[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                    DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND

                    RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS

                                FOR 2001

_______________________________________________________________________

                                HEARINGS

                                BEFORE A

                           SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

                       COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

                         HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                       ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION
                                ________

 SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND RELATED AGENCIES 
                             APPROPRIATIONS

                    FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia, Chairman
 TOM DeLAY, Texas                   MARTIN OLAV SABO, Minnesota
 RALPH REGULA, Ohio                 JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts
 HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky            ED PASTOR, Arizona
 RON PACKARD, California            CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan
 SONNY CALLAHAN, Alabama            JOSE E. SERRANO, New York
 TODD TIAHRT, Kansas                MICHAEL P. FORBES, New York
 ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama        
 KAY GRANGER, Texas                 

 NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Young, as Chairman of the Full 
Committee, and Mr. Obey, as Ranking Minority Member of the Full 
Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees.

 John T. Blazey II, Richard E. Efford, Stephanie K. Gupta, and Linda J. 
                        Muir, Subcommittee Staff
                                ________

                                 PART 6
                                                                   Page
 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION:

   Federal Aviation Administration................................    1

 RELATED AGENCY:

   National Transportation Safety Board...........................  695

                              

                                ________

         Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations

                                ________

                     U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
 64-804                     WASHINGTON : 2000

                        COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

                   C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida, Chairman


 RALPH REGULA, Ohio                  DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin
 JERRY LEWIS, California             JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania
 JOHN EDWARD PORTER, Illinois        NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
 HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky             MARTIN OLAV SABO, Minnesota
 JOE SKEEN, New Mexico               JULIAN C. DIXON, California
 FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia             STENY H. HOYER, Maryland
 TOM DeLAY, Texas                    ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia
 JIM KOLBE, Arizona                  MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
 RON PACKARD, California             NANCY PELOSI, California
 SONNY CALLAHAN, Alabama             PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana
 JAMES T. WALSH, New York            NITA M. LOWEY, New York
 CHARLES H. TAYLOR, North Carolina   JOSE E. SERRANO, New York
 DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio               ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut
 ERNEST J. ISTOOK, Jr., Oklahoma     JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
 HENRY BONILLA, Texas                JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts
 JOE KNOLLENBERG, Michigan           ED PASTOR, Arizona
 DAN MILLER, Florida                 CARRIE P. MEEK, Florida
 JAY DICKEY, Arkansas                DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina
 JACK KINGSTON, Georgia              MICHAEL P. FORBES, New York
 RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey CHET EDWARDS, Texas
 ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi        ROBERT E. ``BUD'' CRAMER, Jr., 
 GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, Jr.,          Alabama
Washington                           MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York
 RANDY ``DUKE'' CUNNINGHAM,          LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California
California                           SAM FARR, California
 TODD TIAHRT, Kansas                 JESSE L. JACKSON, Jr., Illinois
 ZACH WAMP, Tennessee                CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan
 TOM LATHAM, Iowa                    ALLEN BOYD, Florida
 ANNE M. NORTHUP, Kentucky           
 ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama         
 JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri            
 JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire       
 KAY GRANGER, Texas                  
 JOHN E. PETERSON, Pennsylvania      
 VIRGIL H. GOODE, Jr., Virginia     
                 James W. Dyer, Clerk and Staff Director

                                  (ii)

 
 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS FOR 
                                  2001

                              ----------                              --
--------

                                         Wednesday, March 22, 2000.

                    FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

                               WITNESSES

KENNETH M. MEAD, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
JIM HALL, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
JANE F. GARVEY, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
CATHAL L. FLYNN, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY

                            Opening Remarks

    Mr. Wolf. We are waiting for Mr. Sabo, but I will begin 
with an opening statement.
    Today we will receive testimony on vital aviation safety 
programs that are in the fiscal year 2001 budget request of the 
Federal Aviation Administration. In particular, we want to 
spend some time this morning discussing FAA's response to the 
troubling problem of runway incursion and the increasing rise 
in operational errors.
    At a press conference 7 weeks ago, I highlighted the need 
after a number of people came to me for FAA to be more 
aggressive in combating runway incursions, which have risen 
dramatically over the past 7 years in this country. I called on 
the FAA to hold a national summit on runway incursions which 
would bring together private and commercial pilots, air traffic 
controllers, technology manufacturers, and others to reach a 
consensus on a firm action plan to deal with the problem that 
has now been on the Safety Board's most wanted list for at 
least 10 years. I also called on the FAA to increase funding in 
the fiscal year 2001 budget on runway safety programs.
    To her credit, Administrator Garvey has met that challenge 
by scheduling not only a summit, but a series of detailed 
regional conferences, the first being in California, and 5 of 
the 10 worst airports for runway incursions have been in 
California. She has asked for more money in next year's budget, 
and that is an excellent start, but as we will hear today, the 
agency is still behind in procuring the technology needed to 
address runway safety. We need to do more to get the system 
into the field quickly, to get controllers and pilots the tools 
they need to do their job safely.
    We have other aviation issues to cover this morning as 
well. The agency is facing a potentially large shortfall in its 
operating budget over the next 3 years due to the aviation 
reauthorization bill, AIR 21. We want to explore the 
ramifications. I think with the administration's support and 
ill action, poor action of the Congress, you are putting much 
more into concrete, and I think operations are going to have a 
hard, hard time.
    We will also have questions on recent safety and security 
issues at Dulles Airport, which is in my Congressional 
district. We received a number of pictures that different 
people have displayed out there in order to, I would say, trap 
or entrap the FAA inspectors. Perhaps FAA is not standing 
behind their men as they should be. We will have some questions 
on that.

                       Introduction of Witnesses

    So we welcome this morning Jane Garvey, administrator of 
the Federal Aviation Administration; Jim Hall, chairman of the 
National Transportation Safety Board; and Ken Mead, inspector 
general of the Department of Transportation.
    Without objection, all of your statements will appear in 
the record. We will ask you to do an oral summary if you wish.
    We will hear from Mr. Mead first, Mr. Hall second and then 
Administrator Garvey.
    Mr. Sabo.

                      Opening Remarks of Mr. Sabo

    Mr. Sabo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome our 
witnesses. I am looking forward to hearing from you.
    Mr. Wolf. Thank you.
    Mr. Mead.

                  Inspector General Opening Statement

    Mr. Mead. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I 
would like to start off my statement by first recognizing the 
actions of Administrator Garvey and her staff for the successes 
of this past year. FAA was clearly successful in making its 
mission-critical computer systems Y2K-compliant, and for the 
first time since the inception of the Chief Financial Officers 
Act received a clean opinion on its financial statement. And to 
its credit, we have seen the evidence that the FAA has learned 
from past mistakes on selected acquisitions and has adopted a 
``build a little, test a little approach.'' Also, several 
recent air traffic control acquisitions have come in on time 
and within budget. There have been years when we appeared 
before this Committee, and we couldn't give a preliminary 
report like that.
    Notwithstanding these accomplishments, FAA faces 
significant problem areas that need particular attention in the 
coming year. They fall into three categories: safety, air 
traffic control modernization and financing. I will take each 
one of those in turn.


                                 SAFETY


    First, safety. Runway incursions, operational errors by 
controllers, and assessing the safety of U.S. airline foreign 
codeshare partners are areas that we feel need attention. The 
one I would like to take first is runway incursions. Runway 
incursions are incidents on the runway that involve at least 
one aircraft and involve a potential collision hazard. They 
remain at high levels. This is a high-risk area; and has been 
on the National Transportation Safety Board's most wanted list 
for nearly a decade. I would like to remind the Committee that 
the worst aviation accident in civil aviation history involved 
a runway incursion with a loss of over 500 lives.
    I will use the NTSB chart as the frame of reference. I 
think if you take the period from 1993 through 1999, you will 
see that runway incursions have increased enormously, 61 
percent, from 200 in 1994 to 322 in 1999. Mr. Chairman, the 
risk has been increasing exponentially for most of the past 
decade. This is truly an accident waiting to happen. Onemain 
problem is that until recently, nobody with any authority was really in 
charge of the runway incursion program at FAA. They had a good action 
plan, but key initiatives were never implemented.
    And FAA has been unsuccessful in fielding new technologies 
to assist controllers in reducing runway incursions. FAA said 
in 1991 that it was developing key technology to alert 
controllers to potential collisions. Eight years later this 
technology is not operational at any one of the 34 airports 
programmed to receive it. This technology is 150 percent over 
its planned costs, and it is now about 6 years behind schedule.
    I think the Administrator's initiative to appoint a new 
director for the program with the requisite authority to make 
runway incursions a top Agency priority are important steps in 
the right direction. I believe the Administrator agrees that 
this safety issue is one that demands constant high-level 
attention, just like we did with Y2K, where you meet every week 
with the senior managers to assess progress and make 
adjustments. We really have to get a handle on this.
    FAA, in the runway incursion area, must expedite the 
technology solution to help controllers at high-risk airports. 
The agency must follow through on runway incursion action 
plans. We would also recommend a focus on technology such as in 
cockpit displays which provide information on the location of 
aircraft. With this type of technology there would be at least 
two sets of eyes, the pilot, and the controller's, to observe 
risk situations. And finally, as we are applying the pressure 
in this area, it is important to ensure rigorous adherence to 
the reporting requirements for runway incursions. They are 
self-reported, and it is important that we monitor that.

                           OPERATIONAL ERRORS

    A second safety area I would like to touch on is 
operational errors. This chart shows that operational errors by 
controllers have increased from about 750 in 1997 to 940 in 
1999. Operational errors occur, for example, when the 
prescribed minimum separation distance between planes is not 
maintained. A concern here is that we understand that FAA 
proposed to increase its targeted operational error rate above 
the actual fiscal year 1999 rate. By raising the rate, FAA 
could actually incur more operational errors and still meet its 
goal. In our opinion, this sends absolutely the wrong signal, 
especially at a time when FAA is trying new techniques to 
address delays, accommodate more flights, and reduce the 
controller supervisory ratio from 7 controllers for every 1 
supervisor to 10 controllers for every 1 supervisor.
    [The information follows:]



                              Code Sharing

    Mr. Mead. A third safety area is code sharing. Code sharing 
between U.S. and foreign carriers has more than tripled in the 
past 5 years. Code sharing occurs when a passenger flies as a 
ticketed passenger of a U.S. carrier, but the actual travel of 
at least a portion of the trip is on a foreign carrier's 
aircraft. Last month the Department and FAA issued guidelines 
for U.S. carriers to follow in conducting safety audits of 
foreign code share partners. That was an important step 
forward. A safety audit is now a precondition for getting code 
share agreements approved. FAA must now move forward and 
implement the guidelines.

                   AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL MODERNIZATION

    Mr. Chairman, I would now like to move to ATC 
modernization. There are two key modernization programs I would 
like to touch on, the wide area augmentation system, that is 
called WAAS for short, and the Standard Terminal Automation 
Replacement System, STARS for short. Both these programs are 
going to need a lot of attention in the coming year. WAAS is an 
effort to move towards satellite-based navigation. STARS is an 
effort to install a new air traffic control computer system in 
the terminal environment. The combined price tag for these two 
systems is between $4 and $5 billion.
    WAAS has experienced hardware and software problems that 
will have significant cost and scheduling implications that 
have yet to be determined. FAA did not meet the 1998 schedule 
for WAAS operations, and neither will it meet the revised 
September 2000 date. Originally the cost estimate was about 
$900 million. It is now $2.9 billion. The key problem area 
focuses on the integrity of the WAAS system, the ability of the 
system to alert a pilot when the satellite signal can't be 
relied upon and ought not to be used.
    We feel that until solutions to the technical problems are 
identified, it would be prudent for FAA to make a significant 
downward adjustment in the current burn rate to the contract. 
FAA is spending almost $4 million a month now on the contract. 
Also, FAA should seek advice on how to solve the technical 
problems from an independent scientific group. My testimony 
suggests the National Academy of Sciences, but we are not 
wedded to that particular group. The point is to have an 
independent group that doesn't have a vested financial interest 
in the outcome.
    STARS, which, as I indicated, is an effort to install ATC 
computer systems in a terminal environment has undergone 
significant cost increases, from $940 million to about $1.4 
billion, and schedule delays from 1998 to 2002. As an interim 
measure, FAA implemented what is known as the Early Display 
Configuration (EDC). FAA has been successful in doing this. 
However, that should not be confused with full STARS. The EDC 
is primarily a display replacement and does not provide air 
traffic controllers with a full replacement of the 30-year-old 
system currently in use.
    The largest risk ahead to employing full STARS is the 
amount of software code that remains to be developed. The 
original estimate was for 120,000 lines of code. That is 
now415,000. Of this we have approximately 145,000 lines of code to go. 
I caution you, Mr. Chairman, that I am using an estimate of 415,000 
lines of code, and I would not take the 400,000 lines of code estimate 
to the bank yet.

                               FINANCING

    Moving to financing, FAA's reauthorization gives the Agency 
about $40 billion in funding over the next 3 years. Most of 
that increase is going to be dedicated by law to the accounts 
used for capital investments in airports and air traffic 
control modernization. Special provisions of the new law 
guarantee trust fund revenues to first be used for those 
accounts according to prescribed levels, and this chart 
attempts to illustrate that. The gray bar is the airport 
funding level known as the AIP program. The yellow bar is 
modernization, ATC modernization, known also as the Facilities 
and Equipment account. And the light green bar is for FAA 
Operations.
    [The information follows:]



    Mr. Mead. Under the law, the last item that gets paid from 
the trust fund is going to be operations. You must first take 
care of airports and the modernization accounts. So FAA is 
going to be facing a potential shortfall over the next 3 years 
of about $7 billion. In 2001, the budget you are working on, 
that shortfall could be about $2.3 billion. Under the law, once 
you run out of trust fund revenues, and as you can see from the 
chart, there is not enough of them, you are going to have to 
resort to the general fund to make up the difference, and that, 
of course, is going to create competition with other Federal 
programs and, in the case of this subcommittee, programs such 
as Coast Guard and Amtrak.
    We think this has three immediate implications for FAA. 
First, FAA must contain its Operations cost. We have cautioned 
repeatedly that the Operations cost must be contained. This 
legislation makes that a must. Operations costs will probably 
increase about 12 percent from 2000 to 2001 alone.
    Second, we feel FAA needs to field a cost accounting system 
particularly with a huge budget plus-up. FAA is like any 
business. FAA needs a cost accounting system so it can 
accurately identify and allocate costs to its different 
activities. A cost accounting system would be helpful in 
controlling Operations costs.
    I should note the FAA originally planned for its cost 
accounting system to be implemented by October 1 of 1998. 
Implementation is not complete. FAA recently delayed the 
completion schedule until sometime in 2002. We believe FAA 
needs this system sooner than later, particularly since we are 
dealing now with budgets of about $13 billion. They truly need 
a cost accounting system.
    Finally, we would recommend that particularly with the 
budget plus-up, FAA establish a strategic business plan. I 
think they are doing that. FAA needs to establish what they 
would propose to do with the money and what they will get from 
it.
    That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Wolf. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement and biography of Ken Mead follows:]



    Mr. Wolf. Mr. Hall.

                   Opening Statement of NTSB Chairman

    Mr. Hall. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Sabo and 
Congressman Olver. It is a pleasure as always to appear before 
you regarding the important subject of aviation safety. My 
prepared testimony discusses three aviation issues: runway 
incursions, explosive mixtures in fuel tanks of transport 
category aircraft, and the need for updated flight recorders. I 
would like to focus my oral testimony on what is, in my 
opinion, one of the most significant safety issues facing us 
today, runway incursions.

                           RUNWAY INCURSIONS

    According to FAA data, there were 322 runway incursions in 
the United States in 1999. That was a 71 percent increase over 
the number of runway incursions that occurred in 1993, and the 
rate per 1,000 operations was 56 percent greater than that of 
1993, and that is demonstrated on the chart to the committee's 
right.
    In testimony presented before this subcommittee last March, 
I stated, and I quote, that ``we remain concerned that FAA 
efforts to address runway incursions through technological 
development fall short of what is needed.'' The Board's 
position, Mr. Chairman, 1 year later has not changed. Although 
the Board is currently investigating a number of runway 
incidents that occurred last year, I have briefly summarized 
just four of them in my prepared statement. Any one of them had 
the potential to be catastrophic to the over 1,000 individuals 
that were on the eight airplanes involved.

                    O'HARE AIRPORT RUNWAY INCURSION

    Today I thought I would discuss briefly one of them to 
illustrate our concern. On April 1, 1999, a runway incursion 
occurred at O'Hare International Airport when a Boeing 747 
deviated from its assigned taxi route and inadvertently 
reentered a runway. As a Korean Air Boeing 747 approached 
rotation speed, the pilot saw the China Air airplane, abruptly 
rotated the aircraft, banking to the left as he did.
    The Safety Board has prepared an animation of this 
nighttime incident that will be shown while I describe the 
incident. First, you will see a top view showing the location 
of the two airplanes. The time frame for this view is when the 
China Air 747 made a left turn back onto the active runway 
where it had landed just moments earlier. There are two more 
views. One follows Korean Air as it takes off, and the other 
shows the point where the collision almost occurred.
    Mr. Chairman, it was fortunate that the Korean Air aircraft 
was going fast enough for the pilot to lift off. It passed just 
75 feet over the Air China aircraft and was only 3 seconds from 
a collision. There were a total of 390 people on both aircraft.

              AIRPORT MOVEMENT AREA SAFETY SYSTEM (AMASS)

    In response to Safety Board recommendations dating back to 
1991 that asked the FAA to expedite funding, development, and 
implementation of runway incursion efforts, the FAA indicated 
that one of their primary actions to reduce the runway 
incursion problem was the Airport Movement Area Safety System, 
commonly known as AMASS. It was not until recently that the FAA 
modified its position, indicating that AMASS, which will not be 
operational for at least another year, will not help prevent 
runway incursions. It will only help prevent runway collisions.
    Indeed the Board is concerned about AMASS's inability to 
perform as originally intended. Following the runway incursion 
at O'Hare International Airport last April, the Safety Board 
asked the FAA to demonstrate how AMASS would have performed had 
it been available at the Chicago Airport. Their simulation 
showed that the oral and visual alert parameters currently used 
might not have provided controllers and flight crews enough 
time to react and intervene to maintain a safe separation. 
Therefore, the Board's staff is looking into the effectiveness 
of AMASS in preventing runway collisions under various 
conditions and whether the FAA needs to conduct additional 
simulations of AMASS performance to test its ability to meet 
the established standards.

                        LOWER ACTIVITY AIRPORTS

    We are also concerned about the potential for runway 
incursions at lower-activity airports such as Providence, Rhode 
Island. In March 1998, the FAA stated that it was continuing 
its research and development of low-cost Airport Surface 
Detection Equipment, or ASDE, alternatives. However, 2 years 
after that response and 9 years since the Board's initial 
recommendation, low-cost ASDE alternatives remain under 
development, and none have been commissioned for full 
operational use at any airport in the United States.
    Mr. Chairman, the Board remains concerned that despite 
nearly a decade of research and development and six different 
FAA administrators, this issue is still not being adequately 
addressed. It is just a matter of time before we have a 
disastrous runway collision if more is not done to address this 
issue soon. After a series of runway incursions at some of our 
busiest airports last year, at a December 1999 conference held 
by the Department of Transportation on Aviation, Safety, and 
Security for the 21st Century, I urged Administrator Garvey to 
hold a summit to bring together all of those responsible for 
preventing runway incursions in an effort to reexamine the 
issue and find new solutions. In your February 1, 2000 
statement, Mr. Chairman, you also called for a national summit 
conference on runway incursions.
    I am very gratified by the administrator's actions by 
responding to your call and addressing this subject, and I am 
confident that by applying the same direct leadership and 
focused attention on this issue as she did on the FAA's 
successful Y2K program, she will be equally successful in 
implementing an effective runway incursion program during her 
tenure.
    That completes my testimony, and I would be happy, of 
course, to respond to any questions the committee may have at 
the appropriate time, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement and biography of Jim Hall follows:]



    Mr. Wolf. Ms. Garvey.

                 Opening Statement of FAA Administrator

    Ms. Garvey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members 
of the committee. I appreciate very much the opportunity to 
appear before you this morning to discuss not just the 
President's budget, but issues where this committee, where you, 
Mr. Chairman, have played a key leadership role.
    If I could begin by just saying a word or two about the 
Agency. First of all, it is a remarkable Agency with an 
extraordinarily important mission. We operate 24 hours a day, 7 
days a week, day in and day out. The men and women of this 
Agency safely manage over 200,000 takeoffs and landings every 
day, moving about 650 million passengers each year, and those 
numbers are growing by leaps and bounds.
    In the context of the dramatic growth that we are seeing in 
the industry, our President's budget, we believe, provides us 
the resources we need to advance what we know is a very 
ambitious agenda in the areas of safety, security, and system 
efficiency. We believe the budget represents the right balance 
between capital investment while at the same time protecting a 
strong operations budget.

                           OPERATIONS BUDGET

    I thought Mr. Mead's comments were very appropriate on the 
Operations budget. It is a concern that we share and I know 
members of this committee share as well. But we also know at 
the FAA that the issue is not simply a matter of more money. 
The real question we get asked, and a fair question to ask, 
indeed, is the FAA up to the task? Can we meet the challenges 
of the 21st century? I certainly don't want to suggest that we 
have solved all of our problems, far from it. But I do believe 
we are managing differently. I think we are making progress, 
and I think we are on the right track.
    By way of illustration, I would like to comment on two 
programs in particular, two that both the inspector general has 
referred to and then Mr. Hall has referred to as well. One is 
modernizing the Air Traffic Control System, and the second is 
our runway safety program. As you know, Mr. Chairman, the FAA 
has been criticized for not managing large programs very well, 
and I think if you were to ask people within the Agency, many 
of them would agree with that assessment. The real question for 
me and the issue is what have we learned from our experiences 
in the 1980s? Have we changed the way we do business?

                             MODERNIZATION

    I think particularly in the area of modernization, we have 
learned two lessons that we are taking to heart. One is that we 
need to establish consensus. We need to have a strong 
collaboration both with the industry and with our labor unions. 
Secondly, we have learned that the best way to move forward on 
any complex projects, particularly like modernization, is to do 
it incrementally and to do it step by step.
    In my view, these efforts are paying off. By May of this 
year, all 20 of our en route centers will have new display 
terminals and new computer systems. That is significant in and 
of itself, but it is even more significant because it provides 
the platforms for future safety and capacity upgrades. That is 
very important for us. We accomplished this enormous task in a 
very short period of time, HOST in particular, from start to 
finish 18 months. We were able to do that because Congress gave 
us the tools--not just the financial tools, but acquisition 
reform--that allowed us to finish this effort in record time.
    We have got some real challenges in the terminal area. Mr. 
Mead spoke of those. Again, I think we are approaching it with 
exactly the right strategy. With Free Flight Phase One, we are 
taking the same approach, incremental, step by step, measuring 
the benefits as we proceed. Last week in Memphis we had the 
privilege of dedicating both DSR and Conflict Probe, which is 
one of the first elements of Free Flight Phase One. It was 
exciting, and it was rewarding to hear both the controllers and 
technicians say that ``here in Memphis we have the most 
automated system in the world''. That is an extraordinary 
accomplishment. I think in the area of modernization we are 
making progress, and we have the right strategy to approach 
what is a very complicated issue.

                             RUNWAY SAFETY

    The issue of runway safety--and I will take just a minute 
on that. Mr. Chairman, in this area you have provided real 
leadership, as Mr. Hall has indicated and as Mr. Mead as well. 
Let me be very, very clear. We know this is a serious issue. We 
know it is a critical issue, and we know we need to tackle it 
head on. It affects virtually all aspects of the community--of 
the aviation community, commercial aviation, general aviation, 
and airports as well.
    We have taken, as Mr. Mead and Mr. Hall have suggested, 
some important steps to get this program on track. We have used 
Y2K as a model, and we have created one focal point for the 
agency. I want to underscore that it is not just a program 
director in a line of business, but it is a focal point for the 
agency. All of those elements are managed by the program 
director, John Mayrhofer, who is an extraordinary manager. He 
has been a controller. He is a man of great integrity, and I 
have great confidence in his ability.
    Mr. Chairman, as you mentioned, at your suggestion we are 
sponsoring in coordination with the NTSB a national summit on 
runway safety. We think it will give us the kind of national 
focus and the national attention it deserves. We are also, as 
you suggested, leading up to that summit hosting a series of 
regional meetings. The goal for those regional meetings is 
really twofold. First it is to raise awareness, but perhaps 
even more importantly, it is to develop some very specific 
action plans, some time line benchmarks tailored specifically 
to the airports in that region. Those meetings begin next week 
with the first one in California. They will continue 
culminating in the national summit in June. The summit will 
focus on three areas--what we have learned from the regional 
areas, focus on human factors, and again focus on the 
technologies that are available.

