[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CONSUMER SAFETY INITIATIVES: PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS,
TRADE, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 16, 2000
__________
Serial No. 106-130
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
64-762 WASHINGTON : 2000
------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE
TOM BLILEY, Virginia, Chairman
W.J. ``BILLY'' TAUZIN, Louisiana JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan
MICHAEL G. OXLEY, Ohio HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
JOE BARTON, Texas RALPH M. HALL, Texas
FRED UPTON, Michigan RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
Vice Chairman SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania BART GORDON, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER COX, California PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
STEVE LARGENT, Oklahoma ANNA G. ESHOO, California
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina RON KLINK, Pennsylvania
BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California BART STUPAK, Michigan
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
GREG GANSKE, Iowa TOM SAWYER, Ohio
CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland
TOM A. COBURN, Oklahoma GENE GREEN, Texas
RICK LAZIO, New York KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
JAMES E. ROGAN, California DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona LOIS CAPPS, California
CHARLES W. ``CHIP'' PICKERING,
Mississippi
VITO FOSSELLA, New York
ROY BLUNT, Missouri
ED BRYANT, Tennessee
ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland
James E. Derderian, Chief of Staff
James D. Barnette, General Counsel
Reid P.F. Stuntz, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
______
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection
W.J. ``BILLY'' TAUZIN, Louisiana, Chairman
MICHAEL G. OXLEY, Ohio, EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Vice Chairman RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida BART GORDON, Tennessee
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
CHRISTOPHER COX, California ANNA G. ESHOO, California
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
STEVE LARGENT, Oklahoma ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
JAMES E. ROGAN, California RON KLINK, Pennsylvania
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois TOM SAWYER, Ohio
HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico GENE GREEN, Texas
CHARLES W. ``CHIP'' PICKERING, KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
Mississippi JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan,
VITO FOSSELLA, New York (Ex Officio)
ROY BLUNT, Missouri
ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland
TOM BLILEY, Virginia,
(Ex Officio)
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
Page
Testimony of:
Baloga, Tom, President, Britax Child Safety, Inc............. 72
Brown, Hon. Ann, Chairman, Consumer Product Safety Commission 26
Currie, Malcolm R., President and CEO, Currie Technologies... 78
Fackler, Kathy............................................... 100
Gall, Hon. Mary Sheila, Commissioner, Consumer Product Safety
Commission................................................. 31
Graff, John, President and CEO, International Association of
Amusement Parks and Attractions............................ 107
Herndon, David N., Chief of Staff and Director of Research,
Shriners Burns Hospital.................................... 82
Millman, Rosalyn G., Deputy Administrator, National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. Department of
Transportation............................................. 17
Moore, Hon. Thomas H., Commissioner, Consumer Product Safety
Commission................................................. 37
Stone, Judith Lee, President, Advocates for Highway and Auto
Safety..................................................... 66
Wakelyn, Phillip J., PhD, Senior Scientist, Environmental
Health and Safety, National Cotton Council................. 94
Material submitted for the record by:
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers and the Automotive
Coalition for Traffic Safety, prepared statement of........ 118
American Academy of Pediatrics, prepared statement of........ 120
Borowski, David M., prepared statement of.................... 121
Easter Seals, prepared statement of.......................... 121
Gall, Hon. Mary Sheila, Commissioner, Consumer Product Safety
Commission, letter dated May 22, 2000, to Hon. W.J. Tauzin. 122
Herndon, David N., Chief of Staff and Director of Research,
Shriners Burns Hospital, letter dated June 2, 2000, to Hon.
W.J. Tauzin, enclosing response for the record............. 123
National Fire Protection Association, prepared statement of.. 124
Shahan, Rosemary, President, Consumers for Auto Reliability
and Safety, prepared statement of.......................... 125
Tombrello, Stephanie M., Executive Director, SafetyBeltSafe
U.S.A., prepared statement of.............................. 126
Wakelyn, Phillip J., PhD, Senior Scientist, Environmental
Health and Safety, National Cotton Council, letter dated
June 15, 2000, to Hon. W.J. Tauzin, enclosing response for
the record................................................. 129
(iii)
CONSUMER SAFETY INITIATIVES: PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE
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TUESDAY, MAY 16, 2000
House of Representatives,
Committee on Commerce,
Subcommittee on Telecommunications,
Trade, and Consumer Protection,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
room 2322, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. W.J. ``Billy''
Tauzin (chairman) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Tauzin, Oxley, Stearns,
Gillmor, Cubin, Rogan, Shimkus, Pickering, Ehrlich, Bliley (ex
officio), Markey, Eshoo, Luther, Sawyer, Green, and McCarthy.
Also present:Representatives Ganske, and DeLauro.
Staff present: Hugh Halpern, parliamentarian; Robert
Gordon, majority counsel; Robert Simison, legislative clerk;
and Bruce Gwinn, minority professional staff.
Mr. Tauzin. The subcommittee will please come to order. I
am pleased to continue this subcommittee's tradition of
bipartisan hearings on consumer protections. We will be
examining four consumer safety initiatives at this hearing:
children's safety restraints in automobiles, the regulation of
electric bicycles, flammability standards for children's
sleepwear, and regulation of fixed-site amusement parks.
Testifying on H.R. 4145, the Child Passenger Protection
Act, by Representative Shimkus, will be Rosalyn Millman deputy
administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration on the first panel. And Mrs. Judith Stone,
president of the Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety; and Mr.
Tom Baloga, president of Britax Child Safety on the second
panel. They will discuss the need for improvements in the
Nation's standards for child safety restraints. Clearly, we
must protect children from injuries. But we must do so in a way
that does not compromise NHTSA's other important safety
missions.
While I think there is general agreement on the ultimate
objective, I look forward to hearing the different ways in
which our witnesses propose to improve the safety of our
children.
We will also be reviewing a bill introduced by
Representative Rogan. H.R. 2592 will transfer oversight of
electric bicycles from the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration to the Consumer Produce Safety Commission. Low-
speed electric-powered bicycles are currently regulated by
NHTSA as motor vehicles because they have motors that can
operate independently of pedaling. Motor vehicles are required
to have a number of safety features that are proactively costly
or wieldy or consume too much power for the use on a low-speed
bicycle.
H.R. 2592 would reclassify low-speed electric bikes as
consumer products instead of motor vehicles, making them
subject to the oversight by the Consumer Products Safety
Commission. And since they are used a bicycles, they should be
regulated as such with the appropriate safety standards and
comparable oversight.
On the second witness panel, Dr. Malcolm Currie, president
and CEO of Currie Technologies, will tell us how this bill
would not only help reduce air pollution and improve fitness by
encouraging bicycle use but also help the development of the
electric bike industry provide better and safer transportation
for consumers.
Testifying on flammability standards for children's
sleepwear, Dr. David Herndon, chief of staff and director of
research for Shriners Burns Hospital; and Dr. Phillip Wakelyn,
the senior scientist at the National Cotton Council, will
provide us with their views on their decision by the commission
to grant exemptions for tight-fitting and infant sleepwear
under the Flammability Fabrics Act.
The commission has examined this act several times and
determined that there was no unreasonable risk of injury
associated with single-point small open-flamed ignition of
tight-fitting cotton sleepwear. Today's witnesses will help us
determine if the commission made this determination using the
appropriate data and data analysis.
I would like to extend particular thanks on this issue to
Consumer Products Safety Commission Commissioner Moore, who
will be testifying on the first panel, for providing this
subcommittee with information and background on this
commission. All three commissioners will hopefully be able to
enlighten us as to whether we are doing what we can to keep our
children safe and protected in the way that parents can and
should support.
Today's hearing will also examine ideas for making our
amusement parks safer for consumers. In 1981, Congress amended
the Consumer Product Safety Act to transfer jurisdiction over
fixed-site amusement parks from the CPSC to the States.
Representative Markey has introduced legislation, H.R. 3032, to
return jurisdiction to the CPSC, appropriating 500,000 annually
for this task.
On our first panel, Cosumer Products Safety Commission
Chairman Ann Brown and Commissioners Mary Gall and Thomas
Moore, can hopefully help us understand what sort of resources
the commission could be able to commit to this task and what
thoughts of value the commission could add to make our parks
safer.
On the second panel we are privileged to have before us
Kathy Fackler, a cofounder of the computer software design
firm; recipient of A Point of Light Award by President Bush for
her work in child abuse prevention programs; more recently a
full time mother of two sons, one of whom was tragically
injured on a roller coaster ride in California. Kathy will talk
to us about her son's injury and her resulting efforts as a
local and national amusement ride safety activist.
Mr. John Graff, president and CEO of the International
Association of Amusement Parks and Attractions, will describe
for us the safety standards and procedures already in place at
fixed-site amusement parks and his views on whether additional
Federal regulation would complement or interfere with current
State oversight.
As you can see, all four issues are terribly important
consumer protection provisions and laws. We are pleased to have
before us today such a distinguished panel of witnesses to help
us understand and lay a foundation for potential reforms.
Now the chairman of our full committee has asked that I go
to the floor and handle the Internet bill that is on the floor,
I think under suspension, so I will have to leave in just a few
minutes, but we will take opening statements and then begin. We
will also have a visit and a presentation of views from a
colleague, Mr. Rosa DeLauro, who has a great interest in the
flammable children's sleepwear issue. Then we will hear from
our distinguished other panel.
So the Chair is now pleased in the absence of my friend,
Mr. Markey, who is on his way, to welcome the chairman of the
full committee, Mr. Bliley, for an opening statement.
Chairman Bliley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The rules of the
House of Representatives grant this committee jurisdiction over
all consumer affairs and consumer protection. Today's hearing
focuses on a number of consumer protection safety initiatives
to protect America. The first two issues will be H.R. 4145, the
Child Passenger Protection Act, and H.R. 2592, a bill to
facilitate the development of electric bicycles. I want to
congratulate Representatives John Shimkus and Jim Rogan for
their fine work on these bills.
H.R. 4145 would direct the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration to undertake new efforts to make riding safer
for children. Generally, I support efforts to protect kids; but
I recall the tragic consequences of overzealous air bag
legislation. That being said, Mr. Shimkus' bill is an excellent
starting point for directing NHTSA's efforts at keeping kids
safe.
Representative Rogan's bill, H.R. 2592, is an equally
important consumer protection initiative. Low-speed electric-
powered bicycles are currently regulated by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration as vehicles instead of as
bicycles. I pretty much think a bike is a bike and not a
motorcycle. This is a proenvironment, proconsumer bill that
simply reclassifies these electric bicycles in the appropriate
agency according to their intended use.
I hope that outside interest groups and the Consumer
Products Safety Commission will avoid the temptation to use
this bipartisan bill as a vehicle for other agendas. In
particular, it worries me when I hear that the commission
doesn't want to follow existing laws in regulating consumer
products, asking for waivers from the Consumer Products Safety
Act, the Federal Hazardous Substance Act, the National
Environmental Policy Act, and the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Act.
The General Accounting Office has already admonished the
commission for failing to use adequate data collection and
analysis in certain areas. Exempting the commission from
congressional and executive mandates for fact-finding and data
analysis would only exacerbate this problem. The commission has
made several notable improvements over the last few years in
their procedures, and I believe that they would do a fine job
overseeing electric bikes without additional waivers or
exemptions.
Today's hearing will also examine the spate of recent
deaths and injuries at fixed-site amusement parks.
Representative Markey has introduced legislation, H.R. 3032, to
return jurisdiction over fixed-site amusement parks to the
commission, appropriating $500,000 annually for this task. This
hearing will hopefully shed some light on the current safety
standards for amusement parks, whether regulation of fixed
sites is better left to the States or the commission, and
whether the commission has the resources to undertake this
task.
The last issue that will be examined by this hearing is the
decision by the commission to grant exemptions for infant
sleepwear. Today's witnesses will help us determine if the
commission made this determination using the appropriate data
and data analysis to protect our children. I thank the
witnesses for joining us today and look forward to building a
better foundation of understanding on these important consumer
protection issues. Thank you.
Mr. Rogan [presiding]. I thank the chairman of the full
committee for his comments. The Chair is pleased to recognize
our friend and colleague, Dr. Ganske, for an opening statement.
Mr. Ganske. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
holding this hearing. There will be many important issues that
will be talked about, but I particularly want to thank our
colleague, Rosa DeLauro, for being here today and for talking
about a very important issue for children's safety as it
relates to the flammability of children's sleepwear.
A couple years ago, the Consumer Product Safety Commission
changed the standards and weakened the standards of
flammability of children's sleepwear. We are going to hear
testimony today from representatives of the Shriners hospitals
about how there has been an increase in children's burns
related to easier flammability of children's sleepwear.
As a reconstructive surgeon, I have worked on many children
in the past who have been badly burned. In fact, I have worked
at the Shriners Hospital in Boston. This is, Mr. Chairman, this
is an issue that we ought to move in committee and actually get
on to the floor. I believe the changes by the Consumer Product
Safety Commission were ill-advised and we should go back to the
standards as they were a few years ago. And I am happy to
announce today that I also am going to be a cosponsor for Ms.
DeLauro's bill. With that, I will yield back.
Mr. Rogan. The Chair will recognize the gentleman from
Illinois for an opening statement.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it is a good
day for our children as we address some very important issues.
This year, I join my colleague, Senator Peter Fitzgerald on the
Senate side, to address the infant child safety seat standards
which we are going to hear, get a chance to ask questions
about. NHTSA, who has a good record of trying to protect the
public, needs to update its standards. At present, they use a
1973 bench seat of a Chevrolet Impala. They don't use side
impacts, roll-overs, rear impacts. And I appreciate the fact
that National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has come to
talk to me, and we are going to work on issues.
I think that hopefully the hearing will help hash out too a
way that we can make sure that the safety standards that we
want for all our children, that the National Highway Traffic
and Safety Administration is being a good steward of our public
funds in making sure that these are really good standards; that
we are testing them in a manner that we want our children
protected.
So I appreciate the hearing today, and I look forward to
moving this process forward. I also join my colleagues,
Congressman DeLauro and Congressman Ganske--I am very
supportive of what she is trying to do and get involved in
addressing some matters on this sleepwear issue.
I have my son here with me in the office. I was going to
bring him over as Exhibit A--but he is sleeping and not in
sleepwear because he is in his little onesie outfit--to carry
around. But he will probably migrate over here later on, and
hopefully I will have my process of testimony and questions
done before he disrupts the rest of the hearing.
As many of you know, the spouses are in town for the first
lady's luncheon, so a lot of us get to be working dads today as
we cart our children around with us. And I am looking forward
to that. I appreciate the hearing. I look forward to the panel
testimony. I yield back my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogan. The Chair thanks the gentleman from Illinois.
The Chair will recognize himself for a brief opening statement.
First, I want to thank Chairman Tauzin for calling this hearing
on these key issues of consumer product safety. As the author
of one of the bills that will be discussed here today, H.R.
2592, I especially want to thank him for his support in the
effort to promote the use of electric bicycles as an
alternative form of transportation and recreation.
This particular bill would amend the Consumer Product
Safety Act to provide that low-speed electric-bicycles are
consumer products and are not subject to the same regulations
as mopeds and motorcycles. As I think most of our colleagues
know, a legislative remedy to the current classification
problem associated with electric bikes is necessary because the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration currently
interprets the statutory definition of motor vehicles as
applying to bicycles with low-powered motors that can operate
independently of pedaling. As a result, electric bicycles are
subjected to motor vehicle requirements.
NHTSA has never indicated whether it believes that this
position represents a valid policy. Rather it has claimed that
such standards must be enforced as a requirement under the
current law.
Unfortunately, subjecting electric bicycles to motor
vehicle requirements would mean the addition of a large array
of costly and unnecessary equipment on the electric bike: brake
lights, turn signals, automotive-grade headlights, rear view
mirrors and more. These additions would restrict operating
requirements which consumers do not want. These additions would
also raise the cost of an electric bicycle by hundreds of
dollars and in many cases doubling the cost of the bike.
Predictably, such regulations also would kill the growing U.S.
market fpr electric bikes and put the U.S. Firms who
manufacture these bikes at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis
foreign companies.
H.R. 2592 is a straightforward clarification of existing
law that will help consumers and manufacturers alike. It will
promote better health, especially among seniors, by convincing
more people to ride bicycles and forego automobiles when
traveling over short distances. As a result, it should help in
the fight against air pollution. And finally, the bill would
benefit American manufacturers of electric bicycles to helping
make these bikes more palatable to consumers.
In short, it is good legislation that deserves to move
quickly through the committee process to the House floor and on
to the Senate. And once again, I want to thank Chairman Tauzin,
the chairman of the subcommittee, for his leadership.
I am now pleased to welcome and recognize for an opening
statement the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts, the
ranking member of the subcommittee.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. And thank
you for convening this hearing and thank you to Mr. Tauzin, who
I know is on the floor at this very moment. I am looking very
much forward to the statements of each of our witnesses on a
series of consumer issues related to NHTSA and to the Consumer
Product Safety Commission.
I am especially appreciative that the subcommittee has been
given the chance to consider the need for action to improve
safety at amusement park rides as the 2000 summer season
begins. It is time to close the roller coaster loophole. H.R.
3032, the National Amusement Park Ride Safety Act has been
cosponsored by 25 Members of Congress from both parties. In
addition, it has been endorsed by three of the Nation's leading
consumer safety organizations: the Consumers Union, the
Consumer Federation of America, and the U.S. Public Interest
Research Group, as well as the National Safe Kids Campaign. I
would ask that their letters of endorsement be made a part of
the hearing record at this time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogan. Without objection.
[The letters follow:]
Prepared Statement of Mary Ellen R. Fise, General Counsel, Consumer
Federation of America
Consumer Federation of America is pleased to offer its strong
support for H.R. 3032, the National Amusement Park Ride Safety Act.
This legislation closes a gaping loophole in CPSC law, which currently
prohibits the safety agency from regulating rides in fixed site
amusement parks while allowing authority over mobile rides. The
distinction does not make sense and consumers pay the price in terms of
lives lost and injuries incurred.
Fourteen states and DC have no program whatsoever to inspect rides
in fixed site amusement parks. In other states, inspections vary.
Regardless of any state authority, there is no comprehensive mechanism
for the collection of data about unsafe rides. Furthermore, no
compliance authority exists for inspection of hazardous equipment or
for the recall of unsafe or defective ride machinery. The federal
government can not set safety standards for these rides or invoke its
imminent hazard authority to seize amusement ride products which pose
imminent and unreasonable risks of death or severe personal injury.
Manufacturers, distributors and others have no obligation to report to
CPSC when they learn of an amusement ride that could injure or even
kill its patrons. Because of these gross deficiencies in consumer
protection, it is clear that for consumers visiting fixed site
amusement parks the watchwords are: ``Rider Beware!''
More than 28 deaths have occurred on rides at fixed site amusement
parks in the last 13 years and there is an increasing trend in the
number of injuries over the last several years. The National Amusement
Park Ride Safety Act will help reduce these preventable deaths and
injuries. CFA commends Representative Markey for his leadership on this
issue and strongly urges Congress to initiate work toward passage of
this important safety legislation.
______
Consumers Union
March 8, 2000
Congressman Edward Markey
House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection
2108 Rayburn Building
Washington, DC 20515-2900
Dear Congressman Markey: Consumers Union is pleased to support H.R.
3032, the National Amusement Park Ride Safety Act. This bill would
restore to the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) the
jurisdiction to investigate accidents or exercising other jurisdiction
over fixed-site amusement park rides, jurisdiction removed from the
agency in a 1981.
Consumers Union believes that the current situation, whereby the
CPSC may investigate amusement park rides that move from site to site,
but not those at a fixed site, has led to nonsensical and potentially
dangerous results. If the CPSC discovers that one manufacturer's ride
at a mobile site has a safety problem that needs to be addressed, the
CPSC can require the problem be addressed. If, however, the ride is at
a fixed site, current law prevents the CPSC from addressing an obvious
safety problem.
We agree with your statement that overall the record of amusement
parks is generally good. However, the CPSC's statistical analysis
comparing serious injuries on fixed and,mobile, sites provides
compelling evidence on the need for this legislation. The statistical
estimates show that as of the CPSC's July 1999 summary, emergency room
injuries for fixed rides increased from 2400 in 1994 to 4500 in 1998.
This compares with the lower and more steady increase for mobile rides,
with 2000 injuries in 1994 and 2100 in 1998.
This legislation also addresses the problem that 13 states have no
inspection program at all for amusement park rides. Others exempt
certain parks or certain geographical areas. The tragic deaths on
amusement park rides of four people in one week of August, for a total
of 6 deaths last year, tells us that safety is still a problem. The
CPSC should have the jurisdiction to inspect the variety of amusement
park rides across the country, develop action plans to correct defects,
require reports whenever a substantial hazard is identified, and
regardless of whether they are fixed or mobile sites, and use it's
collective knowledge to address safety problems comprehensively.
Consumers Union applauds you for introducing this bill. We look
forward to working with you to see H.R. 3032, the National Amusement
Park Ride Safety Act enacted into law.
Sincerely,
Sally Greenberg
Senior Product Safety Counsel
______
U.S. Public Interest Research Group
February 29, 2000
The Honorable Edward Markey
2108 Rayburn Building
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-2107
Dear Representative Markey: We are writing on behalf of the members
of the United States Public Interest Research Group to officially
endorse the National Amusement Park Safety Act, H.R. 3032. We applaud
your leadership in preventing future amusement park deaths and
injuries.
We believe that the Consumer Product Safety Act, which charges the
Consumer Product Safety Commission (``CPSC'') with the responsibility
of protecting the public against unreasonable risks of injuries and
deaths associated with consumer products, must give the CPSC reculatory
authority over fixed location amusement parks. Federal oversight is
crucial to the prevention of any future deaths and injuries associated
with fixed site amusement parks due to the vast variation in state laws
and the absence of any regulation in some states.
The CPSC has illustrated its ability to identify and prevent
injuries from many consumer products including mobile amusement park
rides. The National Amusement Park Ride Safety Act will grant the CPSC
the same scope of authority to protect against unreasonable risks of
harm on fixed-site rides that it currently retains for carnival rides
that are moved from site to site.
U.S. PIRG applauds your efforts to protect consumers from the
serious dangers posed by amusement park rides. We look forward to
working with you on this important safety issue.
Sincerely,
Rachel Weintraub
Staff Attorney
______
National Safe Kids Campaign
May 15, 2000
The Honorable Edward Markey
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Representative Markey: On behalf of the National SAFE KIDS
Campaign and our Chairman, former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop,
M.D., I would like to express our appreciation for your sponsorship of
H.R. 3032, the National Amusement Park Ride Safety Act.
With six fatalities at amusement park rides in 1999--the most in
any single year in more than a decade--and an estimated 9200 people
treated for ride-related injuries in hospital emergency rooms in 1998,
the time has come for Congress to close the ``roller coaster loophole''
and enable the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) to have
authority over fixed-site amusement parks. Current law allows the CPSC
to have jurisdiction over carnival rides moved from site to site, but
not rides located on permanent grounds. As states have a variety of
amusement park safety laws on the books--including 11 states with no
inspection laws whatsoever--the CPSC must be granted jurisdiction of
fixed-site amusement park rides in order for all states to benefit from
federal investigation of safety hazards.
The National Amusement Park Ride Safety Act, if passed, will help
to ensure the health and safety of our nation's most precious
resource--it's children. If the National SAFE KIDS Campaign can be of
any assistance to you, please do not hesitate to contact me or Tanya
Chin Ross, Public Policy Associate, at 202/662-0600. Thank you for your
leadership on this important safety initiative.
Sincerely,
Heather Paul, Ph.D.
Executive Director
Mr. Markey. The amusement ride safety act does not single
out this industry, quite the contrary. Our purpose is to ensure
that this industry is treated no differently than any other
industry when it comes to basic consumer safety oversight of
activity that places small children on large machines designed
to move them at high speeds.
When a child dies in a plane crash or a train wreck or a
school bus, crack Federal investigators from the National
Highway Traffic Safety Board fly to the scene, reconstruct the
accident, interview all the players, write a report, share that
report with the industry, and the public and the State
authorities and often order safety checks or repairs on similar
vehicles.
But when 8-year-old Jessica Bailey and her mother were
catapulted to their deaths in New Jersey on the side of a
roller coaster car falling backwards or when a 17-year-old from
Coney Island is crushed by the car in which he is riding, dying
from massive internal injuries, what happens? The CPSC checks
to see if the ride is a so-called ``mobile ride.'' Or if it is,
like most roller coasters, a fixed-site ride. And if it turns
out that your son or daughter was unlucky enough to get injured
or to die on a fixed-site ride, guess what? No NTSB, no
Consumer Product Safety Commission, no nothing happens here in
Washington or around the country.
As a result, the accident is never investigated by anyone
whose mission it is to share what is learned with all 50
States. And no one has the power to ensure that a repair that
is ordered in New Jersey, or New York, is also ordered on the
same rides in Florida, or Texas or California or any of the
other 49 States in the Union. That is wrong. That is not smart.
But it is the law. The industry tries to make sense of this by
suggesting that it is not like all those other activities, that
is, that when it comes to safety, it is in another league than
autos or planes or trains. But the fact is the fatality rate
per distance traveled on a roller coaster is only slightly
better than the rate in a car and worse than the rate in a
plane or a train or a bus.
So roller coasters are not in a league of their own. They
are in the same league as other activities where the Federal
safety role is unquestioned. This amusement park industry
surely does not merit immunity from Federal oversight, not when
an accident in one State could be replicated very easily in any
one of the other 49 States, but the Federal Government cannot
investigate or share that information with the other 49 States.
We seek to restore common sense Federal safety oversight to
this industry so that serious accidents are thoroughly
investigated by the CPSC and every effort is made to prevent
foreseeable tragedies from repetitioning themselves across all
50 States.
Regarding the other issues which we will consider this
morning, I want to reiterate my concern about sport utility
vehicles and roll-overs. Sport utility vehicles are twice as
likely to be involved in a deadly roll-over as the average car
on the roadway. I want to again urge NHTSA to move quickly to
develop a dynamic test for vehicle stability so that consumers
are provided the best possible information available on roll-
overs.
I also want to note that I will be introducing legislation
later this week to enhance the Consumer Product Safety
Commission's enforcement powers. This legislation will enhance
the Consumer Product Safety Commission's ability to order
companies to effectively remedy defective products and recall
such products from the marketplace. A disturbing pattern has
developed where companies are concealing their knowledge of
potentially lethal product flaws from consumers and regulators
only to be revealed after a tragedy. Eliminating the cap on
civil penalties for knowing violations of consumer product
safety laws and increasing the penalties for criminal
violations would help to correct this trend.
And finally, I want to encourage the Consumer Product
Safety Commission to look, again, at issues relating to crib
safety as well as child sleepwear safety regulations. The
testimony today from the Shriners hospitals, which treat one-
fifth of all major pediatric burn injuries in the United
States, said they have witnessed a 150 percent increase in
sleepwear-related burns since the commission adjusted its
rules, I believe, warrants a reexamination of what can be done
to help prevent infant burn injuries. I thank you, Mr.
Chairman, and I look forward to the testimony from all of our
witnesses.
Mr. Rogan. Thank the ranking member. The Chair is now
pleased to recognize our friend and colleague, the gentleman
from Florida, Mr. Stearns, for an opening statement.
Mr. Stearns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing today to examine consumer safety initiatives. And also
I appreciate the witnesses taking their time to come here and
testify. The issue before this subcommittee centers around
safety and the role of government. H.R. 4145, the Child
Passenger Protection Act, introduced by my good friend, Mr.
Shimkus from Illinois, updates Federal test standards for child
restraints to reduce the number of children killed or injured
in automobile accidents in the United States. While I commend
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in its
efforts to improve child restraints, I also believe, Mr.
Chairman, in support to determine whether the current
initiatives, the current initiatives are adequate or need
further modernization.
Furthermore, while it is essential to have the highest
standard when evaluating child restraints, it is just as vital
to utilize public information and educational efforts to teach
parents about the proper use of safety seats. So I look forward
to learning more about the initiatives in the NHTSA on child
safety seats. Additionally, we also examine flammability
standards for children's sleepwear. While the issue of
children's sleepwear standards has been before the Consumer
Product Safety Commission on previous occasions, some advocate
that such standards are not adequate in protecting children
from burn accidents and that the labeling standards for
garments need updating.
I hope to learn more about the role of the CPSC in reducing
injuries and what it is doing concerning garment safety
standards.
On another note, the legislation offered by my friend from
California, Mr. Rogan, is a common sense bill. His legislation
H.R. 2592 offers relief from the regulatory morass of the
Federal Government. This bill removes NHTSA's authority to
regulate low-speed electric bicycles by transferring regulation
to the CPSC and provides for a uniform national definition of
electric bicycles.
Regrettably, while I support bestowing the CPSC
jurisdiction over electric bicycles, I am opposed to
legislation giving the commission authority to regulate fixed
amusement parks. As rider accident statistics indicate, fixed
amusement parks are a safe form of entertainment and H.R. 4042,
the National Amusement Park Ride Safety Act, amounts to a
solution in search of a problem. There are more people injured
while bowling as compared to attendance at fixed amusement
parks. Would we advocate giving the Consumer Product Safety
Commission authority to regulate bowling balls? While no one
here advocates allowing unsafe conditions to persist, I
question whether another level of bureaucracy and Federal
regulation is absolutely necessary.
Additionally, I question the commission's regulatory
expertise in maintaining oversight safety of fixed amusement
parks. In fact, State regulations in oversight coupled with
industry's self-regulation has insured that these amusement
parks are one of the safest forms of entertainment today.
Furthermore, when compared to States, the commission by far
lacks the necessary resources to come even close to inspecting
all these amusement parks. Quite simply, safety and consumer
protection over fixed amusement parks is a task best left to
the States and to the industry itself. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogan. The Chair is now pleased to recognize our friend
and colleague from Texas, Mr. Green, for an opening statement.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
subcommittee's attention to today's legislative initiative to
design and protect and enhance the lives of our constituents. I
am long a supporter of the Consumer Product Safety Commission.
I would like to commend Chairman Brown for her continuing
efforts to protect my constituents. Her leadership and
vigilance has saved the lives of many Americans. I am also
pleased that NHTSA, the National Highway Transportation Safety
Administration, is here today to provide members with an update
on their efforts to provide safer child seats. I have two grown
children, but when they were younger my wife and I really did
not know what made one seat better that another. Is, for
example, is a $60 seat safer than a $200 seat?
I would also like to commend Mr. Markey on his legislation
we are considering today. Just as NHTSA expands significant
resources to ensure our children's safety in motor vehicles, we
need to also make sure our children are safe when they are in
amusement parks. And again I understand the concern about the
fixed facilities because I have Astro World that is close to my
district that is fixed site that offers some of the best roller
coasters in south Texas; but we also want to make sure they are
safe. And I know the State of Texas does inspect them on a
regular basis.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will submit the remainder of my
statement and yield back my time.
Mr. Rogan. Thank you. If there is no objection from the
committee members, the Chair will be pleased to accept written
statements from any members of the committee. Without objection
so ordered. The Chair thanks our friend from Texas for his
statement. The Chair is pleased to recognize our friend and
colleague from Maryland, Mr. Ehrlich, for an opening statement.
Mr. Ehrlich. In view of the children's hint, I will submit
my statement. I just want to make one quick comment with regard
to the CPSC. We have been working with representatives over the
last year--many of you know we had our first baby--and shortly
before our son was born, the commission contacted my office and
offered to host a baby safety shower in our district. We did it
and it was very, very successful.
Moreover, now that we have a 9-month-old running around,
the commission contacted us again with regard to a child safe
home inspection program. We are going to be doing that in a few
weeks. This is the way we can publicize how to make your home
safer for infants and toddlers, and I am looking forward to
that. We will probably be put to the test. I am looking forward
to that test, but this is a way we can help really move public
opinion and constituents with respect to something that impacts
our lives in a very important way. I yield back.
Mr. Rogan. The Chair thanks the gentlemen. Chair is pleased
to recognize our good friend and colleague from Minnesota, Mr.
Luther.
Mr. Luther. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will be brief as
well. I just want to say first of all that I appreciate the
subcommittee focusing on the consumer protection part of our
jurisdiction. I think it is very appropriate to have this
hearing, and I look forward to further hearings. I also want to
just say on really a personal note that I am very thankful for
the work of CPSC for developing the voluntary guidelines for
bleacher safety after a young boy in Minnesota died when
falling from a bleacher in our State. In general, I believe
that the CPSC and its current Chairwoman Brown are doing a very
excellent job responding to the needs, the public safety needs,
of our country. I look forward to Mr. Markey's bill in that I
believe that it will capitalize and expand on the commission's
proven competence in the area of product safety. Again, thank
you, Mr. Chairman, for the time and I yield back.
Mr. Rogan. Chair thanks the gentleman. The Chair is pleased
to recognize our friend and colleague from Wyoming, Mrs. Cubin,
for an opening statement.
Mrs. Cubin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you for
scheduling this very timely hearing. As a mother of two sons
and hopefully someday a grandmother, if they would just get a
girlfriend, get married and have babies, I think--I know we
have a ways to go, but we are working on it. I am.
Anyway, as a mother I really think that one of the main
thoughts that occupy a mother's mind is the safety and health
of her children. So I am very delighted we are addressing these
issues today. And of course the first one that we will be
addressing is that of protecting children by updating and
improving the standards for motor vehicle safety seats. I think
Mr. Shimkus' legislation is necessary to give the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration a push in making the
purchase and installation of proper child safety seats easier
and more consumer friendly.
The next piece of legislation we will consider today also
purports to protect children in the context of the safety of
their sleepwear. It is encumbent on this Congress to ensure
that the Consumer Protection Safety Commission is exercising
due diligence when it comes to the safety of our children's
sleepwear. If a stricter standard is necessary to protect
infant children from serious burn injuries and possibly death,
then such a standard should be adopted without hesitation. I am
confident this this panel will learn a great deal from today's
witnesses, and I do look forward to hearing from them.
Last, I want to address the issue of transferring
jurisdiction over the fixed-site amusement parks from the
States back to the Consumer Protection Safety Commission. I am
not entirely sure why this legislation is necessary since
currently 41 States already have regulatory requirements in
place. Of the nine remaining States, most of them are in the
process of enacting legislation or have few or no amusement
park facilities.
The amusement park industry currently adheres to very
strict safety standards, and statistics prove that more people
are injured doing leisurely activities than are hurt on theme
park rides. In fact, Wyoming does not have any amusement parks.
However, during the summer months, you cannot swing a golf club
without hitting a carnival in just about any direction in any
small town in the State. The Consumer Protection Safety
Commission regulates carnivals and has proven that their
jurisdiction is not necessarily a prescription for safety
because that is where the injuries have mostly occurred.
In the April 2000 issue of U.S.A. Today, an article on park
safety demonstrates that the two most tragic cases were in
carnivals over which the CPSC has had authority for a number of
years. So, Mr. Chairman, I do look forward to all the
information that we will get, and hopefully we will move
forward in a wise way.
Mr. Rogan. I thank the gentlewoman. The Chair is pleased to
recognize our friend and colleague from Ohio, Mr. Sawyer, for
an opening statement.
Mr. Sawyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will forego the
opening statement. Just let me make a couple of observations.
In Ohio, the Department of Agriculture has overseen amusement
park safety standards for a very long period of time. I
remember when that legislation was revisited some 20 years ago
in the Ohio general assembly. It was occasioned by an incident
in which a father and his daughters were riding in a ferris
wheel and the safety bar popped open, caught on the framework
of the ferris wheel, and systematically just dumped them out as
people looked on in horror.
The work that has been done since that time to improve not
only the standards of equipment but the frequency of inspection
and the skill of those who come to that task I think has been
laudable. My hope would be that while there may be room for a
national framework in this sort of undertaking, that we provide
a vehicle for the States to act in lieu of a Federal
inspection, set to Federal standards perhaps; but so that those
people who are closest to the rides, those people who are there
and in place will have the opportunity to do their job. And if
they do it to that standard that that will suffice instead of
putting together a large and duplicative national operation to
do the same thing.
With regard to child restraints and safety seats in
automobiles, I just hope that we will pay close attention when
Deputy Administrator Millman testifies this morning that we
should be careful that the legislation not specify the timing
or outcome of actions. This is an enormously complex arena and
the dynamics of automobile crashes and the consequences on
human beings are complicated almost beyond our capacity to
replicate in any way except in actual testing. So I would hope
that we would not prejudge what the outcome of that testing
should be but rather continue to encourage NHTSA to engage in a
thorough and comprehensive system of measurement of outcomes.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Rogan. The Chair thanks the gentleman. The Chair is
pleased to recognize for an opening statement our friend and
colleague from Mr. Ohio, Mr. Gillmor.
Mr. Gillmor. I don't have any.
Mr. Rogan. The Chair is even more pleased. Does the
gentlewoman from California wish to make an opening statement?
Ms. Eshoo. I thought you said ``gentleman.'' That is why I
wasn't responding. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning to
all of the members of the committee. As the title of this
hearing suggests, it is this committee's intention to protect
the vulnerable; and I salute the chairman for his leadership in
this area. I am looking forward to hearing the testimony
regarding legislation involving the safety of electric bicycles
and amusement park rights; and I am especially interested to
learn how better data can be obtained regarding the types of
injuries which occur at these large businesses.
I think the CPSC should expand the National Electronic
Injury Surveillance System to include all injuries treated in
emergency departments. I think that that would be a very
important start. Collecting data involving injury causation at
amusement parks is one place where they can begin right now. I
am chiefly concerned with the legislation H.R. 4145, the Child
Passenger Protection Act. This legislation, while well
intentioned and possessing some potentially positive
components, nevertheless, I believe, seeks to micromanage the
National Highway Traffic Administration.
The recent NHTSA administrator, Dr. Ricardo Martinez, is a
renowned emergency physician at Stanford University Hospital,
which is in my district. Over the last 6 years, Dr. Martinez
and NHTSA advanced the use and the improvement of child
passenger safety seats to an unprecedented level. NHTSA
conducted testing, created standards, and oversaw education
campaigns that were run by safety groups and funded by
automobile manufacturers. NHTSA also helped to reach hundreds
of firefighters, police officers, emergency nurses and doctors
on how to instruct parents to correctly install these seats.
And the agency succeeded in getting the President personally
involved in the rulemaking that improved the installation of
child safety seats.
Every Federal agency can improve its performance. I am
anxious to learn how NHTSA sees how they, too, can improve in
this arena. But this legislation as it is currently drafted, in
my view, does not further NHTSA's success. It institutes
unreasonable deadlines, it interferes with ongoing research and
crash testing, and it fails to adequately fund the demands it
makes of the agency. I am also concerned that the bill's
findings do not recognize the recent accomplishments of NHTSA.
NHTSA's success in this area is commendable not just in
certain aspects. Its leadership, including its supportive
groups that advocate and create safety standards, I think has
been outstanding. It is one of the true successes of this
administration.
Mr. Chairman, as we look for ways to improve upon these
successes, I hope we can find ways to provide the funding and
the guidance that will help NHTSA in its mission to improve the
safety of children. I look forward to working with the sponsors
of the legislation to accomplish this goal. And I yield back.
Mr. Rogan. I thank my colleague from California. Are there
any other opening statements from members of the subcommittee?
Hearing none, the subcommittee before we go to the first panel
of witnesses is pleased to welcome our friend and colleague
from Connecticut, Ms. DeLauro, for a brief statement.
Ms. DeLauro. Thank you very, very much, Mr. Chairman. I
want to say thank you to Chairman Tauzin and to Ranking Member
Markey for allowing me to come here this morning and to testify
on an issue that is very near and dear to my heart and that is
children's sleepwear. I also want to say thank you to the
committee members. I applaud the work of this committee and
what it does with regard to consumer safety. You really make a
difference in the lives of our families. And you are to be
congratulated. Twenty-five years ago, the Consumer Product
Safety Commission established fire standards for children's
pajamas. If the sleepwear caught fire from a small flame, it
had to self-extinguish. The reason for the standards is that
cotton fibers catch fire easily and they burn quickly. The
flames are large, and they move quickly up the body to the
face. Children injured in sleepwear burns are hurt horribly. I
didn't know this until the burn units at Bridgeport Hospital
and Yale-New Haven Hospital, St. Raphael's Hospital, and the
fire fighting community in my district invited me to come and
to watch a demonstration and to get involved in this issue.
Before the standards, an average of 60 children died every
year from burning pajamas. After the standard was adopted, the
average dropped to fewer than four per year. The standard
worked. It made sense. It kept our children safe. Then
something happened which doesn't make sense to me. Four years
ago, the Consumer Product Safety Commission changed the
flammability standard--the CPSC approved new standards that
exempted all sleepwear for infants 9 months or younger from
proven fire safety standards. They also exempted tight fitting
sleepwear in children's sizes up to 14 from the standards.
I don't understand why the CPSC would move to this weaker
standard. The older, stronger standards have proven effective
in the past and according to the National Fire Protection
Agency estimates, there would have been 10 times as many deaths
and substantially more injuries in the past 25 years if these
weaker standards had been in place. If you think of the number
of children now grown up starting families who may have had
their lives cut short or been seriously burned or injured if it
not been the tougher sleepwear standards, the number of
tragedies that have been prevented, or the number of times
firefighters didn't have to answer a call because the stronger
standards prevented a terrible tragedy.
I have high regard for the Consumer Product Safety
Commission. As so many people have indicated here this morning,
on so many issues, standards in baby strollers, toys, as well
as hundreds of other products that we have in our homes. And I
applaud the baby shower efforts and the making the homes safe
in terms of making sure that our kids are safe. The CPSC has
done a remarkable job over the years. They keep the public
informed, and they help to keep unsafe products off the market.
But on the children's sleepwear issue, I believe that they have
made a mistake.
You are going to hear from people who object to the
legislation that if parents just buy sleepwear that is tight
fitting it is more difficult for the flames to spread. That may
be true and that may sound reasonable, but I don't know parents
who go out and buy tight fitting sleepwear or other kinds of
clothing for their children. You normally buy a size bigger;
and if you are going to a baby shower, you buy a gift that is a
size bigger so that the youngster can grow into it. That is
just part of what our culture is all about.
That is why we need the tougher standards, the combination
of nonflame resistance and large sizes can be lethal. But with
a tougher standard, families can be sure they are getting the
safest product that they can get. We must make sure that the
labeling indicates that it is flame resistant or it is nonflame
resistant, if that is the case.
I join my colleague, Congressman Rob Andrews of New Jersey,
Congressman Curt Weldon of Pennsylvania, as well as the Safe
Children's Sleep Coalition, in asking the CPSC for the old
standards to be reinstated, probably the simplest legislation
my colleagues will ever see in this institution. It is let's
just go back to where we were. There is no other change.
Several members of this subcommittee, Representatives Shimkus,
Luther, Green, and Dr. Ganske, who said that he is supportive
of this morning, have joined the effort. I appreciate their
support.
This is a bipartisan coalition, that has tried to work with
the CPSC. The Commission has indicated that it did not intend
to revisit the standards until it saw proof that the number of
burned children has increased due to the change. I don't
believe they really mean that. I truly don't. We do not need to
see and have to wait for children to be burned in this country
for us to go back to a standard that was working perfectly
well. There are two accounts from the GAO that found that the
CPSC data is insufficient to determine whether the number of
burns and death for children have risen since the relaxation of
the standards in 1996. The CPSC says they don't have the data,
so it won't go back to the stronger standard. But I hear from
doctors who have seen burned children in their hospitals; they
don't need to see the data, they need to see the victims.
I apologize to the chairman. I will conclude. This is not a
partisan issue. I am proud to join in a bipartisan way with the
cosponsors of this bill. The chairman of the Fire Caucus, Curt
Weldon, is an original cosponsor. The Shriners, others have
joined forces with the fire fighting community to say let us
win an important victory for America's kids. Let's go back to
the original standard.
I encourage and I thank the subcommittee for bringing up
this issue. Let's make the improvements. We can do this, and we
can really do something to help our youngsters. I apologize to
the chairman for taking more time.
Mr. Rogan. The Chair hates to interrupt your passion.
On behalf of the subcommittee, we thank our colleague for
joining us this morning. We are now pleased to recognize and
invite to the witness table the four witnesses who will make up
our first panel of witnesses. First, Ms. Rosalyn G. Millman,
deputy administrator of the National Highway Traffic
Administration. Our second witness is the Honorable Ann Brown,
Chair of the Consumer Product Safety Commission. Our third
witness is the Honorable Mary Sheila Gall of the Consumer
Product Safety Commission. Our fourth witness is the Honorable
Thomas H. Moore, commissioner of the Consumer Product Safety
Commission.
Ladies and gentleman, welcome. For your convenience you
will notice on the front of the witness table little boxes.
When the little amber light goes on, that is the 1-minute
warning. If you could please summarize at that point.
Ms. Millman good morning you are recognized.
STATEMENTS OF ROSALYN G. MILLMAN, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION; HON. ANN BROWN, CHAIRMAN; HON. MARY SHEILA
GALL, COMMISSIONER; AND HON. THOMAS H. MOORE, COMMISSIONER,
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION
Ms. Millman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I could before I
start, I would like to introduce my guests that I have brought
with me. On my right is a 3-year-old dummy in a child safety
seat; and on the other side is our 6-year-old dummy. And that
dummy is using a booster seat.
Mr. Rogan. With their hair lines they look like relatives
of mine. Your guests are welcome.
Ms. Millman. I have here a 12-month-old dummy, and it is in
a convertible seat which can be used for both infants and
toddlers. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on H.R.
2592, an amendment to the Consumer Products Safety Act relating
to electric bicycles and H.R. 4145, the Child Passenger
Protection Act of 2000. I especially appreciate the opportunity
this hearing affords NHTSA to brief you on the agency's
comprehensive child passenger protection program. Nothing has a
higher priority for us than the safety of children. I want to
congratulate and thank Congressman Shimkus and the cosponsors
of H.R. 4145 for raising awareness about the leading killer of
children in America, motor vehicle crashes. NHTSA welcomes
their support in making this country's roads as safe as
possible.
For more than 30 years, NHTSA has been a leader in
improving motor vehicle safety for all occupants, especially
children. We currently have under way a comprehensive program
that includes research, rulemaking, and public information and
education. The attachment to my written statement describes
major activities in our child passenger protection, and with
your permission I would like to submit that for the record.
Mr. Rogan. Without objection.
Ms. Millman. Many initiatives that H.R. 4145 calls for are
parts of our program and we look forward to making it even
stronger. NHTSA will vigorously pursue these and other
initiatives until every child is safe in every vehicle. Working
with many public and private organizations, we have greatly
improved safety for children. As you can see in the chart on my
left, motor vehicle crashes killed 15 percent fewer children
ages 4 and younger in 1998 compared to 1994.
The child safety seats now on the market are very effective
when used properly. They are saving more than 300 children a
year at the current levels of use. And even though these seats
are often installed improperly, today's seats are 59 percent
effective in preventing fatalities for children ages 4 and
under. That statistic can means that 59 percent of the
unrestrained children in this age group who died in motor
vehicle crashes would be alive if they had been in a child
safety seat, even one that was installed improperly.
Sadly, not enough children are riding in appropriate
restraints. Of the 575 children ages 4 and under that motor
vehicle crashes killed in 1998, half were totally unrestrained.
Fewer than 10 percent of children ride unrestrained, up from 78
percent in 1994. Yet they accounted for half of the fatally
injured children in this age group. We must increase the use of
child safety seats to 100 percent.
