[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PEACEKEEPING IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 2000
__________
Serial No. 106-115
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international
relations
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
65-150 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
DANA ROHRABACHER, California SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PETER T. KING, New York PAT DANNER, Missouri
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South BRAD SHERMAN, California
Carolina ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MATT SALMON, Arizona STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
AMO HOUGHTON, New York JIM DAVIS, Florida
TOM CAMPBELL, California EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
KEVIN BRADY, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BARBARA LEE, California
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
GEORGE P. RADANOVICH, California JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff
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Subcommittee on Africa
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
AMO HOUGHTON, New York DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
TOM CAMPBELL, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California BARBARA LEE, California
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
Tom Sheehy, Subcommittee Staff Director
Malik M. Chaka, Professional Staff Member
Charisse Glassman, Democratic Professional Staff Member
Charmaine V. Houseman, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Richard Holbrooke, U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations........................................................ 9
APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from
California and Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa................ 30
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress
from New York and Chairman, Committee on International
Relations...................................................... 32
The Honorable Sam Gejdenson, a Representative in Congress from
Connecticut.................................................... 34
The Honorable Tony Hall, a Representative in Congress from Ohio.. 35
His Excellency Faida M. Mitifu, Ambassador of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.......................................... 39
Professor Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, President of the Rally for
Congolese Democracy............................................ 43
His Excellency Dr. Simbi Mubako, Ambassador of the Republic of
Zimbawe........................................................ 47
Government of Namibia............................................ 53
Embassy of the Republic of Angola................................ 60
Her Excellency Edith G. Ssempala, Ambassador of Uganda........... 62
His Excellency Dr. Richard Sezibera, Ambassador of Rwanda........ 68
The Honorable Richard Holbrooke.................................. 73
Additional material:
Questions submitted for the record for the Department of State... 79
Response to questions submitted for the record from the
Department of State............................................ 81
PEACEKEEPING IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
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Tuesday, February 15, 2000,
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:09 p.m., in
room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Royce, Chabot, Tancredo, Payne,
Meeks, and Lee.
Also present: Representatives Gilman, Bereuter, McKinney,
Crowley, and Hall.
Mr. Royce. [presiding] The hearing of the Subcommittee on
Africa will come to order. Before we begin, let me apologize
for the tight quarters here today. As you know, the
International Relations Committee full hearing room is
undergoing renovation and so every effort was made to better
accommodate you, but I'm afraid these are our quarters for this
particular hearing.
I'd like to welcome back all the Subcommittee Members. This
is our first hearing of this Congress' second session and I'm
pleased that we have the opportunity today to examine such a
critical and timely issue as the proposed second phase of the
United Nations peacekeeping mission for the Democratic Republic
of Congo.
The Subcommittee has been closely following developments in
Congo for several years. I led a congressional delegation to
Congo in 1997 and met with President Kabila a few days after he
was inaugurated there. The Administration, at this point in
time, is now prepared to approve a substantial peacekeeping
effort for Congo. This hearing will give Subcommittee Members
an opportunity to better understand American options regarding
the Congo.
The Great Lakes conflict is a complex and intense one. The
level of fear, insecurity, and mistrust in the region is as
high as anywhere in the world. How could it be otherwise, given
the backdrop of the 1994 genocide? This makes the proposed U.N.
peacekeeping operation a great challenge.
While the Administration and the U.N. have a formulated
plan, success for this ambitious undertaking is far from
assured. To be successful, this operation, built on the fragile
Lusaka Peace Agreement will have to have its share of breaks.
Any scenario for success should be tested against the UN's
large-scale Congo peacekeeping operation, which ended in
failure in 1964. A key to success today will be making good on
the Lusaka-mandated national dialogue, designed to bring a
democratically based political stability to Congo.
In facing this challenge, there can be no room for
revisionism. In 1998, President Kabila did not have his
democratic aspirations frustrated by the renewed outbreak of
conflict. Before the August 1998 invasion he banned political
parties. Before that invasion, he had unduly restricted
nongovernmental organizations, harassed leading political
figures, including Mr. Tshisekedi, and repressed the vibrant
civil society that had struggled under Mobutu. In hindsight,
more external democratic pressure should have been brought to
bear. Meanwhile, conditions in rebel-held territory have been
no better. There are accounts of attacks on religious
independence, for example. I make these points to illustrate
the extent of the challenge that the U.N. is attempting to
tackle.
I also want to suggest that we have some recent experience
that should be valuable as the U.S. and U.N. attempt to prod
along the national dialogue. Congolese democrats want external
pressure, and it's incumbent upon the international community
in proceeding with this large commitment to apply that
pressure.
Bringing about a successful national dialogue is but one of
the many concerns we should all have about this plan. That
doesn't mean, though, that the U.N. peacekeeping operation
should not proceed. In 1994, the international community sat on
the sidelines as nearly 1 million men and women and children
were slaughtered in Rwanda. Three years ago, at a subcommittee
hearing on the Congo, as the Mobutu regime was literally dying,
I said that the U.S. has a role to play in the Congo because we
can make a difference and because we have interests in doing
so.
It's worth noting that Americans long ago expressed a
humanitarian interest in the Congo. The noted journalist and
historian George Washington Williams and Mark Twain were
central figures in a worldwide movement against slave labor in
King Leopold's Congo.
Today's genocide lurks and we have increasingly evident
national security interests centered on rogue regime activity
in the Congo, which I raised at our last hearing on this
crisis. At that hearing, I also quoted a U.S. Institute for
Peace study which called the Lusaka Peace Agreement, quote, ``A
last exit on the region's highway to hell.'' Now that's strong
language and it's strong language that is still valid.
But, as we proceed with this U.N. option in an attempt to
make a difference, let's make sure that we give ourselves and
the people of the region the best chance of success. That means
not band-aiding problems. In addition to prodding a successful
national dialogue, there needs to be real disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration in the Congo. Territorial
integrity must be respected and nonsignatories to Lusaka must
be dealt with.
Moreover, the U.N. needs competent peacekeepers. I share
the chairman of the International Relations Committee's
recently expressed concern over the incompetence of U.N.
peacekeepers in Sierra Leone. High operating standards must be
set. While Congress should not put up a stop sign for this
peacekeeping operation, rules of the road must be established
and must be obeyed.
Finally, it's important that the U.S. doesn't turn this
operation over entirely to the United Nations. While the Congo
peacekeeping operation will not involve American troops, it
must be bolstered by the active diplomatic engagement of the
world's superpower. Success, as I've said, will require good
luck. The parties to the conflict will have to make good on
their Lusaka obligations. I urge them to look toward the future
and do so. Success will also require a strong focus and will
and a great deal of energy and imagination by the United
States. Without this American commitment, failure is assured. I
know that Ambassador Holbrooke appreciates this reality.
The stakes for this peacekeeping operation are high. It is
no exaggeration to suggest that the lives of thousands of
Africans, if not more, are on the line. I will work to maximize
this operation's chance for success, for failure is likely to
sow devastating consequences.
[The statement of Mr. Royce appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Royce. I'd like to now recognize the Ranking Member of
the Subcommittee, Mr. Payne of New Jersey, for an opening
statement.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let me
once again commend you for your attention to your position as
Chairman of this Subcommittee. I appreciate your calling this
very important hearing on peacekeeping in the Democratic
Republic of Congo.
This Subcommittee tends to look at the totality of the
issue and what comes out of it, we always try to have a fair, a
balanced, and a direct approach to the policy. I have to
indicate that, on this Subcommittee in particular,
bipartisanism is the way that we move forward. I'd also like to
recognize Chairman Ben Gilman who is Chairman of the all
overall Committee and has shown a strong interest in Africa.
Let me also thank Ambassador Holbrooke for coming before
this Subcommittee today. It was his tenacity that brought all
of the signatories to the Lusaka accord to New York at the
United Nations headquarters. I know it took a lot of persuasion
because other meetings were called on the continent of Africa.
The Mobutu Conference, for example, where all of the
signatories did not attend. So I know it took an extra-special
effort to bring all of the participants even five times further
than the meeting that was held on the continent. So we really
appreciate his tenacity.
The interest that the Security Council, under his
leadership, during the month of January, having President
Mandela there talking about the Burundi situation; having Vice
President Gore there talking about the whole crisis of HIV
virus that causes AIDS, which will have to be confronted on a
worldwide basis. Of course, persuading seven heads of state to
come to the United Nations and let me commend you for that.
