[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                    DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND

                    RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS

                                FOR 2001

_______________________________________________________________________

                                HEARINGS

                                BEFORE A

                           SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

                       COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

                         HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                       ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION
                                ________

 SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND RELATED AGENCIES 
                             APPROPRIATIONS

                    FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia, Chairman
 TOM DeLAY, Texas                   MARTIN OLAV SABO, Minnesota
 RALPH REGULA, Ohio                 JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts
 HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky            ED PASTOR, Arizona
 RON PACKARD, California            CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan
 SONNY CALLAHAN, Alabama            JOSE E. SERRANO, New York
 TODD TIAHRT, Kansas                MICHAEL P. FORBES, New York
 ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama        
 KAY GRANGER, Texas                 

 NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Young, as Chairman of the Full 
Committee, and Mr. Obey, as Ranking Minority Member of the Full 
Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees.

 John T. Blazey II, Richard E. Efford, Stephanie K. Gupta, and Linda J. 
                        Muir, Subcommittee Staff
                                ________

                                 PART 5
                                                                   Page

   DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION:

     Amtrak Reform Council........................................  330
     Federal Railroad Administration..............................  363
       Grants to Amtrak...........................................    1
     Research and Special Programs Administration.................  709
     Surface Transportation Board................................. 1009

                              

                                ________

         Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
                                ________

                     U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
 64-253                     WASHINGTON : 2000


                       COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

                   C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida, Chairman

 RALPH REGULA, Ohio                  DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin
 JERRY LEWIS, California             JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania
 JOHN EDWARD PORTER, Illinois        NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
 HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky             MARTIN OLAV SABO, Minnesota
 JOE SKEEN, New Mexico               JULIAN C. DIXON, California
 FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia             STENY H. HOYER, Maryland
 TOM DeLAY, Texas                    ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia
 JIM KOLBE, Arizona                  MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
 RON PACKARD, California             NANCY PELOSI, California
 SONNY CALLAHAN, Alabama             PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana
 JAMES T. WALSH, New York            NITA M. LOWEY, New York
 CHARLES H. TAYLOR, North Carolina   JOSE E. SERRANO, New York
 DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio               ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut
 ERNEST J. ISTOOK, Jr., Oklahoma     JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
 HENRY BONILLA, Texas                JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts
 JOE KNOLLENBERG, Michigan           ED PASTOR, Arizona
 DAN MILLER, Florida                 CARRIE P. MEEK, Florida
 JAY DICKEY, Arkansas                DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina
 JACK KINGSTON, Georgia              MICHAEL P. FORBES, New York
 RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey CHET EDWARDS, Texas
 ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi        ROBERT E. ``BUD'' CRAMER, Jr., 
 GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, Jr.,          Alabama
Washington                           MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York
 RANDY ``DUKE'' CUNNINGHAM,          LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California
California                           SAM FARR, California
 TODD TIAHRT, Kansas                 JESSE L. JACKSON, Jr., Illinois
 ZACH WAMP, Tennessee                CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan
 TOM LATHAM, Iowa                    ALLEN BOYD, Florida
 ANNE M. NORTHUP, Kentucky           
 ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama         
 JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri            
 JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire       
 KAY GRANGER, Texas                  
 JOHN E. PETERSON, Pennsylvania      
 VIRGIL H. GOODE, Jr., Virginia     

                 James W. Dyer, Clerk and Staff Director

                                  (ii)

 
 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS FOR 
                                  2001

                              ----------                              

                                         Wednesday, March 15, 2000.

                                 AMTRAK

                               WITNESSES

GEORGE D. WARRINGTON, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, NATIONAL 
    RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION (AMTRAK)
KENNETH M. MEAD, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PHYLLIS F. SCHEINBERG, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, TRANSPORTATION ISSUES, 
    RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DIVISION, U.S. 
    GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

                         Amtrak Opening Remarks

    Mr. Wolf. I will begin the hearing. I want to welcome the 
witnesses, Mr. Warrington and representatives from the IG and 
GAO. Before you begin, I heard on the radio coming in about the 
accident in Kansas today. Could you please update the Committee 
about this accident and then go into your prepared statement. 
Your full statements will all appear in the record as if read. 
You can summarize.

                   SOUTHWEST CHIEF DERAILMENT UPDATE

    Mr. Warrington. Sure. Mr. Chairman, about 3:00 in the 
morning last night, our Southwest Chief, which is our long 
distance train that runs from Chicago to Los Angeles, derailed 
a number of cars on that train about 15 miles west of Topeka, 
Kansas. We had senior management descend to the scene as 
rapidly as possible as well as the National Transportation 
Safety Board. Several cars did turn over, and fortunately there 
are no life-threatening injuries. We have had about 25 or 30 
passengers taken to local hospitals. The emergency service, 
fire and rescue personnel, did a superb job of evacuating the 
train very quickly, and we have assembled all of the passengers 
in local schools and have already arranged for alternate 
transportation. We and the NTSB, the Federal Railroad 
Administration and the Burlington Northern Santa Fe are 
together already well into investigating the causes. The 
National Transportation Safety Board has the lead around that 
investigation, and we are supporting it in every way we can.
    Mr. Wolf. Thank you.
    Mr. Warrington. Mr. Chairman and members of the 
subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you 
today to talk about the current state of Amtrak and the 
significant progress we have been making to achieve our goals 
of becoming free of operating support and to operate a truly 
viable and productive national system.
    I want to make three major points today, Mr. Chairman. The 
first is the positive results Amtrak that delivering to put us 
on the glide path to operating self-sufficiency by 2003. The 
second is the strategic steps we are taking to operate more 
like a business and to improve Amtrak's annual performance, 
including the recent announcement of our network growth 
strategy. And the third is the very exciting future of high 
speed rail, especially the growing partnerships with States all 
across this land. Amtrak will deliver on its promise to become 
operationally self-sufficient by 2003 and let us start with the 
results.
    First, you will recall from my testimony last year that for 
the first time in Amtrak's history, corporate revenue topped 
the $1 billion mark for fiscal year 1998, and ridership was up 
4\1/2\ percent. Fiscal 1999 was also a record-breaking year for 
Amtrak. Our revenue reached an all time high of $1.84 billion, 
a 7 percent increase from the previous year. Revenue growth 
helped Amtrak exceed the bottom line targets set in our 
business plan for the second straight year--that was about $8 
million ahead of plan--keeping us not only on track, but ahead 
of plan, to achieve operational self-sufficiency by 2003. Total 
ridership exceeded 29 million in 1999, up 2 percent from last 
year and 10 percent since it began rebounding about 3 years 
ago.
    For the first quarter of fiscal year 2000, Amtrak beat its 
business plan by more than $2 million, with total revenue up 8 
percent to $476 million.
    Second, let me turn to our commercial initiatives and 
partnerships, which are really fundamental to all our long-term 
health.
    To improve our bottom line, Amtrak has entered into a 
number of business ventures. These partnerships are expected to 
generate more than $20 million in additional annual revenue and 
$28 million in long-term savings.
    As you know, the mail and express business, which involves 
the transportation of time-sensitive shipments, produced $98 
million in revenue for fiscal 1999, up 18 percent from fiscal 
1998, and it is a major focus for the corporation.
    In fiscal 1999, capital investment partnerships with State 
governors all across this land generated contributions from 
those States in excess of $300 million, which is a very 
different way of doing business for Amtrak.
    The corporation's real estate and telecommunication 
ventures returned profits of $106 million, also a record high.
    Based on its expectation that operational self-sufficiency 
will be achieved, we are also pleased to report that Moody's 
Investor Service improved Amtrak's credit rating to an A3, 
reflecting a stable outlook. Standard & Poor's publicly 
assigned Amtrak a triple B issuer rating.
    In the area of customer service, which really is our core 
passenger business, Amtrak over the past eight months has 
trained 16,500 employees to begin implementation of the 
American travel industry's first-ever service guarantee, which 
we will put in place 112 days from today. And just 2 weeks ago, 
Amtrak announced plans to expand passenger service in 21 states 
and strengthen, in particular, our competitive edge in the mail 
and express business. These steps will increase our reach and 
connectivity of this system and generate $65 million in 
improvements to our bottom line by 2003.
    Before I move to high speed rail, I wanted to say a few 
words about how we developed that network growth strategy.
    As you all know, over the last several years Amtrak has 
attempted to generate savings by eliminating routes andsegments 
of routes. What we found is that we cannot cut ourselves to prosperity. 
While I realize that a number of our trains certainly do not and 
probably will never make a positive contribution to our bottom line, 
they are essential parts of the larger network and provide lots of 
connecting revenue to the system.
    We have also found, and this occurred frankly in 1995, that 
when we eliminate a train, it is very difficult, virtually 
impossible to generate savings beyond that immediate train. In 
other words, there will always be costs which cannot be 
eliminated simply by cutting trains or segments of trains, and 
that is largely attributable to the heavy-fixed costs 
associated with this business, whether passenger business or 
freight business.
    What is certain, however, is that by eliminating trains we 
eliminate a source of revenue, and more importantly, we 
eliminate the potential for mail and express and connectivity 
to other Amtrak routes across the system. The model we have 
developed to complete the network growth strategy looked at the 
actual savings we could reap from a service cut and contrasted 
that with the amount of actual revenue we would lose from 
cutting the service, direct revenue and feeder revenue on other 
routes. While this model looks at similar types of expenses as 
our own root profitability model system does, it is very 
different and much more accurate in determining the actual 
value or potential savings of a given route or a future route 
or a segment of a route.
    While I know we will get to some of this in your questions 
this morning, I wanted to assure that we did look at every 
conceivable opportunity to generate savings through route 
eliminations or route segment elimination across the entire 
system.
    Let me turn now to our third major point, which is around 
the development of high speed rail corridors across this 
Nation. On January 31st, Amtrak took the first step in our high 
speed rail program, the launch of our Acela regional train 
service between Boston and New York. So far the Acela regional 
service is doing 25 to 35 percent better than our own initial 
projections and outperforming the trains they replaced by 55 to 
65 percent in ridership and revenue performance.
    With this success so far of the regional service, it is no 
wonder we are very anxious to debut our Acela Express service. 
When we are confident about announcing a precise start date--
but I would remind everyone that high speed train sets in the 
northeast are a new technology. We owe it to the American 
people as well as ourselves to see to it that this technology 
meet ours high standards. That is our responsibility and we 
will live up to it.
    Of course, high speed rail isn't just something that the 
northeast wants. The development of high speed corridors is a 
key component of Amtrak's long-term business plan, but it is 
even more critical to a balanced and integrated intermodal 
transportation system. A grass roots movement to expand 
passenger rail is sweeping across this Nation, and as is so 
often the case in American history, the States and governors 
are leading the way. State investment in passenger rail is on 
the rise with high speed rail programs now actively being 
pursued and underway in 36 States led by chief executives from 
across the political spectrum proving that states are willing 
to genuinely partner with real dollars with the Federal 
government and Amtrak to help develop these high speed 
corridors.
    But the Federal Government has to play a role here, too. As 
you know, the President has requested that Congress fully fund 
Amtrak at the authorized level of $989 million for fiscal year 
2001. Of that amount, 521 million, or $48 million less than our 
request for fiscal year 2000, would enable Amtrak to continue 
to achieve its goal of operational self-sufficiency by 2003. 
The balance of $468 million would be used to develop in 
partnership with the States' high speed corridors across the 
country.
    Just 2 weeks ago at the winter meeting of the National 
Governors Association, the Nation's governors unanimously 
adopted a resolution calling on Congress to provide Amtrak with 
$989 million in fiscal 2001.
    It can be successful, Mr. Chairman. As Inspector General 
Ken Mead has said in his testimony before the Senate Commerce 
Committee only three weeks ago, if the administration's 
proposed budget for 2001 is adopted Amtrak would have 
sufficient funds to address minimum needs and invest in 
projects with long-term growth opportunities like new high 
speed corridors. We believe that Ken is absolutely right.
    Mr. Chairman, in the past, I have pledged that Amtrak would 
achieve operational self-sufficiency by 2003. However, frankly, 
I would like to go a step further. Our goal is not merely to 
survive, which has been our history over 29 years. It is 
nothing less than to become a world class national passenger 
railroad system, a growing, thriving commercial enterprise that 
is poised to take advantage of market opportunities and meet 
the demands of today's travelers. I believe that our results, 
our commercial initiatives, our network growth strategy and our 
high speed rail plans demonstrate clearly that this is more 
than a promise. We are on track to meet these goals. As Ken has 
said as well, there will be heavy lifting ahead over the next 
several years, and there are certainly risks. But we are 
fixated and entirely focused on executing our business plans to 
get us where we need to be and where we promised we would be by 
2003.
    We are on track to meet these goals and I urge you to 
support this effort. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement and biography of George Warrington 
follows:]



