[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
65-201 CC
2000
DEMOCRACY IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
of the
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 12, 2000
__________
Committee on International Relations
Serial No. 106-116
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.international--
relations
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
DANA ROHRABACHER, California SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PETER T. KING, New York PAT DANNER, Missouri
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South BRAD SHERMAN, California
Carolina ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MATT SALMON, Arizona STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
AMO HOUGHTON, New York JIM DAVIS, Florida
TOM CAMPBELL, California EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
KEVIN BRADY, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BARBARA LEE, California
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
GEORGE P. RADANOVICH, California JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff
------
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska, Chairman
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
PETER T. KING, New York ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
MARK SANFORD, South Carolina Samoa
MATT SALMON, Arizona MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
JOHN McHUGH, New York SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
PAUL GILLMOR, Ohio JIM DAVIS, Florida
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
Michael P. Ennis, Subcommittee Staff Director
Dr. Robert King, Democratic Professional Staff Member
Matt Reynolds, Counsel
Alicia A. O'Donnell, Staff Associate
------
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
PETER T. KING, New York BRAD SHERMAN, California
MATT SALMON, Arizona WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
Grover Joseph Rees, Subcommittee Staff Director
Douglas C. Anderson, Counsel
Peter Hickey, Democratic Staff Director
Nicolle A. Sestric, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
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WITNESSES
Page
Donald L. Pressley, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Europe
and Eurasia, U.S. Agency for International Development......... 5
Dr. Martha Brill Olcott, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, and Professor of Political Science,
Colgate University............................................. 15
Mr. Paul Goble, Director of Communications, Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty.................................................. 21
Ms. Cassandra Cavanaugh, Researcher, Human Rights Watch.......... 25
APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
Mr. Donald L. Pressley........................................... 42
Dr. Martha Brill Olcott.......................................... 54
Mr. Paul Goble................................................... 71
Ms. Cassandra Cavanaugh.......................................... 78
The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress
from New Jersey................................................ 82
The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Representative in Congress from
California..................................................... 83
Additional material:
A letter to Secretary of State Madeleine Korbel Albright
submitted to the by Hon. Christopher H. Smith.................. 86
Documents submitted to the record by Ms. Cavanaugh............... 91
A statement for the record submitted by Hon. Eni Faleomavaega, a
Delegate from American Samoa................................... 85
DEMOCRACY IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 12, 2000
House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Asia and
the Pacific, joint with the Subcommittee on
International Operations and Human Rights,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 1:30 P.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Bereuter
and Hon. Christopher Smith [Chairmen of the Subcommittees]
presiding.
Mr. Bereuter. The Subcommittees will come to order. I am
going to proceed with an opening statement, assuming that the
Ranking Democrat Member, Mr. Lantos, will be here shortly, and
in order to expedite the process today, I will begin.
The Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee meets today together
with representatives of the Subcommittee on International
Operations and Human Rights in open session to receive
testimony in the progress toward democracy in the Central Asian
Republics, after which we will move to a markup of H. Con. Res.
295, a resolution regarding Vietnam's human rights and
political opposition which was introduced by Mr. Rohrabacher
and many of our colleagues.
In March of last year, the Asia Subcommittee held a hearing
on the challenges facing U.S. foreign policy in the Central
Asian Republics. Today's hearing will examine how U.S. policy
has been implemented and the effectiveness of our efforts to
bring democracy to a region that has a history of authoritarian
rule.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, five
independent states--Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan--rose in Central Asia. The
desert's mountain steppes and river valleys in this region are
home to 50 million people. State borders which were imposed by
Stalin artificially partition and breed resentments among
various large ethnic groups, principally the Russians, Uzbeks,
and Tajiks.
Long-term uncertainties and incomplete understanding of the
region, uneven political and economic progress in the five
republics, other global exigencies, and, I believe, indecision
regarding the real import of U.S. interests vis-a-vis other
priorities have resulted in a largely fractured U.S. policy
toward the region and the relegation of these states to a
policy backwater.
However, America's relative inattention to Central Asia, I
think, appears to be slowly changing. At the end of this week,
the Secretary of State embarks on her first trip to the region.
The Central Asian states are at a critical juncture in
their political and economic development, balanced between
democracy and authoritarianism, between free market economy and
systemic corruption, between cooperation with or resistance to
the West. In short, the region is poised between merging into
or retreating from the Free World.
Of all of the Soviet republics, it is certainly arguable
that those in Central Asia were least prepared for
independence. Indeed, each state today still faces three
fundamental challenges. First, they must forge a shared
national identity from a legacy of intermingled ethnic and
religious groups and convoluted borders.
Second, the Central Asian republics must institutionalize
both at and below the national level political and legal
structures and attitudes that are compatible with democracy.
Third, they must create a free and open economic system, a
radical departure from the Soviet past.
Unfortunately, Central Asia appears to be moving along the
path of authoritarianism. While in recent months each of the
five countries have conducted general elections, these
elections varied in the degree of electoral freedom, however,
in no case did any of these elections adhere to internationally
accepted norms. Indeed, most remained reminiscent of Soviet-
style elections.
The world has witnessed the decertification of opposition
parties and, in some cases, the apprehension of opposition
leaders. The State Department's current reports on human rights
practices for 1999 concluded that Presidential power in
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan overshadows legislative and judicial
powers, and that Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan have
lost ground in democratization and respect for human rights.
This continued decline is very disturbing and raises
questions about the ability of the United States to
successfully encourage true democratic institutions and the
rule of law in the region.
It is primarily for this reason that I have scheduled this
hearing. This is not a human rights hearing, yet fundamental
human rights are a key component of any progressive democratic
country.
We look forward to testimony which will address not just
the current state of democracy in the region, but what, in the
witness' opinion, the Federal Government and the Congress can
do to reverse these negative trends that are so prevalent in
the Central Asian republics.
I would tell our witnesses that the Subcommittee comes to
this hearing with no specific prescriptions. The purpose is not
to focus criticism on the Administration for any particular
action it may or may not have taken. Rather, this is part of
our duty to conduct our congressional oversight
responsibilities where the executive branch's efforts are not
yielding the desired results. It is simply that Central Asia
has been too long neglected or ignored.
This hearing seeks, in part, to remedy that shortcoming and
begin to put American foreign policy for the region on a more
appropriate course.
The Subcommittee is privileged today to have two excellent
panels of experts on Central Asia. Testifying for the
Administration is Mr. Donald Pressley, Assistant Administrator
of the U.S. Agency for International Development for Europe and
Eurasia.
A career Foreign Service officer, Mr. Pressley has served
the Agency for International Development in a number of
capacities in a career that has extended over 25 years. Mr.
Pressley is uniquely positioned to explain how the United
States has sought to promote democracy in the region, where we
have been most successful and where we have failed.
Mr. Pressley, I am particularly interested in your
assessment of what the impact of the passage of the so-called
``Strategy of 1999'' has had on U.S. policy toward the Central
Asian region. I imagine, since it was passed so recently, it
will be relatively small, but perhaps you could give us an
indication of what you expect.
We are also honored to have a second panel of imminently
qualified witnesses. I am also pleased then, therefore, to
introduce Dr. Martha Olcott. She is a Professor of Political
Science at Colgate University. Dr. Olcott is a specialist in
Central Asian affairs and inter ethnic relations in the Soviet
successor states, and a Senior Associate of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. Dr. Olcott co-directs the
Carnegie Moscow Center's Project on Ethnicity and Politics in
the former Soviet Union. As such, she organizes seminars,
conferences and publications on the ethnic conflicts in the
Soviet successor states and on regional conflicts within
Russia. It is my understanding that Dr. Olcott has only
recently briefed Secretary Albright regarding her upcoming
visit to the region.
Next, Dr. Paul Goble, Director of Communications and
Technology at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Earlier, he
served as a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. Special Advisor for Soviet Nationality
Problems and Baltic Affairs at the State Department, Director
of Research at Radio Liberty, and Special Assistant for Soviet
Nationalities in the Department of State's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research. Dr. Goble has appeared before the
International Relations Committee before on a number of
occasions, but this is his first appearance, I believe, before
the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.
Finally, Ms. Cassandra Cavanaugh served on the staff of the
New York office of Human Rights Watch where her
responsibilities extended to the Caucasus and Central Asia. Ms.
Cavanaugh is a doctoral candidate at the Columbia University,
and has previously served as Program Officer for Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan for the International Research and Exchange Board.
As is consistent with the policy of the Subcommittee, in
both panels, your entire statements will be made a part of the
record, and we will appreciate if you could proceed in
approximately 10 minutes or so. You may read or summarize your
presentations as you see fit.
I would turn next to the Ranking Member from California,
but he is not here at this point. He will be joining us as soon
as possible. We do have another Californian here, a senior
colleague on the Subcommittee, Mr. Rohrabacher of California.
Do you have any opening comments?
Mr. Rohrabacher. I will make it short, but when you said
Ranking Member from California, I thought I had been both
promoted and demoted at the same time.
I have spent considerable time in this part of the world,
and I frankly am disappointed at what has happened in these
last 8 years. I think that what we have now in Central Asia is
opportunity lost and, if not lost, almost lost.
Obviously, the people on the scene did not take our
admonitions about free elections and human rights seriously
because they have all slipped back into their old ways--if not
all the way back, at least they are going in that direction.
That is what it seems from a distance. I am looking forward to
your testimony on this.
But the last round of elections in the region were
insulting. They were insulting to us who have tried to work
with the various governments in the region to try to establish
personal rapport with some of the leaders and, instead, for
lack of a better word, they ``shined'' us on, and it was a
total disregard for honesty and the basic fundamentals of
democratic and free elections.
This area will not prosper and it will not live in peace if
it does not have freedom. If there was anything we learned
during the Reagan years, it is that freedom and peace go
together, and if you have despots continue to dominate these
countries that have such incredible potential, you will not
have the prosperity and the stability which we seek for the
region and which the people there have longed for, for so long.
One last element is, of course, the element of Afghanistan,
which I think, if you take a look at that map, the entire
Central Asia is pivoting right there on Afghanistan, and I will
renew my charge that there has been a covert policy by this
Administration of supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan despite
their brutality and their violations of the rights of women,
despite the fact that they harbor terrorists. This
Administration has refused to give me the documents necessary
to prove or disprove this charge, but in the documents, Mr.
Chairman, that I have examined, there has already been clear
evidence that the charge that I made was accurate and yet they
still kept away from my office the records of 2 full years of
communications, which are the central years that I have been
asking. For several years now I have been making this request
as a senior Member of International Relations Committee. They
have kept those documents from that time slot away from my
office and prevented us from doing the oversight we feel is
necessary.
With a regime in Afghanistan like the Taliban--anti-
Western, making hundreds of millions of dollars off the drug
trade, involving the training and base areas for terrorists--
that is a destabilizing force for the whole region, and this
Administration, I think, bears full responsibility for whatever
deals it has cut with whichever powers, whether they be
Pakistan or Saudi Arabia or whoever the deal was cut with for
this Taliban policy. The historians will note that it is this
Administration's fault for cutting such a corrupt deal.
So, with that said, I look forward to your testimony as to
the status quo, and some predictions about what is going to
happen in the future there in Central Asia.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you very much, Mr. Rohrabacher.
As we begin, I should explain that I am involved in a
contentious markup in the Banking Committee that is going on
simultaneously, and if I leave here abruptly it is only to go
cast a recorded vote and I will have to turn it over to Mr.
Rohrabacher or someone else.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Then you are really in for it.
Mr. Bereuter. Mr. Pressley, we are very pleased that you
accepted our invitation to testify today. You may proceed as
you wish.
STATEMENT OF DONALD L. PRESSLEY, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
BUREAU FOR EUROPE AND EURASIA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT (USAID)
Mr. Pressley. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Rohrabacher, thank you for
inviting me here today to discuss USAID's efforts in democracy-
building in Central Asia. I have submitted my prepared
testimony for the record and will just summarize my remarks.
