[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE U.S. AND THE CARIBBEAN IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: WHAT IS THE AGENDA?
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
WEDNESDAY, MAY 17, 2000
__________
Serial No. 106-122
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
65-659 WASHINGTON : 2000
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international
relations
______
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
DANA ROHRABACHER, California SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PETER T. KING, New York PAT DANNER, Missouri
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South BRAD SHERMAN, California
Carolina ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MATT SALMON, Arizona STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
AMO HOUGHTON, New York JIM DAVIS, Florida
TOM CAMPBELL, California EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
KEVIN BRADY, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BARBARA LEE, California
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
GEORGE P. RADANOVICH, California JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff
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Subcommittee on The Western Hemisphere
ELTON GALLEGLY, California, Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
Carolina JIM DAVIS, Florida
KEVIN BRADY, Texas EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio
Vince Morelli, Subcommittee Staff Director
David Adams, Democratic Professional Staff Member
Kelly McDonald, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
H.E. Richard Leighton Bernal, Ambassador, Embassy of Jamaica..... 3
George A. Fauriol, Ph.D., Director and Senior Fellow, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Americas Program.......... 7
Anthony T. Bryan, Ph.D., Director and Senior Research Associate,
Dante B. Fascell North-South Center, Caribbean Studies Program,
University of Miami............................................ 11
APPENDIX
The Honorable Elton Gallegly a Representative in Congress from
California and Chairman, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere.... 22
Ambassador. Richard L. Bernal.................................... 24
Dr. George A. Fauriol............................................ 42
Dr. Anthony T. Bryan............................................. 51
Dr. Ransford W. Palmer........................................... 64
THE U.S. AND THE CARIBBEAN IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: WHAT IS THE AGENDA?
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Wednesday, May 17, 2000
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:30 p.m. In
Room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elton Gallegly
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Gallegly. I will open the hearing.
I have a markup going concurrently in the Judiciary
Committee, and Congressman Ballenger is going to pinch-hit for
me.
Today, the Subcommittee continues its oversight hearings on
the Western Hemisphere by reviewing the current political and
economic environment in the Caribbean as well as United States
policy toward the region.
Three years ago, this Subcommittee held a similar hearing
in the wake of the President's somewhat historic trip to
Barbados to meet with the leaders of the Caribbean nations.
This trip produced the Bridgetown Declaration, which was hailed
as the beginning of a new era in U.S.-Caribbean relations and
was referred to as a ``partnership for prosperity and
security'' in the Caribbean.
At our hearing then, Dr. Fauriol said that because the
Caribbean craved greater understanding and attention from
Washington, the Barbados meeting is probably at least
symbolically a step in the right direction.
In the Spring, 1997, edition of the Journal of Inter-
American Studies and World Affairs, Dr. Bryan wrote, ``The
President has the opportunity to make his second term a
memorable one in defining U.S. policy toward the Caribbean,''
and he asked, ``Will there be a difference this time around?''.
Since that Barbados meeting, where such hopes rose, we have
often heard a chorus of complaints from our neighbors in the
Caribbean. These have included concerns that what should be
U.S. interests in the region, such as strengthening democracy,
pursuing economic integration, promoting sustainable
development, and alleviating poverty, have given way to a
vacuum of issues, as some have described it, and dangerously
out of sync, as others have said.
Specifically, the Caribbean nations complain that U.S.
policy reflects a negative image of weak and inefficient
governments, tainted by corruption and influences of the drug
trade. In fact, the Caribbean nations often complain that U.S.
policy, including our attitudes toward trade policy, is now
totally dominated by a fixation with the drug agenda.
Our neighbors in the Caribbean are important to us. While
the drug trade is also important, this Committee is concerned
about the perception that the U.S. agenda for the Caribbean may
be too narrowly focused. We are concerned that the leaders in
the Caribbean are frustrated with the United States and that
anti-American rhetoric, as witnessed after the WTO decision on
bananas, could increase if we hesitate to take a more proactive
role in addressing the numerous problems facing the region in a
sensible, coordinated way.
This hearing, then, poses similar questions asked by Dr.
Bryan: First, since the Barbados meeting, has a true
partnership emerged? Second, have prosperity and security been
adequately addressed? Third, has there been a difference in the
U.S. policy toward the Caribbean in the past several years?
It is the Subcommittee's hope that these and other
questions can be addressed by our witnesses today.
Before we hear from our witnesses, there are other Members
who may want to make an opening statement, and this is the
appropriate time, and I would defer to my good friend, the
gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Menendez.
Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Very briefly, I want to take the opportunity to applaud the
hearing we are having today and also to say that last week I
joined with many of my colleagues in taking I think a major
step forward in the economic future of the Caribbean and
Central America with the passage of CBI parity legislation that
I hope will not only bolster trade with the region and
encourage foreign investment and much-needed jobs but will also
be the beginning of an effort to try to change the conversation
and the focus that we have had with the Caribbean, and I was
happy to join in that effort.
We too often ignore the Caribbean as American policy
makers. We face threats still across the globe in terms of both
security and in promoting democracy and human rights, and in
that regard we focus on that to the detriment sometimes of our
own region.
It is true that we have serious concerns about money
laundering and narcotics trafficking and those nations that are
used for transiting. But by the same token I would hope that
the Bridgetown plan of action, which laid out a plan of action
for funding of education and institution building as well as
dealing with those questions of anti narcotics and money
laundering initiatives, would be heightened by the
administration and by Congress itself, which has not funded
those initiatives to the level that they need to be funded.
It is our problem really, something that I have been
talking about for the last 8 years as a Member of this
Committee. It is a problem that we have with our overall focus
both on the region followed up by the resources necessary in
our development assistance in addition to our trade issues with
the region. When over 50 percent of the people in the
hemisphere live below the poverty level and we have a very
small amount of resources, trade is an important part of
promoting the area's future stability, but trade alone,
unmatched by some of the economic assistance that we need to
promote within the region, will not achieve some of goals.
We look forward to hearing from the witnesses, and I ask
that my full statement be entered into the record.
Mr. Gallegly. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Menendez appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Gallegly. I would ask unanimous consent that a
statement on Caribbean economic relations submitted by Dr.
