operational business in Washington, DC, area, I was
    assigned for special tasking to penetrate through American
    national security system and recruit people with access to the
    secrets of American national security.
        Mr. Weldon. Were you also asked to locate sites where
    caches of weapons could be deposited in our country?
        Mr. Lunev. Yes, sir, but it was some kind of support job I
    made for my field office additionally to my major targets. And
    in time of this support job, I spend many, many hours, many
    hundreds of hours run around big Washington, DC, area trying to
    find places for--we named them dead drops. Dead drops. Dead
    drops which could be used for storage of money, documents,
    microfilms, weapons systems, different types of weapons
    systems, and report about our dead drops proposal to Moscow.
        Mr. Weldon. How many such locations do you think that you
    uncovered while you were on station in Washington
    approximately?
        Mr. Lunev. It's very easy to say because I stay in
    Washington, DC, about 3\1/2\ years. And every 6 months I need
    to find one, two places for different size dead drops. To keep
    in mind the GRU field office in Washington, DC, it's about 40
    person. There's hundreds going every 6 months.
        Mr. Weldon. So hundreds of sites were identified.
        Mr. Lunev. Yes.
        Mr. Weldon. Were there other GRU agents in other offices
    throughout the United States that were doing the same thing?
        Mr. Lunev. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Weldon. So how many----
        Mr. Lunev. And some of them much more were involved in this
    kind of job because they didn't have so hard targets as I had.
        Mr. Weldon. So how many sites do you think were identified
    overall during the course of, say, a year nationwide in
    America?
        Mr. Lunev. Thousands.
        Mr. Weldon. Thousands.
        Mr. Lunev. Thousands. It's only in big Washington, DC,
    operational area, in New York, San Francisco, where we had
    field offices were located, but in every trip outside of this
    area, you know it was 25-mile zone.
        Mr. Weldon. Right. Right.
        Mr. Lunev. Everybody was assigned especially to find some
    places of dead drop and sent description of this location to
    Moscow after return back to Washington.
        Mr. Weldon. And what was your understanding of the kinds of
    drops that would occur there? Was it just communications and
    telemetry equipment, money and small arms, or was there the
    possibility of weapons of mass destruction?
        Mr. Lunev. Sir, from this business nobody from intelligence
    offices in the field doesn't know how this place like they
    found the dead drop would be used. And all the description is
    going to Moscow. And Moscow headquarter deciding how to use
    concrete dead drop position.
        Mr. Weldon. Did you ever have any indication of the
    possibility of a weapon of mass destruction being brought to
    the United States?
        Mr. Lunev. Sir, in time when I had my instructions before
    operational tour to Washington, DC, like the same that was
    before I fly to China, I had very clear instruction. These dead
    drop positions need to be found for all types of weapons
    including nuclear weapons.
        Mr. Weldon. Mr. Lunev, how many sites do you think there
    are today in the United States where caches of weapons and
    military material are still buried? Just an approximate.
        Mr. Lunev. I think hundreds.
        Mr. Weldon. Hundreds.
        Mr. Lunev. Hundreds, yes.
        Mr. Weldon. Are you confident that even though Mitrokhin
    didn't copy down every exact location, that in the KGB files
    those sites are in fact documented down to the exact location?
        Mr. Lunev. I think that much more real information could be
    found in the GRU headquarter, not so much KGB. Because KGB
    traditionally they were active in Europe. It's very close
    countries. But GRU as a strategic intelligence agency was much
    more active if the United States.
        Mr. Weldon. Good point. I agree with you. I think you're
    probably correct. It probably needs to be as to the GRU.
        So therefore is it your assessment as someone who was a
    senior expert and was involved in these kinds of activities
    that there are people in America who are at risk today because
    of the possibility of what happened in Switzerland happening
    throughout the United States in perhaps public park lands or in
    open space that may have been the site where these materials
    were located?
        Mr. Lunev. I hope that it's never happened, but I cannot
    exclude.
        Mr. Weldon. Do you think it's true that we have sites such
    as Switzerland where there are booby-trapped devices that could
    harm American people, do you think that in fact is a very real
    possibility in America today?