                       RUNWAY SAFETY ACTION PLAN

    Mr. Chairman, you mentioned the action plan. We do have an 
action plan. It was established in 1998. It is made up of 
recommendations from MITRE, from the NTSB, from the IG, and 
from Congress as well. There are 186 items in the action plan. 
We have got about 75 percent complete. John has done a really 
good job in focusing on this. Forty-seven of those items are 
still ongoing, and a number of them have to do with technology. 
But I will say that a large number of those recommendations 
focus on what we call the near-term solutions, the things that 
are easier to achieve and easier to implement fairly quickly. 
We have focused on those to a high degree.
    The action plan also recommended site visits to airports 
where there have been specific problems. We had 20 of those 
last year; 30 more are scheduled for this year, so near-term 
actions that we are focused on and implementing those asquickly 
as we can.

                        RUNWAY SAFETY TECHNOLOGY

    Far and away--and you have certainly heard comments about 
this this morning--the most challenging aspect for us has been 
technology. AMASS, which has been extraordinarily complicated, 
extraordinarily challenging, I think we have absolutely turned 
the corner on it thanks really to a dedicated team of both 
controllers and managers. We have tackled human factors issues, 
and we will be putting in an initial operating capability into 
San Francisco in September of 2000. We are going to move out 
and deploy those in January of 2001, with all 31 airports in 
place by 2002. We have got some work going in ASDE and also 
ADS-B, which Mr. Mead referred to, and I would be happy to go 
back to those and answer questions.
    I would say the ASDE-X, which I think has been a good 
suggestion that we received from this committee of the low-cost 
technologies, we are very eager to see what that proposal 
brings us. That probably is out on the street. We are eager to 
see over the next couple of months what bidders we get, what 
interest we get, and something that we can implement fairly 
quickly. I think that is important as well.
    Let me just end by saying that I do not underestimate in 
any way the challenge associated with the runway safety 
program. I think it is an issue that has to be tackled in a 
multifaceted way. There is no one single answer, no simple 
solution, if you will. We have got to keep at the training. We 
have got to keep at the situational awareness. We need to keep 
at the technology, but I am determined to turn the corner as we 
did with Y2K, as we did with free flight phase one, and as we 
did with the clean audit earlier this year.
    Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much your support, your 
leadership, and the leadership of this committee, and that 
completes my remarks, and I am happy to answer any questions 
that you may have.
    Mr. Wolf. Thank you, Ms. Garvey.
    [The prepared statement and biography of Jane Garvey 
follows:]



                           RUNWAY INCURSIONS

    Mr. Wolf. At the outset I think the fact that you are 
directly involved, as Mr. Hall said, in runway incursions 
certainly raises my comfort level, although I do worry. As you 
know, the action plan was in effect in 1998, and there was that 
one individual who was coming forward trying to urge that 
something be done, and someone who is still at the FAA was 
trying to bring about the removal of that person from his job. 
And that troubles me that there was somebody still there who 
wanted to get rid of this individual who brought this issue to 
the attention of Mr. Hall, I believe he met with Mr. Hall, and 
that troubles me. We are not out to ask you for the FAA 
person's name. Now that you are focused on it, maybe that does 
make a difference, but that one or two or three individuals are 
still there, and I assume that they were involved in the runway 
incursions issue, and they were basically going to get one of 
the best experts fired from his job.

                         RUNWAY INCURSION GOAL

    Mr. Hall, runway incursions have been on the Safety Board's 
most wanted list, as you said, for 10 years. The FAA still 
isn't meeting its own goal for addressing them. There were at 
least 12 serious incursions last year, and the incursion rate 
is close to double what it was in the early 1990s. In your 
view, what more needs to be done in making the rate number go 
down significantly? If you were the FAA administrator, what 
would you do if your credibility and record were on the line to 
deal with this?
    And I am going to ask Mr. Mead the same question. And as 
you are doing that, if you can define for the committee, what 
is a runway incursion. We saw the chart saying there were 322, 
but are you absolutely, positively confident that all of the 
runway incursions that are taking place are reported?
    I was told, and you may comment on this, that Providence, 
Rhode Island, at one time was not viewed as a runway incursion, 
and yet it is one that is used as a prime example. So can you 
tell me what you would do if you were the FAA administrator and 
your credibility and record were on the line? And secondly, how 
do you define a runway incursion? And three, a little bit about 
Providence. Are you confident that all the runway incursions 
are now being reported? Is 322 the bottom line, is that the 
number?
    Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, let me try to respond to all of 
those, taking, obviously, the first issue first, what would I 
do if I were the FAA administrator. First let me point out to 
this committee that I am indeed grateful I am not the FAA 
administrator, and every day I pray for Jane Garvey's health. 
She has tremendous responsibility. But I have tried to advise 
the administrator what I would do, and that is, I believe, what 
she is doing, Mr. Chairman, take direct control of the program.
    As I pointed out in my testimony, there have been six 
different administrators since the Board made its initial 
recommendation in this area. All of them, I believe, have had 
good intentions. The program has not been effectively managed 
or coordinated, and as a result, I believe we have lost many 
valuable years in terms of addressing the program. I think what 
the administrator has done by taking direct charge and running 
this program, in essence the way she ran the Y2K program, would 
be certainly my recommendation.

                        RUNWAY INCURSION PROBLEM

    The runway incursion problem covers many areas. The Board's 
recommendations have covered the areas of pilot training; air 
traffic control training; air traffic control operations; air 
traffic control hardware; airport signs, lighting, and marking; 
airport conspicuity and reporting requirements. The Board has 
made 67 recommendations since 1984 to the FAA addressing this 
problem, and I think it is important to note that the 
acceptance rate on the recommendations is 86.6 percent. The 
areas, however, that had been addressed in the past need to be 
revisited and reidentified because, as the Administrator 
pointed out, we have 650 million passengers that are going 
through some 455 towered airports in the United States, 189 of 
those airports are contract tower airports, yet only 39 of 
those 455 toweredairports in the United States will be funded 
to receive the AMASS program when it is finally implemented. I meant 
34. I apologize, 34 programs.
    Technology obviously is only one part of the solution. The 
problem of being able to effectively address the incursion 
problem, which, if I understand, it is a conflict of one 
airplane with other planes, vehicles or personnel on the 
airport surface, is just as important a problem at runways in 
Providence, Rhode Island, Richmond, Virginia, and other 
communities that are not scheduled to receive this equipment. I 
would hope that we would be able to address this with many 
various layers of attention.

                       RUNWAY INCURSION REPORTING

    As Inspector General Mead pointed out, there is a voluntary 
reporting of runway incursions, and we do have a concern over 
whether the number being reported is accurate. In the past, the 
Board has been notified of incursions that were not 
appropriately and properly reported. I think that the attempt 
by the administrator and the leadership, Mr. John Mayrhofer, 
with trying to have this voluntary program of reporting will 
assist that, but it is a problem. I think the inspector general 
has done more in looking at that specific portion of the 
problem than the Board has, but the situation that occurred at 
Warwick, Rhode Island, was not, it was reported initially, 
indicated to be an incursion, and like all the others that I 
have referred to, had the possibility of being in a tremendous 
tragedy.
    I think the investment that the administrator has targeted, 
which I point out is only \3/10\ of 1 percent of the total FAA 
budget for the next fiscal year, is a very important investment 
and one that is much needed.
    Mr. Wolf. Sir, you are agreeing then they may all not be 
reported? That was the question.
    Mr. Hall. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Wolf. So when the FAA put out the release the other 
day, if my memory serves me, I can still see the back page 
saying that success is being made. They said they were down 17 
percent; is that correct? I think--it said 17 percent in a 
press release you put out announcing the plans for the last 
several months? I think it did say that. I saw 17. That 17 
percent decrease may very well not be accurate because it could 
actually be increased.
    I think you really need some sort of definition that 
everyone can understand, and also I think there has to be some 
means of making sure that they are all reported. Sometimes by 
punishing people it is almost a disincentive, and I think there 
ought to be an incentive to tell everything that goes on. It is 
like being ill and not having the doctor find something because 
he didn't want to tell you. I think there should be some 
encouragement for the controllers to tell.
    Ms. Garvey. To your last point, Mr. Chairman, and I think 
that is an excellent point, we are trying to create an 
atmosphere where people feel free to come forward. We are 
putting in the Federal Register this week sort of an invitation 
to pilots, particularly the GA community, to come forward with 
runway incursion incidents, runway safety incidents, with the 
idea that they would be protected from any sort of enforcement 
activity. Again, we often know that there has been one. We know 
that one has occurred, but we don't always know why. So we 
think this kind of program, which is going to be in place for 
at least a year to start off with, will allow us to sort of go 
out and interview, hear what some of the factors were and 
hopefully learn from it.
    I think you are right, creating the kind of atmosphere 
where people are encouraged to come forward is important.
    Mr. Wolf. Mr. Mead, what would you do if you were the FAA 
administrator, and maybe, too, Mr. Hall, you can elaborate a 
little bit more for the record. I know you said you would do 
what Ms. Garvey would do, but we don't completely know 
everything that Ms. Garvey is going to be doing. If you can 
elaborate for the record--I have told Ms. Garvey and I have 
said publicly I think she is doing a very, very good job in a 
very, very tough environment, and I say it with all sincerity. 
I told her publicly. I told her privately. But if you could 
have your people look with the view of the FAA Administrator, 
what would you actually do? Would you put more money in this? 
Would you do this? How would you do that?

               NTSB RECOMMENDATIONS ON RUNWAY INCURSIONS

    Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, the Board will be issuing new 
recommendations in this area shortly based on the 
investigations of some of the incidents that occurred in 1999.
    Mr. Wolf. When will that be?
    Mr. Hall. Well, I would assume that will probably within 30 
days, sir.
    Mr. Wolf. Maybe we can get the FAA to comment----
    Mr. Hall. The first thing, of course, is to explore 
obviously what has been done in other airport surfaces around 
the world, because there are other technologies out there that 
are available.

                  RUNWAY INCURSIONS PROBLEMS IN EUROPE

    Mr. Wolf. What are they doing at Heathrow and DeGaulle?
    Mr. Hall. We have someone right now visiting Heathrow, 
visiting Oslo, which has a very advanced system, and Munich.
    [The information follows:]



    Mr. Wolf. Do you know, Ms. Garvey, what they are doing in 
Heathrow, DeGaulle and Munich?
    Ms. Garvey. I don't specifically know, but I know our staff 
is taking a look at that. One of the discussions we had 
recently was in the ASDE-X contract that we have out. There are 
some technologies that are being used in other places that 
might be applied here, and I think that is something that we 
will be exploring as we go through this process.
    [The information follows:]

    Reports of runway incursions are not viewed as a problem in 
most European countries. There are, however, significant 
differences between air traffic control operations in the U.S. 
and Europe. Differences that impact runway incursions include 
substantially less general aviation air traffic and overall a 
much lower number of total operations in Europe than the U.S.
    In the U.S., about 60 percent of runway incursions are 
caused by pilot deviations and general aviation pilots cause 
approximately 70 percent of those. There are 16 busier U.S. 
airports than the busiest international airport, Charles de 
Gaulle in Paris, and 19 busier than Heathrow in London.
    We have also been informed that runway incursion reporting, 
in most European countries, is not accomplished in the same 
stringent manner as that used in the U.S.

                  RUNWAY INCURSION PROBLEMS IN EUROPE

    Mr. Wolf. Also somebody can look to see--maybe it is not 
very good in England, and maybe it is not very good in France, 
or maybe it is very good there. If we--the committee could get 
some sense of how the runway incursion problem is in Germany, 
Italy and France.
    Mr. Hall. It is certainly not the problem in Europe that it 
is in the United States. One of the things that the Board staff 
closely looking at what is being done there that we need to be 
learning from. There are some stop bars and other technologies 
that are used, some of the things that the FAA had discussed, 
but we have not been able to move forward in terms of 
implementation.

                       BUSIEST AIRPORTS WORLDWIDE

    Mr. Wolf. If this is on the most wanted list, I would 
encourage you to do this.
    What are the four busiest airports in the world?
    Mr. Hall. I think we have most of them in the United 
States. I know Chicago and Atlanta, but after that.
    Mr. Wolf. Heathrow and DeGaulle.
    Ms. Garvey. I think you have identified them.
    Mr. Hall. Heathrow and DeGaulle. I would imagine I could 
get that information for the record.
    Mr. Wolf. Maybe you can have your people look and FAA can 
do the same.
    [The information from FAA follows:]



    [The information from NTSB follows:]

    The four busiest airports, by total movements, are: 
Atlanta, Georgia; Chicago, Illinois; Dallas/Ft. Worth, Texas; 
and Los Angeles, California.

                           RUNWAY INCURSIONS

    Mr. Wolf. What would you do, Mr. Mead?
    Mr. Mead. To reiterate the point Mr. Hall made, I think we 
all three made it. The administrator has to take direct charge 
of this. Given the FAA culture and the nature of the problem, 
the administrator has to meet every other week or every week 
with the top people.
    The point was made earlier today that runway incursions 
have been going up. We have been through five or six FAA 
administrators, and I would say the same is true for the person 
running the program. I think stability at the program 
leadership level is also important, plus the fact the person 
has the authority.
    Being very specific, one area I would emphasize is AMASS. I 
would get one of the systems working, just one, and then move 
out. Secondly, we need a low-cost radar. On page 28 of my 
testimony is a listing of about 30 airports in the country with 
four or more runway incursions. Roughly a third of that list is 
scheduled to get the technology. The others are not scheduled 
to get anything. So we need something short of a full-blown 
ASDE where the--AMASS overlay is affordable for these airports. 
Providence, I might add, is one of those airports that has 
nothing.
    Another technology item I would emphasize is in cockpit 
displays. Pilots currently do not know and can't see what is 
going on behind them or from the sides. An in-cockpitdisplay 
that mirrors to a degree what the controller sees has significant 
potential and should be explored. In effect, this will give us at least 
two sets of eyes looking at it. Ms. Garvey referred to this as the ADS-
B, that is the acronym that is used, but that is an area I would 
emphasize.
    Regional action plans are important too. Some of the runway 
incursion initiatives can be done nationally, but this is also 
an intensely local issue. Each airport has to put together a 
meaningful action plan. I would add to put some teeth in that, 
you could link AIP funding to making certain that airports with 
runway incursion problems are taking care of their runway 
incursion problems before they start getting grant funds for 
other things.
    Mr. Wolf. That is a good idea. With all the AIP funding, 
there is going to be more pork going out now with the increase 
that you have now. Mr. Mead's point is--I think you should 
withhold the grants until they can tell you precisely how they 
are dealing with this issue. Some good can come out of bad, 
since the AIR 21 bill is loaded up for concrete. Let them tell 
you what they are doing with regard to this before they get the 
grant.

                                 AMASS

    Mr. Wolf. Mr. Hall, your views on AMASS.
    Mr. Hall. The AMASS program that the FAA proposed in 1991, 
to put it simply, has been behind schedule and over budget. I 
think the administrator spoke to the FAA's concerns about being 
able to manage effectively some of these implementations, some 
of these large technology programs. I am sure some of the 
lessons that have been learned would have been more effective 
in bringing this program on-line had they been known in the 
early 1990s. The program itself has not been well-managed, and 
I think it is extremely important now, as the inspector general 
said, that we focus on that one program, get it in place.
    Mr. Wolf. Focus on the AMASS?
    Mr. Hall. Yes. I am saying to focus on many things, but 
let's get this program completed and in place. This is 
essentially 1980s technology. We need to obviously focus on new 
technologies, but certainly this program represents quite a 
sizable investment over the years. It needs to be put in place. 
It has essentially gone from a program that was to provide 
protection against runway incursions on all of the airport 
surface areas to being limited to the active runways only. So 
we need to see that program put in place, and we do not need to 
have any more problems in delays of the schedule.
    I recently received a briefing from Mr. Mayrhofer on the 
status of the program. He has assured me that the AMASS system 
will be in place within 18 months.
    Mr. Wolf. We are going to go vote in a minute and come 
back, and Mr. Sabo will begin. In your testimony you say on the 
basis of this simulation and because of the arbitrary 
parameters determined by the FAA, the Safety Board is concerned 
that the current AMASS may not provide controllers and flight 
crews sufficient time to react and intervene. So, in essence, 
you were just a little bit different, I think, than Mr. Mead; 
were you not?
    Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, one of the disturbing things on the 
program is we have a number of real-life situations that have 
occurred out there that the Board is investigating, and there 
is a great deal of information that we need to now model and 
see whether the current AMASS as designed would provide the 
controllers adequate time to alert the crew. So yes, there are 
concerns in terms of how this program is finally going to be 
put in place that need to be addressed as well.
    Mr. Wolf. The last question. I think Ms. Garvey is really 
committed to moving ahead now.
    Mr. Hall. I do.

                      RUNWAY INCURSION TECHNOLOGY

    Mr. Wolf. And I know she has appointed one person, and I 
think the FAA should be congratulated on Y2K. There were 
prophecies of doom and gloom. You got directly involved. You 
flew. I watched you on the TV news.
    Ms. Garvey. Thank you.
    Mr. Wolf. But the technology isn't there yet, and I think 
maybe the question should be can you put together a team from 
NASA and from the National Science Foundation, National Academy 
of Sciences, MITRE and people who have no vested interest in 
selling this to the government to come together on a crash 
basis and say, ``Okay, here is what we are going to do with 
regard to the technology''?
    I believe you are committed, but the technology can lag 
far, far behind. So I think you are almost on a two-track 
approach, having the conferences, having the national 
conference, bringing the controllers in. Are you going to be at 
all the conferences? The Safety Board will have somebody there?
    Mr. Hall. Yes, sir.
    Ms. Garvey. Mr. Chairman, just to underscore that AMASS 
will be operational in September in San Francisco, as Mr. Mead 
and Mr. Hall had urged, and we are on schedule for that.
    [The information follows:]



    Mr. Wolf. Why don't we recess for this vote, and we will 
come back and recognize Mr. Sabo.
    [Recess.]
    Mr. Wolf. We can begin. Why don't we recognize Mr. Sabo; 
Ms. Garvey will be back in just a second.
    Mr. Sabo.

                           OPERATIONS FUNDING

    Mr. Sabo. Thank you. Thank you, all three, for 
yourtestimony.
    Ms. Garvey, I commend you for the great job you are doing.
    Ms. Garvey. Thank you.
    Mr. Sabo. But I have some questions. I have been concerned 
that our current year's budget has been short and tight on 
operations, and my understanding is that we may be getting a 
supplemental request from the Administration for the year 2000 
budget. My question is if the President signs AIR 21, which 
clearly puts operations at the bottom of the food chain, why 
should we take any request for operations in 2000 seriously? I 
also look at the numbers for the proposed budget resolution, 
and if the allocation reflects the assumptions of the budget 
resolution, this committee would be about $461 million short, 
and our options are either to take it from Amtrak or from Coast 
Guard, which are not likely alternatives, which means it would 
have to come from FAA operations.
    It just seems to me to reflect wrong choices by the 
Congress and by the Administration in making AIR 21 law. But if 
those are our choices, it doesn't make much sense to enhance 
operations for the year 2000 when we are facing what needs to 
be significant modifications in the process of operations for 
FAA in the year 2001.
    Ms. Garvey. Let me try--those are obviously very important 
and, frankly, very difficult questions. We are certainly 
painfully aware of how difficult the discussion is going to be 
around the Operations budget for the FAA and painfully aware, 
as Mr. Mead said a little earlier, about the competition for 
the general funds that will occur among the modes of 
transportation in particular and with other parts of the 
budget.
    Mr. Sabo. There is no competition between AIP and F&E with 
Operations.
    Ms. Garvey. No competition with Operations, exactly, and we 
do know that. I guess what I can say from the FAA's perspective 
is that I am going to do the best job I can to present a budget 
that is both defendable and reasonable and looks for every 
efficiency that we possibly can. Mr. Mead spoke about cost 
accounting. I think that is critical and important for us.
    In terms of the shortfall for this year, I want to be very 
clear in saying that the shortfall issues really do not 
represent any growth. It really is to replace some services 
that we have not provided that we are concerned about, some of 
the redundancies that we have in our system that we have had to 
scale back on, the inability to do the right kind of training 
for some of the inspectors that we have. Those are things that 
we are looking to repair. We are not focused on anything beyond 
either the safety inspector's work force or some of the 
services within the air traffic control system. So it doesn't 
represent a growth of any sort, but I certainly hear the point 
that you are making and the concerns that you are raising. I 
watched the statements that you made on the floor last week as 
well as the Chairman, and I know certainly the issue of 
operations, is going to be very difficult for us. I think that 
is the reality. I also know that having a strong F&E budget to 
be able to push forward on modernization is important, and we 
think the President's budget does that, the numbers that we 
have within the President's budget. We think it does do that.
    Mr. Sabo. I understand that, but we are setting up a new 
system where we have limited flexibility, and if that becomes 
law of the land, that is what we have to live with. And it says 
in a very fundamental way that the least important part of the 
FAA is people and people who work for us, it is at the bottom 
of the priority list. I think it makes a very fundamentally 
wrong assumption about which we should be operating, but if the 
Administration agrees with the Congress, we are left with few 
options.
    Ms. Garvey. Congressman, again, I would only add that we 
are standing by the President's numbers. The Operations numbers 
that are identified in the budget that he has presented, I 
think, does recognize, as you have just suggested, the 
importance of the people. I think I began my statement by 
saying it is a remarkable Agency with people who perform 
extraordinary work, and we certainly do believe that.

                               USER FEES

    Mr. Sabo. Can we fund it in the same way as the President 
recommends?
    Ms. Garvey. I am not sure. You mean, given the budget 
resolution?
    Mr. Sabo. With other assumptions and fees. Are we ready to 
accomplish that?
    Ms. Garvey. Well, we are working very aggressively on the 
cost accounting. I believe, as Mr. Mead has suggested, that 
cost accounting, whether or not you are getting to charge your 
fees is a terrific and important management tool. We are 
focused on air traffic control data to get that in place. We 
are beginning to collect the data. If your question is are we 
really ready to use it to implement a pricing mechanism for 
user fees, we are not. We just don't have a system that is 
quite ready for that. I think certainly using it as a good 
management tool and getting the kind of data that we are 
collecting now is the right step, and we are on the right 
track, but we are not there yet. There is no doubt about that.