Right now NHTSA is putting the finishing touches on the May
22 kick off for Operation ABC, America Buckles Up Children, our
nationwide mobilization with police and other law enforcement
officials to educate parents and caregivers and to enforce
State child safety seat and seat belt laws. Planning guides for
this campaign are in the information packets that NHTSA
provided to you. More than 7,100 law enforcement agencies
throughout the Nation participated in last year's Thanksgiving
operation ABC mobilization. I expect about that same number to
join us between May 22 and May 29 this year for outreach, child
seat check points, and enforcement waves.
While child safety seat performance can still improve, the
most promising improvement is to make seats easier to install
and adjust properly. A seat that parents and caregivers use and
use properly is by far the best protection we can provide
children. To increase proper use of child safety seats, NHTSA
issued new requirements in February 1999, for a standardized
attachment system, LATCH, Lower Anchors and Tethers for
Children, for installing child safety seats in cars, minivans,
and light trucks. On September 1, 2002, when the requirements
will apply to all new vehicles and seats, properly installing a
child restraint will be greatly simplified. NHTSA is currently
working with manufacturers and retailers to educate the public
about LATCH. This rule will save as many as 50 additional
children and prevent 3,000 injuries every year.
In February 2000, NHTSA launched a new nationwide public
information campaign, Don't Skip a Step, to educate parents
that as their children grow, their restraint needs change.
Before children are ready for adult seat belts, they should
ride in a belt-positioning booster seat for maximum protection,
as our new 6-year-old dummy in the booster seat is doing. That
is the one on my left.
Because NHTSA will not rest until every child travels
safely, today I am announcing development of a new plan to
raise child occupant protection to the next level. This plan,
which we will unveil by the end of this summer, will be the
successor to the comprehensive plan we issued in 1991 and have
been implementing since then. LATCH, the standardized
attachment system, is one result of the 1991 plan.
This new strategy will describe priority research and data
analysis, rulemaking initiatives, and expanded public
information and education opportunities. Since the beginning of
April, more than 30 NHTSA staff have been reviewing NHTSA's
current and past activities, recommendations from our February
public meeting and from the National Transportation Safety
Board, and other information to identify the activities most
likely to improve child occupant protection over the next 10
years. Today, I am further announcing new plans which include
consideration of rulemaking to ensure that child seat test
procedures are representative of actual usage conditions.
Also I can state that NHTSA is conducting research that may
lead to side impact protection performance standards for child
restraint systems. Among the outcomes of this plan, I expect to
initiate rulemaking to replace the current 9-month-old, 3-year-
old, and 6-year-old dummies with the more advanced ones that we
included in our recent advanced air bag rule. In addition,
NHTSA will evaluate an advanced 18-month-old dummy.
I assure you that NHTSA will follow through with its plans
in a manner that will achieve the goals of H.R. 4145. Many
NHTSA activities both present and planned correspond to the
initiatives that H.R. 4145 proposes. Again, I thank you for
your interest in helping parents and caregivers protect
children in motor vehicles. NHTSA welcomes the opportunity to
work with you further to develop and fund the best possible
program to improve child safety on America's roads. We will
also be glad to work with you on electric bicycles, to ensure
an appropriate transition of authority to the Consumer Product
Safety Commission. This concludes my prepared statement, and I
will be happy to answer any questions the subcommittee might
have.
[The prepared statement of Rosalyn G. Millman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rosalyn G. Millman, Deputy Administrator,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this
opportunity to testify on H.R. 2592, an amendment to the Consumer
Products Safety Act relating to electric bicycles, and H.R. 4145, the
``Child Passenger Protection Act of 2000.'' I especially appreciate the
opportunity this hearing affords NHTSA to brief you on the agency's
comprehensive child passenger protection program. Nothing has a higher
priority for us than the safety of children.
I want to congratulate and thank Congressman Shimkus and the co-
sponsors of H.R. 4145 for raising awareness about the leading killer of
children in America, motor vehicle crashes. NHTSA welcomes their
support in making this country's roads as safe as possible.
For more than 30 years, NHTSA has been a leader in improving motor
vehicle safety for all occupants, especially children. We currently
have underway a comprehensive program that includes research,
rulemaking, and public information and education. Attached to my
statement is a description of major activities in our child passenger
protection program. Many initiatives that H.R. 4145 calls for are parts
of our program and we look forward to making it even stronger. NHTSA
will vigorously pursue these and other initiatives until every child is
safe in every vehicle.
Progress in Child Motor Vehicle Safety
Working with many other public and private organizations, we have
made great progress in improving safety for children. Motor vehicle
crashes killed 12 percent fewer children ages four and younger in 1998,
compared to 1996. Of the 575 children ages four and under that motor
vehicle crashes killed in 1998, half were totally unrestrained.
Observational studies indicate that fewer than 10 percent of children
ride unrestrained, yet they accounted for half the fatally injured
children in this age group. In 1998, 91 percent of child passengers
ages four and under were riding restrained, up from 78 percent in 1994.
Our most recent analysis of fatal crashes indicates that child safety
seats, even though often installed improperly, are overall 59 percent
effective in preventing fatalities for children ages four and under. We
must increase the use of child safety seats to 100 percent.
Of the children killed despite being restrained, it is likely that
a significant percentage were not properly restrained. Either they were
in restraints that were not appropriate for their size, they were not
properly secured to the restraints, or the restraints were not properly
secured to the vehicle. Some of these children would be alive today, if
they had been properly restrained. We must ensure that all children are
not only restrained, but properly restrained.
The child safety seats now on the market are very effective when
used properly. While their performance can still improve, the most
promising improvement is to make seats easier to install and adjust
properly. A seat that parents and caregivers use, and use properly, is
by far the best protection we can give children.
Analysis of H.R. 4145
H.R. 4145 contains three major provisions. The first requires NHTSA
to consider such new rulemaking actions as dynamic tests of child
restraints that simulate an array of crash conditions, using test
dummies that simulate a greater variety of child sizes, and improving
crash protection for taller and heavier children.
While the actions described in the bill's first provision may
improve safety for children, NHTSA's is already planning activities
will accomplish the provision's goals. Today, I am announcing a set of
rulemaking and research initiatives, including rulemaking to ensure
that the test procedures in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 213
(FMVSS 213)--child safety seat requirements--accurately represent the
conditions in which the seats will be used. Further, we are conducting
research that may lead to performance standards for child restraint
systems in side impact crashes. We plan to evaluate existing data on
child restraints involved in both rear-impact and rollover crashes to
determine the feasibility of establishing test conditions simulating
these crashes.
NHTSA has made, and continues to make, significant progress in
improving test dummies to provide more realistic information. NHTSA
will initiate rulemaking to replace the current 3-month-old, 9-month-
old and 6-year-old dummies with the new, more advanced dummies included
in the recent advanced air bag rule. In addition, the agency plans to
evaluate an advanced 18-month-old dummy. When the new dummy is
validated, NHTSA will consider requiring its use in compliance tests.
NHTSA is engaged in several efforts to improve the protection of
older children, those H.R. 4145 designates as children up to 59.2
inches tall and weighing more than 50 pounds. These children have
outgrown conventional child safety seats, but are too small for adult
lap shoulder belts, unless they use a belt positioning booster seat.
NHTSA currently tests booster seats with the dummy that simulates a 6-
year-old child. To evaluate the practicability of booster seat
performance standards for a broader range of children, the agency plans
to study the feasibility of developing a test dummy that would fall
between the size and weight of the 6-year-old dummy and the 5th
percentile female dummy, which is 14 inches taller and 56.4 pounds
heavier than the 6-year-old device. In the interim, NHTSA is
considering using an existing 10-year-old European dummy that
represents children who weigh up to 100 pounds.
The second major provision of H.R. 4145 mandates that NHTSA (1)
issue rules within two years requiring manufacturers to make child
restraints that minimize head injuries in side-impact and rollover
crashes and that provide side-impact protection; (2) include a child
restraint in each vehicle crash-tested under NHTSA's New Car Assessment
Program (NCAP); (3) prescribe readily understandable text for any
required labels on child restraints; and (4) spend at least $750,000 of
its safety funds each fiscal year on crash testing child restraints.
The goals of this provision are laudable, however, at this time
legislation should not specify the timing or outcome of the actions.
Further research and public comment are needed so that NHTSA can
determine their practicability. For example, NHTSA is currently working
with the International Standards Organization (ISO) to develop an ISO
standard for child restraints. This work will enable us to determine
optimum performance criteria for improved head protection in side-
impact crashes.
Including child restraints in vehicles crash tested under the NCAP
may be feasible, although the information yielded might not be
particularly helpful to parents and caregivers trying to choose from
the vast array of vehicles and seats now on the market. The resulting
data for each test would represent only one particular child safety
seat in one particular vehicle and would not help consumers who were
considering using a particular child safety seat model in another
vehicle. However, NHTSA will include child sized dummies in some NCAP
tests to help validate these results to the current FMVSS 213 test.
H.R. 4145's third major provision requires NHTSA to rate child
restraint performance. Developing such a rating was the major topic of
discussion at NHTSA's February 2000 public meeting at which NHTSA
invited comment on such measures as improved labeling, improved test
procedures and additional test dummies. Meeting participants, including
vehicle and restraint manufacturers and others, actively debated each
of these issues. NHTSA is presently reviewing the meeting comments to
determine if a rating program is feasible and cost-effective.
Again, I thank you for your interest in helping parents and
caregivers protect their children with the introduction of H.R. 4145.
NHTSA welcomes the opportunity to work with you further to develop the
best possible program to improve child safety on America's roads.
Improvement of NHTSA Standards for Child Restraint Systems
Since NHTSA first proposed to regulate child safety seats in 1969,
NHTSA has been raising the minimum required performance standards for
motor vehicle child passenger protection. NHTSA's first child safety
seat regulation, FMVSS 213, went into effect in 1971, and dealt with
seat strength, the width and strength of webbing, the means of
attachment to the vehicle, and the use of energy-absorbing materials,
but it did not address actual performance of the seats. NHTSA issued a
new version, effective in 1981, that required seats to pass dynamic
performance requirements simulating the forces of a crash. That version
is the basis for today's standard, but NHTSA has since upgraded it.
NHTSA tests every new seat model in the year it is introduced. We
also conduct defect investigations to identify safety problems that the
standard does not directly address. In the past four years, we have
overseen 26 recalls, affecting 4.6 million seats.
We also continue to upgrade our standard in response to new data
from the field. One recent upgrade responds to an installation problem
that became evident as child safety seat installation rates grew in the
late 1980's and early 1990's. During this period, vehicle manufacturers
began to install combination lap and shoulder belts in the rear seats
of vehicles, rather than lap belts. Combination belts protect adults
better, but make installing a child safety seat more difficult.
To address this problem, in 1994, NHTSA formed an internal child
safety seat team to formulate ways to ensure the proper installation
and use of child safety seats. In 1995, NHTSA convened a panel of
experts on the subject. Likely solutions would involve changes to
vehicles so the panel included representatives from motor vehicle and
child safety seat manufacturers, academic experts, and representatives
of a broad range of safety organizations.
These efforts were the framework for the new FMVSS issued in
February 1999, requiring a single standardized attachment system, LATCH
(Lower Anchors and Tethers for Children), for installing child safety
seats in cars, minivans, and light trucks. On September 1, 2002, when
the rule applies to all new vehicles and seats, properly installing a
child restraint will be greatly simplified. Each child seat will have
two standard attachments at the base of the seat, and all new cars,
minivans, and light trucks will have standard anchors in the back seat
to link to these child seat attachments. NHTSA is currently working
with manufacturers and retailers to educate the public about LATCH. The
rule will prevent as many as 50 child motor vehicle crash deaths and
3,000 injuries every year.
Along with the FMVSS requiring LATCH, we upgraded child safety seat
minimum standards in other respects. In July 1995, NHTSA required a
greater array of sizes and weights of test dummies in compliance tests.
The new dummies represent an infant, a 9-month-old child and a 6-year-
old child. The standard previously required only a dummy representing a
3-year-old child.
We will begin rulemaking later this year to incorporate the dummies
in compliance tests for child safety seats the new dummies included in
the advanced air bag rule. In February 2000 and March 2000, NHTSA
adopted specifications for new, more advanced child test dummies
representing 12-month-old, 3-year-old, and 6-year-old children. The
improved dummies are more representative of humans than the test
dummies previously used and allow the assessment of the potential for
more types of crash injuries.
Along with improvements to FMVSS 213, NHTSA encourages
manufacturers to exceed the minimum requirements. On September 14,
1999, former Administrator Ricardo Martinez urged all child safety seat
manufacturers to increase the margin by which they comply with the
standard. A rating system would further identify seats that exceed the
minimum standards.
Public Information and Education Initiatives
In addition to rulemaking, NHTSA is continuously developing and
implementing public information and education efforts about proper use
of child safety seats. In 1996, we began Patterns for Life, a national
training and educational program to develop and maintain a community
infrastructure of child passenger safety professionals. New parents
need accurate information and technical assistance concerning child
safety seats.1 The national Patterns for Life team consists
of about 30 representatives from federal agencies and national
organizations. It identified public education needs and helped develop
NHTSA's standardized Child Passenger Safety Training Program and the
American Automobile Association's certification program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Every child under age 13 should always ride in the rear seat
and follow the four steps for proper restraint for every trip. Infants
under one year old and 20 pounds should be in rear-facing child safety
seats. Toddlers (children between one year old and 40 pounds) should
ride in forward-facing child safety seats. Children weighing between 40
pounds and about 80 pounds should use a belt positioning booster seat.
At weights above 80 pounds, most children will fit properly into lap
shoulder belts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To date, thousands of people have completed this training, and over
6,000 participants from all 50 states have been certified under the
program. These certified child passenger safety specialists have
checked for the proper installation and use of hundreds of thousands of
child safety seats at special clinics and checkpoints in every state
and territory.
NHTSA currently is developing a planning guide for states and
organizations that wish to establish permanent fitting stations--
locations within a community where parents and care givers can learn
how to install and use properly their child safety seats. We also are
working with states, local communities, and national organizations to
conduct child safety seat checkpoints in every state.
In 1997, NHTSA joined with the Air Bag and Seat Belt Safety
Campaign, an advocacy organization that some vehicle manufacturers and
insurance companies established, to support semi-annual (May and
November) mobilizations, Operation ABC (America Buckles up Children).
Operation ABC mobilizations are high-visibility nationwide efforts that
police and other enforcement officials conduct to educate parents and
care givers and to enforce state child passenger and seat belt laws. In
November 1999, more than 7,100 law enforcement agencies throughout the
nation conducted Operation ABC mobilizations.
A second ``blue ribbon panel'' of experts convened in 1998 to
recommend better ways to protect children ages 4 to 16 years old, those
too large to ride in the child safety seats designed for younger
children and who should be either riding in belt positioning booster
seats or using adult seat belts. In March 1999, the panel presented
recommendations for these children in three areas:
(1) Marketing and Public Education--Educate parents and care givers on
the importance of booster seats; generate peer programs for
increasing seat belt use among older children.
(2) Legislation and Enforcement--Close gaps in the child passenger
safety and seat belt laws that leave children ages 4 to 16
unprotected; encourage high visibility enforcement of child
passenger safety laws.
(3) Product Design and Implications--Improve booster seat design for
safety and comfort; develop recommendations for the use of
after market products.
In February 2000, NHTSA launched a new nationwide public
information campaign, Don't Skip a Step, that responds to the panel's
recommendations. We use it to educate parents that as children grow,
their restraint needs change. Before children are ready for adult seat
belts, they should ride in a belt positioning booster seat for maximum
protection.
Jurisdiction of Low-Speed Motorized Bicycles
Before closing, I want to address H.R. 2592 briefly. NHTSA agrees
that Congress should amend the Consumer Product Safety Act to provide
that low-speed motorized bicycles are consumer products subject to the
jurisdiction of the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). However,
NHTSA recommends that the Subcommittee amend H.R. 2592 to bring all
low-speed motorized bicycles within CPSC's jurisdiction, not just
electric bicycles. The legislation should focus on the low-speed
attribute of these vehicles, not on the energy source that powers them.
Conclusion
Because children cannot protect themselves, adults must make every
effort to ensure child safety. With regard to the leading killer of
children, NHTSA vigorously pursues a comprehensive program to improve
motor vehicle safety for children. Our actions, combined with those of
our partners, have saved the lives of many children. When used
properly, child safety seats provide excellent protection. But, we need
to do more. NHTSA will continue to ensure that seats achieve the
highest levels of safety and that every child passenger uses them
properly. We welcome the opportunity to work with the Subcommittee to
strengthen and fully fund initiatives on this vital issue.
ATTACHMENT
THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION'S CHILD PASSENGER
PROTECTION PROGRAM MAJOR ACTIVITIES
Rulemaking
NHTSA tests and gathers data in support of regulatory initiatives
to increase motor vehicle safety.
In July 1995, NHTSA added a greater array of sizes and weights
of test dummies to FMVSS 213 for use in compliance tests. The
dummies added included ones representing an infant, a 9-month-
old child and a 6-month-old child. The standard retained the
use of a dummy representing a 3-year-old child.
On February 15, 1997, President Clinton announced NHTSA's
proposal for a universal child safety seat attachment system.
The agency proposed that motor vehicle manufacturers provide a
new way of installing child restraints to (1) make them much
easier to install properly in motor vehicles; and (2) eliminate
incompatibility problems.
On February 27, 1999, President Clinton announced a new FMVSS
requiring a single standardized system, LATCH (Lower Anchors
and Tethers for Children), for installing child safety seats in
cars, minivans, and light trucks. The first phase of the new
system was effective on September 1, 1999. On September 1,
2002, when the rule is fully implemented, properly installing a
child restraint will be greatly simplified. All new child seats
will have three standard attachments--one on the top and two at
the base--and all new cars, minivans, and light trucks will
have standard anchors in the back seat designed to link to
these child seat attachments. NHTSA is currently working with
manufacturers and retailers to educate the public about these
improvements. We expect the rule to prevent as many as 50
deaths and 3,000 injuries of children each year.
On July 7, 1999, NHTSA issued a request for comment to help
determine whether to amend FMVSS 213 to permit child restraints
to be tethered to meet the limit on head excursion when tested
with the 6-year-old child dummy. If such an amendment is
adopted, it could facilitate introduction of child restraints
for larger children (weighing over 40 pounds) in seating
positions that have lap belts. The agency is now evaluating the
comments to determine what further action may be appropriate.
On September 14, 1999, NHTSA sent a letter to all child safety
seat manufacturers, urging them to manufacture child seats so
that they ``perform well beyond the minimum requirements of our
standard,'' and pointing out that, with the safety of our
nation's children at issue, mere compliance with the standard's
minimum requirements is insufficient. The letter further stated
that NHTSA planned to schedule a meeting to discuss ways to
maximize the safe transportation of children and the
possibility of creating a system to rate the relative
performance of child restraints.
On February 9, 2000, NHTSA convened a public meeting to
discuss the issues set out in NHTSA's September 1999 letter.
Speakers at the meeting, including manufacturers and other
interested parties, and those who commented on the notice that
announced the meeting, raised a number of issues and offered
varying viewpoints on the merits of a rating for child seats.
Also, suggestions were made for future rulemaking, such as
improved labeling, new test dummies, and changes to the
existing test procedure for child restraints.
NHTSA is currently reviewing the record of the public meeting and
is developing an agency-wide action plan to respond to the
issues raised and related matters. We expect to complete this
plan by late summer of 2000.
In February and March 2000, NHTSA adopted new, more advanced
child test dummies representing 12-month-old, and 3-year-old
and 6-year-old children. The new dummies are more
representative of humans than the existing test dummies and
allow assessment of the potential for more types of injuries in
automotive crashes. NHTSA will initiate rulemaking in the near
future to incorporate use of these dummies into child safety
seat compliance tests.
Research and Development
NHTSA's research and development program covers the full range of
motor vehicle safety issues.
In 1996, NHTSA published the first national study on the types
of misuse of child safety seats. This study showed that about
80 percent of child safety seats are used incorrectly and that
only 6 percent of children of booster seat age ride in a
booster seat.
In 1999, NHTSA began its initial evaluation of the interaction
of seat-mounted and door-mounted side air bags with various
types of child restraint systems.
In 2000, NHTSA began research to identify potentially
effective interventions to address the problem of children
moving prematurely from child safety seats to adult seat belts.
Also in 2000, the agency plans to assess LATCH.
Enforcement
NHTSA's Vehicle Safety Compliance Program ensures that motor
vehicles and motor vehicle equipment, such as child safety seats,
provide the safety benefits intended by the agency's federal motor
vehicle safety standards. NHTSA's Defects Investigation Program
identifies and removes motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment that
contain safety-related defects from interstate commerce.
From 1996 to the present, NHTSA has conducted compliance tests
on 360 models of child safety seats (63 models of booster seats
and 238 other safety seat models). Twenty-three recalls have
been conducted since 1996, involving about 4.7 million child
safety seats. NHTSA has monitored each recall to ensure that
consumers were notified, and that the scope and remedy of each
recall was adequate and timely.
Through NHTSA's toll-free Auto Safety Hotline (1-888-DASH-2-
DOT) or web site--www.nhtsa.dot.gov/hotline--parents and others
report defective child restraints and seat belts to the agency.
Through NHTSA's web site, consumers also may access extensive
information on the correct use of child restraints.
Public Information, Education and Training
Public information, education and training are integral to all of
NHTSA's programs. In particular, NHTSA devotes considerable resources
to working with the states and communities and the private sector to
promote child safety education and enforcement efforts that increase
the correct installation and correct use of these life-saving systems.
On October 25, 1995, NHTSA issued a public warning that urged
parents, in the strongest possible terms, to insist that their
children ride in an appropriate restraint in the back seat
whenever possible.
In 1996, NHTSA started Patterns for Life, a national training
and educational initiative to develop and maintain a community
infrastructure of child passenger safety professionals
throughout the nation. New parents need accurate information
and technical assistance concerning child safety
seats.1 The national Patterns for Life team consists
of about 30 representatives from federal agencies and national
organizations. The Team identified public education needs and
assisted in the development of the NHTSA Standardized Child
Passenger Safety Training Program and the American Automobile
Association (AAA) certification program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Every child under age 13 should always ride in the rear seat
and follow the four steps for proper restraint for every trip. Infants
under one year old should be in rear-facing child safety seats.
Toddlers (children between one year old and 40 pounds) should ride in
forward-facing child safety seats. Children weighing between 40 pounds
and about 80 pounds should use a belt positioning booster seat. At
weights above 80 pounds, children will fit properly into lap shoulder
belts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To date, thousands of people have completed this training and
over 6,000 participants from all 50 states have been certified
under the program. These certified specialists in child
passenger safety have checked for the proper installation and
use of hundreds of thousands of child safety seats at special
clinics and checkpoints in every state and territory.
NHTSA currently is developing a planning guide for states and
organizations that wish to establish permanent fitting
stations--locations within a community where parents and care
givers can learn how to install and use properly their child
safety seats. We also are working with states, local
communities, and national organizations to conduct child safety
seat checkpoints in every state.
On January 23, 1997, President Clinton directed Secretary
Slater to prepare a plan to increase the use of seat belts
nationwide. To carry out this directive, DOT established the
BuckleUp America (BUA) campaign. NHTSA coordinates the
Department's BUA campaign, which required the agency to
implement each of four elements of the President's initiative:
partnerships, legislation, enforcement, and education.
In 1997, as part of NHTSA's comprehensive plan to share vital
information directly with the public on correct child safety
seat use and positioning, the agency announced a new computer
database for parents and care givers to determine whether a
particular child safety seat will fit into a particular make
and model of vehicle. The database program, launched with the
National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA), contains
specifications for child seats manufactured since 1989.
In 1997, NHTSA launched ``Safety City,'' a web site
(www.nhtsa.dot.gov/kids) that provides children with
interactive web pages containing sophisticated graphics about
all facets of highway safety. Child safety seat information is
included on this site.
Beginning in 1997, NHTSA joined with the Air Bag and Seat Belt
Safety Campaign to support the semi-annual (May and November)
Operation America Buckles Up Children (ABC) mobilizations.
Operation ABC mobilizations are high-visibility nationwide
efforts that police and other enforcement officials conduct to
educate parents and care givers and to enforce state child
passenger and seat belt laws. In November 1999, more than 7,100
law enforcement agencies throughout the nation conducted
Operation ABC mobilizations to enforce child safety seat and
seat belt laws.
On November 19, 1998, Secretary Slater, together with NHTSA
officials, convened a second ``blue ribbon panel'' of experts
to recommend ways that children ages 4 to16 years old can be
better protected in motor vehicles. On March 15, 1999, the
panel presented its recommendations for these older children in
the following three areas:
(1) Marketing and Public Education: Educate parents and care givers
on the importance of booster seats; generate peer programs
for increasing seat belt use among older children.
(2) Legislation and Enforcement: Close gaps in child passenger
safety laws and seat belt laws, as these laws often leave
children ages 4 to 16 unprotected; encourage high
visibility enforcement of child passenger safety laws.
(3) Product Design and Implications: Improve booster seat design
for safety and comfort; develop recommendations for the use
of after market products, some of which currently have no
safety performance standards for their use yet are designed
to improve safety belt fit.
In 1999, NHTSA awarded nearly $1 million for 21 cooperative
Buckle Up America (BUA) agreements with organizations that
support child safety seat education and public information
efforts.
In 1999, in partnership with the Automotive Coalition for
Traffic Safety (ACTS), NHTSA initiated a program of periodic
meetings with child restraint manufacturers, vehicle
manufacturers, and associated retailers to share information
and collaborate on the best ways to educate the public about
child passenger safety issues.
In 1999, NHTSA established the Child Passenger Safety Board as
an authoritative body to monitor and provide program and
technical guidance in matters pertaining to the NHTSA
Standardized Child Passenger Safety Training Program and the
American Automobile Association's (AAA) related certification
program. Board members include representatives of national
organizations that have played a role in standardizing child
passenger training.
In September 1999, to increase booster seat use for children
ages 4 to 8 and seat belt use among children ages 8 to 16,
NHTSA awarded a total of $500,000 to six states 2
for pilot and demonstration programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Arizona, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Texas, and
Washington.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On February 14, 2000, NHTSA awarded $7.5 million to 47 states
and the territories under the Child Passenger Protection
Education Grant Program (section 2003(b) of the Transportation
Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21)). The grant program
supports state efforts to develop and implement occupant
protection educational outreach programs for children up to age
16, to promote proper child restraint use (including booster
seats), and to train child passenger safety personnel on proper
restraint use. NHTSA has encouraged states to use these funds
to target minority and rural populations, and children with
special health care needs.
On February 14, 2000, Secretary Slater launched NHTSA's Don't
Skip a Step national booster seat campaign to educate parents
about the risks of improperly positioned adult seat belts and
the effectiveness of belt positioning booster seats.
Mr. Tauzin. Thank you, Ms. Millman.
The Chair wishes also to thank Congressman Rogan for his
stewardship of the committee while I was on the floor. I am
pleased to report, by the way, to the committee the House has
just adopted our Internet Access Charge Protection Act,
ensuring that per-minute charges for use of the Internet for
data services will never be assessed against individuals who
use the Internet. And that bill now goes on to the Senate,
hopefully, where the Senate will concur in the wisdom of the
House.
The Chair is now pleased to welcome the Honorable Ann
Brown, the Chair of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, for
your testimony. Ms. Brown.
STATEMENT OF HON. ANN BROWN
Ms. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and
members of the subcommittee, I am Ann Brown, chairman of the
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission. With me today are Vice
Chairman Mary Sheila Gall, Commissioner Thomas H Moore, and
members of the commission staff.
Before I begin my statement, I want to call to the
subcommittee's attention the amendments to our statutes that
President Clinton proposed to the Congress last Friday.
Briefly, these amendments would strengthen our enforcement
authority by removing the cap on civil penalties when
manufacturers fail to report substantial product hazards to us
as required by current law, making it a felony rather than a
misdemeanor to violate our statutes in a knowing and willful
manner, and provide a more effective remedy for consumers when
a product contains a substantial hazard. The commission voted
two to one to endorse these amendments, and I hope this
subcommittee will favorably consider them next year.
There are four subjects for our agenda today, and I will
address each of them in turn. The CPSC and the National Highway
Traffic and Safety Administration, NHTSA, share jurisdiction
over infant car seats which often serve as a carrier for a
child when a seat is removed from the car. It is our
responsibility to ensure the safety of these products when they
are taken from the car and used as an infant carrier.
In the past 2 years, we have recalled more than 2.1 million
defective car seat carriers from three different manufacturers.
Typically, the defect involved the sudden release of the handle
of the carrier, thereby allowing the child to pitch forward
onto the ground. I am pleased to tell you that each of these
recalls was carried out in a cooperative manner with the NHTSA.
Electric bicycle manufacturers are caught in a regulatory
trap between the NHTSA and CPSC. While their products meet the
strict definition of motor vehicle under the law, the
manufacturers could not comply with the safety regulations that
apply to such vehicles. Moreover, NHTSA has no desire to
regulate these electric bicycles. CPSC is willing to undertake
this responsibility, provided we can do it in an effective and
efficient manner.
Mr. Chairman, I believe the best course here is for our
staff to work with your staff and interested members to draft
legislation that the committee could promptly approve. If that
is acceptable to you, I am ready to move forward quickly.
On September 9, 1996, the Commission issued amendments to
the standards for children's sleepwear excluding garments sized
for infants 9 months or younger and tight fighting garments for
young children above that age. I dissented. I believe that the
original children's sleepwear standard was instrumental in
reducing burn-related deaths and injuries related to flammable
sleepwear.
The standard was straightforward and simple. It provided a
high level of protection for children by requiring fabrics used
in children's sleepwear to self-extinguish when exposed to a
small open flame. The regulation was working well. The long-
standing standard is credited with saving many lives and
preventing countless burn-related injuries. As I have said
repeatedly, my overriding concern is to keep our children safe.
I have seen nothing that has caused me to change my position.
Over the past several years, our staff has spent a great deal
of time on this issue. Each Commissioner and their personal
staffs have done the same.
The situation at the Commission is rigid. There will be no
movement. We have heard from thousands of people on both sides
of the issue. We have carefully considered all aspects of the
issue. The heavy expenditure of resources has been appropriate
because this is a very important safety issue. However, this is
not the only safety issue confronting the commission. I believe
it is now time to move on lest in our vigorous attention to
this sleepwear question we begin to spend less time on and pull
resources away from other critical safety problems. For now, we
turn the issue back to you. If the Congress repeals the current
rules and directs us to return to the prior standard, we will
carry out your direction faithfully.
I would now like to turn to amusement park rides. The most
tragic news the Commission receives is the death of a consumer,
especially a child, particularly when that death is
preventable. In 1998, seven people died on these rides, the
most in any single year in more than a decade. Today, we have
no jurisdiction over fixed-site rides. As a result, the amount
of consumer protection a rider receives depends on an
irrelevant factor, whether it is a fixed site or a mobile ride.
Currently, 11 States have no inspection laws, 13 States have no
laws requiring operators to report injuries, and others have a
patchwork of inconsistent regulations. I believe this is a
situation that requires uniform regulatory oversight so that
all amusement park riders will receive equal protection, no
matter whether the ride is at a fixed or mobile site.
Accordingly, I support Congressman Markey's bill H.R. 3032.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement on the four subjects
on our agenda today. As always, I am pleased to work with you
and the members of your subcommittee; and I am ready to answer
any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Ann Brown follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ann Brown, Chairman, U.S. Consumer Product
Safety Commission
Mr. Chairman, and members of the Subcommittee, I am Ann Brown,
Chairman of the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). With me
today are Vice Chairman Mary Sheila Gall, Commissioner Thomas H. Moore,
and members of the Commission staff.
Before I begin my statement, I want to call the Subcommittee's
attention to the amendments to our statutes that President Clinton
proposed to the Congress last Friday. Briefly, these amendments would
strengthen our enforcement authority by removing the cap on civil
penalties when manufacturers fail to report substantial product hazards
to us, as required by current law, make it a felony, rather than a
misdemeanor, to violate our statutes in a ``knowing and willful''
manner and provide a more effective remedy for consumers, where a
product does contain a substantial hazard. I support these amendments
and hope the Subcommittee will favorably consider them next year.
WHAT WE DO, AND HOW WE DO IT
Since this is my first appearance before you in more than two and a
half years, and many members are probably not familiar with our
activities, I want to describe briefly who we are, what we do and how
we do it.
The Commission was established in 1973, by President Nixon as a
five, now three, member independent agency. We enforce five federal
statutes: the Consumer Product Safety Act, the Flammable Fabrics Act,
the Poison Prevention Packaging Act, the Federal Hazardous Substances
Act and the Refrigerator Safety Act. All told, we have jurisdiction
over 15,000 different kinds of consumer products, which are found, in
and around the home, schools and recreation areas.
Our mission is simple and non-partisan: preventing deaths and
injuries to children and families from hazardous consumer products. I
prefer to work cooperatively with companies, rather than using
compulsory means, whenever possible. I favor market-oriented solutions
to product safety problems. The paradigm for the CPSC is the product
safety triangle, where business, consumers and government each have an
equal role to play.
INFANT CAR SEATS/CARRIERS
The CPSC and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) share jurisdiction over infant car seats, which often serve as
a carrier for a child, when the seat is removed from the car. It is our
responsibility to assure the safety of these products when they are
taken from the car and used as an infant carrier. In the past two
years, we have recalled more than 2.1 million defective car seats/
carriers from three different manufacturers. Typically, the defect
involved the sudden release of the handle of the carrier, thereby
allowing the child to pitch forward onto the ground. I am pleased to
tell you that each of these recalls was carried out in a very
cooperative manner with the NHTSA.
ELECTRIC BICYCLES
Electric bicycle manufacturers are caught in a regulatory trap
between the NHTSA and CPSC. While their products meet the strict
definition of ``motor vehicle'' under Title 49 Section 30102(a), the
manufacturers could not comply with the safety regulations that apply
to such vehicles. Moreover, NHTSA has no desire to regulate these
electric bicycles. CPSC is willing to undertake this responsibility,
provided we can do it in an efficient manner.
Accordingly, I support the intent of Congressman Rogan's bill, but
our staff has several technical problems with the provisions of the
bill as currently drafted. Last year CPSC and NHTSA staffs developed a
bill that I believe is a better approach to resolving this
jurisdictional matter. It is modeled on the bicycle helmet standard
legislation that this Committee and the Congress enacted as part of the
1994 amendments to the Consumer Product Safety Act.
Mr. Chairman, I believe the best course here is for our staff to
work with your staff and interested Members to draft legislation that
the Committee could promptly approve. If this is acceptable to you, I
am ready to move forward quickly.
CHILDREN'S SLEEPWEAR REGULATION
On September 9, 1996, the Commission issued amendments to the
standard for children's sleepwear excluding garments sized for infants
nine months or younger, and tight fitting garments for young children
above that age. 61 F.R. 47634. I dissented.
Thereafter, certain Members and organizations began urging repeal
of the amended rules and a return to the prior standard. They persuaded
the conferees on our FY 1999 appropriation to include a provision
requiring the CPSC to propose for public comment a revocation of the
1996 amendments, and to promulgate a final rule on the sleepwear
standard by July 1, 1999. On June 16, 1999, the Commission voted 2-1 to
reaffirm the 1996 amendments. I again dissented. I ask unanimous
consent that my statement of June 16, 1999, on this issue be included
in the hearing record following my testimony.
I believe that the original children's sleepwear standard was
instrumental in reducing burn-related deaths and injuries related to
flammable sleepwear. The standard was straightforward and simple. It
provided a high level of protection for children by requiring fabrics
used in children's sleepwear to self-extinguish when exposed to a small
open flame. The regulation was working well. This longstanding standard
is credited with saving many lives and preventing countless burn-
related injuries. As I have said repeatedly, my overriding concern is
to keep our children safe. I have seen nothing that has caused me to
change my position.
I am also not convinced that parents will purchase the correct size
of tight-fitting sleepwear so their children will not be at risk. There
also is nothing in the record to demonstrate that the availability of
this tight-fitting cotton alternative has reduced the use of looser
cotton clothing such as cotton T-shirts, for sleepwear. Finally, our
enforcement problems continue.
Over the past several years, our staff has spent a great deal of
time on this issue. Each Commissioner and their personal staffs have
done the same. Our positions are rigidly held. We have heard from
thousands of people on both sides of the issue. We have carefully
considered all aspects of the issue. This heavy expenditure of
resources has been appropriate, because this is a very important safety
issue. However, this is not the only safety issue confronting the
Commission.
I believe it is now time to move on, lest, in our vigorous
attention to this sleepwear question, we begin to spend less time on,
and pull resources away from, other critical safety problems.
For now, we turn the issue back to you. If the Congress repeals the
current rules and directs us to return to the prior standard, we will
carry out your direction faithfully.
I ask unanimous consent to include in the record a copy of the July
27, 1999, letter to all Appropriations Committee Members signed by all
three Commissioners asking the Committee not to require further
expenditure of resources on this subject.
AMUSEMENT PARK RIDES
I would now like to turn to amusement park rides. The most tragic
news the Commission receives is the death of a consumer, especially a
child--particularly when that death could have been avoided.
We all know roller coasters, and other amusement park rides, are
fun, fast and thrilling. They are supposed to create the illusion of
danger, without putting riders at risk.
But the number of deaths tell a different story. In 1998, seven
people died on these rides--the most in any single year in a decade.
Until the 1981 amendments to our statute, CPSC had jurisdiction
over both fixed site and mobile rides. Now we can obtain a corrective
action from a manufacturer, distributor or ride operator only if a
mobile ride presents a significant hazard. In fact, last year, CPSC and
Reverchon Industries announced the recall of the Himalaya ride that
caused two deaths and three injuries.
Today we have no jurisdiction over fixed-site rides. As a result,
the amount of consumer protection a rider receives depends on an
irrelevant factor, whether it is a fixed site or mobile ride.
Currently, 11 states have no inspection laws, 13 states have no laws
requiring operators to report injuries, and the others have a patchwork
of inconsistent regulations.
I believe this is a situation that requires uniform regulatory
oversight, so that all amusement park riders will receive equal
protection no matter whether the ride is at a fixed or mobile site.
Accordingly, I support Congressman Markey's bill, H.R. 3032.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement on the four subjects on
our agenda today. As always, I am pleased to work with you and the
Members of your Subcommittee. I am ready to answer any questions you
may have.
______
STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN ANN BROWN
DECISION ON REVOCATION OF AMENDMENTS TO CHILDREN'S SLEEPWEAR STANDARD
June 16, 1999
I regret that I must differ from my fellow Commissioners today in
voting against the motion to withdraw the proposal to revoke the 1996
amendments to the Children's sleepwear standard.
I believe that the original children's sleepwear standard was
instrumental in reducing burn-related deaths and injuries related to
flammable sleepwear. The standard was straightforward and simple. It
provided a high level of protection for children by requiring fabrics
used in children's sleepwear to self-extinguish when exposed to a small
open flame. The regulation was working well. This longstanding standard
is credited with saving many lives and preventing countless burn-
related injuries.
I voted against the 1996 amendments because I could not agree that
the amendments would improve enforcement of the sleepwear standard or
that 6-month-old infants were necessarily immobile. I also was
skeptical of a promise by the sleepwear industry that it would
implement an aggressive information and education program.
As I have said time and time again, my overriding concern
throughout this entire process is the mission of our agency to keep our
children safe. I have seen nothing to date in the oral or written
testimony that has changed my original position. A compelling case has
not been made to me that infants who are capable of wearing age 9
months sleepwear are not capable of moving to a dangerous ignition
source.
I am also not convinced that parents will purchase the correct size
of tight-fitting sleepwear so their children will not be at risk. There
also is nothing in the record to demonstrate that the availability of
this tight-fitting cotton alternative has reduced the use of looser
cotton clothing such as cotton T-shirts, for sleepwear. Finally, our
enforcement problems continue.
In addition, the industry has not fulfilled its promise to
implement an effective information and education campaign. Although
about three-fourths of the stores had hangtags, the GAO report
evaluating the industry effort concluded that only 16 percent of stores
visited displayed either consumer education brochures or signs about
sleepwear safety requirements. And now, industry blames the Commission
for its own spotty efforts.
In 1996, I said that changing the old standard created an
environment that may put our children at greater risk for burn-related
injuries and death. Even though our data sources have not disclosed any
specific burn cases directly tied to the 1996 standard, I cannot in
good conscience support a sleepwear standard that I believe may provide
less protection for the Nation's children.
I abstained from voting on the staff proposal to require labeling
of tight-fitting garments. While I have supported certain labeling
requirements in the past, and will support them on a case-by-case basis
in the future, I do not believe labeling is sufficient in this case. I
believe that whenever possible, safety should be built into the
product--that is, in this case, the garments themselves should
inherently resist ignition, rather than relying on the purchasing
decisions of parents. While I recognize that the proposed labeling
provisions will improve the standard somewhat, they do not go far
enough in my view.
I wish to make one other point. Over the past several years, our
staff has spent a great deal of time on this issue. Each Commissioner
and their personal staffs have done the same. We have heard from
thousands of people on both sides of the issue. We have carefully
considered all aspects of the issue. This heavy expenditure of
resources has been appropriate, because this is a very important safety
issue. But this is not the only safety issue confronting the
Commission.
And I believe it is now time to move on, lest, in our vigorous
attention to this sleepwear question, we begin to spend less time on,
and pull resources away from, other critical safety problems.
Therefore, while I have not agreed with my fellow Commissioners on this
issue, the issue has been decided and we now need to turn our attention
to other important safety issues.
______
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
Washington, D.C.
July 27, 1999
The Honorable James T. Walsh
Chairman
Subcommittee on VA, HUD and Independent Agencies
U.S. House of Representatives
2351 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman: As you may know, on June 28, 1999, the U.S.
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) voted 2-1 to uphold the 1996
amendments to the children's sleepwear standards. Commissioners Moore
and Gall voted to maintain the 1996 amendments and Chairman Brown voted
to reinstate the original standard. Despite our continuing difference
of opinion on the merits of the changes to the sleepwear standards, we
are writing to you to express our unanimous opposition to any
amendments to CPSC's appropriations legislation on children's
sleepwear.
CPSC has already considered the sleepwear issue twice, spending
approximately 7 years altogether on the issue. During the recent
reconsideration of the amendments, mandated by our 1999 appropriations
legislation, the General Accounting office (GAO), completed two studies
on the effect and implementation of the amendments. After carefully
considering the GAO studies, additional technical data compiled by CPSC
staff, and extensive comments from a public hearing where all views
were heard, the Commission's 2-1 vote in favor of the amendments did
not change.
Given this thorough review, we do not believe that requiring the
Commission to spend more time on this issue will lead to a different
decision by the Commission. If the Commission has to allocate any of
its limited resources on yet another study of children's sleepwear, the
agency will have less time and money to investigate critical safety
issues that threaten American children and families.
If you or your staff have any questions about this, please call Bob
Wager, Office of Congressional Relations; at 301-504-0515. Thank you
for your consideration.
Sincerely,
Ann Brown
Chairman
Mary Sheila Gall
Vice Chairman
Thomas H. Moore
Commissioner
cc: Appropriations Committee Members
Mr. Tauzin. Thank you Madam Chair.
The Chair is now pleased to welcome the Honorable Mary
Sheila Gall, the vice chairman of the Consumer Product Safety
Commission. Ms. Gall.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARY SHEILA GALL
Ms. Gall. Good morning and thank you for the opportunity to
be here today. I have a statement for the record, but I will
spare all of us the reading of it.
Mr. Tauzin. Without objection, if it has not been done yet,
written statements are automatically a part of our record.
Ms. Gall. There are a number of issues that relate to the
Consumer Product Safety Commission, and I will touch upon those
just briefly. We have Representative Markey's fixed-site
amusement rides proposal, which would give CPSC jurisdiction
over fixed-site amusement rides. The commission has not taken a
formal position on this legislation as of this date. There are
a number of issues that I think we need to address as we look
at this legislation from the aspect of Congress as well as the
commission.
We have seen in the last year or so, as Chairman Brown has
noted, that there has been an increase in injuries and deaths
in fixed-site amusement park rides. We don't have the exposure
data, however, that will tell us whether or not the increase is
due to more people attending amusement parks, and increasing
the number of rides that they go on, or if this is an increase
in the hazard of the ride itself. So I think that is something
we need to take a look at.
The second thing is that we have a number of other factors
to study. First of all, we know that we have State regulation
in many of the States. We know some States do not have fixed
rides. And so obviously they won't have State regulation. I
think we really need to take a stronger look at that. We know
some legislation or regulation exist, but we need to look at
that further. We know there are some voluntary standards
through ASTM. We also know that ASTM is looking at the issue
over G forces, not only the number of G forces, the increase of
the force, but also at the extent of time that an individual is
exposed to that G force. So that is being looked at by the
voluntary standards community. We also know that there are
tough insurance requirements for these fixed-ride parks. And so
we need to look at that further and see what the implications
are for safety as far as that is concerned.
I will say this: much as we all like to think that the
Federal jurisdiction over an issue gives us a magic bullet to
address safety, that isn't always the case. Certainly at CPSC
we acknowledge that despite our jurisdiction we do have 22,000
deaths per year associated with products that come under our
jurisdiction; and NHTSA, of course, has 40,000 deaths a year
associated with motor vehicles despite their best efforts. So
it is not necessarily a magic bullet.
The resources issue is something I think we need to
address. The bill that we have before us would give the agency
$500,000; and I think that is clearly inadequate. If we are
going to take on this task, we will need more money to do so.
These are very complex rides and would require travel money and
so on.
Moving on to electric bikes with Representative Rogan's
legislation, I think that bringing electric bikes to the
commission is a natural progression and that we already have
regulations for bicycles. I note that the Chairman mentioned
that she would like to work with the committee to develop a
proposal. And I know that CPSC staff has submitted a proposal.
I am very much opposed to the CPSC staff proposal. It's not a
simple clear cut bill giving us jurisdiction the way
Congressman Rogan's bill is. It really takes a dramatic
departure and bypasses from the normal rulemaking process, and
I disagree with that strongly.
As far as sleepwear is concerned, I know that this is a
very controversial issue. The hazard that the sleepwear
amendments were designed to address is single-point small open
flame ignition such as matches or cigarette lighters. It is not
meant to address whole-house fires because there is very little
we can do for someone in a whole-house fire. The flame-
resistant clothing is really the last line of defense. We have
to count on parents and caregivers to make sure that ignition
sources are kept away from children as well. And the agency has
been very active in designing and regulating child-resistant
cigarette lighters and multipurpose lighters toward that goal
of increased safety.
I voted for the amendments that were made in 1996. They
provided for a tight fitting cotton alternative to flame-
resistant sleepwear. It does exempt garments for infants sized
under 9 months. There is a great deal of confusion that we face
all the time. These are children who are 6 months or under, who
are very unlikely to come into contact with cigarette lighters
or matches. When we look at the market factors, we realize that
there is a very clear desire for consumers to put their
children in cotton fabrics; and so what we did was provide a
safe alternative. You are given the experience we have. Given
the data we looked at and the studies we undertook, we have
done a good job in providing that safe alternative.