    Mr. Mead. Good morning. Five months into this year, we 
think it is still possible for Amtrak to achieve operating 
self-sufficiency by 2003, which is what it is required to do 
under the law. But delays in the deployment of the high speed 
rail service in the northeast corridor are going to make that 
more difficult. We do see Amtrak moving in the right direction, 
but the truth is that the heavy lifting is still ahead, and we 
have basically 2\1/2\ years left in the glide path.
    Last year, over one half of the $692 million in projections 
we thought were at risk in Amtrak's business plan represented 
investments in projects like the market based network analysis 
that Amtrak just announced a couple of weeks ago. Small steps 
were made in 1998 and 1999, but now they have to be replaced 
with large strides. Amtrak's performance in it's first quarter 
of 2000 shows progress, but also shows the large strides are 
slow in coming, and I will just lay out a few indicators of 
this.
    Overall passenger revenue was almost $10 million better 
than this period last year, but more than $9 million behind 
plan. Amtrak West passenger revenues were higher by $2 million 
over the first quarter last year, but also fell short of 
Amtrak's target by about a million, and even with the high 
speed rail delays, the Northeast Corridor revenues were up 7 
percent over last year, and, $2 million better than planned. 
The express business is also growing with revenues about 
$2million more than the first quarter last year.
    A problem, though, is Intercity, which comprises most of 
Amtrak's long distance trains. In the first quarter Intercity 
not only fell short of its passenger revenue targets by nearly 
$11 million, its revenue was more than $2 million shy of the 
same period last year.
    We are pleased to see Amtrak able to offset shortfalls in 
some areas with better-than-expected performance in others, but 
high speed rail revenues won't help Amtrak improve financially 
if all they do is offset growing losses in other business units 
like Intercity.
    To speak for a moment to the high speed rail delays, Amtrak 
is now projecting the Acela Express service will start this 
July. It is a delay of about 6 months. Whether this happens or 
not will depend on Amtrak resolving a number of testing issues 
and pushing the manufacturer to adhere to a strict delivery 
schedule.
    One of the major testing issues was oscillations in the 
wheels at speeds over 135 miles per hour. That is one of the 
issues Amtrak is trying to address. The oscillations caused a 
lot of wear on the train wheels so that the train wheels would 
have to be replaced more frequently than would be cost 
effective.
    Amtrak expects about $142 million in lost passenger 
revenues to be offset by expense savings and late delivery 
penalties. We agree these offsets are likely, but only if there 
are no further delays. We have pushed it really to the edge.
    Nobody should make any mistake about it, high speed rail is 
the cornerstone of Amtrak's business plan, and a relatively 
small financial impact from the delays ought not to detract 
from how profoundly Amtrak's future is going to depend on 
bringing that program home soon. Without the revenue from high 
speed rail, it will be impossible for Amtrak to reach 
operational self-sufficiency by 2003.
    I know that there has been some discussion occasioned by 
the delay that Amtrak might need another year on its glide 
path. We think it is premature to make that call and would 
recommend you hold off on making that call for probably a year 
until Amtrak gets the high speed rail service deployed. We will 
be in a much better position at this time next year to make a 
call on whether you are going to have to face the decision of 
do you want to extend the glide path another year or not.
    If I could comment on Amtrak's yardstick for self-
sufficiency. First, its capital funding. The law eliminates 
operating subsidies after 2002, but it is silent on whether 
capital funds will still be provided. Now if Amtrak makes its 
operating self-sufficiency goal, it is not going to make it by 
much, but Amtrak will not be able to continue operating the 
railroad after 2002 without capital assistance from the 
Congress. I know there has been some confusion on that, but I 
think the facts are that Amtrak is going to need capital 
assistance after 2002 if it will continue to operate as a 
railroad, and Amtrak, for its part, has never said it will not 
need capital assistance after 2002.
    A point about capital depreciation. Because depreciation is 
defined as an operating expense, some have argued that it ought 
to be included in Amtrak's calculation of self-sufficiency. I 
don't think so. Because if we did, it would effectively make 
self-sufficiency by 2003 impossible, and when you passed the 
law, it would have virtually guaranteed that Amtrak never would 
have been able to make the operating self-sufficiency goal. 
Congress has historically funded depreciation, which is the 
consumption of capital, through capital grants, not operating 
subsidies.
    Progressive overhauls. There has also been some debate 
about whether progressive overhauls ought to be considered an 
operating expense, which technically, under the accounting 
standards, it is. But the fact is, a progressive overhaul is 
really heavy maintenance work that the railroad does on its 
cars once every year, and it is done in lieu of the heavy 
overall once every 4 years, and I think Amtrak really needs 
some flexibility to make the judgment of what type of 
maintenance it performs whether it's a progressive maintenance 
approach or heavy overhaul every 4 years. It needs the 
discretion to make that corporate judgment, and decide whether 
it is better to repair its trains and maintain its trains, as 
it goes along, or 4 years down the road, making a major 
expenditure for a heavy overhaul.
    I would like to make a comment about Amtrak's capital 
spending. Amtrak's capital funding is currently projected to 
fall short of it's minimum needs by over $240 million over the 
next 2 years. Still, Amtrak's capital plan is providing funds 
for some projects that go beyond these minimum needs, and 
beyond what Amtrak can afford with the funds projected to be 
available. Amtrak must first ensure the funds are available to 
meet its minimum requirements for the operation of this 
railroad before it starts spending money on other things.
    And finally, a point about life safety needs in the 
northeast corridor. There are approximately $650 million in 
unfunded fire and life safety needs in the New York Penn 
Station river tunnels. I brought some pictures along today that 
are in your packets, and they illustrate my point better than 
words can. If you have a serious tunnel fire in one of these 
six tunnels, the existing systems that they have for evacuation 
aren't ones that you or I would want to contend with. If you 
have this picture, I think just one will do, you will see a 
spiral staircase. That spiral staircase is the exit and access 
to one of these tunnels. So if you have a serious fire, you are 
going to have people trying to go up this staircase, and rescue 
people trying to access the tunnel all at the same time.
    Members of my staff have tried to walk up these stairs. 
These stairs go up 10 stories. It is appalling. If you can 
imagine trying to exit a train in one of these tunnels with 
poor light, poor ventilation and trying to go up these stairs 
while others are coming down these stairs, all at the same 
time, it isn't going to happen. These stairs are about wide 
enough for one person of medium weight, and I wanted to call 
this to somebody's attention because I think it is time that we 
factored this into Amtrak's capital plans.
    Amtrak owns the tunnels. Some of the tunnels they don't 
even use, but the fact is they own them and the Long Island 
Railroad and New Jersey Transit and Amtrak are trying to get 
together to address these problems. They have already spent 
about $105 million of the tab here, but it was a fairly 
alarming situation and one that was serious enough that I 
wanted to call it to the committee's attention in public 
session here.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement and biography of Kenneth Mead 
follows:]



    Ms. Scheinberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the 
subcommittee. I am here today primarily to discuss our recent 
report on Amtrak's use of $2.2 billion that was provided 
through the Taxpayer Relief Act. As you know, these funds were 
provided in 1998 and 1999 to help improve the railroad's 
financial condition. The Congress intended that the funds be 
used for capital improvements and equipment maintenance, among 
other things. At the time of our review, Amtrak had spent about 
$1.3 billion in TRA funds. We reviewed a limited number of 
Amtrak's TRA projects and expenditures and found that most met 
the Act's requirements. However we determined that Amtrak 
improperly used $9 million in TRA funds to reimburse itself for 
expenses paid before the Act was passed. We believe that TRA 
did not authorize Amtrak to do this, as such use would have 
effectively circumvented restrictions imposed by the Congress 
on the use of these funds.
    We recommended, and Amtrak agreed that the corporation 
determine whether it used other TRA funds beyond the $9 million 
to reimburse itself for expenses it paid before the Act was 
passed. While Amtrak disagreed with our findings, it has asked 
the IRS, which has the ultimate authority over the matter, to 
determine whether the disputed expenditures were allowable 
under TRA. It is important to keep in our mind that our review 
was limited. We examined only a fraction of the over200 capital 
projects that Amtrak approved for TRA funding, and the approximately 
81,000 expenditures charged to TRA.
    Our findings cannot be extended beyond our scope, but with 
that in mind, we think a fundamental problem with Amtrak's use 
of TRA funds is its lack of oversight over individual expenses. 
Amtrak does review and approve specific capital improvement 
projects for TRA funding. However, it does not review 
individual expenditures charged to those projects. Instead, 
Amtrak presumes that any expense charged to an approved project 
may be paid with TRA funds. This means that all expenses 
charged to approved projects are automatically considered to be 
qualified for TRA funding.
    We find this lack of review troubling because, without such 
a review, Amtrak does not have reasonable assurance that TRA 
funds are spent in accordance with the law. Therefore, we 
recommended that Amtrak have its Inspector General, in 
consultation with Amtrak's external auditor, review the 
adequacy of its internal controls over TRA funds. Amtrak agreed 
to take this action.
    Now, I would like to briefly discuss three other issues 
concerning Amtrak. First, Amtrak has made only modest progress 
in its quest towards reducing its need for Federal operating 
subsidies. During the past 5 years Amtrak reduced its need for 
operating subsidies by $78 million. During the next 2\1/2\ 
years, Amtrak must make further reductions totaling over $290 
million. This is nearly four times as much as it achieved in 
the past 4 years. We believe that this will be very difficult.
    Second, for fiscal year 2001, the administration has 
requested $521 million for Amtrak's capital grant and $468 
million for a proposed expanded intercity rail passenger 
service program. The new program would provide funds to Amtrak 
and the States for capital investments needed to support 
intercity passenger rail service. Funds for the program would 
come from the highway trust fund, which, as you know, is funded 
through motor fuel taxes which are dedicated to other programs. 
For this reason, this proposal is likely to generate 
considerable debate.
    Finally, the most pressing issue facing Amtrak is its 
substantial capital needs. These needs total many billions of 
dollars. For example, Amtrak recently estimated about $12 
billion will be needed over the next 25 years to modernize the 
infrastructure of the northeast corridor between Washington, 
D.C. and New York City. In addition, Amtrak in recent years has 
used up about $300 million annually in facilities and 
equipment. These are capital assets that will need to be 
replaced.
    Finally, Amtrak recently announced a planned expansion of 
its route system that is aimed at improving its financial 
condition. While we have not looked at this plan in detail, we 
note that at least one element, the acquisition of about 2000 
pieces of mail and express equipment, will require a 
substantial investment. These represent only some of Amtrak's 
capital needs. However, it has been 2 years since Amtrak has 
had a multiyear plan that identifies its capital needs and 
sources of funds.
    Relatedly, Amtrak currently spends a substantial portion of 
its annual Federal capital appropriations on equipment 
maintenance rather than on capital investment. This means that 
Amtrak is not spending the Federal appropriation to make 
investments needed to improve its competitive position in the 
markets that it serves. We expect to report later this spring 
more specifically on Amtrak's capital needs and the funds 
available to meet those needs.
    Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement.
    [The information follows:]



                 LIFE SAFETY ISSUES IN NEW YORK TUNNELS

    Mr. Wolf. Thank you very much. Mr. Warrington, if you 
listen to the other witnesses, you are so upbeat and they are 
not really as positive. It is just an interesting position. The 
first question is, if you had had the accident that you had had 
today in that tunnel, this would be on the story of every major 
newspaper for several days, because probably hundreds of people 
would have died. Do you agree with that? If what took place 
this morning took place in the New York tunnels, what would the 
circumstances be?
    Mr. Warrington. Yes, I agree with you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Wolf. If that is the case, then I think there needs to 
be much more of a focus on life safety in Penn State than in 
redeveloping. The politicians up in New York want this 
redevelopment but life safety really ought to be number one. I 
understand why they want to redevelop it. I think they have a 
lot of great ideas, but I think safety is critical. If you were 
ever to have a major accident like that, you might chime in, 
Mr. Mead, I think you would literally ruin Amtrak for a 
lifetime because nobody would want to be caught into that 
circumstance. What if you had the accident that took place this 
morning?
    Mr. Mead. Though I don't know personally about the accident 
that happened, I think point is well taken. What has happenedin 
these tunnels is that they hope when they have an accident like this, 
that they won't have to get the people out of the train, that they will 
be able to somehow make it to the next station, or get out of the 
tunnel, but there are circumstances where a tunnel evacuation could 
happen, and I think it is a question of time.
    Mr. Wolf. How far down do these stairs go again?
    Mr. Mead. 10 stories. These particular ones are 10 stories. 
When my staff returned from a visit there and explained this to 
me, they were quite alarmed. We have always heard that there 
were fire and life safety needs in these tunnels, but, I just 
don't think there was a full appreciation among the laypeople 
of how serious and pressing they are.
    I would say this on the positive side, Amtrak has just 
recently, two or three weeks ago, disclosed what its capital 
plan and capital needs are. And these life safety needs are 
included, but now what we need is an action plan on when these 
things are going to be fixed, who is going to pay for them and 
in what particular sequence.
    Mr. Wolf. What other train lines, railway lines go in 
there? It is Amtrak and Long Island----
    Mr. Warrington. There are two tunnels between New Jersey 
and New York that are predominantly used by New Jersey Transit 
and Amtrak. There are four tunnels under the East River between 
Penn Station and Long Island which are used jointly by the Long 
Island Railroad, ourselves and New Jersey Transit. We have 
worked very closely with both of those organizations over the 
past 6 or 7 years to address this issue. We are well into most 
of the engineering and design work, which is very complicated 
and complex around much of what Ken has outlined here. We have 
spent together about $105 million to date, and that is over the 
past 3 years.
    Mr. Wolf. I think most of the money the committee has 
designated has been for safety in that area.
    Mr. Warrington. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. In fact, we 
have spend already about $105 million, and we have $42 million 
more programmed this year. We have also worked very hard around 
our operating practices, training of our employees to deal with 
incidents and situations in those tunnels, and we have had a 
series of emergency evacuation practices with all the emergency 
services personnel, both in New York, the fire, police and 
emergency service folks, in anticipation of an incident.
    My point, Mr. Chairman, is I am not disputing at all that 
we have an issue here. It has always been a serious, large 
money issue, which we have not been able to solve overnight. 
Part of this is simply the complexity and the time it takes to 
deal with these issues, they are hard issues. For example, we 
have put a lot of engineering effort and design effort into 
better ventilation. It is the original 1932 Pennsylvania 
Railroad ventilation system. It is an obsolete design in the 
event of a smoke condition in that location.
    For example, in order to locate new ventilation shafts, 
there are a whole host of issues relating to property owners in 
midtown Manhattan and adjacent hospitals, all of whom have 
serious difficulties with the placement of a ventilation shaft 
adjacent to their property. My point is we have been working 
very hard to do the design, the engineering, the property 
acquisition to ready ourselves for substantial new dollars to 
be able to correct this problem.
    At the same time, we have put a lot of effort into our own 
operating practices, positioning of equipment to be able to 
rescue any train that is stranded in that tunnel, and there 
have been instances where that has happened. We have put a lot 
of time, effort, energy and operating money into readiness, 
preparedness, emergency evacuation drills.
    Mr. Wolf. When you say ``We,'' what about the other 
railroads?
    Mr. Warrington. ``We'' being partners. It is the New York 
City fire and rescue folks. It is Hudson County fire and rescue 
folks in New Jersey. It is the Long Island Railroad, New Jersey 
Transit and ourselves.
    Mr. Wolf. Well, I think the next time I am up in New York 
visiting one of my kids who live up there, I will go down in it 
with you. I really would like to do that. We have emphasized 
safety. We have put more money in that. In fact, there are 
times people here wanted to do other things but we have 
consistently emphasized safety. As long as we are here, I 
really want you to emphasize this. I think you ought to bring 
them all together, give us a plan and tell us, what you are 
doing to fix these tunnel problems. If somebody had a heart 
attack you could never get them out. If somebody were 
delivering a baby down there, you can never get them, let alone 
having a major accident.
    While I am on the safety issue before I get to the other 
issues, for the last two years, the committee has carried 
language urging Amtrak and the transit operators to address 
fencing problems in four communities in Massachusetts, can you 
talk to me about the fencing issue and tell me if you are going 
to take care of that so I can tell the members what the status 
is.
    Mr. Warrington. The short answer, Mr. Chairman, is I commit 
to you we will take care of that.