Ransford Palmer of Howard University be made part of the
record. If I hear no objection, that will be the order. Hearing
no objection, that is the order.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Palmer appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Gallegly. At this time, I will turn the meeting over to
our colleague from North Carolina, Mr. Ballenger, to take
testimony from our first witness.
Mr. Ballenger. [Presiding.] I would like to say, gentlemen,
along with my friend here from New Jersey, we have been heavily
involved in South and Central America and probably have not
done the proper amount regarding the Caribbean.
Ambassador Bernal.
STATEMENT OF H.E. RICHARD LEIGHTON BERNAL, AMBASSADOR, EMBASSY
OF JAMAICA
Mr. Bernal. Good afternoon, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for inviting me to testify before this Committee on
this important issue.
These hearings are timely as they take place immediately
after the passage of the Trade and Development Act of 2000
which will promote U.S.-CBI trade. As we have embarked on a new
millennium, it is an opportune time to evaluate the past and
plan for the future. My comments today will focus on the
CARICOM countries, which are the English-speaking countries of
the region as well as Haiti and Suriname.
CARICOM-U.S. relations are good at present reflecting
economic interdependence, political cooperation and a long-
standing friendship based on common goals and shared
principles. However, U.S. policy toward the region has been
subsumed within a larger Latin American policy, and it is not
easy to discern a policy which is specifically designed for the
Caribbean and one which is consistently receiving attention and
application. Attention devoted to policy toward CARICOM varies
with U.S. perception of the state of these small countries. If
the view is that the region is not a problem, attention is
diverted; and, there is a focus when there is a concern.
A more consistent and stable approach to the region is
needed. Indeed, U.S. policy toward the wider Caribbean is
fractured into several different policies. There are different
policies for Central America, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and
Haiti and for the English-speaking Caribbean. There is not a
holistic U.S. policy toward the Caribbean.
In recent years the institution of regular meetings between
the President and the prime ministers and leaders of the
Caribbean as well as an annual meeting between foreign
ministers and the Secretary of State has put the dialogue on
U.S.-CARICOM relations on a much more secure footing, and
enhances the understanding of the issues.
In this regard, I commend the Committee for holding these
hearings at this time. This is a very important mechanism for
garnering the views on U.S.-Caribbean relations and providing
this information to Congress.
Mr. Chairman, the international context in which U.S.-
Caribbean relations have been conducted in the past have
changed. I would suggest that it has changed so dramatically
that the world that we knew no longer exists. The world is not
changing, it has changed and U.S.-Caribbean relations must take
into account these changes.
Two of the fundamental changes which affect the
relationship have to do with the rapid and profound
transformations which are involved in the process of
globalization which have implications for both the United
States and the region and for the relationship. Second, the
traditional post World War political structure rooted very much
in Cold War preoccupations has given way to a new era, and a
new international order has not yet come into place. In this
situation the strategic importance of the region seems to have
declined in the perception of U.S. policy makers.
The English-speaking Caribbean is peaceful, has a well
established democratic system and is pursuing private sector
led, market driven growth strategies. Hence, the region is not
a ``crisis area'' from the U.S. point of view, leading many in
the region is not among the priorities for U.S. foreign policy.
Complacency is unwise since physical proximity and
interdependence means that if the region experiences economic
difficulties or political instability, there will be
repercussions in the United States in the form of migrants,
drug trafficking and other undesirable developments.
The Caribbean reality is dominated by vulnerability, and
this is a factor which has to be taken into account in U.S.-
Caribbean relations. In addition, there is a major disparity in
size and level of development and power between the U.S. and
the CARICOM countries.
Nevertheless, there is a basis for partnership based on
political cooperation and economic interdependence. The
economic importance of the Caribbean is often not recognized.
Let me illustrate.
Co-production of apparel allows U.S. fabrics to be made
into apparel in the Caribbean using U.S. machinery and
Caribbean labor. The result is jobs in the U.S. in the textile
industry and apparel jobs in the Caribbean and indeed the
finished product for U.S. firms allows them to stay globally
competitive, so the disparities in size does not mean that
there is not an important interdependence.
The vulnerabilities faced by the Caribbean, which are the
challenges it faces when trying to adjust to new global
economic and political realities, are the following:
First, economic vulnerability, because, these are very
small economies where the scale of production and the units of
production are small. For example, the largest firm in the
English-speaking Caribbean is a quarter--their total is a
quarter of a day's production of any of the top 10 firms in the
U.S. So there are vast differences.
The vulnerability also derives from the fact that these
economies have traditionally been based on exporting one or two
commodities often to a single market. Dominica used to depend
for 80 percent of its foreign exchange on bananas sold in a
single market, the United Kingdom market.
Second, the region, for the most part, consists of small
islands with fragile ecological systems, and the proneness to
hurricanes has been very debilitating to development. Hurricane
Hubert in 1988 destroyed about 33 percent of Jamaica's GDP. The
hurricanes that hit Antigua in 1995 accounted for damage up to
66 percent of GDP. The region has been hit both by hurricanes
and by volcanic reaction. This is a setback on an ongoing basis
for the region.
Third, there is vulnerability on national security issues.
These are small countries. Some of these countries have a
population of less than 100,000. When matched against the
enormous resources of the narcotrafficking cartels, it is very
difficult to preserve democracy and resist the corrosive effect
of narcotrafficking and the related transnational crimes such
as money laundering.
The challenge is how to overcome vulnerability in the new
global context. One way of doing this is to undertake a process
of strategic global repositioning, moving from old industries,
improving international competitiveness and moving into new
export sectors like infomatics. This is an ongoing process and
one which can be beneficial not only to the Caribbean but to
the United States.
For example, some of these industries are intimately linked
with the United States. The tourist industry, which accounts
for about 30 percent of the export earnings in the region and
one in five jobs, depends critically on U.S. investment and
U.S. cruise shipping and transport and is one in which several
million U.S. visitors go to the region each year.
I now want to turn to the issues which arise from this
vulnerability and the relationship and to suggest some policy
directions. I will do this in two sections, the economics and
then the security aspects.