The Chairman did mention the Consumer Product Safety
Commission Enhanced Enforcement Act of 2000 that was announced
at the White House last week. Although I realize that is not a
matter before the committee today, I would just briefly like to
say that I disagree with the provisions of that bill, with one
exception, and I would be happy to comment on that if the
opportunity arises and anyone would like to follow up. So I
thank you very much for your time.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Mary Sheila Gall follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Mary Sheila Gall, Commissioner, Consumer
Product Safety Commission
I appreciate the opportunity to appear today before the
Subcommittee to address three topics: (1) flammability requirements of
children's sleepwear; (2) the potential exercise of jurisdiction by the
Commission over fixed-site amusement parks; and (3) the potential
exercise of jurisdiction by the Commission over bicycles equipped with
small electric motors. The hearing today also considers standards for
child restraints in motor vehicles, products regulated not by the
Commission, but by the National Highway Transportation Safety
Administration (NHTSA). I would also like to take this opportunity to
state my position on draft legislation, sponsored by Senator Hollings
and Congressman Markey, which was the subject of a press event in the
White House last Friday, and which amends the enforcement sections of
some of the statutes administered by the Commission. I realize that
this legislation is not the explicit subject of today's hearing, but it
will be referred to this Committee and Subcommittee for consideration.
FLAMMABILITY REQUIREMENTS OF CHILDREN'S SLEEPWEAR
Background
Flammability requirements for children's sleepwear are governed by
regulations promulgated under the authority of the Flammable Fabrics
Act. The Commission amended the regulations in 1996 to require that
sleepwear for children be either tight fitting or constructed of flame-
resistant fabric that passes a burn-rate test in which a small open
flame is applied for three seconds. Sleepwear for infants sized under
nine months is exempted from the standard. (Such sleepwear is typically
worn by infants aged six months and younger.) Before the amendments,
all children's sleepwear had to be constructed of fabric that passed a
burn-rate test that exceeded the general wearing apparel flammability
standard.
The Commission based its 1996 amendments to the regulations on an
extensive record that documented that the hazard associated with
single-point, small open-flame ignition of tight-fitting cotton
sleepwear was very low. Tight-fitting cotton sleepwear is less likely
to be ignited in the first place, and, if ignited, it burns slowly,
since its proximity to the skin retards the flow of air that feeds the
fire and the skin acts as a ``heat sink'' to slow the spread of flame.
Infants wearing sleepwear sized nine months or smaller lack the ability
to move to ignition sources.
When it acted, the Commission had the benefit of observing the
results of a stay of enforcement, in effect for nearly four years, that
permitted the sale of tight-fitting children's sleepwear without an
increase in burn injuries resulting from single-point ignition. The
Commission also observed a Canadian study that proved unable to find
incidents of injuries as a result of single-point ignition of tight-
fitting cotton sleepwear. Both the stay of enforcement and the Canadian
standard permitted the sale of sleepwear that had a looser fit than the
requirements of the present regulations. The Commission's record at the
time that it acted was well developed and proved that there was no
unreasonable risk of injury associated with single-point, small open-
flame ignition of tight-fitting cotton sleepwear. There was no
challenge to the Commission's decision in court and I have seen no
evidence since the time of the decision to indicate that burn injuries
associated with single-point ignition of tight-fitting children's
cotton sleepwear have increased or represent a significant problem. The
opponents of the regulatory changes have, however, sought to overturn
them through legislation that falls within the jurisdiction of this
Subcommittee.
Reflections on Preventing Fire Injuries
Many of the issues with which I have dealt during my almost nine
years of service as a Commissioner have concerned fire: smoke
detectors, child-resistant cigarette lighters and multi-purpose
lighters, upholstered furniture flammability, and wearing apparel
flammability. I believe, therefore, that my observations and
reflections on how best to prevent fire injuries, particularly those
involving clothing ignition, will be helpful to the Subcommittee as it
considers whether to repeal the changes that the Commission made to the
regulations on children's sleepwear. My most important point is that
clothing flammability resistance represents a last line of defense.
Preventing fire deaths and injuries begins with adequate parental and
other caregiver supervision that keeps ignition materials such as
matches and cigarette lighters out of the hands of children, and which
keeps children away from other ignition sources such as ranges and
fireplaces. A second line of defense involves making certain ignition
sources child-resistant. During my service with the Commission it has
adopted regulations that require that cigarette lighters and multi-
purpose lighters be made child-resistant, and I anticipate that these
requirements will result in reduced numbers of deaths and injuries from
childplay with fire. Finally, flammability resistance of clothing may
reduce the severity of injuries where ignition does occur. But no
children's sleepwear is flameproof, just as no lighter is childproof.
Adult caregivers have the primary responsibility to assure that
children do not have access to ignition sources that can lead to fires.
Proposed Legislative Changes to Sleepwear Standards
The Commission has been the subject of criticism for adopting the
amendments, and was required by the fiscal year 1999 Appropriations
Conference Report to reevaluate the advisability of the amendments. The
Commission did propose the repeal of the amendments, requested public
comments, held a public hearing and gathered data, decided that there
was no justification for changing the regulations and sent a letter to
the Appropriations Committee stating that conclusion. The Commission
retained the amendments, but modified them to require labels and
hangtags for tight-fitting garments. Data suggested that the public
might not be aware that tight-fitting garments are not flame-resistant
and must be worn with a tight fit. This labeling requirement goes into
effect June 28, 2000. The Commission is working with the American
Apparel Manufacturers Association to develop a national information and
education campaign to inform the public about safe sleepwear and why
non-flame resistant garments must be tight fitting.
There have been a number of attempts to repeal the amendments
legislatively and to reinstitute requirements that all children's
sleepwear pass a test that requires that they pass a burn-rate test
consisting of the application of a small, open flame for three seconds.
Opponents of the Commission's regulatory changes are, of course, free
to use the political process. I urge lawmakers, however, in evaluating
the case made by proponents of repeal, to ask the question that I have
been asking since I started considering these changes. Where are the
incidents, or the studies, that demonstrate that single-point ignition
of tight-fitting cotton sleepwear, or sleepwear used by children sized
nine months and under, is an unreasonable hazard?
When the Commission made its decision in 1996 it had before it an
extensive record demonstrating very few injuries associated with
single-point ignition of tight-fitting children's sleepwear, or any
sleepwear at all for children sized under nine months. Proponents of
legislative repeal of the amendments frequently cite numbers of burn
injuries suffered by children who happen to be in sleepwear at the time
of the injury. But the flame-resistance standard was never intended to
protect children from burn injuries from large-open flames. Clothing
would have to be made of highly flame-resistant fabrics, such as that
worn by auto racing drivers or military pilots, to protect its wearer
from burns in general conflagrations. And even highly flame-resistant
fabrics will do nothing to protect children from inhaling smoke and
toxic gases.
There have been other criticisms of the data gathering and analysis
that the Commission staff performed in developing the record that
supported the regulatory changes. These criticisms have been
considered, analyzed and responded to by the staff. I urge the Members
of the Subcommittee to read the staff response carefully to evaluate
the techniques of the data collection and analysis that supported the
regulatory change. I believe that you will find that the means used to
collect and analyze the data was reasonable.
Other factors that Congress must consider in deciding whether to
repeal or to modify the Commission's sleepwear regulation are consumer
preference for natural fabrics without chemical treatments, and the
difficulty in defining sleepwear. Garments that meet the children's
sleepwear flammability standard have been available since the 1970's.
These garments have not, however, proved popular, since many consumers
do not want chemically treated cotton, and polyester does not
``breathe'' in the same way that cotton does. Consumers who wish to
dress their children in natural fabrics may, therefore, purchase items
intended for use as daywear or playwear and use them as sleepwear. The
Commission is powerless to alter this behavior without becoming some
sort of federal ``pajama police.''
There have been some changes in the patterns of consumer behavior
since the time that the Commission began considering the issue of
amendments to the sleepwear standard. When the Commission began the
process of considering amendments to the standard, one to two percent
of all sleepwear sales were flame-resistant cotton. By 1996, when the
amendments were issued, twenty-five percent of the sleepwear industry
was cotton (a combination of flame-resistant cotton and cotton garments
whose sale was permitted by the stay of enforcement). As of May 2000,
thirty to thirty-five percent of the sleepwear market is cotton,
overwhelmingly the tight-fitting cotton sleepwear that the amended
sleepwear standard permits.
The Commission can, and does, pursue manufacturers and retailers
who market loose-fitting clothing made from non-flame-resistant fabric
as children's sleepwear. Determining whether a garment is being
marketed as children's sleepwear is often difficult. It depends on such
factors as the ornamentation, the position in the store occupied by the
garment (e.g., is it in or near the sleepwear section, the underwear
section or the playwear section), and the responses of sales persons
when asked about the function of a particular garment. Finally,
manufacturers and retailers have proved enormously creative in labeling
garments as daywear, playwear, beachwear, and loungewear, all of which
may have characteristics of sleepwear. The Commission's Compliance
staff must deal with these distinctions on a daily basis. New labeling
requirements will become effective at the end of next month that should
help alleviate the confusion for consumers, industry and our own
compliance staff.
In summary, therefore, the present children's sleepwear standards
represent a reasonable regulatory response that provides adequate
safety from single-point, small open-flame ignition while at the same
time accommodating consumer preference for natural fibers and fabrics
without chemical treatment. The standards have been the product of
extensive data collection and analysis, careful consideration, and full
and free debate. Congress should not overturn it without equally
careful consideration.
Fixed-Site Amusement Parks
H.R. 3032 would extend the Commission's jurisdiction to fixed-site
amusement rides. The decision to exclude the Commission from regulating
fixed-site amusement park rides was Congress's in the first place and
Congress is free, of course, to change that decision. In July 1999 the
Commission staff prepared a report on amusement ride-related injuries
and deaths in the U.S. That report showed that the number of non-
occupational injuries occurring on fixed-site amusement rides had
increased between 1994 and 1998. Additional data collection,
specifically including an exposure survey, will be necessary in order
to determine whether the risk has actually increased to a point that
merits federal intervention.
In considering whether federal regulation is appropriate, I urge
Congress to consider the existence of state regulation, the adequacy of
voluntary standards recognized by the industry, the extent of
compliance with the voluntary standards and the role of insurance
companies in requiring safe operation of rides. I do note that federal
regulation does not, in and of itself, ensure safety. The Commission
estimates that there are over twenty-two thousand deaths and twenty-
nine million injuries every year associated with products within CPSC's
existing jurisdiction. I note that there are approximately forty
thousand deaths each year involving motor vehicles under the
jurisdiction of the NHTSA, the agency with which we share the table
today.
Finally, I must raise the issue of resources. The Commission staff
is already stretched thin to meet its existing regulatory tasks, and
there is no ``slack'' out of which additional regulatory tasks can be
paid. Adding the technically complex fixed-site amusement rides to the
Commission's jurisdiction would require additional funding, including
travel, if regulation is to be effective. I believe that the $500,000
figure set forth in Section 3 of H.R. 3032 would not be adequate to
undertake regulation of fixed-site amusement rides. I prefer to wait
until the Commission staff has an opportunity to conduct some type of
survey and assessment of the fixed-site amusement ride industry before
estimating how much would be necessary for adequate federal regulation.
ELECTRIC BICYCLES
H.R. 2592 proposes to extend Commission jurisdiction to bicycles
with small auxiliary electric motors. The Commission already has
extensive regulations concerning bicycles promulgated under the
authority of the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, and H.R. 2592
subjects these electric bicycles to the existing regulations. To the
extent that these electric bicycles resemble bicycles in general, I am
sure that they will be safer if they comply with the regulations and I
support H.R. 2592.
If electric bicycles are placed under the jurisdiction of the
Commission, I recommend that any regulations promulgated by the
Commission be subject to the three-stage rulemaking procedures and the
deferral to voluntary standards required by the Consumer Product Safety
Act (CPSA) and the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA). H.R. 2592
does this, but I have seen a draft of a bill developed by Commission
staff that exempts rulemaking for these bicycles from the requirements
of any statute and executive order save the notice and comment
requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act. I do not support
such a bill. Three-stage rulemaking helps ensure that additional
mandatory regulations are given wide exposure to the regulated
community, so that the Commission will have the benefit of comments
about the nature and desirability of mandatory standards. Deferral to
voluntary standards in appropriate circumstances has been a feature of
the CPSA and FHSA since the creation of the Commission, and the
desirable aspects of such deferral are just as relevant to this type of
bicycle as to any other product regulated by the Committee under these
statutes. The bicycle regulations to which these vehicles will be
subjected were themselves products of three-stage rulemaking and the
possibility of deferral to voluntary standards. I do not support
exemptions from three-stage rulemaking or deferral to voluntary
standards, except in cases where Congress itself specifies a mandatory
rule and asks only that the Commission issue implementing regulations.
Child Safety Seats
I have examined H.R. 4145, which pertains to the standards for
child safety seats. The Commission does not regulate child safety seats
for use in automobiles, although it does regulate child safety seats
that double as infant carriers. I find nothing in H.R. 4145 that would
affect the Commission's ability to regulate such infant carriers, and I
have no further comments on H.R. 4145.
ENFORCEMENT LEGISLATION
Last Friday First Lady Hillary Clinton, Chairman Ann Brown, Senator
Ernest Hollings and Congressman Ed Markey announced the introduction of
the ``Consumer Product Safety Commission Enhanced Enforcement Act of
2000, which amends some of the enforcement powers of the Commission. I
would like to address the desirability of those legislative proposals.
Restricting Election of Remedy
Section 2 of the proposed legislation modifies the election of
remedy between ``repair, replace or refund'' that manufacturers,
distributors and retailers have under Section 15 of the CPSA and
Section 15 of the FHSA. Present law enables the Commission to order a
manufacturer, distributor, or retailer to repair, replace, or refund
the purchase price of the defective item, at the election of the
manufacturer, distributor or retailer. The change would enable the
Commission to reject the election made by the manufacturer, distributor
or retailer if the Commission found that the election was not in the
public interest. I do not support this change, since it would enable
the Commission to virtually dictate the terms of any remedy, even if it
made no economic sense. It could, for example, order the repair of
products with virtually no economic value, or require refunds for
products that could be economically repaired.
Under present law the Commission is not helpless if a repair,
replace or refund program is not protecting the public. The
Commission's order may require the person to whom it applies to submit
a plan, satisfactory to the Commission, for carrying out the order. If
the Commission concludes that the remedy elected and carried out by the
manufacturer, distributor or retailer has not eliminated or adequately
reduced the risk from the defective product, the Commission may reopen
the case. The present system strikes an adequate balance between
product safety and economic rationality and I do not support a change.
Eliminating Civil Penalty Limits
Section 3 of the draft legislation eliminates any limits on civil
penalties for violations of the Consumer Product Safety Act or the
Federal Hazardous Substances Act. Eliminating limits would obviously
increase the stakes of any failure to report. At the same time, there
has been no civil penalty during my over eight years of service as a
Commissioner that came close to the present limit of 1.6 million
dollars. Staff has developed a list of civil penalties assessed in the
last five years for failures to report and I am attaching this list to
my statement. You can see from this list that most civil penalties are
between one hundred thousand and two hundred fifty thousand dollars. It
is, therefore, difficult for me to see how eliminating the civil
penalty limitation would materially improve our enforcement ability. It
is the certainty of a penalty, rather than its theoretical upper limit
that serves as a better deterrent to failures to report product
hazards.
Criminal Violations
Section 4 of the draft legislation amends the Consumer Product
Safety Act to create two tiers of criminal violations. A ``knowing''
violation of CPSA Section 19 is a misdemeanor. Under present law, a
violation must be both knowing and willful to be even a misdemeanor.
Section of 4 of the draft legislation further amends the CPSA to make a
knowing and willful violation of Section 19 a felony. The legislation
eliminates the present requirement that a company be warned that it is
not in compliance with the CPSA, and be given an opportunity to correct
the noncompliance, prior to a criminal violation of the CPSA. The same
section of the draft legislation makes willful violations of the FHSA a
felony.
I do not oppose making criminal violations of the CPSA and FHSA
felonies, but I firmly oppose removing the requirement that companies
be warned that they are in violation of the CPSA, and being given an
opportunity to correct the violation, before being prosecuted for
criminal violations of the CPSA. While the Commission does deal with
many large companies that have staff and counsel who are aware of the
Commission and its activities, the Commission also encounters many
small companies who have no idea that the Commission even exists and
that there are regulations or standards concerning the products that
they make. These companies should not be subject to criminal
prosecution for violation of the CPSA without receiving at least a
notice that they are in violation and an opportunity to correct the
violation.
CONCLUSION
I appreciate the opportunity to appear today and to share my views
with the Members of the Subcommittee. A dialogue between Congress and
regulatory agencies is highly desirable and hearings are a useful
aspect of that dialogue. I will do my best to answer any questions that
the Members of the Subcommittee may have.
Mr. Tauzin. I thank the gentlelady.
Speaking of hazardous rides now, Mr. Moore, you survived
your tour of duty with Lousiana Senator John Breaux. Some sort
of recognition for that. We want to welcome you, the
commissioner of the Consumer Product Safety Commission. Mr.
Moore.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS H. MOORE
Mr. Moore. He was one of your buddies. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. And I will briefly summarize my statement. The
Commission has taken no position on the bill that would give
CPSC jurisdiction over fixed-site amusement park rides. We have
a lot of work to do in that area. While I have no view at this
time on the substance of Congressman Markey's bill, I do
believe it would take much greater resources than the $500,000
which the bill provides if this agency is to undertake this
responsibility. Many fixed-site rides are extremely complicated
combinations of computer technology and sophisticated
engineering. We would very likely have to seek outside
contractors with special expertise to evaluate these rides for
potential defects. So we are going to need much more than
$500,000, I repeat.
Now, I have no objections to the intent of Congressman
Rogan's bill. The Commission will need to review it in more
detail to make sure the final bill accomplishes its objectives
in the most effective manner. The children's sleepwear issue
has been before the Commission since I became a Commissioner in
1995. The Commission had a three-step rulemaking proceeding
from 1993 to 1996. And then it reexamined the issue at
Congress's request during 1998-1999. I have seen nothing, I
have seen nothing--and I have two children myself--I have seen
nothing that would lead me to believe the commission made the
wrong decision to allow a limited cotton alternative in
children's sleepwear. There is no data showing the tight
fitting cotton creates an unreasonable risk of a fire which
would lead to death or injury.
The incidents which led to the creation of the children's
sleepwear standard involved looser--and I repeat looser--
fitting garments, typically nightgowns and robes. And those
types of garments must still meet the flammability test.
So in essence, Mr. Chairman, that is my statement at this
point. And I appreciate the opportunity and would be more than
happy to respond to any questions that anyone might have. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Thomas H. Moore follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Thomas H. Moore, Commissioner, Consumer
Product Safety Commission
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I thank you for this
opportunity to address several issues of interest to the American
consumer.
The Commission has taken no position on the bill that would give
CPSC jurisdiction over fixed-site amusement park rides. While I have no
view at this time on the substance of Congressman Markey's bill, I do
believe it would take much greater resources than the $500,000 which
the bill provides, for our agency to undertake this task. Many fixed-
site rides are extremely complicated combinations of computer
technology and sophisticated engineering. We would very likely have to
seek outside contractors with special expertise to evaluate these rides
for potential defects. The public should also be aware that the agency
would not be able to do more in this area than it does with mobile
rides, which is primarily look for defects and seek some redress, after
an accident has happened. A federal inspection program that would look
for problems before they happened would be very expensive. According to
an article in U.S.A. Today, the State of Florida alone spends $1.2
million on its State inspectors and they do not inspect the bigger
theme park rides.
I have no objection to the intent of Congressman Rogan's bill,
although I am curious about the choice of a 170 pound rider in the
definition of what constitutes a ``low-speed electric bicycle.'' The
Commission will need to review the proposal in more detail, along with
certain changes our staff has proposed (some of which I think need some
revision) to make sure the final bill accomplishes its objectives in
the most effective manner.
The children's sleepwear issue has been before the Commission twice
since I became a Commissioner in 1995. The Commission had a three-step
rulemaking proceeding from 1993 to 1996 and then it reexamined the
issue at Congress's request during 1998-99. I have seen nothing that
would lead me to believe the Commission made the wrong decision to
allow a limited cotton alternative in children's sleepwear. There is no
data showing that tight-fitting cotton creates an unreasonable risk of
a fire which would lead to death or injury. The incidents which led to
the creation of the Children's Sleepwear Standards involved looser
fitting garments (typically nightgowns and robes) and those garments
must still meet the flammability test.
I understand the heart-felt motives that have caused some people to
try to overturn the Commission's decision. However, the U.S. Consumer
Product Safety Commission would not, and has not, made changes to the
Sleepwear Standards that put children at an unreasonable risk.
Mr. Tauzin. Thank you, Mr. Moore.
The Chair will recognize himself and other members in order
for 5 minutes.
Let me first turn to the question of the children's
sleepwear issue. Ms. Gall and Ms. Brown, obviously you have
different opinions on it. My understanding is that since 1996,
Congress has asked the CPSC to review this issue and that you
have twice done so and twice sustained the exemption. My
understanding also has a lot to do with the problem, at least I
would like you to comment on it, that consumers, mothers wanted
to have cotton on their children. That they were buying loosely
fitting T-shirts instead and that those posed a greater danger
than the tight fitting cotton standard that you permitted.
Mr. Moore, also I would like you to comment too, sir. Were
you in agreement to educate and advise consumers with any
labeling and some educational effort to make consumers aware of
this exemption and why it is in place? Could any one of the
three of you comment. Mr. Moore.
Mr. Moore. In terms of the information education campaign,
that industry is to undertake, industry was immediately ready
to move forward in that particular area. We, however, have re-
examined the problem to make sure of its safety, and we made
some design changes that have taken some time. And over that
time period, industry has been waiting to go forward with this
campaign.
Mr. Tauzin. But it is the construction of the tight fitting
garments.
Mr. Moore. Precisely. The construction of the garment
itself. I think this is an example of the tight fitting
garment, as you see. And I might say that that has not been on
the market very long, but already it is somewhere between 30
and 35 percent of the market.
Mr. Tauzin. Am I correct that the concern that drove the
commission to this exemption is that parents were choosing
loose fitting T-shirts as opposed to tight fitting garments?
Mr. Moore. Loose fitting cotton garments which are very
very susceptible to small open flames. Now, keep in mind--and
this is very important--we are not talking about a house fire.
We are talking about the initiation of a small open flame.
Mr. Tauzin. A cigarette lighter or a candle.
Mr. Moore. That is right. That is what we are talking
about. We are talking about that it must meet a standard
wherein it goes out in a matter of seconds if it has contact
with one of these small open flames.
Mr. Tauzin. So the commission at least twice now already
and continues to take the view that moving with standards on
the construction of these tight fitting cotton garments and an
educational campaign to go along with it yields a better safety
result than not having the exemption and parents choosing loose
fitting cotton garments that are not regulated by the
commission.
Mr. Moore. That is right.
Mr. Tauzin. Is that the essence of the argument?
Mr. Moore. That is the essence of the argument.
Mr. Tauzin. Madam Chair, you disagree with that. Would you
give us your point of disagreement.
Ms. Brown. I thought, and continue to think, Mr. Chairman,
that the regulation was working very well as it was. And I am a
proponent of ``if it ain't broke, don't fix it.'' And I just
wanted to say that one of the primary reasons that the staff
brought these changes up to the Commission was that they felt
that they had a lot of problems with enforcement. And
unfortunately those problems with enforcement do still exist. I
will say, however, Mr. Chairman, that there is going to be no
movement on this at the Commission. The data has been examined.
I do think that it is time to move on from this so we can
address other very serious safety problems.
Mr. Tauzin. Quickly, because I have a limited time. Ms.
Gall.
Ms. Gall. If I may just add, the reason we selected the
tight-fitting cotton alternative was because of market data
that showed us that parents are looking to loose fitting cotton
sleepwear for children and adult T-shirts. People were putting
children in adult T-shirts. We wanted to provide a safety
cotton alternative. The tight fitting reduces the likelihood of
ignition. There is a lack of air to feed the fire and so on. We
look at overseas data; we looked at Canadian data. They had a
similar, although less stringent, standard and they have not
had a series of injuries or deaths with their proposal, as we
have not since this went into effect.
Mr. Tauzin. We have a difference of opinion on the Rogan
bill as well on electric bicycles that I want to air real
quickly. Madam Chair, you recommend a proposal that would
exempt the commission from a whole series of normal regular
procedures such as the Consumer Products Safety Act, the
Federal Hazardous Substance Act, chapter 6 of the U.S. code of
Environmental Policy Act and Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act.
Why is it that you disagree with the other commissioners
and Mr. Rogan, who believe that if you assume jurisdiction over
electric bikes that are you to follow the procedures and adhere
to all these acts? Why do you want to exempt all these acts?
Ms. Brown. Let me have Michael Solender, our general
counsel, explain this to you.
Mr. Solender. We have an existing standard for bicycles
now. Congress would be asking us to take over jurisdiction of
electric bicycles. Now to the extent that they are the same
product, the rule would apply. To the extent that these are
different--and I know note that they have engines in them so
they will have to be different--we will have to be doing some
additional modification changes supplementation of the rule. If
Congress wants us to pursue this and make this a safe--regulate
the safety in the way we have done with bicycles, it will be
necessary in order to do that to be able to do it efficiently
and effectively. Our current statute will require us to make a
series of findings that it would probably, would be unable to
make or be very difficult, doubtful we could do them in order
to do the regulation we need.
Mr. Tauzin. My time is up, but my understanding is if the
other commissioners have a different view or a----
Ms. Gall. I do.
Mr. Tauzin. Mr. Moore, do you have a different view as
well? If you assume jurisdiction over electric bicycles, do you
think you ought to exempt the commission from all of these laws
that the chairwoman would like you to exempt the commission
from?
Mr. Moore. At this point I have not taken a position to
that extent. No.
Mr. Tauzin. All right. Ms. Gall you have.
Ms. Gall. I disagree because I do not think that we should
remove three-stage rulemaking from CPSA and FHSA, and that
would include deferral to voluntary standards. The Congress has
given us a clear direction over the history of our agency that
we are to look to voluntary standards first. Then, of course,
there is getting rid of the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act. It seems to me that that should be
retained and there are a number of other issues as well.
Mr. Tauzin. We will debate that. My time is up. Before I
yield to Mr. Markey, I do want to explain that I do have some
questions that if they are not asked by other members on the
issue of the amusement rides, I would like to get into that
with you and Ms. Millman. On the question of testing of the
child seat, the staff has raised some questions that I would
like answered regarding how the testing proceeds and whether or
not a star rating system might not help consumers understand
which are the better systems. But we will get into that, I
think, as we move along. The Chair will yield 5 minutes to the
ranking minority member, Mr. Markey, for a round of questions.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Brown, you
and your fellow commissioners are appropriately concerned about
the level of funding that would be made available for you to be
able to discharge your responsibilities under my legislation
for you to be able to regulate, monitor the roller coaster
industry in the United States. Let's put aside just for a
second the question of how much money it might take for you to
discharge those responsibilities. Up until 1981, the Consumer
Product Safety Commission had jurisdiction over the roller
coaster industry. Do you think it was inappropriate for the
CPSC to have jurisdiction over the roller coaster industry up
to 1981?
Ms. Brown. I think Congress in its wisdom gave us
jurisdiction over it, and I think it was entirely appropriate.
Mr. Markey. Do you think it would be appropriate for you to
regain authority over the roller coaster industry?
Ms. Brown. I think it would be appropriate, particularly
considering the lives and injuries and deaths and the patchwork
of Federal and State regulation. I think Congress was right
originally to give it to us, and I hope it can be restored.
Mr. Markey. Let me ask the other two commissioners the same
question. Either of you may respond.
Ms. Gall. I would just say this----
Mr. Markey. Was it appropriate for the commission to have
jurisdiction up to 1981?
Ms. Gall. Well, apparently the Congress thought so. I was
not at the commission at that time so I am not aware of all the
history that was involved at that time. However, I will say
this, if we are tasked with this, I think before we even make a
decision like that there are a number of factors we do have to
look at. We have to look at whether or not the increase in the
incidence of injuries and deaths in the past year or 2 is a
result of increased attendance, increased use of the rides at
the park, or if it is an increase in the hazard of the rides
because they are different kinds or whatever. I don't know that
we have the exposure data at this point--I believe we do not--
to make any sound decision about that right now.
Mr. Markey. You won't be able to get that exposure data
until you get jurisdiction over the subject material.
Ms. Gall. Well, to move on to my other point, I think we
also have to take a look at what the State regulations provide,
what ASTM is looking at now and what they provide through
voluntary standards and what the insurance company requirements
are for these particular rides. I am not saying this is a good
idea or a bad idea. I am saying we have work to do before we--
all of us have work to do----
Mr. Markey. So you are saying, Commissioner, that despite
the huge increase in the number of deaths and injuries on
fixed-site roller coasters across the country, despite your own
knowledge that we have moved from the model-T era of roller
coasters that used to go 50 miles an hour when most of us in
this room were children to an era now where they are going 70,
80, 90, 100 miles an hour and you have reservations in your
mind that the Consumer Product Safety Commission should have
jurisdiction, ensuring that there is some national
communication of this information so that an accident in one
State would not in fact injure a child in another State with
the very same flaw, the very same defect in the roller coaster.
But because of the lack of jurisdiction which you have that
information would never be shared, you don't think you should
have that jurisdiction. You have reservations about that?
Ms. Gall. Congressman Markey, none of us in this room want
to see a child or an adult injured or, God forbid, die.
Mr. Markey. Do you want jurisdiction over this?
Ms. Gall. May I finish? Thank you.
Mr. Markey. The question I want answered is do you want
jurisdiction over this, Commissioner. Yes or no.
Ms. Gall. I cannot tell you that yet because I have not
looked at----
Mr. Markey. Fine.
Ms. Gall. I think that is a fair response.
Mr. Markey. It is not a fair response. This is an issue
that is so clear in terms of the fatalities, the serious
injuries to children across this country. It is a consumer
product safety issue which you should have a great deal of
concern for right now, Commissioner. And I am very disappointed
in your answer. Mr. Moore, what is your answer.
I don't think it is a laughing matter, Commissioner. And I
don't think----
Ms. Gall. I would appreciate the opportunity to speak
further, but I have been cutoff several times.
Mr. Markey. You have not been cutoff. Commissioner Moore.
Mr. Moore. The jurisdiction question does not bother me at
all. I think we ought to have jurisdiction. It is a matter of,
if we have jurisdiction, we would need appropriate resources
because we don't have the sufficient manpower under $500,000 in
order to accomplish it in the number of States that would have
these fixed-site rides. But in terms of the jurisdiction, sure.
I have no problem with this.
Mr. Markey. You have no problem with----
Mr. Moore. I have no problem with jurisdiction at all.
Mr. Markey. My feeling about the amount of money in my
bill--I authorize 500,000. Again, it is a number which is
equivalent to the amount of money which you have to look at the
mobile roller coasters; and if you feel that number is
inadequate, you should tell the committee at this time as well.
But my feeling is that with $500,000 if you were able to go in
and at least in a way that ensured that you understand what
happened in each one of these sites and you were able to use
that money to share it with the other 49 States all of the
other amusement park operators in the rest of the country if we
saved just one child's life this coming summer, and I think we
would save many more, not only from death but from serious
injury--we are now talking thousands who are being injured on
these roller coasters--I think it would be a $500,000
expenditure that would be well spent.
Ms. Brown. Let me just add at this point we currently spend
about $100,000 doing what we do to enforce safety on mobile
rides. That means that we investigate the most serious
accidents and seek remedial action where appropriate. We serve
as a clearing house to State governments and amusement ride
operators and owners who are sharing information on mobile
amusement rides on safety. And we assist the States in
investigating specific defects. That minimal amount, which is
what we could begin to do, could be done for $500,000. We are
the best buy in government. We turn on a dime and work very
well. Certainly more money could be used to do a much more
dramatic effort. But as you say, to begin the very act of
working with the States, of having a Federal presence, of
investigating the most serious incidents and as serving as a
clearing house with information is absolutely critical. We
could begin the effort with $500,000.
Mr. Markey. You would think that it would be appropriate
for the CPSC to have that jurisdiction.
Ms. Brown. Absolutely.
Mr. Moore. I agree with that. I am concerned as I said
before about the sufficiency of our manpower.
Mr. Markey. I appreciate that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Tauzin. Thank the gentleman. The Chair wishes to note
that there is a 15-minute vote on the floor at this time. Mr.
Shimkus has gone to vote and is hopefully going to return
briefly. In the meantime, the Chair recognizes the gentleman
from Ohio.
Mr. Sawyer. I am not sure I can get there that fast. Just
go and vote and come back.
Mr. Tauzin. You can do that. The gentleman will go ahead
and vote. I will continue to sit in the Chair until Mr. Shimkus
arrives. Let me recognize myself in the meantime. Let me ask
some questions about the question of regulations of amusement
rides while I have the chance. It is my understanding that most
of the fixed amusement rides are relatively unique rides in
each one of the States. Is that correct or wrong?
Ms. Brown. We have Alan Schoem here, who is very succinct,
but is an expert in it.
Mr. Tauzin. Would you identify yourself for the record.
Mr. Schoem. I am Alan Schoem, director of the Office of
Compliance at the Commission.
Mr. Tauzin. Let me see if you can answer that question. It
is my understanding that the fixed amusement sites around the
country each have relatively unique rides, roller coaster
rides, what have you. Is that accurate or is that wrong?
Mr. Schoem. I don't know precisely. They have rides that I
assume are unique, but there are rides that are both mobile and
fixed that are used at fixed site parks as fixed rides and at
carnivals as mobile rides.
Mr. Tauzin. Is it true that mobile rides generally tend to
look more alike?
Mr. Schoem. They tend to?
Mr. Tauzin. Tend to be more alike.
Mr. Schoem. I wouldn't characterize them as more alike.
There are so many different mobile rides; there are hundreds of
different mobile rides just like there are fixed-site rides.
Mr. Tauzin. Let me ask this question then in regards to the
current administration of State regulations of the fixed
sights. Since the law was changed to give the States authority
in that area, has any State not accepted that authority where
there were fixed amusement sites in the country?
Mr. Schoem. I believe there are a number of States that do
not have regulations for amusement sites.
Mr. Tauzin. Even though there are fixed sites in those
States?
Mr. Schoem. Even though there are fixed sites.
Mr. Tauzin. Could you identify those?
Mr. Schoem. Okay. We can provide that for the record.
Mr. Tauzin. I would suggest that you do so. If there are
States that where there are fixed amusement parks and rides
where the States have not accepted the responsibility, I think
it is an important part of the record. I will ask that it be
submitted by your office for the record.
Ms. Brown. Let me clarify that in 1981 when the
jurisdiction was removed, it was not given to the States. It
was just simply that the jurisdiction was removed from the CPSC
to have authority over fixed-site amusement rides.
Mr. Tauzin. My information now is that there are now only
eight States without such a law, and that Alabama is currently
addressing the issue. In five other States, there are a total
of seven parks with rides. The remaining two have no parks. So
we are talking basically about a universe of five States with a
total of seven parks with rides. Is that close to being
accurate?
Mr. Schoem. It sounds close to being accurate. I think our
numbers are slightly different, but we compiled our list at the
end of last year. But there are also different types of
regulations within those States. Some may just require an
insurance inspection. There are no State regulators that go in
and actually inspect the rides.
Mr. Tauzin. In regard to that point, Mr. Markey asked the
question to some of you about whether or not a defect was
covered in one State on a ride that is common to another ride
in another State which somehow goes unnoticed in the other
State. Would any of you like to comment on that or is there in
an exchange of that information today, do the insurance
companies do that, do the States do that? What is the current
status of exchanging information on regulations and discovery
of defects?
Mr. Schoem. For example, we recently were involved in a
ride in Texas where we identified a defect and worked with the
manufacturer and operators of those rides to fix all of the
mobile rides that were used all throughout the United States.
Secondary restraint systems were added and additional
inspection procedures were added.
Mr. Tauzin. How would that occur right now with the fixed
sites in terms of a defect occurring? Is there any procedure
right now?
Ms. Brown. There is no requirement to report.
Mr. Tauzin. No requirement. Does it happen, however, Ms.
Gall?
Ms. Gall. There is a private sector organization that is
composed of fixed-site amusement park owners and providers, and
they do review routinely any accident information.
Mr. Tauzin. Mr. Shimkus is in the Chair.
Mr. Shimkus [presiding]. Thank you. Let me begin my line;
and, Ms. Millman, do the tests used by NHTSA to test child
restraints accomplish any of the following things: one, do they
examine the durability of child restraints for children under
50 pounds in front-impact crashes in bucket-type seats or
smaller or modern cars?
Ms. Millman. If I could, I would like to introduce one of
the NHTSA staff, Steve Kratzke. He is the head of our
rulemaking office, and he can provide more technical
information about that.
Mr. Shimkus. As much as a yes or no as we can. I understand
the bureaucracy.
Mr. Kratzke. Yes.
Mr. Shimkus. Well, okay. How does child restraints perform
in rear impact, rollover, side impact, or skidding accidents?
Do the bench seats test for roll-overs, rear impacts, and
sliding?
Mr. Kratzke. It does not current----
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you. That is commensurate with the first
answer. Sir, if your first answer was yes, obviously the second
answer is no.
Mr. Kratzke. No.
Mr. Shimkus. Does the bench test how well restraints
perform in compact cars?
Mr. Kratzke. Yes.
Mr. Shimkus. Do they test the effect of loose seatbelts or
inadequate seat bottom stiffness?
Mr. Kratzke. Does it test inadequate--it tightens the seat
belt. So, no, it does not test that and the second part was?
Mr. Shimkus. Inadequate seat bottom stiffness. Obviously,
a manufactured seat with the child seat is not cushion enough.
Does the bench seat test for the adequate softness of the
bottom of the seat?
Mr. Kratzke. The bench seat that we use now is an older
design. It is a more severe test than would be a current seat.
So yes, I would say that it tests more than would an updated
seat in adequate softness or angle or contour or any of those
attributes.
Mr. Shimkus. I would venture to guess for--obviously, for
folks here the issue that we are addressing is the testing--of
one of the issues is the testing of car safety seats. Under the
current standards, we use a bench seat from a 1973 Chevrolet
Impala down a ramp. So my response would have been the ramp
signifies the front-end crash, and really is testing how well
that seat adheres to the bench seat of the 1973 Impala. And
that is about the only thing you are able to test. I think you
correctly stated that you cannot test the side crashes, the
roll-overs under that method. Now, I applauded NHTSA in the
opening comments and appreciation for some of the lapse areas
that we feel that need to be tested, and based upon some of
the, unfortunately, real-world cases; but I also applaud the
work that we have done before.
Ms. Millman. If I could add a little more information about
the testing. One of the things that we try to do is separate
the performance of the child seat from the performance of the
vehicle. In a test of the child seat, we want to find out how
that particular seat performs and then we can see if it exceeds
our minimum standards. But that is only part of the protection
that we provide for children in motor vehicles. Things like air
bags and bumpers and how the energy flows through the car are
also very important determinants of whether that child is going
to be injured or not in a crash. So that bench test that you
are concerned about is only one part of how we look at
protecting children.
Mr. Shimkus. As we discussed in our meeting last week, the
debate is how do we move to an all inclusive testing in which
real life vehicles that are being crashed every day, how do we
make an inclusion of the child safety seat aspects. And the
real debate over whether we should--while we are testing
vehicles today, should we place in various sizes of children
dummies in various seats and simultaneously test them as we are
doing the other test. And I think some of the provisions that
you are going to announce today and move forward with start
addressing some of those questions. So we are happy to see
movement in that direction.
And you also addressed changing some of the sizes, adding
new dummies to, in essence, the lineup. How many currently--how
many child test dummies do we have for children under the age
of 6?
Mr. Kratzke. We have a newborn, a 9-month-old, a 12-month-
old, a 3-year-old and a 6-year-old.
Mr. Shimkus. And how many do the Europeans have?
Mr. Kratzke. The Europeans that they use in their standard
or that they have?
Mr. Shimkus. That they use in testing.
Mr. Kratzke. They use in testing a 3-year-old; they are
developing an 18-month-old. They have a 12-month-old and a
newborn. They don't have a 9-month-old.
Mr. Shimkus. Okay. Will NHTSA have a dummy representing
children between newborn and 12 months? I guess you have talked
about that in the--the question is what is the gap between
newborn and 12 months? How many test dummies are you actively
using to test today?
Mr. Kratzke. A newborn is about 7 pounds. Our 12-month
dummy is 22 pounds. We have a 9-month-old dummy.
Mr. Shimkus. We don't have one of those here, do we?
Mr. Kratzke. Yes. Down on the floor.
Ms. Millman. This is the 12-month.
Mr. Kratzke. This is the new 12-month-old dummy that we use
and we just announced in March to assess risk of injury from
air bags.
Mr. Shimkus. So that is the 12-month. Then there is a
smaller size.
Mr. Kratzke. There is a 9-month and newborn.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you very much. And just to end on this
line of questioning and since I am between votes I will be able
to continue until other colleagues show up, I applaud the
fact--or I wanted to ask one question this is following our
discussion again on Friday. And this legislation is very
similar to Senator Fitzgerald, my senator from Illinois, who
dropped the bill on that side of the legislative branch months
ago, maybe a month prior to the dropping of our legislation
here. He also has attempted to address to meet with you and
address some of the issues. Can you tell me of your response in
working with Senator Fitzgerald on this issue?
Ms. Millman. His staff has indicated, as you did, that the
goals are what he is trying to achieve and he is willing to
look at the specific language to make sure that we are
achieving these goals.
Mr. Shimkus. Have you actually met with members of his
staff?
Ms. Millman. Members of the NHTSA staff have met with
members of his staff.
Mr. Shimkus. One question, one last question and I will
move to the safety, the sleepwear, child safety sleepwear
standards. The Shriners Hospital presented one case to the
Consumer Product Safety Commission in which an 8-month-old
child was severely burned while wearing the Winnie the Pooh
bunny suit. The Consumer Product Safety Commission rejected
this case because using a microscope the label says daywear,
not sleepwear. Should technicalities be allowed to leave
children like this defenseless against fire? I would actually
like Ms. Gall and Mr. Moore to respond to that.
Ms. Gall. All right. Thank you. One of the problems that we
have had, and why we came up with these amendments to the
standard was the difference between some aspects of daywear and
some sleepwear. And the confusion that arises out of long
underwear and some daywear that can be used as nightwear and so
on and so forth. What we have tried to do is provide a safe
cotton alternative and----
Mr. Shimkus. Keep going.
Ms. Gall. I was hoping you might hold up the child. Oh, how
wonderful.
Mr. Shimkus. Exhibit A. I told you he was coming.
Ms. Gall. Is he going to bang the gavel?
Mr. Shimkus. He might.
Ms. Gall. Well, clearly there is a great deal of confusion
between daywear and sleepwear because sometimes it is decorated
quite the same and has the same type of materials.
Mr. Shimkus. Let me cut to the chase. Really, my son Daniel
is here to testify on behalf of all 7-month-olds. And the
reality is there is no--there is really no difference for 7-
month-old children for daywear and sleepwear. The reality is 7-
month-old children sleep. And they sleep at night, hopefully;
and they sleep during the day, hopefully. And the question is,
you know, does he sleep in this daywear? Well, he is a 7-month-
old, the answer is hopefully and hopefully yes, he does.
Children can't run from fires. Children cannot learn to drop
and roll. Infants I guess is the proper term. So why should we
have a separate standard and why should we even be having the
debate of sleepwear versus daywear? I mean, if we can't even
address that in the sleepwear definition, how do we ever get to
daywear, which for infants is sleepwear?
Mr. Moore. I think it depends on mobility--the age of the
child and the child's mobility.
Mr. Shimkus. Well, he is 7 months old; and he is not
crawling yet.
Mr. Moore. He is exempt from coverage under our standards
because the likelihood of his coming in contact with a small
open flame or bringing himself, for instance, out to use a
cigarette lighter or.
Mr. Shimkus. It is not----
Mr. Moore. Or matches.
Mr. Shimkus. With all due respect, Mr. Moore, infants
aren't going to be playing. We know that these fires come into
contact with children because of negligent parents, candles,
cigarettes, having children around some small flame. The
question is if young children 7 month olds cannot escape the
race of the flame, how can we not have this debate for
sleepwear when even in daywear they are wearing daywear to
sleep in?
Ms. Gall. If I may just say this, we made those amendments
based on the data we had available to us. The General
Accounting Office looked at that data; and while they would
have liked to see additional data, they did not disagree with
the conclusion we made. They looked at the years of enforcement
relaxation that we had while we were considering this. They
looked to the timeframe from when the amendments went into
effect until now, and they found that there was no support for
amending the amendment that we undertook. And again, our
standard is for small open-flame single-point ignition such as
matches and cigarette lighters. And obviously caregivers and
parents are the first defense for children. And we recognize
that is important. But there is no clothing alternative that we
can design that would be fireproof under all circumstances,
including house fires.
Mr. Shimkus. And I will let Ms. Brown finish, and then I
will do a quick summation and give it back to the chairman. Ms.
Brown.
Ms. Brown. Congressman Shimkus, I was going to offer a
slightly different subjects that we would offer to you at the
Consumer Product Safety Commission that we come through and
help you and your family babyproof your home for that adorable
child.
Mr. Shimkus. This is my third, so I think----
Ms. Brown. And things have changed and developed so we
offer that to you and we hope we can work with your staff on
that.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you very much. Let me just say again
that Daniel, representing all 7-month-olds, wants to make sure
that they are safe in their cars from side impacts, roll-overs,
rear collisions and they want to be as safe as possible when
sleeping. And we appreciate your work actually in protecting
our children. But I think we can move forward in trying to
protect all 7-month-olds in the future. With that, I will yield
back to the chairman of the committee. Thank you.
Mr. Tauzin. I think John represents the best and safest.
Thanks for bringing him, John. The Chair is now pleased today
to welcome the gentleman from Ohio for 5 minutes.
Mr. Sawyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My first question--and
I don't want it to sound facetious because I don't mean it that
way but it goes directly to a point that I have--I don't know
whether it has been asked since I left, but how do you know
whether sleepwear on any given child is going to be loose
fitting or tight fitting? How do you know when you put it out
there that someone is not going to buy it in a manner that for
one child would have been tight fitting and another would have
been loose fitting?
Mr. Moore. Well, we certainly can't predict that. We can
make a recommendation based on the expected age and size of the
child, and make recommendations in terms of what tight fitting
or snug fitting ought to be. The product itself has a hang tag
on it. It is going to have that on it when we are finished with
it. It has a label in it that says it needs to be snug fitting.
It tells you what snug fitting is.
Mr. Sawyer. It seems to me that relying on that is kind of
an illusion and that simply making sure that the fabric is
appropriately treated, whether or not the child is of a size
that would make it tight fitting seems to me to be the more
prudent way of going about assuring that the protection that
you seek is actually provided.
Ms. Gall. If I could just add one point here. Even if you
buy an extra size up, a larger size of the snug fitting, you
still have the cuffs here and here which reduce the flow of
air.
Mr. Sawyer. I do appreciate that.
Ms. Gall. It conforms to the body, and so it still provides
that measure of protection.
Mr. Sawyer. I understand that.
Mr. Moore. And my people are telling me that we tested one
size up and the product was still snug fitting.
Mr. Sawyer. Let me turn to the question of the amusement
park rides. I mentioned the potential at least initially to
empower the States perhaps with a mutual recognition standard
so that those inspectors who are closest and insufficient in
number to inspect amusement park rides would continue to be
empowered to act on behalf of the commission. Does that make
sense to you?
Ms. Brown. I think that would be one approach. Having the
Federal presence there would of course encourage the States and
States inspections to be much more effective. We can work with
the States to have a central clearing house, to share data.