                        EFFICIENCY IN OPERATIONS

    Mr. Sabo. I would simply say again that clearly what the 
Congress did last year is say that people and personnel are the 
least important. If it is signed into law, that also reflects 
the judgment of the administration, and I think it is an 
unfortunate direction that we are going.
    Mr. Mead, you suggested we could find greater efficiency in 
operations. Do you have suggestions where we can save $450 
million in operations from the administration's operational 
budget for next year?
    Mr. Mead. Not to that degree. I have some suggestions, but 
when you look at these numbers, I believe that FAA should be 
put on notice to tighten its belt on operations. Operations 
costs have gone up 70 percent in the last decade. Between 2000 
and 2001 these costs are expected to increase by 12 percent, 
and FAA needs to tighten its belt. But there is a limit to how 
much you could be asked reasonably to tighten your belt in an 
area as sensitive as this.
    There are some areas where there could be cost efficiencies 
to scale. FAA can't do it this year, which is partly in 
response to your question about why should Congress approve the 
supplemental this year if we are not going to have any money 
next year. There are some things that FAA could put in motion. 
One of them is a cost accounting system. FAA needs a cost 
accounting system so it can figure out how much different 
activities are costing both from the labor standpoint and a 
material standpoint. FAA does not have that now.
    A second area is contract towers. This is very 
controversial with the air traffic controllers, but smaller 
facilities, very low-activity, and nonradar facilities, have 
been using contract towers. They save money, but it is very 
controversial thing to do.
    Another area focuses on oceanic air traffic control. FAA is 
proposing to advance oceanic air traffic control. FAA has been 
really behind in this area, and the agency is under a lot of 
pressure to move forward. The FAA had some proposals on the 
table last year where it would essentially contract out oceanic 
air traffic control. FAA would maintain control over the 
operation so it wouldn't be privatized or anything like that. 
FAA envisioned that the agency would realize some cost savings. 
So there are a couple of areas worth looking into. We are 
probably talking in the neighborhood of $40 or $50 million when 
you add all that up.
    Ms. Garvey. Just one last note. First of all Mr. Mead is 
right when he says we need to do everything we can to control 
the cost. I do think it is important to note, though, that when 
you look at the growth in our Operations budget, but also look 
at the growth in the revenue passenger miles, you are going to 
see that the growth in the Operations budget is just one-third 
of the growth in the industry over the last decade. I think it 
is important to put it in perspective of what has happened in 
this industry.
    Also, just to look at some of the increased activities that 
we have picked up in the FAA over the last several years, Mr. 
Mead and I have talked recently about the code sharing. That is 
a new responsibility, absolutely the right thing to do, but 
there are a number of those kinds of activities in the security 
area as well.
    Having said all of that, his points about are we doing 
enough to control the cost, I think there is always more we can 
do. Cost accounting is going to be critical and important, and 
I am delighted to say we are beginning already to collect that 
data, and more is going to come on-line during the summer 
months. As we discussed earlier, the business plan that Mr. 
Mead referred to earlier is absolutely the right thing to do, 
and we are putting that in place. We have to continue to look 
for those kinds of opportunities, but I think we also need to 
recognize, as Mr. Mead just said, that there is a limit to how 
much of the tightening we can do. But we are going to keep 
pushing it.

                        F&E FUNDING UNDER AIR-21

    Mr. Sabo. Let me ask the question in a different way. The 
AIR 21 calls for a $582 million increase in F&E for the year 
2001, 28 percent increase. Is the Agency equipped and prepared 
to handle that big an increase in the F&E account in the year 
2001?
    Ms. Garvey. I believe we can handle it--and we have 
actually asked ourselves and looked at that question. I think 
it is about--and I am hesitating a little bit because I am not 
sure I am looking at the same numbers. I think it is about $160 
million more than the President's budget.
    Mr. Sabo. But $582 million over last year.
    Ms. Garvey. Over last year.
    Mr. Sabo. It is a 28 percent increase in F&E over last 
year.
    Ms. Garvey. I was focused on the President's budget. We 
have looked at that issue about how we would manage it and 
whether we could manage it.
    Mr. Sabo. With fewer people because we have to cut 
operations back?
    Ms. Garvey. Well, I think we can. We believe we can manage 
it, but I understand the questions that you are asking, and we 
believe we can. We think it is a challenge, but--and I will 
tell you that we probably have a lot more work to do in that 
area about how we organize and so forth. I think we could. And 
I will tell you that we would focus primarily on some of the 
modernization efforts as well as some of the software 
development that is associated with some of the platforms that 
I mentioned a little bit earlier.
    Mr. Mead. One other suggestion that the committee may wish 
to explore, and I don't intend this as a commentary on what is 
legally authorized under AIR 21 or not, but the definition of 
what constitutes an operations cost probably deserves to be 
scrubbed at this particular time. By scrubbed I mean to make 
sure that what we are counting as an operations cost is 
actually an operations cost and not a capital cost and not 
properly allocable to a capital cost.
    Ms. Garvey. Congressman, for example, one of the points 
that Mr. Mead and I have talked about is that if you look at 
the highway program, a number of the personnel out of highways 
is associated with whatever project they are working on, and 
there may be some similar FAA costs. Again, we want to be very 
careful and obviously work----
    Mr. Sabo. We look forward to your----
    Ms. Garvey. Thanks, Congressman. I will leave it at that 
then.

                       STAGE 4 NOISE REQUIREMENTS

    Mr. Sabo. Definition noise. Where are we at and how far 
away are we from a new stage 4 requirement?
    Ms. Garvey. Well, that is certainly something that our 
industry is very focused on. As you know, we met the stage 3, 
and the industry did a good job of meeting stage 3 by January 
1, 2000, but the next question, of course, is where do we go 
from here? Right now we are working very aggressively with the 
international community and working through the summer with a 
September goal of coming together around a standard, that we 
can agree to internationally. At the same time that we are 
doing that, we have got a lot of efforts and a lot of work 
under way with NASA in the area of research and development 
about what is the next generation in terms of quieter engines 
and so forth. I think the technology pieces always hold out 
great promise, but setting that standard internationally is 
going to be very important. Europe is under the same kind of 
pressure that we are, some would say even more pressure than we 
are, from neighborhoods and communities that care about these 
issues.

                      FUNDING FOR NOISE TECHNOLOGY

    Mr. Sabo. How much do we spend in research jointly with the 
industry or independently of industry in looking at new 
technology, either FAA or with NASA?
    Ms. Garvey. Primarily on sort of the noise reduction 
environmental----
    Mr. Sabo. Yes.
    Ms. Garvey. That is an excellent question. I would have to 
get the number back to you. I know that the joint plan that we 
have with NASA which we just announced about a year ago with 
Dan Goldin has a very considerable piece that is focused on the 
environment and noise. I will get you the exact numbers and 
also what industry is doing, which may not be included in that.
    [The information follows:]

    FAA's total fiscal year 2000 budget for environment and energy 
research is $3.5 million of which $400 thousand was for technology. The 
President's budget request for fiscal year 2001 is $7.4 million of 
which $400 thousand continues for technology and $4 million focuses on 
the development of computer simulation to assess the benefits of 
technology.
    As the regulatory authority, FAA is responsible for assessing 
emerging technologies and putting into place appropriate and feasible 
certification standards for aircraft noise. NASA plays a dominant role 
within the Federal government in basic aeronautics research. The 
``Airport and Airway Safety, Capacity, Noise Improvement, and 
Intermodal Transportation Act of 1992'' (P.L. 102-581) mandated that 
the FAA and NASA jointly conduct an aircraft noise reduction program, 
the goal of which is to develop technologies for subsonic jet aircraft 
to operate at reduced noise levels. NASA's and FAA's funding for new 
technology as shown by the table below by fiscal year (funding levels 
are shown in millions of dollars and are consistent with the FY 2001--
President's Budget).

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Fiscal year
                          Agency                          ------------------------------------------------------
                                                              1997       1998       1999       2000       2001
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FAA......................................................        1.2        1.0        0.5        0.4        0.4
NASA.....................................................       31.8       34.1       22.1       10.3        9.9
                                                          ------------------------------------------------------
      Total..............................................       33.0       35.1       22.6       10.7       10.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             noise research
    Mr. Sabo. Is it a joint program, or is it yours and NASA, 
exclusively for your agencies?
    Ms. Garvey. It is a joint program with NASA, but to look at 
both short-term and long-term research so that we are really in 
sync. I think the criticism in the past is that NASA was often 
off in a direction that may not match with the agenda that we 
had and the direction we thought we should be heading. We have 
involvement at the highest level--in fact, Steve Zaidman, who 
is head of our research, meets with his counterpart at NASA 
quite regularly to say, ``is our agenda in sync?''
    I think really we have never had a better working 
relationship with NASA. We are very much in concert in the 
kinds of efforts and research we are doing in these areas, so 
really working together, and it is not too disparate efforts.
    Mr. Sabo. I would like to find out some more about that, 
would like to have a briefing on that.
    Ms. Garvey. I would be happy to do that, Congressman.
    Mr. Sabo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                    AIR-21 IMPACT ON SAFETY FUNDING

    Mr. Wolf. Before I recognize Mr. Packard, I want to put it 
on the record just so the world knows, and I think Mr. Sabo is 
right, the Administration and the Congress, I fault both of 
them, and this is going to come back to haunt this Congress and 
haunt the FAA, haunt you personally and haunt the Secretary. 
Now, the Secretary will be gone when this problem really 
becomes a serious problem, but you put more money in the 
concrete, and I believe a lot of it will end up to be outright 
pure rank pork.
    We started out this hearing talking about runway incursions 
how serious it is. The press has been talking about it. There 
was an article on NBC the other day, and ABC did it and 
everything else. You are going to have a runway summit. You 
look at the budget, operations is where 75 to 80 percent of the 
safety programs come out of, and as Mr. Sabo said, we have just 
literally abandoned it. We have abandoned it, and we are 
putting F&E roughly--if you had to guess, you would have a 
better guess--but 15, 20 percent of that is kind of safety. 
AIP, which is 5 percent or less, which is really safety, comes 
home the winner, so pork and concrete come home the winner. 
Runway incursions, top 10, everything else--and nobody says 
anything about it.
    We are going to say it so that Congress will have to 
address it. Mr. Sabo is exactly right. The Secretary, he will 
be long gone, be gone off. The next Administration will send up 
something, and the Congress's hands are really tied now. This 
is basically an entitlement for concrete, but not an 
entitlement for safety.
    God bless Mr. Sabo. He is right on target, and nobody is 
addressing it. The media hasn't addressed it. They all cover 
this big battle between the appropriators and authorizers and 
everything else. That was really not the battle. The battle is, 
frankly, when are you going to do it. You are going to have 
your hands tied.
    You are running up now asking for a supplemental. If there 
is going to be a supplemental, I will support it. I don't want 
to see anything happen with regard to this safety. This 
committee on both sides of the aisle has put more money into 
safety over the years, the last 5 years, than the 
Administration has ever asked for. You have never had a request 
denied.
    But Mr. Sabo is right. Maybe what we ought to do is put an 
amendment out saying that you have the ability to reprogram 
that AIP funding, and you can take that AIP funding and put it 
wherever you think the national interest is. And I will tell 
you, you go out to the American people, go to National Airport, 
Dulles Airport, interview them as they are coming on, say, you 
want more of that concrete over there, or you want to have 
safety, they are going to say, put me down in the safety 
category.
    But maybe you should be thinking of coming up at the end of 
the term--OMB comes up and, you know, we won't sign this bill 
unless you do this and do that and everything else. Maybe this 
is one of the things. Maybe you should send up some language to 
change the allocation here or at least to give you the 
flexibility. I mean, I think a Member would have a hard time--I 
think people want to say, well, I am not going to take it from 
AIP, but I think to say the AIP and your safety people--the FAA 
have the flexibility if you in your wisdom believe this is a 
major safety issue, as Mr. Sabo is talking the allocations, you 
can go in and take some of that AIP and put it for runway 
incursions or something like that.
    Mr. Hall didn't say AIP funding was on the 10 most wanted 
list. You have never told me that. Mr. Mead is not doing a 
major investigation on that issue, but, Ms. Garvey, it is--and 
so the record is out. I am going to have Rich prepare a 
statement so it is here so that if anything happens, we are 
able to say, hey, I completely agree. Here is what happened. 
The Congress did the wrong thing, the Secretary did the wrong 
thing, and because of that, now we just don't have the money.
    With that, I will recognize Mr. Packard.

                REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY

    Mr. Packard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, all three of 
you, to the committee.
    Ms. Garvey. Thank you, Mr. Packard.
    Mr. Packard. Ms. Garvey, last year this committee requested 
that the FAA conduct a study of international aviation safety 
and report to us the results. I wonder if you could give us 
some idea when that report will bedelivered to the committee 
and maybe even give us a preview of what it might include.
    Ms. Garvey. Let me mention a couple of efforts in that 
area, if I could, Congressman. One certainly is the whole issue 
of code sharing that Mr. Mead referred to earlier, the emphasis 
and the work that was done in the last year to really focus on 
code sharing, which I think, as Mr. Mead has rightly noted 
publicly, is going to be one of the big issues for us as we 
move forward with a great amount of international travel. So I 
think we have done some very good work in that area in terms of 
code sharing.
    One of the issues that this committee raised last year at 
this very hearing was is there a way to provide assessments to 
the American citizen, an American citizen who would like to 
access information about where are we with our safety web 
site--or what is the record of some of the carriers 
internationally. And I am very pleased to say that we will be 
able to provide next month, about mid-April, a Web site. We 
will be able to have exactly that kind of information for the 
American public or for anyone, for that matter, who would like 
to access information on accidents that have occurred. It can 
be categorized by aircraft. It can be categorized by country. 
It can be categorized by carrier, by rate.
    I think that is a request that this committee had and a 
very important step forward. I think the work and the code 
sharing is very important as well as the continuing work that 
we are doing with international assessments overseas. As you 
know, because of Congress's help, we have had teams in place 
since 1992 that do assessments of our counterparts 
internationally. There have been a number of countries that 
have raised their own standards and moved into the higher 
category as a result of those assessments. We can get you more 
detailed information about exactly where we are with each of 
those countries if that would be helpful for you.
    [The information follows:]

    The Report to Congress on International Aviation Safety, 
Security, and System Efficiency is presently undergoing 
executive level review within the Administration, and will be 
delivered after clearance is completed.
    Improving international aviation safety involves three 
primary strategies. First, it includes a data-based analysis of 
accidents and the development of interventions to prevent 
causal factors (e.g., controlled flight into terrain) that has 
the highest probability of success. Second, FAA will expand its 
efforts bilaterally in both its regulatory oversight and 
technical assistance programs. Thirdly, FAA will support safety 
and security improvements through its work with the 
International Civil Aviation Organization and other 
multilateral organizations.

                REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY

    Mr. Packard. The study has been completed or will be?
    Ms. Garvey. Yes, it is. We will be forwarding that to the 
committee.

          GROUND SAFETY TRACKING AND REPORTING SYSTEM (GSTARS)

    Mr. Packard. Thank you.
    In regard to runway incursion, I have been supportive of 
the Ground Safety Tracking and Reporting System, the GSTARS, 
which utilizes loop technology at airports. Loop technology has 
been established as successful in ground highway 
transportation, but it has also been demonstrated at two 
airfields, one at Long Beach Airport and one at McDill Air 
Force Base. Last year the House report directed the FAA to 
conduct evaluation necessary to initiate a certification review 
process for GSTARS. Do you know what action has been taken in 
regard to that certification and the GSTARS technology?
    Ms. Garvey. I would like to get back to you, if I could, 
sir, on where we are with the issue of certification, but I 
will also, though, just add that that issue, that is exactly 
the kind of sort of low-cost technology that we talked about a 
little bit earlier in that we do have a proposal on the street 
to encourage contractors or encourage responses in the area of 
low-cost technology. Whether or not that will be one of them, I 
am not sure. Of course, I don't know who is going to be 
submitting proposals, but let me find out the exact 
certification, and we will let you know if they are one of the 
companies that steps forward.
    [The information follows:]

    GSTARS is one of multiple inductive loop technologies 
(Loops) available for airport surface vehicle tracking. The FAA 
is actively evaluating this technology in two locations and 
preliminary results appear to be promising.
    At Long Beach, California, we have completed two of three 
planned evaluation phases. The third phase, controller 
evaluation, is in progress. Evaluation activities are scheduled 
to be completed by December 2000. Results from these 
evaluations will be used to determine operational suitability.
    At Dallas-Fort Worth, Texas, a Loops system has been 
installed and will be connected to the existing runway safety 
developmental testbed. The test configuration represents a 
typical Loops installation--providing supplemental coverage in 
difficult areas.
    Surveillance systems go through a series of evaluations and 
testing to ensure operational suitability and to address safety 
concerns. Based on airport configuration and operational 
requirements, runway incursion systems will contain one or more 
sensing technologies. These technologies may include radar, 
multilateration, Loops, ADS-B, and acoustics. Once the system 
has been installed and has passed all operational testing, it 
is declared operationally ready for daily use. After a period 
of daily use, the system is eventually commissioned making it a 
full component of the National Airspace System. Our intention 
is to evaluate Loops technology that can be integrated at 
select airports.
    As directed by Congress, we are evaluating Loops technology 
at Long Beach and will determine if it provides acceptable 
performance for operational installations.

                        OPERATIONS COSTS GROWTH

    Mr. Packard. Thank you. I have other questions, Mr. 
Chairman, but I will wait for the next round.
    Mr. Wolf. Mr. Olver.
    Mr. Olver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Mead, am I correct that these are part of your 
presentation, that these graphs were compiled by you?
    Mr. Mead. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Olver. This is a mild comment--meant as a mild comment, 
but it is obvious when the X axis is in years, The first two of 
them, the Y axis, looks as if it is numerical, but has no 
definition of what it might mean. In the first one here, you 
have got operational errors, which is in dark blue. If I may 
draw your attention to the year 1996, it has got operational 
errors in dark blue at 69, and the second one has operational 
errors by facility type, which facilities ought to be--the sum 
total of tower terminal, and then route ought to be the sum 
total of operational errors. For 1996 it comes out to 764, and, 
again, that Y axis is not defined. One of these has to be a 
rate, I assume, but it makes it very difficult to understand 
the data that you are presenting if the axes are not defined 
and they aren't consistent.
    Let me just say, for about a third of these, you had made a 
comment that what really ought to happen. You have to be very 
careful about making certain what is equipment or what 
isconcrete. Something is moved is not--whatever it is, it is in the 
operational side and really should be where properly defined in the F&E 
or the AIP. The problem here is that the total amount of revenue 
available from the funding source is less than the total in any case. 
And so you can move some of the pale green into the pale yellow or the 
pale gray, and all you have actually done in that process is made the 
operational system look even worse, because the operational total 
becomes smaller, but the gap between the total amount of funding and 
the total cost remains exactly the same.
    So the cuts in what is operational, what has been placed in 
the form of what has been described as what happens to people, 
what really affects people, is the salaries and benefits and so 
forth of the people that are involved in all of this. That gets 
cut even more as you do what you have described doing. So it 
doesn't solve any problem at all.
    I would guess about the only solution here that might come 
is if we really were able to get things like WAAS and STARS 
miraculously put into place very quickly, and in a lot of 
places we would hope that that would be more efficient and 
allow for some reduction in operational expenditures. I am not 
at all confident that that would be the case. And I am not sure 
that you expect that the number of personnel, which is really 
largely what is in Operations, by the time you get finished 
redefining things into F&E and concrete under AIP. I would be 
curious whether you, in fact, expect that with the total number 
of operations and traffic at airports going up and up, that 
even if we could solve and get into place these WAAS and STARS 
and the other related alphabet soups there that we have been--
that are part of all the testimony, that getting them into 
place is really going to reduce the the number of people that 
are necessary to operate the system effectively.
    Mr. Mead. I think the direct answer to your question is no. 
I think one area where FAA is going to be forced to tighten its 
belt is in negotiating wage agreements. It is doubtful that FAA 
will be able to replicate a wage agreement with noncontroller 
employees that is as generous as the one they negotiated with 
the controllers. This will likely be one of the constraining 
influences on the amount of operations cost growth.
    I think your point is well taken. I don't think WAAS or any 
of these technologies can really be expected to reduce in any 
consequential way the number of FAA employees. I do think with 
respect to controllers, sir, as part of the negotiated wage 
package, FAA made certain assumptions about productivity 
increases. Those still need to be quantified and to some degree 
identified. At this time, I can't venture a guess as to what 
those productivity gains would yield.

                    IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON STAFFING

    Mr. Olver. Since I am not sure at the end of what I started 
out by saying--let me see if the question that you answered 
``no'' to was that the part where I asked do you really believe 
that full implementation of WAAS and STARS is going to reduce 
the need for people? Is that what you answered no to?
    Mr. Mead. Yes.

                            BUSIEST AIRPORTS

    Mr. Olver. That is fair enough. Thank you for that.
    There was some discussion about the use of examples of 
Heathrow and DeGaulle and Munich and Frankfurt and so forth 
compared with other places. We get into that discussion every 
once in a while. Some of these good pieces of technology have 
been tried in some of those places, and I have no problem. I 
think one should always try your technology in medium or small 
airports before you try to fly with them in the biggest of all 
places. So I have no problem with that.
    It would be very helpful to me in trying to understand 
this, because we hear about this. These hearings are 
exceptionally useful for bringing us up to date and getting us 
refocused upon the issues that are of greatest concern to 
people in the transportation community at that particular time, 
but by the time looking at our position, we have to deal with 
this from highways to airports and rail and public 
transportation and everything else, it is hard to keep these 
things straight. It would be useful, I think, if we had a 
carefully defined list of what the busiest airports are, 
because I suspect that if you took--if you compared the 10 
busiest domestic and the 10 busiest worldwide nondomestic, you 
would find that at least five of ours were larger than the 
largest nondomestic, and probably you would find that the fifth 
largest offshore would be no more than one-tenth as large as 
our busiest. Something along those lines. Quite a shift in 
terms of where they are.
    I think that it is very useful, but we should be watchful 
that we don't get ourselves into thinking that anything that 
you can do in one place is going to be obviously transferable 
to--are very difficult and very dense usage kinds of airports. 
So as I said, it seems to me many of these systems, we ought to 
try them in the El Pasos or the Syracuses and Providences and 
such before we try to make them work in the much busier kinds 
of places.
    Who can get us that kind of data as to who the big ones are 
and what the real list is? And there you get into the 
definition, which is what I bothered to point out, that you can 
see these data, and then if they are scaled in some kind of--or 
normalized in some kind of a way, and we haven't been told what 
the normalization factor is, then you can count it in terms of 
enplanements or total number of passengers that go through. You 
talk about enplanements, and the nature of those two lists may 
be quite different in their actual scale from what it looks 
like if you give the data in terms of the total number of 
passengers pass through a place. Who can we get that 
information from?

                           RUNWAY INCURSIONS

    Mr. Mead. We will work with FAA to get you that.
    To make this a little more complex on the runway 
incursions, the correlation between airport enplanements or 
activity in runway incursions doesn't always follow. There is 
not a direct correlation between them. For example, Mr. Packard 
mentioned Long Beach. Long Beach certainly doesn't have the 
level of activity of a Chicago O'Hare, but Long Beach, in fact, 
was among the top 10 airports in the last year for incursions. 
Chicago was, I think, the 13th with five.
    [The information follows:]



                           RUNWAY INCURSIONS

    Mr. Olver. We can add other dimensions to it and make it 
more complex. If you give one set of data which is consistent, 
then one can--then one I can take into account another 
dimension along the lines of what you spoke of. But when the 
first two are not normalized, then it is very difficult to take 
into account the greater complexity.
    I wanted to explore on the very question of incursions, the 
major runway incursions chart that you provided, Mr. Mead, 
provides--indicates incursions in terms of vehicle/pedestrian, 
pilot deviations, operational errors, those three. Would the 
one that was described in the case of O'Hare, the China Air and 
Air Korean, would that be considered a pilot deviation or an 
operational error?
    Mr. Mead. Mr. Hall could better address that, but it could 
be either. It is not obviously a vehicle/pedestrian deviation. 
It could be either a pilot deviation or an operational error.
    Mr. Olver. It is interesting. To me the interesting thing 
is that the number of what you call operational errors has 
remained constant. Though I suspect that is normalized in some 
kind of a way other than just per year. And while the one which 
is pilot deviation has virtually tripled along the way. And I 
must say I was a little bit worried at the idea that by an in-
cockpit display, that it was going to necessarily improve the 
situation. I suppose we would hope that by having controllers 
in one place with a total view of the airport would be--except 
for their personal errors, their operational errors, 
essentially that they would avoid the problem of pilots down 
there seeing something, too, while controllers are seeing 
something, and suddenly they are trying to decide, well, do I 
negate what the controllers have told me to do? It is a damn 
good thing that the Korean Air pilot did what he did and took 
off to the left and rose, or there would have been an extremely 
bad accident in that case.
    I am not convinced. I think then you get some level of 
confusion coming in as to who to follow, there ought to be some 
override, but I would be wary of getting that--a totally 
judgmental kind of a system to do.
    Mr. Mead. Point well taken. As a matter of fact, that very 
issue is even broader than just runway incursions. It is part 
and parcel of the Free Flight package. Part of Free Flight 
contemplates in-cockpit displays.
    Mr. Olver. How much of this pilot deviation or things like 
that at O'Hare is because of communications problems, language 
problems?
    Mr. Pastor. Mr. Chairman, whoever normalizes these graphs, 
would they make a copy to all of us? Maybe I will understand 
what the question was.
    Mr. Olver. I thank you.
    Mr. Packard [presiding]. We have two votes, and we have 
about 6 minutes. Why don't we adjourn and reconvene as soon as 
the second vote is over, if all the Members would return. Thank 
you.
    [Recess.]