The economic issues are as follows:
The Caribbean is one of the 10 largest export markets for
the U.S. The U.S. has had a trade surplus with the CBI
countries at least for the last 10 years there in economic
interdependence, for example when Jamaica earns U.S. $1 from
exporting garments to the U.S., it spends some .50 cents buying
U.S. goods. In addition, approximately 350,000 jobs in the U.S.
depend on the trade between the CBI region and the CARICOM.
Mr. Chairman, turning to specifications within the economic
gambit, CARICOM has relieved and happy at the passage of H.R.
434 which has been a corrective in that it has provided a level
playing field with Mexico so that the region is no longer at a
disadvantage of facing quotas and tariffs in the export of our
apparel. This is an important development, and we congratulate
you for your role in passing this legislation.
Another important area of trade is the FTAA. Here the
disparities between countries like Canada, Brazil, Mexico, the
United States and countries like St. Lucia and St. Vincent are
enormous. Therefore in the design of the FTAA, account must be
taken of these differences by allowing these countries some
concessions.
The U.S. policy on bananas, Mr. Chairman, is a most
unfortunate policy. It has damaged the friendship with the
Caribbean; and it also will have long-term, deleterious effects
on CARICOM and may eventually have adverse consequences for the
U.S. As these small banana farmers on two or three acres were
eliminated from their only market, it led to a situation of
increased vulnerability to drug trafficking and other illicit
activities.
Mr. Chairman, the WTO has launched a new round of
negotiations focused on services and agriculture, two areas of
critical importance to the Caribbean. The issue of the small
size of CARICOM economies must be addressed by measures
incorporated in the WTO. This will not set a precedent, as this
merely extends principles which are already included in the WTO
agreement for developing countries. These measures should
include variations in the obligations, extended periods for
implementation and technical assistance for capacity building.
Mr. Chairman, trade liberalization has been the engine of
growth in the world economy. Trade liberalization creates
opportunities, but these opportunities only come to fruition
with investment. Private investment has led growth in the
Caribbean, however, there is still a need for development
assistance. Development assistance from the U.S. to the region
since 1985 has fallen from over $459 million to just over a
$136 million. In the case of Jamaica, it has fallen from $165
million to about $50 million in the last 4 years. U.S. aid
still has an important role to play and the U.S. should try to
restore aid to a more appropriate amount.
Turning to security issues, Mr. Chairman there is an
inextricable link between economic issues and security issues.
Economic development is the best antidote to security issues
which arise from narcotrafficking, transnational crime, et
cetera.
The CARICOM consists of small societies which are very
vulnerable. The United States has played a very important
collaborative role with these countries in handling threats to
security. However, narcotrafficking is a growing menace, and
more resources are necessary to cope with this problem. Mr.
Chairman, that over the last 14 years no CARICOM, has been
cited for not cooperating fully with the U.S. on narcotics, but
it is an enormous strain for the region to sustain its counter
narcotics campaign.
In regard to money laundering, an activity associated with
narcotrafficking, the Caribbean has made tremendous progress in
updating regulatory capacity and legislation, and there is a
role here for further cooperation with the U.S.
Migration to this country from the Caribbean has gone on
for over a century and has contributed to the development of
this country as well as to the countries of CARICOM. However,
there has been a policy of deportation implemented by the
United States in regard to criminals which is not efficacious.
It transports criminals back into the Caribbean in such large
numbers that there has been an escalation of crime and violence
throughout the Caribbean. Criminal deportees create
transnational criminal networks because they have contacts in
the United States. Many of them return illegally to the United
States and, therefore, they are not being taken out of society
by incarceration and not being punished by deporting them. They
continue their activities, and this has been a major problem. I
would like to call for a hearing on this issue so that the
Caribbean can be incorporated into a revision of U.S. policy on
deportation.
Environmental preservation of CARICOM is a concern which is
shared by the U.S. and CARICOM.
Mr. Chairman, the CARICOM countries are not only important
economic partners, and good neighbors, but can also, as small
states in alliance with powerful states like the United States,
play an important international role. Jamaica is now on the
U.N. Security Council and is contributing to the struggle for
international peace and security.
Mr. Chairman, the countries of CARICOM and the United
States, are faced by common challenges, but there is long-
standing friendship, economic interdependence and a partnership
based on shared goals. The challenge faced by the Caribbean
region, CARICOM in particular, for economic development while
maintaining peace, the environment and democracy is one to
which the United States can support and contribute, through
partnership and cooperation.
I would urge that in the review and formulation of U.S.
policy, the ideas that emanate from this Committee should be an
integral part. It is in the national self-interest of the U.S.
to support the Caribbean in meeting the challenges of the new
global environment.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your time. I am willing to
accept questions, and I formally request that my written
testimony which will be made available to you will be placed in
the record. Thank you.
Mr. Ballenger. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bernal appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Ballenger. Let me say that the charts that you used,
that you spoke of, we don't have copies up here.
Mr. Bernal. I will be happy to provide those.
Mr. Ballenger. Thank you.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Ballenger. I would like to report to my compatriot here
from New Jersey that I just got word that there are some
procedural votes coming up. So we hope we don't interrupt you.
Dr. Fauriol, would you like to go ahead?
STATEMENT OF GEORGE A. FAURIOL, PH.D., DIRECTOR AND SENIOR
FELLOW, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
AMERICAS PROGRAM
Mr. Fauriol. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Exactly 3 years ago I had the privilege to appear before
this Committee when it held a hearing on U.S.-Caribbean
relations, and at the time I suggested perhaps a bit harshly
that there was no distinct U.S. policy on the Caribbean. There
were, instead, a number of functional and country-specific
issues stitched together. Let me update you on this today.
As has been to some degree mentioned by Dr. Bernal, the
bulk of our relationship with the region remains focused on
four distinct and generally compartmentalized issues. Two of
the most visible politically and contentious diplomatically are
policies associated with Cuban affairs, as well as the fits and
starts regarding Haiti policy.
The third domain could be characterized as trade concerns
which have preoccupied both Washington and the region for more
than 15 or 20 years, particularly if you anchor it around the
history of the CBI, and as already been mentioned is this week
coming to a new stage with the favorable outcome of the Africa
CBI trade bill.