        Mr. Lunev. Yes, sir. And I need to tell a few words
    additionally. Because please keep in mind that the United
    States intelligence and counterintelligence services are best
    in the world. And the people who planned the same operation in
    Switzerland and the United States, they keep in mind difference
    in intelligence and counterintelligence services. And, of
    course, everything which was done in the United States was done
    many, many, many times much more carefully and safety for its
    participants than it was done in European countries.
        Mr. Weldon. Thank you.
        Mr. Burton. Mr. Campbell.
        Mr. Campbell. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        Mr. Lunev, describe please for me the kind of boobytrap
    that might be connected with one of these dead drops or weapons
    caches or communications caches.
        Mr. Lunev. What does this mean, ``boobytrap''?
        Mr. Campbell. Boobytrap is a device that would explode if
    somebody who happened upon this by accident or happened upon
    this by counterintelligence without having information or key
    or a key to defuse it.
        Mr. Lunev. Yes, sir, I understand. I understand your
    question. The devices which would explode this weapons system
    if somebody from strangers will try to open it to approach,
    usually use in combat area in time of warfare, but connected
    with the same devices like portable technical nuclear briefcase
    or containers with chemical and biological weapons using
    different types of devices, so-called self-liquidation devices.
    And if somebody would like to approach this device, it will be
    self-liquidation, first of all. But I cannot exclude
    possibility that for more than 100 percent guarantee second
    level of security would be the same devices for the explosion.
        Mr. Campbell. In the example given in the book to which
    reference has been made from the Mitrokhin files, we have a
    boobytrapped device in Switzerland which was used to protect
    communications devices apparently. My question is whether this
    would be typical of the kind of protection that you would have
    placed around a communications cache, a communications dead
    drop in the United States.
        Mr. Lunev. Yes, sir, it's typical. It's typical and in the
    traditions.
        Mr. Campbell. And if you have an estimate, I would like to
    know it whether this was true for all dead drops and locations
    of this nature or some. And if only some, what was the
    distinction.
        Mr. Lunev. Thank you, sir. No. It's very big difference
    because for dead drops, for communication with agents, for
    exchange of microfilms, information, money, to provide them
    communication devices, it's--I think it's only in few cases
    they could be equipped by this special destruction devices. But
    in general, when you have agent with elementary school
    education to explain him how to switch off this explosion
    device, it's impossible. But for dead drops which could be used
    by special operation forces commanders, yes, it is necessary.
        Mr. Campbell. And those would include dead drops that you
    are aware of within the United States.
        Mr. Lunev. This is dead drops for the future war. It means
    places where weapons system could be storage, communication
    devices not for peace time, not for spy games, but for war time
    and all reserves which would be necessary to command this for
    the war time.
        Mr. Campbell. You mentioned San Francisco field office of
    the GRU. Are you aware of any locations of devices,
    communications, or weapons that would have been the
    responsibility of GRU agents working out of the San Francisco
    office?
        Mr. Lunev. Sure. I didn't have time to tell you all story
    about this. But it's not only GRU operational offices who are
    working in this country under civilian cover or in military
    uniform are involved in this business. Because they, yes, they
    are responsible for finding dead drops and the operations
    according dead drops. But please keep in mind that a lot of GRU
    offices are coming here like businessmen, like students,
    teachers, most popular computer specialists, and all other
    cover they can use. And they will do one of the major part of
    their job is to find these dead drop positions. Plus illegals
    in this country, there is a lot of illegals, not only for GRU
    but for KGB. And all of them are looking around especially to
    fulfill their tasking.
        And San Francisco is extremely important. San Francisco and
    Los Angeles it's strategically important targets for the future
    war operational use. And, of course, I am sure that they are in
    lots of places where these weapons systems are located of
    course not inside but somewhere around, especially to be
    delivered in very short time to the place of the operational
    use. So it's not only San Francisco, Los Angeles, Washington,
    DC, New York City. It's in this country there are a lot of
    targets for these weapons.