As you know, this is our fourth hearing of the Subcommittee
during the past 3 years. In each of those four previous
meetings, we've had the one who has been there right on the
firing line year in and year out as it relates to African
affairs, our Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,
Dr. Susan Rice, who not only for the Congo but in the early
days of the Ethiopian/Eritrean situation and the problems in
Liberia, but wherever there was a conflict on the continent, it
was her skillful negotiations and ability that has brought us
this far. It's good to see you here too.
The development in the Congo has drastically changed over
the 40 years since Congo gained its independence from Belgium.
The conflict in the Congo is described as Africa's first world
war, with nearly 12 countries involved.
I hope that everyone will turn their phones off, because it
is really distracting. If there's something very important,
wait outside and they can get you there.
That the involvement of so many countries really is a move
in a direction that we do not like to see. With the three rebel
groups getting safe haven for their refugees or for providing
troops or providing resources really is a dangerous trend that
we have seen over the past few years.
It is ironic that during the Cold War, the U.S. spent more
than $13 trillion on Defense, with Zaire profiting as a major
staging ground. So much of the problems that we see there, the
disintegration and lack of leadership, is certainly a direct
result, as you know, of our world policy of the Cold War.
Therefore, in my opinion, we, therefore, since we assisted
getting Zaire into the problem that it's in, we have the same
responsibility, in my opinion, to help them come out of the
problem that's been created by 30 years of Cold War activities.
Despite the vast mineral, agricultural, and water resources
and its eminent potential as a country to serve as an economic
power house for the whole continent of Africa, Congo has been
plundered in nearly 30 years because of the vacuum left by a
lack of leadership and, therefore, the potential and the people
have suffered dramatically.
I am concerned about the ethnic hatred and the genocidal
overtones coming from the Uganda/Congo border. I think that
arms embargo must be strongly enforced and possibly extended to
countries that provide weapons to ethnic groups inciting
genocide. We must strive to dismantle the institutional
framework that underlie genocidal hatred.
A key to all of this is a national dialogue which will,
hopefully, let us finally begin to talk about disarmament and
demobilization and reintegration and resettlement and bringing
the people of the Congo into having the determination on their
future.
So, in conclusion, let me say that I had the opportunity to
glance at the statement made by the Senator from Virginia,
Senator Warner, where he stated that he did not want a single
dollar going into Africa until we honor our commitments in
Europe. I think that this is an unfortunate comment. I hope
that he really didn't mean it. I know that he seems to be too
intelligent to make a statement like that and, evidently, was
misquoted. I know that he doesn't mean that.
We should certainly move forward. I know you'll have an
opportunity to clarify this issue. We know it's a big country;
much is at stake. But I know that we need to have everyone
involved.
Another thing that disturbs me is I hear from some of my
good friends on the other side, not on this Subcommittee, but
the Full Committee in general, some of the staff members saying
that we need to be sure that everything is in place before we
move forward. I just hasten to use as an example of stumbled
peace talks, we're in our 42nd year of peace talks in areas and
we have never stopped funding because we've had indictments or
convictions. We've had politicians go to jail. We've had failed
negotiations. We've had people walk out.
But, for example, Fiscal Year 2000, we see another $1
billion added. 11.3 increase, for example, for the Wye Accord,
which I support wholeheartedly and I have supported, for
example, aid to Israel as long as I've been in Congress. But
I've never heard people talk about let's not do it until
everything is right, because we would have stopped it a dozen
times, there. Thank you.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Payne.
I'd like to now turn to the Chairman of the International
Relations Committee, Mr. Gilman, who would like to make a
statement.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you.
Mr. Royce. Welcome, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Chairman Royce. I want to thank you
for arranging this important and timely meeting on this
important issue.
We want to welcome Ambassador Holbrooke and Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice to our
Committee. We appreciate your efforts to focus the Security
Council's attentions on Africa during the month of January.
We've been impressed with your personal energy and commitment,
Mr. Ambassador, to address some of the world's most intractable
conflicts. We're pleased that Chairman Royce was able to
accommodate your request for an opening hearing on this
important issue.
I read your congressional notification with interest and
had a number of questions. In fact, my staff conveyed some 11
modest questions to the State Department last Wednesday and we
requested responses to them prior to this hearing. Regrettably,
we still don't have any of those responses. We hope you can
clarify some of the questions we raised.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission I'd like to submit a
copy of the questions that we submitted to the State
Department, for the record.
Mr. Royce. That will be done.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Gilman. Thank you.
Mr. Ambassador, a few weeks ago Secretary Albright and
National Security Advisor Sandy Berger emphasized their desire
to conduct a bipartisan foreign policy in close cooperation
with the Congress. I know from our many conversations that you
share that perspective and we thank you for reaching out to the
Congress.
It is therefore distressing that we've experienced so
little in the way of forthright cooperation when it came to
this important proposed peacekeeping operation. I assume it may
be some laxity of the Department. We would welcome your
clarifying it.
Ambassador Holbrooke, you have rightly pointed out in the
press that Congress recognizes the importance of this conflict
in the Congo. However, it's the duty of the legislative branch
to ask questions of the executive before we commit hundreds of
millions of dollars overseas on any issue. In like manner, we
believe it's the duty of the executive branch to provide
answers to those questions.
The recent record of peacekeeping in Africa, regrettably,
has not been impressive. In Sierra Leone, for example, we just
authorized the expansion of the peacekeeping operation to
11,000 troops. To date, there have been at least five separate
incidents in which rebel forces there have mugged U.N.
peacekeepers and stolen rifles, and ammunition, armored
vehicles, fuel, rockets, and cash. We are only 3 months into
that peacekeeping operation and it already appears to be bogged
down. We hope we're not going to be confronted with similar
situations with regard to the Congo.
Your testimony here, of course, is not about Sierra Leone,
but about the Congo. Perhaps there is more reason to be hopeful
in the Congo, but there are, clearly, some obvious reasons for
concern. If Sierra Leone, a small nation with a comparatively
good transportation infrastructure, presents such problems to
U.N. peacekeepers, we're concerned what could happen in the
Congo, a country 33 times that size. I think that that
illustrates some of our concern.
Mr. Ambassador, in his famous treatise, Carl Von Clausewitz
warned leaders to consider carefully before embarking on war.
He wrote, ``The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching
active judgment that the statesman and commander has to make is
to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking,
either mistaking it for or trying to turn it into something
that's alien to nature.''
I believe that if Clausewitz were alive today, he might
apply the same dictum to all of our peacekeeping operations.
Those of us who support the United Nations, and I include
myself, and who believe it has a crucial role to play in Africa
are concerned. However, we fear the prospect of peacekeeping
operations, like Somalia, are poorly defined, could end badly,
and leave in their wake little support for future endeavors.
I look forward, Mr. Ambassador, to your testimony here
today and we look forward to reviewing the written answers to
questions we asked about prior to approving funds for this
peacekeeping mission.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Mr. Gilman appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also have a statement
from the Full Committee's Ranking Member which, without
objection, I will enter into the record.
[The statement of Mr. Gejdenson appears in the appendix.]
We've also been joined by the Vice Chairman of the
International Relations Committee, Mr. Doug Bereuter of
Nebraska.
Mr. Bereuter, do you have a statement you'd like to make at
this time?
Mr. Bereuter. Chairman Royce, thank you for letting me
attend today's hearing since I'm not a Member of this
Subcommittee. I wanted to hear the testimony. I think the
subject of the hearing is very important.
I haven't seen Chairman Gilman's questions. I may have some
of those questions myself. But by my presence here today, I
wanted to demonstrate my support for the initiative that
Ambassador Holbrooke and Secretary Rice will be explaining to
us today. Beyond the importance of it and the legitimacy of
taking this initiative, I think it also will enhance the
American credibility in the United Nations and make it more
likely that some of the reforms we've been pushing for, in
fact, are reality.
Thank you very much, Mr. Royce, for letting me sit in with
you.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter. We've also been joined
by Ms. Lee of Oakland, Mr. Chabot of Ohio, Mr. Tancredo of
Colorado, Ms. Cynthia McKinney of Georgia, Mr. Crowley of New
York, and Mr. Tony Hall of Ohio. All members will have a chance
later to ask questions, but if any of you would like to have a
brief opening remark at this time, we'll open it up. We've also
been joined by Mr. Meeks of New York. Thank you.