There is a fourth aspect of policy, narcotics trafficking
control, which has continued its preeminence in the formulation
of U.S. regional engagement.
With this as a backdrop, I am stepping backward and
imagining myself as the average American citizen looking at the
Caribbean. The image that the public at large still has of the
region is principally as a tourism destination and as a source
of the nation's illicit drug trafficking.
The irony or the rub for policy makers, not only here in
Washington but also at the state and local level, is that U.S.
involvement in the region is often underestimated, perhaps
under appreciated. Emergency relief, search and rescue are a
highly visible component of involvement in the region. In the
area of commerce, the aggregates of Caribbean and Central
American economy amounts to a two-way trade with the United
States of about $40 billion, which makes the region a
significant global player for the United States.
Also countering in many ways the message that I often hear
from Caribbean leadership and intellectuals about the
inequalities due to size, portions of the Caribbean region are
in fact engaging in what could be described as a globalized
economic, even political environment. Information technology,
communications-based service industry, new business strategies
that build on that can leapfrog the region's enterprising young
leaders into the mainstream of the 21st century, even if, in
fact, they are in the Caribbean.
The problem for the United States is that we still face a
region that remains fragmented geographically and politically,
which explains in part the compartmentalized aspects of U.S.
policy. Many Caribbean governments and opinion makers remain
fixated by the need to level the playing field, particularly
economically, and outflank the vulnerabilities borne of small
size or small states.
A climate of uncertainty also exists regarding an eroding
quality of regional governance, which is probably particularly
applicable to the English-speaking Caribbean which has had a
long tradition of democratic governance.
In Haiti, democratization is stalled. In Cuba, it is
strangled by the Castro regime. The result has been mounting
stress on the political systems and the weakening of
institutions upon which they rest.
On average, portions of U.S.-Caribbean relations,
therefore, remain involved with mutual frustrations and, to
some degree, annoyances. Some of this is linked to pressures
regarding drugs and money laundering.
Likewise, the banana-producing Caribbean states are still
angered over Washington's missionary zeal regarding market
access for bananas into the EU and the ensuing WTO case. There
are frustrations in the Dominican Republic and Jamaica, more
recently in Trinidad and Tobago and elsewhere, which have taken
issue with the reverse flow of deported criminals and other
undesirables from the United States, and there are also
indications of a flow of arms and weapons into the Caribbean
supplying criminal elements.
Ultimately, however, the practical alternatives in U.S.-
Caribbean relations are probably relatively limited even if
there is a feeling occasionally heard in the region that the
United States is selective and not always a willing ally to the
region's small countries.
Europe obviously remains a potential alternative for the
Caribbean with limited options in both economic and diplomatic
terms, most recently expressed by the visit of the French
President in the Eastern Caribbean. But with the Lome-UE
preferential trade and investment regime beginning to fade, the
proximity and general access to the $570 billion NAFTA market
is the prize for the Caribbean. Beyond that are the hopes, as
Ambassador Bernal has mentioned, somewhere down the road.
There continues to be frustration over Washington's
handling of Cuban policy, but the region has also opened up to
other concerns, unpleasant concerns. This includes well-
connected unsavory types, money laundering, the citizenship-
for-sale program in a number of countries, and the embrace of
suspect investors in offshore banking and gambling. This is
happening in part not only because governments in the region
are weak, weak actors and weak institutions, but many perhaps
are also willing partners in these kinds of activities.
The Trinidad-based Caribbean Financial Action Task Force
recently estimated that there are $60 billion in drug and crime
money that were being laundered every year in the Caribbean
region. The region's narcotics policy file is no more
encouraging today than it was 3 years ago when I testified here
before this Committee. The cycle continues, with pressures in
Mexico and Central America leading to stepped-up efforts in the
Caribbean. Drug money continues to penetrate economies through
real estate and other kinds of investment vehicles.
A word about the CBI. I am still of the belief that
preferential trade arrangements are probably an endangered
species. The Caribbean strategy, which is probably the correct
strategy from its perspective, is to carve out as best as it
can windows of opportunity within the upcoming FTAA process.
That may turn out to be a better effect than the potentially
delayed millennium global trade round. The United States can
and should be understanding of these small country concerns
and, therefore, the current--or the recent now successful
legislative effort to finalize a modestly expanded CBI is a
step in the right direction coming at the right time.
But the practical reality within the Caribbean in response
to international trade investment I believe is likely to be a
continuing informal breakup of the region into sets of
countries which will engage globalization at different speeds.
Recent economic successes in Trinidad and Tobago and the
Trinidad Republic, Barbados, may be good examples of how the
Caribbean, in fact, will be successfully engaging that
globalized environment. Some will do less well and will
therefore have to take advantage of provisions extracted from
multilateral trade negotiations and residual trade arrangements
such as the CBI.
Let me conclude with a few brief comments about Haiti and
Cuba. Three years ago in my testimony before this Committee I
argued that the issue then was to reconcile the
Administration's political imperative to claim success with the
very uncertain reality that existed on the ground at the time
regarding any real chance of democratization and economic
renewal. That more or less remains the reality of U.S. policy
today.
U.S. policy in Haiti, I would argue at this point, has
collapsed and/or is collapsing, and there is a need for
Congress to reimpose some discipline in this area. Local and
parliamentary elections scheduled for March 19 were postponed
until this coming Sunday. These are elections originally
scheduled for November, 1998. Haitian President Rene Preval and
the provisional election commission have in the last 2 months
or so been arguing over authority over the electoral process
with the president getting the upper hand, backed up by a wave
of political violence targeted specifically at the opposition.
In sum, Haiti is a country where elections are not being
held on time, results are not credible, foreign aid is wasted
or not spent, the economy is wide open to the drug trade, the
president of the country rules by decree, political
intimidation is widespread. The new national police is in fact
disappearing and not being very effective and may be the source
of violence. It has become difficult to support a policy which
is so wasteful in resources and missed political opportunities.