Without question, promoting democracy in the five Central
Asian Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan is one of the most difficult
challenges USAID faces in Europe and Eurasia. Still, the
difficulty of the challenge should not deter us--I am sure that
you agree that democracy in and of itself is a worthy goal. In
Central Asia, it is also of particular important to U.S.
national interests.
Mr. Chairman, 2 years ago, I testified before this
Subcommittee on the then-pending Silk Road Strategy
legislation, which authorizes support for the economic and
political independence of the countries of the South Caucasus
and Central Asia.
I said then, and it is just as true today, that the
overarching goal of U.S. foreign policy with regard to the five
republics is to promote stable, democratic, market-oriented
development, so that these independent states are able to
prevent conflict and the expansion of global threats, and to
ensure fair access to the region's substantial oil, gas and
mineral resources.
Moreover, we continue to believe that as these countries
become more democratic and prosperous, commercial opportunities
will increase, and we expect inclinations toward civil strife,
and arms and drug trafficking will decrease. Widespread citizen
participation in the economic, political, and social aspects of
these societies is fundamental to achieving and maintaining
such democracy and prosperity.
Unfortunately, there have been mixed results in achieving
the laudable goals of the Silk Road Strategy. Transition to
democracy and open markets in the Asian republics of the former
Soviet Union has proven to be a very complex undertaking.
Democratic progress has been uneven, at best. People, used
to fearing their government, do not yet trust it.
While civil society and the nongovernmental sector are
growing, there are still no guarantees of freedom of speech and
association. There are still insufficient transparent and
democratic processes to support the rights of citizens as
opposed to suppressing the rights of citizens.
Parliamentary and Presidential elections in each country
have been severely flawed. Electoral institutions, such as they
are, have not contributed to democratic reform in a substantial
way. This situation is exacerbated by pervasive corruption and
the widespread abuse of human rights. Even so, we still believe
U.S. assistance programs can accomplish significant results.
Past experiences in Bulgaria and Romania and more recent
events in Slovakia and Croatia tell us that grassroots
initiatives can create a demand for reform.
The most important aspect of our strategy for Central Asia
is an increased emphasis on individuals and communities and the
institutions that nurture and serve them. We are working hard
to instill democratic skills and practices in local
organizations and governments. We are trying to reach the
younger generation through civic education.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, as Mr. Rohrabacher has just
pointed out, the human rights records of the Central Asian
governments are poor, especially those of Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan. Therefore, our work with human rights NGO's
emphasizes developing the skills to fight for increased
government accountability. For instance, we share information
on international human rights norms in NGO civic education
classes, and we educate women in their legal rights.
Corruption is another deep-seated problem in Central Asia.
USAID's approach to combating corruption is primarily ``bottom
up'', i.e., starting with citizen awareness and participation
and working up to someday hope for real policy change. It cuts
across all sectors of assistance. Our primary thrust is to
introduce the modern concepts of accountability and
transparency. These two concepts, of course, go hand-in-hand
with democracy.
On page 6 of my written statement, I note more specifically
what we are doing in this area. But, basically, within our
modest means, USAID's efforts to address corruption in Central
Asia are broad and multifaceted, befitting the depth and
pervasiveness of the problem. As with so many other aspects of
our program, it is a long-term endeavor.
USAID's core strategy in democracy-building includes
strengthening the political process, and civil society,
promoting an independent media and, as I have said, making
governments more accountable to the people. But our other work
in economic reform, enterprise development, health care, et
cetera, also has the impact of fostering democratic values and
practices. For example, a micro-credit council learns
organization, consensus-building, accountability through
voting, leadership skills and other important skills that are
integral to a functioning democracy. Local water associations
or self-regulating organizations also incorporate all the
elements that open people's eyes to what it really means to
function as a democracy.
While there is clearly much more to do, at USAID we are
proud of what our programs have been able to accomplish despite
the many challenges we face in Central Asia. On page 8 of my
written statement, I have included several examples. But for
now let me just say that civil society is growing in magnitude
and sophistication in all five countries, with citizens'
organizations now numbering over 3,000. Over 100 independent TV
stations have increased the professional quality and quantity
of news reporting. Local governments, particularly in
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, are learning to be more responsive
and accountable to their citizens. All types of groups are
organizing and solving problems locally. People are learning
about their rights and developing the skills to take
appropriate action. These are the building blocks for change.
These activities are creating a culture for democracy.
Mr. Chairman, as I have indicated, USAID is making headway
in supporting civil society in Central Asia. But we must be
realistic. This is a tough place to work. The dismal human
rights records of this region underscores the autocratic nature
of these governments; corruption levels suggest how little
respect there is for the rule of law. Change in Central Asia is
a long-term process as these countries are still grappling, as
you noted earlier, with the realities of being new nations
while simultaneously addressing the basic issues of
development--poverty, declining health standards, and a lack of
economic growth.
Still, this region is important to the United States and,
therefore, it is important to stay engaged. Our experience
tells us it is worth the effort. The grassroots approach
embodied in the USAID assistance strategy is making a
difference in the lives of individuals and communities.
Progress comes one step at a time, but in the end we believe
true reform will arrive. Until then, we must keep working.
Thank you, and I welcome your comments and questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pressley appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you very much, Mr. Pressley. I think
that, since we only have two of us here at this moment, we are
going to proceed under the 10-minute rule so we can develop any
kind of thought process a little bit better.
Mr. Pressley, I wonder if you would tell me, or reiterate
for me for the record here, what are the primary objectives of
USAID at this moment for the five Central Asian republics?
Mr. Pressley. Our strategy for Central Asia focuses on four
areas--broad economic growth through private enterprise
development; instilling democratic values and principles and
developing the NGO's, the nongovernmental organizations to set
that out; working with those countries to develop their water
and energy resources which are so important in that part of the
world for them to develop their own economic well being; and
developing at the local government level those skills and those
practices that in turn should some day lead to the kind of
democracy that we believe are important in that part of the
world.
Mr. Bereuter. Since we start here with no tradition or no
substantial tradition of democracy and democratic
participation, the later point, of course, would seem to be an
appropriate place--the ``bottoms up'' effort in where you are
starting basically with no substantial democratic tradition.
It would seem to me that ability to communicate with the
population, diverse points of view would be essential. Tell me
what the situation is, in your judgment, and what, if any,
concentration of resources there are. Address, too, an open and
uncontrolled media.
Mr. Pressley. The situation with an independent media in
Central Asia is quite sad, actually. We have seen in all five
countries that there is interference with media, that the
countries and governments still do not respect the rights of
the media and do not understand the important role that they
can play.
Through one of our nongovernmental organizations, Inter
News, we have mounted a major program. In each country Inter
News has legal advisors who are helping these media outlets to
exercise the rights that they do have, and to push and advocate
and urge for additional freedom of expression and the ability
to work in a broad way.
Here, as in other cases, we are working with these
independent media outlets so that they can develop the skills
to associate among themselves, to form consensus, to speak out
and advocate for change. So, we have mounted an intense program
to support independent media in Central Asia.
Mr. Bereuter. To what extent are international or locally
developing NGO's active in that area?
Mr. Pressley. It is still an area that is quite nascent
but, as I mentioned earlier, now we have over 100 independent
TV stations that are operating in the region. These are quite
small and quite unsustainable, I must say, in many ways, but
they are developing and we are seeing progress over the years,
and we think this is in, again, an area where we should really
stay the course and continue to support them.
Mr. Bereuter. That is encouraging to hear. I have had a
delegation visiting with me about the print media and the
difficulties of actually getting the printing presses necessary
to distribute their version of the news, their political agenda
on a newspaper basis in at least one of these countries, and I
suspect it is a more common problem than just one country. What
do we do about the situation where they simply lack the ability
to take the printed word to the population of the region?
Mr. Pressley. Again, we have programs that support print
media. I don't know the specific instance that you are
referring to, sir, but in some ways the electronic media seems
to be the area where we have the greatest opportunity and, on
balance, we have emphasized our programs more with radio and TV
because of the widespread ability to get out to the rural areas
that those two approaches have. So we have put the relative
emphasis on those kinds of programs.
Mr. Bereuter. Mr. Pressley, moving to another area, one of
the things we hear from these governments and people in those
countries is the urgency of having foreign, especially in
American investment in the region. But so many American and
foreign firms have had difficulty with the violation of the
contracts in very obvious and costly ways.
With corruption so endemic in the region, do you think
there is some way to effectively convince countries--and I will
just say Kazakhstan is one where we have a particular problem--
and to understand that what they do and how they treat foreign
firms, including American firms--which has a big impact on the
willingness of other firms to make investments--and to
establish an ongoing trade relationship? What do we do. Do we
condition aid in any fashion? How do we get the point across?
It seems like we are not having much success with the normal
kind of discussions and negotiations.
Mr. Pressley. Actually, the level of assistance that we are
able to provide to Central Asia is quite small in terms of
their economies and the areas that they are focusing in.
Kazakhstan, as a prime example, is very interested in the oil
wealth that it potentially has and is working with American
companies in that sector, and so in some ways, being open to
private investment in the oil sectors where they are focusing
most of their attention. I honestly don't think conditioning
the kinds of levels of assistance that we are able to provide
will work very well there.
Mr. Bereuter. Would it be more appropriate, if we decided
to do this, to focus on resources from some of the multilateral
institutions because we don't have that much involved
ourselves--the IMF, for example, the World Bank in particular?
Mr. Pressley. Throughout this region, we have worked very
closely with the IMF and the World Bank to come up with
appropriate conditions that do make sense for those
multilateral organizations, and I think that is an area where
conditions do make sense and where you have the kind of
government and government programs that you get the leverage
that you are looking for.
If I could just continue, one of the lightning rods that we
have supported is the Central Asia-American Enterprise Fund
which is investing in these countries, and it has been a
tremendous struggle, but through its struggles we have learned
where the points of interface and problems are, and we have
been able to go back to these governments and to urge the kind
of policy change that would allow the Enterprise Fund to try to
attract more investment and to try to operate better.
Out of the five countries, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have
the best opportunity for that. We have been virtually unable to
operate in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in a way
that really makes sense. So we are trying to focus in
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, but even there it is a tough
environment for American investment, and the Enterprise Fund
stands out as an example of where Americans are trying to use
actual investments to make policy change.
Mr. Bereuter. Mr. Pressley, I want to mention at this point
that I would like to ask about an opposition leader in
Kyrgyzstan. I think you are not the right person to address
this to, but a man named Kulov was actually apparently taken
from a hospital room and imprisoned. I am going to ask the
State Department to give us an account of that.
My final question is an open-ended one for you, Mr.
Pressley, and that is if you could make a change or give an
additional priority to a particular program that is aimed at
our broad agenda of promoting democracy, rule of law, and human
rights in that region, what would you recommend to the
Congress? What changes would you like to see made?
Mr. Pressley. I believe that we do have the best
opportunity in the grassroots approach in the civil society
work. If I could emphasize the role that nongovernmental
organizations play in that part of the world, that is where I
would put the emphasis.
It doesn't require necessarily a lot more funding because
there is an absorptive issue here and you have to take it step-
by-step. But in terms of the support that the Congress gives to
the work that USAID and the U.S. Government is doing, I think
your acknowledgement that it is a long-term issue, that
grassroots does make sense, would be very helpful to us as we
deal with those governments and continue to push for allowing
that kind of civil society to grow and foster in that part of
the world.
Mr. Bereuter. My red light has not come on yet, so I want
to ask you, to what extent the European Union is putting in aid
now as compared to our own and your own impressions, and to
what extent we coordinate our effort?
Mr. Pressley. The European Union has not focused very much
on Central Asia. I work very closely with the European Union's
assistance program in this part of the world, it is called
TACIS, and I was just in Brussels 3 weeks ago meeting with the
Director of this organization, and they do have programs there
and we do coordinate but, relatively speaking, they are
focusing much more on Central Europe and the countries that are
closer to accession into the European Union. So once again, the
United States is the donor, is the country that these countries
are looking to for assistance and support and helping them make
these changes.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you. The gentleman from California, Mr.