                                 SAFETY

    Mr. Packard. The Chairman will be back in half an hour or 
less. He has asked me to chair, and so we will proceed.
    Mr. Tiahrt, you will be next for questions, so we will 
yield the time to you.
    Mr. Tiahrt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ms. Garvey, greetings from the air capital of the world 
Wichita, Kansas. It was a pleasure to have you there this year, 
and hope you get a chance to come again soon. As I look on the 
name tags here in the committee, almost everybody flies every 
week, and when I come into Reagan National Airport at night and 
we wind down the Potomac River coming in to approach for a 
final landing, I don't think about the concrete on the runway, 
I think about air safety. And not every time when I fly do I 
think about you and your job and how important it is, but 
certainly every time I see an air control tower, I think about 
it and the safety of hundreds of thousands of people that are 
in your responsibility, and I appreciate the job you do. I know 
it is a very difficult job. We probably don't make it any 
easier with the effort that we put forth here in Congress.
    This chart put together by Mr. Mead is a very big concern 
to me because it shows--I have written in the shortfalls of 
each of the 3 years that we have for 2001, 2002, and 2003.

                         CONTRACT TOWER PROGRAM

    Mr. Tiahrt. And they add up to $7.3 billion. There is a lot 
of competition for that money. I notice Sonny Callahan is not 
here. He would say that the Coast Guard is very important. In 
Wichita, Kansas, we don't think much about the Coast Guard, 
although we know it is important, but we think about AMTRAK. 
AMTRAK comes through Newton, Kansas, and we are trying to get 
it to go to Dallas through Wichita. I know there is some 
competition there. If you look at where the money is probably 
going to come from, it is going to come out of operations. And 
so we are very concerned about the safety in making sure that 
operations has enough funding to properly do their job.
    One of the things that I have been able to do in the last 
couple of months is visit one of the contract towers in your 
FAA contract tower program. They cover about 186 airports, and 
we think they add a vital link by being an economic way of 
providing air traffic control. Now I understand that the FAA 
has decided not to pursue funding for about half of the 
contract towers this fiscal year. I am a little concerned about 
the safety again that that is going to provide. And further, 
that that is going to penalize the program that has solidly 
justified the benefit cost ratio standpoint. Could you tell me 
what the plans are for as part of the President'sbudget for the 
contract tower program for 2001?
    Ms. Garvey. First of all, Congressman, thank you for your 
very kind opening comments. I want to just say as I say as 
often as I can what an extraordinary job that the controllers 
and the technicians do. I agree with you that it is an awesome 
responsibility and they do a remarkable job. In terms of the 
contract towers, there has been some discussion earlier this 
year when we were suffering a shortfall that some of those 
contract towers might be held back or terminated. But we 
absolutely agree with you that they are critical and very 
important. I noted some of my colleagues from the airports are 
here as well who have worked very hard on that project and 
those contract towers with us. We are doing everything that we 
can and are still proceeding with the contract towers for this 
year and that program would continue as part of the budget.
    Mr. Tiahrt. Do you think you will keep all 186 open this 
year?
    Ms. Garvey. That is correct, Congressman.
    [The information follows:]

                         Contract Tower Program

    Mr. Wolf. Mr. Mead, your office has been studying the issue 
of contract tower expansion, at the request of the Senate. 
Based on this analysis, could FAA save significant money by 
expanding the contract tower program, and is their case about 
the guaranteed staffing in the NATCA contract a convincing one?
    [The information from for OIG follows:]
    We estimate that FAA would save about $881,000 per tower, 
annually by expanding the program to additional FAA visual 
flight rules (VFR) operated towers. FAA completed a draft study 
of expanding the program and estimated similar savings. 
However, the draft study concludes that FAA could not realize 
any savings because of a Memorandum of Agreement between FAA 
and the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA.) 
This agreement establishes a baseline staffing level of 15,000 
controllers for FY 1999 through 2001. According to FAA, no 
savings would be realized through reductions in personnel 
because FAA agreed to maintain those numbers when attrition, 
transfers, or promotions reduced the size of the controller 
workforce. However, it is important to note that the agreement 
states ``. . . its terms and conditions are subject to 
congressional approval.''
    Regardless of congressional approval or review of the 
agreement, FAA would realize long-term benefit if it expanded 
the Contract Tower Program. FAA's study should have given 
greater weight to the potential impact that controllers from 
contracted VFR towers could have in offsetting future increases 
in system demand and addressing existing staffing shortfalls. 
Contracting additional VFR tower operations would allow the 
agency to redistribute controllers from contracted locations 
(or their equivalent full-time positions) to FAA locations with 
the greatest forecast increases in air traffic activity. 
Experienced FAA controllers from contracted locations could 
also help alleviate existing staffing shortfalls which, in 
turn, could reduce FAA's overtime costs.
    Mr. Wolf. Ms. Garvey, would you respond?
    [The information from FAA follows:]
    Further expansion of the contract tower program would 
result in additional operational costs in the near-term to 
relocate controllers, train them at a new location, and pay the 
cost of a contractor to provide air traffic control services at 
the federal contract tower. In the long-term, the FAA would 
realize an average savings of approximately $800,000 per year 
per facility. The FAA would realize annual savings of $32 
million for the identified 41 air traffic control towers (ATCT) 
and an additional $24 million if all 71 ATCT's are contracted 
out.

                         CERTIFICATION STAFFING

    Mr. Tiahrt. As you already know, Boeing has a large 
facility in my district; Raytheon Beech has a large facility, 
and so does Cessna and Bombardier Leer Jet. Textron, Cessna, 
they have all been bought out from the original people that 
started the companies. But a big part of their market is new 
aircraft. They are constantly working on new aircraft. There 
has been some concern expressed in the manufacturers of my 
district that the FAA's resources for certification are already 
stressed.
    In fact, I have heard that, in some cases, the FAA has 
advised the manufacturers to slow down the introduction of new 
products into the market because there is a shortfall in 
manpower requirements. I can see the challenges that you are 
facing, but this area is one that is very important, not only 
for Wichita, Kansas and the aircraft manufacturers there, but 
also for safety reasons. Each one of these new models that 
comes on-line has additional safety features that are very 
important. This new technology, as they develop these new 
models, brings into the market new safety products. So can you 
tell me how we are going to address this problem of the 
shortfall of manpower that the FAA has for the certification 
process?
    Ms. Garvey. First of all, you are absolutely right, 
Congressman, in saying that it is critical to get the 
certification in place and going. It is true not just for the 
manufacturer of the aircraft, but certification of some of the 
new technologies as well. That has created a real strain on an 
office that really does an extraordinary amount of work. Part 
of the proposal or request that we have with the supplemental 
would allow us to go back to some of those critical issues in 
Aviation Regulation and Certification (AVR), which is the line 
of business thatreally has that responsibility, and do some 
additional hiring to deal with some of that. I will also add that I 
think that is certainly an important step, but also there has been some 
wonderful work done by a combination of both the FAA government people 
and industry people in looking at the whole issue of certification. 
There are some efficiencies and streamlines that we can put in place, 
and people are beginning to implement that. I hope that the results, 
and the work that the committee has done will also give us some 
efficiencies that will allow us to do even more frankly with less. But 
with the combination of the supplemental, the work that we are doing on 
certification, and the continued focus on that I think is the answer.

                      MANAGEMENT ADVISORY COUNCIL

    Mr. Tiahrt. One more question for you, along that line or 
similar lines. I think it was in 1996 we came up with an idea 
for management advisory council and nobody has been assigned to 
that yet. What are your plans for the management advisory 
council? Are you going to move forward on it or are you sort of 
holding up?
    Ms. Garvey. Congressman, we have submitted names or the 
Secretary's Office had submitted names to the White House. I 
believe there were 13 members. Those names have been vetted, 
and I hope that they will be proposed to the Senate very soon. 
I think a couple of people have decided against it and there 
was some concern about whether we should proceed without the 
full slate. But our view is we should put that in place. In 
addition, AIR 21 did also identify some additional members as 
part of an oversight group that would be assigned to air 
traffic control, so we want to obviously take the legislation 
into account as well, if that is eventually signed by the 
President.

                    ENGLISH PROFICIENCY--KOREAN AIR

    Mr. Tiahrt. I would hope that you would move forward on 
that. I think it would be a valuable resource.
    Mr. Hall, you had a video that the NTSB has put together 
about this close call that the Korean Air--I think they were 
both 747s, weren't they?
    Mr. Hall. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Tiahrt. The Korean Air and the China Air. I know that 
the accepted international language for air traffic control is 
English and there have been some incidents internationally when 
there has been some difficulty in understanding control towers 
and pilots because they don't communicate well in English. In 
this close call between Korean Air and China Air, was English a 
factor in that incursion or was it because they didn't properly 
understand what the instructions were from the air traffic 
controllers? Is that part of the problem that we are dealing 
with?
    Mr. Hall. Our investigation of that incident will be 
completed shortly. Generally speaking, language issues pose 
real problems, and the FAA and others are making an effort to 
address that situation. But right now it is a significant issue 
that has to be addressed.

                  VERIFICATION FOR ENGLISH PROFICIENCY

    Mr. Tiahrt. Right now, before we allow a pilot from a 
foreign airline to land in the United States, we require them 
to fill out a form--this is my understanding--and on that form 
they have to say do you understand English and they check the 
box yes or no. We have no testing or any other verification 
that they do that they have a working knowledge of English. 
There is a big difference between being able to read a language 
and speak the language and having fluency. I would hope that we 
get some more confirmation that when these pilots come in for 
the safety of American travelers as well as travelers from 
around the world can communicate in this long-term accepted 
language of international travel for air traffic control, and 
that is English.
    Are there any plans that we have, Ms. Garvey, or Mr. Hall? 
Is there anything that we have in place where we can sort of 
give them a test? There is probably a couple dozen key words, 
``crash,'' ``too close,'' that they ought to be able to 
recognize. What plans do we have in place?
    Ms. Garvey. Congressman, let me speak to at least partially 
an answer. I would like to get back to you because I know David 
Traynham, who is the head of our international office, has done 
a good deal of work with ICAO on this issue, and I believe Rich 
Efford actually accompanied him on a visit to Montreal to 
really explore this a little bit further. We are working very 
closely with the ICAO organization to set in place the right 
kind of standards. I don't believe that the NTSB has had a 
recommendation but I may be wrong.

                           LANGUAGE PROBLEMS

    Mr. Hall. We have made some recommendations regarding 
standard phraseology and will provide that for the record.
    [The information from NTSB follows:]



    Ms. Garvey. I believe that part of the recommendations we 
have done, but I again, will go back and give you a better and 
fuller answer on that.
    [The information from FAA follows:]

    The FAA currently does not plan to conduct its own English 
language testing of foreign pilots, but instead, is working 
with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to 
develop universally accepted standards and procedures. The use 
of English as a common international aviation language is not 
based on law, but on a recommended practice prescribed by ICAO. 
This recommendation is commonly accepted by ICAO member states 
as a matter of mutually beneficial cooperation. We believe, 
therefore, that it is more appropriate to work in concert with 
ICAO to develop adequate and universally accepted standards to 
ensure effective levels of English language proficiency. This 
is the best course of action since unilateral language 
enforcement by the United States could provoke reciprocal 
actions by foreign governments with adverse consequences for 
U.S. international carriers. This would not be in the best 
interest of the American flying public. Our work with ICAO is 
already underway. In 1999 the FAA persuaded ICAO to establish 
the ``Proficiency Requirements in Common English'' study group. 
This group will hold conferences at ICAO beginning in the 
Summer of 2000 to recommend standards for inclusion in the 
appropriate Annex to the Convention on International Civil 
Aviation. The FAA representative will be a key member. The 
group will integrate the language assessment methods of various 
member States to establish minimum skill levels, testing 
requirements, and procedures. This process is expected to be 
completed by August 2001.

                         COST ACCOUNTING SYSTEM

    Mr. Tiahrt. I think getting some standard phrases that 
everybody understands and can speak and hear and comprehend is 
a good step in the right direction. Like I said, there is 
probably not a whole lot of words, ``mayday mayday,'' some 
things that everybody ought to understand. I would appreciate 
if we could--your adding to the record that information. Mr. 
Mead, you talked about controlling the operating cost and a 
more effective accounting system. Within the FAA is the 
accounting system pretty much consistent or is there different 
methods being used throughout their budgeting and expenditure 
process? Could you just tell me what you mean by ``cost 
accounting system'' that would be easy for us to understand and 
audit and make sure they are consistent across the agency?
    Mr. Mead. Yes. A cost accounting system essentially takes 
costs from different types of activities, for example from air 
traffic or other major divisions in FAA, and allocates the 
costs as they are incurred to the activity that they are 
applicable to. FAA presently does not have a system for doing 
that. A cost accounting system would allow you, for example, to 
say for a billion dollars worth of operations cost, what 
particular activity they are being allocated to at an en route 
center. So you would know how much the things that we are doing 
were, in fact, costing. If you found, for example, that the 
cost for five similar activities occurring in FAA and found 
that the costs were widely disparate, the agency would know if 
it was doing something right in one of those activities and 
something wrong in another. Presently, FAA is handicapped by 
not having a cost accounting system, and it cannot make such 
determinations.
    Mr. Tiahrt. This is a problem that is not just an FAA 
problem. This is a problem that goes across many agencies in 
the Federal Government. In fact, if you look at cabinet level 
agencies, there are five or six of them that are unauditable 
today. Somewhere in this grand scheme of things of $1.8 
trillion that we are going to spend, we have to dedicate a 
little bit of our resources to figure out what good standard 
cost accounting procedures should be for a Federal agency and 
put it in place. I am becoming increasingly frustrated in 
trying to get to the details, just like I am sure Ms. Garvey is 
getting frustrated. How do you control your cost overruns? If 
you can't pinpoint those problems and make some good 
comparisons with the five different similar activities, then 
you have no way of knowing where to target your effort. So----
    Mr. Mead. That is exactly right. As a matter of fact, if 
FAA were to establish a cost accounting system in the next 2 
years, it would have the distinction of being one of the very 
few Federal agencies that has a cost accounting system. And to 
FAA's credit, this past year the agency received a clean 
opinion on its financial statements. We were able to give FAA a 
clean opinion. We felt that FAA had its expenses in order but 
that is quite different from a cost accounting system. The 
Department of Defense does not yet have a clean audit opinion.

                         COST ACCOUNTING SYSTEM

    Mr. Tiahrt. In many ways, the FAA is leading the power 
curve in the Federal Government. But as you said, the 
Department of Defense, Department of Education, Department of 
Agriculture, there are many agencies that are having difficulty 
in pinpointing their cost overruns--I will use the term ``cost 
overruns''--those cost centers that are expending more than we 
are getting in return. This is not just a government problem 
but also an industry problem. We need to recognize it is a 
problem, that you must control costs in you are going to meet 
the budgets. We are looking at a shortfall this year which is a 
36 percent reduction in operating cost.
    This $2.3 billion that is coming out of the operating 
budget, and one way that we could alleviate the process--I 
don't know that we come up with that much. A 36 percent 
shortfall, it is hard to find 36 percent of fat anywhere. But I 
am sure there are some areas in there that could be run more 
effectively, more efficiently, and you can't get there unless 
you understand the controlling the cost or a method of 
controlling the cost.
    Mr. Mead, to your knowledge, is there some standardizedcost 
accounting system that is currently effective that could be a model for 
Federal agencies?
    Mr. Mead. Yes. Actually, I don't think there is one that 
you can just say ipso facto, this would be good at FAA without 
any refinement. But the truth is, FAA has made a great deal of 
progress on the cost accounting system. It is fair to say there 
is something of a difference of opinion between us and FAA. FAA 
says there is a $2 million shortfall in its funding this year 
and therefore, they had to slow down the pace of implementing 
this cost accounting system. We thought FAA's progress was 
good. Our point is that when you are running a business that 
costs $13 billion annually, and operates 365 days a year like 
Ms. Garvey says, and is faced with this rather unique funding 
arrangement that Congress just passed, that you need a cost 
accounting system sooner, not later. A cost accounting system 
can help FAA answer questions such as you are raising and Mr. 
Olver was raising.
    Mr. Tiahrt. Ms. Garvey, you talked about the lessons 
learned of being established in consensus and incremental 
progress in implementing these programs. When you figure out 
how to establish consensus, I want you to write it down and 
send it to me, because that is one of the problems that we face 
every day.
    Ms. Garvey. I agree. And I have to tell you, and I say this 
seriously, it is fragile and something that you have to 
constantly work at and keep pushing. It is probably one of our 
greatest challenges.
    Congressman, if I could, and I hope this is--but the cost 
accounting, I think Ken's points are so right on target in 
terms of the importance of it. I just wanted to make two 
observations. One is already to get at some of the issues that 
you have identified, we are able to see with the kind of data 
that we are getting in, make some comparisons among our 
facilities. Why is this costing more? Why does this same 
operation in two different places have a widely different cost 
associated with it?
    It is giving us some really exciting information. I want to 
credit the team because when we experienced what we believed 
was a shortfall we issued a challenge to the team and said, 
``look, even within the constraints that we have, can we step 
up this schedule? Can we really get all of the air traffic work 
done in a fashion that would be even sooner than we first 
anticipated?'' They have done that and the new schedule that we 
have in place is really going to, by the end of this year, give 
us some very good information. We are pleased with that.

                          MOVING AIRPORT HUBS

    Mr. Tiahrt. I am pleased to hear about the progress.
    Mr. Chairman, I have one last comment. With a lot of these 
runway incursions and a lot of the traffic that we have that is 
condensed in these hubs, these big airports like Chicago, 
Atlanta, and Dallas, I think one way that we would alleviate 
some of that pressure is move some of these hubs to smaller 
communities like Wichita, Kansas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                        EL TORO MILITARY AIRPORT

    Mr. Packard. Thank you, Mr. Tiahrt. We have another vote, 
but I have a couple of questions that I would like to ask. One 
of the hottest issues in my part of California is the closing 
of the El Toro military base. Orange County is working to try 
to convert El Toro to a commercial airport, but many of the 
cities and people in my district surrounding the air base are 
very reluctant to see a commercial airport go in for a variety 
of reasons. It is a very controversial issue, as you may well 
know.
    The Navy issued a draft EIS last month, for the disposal of 
the base and the subsequent reuse of the property. That EIS was 
based on the county's plan (the county is the lead agency on 
the conversion of the property). But the EIS did not seriously 
take into consideration a lot of the community opposition that 
was there, and there is a strong feeling that many of the major 
issues were not really taken seriously.
    Is it likely that the FAA would take the same position in 
regard to some of the issues that were lightly covered in the 
EIS? One of these issues is the terrain, which is a major issue 
for any new airport. The wind patterns at El Toro would force 
the pilots to land with a tail wind rather than into the wind, 
and there would be conflicts with John Wayne, which is within a 
6-mile or 7-mile area. The flight patterns of John Wayne go 
right over El Toro. Do you have a feel for what the FAA 
believes should be done in terms of the reuse?
    Ms. Garvey. Congressman, I do know the sensitivity of this 
issue. In fact, when I flew on New Years Eve, there was a young 
reporter who was on the plane and all he wanted to do was talk 
about El Toro. He was less interested in Y2K.
    As you indicated, the Navy has finished its environmental 
work. We will be following up with a supplemental. In other 
words, we would be building on what they did. Although some of 
the issues, for example, that you have just mentioned are 
included in a supplemental document that we will do and attach 
to the EIS that the Navy has done. We don't want to duplicate 
their work, but we want to make sure that any issues that were 
not fully explored are fully explored. I want to ask my staff 
to make sure that we follow up with you and make sure that all 
of the issues that you have identified are included. I suspect 
they are, but I just want to double-check as well. I will 
actually be meeting later on today with Lydia Kennard from the 
Los Angeles Airport, who I know has been looking at a number of 
the regional airports as well. We will also ask her about this 
as well.
    [The information follows:]

    The FAA is aware of and will take into consideration the 
concerns of all parties relative to the redevelopment of El 
Toro as a commercial airport. In conjunction with its review of 
the Orange County Airport master plan for El Toro and the 
accompanying Environmental Impact Report, the FAA is conducting 
its own independent examination of proposed flight procedures, 
airspace utilization, and obstruction analyses. Because of the 
need to address civil aviation reuse issues and other 
environmental impacts and requirements, the FAA is planning to 
supplement the Environmental Impact Statement prepared by the 
Navy. The FAA's environmental document will identify and 
respond to these and other concerns raised during this planning 
process.

                       EL TORO AIRPORT REUSE PLAN

    Mr. Packard. I appreciate that. I hope this would not be 
just a simple rubber-stamping of the surveys you mentioned. 
Also in regard to the El Toro reuse problem, there were some 
restrictions when El Toro was operating as a military base 
regarding flights over Camp Pendleton, which is a separate 
Marine Corps training facility. The restrictions involved some 
of Camp Pendleton's artillery range and so forth, which 
obviously should be off limits to flights, flyovers. I would 
appreciate your staff doing some research to determine whether 
a commercial airport at El Toro would have to reapply for those 
restrictions or whether those restrictions over Camp Pendleton 
would be passed onto the reuse or the reuser.
    Ms. Garvey. Congressman, I will follow up, just to be sure, 
but I would say that those would have to be reexamined. Because 
as you have suggested, the operations are changing and we are 
always looking at the operations for an airport from a safety 
perspective and making sure that we have brought them up to 
reflect the latest traffic numbers and so forth. This would 
certainly be a similar case.
    [The information follows:]

    US Marine Corps (USMC) operations at Camp Pendleton will 
continue to use the restricted airspace as configured. There 
are no plans to redesign or reduce this airspace.
    If changes are needed in the restricted airspace at Camp 
Pendleton to accommodate requirements at El Toro, the community 
should request the FAA's Western Pacific Region to negotiate 
with the USMC to see if any proposed changes could be made 
without undue impact on the USMC mission.
    When the FAA does its airspace assessment of El Toro 
airport, the FAA will not consider restricted airspace as 
available for El Toro use.

                             CAMP PENDLETON

    Mr. Packard. In fact, there could be a rerouting to 
accommodate a commercial airport versus the military. The 
existing runways might have to be refigured, and if that is the 
case, it could impact Camp Pendleton. I would be very 
concerned. I am very protective of Camp Pendleton because it 
has such a remarkable mission in terms of our readiness, and I 
would be very concerned about any flight pattern that would 
compromise training activities.
    I am going to call a recess unless there is a question. 
Let's take a little recess, and by that time I think the 
chairman will be back. I know that he has many other questions. 
I will be back and if he is not here, I will proceed with these 
same questions. I apologize for these votes, but we have no 
control over that.
    [Recess.]
    [The information follows:]




                    DULLES AIRPORT SECURITY INCIDENT

    Mr. Wolf. I think we will have an hour now at least, so 
hopefully we can proceed.
    Ms. Garvey, on March 7, one of your safety inspectors was 
arrested at Dulles Airport and charged with trespassing 
essentially, because he was not displaying airport credentials 
as he walked outside the aircraft conducting a safety 
inspection. However, the inspector and his union claimed that 
he had all of the proper credentials and provided them each 
time he was challenged. The security officer specifically asked 
for an airport badge which these inspectors are not required to 
have. Is that accurate, they are not required to have them?
    Ms. Garvey. I believe that is true.
    Mr. Wolf. And summarily arrested the inspector when he did 
not have them. From what you know of this case and I have asked 
Mr. Mead, the IG, to investigate it, did the FAA inspector do 
anything improper in the conduct of his duties that day?
    Ms. Garvey. Mr. Chairman, first of all, at this point we 
are still involved in the investigation with Mr. Mead working 
very closely with him. Let me just make a couple of statements. 
One, it is very important to make sure that our inspectors can 
do the job that they need to do. I have spoken to Mr. 
Fanfalone. I have spoken to Mr. Wilding at the airport, whom I 
have great respect for, and expressed our great concern as an 
agency. So we are obviously going to work very closely with Mr. 
Mead to make sure that we sort through all of the facts and 
understand them clearly. At this point, I don't think that we 
have all of the facts laid out for us to be able to respond 
with definition to your question.
    I think, making sure that he can do the job that he needsto 
do is critical and important. If there are any changes that we need to 
make in order to make sure that that process is made clear or the 
procedures are clear we will do that. I have, again, communicated that 
to Mr. Fanfalone and offered to meet with Mr. Gore as well. I think, 
after talking with Mr. Mead, we can understand this and get the facts 
out in just a matter of days.