        Mr. Campbell. I ask about San Francisco only because you
    brought it up as a field office of the GRU.
        Mr. Lunev. Yes. And it's very important strategically. You
    know what Navy, Army, Air Force facilities you do have, and how
    San Francisco military area is important for the future war
    operations. It's extremely important.
        Mr. Campbell. I'm tempted to ask one additional question if
    I might, Mr. Chairman. Silicon Valley, would that have an equal
    interest to your operations?
        Mr. Lunev. Yes, sir. Because to believe that in this
    country it's very difficult to find location of nuclear
    weapons, American nuclear weapons or military units, no, it's
    very clear from space satellites. But the major secrets of the
    United States are in up-to-date technologies development, first
    of all connected with military. And Silicon Valley is a
    recognized leader in this technologies, research, development
    and production. And of course Silicon Valley is one of the
    targets for penetration by GRU; but it's not by nuclear
    briefcases, it's by recruitment of people.
        Mr. Campbell. Very well.
        Mr. Chairman, I have one final question and that is to ask
    Colonel Lunev why he defected.
        Mr. Burton. Why did you defect?
        Mr. Lunev. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Campbell, it's very long
    story. But very briefly I can tell you if you have couple
    minutes of course because I cannot do it in shorter period of
    time.
        For me, as a graduate of law school of Moscow Military
    Political Academy, I had access to secret archives of Communist
    party in time when I get this advanced military education. When
    I saw papers and documents signed by Lenin, Stalin, and other
    leaders of Soviet international communists, after I saw these
    papers, communism ideology never play any role in my life. I
    keep my membership in Communist party only like some kind of
    ordinary or regular staff I need to have, but I do it for my
    country, I believe in my country, not communist ideology.
        And all my life I believe that Soviet propaganda which tell
    me and other Soviet people that way of life in Soviet Union is
    fair and equal for all people, I believe in this way of life
    maybe because I didn't see any other. I believe in this when I
    worked in Singapore, in China and Soviet Union, until I came to
    the United States. When I came to this country, I found that
    it's different story. Because, please, turn back the Soviet
    Union 10 years ago what was it in America. Evil empire, leader
    of international imperialism, country where only small number
    of people are living very good, this is millionaires, and all
    other population living very bad and working for these rich
    people to become more and more rich.
        When I came to this country, I found that's wrong. I found
    that, yes, in this country there is limited number of very
    wealthy or rich people, limited number of very poor people who
    are living very bad. But between in this country there is huge,
    huge middle class which lives in this country, I cannot say
    very good, not bad. Not bad.
        And when I found that, that it's absolutely different
    society, different--the polar different types of living, of
    course I reduce my hostile activity against this country
    dramatically if not to zero and try to do minimum what I could
    do against this country in my operational stay here.
        And, of course, I didn't want to fight against America. And
    I didn't want to damage America. And it's happen 1991, 1992,
    after your society's integration, the society's integration, I
    found that unfortunately information I receive from my sources
    with risk of myself and people who believed me is going to
    wrong hands. And I found that some of my information is going
    through the hands of Russian, just now it's name of criminals
    or people who are conducted with organized crime activity
    against the United States.
        It was some kind of last drop in my decision to cancel my
    hostile activity against the United States. But last drop, real
    last drop, it was in my conversations with my friends and
    associates--maybe you remember the beginning of 1992,
    wintertime, and American Air Force cargo plans deliver
    humanitarian aid to Russian people. In time when America tried
    to assist my own country and my own people, in time when
    Russian Government didn't do nothing but requested new credits
    and loans from the United States, I with my friends and
    associates we discussed very actively problem what to do in
    this country. Because America, if to believe Yeltsin, it was
    not anymore enemy but became friend or partner.
        And in this situation we need to cancel our hostile
    activity against America. And if it's necessary to continue our
    spy business, but by other ways like friendly countries, you
    know what foreign intelligence services are working in this
    country, but most of them are friendly intelligence services.
    And when we requested Moscow what to do in this situation, we
    received direct order from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to
    activate our spy business against America and to make it more
    dangerous for the United States than before. It was last drop.