              NORTHEAST CORRIDOR HIGH SPEED SERVICE UPDATE

    Mr. Wolf. I appreciate that. The Acela Express service, was 
originally scheduled to begin the end of 1999, now delayed to 
the year 2000. What are the reasons for the delay and what is 
the status now? What day will it start?
    Mr. Warrington. I can't promise you a specific day.
    Mr. Wolf. What week or month?
    Mr. Warrington. I can't promise you a specific week, but 
right now the consortium has advised us that they expect to be 
able to deliver the first train set in July, and I think that 
we are reasonably comfortable with that schedule.
    Mr. Wolf. What effect will that have on your revenues?
    Mr. Warrington. We have estimated what the consequences of 
delay will be, which is about 6 months, and we have also put in 
place a very detailed financial plan to offset and compensate 
for that for this year.
    [The information follows:]

    Ticket revenues are anticipated to be $156 million less 
than originally planned. However, Amtrak has identified 
alternative revenue sources to offset the cash loss associated 
with the delay. These revenue sources include liquidated 
damages from the contractor, savings in interest and operating 
costs due to the delayed implementation of service and 
incremental lease revenue.
    The contract between Amtrak and the manufacturer 
Consortium, responsible for the production of the trainsets, 
includes provisions for liquidated damages. The value of the 
liquidated damages is directly dependent upon the date that 
each unit is delivered to Amtrak, therefore a precise value 
cannot be determined today and can only be calculated when each 
unit is delivered. The contract provisions allow Amtrak to 
deduct the value of estimated liquidated damages from the 
payments made to the Consortium, which Amtrak intends to do.

    Mr. Wolf. What impact for 2001?
    Mr. Warrington. We are putting that plan together now, and 
that is heavily dependent on the precise schedule for the 
delivery of each of the subsequent train sets. The consortium 
has not concluded what that schedule is, so I cannot give you a 
precise number relating to that, but we have a very specific 
plan to deal with any gap that would arise this year, and we 
are assembling that plan for 2001.

                         ACELA REGIONAL SERVICE

    Mr. Wolf. On January 31, Amtrak launched the Acela regional 
service between Boston and Washington. How is that going?
    Mr. Warrington. It has been terrific.
    Mr. Wolf. What is the on time record and load performance?
    Mr. Warrington. Both from an on-time performance point of 
view, we are running in the 95 percent range, which is very 
good between Washington and Boston. From a ridership and 
revenue point of view, performance of those four trains 
compared to the four trains they replaced have improved by, 
depending upon the day, anywhere from 45 to 65 percent better 
than last year, and the average ridership improvement as of 
this morning, over those trains last year through this morning 
is about 48 or 49 percent.

            PROPOSED FARE INCREASE FOR ACELA EXPRESS SERVICE

    Mr. Wolf. Last question before I recognize Mr. Sabo, the 
Acela Express trains are supposed to substantially reduce the 
trip times between New York and Boston from five hours down to 
three. Between Washington D.C. and New York the trip times may 
only be reduced by 15 minutes. Last year you testified that 
passengers who wanted these reduced trips would pay a premium 
price. Is this premium price on both the north and the south 
end of the corridor or largely on the north end because of the 
dramatic trip reductions?
    Mr. Warrington. Most of the premium pricing would be on the 
north end attributable to the time-saving improvements. I will 
tell you, Mr. Chairman, that our planning right now envisions 
several peak period express trains between Washington and New 
York, perhaps with one stop in Philadelphia, that would bring 
that travel time down to between 2 hours and 30 minutes and 2 
hours 35 minutes.
    Mr. Wolf. Compared to what now?
    Mr. Warrington. Compared to today's 3 hours.
    [The information follows:]



                   STATE SUPPORT FOR HIGH SPEED RAIL

    Mr. Wolf. Mr. Sabo.
    Mr. Sabo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome. Mr. 
Chairman, our Ranking Member Mr. Obey has a letter from 13 
States, I believe in support of high speed rail that I would 
like to enter in the record.
    Mr. Wolf. Without objection.
    [The letter follows:]



    Mr. Sabo. I am curious, when all of the governors 
association passed a resolution in favor of the 468 million for 
intercity high speed rail, that they also passed a resolution 
in support of how it was to be paid for?
    Mr. Warrington. No.
    Mr. Sabo. So we could expect to hear from them not to use 
RABA funds.
    Mr. Warrington. I really can't speak to that precise point. 
I can't speak for the mechanics of how the money is produced, 
Mr. Sabo, but I will tell you that the important, very 
important issue for us is establishing the appropriate level of 
investment that is required. You know, we had an earlier 
conversation about, life safety issues in the tunnels below 
Penn Station. We have tunnels, Mr. Chairman, in Baltimore also, 
that date back to the late 1800s, not with the same level of 
hazard attached to them, but we frankly have a plant that has 
been reaching an aging condition for decades now. We are trying 
to hold it together and focus those resources in places that 
give us the best return, because we are under the gun in 
getting to where we need to get to by 2003.
    The issue for us is the level of effort that is required, 
not just next year, but over the long haul in order to really 
make this a world class railroad. So we are not just dealing 
with these kinds of issues around recovering from investments 
that were initially made in 1932, according to 1932 
designstandards. I can't solve the matter of--I can't solve the matter 
of how the problem gets fixed. I can only credibly demonstrate that we 
are continuing to make progress around the directive to be 
operationally self-sufficient I can only articulate what we can be, and 
we can be a very powerful institution with the right amount of capital. 
I can't tell you how to fund it or how to deliver it to us if you are 
so disposed. I can tell you we can have a world class railroad in this 
country that we can be proud of if we fix adequately address that hard 
question. I just can't tell you exactly how to do it today.
    I also have a responsibility to be articulate and share 
exactly what that level of effort is that is needed on an 
ongoing basis. With regard to the Northeast corridor, and we 
clearly have articulated over the next 25 years what those 
requirements are as, Ken alluded to earlier. We will be 
wrapping up later this summer our high speed corridor planning 
work in consultation with the States, and at that point, be 
able to combine our high speed requirements, capital equipment, 
with our northeast requirements and our long distance train 
equipment requirements. Then we will be in a much better 
position to share with you, really for the first time, a very 
clear and very precise annual requirement for capital that this 
railroad needs in order to really grow and be something we can 
be proud of. I can't give you that number here today, but we 
are very close to being able to define that. The challenge will 
then be, as a matter of public policy, to determine we want to 
make that commitment and how we do it. I can't get into a 
debate about whether RABA is appropriate as opposed to some 
other source.
    My responsibility is to define what those needs are and 
what we can do with those dollars to make a difference.
    Mr. Sabo. Go ahead.
    Ms. Scheinberg. Mr. Sabo, I just wanted to comment on what 
Mr. Warrington just said. Amtrak has billions of dollars in 
capital needs. The real issue is the priority of those needs. 
This is part of the discussion that we have been having this 
morning on the life safety in the tunnels on the northeast 
corridor. The question is: where should these moneys be spent? 
Clearly, there are more needs than there is money. The priority 
and whether, we as a country should be spending money on new 
corridors and new routes versus life safety equipment in the 
northeast corridor, is the question that needs to be addressed.
    Mr. Mead. I was at a hearing a couple of weeks ago and in 
fairness to Amtrak, the questions that were being put to Amtrak 
by members of Congress actually asked for more service, service 
not to be discontinued, corridor development and things of that 
nature. It is true that for many years, Amtrak has been under a 
lot of pressure to maintain its national network. I think the 
pressure for these high speed rail corridors in development and 
so forth is good, but Amtrak has to get the money from 
somewhere.
    We know Amtrak is about $250 million short of the capital 
needs to maintain the things it has already. So I think 
implicit in your question is who is going to pay? State 
contributions, I do believe, are a wave of the future.
    Mr. Sabo. I suppose one alternative would be to let the 
States use--I don't particularly have problem with the RABA 
proposal, but it is clear it is not going to pass here as we 
face this year's funding, but letting the States have the 
flexibility to use some of those funds for high speed rail, 
whether that is salable or not, but more fundamentally, to the 
question of priorities--and we have lots of interest in the 
Midwest--but I am never sure when we are talking about high 
speed rail what image people have.
    I was in France maybe 15 years ago on TGV--have I got the 
initials right? Rode that, Paris to Leon, it was great, went 
very fast, comfortable ride, you didn't feel like you were 
moving fast. But that was its own right of way, its own track. 
That clearly is not what we are talking about.
    Mr. Warrington. Mr. Sabo, I was on the TGV last Sunday from 
Paris to Tours, and it makes me ill to see what we are 
potentially capable of, but for a lack of public policy 
commitment to doing it right. I feel like--and we feel like 
dogs fighting over table scraps frankly. The highway industry 
receives $33 billion a year, the aviation industry receives $11 
billion a year, and mass transit receives $6 billion a year, 
while Amtrak is scrapping for $520 million or $968 million. We 
are in this position of being on the edge of our seat every 
year when we know that there is extraordinary potential to be a 
very powerful economic force in this country. We are fighting 
amongst ourselves about where we allocate every individual 
dollar when there are so many pressing needs out there around 
basic state of good repair issues that we need to correct, and 
at the same time, serve real mobility interests and drive local 
and regional economies around high speed rail service.
    There is a very clear vision about who we can be and what 
we can be. What the fundamental question is, are we going to 
continue to be on the edge of our seats around capital or are 
we going to be committed to fixing that problem? My 
responsibility is to deal with the operating subsidy question, 
and we do have a lot of heavy lifting ahead, but we are fixated 
and focused on getting there. We need to get there, and we will 
make the tough decisions about getting doing it right, but we 
will get there.
    This is a capital-intensive industry. Just talk to any of 
the class 1 freight railroad presidents today and take a look 
at their stock prices and how difficult it is for them as very 
profitable institutions to raise the kind of capital that they 
need.
    Mr. Sabo. But again, we are not talking about that kind of 
line. Even in the high speed rail proposals we are talking 
about coordinating lots of trackage for joint use with the 
freight trains; is that not accurate?
    Mr. Warrington. Yes. The plan is to get to 90 to 110-mile-
per-hour service, maybe some day 125-mile-an-hour service, but 
principally, 90 to 110-mile-per-hour service between critical 
city pairs, Chicago-Detroit, Chicago-Milwaukee, Madison-
Minneapolis, Chicago-St. Louis. There are terrific 
opportunities there that requires partnership with both the 
States and governors around investment as well as freight 
railroads who own those tracks. Yet, compared to today's 
operation, that is a significant improvement, and our modeling 
tells us that the demand is there if we are able to provide the 
kind of travel time and frequency between those particular city 
pairs.
    Mr. Mead. There is probably no other place in the worldthat 
is trying to deploy high speed rail under the conditions that we are 
deploying it under. As you mentioned in France, you go there, it is 
dedicated straight track, no grade crossings, and no freight trains, no 
commuter lines competing and it is not curved. You come to the United 
States and in the northeast corridor, which is our flagship for 
deploying high speed rail, you do not have dedicated track, it is 
curved and the service competes with commuter lines. Those particular 
combinations make the challenge of deploying high speed rail in this 
country with the current infrastructure condition really challenging. 
In fact, the testing issues that we referred to earlier are actually 
partially attributable to those very conditions, and Amtrak is trying 
to cope with those conditions as it deploys high-speed rail.
    Mr. Sabo. But that still leaves us with the dilemma. We 
operate also with limits of dollars, when we get limited 
capital dollars on where those priorities should be. Yeah. 
Obviously we would like some in the Midwest, but in a way, it 
is hard to argue that the northeast corridor is not sort of the 
flagship of the whole operation. We have got to make sure that 
works. I am not sure that--of the Midwest routes how many exist 
today?
    Mr. Warrington. We have trains operating on probably 60 to 
70 percent of those lines today, primarily long distance trains 
that are travelling beyond those particular corridors or 
travelling over those corridors. The plan would call for those 
trains to be increased around a more regionally-based service 
with more frequencies at higher speeds on segments of those 
existing long distance train routes. There are also several 
routes, for example, Chicago to Davenport and Des Moines, 
principally driven around mail and express business 
opportunities, and which would be over railroad track that 
doesn't carry passenger trains today. So it is really a mixed 
bag, Mr. Sabo.