Just as an indicator, the most recent incident involving
the expulsion of the head of the International Foundation for
Electoral Systems, IFES. The IFES mission is one of the major
actors in the technical implementations of elections in Haiti
with funding from USAID. The government of Haiti had obtained
an internal IFES document suggesting that President Preval was
attempting to postpone the elections.
To me, this is in many ways the end of the line as far as
the credibility of the electoral process in Haiti is concerned,
and I would therefore at this point confirm my impression in
two areas about elections in Haiti:
First, clearly a continuation of the various congressional
holds on the electoral assistance to Haiti until there is a
clarification of these various problems surrounding the
process. Second, although it is awfully close to the date, I
would be cautious in supporting U.S. congressional observer
delegations to the process this coming Sunday. Despite the fact
that other governments and other organizations may be sending
observers, I hear in the last few days, for example, that the
Quebec parliament has withdrawn plans for its delegation
because of concerns over violence.
Finally, on Cuba, this is still arguably one of the least
satisfying components of U.S. policy not only in the Caribbean
but in probably the rest of the hemisphere.
Mr. Ballenger. Could you speed up? We would like to get Dr.
Bryan's testimony before the vote.
Mr. Fauriol. There is not much for me to add from where I
was 3 years ago. The danger in the present situation are not
the defects of U.S. Legislation but the deteriorating logic of
the Cuban communist state.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fauriol appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Ballenger. Dr. Bryan, I don't want to rush you, but----
STATEMENT OF ANTHONY T. BRYAN, PH.D., DIRECTOR AND SENIOR
RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, DANTE B. FASCELL NORTH-SOUTH CENTER,
CARIBBEAN STUDIES PROGRAM, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI
Mr. Bryan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
invitation to testify before this hearing.
I was given a fairly large agenda, namely to assess the
current political and economic conditions facing the Caribbean,
the region's priorities and the U.S. role. I will deal with
each of them very briefly. I will limit my comments to the
island nations and the continental enclaves of Guyana, Belize,
and Suriname.
Economically, this region has followed the neo-liberal
reform rule book. It has implemented policies mandated by the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and regional
funding agencies. Its governments have trimmed fiscal deficits,
privatized state-owned commercial enterprises, and liberalized
trading regimes. Even Cuba, which still continues to labor
under a deliberate ideological model that doesn't encourage
democracy, has introduced what I call some version of ``a la
carte capitalism'' which encourages direct foreign investment
in certain sectors of the economy.
The present transition in the political economy of the
Caribbean region is full of uncertainties. Many of the small
economies are heavily dependent on one or a few traditional
export commodities for which world prices are not likely to
rise.
While inflation rates and fiscal deficits are being
contained in most Caribbean countries and growth rates are
respectable, the economic foundations are shaky. Revenues from
privatization sales and reductions in basic government services
are not formulas for sustainable growth. So global enterprise
competitiveness is the real challenge that most of the
countries face.
When we look at the Caribbean, we have to appreciate the
diversity in economic growth; and if we look at the review of
the 1999 economy, which was done by the Caribbean Development
Bank, we find that GDP growth in the region ranged from 1
percent to over 8.3 percent. The growth was strong in service-
oriented economies which had invested heavily in tourism in
recent years. The star performers were the Dominican Republic,
which achieved a growth rate of 8.3 percent, one of the highest
in the world, and Trinidad and Tobago which grew at 6.9
percent.
The new regionalism in the Caribbean is reflective of this
economic diversity. The absence of a large regional market
means that the approach to integration has to be different from
any large integration area. In that context, the formation of
the CARICOM single market and economy whose remaining protocols
were signed during 1999 and early 2000 is a significant step
toward the ideal of economic integration.
I think there are three characteristics at this juncture
which are clear about the Caribbean economy: First, there is
growing acceptance of globalization, corporate integration and
the hemispheric trade momentum. Second, there is a paradigm
shift in integration theory and practice from a vertical
perspective (North America and Europe) toward a horizontal
relationship between the countries of the wider Caribbean and
Latin America. Third, the challenges confronting the Caribbean
with respect to trade with Europe and the Americas are
essentially similar. These have to do with the future of
existing regimes of significant differences, and a strategy is
developing which allows simultaneous access to as many global,
regional and bilateral trade pacts as possible.
I take a slightly different view to a number of my
colleagues with respect to Caribbean economies. I think in the
future the assumption that small Caribbean economies cannot
compete in international markets may no longer be valid. Some
small economies can dominate niche markets; tourism,
information services, energy based or petroleum industries, and
some of the larger Caribbean economies are already
demonstrating their ability to compete globally in such niche
markets. They have high educational standards and skilled labor
resources which compete with many other areas of the world.
With respect to governance, I think that trends in
politics: declining political participation, frustration with
the parliamentary system of politics, changes in leadership,
conversion to neoliberal economic policies by political parties
which have traditionally represented labor, and changing
relationships between labor, business and government, all of
these will have an impact on the political economy of the
region in the earlier years of the 21st century.
Finally, what about the role of the United States? I think
both the Caribbean countries and the U.S. share common ground
on a wide range of issues. Individual Caribbean countries have
their own perception of the kind of relationship that they want
to develop, and the political and economic diversity of the
Caribbean does not now provide the U.S. with any possibility of
devising a single comprehensive policy to the region as a
whole. However, there are agendas of opportunity.
I think the passage last week of H.R. 434 is a welcome step
in the direction of such convergence and cooperation. Also
important are the frequent meetings between Caribbean heads of
government, and other foreign ministers and their counterpart
in the United States, which were set in motion by the
Bridgetown Accord in April 1997.
I have just returned from the region, and I would suggest
that there are several issues which are critical:
First, hearing of Caribbean concerns about the OECD 1998
report on harmful tax competition as well as the Clinton
administration's budget proposals for a bill which would
require the U.S. for the first time to establish a blacklist of
tax havens.
Second, the possibility of a U.S. European Union accord on
the granting of a WTO waiver for Caribbean bananas.
Third, the strengthening of a joint approach to fight drug
trafficking, illegal firearms and transnational crime.
Fourth, completion of discussion of a memorandum of
understanding on deportation procedures for criminals deported
from the U.S. to the Caribbean that are acceptable to both
parties. This would include more timely notification and
sequencing of deportation.