Any questions or any opening statement at this time?
Ms. Lee. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Royce. Yes, Congresswoman.
Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just briefly thank
you and our Chairman, Mr. Gilman, and our Ranking Member, Mr.
Payne, for this hearing. Also Assistant Secretary Susan Rice
and our Ambassador for being here.
This is such an important issue for this country and for
all of us here. Peace and stability in Africa is critical if
we're going to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic and all of the
other issues that the continent needs to address and very
quickly must address. I want to thank the Ambassador for really
helping us focus on the whole AIDS crisis in Africa because
certainly none of these issues are separate. They all are
interrelated.
So I look forward to your testimony today. I hope that we
can hear what the United States is doing in terms of ensuring
that the Lusaka Agreement is moved forward and also in terms of
peacekeeping. Whatever it takes, I think we must move ahead in
that accord.
Thank you.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Congresswoman Lee. We've also been
notified that Congressman Hall would like to make a brief
statement. I know he's just back from Sierra Leone so
Congressman Hall.
Mr. Hall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have a statement
for the record. I won't read it. I just have a couple of points
I want to make. I, like the other representatives, want to
thank you for allowing me to be here. I don't serve on this
Subcommittee. I don't serve on the Full Committee. I used to be
on it when I was in my first term in the Congress.
It's good to be with Ambassador Holbrooke and Assistant
Secretary Rice. You're talking to our best people; our great
representatives of our government. They have been at the heart
of so many important issues and have performed so well. So I
look forward to their testimony.
I'm glad that you're focusing on Africa as well. It fits
right in with the fact that 5,000 Americans are coming to
Washington from all over the country this week to talk just
about Africa and about the issues and about our policies.
I'm troubled about some of the aspects of the proposal
that's before us. There are many key points that all of you
have mentioned. I think the one key point that I just want to
touch on briefly is the fact that I think that, at the heart of
this problem, are diamonds. It's an issue that, I hope, that we
can address this year. The U.S. estimates that the trade in
Congolese diamonds is about $600 million per year. That's cash.
News reports say $20 million worth of Congolese diamonds pour
through Rwanda and Uganda every month.
I think diamonds are at the root of wars in three other
countries: Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Angola. Capturing
diamond-rich regions is one aim of these wars. Frank Wolf and I
went to Sierra Leone. We've been all over Africa together. We
see what diamonds do when they're used to buy weapons that
terrorize people and keep these civil wars going.
In the past 10 years, we have put about $2 billion on
humanitarian aid into these countries but, at the same time,
$10 billion in illicit diamonds has come out of them. Great
Britain and Canada are with us on this. As Britain's foreign
secretary, Robin Cook, put it, ``The diamond market is pretty
tight. The places you can sell uncut diamonds are pretty
limited. It should not be beyond our wit to devise an
international regime in cooperation with the diamond trade that
cuts off the flow of these diamonds to use them to buy arms and
fuel conflicts.''
So far, the diamond industry hasn't done much. They've had
a public relations campaign going on. It hasn't really helped
very much. They could police themselves. We've introduced a
bill to cutoff illicit diamonds, to let Americans know where
these diamonds are coming from. As a matter of fact, we buy 65
percent of all the diamonds in the world. We ought to know
where they're coming from. The United Nations has the ability
to stop this. They can help on Congo right now, by sanctioning
Congolese diamonds that are fueling this war.
So, with that, I'd just want to thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It's a very important hearing.
[The statement of Mr. Hall appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Hall.
We also have Mr. Meeks of New York who wanted to make an
opening statement.
Mr. Meeks. Yes and I'll be brief.
Mr. Royce. Thank you.
Mr. Meeks. But I just wanted to first thank you, Mr.
Chairman, and Ranking Member Payne for conducting this hearing
and holding this hearing today. But I particularly want to
thank Ambassador Holbrooke and Secretary Rice for your
leadership on this matter.
The unprecedented event that took place at the U.N.
Security Council earlier surely let all of us in the United
States and the world know that Africa is a focus. As I look at
that map on the wall, it just reminds me of how small the world
has become. What is taking place in Africa will indeed affect
us here in the United States of America and those all around
the globe, as my colleague has talked about, particularly in
reference to the AIDS epidemic. When you talk about the
economies of all the world, it affects the economy here. I just
think that it is very important for us, at this point, to not,
because of what's going on, to not withdraw, but we need to be
more affirmative in our actions as to what's taking place in
Africa.
When I look at, and I know it's a start, of the 5,000 some-
odd troops that we have there and we talk about how to enforce
the Lusaka Agreement, we know that that's nowhere near enough,
when we look at the size of that great country and that we need
to let all of the countries that are involved know, I mean, and
there are several countries that are involved in this, that the
world is indeed looking at them. That is what will help force
them to do what took place at the U.N. Council: sit down, talk
to one another, and work out an agreement and have someone to
oversee those agreements so that we could make sure that we
could have peace.
Our hands are not clean in this one. I don't think that is
clear. Our hands are not clean and the Cold War will testify to
that. I think that we just have an obligation to make sure that
we do all that we can to have peace in the Congo and on the
Continent of Africa.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Meeks.
Now before we proceed, without objection, I will submit for
the record statements presented by several of the countries
involved.
[Statements referred to appear in the appendix.]
We're fortunate to have the presence of several
Ambassadors, including Ambassador Mitifu of Congo here today.
My message, again, to the Ambassadors is that we all need to
cooperate now to make this process work. The international
community's commitment to Central Africa cannot be taken for
granted.
We'll now go to our first panel. Ambassador Richard
Holbrooke was confirmed by the Senate as the permanent U.S.
representative to the U.N. last August. This was the latest in
a diplomatic career that dates to 1962, when the Ambassador
began his foreign career fresh out of Brown University. During
his distinguished career, Ambassador Holbrooke has been a
professional diplomat, a magazine editor, an author, a Peace
Corps director, and an investment banker.
Ambassador Holbrooke has taken a particular interest in
Africa, for which he should be commended. In December, he made
a lengthy tour of the Great Lakes region. In January, building
on this trip, he engineered the attendance of seven African
heads of state at a special session of the Security Council
dedicated to the Congo crisis, which I was able to attend. At
that session, these African leaders recommitted to the lagging
Lusaka peace process.
We look forward to hearing more about this process and the
U.N. and U.S. commitment to the region. Ambassador, we thank
you for your appearance. Before we begin, let me mention that
the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Susan
Rice, is with us also, available for questions. Dr. Rice, we
thank you. Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD HOLBROOKE, U.S. AMBASSADOR
TO THE UNITED NATIONS; ACCOMPANIED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS SUSAN RICE
Ambassador Holbrooke. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for
inviting us to testify today. It's a great honor to appear
before your Subcommittee for the first time. I am particularly
pleased to be joined by Susan Rice, who will answer the tough
questions after I deliver the single statement.
The participation of so many members of this Committee in
our efforts in New York in the last 8 weeks is a remarkable and
extraordinarily important fact. I would like to begin by
thanking you, Congressman Payne, Congressman Meeks,
Congresswoman Lee, Congressman Crowley, Congresswoman McKinney,
Congressman Bereuter, and, of course, Chairman Gilman and
Congressman Hall and many others who are not here today for
coming to New York; sitting with our delegation; meeting the
permanent representatives; in your case, participating on the
inner deliberations of the Security Council in an unprecedented
way.
I want to stress at the outset that in my 37 years in and
out of the government, this was the most intense congressional
consultative process I've ever been involved in. I was glad
that Chairman Gilman made similar remarks last week at the
Woodrow Wilson Center after my speech. I believe that you sent
a very important signal to the U.N. membership and this went
equally for the Members of the Senate who also visited. I think
the U.N. permanent representatives are far more knowledgeable
today than they were 3 months ago as to the role of the
Congress, both houses, both parties, in the way we make foreign
policy.
I reiterate to those of you who haven't yet joined us in
New York that we hope you will. Many of you can attest to
whether the hospitality is sufficient or not, but we hope it
is.
Your continued interest in Africa is essential. We need
your support. We cannot forge, in a period in which two
different parties in an election year control the two branches
of government, a foreign policy for Africa or almost any other
part of the world without a bipartisan effort.