Rohrabacher, is recognized for 10 minutes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. Let us talk a little
bit about China and Russia's influence in this region, and as
we know that this was the area where a century and a half ago
they used to call it the ``playing field of the great game'',
Britain and Russia seeking influence.
Is Russia now engaged in trying to dominate these former
territories that it has dominated for the last 70 or 80 years?
Mr. Pressley. Mr. Rohrabacher, I am probably not the best
witness to speak definitively on Russia's intentions. I can
tell you that from my perspective of seeing the assistance
activities that are carrying out in Central Asia, that Russia
remains very engaged in this area, it regards it as an area
that is of extreme importance to its own national interest.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Do you see Russia as a positive force or
negative force?
Mr. Pressley. I think that there an attempt to be sure to
continue the domination of these countries because it has been
such an important part of their economy. I have seen, for
example, that as Kazakhstan is talking about joining the WTO,
they are very nervously watching what Russia is doing and
trying to get guidance from that, and trying to understand the
impact this would have on their economy. That is only
understandably so, from my perspective.
Mr. Rohrabacher. The people I met from the region, a lot of
them believe that Russia is engaged in destabilizing the region
intentionally. Would you say that the Russians, for example--
one example I have always heard is that they are trying to keep
the war going between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Is there any
validity to that, do you think?
Mr. Pressley. I am not aware of any validity to that. That
might be a question I could take back to the State Department
with me. We have the contact group, the Group of Five, that
have been working to resolve--help resolve the issues between
Azerbaijan and Armenia. Russia is a member of that group, and
the reports that I get from our representative on that group is
that there is coordinated effort to try to resolve those
issues. But, as I say, I may not have the full information on
that.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Is there Chinese immigration evident in
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, perhaps Tajikistan?
Mr. Pressley. I cannot answer that question. I would be
happy to take it for the record and check with my colleagues in
the State Department on this.
[This information was not submitted at the time of
printing]
Mr. Rohrabacher. Two years ago when I visited the region,
there were complaints in Kazakhstan, in particular, that there
seemed to be an intentional illegal immigration of Chinese
Nationals into the country, and you haven't seen any evidence
of that?
Mr. Pressley. I have not seen that.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. The Uzbekis seem to be, just
from my perspective, more sophisticated in their leadership. Of
the various leaders I met in the region, Karimov and his group
seemed to be much more sophisticated and even pro-Western than
the others who I met, especially this guy from Turkmenistan,
the guy who has his picture all over the place, with the big
hat on and everything. That is really strange.
Mr. Pressley. Niyazov.
Mr. Rohrabacher. But even in Uzbekistan where they seem to
be sophisticated and pro-Western, in the last elections they
let everybody down. In Uzbekistan, they are very suspicious of
Russians. Their rhetoric has been certainly pro-Western. So,
for people who seem to understand, have an understanding, they
seem to be sophisticated, yet they make a travesty out of the
electoral process. How do you explain that?
Mr. Pressley. As we mentioned earlier, these are new
nations. These are leaders who had not come from any sense of
change. They are former Communist leaders who----
Mr. Rohrabacher. All of them are. Are we just going to have
to wait it out for a generation or two, for all these people to
die off either naturally or otherwise?
Mr. Pressley. I certainly hope not, but we are going to
have to work away at the citizen level, and work with these
nongovernmental groups that I have been talking about.
I think that the leaders of this region feel that they are
under a variety of pressures, including those coming from
Afghanistan and other parts, that lead them to believe
incorrectly that they need to maintain that ``iron fist'', that
they need to be in charge and not let people speak out against
them, and not allow the kind of dissent that is so healthy.
So, I think it is going to have to come up from the bottom,
and that is where we are working.
Mr. Rohrabacher. From what you have said, I take it the
National Endowment for Democracy and other of our pro-human
rights institutions in the United States have been active in
the region and have done a fairly good job, from what you can
see?
Mr. Pressley. Yes, that is right. I can't speak
specifically to the National Endowment for Democracy in this
part of the world, although they are working in this region
more broadly. But I think that there are a variety of human
rights groups that have had programs there, and we have
supported them, and we think they are doing the right thing and
are trying their best.
Mr. Rohrabacher. You agree with my assessment that unless
there is some kind of change in Afghanistan, that it will
continue to be a source of instability for the region as a
whole?
Mr. Pressley. I do.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Again,
for the record, I am very deeply disappointed in this last 8
years. I really believe that if we would have been more
forceful in that region, we could have had more progress toward
a truly democratization; instead--and I have met almost all of
these leaders, and some are more sophisticated, like in
Uzbekistan, and others are less sophisticated perhaps, like in
Kazakhstan or in Turkmenistan, but whatever their level of
sophistication, they seem to have not made the progress that we
felt was potential 8 and 10 years ago and, without that success
on the political end, we are not going to have the economic
success that we all know is the potential of Central Asia.
So, thank you very much, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. I agree with your
assessment.
The gentleman from South Carolina.
Mr. Sanford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I might, I am
gathering a few thoughts, would the gentleman from New Jersey
like to go? If not, I will go, but----
Mr. Bereuter. I am pleased to yield to the Chairman of the
International Operations and Human Rights Subcommittee, the
gentleman from South Jersey?
The gentleman from New Jersey, who Chairs the International
Relations Operations and Human Rights Subcommittee.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I thank
Mr. Pressley for his testimony and regret that I was not here
earlier. I was one of the speakers at the rally on PNTR and had
to wait my turn, and finally got up there and it set me back
time wise. So, I do apologize for not hearing your testimony.
I would like to make a very brief opening statement and
then submit some questions to our very distinguished witness.
I am very pleased that we are able to conduct this joint
hearing on the state of democracy in the Central Asia
Republics. As you know, Mr. Chairman, I introduced last fall,
H.Con.Res. 204, voicing concern about the serious violations of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in most states of Central
Asia.
Much has transpired in the region since the time of
introduction, and I am eager for us to schedule a markup and
Floor consideration on the measure as soon as we return from
the Easter recess.
As we all know, the Secretary of State is traveling to
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan in the coming days, and
members of the Helsinki Commission, which I chair, joined me
just recently in sending a letter to the Secretary of State
urging her to raise a number of very specific human rights and
democratization issues in her talks with authorities in the
region, and I would ask that that letter be made a part of the
record.
Mr. Bereuter. Without objection, that will be the order.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Smith. Thank you. In general, the state of
democratization and human rights in the countries of Central
Asia is a source of serious concern, frustration and
disappointment.
Over the past year, the Commission has conducted a series
of hearings on the countries in the region. The five newly
independent States of Central Asia were admitted to the OSCE in
1992, after freely accepting all commitments contained in the
1975 Helsinki Final Act and subsequent OSCE documents.
Let us not forget that each of the leaders, having signed
the OSCE documents, have personally acknowledged ``democracy is
the only system of government for our Nations'', and committed
themselves to foster democratization by holding free and fair
elections, to promote freedom of the media, and to observe
human rights.
Some 8 years later, these countries remain independent
sovereign entities, but in much of Central Asia the commitments
have been slighted. Central Asian leaders give every indication
of intending to remain in office for life, and Western
Capitals, though dutifully pressing their leaders to observe
OSCE commitments, seem to have accepted this unpleasant reality
as unalterable.
Throughout the region, fundamental freedoms are ignored
while leaders entrench themselves and their families in power
and in wealth.
Mr. Chairman, the deterioration of democracy, the lack of
the rule of law, and the violations of human rights seriously
jeopardize genuine stability in the region and are contrary to
U.S. interests. I would strongly suggest that our interests
could only be advanced through the promotion of democratic
principles where officials are accountable to the electorate
and justice is administered impartially.
I want to thank you again, and I look forward to our second
panel, and I will, again, Mr. Pressley, read your statement
very carefully. Yield back.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you very much, Chairman Smith.
Is the gentleman from South Carolina prepared to proceed?
The gentleman is recognized.
Mr. Sanford. I was looking through notes--and, again, I
apologize for being late as well. I would simply say this, I
guess I have two questions--one on the role of Islam in the
region. What are your thoughts on radical Islamic faith versus
not? Is that increasingly becoming a problem point? If you
already covered this in your testimony, just say so.
The second question I would have would be exactly how much
do we give in aid to that region, because I missed it, and it
may be in your notes.
Mr. Pressley. Thank you, sir. On your first point, I did
not talk about the role of Islam. Central Asia has a form of
Islam that varies across the countries, and we have seen in
some countries that there is a great comfort level there, if
you will, with that religion. In others, there is considerably
more tension. Tajikistan, for example, unfortunately, is an
area of civil strife, and the various warring factions that are
there are influenced by their various views on religion.
As we mentioned earlier, there are radical elements of
Islam that are very interested in expanding their role and
influence and control in this part of the world, and the
leaders of these countries are quite determined to keep that
radical element out.
So, it is an area where unfortunately this major religion
is being used by various groups for their own means and
devices, and they are using this as a way to stir up the
people, and it has caused both unrest and great conflict in
this region.
In terms of the budget, if I could just put this in
perspective, the level of assistance that was appropriated
under the FREEDOM Support Act that covers the NIS, over all the
years that we have been there is approximately $7.5 billion.
Out of that, we have allocated approximately $900 million to
the Central Asia Republics.
Mr. Sanford. For some reason, I thought it was more in the
neighborhood of like $400 million a year that was going to--us
that the neighborhood, or that is high?
Mr. Pressley. That is high. For Kazakhstan, in this fiscal
year, the amount allocated for USAID programs is $27 million;
Kyrgyzstan is approximately $21 million; Tajikistan is $7
million; Turkmenistan is $4 million, and Uzbekistan is $9
million.
Mr. Sanford. So I am mixing up former Soviet republics to
the east when I get to that. Yes. If you look at the
configuration of the presidency, in essence, for instance, in
Kazakhstan, as I understand, power is very centrally located in
the executive branch as opposed to other branches of
government. Is America getting a good return on--in essence,
you have a king over there, as I understand. Is that not the
case?
Mr. Pressley. You have a very authoritarian government,
there is no doubt that. We have seen that elections are
severely flawed, and that power remains very heavily
centralized.
Our approach to deal with that issue, as I mentioned
earlier, is to work at the grassroots, to promote civil
society, to promote citizens' awareness, to cause them to
understand the benefits of democracy and want to advocate for
change themselves. This is a long-term strategy but, as we have
all indicated, over the past 8 years we have been disappointed
in the level of reform and the movement toward democracy, and
we think this kind of grassroots approach has to be the one
that will pay off for us in the end.
Mr. Sanford. I am burning through my time, but you would
say that that $23 million a year that the taxpayer is sending,
for instance--and I am not picking on Kazakhstan other than the
fact that you mentioned it, you could pick each of the
different countries--but you would say that could be an
exceedingly long-term investment by the American taxpayer--
several generations is essentially what you are saying.
Mr. Pressley. I would hope not several generations.
Mr. Bereuter. The gentleman's time has expired.
Thank you, Mr. Pressley, for appearing here today and for
your testimony.
Mr. Bereuter. If our second panel would come forward, we
are going to hear from Dr. Paul Goble, Director of
Communications for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty; Dr.
Martha Olcott, Professor, Department of Political Science,
Colgate University; and Ms. Cassandra Cavanaugh, Researcher for
Human Rights Watch in New York City. As I mentioned, your
entire statements will be made a part of the record. You may
proceed as you wish. I would like to see if you could summarize
your comments in about five or 6 minutes, if possible, or give
us that part that you would like to supplement your prepared
remarks, and then we will move to the questions.
First, we will call on Dr. Martha Olcott, Professor at
Colgate University.
Dr. Olcott, you may proceed as you wish.