    After this I made my decision.
        Mr. Campbell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Burton. Let me just ask two questions then I'll yield
    to my colleagues again for a second round if they choose to ask
    questions. No. 1, do you know anything about these nuclear
    devices that we were talking about? Do you have any knowledge
    of those nuclear devices?
        Mr. Lunev. No, sir, because I was assigned to strategic
    intelligence.
        Mr. Burton. So you wouldn't know if it took more than one
    person to detonate one of those.
        Mr. Lunev. I know only one that special operation forces
    commanders, they had special groups of people, specially
    trained how to use these devices.
        Mr. Burton. Can one person set the devices off?
        Mr. Lunev. Maybe this is only one person in group who can
    handle this problem.
        Mr. Burton. So one person could detonate a device like
    that.
        Mr. Lunev. Yes.
        Mr. Burton. OK. That's what I thought. The other thing is
    in the event that it was boobytrapped if we had a nuclear
    device like that here in the United States buried, in the event
    that it was boobytrapped, do you know if the boobytrap went off
    if the nuclear device also would be exploded?
        Mr. Lunev. It's very difficult to expect that this nuclear
    device would be destroyed by this explosion.
        Mr. Burton. Would it explode?
        Mr. Lunev. Yes. If it would be exploded, it would be a lot
    of evidences that it was nuclear device. So it's much more easy
    to have special self-liquidation device.
        Mr. Burton. What I meant is let's say there's a boobytrap
    on a site where they have a nuclear device. If the boobytrap
    went off, would that also explode the nuclear device?
        Mr. Lunev. Very good question, but I think it's for more
    specialist than me in this area.
        Mr. Burton. OK.
        Mr. Lunev. But I can tell you that if somebody in his
    design would like to destroy this device, he would like to make
    it much more chemically than by regular explosions.
        Mr. Burton. Thank you.
        Mr. Weldon, do you have any more questions?
        Mr. Weldon. Colonel Lunev, several decades ago there was
    what we call a sleeper agent of the Soviet government who
    turned himself into the Royal Canadian Mounted Police who was
    living in Canada. And as a part of his turning himself in, he
    said that he was--his job was to wait for a coded signal from
    the GRU which he would then use to detonate a bomb that would
    eliminate a main oil pumping station north of Edmonton and
    destroy it.
        Now, that individual was known; and in fact I have talked
    to the people who interviewed him and I'm trying to get to him
    now. Are the use of these so-called sleeper agents, were they
    common among the GRU to have people prepositioned; and do you
    still think that that type of a person could exist today in
    both the United States and perhaps Canada?
        Mr. Lunev. It sounds very familiar for me because it's
    regular practice to use as you said sleeping agent, especially
    for using of these devices in time of war after receiving
    special authorization from radio or by other devices. So it's
    very regular practice, sounds very typical for this. And just
    now--it's just now it's very difficult to say how to use these
    people now. But we name these people illegals or illegal
    intelligence agents or officers. Illegal intelligence was not
    canceled, is in place, and would be in place until the time
    when country could be existing. So I think that this methods of
    operational use of people would be in place for unlimited time.
        Mr. Weldon. One final question, Mr. Lunev. I referred today
    to a document from the Russian military publication Military
    Thought. I believe it's called Voennaya. Is that correct?
        Mr. Lunev. Yes.
        Mr. Weldon. It says this has been published every year
    since June 1918. Are you familiar with this document?
        Mr. Lunev. No, sir.
        Mr. Weldon. The internal Russian Military Thought?
        Mr. Lunev. No, sir.
        Mr. Weldon. In the document in July 1995 I referred to the
    article that talks about the employment of special task forces.
    And I referred to the one sentence that says special task
    forces can be used not only in war but also in peacetime during
    a period of threat.
        Do you believe that there is the possibility that there are
    some in Russia today that would want to use these kinds of
    weapons and these kind of special forces in peacetime as well
    as in time of perhaps conflict if they believed that perhaps a
    war was about to begin?