This would be an enhancement as I would see it to encourage the
States and enhance their own protective power. What we need are
people on the ground who are keeping these up to date and who
know what is going on. So I think what you are talking about
is, in the end, State partnership in its best sense with this
legislation.
Mr. Sawyer. On another topic, can you tell us a little bit
about how low-speed motorized bicycles differ from electric
bicycles? Is there a substantial difference?
Ms. Brown. Mike, could you do this. I have a resident
expert on this.
Mr. Sawyer. NHTSA has proposed that you take over the whole
field.
Ms. Brown. It is a good question.
Mr. Tauzin. Would you identify yourself.
Mr. Solender. My name is Michael Solender. Could you just
state the question one more time to make sure I heard.
Mr. Sawyer. I am running out of time. NHTSA has suggested
that you all assume the full range of bicycle responsibility
and that would include motorized low-power motorized bicycles
as well as electric bikes. Could you tell us how these differ
and----
Mr. Solender. There are some technical issues as to what is
an electric bike, and you can see in the drafts there is 2-
wheel, there is 3-wheel, and there is a speed issue. That was
something that was new to us that we saw from NHTSA. We will
have to look at that and see what other models are involved. At
this point we can't say who would or should or can't take
jurisdiction over it. It may well be appropriate. But it is
something that we haven't had a chance to consider.
Mr. Sawyer. Director.
Ms. Millman. If we are looking at the safety of the
vehicle, then I think the distinguishing factor is the speed
and not necessarily the source of the energy.
Mr. Sawyer. Let me turn then finally to the child
restraints question. Where would you put child safety seats in
terms of the overall spectrum of NHTSA safety programs?
Ms. Millman. Are you asking in terms of our priorities?
Mr. Sawyer. Priorities, yes. Effectiveness and cost.
Ms. Millman. We think that the seats themselves perform
well. Where we can make the biggest improvements is getting
people to use them for every trip and making sure that they are
installed properly. And not to be out done by my colleague, I
would like to offer each of you the opportunity to have a
certified child safety seat technician inspect your child seats
to make sure they are installed properly.
Mr. Sawyer. Let me ask you about the dynamics of child seat
testing and the many dimensions including the size of the
child, the direction and speed of the impact and so forth. As
you undertake this program, would the legislation that is
before us limit you or in any way misdirect you in terms of the
arenas of research that you undertake?
Ms. Millman. The legislation has very specific
requirements. We have our planning effort underway right now
that we expect to complete by the end of the summer. I would
prefer that we complete that effort, which will identify the
most promising areas for us to pursue. Some of those may be the
things that the legislation calls for.
The other concern is that the legislation specifies
timeframes. Given the state of the research and the test
devices that we have available, we have some concerns about
being able to meet those timeframes.
Mr. Sawyer. Let me just say in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I
appreciate your flexibility. I very much support the
legislation, but I really want to make sure that you all are in
the position to do the best technical job that you can do so we
get the kind of outcome we want. Thank you.
Mr. Tauzin. I thank the gentleman. The Chair recognizes the
gentleman, Mr. Ganske, for a round of questions.
Mr. Ganske. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I will direct
most of the questions to Ms. Brown. We are going to hear
testimony a little later today from the Shriners Hospital for
Children that treat over 20 percent of major pediatric burn
injuries in the United States. And they have experienced over
150 percent increase in sleepwear-related burn injuries since
the commission lowered the safety standards.
In fact, when they compared the years 1995 through 1996
with 1998 and 1999 they had 157 percent increase. In another
category the number of children suffering clothing-related burn
injuries increased from 70 to 147 in their institutions, 110
percent increase. 1995, 1996 Shriners Hospital for Children
treated three children with sleepwear-related burn injuries
under 9 months of age. But in 1998, 1999 the total number of
infants with injuries rose to eight, 167 percent.
I am hearing from other burn surgeons who are friends of
mine around the country the same story, not just from the
Shriners hospitals. And so I was struck by your testimony,
which was that you took the position that if it isn't broken
why fix it in terms of the rules that CPSC had before. I am
interested, what was the push? Who made the push to change the
regulations?
Ms. Brown. I think this originally came from the staff that
had problems, two problems that they felt were important. One
was there was an enforcement problem, which Congressman Shimkus
has given us right away, trying to figure out what is sleepwear
and what is daywear. That was one thing. Enforcement was quite
difficult. And the other----
Mr. Ganske. Was there lobbying from the Cotton Council?
Ms. Brown. This originated without lobbying from the Cotton
Council. That has been a misconception. You know I, voted
against the change in the regulations originally. There has
been plenty of lobbying from the Cotton Council now. But
originally from the staff that thought they could help with
enforcement.
Mr. Ganske. So the Cotton Council is weighing in heavily
now.
Ms. Brown. Certainly weighing in now but not before.
Mr. Ganske. How much does it treat with flame retardant a
child's sleepwear?
Ms. Brown. Alan, can you tell me that. Several dollars is
the answer. Several dollars.
Mr. Ganske. Several dollars per item.
Ms. Brown. Come on up. This is Ron Medford, who can give
you some of the technical information.
Mr. Medford. I am Ron Medford. I am the assistant executive
director for hazard identification and reduction at the
commission. Our best estimate it is about $2 a garment at
wholesale level.
Mr. Ganske. Is there cotton cloth now available that has
fibers woven into it that is flame retardant, and is that
significantly less expensive?
Mr. Medford. There are a number of different fire retardant
treatments that are available for cotton sleepwear. That is one
type. And it is in about the same cost range that I just
mentioned. There are a number of types of applications for the
fire retardant chemicals.
Mr. Ganske. Ms. Brown, we have heard from members of the
committee that there is sort of an artificial distinction
between sleepwear and not because I think that the commission
itself has recognized the fact that a lot of kids are sleeping
in T-shirts, things like that. Why wouldn't we just move
instead of this sort of artificial distinction of tight
fighting, loose clothing, why not just move to a clear labeling
for consumers that says this item of children's clothing is
flame retardant or is not flame retardant?
Mr. Medford. Flame retardant may not be the best
phraseology. The current labeling that is going to be required
at the end of June regarding the snug fitting garments is to
ensure the parents know these garments have not been treated,
but they are relying on the snug fit of the garment to provide
the protection to the consumer.
Ms. Brown. It is a very confusing issue. It is confusing
for the people who are selling it in the stores. It is
confusing for consumers. That is why originally I didn't want
it to change at all. I just wanted it to be straightforward.
But we had enough trouble identifying what sleepwear is,
because manufacturers wanted to try and make everything
daywear, so that we had a big enforcement problem, which by the
way, we still have under the changed regulations. But what it
should be is very straightforward, that everything, all the
sleepwear that is provided to a family would be fire resistant.
Mr. Ganske. Anything that is marketed as sleepwear should
be fire retardant.
Ms. Brown. Exactly.
Mr. Ganske. But also, is it correct to say that your
position would be that for all children's clothing, that it
should be labeled either fire retardant or not?
Ms. Brown. No. Now children's clothing you are into a
larger situation, all children's clothing.
Mr. Ganske. How about T-shirts?
Ms. Brown. All of that is a general wearing apparel
standard for children's clothing which is not as stringent as
it should be. Then the Congress might be talking about an
enlarged regulation. But we are just talking right here about
sleepwear. Sleepwear is the only one that has this more
stringent regulation, either before or after general wearing
apparel takes care of all children's clothing.
Mr. Ganske. Let me just ask a final question, that is, in
light of this data that is being provided for us around the
country from the institutions that are treating children, the
only thing that is significantly changed is the ruling from the
commission.
Ms. Brown. I want to clarify one thing about the data.
Because the CPSC has an excellent data system. As you know, I
supported the original regulation. But the Shriners who are the
most excellent group and we all respect them enormously, are
still counting all full house fires. This regulation was only
supposed to, even in its original intent, apply to small open
flames. In a full house fire, the pajamas really did not
protect the infant. It would only--it would only protect it if
an infant brushed up--and it has nothing to do with cigarettes
by the way, there's been a misconception here. If they brushed
up against a candle or a lighter or a match, then the sleepwear
was supposed to protect the child and, in fact, it did. We saw
the injuries go down. In a full house fire, tragically, there
is nothing in a full house fire that will protect a child short
of an asbestos suit.
Mr. Ganske. I think you hit upon it, an asbestos suit. But
as a physician who has treated a lot of kids with burns, I find
that that distinction is rather artificial too. I think we are
going to hear some testimony from the Shriners and that makes,
that allows you then to play with your statistics. So when I
look at the data, okay, if I am looking at total children
burned, 1995, 1996, as to today and I see that we are dealing
with 150 percent increase and the most notable thing that has
changed in the meantime has been that we have moved to a weaker
standard, in my opinion, for fire retardant children's
sleepwear, I think that we need to look seriously at doing
something about that. And your point, though, was that in your
opinion as chairman, the position of your colleagues is set in
stone.
Ms. Brown. Absolutely.
Mr. Ganske. And that no amount of additional requests from
Congress for the commission to look at this is going to change
anybody's opinion.
Ms. Brown. That is absolutely correct. But the Congress in
its wisdom could and this I see as the only out that you could
get to have your point of view would be to have the Commission
to go back to the old standard. But I see no movement on the
Commission whatsoever in doing more work, spending more
resources, trying to talk among ourselves. We are a very
friendly group on this issue. I think it is rather set in
stone.
Mr. Ganske. I thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Tauzin. I thank the gentleman. At the request of
Congressman Shimkus, the Chair would ask unanimous consent to
include in the record a document from the Consumers Union dated
May 15, 2000 responding to his request for counsel on the child
restraint issue. Without objection that document is offered
into the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Consumers Union
May 15, 2000
Honorable John Shimkus
House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection
Dear Congressman Shimkus: Consumers Union (CU) \1\ commends you for
your efforts to improve the safety testing of child restraints and for
introducing in the House H.R. 4145, the Child Passenger Protection Act
of 2000. CU, the publisher of Consumr Reports magazine, has been
testing child restraints for over 25 years. We believe we can offer
constructive suggestions to improve the effectiveness of testing
procedures and recommend effective methods for sharing that information
with consumers.
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\1\ Consumers Union is a nonprofit membership organization
chartered in 1936 under the laws of the State of New York to provide
consumers with information, education and counsel about good, services,
health, and personal finance; and to initiate and cooperate with
individual and group efforts to maintain and enhance the quality of
life for consumers. Consumers Union's income is solely derived from the
sale of Consumer Reports, its other publications and from noncommercial
contributions, grants and fees. In addition to reports on Consumers
Union's own product testing, Consumer Reports with approximately 4.5
million paid circulation, regularly, carries articles on health,
product safety, marketplace economics and legislative, judicial and
regulatory actions which affect consumer welfare. Consumers Union's
publications carry no advertising and receive no commercial support.
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Perhaps more than any other safety concern, consumers worry about
the safety and well being of their children. Recognizing this concern,
state legislators have enacted laws In all 50 states requiring children
to be in child restraints, and many of those laws have been
strengthened in recent years. The National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration's (NHTSA) estimates that child restraints have saved
over 1500 young lives over the past five years. We believe that
consumers are more aware now than ever of the need to install child
restraint systems properly and to keep children in a restraint well
beyond their use of infant seats.
Child Restraint Testing Requirements
CU doesn't believe that a manufacturer ought to be permitted to
advertise that a restraint is safe for a child at a specific weight
unless the restraint has been tested with a dummy at that weight. In
August of 1995, CU petitioned NHTSA, asking that it revise its rules to
insure that statements on child restraint product labels and packaging
indicating maximum ``designed for use'' weights not recommend a weight
greater than that of the test dummy used in compliance tests. We also
asked NHTSA to require restraint manufacturers to test at the 30-mph
speed message as specified in the standard, with only minimum variation
permitted.
The impetus for this petition resulted from CU's testing, in which
three child safety seats failed Consumer Reports (CR) crash tests.\2\
CU noted in the September 1995 CR article, ``In our past reports on
child safety seats, we took statements of compliance with the Federal
standard as assurance of their safety. This time, we crash-tested the
seats ourselves to find out how well they perform in trials that were
similar to, but in some cases slightly tougher than, the ones the
Government specifies.''
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\2\ See Consumer Reports, September 1995. 22 of the tested models
performed well. The three models that failed were the Century 590, the
Evenflo On My Way 206 infant seats, and the Kolcraft Traveler 700
convertible seat for infants and small children. NHTSA recalled the
Kolcraft and Evenflo independently issued a recall of its own seat.
Century continued to deny there were safety problems with the seat.
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Three seats received a ``Not Acceptable'' rating. Two popular
infant seats, certified by the manufacturers as safe based on tests
with smaller, lighter dummies, but labeled for use by children up to 20
pounds, performed poorly when tested with the 20-pound dummy. A third
convertible seat failed in a forward facing position with a 33 pound
dummy--the same sized dummy used by manufacturers to meet current
government standards.\3\
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\3\ CR found that the Century 590 used with its base failed in a
test with a ``9 month-old'' 20 pound dummy, the force of the crash
causing the carrier to break away from the base. The seat performed
well without its base. The Evenflo On My Way 206 failed in tests
without its base, the force of the crash breaking the shell near one of
the hook-ups for the vehicle safety belt, leaving one side of the
carrier with the dummy strapped inside unsecured from the bench seat.
The seat performed well in tests with the ``9 month old'' dummy when
used with its detachable base. The Kolcraft Traveler 700's buckle
failed in the forward-facing position with the 33 pound dummy,
releasing the harness and allowing the dummy to strike the overhead
shield. The shield then broke away and, in one test, the dummy was
ejected from the seat. In another test, the dummy was left hanging from
the seat's harness straps. When tested in the rear facing position, the
seat performed safely. The three failing car seats were judged ``Not
Acceptable'' by the magazine.
Consumer Reports crash-tested the seats in a trial that was similar
to--but slightly tougher than--the existing government tests. Consumer
Reports tests closely parallel those used for government certification.
Each safety seat is installed securely on an automobile seat attached
to a test sled. A crash-test dummy is harnessed snugly into the seat,
and the sled then simulates a 30-mph head-on crash into a fixed barrier
while high-speed cameras track the movement of the dummy and seat.
After the crash, the integrity of the safety seat is examined. We used,
where possible, a dummy whose weight matched the manufacturer's claims
on the seat.
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CU asked the agency to reconsider its amendments to Standard 213.
``. . . [b]ased on our own testing we believe that the amendments are
insufficient to assure the safety of many children who will be the
users of seats certified and deemed safe in compliance tests conducted
in accordance with the provisions of the amended standard. Our tests
reported in the Consumer Reports rating of child safety seats will
appear in the September issue. Three models in that report are rated
Not Acceptable for safety reasons.''
We asked that NHTSA's rules be revised to reflect the following
principles:
The statements on product labels and packaging indicated
maximum ``Designed for use'' weights should not recommend a
weight greater than that of the test dummy specified in
certification and compliance tests.
Testing should match the 30-mph speed specified in the
standard, with only minimum variation permitted. Our review of
compliance reports in 1995 showed that though the existing
standard and the amended standard specified an impact of 30-
mph, the tests were regularly being conducted at speeds in a
range from 27.6 to 28.7, and that testing at 27 instead of 30
mph generated only 81% as much energy going into the crash. In
the case of one car seat, our testimony at 30-30.3 mph showed
the product failing in a catastrophic manner. We recommended
testing be required at 29.7 to 30.3 mph.
The standard should require safety for most infants who use
the product. In particular, NHTSA should revise the amended
standard to require that certification and compliance tests
specify a test dummy corresponding to the 95th-percentile size
when a maximum age user is recommended.
Product labeling and recommendations for both height and
weight should be consistent with size of the dummy used in
certification and compliance tests.
Within weeks after CU filed our petition with NHTSA in 1995, then-
NHTSA Administrator Dr. Ricardo Martinez issued a press release
stating: ``Because of Consumers Union's announcement that it had rated
three models of child seats as `not acceptable,' parents across the
country understandably are confused and concerned that the safety seat
they are using may not be safe. I want to set the record straight--
parents should have confidence in any safety seat that meets the
federal safety standard. Their safety performance has been validated
time and again in real world crashes. The agency has carefully
monitored their test performance for more than a decade.''
NHTSA rejected CU's 1995 petition and to our knowledge, it has not
to date adopted any of the recommendations CU made in that petition.
More recent testing confirms our belief that the concerns CU outlined
in 1995 remain as valid today as they were five years ago.
In Consumer Reports January 1999 issue, we published results from
our most recent tests of 28 child seats. Five seats did not pass our
tests, which initially were carried out at the 30mph speed specified by
the standard and at the maximum dummy weight recommended by the
manufacturers. With four convertible seats the head of the toddler
dummy moved forward farther than the government standard allows. We
downrated those seats and retested them at 28.5 mph. All but one passed
the second test. We rated the seat that did not pass even the second
test ``poor'' for use with a toddler. With another toddler-booster seat
combination tested at 30 mph with a 40 pound dummy--the maximum child
weight specified for use with its harness--the base cracked and the
seatback tore away. We recommended against using the seat with its
harness.
Clearly the same problems exist today as did in 1995: in tests of
child restraints conducted at the speed specified in the standard and
with dummies that weighed the maximum weight specified by the
manufacturer, some child restraints failed the tests.
We therefore ask members of this Subcommittee on
Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection, in your very worthy
efforts to improve safety standards for child restraints, to consider
directing NHTSA to make the following changes in its testing
requirements:
Revise the standard to require that statements on products
labels and packaging, indicating maximum ``Designed for use''
weights should not recommend a weight greater than that of the
test dummy specified in certification and compliance tests
unless weight has been added to the dummy to the level
recommended on the car seat. Parents and caregivers have the
right to expect such performance for children whose weight is
less than or equal to the package claims.
Revise the certification and compliance programs to require a
sled speed specified in NHTSA's Laboratory Procedure for Child
Restraint System. Testing should match the 30-mph speed
specified in the standard, with only minimum variation.
Revise the standard to require that certification and
compliance tests specify a test dummy corresponding to the 95th
percentile size when a maximum age user is recommended.
Revise labeling requirements to assure that manufacturer-
recommended heights and weights for usage of each restraint
system are consistent and match certification requirements for
that system.
Consumer Information Programs
Section 2 of H.R. 4145, the Child Passenger Protection Act of 2000,
calls for a safety rating program for child restraints. We believe that
consumer information programs serve two functions: they give consumers
reliable and accurate information about the product so they can make
rational choices for their families, and they tend to serve as an
inducement to manufacturers to improve their product. NHTSA's New Car
Assessment Program (NCAP) is a good model of a successful consumer
information program. Over a million consumers each year go to NHTSA's
website to learn about side and frontal crashworthiness of vehicles
they're considering leasing or buying and to compare vehicle crash
scores. The NCAP program also rewards manufacturers by allowing them to
achieve higher scores for safety improvements in their cars. Many
safety experts credit the NCAP program with effectively inducing
automakers to build more crashworthy cars. Despite the complaints of
the auto industry, the crashworthiness of scores of U.S. cars have
improved dramatically in the 20 years since the government started
publicizing the test results. We would hope to see similar results for
child restraints if NHTSA launches a consumer information program
devoted to testing and rating them, and making the results available to
consumers.
To our knowledge, CU is the only organization that currently tests
and rates child restraints and makes those results available to
consumers. We support the establishment of a governmental consumer
information program for child restraints, with the caveat that the
changes in NHTSA's testing as highlighted above be made a mandatory
part of any NHTSA consumer information program. If NHTSA is to test
child restraints, the agency must do so at the speed specified in the
regulations and using dummies whose weight is the maximum weight
recommended by the manufacturer of the child restraint.
We greatly appreciate the opportunity to share Consumers Union's
with members of this Subcommittee and commend you for your work on this
issue of critical importance to child safety. We look forward to
working with you.
Sincerely,
Sally Greenberg
Senior Product Safety Counsel
Mr. Tauzin. I would also like to, for the record, inform
the committee that young Daniel was accompanying our friend Mr.
Shimkus today because his wife is attending the first lady's
luncheon today. So this is his child duty day. The Chair is now
pleased to welcome and recognize for 5 minutes the gentleman
from Florida, Mr. Stearns.
Mr. Stearns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
again for holding this hearing. I think I'd like to address
most of my questions to H.R. 3032. Ms. Gall, if you could
answer this question: Since permanent fixed-based amusement
sites are unlike carnivals or fairs and never leave the
boundaries of their State, would ride safety be better left to
those individual States to regulate or the Federal Government?
Ms. Gall. Well, it seems to me most of the States are
addressing those issues right now. We would have to look at the
other materials. As I have stated before, we have to look at
the increased incidents and see whether there is an increased
hazard that perhaps is not addressed by the States. There are a
host of other factors as well. But certainly from my philosophy
and because I haven't seen anything to change my mind about
that at this point, it would seem to me that the States would
be adequately addressing it.
When you look at the numbers of injuries and deaths on
fixed-site amusement rides and compare it with other
recreational activities that come under the jurisdiction of
CPSC, the incidence of death and injury is much lower on fixed-
site amusement rides than it is with other issues that come
before the commission with other regulated consumer products.
Mr. Stearns. Maybe a logical question would be which States
are doing a good job of overseeing and regulating fixed
amusement and which States are not maybe.
Ms. Gall. And I don't know that we know that at this point.
I certainly don't. And I don't think we have sufficient data
before the commission to make that determination.
Mr. Stearns. Ms. Brown, do you have any information to
identify which States are?
Ms. Brown. Yes, I do.
Mr. Stearns. Do you have that?
Ms. Brown. We will provide that for you, Mr. Stearns. There
is a patchwork of regulations, not only do some States not
regulate, but they are different in what they do. I think what
we are talking about here is, in effect, a Federal-State
partnership. This regulation would provide for people to more
thoroughly and better help regulation in their own State. We
would be enhancing what the States would do by having a central
data source so that they would know about different issues and
also know about different kinds of problems and have more
standardized kinds of tests that they could perform. It isn't
that we are trying to take anything away from the States, and I
may say that in 1981 when the jurisdiction was taken away from
us, it was not given to the States. It just meant that there
was no Federal regulation at all on fixed-site rides.
[The following was received for the record:]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
States with NO Fixed-Site
States with NO Fixed-site Ride Regulations Rides Operating in the
or Statutes* States**
------------------------------------------------------------------------
District of Columbia District of Columbia
Montana Montana
North Dakota North Dakota
South Dakota South Dakota
Utah Utah
Kansas
Missouri
Mississippi
Arizona
Alabama
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTE:
*Per Oct 1999 USCPSC Directory of State Amusement Ride Safety Officials
**Per IAAPA Membership Directory
Mr. Stearns. I think your idea about data collection is
good. I think what some of us are concerned about is a new
budget, a new bureaucracy set up. I think the industry itself,
they are self-regulation, in many ways might exceed what the
Federal Government would provide. And I think this was touched
on earlier about the legislation's proposing to spend 500,000
annually. Yet it has been reported by the Consumer Product
Safety Commission that it would cost a minimum of $5 million.
Additionally, the State of California alone currently
appropriates $24 million for ride safety review. So the bill
when it says it is only going to be $500,000 and the State of
California is spending $24 million, what we are all worried
about is that you would set up not only a data collecting
commission but a huge bureaucracy with inspectors, and this
would go on and on.
Ms. Gall pointed out that a lot of the States are pointed
doing a great job. So if we identify just those few States that
are not doing a good job, why don't we talk to those people and
let them put in the industry self-regulation, which has been
very successful in all these other States without a huge new
appropriations of money and also bureaucracy.
Here's another question here. Does the Consumer Product
Safety Commission along with ride manufacturers sit on the
appropriate American Society for Testing and Materials
committee? I guess, Ms., Gall would you say would that possibly
be a better review board than the Consumer Product Safety
Commission?
Ms. Gall. Certainly the ASTM does have voluntary standards
that does address some aspects of fixed-site amusement rides.
And they are looking at some additional issues, as I mentioned
earlier, the G force issue, the number of Gs that someone would
experience and the length of time that they would experience
that G force. Congress has told us repeatedly over the years
this commission has been in business to look to voluntary
standards first whenever possible and then to manditory
standards when voluntary standards fail.
Ms. Brown. We are prevented from sitting on that task
force, of the ASTM task force, if it has anything to do with
fixed-site amusement rides. We are particularly prohibited by
Congress from expending any resources on fixed-site amusement
rides.
Mr. Stearns. Let's say you have 300 to 400 million people
riding fixed-base amusement rides. So that is anywhere from a
billion rides or more every year. I mean, considering what has
occurred in these fixed amusements and that huge numbers and
that repetition it seems to me that individual States are doing
a remarkably good job. And I think we have got to be careful to
go out and propose a whole new appropriation and whole new
bureaucracy and regulation when it appears that most of the
States are doing it.
So, Mr. Chairman, I urge this committee not look at H.R.
3032 as a panacea here, but I think the chairlady, Ms. Brown,
has touched upon possibly something which is a compromise
language which would be a data collection that might be
helpful. But possibly the States themselves that do not have
the State regulation could go ahead and do it. I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. Tauzin. I thank the gentleman. Chair is now pleased to
recognize the gentlelady, Ms. Cubin, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Cubin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a couple
questions. One for--actually both for Ms. Millman. It is
estimated that 80 to 90 percent of children are not properly
restrained. Isn't that an area where NHTSA could be more
active? Education and those kind of things?
Ms. Millman. Yes, that is the number that we typically use.
About 80 percent of the car seats are installed improperly.
Now, that can be minor things or it could be major things.
Mrs. Cubin. What have you done to date to address that
problem?
Ms. Millman. Probably the most important thing is that we
have developed with partners a standardized curriculum for a
certification in child protection. Over 5,000 people have taken
that course and achieved the certification. These are people
that conduct safety seat checks. They will inspect the seat,
make sure it is not a seat that has been recalled, and check
the installation of it and also how the parents are putting the
child in the seat.
Mrs. Cubin. Five thousand doesn't seem like very many,
since the statistic has been out there for quite a long time,
it seems to me. So I would hope that would continue and maybe
expand that, maybe do even more.
Ms. Millman. If I could add, that is just one part. The
other part of our effort in that area is the uniform attachment
system that will be fully implemented by September 1, 2002.
This system means that every seat will connect to every car in
the same way. That will help eliminate part of the installation
problem.
Mrs. Cubin. In your testimony, you stated that NHTSA tested
every new seat and model in the year that it is introduced. So
doesn't that mean that for up to 12 months before you even--
that the seats could be used for up to 12 months before they
have even been tested? Is that right?
Ms. Millman. The general framework that we use in our
standards is that the manufacturer certifies to us that their
product meets or exceeds all of the minimums that are laid out
in our standards.
Mrs. Cubin. Would you--I am sorry. Would you repeat that.
Ms. Millman. The framework that we use in general in our
regulations is the manufacturer certifies to us that their
product meets or exceeds the minimum standards in the
regulation.
Mrs. Cubin. I think it has been widely documented that a
significant number of child safety seats fail compliance tests
and have to be recalled after they have already appeared in
retail stores. So if there is no need for legislative action in
this area, how do you explain--I mean, to me it seems like
waiting 12 months is waiting too long even though the
manufacturer certifies it. Then if your own tests show a
significant number to be recalled, it seems like you ought to
be more ahead of this problem rather than behind it.
Ms. Millman. Not to quibble but the test is within the year
that it is introduced, so 12 months would be the maximum. But
we agree that we want to make the program as strong as it can
possibly be. That is why we look forward to working with the
committee.
Mrs. Cubin. Ms. Gall, you were referring to G force and the
possible injuries or situations resulting from G force. Do you
think anywhere near the adequate amount of study has been done
on that to be passing regulations that result in----
Ms. Gall. Well, as I said before, it seems to me that not
only do we need to look at the number of Gs but also the amount
of time that an individual is exposed to that number of Gs.
Mrs. Cubin. Has that been done?
Ms. Gall. I don't know that that has been explored in any
detail as of yet by the ASTM committee. I know they have
received data on it and they are taking a look at it. Beyond
that I can't really comment.
Ms. Brown. There is a new study just issued by the National
Institute of Neurological Disorders and Strokes, which
documented numerous cases of brain injury suffered by riders
during normal operation of roller coasters and similar
amusement rides. The study reported cases 15 cases, 14 of which
occurred in the 1990's where routine roller coaster incidents
resulted in brain trauma, internal bleeding, and neurological
change.
Mrs. Cubin. Is that the only study?
Ms. Brown. That is the only study I know of to date. There
may be others.
Mrs. Cubin. So it wouldn't be unreasonable to say maybe it
is too early to make a decision of the effect of G force.
Ms. Gall. I think there are a number of things we have to
look at and that is one of them.
Mrs. Cubin. Would you agree with that, Mr. Moore?
Mr. Moore. Yes, indeed.
Mrs. Cubin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Tauzin. There are no other members so the Chair
recognizes himself quickly for a separate round, then I will
recognize any of the members in order. Ms. Millman, I mentioned
to you earlier that I wanted to ask you a couple of questions
about the child safety restraints.
First, let me thank you as I know other members have for
introducing the next generation of the crash test dummies to
the scene, because obviously that is a major step forward. We
thank you for that. In regard to the testing, however, how do
you account for the fact that child safety seats performed
differently in various models in motor vehicles? Why does that
occur and why--how is that information being, you know, given
to consumers, or is it?
Ms. Millman. I would like to have Steve Kratzke answer that
for you.
Mr. Tauzin. Identify yourself for the record, sir.
Mr. Kratzke. I am Steve Kratzke; I am in charge of our
safety standards.
Mr. Tauzin. If you can, first of all obviously there are
different performances by the safety seats in different model
vehicles. And I was asking why is that? Can you tell us why
that is true, and, second, is that information given to
consumers?
Mr. Kratzke. The first part of it is the safety seat
performs in a complex environment. It has the vehicle
attributes--if you are in a pickup or sport utility, you will
experience different forces in a crash than if you are in a
small car. There are parts of the interior that you may or may
not contact during that. The seat itself if it is exposed to
the same forces will do the same things. That is what we do in
our testing. However, it performs differently in different
vehicles because the vehicles perform differently. One of the
things we are looking at right now in response to the
comprehensive plan is if we can develop a way to give
information about performance in particular vehicles. So it is
not something that we know right now exactly how would you do
that.
Mr. Tauzin. You know there are differences, but you are not
yet prepared to advise consumers as to what seat performs
better in each vehicle. You want to get there?
Mr. Kratzke. Yes, we do want to get there.
Mr. Tauzin. I would suggest that would be a critical
important bit of information for consumers. If John Shimkus is
buying a car seat for his child, Daniel, and he drives a
particular vehicle, it would be incredibly good for him to know
that the seat purchased performs best in that vehicle and that
perhaps the seat that otherwise is rated well, may not perform
as well in that vehicle.
Mr. Kratzke. One of the things we are really trying to
understand is how much of it is just the vehicle performance.
What is different about child seats? If we can tell you that
this vehicle is exceptional protection in a side impact and
average impact in a frontal impact, and it does the same thing
where the child seat in there, we are trying to see if we can
do that. But the question I thought you were driving at is
beyond the vehicle performance differences, and that part we
don't know, how to get to, but we are trying to.
Mr. Tauzin. Regardless of what the causes are for a safety
restraint to perform better in one vehicle or another, it just
seems to me that is a critical piece of information for
consumers not only when they are purchasing a vehicle, but when
they are making a decision on which one of the car seats they
are going to purchase for their children.
Ms. Millman. We agree. I just want to emphasize that our
standards are the minimums. And a seat that is on the market
meets or exceeds the minimum standards. So what we are looking
at is providing information about by how much a particular seat
would exceed the minimum standards.
Mr. Tauzin. I am sure you know parents probably--given a
choice for a seat that protects beyond the minimum--might want
to do that. And given information that the car they are driving
or the truck they are driving the seat performs better there
than somewhere else might be very valuable. We are going to
hear testimony from Mr. Baloga later on that roll-overs by
their very nature are very difficult to replicate in a
scientific action. Is that the reason why you don't have a
separate roll-over end cap rating?
Ms. Millman. I am very glad that you asked that because we
are about to unveil a proposal that would do just that. We
believe that we have come up with a way that we can rate
vehicles based on their propensity to roll over and we hope to
provide that information along with the star ratings that we
provide on our crash tests.
I would also like to draw your attention to the pamphlet in
the information packet that we provided, which is called Buying
a Safer Car for Child Passengers. This includes the discussion
of safety features that parents and caregivers can look for
when they are comparing vehicles and includes our crash test
ratings.
Mr. Tauzin. If somebody wants that pamphlet, how do they
get it?
Ms. Millman. The information is on our Web site at
www.nhtsa.dot.gov and also we have a hotline. They can call,
and we will mail the pamphlet to them.
Mr. Tauzin. That hotline is?
Ms. Millman. 1-800-DASH2DOT.
Mr. Tauzin. Thank you. Mr. Markey.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. I am going
to return again to this issue of roller coasters. And I am
going to introduce some startling statistics in terms----
Ms. Brown. What kinds of statistics?
Mr. Markey. Startling.
Mr. Tauzin. It is Boston for ``startling.''
Mr. Markey. You all sound funny to me. When President
Kennedy sounded like this, everybody thought it was charming.
When it comes out of my mouth, it doesn't sound quite so.
Mr. Tauzin. Confusing is the word.
Mr. Markey. So the numbers that have been gathered actually
by the Consumer Product Safety Commission on the number of
injuries requiring emergency room treatment over the last 5
years, gives us all great reason to be concerned about what is
happening. In your own survey, looking at mobile sites, mobile
roller coasters, over which you do have jurisdiction, the
number of emergency room visits related to roller coaster
accidents at those sights has risen since 1994 to 1998 from
2000 to 2100. Not that large of an increase.
However, on the fixed-site roller coasters, over which you
have no jurisdiction, the number of emergency room visits has
risen from 2,400 to 4,500 in just those 5 years. A near
doubling of emergency room visits by those who have been
injured on these roller coasters. Now, here is the next
interesting fact about it. Who is injured on roller coasters
and other amusement park rides? This is the interesting
statistic. Children are injured on roller coasters. Children
who are 1----
Ms. Brown. Can you move the water.
Mr. Markey. Children who are 1 or under have very few
injuries. But beginning at age 2, there is a huge spike. That
continues all the way through approximately age 13 or so,
related, I think, to a certain extent to more reckless
behavior, if there is an absence of already industry provided
safety protection and the additional vulnerability that those
younger children might have to neurological injury because they
are not yet fully developed. So these statistics are a
blistering, scalding indictment of the roller coaster industry.
A doubling of the injuries, almost all of them concentrated
among children ages 2 to 13, an objection to any coordinated
national effort to ensure that information about the flaws
about the defects in a roller coaster in one State being shared
with all of the other roller coaster operators across the rest
of the country. An actual opposition to any Federal role in
ensuring that there are proper inspections when an accident has
already occurred so that that information can be shared the way
we do with buses and trains and planes and other vehicles.
I find this to be something as we head into this vacation
summer, very very troubling. We are going to wind up in a
situation in which parents again put their kids in a station
wagon, head toward States which I am afraid they are going to
assume have safety standards in place, but not knowing that an
accident that may have occurred in one State has not in fact
now been communicated to another State and no requirement that
they provide for the safety protections that could prevent a
young girl or a young boy from suffering the same injury.
Now, people can say, well, this isn't like handgun control
or some other issue or 30,000 people may be harmed in the
course of a year. But for every family with every child who is
seriously injured it changes the fate, the destiny of that
family. It has a profound impact. And we are now talking about
4,500 children for the most part per year. And this just is a
survey of 100 hospitals by the Consumer Product Safety
Commission. I think it vastly understates the number of
children who are visiting hospitals after taking these roller
coaster rides. Remember, this is after the amusement park
operators have done everything that they can to treat the child
onsite with their own nurses, with their own doctors so the
family wouldn't have to take the child to an emergency room.
So my hope is that this committee and ultimately the
Consumer Product Safety Commission will do what is right for
those families as they get in their station wagons or SUVs this
summer so that we don't see a continued increase in the number
of injuries, which I am afraid we are going to and the number
of deaths which are also skyrocketing from numbers of 20 and 30
years ago when we rode on this relatively slow 50-mile-an-hour
roller coasters.
So this is, I think, a great opportunity for the Congress.
I would be honest with you that I think it is a big mistake for
Congress to give up jurisdiction over this subject and to just
trust the States because this is one subject in which the
States are letting ordinary families down. Thousands of
children are being injured every year as the States turn a
blind eye and the Federal Government turns a blind eye to the
safety risks for those families across this country. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Tauzin. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Mr.
Mississippi, Mr. Pickering for 5 minutes.
Mr. Pickering. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is always
difficult to compete with my good friend, Mr. Shimkus from
Illinois, with his one baby. I started to bring my five today
but was concerned it would be too disruptive. It is good to
have Commissioner Moore here and the other commissioners, and I
appreciate their testimony.
Let me ask Commissioner Moore, having read your statement
on the proposed revocation of the children's sleepwear
amendments, a few questions. And I realize our time is brief
because of votes. I was struck that you stated that there is no
data or any baseline figures upon which to base whether there
has been a reduction in risk or burns or injuries after the
adoption of the original standard. Is that correct?
Mr. Moore. That is correct because we did not have the
system, the emergency room data collection system, in place at
that time.
Mr. Pickering. Are there any other--were there Shriners or
consumer groups or outside groups that have any data or
information that they have submitted on the increased rate of
injury or burn?
Mr. Moore. They have submitted some data, but I think it is
very important, it is critical to understand that many times--
and I will have our staff speak to this--that when we are
talking about this data, the Shriners and ourselves are not
talking in the same direction. They are talking about, in many
cases, house fires and we are talking about 3-second small open
flame contact by a child. That is what we are trying to protect
a child against. Not from a house fire. There is no product out
there that can protect a child from a conflagration fire in a
home. And many times that is important to understand. It is
critical to understand what we are talking about. And I'd like
our staff people who have been looking at the data to respond
to that question about the data.
Mr. Tauzin. Again, identify yourself for the record, sir.
Mr. Medford. Ron Medford, Consumer Product Safety
Commission. At the time that the original sleepwear standard
was promulgated in early 1970, actually by the Department of
Commerce, there were no national statistics kept on fire
incidents. There is a known statistic that exists for the total
number of fires involving clothing of all types, not just
sleepwear in 1970, and that was referenced earlier. That number
was 60 at the time the sleepwear standards were issued. No one
knew then and really not today the number of deaths that are
caused or related to sleepwear. We do know that the number is
about two or three deaths per year today related to all
clothing. That is sleepwear and daywear, general wearing
apparel. That is the total number that exists. The biggest
confusion----
Mr. Pickering. Of those two to three, you would not know if
it was daywear or sleepwear.
Mr. Medford. That is right, we don't. You do not know. The
main confusion revolving around the sleepwear standard has to
do with what the standard was initially intended to prevent and
what it was not intended to prevent. It was only intended to
prevent the application of a very small flame for 3 seconds
directly on the sleepwear, which is called the first item
ignited. That is the only kind of injury it was intended to
prevent. The kinds of cases that have been referred to time and
time again by the Shriners and investigated in every instance
by the commission staff wherever we get permission from the
parents to investigate has shown that those fires are not those
that are intended to be addressed by the sleepwear standard.
That is really where the confusion lies.
Mr. Pickering. Let me ask if there is common ground upon
which we can all agree. Are there educational initiatives or
efforts? When will the labeling requirements take effect? Will
that be something where all sides can agree and take part in
efforts to reduce the two or three deaths that we are now
seeing related whether it is to sleepwear or daywear? And I
know with five children, many times my wife and I by the end of
the day we just want the easiest thing possible to put our
children in. If it is a big T-shirt or a T-shirt that we just
throw them if that and put them in bed and thank God that the
day is over. But what can we do from an educational initiative
and effort and when will the labeling requirements and will
that help parents as they try to protect their children, as I
try to do that for my own children?
Mr. Moore. Well, we expect an educational campaign. The
industry is willing to participate in an information and
education campaign. As I indicated, they are ready to go
forward at any time with that. And we expect them to go forward
with that at least by I think it is June, I believe, in this
year. Yes, by June of this year. We have been making changes in
the product. That is one reason why to date there has not been
a national information and education campaign. But such a
campaign will get under way in June.
Mr. Pickering. Okay. Mr. Chairman, that is good to hear. I
know that we are out of time. I have one question on the
amusement park issue that I would like to submit to the record.
Mr. Tauzin. Without objection the record will stay open for
30 days and members can submit written questions. We hope the
witnesses will respond in that time. I thank the gentleman. I
am going to dismiss this panel as we go to this vote. But let
me make one point by way of advertisement to our viewers, sort
of a commercial announcement. When we come back, we will hear
from a seven-member panel, one of whom, representing the
International Association of Amusement Parks and Attractions,
will say as he has said for the record that the Consumer
Product Safety Commission staff indicated to them that the
enormous increase in accidents reported by Mr. Markey was not
the result of an actual increase in the number of accidents,
but was a result of a change in methodology at the commission
and that an independent analysis produced different results.
Before I leave, would the commission like to speak to that
allegation?
Ms. Brown. Mr. Chairman, what happens is that we have 101
hospitals in our system. That gives us statistically
significant results.
Mr. Tauzin. But you added 30 hospitals, didn't you?
Ms. Brown. Which doesn't change, except in one way which I
will explain. What happens is if there is a hospital that is
near an amusement park, it may get the more injuries and others
less. Therefore, under this system the number of injuries are
underreported, they are not overreported.
Mr. Tauzin. It is not the question of the number of
injuries that the gentleman will complain about. It is the fact
that statistically there may not have been a jump of 54 percent
in the year 1995, 1996; that that increase may have been the
result of simply a change in the methodology. At least that is
what he is going to say. The staff of your own agency informed
his association.
Ms. Brown. I think he may have misunderstood.
Mr. Medford. Every few years the commission redraws a new
sample of hospitals to update the most current population of
emergency room-based hospitals in the country. And when you do
that, some hospitals that are in your system move out and some
new ones come in.
Mr. Tauzin. So you move 30 in in that period; and his claim
is that by moving the hospitals around, it artificially changed
the results. But the bottom line is I have to go vote.
Ms. Brown. We disagree.
Mr. Tauzin. It will be interesting to hear. So as a
commercial announcement, please come back after we resume after
this vote. We are voting on my military construction final
passage. Let me thank this panel. Please respond in writing.
You have 30 days to do so if you have additional comments, and
the record will stay open for additional written comments.
Thanks a great deal. You have added immeasurably to our store
of knowledge. The committee stands in recess for 15 minutes.
[Brief recess.]
Mr. Tauzin. The subcommittee will please come back in
order. Let me ask our guests to take seats and to cease
conversations. I have a very important announcement to make and
that is that I think we gave you the wrong phone number to get
that wonderful pamphlet on how to find a safe car with the
right safety features for your children. I wanted to give the
correct number out.
The correct number for the hotline to receive those nice
pamphlets and help consumers make good decisions about child
safety in the car is 1-888-347-4236. So it is 1-888-347-4236.
And if you are on the Internet, and you want to contact the
National Highway and Traffic Administration for this
information, it is www.NHTSA.DOT.gov. Again, it is
www.NHTSA.DOT.gov for that same information on the Internet.
We are pleased to welcome now our second panel, which
consists of seven folks, beginning with Ms. Judith Lee Stone,
president of Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety; Tom Baloga,
president of Britax Child Safety Incorporated; Dr. Malcolm
Currie of Currie Technologies; Dr. David Herndon of the
Shriners Burns Hospital in Galveston Texas; Dr. Phillip
Wakelyn, the senior scientist, National Cotton Council; Mrs.
Kathy Fackler of La Jolla California; and Mr. John Graff,
president and CEO of International Association of Amusement
Parks and Attractions, the gentleman I mentioned earlier.
We will start with Ms. Judith Stone, president of Advocates
for Highway and Auto Safety. Ladies and gentlemen, the rules of
our committee are that your testimony has by unanimous consent
been made a part of the record. So you needn't read it all to
us. We would like you to use the 5 minutes allotted to you to
highlight the chief points you want to make in your oral
testimony for us today so as members rejoin us we can get into
a good Q&A session with you. Ms. Stone.
STATEMENTS OF JUDITH LEE STONE, PRESIDENT, ADVOCATES FOR
HIGHWAY AND AUTO SAFETY; TOM BALOGA, PRESIDENT, BRITAX CHILD
SAFETY, INC.; MALCOLM R. CURRIE, PRESIDENT AND CEO, CURRIE
TECHNOLOGIES; DAVID N. HERNDON, CHIEF OF STAFF AND DIRECTOR OF
RESEARCH, SHRINERS BURNS HOSPITAL; PHILLIP J. WAKELYN, PHD,
SENIOR SCIENTIST, ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND SAFETY, NATIONAL
COTTON COUNCIL; KATHY FACKLER; AND JOHN GRAFF, PRESIDENT AND
CEO, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF AMUSEMENT PARKS AND
ATTRACTIONS
Ms. Stone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am Judith Lee Stone,
and president of Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety. We call
our self Advocates, so you may hear that in the testimony. I am
testifying today in support of the Child Passenger Protection
Act of 2000 because it is an important first step in attempting
to address areas that need to be improved.
If enacted into law, H.R. 4145 would require NHTSA to
consider the need for more comprehensive testing procedures
including dynamic testing that simulates different crash modes
and the need to use additional child test dummies. The bill
would require the resulting regulations to minimize child head
injuries, inside impact and in roll-over crashes and to require
in vehicle testing as part of a the New Car Assessment Program.
We support most of these proposals. Child restraint performance
is tested on a laboratory sled, not in a full vehicle crash
test. Add-on child restraints, the most prevalent restraints
purchased in the U.S. Are secured to old- style 1950's standard
bench seats and for built in-child restraints the seat is
placed in a partial vehicle shell. Both are mounted on the sled
for testing.
Although this is referred to as dynamic testing, sled
testing merely simulates crash forces when the sled is suddenly
decelerated. Since it does not involve a full vehicle in an
actual crash, the sled test does not provide information on the
interaction between the child, the child restraint and the
vehicle interior under real-world crash conditions. Such
testing should include consideration of an array of crash modes
as provided in the bill geared toward minimizing head injuries
to children, especially side impact crashes. Current sled
testing only simulates head-on full frontal crashes. Head and
neck injuries also occur in side impact crashes and roll-overs.
The side impact aspect is particularly important as child
restraints have no current injury requirement for side impact
protection. This is a problem because child restraints that are
now secured with vehicle seat belts are frequently placed in
the rear outboard seating positions in order to take advantage
of the 3-point lap shoulder belts which are typically provided
in the outboard but not the center seating position. In the
future, child restraints will be secured in the rear outboard
seating positions because NHTSA recently adopted a uniform
anchorage system for child restraints which goes into effect in
the year 2001. The NHTSA rule requires two sets of lower
anchorages in the rear set which will most likely only permit
child restraints to be secured in the outboard seating
positions.
Advocates also supports the need to update and improve the
child test dummies currently available for child restraint
testing. Each type of child restraint should be tested with
instrumented dummies at the high and low end of each size and
weight range recommended by the manufacturer. NHTSA is adopting
a new set of more advanced test dummies, the hybrid 3 for use
in evaluating performance requirements in connection with seat
belts and air bags under the occupant protection standard. This
set of better-instrumented, more advanced test devices should
quickly be made part of the testing requirements under the
child restraint standard.
The agency should as part of the rulemaking revise standard
213, the child restraint standard, to comport with the injury
criteria adopted for child dummy testing for air bags and
consider the need to add a neck injury criterion similar to
that adopted in the standard 208.