STATEMENT OF DR. MARTHA BRILL OLCOTT, SENIOR ASSOCIATE,
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, PROFESSOR OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE, COLGATE UNIVERSITY
dR. Olcott. I apologize that I am going to have to leave
after my testimony and any questions that are directly for me
because I am testifying in the Senate subcommittee at exactly
the same time as I am here.
Mr. Bereuter. I understood that you were not going to be
there until 3:30.
Dr. Olcott. They moved the hearing back to 2 and they
wanted me there at 3, if I could.
Mr. Bereuter. It is very difficult for us to intervene and
have members ask questions of just you without listening the
other panelists. We will see as we go.
Dr. Olcott. Then, am I excused to leave after my testimony?
Mr. Bereuter. That is not too helpful to the members. We
like to be cooperative with the Senate, but I believe you were
scheduled to come here to the House of Representatives. We will
see if we can work something out as we proceed.
Dr. Olcott. Because I feel really awkward, but that was the
negotiation with the staff. I am sorry.
Mr. Bereuter. Staff is not authorized to give way to the
Senate. Doctor, you may proceed.
Dr. Olcott. I am going to summarize part of my testimony.
The Central Asian region has been a disappointing one from
the point of view of democracy-building. In fact, the situation
appears to grow worse with every passing year. Initially,
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan seemed to be making steady progress
toward the development of democratic or quasi-democratic
politics, but in the past 2 years the regimes in each country
have become more autocratic. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have
had strong man rulers from the outset. Hopes for achieving a
political opening in the former case were largely dashed after
the February 1999 bombings in Tashkent.
The one ``bright light'' is Tajikistan, where part of the
opposition has been brought into government and the role of
nongovernmental groups has expanded in recent years. However,
the government in Dushanbe is not yet in control of this war-
torn country, and leaders in neighboring states see the
``victories'' of democracy in Tajikistan as further
destabilizing the situation in their own countries.
The main reason why democracies have not developed in
Central Asia is that the region's leaders don't want them to.
However, the region's rulers would like us to believe that the
failure of democracy-building in the region is a good thing,
not a bad one. They portray their populations as unready for
democracy, politically immature, and capable of being swayed by
extreme ideologies. In addition, they say that their people
respect strong rulers, and as traditional Asians they are ill-
disposed to democracy.
Most importantly, they argue that their neighborhood is too
dangerous to allow them the risk of empowering the people. The
latter explanation has become more popular over time, given the
obviously deteriorating security situation in the countries in
and around the region. Decisions about economic reform and
political institution building are regularly subjected to the
litmus test of whether policy initiatives are likely to help
the government keep the peace.
Invariably, though, those in power view their continuation
in office as inseparable from the cause of stability. Partly
this is because they view themselves as most fit to rule, but
in many cases it is also because they do not want to lose the
perquisites of power. The latter has allowed these men to
enrich themselves, their families and their cronies, although
the abuse is varied from country to country.
For now, the population of the region generally tolerates
the actions of their leaders, but this does not mean that they
are unprepared for democracy, or that they will forever accept
the current situation.
The level of preparedness for democratic institution
building and level of public engagement on civil society issues
varies dramatically from country to country. Unfortunately,
many of the support structures necessary for democracy-building
are disappearing in these countries with each passing year,
this includes a committed elite and the institutions necessary
to sustain pluralistic or democratic societies.
Decisions to restrict democratization have reduced the
number of political stake holders in each of these societies.
There is also an implicit relationship between political and
economic reform. Economic reform also creates new political
stake holders, and the pattern of economic restructuring has
varied considerably. So, too, have decisions about the
empowerment of traditional institutions and local governments.
Thus, the potential consequences of the current failures in
democratic institution building vary from country to country.
There are also interdependencies throughout the region, and
failures in one state can create problems in another.
These patterns of interdependency make Uzbekistan a
critical nation to watch. Developments here will influence
those in neighboring states.
In this regard, the political map of Uzbekistan was quite
similar to that of Tajikistan, although the economic, political
and social structure of the Uzbeks was more complicated than
that of the Tajiks. Political unrest in Uzbekistan has never
reached that same fevered pitch. At the same time, the
government has pursued a highly focused campaign against
secular and religious political activists.
In many ways, Uzbekistan has the most thought-out model of
state-building in the region, although it is far from clear
that it is able to meet the challenges that this state faces.
Karimov has looked to institutionalize a system where there is
a strong man on top, who chooses regional rulers and then
allows a certain range of autonomous action and functioning of
re-empowered traditional institutions. This model is designed
to create a wide range of stake holders in the regime,
particularly at the local level. Key to the model is Karimov's
support for the maintenance of a strong social welfare net,
which is designed to stimulate mass political allegiance. Local
institutions are charged with the supervision of this net and
this makes local officials important stake holders. At the same
time, though, it allows the Karimov regime someone to blame
when things go wrong.
The system, however, is directly linked to the state
maintaining a certain threshold of economic productivity. While
official Uzbek figures on GDP suggest that the country has not
suffered the same precipitous economic decline as neighboring
states, conditions on the ground tell a different story. The
Uzbek government has managed to maintain a minimum standard of
living across society by sharply restricting the convertibility
of the national currency.
These decisions about economic reform are creating their
own political risk. However, economic conditions in the country
in recent years have led to the thwarting of many thousands of
these potential entrepreneurs at all levels. In other words,
the number of potential economic stake holders in the country
has been sharply reduced, and with them the number of potential
political stake holders. This has increased elite
dissatisfaction in favor of meeting a perceived mass demand. It
is not clear if the regime has set up the conditions necessary
to meet mass demand in the future, they may simply have
transferred the period of maximum political risk from the years
just after independence to a period down the road.
Islamic opposition groups have been forced underground or
to flee the country. The nature of religious opposition is such
that anti-regime groups have been able to better position
themselves than have their secular counterparts. The number of
Muslim followers of fundamentalist ideologies has increased in
the past several years, but it should not be presumed that all
Islamic activists are potential terrorists, they obviously are
not, but a serious Islamic threat now exists in Uzbekistan.
Given the level of elite dissatisfaction and the continued
presence of religion, religious themes are far more likely to
be used as a way to mobilize popular opposition to the regime
than might otherwise have been the case, and it is not beyond
the realm of the possible that secular and religious opponents
could make common cause.
The longer economic reform is postponed, the more difficult
it will be for an alternative political elite to find an
independent power base.
Kyrgyzstan. The situation in Uzbekistan has had an obvious
influence on developments in neighboring Kyrgyzstan. The risks
associated with this permeability were clearly demonstrated in
the Batken hostage crisis last summer when a group of Uzbek
fighters held Kyrgyz and Japanese hostages for several months.
These actions occurred at a time when the Kyrgyz government
was in the process of backing away from its commitment to
democratic principles, and provided a further justification for
them to do so.
President Akaev used to be an ardent supporter of
democratic principles that worked well for him. Kyrgyzstan was
the model in the region, and it led to a much higher than
average per capita foreign assistance in the country. However,
the standard of living in Kyrgyzstan continues to deteriorate.
This has made President Akaev far more unpopular. This
unpopularity as well as growing corruption tied to the official
family has made him very suspicious of political opposition.
At the same time it has become more difficult to complain
about these abuses. Formal and informal restrictions on the
press have increased, and most serious of the abuses is to the
electoral system, particularly the treatment of opposition
politicians, including most recently the arrest of Feliks
Kulov.
Political crack down in Kyrgyzstan need not be a recipe for
civil war or civil unrest, but it certainly makes a poor
country poorer and more dependent upon powerful neighbors as
well as a growing drug trade.
The current pattern in Kyrgyzstan is similar to that of
Kazakhstan, where there has also been a crack down on political
opposition and jailing of figures that contested the authority
of Nazarbayev and corrupt parliamentary elections. However, in
many ways, the crack down in Kazakhstan is less troubling than
that in Kyrgyzstan. The problem is that the nature of stake
holding in Kyrgyzstan is much more restrictive. Kazakhstan is
implicitly pluralistic, given the country's enormous size,
economic complexity, and ethnic diversity.
This informal pluralism is not a substitute for formal
pluralism, but it does help keep alive the potential for
democratic development in the absence of a supportive
environment. The supportive environment is no longer present in
Kazakhstan. Although economic reform has been episodic, it has
been largely linear, and it has led to the empowerment of some
independent economic stake holders. Regional economies are also
beginning to develop. These are still too small and those tied
to them too cautious to actively seek political power, but they
are likely to become a force that will need to be reckoned with
at the time when power begins to ebb away from President
Nazarbayev.
Just a few comments about Turkmenistan. It is the most
opaque of the Central Asia societies. It has an anachronistic
political system, media is tightly controlled, and there is no
intellectual life to speak of in the country.
In the first years of independence, when it looked like oil
and gas wealth was around the corner, the peculiarities of the
Turkmen political system were less troubling to potential
political and economic stake holders. Now, the crack down in
Turkmenistan's political life combined with the closing down of
economic prospects mean that there will be no democratic
institutions to be used by increasingly more thwarted political
and economic stake holders.
In many ways, Tajikistan has made the most strides toward
achieving a civil society, in part because a coalition seemed
the only way out of the crisis engendered by the civil war. At
the same time, Tajikistan has the most criminalized economy in
the region, creating a state within a state. Drugs dominate in
the border areas with Afghanistan, and the mayor of Dushanbe is
said to meet his municipal needs by taxing the drug trade. The
pervasive atmosphere of lawlessness in Tajikistan makes other
Central Asian leaders frightened of the Tajik example.
What lessons can we draw from the past 9 years of U.S.
policy? I would argue that these dismal results do not mean
that U.S. efforts have been for naught. There is a tradition of
independent media developing in most of the countries of the
region, even if what they can broadcast is still restricted. A
new generation of lawyers and other legal experts is receiving
training, and with time they should be able to provide a more
forceful lobby for the need for legal reform. the number of
people with formal training in business and economics is also
increasing, and they too seem certain to push for the need for
legal reforms in the area of protection of property. The next
generation of administrators throughout the region should be
better trained than the current one, and they will be able to
draw on the expertise and involvement of those active in the
NGO sector.
The U.S. should continue to make an investment in the human
capital of Central Asia, however, we shouldn't exaggerate the
influence that these training programs are likely to have.
Young people with knowledge of the West are likely to make more
effective interlocutors when they come into positions of
importance, but they need not make better or more dependable
partners for the U.S.
Thank you.
[The statement of Dr. Olcott appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Bereuter. We are going to bend our rules and we will
call on Mr. Rohrabacher for a question, and then we will
proceed to the other two gentlemen for a question each.
Mr. Rohrabacher. The real trouble is that you have got
every one of those countries is being run by a very strong
individual who doesn't want to give up power. Am I being too
simplistic there?
Dr. Olcott. No.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Because if it wasn't that, there is a good
possibility that we would have some evolution, but we are not
seeing this evolution because of the strong individuals.
Maybe a policy I suggested to Hun Sen down in Cambodia
might be an idea, and that is to say if we are going to have a
relationship with you, we have got to know that you are not
going to try to be the strong man and the power in this country
forever, for as long as you are alive, and suggested that there
be a voluntary term limit agreement that these tough guys, for
us to even have any relations with them, have to agree to
announce that after a certain number of years--4, 8, or 10
years, whatever that is--that they will no longer be the head
of their country and they will leave power. What do you think
about that?
Dr. Olcott. I think it is a great idea, but I don't think
you would find any takers in the region.
Mr. Rohrabacher. It depends on what the price was for not
agreeing to that. Certainly, if we just continue to treat them
as a legitimate government--I made it very clear to Hun Sen
that I wasn't going to treat him like legitimate head of state
and that I would be a royal pain if he continued to act as if
he was going to control that country forever. But what if our
whole government was telling Hun Sen and these various
dictators that and just walk away from them if they don't agree
to that?
Dr. Olcott. I would say that as bad as these regimes are,
most of them aren't on the short list of the most horrible
regimes in the world, which is probably why it would be hard to
totally walk away from the regimes.