                 Dulles Security Incident--Bail Payment

    Mr. Wolf. The individual who was arrested I understand was 
arrested in the aisle of the airplane, humiliated in front of 
the passengers he was supposedly sworn to protect, handcuffed, 
searched three times, wasn't even told that he was being 
arrested and read his rights until he had been at the police 
station for an hour. We then were told--and we will wait for 
Mr. Mead's investigation, but that the only FAA employee who 
came to his aid was an investigator who asked a lot of 
questions, then left the station telling him good luck.
    Do you have a procedure to stand by your people? And do you 
have a procedure? And who paid for the bail?
    Ms. Garvey. I am not exactly sure who paid for it. 
Certainly I am sure there are procedures. Again, if it is not 
clear enough, we will make it clear. That is the part that I 
find from my perspective at this point right now the most 
disturbing. I want to make sure that we are giving the right 
kind of support and providing the right kind of representation. 
I know that the security officers that arrived a little bit 
later were very good and have worked continually with him. If 
there was a problem in the beginning, again, that is what we 
are still trying to get at.
    We are taking statements now and getting information now. 
Admiral Flynn, who is here, by the way, is working closely with 
Mr. Mead and also to get at this very issue. That is the part 
that I want to really focus on and make sure if there were any 
breaches on our part as an agency, that we certainly at the 
very least, issue an apology and make sure that we have the 
right procedures in place. We need to sort through some of the 
additional facts. As I said, Admiral Flynn is collecting a lot 
of that information right now and providing some of it to Mr. 
Mead as well.
    Mr. Wolf. Do you know who paid for the bail?
    Mr. Flynn. I do not know, sir.
    Mr. Wolf. Mr. Mead, do you know who paid for the bail?
    Mr. Mead. No, I don't.
    Mr. Wolf. Does anyone out there who works for the union or 
FAA knows who paid for the bail?
    Ms. Garvey. We can certainly find out, Mr. Chairman.
    [The information follows:]

    Although the bond was originally set at $1000, Mr. Gore was 
released on a $500 non-surety bond. There was no requirement to 
tender cash payment at the time of his release.

                     Dulles Security Incident--Memo

    Mr. Wolf. We were told that a few days later an FAA 
official sent an e-mail to other inspectors implying that the 
arrested inspector could have done more to avoid his own 
arrest. The memo says that airlines cannot be expected to know 
the difference between a safety inspector who does not need an 
airport badge and a security inspector who does. It also 
outlines extraordinary procedures that the inspector should go 
through if challenged saying that it might save you a night in 
jail. Have you seen that?
    Ms. Garvey. I have not seen that memo, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Wolf. Have you seen that, Mr. Mead?
    Mr. Mead. Yes.
    Mr. Wolf. Of course, the security officials at airports 
should know the badge requirements and should respond, but if 
this memo was actually sent--and Mr. Mead shook his head yes--
it really sends a message to the field inspectors that the FAA 
will not stand with them. If it actually says it may save you a 
night in jail, that really indicates that your security people 
are not backing up your employees, regardless of the merits or 
demerits of this gentleman's case--is that--do you have any 
thoughts on that, Mr. Mead, since you saw the memo? Did I 
accurately----
    Mr. Mead. I think you and I are thinking of the same memo, 
and yes. I think that the relevant issues that we will try to 
examine are, one, was this inspector properly in furtherance of 
his duties for FAA at the time this happened? Two, was he 
appropriately credentialed and did he present those credentials 
at the appropriate time. I think there is a third issue running 
through this, is this an unhealthy amount of friction between 
FAA security personnel and the airports? This is all occurring 
at that time when we, the Administrator, and the Secretary, 
have all been encouraging FAA security to require airports and 
airlines to be more rigorous in allowing access to airplanes 
and to the tarmac areas. FAA has been working on this. I am 
curious as to whether a thread running through this is a 
reaction to some degree of that. As Ms. Garvey points out, 
right now we are trying to sift through the facts to find out 
why this arrest was made in the first instance. This might be 
an area where FAA--not just at Dulles Airport, but system-
wide--needs to clarify some procedures on credentials.
    [The information follows:]

                   Dulles Airport Security and Safety

    Mr. Wolf. In a March 14th letter to you, the union 
president called FAA's response ``inappropriate and timid,'' 
and said it is negatively affecting inspector morale all around 
the country. He said inspectors ``want to know if their own 
agency will act quickly to reduce whatever tensions might exist 
between the FAA and local airport authority security forces and 
that where those tensions persist, their own agency will 
provide them all the support they need to ensure their personal 
safety and freedom from abuse.'' What specific steps have you 
taken to let inspectors know that you will stand by them?
    [The information from FAA follows:]
    On March 16, 2000, the Director of the Flight Standards 
Service sent a ``priority urgent'' message to Aviation Safety 
Inspectors regarding the airport security incident at Dulles 
International Airport. The message explained the facts of the 
situation up to that point to dispel any rumors that might be 
circulating. Inspectors were asked to properly display their 
credentials during inspections to facilitate performance of 
their safety oversight functions. They were also encouraged to 
contact the Director or Deputy Director of the Flight Standards 
Service immediately if a similar situation should arise.
    The Flight Standards District Offices are working with 
local airports to modify procedures for recognizing inspectors' 
credentials to eliminate any areas that may create a situation 
similar to the one in Dulles. In a similar manner, regional 
managers are working with their security managers to change 
procedures as needed.

                    Tests to Breach Airport Security

    Mr. Wolf. You had your people breach the security at a 
number of cases and you had a report out to that effect. So 
this is the policy of the agency which I think is an 
appropriate policy to make sure that you don't have an Osama 
bin Laden or somebody like that trying to breach the security.
    Mr. Mead. Yes, sir. And it is highly unusual for there to 
be an arrest. First of all, our folks found it is fairly 
unusual even to be challenged, and secondly, if challenged, it 
would certainly be unusual to be arrested.

                        Bounty on FAA Inspectors

    Mr. Wolf. I think--and I represent Dulles Airport. 
Geographically, it is almost in the middle of my district. When 
I first ran for office, I ran the transfer of both of those 
airports over to the regional airport authority. I am 
disappointed in the management of Dulles if they have done 
this. It is kind of like in a war game. If you have team A and 
team B and team B is trying to breach the security that both 
sides learn by and if they have been targeted--now, we saw 
these pictures. ``Federal inspectors are trying to breach 
security, if you see someone unbadged challenge him and notify 
your supervisor.'' Have you seen this?
    Ms. Garvey. I haven't seen the exact pictures but I know 
those are documented.
    Mr. Wolf. This is a new one. This one here has pictures of 
women with their names and numbers on. Was there a bounty on 
that? I had heard there was a bounty given for the catching of 
one of these FAA inspectors. Do you know anything about a 
bounty given?
    Mr. Mead. The issues we are trying to establish, Mr. Wolf, 
is one, whether there was a bounty; two, whether the bounty was 
directed towards FAA people in particular; or three, if the 
bounty was directed as a general matter to anybody who was in a 
secured airport area.
    [The information follows:]

    Ms. Garvey. In some cases, air carriers and airport 
authorities have implemented incentive programs intended to 
increase vigilance on the security-controlled areas of airports 
and especially around parked passenger-carrying aircraft.
    Employees are asked to challenge any person who appears to 
be unauthorized and to report their presence to airport, air 
carrier, or law enforcement authorities. The programs offer 
cash awards of up to $50 or special recognition and benefits 
for challenging persons, including FAA inspectors, not 
displaying appropriate identification.

                       Airport Security Breaches

    Mr. Wolf. Just to interrupt, I don't know if this is 
accurate, it says Federal inspectors are trying to breach 
security. It says Federal inspectors. It doesn't say Osama bin 
Laden or terrorists. And if you see someone unbadgedchallenge 
him or her and notify your supervisor and MWA immediately. Were these 
pictures sent out to a number--did MWA send these out to a number of 
airlines? Do we know that?
    Ms. Garvey. I think that is all part of what Mr. Mead is 
looking at. We understand that it has just been confined to 
Dulles but I know that is something that Mr. Mead is looking at 
as well. I think Mr. Mead has raised a very good point in the 
last point he made. Is this more of a systemic problem in the 
relationship between the airports and the FAA? His point, too, 
that we are responding to what is a real heightened concern 
about airport access and our desire to make sure that it is 
being done in absolutely the right way. In speaking with Mr. 
Wilding last Friday, he and I both agreed that a very 
productive and good discussion would be--I will say that we 
were waiting until after the hearing because we were focused on 
this--but a good discussion would be to have a discussion with 
Mr. Wilding and perhaps even some of the other airport managers 
with Mr. Mead, with ourselves, Admiral Flynn, to talk about 
just what is it that we are trying to accomplish, and how 
serious is this issue. Because we don't want this to get any 
more out of hand, and certainly it seems to me that publicizing 
pictures like that is absolutely the wrong thing to do and 
terribly inappropriate.

                      PICTURES OF AGENCY PERSONNEL

    Mr. Wolf. The staff said that the FAA inspector took these 
pictures down, that they went through the airport and took them 
down, security.
    Mr. Mead. They should not be putting up pictures of the FAA 
inspectors.
    Mr. Wolf. I am surprised Mr. Wilding--he works at the 
airport. He used to be an FAA employee. He is a good friend of 
mine----
    Ms. Garvey. He was very apologetic and at that point he 
said they were all down and was very profusely apologetic and 
said it was really the wrong thing to do.
    Mr. Wolf. Are safety inspectors now reluctant to go to 
Dulles for fear of arrest?
    Ms. Garvey. I should probably ask Admiral Flynn. I don't 
think that is the case, that they are reluctant to go, but he 
may----
    Mr. Flynn. Speaking for my work force, the security 
inspectors, no, they are not.
    Mr. Wolf. If you could just identify yourself for the 
record.
    Mr. Flynn. I'm sorry. Cathal Flynn, C-A-T-H-A-L, F-L-Y-N-N, 
associate administrator for civil aviation security for FAA.
    [The information follows:]




                      PERSONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE

    Mr. Wolf. Admiral, I put language in the appropriation bill 
last year to set up a policy because the Administration refused 
to have the agency pay 50 percent of the liability, so that 
when a Federal employee, FBI agent, whatever the case may be--
do you participate in that? Do you pay----
    Mr. Flynn. No, sir.
    Mr. Wolf. Why not?
    Mr. Flynn. Because I don't believe that I should have to 
pay insurance to be protected by my government when I am in the 
line of duty.
    Mr. Wolf. But you apparently didn't go to the rescue of 
this person. If we go back and just to put on the record again, 
is there a chance that this man paid for his own bail?
    Mr. Flynn. Yes, since I don't know how he paid it.
    Mr. Wolf. Well, then, if you had security people and they 
knew they were potentially going to be arrested and taken to 
the jail and booked, and having a record and would have to pay 
for their own bail--and this individual did not live around 
there; is that correct? He lived outside?
    Mr. Flynn. That is my understanding.
    Mr. Wolf. He probably didn't know a lot of people to call. 
Then to me that would be a major disincentive for somebody to 
be active at Dulles Airport, which I think is offensive and 
wrong, because that is an airport that most of the people who 
live in my congressional district and live in this region fly 
out of. When I go to pick up people at both National and Dulles 
Airports, the police and security are saying move your car and 
I move. I don't park at the congressional parking. I park like 
everybody else and I usually just go around and around and 
around or go in and pay. They are pushing me to move and so 
they are going to do that for security. And then, you know, one 
of your people are going to be arrested and perhaps pay their 
own bail? What if he did pay his own bail? What would your 
feelings be about that? Do you think you have an obligation to 
pay it for him?
    Mr. Flynn. I would very much want the government to support 
our people when they are in the performance of their duty, and 
the FAA would want to support people when they are in the 
performance of their duty.
    Mr. Wolf. So if he paid his own bail, you all will pay for 
his bail?
    Mr. Flynn. I am sure if it is permitted via the 
appropriations, sir, that would be done since he was in the 
performance of his duty.
    Mr. Wolf. If your people are sued, you don't participate in 
the program whereby you help them out, pay for their liability?
    Mr. Flynn. Very much so.
    Mr. Wolf. You do?
    Mr. Flynn. We have had our people sued in an instance and 
working with Counsel, we have arranged for them to be defended.
    Mr. Wolf. Has this happened at other airports or just the 
one?
    Ms. Garvey. I am not familiar with any other incidents like 
this. As Mr. Mead said, it is very rare. I don't want to say it 
has never happened, but I am not familiar with any that 
happened recently.
    Mr. Wolf. Mr. Mead, do you know if this is at other 
airports or just at Dulles?
    Mr. Mead. So far, I have not heard of any reports 
elsewhere, but I have got to say I am concerned because FAA's 
efforts at strengthening security have not been confined to 
Dulles International Airport. I don't know why Dulles Airport's 
behavior would be aberrational and hope no other airports in 
the country would follow suit. So I have to caveat my answer 
that I haven't heard of any.

                   CURRENT STATUS OF DULLES INCIDENT

    Mr. Wolf. Okay. Well, I guess the sooner you do it, the 
investigation, the better, because I think you are going to 
have a situation that where anybody is going to say they are 
not going to go in there and get involved whereby they get a 
bad record, they become personna nongrata and they become 
booked, there is a story in the paper they have been arrested. 
The retraction never catches up with the charge. I wonder has 
the case been dropped or is the airport authority pursuing----
    Mr. Mead. It is my understanding that the current status is 
that the local prosecutor, who is not a Federal prosecutor, 
indicated that the charges could be dropped if the inspector 
were to sign a statement promising not to sue Dulles Airport. I 
haven't verified that to be so. I think the correct disposition 
of this case is if the facts turn out that this agent was in 
furtherance of his duties and he was appropriately 
credentialed, I am not sure that I see a case. If the case is 
without prosecutorial merit, I guess I would have to question 
whether the inspector ought to be put in a position of, gee, 
having to sign a form releasing the airport in order to have 
the case dropped. But that remains to be seen. We need to 
finish up our review. We got on it the first day that we 
received your inquiry relative to the photograph issues. The 
union wrote in on behalf of the inspector, and that very day, 
officials from my office met with the inspector and are 
proceeding with the investigation.

                   ARREST AND IMPACT TO THE INSPECTOR

    Mr. Wolf. One last question. Admiral, one of your people 
actually went out to Leesburg to meet with him.
    Mr. Flynn. Went to Dulles. Two of my people were there and 
one of them actually spoke with Mr. Gore.
    Mr. Wolf. And just kind of let him be booked and taken 
away? Did they go to the courthouse with him or did they go to 
the jail with him? Was he actually booked at the Loudoun County 
Courthouse or was he booked at Dulles Airport?
    Mr. Flynn. He was being held in the station at Dulles and 
was taken from there to proceedings before the county 
magistrate.
    Mr. Wolf. Nobody went with him there?
    Mr. Flynn. Nobody went with him there.
    Mr. Wolf. Boy, I wouldn't want to work with your 
organization if you can't stand by your people. I think you 
really have an obligation to stand by them. If you find out 
after you stand by them that they are wrong--this is why people 
are reluctant to get involved. You have had FBI agents who have 
been sued and different people sued and different things. They 
are very reluctant. I think by your not sending somebody out 
there with him, you send a signal, and any normal person is 
going to say I am not going to have that happen to me. I could 
be prosecuted and convicted and have a record. If he were 
prosecuted, I guarantee that you would probably fire him. If he 
were prosecuted and convicted, would he keep his job?
    Mr. Flynn. For trespass, we would have to look at that.
    Mr. Wolf. What do you think?
    Mr. Flynn. I don't know, sir. We would have to look at the 
totality of the circumstances but I do not believe--I firmly 
believe that trespass did not occur.
    [The information follows:]

    Reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we find that 
the inspector was (and is) a Federal employee who was acting 
within the scope of his employment and was lawfully present in 
the airport operating area. The Washington Metro Airport has 
dropped the charge of trespass.

                        DULLES SECURITY INCIDENT

    Ms. Garvey. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add to that last 
point, I really want to respond to it. If we were not 
appropriate at that point in time, we will absolutely make sure 
that we make it clear what the appropriate action ought to be 
for our employees. We want them to be able to do their jobs and 
we want them to be able to do their jobs well.
    Mr. Wolf. My sense is what ought to happen. If the man has 
right on his side, I think the airport ought to apologize to 
him. I don't think that he should sue the airport either. There 
is too much litigation in suing people. But I think if he was 
in the right, and you believe him, then I think the airport 
ought to be asked for an apology and after that, they ought to 
drop the case if he is not guilty and they ought to let him go. 
And hopefully he won't see fit to then turn around and get a 
lawyer to try to sue them where this thing gets out of control. 
Before we go onto other areas, I recognize Mr. Sabo. No 
questions?

                            OPERATING BUDGET

    Mr. Wolf. Mr. Mead, in the answers for the record, last 
year the FAA stated that even though the agency staffing 
standards called for 14,373 air traffic controllers for fiscal 
year 2000, agency's budget included funding for 15,000 simply 
because the labor agreement required. On this committee we are 
always asked to find examples of government waste or whatever. 
When the budget request for funds staffing in excess of the 
agency's own requirements, what is that? Do you think that is a 
problem or what?
    Mr. Mead. No, I wouldn't say that is an example of awaste, 
because the situation with the controllers is they have to have a 
developmental line so they can train in advance of attrition. I can't 
speak to the exact reasons why FAA came in with 15,000 and the budget 
request was 14,700 or whatever the number was. I do think that the 
agreement calls for a level of 15,000 controllers, but there is a 
clause right in the NATCA agreement with FAA that says that the overall 
level is subject to congressional appropriations and judgment.
    Mr. Wolf. That would be paid for out of the operations?
    Mr. Mead. That is out of operations.
    [The information follows:]

    Mr. Wolf. Ms. Garvey, your fiscal year 2001 budget requests 
about $700 million more for operations. However, only $350 
million of this is for increases in compensation, benefits, and 
staffing. The rest--about $390 million--is for new or expanded 
program initiatives, only $40 million of which is offset by 
budget reductions. Almost $70 million of the increase is for 
administrative and computer systems, such as ``next generation 
e-mail'' and new telecommunications systems. How do you justify 
so much of an increase in a single year for administrative 
items and new initiatives?
    [The information follows:]
    The need for funding for new or expanded program 
initiatives is driven by several factors. Over the last couple 
of fiscal years, the FAA has experienced significant funding 
shortfalls in the Operations Appropriation. These shortfalls 
have led to the need to defer or delay implementation of new 
initiatives (even high priority items such as cost accounting) 
and cuts in existing programs. Our shortfalls have become so 
severe that the Administration is proposing a supplemental for 
fiscal year 2000 to ensure that we can continue existing 
programs. As a result, these new initiatives will be 
implemented in fiscal year 2001.
    The funding shortfalls of the last several years have 
resulted in the virtual elimination of funding for all but the 
most essential items. As a result, any savings that might have 
otherwise been reflected in a budget have already been taken in 
executing the prior year's budget. In addition, because all 
non-essential expenses have been cut, there is not any 
flexibility to fund necessary administrative improvements for 
such things as the Next Generation E-Mail, cost accounting, 
implementation of a new accounting system, and growth in the 
use of our telecommunications systems. While these types of 
improvements can be delayed, they must eventually be funded in 
order to avoid more chronic systemic problems.
    Finally, it must be realized that the capital investments 
funded through the Facilities and Equipment Appropriation are 
now bearing fruit with many new systems being fielded and 
becoming operational. Most of these new systems add new 
capability rather than replace current systems. As a result, 
the number of facilities maintained through the Operations 
Appropriation continues to grow (from about 41,000 in 1995 to 
over 63,000 in 2001). These capital investments require an 
increase in Operations funding of over $135 million in fiscal 
year 2001 to operate these new systems (for example Traffic 
Management System, Voice Switching and Control System, Display 
System Replacement, and Automated Surface Observing System).

                               USER FEES

    Mr. Wolf. In fact, the other two things I was thinking as I 
left to go for the other vote, when Mr. Hall, most of Mr. 
Hall's recommendations dealt with appropriations. The fuel 
tanks issue was certainly an operations issue and the black box 
and the recorders is an operations issue. This is an operations 
issue, and at the very time, again, operations is going down, 
which I have some other questions there. We mentioned fees, and 
you mentioned fees, Ms. Garvey, earlier, and I wrote myself a 
note when were you talking about fees. Have we ever collected 
any of the overflight fees? Do you have any of the overflight 
fees? You had to give them back----
    Ms. Garvey. We did the overflight fees. There was a court 
case as you may remember. It was overturned. We had to go back 
and rework the approach that we took on overflight fees, and I 
understand that it has cleared, that rule has cleared OMB. I 
believe we will be putting that in place in the next few weeks.
    Mr. Wolf. That has been 3 years though, and there has been 
no collection.
    Ms. Garvey. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Wolf. How much of your budget is based on fees?
    Ms. Garvey. I would have to go back to give you the exact 
number. $965, I think.
    Mr. Wolf. $965? Is that millions or thousands?
    Ms. Garvey. I believe it is millions.
    Mr. Wolf. That makes a point though, because you really 
haven't been successful. I saw Mr. Mead kind of wince when you 
talk about the accounting system. I don't know if you realized 
he did that----
    Mr. Mead. Sometimes an Inspector General can say things 
that others may find more uncomfortable to say. But the truth 
is, FAA cannot go out and order people to pay user fees to the 
tune of $900-odd million a year until it has a cost accounting 
system in place that can stand up in court. It is as simple as 
that. It does not have one now. In fact, the agency's current 
schedule doesn't call for the cost accounting system to be 
validated and in place until 2002. Just getting a basic system 
in place that would sustain overflight fees has been an 
extraordinary challenge.
    Mr. Wolf. What percentage of that $965 million would the 
overflight fees pay?
    Mr. Mead. Nominal. Are we talking $20 million?
    Ms. Garvey. $20 million for this year.
    Mr. Mead. So I was close. $20 million as against $900-odd 
million. FAA has really had to put forth an extraordinary 
effort just to get in shape to sustain the overflight fees.
    Mr. Wolf. Did AIR 21 set the fees?
    Ms. Garvey. For overflight, no.
    [The information follows:]



                               USER FEES

    Mr. Wolf. Well, are we going to get that? Where are you 
going to get that kind of money? I think the media ought to 
cover this, too. I think it is a big issue, an important issue. 
When we come down to marking up the bill, I can hear people on 
the floor saying there is not enough money for this and not 
enough money for that. If $965 or $25 million is based on--if 
$65 million is based on the fees and it has been 3 years on the 
overflight fees, there is a major gap.