                    STATE SUPPORT FOR PASSENGER RAIL

    Mr. Sabo. I am just curious, in your judgment, and we hear 
from the States, to what degree are they participating in any 
real way today in capital projects? I know you indicated some.
    Mr. Warrington. I will tell you that I have watched Amtrak 
from the outside for 20 years. I used to run the New Jersey 
Transit, and I have been inside the place now for 5 years. I 
have to tell you that never in my career have I seen the kind 
of genuine and real interest at a State level by governors and 
State Departments of Transportation, which historically have 
been highway departments. I have never seen the kind of genuine 
interest around and passion and money being devoted and 
committed to making this a reality. There are governors all 
across this land who are under siege because of serious urban 
and regional congestion problems, and they can't build their 
way out around the interstate system. As you know, the air 
network is saturated and at capacity. We all read about that 
every day, and increasingly governors, Republicans and 
Democrats, northeast, midwest, south, southeast and west are 
realizing that there is a way out here, and that it is a 
relatively inexpensive way to deal with some very serious air 
quality and congestion problems that are strangling whole 
regions in this country, and it is not just, you know, downtown 
urban centers. It is suburban areas and regional environments, 
and I have not seen anything like it.
    Just over the past 18 months or so, we have had $300 
million committed to us by States. Frankly, one of the reasons 
why we are very interested in seeing the flexibility provisions 
in S1144 enacted around Federal transportation programs is--and 
why the governors are so supportive--is they see it as a way 
out and as a relatively inexpensive way to begin to fix and 
address some of these problems. These governors should be given 
the ability to flex Federal transportation dollars for 
intercity rail, you know they can be flexed today for 
snowmobile paths and bike paths and pedestrian walkways but not 
for intercity passenger rail.
    Those Federal transportation dollars can be flexed for 
driver education training, but they cannot be flexed for Amtrak 
or intercity rail, and that is something we believe needs to be 
corrected. The governors' hands are literally hamstrung today 
because they can't make those local judgments about directing 
some of those STP or NHS funds or other Federal transportation 
dollars if they want to make that commitment to intercity rail 
to solve the kinds of serious problems that they are dealing 
with. It has been sea change, Mr. Sabo, around genuine 
interests, not only in State Departments of transportation but 
also by governors.
    Mr. Sabo. I would assume from Milwaukee--well, I don't 
know. How far is Milwaukee-Chicago by air?
    Mr. Warrington. I don't know.
    Mr. Sabo. Ninety miles, they probably don't go by air, they 
probably drive. I would assume going by train from downtown of 
one place to downtown of the other would be quicker than 
getting to the airport and getting to downtown Chicago.
    Mr. Warrington. Actually, our Hiawatha service that runs 
from Chicago to Milwaukee is one of our more successful 
services. We run six roundtrips a day.
    Mr. Sabo. And at what speed?
    Mr. Warrington. I think it is about an hour and a half. I 
don't recall off the top of my head. It is about an hour and a 
half. It has become a very competitive service. It is a nice 
service. It has become a business, a business-oriented service. 
Since we have got a good service there and it is a basic 
service, one of the things we looked at is can we take the 
train and extend it, for example, up to Fond du Lac where Quad 
Graphics, a big printing operation, exist. Since we have the 
railroad there and we have the train and crew there, why not, 
as part of our network growth strategy, tap into other 
passenger and express markets? And, since we are hauling a lot 
of that business from Quad Graphics by trucks today, why not 
run the train up there and handle a lot of their periodicals 
business, and get it right on our train and bring it down to 
Chicago, and then transfer it in Chicago to other trains around 
the system. It helps the postal service, because it gets all of 
that bulk mail out of their regional distribution centers, and 
we handle it from A to Z.
    But it is that kind of planning around connectivity and 
reach that is really going to make the difference around this 
system.
    Mr. Sabo. Thank you.
    Mr. Wolf. As I recognize Mr. Packard, let me just say I 
think Mr. Sabo is on target. Governor Carver in Delaware can't 
build any more north--south roads. I think I95 has been widened 
as wide as it can be. I think you ought to come up to the 
Congressand you ought to ask for the funding outright--I think 
you make a very compelling point. I think Mr. Sabo's comments were 
right on target. The administration has taken almost the chicken's way 
out, if you will.
    RABA is probably not going to pass because, in essence, you 
are taking away from everybody. There may be some areas you 
can't do rail or the governor doesn't want to do rail, but 
there are 26 governors you say or 13 governors who would like 
to spend highway funds on rail projects. I see nothing wrong 
with allowing the governor of California or the governor of 
Virginia or the governor of Minnesota, if he or she in their 
wisdom wants to take their money and spend it on rail, I think 
that is the way to go rather than the RABA route. So I would 
ask you to go back and huddle with your people and write 
languaging asking the Congress to do so.
    I personally would and will support giving any governor or 
whoever the right to do whatever they want to do with their 
money as long as it is used for transportation, and I think Mr. 
Sabo is exactly right.
    The committee has been as generous as it could be and there 
have been times on the floor, as you know, different members 
wanted to reduce your funding. You are at a point now where you 
are going to take off or you are going to go dive. You have got 
the enormous capital needs, you have got pressing safety needs, 
and so let us hear from you.
    Mr. Packard.

                     SAN DIEGO INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS

    Mr. Packard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Warrington, an 
approximately 50-mile line from San Juan Capistrano to La Jolla 
there are at least three areas of the Amtrak line that are very 
vulnerable to Hood Control problems and erosion along the 
bluffs of the beach. San Juan Creek has a flood control problem 
that during El Nino undermined the railroad, and it has the 
potential to allow a train to literally go down with 
passengers. It also has the distinct potential, even if a train 
is not on the tracks at the time the erosion problem occurs, to 
put the rail corridor out of commission for a significant 
period of time. It could be weeks before service could be 
restored. And that, of course, would interrupt the only service 
on the west coast from San Francisco to San Diego. So you would 
have a significant interruption of passenger rail service, 
which would affect some of the other commuter lines that share 
the line with Amtrak.
    Have you done an analysis of these kinds of potential 
disaster areas on your entire nationwide network? Have you 
evaluated how you would deal with those kinds of emergencies or 
catastrophes that could happen to rail service?
    Mr. Warrington. We have. In fact, that situation occurred, 
principally in California around mudslides and flooding.
    Mr. Packard. Three in the last four years.
    Mr. Warrington. And the train which you speak of which has 
been most impacted by that has been the Coast Starlight, which 
is one of our premium trains from San Diego to Seattle. As you 
know, all of that railroad is owned by, operated, maintained 
and dispatched by freight railroads principally, Union Pacific, 
and the Burlington Northern Santa Fe. We do work with them 
around operations planning. We do work with them to plan for 
capital investments. I will tell you, frankly, it is primarily 
around capacity associated with our trains, and the impacts on 
their freight operation. We have increasingly been willing to 
work with them and invest with them together to improve 
capacity.
    I will tell you that we have not done a lot of planning 
around major reroutes associated with weather events and the 
like. I mean, we could certainly take a look at that, but we 
have not focused a lot of time, effort or energy there. I am 
just being frank with you. To reroute that train would be a 
massive undertaking, and we have made a judgment that it is not 
in the cards over the short haul. I will tell you, though, that 
we are working very closely with California, and we are leading 
the planning work around corridor development and investments 
required to improve frequencies in travel times on many of 
these corridors, including that route. I would say that it is a 
long-term issue, and that we should be incorporating that kind 
of thinking in our planning for the long-term future.
    Mr. Packard. So in essence, you address the problem after 
the fact, after something happens. This is a 50-mile stretch 
that I am very familiar with, there are three places that could 
put the trains out of service. I would have to assume that 
there are hundreds of such potential problem areas around the 
country, and I would assume also that it would be useful to do 
some kind of review or study as to where these danger sites 
are. If these problems were to put service out of commission, 
they would affect all of the things that you have been trying 
to do to make yourself self-sufficient. I would think that 
there would be some usefulness in determining how serious this 
problem is nationwide.
    Mr. Warrington. I can commit to you, Mr. Packard, that we 
will take a look at that. In fact, we probably have some of our 
planning and operating people on the west coast who have been 
doing some of that. The other location, frankly, where we tend 
to come up against weather adversity that affects our train 
operations, mostly causing us to have to suspend service for 
days on end in addition to the Coast Starlight is our Florida 
service.
    Generally in the fall, CSX is seriously impacted by 
hurricanes and flooding, Florida, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Georgia and Virginia, and it is the other location 
where we frequently encounter service disruptions or 
terminating service, suspending service to deal with those 
kinds of things. They are not easy fixes there, and I assure 
you they will be very, very expensive to correct for.
    Mr. Packard. I recently met with some officials from the 
city of Del Mar, which is just south of my home in Carlsbad. 
They showed me pictures of a 40-, 50-feet bluff, and the rail 
ran right along the bluff dropping into the ocean. Last year a 
person was buried under a fall from that bluff down on the 
beach. The railroad is right there on the edge of that bluff. 
It would appear to me in the event of another El Nino-type 
problem, the rail line could literally go down. It has that 
potential. Again, I have to assume that there are many, many 
places around the country that have these same kinds of 
problems, both safety and service problems. My point has been 
made. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Wolf. Ms. Kilpatrick.

                      CURRENT CONDITION OF AMTRAK

    Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning.I 
heard quite a different picture from Mr. Warrington somewhat as opposed 
to the IG and the GAO in terms of the healthiness of Amtrak, and if you 
are going to meet the 2003 self-sustaining mark. I am a bit confused 
because I didn't hear that you are going to meet it from the two who 
monitor you, but I did feel that in your comments, you did think that 
you would meet that timeline and be healthy beyond that. Am I 
confusing----
    Mr. Warrington. The glass that I look through here is the 
past, and I have to tell you that when you compare our progress 
over the past 2 years with the condition of the railroad 
operationally and financially in the 1980s and most of the 
1990s, it is a very different place operationally and 
financially. We have a very aggressive target to get to where 
we need to get to by 2003. We have met all of our own 
projections for the first 2 years. We do, as Ken has said, have 
a lot of heavy lifting to do over the next 2\1/2\ years. Is 
there risk associated with that? Absolutely. I am a pragmatist 
and realist, but I am also very aggressive about fulfilling our 
commitments, and we will do everything possible to get where we 
need to get to by 2003.
    There are a whole host of critical things that have to 
happen, many of which we can control as management for us to 
get there. There are no slam dunks, and none of them are easy. 
They are going to require a lot of hard work. The first thing 
we need to do is implement our Acela high speed rail program, 
and hopefully that will begin this summer. That is worth a lot 
of money. Has that been a risk? Absolutely, but we are fixated 
and committed on getting there.
    We will be introducing our service guarantee program this 
July, and it is around massively upgrading the quality, 
consistency, reliability of our long distance train network.
    Ms. Kilpatrick. Okay. Let me stop you because that is 
confusing, what you repeated and commented in your testimony. I 
appreciate that and I am a realist, and we are in 2001. As I 
heard, Mr. Mead, you also said you didn't think we ought to 
extend that date right now, that we ought to assess that later, 
I don't know much further, you didn't say, but the two of you, 
with all the deficiencies and things that Mr. Warrington has 
coming on line, do you feel Amtrak will make the 2003 deadline?
    Mr. Mead. I think that, one, Mr. Warrington is correct. 
Things are clearly different at Amtrak and, management is 
paying attention to these issues. They know they just can't 
march up to the Congress and say give us money and get money 
every year, in and out. Amtrak is paying attention to the 
railroad nationally. It has a disciplined approach, strategic 
business plan and so forth and so on. There is no question 
there are big bucks in a row.
    I would say in direct answer to your question, if high 
speed rail gets deployed in July of this year and ramped up, 
meaning all 20 train sets, soon thereafter there is a good 
chance that Amtrak will come close to meeting the statutory 
objective.
    Ms. Kilpatrick. You still stand by your comments today that 
we ought not make an adjustment?
    Mr. Mead. No. I think it would be premature to do that, and 
also I think it would send a wrong signal. I think it is good 
to hold Amtrak's feet to the fire, and I think Amtrak wants its 
feet held to the fire on that score.
    I would say, though, that come 2003, even if Amtrak does 
meet its operating self-sufficiency goal, you are going to 
receive a request for a lot of money for Amtrak's capital 
requirements, and that capital requirement probably runs in the 
neighborhood of 500 million to a billion dollars a year.
    Ms. Kilpatrick. Let me go to Ms. Scheinberg on that because 
that is where I was going. In her comments, she mentioned much 
of the money they get now is more for maintenance and not for 
capital improvement, and on the same question of the 2003 
deadline, can you comment on both?
    Ms. Scheinberg. Yes, Ms. Kilpatrick. I am less optimistic 
certainly than Mr. Warrington, and less optimistic than Mr. 
Mead that Amtrak will meet the 2003 deadline. Amtrak has a long 
way to go. They have made some modest progress but they have a 
long way to go, and my concern is that the high speed rail, the 
Acela Express, is not the only thing that needs to get them 
there. Actually, according to Amtrak's last strategic business 
plan, the Acela Express revenues would be only a fourth of what 
they need to make the self-sufficiency goal. There is three-
quarters of the improvements that they need to make from other 
things, and those things are only in their infancy, and some of 
these things haven't even been defined. I think there is a lot 
of heavy lifting to do, and there is a lot of things that need 
to be proved before self-sufficiency comes along, and it is not 
just based on the Acela Express.