We need your support because, as Congressman Meeks and
Congresswoman Lee and others, Chairman Royce, have just said,
because Africa matters. I'm very struck by the fact that the
National Summit on Africa, which Leonard Robinson will begin in
a few days and which many of you will participate in, has as
its motto, ``Africa matters.'' That has been their motto for
some years and we have adopted the same motto in New York in an
effort to dispel the pernicious and false argument that the
United States follows a double standard in regard to Africa, a
point that Congressman Payne addressed very specifically a
moment ago.
Last December, we made a trip to 10 nations in Africa,
accompanied by Senator Feingold and backed strongly by Chairman
Royce and Congressman Payne, neither of whom were able to go
but both of whom we consulted in detail before we left and who
we talked to as soon as we returned. Susan and I were on that
trip together along with Howard Wolpe. We had many items on our
agenda, but two dominated: the spread of HIV/AIDS and the
crisis in Congo.
We are not here today to discuss AIDS, but I want to echo
what Congresswoman Lee has already said. It is a scourge beyond
imagination. We must deal with it.
We are proud that the Vice President came to New York to
begin the Month of Africa with a significant increase in what
the Administration will ask for in regard to dealing with that
problem. I've heard that many of you are considering bills
which would be even higher than that number. I commend you for
your attention. I know, because I spoke to President Clinton
about this just 2 days ago, that he wishes to deal with this
problem head-on.
I can report to you today that the Security Council, having
broken new ground by dealing with a health issue for the first
time in its history, intends to keep it up. The Economic and
Social Council will be having meetings on it. We are going to
be meeting with businessmen in New York. We're working very
closely with the White House. This was not a gimmick or a piece
of theater; it was the beginning of an intensification of an
issue which we cannot leave alone.
I'd now like to turn to the Congo, Mr. Chairman, because we
believe, as you know, that the time has come to take the next
steps in the search to bring peace to that explosive area. You
are aware, of course, of the fact that on February 7, the State
Department notified this Committee and other Members of the
Congress that the U.S. intends to support a resolution in the
Security Council to expand the U.N. Observer Mission in the
DRC, called MONUC for its French initials, M-O-N-U-C. This
peacekeeping operation will subsume and expand upon the current
U.N. mission in the Congo. It is imperative that we fulfill our
responsibility to help.
No Security Council resolution has yet been adopted, but as
we speak here in Washington, my colleagues in New York are
negotiating with members of the Security Council and other
concerned countries, many of whose Ambassadors, I'm glad to
say, in Washington, are sitting behind us today. I'm very
pleased that you all could attend. We are negotiating with
other Security Council members on the resolution, which we
expect will be voted on next week and, in any case, no earlier
than February 23.
Let me now outline the background to the situation in the
Congo and also address the specific concerns that were raised
by some of you, particularly Chairman Gilman, Congressman Hall,
and others. Let me say at the outset, Mr. Chairman, Congressman
Gilman, that I regret that your questions were not answered
prior to this hearing. I read them this morning for the first
time. I believe we will answer most of them during this
hearing, directly or indirectly, and we will be happy,
Congressman Gilman, to give to you a more detailed written
answer after this hearing.
As you know, we focused on Africa in January in the
Security Council. As several of the members have already said,
we had seven heads of state and I might add two of the three
rebel signatories to Lusaka come to New York at the end of
January for the open meeting chaired by Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright.
The summit meetings and the follow-up and the private
meetings not reported by the press went well. All of the
leaders in New York recommitted themselves to the Lusaka
Agreement, including, and I stress this, President Kabila, who
was making his first trip ever to the United States. We also
had in New York former President Masire of Botswana, who
outlined his plans on the national dialogue.
This morning I spoke to Ambassador Swing in Kinshasa, who
had just concluded a 3-hour meeting with President Masire in
Kinshasa, had just met with the U.N. special representative and
was waiting to see President Kabila. He reported to us and
asked me to report to the committee that President Masire has
gotten off to an excellent start in the national dialogue. In
fact, if you want to be precise about it, the national dialogue
is not technically supposed to start for another month and a
half or so, but President Masire has done a kind of a pre-
national-dialogue dialogue, which we are glad is off to a quick
start. The United States will do everything it can to support
President Masire and the OAU.
But success, as all of you have already said, requires more
than just talk. Action is necessary to prevent further conflict
and the resurgence of genocide and mass killing in Central
Africa. The U.N. can and must play a key role in this process
and, in our view, the next step is to deploy the next phase of
the process called for by Lusaka, that is a peacekeeping
mission or, to be more precise, an observer mission backed up
by support and logistics and security forces in the Congo as
soon as it is practical to do so.
Allow me, therefore, Mr. Chairman, to review for you the
phased approach to peacekeeping in the Congo. I should stress
that this plan reflects what the U.S. Government, including the
Pentagon, has advocated as the best approach. For many months,
the Pentagon-UN relationship--for many years, I should say--was
perhaps not as close as it should have been, but, in the last
month, the Secretary of Defense William Cohen has come to New
York to talk to the leadership of the U.N. Undersecretary of
Defense Walt Slocombe has been there twice and has invited his
United Nations counterpart, Bernard Miyet, to Washington. Even
as we speak, Secretary Cohen is in Pretoria on a swing through
Africa.
So I think you can see that the Pentagon involvement with
Africa has dramatically increased in the last 6 weeks. I stress
this point to you, because I do not think the U.S. Government
can operate in these areas without an integrated policy that
includes the Pentagon.
After months in which the United States intentionally and
publicly dragged its feet on this effort--and I had discussed
this with many people in this room. I remember particularly
conversations I had with Congresswoman McKinney on this point--
we had intentionally dragged our feet because we felt that the
U.N. Peacekeeping Office did not have a viable plan and we felt
that the Lusaka signatories had not been keeping their part of
the bargain. We feel that, after the Month of Africa in New
York, after the Pentagon's new hands-on relationship with the
United Nations, that it is time to move to the next phase of
the process. This approach ties U.N. deployments to concrete
progress toward the Lusaka Agreement's objectives, both
political and military.
There are three phases to the Lusaka Agreement. The first
phase focused on establishing liaison with the parties, their
field commanders, and the Joint Military Commission. Phase I
was launched in August of last year when the Security Council
authorized MONUC to send up to 90 U.N. military liaison
officers to the Congo and to the capitals of other African
countries involved in this issue.
Implementation during Phase I was imperfect. The cease-fire
has been violated intermittently with heavy fighting in the
northwest and around the central town of Ikela. The U.N.
liaison officers also encountered some setbacks initially in
their deployments. But today, 79 of the 90 military liaison
officers have deployed to rear headquarters on both sides in
multiple locations. Still they've been barred from some key
sites, including those held in government areas.
That being said, the peace process in Congo is moving
forward, although slowly. Fighting that was once wide-scale has
been contained to a relatively smaller number of areas. The
international community is now poised for greater action and
the parties have renewed their commitments. In no way, Mr.
Chairman, do I wish to suggest by what I've just said that we
minimize what is actually going on in the area now or recent
reports of refugees in eastern Congo.
As a result of the meeting of the JMC political committee
in Harare on January 18 and the Security Council session that
many of you attended in New York on January 24, the Lusaka
signatories reiterated their commitment to the peace process
and to providing full security and access for all U.N.
personnel. Significantly, all parties including President
Kabila, called for the immediate deployment of the Phase II
military observer mission.
The Secretary General's report on January 14 outlined the
fundamental structure and mandate for Phase II. It recommended
an expansion of the current U.N. mission of 90 military liaison
officers to a 500-member observer mission with force protection
and support, bringing the total up to 5,537 military personnel.
If the Council authorizes this deployment, Phase II deployment
of MONUC would begin when and only when key conditions are met,
including security, access, and cooperation with U.N.
personnel. No United States peacekeeping troops would be on the
ground as part of this operation.
The observers would monitor the implementation of the
cease-fire on the ground, assist with the disengagement of
troops at certain locations, and assist the JMC with developing
the mechanisms to implement Lusaka. Phase II operation would
not, repeat not, be an interposition force.
Upon the successful completion of Phase II, the U.N. might
recommend a Phase III operation to build on the progress of the
national dialogue under President Masire and to support full
and complete implementation of Lusaka. The precise mission size
and functions of such a Phase III U.N. force remain undefined
and cannot be defined in any precision at this time.
I think Congressman Payne's point earlier about why you
can't have certainty about the final phase before you go into
the intermediate phase and his references to the Mid-East
resonated with me. That is a very strong evocation of my own
views, Mr. Congressman. Although I'd never thought about it
that way, when you said it, I was very struck by it.