                        GPS SATELLITE NAVIGATION

    Mr. Wolf. Well, on the GPS satellite navigation, the GPS 
wide area augmentation system, WAAS, is beginning to look a lot 
like the AAS. I remember when Lynn Helms came before the Public 
Works Committee in 1981, I think. He came before the Post 
Office and Civil Service Committee too, because we were just 
going through the air traffic controller strike.
    In the Fall of 1998, both you and Mr. Mead assured the 
Appropriations Committee that the program was in good shape 
technically and should not be reduced in the appropriations 
process. Only 2 months later, the agency announced a 13-month 
delay. This was expected to be a high confidence schedule. In 
fact, the prime contractor protested that it should not take 
that long. However, 2 months ago, the FAA abruptly stopped 
testing the system due to the accumulation of significant 
problems found during the test. There are rumors now that the 
program may never deliver the requirements promised under the 
contract, and even the easier set of requirements would take 
another year or two to accomplish. It was this same cycle of 
almost annual surprises in the AAS program which led to its 
ultimate termination. Can you tell us how much more of a 
schedule delay and cost overrun we are likely to see in the 
WAAS program?
    Ms. Garvey. Let me give you the status, Mr. Chairman, in 
terms of WAAS. First of all, we were deeply disappointed to say 
the very least at the difficulty that we ran into with the 
testing. I want to underscore, as people have with me from 
outside the agency, and that is the great complexity of WAAS. I 
was interested in a conversation that Mr. Mead and I had not 
long ago. They were clearly saying this is complicated and 
challenging. We will let you all figure this out and then we 
will purchase it off the shelf. There are probably 9 or 10 
people in the world who understand WAAS. It is extraordinarily 
complicated. The good news of the testing was that in terms of 
accuracy, it exceeded the expectations that we set for 
ourselves. It exceeded what we wanted in terms of accuracy. 
Where we ran into enormous challenges and difficulties was the 
inability of WAAS to meet the integrity models to meet the 
safety standards. None of us want to compromise obviously the 
standards. We have got to keep those in place, and the 
challenge is how do you meet those safety standards? Last week, 
really, at industry's suggestion, there was an industry day and 
the FAA obviously participated, and the Inspector General had 
representation there as well. We really laid out all of the 
issues in a open and candid a way as we can; what do we know 
about the problems? What do we think are some potential 
solutions? Where are the users? We have to understand where the 
users are with this. What are their views of it as well. We 
laid out a schedule that would deliver on LNAV/VNAV, lateral 
and vertical navigation approach capability by 2002. We had a 
great deal of discussion of that with the industry. What came 
out of the discussions was also, and I heard it reflected in 
Mr. Mead's testimony today, the need to set up an independent 
panel to take a very hard look at the approach that has been 
laid out by the FAA and by the contractor.
    Again, I mentioned there were about nine or 10 people who 
are available who are experts in WAAS. They will be part of 
that independent review. Mr. Mead has suggested that possibly 
we want to look at the National Academy of Science. We would 
certainly look at that. But the point, though, is we need an 
independent review by some very talented people to verify the 
approach that we are taking and to refine the schedule.

                         WAAS program schedule

    Mr. Wolf. What is the schedule roughly now?
    Ms. Garvey. The LNAV/VNAV, lateral and vertical navigation 
by 2002.
    Mr. Wolf. So you are going--I think their recommendation 
makes sense to have people who are not to be critical of 
anybody, but to have outside people who have no vested interest 
insofar as they are not going to build it to come in and take a 
look at it.
    Ms. Garvey. And have a real expertise in this area. I think 
the implications for the budget, and we are still in the early 
process of this, it does mean a scaling back of the WAAS 
program. I think again Mr. Mead suggested in his testimony to 
reduce the burn rate, if you will. We are in full agreement 
with that. We think that scaling it back to really focus on 
understanding the integrity model, understanding the safety 
issues and working with the independent committee. So we do 
think there will be some adjustments on the budget. We would 
like to see LAAS perhaps beefed up to some degree but we would 
like to come up over the next couple of weeks. We have not had 
a chance to either explore this with the Office of the 
Secretary or with OMB. Although we think they would certainly 
be in agreement with the approach particularly of the 
independent panel. I think it would take about 6 to 9 months 
for their work to be completed, but I would like to get back to 
with you a specific schedule.

                      WAAS REVISED COSTS ESTIMATES

    Mr. Wolf. I am going to recognize Mr. Aderholt, but before 
I do, what were the contractor's estimates for the overrun 
amount?
    Ms. Garvey. I can get that for the record. I apologize, I 
don't have that. You are saying the overrun for this particular 
work?
    Mr. Wolf. Yes, and do you accept their estimate?
    Ms. Garvey. Let me get back, if I could, with the exact 
numbers and the agency's position on that.
    [The information follows:]

    At this time, neither the detailed Raytheon WAAS schedule 
nor the detailed cost estimates are available. Raytheon has 
indicated that until they develop the revised scope of work 
based on the work with the WAAS Integrity Performance Panel, 
all Raytheon's cost estimates will be rough order of magnitude.
    The GPS Product Team is considering an independent review 
board to oversee the work of the WAAS Integrity Performance 
Panel (WIPP). The WIPP will spend the next six to nine months 
detailing the work that needs to be done by Raytheon to correct 
the problems with system integrity. During this six to nine 
month period, Raytheon will be producing schedules and refining 
associated costs. The fully negotiated schedule should be 
available by the first part of the calendar year 2001.



                             COCKPIT VIDEOS

    Mr. Wolf. Mr. Aderholt.
    Mr. Aderholt. Thank you for being here today. One issue 
that I really just want to ask about as far as general 
information. There was an interesting article that appeared in 
USA Today recently about they were making a strong case for 
these cockpit videos. My question really was what has the FAA 
done to look at this issue, and how much do you plan to spend 
and investigate the issue?
    Ms. Garvey. Interestingly enough, Congressman, that has 
been a recommendation that we received from the NTSB. We are 
looking at that. I believe that we need to get back to the NTSB 
in early April with a recommendation. We are certainly looking 
at it very seriously. Mr. Hall and I are also cochairing an 
effort that really looks at data collection in the future, and 
certainly including the video camera is part of that as well. 
We know there are privacy issues.
    Mr. Aderholt. Sure, and I think those are legitimate 
concerns that need to be looked at. I guess the possibility of 
trying to address those privacy concerns, maybe the pilots have 
which are certainly legitimate, but also maximize the safety 
that could come from those videos.
    Ms. Garvey. And certainly getting at the data which is 
really what we want to do, getting at the right kind of data to 
make the right kind of determinations. So we are looking at the 
recommendations from the NTSB. We are very conscious and aware 
of some of the public policy issues and will be----
    Mr. Aderholt. Do you plan to have some money set aside to 
investigate that?
    Ms. Garvey. That would be part our AVR budget, our research 
budget, and some of the work that is underway.
    Mr. Aderholt. Okay. That is all I have right now. I may 
have some questions I will submit.

                                  WAAS

    Mr. Wolf. Just one other question on that. You are almost--
I think your recommendation or Mr. Mead's is a good idea. You 
are almost going back into the research phase?
    Ms. Garvey. I tell you what. We have actually talked about 
that. I think it is further along. For example, we have about 
2000 procedures that are in place that we have already done and 
we don't want to lose sight of that, and so I am not sure I 
would really call it the development phase, but it is certainly 
scaling it back and saying ``let's make sure we understand that 
we are heading in the right direction'' and, that is why I 
think that panel is so important.

                          IG COMMENTS ON WAAS

    Mr. Wolf. The last question, Mr. Mead, you have followed 
this for years. You are from the IG. What are your comments 
about this? What would you like to add?
    Mr. Mead. I know there have been some calls that say ``the 
Wide Area Augmentation System is not going to provide 
benefits.'' I think it is too early to draw that conclusion. I 
think it is time to take a time out and assess where we are. 
The technical issues involved are very challenging. In fact, 
some of these issues may turn out to be very developmental in 
nature.
    There may well be some serious technical issues here that 
are not easily resolved, and that is one reason why we are 
recommending a technical scientific review so you can have some 
professionals and some scientists, people that understand this 
area, opine on what is going to be required to get the 
integrity.
    As you know, people talk about this integrity term. Why is 
this integrity term so important? If the WAAS satellite signal 
is coming down and it is wrong, materially wrong, you want to 
know it. A key part of the issue here is alerting the pilot to 
when that satellite signal is incorrect. This is a most 
important issue as you are approaching the terminal and airport 
area where the margin for error is not great at all. So that is 
why I think the contract, the burn rate on it needs to be 
adjusted. I don't know why FAA needs to spend $4 million a 
month on the contract when we are having problems like this. I 
would put that on hold and move out with an independent panel. 
I don't think we have an AAS here. One reason why we don't have 
an AAS I think is illustrated by the fact that we are sitting 
here talking about this problem. We are not pretending there is 
no problem.

                    WAAS INTEGRITY PERFORMANCE PANEL

    Mr. Wolf. Well, I guess the quicker you put the panel 
together, the better.
    Ms. Garvey. Most of them are at the industry gate and step 
right up.
    Mr. Wolf. They already know who they are?
    Ms. Garvey. Yes.
    Mr. Wolf. Who are they then, just for the record.
    Ms. Garvey. If I could give you the names because I am not 
sure I am going to remember them. I know they are from Jet 
Propulsion Lab and Mitre.
    [The information follows:]

    At this time, the composition by name of the independent 
review board and WAAS Integrity Performance Panel (WIPP) is not 
firm and is being discussed. However, membership will include, 
but is not limited to, MITRE, Stanford University, NASA's Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory, and Ohio University. Raytheon's 
involvement in the WIPP will be confined to technical groups 
where the solutions are identified. The WIPP charter is work in 
progress at this point and the FAA Product Team is working to 
reach agreement on specific names, roles, and responsibilities 
by all key members.

                    WAAS INTEGRITY PERFORMANCE PANEL

    Mr. Wolf. Will there be a lead group or--how will they work 
it?
    Mr. Garvey. We need to discuss some of that. Particularly 
given some of the comments that Ken has made, we want to make 
sure it is independent. If there is anyone else we should add 
to it, we want to be able to add it.
    Mr. Mead. I think you need a diverse set of people. I think 
it is appropriate for the contractors' views to be sought by 
this panel. I do not think it is appropriate for the contractor 
people to be on the panel or, if it is the National Academy of 
Sciences, part of the independent group.

                         FREE FLIGHT PHASE ONE

    Mr. Wolf. On the Free Flight Phase One, Mr. Mead, we are 
all familiar with the first generation acquisition disasters of 
the FAA programs like AAS and MLS. Now we are experiencing the 
second generation of similar programs with problems in STARS 
and WAAS. An audit you issued four months ago may serve as a 
warning sign that there is also a third generation of troubled 
programs waiting for your turn. Your audit of the Free Flight 
Phase One, still in its infancy, raised a number of the same 
concerns. We found that software development was taking more 
time than planned, that test programs were inadequate and 
personnel didn't have enough experience and the FAA was not 
managing these contracts in a way which promotes cost control 
or efficiency.
    Would you just comment on the audit and tell us what you 
found?
    Mr. Mead. What we found is that some of the contracts being 
let and associated with free flight ought to involve the 
contractor more on risk sharing. They are essentially labor-
materials-cost type contracts with this type of arrangement the 
contractor, if the contractor is writing lines of code and has 
people working those lines of code, they get paid somewhat 
independent of their progress. What we are saying is that there 
are various techniques that you can use to measure progress in 
software development. One of them is called earned value 
management. FAA ought to move out in that direction and use 
this technique. They have agreed to do that.
    Secondly, with free flight the human factor considerations 
are pervasive. If you think we had human factor problems or 
issues in STARS, they pale in comparison to the human factor 
issues associated with free flight. In free flight you have 
human factor issues associated not just with the controllers 
and how they are going to interface with new systems but with 
pilots as well. And FAA is very much aware of that, I think.
    Ms. Garvey. Mr. Chairman, if I could add just one--because 
this is a very important program in my view and I think 
actually the program director, Charlie Keegan, if we could 
clone him, it would be wonderful. He is doing a terrific job. 
The recommendations that Mr. Mead suggested, Charlie Keegan was 
way out in front, even midway through the report was already 
implementing those. We are meeting every deadline with Free 
Flight Phase One. I mentioned being in Memphis last week and we 
are already starting to see benefits. Our challenge right now 
is now industry has said here is where we want to head with 
Free Flight Phase Two. They are so enthusiastic about Phase 
One, and we want to make sure we manage in the same way and not 
detract from Charlie's efforts and allow him to continue to 
deploy that, but also make sure that we are folding the Free 
Flight Phase Two into it as well. I think he is and that 
program has been a success.
    The human factors issues, Ken is absolutely right, they are 
challenging. The controllers are part of the team. They are 
over at that Free Flight office every single day and they have 
a wonderful human factors group. I think it is one of the best 
that I have ever seen dealing with these issues early on.
    Mr. Wolf. With all that, Mr. Mead, FAA's requesting $50 
million next year to expand Free Flight Phase One technologies 
to a nationwide deployment. In light of what has been said and 
what you have looked at, is the FAA getting the cart before the 
horse? Is that a good number? Should it be higher, lower? What 
do you think?
    Mr. Mead. I would like to respond to that for the record if 
I might.
    [The information follows:]

    FAA's $50 million request for Free Flight Phase 2 for 
fiscal year 2001 includes geographic expansion of some Free 
Flight Phase 1 technologies as well as new research and 
development initiatives. This is a bit confusing because the 
$50 million is over and above the $170 million requested for 
Phase 1 efforts in Fiscal Year 2001. We have not seen cost 
estimates for deploying Free Flight Phase 1 technologies 
throughout the National Airspace System. However, the cost will 
be substantial, probably totaling hundreds of millions of 
dollars.
    Making a decision on nationwide deployment for Free Flight 
Phase 1 technologies at this time is getting the cart before 
the horse. As this Subcommittee is well aware, a key component 
of Free Flight Phase 1 is the deployment of new automated 
controller tools--Conflict Probe and the Center TRACON 
Automation System. These tools are software intensive efforts 
and have significant human factors concerns for controllers 
that extend well beyond the traditional man-machine interface 
issues. Given that the bulk of software development for the new 
tools lies ahead and the human factors issues involved, FAA 
should take stock of where the agency is and definitize plans 
before making firm financial commitments for deploying the new 
controller tools nationwide.



                                  RTCA

    Mr. Wolf. Mr. Mead, last year the Committee expressed 
concern over FAA's relationship with one of its advisory 
committees, the RTCA. The committee report said last year, 
quote, ``although the committee values the work of RTCA, the 
FAA and Congress should maintain an appropriate relationship 
and not use RTCA simply out of convenience.''
    At our request last year, your office has begun 
investigating the structure of RTCA and its relationships with 
the FAA. From that review, do you believe the current 
arrangement between FAA and RTCA constitutes a good 
relationship, an appropriate relationship, the perfect 
partnership or is there a problem?
    Mr. Mead. RTCA has made valuable contributions on a number 
of fronts, including Free Flight. I think it was a good idea, 
though, that the committee ask for the relationship to be 
examined and we have briefed the Administrator. We are about to 
brief RTCA and shortly thereafter we will issue our report.
    I should say that our findings go to three issues. One is 
FAA membership on RTCA. This is an advisory committee that FAA 
is supposed to look to for independent advice. Therefore, some 
questions can be raised about formal FAA membership on the 
committee.
    A second area is an advisory committee is supposed to have 
a balanced membership. In order to make the judgment of whether 
it has a balanced membership, most advisory panels in 
government require some form of disclosure of financial 
interests and conflicts of interest. At least if somebody has a 
conflict of interest, you should know what that conflict of 
interest is.
    And a third area was the openness of RTCA meetings when 
various subjects are being discussed. This is particularly true 
with respect to Free Flight activities. If you will indulge me, 
I would like to defer a more detailed exposition of our 
findings until we have briefed RTCA and your committee and have 
issued our report.
    [The information follows:]



                    rulemaking on baggage screeners

    Mr. Wolf. We will have others we will just submit for the 
record, particularly in light of Mr. Mead's comments. Airport 
security, the Committee has been interested in improving 
security at the airports. We received testimony going back many 
years documenting that one of the weakest links in the security 
system is the inadequate performance of baggage screeners due 
largely to poor pay, poor training and poor supervision. We 
have pressed the FAA to issue regulations mandating that 
screening companies meet certain standards. After the special 
hearing last year, we asked you to give your urgent attention 
and directed that you take all actions necessary to accelerate 
the rulemaking in order to issue a final rule no later than 
March 31, 2000. If you had met that directive, we would 
certainly have more people in place. The final rule will be 
issued when?
    Ms. Garvey. The comment period for the NPRM is May 4. That 
is the final comment period.
    Mr. Wolf. When do you think the rule will be issued then?
    Ms. Garvey. Another year after that. We would agree. I 
think that is an excellent suggestion and I know the NPRM has 
generated a number of comments, which is one reason we have 
been asked to extend it by a month. It was originally April 4. 
But I think they are productive comments and helpful comments. 
I think it will be a good rule.
    Mr. Wolf. Are the stories accurate when you hear that a 
person left and went to McDonald's and made more money or is 
that just an anecdote?
    Ms. Garvey. That is probably not much of a difference in 
terms of pay. That is exactly right. We think by also raising--
or establishing the standards with the companies, that sort of 
forces the pay issue to work out to a greater--to a higher 
rate. I think that is important.
    Mr. Wolf. Was the rate 400 percent last year? I heard that 
on NPR the other day. What was the turnover rate?
    Mr. Flynn. That was at a single airport, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Wolf. What airport was that?
    Mr. Flynn. I prefer to provide that separately. The 
turnover in excess of 100 percent was fairly frequent.
    [The information follows:]



                           BAGGAGE SCREENERS

    Mr. Wolf. It is a serious issue then.
    Ms. Garvey. And they work very, very hard. It is a tough 
job.

                    Dulles Incident Inspector's Bail

    Mr. Wolf. They do. You want them to be sharp and catch it 
and not----
    Mr. Mead. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Wolf. Yes.
    Mr. Mead. Could I clarify the record about the question you 
asked before about the inspector's bail. I think the record 
will be confusing if left as it is. I was handed a note from my 
office that said that they have checked with the magistrate's 
office concerning his bail. They were advised that he was 
released on $500 unsecured bond, which is similar to being 
released on your own recognizance. So he had to pay no money 
for his release. That is what we are advised. But if he fails 
to appear for his court appearance, he would be liable to the 
court for $500.
    Mr. Wolf. We have some more, maybe one or two more. Mr. 
Sabo, do you have any questions?
    Mr. Sabo. No.

                      Explosives Detection Systems

    Mr. Wolf. Ms. Garvey, on the FAA, we are hopeful to be able 
to develop a meaningful competition in the acquisition of bulk 
explosive detection systems. When this program was started, 
only one manufacturer, InVision, was certified by the FAA. It 
was the common goal, I think, the desired goal of the FAA and 
Congress to develop additional sources. Three years into the 
program not much competition. The vast majority of the orders 
are still going to the original manufacturer. How important is 
it to have more than just one source?
    Ms. Garvey. Mr. Chairman, I think it is always important to 
have as much competition as you can possibly provide. I know 
there have been some--again, some real challenges in technology 
with some of the new companies that are starting up. We have 
had several go through the Technical Center, and I believe a 
couple are in the final stages. Mr. Flynn may have a little bit 
more accurate information.
    Mr. Flynn. Another company's equipment has been certified.
    Mr. Wolf. So there are now two?
    Mr. Flynn. There are two. And the process of acquisition 
has built in delays in order to permit the second competitor to 
have the equipment demonstrated in airports and for the air 
carriers who will ultimately use that be able to make decisions 
on their preference.
    Mr. Wolf. Have any of their units been installed, the new 
one been certified?
    Mr. Flynn. Not yet. It is about to be. The first one is 
about to be installed in Dallas.
    Mr. Wolf. We will just--there are a lot of questions. We 
will just submit them for the record. Do you have any comment 
about that, Mr. Mead?
    Mr. Mead. No.
    [The information follows:]



                        Airport Security Testing

    Mr. Wolf. One of the few things. Last year, Mr. Mead, your 
office issued an audit review on serious weaknesses in access 
control at the Nation's airports. After the report, FAA 
conducted some more aggressive testing and in November 
concluded these tests show airports have fixed the problem. Do 
you agree the problem has been fixed?
    Mr. Mead. No.
    Ms. Garvey. That was good the first time.
    Mr. Wolf. Both the Pan Am--if you want to say more--no is 
probably as good an answer. Pan Am 103 Commission and the White 
House Commission on Aviation Safety said FAA should 
aggressively test airport security systems using red team 
adversary testing. Your audit last year found this adversary 
testing to be limited in scope and not guided by standard 
testing procedures. Your office wrote, our test results confirm 
the importance of a standard test protocol that includes 
realistic and aggressive testing procedures. Is this testing 
realistic and aggressive today and guided by a set of test 
procedures, standard test procedures?
    Mr. Mead. I would want to respond to that on the record, 
Mr. Chairman.
    [The information from OIG follows:]

    Since we reported that FAA's testing was limited in scope 
and not guided by standard testing procedures, FAA has improved 
its testing. FAA has conducted three series of aggressive 
testing in 1999 and 2000 using three similar testing protocols. 
However, the protocols need to be further standardized so that 
more meaningful comparisons of test results can be made and 
improvement in compliance can be better determined. We found 
that the types and methods of testing were not always the same. 
For example, the three series of tests had different protocols 
for when an aircraft could be boarded (i.e. empty, passengers 
boarding, and/or passengers deplaning), how long the tester 
must remain onboard an aircraft before determining the test a 
failure (i.e. 1 minute, 3 minutes, or no time requirement), and 
how many aircraft could be boarded during a single test (i.e. 
limited to one or four, or unlimited).

                        AIRPORT SECURITY TESTING

    Mr. Flynn. Mr. Chairman, may I speak?
    Mr. Wolf. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Flynn. Yes, we do have standard protocols. We are 
testing aggressively and part of what we were all talking about 
at Dulles is the unfortunate aspect of response to that but 
there is very aggressive testing going on at all of the 
airports that we regulate.
    Mr. Wolf. I commend you for that. I think there ought to be 
because that is the only way you find out if you have a 
problem. So hopefully the Dulles situation will be in FAA's 
favor and in your favor and not in the favor of somebody that 
wants to just stop it so they look like they have a better 
record than they actually do.
    Ms. Garvey, I have seen instances where the FAA 
headquarters officials have tipped off industry as to when the 
red team will be coming to their airport to conduct surprise 
inspections, which would obviously give the local airport a 
better opportunity. Does this happen and do you have any----
    Ms. Garvey. Mr. Chairman, I have never been notified. That 
would be absolutely irresponsible and certainly we would be 
taking action if that were the case because we cannot do our 
job if that is--if that were the case.
    Mr. Wolf. Would you have any comments on that?
    Mr. Flynn. I have looked into that when I have heard of 
that and it doesn't happen. When there is red team testing, the 
airports are not aware, neither are the air carriers aware of 
the particulars of when and where. Clearly like now, airports 
know that there is an intensive effort of a number of 
directions, a number of aspects on security so that they are 
not surprised when they are tested but they are not told the 
details of when and where.
    Mr. Wolf. How did the people at Dulles get the photos?
    Mr. Flynn. From the ID system. When you get an airport ID, 
your picture goes into a database and they--my understanding is 
they got it from the ramp ID database but I am sure that Mr. 
Mead's people will be investigating that.
    Mr. Mead. I think, Mr. Wolf, if you are going to be in an 
airport for 30 or more days, the rule is that you should have 
an airport ID. If it is a shorter period of time, that is not 
the case. That is why in the case of the security people, I 
think they spend a great deal of time there and therefore that 
is why an ID card requirement would be a trigger.
    Mr. Wolf. Would that be--would the security people know? It 
seems to me there was a breach there that whoever had the 
pictures----
    Mr. Flynn. It was an inappropriate use of the information 
from the ID database. Should not have been used that way but it 
is quite appropriate for the photographs to be in that database 
in order--in case there is a fabrication or an attempt to alter 
an ID.
    Mr. Wolf. Is there a problem that the people who have the 
pictures are the same people who look bad if there is a breach 
of security and therefore the pictures should only be given to 
the airport operator or the manager or something like that?
    Mr. Flynn. It requires people to behave properly. It is 
hard to say who should hold that other than airport security.

                        TWA ACCIDENT--FUEL TANKS

    Mr. Wolf. The other question, leaving that, is would you 
want to comment on Mr. Hall's earlier comments which are two 
very important issues and I don't want to leave as we are 
coming to the end on the black box and on the TWA situation, 
the testing and the fuel tanks? Did you read Mr. Hall's 
testimony?
    Ms. Garvey. I have not seen the testimony.
    Mr. Wolf. Would you please make a couple of comments on 
that?
    Mr. Hall. The testimony just speaks to the four 
recommendations that were made in light of TWA 800 on the 
subject of flammability in center tanks. I know there is 
ongoing discussions between NTSB and FAA on this issue, but it 
still has not been addressed. The Administrator did address and 
move forward on some of the Board's recommendations on 
recorders but we have some outstanding recommendations that 
still require action. As the administrator mentioned, we will 
jointly chair a symposium in September addressing the future 
use of recorders in aviation. We will be looking at how we can 
get ahead of the curve in this area so we are not constantly 
trying to play catch up, but that we can anticipate, look at 
the future, look at the technology and the traffic of the 
future and see how we can effectively put in place recorders 
now.