                       MODAL FUNDING COMPARISONS

    Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you for all three of those. I do want 
to, first of all, commend Amtrak for moving forward and doing a 
good job and upgrading the deficiencies and moving foward with 
the other programs that you are planning. I tend to agree with 
the GAO, too, we still have a way to go. And Mr. Mead, you 
mentioned the capital improvements problem will be with us for 
awhile.
    Mr. Warrington, you mentioned in some of your earlier 
remarks, the $33 billion the Highway Department gets for 
highway funding, $11 billion FAA, $6 billion FTA, $521 million 
for your agency, Amtrak being 29 years old, give or take. 
Something was made, a decision was made over 30 years ago to 
defund railroads in our country and build more roads, which is 
why we have that there, in addition to the heavy lobbying that 
happens here in and State legislatures where I just left. 
Highways, everyone thought, was the way to go. We are in a new 
century. There are other modes. We need to be looking at it. 
You mentioned France, both you and my ranking member, and other 
modes across the world, and we are finding that we probably 
ought to take another look at it, I think, as the chairman said 
today, which will mean a major shift in what our country's 
goals have been over the last three decades or more.
    As a member new on this committee and one who, I think, 
mass transit is the way to go, I don't think everybody has to 
drive everywhere they go, that you need all of that 
intermodally, and the big three headquartered much in my 
Michigan, I think, is coming on line. They tell me they build 
cars today, they can build trains tomorrow, buses too if they 
have to. I think we have to be creative when we talk about 
intermodal or moving services or goods or people.
    I support Amtrak. I want to see more. The Chicago-Detroit 
corridor is not in full operation. It is about a third of the 
way there, a long way to go. Won't make the 2003 mark we have 
been talking about here today.
    Several years ago, as we talked about and even today in the 
last few meetings we have had in this subcommittee in terms of 
transit dollars, it is limited. There is only a limited amount 
of money that is coming here. You mentionedthe governors 
agreeing to expand Amtrak. The governors have State gasoline taxes as 
well. Have they made that commitment? It is one thing to agree, but to 
agree without dollars, and I think Mr. Sabo was asking, yes, we all 
would like to see it, but are the dollar commitments there from their 
own source of revenue and not Federal? Did you get that kind of 
commitment?
    Mr. Warrington. I can't tell you exactly what the mix is, 
but I know that governors all across this country have 
committed real dollars. Some of them are Federal dollars and 
some of them are State dollars, and you know, to name--Governor 
Pataki, basically a 50-50 arrangement around the empire 
corridor; Governor Ridge, 50-50 arrangement on Philadelphia to 
Harrisburg; Governor Hunt, Governor Gilmore, Governor Barnes of 
Georgia, Governor Davis, all of these governors, and many 
others are literally committing real dollars, a combination of 
Federal dollars and State dollars to partner with Amtrak, and 
the difficulty here is we run the risk, unless we fix this 
capital problem, of not having the dollars to be able to match 
and partner with----

                  DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS AGAINST AMTRAK

    Ms. Kilpatrick. Which is a very real possibility with 
country's spending priorities. Will it be highways, will we 
stay there, will we look at other kinds of intermodal 
transportation opportunities at other places? I don't see the 
discussion starting, and as the chairman mentioned, if you 
could bring a comprehensive package and get the right people 
behind you, that would be a way to begin that discussion. That 
is, don't wait until 2003 for it. It needs to be done 
yesterday. I would encourage you to do that because I think you 
need to have support from this committee.
    And then finally from me, the last couple of years Amtrak 
has faced some class action law suits. One was settled for 16 
million dollars, another for eight million, with a more recent 
filing in November. All impacting your bottom line, I am sure, 
over the several years they run, and they have all been filed 
for the same reason. This current suit is for the same reason, 
very sensitive and very real as I am told. What are you doing 
to change the culture at Amtrak. If you keep paying out heavy 
awards you will not be able to get Amtrak where it ought to be 
in the 21st century. How are you handling the current case and 
what can we expect in the future?
    Mr. Warrington. I will tell you that it is a very difficult 
and sensitive subject, and it is one that has concerned me 
deeply. I have personally, and management, have significantly 
altered the way Amtrak does business. Starting with the entire 
process we use for hiring, selecting, promoting and evaluating 
employees, we have invested $2 million just this year in a 
massive and very good diversity training initiative. As a 
matter of fact, we have had already 17,000 of our employees 
trained.
    As a matter of fact, I and senior members of our management 
committee have spent several days in training. Every employee 
in the company is receiving diversity training. We have 
overhauled our processes big time and I am personally committed 
and looking forward to assuring that that history at Amtrak 
does not repeat itself, Ms. Kilpatrick.
    Ms. Kilpatrick. Okay. The November suit, which was a 
continuation of the other two, hiring management practices, are 
you looking at it? Are you on top of it? Are you making the 
changes necessary?
    Mr. Warrington. I will tell you that we have made massive 
changes inside the company around the way we do business. One 
of the things I also did was create a vice president of 
business diversity that reports directly to me and has several 
responsibilities, including being a formal enforcement arm for 
me around our settlements to make sure that I have the right 
kind of pressure and oversight around our internal practices. 
That organization is also responsible for leading the training 
of all of the management and troops in the company.
    Ms. Kilpatrick. I would like to be kept up to date as you 
get to 2003. I think it is easy to alleviate your management 
problems if you just do it. And you said you are committed to 
it and I want to hold you to it.
    Finally, Mr. Chairman, the high fuel costs on Amtrak, are 
you budgeted for it? Will we see some additional funding needs 
there? The supplemental is going through now so you missed that 
opportunity. How is it affecting Amtrak?
    Mr. Warrington. I can't tell you we will be fine because I 
can't predict where we are all going to end up here, but I will 
tell you, that over the past year we did take about 60 percent 
of our long distance train network fuel supply and hedged it 
and locked in, and it has been a really terrific move. In 
hindsight, it could have been a disaster if prices dropped, but 
we make those judgements on a regular basis. We consume a lot 
of diesel fuel on our long distance network. In fact, the train 
that derailed this morning, Mr. Chairman, had four locomotives 
on it, diesel locomotives. We consume a lot of fuel. We took 
about 60 percent of our supply last year and hedged it and 
locked in. So we have been reasonably insulated for a large 
portion of our supply from the recent market prices, and we 
tend to be on top of that. There are other pieces of the 
business where we haven't locked in, and we are paying the 
price for it today, and our responsibility is to cover that in 
some way, shape, or form.
    Ms. Kilpatrick. You never know the entire things that might 
happen during the budget year, but as you budget, I am happy to 
hear that you did fudge it a little bit--I hate to use that 
word--but increase what you might have thought. It is better to 
have more. Thank you and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Wolf. Mr. Tiahrt.
    Mr. Tiahrt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I am 
Kansas, and we are, of course, concerned about the passengers 
that were injured this morning. I have been in contact with 
Representative Ryun, Jim Ryun, who has that area, and he also 
expresses his concerns for the passengers, and we hope that you 
can come to a quick decision on what caused the accident. It is 
kind of unusual, because apparently, the four locomotives 
passed over that portion of the track, if I understand it.
    Mr. Warrington. It was sixty-mile-an-hour territory moving 
out of one curve and into another sixty-mile-an-hour curve, and 
we believe it was on a tangent track between those two curves 
in a reverse curve move, but we and the NTSB will get to the 
bottom of it as soon as possible.
    Mr. Tiahrt. We wish the best for the passengers that were 
injured. I think all of them are in Topeka hospitals in form or 
another, either the veterans hospital or the two hospitals in 
Topeka.
    Mr. Warrington. I also would like to pass along to youour 
thanks for the cooperation and the response by the local emergency 
services personnel. I have been told by the President of our intercity 
operations, who is managing this situation on a minute-to-minute basis, 
that the local fire rescue and emergency service personnel have done a 
terrific job.

                   NEW ROUTE OPPORTUNITIES ASSESSMENT

    Mr. Tiahrt. I will pass that along to local authority and 
appreciate you telling us that very much.
    In Kansas, you know, we are not worried about El Nino or La 
Nina. We don't have any tunnel problems, but from Wichita--
Kansans like to drive, incidentally. Some of them drive 90 
miles to work in Wichita, but they prefer to fly, and part of 
it is sort of the culture there because we have Boeing, the 
largest employer in the State in Wichita. We also have Beech 
and Cessna, Learjet. We are considered the air capital of the 
world. So people really prefer to fly.
    Yet every year some 400,000 people choose their second mode 
of transportation to go from Wichita to someplace else because 
of high air fares, and it is the same problem that many medium 
size cities face. Currently there is an infrastructure in place 
to get from Wichita to Dallas-Fort Worth area, and I believe 
that Amtrak runs from Oklahoma City to the Dallas-Fort Worth 
area. I would like to request that you would look at some kind 
of cost-benefit analysis between the Wichita area and Oklahoma 
City to get included on that line, because Amtrak does come to 
Newton now which is just 20 miles north of Wichita.
    The infrastructure is in place. It may be an inexpensive 
route, and those 1,600 travelers that, on an average workday, 
choose to drive, you pick up a fourth of them. Right now it 
costs more than a dollar per mile to fly from Wisconsin to 
Dallas Fort Worth area, more than a dollar a mile. That is a 
pretty significant ticket fare. If you picked up 400 of them a 
day, that would be possibly a profitable line. I don't think we 
would know unless somebody looked into it.
    And I don't know what your policy is about looking at 
future routes. I know you have a lot of problems in the 
northeast you have to deal with, but if you have it within your 
means, I would ask that you look at that and have somebody come 
out and look at the situation, because it has been requested by 
the mayor of Wichita, who is currently the chairman of the 
National League of Cities and Municipalities, and he is cutting 
a wide swath for the next year, and he would like sort of an 
answer in that area.
    Mr. Warrington. I do believe I received a letter from the 
mayor of Wichita recently, and fortunately we do have a model 
in place now as a result of our network growth planning work 
that we have done which can assess those kinds of services and 
understand what the real variable costs and revenues are 
associated with services like that from both the passenger 
demand point of view as well as mail business or express 
commercial business point of view. I will ask our people to 
assess that, using the same kind of planning techniques that we 
have used for the rest of the system.
    Mr. Tiahrt. I would only want to consider it if it made 
sense, if it financially makes sense, but I would appreciate if 
you let my office know, or let me know what you find out.
    And my wife and kids and I have ridden on Amtrak in the 
northeast corridor, and also to Newton, my family has ridden to 
Newton on the train, and it was a very enjoyable experience. 
Your personnel did an excellent job. I want to commend you and 
your people. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Warrington. Thank you, Mr. Tiahrt.
    Mr. Tiahrt. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

               OPERATING CASH LOSSES IN FISCAL YEAR 1999

    Mr. Wolf. In 1999, Amtrak's audited operating loss was $916 
million, including depreciation, which was $56 million more 
than the corporation's 1998 loss and the largest in Amtrak's 
history. Similarly, the cash loss for the corporation was $579 
million in 1999, $54 million higher than in 1998, and $19 
million worse than Amtrak projected. What were the reasons for 
the higher-than-planned operating cash losses this fiscal year 
1999?
    Mr. Warrington. I believe that was in part attributable to 
an increase in the progressive overhaul amount, which we book 
as expense and charge to capital. I believe that was the lion's 
share of that, Mr. Chairman, but I can certainly furnish you 
with those details.
    Mr. Wolf. If you would do that we would appreciate it.
    Mr. Warrington. Sure.
    [The information follows:]

    In FY1999, four items contributed $19 million (net) to a higher 
than planned operating loss.

                          [Dollars in millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   FY1999
          Operating Loss          --------------------------------------
                                      Actual        Plan       Variance
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Greater due to:
    Progressive Overhauls........         91.7         76.2       (15.5)
    Y2K..........................         10.6          0.0       (10.6)
    Great American Sation                  1.0          0.0        (1.0)
     Foundation..................
Less due to:
    Depreciation.................        328.8        336.5          7.7
      Net Impact.................        432.2        412.7       (19.4)
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    All three items that increased operating expenses were funded by 
the capital program and specifically made part of the capital budget.

                          REVENUE IMPROVEMENTS

    Mr. Wolf. In analyzing the financial results from the first 
quarter of fiscal year 2000, passenger revenues improved over 
the first quarter of 1999. How does this compare with Amtrak's 
planned performance for the first quarter?
    Mr. Warrington. Yes. As Ken indicated earlier, we have 
generally had very strong performance, not only over the first 
quarter, but over the last several years on both our northeast 
corridor operation and our West coast operation. The group of 
services that have lagged both behind plan, are a number of our 
long distance train intercity services. Collectively, when you 
put it all together, we are growing, but as Ken said there are 
pieces of the business that are not doing as well as we want 
them to do.
    The difficulty is that the trouble we trace to several 
things, all of which we are and others are dealing with. One 
is, we have had some fundamental issues around service quality 
and consistency on our long distance network, and we are 
putting a lot of time and effort into that, which willculminate 
in service guarantees being launched this July. I have gotten terrific 
reports from the field and from customers about a significant 
improvement in consistency and quality on our long distance train 
network. That is a testament to the troops, principally, who clearly 
understand their relationship between return business and revenue and 
new business and they get it, they understand it. We are providing the 
training tools to enable them to do their jobs better, and I think we 
have got a better performing railroad from a customer service point of 
view. That is going to make a big difference, and principally, on our 
long distance train network.
    Unfortunately, during that period of time we were also at 
the height of the negatives associated with the NS, CSX, 
acquisition of Conrail. All of us have gone through a very 
difficult period since last June around train service 
performance in connection with that acquisition. Our trains 
between New York and Chicago and Washington and Chicago and 
some of our trains to the south experienced massive delays for 
extended periods of time as a result of congestion flowing from 
that acquisition. Shippers, as well, have been up in arms 
around the quality of service and disruptions to service.
    I will tell you that the condition is getting much better. 
We are working very closely with both Norfolk Southern and CSX 
together, around helping them solve those problems, but I have 
to tell you that a part of our intercity problem over the past 
8 or 10 months is directly attributable to on-time performance 
issues relating to those mergers.
    [The information follows:]



                         Amtrak's Grant Request

    Mr. Wolf. There is going to be a vote about 12:30, so we 
will try to finish by then. Amtrak is requesting $989 million 
for capital needs, although the dollar figure is the same as 
that contained in the President's budget. The proposed uses are 
dramatically different. As you know, the President's budget 
request of $521 million for Amtrak capital and $468 million for 
new intercity rail which will benefit Amtrak. You seek 
obviously all of that funding. If Congress were to fund Amtrak 
as you have requested, what assurances could you provide the 
Committee that about half of your funding will be to enhance 
rail services along current and future high-speed corridors?
    Mr. Warrington. Our plan is to have $521 million consistent 
with our long-term plan.
    Mr. Wolf. But the other $468 million?
    Mr. Warrington. The $468 million would be devoted to 
partnering with States that I referenced earlier, 50-50 
packages basically, around investing in engineering design, 
trains and acquisition and launching services around high 
density corridors across the country. Exactly where this will 
happen will be a function of the extent to which States are 
ready, willing and able to step up and make those kind of 
commitments over the next 12 to 18 months.
    Mr. Wolf. Their hands are somewhat tied though, aren't 
they, States?
    Mr. Warrington. They would have an easier time of it if 
they had the kind of flexibility provisions we talked about, 
that are included in S. 1144. Many States have local gas tax 
revenues and trust funds available and can self-fund a number 
of these investments, but they need a partner and we can be the 
partner.
    Mr. Mead. Mr. Chairman, if you go that route, I think it 
would be reasonable to, first, have Amtrak satisfy the 
immediate capital funding shortfall that has already been 
identified. Some of this money ought to go to those minimum 
needs. And second, in the northeast corridor, why couldn't that 
money be pegged to a number of these life safety requirements? 
I mean, those would seem to me to be very high priorities, one, 
directing funds where we have already identified a capital 
needs shortfall, and number two, addressing the life safety 
requirements in the northeast corridor.
    Ms. Scheinberg. I think this raises a really interesting 
question about where the $468 million would be spent. Depending 
on which States come forward, the priorities are really being 
determined by the States. Deciding between States' priorities 
for expanding service versus Amtrak's priorities is really 
going to be driven, it sounds like, by what the States want to 
do. There is a real conflict here between Amtrak's life safety 
needs and states' priorities.