We have stated repeatedly that the U.N. would not take on
enforcement responsibilities, including any potential forcible
disarmament of non-state actors. Let me stress, Mr. Chairman,
transition to Phase III is not automatic, but would depend on
developments during Phase II, including significant progress in
the national dialogue. Any movement toward Phase III would
require further Security Council action and would involve
extensive consultations with you and your Committee at the same
level of intensity of early consultations and discussions that
has, I believe, characterized the relationship Susan and I have
had with you and your Committee in the 5 or 6 months since I
first got involved in this. I know that Susan has been heavily
involved in the consulting with you long before that.
Moving to the U.S. national interest, Mr. Chairman. We have
a profound interest in regional stability in Central Africa, in
preventing the resurgence of the genocide and mass killing
which we saw in Rwanda in 1994. In particular, the former
Rwandan Army, referred to as the ex-FAR, and the Interahamwe
militia, who were heavily responsible for the genocide of 1994
in Rwanda, are still operating in the region. They contribute
significantly to instability. Congo is a contagion of crises.
If the conflict there is allowed to fester, efforts to resolve
conflicts and promote stability throughout the region in
Angola, Rwanda, Uganda, Sudan, and Burundi, will be even more
difficult.
Let me at this point, Mr. Chairman, draw your attention to
the fact that President Mandela will be in Arusha next week to
try to prevent Burundi from exploding. President Clinton, who
was invited to attend the Arusha meeting will not be able to
attend because of prior commitments, but I can tell you today
that, for the first time in history, at least as far as I'm
aware, the President of the United States will participate in a
negotiation by two-way teleconference and will, from the White
House, participate in President Mandela's Arusha meeting. We're
very proud of that fact. I know President Mandela is very
pleased and he himself will return to New York for the second
time in 6 weeks upon completion of the Arusha mission to bring
us up to date on his efforts.
So I want to stress that President Clinton is personally
involved in the effort in Burundi and is actively following our
efforts in the Congo and is following this hearing very
closely.
The political and military vacuum in the Congo has drawn in
the rogue states I regret to say. Libya, Iran, North Korea,
Cuba, and the Sudan are all finding ways to be opportunistic.
These states are seeking a foothold in a destabilized Central
Africa for weapon sales, political allies, terrorist bases, and
access to strategic minerals.
At this point, let me comment briefly on Congressman Hall's
comment, although I guess he's left already, we share his
concern. We have put $1 million down to work on this with
Sierra Leone. It's part of the agreement that's supposed to
bring peace to Sierra Leone. The Lome Agreement. I am
profoundly troubled by the diamond problem. I do not, however,
know how to get ahold of it in a fundamental way because of the
unique and fungible nature of diamonds and the ease with which
they can be moved across international borders. For all these
and more reasons, Mr. Chairman, the U.S. has a clear national
interest to support the U.N. effort in resolving the conflict
in the DRC.
For purposes of clarity, let me review for you the key
points. This operation will not involve U.S. troops. The
observers in Phase II would monitor the cease-fire and verify
the redeployment of the party forces to defensive positions as
agreed upon in the agreement. Transition to Phase III in the
future is not automatic. Movement to Phase III is dependent on
the parties observing Lusaka; disengagement of forces along
confrontation lines; substantial progress in the national
dialogue; the completion by the parties of a viable plan for
dealing with nonsignatory armed groups; further action by the
U.N. Security Council; and extensive consultations and
notification, if required, to this and other relevant
Congressional Committees.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to assure you that the
administration is fully aware of the risks of this operation.
Any effort toward peace in the Congo will not be easy. However,
while there are risks undeniably involved with Phase II
deployments by the United Nations, the risk of inaction is far
greater. We cannot promise you immediate peace in the Congo.
What we can say is that without strong U.N. leadership, there
is a high probability, in fact, a near-certainty, of a
catastrophic disaster in Central Africa. Inaction risks the
resurgence of genocide, as we saw in Rwanda, and the danger
that this proxy war will devolve into a direct war between the
states already involved.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me point out that this
past year has been a dramatic one for the United Nations in
peacekeeping. New missions in Kosovo and East Timor and the
expanded mission in Sierra Leone have not only greatly
increased the number of U.N. peacekeepers in the field, but
have added a new level of complexity to international
peacekeeping. Congo is important, but success in these missions
is also critical. We will not allow our concern for the Congo
to come at the expense of our commitment to fulfilling our
other missions, in particular Kosovo. No money will be
reprogrammed from Kosovo for this program.
To sustain all of these U.N. peacekeeping efforts, we need
the support of other UN-member states, the parties to the
various conflicts, and, most importantly, the support of
Congress. Without the means to finance our assessed
contributions to peacekeeping activities, the U.N. would be
unable to fulfill its mandates.
The stakes are high. The challenge is daunting. We cannot
expect the U.N. to impose peace on the Congo. But it is
imperative that the U.N. do what it can to support the peace
process created by the African political leaders themselves.
Failure to act could irreparably damage the capability and
credibility of U.N. peacekeeping and American policy in Africa.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your time. We hope that we
will have the support of you and Chairman Gilman and your
Committee. Your role is crucial to our success. I thank you
again on behalf of Susan, myself, the Secretary of State, and
the entire administration for the immense amount of time that
you and your colleagues on this podium today have spent in New
York in consultations leading up to this important hearing.
Thank you.
[The statement of Ambassador Holbrooke appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Royce. I thank you, Ambassador Holbrooke. I have two
questions, but before I ask them, I'm going to turn to the Full
Committee Chairman, Chairman Ben Gilman. He has two questions
for you.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I regret I'm being
called to another meeting and I appreciate your allowing me to
move ahead on my questions.
Mr. Ambassador, we thank you for your review of where we
are with this peacekeeping mission. We recognize it's an
important mission and we recognize that it is complex.
Mr. Ambassador, has the United Nations asked the
administration to provide support to the proposed expansion to
the current monitoring mission in the Democratic Republic of
Congo?
Ambassador Holbrooke. No.
Mr. Gilman. Is the Department of Defense currently
considering providing strategic airlift to the proposed
peacekeeping force?
Ambassador Holbrooke. No.
Mr. Gilman. Will it be asked to provide lift to support the
peacekeepers inside the DRC as well?
Ambassador Holbrooke. They have not been asked at this
point.
Mr. Gilman. Will the administration seek reimbursement for
any formal request from the U.N. for logistical support?
Ambassador Holbrooke. I will have to get you a written
answer on that because I need to consult the Pentagon whose
leader is in Pretoria today I think addressing similar
questions.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you very much.
In an editorial, Mr. Ambassador, in the Washington Post on
February 14, yesterday, it was noted that ``The Congo plan is
being discussed at a time when other major UN-led peacekeeping
operations are faltering.'' While the editorial noted that the
crisis in the Congo should not be ignored, it did suggest that
the Administration would have a more credible case to make for
an expanded mission in that country if you were more fully
meeting the commitments you've made elsewhere in other
missions, such as those in Kosovo and East Timor. What's your
reaction to that editorial?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Mr. Chairman, I read that editorial
with great interest. It was a very smart editorial, but I would
quibble with that last sentence. There is no question that the
peacekeeping effort in Kosovo is encountering some very
significant difficulties, as we speak, in the town of
Mitrovica. They are widely publicized and deserve our undivided
attention when we're dealing with the Balkans. Indeed, I
participated in as many meetings on Mitrovica as I have on the
Congo in the last few days. As for East Timor, East Timor is
going quite well, all things considered. I wouldn't say that
for the last 20 years, but the last 6 months have been pretty
good.
With all due respect to the rest of the editorial, which
was very well informed, I would go back to what Congressman
Payne, Congressman Meeks, and others said. I do not understand
why a great nation, the world's only superpower, at the apogee
of its power, cannot deal with the crisis in the Congo simply
because we're having a problem in Kosovo.
I underline one point again, Mr. Chairman, no reprogrammed
funds away from Kosovo. Nothing we do in Congo will in any way
diminish the resources we have to support our men and women on
the line at Camp Bonesteel where Congressman Bereuter is about
to lead a very important congressional delegation. We have made
a firm commitment to you, to the Armed Services Committee, to
Senator Warner, and to Chairman Helms as well as yourself. But
I simply don't understand how you could follow a policy which
says don't do it in the Congo until you have solved the Kosovo.