              TRANSPORTATION SAFETY AND THE LAW SYMPOSIUM

    I might also add, that I know Congressman Aderholt has 
left, but we are having a symposium on April 25 and 26 at the 
Crystal City Hyatt which will address two issues. One is the 
privacy issues surrounding the use of data collected in our 
investigations. This is an extremely important issue, and we 
will have participation from the pilot community and all 
individuals represented there. The second day of the symposium 
will address concerns about the increasing criminalization of 
accident investigations and what might be done to address that 
issue.
    Mr. Wolf. The concern last night when I was reading this, 
and if you could comment on this, it said on page 10, this is 
Mr. Hall's testimony, as a result of the Board's investigation, 
we issued four recommendations in December of 1996, five months 
after the accident, to the FAA that urged both short-term and 
long-term access to reduce the potential for a fuel-air vapor 
explosion in the center fuel tanks of the Boeing 747 as well as 
in fuel tanks of other aircraft. We also suggested possible 
means to reduce the explosive potential of the fuel vapors such 
as adding cold fuel to the center tank before takeoff, 
providing insulation or other methods to reduce the transfer of 
heat from the air conditioning units beneath the center tank or 
inserting the tank by replacing the explosive vapor with a 
harmless gas.
    Then Mr. Hall said, we are disappointed that the FAA has 
still not taken action to develop operational procedures that 
will reduce the potential for explosive fuel-air mixtures or to 
require that fuel should be loaded in center wing tanks. That 
is what I--you know, your comments about that.
    Ms. Garvey. Mr. Chairman, if I could, let me get back to 
you with the specifics. I apologize. I did not see Mr. Hall's 
testimony. I know I got it late last night but I didn't get to 
it so I will take a look and answer very specifically. I know 
that there were some professional differences about the right 
approach but I understood that most of those had all been 
resolved and we had a schedule in place. Let me get back to you 
and also to the chairman on that as well if I could.
    [The information follows:]

    The FAA has taken the actions to address these fuel tank 
safety issues. For example, extensive efforts have been 
undertaken to reducing potential for explosive fuel-air 
mixtures. FAA Technical Center has completed a study of the 
ground equipment required for ground based inerting. The data 
has been analyzed and the report is being completed. The data 
indicates that ground based inerting may be a practical method 
of nearly eliminating exposure to flammable vapors in heated 
center wing tanks. Further study is planned to determine the 
cost of airplane modifications that would be required to 
implement ground based inerting. The FAA continues to evaluate 
ground based inerting and onboard inerting system methods that 
could be practical for retrofit on inservice airplanes and 
incorporation on newly manufactured airplanes and new airplane 
designs. As part of this evaluation, we will perform a detailed 
study to develop the detailed information necessary for the FAA 
to determine if regulations would be feasible to require 
retrofit of such modifications on in service and new production 
transport airplanes.
    Additional, we have analyzed the impact of requiring fuel 
loads for center wing tanks. The FAA has concluded, based on 
the independent review of available jet fuel data as well as 
continued (FAA) analysis of new data, that there is not a 
significant safety improvement from adding fuel to the center 
wing tank of a Boeing 747 airplane or other transport airplanes 
with heat sources located near center wing tanks. The FAA is 
continuing to take short-term actions to reduce the likelihood 
of fuel tank explosions by proposing airworthiness actions to 
correct any design or maintenance-related deficiencies in 
transport airplanes' fuel tank systems that may lead to an 
ignition source being present. Since the TWA 800 accident, the 
FAA has issued 31 airworthiness directives (AD) that address 
fuel tank safety issues.
    The FAA has also initiated studies and research regarding 
fuel tank flammability reduction, which have been closely 
coordinated with the NTSB. The FAA is working with industry to 
establish a voluntary program that would provide some reduction 
in the potential for flammable vapors to develop in heated 
center wing tanks. The program would encourage operators to use 
ground air conditioning equipment when available to provide 
preconditioned air (PCA) to transport airplanes that have the 
airplane's air conditioning packs located below center tanks. 
The use of PCA reduces the heating of the fuel in those center 
wing tanks and therefore reduces the potential for explosive 
fuel-air mixtures.

                ACCIDENTS INVOLVING FUEL TANK EXPLOSIONS

    Mr. Wolf. Because later on on page 11 he says, ``however, 
the evidence gathered during the investigation of TWA Flight 
800 and the previous accident that occurred on May 11, 1990 in 
the Philippines involving a Philippine Airline Boeing 737 
indicates that they do occur and that extraordinary steps may 
be needed to be taken to prevent similar accidents.'' So you 
will be talking.
    Mr. Hall. I think the testimony pretty accurately expresses 
the Board's concerns. It is a difficult issue, Mr. Chairman. 
Explosions of this nature are very rare events but, 
nevertheless, we do not feel that these recommendations have 
been addressed.

                          EGYPT AIR FLIGHT 990

    Mr. Wolf. If you could do that. Also, too, to divert, but 
it is still a very serious issue, just the Egypt Air Flight 
990, my sense is this is not moving as fast? Is there some 
concern of offending the Egyptian Government to say--I saw in 
the paper that the Egyptian Government had hired a lot of law 
firms in town and former people that work where you work. What 
is that about?
    I would hope--you know, I view Egypt as a good friend and I 
have got respect for them except for the way they are treating 
the Coptic Christians in certain parts of the country. Other 
than that, Egypt is a good friend of ours. I would hope that 
there would be no political reluctance to say what you actually 
have found and I will say that to both of you. I think the 
American people are obligated, particularly when you both 
mention the code sharing issue. I think this is a very serious 
issue and I think if I am flying to Egypt next year and I am on 
Egypt Air, I want to know or if I am flying wherever. You want 
to both comment on how that thing is going and is there any 
reluctance to say anything for any particular reason?
    Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, we have the responsibility for the 
investigation that was delegated to us under Annex 13 of the 
international treaty covering aviation in the world for the 
conduct of the investigation. Let me assure you that the Board 
will always accurately report to the American people the 
results of our investigations. This investigation has been 
proceeding in a cooperative fashion with all the parties to the 
investigation, including the Egyptian Government.
    The investigation has been delayed as a result of the 
strike that occurred at the Boeing Aircraft Company. There were 
a number of simulations that we had planned to undertake. I'm 
hopeful with the conclusion of that strike that we will now be 
able to proceed. Representatives of the Egyptian Government 
have been provided office space as they assist in the 
investigation.
    We are doing everything we can to expedite the 
investigation. There has been a great deal of media attention, 
not just in the United States but in Egypt and other countries 
in the Arab world, regarding this investigation. I can only say 
that we are doing everything we can to move this investigation, 
and at the appropriate time, as we do in all our 
investigations, we will report the factual information we 
develop.
    Mr. Wolf. I think that is the way it should be. I don't 
think it should--we should treat everything above the board----
    Mr. Hall. In addition, I think it is important to note that 
there were 101 American passengers on that flight. We expect to 
spend approximately $17 million on the recovery of both the 
victims and the aircraft structure. Some of that work is 
continuing. We have a tremendous obligation to both the 
citizens of the United States as, well as the citizens of the 
world, tocomplete this investigation and report the facts.
    Mr. Wolf. I agree. Who is the lead agency, you or the FBI?
    Mr. Hall. We are the lead agency. Under Annex 13, we had an 
obligation to notify the FBI if we felt that there might--and I 
put the emphasis on might--be criminal activity that resulted 
in the crash. That notification was made and they have a 
separate investigation ongoing as well.
    Mr. Wolf. I just think it is important. I have great 
respect for Egypt. I think President Mubarak has done an 
excellent job but I do think honesty and integrity of the 
process to make sure that the American people and the Egyptian 
people and the people who fly know precisely what happened. It 
is very important.

                              CODE SHARING

    Mr. Wolf. Two last questions. The Mitre code sharing issue 
is a very, very important issue. I had it happen to me. You buy 
one ticket and you are on a different type of airline. We have 
raised this in the past. Is there an Internet website you can 
go to, find out if you are going to China, to find out the 
safety records of the airlines you are flying on?
    Ms. Garvey. I am so glad you asked that question because I 
remember you asked that last time. I think it was the last time 
I remember you were standing outside and you talked about this 
last year and I mentioned it earlier when you weren't here. We 
are putting on the website in just about three or four weeks 
just exactly that information and it is something that we--we 
actually thought we might have to develop it ourselves and we 
found out there was something out there that was excellent and 
I think it is going to be the best in government where you can 
access, and anybody can do this, find out what has happened in 
a particular country in terms of aviation accidents. You can 
categorize it by aircraft, by country, by airline and it is 
very user friendly.
    I remember that was an issue we talked about last year 
about how difficult it is sometimes to understand the 
information. It is very user friendly and we are pleased that 
we have been able to find it and then also get it up on the 
web. Monte Belger did a lot of work on this to make sure----
    Mr. Wolf. I commend you for that. When will it be 
available?
    Ms. Garvey. About three weeks.

                        WEB SITE ON SAFETY DATA

    Mr. Wolf. If you are flying through a particular country 
and you are flying on--I won't single out a country so we don't 
get into a problem here, and you are flying on X, you will be 
able to go and access and see the safety record and accidents?
    Ms. Garvey. The accidents that they have, what kind of 
accidents they have been. We think that will be very good news. 
Tied to that, by the way, in terms of customer service, one of 
the issues around delays, the Spring/Summer plan we announced a 
couple of weeks ago with the President, one component of it is 
to have on a separate website information for people who are 
traveling if there are delays that they might be experiencing 
at a particular airport. They would still have to go to their 
airline but at least you would know that if you were having 
problems in Boston or having problems in Chicago, you would 
know what to expect and would at least be a sort of suggestion 
then to hook into the airline and find out how your specific 
flight is doing.
    [The information follows:]

    The FAA's web site went on-line and became fully functional 
on March 30, 2000. The address is ``www.fly.faa.gov.''

                            SECURITY ALERTS

    Mr. Wolf. When you do that Web page, if you could let us 
know. Well, what we will do, maybe Mr. Sabo and I can do just a 
Dear Colleague to every Member letting them know so they can 
then print it in their newsletter or whatever. But this has 
always been, if your children are traveling or you are 
traveling abroad and you are going to some place you are not 
quite sure of, it will be helpful. If you recall in the Pan Am 
103, that information was available to the people in the 
embassy who happened to be privy to that but it was not 
available--if my memory serves me, it was not available to the 
families and to the people who were actually on the plane. Was 
it not accurate that there was a warning posted?
    Mr. Hall. There was a security alert. Admiral Flynn would 
probably be the best person to respond.
    Mr. Wolf. Is that the case, on Pan Am 103 there was a 
security alert that was posted in the embassy?
    Mr. Flynn. That was one of the findings that has led to the 
``no double standard'' rule, where there is no information that 
is provided within government that isn't made open to the 
public.
    Mr. Wolf. So it will be the same way, security problems, 
everything will be there; is that correct?
    Ms. Garvey. The accident rates, yes, it is focused on 
accidents.
    Mr. Wolf. You also--would that cover----
    Mr. Flynn. Information with regard to the security 
situation in countries is in the State Department advisories 
with regard to criminality, terrorism threats.
    Mr. Wolf. Everyone isn't always--and we don't have any 
jurisdiction over the State Department here but it would be 
helpful, I think, if you could blend them. If somebody were 
going--.
    Mr. Flynn. I think if it is possible to indicate through 
link.
    Mr. Wolf. Can you do that?
    Ms. Garvey. We will look into that, Mr. Chairman.
    [The information follows:]

    Under the option ``For Passengers'' the FAA's Web Site 
(http://www.faa.gov) includes ``Consumer Links for the Flying 
Public.'' A section of this page is devoted to providing 
information to the flying public and is linked to the U.S. 
State Department for information relative to traveler 
advisories. This link allows airline passengers to see all 
State Department current travel warnings and public 
announcements.

                           RUNWAY INCURSIONS

    Mr. Wolf. The last question, the Federal Managers 
Association has contacted me and asked to be included in your 
upcoming regional meetings and summits on runway incursions. 
These individuals supervise air traffic controllers. I think 
they ought to be----
    Ms. Garvey. Mr. Chairman, actually after you mentioned that 
yesterday, I talked with our folks just to make sure that we 
have got the right mix and there are a number of FAA members 
who are and I have just talked with a member recently or today 
and suggested that we make sure he follows up and we will 
follow up with the California one. I might also mention that 
another great group of people that I think we need to make sure 
they are very involved are the operational supervisors. I think 
there are a couple of members who are here today and we want to 
make sure we do that.
    Mr. Wolf. Your people will be at every meeting?
    Mr. Hall. Yes, sir.
    Ms. Garvey. Mr. Chairman, could I make one correction for 
the record because someone mentioned on the way out that I may 
have created a misimpression. For runway incursions and for 
Operations errors, there is nothing voluntary about reporting 
it. Our folks have to report them. They--if they don't, there 
are penalties for not reporting it. So in those cases where we 
discover that something has occurred and hasn't been reported, 
we would take some action. So I want to make sure that it was 
not----

              WASHINGTON AIR ROUTE TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTER

    Mr. Wolf. I understand that, and I appreciate it. I was 
referring to--there was a Wall Street Journal piece last year 
about that and I think the more people should be encouraged and 
not feel--everybody makes mistakes. My goodness gracious. The 
article was FAA Scary Findings, Controllers Sometimes Conceal 
Close Calls. That is a very tough job to be a controller. I 
think the more we are encouraging people to come forward and 
say, yeah, it was error and I am sorry and I learned by it, I 
think the better that is. There was one other issue in reading 
Mr. Mead's testimony which kind of troubled me. On the fiscal 
year 1999 top 25 facilities for errors, the top one is 
Washington air route traffic. Do you have any thoughts on this?
    Ms. Garvey. This is the Operations funding errors?
    Mr. Wolf. Yes.
    Mr. Mead. It wasn't just----
    Mr. Wolf. Do they need more people? Do they need more 
people? Is there something that you can be helping out with 
them?
    Ms. Garvey. In each one of those cases, Mr. Chairman, where 
we have more errors than we should be having, we are taking a 
look and looking at staffing, looking at procedures. We had two 
facilities in last week, Chicago O'Hare and Tulsa, both of whom 
have had no operational errors. We had a great afternoon 
discussion with them about what were some of the reasons--when 
it works, why does it work so well and they mentioned two of 
the issues you just did. In one case it is right staffing but 
they also talked about a terrific working relationship with the 
city. Chicago talked about the great relationship with the city 
aviation and issues like being able to establish perimeter 
roads so they were not creating problems. This was on runway 
incursions, for example. So I think there are a number of 
factors, but in those cases, in each case we are going back 
with a quality assurance team to take a look at that.

                             PERIMETER RULE

    Mr. Wolf. I know there have been staffing problems out at 
the Washington Center, particularly if they are pushing too 
much and not enough people. Are you concerned at all about the 
provision in the AIR21 bill, what has lifted the perimeter rule 
and added more flights into National Airport? Mr. Hall, you 
might want to comment too. Are you concerned, Ms. Garvey, about 
that.
    Ms. Garvey. From my perspective and I have talked directly 
with the controllers about that, as you mentioned they are the 
best in the world. We will make sure the operational procedures 
we put in place are safe and certainly be very, very mindful of 
that. That clearly has got to be our driving factor and should 
be and is in every decision that we make. So as we look at the 
operations, we have got to take that into account and make some 
changes if necessary. So we will be watching that very 
carefully.
    Mr. Wolf. Mr. Hall, do you have any thoughts on it?
    Mr. Hall. We haven't looked at that issue, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Wolf. I am concerned now. You know, they not only 
increased the slots but they lifted the perimeter for six and I 
know there are many more cities outside that perimeter than six 
and if L.A. gets one, San Francisco is going to have one and 
pretty soon--and I really am concerned that you are going to 
begin to have an aluminum sky policy that everyone is going to 
come in and say I want to go directly to National, and I 
remember the Air Florida crash.
    I don't know if all of you were living around here then but 
I am really concerned. I would hope the Administration would 
have spoken out against it. It was really kind of a break in 
the faith of the people in this region to do that and as you do 
that I just think it is common sense the more flights you put 
into that airport, you just are creating a dangerous situation. 
And it is your people that fly in there. It is people who live 
in my district, people who live all over.
    Mr. Sabo, do you have any other questions?
    Mr. Sabo. No.

                            IMPACT OF AIR 21

    Mr. Wolf. I want to thank all three of you and I like and 
respect all three of you. I think you all did a good job. Mr. 
Hall, you know, we have always been very supportive of your 
efforts. And Mr. Mead, we appreciate youraggressiveness and 
whether it is disclosing the cult at the FAA in the old days, which 
people forget about but your people did, I do appreciate it. And, Ms. 
Garvey, I want to again say publicly I think you do a very good job. 
You have probably the toughest job in the government and as the 
committee--I am really concerned about the AIR 21. As you know, the 
Republicans have a policy which I support whereby in 6 years we rotate. 
This will be the last year facing this with regard to, your coming 
before the committee. Mr. Sabo, and I have had a good relationship. We 
have never had a difference on any of these issues and if I can, and I 
know Mr. Sabo shares it, we can help in any way with regard to the 
runway incursion, with regard to any of these safety issues, let us 
know.
    If I have to offer an amendment on the floor which is ruled 
out of order which offends the T&I committee, I don't want to 
do that--because I want to know when I have left and I know 
having talked to you privately how concerned and how on top of 
things you are and how you sort of worry about it too that 
everything is possibly done so that anyone and everyone flying 
knows that everything is possibly done. So when we get to the 
end and this Operations funding isn't enough and you think an 
amendment to allow you to go into the AIP funding, I know a lot 
of members might not like it. I don't know how the 
Administration would like it. But I just want to make sure that 
we have given you everything you possibly need so that you can 
do the job.

                            INDEPENDENT FAA

    Mr. Wolf. The last issue is not a question. I think you 
ought to after the elections give a major speech on aviation 
safety in November or December and if whoever is the new 
President doesn't like it they can get somebody else. You can 
almost hope they will take somebody else and I think you will 
go back and run for governor of Boston. And I think that that 
somebody ought to be looking at setting up an independent FAA 
and getting the best minds, the best air traffic controllers, 
the best thinking in the aviation industry, the airlines, 
general aviation, and looking at how we can put together 
something that--the AIR 21 doesn't take care of it and it is 
just kind of--and I think you really need an independent agency 
that has congressional oversight that requires it to come back 
but that you can really do and the airlines can do what they 
think and I think you have to do to bring the air traffic 
controllers in.
    You have to bring all the groups in and let them craft 
something that would really work but I think maybe I would 
encourage you in December to just give a major address saying 
the hard and tough things that people really, really have to 
hear. Thank you.
    Ms. Garvey. Thank you very much. Thank you for your 
support.
    Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to add before the 
committee gets away how much we, and I know Jane and Ken will 
want to speak on the subject, the support of this committee and 
keeping transportation safety up in the forefront during your 
tenure has been extremely important and supportive of all of 
our transportation safety initiatives across the modes. Right 
now my agency has more workload than it has ever had in the 
history of the agency and certainly more than any time in my 
tenure which has not been a time with a lot of light activity. 
And if it hadn't been for the support of this committee, I 
would have today one-third less people in resources than I have 
today to try to address the challenges I have. So the 
committee, the committee staff, greatly appreciated all your 
support and never want to miss an opportunity to publicly 
express that.
    Mr. Wolf. Thank you. Thank you very much. The hearing is 
adjourned.

                            PERFORMANCE PLAN

    [Clerk's note.--The Federal Aviation Administration failed 
to provide the annual Performance Plan in time to be printed in 
this part. This plan is due by March 31, as required by the 
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Public Law 103-
62.]