                      Competing Capital Priorities

    Mr. Wolf. And their priority would be service. It wouldn't 
be the life needs. It wouldn't be safety. I mean, if you get a 
State giving you a lot of money, it is going to be they want 
more service.
    Mr. Warrington. I will tell you, Mr. Chairman, that both 
New York and New Jersey, both New York and New Jersey are 
willing and able to devote resources to the life safety 
question. Amtrak could certainly use a piece of that to partner 
with New Jersey and New York around the tunnels.
    [The information follows:]



                             Capital Needs

    Mr. Wolf. Let me just ask, with regard to capital needs, in 
its 1999 assessment, DOT's Office of Inspector General 
identified capital spending that was taking place in areas 
outside of Amtrak's minimum needs, particularly corridor 
development, refurbishment of cars to be consistent with the 
new Acela design.
    Mr. Mead, how do you define minimum needs and what kind of 
projects is Amtrak spending on outside of these needs and will 
characterize these as trivial projects or important projects?
    Mr. Mead. Minimum needs are essentially what is required to 
keep the railroad operating. In other words, things that the 
railroad could not continue operating unless it paid those 
things, debt, mandatory payments such as those for the 
environment, environmental cleanup and items of that nature. 
There are no luxury items in there, though.
    The point that we were making about Amtrak's spending on 
things exceeding their minimum capital needs, pertains to like 
projects fixing up the Heritage diner cars, and making cars in 
the northeast corridor cosmetically compatible with the new 
Acela design; and expenditures in the Las Vegas corridor and a 
corridor in California. It is not that this is wasteful 
spending, Mr. Chairman. It is just that ``first things first'' 
is the point. I mean, I don't want to have sloppy or slovenly 
diner cars either, but the railroad has more compelling needs. 
Amtrak can't afford these things under its current budget.
    One example with the Heritage diner car is they want to put 
in an etched glass partition and incandescent lighting. It 
would be very nice. It is not a wasteful expenditure. I am sure 
the patrons would appreciate it, but Amtrak can't afford it.
    Mr. Warrington. The difficulty here is at the same time we 
have got to be competitive in the marketplace, and we have to 
be attractive, and the reality is that we are trying to attract 
riders to the system. When we get them, we need to retain them. 
We could forego a lot of what appears to be cosmetic 
improvements to, for example, the interiors of our cars, but 
once we acquire somebody and they make a decision to ride with 
us, we can't feel or look like nobody is home. That is the 
price you pay for being competitive in the marketplace and 
being attractive in the marketplace. We have to make those 
judgments, and they are judgments we make about what sort of 
look-and-feel and attractiveness in a competitive environment 
are we going to deliver to a customer who tries us.
    Our problem has been historically that a much larger share 
of people who try us once don't return to us because they 
didn't have a good on-board experience. It starts with visual 
merchandising and how the institution looks and feels. Do we 
feel like we are modern? Do we feel like we are attractive. We 
don't spend a fortune there, but we have got to balance on a 
regular basis, you know, how we look and feel and behave in a 
very competitive marketplace with automobiles and air shuttles.
    Mr. Wolf. But a clean Ford Taurus fulfills the need as well 
as a clean Cadillac. I think your biggest problem was your cars 
were dirty, the windows were filthy. You put your arm up on the 
window and you felt like you had been working out by the time 
you got to New York. You have made big progress in that area, 
but I think that was part of the problem you got in some of the 
cars, and they were dirty. What the customer needs is just 
good, clean, efficient service, to get there on time, with good 
coffee and sandwiches, the service was good, and friendly, the 
train was clean and safe. You never, ever, ever plan on 
instituting gambling on your trains, do you?
    Mr. Warrington. Mr. Chairman, I committed that to you last 
year and I commit it to you again this year.
    Mr. Wolf. But not just for this year. If there is somebody 
out there with Governor Thompson of Wisconsin, he seems to have 
a love affair with the gambling interest in his State, and I do 
worry a little bit that Governor Thompson has moved in his own 
State towards gambling, which he has every right to do, but I 
don't want him to bring his interest in gambling from Wisconsin 
to Amtrak. I have great respect for Governor Thompson, but I 
have watched what is going on in Wisconsin with regard to their 
relationship with Indian tribes and I would not want to see 
somebody say hey, I have got a great idea, we can bring a lot 
of revenue by putting the slots on the Metroliner or some other 
train. I don't mean that as joke. I am serious.
    Mr. Warrington. I can't speak for Governor Thompson.
    Mr. Wolf. I know you can't.
    Mr. Warrington. But I will tell you that Governor Thompson 
and I and all of us at Amtrak have never had any discussions or 
intentions or vision about that.
    Mr. Wolf. There was a discussion several years ago.
    Mr. Warrington. Was there?

                    Northeast Corridor Capital Needs

    Mr. Wolf. Yes. GAO and DOT have both stated that none of 
Amtrak's business plans set aside any money for all of 
addressing the repair and maintenance of the northeast corridor 
between Washington and New York. In 1995 GAO estimated the 
deferred maintenance at over $4 billion. Amtrak just released 
its plans to improve the southern end of the northeast 
corridor. Over 25 years Amtrak estimates it will need to spend 
$12.5 billion to get the south end into a good state of repair, 
almost three times GAO's estimate. Why is your figure so much 
more than GAO prepared less than 5 years ago?
    Mr. Warrington. What we did, Mr. Chairman, was consult a 
lot with all of the existing and potential users of the 
northeast corridor. We defined those needs in several 
categories, some of which related to our own high speed 
program, some related to life safety, to operational 
reliability, and capacity expansions and improvements 
associated with the non-Amtrak services.
    We also identified potential needs associated with freight 
services on the corridor. My point being we identified all of 
the potential and prospective needs not just by Amtrak, but by 
all of the users of the corridor, including all of the commuter 
agencies, as well as potential freight railroad-related 
requirements.
    Mr. Wolf. Are they all going to participate?
    Mr. Warrington. Our expectation is that depending upon what 
the investment is for, there would be an appropriate 
participation by the principal beneficiary.
    Mr. Wolf. How do you force them to do that, because they 
really don't have the same concerns you have with regard to 
moving freight.
    Mr. Warrington. Which is the reason why we have segmented 
the costs associated with different benefits in that plan. For 
example, the high speed improvements on that corridor simply 
relating to improving the travel time of our own Amtrak high 
speed service, as I recall, are about $800million. That would 
be a 100 percent improvement that Amtrak would bear the responsibility 
for. On the other hand, there are improvements in that plan relating to 
capacity expansions in, for example, Washington's Union Station, 
entirely driven by modeling projections by MARC or VRE about track, 
platform, lighting, electricity requirements tied to forecasted 
expansions to commuter services. Those dollars we would expect would be 
provided by MARC or VRE.
    Mr. Wolf. But they don't have a lot of money either.
    Mr. Warrington. This is a 25-year plan, and our 
responsibility is to say if this is what we want and if America 
or the northeast wants a 2 hour or 2 hour and 10 minute service 
between Washington and New York, rather than a two hour and 30 
minute service, there is about an $800 million price tag that 
goes with that. If we want to fix the fire life safety problem 
in New York, there is a $700 million price tag that goes with 
that. On the other hand, if we want to provide capacity for 
MARC or VRE or New Jersey Transit or SEPTA or any of the 
commuter agencies, there is a specific price tag associated 
with capacity reliability associated with those services. The 
next step is for all of us, as a matter of public policy, to 
agree on which of those plans we each want to move forward with 
and what the appropriate funding participation is for each of 
them. I suspect it will be based on a project-by-project, case-
by-case basis, depending upon who benefits the most.
    Mr. Mead. Mr. Chairman, I think this plan, first of all, is 
a positive step but it is something that has a lack of 
descriptive clarity as to, one, when Amtrak feels a particular 
capital need in the south end needs to be addressed, in other 
words, putting it in time frames of two-year blocks; 
establishing when each need must be addressed. And secondly, 
what specifically does Amtrak anticipate in terms of 
contribution from other Corridor users. So we need to take this 
plan to a more refined level of detail. Because right now it is 
lumped into, for example, $9 billion needed somewhere between 
fiscal year 2008 and 2025. It is good that Amtrak has taken it 
this far, but we need to make this more concrete.
    Ms. Scheinberg. Mr. Chairman, could I just add to that?
    Mr. Wolf. Sure.
    Ms. Scheinberg. I think the other issue with this plan is 
that it does not have priorities. $12 billion is a huge amount 
of money. Building on what has just been said, the priorities 
of what needs to be done first, what is most important in the 
plan and what Amtrak is going to do to fund the things that it 
has to get done has to be established. Again, if some of this 
money is going to come from the States, the States are going to 
fund projects on their priorities, not on the national 
priority.
    Mr. Wolf. Yes. Maybe you ought to have a big conference 
with Amtrak the transit operators, freight railroads and the 
states participating to identify what are the priorities and 
who will pay what. As it now stands, it becomes overwhelming as 
you look in the outyears.
    Mr. Warrington. It is a $12 billion plan, and roughly one 
half of it or $6 billion benefits local commuter agencies and/
or freight railroads in some way, shape or form. So the price 
tag associated with Amtrak over that period of time----
    Mr. Wolf. There is a bill up on the floor, and I may have 
to go over and speak. That is the problem. Excuse me.
    Mr. Warrington. The price tag associated with Amtrak over 
that period of time is half of that, or $6 billion. We do have, 
lots of detail, as Ken is requesting, around exactly where that 
money would be spent and what the benefits of it would be. It 
covers all of those needs, and it does require a balancing in 
terms of timing between those investments that relate to 
reliability, those investments that relate to improving travel 
times, which directly affect our bottom line. Every minute of 
saving we get between New York and Washington is worth $8 or $9 
million a year in revenue, but the price tag associated with 
getting each incremental minute is very expensive, and we have 
done that work.
    And then you have to balance that off against life safety 
in New York or the Baltimore tunnels, and in the absence of, 
you know, sort of knowing what the fix is financially, it is 
hard to assert exactly which you would do first. We are capable 
of doing that. We have done some of that work internally. 
Clearly, life safety would move to the top of the list if we 
had a sizeable--it is always at the top of the list. The 
difficulty is there are lots of competing needs and they are 
all important. We are struggling to balance life safety in New 
York against a deadline around operating self-sufficiency when 
you know that an incremental dollar of investment around 
reliability or travel time gets you a positive contribution to 
your bottom line immediately. We are always struggling with 
that balancing act internally.
    Mr. Wolf. Thank you.
    [The information follows:]



    Mr. Tiahrt [presiding]. Following General Alexander Hague's 
lead, I am now in command. If you will just give me a second 
here.
    Following the line of questioning that the chairman has 
here for me--I will be up to speed here shortly--we have some 
questions concerning the capital needs.
    Ms. Scheinberg, Amtrak has substantial capital needs. Could 
you tell me more about the needs in Amtrak's plans and how they 
are meeting them?
    Ms. Scheinberg. Yes, sir. As we have been discussing this 
morning, Amtrak has substantial capital needs, billionsof 
dollars in capital needs. The discussion, we have just been having is 
on the $12 billion needed to upgrade the south end of the northeast 
corridor. Clearly, there are capital needs on the north end of the 
northeast corridor that need to be added to that. In addition, Amtrak 
has, in the recent years, consumed about $300 million a year--in a 
depreciation sense--for capital equipment and that is going to increase 
to about a half a billion dollars a year in the next several years 
because of the acquisition of more equipment. On top of this, there is 
the recent plan to expand routes which requires the acquisition of 
about 2,000 pieces of equipment for mail and express.
    These are only some of the needs that have been identified 
because Amtrak doesn't have a long-range capital plan. It 
hasn't had one for 2 years. We are very concerned about this: 
about what the total needs are, what the priorities of those 
needs are, and where the funding would come from.