While Advocates supports real-world dynamic testing in
vehicles to ensure safety, we are not sure what approach is
best to achieve this purpose. Using vehicles crash tested as
part of NCAP is appealing because NHTSA already conducts both
frontal and side impact crash testing in this program. However,
we perceive several pitfalls with using NCAP. Only about 40 or
so crash tests are conducted under NCAP in a given year,
limiting the number of child restraints that could be tested in
this manner. NCAP is a consumer information program which
conducts crash testing at 35 miles per hour, higher than the
current 30-mile-per-hour maximum test speed. This would not be
appropriate for compliance testing conducted to determine
whether child restraints meet performance requirements in
safety standard 213.
Finally, NCAP testing is conducted with no seat in the back
of the vehicle which is where the instrumentation to report the
crash is placed, posing both logistical and financial problems
for NHTSA. Alternatively, child restraint manufacturers could
contract either with private crash test centers or with the
vehicle manufacturers to place child restraints in the rear
seats of vehicles that are going to be crash tested.
At a minimum a limited testing program to validate child
restraint performance in the sled test should be conducted.
NHTSA should evaluate which option promotes child restraint
safety.
I want to move to booster seats. Advocates wholeheartedly
supports the language in this bill that would require
consideration of protection for children who weigh more than 50
pounds. Children roughly between the ages of 4 and 8 years and
older are disenfranchised under both State restraint laws and
Federal occupant protection requirements. I see the red light.
I will try to move as quickly as I can.
As regards consumer information, which is a very important
area, we think that labels for child restraints should be
written in a language that is readily understandable. We also
believe that the ratings system, a child restraint rating
system, is another important step in the bill that Advocates
does support. There are several elements about that that we
could discuss perhaps later on. I would like to close by just
saying that it is important for child restraint manufacturers
to inform the public about which vehicle models are not
compatible with their child restraints. Each child restraint
package should be clearly labeled with this information so the
consumers do not mistakenly purchase restraints that are
incompatible with their vehicle. I really believe also that
child restraint manufacturers could share that information with
NHTSA, who in turn could publish it for consumers. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Judith Lee Stone follows:]
Prepared Statement of Judith Lee Stone, President, Advocates for
Highway and Auto Safety
INTRODUCTION
Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee on
Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection. My name is Judith
Lee Stone, I am President of Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety
(Advocates), a coalition of consumer, health and safety groups and
insurance organizations working together to reduce motor vehicle deaths
and injuries.
Since its inception in 1989, Advocates has been involved in all
aspects of child safety and protection issues in motor vehicles.
Advocates has conducted campaigns to promote child safety and child
restraint use including the ``Children At Risk'' campaign in 1993 and
the ``Kids, Cars and Crashes'' campaign launched in 1996. Advocates has
been in the forefront of efforts to enact state laws to improve child
safety in motor vehicles including amendments to close the gaps in
existing state child restraint laws. Despite many efforts, there
remains a long list of states whose occupant protection laws do not
cover all ages of children in every seating position. (See attached
chart). We have filed regulatory comments with the National highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) on a wide variety of important
child safety rules issued by that agency. Advocates has also worked to
include child safety protection provisions in federal legislation such
as the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA)
and the Transportation Efficiency Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21).
Most recently, I personally participated as a member of the Department
of Transportation's Blue Ribbon Panel--Protecting Our Older Child
Passengers--which issued a set of recommendations one year ago. I also
serve as a member of the Advisory Board of ``Partners for Child
Passenger Safety,'' a ground breaking research project at Children's
Hospital of Philadelphia supported by State Farm Insurance.
Advocates is well aware of the need for child safety and we have
documented that this concern is shared by the American public. In a
1999 poll commissioned by Advocates, the eminent pollster Lou Harris
found that 93% of the American public overwhelmingly supports the
federal government in their quest to set highway and auto safety
standards, including standards for child safety. A 1998 Lou Harris poll
showed that 90% of the public want better enforcement of child safety
seat laws.
PAST IS PRELUDE
In the last 20 years there has been extraordinary progress in motor
vehicle child safety, with improved child safety seat protection and
adoption of state laws requiring their use. But the more we know, the
more we are compelled to act in order to ensure maximum protection for
all children of all ages, on every ride in a motor vehicle. NHTSA has
been in the lead on improving child safety in a number of ways. For
example, several years ago, the agency required child restraint
manufacturers to determine the recommended use of their restraints in
ranges of height and weight based on testing with different sizes of
child dummies. More recently, NHTSA issued a rule to require a new
system of child restraint anchorages in order to reduce the chances of
incorrect installation of child restraints. New vehicles are already
being produced with ready-to-use upper tether anchorages that will
secure the top of the child restraint to the vehicle chasis. By 2002,
all new vehicles will be required to have the new set of lower
anchorages that will allow child restraints to be installed without the
use of the adult lap belt or lap/shoulder belt.
While the record of NHTSA is commendable in certain respects, and
Advocates has supported them, there are areas of child safety in which
the agency has not taken action. First, the testing of child restraints
should be upgraded. Second, little has been done to provide protection
for the so-called ``forgotten child,'' between approximately 4 and 8
years old, who is too old or large for child restraints and too young
or small for adult seat belts. In this respect, Section 2503 of ISTEA,
which Advocates lobbied Congress to adopt, required that the agency
address in regulation the ``safety of child booster seats used in
passenger cars and other appropriate motor vehicles.'' In response,
NHTSA made a change in the rules to permit the use of belt-adjusting
booster seats without an overhead tether, but has taken no other
regulatory action to address the need for booster seat performance and
use. Finally, the agency has not adequately addressed the need for
consumer information on child restraints and child safety. I would
point out that the lack of adequate resources to pursue safety in all
areas is one of the major reasons for this deficiency.
Advocates addressed several aspects of the child restraint issue in
our 1999 safety report entitled ``Stuck In Neutral--Recommendations For
Shifting The Highway And Auto Safety Agenda Into High Gear,'' which I
would like to submit for the record. I have provided the committee with
several copies of the report. With respect to child restraints the
report concluded that NHTSA should take action on the following four
recommendations:
1) expand the scope of the child restraint standard to children who
weigh 80 pounds;
2) establish minimum requirements for child booster seats and belt-
adjusting devices;
3) develop a child test dummy that is representative of a 10-year-old
child; and,
4) require that child restraints be dynamically [crash] tested.
Provisions in H.R. 4145 would require NHTSA to address these
recommendations.
CHILD PASSENGER PROTECTION ACT OF 2000--H.R. 4145
I am testifying before you today in support of the Child Passenger
Protection Act of 2000, H.R. 4145, because it is an important first
step in attempting to address the three areas mentioned above that need
to be improved. The bill would direct NHTSA to conduct rulemaking to
improve child restraint testing and performance, address the protection
of children who weigh more than the 50 pound limit in the current child
restraint safety standard, and require understandable labels and safety
ratings for child restraints. Advocates supports the effort to put
these issues on the front burner of the agency's rulemaking agenda.
TESTING REQUIREMENTS
If enacted into law, H.R. 4145 would require the NHTSA to consider
the need for more comprehensive testing procedures including dynamic
testing that simulates different crash modes and the need to use
additional child test dummies. The bill would require the resulting
regulations to minimize child head injuries in side-impact and in
rollover crashes and to require in-vehicle testing as part of the New
Car Assessment Program (NCAP). We support most of these proposals.
There is no doubt that there is room for improvement when it comes
to the current methods of child restraint testing. Child restraint
performance is tested on a laboratory sled, not in a full vehicle crash
test. Add-on (after-market) child restraints, the most prevalent
restraints purchased in the U.S. are secured to old style, 1950s
standard bench seats, and for built-in child restraints the seat is
placed in a partial vehicle shell. Both are mounted on the sled for
testing. Although this is referred to as dynamic testing, sled testing
merely simulates crash forces when the sled is suddenly decelerated.
Since it does not involve a full vehicle in an actual crash, the sled
test does not provide information on the interaction between the child,
the child restraint, and the vehicle interior under real-world crash
conditions. Advocates supports the provision in H.R.4145 that requires
consideration of the need to conduct more comprehensive and real-world
dynamic testing of child restraints.
Such testing should include consideration of an array of crash
modes, as provided in the bill, geared toward minimizing head injuries
to children, especially in side-impact crashes. The current sled
testing only simulates head-on, full frontal crashes. Head and neck
injuries also occur in side-impact crashes and rollovers. The side-
impact aspect is particularly important as child restraints have no
current injury requirement for side impact protection. This is a
problem because child restraints that are now secured with vehicle seat
belts are frequently placed in the rear outboard seating positions in
order to take advantage of the three-point, lap/shoulder belts which
are typically provided in the outboard, but not the center, seating
positions. In the future, child restraints will be secured in the rear
outboard seating positions because NHTSA recently adopted a uniform
anchorage system for child restraints, which goes into effect in 2001.
The NHTSA rule requires two sets of lower anchorages in the rear seat
which will most likely only permit child restraints to be secured in
the outboard seating positions.
Dynamic side-impact testing is also necessary to ensure that
interactions between side-impact air bags, now being introduced in the
market, and children placed in outboard seating positions, are safe and
compatible for children secured in child restraints, in seat belts, as
well as for unrestrained child passengers.
Advocates also supports the need to update and improve the child
test dummies currently available for child restraint testing. Each type
of child restraint--rear facing infant, adjustable, forward facing
toddler and booster seats--should be tested with instrumented dummies
at the high and low end of each size and weight range recommended by
the manufacturer. In general, NHTSA is adopting a new set of more
advanced test dummies, the Hybrid-III test dummies, for use in
evaluating performance requirements in connection with seat belts and
air bags under the Occupant Protection Standard (Safety Standard 208).
This set of better instrumented, more advanced test devices should
quickly be made part of the testing requirements under the Child
Restraint Standard (Safety Standard 213). In addition, the existing 9-
month-old child test dummy should only be used for testing infant
restraints, but it is not large enough to be used to test forward
facing child restraints. A slightly larger 12-month-old test dummy
should be used for testing forward facing child restraints. The Child
Restraint Air Bag Interaction, or CRABI-12 test dummy representing a
one-year-old child was recently added to the test dummies listed in
Part 572, Anthropomorphic Test Dummies, of Title 49 Code of Federal
Regulations. NHTSA should evaluate the use of the CRABI-12 for testing
rear facing infant restraints or, possibly, forward facing toddler
seats. The need to add at least one other test dummy, representing
children over six years of age and 50 pounds, is discussed below in the
section on booster seats.
With respect to performance requirements for injury, NHTSA recently
issued a final rule on advanced air bag systems that includes newly
revised injury criteria performance levels for head, chest and neck
injury. For example, the agency adopted a head injury criterion of 700
HIC for the 6-year-old child test dummy and 530 HIC for the 3-year-old
child dummy. The agency should, as part of the rulemaking, revise
Standard 213 to comport with the injury criteria adopted for child
dummy testing in Standard 208 and consider the need to add a neck
injury criterion similar to that adopted in Standard 208.
While Advocates supports real-world dynamic testing in vehicles to
ensure safety, we are not sure what approach is best to achieve this
purpose. Using vehicles crash-tested as part of the New Car Assessment
Program (NCAP) is appealing because NHTSA already conducts both
frontal- and side-impact crash testing in this program. However, we
perceive several pitfalls with using NCAP. First, usually only about 40
or so crash tests are conducted under the auspices of NCAP in a given
year. This limits the number of child restraints that could be tested
in this manner. Second, NCAP is a consumer information program which
conducts crash testing at 35 miles-per-hour (mph), higher than the
current 30 mph maximum test speed required for testing child
restraints. This would not be appropriate for compliance testing
conducted to determine whether child restraints meet performance
requirements in Safety Standard 213. Finally, NCAP testing is conducted
with no seat in the back of the vehicle, which is where the
instrumentation to record the crash is placed. Thus, requiring child
restraint tests in NCAP vehicle back seats would pose both logistical
and financial problems for NHTSA. Alternatively, child restraint
manufacturers could contract either with private crash test centers or
with the vehicle manufacturers to place child restraints in the rear
seats of vehicles that are going to be crash tested. At a minimum, a
limited testing program to validate child restraint performance in the
sled test should be conducted. NHTSA should evaluate which option best
promotes child restraint safety.
Advocates also believes that H.R. 4145 should direct that any
rulemaking also specifically consider the need to update the design of
the standard bench seat used in child restraint testing under Safety
Standard 213. A more realistic seat, or array of seats, including
possibly contoured, angled and bucket seat designs, should be used to
appraise child restraint performance in current, real-world vehicle
models.
BOOSTER SEATS
Advocates whole heartedly supports the language in H.R. 4145 that
would require consideration of protection for children who weigh more
than 50 pounds. Advocates has on many occasions stated that children
roughly between the ages of 4 and 8 years old and older are
disenfranchised under both state restraint laws and federal occupant
protection requirements. We firmly believe that the current 50 pound
weight limit in Standard 213 should be raised to 80 pounds and that
booster seat performance requirements should be regulated by NHTSA. It
is essential that minimum performance requirements be established for
booster seats in order to assure parents that their use is safe for
older children who no longer fit comfortably in child restraints. NHTSA
should also undertake an education and publicity campaign to
disseminate information about the need for, and to promote the use of,
child booster seats. Adult seat belts, either lap belt only or lap/
shoulder systems, do not afford adequate fit and protection to children
who are too short or small to use them properly.
In addition, the agency should develop and adopt a crash test dummy
representative of a 10-year-old child that can be used in testing
booster seats. This was among the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon
Panel on Protecting Our Older Child Passengers, and Advocates fully
endorses this recommendation. While we understand there may be an
effort to develop such a test dummy already underway, efforts should be
made to ensure that it is ready for use in the next two to four years.
CONSUMER INFORMATION
Advocates agrees that labels for child restraints, as well as all
other safety and warning labels, should be written in language that is
readily understandable. NHTSA has already made efforts to revise air
bag labels using clear and concise language and unambiguous depictions
to communicate information and warnings. The same effort should be made
to ensure that all child restraint labels are equally effective in
communicating information and instructions to the public.
A child restraint rating system is another important step included
in H.R. 4145 that Advocates supports. The current information available
to consumers, whether child restraints pass or fail the minimum federal
requirements, is not sufficient to provide the public with accurate
information about the comparative safety of child restraints. A rating
system should be devised to provide information about how well child
restraints perform above the federal requirements. Ratings could
individually address several aspects of child restraint safety
including structural integrity and durability, head, chest and possibly
neck injury protection in both frontal- and side-impact crashes, the
degree to which the restraint limits head and knee excursion, and the
flammability (burn rate) of the material used in the seat covering. A
child restraint rating system could be modeled on NCAP, in which crash
tests are conducted above the minimum level for compliance, or
restraints could be subjected to a test-to-failure approach in order to
determine maximum performance levels. Regardless of the method chosen,
a rating system should provide consumers with practical and readily
understandable information that can be used as the basis for
comparisons when shopping for child restraints. Advocates will work
with NHTSA to develop a comprehensive rating system that will be
informative and useful to consumers.
As written, H.R. 4145 requires the substantive rulemaking to
improve child restraint testing standards be completed in two years, at
the same time the rule establishes the safety rating system. While the
agency can work on both issues simultaneously, it would be logical to
require that the improved testing requirements be implemented before
the rating system takes effect, so that the rating system will reflect
information on child restraints designed to the improved standards and
requirements.
In addition, it is important for child restraint manufacturers to
inform the public about which vehicle models are not compatible with
their child restraints. Each child restraint package should be clearly
labeled with this information so that consumers do not mistakenly
purchase restraints that are incompatible with their vehicle. This type
of information is provided by vehicle equipment suppliers for items
such as windshield wipers and headlamps. There is no reason why this
could not be accomplished for child restraints, and it would eliminate
a frustrating and potentially dangerous concern for many parents. Child
restraint manufacturers could also be required to report this
information to NHTSA who, in turn, could publish it for consumers.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to address these
important issues. Advocates is prepared to work with the committee in
its evaluation of H.R. 4145, and I will answer any questions you and
the committee may have.
Children Not Covered By Safety Belt Or Child Restraint Laws
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alabama................................... Younger than 6-yrs. In out-
of-state vehicle, 6+ yrs.
in rear seat
Alaska.................................... all children covered
Arizona................................... all children covered
Arkansas.................................. 5+ yrs. in rear seat
California................................ all children covered
Colorado.................................. all children covered
Connecticut............................... all children covered
Delaware.................................. all children covered
District of Columbia...................... all children covered
Florida................................... all children covered
Georgia................................... all children covered
Hawaii.................................... 4+ yrs. in rear seat
Idaho..................................... 4+ yrs. or 40+ lbs. in rear
seat
Illinois.................................. 6+ yrs. in rear seat if
driver is 18+ yrs.; all
children if driver is other
than parent/guardian unless
parent provides child
restraint
Indiana................................... younger than 4 yrs. in out-
of-state vehicle; 12+ yrs.
in rear seat
Iowa...................................... 6+ yrs. in rear seat
Kansas.................................... 14+ yrs. in rear seat
Kentucky.................................. all children covered
Louisiana................................. younger than 13 yrs. in out-
of-state vehicle; 13+ yrs.
in rear seat
Maine..................................... all children covered
Maryland.................................. all children covered
Massachusetts............................. all children covered
Michigan.................................. all children covered
Minnesota................................. 11+ yrs. in rear seat
Mississippi............................... 8+ yrs. in rear seat
Missouri.................................. all children covered
Montana................................... all children covered
Nebraska.................................. all children covered
Nevada.................................... all children covered
New Hampshire............................. all children covered
New Jersey................................ 5+ yrs. in rear seat or
pickup truck
New Mexico................................ 11+ yrs. in rear seat
New York.................................. 10+ yrs. in rear seat
North Carolina............................ all children covered
North Dakota.............................. all children covered
Ohio...................................... 4+ yrs. & more than 40 lbs.
in rear seat
Oklahoma.................................. 13+ yrs. in rear seat;
younger than 13 yrs. if
driver is nonresident of
state
Oregon.................................... all children covered
Pennsylvania.............................. 4+ yrs. in rear seat
Rhode Island.............................. all children covered
South Carolina............................ younger than 6 yrs. in out-
of-state vehicle; 6+ yrs.
in rear seat without
shoulder belt
South Dakota.............................. 5+ yrs. in rear seat
Tennessee................................. 13+ yrs. in rear seat
Texas..................................... 15+ yrs. in rear seat
Utah...................................... all children covered
Vermont................................... all children covered
Virginia.................................. all children covered
Washington................................ all children covered
West Virginia............................. all children covered
Wisconsin................................. 8+ yrs. in rear seat without
shoulder belt
Wyoming................................... all children covered
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Tauzin. By the way, as a consumer who just bought a
universal remote for his television set that doesn't work, and
I called the manufacturer he said oh, yeah it won't work for
your set. I said why do you call it universal? I understand
your point. Thank you. Mr. Tom Baloga, president of Britax
Child Safety Incorporated, on behalf of Juvenile Products
Manufacturers Association. Mr. Baloga.
STATEMENT OF TOM BALOGA
Mr. Baloga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am Tom Baloga.
President of Britax Child Safety. I was formerly with Mercedes
Benz of North America, manager of safety engineering; and I am
the proud father of four children, and I am pleased to provide
comments here today on behalf the Juvenile Product
Manufacturers Association. The JPMA is a not-for-profit trade
association whose 200 members manufacture and produce a variety
of children's products. Our membership includes all of the
domestic manufacturers of child restraint systems.
Clearly, children are unsafe at any speed if not in a car
seat. The need for child seats is clear. It is essential to
understand the important function that these seats perform. It
is clear that unrestrained small children are unsafe at any
speed. It is extremely dangerous for children to ride without
proper protection in a motor vehicle at any time under any
circumstances.
Children have been killed or seriously injured on what
parents may perceive as routine trips. Unrestrained children
are more likely to be killed or to suffer severe injuries if
they are being held in the arms of an adult or if they are
ejected from the vehicle. Almost all fatal and serious unjuries
to unrestrained children result from head or spinal injuries,
which are particularly debilitating. Unrestrained children
being held in the arms of an adult are crushed or released and
ejected from the vehicle. An unrestrained child is also in
danger of being injured in certain common every day driving
incidents even if the crash is not severe. Additionally,
unrestrained children cause accidents which endanger not only
the children but every other person on the road.
Child car seats are specifically designed to decelerate
children in a controlled manner and restrain them to prevent as
much as possible their striking the vehicle interior during a
collision. They are designed to provide more protection for
small children than a standard vehicle safety belt in a vehicle
which is designed for adults. They work by using a safety
harness or shield to distribute crash forces over a large area
of the child's fragile body and very importantly they link the
child to the vehicle's crumple zone. The vehicle plays a very
important role in this process.
Manufacturers are required to certify compliance before
they market these seats. Every child seat must bear the
manufacturer's certification by way of a label that they are
certified and the testing, sufficient testing has been done
prior to say sale on the market. Manufacturers conduct these
tests with their own laboratory test sleds or by using the same
laboratory sleds used by the NHTSA.
Child car seats are probably the single most effective
safety device ever developed for use in motor vehicles. When
correctly used, the car seat reduces a child's risk of death or
serious injury in a crash by 70 percent. With 100 percent
correct usage, even greater reductions could be achieved. In
comparison, adult lap and shoulder belts are 40 to 50 percent
effective in preventing fatalities and 45 to 55 percent
effective in preventing seriour injuries. This is impressive
real-world experience and an indication of the effectiveness of
child car seats. That is even more impressive when one
considers that this is being achieved in a truly violent
environment. Given this violent environment, there is no doubt
that fatalities do occur. Unfortunately, children continue to
die in automobile accidents. Most of the deaths involve
unrestrained children. In fact, in 1998 half the fatalities
were unrestrained children.
It would be nice to think that every life could be saved,
but the answer to the question is clearly no. Vehicle crashes
involve force that can be catastrophic. Lap and shoulder belts,
child care seats, and even air bags provide a certain degree of
protection but cannot provide absolute protection. Misuse is a
significant problem that, while showing signs for improvement,
has not been truly abated. We believe that misuse must be
addressed very aggressively.
The good news is that in the real world even partially
misused child seats continue to provide good crash protection.
And in closing, I would just like to say that we believe
that we have gone a long way with the NHTSA working together
toward coming up with the LATCH system, which is lower anchors
and tethers for children that was an initiative between
industry and government; and we think that the results are very
impressive and we will continue to improve as time goes on with
the system. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Tom Bologa follows:]
Prepared Statement of Tom Baloga, President, Britax Child Safety, on
Behalf of Juvenile Products Manufacturers Association
The Juvenile Product Manufacturers Association is a not-for-profit
trade association whose 200 members manufacture and produce a variety
of children's products. These products range from cribs, high chairs,
strollers, playpens, bedding, decorations, to an immensely diverse
range of products designed to help parents care for their children. Our
membership includes all of the domestic manufacturers of child
restraint systems. Currently, there are seven major manufacturers or
distributors of child restraint systems who account for more than 95%
of the market.
CHILDREN ARE UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED IF NOT IN A CAR SEAT
The need for child car seats is clear. I am here today to report on
our industry's view of the State of the Union with regard to the use
and effectiveness of child car seats. First, it is essential to
understand the important function that these seats perform. It is clear
that unrestrained small children are unsafe at any speed. Too many
accident investigations conducted by the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) show that it is extremely dangerous for children to ride
without proper protection in a motor vehicle at any time, under any
circumstances. Children have been killed or seriously injured on what
parents may perceive as routine trips; within yards of the family home
or while going to or returning from shopping, a baby-sitter, a
relative, a local restaurant or a family trip to the ice cream store.
Unrestrained children are more likely to be killed or to suffer severe
injuries if they are being held in the arms of an adult or if they are
ejected from the vehicle. Almost all fatal and serious injuries to
unrestrained children result from head or spinal injuries when they are
propelled into the instrument panel, windshield or other interior
surfaces, or from the vehicle or into other restrained articles or
persons in the vehicle. Unrestrained children being held in the arms of
an adult are often crushed into the instrument panel or other interior
surfaces by the weight and acceleration of the adult holding them or
ejected from the vehicle and crushed when they collide with exterior
surfaces such as another vehicle or the pavement. An unrestrained child
is also in danger of being injured in certain common everyday driving
incidents, even if the vehicle is not involved in a crash, such as
sudden stops, swerves, turns and falling out of the vehicle.
Additionally, unrestrained children can cause accidents which endanger
not only the children involved, but every other passenger in that
vehicle.
HOW CHILD CAR SEATS WORK
Child car seats are specially designed to decelerate children in a
controlled manner and restrain them to prevent, as much as possible,
their striking the vehicle interior during a head-on collision or
sudden stop. They are designed to provide more protection for small
children than a standard vehicle safety belt. They work by using a
safety harness or protection shield, or both, to distribute the crash
forces over a larger area of the child's fragile body.
These seats are required to comply with the Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard 213, Child Restraints, which require the seats to be
configured to certain dimensions, to be labeled and provide important
instructions on correct usage, to be fire-resistant, and to conform to
certain dynamic performance criteria to ensure proper force
distribution and restraint of the child. Compliance with FMVSS 213 is
administered by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA), whose test programs extensively check for compliance by
conducting large scale compliance testing of actual child car seats
produced and available in the marketplace. This represents testing of
hundreds of various car seat models annually. Manufacturers are
required to certify compliance before they market these seats.
Manufacturers conduct pre-market dynamic tests with the same
independent laboratories used by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration in its compliance program.
CHILD CAR SEATS ARE A RELATIVELY SAFE HARBOR IN A VIOLENT ENVIRONMENT
Child car seats are probably the single most effective safety
device ever developed for use with a motor vehicle. When correctly
used, a car seat reduces a child's risk of death or serious injury in a
crash by 70%. With 100% correct usage, even greater reductions in risk
of death could be achieved. In comparison, adult lap and shoulder belts
are 40-50% effective in preventing fatalities and 45-55% effective in
preventing serious injuries for the population as a whole. This is an
impressive, real world indication of the effectiveness of child car
seats. It is even more impressive when one considers that this is being
achieved in a truly violent environment.
NON-USE IS A PROBLEM
Given this violent environment, there is no doubt that fatalities
do occur. Unfortunately, children continue to die in automobile
accidents. Most of the deaths involved unrestrained children.
As might be expected, the number of fatalities among restrained
children has risen as child car seat and adult belt usage increases.
Our analysis indicates that the incidence of fatalities involving child
car seats in use is extremely low and shows relatively little deviation
from year to year.
It would be nice to think that every life could be saved but the
answer to the question--Can all lives be saved?--is clearly no.
Automobile crashes involve forces that are beyond our ability to cope
with. Lap and shoulder belts, child car seats and even air bags can
only provide a certain degree of protection. Fatalities and injuries do
occur.
Consider that the use of child car seats increased significantly
over the last two decades, when it was estimated that child car seat
use was only about 15%. These figures indicate significant and
substantial progress in getting parents to use child car seats during
the last two decades. This increase in usage, in large part, can be
attributed to intensive efforts by child passenger groups and the
enactment in all fifty states and Washington, D.C. of child passenger
protection laws, which in varying degrees require use of a child
restraint system in vehicles.
MISUSE IS A PROBLEM
Misuse is another significant problem that, while showing signs of
improvement, has not been truly abated. We believe that misuse by
almost a quarter of the users of child car seats is still not
satisfactory. Failure to properly anchor the child car seat to the
vehicle with the adult seat belt, improper seat belt routing and
failure to use the child's harness and/or shield properly are the major
types of misuse that is prevalent. User apathy plays the largest part
of this misuse. It is not enough for a parent to own a car seat. It is
not enough for a parent to place that car seat in their car if it is
not properly belted and used. Unfortunately, studies have shown that
users often are not attentive enough, or worse yet, realize they are
not properly using a car seat (i.e., facing the child in the wrong
direction or not using the harness properly).
The good news is that in the real world it is apparent that even
partially misused child car seats continue to provide some crash
protection in real-life crash situations. However, grossly misused car
seats provide little or no protection.
Child restraint system manufacturers have attempted to combat
misuse by making their designs easier to use and more resistant to
misuse. For instance, child safety seat models are now made to easily
tether to the vehicle anchorage points which all vehicles produced
since September 1999 are required to have installed. We believe the
Lower Anchor Tethers for Children (``LATCH'') system requirements will
prove very effective in combating misuse. All cars and seats now
contain the easier to use LATCH system. Some models of seats contain
automatic locking straps, similar to the types used on adult safety
belts. We applaud recent collaborative efforts aimed at promoting
proper use of car seats, however, in the final analysis, only the
user--the parent of the child--can make sure that the seat is used and
securely attached in their vehicle.
COMMENTS ON S. 2070 AND HR 4145
The proposed legislation suggests that NHTSA should refine and add
testing requirements to existing standards for child car seats. While
we agree that test conditions employed to test the FMVSS 213 should
reflect ``real world'' conditions, we have to be careful to avoid an
overly simplistic approach. We certainly support standardized labeling
where possible. As to the other provisions of the proposed bills,
please note the following:
(1) Side impact and rollover testing does not add to the benefits
provided by car seats. Because rollovers are generally considered non-
repeatable events, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to establish a test protocol which is, by definition, repeatable.
Moreover, rollover testing is destructive in nature, as such, the tests
costs could be prohibitively expensive and would likely price some
consumers out of the market. There is no protocol for side-impact
testing, and we are unsure what, if anything, side impact testing would
teach us.
Child restraints are currently designed to minimize these types of
injuries. It is our position that NHTSA needs to address this issue
carefully because in many instances providing additional protection for
potential head strikes could have an overall negative effect on the
performance of the car seat. For example, in many situations head
excursion may be reduced but the result is also a significant increase
in neck loads which may result in very serious injury to the occupant.
As for side-impact protection, most restraints manufactured by the
industry today do provide side-impact protection. Although we would
examine this issue with NHTSA, it is well accepted that the vehicle
itself provides the greatest protection in side-impact collisions.
However, we are willing to work with NHTSA to discuss whether rollover
or side impact testing standards could be useful.
(2) NHTSA should consider the use of test hardware that reflects
the designs of passenger motor vehicles. JPMA members have encouraged
NHTSA for some time to update the sled test bench to a more
contemporary design. Test equipment which reflects an artificial
laboratory environment should be modified. We believe that the current
sled bench used may actually result in a more severe simulated crash
environment than is actually present in the real world.
(3) JPMA would support use of a greater variety of anthropometric
dummies for testing, provided they are available for testing by
industry and the cost of such testing does not increase the cost of
products to consumers. Most of our member companies would consider
testing with additional anthropometric dummies. However, the dummies
will need to first be specified by NHTSA, and then will need to be
built by dummy manufacturers. These products would then have to be
widely available at the same cost as current dummy testing.
(4) JPMA would support NHTSA's regulation of restraints (boosters)
for children above fifty pounds. We agree with this recommendation. Per
the NTSB's recommendation, boosters should be regulated to 80 pounds.
(5) A rating system is only valuable if everyone understands what
is being rated. Child restraints provide proven benefits to children
involved in crashes. Child restraint manufacturers acknowledge and
understand that some people may want a rating system for child
restraints. However, due to the complexity and variety of real-world
crashes, the wide variety of vehicle configurations, and differences
among child occupants, a simple rating system based on the current
Standard 213 and without an up-to-date real-world analysis of crashes
would be premature and flawed. A flawed rating system is far worse than
no rating system because consumers would be deceived.
Based on years of experience, child restraints have proven to do an
excellent job in real-world crashes, but no child restraint can do its
job when it is not used, when misused, when involved in a catastrophic
crash and/or when excessive vehicle structural intrusion occurs. How
would you rate these possibilities?
The issue of proper installation is already substantially addressed
with the new LATCH system. Before a rating system is initiated, it is
critically important for NHTSA to evaluate real-world crashes involving
children restrained in child restraints and determine what aspects of
lab test performance are actually relevant to a rating system.
CHILD PASSENGER SAFETY IS A CONTINUING OBLIGATION
As an association dedicated to children, we also believe that it is
important not to overlook the importance of continued public education
about the importance of seatbelt use among children past the toddler
stage, that is to say, over four years of age. Parents who have a child
who has graduated from a child car seat or booster seat should be urged
to use the vehicle's lap and shoulder belts.
Belts should never be shared, and the common misuse of placing the
shoulder strap behind the child's back should be avoided. Two children
sharing the same seatbelt in a collision can result in a tremendous
increase in the injury severity to both children as they collide
violently into one another. The heads and shoulders of the children can
strike one another. Failing to use the shoulder belt places the child
in a lap-only belt situation. A lap belt can cause serious spinal, head
or abdominal injuries to a child. A recent review of fatality data by
the Children's Hospital of Philadelphia found that car seats are
currently 95+% effective, even when misused. Lap shoulder belts should
be used correctly, just as a child safety car seat must be used
correctly to receive full crash protection. Keep in mind that
physiology and anatomy of children is not the same as adults. There is
a greater need to distribute the force of a crash impact more evenly
over a child's body. This is aided by the use of both the lap and
shoulder belts. Obviously, when using the shoulder belts, parents
should make sure the child is old and large enough so that the shoulder
belt fits correctly. The good news is that it seems that children are
much more attuned to wearing lap and shoulder belts than were their
parents. This rise in usage continues.
The JPMA recommends, however, that children be kept in child
restraint systems as long as possible. A restraint especially designed
for a child's body is always to be preferred over a seat belt which is
designed for an adult's body.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS
The most serious problem continues to be the non-use and misuse of
child car seats. Significant strides have been made to improve the use
and minimize the misuse of child car seats over the last seven years.
There is much to be done. It is still not satisfactory when millions of
children are not receiving the benefits of child car seats, despite
child passenger protection laws in all fifty states. The industry has
made significant improvements in designing child car seats that are
easier to use and which afford significant protection to children in
the violent world of vehicle collisions and accidents.
The greatest enemy in this battle for wider proper usage of child
car seats (and it is a battle) is apathy. The primary goal of all of us
should be to increase use of child car seats. They are effective in
saving children's lives and preventing serious injury to children. It
is important that the public be reminded of their usage as often and
through as many means as possible. Even when partially misused, child
car seats offer significant protection to children in vehicles. If the
premises of the proponents of this Act is that properly used child
restraints are not working, then I would suggest they are mistaken.
While we should always strive for improved standards, we should
acknowledge how extraordinarily effective currently produced child
restraints are in saving lives and preventing serious injury.
The media must and can play an important role in educating the
public. Reporters have themselves conceded that it is unfortunate that
all too often the media only understands the value of a story if is it
sensationalized. Nothing is more tragic than the scene of an accident
where a child has been killed needlessly because that child was not
placed in a child car seat; it would help tremendously if the next time
a reporter reports on a traffic accident (whether it be by television,
radio or newspaper), he or she indicated whether the occupants of the
vehicles involved in that accident were wearing seatbelts or whether
children were placed properly in a child car seat or not. If made a
general practice, something as simple as that could have a profound
long-term beneficial effect with the public.
The existence of child passenger protection laws in all fifty
states was a significant step forward in increasing use rates for child
car seats. But a law in and of itself does not save lives. In order for
such laws to continue to have an effect, they must be vigorously
enforced with the active support of local law enforcement officials.
Loopholes and exemptions which exist in a variety of state laws must be
eliminated. It is not sufficient for a law to allow an infant or small
child to be removed from that seat for the purpose of changing its
diaper or feeding when the car is in motion. Local police officers
should be rewarded for issuing citations. Next time you have a few
minutes at home, call you local police department and ask them how many
citations they have issued in the past year to drivers who have failed
to place small children in their cars in child car seats. Also, fines
should be increased for failure to abide by these laws.
To the public, I say the next time you see someone in a car with a
small child who is not in a car seat, don't be embarrassed--say
something. It is important to constantly publicize and provide funding
for the education of the public on this important issue. I know
industry will work with consumers and government in trying to get the
message out and remind users of child car seats to use them
consistently. When you get in that car with your child it should be
second nature to you to buckle your child up and then to buckle
yourself up and make a point of telling the child that it is important.
Take a few minutes out periodically just to check and make sure the
child car seat is securely anchored to your vehicle and make sure the
harness or shield is used properly and don't cave in to the crying and
wiggling of a child who wants to get out of their seat. The momentary
inconvenience to you and your child might one day mean the difference
between life and death.
Mr. Tauzin. Thank you, Mr. Baloga.
Now, Dr. Malcolm Currie, president, CEO, Currie
Technologies of Agoura Hills, California. Mr. Currie.
STATEMENT OF MALCOLM R. CURRIE
Mr. Currie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am president and CEO
of Currie Technologies. My name is Malcolm Currie. I am going
to submit a statement which outlines the gratitude we have for
James Rogan for sponsoring the bill, Lois Capps on the other
side. It is a noncontroversial but yet extremely important bill
and also the many staff members who worked with us.
Let me tell you a little bit about our industry. The
electric bicycle industry is comprised of a growing number of
companies, both domestic and overseas, who have made great
strides in the last few years to develop affordable and
accessible electric-powered vehicles for mass distribution.
Electric bicycles comprise a new product category of the
products we make, such as the bicycle you see in front of you
here today. And the pictures on the poster are, in essence,
regular bicycles with small electric motors attached and
batteries to drive them. The purpose of the motors is to
provide a clean nonpolluting power-assist to the rider. This
allows more people to use more bikes in more situations.
Mr. Tauzin. Dr. Currie for the sake of our audience, what
is the difference between that bike and a moped.
Mr. Currie. A moped is generally higher. These are fairly
lightweight, regular bicycles. Moped you will see much heavier
plastic around it. It is more like a light-motor cycle. A
typical moped is gasoline operated. And you use the pedal only
to get it started, then it just runs on the gasoline engine.
The gasoline engine has many times the power of these little
electric motors.
Mr. Tauzin. So the basic difference is that this is a
regular bike with a battery-powered assist motor.
Mr. Currie. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tauzin. As the moped, which is generally a much larger,
heavier unit with a gasoline or some other powered engine
attached.
Mr. Currie. That is correct. These bicycles, their top
speed is 16 to 18 miles an hour. That is the fastest they can
go, even if you are pedaling with them. A typical moped and
within the NHTSA regulations that can go up to 30 miles an hour
for extended periods.
Mr. Tauzin. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Currie. The customers include older riders and those
with disabilities, who may be otherwise unable to travel by
bicycles. They include law enforcement agencies. Well over 200
of them are using them regularly on patrol today; and numerous
other constituencies nationwide will find that electric
bicycles increase the practicality of bicycles. And in fact,
many and a growing population are using them for commuting when
they cannot afford automobile transportation.
The electric bikes all have something in common. They are
essentially regular bicycles, as I mentioned, using typical
bicycle frames and bicycle components. The motors are very low
powered, low speed. The top speed of all of our products is 16
to 18 miles an hour. They all produce zero air pollution.
To put the electric bicycle in further perspective, it is
easy for us all to visualize an average person can produce
roughly 140 or 150 watts of power for perhaps 1\1/2\ or 2 hours
before they get exhausted. A top athlete like Lance Johnson, of
course, and it is in one of those upper corners on the poster,
can maintain a speed of 25 miles an hour for many hours using a
very lightweight racing bike. By contrast, a typical electric
bike without pedaling can go at 12 miles an hour or so for 90
minutes at which time the battery will need recharging. The
simultaneous pedaling while using the motor as an assist it can
go longer at low speed because battery power is thereby
conserved.
Mr. Tauzin. About how much longer?
Mr. Currie. It depends upon how much energy the rider wants
to put in. Typically a bicycle like that without pedaling for
an average weight will go 15 to 20 miles. You can extend it to
30 miles on the level if you put in just a little bit of
energy; and it really doesn't require your pulse rate to go up
very much.
By comparison, and this gets back to your question of the
moped, in even the smallest gasoline-powered moped has at least
5 horsepower compared to 1 or less here and can sustain a speed
of 30 miles an hour or more for several hours without
refueling. The electric bike, therefore, maintains what we call
human equivalency. And the purpose of the motor is mainly to
help climb hills at very low speeds. And for night operation,
there is a plethora of small after-market bicycle lights that
can handle night riding.
Now, why is H.R. 2592 necessary? The purpose of the bill is
very simple. It is to provide a uniform national definition of
electric bikes and to ensure that the Consumer Product Safety
Commission regulates these products as they do all other
bicycles. The legislative remedy is necessary because NHTSA
currently interprets the statutory definition of motor vehicle
as applying to bicycles with low-power motors that cannot
operate independently of pedaling, thereby subjecting them to
motor vehicle requirements.
This means the addition of a large array of costly and
unnecessary equipment, brake lights, turn signals, automotive-
grade headlights, fairly large headlights, powerful headlights,
et cetera. This increases the cost tremendously, and the
additional cost and waste and power drain of these devices
would effectively kill the growing market for electric bikes.
NHTSA has taken this position only because it is the only
position they could take within the current law. And the
electric bike, as I mentioned, is defined in this proposed
legislation as a new product category. I would like to make it
absolutely clear at this point that our industry is firmly in
favor of safety standards. In fact, we believe very strongly
that safety standards are essential to the long-term success of
our industry. And we introduce new improvements all the time
adding to safety.
Our point is merely that these vehicles should be subject
to bicycle safety standards, since they are indeed bicycles,
and should not be subjected to motorcycle-type safety standards
since they are clearly not even light motorcycles or mopeds.
H.R. 2592 would ensure that this would be the case. Not only is
this legislation noncontroversial and much needed, but it is
also pro Americans with disabilities, pro elderly, pro safety,
and pro environment. A lot of good stuff there.
Many disabled riders are able to employ electric bicycles
to provide them freedom of mobility without the cost or stigma
of an electric wheelchair. Because of electric bicycles, older
Americans are now reaping the benefits of increased exercise
and life-style flexibility enjoyment of the outdoors. Electric
bicycles provide effective low-cost transportation and
particularly for those who cannot afford automobiles. Law
enforcement operators, a large and crucial segment of our
market, are finding electric bikes extremely practical in
patrolling neighborhoods and downtowns. Electric bicycles
preserve our environment, reduce air pollution, reduce
congestion, conserve energy, and enhance the quality of life
for all Americans.
Mr. Chairman, this bill enjoys widespread support in our
industry, and in this statement is a list of a number of the
companies involved. One again, I thank the subcommittee for its
time and urge favorable consideration of this bill. And a
couple of my colleagues are in the audience, we are available
to answer any questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Malcom R. Currie follows:]
Prepared Statement of Malcolm R. Currie, President and CEO, Currie
Technologies, Inc.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, my name is Dr. Malcolm
Currie. I am President and CEO of Currie Technologies, Inc., and am
here today on behalf of the entire domestic electric bicycle industry.
With me are representatives from two of the other largest companies in
the U.S. electric bicycle industry: Mr. Warren Dennis of the Electric
Transportation Company, and Mr. Doron Amiran of ZAPWORLD.COM.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin by thanking you not only for
holding this hearing, but also for the interest you have shown in this
non-controversial, yet extremely important legislation. I would also
like to thank Full Committee Chairman Bliley and Ranking Minority
Member Dingell for their bipartisan support of Committee action on this
bill. Most importantly however, I want to pay special recognition to
Congressman James Rogan who is not only the sponsor of this
legislation, but whose dedication, perseverance, and commitment made
today possible. And, as a further affirmation of the bipartisan support
for their bill, a word of appreciation for Congresswoman Lois Capps who
has also worked tirelessly on behalf of our cause.
Industry Overview
Mr. Chairman, before explaining the details of the bill you have
before you, and the reasons why it is so crucial to our young industry,
I would like to take just a few moments to outline who we are.
The electric bicycle industry is comprised of a growing number of
companies--both domestic and overseas--who have made great strides in
the past few years to develop affordable and accessible electric
powered vehicles for mass distribution. Electric bicycles comprise a
new product category. The products we make, such as the bicycle you see
before you here today, are bicycles, with small, low-powered motors
attached. The purpose of the motors is to provide a clean, non-
polluting power-assist to the rider. This allows more people to use
bikes in more situations.
To date over 40,000 electric bikes have been sold in the U.S.
alone, and we believe this represents just the tip of the iceberg.
Customers include older riders, and those with disabilities who may be
otherwise unable to travel by bicycle; law enforcement agencies--well
over 200 of whom are using electric bikes on patrol--who use electric
bikes in their community policing programs; and numerous other
constituencies nationwide who find that electric bicycles increase the
practicality of a bicycle. Many are now being used for commuting to
work, often by people who cannot afford automobile transportation.
Although electric bikes come in many styles and designs, they all
share a few common features:
They are essentially bikes, using typical bicycle frames and
components.
The motors are low speed--the top speed of all our products is
16-18 mph.
They all produce zero air pollution.
To put the electric bicycle in further perspective that is easy for
us to visualize, an average person can produce roughly 150 watts of
power for perhaps a couple of hours before exhaustion. This is
sufficient to pedal a regular bicycle at a speed of about 15 mph for
perhaps 90 minutes. (Of course, a top athlete like Lance Armstrong
could maintain a speed of 25 mph for many hours.) By contrast, a
typical electric bicycle without pedaling can go at 12 mph for about 90
minutes at which time the battery will need recharging. With
simultaneous pedaling while using the motor as an assist, it can go
longer because battery power is thereby conserved.
By comparison, even the smallest gasoline-powered moped has at
least 5 horsepower and can sustain a speed of 30 mph or more for
several hours without refueling.
The electric bike therefore maintains what we call ``human
equivalency'' and the purpose of the motor is mainly to help climb
hills at very low speeds. For night operation, a number of powerful
after-market lights are adequate (same as for a regular bicycle).
HR 2592
What is HR 2592 and why is it necessary?
HR 2592's purpose is simple: to provide a uniform national
definition of electric bikes, and to ensure that the Consumer Product
Safety Commission regulates these products, as they do all other
bicycles.
A legislative remedy is necessary because the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration currently interprets the statutory
definition of ``motor vehicle'' as applying to bicycles with low
powered motors that can operate independently of pedaling, thereby
subjecting them to motor vehicle requirements. Subjecting electric
bicycles to motor vehicle requirements would mean the addition of a
large array of costly and unnecessary equipment--brake lights, turn
signals, automotive grade headlights, rear view mirrors, and more.
These additions would raise the cost of an electric bicycle by hundreds
of dollars, in many cases doubling the cost of the bike. This would
effectively kill the growing market for electric bikes.
NHTSA has never indicated that they have taken this position
because it is good policy. Rather they have claimed that existing law
requires them to do so.
I would like to make it clear at this point that our industry is
firmly in favor of safety standards. In fact, we believe very strongly
that safety standards are essential to the long-term success of our
industry. Our point is merely that these vehicles should be subjected
to bicycle safety standards, since they are indeed bicycles, and should
not be subjected to motorcycle safety standards, since they are clearly
not even light motorcycles or mopeds. HR 2592 would ensure that this
would be the case.
Not only is this legislation non-controversial and much needed, but
it is also pro-Americans with disabilities, pro-elderly, pro-safety,
and pro-environment.
Many disabled riders are able to employ electric bicycles to
provide them freedom of mobility without the cost or stigma of
an electric wheelchair.
Because of electric bicycles, older Americans are now reaping
the benefits of increased exercise and lifestyle flexibility.
Electric bicycles provide effective low-cost transportation,
and particularly for those who cannot afford automobiles.
Law enforcement officers, a large and crucial segment of our
market, are finding electric bikes extremely practical in
patrolling neighborhoods and downtowns in a manner consistent
with the highly successful emphasis on ``Community Policing'',
and,
Electric bicycles preserve our environment, reduce air
pollution, reduce congestion, conserve energy, and enhance the
quality of life for all Americans.