Because Kosovo is one tough problem.
The United States, without trying to be the world's
policeman, without trying to solve every problem on earth, and
there are dozens of problems way beyond our reach, should not
say that we have to get Kosovo right before we do other things,
because it may not be possible. I would also draw your
attention to Tim Juda's article in today's New York Times on
this same point.
But I appreciate your point. I'm very glad you raised it
because it gives us a chance to make clear, on behalf of the
entire administration, that Kosovo will not in any way, shape,
or form, be diminished by what we're asking from you today.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Based on your
familiarity with the U.N. and with its Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, does the U.N. have the capability of
handling three or more major missions in Africa, in Asia, and
Europe?
Ambassador Holbrooke. I don't know, Mr. Chairman. I really
don't know.
Mr. Gilman. We hope they do.
Ambassador Holbrooke. If you want me to say yes, I'll say
yes. But I----
Mr. Gilman. I just want your accurate----
Ambassador Holbrooke. I know you. I know you were expecting
a different answer. But I would be misleading you if I said
yes. The DPKO office is headed by an excellent senior French
official, Bernard Miyet. He has only 300 people in that office.
As you know, because you and I have discussed this before, he's
understaffed. Much depends upon his success.
Secretary General Kofi Annan, who I think is one of the
finest international civil servants we have ever seen and I
believe the best secretary general since Dag Hammerskjold is
concerned about this issue, as you and I are. If the U.N. did
not do such a great job in the early 1990's in peacekeeping
twice in Africa and once in Europe--Rwanda, Somalia, and
Bosnia--they have got to get it right this time. That is one of
the reasons I have stressed the role of the Pentagon.
I would draw your attention again to the fact that
Secretary Cohen is in South Africa today on a very important
trip. South Africa is critically involved in these issues.
We are working overtime to help DPKO without taking over an
area which is, after all, an international body. There is no
friction between us. There is no national issue. There is no
U.S.-French thing. We're working very closely together. But I
don't know the answer to your question. Much depends on it. In
fact, I have said in my speech that you and I did together a
week ago, I have said that I think, overall, not just the
Congo, but the future of the U.N. as a peacekeeping
organization will depend on it.
Now one last point, Mr. Chairman. When the U.N. was formed
by Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and the founding
fathers, this was what they had in mind: conflict prevention
and conflict resolution. This is through the Security Council
and through a secretariat which would carry out its mandate.
With a few notable exceptions, Namibia, Mozambique, and a few
special cases, it's had a very mixed record. We must work with
the U.N. to get it right.
Because if we don't, consider the alternative. This is not
an issue the American public or your esteemed body wishes to
take over for the U.S. This is not going to fall in the same
category as something in the heartland of NATO or where we have
a solemn security treaty like Japan. We have to make the U.N.
work.
So I'm not prepared to give you a simple yes. All I can
tell you is that the entire mission in New York and your direct
involvement and support are critical to helping the U.N. get
there. I stress again, the secretary general is 100 percent
behind this effort. He knows how important it is.
Mr. Gilman. Mr. Ambassador, we appreciate your candid
assessment. We also appreciate the manner in which you're
handling these very difficult problems.
Just one last comment. How will a peacekeeping operation
address Congo's financial commitments to the rogue states that
you mentioned?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Congo's financial commitment to the
rogue states? I'm not sure I understand the question, sir.
Mr. Gilman. President Kabila has some debts to pay. How
will this peacekeeping operation affect those commitments?
Ambassador Holbrooke. You mean, how will this.
Mr. Gilman. Peacekeeping operation.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Do you want to take it? It's a good
chance to let Susan get warmed up here.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you.
Ms. Rice. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Mr. Chairman, I think,
to be quite plain about it, MONUC itself will not directly
address any obligations that Congo may have incurred to rogue
states or even to neighboring states that have participated on
its behalf in the Congo. That's not its mission. Nevertheless,
the involvement of rogue states is a source of major concern to
us, as Ambassador Holbrooke noted in his opening statement. We
believe the best way to minimize the opportunities and the
influence of those rogue states is through a lasting and
effective peace in the Congo so there is no vacuum and no
opportunity for them to gain a further foothold.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Rice, and thank you,
Mr. Chairman, for allowing me.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Mr. Chairman, we will give you
written answers to the 12 questions. I apologize profusely that
you didn't have them before this hearing. That was a logistical
oversight. You should have. They're very good questions. They
were helpful because we practiced answering them before we got
here so we were ready.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador
Holbrooke for your commitment to respond in writing to those
questions.
Ambassador Holbrooke. In writing.
Mr. Royce. Yes.
[The answers to the questions appear in the appendix.]
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Now let me go to my two questions, if I could, Ambassador.
The first would be this. The congressional notification for
this peacekeeping operation notes that the Lusaka Peace
Agreement calls on the Joint Military Commission to develop
mechanisms for the disarmament and demobilization of non-state-
armed groups that are non-signatories of Lusaka. Now that would
include the Interahamwe.
As we've discussed before, this is critical, in my view,
toward peace. So my first question goes to the question of how
has the JMC worked to date? What kind of muscle does it have?
How will it undertake this difficult task?
My second question is this: When you sent the notification,
in it it warns of ``a dangerous security vacuum that has drawn
in rogue states which are seeking weapon sales, political
allies, and access to strategic minerals,'' unquote. Now you
cite this in your testimony as well.
At our September hearing, when I asked the Administration
about press reports of North Korean activity at the Lakasim
uranium mines, the response was, and I'm going to paraphrase
here, but the response was, yes, we have seen reports of a few
hundred North Koreans in the country but we cannot tell you,
with any precision, where they are or what they are doing. With
this notification, the administration seems to be suggesting
that it has a better sense of what the North Koreans are up to
and, in fact, last week there were more press reports of North
Koreans mining uranium in Congo.
Now on this issue, it is worth noting that over 80 percent
of the uranium in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs came from
the Congo mines. What, exactly, can you tell us about North
Korean and other rogue state activity in Congo? Ambassador, is
a U.N. peacekeeping operation the best way to deal with this
challenge?
Ambassador Holbrooke. On the first part of your question,
Mr. Chairman, as all of us who traveled in Southern Africa in
the last few months saw--and I know this includes Congressman
Payne, the CODEL headed by Congressman Gephardt, Congressman
Houghton, myself, Senator Feingold, many of your colleagues, as
you know from our discussions--the JMC, the Joint Military
Committee got off to a very, very slow start.
It is for this reason that we have been clear, and this is
where the Pentagon's role has been so valuable, that the Joint
Military Committee and the United Nations must colocate and
work together in the closest possible manner. We are not going
to vote for the Security Council resolution until we get this
right. As we speak, Susan has been sending cables out to her
Ambassadors in the region about this. It's a very technical
issue at one level. It's a very simple issue at the other.
We're not going to move forward until our own military people
are satisfied.
On the second issue, I'd like to ask if Susan could address
this because she has been heavily involved in this for some
time. It was not clear to me who you were quoting earlier. May
I just----
Mr. Royce. In terms of press reports?
Ambassador Holbrooke. No, you quoted somebody from----
Mr. Royce. Ambassador Wolpe.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Was it Howard Wolpe?
Mr. Royce. Yes.
Ambassador Holbrooke. That's what I thought. Susan.
Ms. Rice. I'd like to think I haven't been heavily involved
with North Koreans over a long period of time.
But, in any case, Mr. Chairman, as you know, we can provide
futher details on this question in a closed session, some of
which would not be appropriate here for an open session. But
as, I think, you and others on the Committee know that the
North Koreans have had ties for many years to a number of
African countries, including Congo, going back to the era of
Mobutu.
North Korea, as you know, has its own uranium mines and the
quality of their ore is suitable already for military purposes.
The Congo mines in Katanga Province in southeastern Congo have
not produced uranium for several years and have not received
proper maintenance. The mines would require a great deal of
capital investment for future exploitation.
So that is what we can share with you in this session.
We're happy to provide what details we have further on this
subject in a closed session.
Mr. Royce. I raised this issue with President Kabila as
well. The answer was much the same in terms of the assumption
that, because President Mobutu had a North Korean presence,
this justified a North Korean presence today. Basically, the
position was, we had a contract. I joked at the time, it's a
rule of law thing. You've got a contract that you couldn't
break.