             NORTHEAST CORRIDOR LONG-TERM CAPITAL PLANNING

    Mr. Tiahrt. Mr. Warrington, this long-term need that she 
isreferring to, is there a plan, a development plan?
    Mr. Warrington. We have clearly done the first phase 
planning around our intercity, long distance train network. We 
are in the process of defining the capital requirements 
associated with the high density corridors, which we expect to 
wrap up this summer. We have concluded our northeast corridor 
capital requirements, and in combination, I would expect later 
this summer we will have a very specific plan relating to 
capital requirements for our existing network and high density 
corridors around the system including the northeast corridor as 
well as what shares we believe are appropriate for Amtrak and 
what shares we believe are appropriate for other parties.
    The short answer is I hope to have that kind of vision of 
who we can be and what we can be associated with what the 
capital requirements are to run that system, grow it and invest 
in it hopefully later this summer.
    Mr. Tiahrt. This summer?
    Mr. Warrington. That is what we are shooting for.
    Mr. Tiahrt. Do you do this in-house or is this something 
you employ consultants? How will you achieve this?
    Mr. Warrington. Both, depending upon the particular need, 
we use consulting engineering firms. We use outside planning 
folks and we use our own staff. It is frequently a combination.

                 MULTI-USE CORRIDOR DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

    Mr. Tiahrt. Part of this will be based on tracks that have 
the current multiple use as we have talked about, there are no 
plans to go to a dedicated use or is that in the cards for the 
northeast corridor?
    Mr. Warrington. The cost of dedicated use is prohibitive. 
One of the sensitivities around our capital planning is that 
much of our investments would be around freight carriers. The 
issue is around investing in capacity and passing sitings and 
some pieces of primarily dedicated right-of-way to be able to 
enable both freight trains and our trains to run at the same 
time in the same areas. I would envision that entirely 
dedicated, exclusive rights of way are not in the cards, 
otherwise, the capital requirement numbers will truly grow 
exponentially.
    What we have tried to do is be practical and reasonable 
about using existing rights of way and using reasonably 
conventional technology which, in the scheme of things, will be 
a relatively low price tag compared with, as I said earlier, 
the billions and billions that are invested in highway miles 
and the aviation system today.
    Mr. Tiahrt. Some of what we are seeing in the midwest, and 
it may not be the case in the northeast, probably is not, but 
we do see a lot of tracks that are currently being considered 
for abandonment or are abandoned because there is a 
consolidation of railroads and a consolidation of routes. Is 
that a possibility in the northeast? I know there is some 
consideration of merging with CN and BNSF to be the largest 
railroad in North America, I suppose. In the northeast, is some 
consolidation going on? Would that potentially free up some 
tracks, to your knowledge, that would be dedicated to Amtrak?
    Mr. Warrington. Certainly as a consequence of mergers over 
the years freight railroads have attempted to what they call 
rationalize their system down to take out maintenance costs 
associated with pieces of railroad that they have historically 
operated over. We have seen some of that and there have been--
if you go back to the early and mid 1970s when Conrail was 
formed, the final system plan, my recollection is, probably 
took somewhere between 20,000 and 30,000 miles out of the 
northeast system primarily around light density lines.
    Mr. Tiahrt. I am sorry.
    Mr. Warrington. You go back to the 1970s when Conrail was 
formed from the seven bankrupt railroads, the final system plan 
as a way to help them economically eliminate thousands of 
miles, mostly light density lines, and that has been a 
tradition associated with mergers to do that and all of the 
railroads have done that over the years. Frankly, what I think 
everyone is up against these days is with the economy booming 
and shippers seeking service, seeking competitive service, all 
of that rationalization that has gone on over 20 years or so 
has resulted in a serious capacity problem across the entire 
system. That is an issue for the freight industry and their 
ability to serve shippers, and it has a consequence on Amtrak 
as well.
    I often say that one of the biggest issues confronting us 
as an industry, freight industry and Amtrak together, is 
dealing with the modal equity question as an industry for both 
passengers as well as shippers and putting the industry on a 
level playing field to deal with these capacity issues. The 
industry can be a much stronger industry, but it has to deal 
with these capacity constraints. What we are all seeing today 
is the consequences of 20 or 25 years of rationalizing down the 
freight network.

                      AMTRAK'S NETWORK GROWTH PLAN

    Mr. Tiahrt. I am going to change gears a little bit. Mr. 
Mead, at the Senate hearing last month, you testified that 
Amtrak wants to expand but simply doesn't have the money to do 
so. Do you think this statement is still accurate, particularly 
now that Amtrak has announced its plan to expand its routes and 
increase frequency beginning in May of this year?
    Mr. Mead. Yes, I do, and I don't know if you were here 
before when I observed that both at that hearing and a 
subsequent hearing, and even this hearing to some extent, 
members have expressed an interest in more service, 
understandably, intheir geographic areas Amtrak is under a lot 
of pressure to maintain the national network and improve service, and 
some of this frankly, it just won't be able to afford under the current 
funding framework.
    Mr. Tiahrt. Ms. Scheinberg, the market-based network 
analysis identified service changes that, in many cases, 
indicate State contributions for capital and operating costs. 
In your opinion, is this fair and is it realistic to expect 
this level of contribution?
    Ms. Scheinberg. Well, I think clearly the States have to be 
a partner in any expansion, and even in continuation of routes. 
There is just not enough money for the Federal Government to 
provide everything that is needed. I think that following up on 
the discussion that we have just been having, the freight 
railroads need to be taken into this partnership. Clearly, on 
the congested routes outside the northeast corridor, Amtrak 
operates on freight routes exclusively, and Amtrak will not be 
able to expand its service without the cooperation, agreement, 
and consent of the freight railroads. Amtrak does have an 
advantage here by law, but still there is enormous congestion 
on those routes, and whether or not this is even feasible is an 
issue.
    It is also going to cost Amtrak to do it. It is not a huge 
cost, but in a marginal incremental sense it is still going to 
be an added cost to expand those routes.

                             State Support

    Mr. Tiahrt. Mr. Warrington, I think it is still a goal to 
be self-sufficient by the year 2002. Based on what Ms. 
Scheinberg said, it is going to take some State contribution. 
What mechanism do you have in place to increase the State 
contribution or lobby for State contributions to provide this 
additional help to achieve this goal of self-sufficiency by 
2002?
    Mr. Warrington. It is all a zero-sum game, and we have 
taken a little bit of criticism actually. In fact, the Amtrak 
Reform Council has had a number of hearings around the country 
and heard from a number of States about their anxiety 
associated with increasing State contributions to the operation 
of State-supported trains. The facts are we are under a mandate 
to be operationally self-sufficient, and one of the 
consequences of that is to be more practical, more realistic in 
assessing our costs and being straight about what the costs in 
direct and overhead services in connection with State supported 
trains. There has been a little bit of argument around that by 
a number of States who we have very good working relationships 
with. Yet, it is a zero-sum game and we are passing along more 
of those costs around to State-supported trains.
    Actually, I just received a note here that 5 years ago we 
received $35 million in operating support from States around 
These State-supported trains. Three years ago it grew to $70 
million and this year we will receive $100 million from States 
around State-supported trains. That is more than a tripling of 
State contributions over 5 years in support of State-supported 
trains.

                          Future Capital Needs

    Mr. Tiahrt. Thank you. You are in the process of developing 
some legislation to identify your future funding needs 
beginning 2003. Currently, what level of capital funding does 
Amtrak expect from Congress in 2003 and the following near 
term, and how will it be used?
    Mr. Warrington. I will be in a much better position to 
answer that question directly when our planning work I 
referenced earlier, is concluded. It will be a fairly sizeable 
number, but minuscule compared to the other modal investments 
in the aviation highway and transit arenas. I will be in a much 
better position later this summer to be able to share what is a 
reasonable annual amount of capital investment that can make 
this system hum. We will put it in the context of comparative 
investments internationally and domestically around competing 
modes, and I think what you will find is that it is a 
relatively small price to pay for the kind of benefits and 
market share which we will grab as a consequence of those 
investments. It will be a relatively small price to pay 
compared with the benefits one would get from adding lane miles 
to the interstate system or investing in the aviation system.
    Mr. Tiahrt. We have had a TEA-21 for highways. We have an 
AIR-21 for airports. Are we going to have an Amtrak 21 that is 
going to be $1 billion or more a year? Do you have any ballpark 
for what this is going to be?
    Mr. Warrington. Not at this moment.
    Mr. Mead. I do. I think they are looking at--you should be 
prepared for something in----
    Mr. Tiahrt. Do I need to be sitting down before you say 
this?
    Mr. Mead. I don't know what the shock test is, but you are 
probably looking at a number between $500 million and $1 
billion and $750 million just to keep things on an even keel. 
That is a crude estimate, but I don't think you should be 
surprised that the numbers fall into that ballpark.
    Mr. Tiahrt. Okay. We will be braced.
    Ms. Scheinberg. Can I just add to that? I think that is not 
enough. If $750 million is just to keep things on an even keel, 
that is not going to do the things we are talking about. We are 
talking about improvements, expansions, and acquisitions. I 
think the number is going to be over a billion dollars a year, 
and we have talked about that before.
    Mr. Tiahrt. That excludes movie tickets?
    Ms. Scheinberg. That excludes movie tickets.
    Mr. Tiahrt. I am sorry, being in Congress, we really have 
no room to speak, but I do hope that when you do get your 
figures together that it is something we can get our arms 
around. We do have a lot of priorities. There is a lot. You 
point out that we do spend a lot of money on air travel, a lot 
on our highways, and those priorities are very high, and so I 
think that is part of a plan that has to be sort of something 
you get your arms around, something that is going to be 
solvable, otherwise it is too far gone. I don't think you won't 
have much support for it.
    Mr. Warrington. I agree completely. That is what we are 
trying to do, be real, be practical, and also put it in the 
context of alternative investments and competing modes.
    Mr. Tiahrt. I want to thank you for your time. Good luck 
with your plan. We are looking forward to seeing it, and the 
meeting is adjourned.





                               I N D E X

                              ----------                              

                                 AMTRAK

                                                                   Page
Accidents and Injuries:
    Accidents...................................................298-303
    Grade Crossings..............................................   304
    Injuries/Fatalities...................................303, 304, 307
    NTSB Recommendations........................................307-312
    Safety Outreach/Education...................................305-306
    Southwest Chief.............................................. 1, 73
Acela (see also ``High Speed Rail'').............................3, 162
    Consortium...................................................    56
    Delay......................................56, 58, 59, 143, 201-203
    Electrification.............................................203-207
    Express......................................................    56
    Regional..................................3, 8, 56-57, 59, 156, 157
    Testing......................................................    58
    Trainsets..............................................201-202, 254
Amtrak Reform Council......................................110, 286-296
Amtrak West Strategic Business Unit...................121-125, 161, 253
Bonding Legislation (See ``High Speed Rail Investment Act'').
Budget Gap.......................................................   200
Business Plan..........................................85, 111-129, 132
    Cash Flow..............................................147-148, 163
    FY1999 Results...............................................  2, 6
    Maintenance.................141-142, 195-196, 261-264, 266, 267-269
    Operational Self Suf4, 8, 59, 69-71, 77, 137, 155-157, 160-161, 320
    Partnerships.................................................  2, 7
    Revenues6, 56, 58, 75, 143, 144-147, 161-162, 164-165, 221-226, 233
Capital Needs (See ``Funding--Capital/Capital Needs'').
Cash Flow (See ``Business Plan--Cash Flow'').
Commuter Operations.............................................224-225
    Ridership....................................................   237
Conrail (dual acquisition by Norfolk Southern and CSX)...........    76
Corporate Offices..........................................126-129, 252
C3-4, 8-9, 65, 67, 68, 71-72, 100, 101, 197, 210-213, 322, 323-324, 328
Credit Rating....................................................  2, 7
Customer Service (See ``Service Standards'').
Department of Transportation:
    Inspector General, Biography................................. 29-30
    Inspector General, Oral Statement............................ 11-13
    Inspector General, Previous Testimony........................     9
    Inspector General, Written Statement......................... 14-28
Depreciation.....................................111, 136, 163, 287-288
Diversity Initiatives............................................    72
Employment......................................................284-285
Equipment.......................................................254-260
    Maintenance.................................................261-264
Excess Railroad Retirement............................137, 200, 312-319
Expenses (see also ``Depreciation'').............................   286
    Administrative...............................................   297
    Onboard Services.............................................   285
    Routes.................................................231, 249-251
Fencing..........................................................    55
Flexibility (see also ``Funding--State & Local'')............66, 67, 79
Freight Railroads (see also ``Partnerships--Freigh65, 101-102, 135, 162
    Delays......................................................76, 237
    Incentive Payments...........................................   236
Fuel Price Impact................................................    73
Funding..........................................................   133
    Amtrak Grant Request.........................................79, 81
 65, 66, 71, 79, 84, 88, 100, 103, 110, 111, 132, 153, 176-195, 197-199
    Federal...............................63-64, 200-201, 235, 320, 321
    Modal Comparisons............................................64, 71
    President''s Budget Request...........................4, 9, 67, 134
    State & Local.....2, 4, 8, 64, 66, 71-72, 79, 102-103, 131, 226-230
Gambling.........................................................    85
Government Accounting Office (GAO):
    Associate Director, Biography................................    53
    Associate Director, Oral Statement........................... 37-38
    Associate Director, Written Statement........................ 39-52
Grant Request See (``Funding--Amtrak Grant Request'').
High Speed Rail (see also ``Acela'' and ``Corridors'')...........   197
    Delay......................................56, 58, 59, 143, 201-203
    Funding....................................4, 56, 58, 136, 321, 322
    Grade Crossings..............................................   210
High Speed Rail Investment Act (S. 1900 & H.R. 3700).............81, 90
Intercity Strategic Business Unit......................115-17, 253, 269
    Revenues..................................................... 77-78
Labor Relations:
    Agreements...................................................   159
    C-2.........................................................217-218
    Work Rule Changes............................................   159
Life-Safety Needs...............54-55, 79, 87, 92-94, 110, 197, 213-215
Mail & Express (see also ``Business Plan'' and ``Part2, 7, 67, 130, 157
    Equipment...................................................219-220
    Revenues..........................................144-146, 220, 224
Maintenance (See ``Business Plan--Maintenance'').
Market-Based Network Analysis (See ``Network Growth Strategy'').
Market Share....................................................246-247
Mead, Ken (See ``Department of Transportation--Inspector 
  General'').
Natural Disaster Planning........................................ 68-69
Network Growth Strategy.2-3, 7, 67, 102, 112-113, 130, 153-154, 157-158
    Implementation.....................................149-152, 247-248
    Rerouting/Discontinuance.....................................8, 145
    Route Analysis Request.......................................    74
    Mail & Express Component.....................................   145
Northeast Corridor (NEC) (see also ``Life Saf118-120, 253, 267-269, 322
    Capital Needs...............................................208-209
    Commuter Reimbursements......................................    89
    South End Plan............................63, 85-87, 90-92, 208-209
Obligation Rate.................................................200-201
On-Time Performance..............................................   237
    Freight Associated Delays....................................    76
Operating Loss.............................................75, 163, 164
Operational Self Sufficiency (See ``Business Plan--Operational 
  Self Sufficiency'').
Partnerships (see also ``Business Plan'' and ``Mayors'' Advisory 
  Council'')....................................................155-157
    Commercial............................................2, 7, 221-223
    Commuter.....................................54-55, 88-89, 147, 213
    Freight.............................................88-89, 135, 162
    Mail & Express............................................2, 7, 145
    State & Local 2, 4, 7, 8, 71-72, 79, 102-103, 131, 216-217, 226-230
Progressive Overhauls................................111, 136, 137, 138
Railroad Retirement (See ``Excess Railroad Retirement'').
Rerouting (See ``Network Growth Strategy'').
Revenues (See ``Business Plan--Revenues'').
Rhode Island Rail...............................................216-217
Ridership (see also ``Business Plan'')....................3, 6, 237-246
Route Profitability/Expenses (see also ``Expenses'').......231, 249-251
    Onboard Service Expenses.....................................   285
Safety (see also ``Life Safety Needs'') (See ``Accidents and 
  Injuries'').
Service Standards.................................2-3, 75, 112-113, 158
    Customer Service Training....................................  2, 7
    Service Guarantee......................................70, 158, 162
    ``Right and Ready'' Trains..................................84, 158
Staffing levels (see also ``Employment'')........................   253
    Administrative Costs.........................................   297
State & Local Government (see also ``Partnerships'' and 
  ``Funding'')....2, 4, 8, 9, 61, 71-72, 79, 102-103, 131, 197, 226-230
Stations:
    Renovations.................................................271-273
    Operating Costs.............................................274-283
Strategic Business Units (See ``Northeast Corridor'', ``Amtrak 
  West'' or ``Intercity'').
Taxpayer Relief Act (TRA) Funds..95-99, 136, 155, 166-176, 195-196, 198
Tunnels:
    New York--New Jersey (See ``Life Safety Needs'').
    Baltimore....................................................    63
Warrington, George D.:
    Biography....................................................    10
    Oral Statement...............................................   1-4
    Written Statement............................................   5-9
Wholesale Purchase of Electric Power.............................   140