Mr. Chairman, this bill enjoys widespread support in our industry.
The list of organizations supporting HR 2592 includes: Electric Cycle
Association; Diamondback Bicycles; ZAPWORLD.COM; EV Global Motors;
Electric Transportation Company; Total EV (subsidiary of CSW
Utilities); Currie Technologies Incorporated; and Raleigh Cycle USA
Once again, I thank the Subcommittee for its time and urge
favorable consideration of this bill. My colleagues and I are available
to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Tauzin. Thank you, Dr. Currie.
We are now going to switch gears again and hear a little
bit about burn safety, and we hear from Dr. David Herndon of
the Shriners Burn Hospital in Galveston, Texas. On behalf of
the American Burn Association and the Shriners Hospitals for
Children, Dr. Herndon.
STATEMENT OF DAVID N. HERNDON
Mr. Herndon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great honor
to be able to testify today. I have with me today the chairman
of the board of the Shriners Hospital, John VerMaas; the
chairman of the board emeritus, Mr. Gene Bracewell; and the
chief of staff of the Shriners Burns Hospital in Boston, Ron
Tompkins, who is also president of the American Burn
Association. There are also members of the Safe Environment for
Children Fire Coalition here today.
What we would like to testify for is expansion of
flammability standards for children, not restrictions. Since
the Commission withdrew requirements for protection of children
between the ages of 0 and 9 months of age and for close-fitting
clothing in the year that began in 1997, we have compared the
incidents of flame injury at the Shriners Hospitals, at our
four different hospitals between the years 1995 and 1996 and
the years after the regulations were decreased, 1998 to 1999.
As is present after page 23 in the written testimony that I
provided, the number of burn patients in which sleepwear of the
first thing ignited in the accident increased from 14 pre-
reduction in regulation to 36, 157 percent increase between
those 2 periods.
We also saw 110 percent increase in clothing-related
injuries and a 43 percent increase from 218 to 311 in burns
that were caused by fire that we could not isolate the cause of
burning injury precisely. Many of those probably did involve
sleepwear. But we, as health care individuals, are not
gathering labels in the emergency room. We are thinking more
about saving the patients. The data that was used by the
Commission to determine that there has been no increase in
incidence of injury since the withdrawal of regulations draws
upon a hundred sample of emergency rooms from around the
country. Only four burn units are represented there in that
sample, and three of those do not admit children. One is the
Massachusetts General, run by Dr. Tompkins who is here with us
today. Children are admitted directly to the Pediatric Burns
Institute of the Shriners in Boston. Kings County in Brooklyn,
pediatric burn patients are admitted to the New York Hospital
in the city of New York. Kansas City Children's Hospital,
patients in that district are admitted to the Galveston Burn
Unit for treatment of burns.
So a sampling error has been made in data collection that
has allowed us to let go unrecognized the fact that children
under 9 months of age who are no longer protected by having
fire retardant placed in their sleepwear have had an increase
of 167 percent in sleepwear-related injuries between the period
when the protections were present and the current era when the
protections are not present. Detailed data are available in my
testimony that has been submitted, but I want to share with you
a couple of examples.
LT, a 5-month-old whose sleepwear was caught on fire,
sustained an 18 percent total body surface burn. LT no longer
has a foot.
JD, a 9-month-old child who was sleeping in bed when one of
his siblings came and lit his clothing on fire with a cigarette
lighter, sustained a 45 percent total body surface burn. He is
still rehabilitating.
A child in her mother's arms is depicted. And then we go to
tight-fitting clothing. JF, a 4-year-old who was wearing close-
fitting long underwear, a bunny suit, brushed against a candle
in his family's dining room. He sustained a 15 percent total
body surface burn, burning the surface of his back rather
seriously.
A 2-year-old child on whom a candle fell on top of his
sleepwear. The sleepwear caught fire, and the flames went to
his face. His face is now scarred for life.
Another case of a 50 percent total body surface burn in
tight-fitting clothing.
I would like to describe another child, Dorian Morales, one
that was briefly alluded to before, who is in a bunny suit such
as this one which, if you use a microscope, the label says it
is not intended for sleepwear. But mothers frequently use this
kind of fabric for sleepwear. A halogen lamp fell upon that
garment, the clothing lit on fire, then the bed subsequently
lit on fire, and he sustained an 80 percent total body surface
burn.
We are led to believe that any burn that is greater than a
small circumscribed burn is not contributed to by burning
clothing. We are also led to believe that clothing itself does
not protect. RO is a 2-year-old child who was wearing a flame-
resistant pajamas top and diaper when he ran through a house
that was burning. He was totally unburned where the fire-
resistant clothing was present. He was burned everywhere else,
his face, his legs his feet where the fire-resistant clothing
was not present.
We would submit, Mr. Chairman, that you should expand fire-
safe clothing laws not restrict them. We believe, since the
restriction, the incidents of injury has truly gone up. We
believe that the limited definition of what an injury is that
is caused by flame that the CPSC is using is misleading. We
believe new legislation is required so that there is no longer
any misleading possible.
We think that clearly labeled sleepwear that says it is
fire resistant or not fire resistant, rather than this tight-
fitting fabric which currently says sleepwear should be flame
resistant or snug fitting to meet U.S. Consumer Product Safety
Commission sleepwear requirements. And then a little bit
further down, if you bother to keep going, this garment should
be worn snug fitting. Fire engine, rescue. Is that always going
to be snug fitting? Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of David N. Herndon follows:]
Prepared Statement of David N. Herndon, Shriners Hospitals for
Children, American Burn Association, Task Force for Fire Safe
Environments for Children 1
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Task Force for Fire Safe Environments for Children is
comprised of the following organizations: American Burn Association,
Burn Foundation, Coalition for American Trauma Care, Congressional Fire
Services Institute, Fairfax County Fire & Rescue Department, National
Fire Protection Association, National Volunteer Fire Council, Prince
William County Fire & Rescue Department, Shriners Hospitals for
Children, Trauma Foundation, and Washington Metropolitan Regional Fire
& Rescue Departments/ Aluminum Cans for Burned Children.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for holding
this hearing today. A burn injury is one of the most devastating of the
accidental injuries that can occur to an individual. Health care
professionals consider burn injuries to be one of the most intensely
painful injuries the body can sustain. If a child survives a burn
injury, it often leaves a legacy of years of painful reconstructive
surgery, permanent scarring, disfigurement and severe functional
disabilities. These injuries, terrible for an adult, are particularly
cruel for children, who rely on adults to protect them.
We come here today representing organizations that have all too
much experience with traumatic burn injuries, the Shriners Hospitals
for Children, the American Burn Association and the Task Force for Fire
Safe Environments for Children. I am the chief of staff of the Shriners
Hospitals for Children Burns hospital in Galveston, Texas, a Professor
of Surgery at the University of Texas and a past President of the
American Burn Association. Accompanying me is Dr. Ron Tompkins, Chief
of Staff of the Shriners Hospitals for Children Burns Hospital in
Boston, Professor of Surgery at the Harvard Medical School and current
President of the American Burn Association, the primary association of
health care professionals working in burn care, prevention, research,
rehabilitation and teaching in this country.
I would also like to acknowledge the presence of Mr. John VerMaas,
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Shriners Hospitals for Children,
and Mr. Gene Bracewell, Chairman Emeritus of the Shriners Hospitals
Board of Trustees. It is through the support of Shriners such as John
VerMaas and Gene Bracewell that Dr. Tompkins and I are able to carry on
our work on behalf of the children who suffer these horrible burn
injuries. Shriners Hospitals have been in existence for over seventy-
five years. The 20 Shriners Hospitals in the United States provide 100
percent free care to hundreds of thousands of children, accepting
neither government, insurance or parental reimbursement for the care
provided.
Dr. Tompkins and I everyday see terrible burn injuries that could
have been prevented or minimized. Sadly, the government agency charged
with protecting children from burn injuries, the Consumer Product
Safety Commission (``Commission'' or ``CPSC'') has dropped the ball. An
agency with many strengths, the Commission has a weak link when it
comes to protecting infants and children from fire related injuries
sustained while wearing sleepwear and certain types of daywear used as
sleepwear.
II. SHRINERS HOSPITALS TREAT OVER TWENTY PERCENT OF ALL MAJOR PEDIATRIC
BURN INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES. SINCE THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY
COMMISSION LOWERED THE SAFETY STANDARDS BEGINNING IN 1997, THE NUMBER
OF SLEEPWEAR-RELATED BURN INJURIES TO CHILDREN HAS INCREASED OVER 150
PERCENT AT SHRINERS HOSPITALS.
Originally, Shriners Hospitals focused on pediatric orthopaedic
work, but in 1966 Shriners Hospitals decided to provide care for the
thousands of children burned across the country every year and started
the first of its four burn units in Galveston, Texas. Today, Shriners
Hospitals operate four burn units in Galveston, Boston, Cincinnati and
Sacramento, which together treat over 20 percent of all major pediatric
burn injuries in the United States. As such, the experience at Shriners
Hospitals provides a unique database for assessing the impact of the
Consumer Product Safety Commission's actions on the safety of our
nation's children.
The CPSC's actions took effect in 1997. To determine whether these
actions resulted in any increases in pediatric burn cases (U.S.
citizens only), we compared 1995 and 1996 with 1998 and 1999. We did
not include 1997 because it was a transition year. We knew,
instinctively, that we were seeing more children with sleepwear and
clothing-related burn injuries, but until we performed this analysis,
we did not realize the magnitude of the increase. For 1995-1996,
Shriners Hospitals treated 14 children for sleepwear-related burn
injuries; the number of children suffering these sleepwear-related
burns has increased to 36 for the 1998-1999 period, a 157 percent
increase.
We also looked at two other categories. Clothing-related burn
injuries and undefined flame injuries. With respect to the clothing
category, in some cases we were able to determine that clothes were
involved, but not the exact type of clothing. In other situations, we
knew that the clothing was not technically sleepwear, but the child may
have been using the clothing to sleep in. In this category, the number
of children suffering clothing-related burn injuries increased from 70
to 147, a 110 percent increase.
Finally, we have the undefined flame category. These are situations
in which the we don't know anything about the clothing the children
were wearing, except to say that it is likely that the children were
wearing clothes because of the severity of the burn injuries. For
example, the clothing might have been totally burned away. Without a
doubt, some of these children were wearing sleepwear. In this category,
the number of injuries went from 218 in 1995-1996 to 311 in 1998-1999,
a 43 percent increase.
If one totals all these categories, the number of burned children
treated at Shriners Hospitals increased from 302 in 1995-1996 to 494 in
1998-1999, a 64 percent increase.
The data regarding infants age 0-9 months, the most defenseless of
our citizens, whom the Commission stripped of all protection, is also
revealing. In 1995-1996 Shriners Hospitals treated 3 children with
sleepwear-related burn injuries under nine months of age. For 1998-1999
the total number of infants suffering such injuries has risen to 8, a
167 percent increase! For flame injuries, the figures go from 8 to 19,
a 138 percent increase.
There really is only one variable between these two time periods.
In 1995-1996 the CPSC had not yet lowered the safety standards for
children's sleepwear. In 1998-1999, the Commission's lowered standards
were in full effect, and the results have been a major increase in the
number of children suffering sleepwear-related burn injuries.
We will hear a lot of discussion from the CPSC and others regarding
whether these children that we care for really suffered ``sleepwear-
related'' burn injuries. All we as physicians who care for burned
children can say to you is that we are seeing more burn injuries
involving sleepwear and what should be categorized as sleepwear than
ever before. The saying in Latin is ``Res Ipsa Loquitur,'' the thing
speaks for itself.
We are attaching an appendix, which includes several cases studies
regarding these children who have suffered sleepwear-related burn
injuries since the Commission changed the regulations. In some
instances, these cases fit even the artificially narrow definition the
Commission has adopted to justify its actions. In other instances, the
cases will illustrate the benefits of flame resistant sleepwear can
provide, even in larger household or bedding fires. Finally, these
cases will show why Congress must seriously consider broadening the
definition of sleepwear to cover those items of clothing that are
commonly used by young children as sleepwear.
III. THE PRE-1997 CHILDREN'S SLEEPWEAR SAFETY STANDARDS PLAYED A MAJOR
ROLE IN REDUCING THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN'S BURN INJURIES.
I have personally been involved in the surgical and medical care of
burned children for over 25 years. I have seen first-hand the horrific
reality of sleepwear and other burn injuries. Over this period, as a
result of intensive research and state of the art clinical care, a
burned child's chance of survival has now more than doubled. In the
late 1960's, shortly after the Galveston Burn unit opened its doors,
Shriners burn physicians realized that the most effective cure for burn
injuries was prevention.
Historically, Shrine doctors have been particularly concerned about
the number of children being treated for burn injuries resulting from
their sleepwear igniting. They found that many people warmed their
homes with open gas fires, and that children, while warming themselves
next to the fire, sustained burn injuries when their sleepwear ignited
from the open flames. A lobbying effort commenced in Texas, and that
state's legislature became the first in the country to pass a law
requiring sleepwear to be flame resistant.
As you all know, Congress followed suit, and in 1971 national
flammability standards for children's sleepwear were adopted. These
standards had a profound and positive impact for kids. The average
number of clothing-related burn deaths for children under the age of 14
dropped from 60 per year to 4.
While these figures represent all clothing-related burn injuries,
not just those involving sleepwear, we believe that the sleepwear
standards were primarily responsible for this development. According to
one classic epidemiological study regarding the decline in sleepwear-
related burn injuries following enactment of the national standards,
the authors concluded that ``[I]t is probable that the single factor
most important to the decline . . . is lower fabric flammability.''
Indeed, during the nine-year period between 1980 and 1988, only 7.9
percent of all reported children's burn injuries resulted from the
ignition of sleepwear that complied with the standards. The National
Fire Protection Association has also estimated a tenfold decrease in
the number of deaths associated with children's sleepwear since
enactment of the standards.
Estimates vary regarding the number of sleepwear-related burn
injuries today. The CPSC has estimated that the annual average number
of sleepwear-related burn cases is around 90, plus or minus 59 and the
average number of clothing-related burn injuries 1,045, again plus or
minus 256. What is commendable is that in the years following enactment
of the standards in 1971 until 1996, kids slept more safely. Despite
this progress, we find the CPSC's methodology for determining
sleepwear-related burn injuries flawed and unsound, overlooking the
continued danger, particularly for children who wear non-flame
resistant clothing as sleepwear. We need to raise the overall standards
for children's sleepwear and daywear to protect our most vulnerable
citizens--our infants and children.
IV. THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION'S 1996 DECISION TO RELAX THE
SAFE SLEEPWEAR STANDARDS WAS ILL ADVISED.
Notwithstanding the great success of children's safe sleepwear
standards between 1971 and 1996, the Consumer Product Safety Commission
voted in 1996 to make two critical modifications, which placed children
at greater risk. The two changes were as follows: first, sleepwear for
infants age 0-9 months no longer has to meet the flammability
requirements; and, second, so-called ``snug'' or ``tight-fitting''
sleepwear for children of all ages was exempted from the safety
standards.
As we understand it, the Commission was concerned that the
sleepwear regulations were being ignored, evaded or circumvented.
Parents were using non-sleepwear garments such as long underwear or t-
shirts in lieu of sleepwear that met the safety requirements. Moreover,
manufacturers were exploiting the subjective definition of sleepwear by
labeling garments as ``daywear,'' thus avoiding the regulations.
The Commission's regulations define sleepwear as clothing that is
``intended to be worn primarily for sleeping or activities related to
sleeping.'' The regulations state that whether wearing apparel is
``intended to be worn primarily for sleeping'' depends on the facts and
circumstances present in each case. Section 1615.649(c)(2) of the
Commission's regulations defines relevant factors to include the nature
of the product and its suitability for use by children for sleeping,
the manner in which the product is distributed and promoted and the
likelihood that the product will be used by children ``primarily for
sleeping or activities related to sleeping in a substantial number of
cases."
Despite the facts and circumstances test permitted by the
regulation, the use of an intent and primary use standard made it
extremely difficult for the Commission to enforce the standards. The
Commission does not seem to be following its own standards. For
example, it admits that kids are sleeping more and more in t-shirts. If
this is true, as the CPSC suggests, it should find that t-shirts are
``sleepwear'' because they are being used by a substantial number of
children for sleeping.
It is not just t-shirts where the regulations are not working. I
would like to show you some examples of exactly what I mean. I have
with me a so-called ``Winnie the Poo'' bunny suit which was worn by one
of my eight-month old patients when she was severely burned. The suit
instantly ignited, and the child suffered 90 percent body burn. You may
need a magnifying glass, but if you read the label, you will discover
that these bunny pajamas are not sleepwear but daywear. You may also be
interested to know that the CPSC rejected this case as outside the
scope of its regulations because it involved daywear, not sleepwear.
In any event, faced with these enforcement problems, the Commission
made two key decisions, which actually made the situation significantly
worse. H.R. 329 attempts to reverse these two exemptions created by the
Commission. This is a step in the right direction, but it does not go
far enough. Congress must direct the Commission to close the loopholes,
which enable manufacturers to label Winnie the Poo or similar outfits
as daywear. To protect our children, we need a functional definition of
sleepwear.
We also want to make policing by the CPSC easier and more
effective. This means requiring clothing like all in one bunny suits
with enclosed feet, togs, onesies, body suits with snaps at the bottom
for easy access to a diaper, garments with cartoon characters or
symbols that are particularly attractive to children, t-shirts and
other garments to be fire resistant. If a child, particularly one under
the age of reason, sleeps in these types of garments, they should have
to meet the safety standards. The CPSC chose to go in another
direction, one that put a greater number of children at risk.
Since we all want kids to have the most fire safe environment
possible, it will be up to Congress to act.
V. THE COMMISSION'S DECISION TO EXEMPT INFANT GARMENTS FROM THE SAFETY
STANDARDS WAS BASED ON THE FAULTY ASSUMPTION THAT INFANTS ARE IMMOBILE
AND THEREFORE NOT AT RISK.
The first major change made by the Commission was to exempt
garments for infants age 0-9 months from any sleepwear standards.
According to the Commission, the risk of burn injury or death from all
clothing, including sleepwear remains low. Of course, the reason for
this was the standards that were put in place in 1971. In particular,
the CPSC argued that infants are immobile and could not expose
themselves to ignition sources as could older children and therefore
would not be endangered by eliminating the protections for this most
vulnerable group. The CPSC further claimed to have analyzed over 150
burn injuries involving infants age 0 to 9 months from 1990 ``1999 and
found ``insufficient information to conclude there is an increased risk
of sleepwear-related burn injuries for pre-ambulatory infants.''
This is a matter of pure common sense. Not only can infants below
the age of nine months crawl to flame sources, the flame source can
come to them. Children can be very mobile and are at a great safety
risk as early as five months of age. At five months, infants may start
crawling towards objects of interest. It is not possible to teach an
infant safety, so it is our responsibility to provide a safe
environment for them. Infants between 0-5 months are totally unable to
protect themselves from injury or even to escape heat or flame by
crawling or rolling away. If you have any doubt regarding whether
infants are vulnerable to sleepwear-related burn injuries, you can talk
to Dave Borowski, a coalition member here today, who was burned at age
six weeks. Had Dave been wearing fire resistant sleepwear, his injuries
would have been far less severe.
Candles, which are used in many homes for decoration, lighting or
aromatherapy, have caused many burn injuries to children. Space
heaters, which are frequently used for heating homes, have been
responsible for many burn injuries to children. Infants may be laid
next to the heat source for warmth and either get radiant heat burns or
the clothing may accidentally catch on fire.
Infants 0-9 months are also at the greatest risk for morbidity and
mortality. An infant's skin is thinner than an adult's, often resulting
in a much deeper burn. Relatively immature organs such as kidneys make
recovery more difficult for infants sustaining traumatic burn injuries.
Functional and cosmetic disability affects infants much more than
adults, and infants are at higher risk for loosing fingers, toes,
hands, feet, ears and noses from burn injuries. Infants also scar more
easily and these scars are permanent.
We have observed many cases in which infants, the group that needs
the most protection but receives the least from the CPSC have suffered
horrible sleepwear-related burn injuries. For example, in one case the
mother was holding the child in her arms when a candle tipped over and
landed on the infant's sleeve. The sleeve caught fire and severely
burned the infant's arm and hand before the parents could extinguish
the flames. Far from being a benefit, immobility also traps a child who
cannot move away from the flame source that comes to them.
As discussed earlier, the number of infants suffering sleepwear-
related burn injuries at Shriners Hospitals have increased from 5 in
1995-1996, the two years prior to the Commission's decision to exempt
infant garments from the sleepwear standards, to 19 in 1998-1999, after
the safety standards were lowered. A 280 percent increase cannot be
ignored! Although we have not included 1997 in our comparisons because
it was the first year the lowered standards were in effect, Shriners
Hospitals experienced a 200 percent increased in the number of infants
suffering sleepwear-related burn injuries in that year alone.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, we will discuss the
types of injuries the standards were designed to guard against and the
clinical evidence of injuries that we have assembled, but a major
policy decision based on the faulty assumption that an infant's
immobility protects him or her from exposure to fire should not be
allowed to stand.
VI. THE COMMISSION'S DECISION TO EXEMPT TIGHT-FITTING SLEEPWEAR FROM
THE SAFETY STANDARDS WAS BASED ON THE FAULTY AND SCIENTIFICALLY
INCORRECT ASSUMPTION THAT TIGHT-FITTING SLEEPWEAR IS MORE DIFFICULT TO
IGNITE.
The second exemption put into place by the Commission relates to
snug or tight-fitting sleepwear. First, I would like to observe that if
the Commission were having trouble enforcing the standards because of
the confusion between daywear and sleepwear, it certainly would have
trouble determining what is or is not tight-fitting. Second, parents
buy oversized garments for children, who then grow into them. With
growing children, tight-fitting is an illusory concept. Third, the
Commission believes that tight-fitting garments are not easily ignited
because the body acts to absorb heat from the ignition source and thus
slows the heating of the fabric to the point at which ignition can
begin. And, if the sleepwear is ignited, it tends to burn slowly
because only one side of the fabric receives sufficient oxygen to
support combustion. Even if we assume that children will be wearing
sleepwear that actually fits tightly, there is no scientific evidence
to support the theory that tight-fitting sleepwear will not ignite. The
Commission most likely relied on mannequin data in coming to such
conclusions. Before endorsing such a significant policy change, the
CPSC should have relied on studies utilizing patient data before
acting. Like the assumption that governed the decision to exempt
infants' sleepwear, the Commission's assumption that tight-fitting
sleepwear will not ignite is horribly flawed.
Again, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, we will review
many cases that we have actually treated where tight-fitting clothing
has ignited.
VII. THE COMMISSION USED A HIGHLY FLAWED DATABASE TO DETERMINE THE
EXTENT OF SLEEPWEAR-RELATED INJURIES.
The Commission has refused to concede that the assumptions
underlying its decisions are flawed. They ultimately resort to just
denying the reality we see every day in our hospitals. According to
their briefing documents the ``CPSC knows of no burn incidents
involving the types of children's sleepwear that the amendments
affected.'' In making this statement, the CPSC relied on data
accumulated by the CPSC's National Electronic Injury Surveillance
System (NEISS). According to the NEISS sample, only 13 cases involving
sleepwear-related burn injuries were reported from 1990-1998, including
a maximum of 4 in any one year. The CPSC extrapolates these figures to
a national estimate of 90 sleepwear-related burn injuries, plus or
minus 59.
Our first reaction regarding this statistic is, ``how can this
be?'' We treat many more children with sleepwear-related burn injuries
in just our own hospitals.
The first problem with the CPSC's reliance on NEISS is that its
database is seriously flawed. NEISS samples 101 hospital emergency
rooms around the country, including 4 burn centers, less than 4 percent
of the 139 hospitals that are self-identified burn treatment centers.
The four burn centers included in the NEISS sample are the
Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston, Kings County Hospital in
Brooklyn, Children's Mercy Hospital in Kansas City, Missouri and
Children's Hospital in Columbus, Ohio.
The CPSC's reliance on NEISS data, particularly emergency room
data, creates severe reliability problems. The NEISS methodology does
not provide for actual investigations of product injuries. Only if the
doctor in the emergency room identifies a specific case as the cause of
the injury is the product entered into the NEISS database. The doctor's
notes must be legible and identify the product by name. Most of the
time, doctors don't mention the product in their clinical treatment
documentation. According one experienced NEISS data collector, the
individuals collecting this data can't even read the doctor's notes
over 40 percent of the time.
Identification of the product is particularly problematic in the
burn area. In the case of a burn injury, the first thing that the
paramedics do is to remove whatever remnants of burned clothing might
remain on the child to stop the burning process. Of course, often there
is no clothing left to examine. And, the last thing one should be
thinking of in an emergency room is ``what was the baby wearing?'' The
priority is to save the child's life, not investigate the labels of the
charred remains of the clothing.
As the GAO stated, ``national data on burn injuries must be
interpreted cautiously because these data necessarily provide only
limited detail about the circumstances surrounding each individual
case.'' NEISS also does not identify or separately report non-sleepwear
garments that children commonly use for sleeping. The emergency room
environment is simply not conducive to the accumulation of accurate
data on sleepwear-related burn injuries. All this is to say that the
NEISS methodology produces an inordinate number of false negatives, and
therefore it was completely inappropriate for the CPSC to rely upon
this flawed methodology when it decided to lower the children's
sleepwear safety standards, presumably because of a lack of reported
sleepwear injuries.
Looking at the four burn centers included in the NEISS sample also
reveals much about the CPSC's flawed approach towards this issue. Dr.
Tompkins, who is with me today, heads up the Shriners Burns Hospital in
Boston, which is directly adjacent to Massachusetts General Hospital.
Dr. Tompkins also is in charge of burn treatment at MGH. He can tell
you that MGH does not admit any pediatric burn patients. They are
immediately sent to the Shriners Hospital right next door. Similarly,
Kings Country Hospital in Brooklyn admits all pediatric burn patients
to New York Hospital at Cornell Medical Center; Children's Mercy
Hospital in Kansas City sends all major pediatric burn injuries to the
Shriners Hospital in Galveston; and, Children's Hospital in Columbus
has a limited referral network for pediatric burn injuries because of
the Shriners Hospital in Cincinnati.
I can't say it any more directly than this. The CPSC is basing its
conclusions regarding the lack of sleepwear-related burn injuries on
the experience of hospitals that do not treat pediatric burn injuries.
These burned kids are sent to hospitals that the CPSC did not even
bother to call. Interestingly, the Shriners Hospitals for Children,
which treat over 20 percent of all major pediatric burn injuries in the
United States, were never even contacted by the CPSC before deciding to
relax the safety standards. And, when we contacted them, the Commission
dismissed our clinical data out-of-hand because it did not support its
conclusions.
VIII. THE COMMISSION HAS ADOPTED AN OVERLY NARROW AND ARTIFICIAL
DEFINITION OF BURN INJURIES TO DISCREDIT THE HUNDREDS OF DOCUMENTED
CASES INVOLVING CHILDREN BURNED AS A RESULT OF THEIR ACTIONS.
Realizing that the CPSC was utilizing a highly flawed database that
underestimated the number of pediatric burn injuries, Shriners
Hospitals provided several case studies of children treated at our own
facilities for burn injuries involving sleepwear. The CPSC uniformly
rejected every one of these cases. To do otherwise would have destroyed
the rationale for their actions. We cannot let bureaucratic bungling
win the day on this issue.
The Commission stated as follows:
``The children's sleepwear standards were never intended to
address the risk of death and injury from exposure to a whole
house or bedding fire. The intent of the sleepwear standards is
to eliminate the risk of serious personal injury or death from
fire as a result of contact between the sleepwear garment and a
small ignition source such as a match or lighter flame.''
The Commission has further explained that the standards are
performance based, and that if the garment self-extinguishes after the
administration of a one and one-half inch flame for three seconds, it
passes the test. Simply put, the CPSC has confused the standard by
which the sleepwear is tested with the intent of the regulations. The
three-second test was the standard used to prevent ignition and did not
purport to describe the types of burns involved. In so doing, the
Commission has virtually defined sleepwear-related injuries out of
existence. This gross oversimplification defeats the original intent of
the legislation and eliminates more common injuries, which also involve
ignition of other materials. This fact pattern occurs at least 100
times more frequently than the CPSC's highly unusual scenario in which
an open flame, match or lighter is placed on a small part of a child's
clothing, which ignites and there is nothing else burning in the
environment.
We will show you cases in which precisely what the CPSC claims
never to happen has in fact occurred. However, the sad truth is that
the CPSC is ignoring real life fire scenarios in favor of most uncommon
types of injuries, all in an effort to deny the harsh consequences of
their actions.
IX. FLAME RETARDANT SLEEPWEAR CAN PROTECT CHILDREN FROM MORE SERIOUS
INJURY OR DEATH IN LARGER HOUSEHOLD OR BEDDING FIRES.
What is particularly unfortunate about the CPSC's semantics is that
flame resistant sleepwear can be highly effective in reducing the
extent and severity of burn injuries resulting from larger fires. The
Cotton Council has argued that the sleepwear standards were never
intended to protect children from anything other than brief contact
with a small flame, and that ``in all cases on record involving fire
accidents with pre-ambulatory children, the accidents would have
occurred no matter what type of clothing the child was wearing.''
Similarly, the CPSC claims there are no substantial benefits associated
with the standards beyond those represented by the test method.
In 1972 the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (``HEW'')
published a study, which reviewed over 1,500 sleepwear-related
injuries. The study concluded that children in fires whose clothing
ignited had a four to six-fold increase in mortality and associated
morbidity and more than $70,000 in increased hospital costs compared to
those whose clothing did not ignite. Preventing ignition of the
clothing also decreases the extent and severity of the burn injury. For
example, in a larger fire, if the clothing ignites, the total burn
usually doubles and there is nearly six times the amount of full-
thickness injury.
Let me posit just one scenario that makes this point quite clearly.
A house is on fire and a parent picks up her infant and flees the
burning house. Sparks are flying, but the infant's garments do not
ignite because they are flame resistant. However, if the sleepwear is
not flame resistant, the sparks catch the clothing, which virtually
explodes into flames.
The Commission and its supporters also ignore one other rather
logical point. For example, the Commission ignores cases involving crib
fires. The sheets, they say, caught fire first, and then the sleepwear.
How do they know? We have cases where we believe the flame dropped
first onto the sleepwear, and then the bedding ignited thereafter. If
the infant had been wearing flame resistant sleepwear, the bedding fire
would not have occurred. Perhaps what Congress should do if we really
want to protect helpless infants is to not only eliminate the infant
exemption for sleepwear but recognize that regardless of what infants
are wearing, they sleep virtually all the time. We should also consider
requiring crib sheets to be flame resistant as well.
X. THE COMMISSION'S STATEMENTS CLAIMING THAT THE SAFETY STANDARDS WERE
ONLY INTENDED TO COVER BURN INJURIES RESULTING FROM SMALL LOCALIZED
IGNITION SOURCES ARE WITHOUT ANY LEGAL OR LOGICAL SUPPORT.
One last legal point. There is no basis in law for the Commission's
assertion that the standards were not designed to protect children from
just the uncommon type of injury we have been discussing. The
Flammability Fabrics Act, 15 USC section 1193, et seq does not restrict
the Commission to such a contorted definition of sleepwear-related
injury, nor do the implementing regulations. Indeed, section 1193(a) of
the Flammability Fabrics Act charges the Commission with developing
standards that ``may be needed to protect the public against
unreasonable risk of the occurrence of fire leading to death or
personal injury . . .'' Congress gave the Commission latitude to
determine exactly how children should be protected, not the discretion
to so circumscribe the protections as to make them meaningless.
XI. CONGRESS NOT ONLY SHOULD REPEAL THE COMMISSION'S TWO EXEMPTIONS TO
THE SAFETY STANDARDS, BUT SHOULD BROADEN THE DEFINITION OF SLEEPWEAR
FOR CHILDREN BELOW THE AGE OF REASON WHOM OTHERWISE REMAIN AT SERIOUS
RISK OF BURN INJURIES.
A CPSC Memorandum regarding the Enforcement History of Children's
Sleepwear Standards, dated May 12, 1999, did at least acknowledge some
of the difficulties inherent in determining what is or is not a
sleepwear-related injury:
``In-scope classification of sleepwear-related burn incidents
is complicated by inherent difficulties in defining sleepwear,
especially for infants, and in determining the size of the
flame intended to be addressed by the children's sleepwear
standard. Identifying sleepwear-related cases for infants is
difficult because infants sleep frequently and for long periods
of time and are likely to do so regardless of the clothing they
happen to be wearing at any given time. Identifying sleepwear-
related cases for older children is also difficult because they
frequently use certain garments as both daywear and nightwear
(e.g., t-shirts, long underwear).''
We agree with the Commission regarding the complicated nature of
determining what is or is not a sleepwear-related injury and the
attendant confusion over what is daywear and what is sleepwear. As the
Commission noted, ``[A] primary problem in enforcing the children's
sleepwear standards is that ``children's sleepwear'' is a moving
target.'' Congress needs to make it clear that the sleepwear standards
are not designed to deal just with the rare situation in which a small
open flame ignites the sleepwear and nothing else. It also needs to
adopt a more functional definition of what is sleepwear.
Just recently, Australia broadened the definition of sleepwear to
include some types of daywear that children use as sleepwear. If a
child sleeps in a particular type of clothing, then it should be flame
resistant. Congress should list certain types of garments, which
function as sleepwear and require that they meet the flammability
standards. These types of garments could include underwear, t-shirts,
bunny suits, garments with cartoon characters particularly attractive
to children and more.
We recognize that it is not practical to recommend that all
clothing be treated, but we believe that this broader, functional
definition of sleepwear should apply to children age 0-7. The age of
seven is sometimes referred to as the age of reason, a time when,
hopefully, a child will appreciate the danger of fire. This age
grouping also happens to account for well over half of sleepwear or
clothing-related burn injuries. Congress might even consider simply
requiring that all clothing for infants age 0-9 months be flame
resistant, since infants sleep virtually all the time. In other words,
Congress should go in 180 degrees the opposite direction as the
Commission.
XII. CONGRESS SHOULD STRENGTHEN AND BROADEN THE CHILDREN'S SLEEPWEAR
STANDARDS BECAUSE THE TECHNOLOGY NOW EXISTS TO MAKE COTTON FIRE
RESISTANT.
Finally, we are encouraged that the Congress may direct the
Commission to take these steps to provide broader protection for our
children without excluding cotton products from the marketplace. Many
consumers prefer cotton products, but there have been concerns
regarding the desirability and feasibility of making such cotton
products flame resistant. We now know that the technology exists to
make cotton safe for children, without sacrificing the product's other
attributes. A new type of children's sleepwear called ``Skivvydoodles''
is on the market. Skivvydoodles are made with flame resistant cotton.
You can get them at Target or other stores. The flame retardant doesn't
wash out because it cannot be separated from the cotton fiber itself.
There is no reason why those of us representing children at risk from
serious burn injury cannot join with groups such as the Cotton Council
to ensure that this new technology becomes the standard in the
industry.
XIII. CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, the Consumer Product Safety Commission made a very
dubious assumption when they concluded that immobile infants were not
at risk from fire. The Commission also made a very dubious scientific
decision when it concluded that tight-fitting garments really wouldn't
burn. The Commission then compounded these errors by relying on a
highly flawed database, and then using semantic maneuvering to define a
real world problem out of existence. Finally, the Commission ignored
the medical data regarding the benefits of preventing clothing ignition
in its attempt to further justify a discredited and dangerous
interpretation of what is or is not a ``sleepwear-related burn
injury.''
The Commission's actions in 1996 cannot be justified, either
logically or empirically. However, the Commission was right when it
identified the difficulty in determining what is or is not sleepwear.
Congress needs to broaden this definition to include the clothing that
young children actually sleep in, no matter what it may be called by
the manufacturer. In fact, the Commission should have moved long ago to
broaden, not narrow the safety standards. When the agency charged with
protecting our children takes steps that leave them vulnerable to
horrible burn injuries, Congress should step in and fill the breach.
Please think of the children whom we have discussed who have suffered
through these horrible burn injuries and ensure that others like them
do not have to go through the same thing.
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4762.002
Mr. Tauzin. Thank you Dr. Herndon.
Next, Dr. Phillip Wakelyn. Ph.D., senior scientist,
Environmental Health and Safety of the National Cotton Council,
Washington, DC. Dr. Wakelyn.
STATEMENT OF PHILLIP J. WAKELYN
Mr. Wakelyn. I am Phillip Wakelyn, senior scientist for the
National Cotton Council. With me today is Bruce Navarro who is
a former CPSC employee.
Mr. Tauzin. Dr. Wakelyn, would you please take the mike
sir.
Mr. Wakelyn. With me today is Bruce Navarro, a former CPSC
employee and consultant. I am also testifying today on behalf
of Apparel and Retail Associations, the Apparel Manufacturers
Association, and the National Retail Federation and the
International Mass Retailers Association. All of these groups
are very much concerned about children and have a long history
of deep commitment to consumer safety and safety of children.
As you mentioned earlier, you have my complete statement
for the record, I will just raise a few points. The 1996
amendments are not the cause of burn injuries seen in burn
hospitals, and the amendments have nothing to do with the
concern raised by the opposition. The children's sleepwear
standards are doing what they were intended to do in 1971 when
they were first issued, and what was considered then the
unreasonable risk that they were set to address. This is not a
weaker standard.
While all burn injuries are troubling and the images they
present very disturbing, nobody wants to see a burned child.
CPSC doesn't, we don't, and we would not support anything that
would lessen the standard. The fact remains that snug-fitting
cotton and infant-sized sleepwear are safe. Since 1991, the
Consumer Product Safety Commission has thoroughly and
sufficiently reviewed and re-reviewed the children's sleepwear
flammability standards. No further action is necessary on these
standards at this time.
There is no basis from all the burn incidents data since
1965, and I have personally gone back and looked at everything
in all the records, there is no source or other data that would
say that these 1996 amendments diminish the safety of the
standard. CPSC made the correct decisions for the correct
reasons.
Those opposed to the amendments believe the CPSC analysis
was flawed, but they have never presented any substantive data
that show that the data in the various data bases used by CPSC
are incorrect. In fact, in their own comments in testimony to
CPSC, these parties state that in the data they have given to
CPSC they do not know whether the child was wearing sleepwear
at the time of the incident or whether the sleepwear was or was
not in compliance with the standards. They also do not know
what the flame source was that ignited these garments or the
whole fire scenario.
All of their data were given to CPSC for investigation, but
none of it showed that snug-fitting or infant sleepwear or any
sleepwear was the first item to ignite or caused the incident.
You realize that the CPSC has been under an extreme microscope
because of all the pressure and because this is such an
emotional issue, and they have looked at every piece of
information that has been submitted to them by the Shriners,
none of it supports that this standard has been diminished in
any way.
Surely if burn injuries were occurring with the garments
affected by the amendments, data from the U.S., Canada, and
other countries would show some incidences. The original
standards were promulgated in 1971 and 1974. They were designed
to protect against burn injury or death caused by small open-
flame ignitions, that is matches, lighters, and candles, to
children when they were up moving around.
This was the unreasonable risk that they were designed to
prevent. Testing involved a 3-second ignition with a small open
flame. This has been in effect since 1971. The amendments had
nothing to do with changing that test method. The standards
never were intended to protect against large flame sources such
as burning mattresses or house fires. No apparel except perhaps
heat-protective clothing worn by firefighters will do that.
The standards are doing what they were intended to do. The
standards, the original standards, were justified on data
collected from 1965 to 1972 by Health, Education and Welfare.
That is the F facts data base and the standard for zero to 6x
sizes was for children 0 to 5 years. There were 580 cases in
that data base, 37 of them involved sleepwear.
None of the garments in the data used to justify the
original standards were snug-fitting garments. In all cases on
record involving a fire incident with preambulatory children,
the accident would have occurred no matter what type of
clothing the child was wearing. All data indicate that loose-
fitting garments are the types of garments involved with the
burn instances.
Mannequin studies and actual experience in the U.S., the
UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand the only countries who have
such a standard and that have the same sort of amendments to
their standard, and only our standard is more severe than any
other standard in the world, continue to show that tight-
fitting garments and infant-size garments are not the type of
garments that are involved in burn injures.
The standards have been amended several times. In February
1978, CPSC amended the standards because of Tris which was a
fire-retardant agent that was used to make polyester flame
resistant. Nothing is fire retardant. The term is flame
resistant. The amendments removed residual flame time which is
also referred to as melt drip from the standard so that meant
that polyester and nylon would pass the test without any
treatment.
So since that time, 1978, virtually no garments in the
marketplace have been treated with fire retardant chemicals to
make them flame resistant. I also might add that cotton and
polyester ignite at about the same temperature and both burn
similarly in tests. I have actually published articles on this.
I can provide much more information if you like.
Human burns occur when skin temperature exceeds 110 degrees
farenheit which may explain how a child can be burned on
exposed skin and protected in areas covered by sleepwear or
other garments, flame resistant or not. And these 1978
amendments did not diminish the protection of the standard. We
have not heard anybody raise that issue. We also feel that the
1996 amendments to exclude snug-fitting and infant garments do
not diminish the standard.
I would also mention that Canada originally had our
standard, but in 1987, adopted a standard based with fit
characteristics and removed and exempted infant garments. The
reason for amending their standards, they had extensive
mannequin testing of garments, I had video tapes of it which
produced a thick final report. There is a Canadian Medical
Association paper which describes all of this. There are many
papers in the literature that describe how a design affects
flammability. Even the classical work in the 1970's called
America Burning referred to the design having an effect on
preventing burns.
We also got a letter from the head of Health Canada which
states that since the regulations have come into effect, injury
due to the ignition of children's sleepwear are no longer a
problem in Canada. The standards in Australia and New Zealand
and UK are all also working.
Mr. Tauzin. Would the gentleman please conclude.
Mr. Wakelyn. There is no basis in documented fact to
overturn the CPSC decision to amend the children's sleepwear
standards. We urge the Congress to uphold the amendments to
these standards and to refrain from further legislative action
on these standards.
In addition, groups concerned with fire safety and children
should be encouraged to focus their resources and efforts with
those of CPSC and the industry on an information educational
campaign to inform American consumers about the current
sleepwear standards and the importance of teaching fire safety
to children.
[The prepared statement of Phillip J. Wakelyn follows:]
Prepared Statement of Phillip J. Wakelyn, National Cotton Council
I am Phillip Wakelyn, Senior Scientist with the National Cotton
Council. I have been involved with flammability issues since 1963. The
National Cotton Council (NCC) is the central trade association of the
American cotton industry. Our members include producers of over 75% of
the US cotton and cotton processing industries.
Today I am also testifying on behalf of several apparel and retail
association, the American Apparel Manufacturers Association, the
National Retail Federation and the International Mass Retailers
Association who support this statement. NCC, the US cotton industry,
and all of these associations have a long history of deep commitment to
the safety of consumers.
We appreciates the opportunity to testify at this hearing in
support of the 1996 CPSC amendments to the Children's Sleepwear
Flammability Standards (that exclude infant garments, sized 9 months of
age or younger, and snug-fitting garments), because there is no
indication from technical data (mannequin research, etc.), and burn
injury and fatality incidence data, from all sources (the US, Canada,
and other countries) that these garments present an unreasonable risk
or that these amendments diminish the protection provided by the
standards. An examination of the original data sources show there never
have been data to support the coverage of these garments under the
Children's Sleepwear Flammability Standards.
I. INTRODUCTION
At the outset I would like to say that it is unfair and untrue for
anyone to suggest that the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)
would do anything that would cause children harm. Or that Canada and
the three other countries in the world that have standards and that
also do not cover infant sizes and snug-fitting garments are not
concerned about children's safety. Or that the cotton, apparel, and
retail industries would support anything that would harm children.
Indeed, while all burn injuries are troubling, and the images they
present disturbing, the fact remains that snug-fitting cotton and
infant-sized sleepwear are safe.
CPSC is a regulatory agency that is committed to the safety of
children and all consumers. Those opposed to the amendments believe the
CPSC analysis was flawed but they have never presented substantive data
that show that the data in the various databases [Flammable Fabrics
Accident Case and Testing System (FFACTS), National Electronic Injury
Surveilance System (NEISS), In-Depth Investigations(IDIs), National
Fire Incidence Reporting System (NFIRS), Institute for Textile
Technology, Charolottesville, VA (ITT)] used by CPSC are incorrect. In
fact, in their own comments (CF99-1-108) to CPSC these parties state
that in the data they have given to CPSC they do not know whether the
child was wearing sleepwear at the time of the incident or even
``whether the sleepwear was or was not in compliance with flammability
standards''. All of their data was given to CPSC for investigation but
none of it show that snug-fitting or infant sleepwear or any sleepwear
was the first item to ignite or the cause of the incident. CPSC
sometimes finds that other wearing apparel (e.g., shirts, t-shirts) are
involved. However, the burn injuries are usually the result of a house
or other large flame fire in which the clothing is not the first item
to ignite or even a contributing factor.
For children under 15 years old (about 50 million children), there
were 2 or 3 clothing-related thermal burn fatalities (for all clothing)
each year in the US from 1993 through 1998. The portion of these cases
involving sleepwear is unknown, because no data system in the US
specifically identifies sleepwear. Estimated thermal burn injuries
involving sleepwear and other clothing among children under 15 years
old remained low and showed no statistically reliable annual trends
from 1990 to 1998. (C.C. Morris, ``Sleepwear-Related Thermal Burns in
Children under 15 Years Old,'' CPSC June 1999) Therefore, it is not
really known if sleepwear of any kind or small open flame ignitions are
involved in any of these incidents.
The databases could always be improved, but they are much better
today than when the standards were first promulgated in 1971 and 1974.
Available data do not support the notion that the 1996 amendments have
caused burn injuries to children. Surely, if burn injuries were
occurring with the garments affected by the amendments, data from the
US, Canada and other countries would show some incidences.
A. CPSC has Extensively Reviewed the Standards
From Nov. 1991 to July 1996 and again in 1999, CPSC thoroughly and
sufficiently reviewed and re-reviewed the Children's Sleepwear
Flammability Standards. In the process, the CPSC twice conducted
complete notice and comment rulemaking, received comments and testimony
from thousands of witnesses, held hearings and exhaustively analyzed
burn incidence and other data. The CPSC, in four separate extensive
briefing packages, explained the rationale for all decisions at all
steps and the Commissioners voted at each step. Over $7 million was
spent on this effort, which continues to review all pertinent data. All
data since 1965 indicate that CPSC made the correct decision for the
correct reasons.
II. THE STANDARDS WERE DESIGNED TO PREVENT BURN INJURIES FROM SMALL
OPEN FLAME IGNITION AND COVER ONLY SLEEPWEAR
Some seem confused about the purpose of the sleepwear standards,
including the burn scenario and unreasonable risk these standards were
designed to prevent. Let me explain. The original standards promulgated
in 1971 and 1974 were designed to provide protection against serious
personal burn injury or death, caused by small open flame ignition
sources (e.g., matches, lighters, and candles), to children in
sleepwear when they were up moving around. (This was the unreasonable
risk the standards were designed to prevent.) Testing involves a 3
second ignition with a small open flame. The standards never were
intended to protect against large flame sources, such as a burning
mattress or house fire. No apparel except heat-protective clothing worn
by firefighters (only protective clothing that resists burning,
melting, or disintegration on exposure to high heat or flame) will do
that.