I think there's a lot that we don't know. In talking with
others from the region and from representatives from other
states, there's a great deal of concern here. I will be
following this up. But I thank you very much for your questions
and I'm going to turn to our ranking member, Mr. Payne of New
Jersey, for his questions.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Ambassador, we know that some of the weapons are coming from
Russia, Bulgaria, perhaps the Ukraine, some of the Baltic
states. Have we tried any kind of negotiation in the region of
those capitals to try to meet with their leadership as it
relates to trying to get them to cease and desist in the supply
of military weapons to the various belligerents in the conflict
in the DRC?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Efforts have been made. I've talked
to several of the countries you've mentioned directly in New
York, and our Ambassadors have in capitals. I would be
misleading you if I suggested we're satisfied with the
responses, even from the countries we have good relations with.
Of course, there are some rogue states heavily involved in this
operation. It is a very serious aspect of the problem.
I don't believe it can be dealt with, absent progress on
the political front. That's just an instinctive feeling on my
part. But it is a real problem.
I do not, however, Congressman Payne, despite the
importance of it, and I completely agree with what you and
Chairman Royce have said about its importance, I do not
actually believe it's the critical variable here. I think the
critical variable is political will and not simply leverage on
arms sales. Here, the immense wealth of the Congo is its
greatest tragedy, of course. There's just all this money going
into the wrong hands and being spent for the wrong purposes.
Angola as well.
Mr. Payne. I had an opportunity to speak to most of the
heads of state there at the U.N. I was unable to speak directly
with Mr. Kabila, but the question that I would have asked him
with the JMC, they are supposed to each work in concert with
demobilization, attempting to go and to disarm or to bring the
Interahamwe and the ex-FAR out of the Democratic Republic of
Congo and reintegrate it back into their countries of Uganda
and, primarily, Rwanda.
In your conversations with Mr. Kabila, or maybe Mr. Royce
had a chance to see him. He's the chairman and I missed out
because I saw him when nobody went out to catch him. Is there
willingness on the part of the government to try to separate
the Interahamwe from average ex-military Hutus, who are not all
Interahamwe or who are not genocidaires but who could be
separated and those who are accused sent to the authorities in
Arusha or in Rwanda?
Ambassador Holbrooke. The starting point for an answer to
this rather critical question is quite basic. President Kabila
has signed the Lusaka Agreement, which calls for the disarming
of the non-state armed forces. One of those armed forces is
about as odious a group as the world has seen since the Khmer
Rouge were at their height. In fact, they are really the
African equivalent of the Khmer Rouge, and that's the group
you're referring to. Or at least parts of it.
Now, we have some problems here. We don't really know the
exact size. We had several very interesting private meetings in
New York between the presidents, some of which I discussed with
you and Chairman Royce privately. They argued vehemently about
the size of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe; who's supporting them;
where they are; how heavily they're armed. Our information is
very uneven. So it's very hard for me to give you a clear
answer.
However, if President Kabila does not honor his part of the
commitment, we would have a serious problem. His response, were
he here today, would be let the other side honor its
commitments. There are obligations on both sides here. The
African parties involved in this fighting have split in a
tragic way along lines that are both hostile and supportive of
the government in Kinshasa.
I, while the ex-FAR/Interahamwe issue is probably--not
probably, it is certainly--one of the two or three critical
issues, it cannot be solved unless the other elements of the
Lusaka process are also dealt with in parallel processing:
disarming other foreign elements; getting the national dialogue
moving; and, and this is why we're here today, getting the
United Nations to start putting its Phase II observer mission
in. If any part of that process breaks down, we're going to be
back to square one, notwithstanding all the drama and good
words of the Month of Africa in New York.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Payne. We're now going to go to
the Vice Chairman of the Full Committee, Mr. Bereuter of
Nebraska.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador
Holbrooke, thank you very much for your testimony. I would seek
comments from you in two areas. Next week the congressional
delegation I'll lead will visit with the European NATO
countries and Canada plus European Union personnel, including
Javier Solano and Chris Patton. First, what level of
cooperation and interest are you getting from the Europeans in
moving ahead with Phase II of MONUC?
Second, what kind of benchmarks should we look for--actions
accomplished, actions taken on the part of the United Nations
to prepare themselves to make sure that Phase II does work and
that we find ourselves ready to take on Phase III?
Ambassador Holbrooke. On your first question, Congressman,
the Europeans are fully supportive, right now, of what is
happening. There is a lot of the traditional rivalries of
Central Africa, which have such a long history going back into
the pre-independence era, have not manifested itself this time
around so far. Probably because everybody realizes that, as
Secretary Albright has said, we could be on the brink of the
first world war of Africa and that would be a tragedy.
So our cooperation with all of the groups you mentioned
and, indeed, with Solano himself, with whom I met at length on
this. Chris Patton, who also has a role. The British, French,
Belgium, and Canadian Ambassadors. The Canadians are very
active here and they're looking forward to playing an important
role. It's been very good.
There is one area, though, that I'm concerned about. That's
the one Congressman Hall raised: diamonds. Diamonds are a whole
different issue. They transcend everything else. I don't
profess to understand the issue. I doubt anyone in this room
really does, but Congressman Hall was very right to single it
out.
On your second question, the benchmarks, perhaps we could
submit for the record the Harare Declaration of January 18 in
which they laid out their own benchmarks. The answer to your
question is the Africans have given us the benchmarks. There
are a series of very precise dates by which certain things must
happen. One of the reasons we dragged our feet earlier, the
point I made earlier, was because they were missing their own
benchmarks. They hadn't appointed a facilitator. They hadn't
started the withdrawals. Under those circumstances, it seemed
inappropriate for us to start down the U.N. peacekeeping route.
Mr. Bereuter. Ambassador, you expect the Security Council
would accept or has endorsed those kinds of benchmarks?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Yes. The Security Council actually
endorsed Lusaka in macro terms when it came out. In the draft
resolution we're now negotiating, we will reendorse Lusaka.
That brings us to the benchmarks. I mentioned earlier Mr.
Masire. The fact that he is in Kinshasa today for the first
time on an agreement that was signed on July 10 is really a--
let us not underestimate this. He is in charge of the all-
important political dialogue. We've finally gotten him there. I
don't think it's a misstatement to say that the United States
played a role of which we can all take some pride that he's
there. He just spent 3 hours with President Kabila.
So the benchmarks, which we will submit to you in writing,
Congressman, are very clear.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter. We'll go to Ms. Lee of
California.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Could I just ask you, Congressman, to
please convey to the American troops at Camp Bonesteel and to
the commanders particularly that there will be no reduction in
our support for their efforts because of any other activities
in any other part of the world? It's very important, because we
are focusing on Africa, but nothing will diminish our support.
You will be leading the biggest CODEL, I think, ever to go to
Bonesteel. So it would be very helpful to us.
Mr. Royce. We'll take that assurance. Thank you.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Thank you, sir.
Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Holbrooke, I
would once again thank you for bringing all the signatories
together and the heads of state at the United Nations.
I read and have talked to you a little bit about these
discussions that took place. Obviously they were very
difficult. I'm wondering, in terms of the reluctance to proceed
with Lusaka, where do you see any reluctance among the
signatories to the agreement? Or is everyone kind of waiting
for the other to move forward?
Ambassador Holbrooke. No, I think it's more the latter.
This has got to be parallel processing. The way I envisage
Lusaka, everyone has their own metaphor, Congresswoman Lee, but
the way I envisage it, it's like one of those old-fashioned
European train stations where all the trains are lined up at,
Victoria Station, together. One is called the national
dialogue. That's under President Masire. One is called the ex-
Far/Interahamwe. One is called the rebel forces: Bemba, Wamba
dia Wamba, and Ilungo who, between them, have 25,000 to 30,000
armed men in the field. One is called the foreign forces under
the control of the pro-Kinshasa forces, the so-called
``allies.'' Then there are forces in the field that oppose
them.
Each one of those is a track. All of them need to move
forward together. If one doesn't move, the others are going to
say, I'm not moving. In that sense, it's very similar to what
we've tried to do in Bosnia with two major differences. This is
far more complicated because there are more actors, more
participants. Second, American military power, NATO force of
the sort we had available to us in the Balkans is not a clear
option.
But in terms of parallel processing, it takes an immense
amount of effort. Howard Wolpe's name has been mentioned
earlier today, your former colleague. He would be with us today
except that Susan has sent him out to the region to work on
this issue, pushing those trains forward and, also, to join
President Mandela in Arusha.