The big problem is that the leaders of the countries are
really greedy and the problem of official corruption is really
a serious one, and they are not going to walk away easily. But
I would say where the U.S. has to put its influence is to work
with these people to create institutions necessary to support
the inevitable political successions that are going to occur,
that even though it is harsh to say we have to take the hit on
the next 5 or 10 years, I think what we have to do is begin
working toward the transfer of power, and to try to keep things
from deteriorating even further.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Pressley recommended that we try to
set up and support these alternatives from the ground up.
Frankly, I don't think that the problem is with the grassroots
in these societies. I think it is the other way around, and no
matter how much money and effort we put in trying to convince
the people to develop democratic institutions, they are ready
for it. It is these tough guys that are the real problem.
Mr. Chairman, I think that is all the questions I have.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Sanford, one
question for the Professor.
Mr. Sanford. My one question would be regarding the number
for Turkmenistan it was around $5 million or something that we
sent there. In politics, if you don't have a certain level of
saturation in advertising, frankly, it is a waste of time. Are
we at that waste of time level with some of these countries?
Dr. Olcott. Honestly, I think we are with some of them. I
don't think we can make a dent in Turkmenistan's domestic
politics and their decision to go back to selling gas through
Moscow, I think, is proof of the fact that they have options.
They may not be options we like, but I think engagement with
Uzbekistan is really critical because they create a security
risk for the whole region. I think engagement with Kazakhstan
is really critical because I think, as I say in my formal
remarks at greater length, that Kazakhstan is implicitly a
pluralistic society even though it is not legally or explicitly
a pluralistic society, and I think by really engaging in
Kazakhstan today, we can help ensure the chance that when
Nazarbayev passes from the scene, Kazakhstan will become a more
attractive place to do business with. It is not lost, it really
isn't.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you. Good question, Mr. Sanford.
Dr. Cooksey.
Dr. Cooksey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Is it correct that
most of our aid is going to Kazakhstan?
Dr. Olcott. I think so, yes. I think that Kazakhstan
receives more monetarily and Kyrgyzstan receives more per
capita.
Dr. Cooksey. Where did you say you would place that aid, if
you were to place it?
Dr. Olcott. I would continue with what we are doing in
Kazakhstan, and even upgrade. I think the money we are spending
on economic restructuring, which is really where a lot of this
is going, is really having an impact. I think that economics
will help lead Kazakhstan out of its political mire. It is a
large, complex country, and the degree to which they create an
independent entrepreneurial class, which is beginning to be
formed, I think is really the hope of the future.
Unfortunately, we can't engage in the same way in Uzbekistan
because their currency is not convertible. Even though I am a
political scientist, I think in the long-run money spent on
economics in these transition societies will contribute more.
We have to keep working with the NGO's. We obviously have to
keep defending human rights and human rights activists, but I
think that the future of transition will really only occur if
there can be the creation of a new, independent entrepreneurial
class and if local governments can begin to function in a more
or less quasi-pluralistic way.
Dr. Cooksey. Elaborating on your last comment, Dr. Olcott,
is there a meaningful way for American business and American
businesswomen and businessmen to participate in this economic
growth development that we are helping support in Kazakhstan,
for example?
Dr. Olcott. There is, especially in Kazakhstan where the
currency is freely exchangeable. The two problems with business
in Kazakhstan--and I serve as one of the directors of the
Central Asian American Enterprise Fund, as its Vice Chair in
fact--the problem that we encounter with our investments is
that the market is really still very small. That is one of the
problems, how big a prize is the capture a market of only 18
million people, as Central Asia is not yet a whole single
functioning economic region. The second is the dependability of
contract, and the second is one I think that we can really
continue to work with the Kazakh government to increase
training of economic judges. I think these are all things that
we really can do and where AID is really making a real and
important contribution.
Dr. Cooksey. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Dr. Olcott.
Dr. Olcott. May I be excused?
Mr. Bereuter. Yes.
Dr. Olcott. I am really sorry, I apologize. Thank you.
Mr. Bereuter. Mr. Goble and Ms. Cavanaugh, we are pleased
to hear from you.
Mr. Goble, you are listed first, you may proceed as you
wish.
STATEMENT OF MR. PAUL GOBLE, DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS, RADIO
FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY
Mr. Goble. I am pleased to be speaking before this
Subcommittee for the first time because I think it represents a
major step forward--not that I am invited--but that Central
Asia is being focused on by something other than the European
aspect of looking through Moscow to get to Central Asia, and I
want to commend you for the reorganization which,
unfortunately, has not been paralleled everywhere else in this
city.
The governments of post-Soviet Central Asia are producing
what they say they most want to avoid--growing instability and
the rise of a radical Islamist opposition. Moreover, the two
more important outside actors in the region, Russia and the
West, are unintentionally encouraging this process, in the
first case so as to extend Moscow's influence and in the second
in the name of maintaining stability, and imposing an Islamic
threat which, in fact, the approach that has been adopted is
producing rather than containing.
But as a result of all this, the prospects for democracy
and the stability that democracy can bring in these countries
in this region are now far worse than they have been at anytime
since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
That sobering conclusion is one that suggests that these
countries may, in fact, in the upcoming leadership transition,
go in the direction of the authoritarian, anti-Westernism
pursued by Iran, Algeria and several other Islamic countries.
It in turn reflects the nature of the post-communist regimes in
these countries, the nature of Islam as it has evolved there
first under the Soviet system and now in post-Soviet times, and
finally the nature of the involvement of outside powers. I
would like to comment briefly on those three topics, and I have
spoken more fully in my written presentation.
In his classic essay of the early 1970's, ``Will the Soviet
Union Survive until 1984?'', Andrei Amalrik predicted that the
countries of post-Soviet Central Asia were far more likely to
continue Soviet patterns of behavior long after communist power
fell than any other countries to emerge from a post-USSR
environment.
He argued that the congruence, even fusion of the
traditional patriarchal forms of rule with Marxist-Leninist
methods would have the effect of preserving the Soviet system
in important ways, and that preservation of the past, he
concluded, would mean that when change did come to the region,
it was likely to be more radical, more anti-Western, and hence
more dangerous than anywhere else. I believe that is true.
Tragically, as so often happens to a prophet, Amalrik's
words on this point have been ignored even after his
fundamental prediction about the demise of the USSR proved
true. Even more tragically, his prediction about Central Asia
are proving to be true right now.
Overwhelmingly, as has already been noted, the Soviet-era
leadership of these countries remains in place. Three of the
five presidents were first secretaries of the Communist Party
and the apparatus is more than 80 percent holdovers from the
Communist Era. It is going to take more than a couple
generations to change that because we are already watching the
nomenclature reproduce itself with people accepting the values
of their bosses from Soviet times because no one is being
sufficiently critical of what they are doing.
What we have seen in the last few years, after a great deal
of optimism in the early 1990's, is that Kazakhstan President
Nursultan Nazarbayev has become ever more authoritarian, and
Kyrgyzstan President Asker Akayev, in whom so many placed so
much hope, has become as authoritarian as anyone else.
Turkmenistan cannot begin to be called a democracy; indeed, it
is very difficult to speak of it as a legitimate state.
Uzbekistan, the joke in Uzbekistan is that Uzbekistan did not
leave the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union left Uzbekistan, and
much of it has been preserved.
Still worse, the leaders of these countries have done
everything they can to prevent the emergence of a genuine civil
society that could simultaneously support their governments
over time, and produce a new generation of leaders. Precisely
because so many people in the West have defined the emergence
of NGO's as being the equivalent of the emergence of democracy,
what we have seen is the restoration of a Soviet-era pattern,
namely, government organized nongovernmental organizations, or
``GONGO's'', which can be trotted out to visiting Congressmen
and others to demonstrate that somehow democracy is happening.
But to compound this problem, the leaders, compelled
largely by us, have used the vocabulary and occasionally the
forms of democracy, while draining both of any real content.
That combination has produced a fragile authoritarianism, one
that is likely to meet its demise with the passing of this
generation of leaders.
Who is going to come next? Unfortunately, the post-Soviet
leaders of these countries are producing their own nemesis,
namely, a kind of fundamentalist Islam. Islam, by itself, does
not represent a threat to either the social order or to the
political arrangements in Central Asia, but Islamist politics
do to both.
This paradox reflects three important things. First, Soviet
policies in the region had the effect of removing the content
of Islam while leaving the label as an important marker of
identity, thus opening the way for its fundamental redefinition
by opposition political entrepreneurs, particularly when they
were deprived of the possibility of speaking anywhere else. It
is truly tragic that large numbers of people in this city have
accepted Russian characterizations of Muslims as being
fundamentalists, when they are not even good Muslims.
I once had the opportunity to speak to President Djokhar
Dudayev from Chechnea, and Mr. Dudayev told me, ``Mr. Goble, I
am a good Muslim, I pray three times a day``. A good Muslim
would know that you pray 5 times a day. But having been a
member of the Communist Party since age 18, he was not totally
familiar with the religion he was being blamed as a spokesman
for.
Second, the post-Soviet regimes in this region have
continued the Soviet practice in dealing with Islam,
officializing part of it and suppressing much of the rest,
which has the effect of making the suppressed part of Islam
that which is most attractive to political opponents.
Third, precisely because these regimes have been able to
contain most of the elements that could provide for the
emergence of an independent civil society but refused to deal
with Islam in that way, these governments have put themselves
at risk of going the way of the Shah of Iran. In other words,
if you destroy all other parts of civil society or prevent
their emergence, all political opposition is just placed on
Islam, and that radicalizes Islam which is more possible
because of the denaturing of Islam that took place during
Soviet times and is continued under post-Soviet times.
I could say a great deal more about those things. Let me
only add that it is equally unfortunate that people see the
Taliban of Afghanistan as threatening Moscow. The Taliban is a
PASHTO--based organization. The instability related to Islam in
Central Asia is generated in Central Asia, not by the Afghan
model, with the exception partially of Tajikistan, because the
spillover is caused only as a model, not as an export of the
organizational structure. I think that is important that we get
that.
What has happened and what has made it more dangerous is
that all five of the regimes in post-Soviet Central Asia have
sought to enlist the support of Islamic identity making it
possible to talk about it even as the organizations are
structured. Islam has become more dangerous, not less, but it
is because of the way the regimes have behaved and the failure
of the criticism of the West.
Meeting these challenges, creating a civil society which
would allow for the transition from one generation of leaders
to another would be difficult in the best of cases if nobody
was doing anything from outside.
Unfortunately, the challenges that the Central Asian
countries have been compounded by the policies adopted by the
two actors who matter most. On the one hand, the Russian
government is ever more interested in winning back the
positions it lost in the region in 1991 by playing up to the
current leaders--in other words, the Commonwealth of
Independent States is routinely described as a ``Club of
Presidents''--and by positing threats to them so that the
region will turn again to Moscow for aid. Ten days ago, the
Russian government organized a meeting of Security Council
Chiefs in Dushanbe to talk about the possibility of cooperation
and signed an agreement where the Russians will rebuild the
security agency of Tajikistan. If you think that Tajikistan is
going to have an independent security organization after that,
I will have to disagree with you.
But it is not only the Russian effort to posit an Islamic
threat and therefore justify more repression and keep these
countries from evolving in the direction of civil society, it
is also the case that Western governments have generally
adopted a very short-term approach supporting, or at least
avoiding, too open criticism of the harshly authoritarian
regimes in this region either in the name of stability or to
allow for economic development, which is supposed to cure
everything, or to promote geopolitical goals.
The Russian behavior is getting worse, and let me tell you
that it is not just the older generation. A poll published in
Moscow on Monday of this week shows that more than 50 percent
of high school students in the city of Moscow--supposedly the
most reformist-minded part of the Russian Federation--more than
50 percent of high school students believe that the proper
borders of the Russian Federation should be those of the Soviet
Union, or even more, those of the Russian Empire before 1914.
So, Poland and Finland had better worry, too, in the future.