Fifth, speedy implementation of the agreed support and
cooperation of the USAID Caribbean regional strategy and 5-year
program of assistance with regard to trade, business
development and economic diversification and investment.
Sixth, the provision of technical assistance for economic
reforms, particularly in smaller economies.
Seventh, closer cooperation with key Caribbean countries,
not only in major security matters but also in broader gray
areas such as the prevention of environmental degradation and
the provision of food security.
Finally, continued dialogue between the Caribbean nations
and the U.S. to assure peaceful political transitions in Haiti
and Cuba.
This mix and management of the broader concerns is where
the U.S. would have to direct its efforts. There is need I
think for consolidation of a mutually productive relationship
with the Caribbean, and it does not have anything to do with
big brother or small country; it is simply that this is a
common neighborhood. A lot of the problems that we share cannot
be resolved without further collaboration and cooperation and
continuous discussion.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bryan appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Ballenger. We are going to have several votes. The
basic idea is that it may be continuous. I would like to check
and see if my vote is needed. I am going to go vote, and then I
will just skip the rest.
I think we are playing games, and that occurs every once in
a while in potential political problems. We only have a five-
vote spread, and so if I have to come back and go back, I will.
But I will be back to question you gentlemen, if I may. I hope
you don't mind. It will probably take 10 or 12 minutes to go
over there and get back.
We will recess the Subcommittee for 10 or 12 minutes.
[recess.]
Mr. Ballenger. Dr. Bryan, since we cut you off, maybe you
had some more words of wisdom that you would like to pass on
before we get into questioning.
Mr. Bryan. Actually I would defer to questioning. I think
it would be appropriate.
Mr. Ballenger. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bernal. I would like to add two points which, I
neglected to mention.
First, is that the sugar quotas for the U.S. is an
important issue because that is still an industry that is
important to the CARICOM, but the quotas are being threatened
because Mexico has asked for its NAFTA quota to be increased.
Given that there is a surplus of sugar in the world and
increased domestic production as well, the only way that
Mexico's quota could be increased would be to take it from the
bilateral quota system. Nothing should be done to reduce the
quotas of the CARICOM countries which are already quite small,
but very important.
The second issue is that there is a major agreement between
the EU and the ACP countries, and it is an agreement which
gives concessions to those developing countries, and in the
past it has been known as the Lome convention. Like CBI, it
requires a waiver under the WTO rules.
The assurances by the administration, that there will be no
objection to the waiver for the new EU-ACP agreement, is very
important.
Thank you for allowing these additional comments. I would
be happy to take questions.
Mr. Ballenger. When you mentioned your hurricane, whatever
happens in Central and South America--I apologize to people
down there--my wife and I have been working in that area for 35
years. We tell people, if you want to get our notice, have a
war or blow up--hurricanes, we pay some attention all of a
sudden. But the sad part is that it does have that effect.
When Hubert hit Jamaica in 1988, I am sure you didn't know
that the first airplane that landed there came in from
Charlotte, North Carolina; and it had a package disaster field
hospital on it, and my wife and I, we delivered 13 field
hospitals all over the world, and one was to Jamaica.
Sadly for us, we were involved in Haiti. A little lady came
to see me, and she said, I am the mayor of my town, and I am
also the school mistress. She said, I need pencils and paper. I
got 800,000 sheets of 8\1/2\ by 11 paper and 50,000 pencils
lined up with the solution order to take care of it; and the
day after we shipped it, they burned her school down. The sad
part, it was to no avail.
One thing I would like to ask, and I don't know whether it
is even feasible amongst you all, but having been involved in
Central America, say, for 35 years and various and sundry
countries there, I keep trying to tell them over and over again
the one thing that will attract something other than a cut-and-
sew industry--and I come from North Carolina where we used to
have the majority of the cut-and-sew industry in the United
States. I voted for NAFTA, and my name has been mud in North
Carolina ever since, because they blame it all on me. But, in
reality, the jobs that we have sent elsewhere throughout the
Caribbean and in Central America have been replaced by the
three largest fiber optic cable plants in the world and heavily
oriented toward German and Japanese industry, and so we are
really much better off.
But the one thing that made it attractive to these other
areas was, in my considered opinion, education; and the greater
your education is in your community or your island or whatever
it happens to be, in my considered opinion you are going to be
able to attract better industry.
The example I use most often is, how did Costa Rica get
Intel which has 2,000 or 3,000 people working there? Electronic
assembly jobs are better paying than the cut-and-sew
operations. I don't know whether the effort by the governments
in the islands in general have been to upgrade their
educational system, but I would like to have somebody's
reaction to the fact that it appears to me that if the
governments in these areas really are dedicated to try to
upgrade the quality of their people and their lives--growing
bananas doesn't take a developed intelligence, whereas the
further you develop it the more you eat the bananas and try to
do something else rather than ship them.
Mr. Bernal, you represent a country.
Mr. Bernal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me say, first of all, on record, thank you on behalf of
the government of Jamaica for the action that you and your wife
took so expeditiously. One of the things that always strikes me
about the U.S. society, is that it is not just a rich society,
it is a generous society, and that stands to your credit.
Education, sir, is critical. It is a factor which the
Caribbean has always placed emphasis on; and indeed many of the
Caribbean persons who come here for employment are not in low-
end jobs, they are in high-tech jobs, in medicine, law, et
cetera. The CARICOM countries are well placed to move, as you
correctly stated, out of some of the lower-paying jobs in, say,
apparel and agriculture into informatics and business services.
Indeed, certainly for Barbados and for Jamaica, information
technology is a priority. In the case of Trinidad, there is a
very sophisticated high-tech industry based on oil and natural
gas.
Indeed, the CARICOM has produced all of the skills that are
needed for the 21st century once you think of the Caribbean not
as a physical but a nation without borders in which our
Caribbean citizens here are available to join in nation
building in their homelands.
Mr. Bryan. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I think I just want to refer
to what I said a little earlier when I had to race through this
testimony.
Caribbean economies in many instances are competing very,
very well and some of them, as I said, in niche markets, such
as information services, energy-based industries, and tourism.