These standards were justified on data collected from 1965 to about
1972 (FFACTS: 580 cases by Nov. 1971; 1964 cases by Dec. 1972; Cases
were investigated in the Denver area, the Boston area, the state of
Iowa and 99 from other areas by FDA.) All data since 1965 indicate that
loose fitting garments, loose nightgowns, robes, nightshirts, loose
pajamas, etc., are the garments involved in burn incidence cases. There
were no data to justify including infant garments sized 9 months of age
or younger and snug-fitting garments. None of the garments in the
database used to justify the original standards were snug-fitting
garments. In all cases on record involving fire accidents with pre-
ambulatory children, the accidents would have occurred no matter what
type of clothing the child was wearing. There was a house fire, or a
crib fire, or some other general conflagration in which the sleepwear
garment was not the first to ignite, but instead became involved in a
larger, external fire situation. The infant plays a passive role in the
ignition sequence, according to NBS reports. Details on the 22 cases
involving children under three are given in NBS Technical Note 815 by
Elaine Tyrrell published in Feb. 1974.
Mannequin studies and actual experience in the UK, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand and the US (since 1993) continue to show that
tight-fitting garments and infant sized garments are not the types of
garments that are involved in burn injuries and fatalities.
The philosophy of the DOC (CPSC took over in 1974) at the time when
the original standards were promulgated was to cover everything--even
those products that were not shown to be a risk. Therefore, in the
original 0-6x standard (1971) and 7-14 standard (1974), all sleepwear
products, including 100% polyester and nylon, had to be treated with
fire retardant chemicals to make them flame resistant to meet the
standard, because the standard applied to all products, even those that
were not part of the problem the standards were designed to address.
A. 1978 Amendment to the Standards
The standard has now been amended several times. In February 1978,
CPSC amended the standard because ``tris'' (tris 2,3-dibromo propyl
phosphate), a fire-retardant agent used on polyester and other
synthetics to make those garments flame resistant, was shown to be a
carcinogen. Tris was never used on cotton garments, only on polyester
and nylon garments. This amendment removed the ``residual flame time''
(also referred as ``melt drip'') requirements from the test method of
the standard. As a result, since 1978 essentially no sleepwear in the
marketplace was treated with FR-agents to make them flame resistant,
until the last 1-2 years. Consumers appeared to be more concerned about
potential toxicity (real or imagined) of FR-treatments to their
children, than the risk of burn injuries in sleepwear. The cotton FR-
treatments have been shown to be safe by the National Cancer Institute.
Nevertheless, essentially every time FR-cotton sleepwear was put on the
market until recently, it has not sold well and was removed from the
market.
Cotton (700-1560 F) and polyester (840-1290 F) ignite at about the
same temperature and both burn. Polyester fibers generally begin to
melt between 480 and 570 F. Human burns occur when the skin temperature
exceeds 110 F, which may explain how a child can be burned on exposed
skin and ``protected'' in areas covered by sleepwear or other garments,
flame resistant or not. The 1978 amendments allow untreated polyesters
and other synthetic fibers that melt and drip away from the flame to
pass the test. Cotton, a char former, which does not melt and drip,
will not pass the test [(which requires the tested material to be bone
dry (0% moisture)] without a FR-treatment. Since the 1978 amendments,
virtually no garments in the marketplace have been treated with fire
retardant chemicals to make them flame resistant.
The 1978 amendments appear not to have diminished the safety
provided by the standards.
B. 1996 Amendments to the Standards
In 1996, CPSC amended the standards again. This time, snug-fitting
and infant garments (sized 9 months of age or younger) were removed
from coverage, since these products were never part of the problem.
Contrary to the impression conveyed by some, these amendments did not
affect loose pajamas, nightgowns, and robes. These items still must
meet the requirements of the Children's Sleepwear Flammability
Standards and be flame resistant.
In data from 1994 and before, CPSC has found virtually no injuries
associated with snug-fitting garments or long underwear worn as
sleepwear, or sleepwear worn by infants under one year. And along with
data from Canada and other countries these data strongly support and
reinforce the CPSC finding that the amendments do not diminish the
safety provided by the Children's Sleepwear Flammability Standards.
Burn injuries that have been reported are usually the result of a house
fire or other large fire tragedy in which sleepwear is not the first
item ignited or even a contributing factor.
Therefore, the 1996 amendments to exclude snug-fitting and infant
garments do not diminish the safety provided by the standards.
III. SNUG-FITTING GARMENTS SHOULD REMAIN EXEMPT FROM THE CHILDREN'S
SLEEPWEAR FLAMMABILITY STANDARDS (16 CFR 1615 AND 1616).
CPSC has very strong data indicating that the exemption of tight
fitting garments does not diminish the protection provided by the
standards. All currently available data strongly demonstrate that loose
and flowing nightwear garments are the kind of nightwear involved in
burn injuries and fatalities (59 FR 53620; Oct. 25, 1994, ref. 8, 10,
11 and 61 FR 47634; Sep. 9, 1996); that tight-fitting garments are less
likely to contact an ignition source and less likely to be ignited and
if ignited burn less rapidly than loose fitting garments; and that
tight-fitting sleepwear does not present an unreasonable risk of fire
leading to burn injury or death to children.
These amendments did not affect loose pajamas, nightgowns, and
robes. Those items still must meet the requirements of the Children's
Sleepwear Flammability Standards and be flame resistant. In addition,
tight-fitting garments must comply with the Standard for the
Flammability of Clothing Textiles, 16 CFR 1610.
A. Snug fitting garments are one of the safest types of garments
because: (1) they are not easily ignited because the body acts to
absorb heat from the ignition source and thus helps to slow the heating
of the fabric to the point at which ignition can start; (2) they make
the wearer immediately aware of an ignition source, since the heat of a
match or lighter flame is transferred through the fabric directly to
the skin; and (3) if they are ignited, they tend to burn slowly,
because only one side of the fabric receives sufficient oxygen to
support combustion. Using mannequins and video-tape recordings, the
safety of tight-fitting garments has been demonstrated and illustrates
why those garments do not represent an unreasonable flammability
hazard.
B. Canada originally adopted the US Children's Sleepwear
Flammability Standards but modified them in 1987. The major reasons for
amending their standard were results from mannequin testing of garments
that were described in a Final Report to the Consumer and Corporate
Affairs Canada by E.M. Crown, U. of Alberta, July 1985 and a Canadian
Medical Association paper (J.R.S. Stanwick, CMAJ 132, 1143, 1985).
Since promulgation of the amended Canadian sleepwear standards in
1987, no burn injuries or deaths associated with children's sleepwear
have been reported in Canada (61 FR 47634; Sep. 9, 1996). A December
18, 1995, letter from Therese Gagnon, Acting Chief, Mechanical and
Electrical Hazards Division, Health Canada, Health Protection Branch,
Product Safety Bureau, to NCC concerning the Children's Sleepwear
Flammability Standards and the Canadian experience, states:
``Since the Regulations have come into effect, injuries due to
the ignition of children's sleepwear are no longer an issue in
Canada.''
Australia and New Zealand also have standards that include fit
characteristics that exempt tight-fitting garments. The burn injury and
fatality data in these countries show that these standards are working
(59 FR 52620; Oct. 25, 1994 and 61 FR 47634; Sep. 9, 1996).
D. Other than the United Kingdom, no other European country has
legislation or standards specifically to control the fire safety of
children's sleepwear. The UK Nightwear (Safety) Regulations 1985
(finalized December 20, 1985) came into effect March 1, 1987. Since
1987 the UK has allowed children's nightwear that does not meet strict
vertical flame test requirements in the marketplace (if it is labeled).
The UK burn incidence data indicates that their standard is working.
IV. INFANT GARMENTS, SIZED 9 MONTHS OF AGE OR YOUNGER, SHOULD REMAIN
EXEMPT FROM THE CHILDREN'S SLEEPWEAR FLAMMABILITY STANDARD SIZES 0
THROUGH 6X (16 CFR 1615).
Infant sleepwear should never have been covered in the original
standard. The determined unreasonable risk that the Children's
Sleepwear Flammability Standards are designed to protect the child
against is when the child is up and ambulatory and can obtain matches,
cigarette lighters, candles, or be exposed to other sources of flame,
including stoves, fireplaces, and space heaters, not when the child is
in bed. These exposures are not encountered by pre-ambulatory children.
The Canadian and other countries' experiences for burn injuries and
fatalities for infant sleepwear sizes are similar to the US as reviewed
by CPSC--there are no cases under 15 months. These infant items are not
included in the Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand Children's
Sleepwear Flammability Standards, all of which are effectively
protective standards (59 FR 52620 and 61 FR 47634).
The rare or exceptional accidents for infants lying in their cribs
still occur. In exposures to large flame source such as a burning
mattress or crib or house fire, or if something burning is tossed on
the bed and over the child, none of the products on the market, flame
resistant or not under 16 CFR 1615 and 1616, will provide protection
from injury. Complying flame resistant garments provide no protection
from injury under these circumstances. No general wearing apparel will.
If anything cotton sleepwear may be slightly more protective than
untreated polyester garments (1977 memo/report from J. Krasny, NBS, to
M. Neily, CPSC).
V. OTHER
Some also argue that a more severe Children's Sleepwear
Flammability Standard is required in the US because we have more
residential fires than almost any other country. This argument is
without merit since in the US the number of residential fires where
``all wearing apparel worn'' was the form of material first ignited was
less than 0.2% (CPSC Report, 1993 Residential Fire Loss Estimates, Nov.
1995). Therefore, sleepwear is not a risk factor in residential fires.
Changes in lifestyle in the US, as in other countries, e.g., in
smoking habits, elimination or reduction in use of space heaters, and
other socio-economic changes, also provide additional reasons that
these amendments to the Children's Sleepwear Flammability Standards
were the justifiably correct thing to do.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We agree that CPSC is correct in its determination that these
amendments afford the consumer a wider selection of sleepwear garments
without reducing the protection provided by the standards.
There is no basis in documented fact to overturn the CPSC decision
to amend the Children's Sleepwear Flammability Standards. All available
burn injury and fatality incidence data from the US and all other
countries, as well as technical studies with mannequins, support the
CPSC conclusions that the amendments to the Standards for Flammability
of Children's Sleepwear (sizes 0 through 6x and 7 through 14, 16 CFR
1615 and 1616) which exclude tight-fitting sleepwear garments and
garments sized for infants 9 months of age or younger do not diminish
the protection to the public from unreasonable risk of fire provided by
these standards. The CPSC's conclusions to amend and reaffirm the
standards were arrived at after many years of intense and thorough
study and two full notice and comment rulemakings, which included
extensive briefing packages outlining the rationale for the staff
recommendations.
We appreciate the opportunity to testify at this hearing. We urge
the Congress to uphold the amendments to the Children's Sleepwear
Flammability Standards that exclude infant garments (sized 9 months of
age or younger) and snug-fitting garments and refrain from further
legislative actions on these standards. In addition, groups concerned
with fire safety and children should be encouraged to focus their
resources and efforts, with those of CPSC and industry, on educational
campaigns to inform American consumers about the current sleepwear
standards and the importance of teaching fire safety to children.
Mr. Tauzin. Thank you is very much, sir.
We will now switch to the issue of the amusement park bill,
and we will hear from, first, Mrs. Kathy Fackler of La Jolla,
California.
STATEMENT OF KATHY FACKLER
Ms. Fackler. Thank you, Congressman Tauzin, and thank you,
Congressman Markey, wherever you are for introducing this bill.
Mr. Tauzin. If you will allow me, the problem we are
experiencing today is that another subcommittee of our full
committee is engaged in a very controversial markup. So Members
are required to cast votes in that controversial markup; and,
therefore, they are not with us and apologize for Mr. Markey
and Mr. Rogan and others who are part of that markup.
Ms. Fackler. I know you are busy. I am going to summarize
what is in my statement then I would like to move actually and
comment on what I have been hearing around here. On March 10,
1998, my 5-year-old son David's foot was torn in half on a
roller coaster ride at Disneyland. The accident occurred while
he was sitting next to me with my arm around his shoulder and
the safety bar in place across his lap.
He became confused when the car made a temporary stop
before the platform, thought it was time to get off and tried
to get out of the car. And my arm and the bar kept his body in,
but his foot came out the open side of the car. The operator
wasn't able to see it in time, people yelled on the platform.
But it was just crazy at that time, and his foot was pinned in
between the car and platform as the ride came into the station.
In the wake of that, what I was more surprised at, frankly,
than the accident itself was the lack of any kind of outside
oversight surrounding this accident. The fact that Disneyland
did not have to report the accident to anybody. They didn't
have to have anybody come in from outside the company to
investigate the accident. The police weren't called in. The
press never found out about it. Even though my son screamed for
an hour in the middle of Frontierland during business hours no
one knew about this accident for a year after it happened. It
passed unnoticed, as do the vast majority of amusement-park
accidents.
So my concern with the industry actually has little to do
with their technical capacity. I have nothing but admiration
for the technical arm of the industry. But what bothers me,
frankly, is that David's accident is typical of the 65 to 85
percent of amusement-ride accidents that industry attributes to
patron misconduct. And yet none of that data is out there where
it needs to be.
I find it doesn't make any sense to me that consumers are
considered fully responsible for up to 85 percent of accidents,
and yet those same accidents are considered none of our
business. And so since David's accident, I have learned more
and more about the problem and learned that it is a child-
safety issue. These preschoolers are at highest risk. I think
that those issues need to be addressed. There are no mandatory
Federal safety standards for these rides. The restraints can
range from anything that can sell. Many kiddie rides have no
restraints at all. Some have a piece of clothes line that is
clamped off across.
No one is looking at this stuff, and the data is not out
there where it needs to be.
So as I have listened here to the panel, the things that
come up that surprise me the most, frankly, was the mistaken
impression that we are looking to Federal regulation to set G-
force limits or to provide, you know, yearly inspections of
these rides. And to my knowledge all I am looking for is more
data, more public access to data, and to have some agency that
can take a broader view of this. The State agencies do a
marvelous job of looking at individual accidents. But they
can't connect the dots between an accident that happens on a
Tilt-a-Whirl in one State and another State. Only a Federal
agency can do that. They also can't disseminate that data
nationwide.
I would like this added to the record if I could. It is a
copy of a letter that I wrote to Senator Feinstein's office. It
recounts a conversation that I had with Bob Johnson who is the
executive director of the Outdoor Amusement Business
Association. He is the counterpart to Mr. Graff in the
traveling carnival world. He talked about how the CPSC
oversight complements the State programs, and he felt actually
that it was anything but intrusive and that their industry gets
some benefit mostly having to do with the collection and
dissemination of data.
I have another letter that I would like to have introduced
as well, it actually was an excerpt of a letter that I wrote to
some of the California Park representatives outlining what it
is like as a consumer to try to track down this injury data.
I went through this exercise last fall. And again, I was
appalled not only by how difficult it is, I mean that is all
right, but the fact that this data just doesn't exist. The
NEISS data from the Consumer Product Safety Commission is far
and above the best data and it isn't technical at all. It comes
from hospital room records. So there is nothing in there that
oftentimes they don't even sight what ride it was on, and they
certainly don't say what happened to cause the accident. So
while it gives you a good overview of the age data which is
important and a good overview of the kinds of physical problems
that are caused or injuries that can are caused by these rides,
it doesn't help to highlight where we need to go to solve the
problem.
I heard several people mention that one representative said
that the 12 most tragic deaths happen at traveling carnivals,
and I am not sure where they got that impression. First of all,
every death is tragic to the parent. But second of all, last
year all of the deaths happened at permanent parks. I agreed
with Representative Eshoo about the need for more data. I mean
it makes sense. You cannot possibly understand the problem
without more data. I have heard that from the Consumer Products
Safety Commission commissioners as well, even though they may
differ on what the Consumer Products Safety Commission ought to
do. They all say, well we just don't know because we don't have
the data.
What I would like to do here, and this is what I have been
lobbying for in California as well, is to give the consumers
the information that empowers them to keep their own families
safe. And if most of these accidents are, in fact, caused by
rider errors such as my son made, the only possible solution is
public education. And the industry is not in the business of
public education. They are great in technology and they are
great in selling tickets, but the one thing that they don't do
is put that information out where it needs to be.
In my son's case, when Disneyland went through their
investigation they didn't talk to me or either of my two
children who were riding with me. They didn't interview any of
the eye witnesses, that were not Disneyland employees. They
conducted their whole investigation and the changes to the ride
while we were still in the hospital. And the changes, they
never did anything to keep a child's foot from coming out of
the side of the ride. They never did anything to warn parents
that they need to watch their children's feet. Again there are
simple solutions to these problems, but not if you stop the
free flow of data.
I have heard their ride designers; I have heard from people
in the industry, inspectors, they all want more data because it
helps them do their job. A ride designer can't pull up a list
of all of the accidents that have hurt children if he is
designing restraints for a kiddie ride. Many of those
restraints are the same restraints that they have used for, in
the case of ferris wheels, for 100 years, and no one has looked
at this to see whether possibly we could upgrade the standard.
The newer roller coasters, the wild rides, actually the
safety technology has improved along the same rate as the
thrill technology. So, frankly, I am way less worried about,
you know, a super coaster that uses an over-the-shoulder
harness to retrain an adult than I am a kiddie train that uses
a piece of clothesline to restrain a toddler. So I think again
we need to look at the problem itself.
There was a question asked about State programs, and I have
looked. Again this is another subject I have researched
extensively and while some States, Ohio for one, New Jersey for
another, have excellent programs, some States don't necessarily
have great programs. I will tell you there are some States like
Florida that exempt the large parks. In that State, 20 percent
of the amusement park business operates out of the Orlando area
in the large theme parks. They are exempt from the State law.
Those parks like Disney World, Universal Studios Florida,
they don't have to report injuries or deaths even if a death
happens. They need to report it to the coroner, but they are
not allowed to have the safety regulators come in and take a
look at that from a technical standpoint. There was, oh gosh, I
know I am going through my time. I am so sorry. There has been
bickering over the NEISS system and whether the data is valid
or not valid. Why don't we come up with better data? Then if
the data is inadequate, I think we ought to come up with better
data.
Just to say California, that was the first news I ever
heard that California has allocated $24 million for ride safety
review. The last figure I heard was 1.6 and it was being
negotiated down by the industry.
So to sum up, all the available data indicates that
amusement ride accidents are a child-safety issue. The Consumer
Products Safety Commission has an established track record in
this area. It is foolish to exclude certain amusement rides
from their jurisdiction simply because the rides aren't being
regularly transported. Children aren't hurt because the rides
are moved from place to place. Children are hurt because the
rides are heavy machinery and because the injury data is hidden
from the public.
I have seen first hand the kind of damage that an amusement
ride can do to a small child. My 5-year-old son's foot was torn
in half while he was sitting next to me with my arm around his
shoulder and the safety bar in place across his lap. When we
boarded that ride, I assumed it was subject to the same
oversight and protections that apply to all other children's
products. I was wrong.
My son will live the rest of his life paying the price for
my misplaced trust. It is time for Congress to stop protecting
theme parks and start protecting children who visit them. I
urge the committee to move H.R. 3032 forward as soon as
possible so that the safety lessons we learn through personal
tragedies, like David's, can be shared nationwide.
Mr. Tauzin. I believe you brought your sons with you. You
want to introduce them to the audience.
Ms. Fackler. This is my husband, Mark, over on the end. He
is a conservative Republican, by the way. This is David.
Mr. Tauzin. This is David.
Ms. Fackler. I am so proud of David. He has been just the
hero through all of this. He has really done a fine job. This
is my older son, Steven, who has been a giant help as well.
[The prepared statement of Kathy Fackler follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kathy Faclker
On March 10, 1998, my five-year-old son's foot was torn in half on
a roller coaster ride at Disneyland. The accident occurred while he was
sitting next to me, with my arm around his shoulders and the safety bar
locked in place across our laps. David mistook a temporary stop for the
final stop, and tried to get off the ride. In doing so, his foot came
out the open side of the car, and was crushed between the car's edge
and the loading platform.
David's accident is typical of the 65%-85% of amusement ride
accidents which the park industry attributes to patron misconduct.
Hospital emergency room data provided by the Consumer Product Safety
Commission shows that \2/3\ of all ride-related accidents involve
children. Preschoolers are at higher risk than any other age group.
Yet there are no mandatory federal safety standards for amusement
rides. Restraints on kiddie rides range from seatbelts and lap bars to
pieces of clothesline or, in many cases, nothing at all. Permanent
amusement rides are the only consumer product marketed to children that
are specifically exempt from federal safety oversight. Although many
states have some form of regulatory law governing some amusement rides,
the largest theme parks are almost entirely self-regulated. Parks like
Disney World and Universal Studios Florida are not required to report
injuries to any outside agency, or allow ride safety officials to
investigate serious accidents--not even if a rider dies.
Disneyland is also self-regulated, and will be until California's
new regulations have been finalized. The maiming of my child was not
reported to anybody. The police weren't called in. No one from the
press found out about the tragedy, despite the fact that David screamed
for an hour in the middle of Frontierland during business hours. The
incident passed without notice--as the vast majority of amusement ride
accidents do.
Disneyland conducted their own investigation and made changes to
the ride while David was still in the hospital. No one from
Disneyland's technical staff contacted me as part of that process. Nor
did the company interview the three best eye-witnesses: a man riding
directly behind us, and a couple waiting on the platform.
Disneyland did not modify the ride to guard against young children
sticking their feet out the open sides of the cars. Nor did they do
anything to warn parents about the platform entrapment hazard. Instead
they added the word ``feet'' to the warning sign that David was too
young to read. And they built a ramp on the facing edge of the platform
in the hopes that a child's foot would be more likely to ``bounce off''
a ramped approach, and not be caught in the one-inch gap that still
exists between the cars and the platform.
Thanks to self-regulation, the thousands of visitors who line up
every day for a turn on Big Thunder have no way of knowing that they're
loading their own children onto a ride that once tore a 5-year-old
boy's foot in half.
Congressman Markey's bill is a model of brevity. In four sentences,
it returns consumer rights to a heavily protected industry. The
Consumer Product Safety Commission has been regulating traveling
carnival rides for more than 20 years. They are the only agency that
has authority to ``connect the dots'' between related accidents in
different states, and develop a plan of action to address product
hazards. Sometimes this involves a modification to the design,
operation, or maintenance of the ride, information which the CPSC
disseminates to ride owners/operators across the country.
Product safety also involves public education. The amusement park
industry attributes the majority of accidents to rider error. Given
that amusement parks are in the business of loading children onto heavy
machinery, their claim makes perfect sense. Yet the industry, which
claims safety as it's number one priority, does very little to
constructively address what they readily admit is the primary cause of
accidents. In a recent USA Today article ("Park Safety Rules Lax",
April 7, 2000), John Graff of the International Association of
Amusement Parks and Attractions (IAAPA) claimed that "that kind of
thing is largely beyond our control."
Unlike the IAAPA, the CPSC is both willing and able to raise public
awareness about child safety issues. They're the people who issue
safety bulletins about bike helmets and window cord strangulation and
keeping kids away from rider mowers. Those bulletins are picked up and
published by parenting and women's magazines, so that parents learn how
to keep their children safer.
The amusement park industry deserves high praise for their
technical achievements. They put enormous effort into constructing,
testing, and maintaining safe equipment. They are not, however, in the
business of disseminating safety information to the public. Although
they consider 65%-85% of accidents to be wholly the consumer's
responsibility, they also consider those same accidents to be none of
our business.
In fact, the CPSC is the only source of nationwide injury data on
amusement park accidents. The agency has been monitoring the safety of
traveling carnival rides for more than 20 years. I see no logical
reason why permanent rides should be exempt.
It's important to understand that, with the exception of giant
roller coasters and a handful of custom-built rides found at parks like
Universal Studios, there is no difference between traveling carnival
rides and amusement park rides. In fact, it's quite common for an
amusement park to sell a used ride to a carnival, or vice versa. So a
Ferris wheel or Tilt-a-Whirl can be subject to consumer protection
regulation one day and exempt the next, following a change in
ownership. The 1981 exemption didn't eliminate a product from CPSC
oversight, it created a loophole by which a select class of business is
allowed to operate without governmental oversight.
CONCLUSION
All the available data indicates that amusement ride accidents are
a child safety issue. The Consumer Product Safety Commission has an
established track record in this area. It seems foolish to exclude
certain amusement rides from their jurisdiction, simply because the
rides aren't being regularly transported. Children aren't hurt because
the rides are moved from place to place. They're hurt because the rides
are heavy machinery, and because injury data is hidden from the public.
I have seen, first hand, the kind of damage an amusement ride can
do to a small child. My 5-year-old son's foot was torn in half while he
was sitting next to me with my arm around his shoulders and the safety
bar in place across his lap. When we boarded that ride, I assumed it
was subject to the same oversight and protections that apply to all
other children's products. I was wrong. My son will live the rest of
his life paying the price for my misplaced trust.
It's time for Congress to stop protecting theme parks, and start
protecting the children who visit them. I urge the committee to move HR
3032 forward as soon as possible, so that the safety lessons we learn
through personal tragedies like David's can be shared nationwide.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4762.003
Mr. Tauzin. Glad to have you here. Thank you, Kathy.
Now we will hear from John Graff, president and CEO of
International Association of Amusement Parks and Attractions
here in Alexandria, Virginia. Mr. Graff.
STATEMENT OF JOHN R. GRAFF
Mr. Graff. Good afternoon. My name is John Graff. I am
president and CEO of the International Association of Amusement
Parks and Attractions. Our parks have as their No. 1 priority
the safety of our guests. We have in place extensive training
programs for our employees and systems to check and recheck the
safety of our rides. We are safety oriented out of a concern
for our guests, but we are also highly motivated to promote
safety because any accident, certainly any large number of
accidents, can threaten our business and put us out of
business. We are in the amusement business, and we know that
people expect their amusement and leisure-time activities to be
as free as possible from potential harm. The full text of my
remarks make three points that I believe should be central to
your examination of this issue. These are: First, amusement
rides are an exceptionally safe form of recreation and
entertainment, probably the safest available.
Second point, the industry is highly regulated and
adequately regulated by various government and private entities
at the present time.
Third, the industry has demonstrated its capacity for
effective self-regulation and constant adaptation to new
technology that is improving the way we provide safe fun to our
guests.
The annual CPSC report that has been referred to often this
morning have consistently shown for over 20 years that there
are very few new activities or products of any kind that
produce fewer injuries than our park rides. Three hundred nine
million visitors annually visit our parks, and they take a
conservatively estimated 900 million rides. The incidents of
those of serious injuries, injuries serious enough to require
hospitalization is 1 in 25 million rides. Fatalities have
averaged 2 a year for some 20 years, and that is a rate of
incidence of 1 in every 450 million rides.
We regard 36 accidents which is the number of serious
accidents last year and 2 fatalities or even one accident as
too many. We recognize the human pain and grief that attend
each of them. But the question you must confront is whether
there is a realistic possibility that another layer of
regulation will further reduce those incidents and whether the
resources that would have to be spent trying should be diverted
from other critical national needs.
The media has reported that the incidents of ride injuries
increased 54 percent between 1995 and 1996 and 24 percent over
the past 4 years. These numbers appear to be inaccurate. When
they first appeared in the agency report, we contacted CPSC to
discuss these reports. And we are told on three different
occasions that they were not an increase in the number of
actual injuries but that the method of collecting and reporting
data had been changed which was the reason for that jump in
1955, 1956. Ms. Brown suggested there was a misunderstanding. I
say again, we were told that on at least three occasions to
three different people on my staff over a period of years. But
to double-check the statement, we hired an independent expert,
a former CPSC employee, the director of strategic planning for
the agency to analyze the numbers. Using the data supplied by
the CPSC and the CPSC's own analytical methods, this expert
found that the figures on which these claims are based are not
accurate. In fact, he found there was a substantial decrease in
the incidence of accidents between 1995 and 1996.
Our expert confirmed that the CPSC changed its methodology
in 1997 and suggested that this change could account for the
increase that took place during this period of time. That is
exactly what we were told on three occasions by the staff of
the Commission. In other words, the accident increase
justification being cited for this legislation simply does not
exist.
My second point is that the industry is already highly and
effectively regulated by a number of agencies. All but a
handful of parts are subject to State regulation. Only eight
States do not have ride laws, Alabama is one of them, but is
currently considering legislation. Of the remaining seven
states, two have no parks and therefore no need for regulation.
The remaining five have a total of seven parks between them.
Whatever your personal opinion may be. I would suggest that it
is a legitimate issue of public policy that States with so few
parks need to set up an agency to oversee them, especially in
the absence of a demonstration of need.
My final point is that our industry has proven its capacity
for leadership in the area of safety and for constant
adaptation to new technology. Great concern has been expressed
that technology is out of control in our industry. For years,
there has been an independent committee that has produced a set
of standards dealing with issues of safety raised by
technology, the ASTM standards that have been adopted by many
States as law and would serve as the standard that
manufacturers and parks must operate to even if it has not
formally adopted them into law.
I was quite puzzled by Mrs. Brown's comment that CPSC is
prohibited from participating in this process because they deal
with fixed-location rides. The agency was represented for years
on the ASTM committee by a Mr. David Caplan who eventually
retired, and now there is a Thomas Cayton who represents the
agency on the ASTM committee. There is nothing that I know of
in either the rules or the methods of operation of ASTM that
would prohibit them from being there because fixed-location
rides are discussed along with mobile rides. There is no
distinction made in the presentations that are the discussions
that are made there.
Let me address just very briefly, the issue of G-forces. G-
forces were under discussion by both the German agency
responsible for ride standards and by the ASTM before the issue
was ever raised in this Congress. There is a great deal of
exchange of that kind of information between all of the policy
and standards writing organizations, amusement ride safety
standards organizations that stand in the world. I am confident
that these groups which cooperate extensively, as I just said,
will reach a consensus on appropriate action with respect to
that subject. That this multitiered system of private and
public regulation works and works well is again best evidenced
by the success the industry has enjoyed worldwide in keeping
the number of accidents very low.
I would also point out that the chart that Mr. Markey used
is a chart of all amusement park accidents not just ride-
related accidents. And children from 2 years old up to 7 or 8
or 9 are not allowed on roller coasters because they can't meet
the height requirements. So we have to be sure what we are
looking at and what we are talking about here.
I mention in my statement there are other organizations
such as the AIMS organization, the Amusement Industry
Manufacturers and Suppliers organization, which is involved in
all of this and works closely with the operators, and the
National Association of Amusement and Recreational Officers.
These people provide very important information sharing
function which is a matter of some concern here. They also
conduct regular teaching seminars for operators and for public
inspectors. All of this taken together is why the accident rate
is as low as it is. The effort goes on ceaselessly to improve
it even further. We are at least as concerned about this as
anyone in this room and perhaps more so because of the acute
interest that I mentioned. So I thank you for the opportunity
to be here today, Mr. Chairman, and to discuss this with you
and obviously like everyone else here am here to respond to
questions.
[The prepared statement of John R. Graff follows:]
Prepared Statement of John R. Graff, President/CEO, International
Association of Amusement Parks and Attractions
Good morning, my name is John Graff. I am President and CEO of the
International Association of Amusement Parks and Attractions (IAAPA).
IAAPA is a trade association for fixed location amusement parks and
attractions with 5600 members in 91 countries. About 1,500 of those
members are amusement parks and other facilities. The remainder is
suppliers to the industry.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear here today to discuss with
you the amusement park industry's number one priority, the safety and
well being of our guests and patrons.
Our amusement parks have as their number one priority the safety of
our guests. We have in place extensive training programs for our
employees and systems to check and recheck the safety of our rides. We
are safety oriented out of concern for our guests, but we are also
highly motivated to promote safety because any accident can threaten
our business. We are in the amusement business and we know that people
expect their amusement and leisure time activities to be as free from
potential harm as is humanly possible.
This is the reason we are constantly striving to ensure the safest
possible attractions and rides through a variety of programs and
activities and through our cooperation with public and private
regulatory and standards setting organizations. When an accident does
occur, and accidents are rare, we take whatever steps are needed to
assure that our guests receive prompt care and attention. We want to be
measured not just by the steps we take to prevent accidents, but also
on the actions we take when there is that rare accident. Our staff is
trained to handle medical emergencies that are inevitable whenever
people congregate, as well as for accidents. We are sensitive to the
needs of our guests, and for their care from the time they enter our
gates until they leave.
I intend here to very briefly discuss three points that should be
central to your examination of this issue. They are highly relevant to
the decision you must make concerning the wisest use of limited federal
resources. That is, the critical element of every public policy debate
of this type is whether a realistically perceived benefit to be
realized from some action justifies the diversion of resources from
other priority items.
My points are these:
1. Amusement rides are an exceptionally safe form of recreation and
entertainment--perhaps the safest available;
2. The industry is highly and adequately regulated at the present time;
and
3. The industry has demonstrated its own capacity for effective self-
regulation and constant adaptation to new technology and new
challenges in the area of safety.
IAAPA strongly and with ample justification believes that our
industry is exceptionally safe. This belief is supported by the
government's statistics. While attendance at fixed-site U.S. parks and
attractions has grown to 309 million annually, the CPSC estimates that
of the 4,500 injuries nationwide in 1998 involving rides at these
venues, only 36 resulted in hospitalization. Again, according to CPSC
statistics, fatalities related to fixed-site amusement rides have
averaged just 2 per year over the past two decades.
Assuming each guest takes only three rides (for a conservative
total estimate of 900 million rides in the U.S. yearly), the odds of
being injured seriously enough to require hospitalization are therefore
1 in 25 million, and the odds of being fatally injured are 1 in 450
million. I invite you to look at the entire list of products and modes
of conveyance regulated by CPSC and other federal agencies and see
which, if any, come even close to our record in terms of the number of
injuries.
Year after year, rides have remained at the low end of the CPSC's
figures on product-related injuries. In fact, the latest statistics
estimate that more people were injured in 1998 while fishing (77,643),
dancing (38,427), golfing (46,019), and bicycling (597,284) than were
injured on or in fixed-site amusement rides (4,500). Please remember,
too, that in each of these instances we are talking about injuries
serious enough to require the individual involved to be examined or
treated in a hospital emergency room--the same threshold as is used for
counting amusement ride injuries.
I know that some question the relevance of these comparisons. They
are nonetheless relevant and informing. They demonstrate that there are
risks in life, sometimes from everyday activities. Yet, we in the
amusement park industry have minimized these risks well below these
other, some seemingly innocuous, activities.
Let me add that it seems clear that the public is very confident of
our ability to provide safe entertainment. As already noted, amusement
park attendance is currently at 309 million visits. Despite the
occasional accidents that do occur and the tremendous amount of media
coverage they generate, that attendance number has been increasing
steadily for years.
If you will permit me a further, personal, note, I can state
truthfully that I have visited hundreds of amusement parks all over the
world. My employment provided me the opportunity to take my children to
many parks of all types and sizes. We are all enthusiastic riders and
to this day there is not a ride I would be afraid to get on alone at
age 64 or with my children.
It has been said that there is a loophole in the law for fixed site
rides. There is no such loophole. In 1981, Congress examined the issue
of ride safety and the jurisdiction of CPSC. That review was not a
Reagan administration initiative to take away CPSC jurisdiction over
our parks. For several years CPSC had been exercising a jurisdiction it
did not have.
Prior to 1981 there had been a number of court cases asking the
court to decide whether the definition of the term ``consumer product''
in Consumer Product Safety Act was intended to cover amusement rides.
The decisions had split. Congress was urged, by our organization among
others, to clarify the law. It did. After hearings and much discussion,
including a review of the safety numbers and our industry practices, it
concluded that our rides were not consumer products and not in need of
regulation by CPSC. Several times over the intervening years the issue
has been presented again. Congress has never seen fit to change its
mind.
The safety record to which I refer doesn't just happen. It is the
result of concerted effort. IAAPA members have in place a variety of
procedures and protocols to minimize the chance of an accident and to
evaluate accidents that do occur in order to take appropriate action.
IAAPA members do all they can to maximize safety.
Although there is some disagreement as to the exact number of
accidents that are caused by rider action or inaction, it is widely
agreed that the majority of the accidents that do occur are unrelated
to design, manufacturing, maintenance defects or defaults or operator
error. I mention this because it means that of the already very small
number of serious accidents that occur, an even smaller number are due
to the kind of things that might be, and usually are, found by
inspection.
While it is impossible to control all human behavior, IAAPA members
review every accident case, including those cases where rider horseplay
or other patron negligence is shown to have caused the accident, in an
attempt to develop operations and security methods to minimize the
potential risk of harm to all of our patrons.
Proponents of this legislation maintain that there has been a
dramatic increase in the number of ride-related accidents in the last
five years, particularly during the period 1995-96. I would invite you
to take a very careful look at that claim before relying on it as
justification for a new federal program. IAAPA undertook to check this
out as soon as we saw the increase reported for 1995-96. We were told
by the CPSC staff that the increase did not reflect an actual increase
in the number of accidents but was, rather, the result of a change in
the methodology used to collect and analyze the results.
That explanation seemed more plausible than that all of a sudden,
and for one year only, there was a 54% increase in accidents.
To further satisfy ourselves on that point, we recently
commissioned an independent analysis of the years in question by a
company thoroughly familiar with the CPSC reporting system. Working
with the data supplied to them by CPSC and using the same methods
followed by the agency, our independent analysts found that the CPSC
conclusion that injuries had substantially increased for 1995-96, was
not supported by the agency's data.
Further, this independent analysis reveals that in 1997 CPSC
significantly redesigned its injury data collection sample, adding
approximately 30 new hospitals to that sample. The analysis indicated
that this significant redesign of the sample raised questions about the
statistical representativeness and year-to-year comparability of the
data for a product like fixed site amusement rides, with their non-
uniform geographic distribution across the nation. The modifications in
methodology could also account for an increase that is revealed for the
following and subsequent years. This is precisely what we were told
when we contacted the Commission.
It would seem important that you proceed with extreme caution and
diligence so as to base sound policy decisions on valid and accurate
data.
For our part, we believe that even if the agency's numbers are
correct, they show a leveling off after 1996 and, in fact, a decrease
for the years 1997-98. There is simply no basis for believing that
there has suddenly been a sharp, systemic, increase in ride injuries in
recent years. Some variation is almost inevitable as total park
attendance increases (or, as is happens quite rarely, decreases) each
year.
Efforts have been made to cast our safety claims in terms of
accidents per mile and other comparisons; but the simple fact remains-
and it is confirmed by the public record--that what is at issue here is
an annual average of 36 injuries serious enough to require over-night
hospitalization and two fatalities in the entire country.
The second of my three main points is that the industry is already
highly and effectively regulated.
In addition to the thorough set of internal protocols and
procedures followed by member parks, all facilities are subject to one
or more layers of outside, independent examination.
Almost all parks are subject to compliance with various
governmental codes and requirements. State and/or local officials
perform a range of ride-inspection tests, and often assist park
personnel with accident prevention programs.
Much is being made of the fact that only 41 of 50 states regulate
parks. Again, I invite you to look carefully at this. A critical factor
is the distribution of parks among the states and whether they have any
rides. More than a dozen years ago we surveyed and discovered that at
that time 85% of all the parks in the country were subject to some, in
almost all instances State, jurisdiction. Since that time, a number of
additional states, including California which has a great many parks,
have enacted ride regulation statutes. Since the figure 41 was
published, the State of Missouri has enacted a law. So, there are now 8
states without such a law. Of those, the legislature in Alabama is
currently addressing the issue, and five states have a total of only 7
parks with rides (AZ, KS, MS, SD, UT). The remaining two states have no
parks (ND, MT).
I might add parenthetically that I was surprised to find South
Dakota, my home state, among those having an amusement park. I visit
there constantly and have never been aware of such. In investigating, I
found that an indoor swimming pool that has been in the Black Hills for
nearly a century recently added a Ferris wheel to its property and thus
became, by somebody's definition, an amusement park.
I think it is a fair question of public policy with respect to
which reasonable people can disagree as to whether a state with no
parks or even only one or two should set up an agency to regulate
parks. I would note, however, that as an organization we have never
opposed state regulation.
One has only to look again at the number of serious accidents
occurring to be re-assured that this system of regulation is working
very well. But it is not the only safeguard.
Amusement parks must pass rigorous ``risk control'' inspections
carried out by representatives of insurance companies. Other outside
specialists are also used to inspect rides. All these various
government agencies, organizations and specialists work together
effectively to provide the public with a very high level of assurance
that their day in the park will be a safe one.
Finally, I point with pride to the fact that the industry has
proved its capacity for leadership in the area of safety and for
constant adaptation to new technology and the changes that affect our
industry.
Years ago we took the leadership in getting the industry involved
in the development of comprehensive amusement ride standards, under the
auspices of the American Society for Testing and Materials. ASTM is an
independent standards-writing organization that requires broadly based
committees, including representatives of the public interest, in
setting their standards. CPSC has participated in that process for many
years.
That ASTM committee exists precisely to analyze the uses of
technology and to provide standards to both manufacturers and operators
concerning safe design, manufacture and practices.
The ASTM standards are in place. They are, however, constantly
subject to review and revision as new technology and new experience
dictates. The committee meets twice a year for this purpose.
The ASTM standards are voluntary as drawn but many states have
incorporated them in their regulatory schemes, thereby giving them the
force of law. Where they are not encoded, the standards still provide
an effective shield for the public. The nature of our legal system is
such that no one operating in the industry could afford to ignore the
standards.
The issue of g-forces and ride design has been raised. This, too,
needs to be looked at objectively. The designers and manufacturers of
rides have been designing rides for years in accordance with the best
knowledge available concerning the effect of such forces on our guests.
The same modern technology that makes higher and faster rides possible
also makes it possible to much more accurately assess these forces and
accommodate them in design and manufacturing processes.
Proposals relating to g-force analysis and safety are under
discussion in both the German organization responsible for ride safety
and the ASTM committee in the U.S.
Furthermore, for years there has been a high level of communication
and cooperation between those involved in writing ride standards in the
U.S. and the various standards writing bodies in Europe. I am confident
that this process of international sharing of information and ideas in
the standards area will continue.
The maintaining of the industry's excellent safety record also
involves an assurance that information concerning safety matters be
communicated effectively throughout the industry. There are many
protocols involving the parks, manufacturers and government agencies
that result in the reporting of incipient or actual problems involving
ride safety. The ASTM ride standards also require reporting of both
accidents and ride-related defects.
The existing regulatory system which helps insure the extraordinary
safety record of the industry is capable of making whatever adjustments
are necessary to produce and make available vital information.
The industry has long opposed being subject to the reporting
requirements contained in Section 15 b of the Consumer Product Safety
Act. Those provisions may be quite adequate for most general consumer
products but they are not at all appropriate for something like an
amusement ride.
It is the conclusion of all legal experts in the industry that I
have spoken to over the years that the language of Section 15 b is
ambiguous at best when applied to rides and could very well require
every ride in every park to be reported to CPSC as a potentially
dangerous product. That would include such things as carousels and
kiddie cars.
Let me conclude by stressing once again that the safety and well
being of our guests and patrons is our number one priority. Anyone in
the business who had had to deal with an serious accident knows the
anguish and anxiety that results--certainly for the injured guest and
his or her family, which is our first concern, but also for the people
on staff. IAAPA members recognize and accept that full responsibility
for providing a safe environment rests squarely with the parks
themselves. We strongly believe that the current scheme of voluntary
and state-based regulation is working and that adding another layer of
federal regulatory oversight will not improve safety in our parks.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I stand ready to answer
any questions that you might have.
Mr. Tauzin. Thank you very much. The Chair recognizes
himself and other members in order. Let me first of all, Mr.
Graff, ask you with reference to the statistics compiled by
CPSC on accidents and amusement parks, you quarrel with the
statistical finding that that was a dramatic increase in
injuries in the year 1995, 1996, but you don't quarrel with the
number of injuries reported do you?
Mr. Graff. We have accepted the number of injuries reported
by the agency for years. Mr. Hyden, the CPSC expert I talked
to, suggests that because of the reporting system, because of
the NEISS reporting system the number of accidents in our parks
is probably overestimated. Mrs. Brown said underestimated. Mr.
Hyden says that because of the way the NEISS system works with
these 100 sample hospitals from which they determine a
statistical average which is then multiplied times all the
hospitals in America. There is a severe distortion in what he
called location specific. There are 450 parks in the country,
and there are 5,000 hospitals.
Mr. Tauzin. Ms. Fackler makes a point that there are some
parks which don't report to anyone, exempted. In the cases
where parks do report to State inspectors or ride
manufacturers, that information never reaches a central
clearing house so that it can be distributed to other parks and
other manufacturers or other operators so that they might make
the changes that might protect a child from the foot injury her
own son suffered. In terms of improving the ride safety or
advices to those who are going to be riding the ride, what is
wrong with a minimum requirement for centralized reporting and
distribution of that information?
Mr. Graff. Let me say first with respect to that, then I
will get after the question. There is a great deal of
communication of that type of information within the industry.
Mr. Tauzin. I suspect there is, but I am asking you what is
wrong with a mandatory requirement that everyone report these
accidents and the defects that may be related to them so that
everybody can fix them?
Mr. Graff. Our basic objection to this process was the same
one that was made in 1981, when you were still--I mean we were,
you were involved in this committee, and again in 1987 that and
that has to do with the specific language of the Consumer
Products Safety Act as it applies to amusement rides and
devices. On of the greatest things that was discussed in
Congress in 1981 and 1987 was whether the NEISS language could
be reasonably applied to amusement parks and it was decided
that it couldn't. The act would require----
Mr. Tauzin. But look I am going to have to move on. I want
to ask you specifically regardless of the legalities of what
the law says today, what it might say if we pass a different
bill, what is wrong with the simple notion of all amusement
parks whether fixed or mobile reporting to a central data bank
from which--managed by CPSC or anyone, would mandatorily report
any incidents of defects and accidents so that everybody can
share that information and act accordingly.
Mr. Graff. Reserving my objection to the precise language
of the statute, I would say anything that will facilitate the
exchange of useful information in a way that is protective of
everybody's legitimate interest is certainly something that we
will look at.
Mr. Tauzin. Ms. Fackler, let me go to you and commend you
for your efforts following your son's injury. By the way, I
came within a week of having my own foot amputated as a child
from a roller accident, you know, just roller skates. And so
you know, accidents like that are just awful. That is the foot
I love the most because I always put it in my mouth. So I am
glad to still have it. But the bottom line is that kids have
accidents, kids make mistakes.
What you are saying in effect is that these things are
going to happen by the nature of children making mistakes. They
are asking simply that there be some systems by which when
those things happen people know about them, people generally
share that information. And hopefully rides can continually be
improved so that there are fewer of those mistakes that lead to
the accidents like your son suffered. Is that about the
substance?
Ms. Fackler. That is about it. And it is not just that the
rides be improved. There has been a lot talk about product
defects. I am not sure that the vast majority of the problems
here has to do with a defective product, but it is the fact
that children are being loaded on to heavy machinery. There is
an expectation gap. We have heard a lot about car seats today.
It is so interesting. Today we talk about restraining children
in cars. We restrain children everywhere else in high speed
vehicles, and then you get to an amusement park and those same
protections don't apply. But oftentimes parents don't
understand that when they go on.
You know those hard metal lap bars that come down across
your lap are not considered restraints by the designers I have
talked to. They are considered something to hold on to. They
help keep someone from being thrown bodily out of the car. But
there is a chronic problem with those lap bars fitting closely
against only the largest person in the car, and the children
slip out either through the motion of the ride or if they are
young enough they will just stand up. So having an adequate
data base allows someone like me maybe to go out and help
educate the public to the problem so that parents know when
they go on those rides that they need to watch more closely
than in a car.