Happily, we have begun to see some more criticism of these
regimes. I believe that the failure to be critical about this
is a big problem. I also believe that the way in which we
choose to measure how much democracy there is, counting GONGO's
or only surveying elections, is problematic.
One American official in the region noted privately not
long ago that the only reason people in Washington think
Kyrgyzstan is more democratic than Kazakhstan is because the
Kyrgyz government had not conducted an election as recently,
and therefore we had not been able to see just how repressive
Asker Akayev had been.
All of this--the support of authoritarian regimes in the
name of temporary stability, the belief that that is enough,
and that ultimately something will turn up to allow there to be
a reasonable transition--recalls the Western approach to the
Shah of Iran, to the uncritical support of his openly
authoritarian regime and creating a situation in which, when he
fell, the only available force to replace him was a radicalized
Islamic Ulemah (phonetic), and now we have had to deal for very
much too long with a theocratic and anti-Russian tyranny.
The governments in Central Asia unfortunately are breading
Islamic fundamentalism even as they talk to us about democracy,
however modified, and the historical record suggests that a
failure by us or by others to speak up on this will have the
most serious consequences for the people of this region and for
the interests of the United States as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Mr. Goble appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Mr. Goble, your comments are
always interesting, worth waiting for.
Next we would like to hear from Ms. Cassandra Cavanaugh,
from Human Rights Watch. Thank you for your patience. We look
forward to your testimony. You may proceed as you wish.
STATEMENT OF CASSANDRA CAVANAUGH, RESEARCHER, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH
Ms. Cavanaugh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to Chairman
Smith as well, for the opportunity to testify at this hearing.
Coming as it does on the eve of the Secretary of State's trip,
it is a very important opportunity to review both the political
development of this region, but U.S. policy over the past
decade as well.
Since 1990, Human Rights Watch, which is a nongovernmental,
nonprofit organization, has closely monitored human rights in
the five former Soviet Central Asian republics and we have had
researchers stationed in Dushanbe, Tajikistan since 1994, and
in Tashkent, Uzbekistan since 1996.
Nearly a decade ago, the dissolution of the Soviet Union
raised hopes that vast new areas of the globe would come under
democratic forms of governance. The five states of former
Soviet Central Asia have done the most, I think, to dash these
hopes. Once known as countries in transition, at the turn of
the new century the Central Asian states, I would argue, have
largely seen their political transitions from communism
completed, the transition is over, but it was a transition to
authoritarianism, not to democracy.
The United States has pursued an integrated policy toward
the region, correctly recognizing that democratization,
economic development and stability are inseparable. Now that
progress toward democratization in the region has decisively
stalled, or even gone backward, the U.S. has continued to
advance other aspects of bilateral relations, such as economic
support and security assistance, without linking them to the
third prong, to political reform. A short summary of the
political developments of the past year will demonstrate, I
hope, how integrally democratization and stability in the
region are linked, and that they should be pursued in tandem
and with equal vigor.
From 1991 to 1999, the states of Central Asia made some
progress, as my fellow members of this panel have argued, in
creating the outward trappings of democracy. All of the
countries have elected legislatures and enacted constitutions
which enshrine popular sovereignty, the rule of law and the
separation of powers. All states but Kazakhstan have signed the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Despite these innovations, substantive democratization was
highly uneven, to say the least. Throughout this period, the
international community waited patiently for democracy to take
hold in the region, and supplied millions of dollars in
technical assistance and aid aimed at building democratic
institutions, as Professor Olcott has emphasized. The elections
scheduled in each of the countries over the past 2-year period,
however, were viewed as a test of those states' commitment to
democratic reform. It is a test that all five states have
failed miserably and predictably, not for lack of knowledge of
democratic procedures or lack of desire on the part of the
population, but, as Mr. Rohrabacher has pointed out, because
the leaders did not want it.
Presidential and parliamentary elections in 1999 took place
amidst coordinated government efforts to limit freedom of
speech, assembly, and association, which prevented citizens
from making free and informed decisions on voting day. Each
government kept would-be candidates off the ballot by
questionable means. Flagrantly violating their own election
laws, local government authorities, which Mr. Pressley has
asserted were becoming more accountable to citizens, used all
means at their disposal to promote government-favored
candidates, to block any opponents from campaigning
effectively, and to falsify counts where necessary, as
documented by local and international monitors in Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the
OSCE considered elections to be so meaningless as to not merit
full fledged observer missions.
The elections of 1999 and 2000 occasioned massive and
systematic violations of citizens' rights. But even more
troubling, the consolidation of authoritarian rule in each of
these states has complicated efforts to find solutions to deep
social crises, deteriorating economies, and to ward off
external threats that each country in the region faces.
So, briefly, I will summarize the aftermath of the
elections in each of the five countries.
In Turkmenistan, the virtual one-man government of
President Niazov has intensified pressure against the few frail
expressions of civil society, particularly Protestant and other
nontraditional religious groups. Niazov continues to jail the
few remaining government critics that he has, and has presided
over the removal of all term limits in order to become
president for life, which raises interesting implications for
the Hun Sen policy that you mentioned.
In Tajikistan, elections were accompanied by state-condoned
violence. The effective exclusion of most opposition factions
from the legislative and executive branches continues to
threaten the fragile peace accord.
In Uzbekistan, as I think my co-panelists agree, is in many
ways the most troubling case. The government blamed bombings in
the capital Tashkent last year on a conspiracy of outlawed
secular and religious opposition leaders. Over the course of
1999, thousands of their supporters were arrested, tortured,
and jailed. Hundreds fled the country, and some joined armed
bands calling themselves the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
based in neighboring Tajikistan. In August, those bands staged
an incursion into neighboring Kyrgyzstan, and are said to be
planning further military actions. Only state-sponsored parties
were allowed to take part in November's elections. In the
Presidential vote, even the one alternative candidate, the head
of the successor to the Uzbek Communist Party, admitted voting
for President Karimov. Arrests of all those still accused on
ill-defined charges of religious extremism for discussing ideas
inimical to the government have not flagged in 2000. Violations
of due process rights, vicious torture, long periods of
incommunicado pre-trial detention, and sham trials clearly
flaunt international human rights guarantees and are
threatening Uzbekistan's stability not from without, but from
within.
In Kazakhstan, the government of President Nazarbayev
continues to harass and suppress the few remaining independent
media outlets not controlled by the president's family. It uses
criminal liable suits to close independent newspapers, and has
engineered the dismissal of critical journalists using threats
and intimidation. All those who take to the streets in public
protest face the risk of prison.
In Kyrgyzstan, which has experienced the most dramatic
regression to the most repressive practices of its neighbors,
Presidential elections still scheduled for October, in advance
of these elections President Akaev has imprisoned one of his
leading opponents, former Vice President Feliks Kulov, and
ensured that the other one will be disqualified from the
ballot. Independent media and NGO's continue to be harassed,
severely harassed, while demonstrators protesting electoral
fraud have been arrested and beaten.
What has been the U.S. response so far. If 1999 was a test
of the Central Asian countries' commitment to democracy, it was
also a test of U.S. Central Asia policy.
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, democracy
promotion, coupled with economic development, particularly in
the oil and gas sector, and security assistance has been the
Administration's recipe for stability.
After the elections last year, however, the impasse in
democratization has not been accompanied by a parallel slowdown
in other areas of these bilateral relationships. The case of
Kyrgyzstan, I think, demonstrates how this failure to maintain
the linkage between all facets of U.S. policy works against the
very progress the U.S. is trying to promote.
Just after the arrest of Mr. Kulov, whom I have just
mentioned, one of Kyrgyzstan's most respected journalists,
Zamira Sydykova, reported on her conversation with a senior
Kyrgyz government official. This official, who is an advisor to
President Akaev, dismissed OSCE and U.S. criticism of
Kyrgyzstan's electoral violations. He gave the rationale that
during the elections last year in Kazakhstan, that country was
also criticized but suffered no concrete ill effects. In
addition, this official cited continued U.S. aid flows to
Kyrgyzstan at the same time as critical statements were
emanating from the Department of State as proof that there was
no consistent U.S. policy toward human rights violations in the
region. Surely this reasoning must have played a role in
President Akaev's decision to jail his major opponent.
We draw the conclusion that critical rhetoric alone, which
I must say over the past year has been increasing from the
State Department, is not sufficient to promote real change,
especially when criticism is undercut by the extension of
significant benefits, whether through aid, taxpayer-funded
Eximbank loan guarantees, or support for international lending
institutions' activity. I should say that the aid is
considerable, not only the Freedom Support Act tens of millions
of dollars that was cited by the previous witness, but in the
hundreds of millions of dollars for Eximbank loan guarantees.
Uzbekistan alone has received over $950 million in Eximbank
loan guarantees, $250 million last year alone when it was
engaged in this bloody crack down.
The U.S. must make continued economic and political support
to the countries of Central Asia conditional on their
introduction of real democratic reform. In this regard, we
welcome the linkage between corruption and assistance which
came out of report language from the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee last Friday, on the Technical Assistance Trade
Promotion and Anti-Corruption Act. We would even welcome this
language becoming statutory and its expansion to address not
only corruption, but other aspects of the rule of law, such as
independence of the judiciary, freedom of the media, and
transparency.
The current Administration, however, sadly, seems to be
moving farther away from aid conditionality on human rights
grounds. Military and security issues are beginning to take
center stage, as the recent visits by FBI and CIA Directors to
the region attest. The Secretary of State's trip to the region
has been presented as the inauguration of a new expanded
relationship with the countries of the region. Rumors suggest
that all of the countries the Secretary will visit will be
certified by the State Department to receive military
assistance under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program,
although the Department of State itself recognizes that
Uzbekistan systematically and egregiously violates its
citizens' basic rights.
The sad irony is that, as many observers of the region and
political scientists note, neither the thorough-going market
reforms nor the external and internal stability which the U.S.
aims to support with this enhanced assistance can be achieved
without democratization and respect for the rule of law.
The U.S. must reject the arguments of Central Asian states
requesting indulgence of their anti-democratic practices,
pleading dangers of Islamic radicalism and other risks to
security, because these are self-serving and counterproductive
explanations. Citizens will reject the call of extremism only
in societies where broad sectors of the population feel that
the government is responsive to, and adequately protects their
interests.
In conclusion, Central Asia's democratization and progress
toward the protection of human rights is in the U.S.' best
interest, not only because these are the core values of this
nation, but also because democracy and the rule of law are
necessary for lasting development and stability.
Human Rights Watch urges Congress to ensure that U.S.
economic assistance, particularly those forums requiring
consideration of human rights grounds, such as Eximbank, will
be tied in the future to genuine democratic reform in Central
Asia.
Thank you.
[The statement of Ms. Cavanaugh appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Smith [presiding]. Thank you very much, Ms. Cavanaugh,
for your excellent testimony. I think, for the record, it
should be known that both in my Subcommittee and I am sure Mr.
Bereuter's, and in previous times with the Helsinki Commission,
both of you have been invited to testify on a host of issues. I
was just looking at the record, whether it be the situation in
Uzbekistan last October, both of you testified on that before
the OSCE on Turkmenistan. Ms. Cavanaugh, you testified just a
couple of weeks ago on March 21st, and it is precisely because
we so value your opinion and the credibility of your remarks
that you continually get invited to appear before these
Committees and before the Helsinki Commission. You really do
raise a number of critical issues that are largely ignored by
Congress, by the executive branch, at least by certain members
of the executive branch, as we strive toward stability and a
sense of glossing over or papering over certain issues.
I joined you, Ms. Cavanaugh, when your organization was
crying out for withholding of that tranche to Russia because of
the Chechnea conflict. Many of us saw Chechnea I coming. Paul
Goble was outspoken, as was Human Rights Watch, about the
miscues that led to the, what, 80,000 people who were butchered
in that horrific battle or war, and Chechnea II was also on the
radar screen, and regrettably there has been no penalty
whatsoever imposed by the West, by the United States and by the
lending institutions that you just mentioned, whether it be
World Bank, IMF, or anyone else.