They also show great potential in a number of areas. Part of
the reason for this is the highly educated and skilled labor
resources in the region. This is what helps them to compete.
One of the ironies is that education is one thing, but the
lack of resources in some countries is another. What is a bit
disturbing is that, despite democratic traditions, good human
rights records, high educational levels, and relatively high
levels of per capita income, some countries are still unable to
obtain adequate levels of international funding to give them a
jump start. This has been of great concern to the Commonwealth
Secretariat and the World Bank which have just issued a report
on small states and their needs and the recommendations which
should be accepted by the international community and the
international organizations. So we have the wherewithal in the
region, but this irony still exists.
Mr. Ballenger. If I may interrupt, that complaint is
generally true in the larger Central American countries. The
President of Nicaragua has told me over and over again, if I
can just get a big bank--we have a little bank that can lend
you 5 or $10,000 but they don't lend you $10 million and that
necessary financing--I basically am a businessman who founded
my own company, and you can't operate on $5,000 or $10,000
worth of credit. I understand exactly what you are saying.
Mr. Fauriol. Mr. Chairman, you mentioned the Intel example
in Costa Rica, and you recall that was a multi-year strategy on
the part of the Costa Rican government. It involved a carefully
negotiated trade regime that made Costa Rica competitive for an
Intel kind of investment.
Looking at the Caribbean outside of the unique case of
Haiti, a country that you are quite familiar with, the
Caribbean has, historically had high standards of education. In
some ways, that is not really the challenge. The challenge
conceptually is education versus what has been a problem in the
Caribbean, which is an insular vision or mentality. You can
have highly educated people, but if they only look around their
immediate neighborhood, it is not going to be fully
articulated. But you probably have a consensus among the three
statements that you have heard here, that in the Caribbean, the
combination of high-value human resources and new technologies,
will allow the region to enter the 21st century with a high
degree of competitiveness.
Mr. Ballenger. Ambassador Bernal, you mentioned the highly
educated who have come to this country. My wife and I, at the
request of Mrs. Jemaro, when she said that none of the young
people in Nicaragua were being educated in this country, they
were being taken to East Germany and was it possible for us to
do anything. So we brought these children up from Nicaragua and
sent them to college, but on the prerequisite that they had to
go home. Because if you are educating people to upgrade the
economies elsewhere and they don't go home, then all you have
done is just added some educated people in this country. We
need them, but your islands probably need them much worse than
we do.
Mr. Bernal. Mr. Chairman, that is a dilemma. But these
people who migrate initially to study or if they are already
qualified to work here are not lost to our system. They make a
very significant contribution not only here in terms of their
taxation and employment, but they send back to the Caribbean an
enormous amount of resources which go not only into private
investment but also to support schools and so on.
There is actually a debate now in which many people suggest
that the export of one person may actually be worth more to the
economy than if we kept them at home. We have managed by
producing a lot of skills that we have adequate skills in our
country.
However, I should enter the fact that Caribbean migrants
are unique in the United States. They all intend to go back and
in many cases there are cycles of movements where they go back
and then they come back and it goes on. So they are not lost to
us. Particularly now with the new technology of e-mail and so
on, we can tap those skills in a way that we couldn't before.
So we feel with this new technology they are not lost to us,
and I might say that some of the most patriotic people in the
Caribbean are in the United States. Patriotic both for this
country and for our country. They are great Ambassadors for us,
not lost to us.
Mr. Bryan. I agree entirely with Ambassador Bernal. I am
from Trinidad and last week we had meetings there on this very
issue. A number of corporate entities in Trinidad are starting
to face manpower problems at certain managerial levels. The
economy has grown to the extent that there is also a labor
shortage at some levels.
A lot of the contribution is now being made from the
Diaspora in the United States and elsewhere using e-mail. It is
a border less world.
For the first time, I am starting to see the tapping of
investment potential from the North American diaspora. This is
a very interesting phenomenon. It is not simply a question of
remittances in the case of Trinidad and Tobago. It is more of a
search for investment capital and a movement of investment
capital. These are very interesting trends.
Mr. Ballenger. If I may add to that, I worked rather
heavily, as hard as I could, on passing CBI, and I had some
friends from El Salvador working on that very thing. The
reality--if I were going to skip Mexico but the rest of Central
America--it seems to me that El Salvador is one of the few
places that really has developed rather substantial light
industry.
The gentleman that was here working with me on this thing,
he has two box plants, and he prints and makes plastic bags
which is all fairly heavy machine oriented, investment in
machinery. After it passed, he went from having laid off 600
people in his plant--the day that we announced that we were
going to vote on it and it looked like it was going to pass,
his orders took off, and he immediately was offered the
opportunity to sell two of his cut-and-sew plants. He was
saying he thought he would sell them and build himself another
one.
The basic thing that I saw differently there was the
ability to have investment capital, and I think it really--
again, you don't have the wars that I was involved with in El
Salvador and Nicaragua, but people stayed there. Especially the
Christian Arabs did not leave the country. They stayed there
and continued to grow.
Let me ask you, how would you as individuals assess the
success of CARICOM at this point right now?
Mr. Bernal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CARICOM is the longest operating integration
arrangement other than the European Union, and it has had
success. It has had success in two ways.
First, by integrating these small economies, it has
provided a larger market in which companies can gain some
economies of scale but also compete in that regional pool
before they move into a global marketplace. The limitations on
those achievements stem from the fact that these are very small
economies. Even together as a regional market, they are still
small by global standards. So there are limitations to this
process, but it has been useful.
Second, the regional cooperation aspect has been critically
important. By cooperating as a group in mediating the encounter
with the global economy and in international negotiations,
there has been success. Certainly it has been a way in which
these countries can pool their resources and therefore save on
costs as well as get the best that the region has to offer. In
those aspects CARICOM has been useful.
In recent years, Suriname and Haiti have joined CARICOM,
which is good particularly for Haiti but also good for CARICOM
as well. CARICOM is strengthening links with the Dominican
Republic through a free trade arrangement similar to those with
Colombia and Venezuela. CARICOM is seeking to expand the size
of the regional market but also to deepen the process of
economic integration. For small countries, regionalism is an
important strategy both economically and politically in
articulating interests of the region in international affairs.