                               I N D E X

                              ----------                              

                    Federal Aviation Administration

                                                                   Page
2000 Operations Shortfall........................................   671
2000 Supplemental Request........................................   672
Accidents:
    Accident and Fatality Rates..................................   306
    Accidents Involving Fuel Tank Explosions.....................   183
    Fatal Accidents for United States Air Carriers...............   316
    Turbulence Accidents and Incidents...........................   361
Administrative Services Franchise Fund....................382, 432, 548
Advisory Committees..............................................   320
Aeronautical Center Infrastructure Modernization.................   657
Aeronautical Charting............................................   600
AIR 21.........................................................148, 534
    AIR 21 Competition Provision.................................   679
    AIR 21 Impact on Safety Funding..............................   105
    F&E Funding Under AIR 21.....................................   103
    Impact on AIR 21.............................................   188
Air Traffic:
    Air Traffic Control Training.................................   677
    Air Traffic Training.........................................   604
    ATS Requirements Service.....................................   569
    Controller Hiring Policies............................368, 371, 379
    Controller Incentive Pay Agreement...........................   256
    Controller Pay Agreement.....................................   321
    Controller Productivity......................................   367
    Controller Retirements.......................................   682
    Controller Training..........................................   366
    Controller Workforce Staffing..............................305, 330
    CWF Employment Data........................................325, 335
    PATCO Rehires................................................   323
Air Traffic Control Beacon Interrogator..........................   638
Air Traffic Control Modernization................................ 6, 62
    ARTCC Building Improvements..................................   637
    ATC Tower: Vero Beach, Florida...............................   647
    ATC/TRACON Facilities Improvement............................   648
    Facilities and Equipment New Programs........................   457
    Five Most Important Modernization Programs...................   456
    Terminal ATC Facilities Replacement..........................   645
Aircraft-Related Equipment Program...............................   653
Airline Carrier Slots............................................   630
Airline Delays...................................................   176
Airport and Airway Trust Fund....................................   194
    Airport and Airway Trust Fund Uncommitted Balances...........   198
Airport Improvement Program....................................522, 527
    AIP Contract Authority.......................................   531
    AIP Obligations..............................................   525
Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS).................43, 84, 483
    AMASS Commissionings.........................................   394
Airports:
    Busiest Airports Worldwide...................................    82
    Busiest Airports.............................................   109
    El Toro Military Airport.....................................   121
    Grants-in-Aid for Airports.................................665, 669
    Moving Airport Hubs..........................................   121
Airport Security Breaches........................................   134
    Pictures of Agency Personnel...............................134, 136
    Bounty on FAA Inspections....................................   133
Airport Security:
    Airport Security.............................................   171
    Airport Security Testing.....................................   180
Airport Surface Detection Equipment (ASDE).......................    91
    ASDE-3 Commissionings........................................   393
    ASDE-X.......................................................   126
Air Route Traffic Control Center:
    ARTCC Building Improvements..................................   637
    Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center..................   186
Airspace:
    Airspace Incidents...........................................   357
    Airspace Redesign............................................   550
Annual Leave.....................................................   262
ARTCC Building Improvements......................................   637
Assessment by OST................................................   242
ATS Requirements Service.........................................   569
Automated Observation of Visibility for Cloud Height and Cloud 
  Coverage (AOVCC)...............................................   483
Average Annual Civil Service Retirement Pension..................   216
Average Workers' Compensation Payment in Series 2152.............   215
Aviation Safety Analysis System (ASAS)...........................   653
Aviation Safety Inspections......................................   673
Aviation Safety Program..........................................   379
Aviation Weather Research........................................   514
Baggage Screeners................................................   169
    Baggage Screening............................................   606
    Rulemaking on Baggage Screeners..............................   167
Baselines........................................................   462
    Financial Baseline Control Notices...........................   477
    Schedule for Baselining Remaining Programs...................   469
Bounty on FAA Inspections........................................   133
Budget:
    Budget and Staffing Plan for Fiscal Year 2000................   220
    Budget Request to OST and OMB................................   243
Building Repair, Maintenance and Inspection......................   252
Busiest Airports Worldwide.......................................    82
Busiest Airports.................................................   109
Camp Pendleton.................................................123, 127
Capital Investment Plan..........................................   457
Centennial Flight Commission.....................................   548
Center for Management Development................................   428
Certification Staffing...........................................   114
Civil Aviation Security Statistics...............................   397
Civil Aviation Security........................................397, 606
Cockpit Videos...................................................   158
Code Sharing.....................................................6, 184
Collegiate Training Initiatives..................................   424
Commercial Launches..............................................   613
Commercial Space Transportation................................432, 610
Commissionings:
    AMASS Commissionings.........................................   394
    ASDE-3 Commissionings........................................   393
    Commissioned Facilities......................................   389
Contract Maintenance:
    Contract Maintenance (Hardware)--Support Contracts...........   385
    Contract Maintenance Costs...................................   388
Contract Towers..................................................   345
    Contract Tower Cost Sharing Program..........................   322
    Contract Tower Program................................113, 114, 671
Controller:
    Average Workers Compensation in Series 2152..................   215
    Controller Incentive Pay Agreement...........................   256
    Controller Pay Agreement.....................................   321
    Controller Productivity......................................   367
    Controller Retirements.......................................   682
    Controller to Supervisor Ratio...............................   684
    Controller Training..........................................   366
    Controllers Hiring Policies...........................368, 371, 379
    Controllers Workforce Staffing.............................305, 330
    CWF--Employment Data.......................................325, 335
    Oceanic Controllers..........................................   690
Core Compensation Plan...........................................   422
    Core Compensation Program....................................   413
    Executive Compensation.......................................   423
Corporate Systems Architecture...................................   659
Cost Accounting System..........................119, 120, 190, 192, 628
Cost of Living Differential (COLD)........................257, 262, 588
Current Status of Dulles Incidents...............................   142
Controller Work Force (CWF):
    CWF Employment Data........................................325, 335
Depot Spare Funding Requests.....................................   385
Disadvantaged Business Enterprise................................   629
Distance Learning Computer-Based Instruction.....................   383
Dulles Airport Security and Safety........................133, 136, 138
Dulles Airport Security Incident.................................   131
    Arrest and Impact to the Inspector...........................   142
    Current Status of Dulles Incidents...........................   142
    Dulles Incident Inspector's Bail.............................   169
    Dulles Security Incident--Bail Payment.......................   131
    Dulles Security Incident--Memo...............................   132
    Dulles Security Incident.....................................   143
Efficiency in Operations.........................................   101
Egypt Air Flight 990.............................................   183
El Toro Air Station............................................126, 128
    El Toro Airport Reuse Plan...................................   122
    El Toro Military Airport.....................................   121
Employee Separations.............................................   269
Employment:
    Controller Hiring Policies............................368, 371, 379
    Controller Workforce Staffing................................   305
    CWF Employment Data........................................325, 335
    Staffing Dulles..............................................   336
English Language Proficiency.....................................   448
    English Proficiency--Korean Air..............................   115
    Language Problems............................................   116
    Verification for English Proficiency.........................   116
Essential Air Service............................................   675
Eunomia..........................................................   509
Executive Compensation...........................................   423
Explosive Detection Systems....................................169, 655
Facilities and Equipment (F&E) Funding:
    F&E Funding Under AIR 21.....................................   103
    Facilities and Equipment New Programs........................   457
    Obligations and Unobligated Balance--Facilities and Equipment   473
    Outlays--Facilities and Equipment............................   471
    PCS Moves--F&E Funded........................................   658
FAA:
    FAA Executive Positions......................................   278
    FAA Sexual Harassment........................................   681
    FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure.................486, 488, 641
    Independent FAA..............................................   188
Facilities and Equipment New Programs............................   457
Fatal Accidents for United States Air Carriers...................   316
Federal Employee Protection......................................   136
Fees:
    Overflight Fees..............................................   674
    User Fees..............................101, 144, 151, 265, 267, 405
Field Maintenance--``Other Objects'' Costs.......................   388
Financial Baseline Control Notices...............................   477
Financing........................................................     7
Five Most Important Modernization Programs.......................   456
Franchise Fund............................................382, 432, 548
Free Flight Phase One..........................................160, 162
    Free Flight..................................................   634
Frequency and Spectrum Engineering...............................   657
Fuel Costs.......................................................   694
Full Funding Principle...........................................   644
Full-time Equivalent Estimate....................................   534
Funding for Noise Technology.....................................   104
GAO Comments on WAAS.............................................   158
General Aviation:
    General Aviation Accident Rate...............................   318
    General Aviation Instrument Operations.......................   299
GPS Satellite Navigation.......................................151, 155
Grants-in-Aid for Airports.....................................665, 669
Ground Safety Tracking and Reporting System (GSTARS)...........107, 125
GSA Rent.........................................................   222
Gulf of Mexico Offshore Program..................................   650
Health Benefits..................................................   267
    Health Benefits Increase.....................................   269
Human Factors Research...........................................   514
Impact of Technology on Staffing.................................   109
Impact on AIR 21.................................................   188
Independent FAA..................................................   188
Information Security.............................................   631
Infrastructure Replacement.......................................   601
Inspections......................................................   687
Inspector General:
    Air Traffic Control Modernization............................     6
        Comments on WAAS.........................................   158
        Free Flight Phase I......................................   160
        WAAS Integrity Performance Panel.........................   159
    Air Traffic Control Training.................................   191
        Technical Training.......................................   197
    Airport Security Testing.....................................   180
        Airport Security.........................................   171
        Baggage Screeners........................................   169
        Test to Breach Airport Security..........................   133
    Airport Security.............................................   171
        Airport Security Testing.................................   180
        Baggage Screeners........................................   169
        Explosive Detection Systems..............................   169
        Test to Breach Airport Security..........................   133
    Baggage Screeners............................................   169
        Airport Security Testing.................................   180
        Airport Security.........................................   171
    Bounty on FAA Inspectors.....................................   133
        Current Status of Dulles Incident........................   142
        Dulles Security Incident--Bail Payment...................   131
        Personal Liability Insurance.............................   141
        Pictures of Agency Personnel.............................   134
    Busiest Airports Worldwide...................................    84
    Code Sharing.................................................     6
    Comments on WAAS.............................................   158
        Air Traffic Control Modernization........................     6
        WAAS Integrity Performance Panel.........................   159
    Contract Tower Program.......................................   114
    Controller-to-Supervisor Ratio...............................   193
        Operational Supervisors..................................   192
    Cost Accounting System.......................................   119
    Cost Accounting Systems......................................   120
    Current Status of Dulles Incident............................   142
        Bounty on FAA Inspectors.................................   133
        Dulles Security Incident--Bail Payment...................   131
        Personal Liability Insurance.............................   141
        Pictures of Agency Personnel.............................   134
    Dulles Security Incident--Bail Payment.......................   131
        Bounty on FAA Inspectors.................................   133
        Current Status of Dulles Incident........................   142
        Personal Liability Insurance.............................   141
        Pictures of Agency Personnel.............................   134
    Efficiency in Operations.....................................   102
    Explosive Detection Systems..................................   169
        Airport Security.........................................   171
        Tandum Accelerator.......................................   198
    F&E Funding Under AIR-21.....................................   103
        Financing................................................     7
    Financing....................................................     7
        F&E Funding Under AIR-21.................................   103
        Operating Budget.........................................   143
        Operations Cost Growth...................................   108
        User Fees................................................   144
    Free Flight Phase I..........................................   160
        Air Traffic Control Modernization........................     6
    Fuel Costs...................................................   203
    Impact of Technology on Staffing.............................   109
    Inspections..................................................   196
    Inspector General Opening Statement..........................     2
    Oceanic Controllers..........................................   199
    Operating Budget.............................................   143
        Financing................................................     7
        Operations Cost Growth...................................   108
    Operational Errors...........................................3, 190
        Busiest Airports Worldwide...............................    84
        Runway Incursions......................................110, 112
        Safety...................................................     2
    Operational Supervisors......................................   192
        Controller-to-Supervisor Ratio...........................   193
    Operations Cost Growth.......................................   108
        Financing................................................     7
        Operating Budget.........................................   143
    Personal Liability Insurance.................................   141
        Bounty on FAA Inspectors.................................   133
        Current Status of Dulles Incident........................   142
        Dulles Security Incident--Bail Payment...................   131
        Pictures of Agency Personnel.............................   134
    Pictures of Agency Personnel.................................   134
        Bounty on FAA Inspectors.................................   133
        Current Status of Dulles Incident........................   142
        Dulles Security Incident--Bail Payment...................   131
        Personal Liability Insurance.............................   141
    RTCA.........................................................   164
    Runway Incursions..........................................110, 112
        Operational Errors.......................................3, 190
        Safety...................................................     2
    Safety.......................................................     2
        Operational Errors.......................................3, 190
        Runway Incursions......................................110, 112
    Staffing Levels..............................................   194
    Statement of Inspector General...............................    10
    Tandem Accelerator...........................................   198
        Explosive Detection Systems..............................   169
    Technical Training...........................................   197
        Air Traffic Control Training.............................   191
    Test to Breach Airport Security..............................   133
        Airport Security Testing.................................   180
        Airport Security.........................................   171
    Travel Agents................................................   201
    User Fees....................................................   144
        Financing................................................     7
    WAAS Integrity Performance Panel.............................   159
        Air Traffic Control Modernization........................     6
        Comments on WAAS.........................................   158
    Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center..................   186
    Witnesses....................................................     1
Inspector General Opening Statement..............................     2
Instrument Landing Systems (ILS)...............................154, 650
Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS)........................   632
International Aviation Safety....................................   124
Introduction of Witnesses........................................     2
Launches:
    Commercial Launches..........................................   613
    Space Launches...............................................   615
Leased Telecommunications--Airway Facilities...................570, 572
Leasing..........................................................   458
Leave:
    Annual Leave.................................................   262
    Sick Leave...................................................   264
Lighting Systems.................................................   651
Logistics Center--Operations & Maintenance Costs.................   380
LOOP Technology..................................................   351
    Ground Safety Tracking and Reporting System (GSTARS).......107, 125
LORAN-C..........................................................   479
Lower Activity Airports..........................................    44
Maintenance Pre-Hire Screening and Training......................   383
Maintenance Staffing.............................................   380
Management Advisory Council......................................   115
Mid-America Aviation Resource Consortium.........................   428
Military Airport Program.........................................   524
    El Toro Military Airport Program.............................   121
Modernization....................................................    62
Moving Airport Hubs..............................................   121
NAS Handoff....................................................598, 600
National Air Traffic Controller Union (NATCA):
    NATCA Contract Costs.........................................   588
    National Air Traffic Controller Union (NATCA) Representation.   366
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB):
    Runway Incursion NTSB Recommendations........................    74
    Opening Statement by NSTB Chairman...........................    43
Next Generation Air to Ground Communications (NEXCOM)............   475
Next Generations Messaging.......................................   609
Noise:
    Funding for Noise Technology.................................   104
    Noise Research...............................................   104
    Stage Four Noise Requirements................................   103
Non-Routine Overseas Travel......................................   227
Northern California TRACON.......................................   678
Obligation Plan Versus Actual--Fiscal Year 1999..................   279
Obligations and Unobligated Balance--Facilities and Equipment....   473
Oceanic:
    Oceanic Automation System....................................   633
    Oceanic Controllers..........................................   690
Office of Chief Counsel..........................................   627
Office of Civil Rights.........................................620, 623
Office of Financial Services.....................................   401
Office of Government and Industry Affairs........................   625
Office of Policy, Planning and International Aviation..........440, 426
Office of System Safety..........................................   454
Office of the Administrator and Deputy Administrator.............   453
O'Hare Runway Incursion..........................................    43
Onboard Staffing.................................................   218
Opening Remarks..................................................     1
    Chairman Wolf................................................     1
    Opening Remarks by Mr. Sabo..................................     2
    Opening Statement of FAA Administrator.......................    62
    Opening Statement by NSTB Chairman...........................    43
    Inspector General Opening Statement..........................    43
Operational Errors................................3, 345, 351, 357, 676
Operational Supervisor...........................................   633
Operations:
    2000 Operations Shortfall....................................   671
    2000 Supplemental Request....................................   672
    Efficiency in Operations.....................................   101
    Obligation Plan Versus Actual--Fiscal Year 1999..............   271
    Operating Budget.............................................   143
    Operations Costs Growth......................................   108
    Operations Funding...........................................   100
    Operations Budget Shortfall..................................   217
Other Services...................................................   248
Outlays--Facilities and Equipment................................   471
Overflight Fees..................................................   674
Overseas Personnel...............................................   200
Paine Field......................................................   647
Passenger Board Bridges..........................................   533
Passenger Facility Charge........................................   531
PATCO Rehires....................................................   323
Pay:
    Controller Incentive Pay Agreement...........................   256
    Special Pay..................................................   252
    Sunday Premium Pay...........................................   265
Payroll Costs....................................................   267
Permanent Change of Station (PCS):
    PCS Moves--F&E Funded........................................   658
    Permanent Change of Station--Airway Facilities...............   605
    Permanent Change of Station--Air Traffic.....................   588
Percentage of Onboard Staff......................................   332
Perimeter Rule...................................................   187
Permanent Change of Station--Airway Facilities...................   605
Permanent Change of Station (PCS) Air Traffic....................   588
Personal Liability Insurance.....................................   141
Personnel, Benefits, and Compensation:
    Average Annual Civil Service Retirement Pension..............   216
    Average Workers' Compensation Payment in Series 2152.........   215
    Controller Incentive Pay Agreement...........................   256
    Controller Pay Agreement.....................................   321
    Workers' Compensation......................................214, 216
Pictures of Agency Personnel...................................134, 136
Pilots Concerns Regarding Operational Errors.....................    97
Planning, Direction, and Evaluation..............................   568
Policy Studies...................................................   449
Positions:
    FAA Executive Positions......................................   278
    Human Resource Management Positions..........................   407
    Positions and Employment Summary.............................   293
    Positions by Office..........................................   273
Potomac TRACON...................................................   486
Precision Runway Monitors........................................   649
Public Affairs...................................................   429
Regional Offices.................................................   430
Regulation and Certification.....................................   396
Remote Radar Capability..........................................   678
Report on International Aviation Safety........................106, 107
Research:
    Aviation Weather Research....................................   514
    Human Factors Research.......................................   514
    Noise Research...............................................   104
    Research and Acquisitions Discretionary Increases............   608
    Research, Engineering, and Development.......................   663
    University Research..........................................   517
RTCA, Inc......................................................164, 165
Rulemaking on Baggage Screeners..................................   167
Runway Incursions:
    O'Hare Runway Incursion......................................    43
    Runway Incursions....................43, 72, 84, 110, 112, 186, 346
    Runway Incursions and Operational Errors.....................87, 93
    Runway Incursion Goal........................................    72
    Runway Incursion NTSB Recommendation.........................    74
    Runway Incursion Problem.....................................    73
    Runway Incursion Problems in Europe..........................74, 82
    Runway Incursions Reporting..................................    73
    Runway Incursions Technologies...............................   482
    Runway Incursions Technology.................................    85
Runway Safety....................................................    63
    Runway Safety Action Plan....................................    64
    Runway Safety Technology.....................................    64
Runway Visual Range..............................................   652
Safe Flight 21.................................................515, 637
Safer Skies......................................................   606
    Safer Skies Initiative.......................................   602
Safety Systems--Top Priorities...................................   476
Safety...........................................................2, 113
    Aviation Safety Analysis System (ASAS).......................   653
    Aviation Safety Inspections..................................   673
    Aviation Safety Program......................................   379
    International Aviation Safety................................   124
    Report on International Aviation Safety....................106, 107
    Safety Systems--Top Priorities...............................   476
Satellite Navigation:
    LORAN-C......................................................   479
    Next Generation Air to Ground Communications (NEXCOM)........   475
    GPS Satellite Navigation...................................151, 155
    Satellite Navigation WAAS....................................   478
Schedule for Baselining Remaining Programs.......................   469
Second Career Training...........................................   413
Security:
    Airport Security.............................................   171
    Airport Security Breaches....................................   134
    Airport Security Testing.....................................   180
    Civil Aviation Security Statistics...........................   397
    Civil Aviation Security....................................397, 606
    Dulles Airport Security Incident.............................   131
    Information Security.........................................   631
    Security Alerts..............................................   185
    Security Testing.............................................   400
    Tests to Breach Airport Security.............................   133
SES:
    FAA Executive Positions......................................   278
    SES and Other Executive Positions Unfilled...................   292
    SES Bonus Awards...........................................286, 291
Sick Leave.......................................................   264
Space Launches...................................................   615
Spare Parts......................................................   602
    Depot Spare Funding Requests.................................   385
    Spare Parts Problem..........................................   673
Staff Offices...................................616, 618, 619, 620, 626
    Office of Chief Counsel......................................   627
    Office of Civil Rights.....................................620, 623
    Office of Financial Services.................................   401
    Office of Government and Industry Affairs....................   625
    Office of Policy, Planning and International Aviation......440, 626
    Office of System Safety......................................   454
    Public Affairs...............................................   429
Staffing:
    Budget and Staffing Plan for Fiscal Year 2000................   220
    Controller Workforce Staffing................................   305
    Impact of Technology on Staffing.............................   109
    Maintenance Staffing.........................................   380
    Onboard Staffing.............................................   218
    Percentage of Onboard Staff..................................   332
    Positions by Office..........................................   273
    Positions and Employment Summary.............................   293
    Staffing--Dulles.............................................   336
    Staffing Levels..............................................   685
Stage Four Noise Requirements....................................   103
Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS)..........   504
    STARS........................................................   509
Sunday Premium Pay...............................................   265
Support Programs.................................................   663
Tandem Accelerator...............................................   689
Technical Training...............................................   688
Telecommunications:
    Leased Telecommunications--Airway Facilities...............570, 572
    FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure.................486, 488, 641
Terminal ATC Facilities Replacement..............................   645
Terminal Doppler Weather Radar:
    TDWR New York City...........................................   345
    Terminal Doppler Weather Radar: New York.....................   641
Tests to Breach Airport Security.................................   133
Tower Replacement................................................   488
    Tower Replacements--Funding and Construction Status..........   493
Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON):
    ATC/TRACON Facilities Improvement............................   648
    Northern California TRACON...................................   678
    Potomac TRACON...............................................   486
Traffic Management Coordinators (TMS)/Traffic Management 
  Supervisors (TMS)..............................................   569
Training:
    Air Traffic Control Training.................................   677
    Air Traffic Training.........................................   604
    Collegiate Training Initiatives..............................   424
    Controller Training..........................................   366
    Maintenance Pre-Hire Screening and Training..................   383
    Second Career Training.......................................   413
    Technical Training...........................................   688
    Training Funds...............................................   412
Transit Subsidy Benefit Program..................................   241
Transportation Administrative Service Center (TASC)..............   222
Transportation Safety and the Law Symposium......................   182
Travel:
    Non-Routine Overseas Travel..................................   227
    Travel--Operations Funded....................................   223
    Travel and Transportation....................................   567
    Travel Expenditures by Object Class..........................   224
Travel Agents....................................................   692
Travel and Transportation........................................   567
Turbulence Accidents and Incidents...............................   361
TWA Accident--Fuel Tanks.........................................   181
University Research..............................................   517
User Fees..................................101, 144, 151, 265, 267, 405
Verification for English Proficiency.............................   116
Visual Navaids...................................................   652
WAAS:
    GAO Comments on WAAS.........................................   158
    Satellite Navigation WAAS....................................   478
    WAAS Integrity Performance Panel.............................   159
    WAAS Program Schedule........................................   152
    WAAS Revised Costs Estimates.................................   152
    WAAS.........................................................   158
Warehouse Equipment Listing......................................   511
Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center......................   186
Weather Systems:
    Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS)....................   632
    Automated Observation of Visibility for Cloud Height and 
      Cloud Coverage (AOVCC).....................................   483
    Aviation Weather Research....................................   514
Website on Safety Data...........................................   185
Within-Grade (WIG)/Grade-to-Grade (GTG) Increases................   573
Witnesses........................................................     1
Workers' Compensation..........................................214, 216
    Average Workers Compensation in Series 2152..................   215
Workload Measures and Industry Trends.....................297, 301, 303

                  National Transportation Safety Board

Accident Report Timeliness.......................................   950
Administrative Law Judge Cases...................................   959
Authorized Funding Levels........................................   958
Aviation:
    Alaska Airlines/Point Mugu, California.......................   806
    American Airlines/Chicago, Illinois..........................   804
    American Airlines/Little Rock, Arkansas......................   804
    American Airlines/Palm Springs, California...................   807
    American Airlines/West Palm Beach, Florida...................   803
    Aviation Reports Adopted.....................................   957
    Completed Major Aviation Investigations......................   800
    EgyptAir/Atlantic Ocean......................................   805
    Emergency Evacuation Safety Study............................   808
    Emery Air Freight/Rancho Cordova, California.................   807
    Federal Express/Newark, New Jersey...........................   804
    Foreign Aviation Investigations..............................   808
    International Role...........................................   942
    Kenya Accident...............................................   940
    Korean Airlines/Guam.......................................801, 939
    Midair Collisions............................................   944
    On-Going Major Aviation Investigations.......................   802
    Part 245 Repair Operations Safety Study......................   808
    Pending Major Aviation Accident Investigations...............   952
    Runway Incursions............................................   941
    Southwest Airlines/Burbank, California.......................   808
    Sun Jet Lear 35/Aberdeen, South Dakota.......................   805
    TWA 800 Accident Investigation.............................802, 932
    TWA 800 Wreckage.............................................   935
    USAir/Aliquippa, Pennsylvania................................   800
    Water Investigations.........................................   924
Board Member Terms...............................................   821
Budget Request.................................................826, 857
    Supplemental.................................................   928
Conference and Seminars..........................................   884
Emergency Fund...................................................   931
Fatalities.......................................................   945
Financial Management System......................................   860
Highway:
    Adequacy of CDL Process and Medical Issues/Public Hearing....   813
    Bus Crashworthiness Special Investigation....................   811
    Collision Warning Technology Special Investigations..........   814
    Commercial Vehicle Parking Special Investigation.............   813
    Greyhound Bus Collision/Burnt Cabins, Pennsylvania...........   810
    Highway Reports Adopted......................................   957
    Highway Safety Issues Surrounding NAFTA/Public Hearing.......   813
    Interstate Truck Safety Safety Study.........................   814
    Non-Conforming Buses Special Investigation...................   811
    On-Going Highway Activities................................812, 953
    Oversight of Commercial Vehicle Safety/Public Hearing........   812
    Selective Motorcoach Issues Special Investigation............   810
    Technology Applications for Heavy Vehicle Safety/Public 
      Hearing....................................................   812
Inspector General Investigation..................................   947
Marine:
    Allision of M/V Anne Holly with Admiral, St. Louis, Missouri.   816
    Completed Major Marine Investigations........................   815
    Cruise Ship Ecstasy Fire/Miami, Florida......................   817
    Emergency Response...........................................   960
    Marine Reports Adopted.......................................   957
    On-Going Major Marine Investigations.......................816, 954
    Sinking of Miss Majestic/Hot Springs, Arkansas...............   817
    Sinking of Sail Boat Morning Dew/Charleston Harbor, South 
      Carolina...................................................   815
Most Wanted....................................................798, 837
National Safety Foundation.......................................   962
Pipeline/Hazardous Materials:
    Bellingham, Washington/Gasoline Release and Fire.............   820
    Bridgeport, Alabama/Natural Gas Release and Explosion........   819
    Biloxi, Mississippi/Overflow of Underground Storage Tank.....   818
    Clymers, Indiana/Rupture and Explosion of Tank Car with 
      Hazardous Wastes...........................................   820
    On-Going Pipeline/Hazardous Materials Investigations..819, 953, 954
    Pipeline/Hazardous Materials Reports Adopted.................   958
    St. Cloud, Minnesota/Natural Gas Release and Explosion.......   819
Political Appointees.............................................   922
Railroad:
    Arlington, Texas/Amtrak Derailment...........................   824
    Bourbonnais, Illinois/Grade Crossing Accident Involving 
      Amtrak Train and Tractor Semi-Trailer......................   824
    Bryan, Ohio/Freight Train Rear-end Collision.................   824
    Butler, Indiana/Norfolk Southern Railroad....................   821
    BWI Airport, Maryland/MTA Light Rail Collision...............   825
    Cox Landing, West Virginia/CSX Transportation................   822
    Crisfield, Kansas/Derailment of Burlington Northern Santa Fe 
      Freight Trains.............................................   823
    Lissie, Texas/Amtrak-Tractor Semi-Trailer Grade Crossing 
      Accident...................................................   825
    Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District Special 
      Investigation..............................................   822
    On-going Major Railroad Investigations.....................823, 955
    Portage, Indiana/Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation 
      District...................................................   821
    Positive Train Separation Special Investigation..............   825
Rand Study.....................................................797, 848
Safety Recommendations...........................................   843
Safety Studies...................................................   827
SES Employees....................................................   922
Staffing.........................................................   914
Supplemental Appropriations......................................   928
Training.........................................................   884
Travel...........................................................   864
User Fees........................................................   858

                                
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