Wage your wars, do so with impunity--not a peep other than
some rhetorical reaction from the West, and they see right
through that. Money talks. It is just like one of the reasons
why I was late, I was speaking out against PNTR, and reasonable
men and women can differ as to whether or not that is the way
to go. I happen to believe we are supporting dictatorship in
our policy. They have gone from bad to worse over the last 7
years, when Mr. Clinton wisely, at first, had an MFN linkage to
human rights, and if you read it--and I went back and reread
his Executive Order and his speech of that day in 1993--it was
a brilliant speech, a brilliant Executive Order. One year
later, when they went from bad to worse, from significant
progress, as spoken of in that Executive Order as well as his
statement, to significant regression in every single solitary
category. That sends a message to others, like in Central Asia,
like in North Korea, and every other despotic or near despotic
country around the world.
Just let me ask, if you would, Ms. Cavanaugh--and, Mr.
Goble, you might want to speak to this as well--this issue of
withholding Eximbank credits and really getting serious--it is
as if these people just see us as business-as-usual types. We
will say something, we will put out a very accurate human
rights report--and Harold Koh, I think, does a magnificent job
as Assistant Secretary for Labor and Democracy and Human
Rights--and it is as if none of that matters when it comes to
implementation. There is a disconnect, as Amnesty International
says over and over.
What should be done? What do you think should be Congress'
role? It is as if these countries are not on too many people's
radar screen, regrettably, but if you could speak to that,
because I think we are at a crucial time, with the pipeline and
all those other issues, and now with the prospects of military
assistance to a dictatorship, that is outrageous.
Ms. Cavanaugh. In the report language for the House Foreign
Appropriations Act, there was language introduced by
Congresswoman Pelosi that instructed Eximbank to beef-up its
human rights assessment procedures.
At the current time, Eximbank refers projects of over $10
million to the State Department for what its own language here
is ``State Department clearance'', political clearance and
human rights clearance.
We have requested these clearances again and again through
the Freedom of Information Act, and we continue to see that
with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan they are completely cursory. I
have copies of them here that you are welcome to take a look
at. They are signatures.
Mr. Smith. Without objection, I would like to make them a
part of the record.
[The information referred appears in the appendix.]
Ms. Cavanaugh. I will submit them. They are completely
cursory and meaningless. We feel that it would be a marvelous
step forward if Congress were to mandate that Eximbank increase
this procedure for examining the human rights effects of
extending hundreds of millions of dollars to these corrupt and
abusive states.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. Mr. Goble.
Mr. Goble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Like any other country,
the United States has three competing sets of interests in
these countries--economic, geopolitical, and political
transformation in the direction of democracy and human rights.
I am absolutely convinced that the focus on economics and
geopolitics alone is counterproductive, and it is driven by a
short-term approach to life. It is sometimes called in the
region the policy of ``stabil `nost' uber alles'', from the
Russian, that the idea is that if we can just hold on for
another year, another 2 years, and it will be stable.
But by failing to address the political problems--and these
are structural political problems--by failing to be honest
constantly with ourselves and with the governments of these
countries--and that is the top of these governments where the
repression is the greatest--what we are doing is creating a
situation where we may have stability now, but where the coming
instability will be far worse.
It is my view that the single most important thing that we
can do is to first off make it very clear that we are
consistent across-the-board. If people are doing bad things,
they should not receive assistance. But we should also label
what they are doing very clearly.
It is, I think, unfortunate in many ways that the only
assessment we give of democratic process on a regular basis is
when elections are held. Delegations go in for 1 or 2 weeks and
they come back and they say, technically, it was a fine
election, or it wasn't.
Most of these countries know what you have to do to do it
technically right so you don't get criticized too much. But if
the government controls almost all of the electronic media, if
it controls almost all of the print media, if it intimidates
and locks up journalists as the governments of this region and
across the former Soviet space do, then it is not possible to
have an open democratic competition. We have seen that in the
Russian Federation, we have seen that in the Caucasus, we have
seen that in Central Asia, and all too often we have not
labeled that behavior as anti-democratic.
We have, to my mind, been much too accepting of the idea
that if there is enough economic change, there will be
political change that will follow. It seems to me that if you
want political change, you have to address the political
questions. Economics can be a lever, but it has to be used as
such. The self-confidence of some that if there is just a
rising amount of economic wealth, that that by itself will
produce democracy, I am afraid is not confirmed by the
historical record across the world.
Mr. Smith. Let me just ask with regards to Kazakhstan,
which many of us thought was on the right track in the 1990's.
President Nazarbayev has flagrantly, as you know, flouted OSCE
commitments on holding free and fair elections, while his
family members seized control of the country's media outlets.
With cycle of farcical elections over for the foreseeable
future, we believe--and we have conveyed this to the
Administration, we did so in a letter to Secretary of State
Albright just recently and it was signed by Steny Hoyer, my
Ranking Member on the Commission--that one of the best ways of
promoting this would be a very modest move, and that would
involve setting up an independent printing press.
I would appreciate your thoughts on that, and also the
issue of the upcoming may round table meetings that the Kazakh
officials have announced. Many of us would like to see the
Kazakhgeldin as a part of that. If these things have any kind
of credibility at all, an opposition leader ought to be a
participant.
Ms. Cavanaugh. Certainly, the issue promoting the
independent media is the key one in this interim before
elections are to come again for 5 or 7 years. I think it is
wonderful that Congress is promoting this idea of creating an
independent printing press in Kazakhstan. You will know that
USAID supported the creation of a privately owned printing
press in Kazakhstan, but privately owned doesn't mean
independent because that was soon taken over by people close to
Nazarbayev, and we know that it doesn't print anymore
opposition or critical material after that buy out.
So, to have a printing press owned by a third party really
is the only to ensure its independence in Kazakhstan. I
certainly hope that the aid organizations and the
Administration will find a way to do that.
With respect to the round table in Kazakhstan, I am not
sure where negotiations between the government and the OSCE and
various opposition groups stand on that issue right now, but I
think the example of Kyrgyzstan is an interesting one.
A coalition of Kyrgyz NGO's and opposition groups just
recently called on the OSCE in that country not to hold such a
round table because they felt the government was using it as a
way to excuse what they had done in the parliamentary
elections. They felt the government was going to be able to get
away without discussing the key issues on the table, and that
is continued repression and actually revoking or redressing
some of the fraud that went on in the elections. They felt that
it would be an easy way out for the government.
I would feel that it would be important for the U.S.
Government to look to what the opposition and the broad segment
of the Kazakh opposition, not just one or two groups, feels
about holding this round table, and make sure that it is not an
easy way out for the Kazakh government as well.
Mr. Goble. Could I just add very briefly two thoughts? The
first is that I would certainly urge--I am delighted to see the
print media grow, as I tend to be a print person, no matter
what--but I would tell you that I think it would be far better
to invest in the electronic media.
In most of these countries, upwards of 75 percent of people
get their news from radio or television because they can no
longer afford to buy the newspapers. In most of these
countries, people must choose between buying a loaf or bread or
buying a newspaper. Guess what they choose most of the time?
The electronic media, and especially television, is the
best possible way to get to these people. Increasingly, the
Internet plays a role, but in the short-term it is the
electronic media that is a bigger deal, and I would urge
consideration of supporting that because, right now, the so-
called ``privately owned'' media is mostly in the hands of the
old party nomenklatura, or even the family members of the
dictators. That is just the reality in this region. The people
can count how many privately owned radio stations or TV
stations there are, but the reality is most of those are owned
by the old nomenclatura, or in Kazakhstan in particular, by
members of Nazarbayev's family.
With respect to a round table, I am very skeptical, too,
because I think it does allow these dictators to get off the
hook for not allowing elections. On the other hand, round
tables coupled with a constant monitoring not just by Human
Rights Watch/Helsinki, but by U.S. Government officials who
will then speak out could make a difference.
At present, we have essentially privatized the monitoring
of what goes on in this part of the world, and if it could be
re-officialized--that is, that there would be very tough
statements--we have journalists beaten up, we have people being
arrested for talking--talking--to Western journalists. We have
people being arrested, as you said, out of their hospital room,
Feliks Kulov in Kyrgyzstan. We have people disappearing, and
all too often nothing gets said except by groups like Human
Rights Watch/Helsinki. As important as they are, they tend to
be ignored by many of these governments much of the time.
When the U.S. Government speaks, there is usually a
reaction with one of these convoluted explanations of why it is
justified, but it is a different thing, it is to officialize
the criticism of what is going on.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Goble, thank you. I have some additional
questions, but I will them for the second round. Mr.
Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney and I have
a piece of legislation that I believe now is signed into law,
called ``A Code of Conduct'', that we are not going to be
selling weapons to dictatorships, and by your analysis we
wouldn't be selling--we shouldn't be selling weapons to any of
these countries in Central Asia, is that correct?
Mr. Goble. That is correct.
Mr. Rohrabacher. That sounds right. Is the National
Endowment for Democracy and the ACYPL [Council for Young
Political Leaders] are they reaching out to try to find young,
perhaps more liberal, for lack of a better word, people in
those countries?
Mr. Goble. I think that they have made some progress. I
think, however, as has been pointed out before, these are
extremely difficult countries to work in, and sometimes the
people who were presented as options for these exchanges and
these activities are, in fact, selected by the government. That
is why I made reference to GONGO's. We really have the
government organizing these NGO's.
The rate of exchange is not yet so massive, especially from
these states, that we have been able to break through
necessarily the old nomenclatura. I think there is some hope
because there were some people who were fed up with the old
nomenclatura system even though they were inside it.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me ask you a question. In an ideal
world--I am not talking about right now because we may not even
have an ideal government here in the United States in terms of
the policies that we would like to see--clearly, the U.S.
Government does not make human rights and democracy a priority.
That is clear. This particular government and this
Administration has made a mockery of that standard. I know my
Democratic friends aren't here to defend the government, but
that is my honest assessment. I wish it was different. In fact,
when President Clinton became president, I said to myself,
``well, gee, at least I am going to be able to work with this
fellow on things like China and other issues where he is going
to be a little bit more oriented toward human rights than
George Bush was'' and, boy, was I disappointed.
In an ideal world, would you have the CIA and the U.S.
Government undermining dictatorial regimes like this? Would you
have the CIA going into Burma and perhaps Turkmenistan and
trying to find a democratic, potentially democratic clique in
the military or something like that?
Mr. Goble. Congressman, I think that the problem with
trying to do that is you sometimes end up installing people who
rapidly become as bad as the people that they are replacing
simply because of the way they would be installed. It requires
a much broader approach to transform these societies and to
transform these political leaders.
I will tell you that I am more worried about the day after
these five dictators die than I am about the days now, as bad
as things are, because there has been absolutely no preparation
for that transition. That would create challenges, and I am
afraid and--indeed, I believe it is Russian state policy--that
when one of these leaders dies and when there is instability,
that the Russian government will attempt to introduce troops in
the name of peace keeping. It will be peace keeping, but they
will be spelling it differently than we do.
But I would like to go back to what you said earlier about
the human rights component. The human rights component is
absolutely essential to American foreign policy. We have
watched the citizens of a large number of the countries in the
former Soviet space become something that Stalin was never able
to achieve, namely, anti-American, because the perception is
growing that we will support dictators, that we will support
those who repress them. That is true in the Russian Federation,
it is true across Central Asia. Those people were looking to
the United States as the archetypical first new nation.
I had the privilege in 1991 of leading some of the leaders
of the Baltic countries around this town, and I will tell you,
the proudest moment in my life, in many ways, was taking the
former president of Estonia to the Lincoln Memorial, Arnold
Ruutel with his two Orders of Lenin. I was translating the
Gettysburg Address into Russian, because that was our best
common language, and the National Park Ranger came up and said
to me, ``What language are you speaking?'' I said Russian. He
said, ``Are these people from Russia?'' I said, ``No, these
people are from Estonia''. This National Park Ranger who wanted
to give us a folder said, ``Oh, I have heard of Estonia. It is
just a little country that wants to be free''.