Mr. Tauzin. Let's talk about restraints quickly. Ms. Stone,
you made the observation that in fact there ought to be better
information to consumers about whether or not in particular a
child restraint will work well in a particular car they own. I
want to turn to your Britax seat, Mr. Baloga. It may perform
very well in a Chevy Blazer but not so well in a Ford Taurus is
what we are told. Can you answer that criticism on whether that
is true and whether parents ought to be told whether a seat
performs better in a given vehicle.
Mr. Baloga. It is a very complicated issue and to answer
that the engineers would need to know what kind of crash is it
going to be, which is virtually impossible to answer. The
characteristics of the vehicles are so much different because
the seats are designed for adults and therefore vehicle seats
need a child restraint. So there is such a variety of
performance that it is really impossible to answer that.
Mr. Tauzin. For example, just the simple question of
whether the seat will fit in the car, shouldn't you give
consumers information as to whether the seat you are selling
them the seat for the child will actually fit in the car that
the parents own?
Mr. Baloga. There is a factor where the seat belt location
is dictated by the vehicle manufacturers to fit adults and the
child seat manufacturers have no influence on that whatsoever.
Mr. Tauzin. I am not questioning whether you have
influence, I am just saying consumer information. Wouldn't it
be useful for you to put on your seats, in fact, all
manufacturers whether or not it will fit in a car? I just made
the case for my remote, you know, I was pretty upset when I
called last night and found out this universal remote didn't
work on my television. Just how much worse it is when you go
buy an expensive car seat for your child and find out it
doesn't fit in your car.
Mr. Baloga. This is a good point. That is why we recommend
try before you buy in terms of the child seat.
Mr. Tauzin. But do you know as a manufacturer which cars
your seat won't fit in.
Mr. Baloga. In some cases where there are extreme problems,
yes.
Mr. Tauzin. I would just suggest, you know, maybe we have
some need for some good consumer education information here.
Because apparently the agency is not yet ready to report to
consumers about which seats work better in which cars, but you
certainly can tell at least whether they fit in a car. We
probably ought to know that. I want to quickly turn to the
other point with you that is the LATCH system. My understanding
is that new cars do not need to be equipped with anchors until
the year 2002. If that is correct, how much more do you think
it will cost to equip car seats with the LATCH hardware?
Mr. Baloga. Are you talking about vehicles or child seats.
Mr. Tauzin. I am talking about vehicles that do not need to
be equipped with the anchors that are critical to a LATCH
system as I understand it.
Mr. Baloga. So how much would it cost?
Mr. Tauzin. To equip cars that don't have it. What are we
talking about?
Mr. Baloga. I am not really the right one to answer that.
If it means a redesign, serious redesign of the whole vehicle
it could be 10's of millions of dollars to retool.
Mr. Tauzin. How much would it cost to make a change in the
seat?
Mr. Baloga. We are doing that right now, the industry. It
can be $15 to $75 depending on the complexity of the
attachment.
Mr. Tauzin. You are in the business of doing that right
now.
Mr. Baloga. Absolutely, yes.
Mr. Tauzin. Mr. Markey.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. When I was 5, I was
chasing Bobby Olson and Charlie Kiddaro across the street. They
were 9. In retrospect, I was way up where I should have been up
there on the corner of Welsh Street, and I was run over by a
car. There were two things my mother always told me, if I got
run over by a car and was taken to an emergency room. One was
my telephone number is M840815. Your name is Eddy Markey. And
second make sure you change your underwear every day because I
will be totally embarrassed if you ever go into your emergency
room and they found out you didn't change your underwear.
There is another lesson I learned too because I carry it
with me for my whole life, which is this huge bump up here on
the top of my head, which is--unlike other kids when they were
15 or 16 back in the 1960's, I put my seat belt on. These cars
can hurt you if they hit you.
Now better to learn that lesson vicariously than in person.
Huh?
So now we look at the roller coaster industry, and they are
over here kind of in this separate world where you are putting
a whole bunch of kids into a ride which we know is very
dangerous but without any Federal and in many States any State
regulation. And we have got this huge increase now in the
number of kids who will have a memory of the injury which they
suffered.
And I think that it again is much better for people to
learn this lesson vicariously. The injury really isn't
necessary and hundreds of millions of kids learn how to buckle
up now or protect themselves without having to learn it in
person. But there were no laws, obviously, when I was a kid
that dealt with those kind of issues.
So Mr. Graff, here is the problem for your industry. Your
industry has--if we can put up the chart--your industry has a
higher fatality rate per distance traveled than scheduled
airlines, passenger trains, buses. In 1997, 42 passengers died
on scheduled airlines at a rate of .01 per 100 million miles
traveled. Roller coaster rides are much shorter than plane
rides, but even so people are dying on roller coasters on a
much higher rate than on airplanes. Now, do you think the
airline industry is not sensitive to safety concerns? No, I
don't think the answer is no to that. They are concerned. But
do you think it makes sense for us not to regulate them at the
Federal level to make sure that there are safety precautions
built in for the public? I think obviously the answer to that
is no as well.
So your industry may be concerned, but there is no other
industry that has such a high rate of accidents and fatalities
for a million miles travelled that we allow to escape some form
of Federal regulation. So the information is shared. If there
is a plane accident in one State, the information is then
shared with every other airline so that every other passenger,
every other child getting on a plane any place else in the
United States is given the opportunity to be given the
protections which they need.
Do you think, sir, Mr. Graff, that your industry should be
exempt while the bus, plane, train, automobile industries are
not except from some form of Federal regulation?
Mr. Graff. Yes, I do. First place, I take issue with your
characterization that you say these are really dangerous
instruments, these roller coasters. They are not. And again I
point to our public safety record. You characterize it, sir, in
this manner, and that is fine and that is an interesting way to
do it. The fact remains that there are 41,967 people killed in
motor vehicles in 1997. From 1994 to 1996, the average number
of airline deaths was 262. Our average for 20 years has been 2.
Now, I suggest that the regulatory system that is out there and
plus the industry activities that go on are producing an
extraordinary safety record.
Mr. Markey. Well, I think I am going to have to disagree
with you. Because obviously every American for the most part is
in an automobile every day. Every American is not on a roller
coaster every day. Americans only go on a roller coaster once a
year, and it is a very small percentage of all Americans that
do and it is mostly families with small children for that 1 day
they are going to go to the amusement park.
So the absolute numbers may be smaller, but the percentage
per mile traveled in the vehicle is higher in terms of the
actual risk. And that is the only way there which you can have
a fair comparison in terms of the rate of injuries and deaths
on these competing modes of transportation.
Mr. Graff. I would suggest that a more meaningful one would
be the number of times the number of incidences that you get in
your car as compared to the number of times you get in a
coaster and how many times you have an accident.
Mr. Markey. Let me move on. I know the Chairman wants me to
wrap up. The industry has moved to adopt G-force limits, the
amount of stress that these children should be placed under. At
least one ride in the United States, Texas Tornado boasts of G-
force standards that exceed the German industry standard. Does
that concern you that there are no standards in the United
States, that other countries have standards, and we have yet to
adopt one?
Mr. Graff. First of all, you point out the Germans have not
adopted a standard. They have a standard pending. There is a
standard related to G-forces pending before the ASTM, the
American Society of Testing Materials. So both of these
organizations have that issue under consideration. There is a
European Union committee working on amusement right standard.
The issue is relevant to them. This is not anything new.
Mr. Markey. When will your industry adopt a standard? Are
you going to adopt a standard, Mr. Graff, on G-forces?
Mr. Graff. The ASTM's committee of experts will look at
that and determine what standards, if any need, to be adopted.
That is what the process is about. And the CPSC has been
involved over the years in that. I said again today, I don't
know why they said they can't because they have been.
Mr. Markey. We need a G-force standard, Mr. Graff.
Mr. Graff. It is being considered by the committee.
Mr. Markey. I don't know how many children have to die or
be injured before G-force standard is put in place, but we are
long past the time where your industry should ensure that every
child is safe going on a roller coaster.
Mr. Graff. We have exchanged that information with the
Germans. I talked to Mr. Leitensdorfer this week about this
very subject. I have known him for years. They come back and
forth to our meetings. We go to theirs. This information is
traded. I think you can assume that the industry across
national boundaries will be arriving at some point of a
consensus about what happens to G-forces.
Mr. Markey. Mr. Graff, as long as the consensus is that you
are going to have a standard then it is a good consensus. But
it would be just plain wrong for us to go through another
summer without having you built in the safety precautions for
families with small children heading toward amusement parks in
America.
Mr. Tauzin. Thank you Mr. Markey. We have another vote on
the floor. Let me just say for the record, Mr. Currie, you have
sold me on your bikes. I am going to pass on you. But the other
two of you that spoke on the children's sleepwear issue there
are some questions I would like you to respond in writing. I
will send them to you, but they basically have to do with the
three commissioners testifying that there is not a single
incident of a child wearing tight-fitting cotton sleepwear and
receiving burn injuries. I would like to get your comments on
that whether it is true or not.
Second, that we have heard that there has been some real
problems with consumers buying clothes that have been treated
because of their fear of the toxicity of the chemicals involved
in treating the sleepwear. I would like to get your comments on
that.
And finally whether or not you think the CPSC burn data
information itself is flawed. Because obviously we have got a
spotty record when it comes to Congress telling them what to
do. You remember the first time we told them what to do with
seat belts, some at least claim may have cost a lot of children
their lives in the way--not seat belts, rather the air bags, by
the way those air bags operate.
And our record is spotty in that regard. We want to be very
careful here to make the right decisions. Please respond in
writing. We will issue the questions to you. The record will
stay open for 30 days.
Thank you all very much for the information you provided us
today and the time you spent with us. The hearing stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Additional material submitted for the record follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers
and the Automotive Coalition for Traffic Safety
We are pleased to offer our comments on H.R. 4145, the Child
Passenger Safety Act of 2000 and welcome the opportunity to work with
the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection,
along with the bill's sponsors and the sponsors of S. 2070, the Senate
version of this legislation. Our section-by-section comments are as
follows:
We suggest expanding Section 2, Findings to include language noting
that, notwithstanding the need to update test standards for child
restraints, most children who are killed or seriously injured in motor
vehicle crashes are completely unrestrained or are in child restraints
which are either grossly misused or inappropriate for their age or
size. In addition to upgrading test standards, NHTSA should expand
programs that encourage parents and caregivers to properly secure
children in child restraints, and in the rear seat, whenever possible.
Additional funding for programs addressing these problems should be
authorized.
While we prefer to leave the specifics of regulatory matters in the
hands of executive branch agencies, to provide flexibility to address
changing situations, we agree that Congressional encouragement for
NHTSA to review and update FMVSS 213 may be warranted. In addition,
given the complexity of the issue of child safety in motor vehicles, we
suggest that the Subcommittee consider requiring NHTSA to both initiate
and complete actions by specified dates, and allow the agency to
terminate rulemaking, or conduct additional research, should the record
lead NHTSA to those conclusions. Mandating revised rules in so complex
an area could lead to unintended consequences and we believe NHTSA
should have the flexibility we suggest. Such a course of action would
be similar to directions that Congress gave NHTSA in the 1991 ISTEA
legislation.
We support new side impact test requirements as described in
Section 4(b)(1)(A) (except for belt positioning booster seats), but
believe that rear impact and rollover test requirements may not be
necessary. Few children in child restraints are seriously injured in
rear impact crashes. We believe that a child restraint that performs
well in frontal and side impact tests will also provide protection in
rollovers. Updating child restraint test platforms to reflect
contemporary motor vehicle designs is appropriate; however, we hope
that when doing so NHTSA would consider harmonizing with the current
ECE R44-03 standard, which has been recently updated.
With respect to the use of additional anthropomorphic test dummies
as specified in Section 4(b)(2), we believe that switching to the
updated, more biofidelic test dummies (including an instrumented infant
dummy) is as important as is adding more dummy sizes. However, as the
world's technical community develops additional child dummy sizes,
particularly representing children above age six, NHTSA should consider
adding them to FMVSS 213.
It is important to note that the new LATCH uniform attachment point
requirements will, as of September 1, 2002, require many child
restraints to be tested both forward-facing and rear-facing with lap
belt, lap belt and tether, and LATCH attachments with several dummy
sizes. The resulting matrix may involve approximately one dozen
certification tests for a single child seat. Adding side, rear and
rollover tests would expand the matrix to approximately fifty tests per
convertible child restraint model. In view of the fact that
affordability is already an issue with many families, Congress should
direct NHTSA to carefully consider increased child restraint costs as
it formulates its revised standards.
Section 4(b)(3) appears to require that FMVSS 213 be extended to
cover belt positioning booster seats. This issue is not easily
resolved. A number of safety groups and the Blue Ribbon Panel II--
Protecting Our Older Child Passengers--have supported such a measure.
However, belt-positioning booster seats rely on vehicle lap/shoulder
belts, the geometry of which varies among vehicle models, to restrain
the child. Since lap/shoulder belts are designed to restrain heavier
adults, the strength of such belts is adequate to protect children in
booster seats. In addition, current booster seats appear to be
performing well in the field and booster seats rated for children up to
eighty pounds are now being manufactured. The safety need for the
existing dynamic test of belt positioning booster is highly
questionable. While we are willing to work with child restraint
manufacturers and NHTSA to explore possible testing protocols, we are
not certain that an additional test for belt-positioning booster seats
would necessarily improve child safety. NHTSA should carefully weigh
the benefits and costs of such a test as it could have a negative
effect on the cost and availability of booster seats, and, thus, on the
fledgling booster seat market. Section 4(c)(1) should be redrafted to
exempt belt-positioning booster seats. Side impact head restraint
requirements are not practicable for booster seats because they utilize
the lap/shoulder belt to restrain the child.
Due to the large number of vehicle models, seat and seat belt
configurations and the number of child restraint models in the
marketplace, the inclusion of a limited number of specific child
restraints in NHTSA's New Car Assessment Program protocol each year
would appear unlikely to provide useful information for consumers. For
example, inclusion of a certain child restraint in a specific vehicle
NCAP test would provide information only for that child restraint-
vehicle combination. It would provide no information about other child
restraints in that vehicle or that child restraint in other vehicles.
In addition, even placing the child seat in a different seating
position in that vehicle might yield different results. As discussed
with regard to Section 5, below, we believe the use of a child seat
that ``fits'' the vehicle seat is a more important criterion. Also,
LATCH system attachments, as required by FMVSS 225, will help alleviate
past child restraint and vehicle compatibility problems.
We support changes to FMVSS 213 to make labeling text more readable
and note that the Blue Ribbon Panel on Child Restraint and Vehicle
Compatibility also recommended improved labeling.
As an added objective for NHTSA, any updated U.S. standards issued
under the directive of Section 4 should be harmonized with
international standards and test procedures to the extent possible.
Section 5 requires the Secretary to develop and implement a safety-
rating program for child restraints. Because of child restraint and
vehicle compatibility issues, the current widely accepted definition of
the ``safest'' child restraint is the one that will fit a person's
vehicle and child and will be used consistently and properly. Many
child restraints that fit securely on NHTSA's test seat may fit with
varying degrees of security in different seating positions in different
vehicles, depending on variations in seat and seat belt design. Thus,
there can be no single best or safest child restraint for all seats in
all vehicles. Many of these compatibility issues will be resolved with
the implementation of LATCH system uniform attachments. In addition,
NHTSA is developing a database which, when completed, will identify
which child restraint models can be securely installed in different
model vehicles.
Because all vehicles and all child restraints manufactured after
September 1, 2002 must be equipped with LATCH attachments, we suggest
that any child restraint ratings program promulgated under the
requirements of Section 5 rate child restraints as installed with LATCH
system attachments. Such ratings could be based on the results of the
updated compliance tests developed under Section 4(b)(1). In keeping
with the NCAP practice of using all available restraint systems, the
ratings should also utilize any standard equipment top tether straps or
other standard safety features. Attempting to rate child restraints
installed with the lap belt on the NHTSA standard test could
unintentionally confuse consumers and could induce them to purchase
child restraints that are not the best for the seats and seat belts in
their vehicles.
In closing, we reiterate that while this bill can have a positive
impact on child passenger safety, the most common causes of death and
serious injuries are riding unrestrained or in a child restraint that
is being grossly misused. We urge the Congress to also address these
important issues.
______
Prepared Statement of American Academy of Pediatrics
The American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) is an organization of
55,000 primary care pediatricians, pediatric medical subspecialists and
pediatric surgical specialists dedicated to the health, safety and
well-being of infants, children, adolescents and young adults.
We are pleased to submit this testimony for the record of the May
16, 2000, subcommittee hearing on ``Consumer Safety Initiatives:
Protecting the Vulnerable.'' Specifically, our testimony addresses the
``Child Passenger Protection Act of 2000'' (H.R. 4145), introduced by
Representative John Shimkus and others, and the issue of regulations
regarding the flammability of children's sleepwear.
Child Passenger Protection
Every day, infants and children are injured and killed in motor
vehicle accidents because they are not well restrained. In fact, more
children are killed and injured in car crashes than from any other type
of injury. As pediatricians, we see the terrible results of motor
vehicle injuries in children.
Using a child restraint that is well-designed and used correctly
can prevent many of these injuries. However, we know that children are
not always adequately restrained. Larger, older children are often
transitioned to adult seat belts too soon. Booster seats are essential
to keeping these kids safe. By using an adult seat belt too early,
children are at risk for serious head injuries, which are the most
common injuries in car crashes, as well as damage to the liver, spleen,
intestine and spinal cord. These types of injuries can be prevented
through widespread use of booster seats.
Pediatricians strive to ensure that parents have up-to-date,
appropriate information about car safety seat choices and use. A safety
rating program to provide parents with clear, easy to understand
information about choosing a child safety seat will help us spread that
important message.
By addressing these issues, we can help ensure that children are
better protected in the car. We commend the sponsors of this
legislation for their efforts to address the safety needs of our
nation's youth.
Flammability Standards for Children's Sleepwear
Injury is the leading cause of death and disability in childhood
and early adult life-more school-age children die of injuries than all
other diseases combined. Yet most of these major injuries are
preventable.
As pediatricians, there is nothing more tragic than seeing a child
suffering from an injury that could have been prevented. This is true
whether it is a severe burn treated at a burn center or a minor burn
that is seen in a pediatrician's office. In many cases, the best way to
prevent an injury is by altering the environment. The CPSC made the
right decision years ago when it issued a standard to ensure that
children's sleepwear would not cause burn injuries to children.
Considerable progress has been made in the development of ways to
understand and control childhood injury. The most notable successes
have been in the reduction of poison and flame burns as causes of death
and disability in childhood.
Since the CPSC issued the children's sleepwear standards
approximately 20 years ago, there has been a substantial decrease in
the number of burn injuries and deaths to children. This includes an
estimated tenfold decrease in the number of deaths associated with
children's sleepwear. This strong association leaves little doubt that
the sleepwear standard has had a major impact on children's safety.
That is why the CPSC's decision to relax the children's sleepwear
flammability standards is so disturbing.
The American Academy of Pediatrics has had a long history of
working successfully with the CPSC to prevent injuries to America's
children. We have urged to reinstate the more stringent flammability
standards for children's sleepwear in order to ensure maximum
protection for children.
______
Prepared Statement of David M. Borowski, Manager of Reporting and
Information, Corporate Finance Division, Freddie Mac
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee. My name is David Borowski.
I'm the manager of reporting and information in the Corporate Finance
Division of Freddie Mac. I'm also a counselor for young burn survivors
at the Mid-Atlantic Burn Camp. There we help children from the
Washington, Baltimore and Philadelphia areas adjust to living as
normally as possible with the emotional and physical scars caused by
fire.
Proponents for the 1996 relaxation of the safe children's sleepwear
standard say children are not likely to be involved in fire situations
if they are younger than nine months. They say we should keep the
relaxed standard and monitor statistics to see if further adjustments
are necessary. And they seem to have decided that the risk of fire
injury to children does not justify the added cost of making infants'
sleepwear with fire-resistant materials. This is my response.
First, I am a burn survivor. The fire occurred in 1954, years
before the safe sleepwear standard was enacted. I was six weeks old.
Now, I was a precocious child, but trust me, even I wasn't playing with
matches at that age. In my case, a puppy chewed an electrical cord
causing sparks that flew to me and the bassinet in which I lay,
starting the fire. I sustained second and third degree burns over
eighty percent of my body, and lost, most significantly, my entire
right hand and part of my left hand. Much of my face, ears, scalp and
feet have been reconstructed.
The Consumer Product Safety Commission's statement relaxing the
safe sleepwear standard says, ``infants under nine months are
insufficiently mobile to expose themselves to sources of fire.'' I am
living proof that lack of mobility does not protect children from the
danger of fire. Fires can and do make their way to infants, who have no
means of escape. And the younger they are, the more vulnerable they
are.
Second. Monitoring. Does anyone really want to wait for statistics
to prove the previous standard was working? Let me tell you something.
These statistics will not be neatly typed numbers on tidy white paper.
They will be bodies: young, burned, in unimaginable pain and some
horribly disfigured. Worst of all, they will be the same ``statistics''
that established the standard in the first place, twenty-nine years
ago. Some lessons should not have to be re-learned.
Finally, clothing manufacturers appear to be concerned about costs.
Whatever that cost is, there is a far greater cost if the fabric is not
flame resistant.
There was a cost for me to be in the hospital for months. There was
a cost to my insurance company for more than fifty surgeries. There was
a cost to the Government as I continued my efforts to look more normal.
And I was only one child.
I'm sure you're aware that there is an even greater cost than
money. There was the cost to my parents who, to their credit,
magnificently adjusted to my limitations and helped me overcome them.
And there was the cost to me, which I was able to pay because I had the
emotional resources and family encouragement to do so.
But I am not the norm. Many disfigured burn survivors choose not to
engage in a society that places so much emphasis on traditional,
physical beauty. I'm very aware that without my support system, I might
not have accomplished what I have.
Now, I know that we won't prevent every fire. But shouldn't we do
what we can to minimize their effects on children? Today, you have the
opportunity to do this. By re-establishing the safe sleepwear standard,
you can, once again, help protect children from the physical and
emotional scars brought on by fire.
Each child at the Mid-Atlantic Burn Camp has his or her own sad
story. Yet, in a way, the emotional results are the same. Even when the
physical pain is gone and the children are declared physically
recovered and are released from the hospital, the long, truly hard road
is just beginning for the seriously injured and disfigured ones.
Every time we prevent a child from being burned, we keep one more
little person from ever having to set foot on that road. In light of
the failure of the CPSC to fulfill its role as public protector, you
are now charged with the responsibility of being the vigilant guardians
at that gate.
______
Prepared Statement of Easter Seals
Easter Seals national headquarters appreciates the opportunity to
submit a statement for Subcommittee consideration that supports the
``Child Passenger Protection Act,'' H.R. 4145. Please include our
statement in the record for the legislative hearing, titled ``Consumer
Protection Initiatives: Protecting the Vulnerable,'' held by the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade & Consumer Protection on May
16, 2000,
Easter Seals strongly supports efforts to reduce the number of
children who are injured or killed in car accidents. The Child
Passenger Protection Act, H.R. 4145, includes provisions that will
improve the accuracy of safety testing methods and ensure that parents
have greater access to information about car seats, including proper
installation and use.
Easter Seals has partnered with the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration to improve access to child passenger safety information
and car seating for all families. Easter Seals is concerned that child
passenger safety information and seating does not adequately provide
for the needs of families with children v4th disabilities. It is our
hope that passage of this legislation will enhance testing, information
and support to increase passenger safety for children with disabilities
and special needs.
Easter Seals is a community-based nonprofit organization dedicated
to promoting independence for people with disabilities. Through a
nationwide network of 105 affiliates, Easter Seals provides early
intervention and special education, vocational rehabilitation, training
and employment, medical rehabilitation, and an array of other home and
community services to more than one million children and adults each
year.
Easter Seals appreciates the Subcommittee's interest in this
legislation and encourages passage of this legislation as an effective
means of promoting child passenger safety.
______
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
Washington, DC 20207
May 22, 2000
Mr. W.J. Tauzin
Chairman
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection
House Committee on Commerce
2125 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington DC 20515-6115
Dear Mr. Tauzin: During the hearing on May 17, 2000 before the
Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection Subcommittee, a
number of statements were made by Members and witnesses that indicate
to me that the reasons for the Commission's amendments to the
children's sleepwear standards have been misinterpreted and
misconstrued. I ask that this letter be included in the hearing record.
The Commission changed the sleepwear regulations to permit the sale
of snug-fitting, non-flame resistant cotton sleepwear to give consumers
who preferred non-flame resistant sleepwear a safe choice for their
children. When the Commission began its consideration of amending the
children's sleepwear regulations only one to two percent of all
children's sleepwear sales consisted of chemically-treated flame-
resistant cotton. The market for flame resistant cotton sleepwear
remains very small. Sales figures indicate that consumer acceptance of
flame-resistant sleepwear was and is low. While more advanced chemical
treatments or other methods of flame-resistance may increase consumer
acceptance of flame-resistant sleepwear, the Commission was, and
continues to be faced with the fact that consumers prefer natural
fibers for children's sleepwear.
With low consumer acceptance of flame-resistant sleepwear, the
Commission amended its regulations to provide consumers with a safe
cotton alternative for children's sleepwear. The Commission developed a
careful record documenting why snug-fitting cotton sleepwear was
reasonably safe. The testimony that I delivered at the hearing shows
why snug-fitting cotton sleepwear is safe and I will not repeat those
arguments here.
Dr. David N. Herndon, MD testified during the hearing on behalf of
the Shriners Burn Centers. Dr. Herndon's testimony proceeds from the
premise that children are virtually safe from burn injuries if they are
dressed in flame-resistant sleepwear. He even claims that such clothing
will protect its wearers from burn injuries in house fires (pages 9 and
10 of his testimony,) a claim that not even the manufacturers of flame-
retardant sleepwear will make. The Commission staff has conducted over
200 investigations of combustion incidents involving children's
clothing since 1993. About 70 of those incidents involved clothing that
the children used for sleeping. While the majority of the incidents
involved the ignition of garments not intended for use as sleepwear
(e.g., T-shirts, sweatshirts, etc.), fifteen completed investigations
involved burn injuries to children in sleepwear covered by the
flammability standard, in other words, made of flame-resistant fabrics.
Flame-resistant sleepwear is designed to protect its wearers from small
open-flame, single-point ignition. It is not intended, designed or
manufactured to protect a child in a house fire, and it will not do so.
An objective that appeared to receive little attention at the
hearing was consumers' freedom to choose among safe sleepwear
alternatives. Consumers who wish to do so may purchase chemically-
treated flame-resistant traditional sleepwear (e.g., nightgowns,
nightshirts, and traditional pajamas). Consumers who prefer untreated
natural fibers may now purchase safe alternatives in the form of snug-
fitting sleepwear. I hope that the availability of safe sleepwear made
from natural fibers will prompt consumers to reject unsafe alternatives
such as oversize cotton T-shirts. The action taken by the Commission
provides a greater net safety because it permits the sale of additional
safe sleepwear options. Congress should not overturn the Commission's
action legislatively and reduce this net increase in safety.
Sincerely,
Mary Sheila Gall
Vice Chairman and Commissioner
cc: Members, Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer
Protection
The Honorable Greg Ganske
The Honorable Ann Brown, Chairman, CPSC
The Honorable Thomas Moore, Commissioner, CPSC
______
Shriners Hospital for Children
June 2, 2000
W.J. ``Billy'' Tauzin
Chairman
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection
Dear Mr. Tauzin, thank you for the opportunity to speak to the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection. I
appreciate the opportunity to clarity any issues before the hearing
record is printed. Please find below my responses to each question.
Question 1 All three CPSC Commissioners have testified that there
has not been a single serious incident of a child wearing tight-fitting
cotton sleepwear and receiving burn injuries resulting from single
point ignition. Is this true?
Answer: No, this is not true. We produced three examples in the
testimony that was submitted to Congress. The patients are: a) J.F.
burned 12-1-99 (page 36-36). The four-year-old child from California
was wearing close fitting, long underwear like bunny suit sleepwear
when he brushed against a candle in the family's dining room. b) U.S.
burned 1-20-98 (page 37-38). The two-year-old child from California was
sleeping when a candle fell over and caught her close fitting pajamas
on fire. c) D.S. burned 4-16-97 (page 39-40). The seven-year-old child
from Florida was involved in a house fire when he was wearing tight
fitting pajamas.
Question 2. In the past, haven't some parents been concerned about
the toxicity of the chemicals used to treat children's sleepwear, and
have been less willing to buy those garments?
Answer: Yes. The substance used to treat sleepwear in the 70's was
called ``Tris'' which had potential difficulties and was withdrawn,
Today, technology is available to treat sleepwear so it is flame
resistant but that treatment does not alter the quality of sleepwear in
any way. It feels and looks the same as normal cotton, The product is
being marketed under the brand name ``Skivvydoodles'' which meets all
these characteristics and consumer acceptance has been excellent.
Question 3. Has the CPSC been basing their analysis on faulty burn
data?
Answer: Yes, their data was flawed, as already stated in the
testimony. It was based on a random sampling of 101 emergency rooms in
the United States, which included only 4 burn centers. Those burn
centers do not admit pediatric burn patients at a rate that would be
demonstrative of national statistics. In fact, three of those refer
pediatric burns in their area to other hospitals. The Massachusetts
General Hospital in Boston refers all pediatric burn patients for
direct admission to the Shriners Hospitals for Children in Boston.
Children's Hospital in Kansas City Missouri refers their patients to
Shriners Hospitals for Children in Galveston and King's County Brooklyn
emergency room preferentially diverts patients with large pediatric
burns to the New York Hospital Burn Center in New York. This leaves
only one burn center in their sample, the Columbus Children's Hospital
that routinely does admit children with burn injuries. Their referral
area, however, is limited by proximity to Cincinnati where the
Cincinnati Shriners Hospitals for Children admits pediatric patients
for burn care.
Sincerely,
David N. Herndon
Chief of Staff, Shriners Burns Hospital
Professor of Surgery
Jesse H. Jones Distinguished Chair in Burn Surgery
University of Texas Medical Branch
______
Prepared Statement of The National Fire Protection Association
Thank you for the opportunity to submit this statement. The
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) commends the Chairman and
the members of the Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection
Subcommitteefor holding this important hearing on child safety.
NFPA is the premier source worldwide for the development and
dissemination of knowledge about fire and life safety. Our mission is
to reduce the worldwide burden of fire and other hazards on the quality
of life by providing and advocating scientifically-based consensus
codes and standards, research, training, and education.
NFPA is an independent, voluntary membership, nonprofit
organization. Our membership totals over 68,000 individuals and our
activities fall into two broad, interrelated areas: technical and
educational. The basic technical activity involves the development,
publication and dissemination of state-of-the-art consensus codes and
standards intended to minimize the possibility and effects of fire in
all aspects of life.
For over 90 years, NFPA has been teaching how to be fire safe. Our
public education materials include school-based programs such as the
Learn Not to Burn Curriculum', and Risk Watch TM.
The Association's Fire Analysis and Research Division maintains the
world's most extensive fire experience databases.
In 1996 the NFPA opposed the decision made by the U.S. Consumer
Product Safety Commission (CPSC) to amend the children's sleepwear
flammability standards. NFPA's disagreement with CPSC over standards
for children's safety is an anomaly. Our two organizations have a long
history of concurrence on the needs of a nation that values safety.
NFPA has contended throughout the debate that CPSC abandoned the
mandatory flame resistant children's standards without appropriate
analysis or sufficient facts or data.
The pre 1996 sleepwear flammability standards were successful in
preventing injuries and deaths to children by fire. The relaxation of
the standards purported to address CPSC's concern with parents putting
children to bed in loose fitting T-shirts or underwear. We do not
believe these amendments eliminated any risks. To the contrary, we
believe the amendments placed children at higher risk by compromising
the mandatory flame resistant requirements.
The old standards for flammability of children's sleepwear served
for decades to protect America's children from fatal or disfiguring
burns due to clothing ignitions. Children under the age of five are
among America's population at highest fire risk. Current fire death
rates for preschool children is more than twice the average of people
of all ages and four times the rate for young youths. They also suffer
a substantially higher rate of fire injuries.
The leading cause of fatal fires in this age group is children
playing with matches and lighters, a scenario in which the ignition
heat source is very close to the children's clothing from the beginning
of the fire. Children's sleepwear must be able to stand up to these
exposures.
The arguments we used to oppose the 1996 decision have been
reinforced and validated over the past 3 years. The difficulty in
achieving compliance with the flame resistant sleepwear standards led
to the CPSC conclusion that ``snug fitting'' cotton garments could
deliver an equivalent level of safety. NFPA questioned whether skin
tight was achievable. There is an American tradition of hand-me-downs
and the common practice of buying clothing large enough for the child
to grow into. Parents do not buy age-appropriate garments.
The revised standards also added a new concern, an exemption for
infants up to 9 months of age. The theory was that infants are not
mobile and therefore are not exposed to fire. This was asserted without
supporting data and in the face of data showing that many infants are
mobile and that fire play by older siblings and playmates can and does
bring fire near younger children.
For the old standards, the problem was non-use of compliant
sleepwear. For the revised standards, the problems are non-use of
compliant sleepwear, compliant sleepwear that is not snug enough to
assure protection, compliant sleepwear in age-inappropriate use, and
the lack of protection for infants.
In June 1999 GAO issued the report ``Consumer Education Efforts for
Revised Children's Sleepwear Safety Sandard''. GAO's conclusion
reaffirmed NFPA's position that ``while consumers often have some
information on children's sleepwear safety available at the point-of-
sale, it is not to the extent envisioned by CPSC. The effectiveness of
this consumer education effort is unknown . . . neither CPSC nor the
industry has assessed whether consumers use this information to select
the proper size of snug-fitting garments''. The old standards protected
children even if families had no idea how they worked. The revised
standards are much more dependent on the level of knowledge and the
consistency of safe usage by customers. There is no evidence that the
revised standards will achieve a high rate of proper usage, and little
evidence that industry is doing much to raise the rate of proper usage.
And, there is no evidence that families previously using daywear as
sleepwear are returning to sleepwear.
After three years, we still fail to see the logic behind the 1997
amendments. Why weaken the standards that for over twenty-five years
worked to reduce the number of burn injuries and deaths suffered by
children? We recommend a return to safer standards.
This is not an industry versus safety advocate issue, or a
political issue. As the Subcommittee recognized by including it in
today's hearing, it is a child's safety issue.
______
Prepared Statement of Rosemary Shahan, President, Consumers for Auto
Reliability and Safety
Mr. Chairman and Members, I am Rosemary Shahan, President of
Consumers for Auto Reliability and Safety (CARS), a national auto
safety and consumer advocacy organization based in Sacramento,
California. CARS is affiliated with the CARS Foundation, formerly named
Motor Voters, which for over 20 years has been active in promoting auto
safety and preventing vehicle-related deaths and injuries.
The CARS Foundation helped form the National Coalition to Reduce
Car Crash Injuries, which worked to promote seat belt use and ensure
the availability of more advanced occupant restraint technologies,
including improved seat belt systems and air bags.
On behalf of the members of CARS and the motoring public which
benefits from our work, I offer this testimony in support of the Child
Passenger Protection Act of 2000, H.R. 4145, because it is an important
step in improving protection for America's children from preventable
deaths and injuries.
Car crashes remain the leading cause of death among children ages 6
to 14. Despite progress in the enactment of child safety seat laws,
there is much more that needs to be done, particularly as new
technologies become available. The advent of side impact air bags,
which may offer increased protection to some occupants but not
necessarily to children, poses a special set of challenges.
CARS is particularly pleased to support H.R. 4145's provisions for
better protection for older children, addressing the ``forgotten
child'' problem, which persists. For decades, NHTSA has been in the
forefront of efforts to improve child safety, in a number of ways.
However, the agency and the public can still benefit from direction
from Congress.
In 1990, the CARS Foundation petitioned the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration to require auto manufacturers to provide
height adjusters for seat belt shoulder harnesses, allowing seat belts
to be easily adjusted to properly fit smaller or taller children and
adults. The efficacy of properly worn seat belts in reducing deaths and
injuries is well-documented, and was not in dispute.
The CARS Foundation was particularly concerned about the lack of
comfortable, properly fitting restraints for older children and smaller
adults, many of them women and older citizens. It had also come to our
attention, through consumer complaints and real-world observation, that
children who are too large to fit into child safety seats but too small
for seat belts designed to meet standards set for adult-sized dummies,
are at risk. It was common to see children ages 5-16 riding either
unrestrained or with the shoulder portion of the belt under their arms
or behind their backs, compromising the benefits of the restraint
system and posing new risks, including the threat of devastating
internal injuries, spinal cord injuries, and head injuries.
The petition was supported by many respected organizations,
including the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety and the National
Coalition for Consumer Health and Safety, including leading physicians
organizations, consumer and public safety groups, and insurers. The
petition also attracted support from many individuals including parents
and smaller adults. However, it was opposed by a number of auto
manufacturers, although some of them at the time were installing height
adjusters, mostly in the front seats of luxury models.
In 1991, NHTSA denied the petition, citing a lack of evidence the
height adjusters were needed, and their cost, which the agency
estimated to be approximately $2 per seating position, or a total of $8
per typical passenger car.
The CARS Foundation then worked with the National SAFE KIDS
Campaign and Congress, and succeeded in gaining enactment of a
provision in ISTEA requiring the agency to revisit the issue. In 1994,
NHTSA issued a rule requiring that auto manufacturers install the
height adjusters beginning in the 1998 model year, but only for seating
positions in the front.
H.R. 4145 may help spur NHTSA to take the long-overdue step of
mandating seat belt height adjusters in rear seats. This is an
important step, particularly since the entire safety community urges
children to ride in the rear seats, rather than in the front. Belt-
positioning child booster seats offer greatly enhanced protection.
However, many children will remain dependent upon the systems available
as original equipment, particularly as the vehicles age and are resold
to families that may be less likely to provide the additional
protection of a booster, due to cost constraints or other factors.
CARS also is pleased to support the provision in H.R. 4145 that
requires consideration of the need to conduct more comprehensive and
real-world dynamic testing of child restraints. Dynamic side-impact
testing is necessary to fully evaluate the effect of existing
technologies on safety. With increasing numbers of new vehicle models
equipped with side impact air bags, dynamic tests are also needed to
ensure that new air bag designs are compatible with child safety
restraints and do not jeopardize the safety of children riding in
outboard seating positions.
For purposes of testing child restraints, CARS is concerned about
the limitations inherent in the NCAP program, which tests only about 40
vehicles each year. There may be other more comprehensive, yet cost-
effective approaches available which NHTSA should explore.
The consumer information provisions of H.R. 4145 are also worthy of
support, in CARS' estimation. The child safety seat rating system
promises to provide valuable information for parents and caregivers,
allowing market forces to encourage innovation and superior designs. We
would also urge that NHTSA continue to expand upon its outreach efforts
in multiple languages, as we are a diverse nation, and all our children
need protection from vehicle crashes.
Thank you for this opportunity to present our views. Should you or
your staff have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me
directly via phone at 530-759-9440 or via e-mail at Error! Bookmark not
defined.
______
Prepared Statement of Stephanie M. Tombrello, L.C.S.W., Executive
Director, SafetyBeltSafe U.S.A.
It is our privilege to share ideas about beneficial outcomes
expected from passage of H.R. 4145 which has been introduced to
increase statutory protection for youngsters across the United States.
Our goal is to demonstrate the importance of assisting parents and
other caregivers in finding the best protection from injury and even
death as motor vehicle passengers for the youngsters for whom they are
deeply concerned. By increasing the testing approaches to better
simulate the multiple conditions to which children are exposed in motor
vehicle crashes, particular characteristics of safety seats will be
enhanced by their producers, providing a level playing field for all
and assuming that even the least expensive safety seat will offer more
protection.
Safety seats already do a good job in most circumstances. However,
the position of SafetyBeltSafe U.S.A. (SBS USA) is that in any area in
which parents cannot modify the performance of the product by being
more assiduous themselves in ``getting it right'', the changes must be
regulatory. The other differences for which parents can compensate by
overcoming, for example, less convenient systems can be left to the
companies.
Therefore, we believe that in the following areas, regulatory
change is needed.
These aspects fall under the first three provisions of H.R. 4145,
enumerated below:
1)\1\ require that some car seats and boosters seat be crash-tested
in actual vehicles (under NHTSA's existing, annual ``New Car Assessment
Program'');
2)\1\ require the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
or NHTSA, to revisit its current standard for child safety seats within
the next two years (to improve outdated crash testing methods);
3)\1\ require that child safety seats have side-impact padding to
better protect against head injuries in rollovers and side-impact
crashes, as they do in Europe.
The six areas SBS USA has identified for regulatory action are:
1. Recalls: Investigations of possible child restraint system [CRS]
defects which affect crashworthiness, as opposed to less dangerous non-
compliance problems, should be handled very quickly. SBS USA has
identified at least eight persistent, repetitive problems with safety
restraints that need to generate recalls so all owners can become aware
of the resolutions available. [If it is determined that there is a
defect and a recall campaign cannot be carried out because the
manufacturer is out of business, NHTSA should notify the public about
the problem. Currently, consumers who own products which have failed
NHTSA testing and have no manufacturer support, such as the Safe Rider
Harness, receive no warning that their children are at risk.]
2. Padding: Specifications for the quality and placement of padding
protecting the child's head should be revised to require energy-
absorbing material.
3. All convertible CRS should be tested forward facing with an
instrumented 12-month dummy, not the uninstrumented 9-month dummy, to
better judge the effect of particular designs on the well being
especially of tiny babies. [(Convertibles are tested with rear-facing
newborn, rear- and forward-facing 9-month, and forward-facing 3-year
dummies; the 9-month dummy cannot measure head contact.) There is a
concern that shields may cause increased head and neck injuries for
smaller children; at least one death was caused by interaction of a 9-
month-old with a shield.]
See overhead of baby in a convertible safety seat labeled
inappropriately as fitting an infant.
4. The plastic shell of convertible CRS should be strong enough to
hold a harnessed 40-lb. child at 30 mph, even if the parents fail to
use the proper slots. Of 15,482 convertible CRS checked by the Family
Safety in the Car program from 1992-1998, 37% had straps in the wrong
slots. At least two cases are known in which children were ejected and
died when the harness ripped through non-reinforced slots in the shell
See the consequence of choosing the wrong strap slots; the
youngster died.
5. Indelible identifying information: Labels with identifying
information and manufacture date should be marked indelibly on the CRS,
not on paper stickers which can peel off or be washed off
inadvertently. Twenty-six percent of 19,725 CRS checked by the Family
Safety in the Car program from 1992-1998 had no readable date.
Transport Canada is using these data as part of their study of
improvements; we invite US regulators to review them as well.
See the label coming off 3 weeks after manufacture--when the photo
was taken.
The model name should be on the CRS (some manufacturers leave it
off) so consumers can identify their restraints easily in case of a
recall or if they need to order an instruction booklet or other parts.
6. Height ranges for certification should not be based on total
height, which does not accurately address CRS fit. For rear-facing
seats, the child's head should be no higher than a specified point on
the back of the CRS. For forward-facing CRS, the child's shoulders
should be at or below the highest set of strap slots. Ideally, a mark
on the CRS cover would indicate the height limit; one manufacturer
already provides height indicator lines on the CRS cover.
Two other areas covered by the bill cover the areas in which
reporting of the features of the product would allow parents to make
informed decisions about the facets where they can increase their
personal efforts or choose a more convenient product.
4)\1\ call for NHTSA to furnish crash test results information that
is reliable and easy to understand, for parents' use in deciding which
car seats to purchase and install;
5)\1\ require that warning labels and instructions on child safety
seats be written in plain English.
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\1\ Summary comments on S. 2070 from Senator Fitzgerald's office.
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Any rating system developed should be based on real-world
conditions and behavior, not just crash testing with dummies secured
properly in brand-new CRS. Children are not dummies. Developmental and
behavioral issues must be taken into consideration in any evaluation of
child restraints. Crash test results, alone, cannot accurately predict
the performance of a child restraint in the real world. For example, a
two-year-old who meets size criteria to ride in a belt-positioning
booster generally is not mature enough to sit still with the lap/
shoulder belt properly positioned. Or parents may not tighten harness
systems as children change their clothing if the adjustment mechanisms
are hard to reach or balky. These factors can have enormous effects on
the real-world protection of children. Parents do not know enough about
the way the systems operate BEFORE they use them; a grid listing such
factors along with the most critical aspects of crash-test performance
will make it possible for parents to make intelligent choices.
The specific areas in which SafetyBeltSafe U.S.A. sees the effect
of the bill are enumerated below:
1) Crash test results. To help parents evaluate performance,
provide one or two of the most important measures, such as head
excursion and HIC (head injury criteria). Today, most parents and many
professionals believe that the federal government tests and certifies
safety seats BEFORE they are placed on the market, not understanding
the self-certification system.
2) Frequently updated information about ongoing investigations of
CRS for alleged defects with extremely dangerous potential
consequences, such as ejection or severe head injury.
3) Characteristics of the safety seat that can affect correct use.
Bringing these inconvenient designs to parents' attention may encourage
their improvement without regulatory mandate, AND parents can strive to
equalize the outcomes with both inconvenient and convenient features.
a) Ease of harness adjustment. Parents have a tendency to leave the
straps loose if they cannot adjust the harness without unbuckling the
CRS from the car every time the child puts on or takes off a jacket.
Although SAFE KIDS found 33% of the seats evaluated at checkups had
loose harnesses, random review of safety seat checkup data gathered by
SBS USA indicates an even higher level of failure. Once the situations
evaluated that do not include harness snugness tabulations (no kids,
boosters, etc.) were omitted, in a series of three checkup events, SBS
USA found that 69% of the cases in which harness snugness was evaluated
were too loose!!
[The adjuster strap and release lever on some rear-facing CRS
cannot be reached when the CRS are securely installed. Some forward-
facing CRS are adjusted behind the shell which prevents tightening of
the harness without unbuckling the vehicle belt.] HOWEVER, bringing
these inconvenient designs to parents' attention may encourage their
improvement without regulatory mandate, AND parents can strive to
equalize the outcomes with both inconvenient and convenient adjustment
mechanisms.
b. Width, thickness, and material of harness straps. Thinner straps
are more likely to become twisted and ropy, which may cause injuries in
a crash. The harness may not be adjusted snugly because the child
complains that the straps hurt. However, parents can make extra efforts
to keep straps clean and flat.
4) A number of critical measurements/features of the products
should be listed since they affect the proper selection and use of the
products. Among them are the I) Height of bottom and top harness strap
slots; II) Distance from back of CRS to crotch strap and availability
of two crotch strap positions. III) Width of the CRS at the base to
compare to distance between vehicle belt anchor points; also will
assist in selecting seats for use on aircraft. IV) Vehicle belt path,
especially if it is unusual and could help or hinder installation in
certain vehicles. V) Color-coding of the belt paths, strap slots, and
other features appropriate for use with babies and older children.
The most common question asked of SafetyBeltSafe U.S.A. volunteers
and staff has not changed since our founding in 1980. It is, ``Which
car seat is the best?'' Our response has always been, ``The best seat
is the one that fits your child, fits your vehicle, and fits the needs
of your family.'' It is essential that any rating system include all of
these essential factors so that parents do not inadvertently ignore the
impact of features of the products which contribute mightily to the
protection of their children.
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