        Mr. Lunev. Sir, in military plans everything is possible.
    And it could be look like that just now it's peacetime, but for
    people who are in decisionmaking process it looks like
    preliminary time for the future war. So we cannot operate by
    the same time which these people. And yes, it's possible for
    using of this weapons system during so-called peacetime for
    different purposes, but decision could be made by supreme
    commander in chief only.
        Mr. Weldon. One final if you don't mind, Mr. Chairman.
    Colonel Lunev, the $64,000 question today and has been for the
    past 3 months, the major question is why wouldn't our
    administration ask the Russians to give us the exact locations
    of these sites? Now, I've given my own speculation. What's your
    speculation as a former GRU official now living in the United
    States? We've had two agencies tell us that we haven't asked
    the question. Why in the world wouldn't our administration ask
    that question of the Russians to tell us where those sites are?
        Mr. Lunev. Sir, why are you asking me about this?
        Mr. Weldon. Because I had to give my own speculation and I
    gave that earlier today. I think it's a part of our policy of
    we didn't want to embarrass Yeltsin in 1992 and 1993 when we
    found out about the Mitrokhin files so we didn't want to ask
    the question. So now we're between a rock and a hard place
    because if we ask the question now people are going to
    criticize the administration for waiting 8 years or 7 years to
    ask it. I'm just asking you to speculate. What do you think
    would be the reason?
        Mr. Lunev. Sir, I can give you my thoughts very briefly
    because you know that in this country as I already said you
    have very good and professional intelligence and
    counterintelligence. And I am sure that these people are--I
    very highly respect these people. By the way you have some of
    them behind me now. I saw them in Washington. I am sure that
    they inform politicians about what's really going on, what
    could be happening with these devices. But why politicians
    didn't do it, it's not question for me. How to do it, I think
    it's very easy. You know how many billions of dollars America
    already sent to Russian Government and this money disappeared.
    Russian people didn't get one penny from this billions and
    billions of dollars.
        Mr. Weldon. Exactly.
        Mr. Lunev. Why not to ask before sending this money for
    this information. It's very easy to say. Russian Government
    existing on money from America. Why not to ask for favor.
        Mr. Weldon. I agree with you absolutely 1,000 percent.
    That's the question for the administration. Why haven't they
    asked.
        Mr. Burton. I think that's a good question to end this part
    of the hearing on. Before we dismiss our panel, I want to thank
    very much the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation
    Authority for allowing us to use this facility. I also want to
    thank all of the MTA staff that's worked so hard and so closely
    with my staff to make sure this hearing was possible.
        I also want to thank the panel. You've been very, very
    informative to us. We really appreciate it. We appreciate your
    coming all the way to Los Angeles. And hopefully we'll be able
    to pick your brains in the future for more information as this
    process goes forward.
        And, Mr. Lunev, thank you for helping America by giving us
    this information. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Lunev. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Burton. We're going to let you leave first. So we'll
    let you put your sack over your head.
        Mr. Lunev. May I say a few words only? Few words.
        Mr. Burton. Yeah, sure.
        Mr. Lunev. Because just now I told you that I am working
    for an information company. And I found that in my
    conversations with my readers, with listeners that just now
    America, situation is in America is not bad, not bad. Economy
    is growing. People are living not bad. And I think that just
    now maybe it's very good time to think about American national
    security a little bit more than usual. Because maybe later it
    could be too late.
        And thank you for you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for you,
    ladies and gentlemen, for inviting us, for listening to us. And
    I am really respect what are you doing for this country.
        Mr. Burton. Thank you very much. We'll meet you outside. I
    would like to shake your hand.
        Would you escort him out.
        And the other panelists, thank you very much.
        We will go into executive session, the Members of Congress
    with the intelligence agencies. It's for the classified
    briefing. And we'll do that in about 10 minutes in the
    adjoining room.
        Thank you all very much. And thanks to the media for being
    here. We appreciate your attendance.
        [Whereupon, at 1:28 p.m., the committee was recessed.]
        [Additional information submitted for the hearing record
    follows:]

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