Mr. Bryan. I think CARICOM has always been an ambitious
organization and it has a long tradition of regional
cooperation and integration. But sometimes the goal falls short
of the ambition because of regional disparities in resources
and capabilities.
I think it is an organization that we have to be very proud
of because it has really been one of the successful examples of
functional cooperation and integration in the Western
Hemisphere.
Mr. Fauriol. CARICOM underscores one important factor,
which is the unique institutionalization of the Commonwealth,
the English-speaking Caribbean, for a long period of time, and
that has an effect. Despite perhaps being an institution losing
its way in the 1970's and 1980's and 1990's in terms of having
an impact on the region itself, it did create an environment in
which a whole subsidiary of set of dialogues, regular contact,
a sense of continuing political and economic community, were
sustained. These days, through technology changing
international circumstances, as Ambassador Bernal suggested, a
rationalization of these institutional efforts such as CARICOM
is helping it become effective internationally. At this point
my assessment of CARICOM is that it has been not historically
very effective but still remains an important player in the
institutionalization and progress of the region.
Mr. Ballenger. Let me ask you, Dr. Fauriol, since you spoke
earlier about Haiti, and we wonder what are we going to do, and
our Committee is involved very heavily, we read that Mr.
Aristide is pretty cut and dried going to be the next
President. Could you venture an opinion as to--I don't think
there are any newspapers here now. You are safe to say what you
want. Could you venture an opinion as to what you think is
going to go on there?
Mr. Fauriol. The first marker is obviously the elections
coming up this Sunday. I can only speculate. Conventional
wisdom is that some form of an electoral process will take
place. There will be voting and ballots and so forth. There is
some concern that there could be some violence, although there
is a contrary view that that is not going to occur. If there is
any violence, it is going to occur in the subsequent phase
which is the counting of the ballots and the confusion over the
vote count and ultimately growing tensions as to what is really
happening.
My concern here, as I tried to express a little bit in my
statement, there is a point after which the international
community, including the United States, does have to be able to
reconcile what we mean by democracy and elections.
In Haiti, we may be reaching an awful low standard. The
last elections that Haiti had in 1997, by the best accounts,
the consensus that 5 percent of the folks even bothered to
vote. I was an observer, and it was easy because there was not
much to observe. Ultimately, those elections were, in effect,
canceled over a period of about 2 years of political confusion.
The other conventional wisdom, regardless of where one
stands on the issue, is that ultimately this is just a prelude
to Presidential elections at the end of the year and the return
of former President Aristide to the National Palace.
My scholarly hat tells me the following, which is that I am
less concerned about the outcome of the election and I am more
concerned about the process, and I am troubled by the
cumulative effect of a qualitatively deteriorating electoral
process since 1995 where a controversial individual will be
elected in an environment which, even among Haitians, will be
controversial, and the situation could deteriorate dramatically
between now and the end of the year if violence and the
collapsing economy become an issue.
At this point, I am pessimistic, without a practical
recommendation except to suggest that this may be the time to
hold back and actually make a determination of where we are,
what we have been doing and what hasn't worked. Therefore, the
question of election observation to me is a good marker. If you
sent observers, you are likely to be stuck in a situation where
you have to pass judgment over an imperfect situation. If you
withhold observation, you are in a position of being able to
determine what might have happened or what, in fact, did
happen.
Mr. Ballenger. Was Porter Goss with you in that last
election? Congressman Goss?
Mr. Fauriol. Yes, I had the honor of being a Co-chair of
the International Republican Institute Observer Delegation with
Congressman Goss.
Mr. Ballenger. When he told what he thought of the
election, he caught hell for actually telling the truth. Our
responsibility to the rest of the world seems to be getting
terribly large, and in certain areas where you think that you
can be effective, I don't know where that is, but it is not
Kosovo and it is not Haiti. But Haiti is so close that if this
country can tie up its news media for one little Cuban boy,
what could we do for a couple of hundred thousand Haitians when
they actually land here?
I told Congressman Menendez that I would keep it going, but
I think you all have a time schedule, and I would like to say
that I thank you profusely for coming forward since I am
heavily involved in Central and South America but I haven't
done my little bit as far as your islands are concerned.
My wife and I--because of the floods that Mitch caused we
shipped enough steel to put the roofs on 2,500 homes in
Honduras and Nicaragua. Venezuela, the floods there, we just
shipped eight containers of used school furniture. If you
gentlemen ever feel the need--things that we in the United
States--obviously, in the United States you can't build a new
school and keep old furniture. Old furniture in a school is not
old furniture anywhere else in the world except here in the
United States. I think I have sent four container loads to
Honduras and eight to Venezuela. You haven't been hit by a
hurricane lately, and I don't wish you bad luck, but the next
time you do, let me know if we can help out. My wife and I, we
are not a United Nations or USAID, but we try to be involved.
I would like to thank you all for participating today.
Mr. Bernal. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for
arranging this hearing. I thought it was very timely. I think
it serves to direct attention to an issue which deserves more
attention. I thank you for your leadership on these issues and
your continuing interest.
A hearing like this is useful because it promotes the
dialogue not only among those have participated but in the
written record it makes available to a wider audience a source
of information which can be used for those interested in the
Caribbean.
I hope that these hearings will become a regular feature of
the Congress. I note in your opening remarks that there had not
been a hearing for about 3 years. I think this was what I hope
will be the start of a regular series of dialogues, because the
challenges that confront the U.S. and the Caribbean can only be
overcome by our economic and political cooperation.
I thank you for the attention of the Committee.
Mr. Ballenger. Let me also thank you for being as active as
you are. I know quite a few of the other Ambassadors we never
hear from. Just a general appearance of the Ambassadors is
effective in letting us know about problems that we don't know.
Unless you take the Miami Herald, we don't know what goes on in
Central or South America or the islands. The Washington Post
and the New York City Times don't seem to care.
Mr. Bernal. If I have not sent you enough letters on the
CBI, I pledge to send you more information. Thank you.
Mr. Ballenger. Again, we thank you all. Thank you for being
here today. The Committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
May 17, 2000
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