Ms. Lee. Yes, I was going to ask you. What is our role,
then, and how can the United States be helping you in moving
these three tracks forward as quickly as possible?
Ambassador Holbrooke. With the greatest respect for the
sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all the
states in Central Africa, the United States should continue to
do what it's been doing.
Here I'd like to make a point. I had been told by many
people that there would be sensitivity on the part of the
African states if the U.S. was too, ``aggressive.'' All I can
tell you is that that was not what Susan and Howard and I found
on our trip. I felt that, despite our legacy in a country that
used to be called Zaire, which is a very specific, unique
historical burden, but what I now think is clearly in the past,
after President Kabila's trip to New York, despite that legacy,
the African states understand that this is no longer the Cold
War; that the U.S. has no live-or-die strategic interest at
stake in Africa.
We are there to help them because it is in our long-term
interest to do so; because it's the right thing to do; because,
as the wealthiest nation of the world and the only superpower,
we can do it through the U.N. and that we have no vested
interest and we're not taking sides. That all we're doing is
trying to help the African leadership implement what Salim
Salim, the OAU's secretary general calls, ``an African solution
to an African problem.''
As you well know, because you and I have talked about this,
this is my first extended involvement with Africa. Before it, I
called on many of you. I spent 2 hours with Congressman Payne,
an hour with Chairman Royce, and got your advice. What I found
was that the leadership in Africa, and I think that's
demonstrated by the quality of the Ambassadors sitting behind
us today, welcomed our activities in support of their policy,
as long as we don't put forward an American plan. We don't have
an American plan, Mr. Chairman. What we have is American
support for the African plan, the Lusaka plan, through the U.N.
I have been assured by every African leader, including
leaders who are really hostile to each other, that they all
want continued American engagement. That specifically includes
this Committee.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Ambassador. I know we have just
enough time here for a question from Mr. Meeks and one from Mr.
Tancredo. Mr. Meeks.
Mr. Meeks. I just want to echo what you just said. I've
found in my conversations with some of the presidents that I
had the opportunity to talk to in the United Nations, that they
did very much, in fact, want the UN's involvement because they
thought that if peace were to happen, it could not happen
without the U.N. and the United States.
But, also, I have a number of individuals from the Congo
that live in my district. One of the things that seems to
emanate from them quite often is what can the U.S. and/or the
U.N. do? Whether or not there was anything under the U.N.
charter that would help humanitarian causes for the civilians
and the hundreds or thousands of civilians that are being
killed every day, is there anything that we can do or can the
U.N. to enforce, through their charter, so that we can have
some kind of mandate with regards to the civilians that are
being killed in the Congo?
Ambassador Holbrooke. I couldn't agree with you more,
Congressman Meeks, about the humanitarian consequences of this.
That's why we had the special session on refugees in Africa on
January 13 with Mrs. Ogata. In that session, I really took the
gloves off and blasted the United Nations, and will gladly
repeat it here again today, for an arbitrary distinction
between a refugee and an internally displaced person, which
leaves somewhere between 2, 3, and 90 percent of the refugees
in Africa uncovered by the UNHCR.
I find a lamentable situation. I have talked to the head of
the World Food Program, Carolyn Bottini, about it. I have
talked to Mrs. Ogata. I do not think we can let these issues
slip through the cracks. Mr. Chairman, I would urge that you
consider additional hearings on the refugee issue.
But I hope, if you do so, you will help us address what I
think lies behind your question. In Angola, for example, 90
percent of the homeless people are not considered refugees
under the U.N. definition. Worldwide, including Asia and
Central America, two-thirds of the homeless people in the world
don't fall under the U.N. definition of refugee. So they get
catch-as-catch-can help from the World Food Program and so on.
Now this is, let's be honest with each other, when I talk
about this, if we decide to undertake, it may mean some
additional money. It's a big decision. But if you go to a
refugee camp in Congo or Angola and people say, this isn't a
refugee camp, this is an IDP for internally displaced people,
it's an acronym, you get very angry. I think that's what your
Congolese constituents are reflecting. I share that concern. I
spent over 20 years of my life working on refugees in Asia and
Africa and Europe. I would urge that you consider a separate
hearing on this and bring in the refugee experts.
I know that the secretary general and other people would
welcome this kind of public exposure to a bureaucratic anomaly
which is increasingly distressing as the African situation
continues to cause the problems that Congressman Meeks referred
to.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Ambassador. I want to thank the
members of this panel for their participation today. We have
one last question. I'm going to turn to Congresswoman McKinney
of Georgia. Then we'll conclude this hearing.
Ms. McKinney. Great, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Actually, I have two questions. One is a theoretical question
and one is a bit more pragmatic.
We know that this Administration's Africa policy has as its
cornerstone forging relationships with key renaissance leaders.
Yoweri Museveni of Uganda is one of those leaders and Paul
Kagame is another. The United States has a close military
relationship with these countries, including lethal JCET
training. The U.S. has supported multilateral loans for these
countries, despite their having violated international law and
invaded the Democratic Republic of Congo.
These countries have invaded the DRC stating security
concerns on their border, yet they station troops as far west
in the DRC as Boma on the Atlantic Ocean. They are currently
supported armed factions that have become known in
international parlance as rebel groups. These armed factions,
along with the invading troops of Uganda and Rwanda have
committed and are committing crimes against humanity. In
addition, they are fomenting nationalism, ethnic strife in
Congo and the ready availability of weapons makes the situation
even more lethal.
I requested a briefing today from the State Department to
know what the U.S. has done to emphasize in more than
rhetorical terms for our allies that their invasion of Congo is
unacceptable, that the United States stands with the rest of
Africa and not with them in the de facto partition of Congo.
That their continued presence is creating ethnic hatred
heretofore unknown in the Congolese context.
Unfortunately, Mr. Ambassador, I didn't get satisfactory
answers to my questions. In fact, I learned instead that we
still have a military relationship in IMET with these
countries. That we have not yet voiced our concern about the
situation with Archbishop of Bukavu, Monsignor Kataliko and
that we continue to cover up and make excuses for our
successive policy failures with respect to this region.
Mr. Ambassador, can you tell me how your stewardship of the
Great Lakes peace will be any different than the failed
policies of the past that seemingly have abetted the current
climate of ethnic hatred, genocide, revenge genocide, crimes
against humanity, and the violation of any national law?
My second question, Mr. Ambassador, is that I believe the
U.N. must be the only place on the planet where colossal
failures result in promotions. In 3 weeks, the U.N. apologized
for its behavior in Rwanda, Srebrenica, in East Timor, and,
this week, Kosovo. We have seen the U.N. repeatedly get it
wrong and then those very people who got it wrong get promoted
to more responsibility.
Could you tell me what safeguards you will make sure get in
place that, so that the Congo becomes a place of opportunity
for the U.N. to redeem itself, rather than just another
opportunity for yet another apology?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Can I take the second question first?
Who has been promoted as the result of Srebrenica in the U.N.
system or Rwanda that shouldn't have been? I quite take your
point about the Dutch. I don't understand how Colonel Karden
could have been promoted after Srebrenica. But I don't see
rewarding in the U.N. system. Do you have someone specific in
mind?
Ms. McKinney. I absolutely do have some specifics and we
can talk about it afterwards if you like.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Because I must say, I thought that
the Rwanda and Srebrenica reports were truly courageous on the
part of the secretary general insofar as he allowed reports in
which he himself took some criticism.
I take it you're not arguing with the substance of these
reports. You agree with them. I certainly do. I've spoken out
quite strongly on this. But I do want to reiterate my high
admiration and support for the secretary general and that
includes the fact that he did something that very few
politicians in our country or anywhere else have done.
Mr. Royce. Ambassador, might I make a suggestion?
Ambassador Holbrooke. Yes, sir.
Mr. Royce. Because we face a series of votes upon the
conclusion of our hearing. I wonder if there would be any
objection if your responses are to the record to Congresswoman
McKinney and, at the same time, also, we very much appreciate
your commitment to respond to the chairman's questions in
writing, for the record.
Mr. Royce. We want to thank you for your frankness. We want
to thank Assistant Secretary Rice for her participation as
well. Ambassador, we very much look forward to working with you
and thank you so much for this hearing today.
Ambassador Holbrooke. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Royce. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:42 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
February 15, 2000
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