Let me tell you something. That kind of popular American
attitude is what the peoples of this region expected from this
country in 1991. When we have supported dictators, it has
undercut that.
Mr. Rohrabacher. To be fair, I think the American people
still have their idealism, this idealism. I think that the
cynicism found in our business community in the fact that they
would make a buck off selling torture equipment to Nazis if
they could, as I see, I do not find any moral standards for
which our business community will not sink in order to make a
quick buck, and that has only been surpassed by this
Administration's ability to just totally make a mockery of any
human rights standards of other countries, and it is
unfortunate.
But on the bright side, I think the American people, both
Democrats and Republicans, have a love of liberty in their
heart that has a side with little guys who want freedom in
their countries. One prediction for this region--and, again, I
agree with you folks on what is our long-term goal, we are
people who promote liberty and justice and treating people
decently and are against the bad guys--but in the long-run, I
think that we are going to face some very strategic maneuvering
around Central Asia that is very similar perhaps to what the
maneuvering was a century and a half ago, only England is not
going to be the player. The other player is going to be China.
I would predict that within 10 years you will see a major
competition going on in this region between China and Russia,
and I will even go further, that I would predict that within 10
years you will see incursions by China into Kazakhstan, and
that will change the whole formula. Unfortunately, this area,
these people, deserve better than just being pawns in a
strategic game between huge players. They deserve like people
anywhere else, to be able to control their own destiny and, if
they were able to do so through the democratic process, I think
the world would be a safer place because this would be less
susceptible to that type of outside coercion and outside
targeting.
So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me
just ask a few followup questions. Kyrgyzstan's President
Akaev, once on of the fondest hopes of reformers, orchestrated
the recent parliamentary elections and demonstrated his
determination to eliminate any challengers.
The recent arrest, however, of Feliks Kulov as well as the
violent dispersion of demonstrators signals an attempt to
intimidate society in advance of the upcoming Presidential
elections.
Given Kyrgyzstan's previous record and the hopes it
engendered, no country in Central Asia is more disappointing.
The February-March parliamentary election made plain that the
president's intention to pursue a regional pattern of
falsifying and keeping noncommunist parties and rivals from
running against him ala Nazarbayev.
Let me just ask you on the arrest of Kulov and Uzanov, who
we in the Commission have spoken out a number of times in
recent days about, if Secretary of State Albright was sitting
up here, not me or Dana Rohrabacher or Tom Lantos who was here
just a moment ago, and Chairman Bereuter, what would you tell
her about those issues, especially as it relates to--when you
take a man from his hospital bed, as Feliks was taken--cardiac
problems, in an exhaustion state, and the Minister of Interior
scoops him up and takes him to one of their cells--what does
that say on the eve of a trip of our very distinguished
Secretary of State? What would you advise her in terms of when
she meets face-to-face with the leadership there?
Ms. Cavanaugh. In Human Rights Watch' letter to the
Secretary of State, we supported the CSCE's call to make the
release of Feliks Kulov a nonnegotiable condition of the
Secretary of State's trip. We think it is a real slap in the
face to the United States that Mr. Kulov was arrested on the
verge of this trip being announced. It was a real throwing down
of the gauntlet, just the kind of attitude that I described in
my testimony, that we know nothing is going to be done, so we
are going to do whatever we want.
I think it is interesting to note that Mr. Kulov, former
mayor of Becshkek, former head of the MVD, former vice
president, is genuinely very popular in Kyrgyzstan, and it is
indicative to me that Mr. Akaev fears him probably the most
because there is no opponent like someone who used to be so
close to you, but obviously the trip of the Secretary is
happening anyway. We seriously hope that there will be distinct
and definite conditions placed on all forms of assistance to
Kyrgyzstan predicated on Mr. Kulov's release.
Kyrgyzstan is a ward of the international financial
institutions. Its loans and assistance from the IMF and the
World Bank exceed its GDP. The kind of language that is in this
bill coming out of the Senate could really place pressure on
Kyrgyzstan, and I hope that it really comes to pass.
Mr. Goble. Since the trip appears to be going ahead, I
would hope that the Secretary of State would demand to meet
with Mr. Kulov publicly and make it very clear that the United
States supports democracy and opposes this kind of abuse, and
that is the kind of thing Secretaries of State have done, and
it would be a very powerful signal if the trip is going ahead.
I think you have to do that in addition to the conditionality.
It is the symbolism of doing these things that are often more
important given the relatively limited financial exposure we
have in some places.
Mr. Smith. Let me ask you again, in Kyrgyzstan, the issue--
there are a number of ways you can silence your critics. You
can arrest them. You can torture them. You can shut down their
printing presses. You can also initiate a series of libel
suits, and we know that Milosevic in Serbia used this against a
number of the independent media, and we know that Akaev is
using that device as well to shut down a number of the
independents.
Again, in speaking to us and hopefully by amplification to
the Secretary of State--because we are grateful that her
representatives have stayed here--what would you say with
regard to that issue, that it is not so subtle just shut down
the media by suing, and by way of theft taking their ability to
give an independent voice?
Ms. Cavanaugh. You are well aware that it is happening in
Kyrgyzstan, and it is happening in Kazakhstan as well. The
recent case of the newspaper ``Let's begin on Monday'', they
have 14 libel suits pending against them, over $2 million U.S.
dollars in damages. They will be bankrupt for the rest of their
natural lives, and never dare so much as to start another
newspaper again.
I think it is very important for the Secretary to express
that she sees through this tactic that is being used in both of
these countries, and that it does constitute--using the legal
system in this way does constitute a violation, a clear
violation of rights, of bilateral commitments, of international
commitments, and that--again, not to be a one-trip ponier--but
that there will be consequences for this.
Mr. Goble. I think that it is terribly important that a
country which really got its start by the John Peter Zanger
case in the 1750's where the principle, the truth, was a
defense against a charge of libel, should be very clear that
all the laws in all of these countries--and they exist in
varying form in all 12 member states of the Commonwealth of
Independent States--against attacks against the president,
slandering the president, where truth is not a defense under
the available legal system, that the elimination of those laws
should be a major item on the American agenda with these
countries precisely because it is our position, going back to
the Zanger case, that is at the foundation of what makes
American democracy possible.
Mr. Smith. Let me ask you with regards to Uzbekistan,
President Karimov made a president to Audrey Glover, then
Director of ODER--this was back in 1996--to register the Human
Rights Society of Uzbekistan. So far, he has not done so.
Today, the society, as well as the independent human rights
organization, exists through their functioning, though their
function has been impaired by a series of arrests and beatings.
Again, Secretary Albright will be there. Here we have a
situation where the human rights monitors--and I will never
forget one of the most moving meetings I have ever had was with
members of Charter 77 in the former Czechoslovakia--and when
Steny Hoyer and I tried to meet with a larger number of groups,
several of those people were arrested en route to our meeting.
Fr. Amali came and a few other people came who were able to get
through the secret police net, but others were detained.
Human rights monitors have always been the people that we
have got to put the sandbags around. As a matter of fact,
several of them, including Ishmael Adelov, Makubov Kasimova and
Mile Kobilov have been arrested--and, again, these are the
people who are the salt of the earth in Uzbekistan--and our
Secretary of State is going there. She has got to demand that
they be released immediately, and everyone else who has been
put in prison, has been tortured due to trumped up charges. But
with regards to the monitors, if you could speak to that.
Again, this is a president who freely made a promise to the
ODER representative back in 1996.
Ms. Cavanaugh. The case of the human rights monitors, as
you rightly pointed out, is the pivotal one. It exposes the
essence of these governments' policies with clarity that is
just unsurpassed in any other way.
We understand that there will be a round table so that the
Secretary of State can meet with representatives of NGO's--we
hope with some real NGO's, not just GONGO's--as well as the
representatives of some of these unregistered human rights
groups that remain unregistered to this day. But I hope that
the Secretary makes it perfectly clear that she understands
that there are two people missing--three people missing in this
room, and those are the ones that you have mentioned. Their
prison sentences of 5, 6, and 7 years, in conditions of
Uzbekistan, may very well be tantamount to death sentences, and
we hope that there will be the strongest pressure exerted on
Uzbekistan to release these people and to live up to the
commitments, as you mentioned, that they so freely made a few
years ago.
Mr. Goble. I would add only that it is terribly important
not only to seek the release of these individuals, but to
demand the creation of the conditions which will allow human
rights monitors to work.
One of the things that is a trap in dealing with dictators
is that dictators frequently arrest people so that they can
then free them and this is proclaimed a major step forward. But
if there is not an additional step, which is to create the
conditions under which the human rights monitors can do their
jobs, what we will see is more of them will be arrested as soon
as a Western leader has left the airport.
Mr. Smith. If I could ask you with regards to religious
freedom issues in Uzbekistan, while we were all happy in
September 1999 when five evangelical Protestants and one
Jehovah's Witness was released, Tashkent's policies have always
been of concern. We raised this at our hearing recently, as you
might recall.
Again, what should be the message of the U.S. Government,
of our Secretary of State, when she does indeed meet with the
leaders in Uzbekistan with regard to religious freedom issues?
I think, Mr. Goble, you made a very good point, you arrest
people and you release them and you are supposed to get kudos
for it. Don't arrest them in the first place. We have seen some
very riveting testimony, or heard riveting testimony about the
repression of religion in Uzbekistan, and it is very, very
significant, but if you could respond.
Mr. Goble. I would only urge that we should raise the
possibility that religious groups should not be subject
registration because as long as there are subject to state
registration, they can be subject to state interference.
It is an unfortunate reality of the post-Soviet states that
laws on religion which were supposed to open the door to
greater religious freedom, created a variety of institutions
not only in Uzbekistan but elsewhere, for interference and for
selective prosecution. It is precisely the fact that it is
inevitably selective that it is repressive against those who
are unfavored at the moment, which exercises a chilling effect
on any possibility of religious freedom.
This is not just a problem in Uzbekistan, this is a problem
across all 12 countries in the Commonwealth of Independent
States, and it is something that has to be addressed
constantly. The mistake is to demand registration because that
is the beginning of the slippery slope down to control and what
it is doing.
Let me just end with this one thought. The most dangerous
reality that these governments are creating--Karimov of
Uzbekistan, in the first instance--is by having an official
church--be it official Islam, official Pentecostals, official
Presbyterians, whatever--you inevitably create an underground
church in all of those cases by people who are unwilling to
participate in the charade of ``religious registration''. Those
underground groups, by shifting into that underground mode,
become politicized--not only do they become victimized, but
they become radicalized, and they are then in the business of
trying to overthrow the government.
So, we need to explain to the governments of these
countries that they are generating this time bomb under them in
the name of short-term control.
Mr. Smith. I want to thank our very distinguished
witnesses, and Mr. Bereuter may have some questions as well,
and just say that we are planning a hearing on Kyrgyzstan in
the very near future in the Helsinki Commission, and we will do
a review--especially post-Secretary of State Albright's trip--a
public hearing to determine what was said, how was it said, and
in keeping with our very important role of oversight. I do
believe we are on the same page, but this has to be promoted
not only robustly, but also with linkages because, without it,
it could be ``in one ear, out the other'' on the part of these
offending governments.
So, I want to thank you very, very much for your very fine
testimony, and yield to Chairman Bereuter.
Mr. Bereuter [presiding]. Thank you very much. There are
some days when hearings don't work out, at least for the
Chairman, and this was one of those days. But I very much
appreciate the testimony that you have given, and the responses
you have undoubtedly given to my colleagues' questions.
I think now, in light of the votes that are here and the
need to move to a markup immediately, I will just express again
my appreciation to both of you for your testimony. I thank you.
The joint hearing of the Subcommittees is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the Subcommittees were
adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 12, 2000
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