                         AMTRAK REFORM COUNCIL

Activities Planned...............................................   361
Annual Report Minority Views.....................................   348
Annual Report Summary............................................   345
Budget Request.................................................330, 335
Council Meetings.................................................   339
Council Meetings Schedule........................................   343
Current Council Members..........................................   339
Depreciation and Progressive Overhauls Funding...................   359
Federal Railroad Administrator Letter............................   356
First Annual Report Summary......................................   345
Funding.........................................330, 333, 335, 337, 359
General Accounting Office Cooperative Work.......................   362
GTECH Corporation Letter.........................................   358
Hiring Needs.....................................................   338
Inspector General Cooperative Work...............................   362
Meetings.........................................................   339
Minority Views to Annual Report..................................   348
Part-time Staffing...............................................   338
Planned Activities...............................................   361
Preliminary Meeting Schedule.....................................   344
Schedule of Meetings.............................................   343
Staffing.........................................................   338
Technical Assistance Funding...................................333, 337
Technical Assistance Work Plans..................................   334
Technical Support and Analysis...................................   336
Temporary Staffing...............................................   338

                    FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION

Accident Rates:
    Class I......................................................   535
    Class II.....................................................   536
Accident Trends..................................................   570
Actions to Enhance Safety Partnerships...........................   474
Actions to Reduce Trespass Accidents.............................   428
Alaska Railroad FY 1996-2000 Obligations/Expenditures............   527
Allocation of FY 1999 TEA-21 Funds...............................   423
Allocation of FY 2000 TEA-21 Funding.............................   425
ALPS:
    Status of ALPS Project.......................................   500
    Another Subsidy to...........................................   388
    Definition of Positive Financial Contribution to.............   387
    Feasibility of 50 Percent State Match........................   388
    HSR Corridor Strategy........................................   386
    Impact of No Positive Financial Contribution.................   389
    Intercity Rail Passenger Program.............................   415
    Need for Under New Rail Program..............................   386
    RRIF and Eligibility of......................................   418
    Support for HSR, FRA vs......................................   414
AMTRAK'S HSR Corridor Strategy...................................   386
Another Subsidy to AMTRAK........................................   388
Attrition Rate for Field Positions...............................   460
Authorized FTES and Onboard Personnel............................   528
Basis for Proposed Rule on Locomotive Horns......................   703
Budget Request:
    FY 2001 Budget Request.......................................   365
    Increase in OC 23--Communications and Utilities..............   472
    Increased in R&D Facilities..................................   483
    Increase in Travel Budget....................................   467
    Increases in Advisory and Assistance Services................   472
    MAGLEV Administrative Funds..................................   508
    MAGLEV Funds.................................................   508
    Cost of Penn Station Project.................................   489
    Use and Benefits of Sealed Corridor Funding..................   504
    Total Travel Funding.........................................   468
    Why RABA Funds...............................................   390
Calculation of RRIF Risk Premium Rates...........................   416
Carbon Composites on Steel Railroad Bridges......................   703
CIO Position.....................................................   472
Civil Penalties:
    Number of Open Cases and Penalty Amounts.....................   613
Civil Penalty Collected in Last Three Years......................   573
Civil Penalty Trends.............................................   574
Challenge--The Changing Railroad Environment.....................   363
Class I Accident Rates...........................................   535
Class II Accident Rates..........................................   536
Commitment of FY 2001 Rhode Island...............................   488
Communities with Nighttime Whistle Bans..........................   705
Completed Rulemakings in FY 1999.................................   580
Completion Date for Locomotive Horn Rule.........................   707
Completion Date for Sealed Corridor Projects.....................   504
Completion of Rhode Island Rail Project..........................   489
Concern Regarding the Penn Station Project.......................   492
Consulting Services..............................................   614
Cost of Penn Station Project.....................................   489
Costs of Positive Train Control Systems..........................   520
Credit Risks for RRIF Program....................................   416
Definition of Positive Financial Contribution to AMTRAK..........   387
Delay in Michigan PTC Project....................................   496
Difference in New Fatigue Campaign...............................   463
Eligibility of Rhode Island Project..............................   387
Employee Accidents/Injuries......................................   553
Employee Casualty Rates..........................................   549
Employee On Duty Injuries/Casualties.............................   550
Enforcement Cases by Class of Railroad...........................   612
Enforcement Cases in Last Three Years............................   612
Fatigue Campaign:
    Difference in New Fatigue Campaign...........................   463
    New Fatigue Campaign and RSPA................................   463
Feasibility of 50 Percent State Match............................   388
Federal Share of Non-Electric Locomotive Project.................   500
Federal/State Inspection Resources...............................   537
Final and Proposed Regulations in FY 1999-2000...................   581
FRA vs. OLI Outreach Campaign....................................   465
FRA vs. AMTRAK Support for HSR...................................   414
FRA's Five Key Safety Rulemakings................................   578
FRA's Participation in Valley Trains & Trails Project............   618
FRA's Priorities.................................................   365
    Infrastructure...............................................   367
    Other........................................................   367
    Safety.......................................................   365
FRA's Programs...................................................   367
    Amtrak.......................................................   383
    Grade Crossing & Trespass Prevention.........................   376
    High-Speed Rail Initiatives..................................   377
    Nationwide Differential Global Positioning System (NDGPS)....   381
    Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC)....................   374
    Research & Development.......................................   382
    Safety Assurance and Compliance Program (SACP)...............   367
Freight Railroads and HSR Projects...............................   389
Future Funding for Operation Respond.............................   617
Future Funding of Non-Electric Locomotive........................   498
FY 1994-2000 Safety Workforce....................................   539
FY 1995-1999 Safety Trends.......................................   542
FY 1999 Safety Inspections.......................................   541
FY 1999-2000 Grade Crossing Accidents............................   454
FY 1999-2000 Grade Crossing Funding/Projects.....................   435
FY 1999-2000 Hazmat Accidents....................................   546
FY 2001 Budget Request...........................................   365
FY 2000 Funding for Illinois PTC Project.........................   494
FY 2000 IT Costs.................................................   470
FY 2000-2001 R&D Projects........................................   476
FY 2001 Operation Lifesaver Funding..............................   455
FY 2001 Operation Respond Funding................................   616
FY 2001 Request for Rhode Island Rail............................   488
Funding:
    Increase in R&D Facilities...................................   483
    Increases in Advisory and Assistance Services................   472
    MAGLEV Administrative Funds..................................   508
    Overview.....................................................   363
    Project Budget for Penn Station..............................   490
    Projected Unobligated Balances...............................   531
    Spend Out of Unobligated Balances............................   533
    Total Travel Funding.........................................   468
    Use and Benefits of Sealed Corridor Funding..................   504
    Use of FY 2001 Sealed Corridor Funds.........................   504
    Why RABA Funds...............................................   390
Grade Crossing:
    Accidents/Fatalities and Trespasser Fatalities...............   447
    Activities...................................................   456
    Closings.....................................................   444
    Fatalities by State........................................448, 450
    FY 1999-2000 Accidents.......................................   454
    FY 1999-2000 Funding/Projects................................   435
    Hazard Mitigation............................................   502
Highway-Rail Crossing............................................   442
    Intermodal Approach to Crossing Safety.......................   432
    How to Facilitate............................................   422
    States with Highest Crossing Accidents.......................   466
    Status of 25 Percent Reduction in............................   420
    Task Force Report, 1966......................................   433
    Top 16 States with Most Accidents............................   443
    Trespasser Accidents/Fatalities..............................   453
    Work of Managers.............................................   434
Hazardous Material Accidents.....................................   545
Highway-Rail Crossing............................................   442
High-Speed Rail:
    High-Speed Rail Initiatives..................................   377
    Freight Railroads and HSR Projects...........................   389
    Results of Corridor Risk Model...............................   510
    States Investment in High-Speed Rail.........................   391
    States With Completed EIS and Designs........................   409
    Status of Remaining RTL Trainsets............................   502
    Upgrades Without EIS.........................................   409
    Upgrades Without Engineering Designs.........................   410
How to Facilitate Grade Crossings................................   422
HSR vs Non-HSR Projects..........................................   387
Illinois PTC Project Funding.....................................   515
Impact of BNSF/Canadian National Merger..........................   699
Impact of Delayed RRIF Rule......................................   419
Impact of HSR Rhode Island Project...............................   486
Impact of MTA Plans on Penn Station Project......................   493
Impact of MTA Plans on Penn Station Users........................   493
Impact of Separating Trespass from Action Plan...................   430
Impact of No Positive Financial Contribution.....................   389
Impact on Safety and Technology..................................   364
Increase in Car Safety Research..................................   484
Increase in Equipment Costs......................................   473
Increase in OC 23--Communications and Utilities..................   472
Increase in R&D Facilities.......................................   483
Increase in Rail-Related Crashes.................................   473
Increase in Rhode Island Expenditures............................   487
Increase in Travel Budget........................................   467
Increase in Advisory and Assistance Services.....................   472
Innovation Techniques in Reducing Crossing Fatalities............   427
Inspections:
    FY 1999 Safety Inspections...................................   541
    Leval and Effect of Site-Specific Inspections................   461
Inspection Data..................................................   538
Inspector Resources..............................................   460
Inspectors Authorized/On Board...................................   538
Integration of ALPS and Non-Electric Locomotive..................   501
Intercity Rail Passenger Program.................................   415
Interest in RRIF Program.........................................   418
Intermodal Approach to Crossing Safety...........................   432
IT:
    FY 2000 IT Costs.............................................   470
    IT Program Cost & Schedule...................................   470
Level and Effect of Site-Specific Inspections....................   461
Link Between Illinois and Other PTC Projects.....................   516
Link Between User Fee and FRA's Services.........................   523
MAGLEV Administrative Funds......................................   508
MAGLEV Funds.....................................................   508
Mergers:
    Impact of BNSF/Canadian National Merger......................   699
    Safety Concerns--BNSF/Canadian National......................   701
Most Helpful Initiatives in Reducing Accidents.................431, 462
NDGPS:
    Nationwide Differential Global Positioning System (NDGPS)....   381
    Operating Costs of NDGPS.....................................   509
Need for AMTRAK Under New Rail Program...........................   386
NEPA Requirements................................................   410
New Fatigue Campaign and RSPA....................................   463
New Field Positions in Last Five Years...........................   457
 New Initiatives to Reduce Train Accidents.......................   458
 Next Generation High-Speed Rail.................................   499
Non-Electric Locomotive:
     Federal Share of Project....................................   500
     Future Funding of...........................................   498
     Integration of ALPS and.....................................   501
     Status of...................................................   497
     Status of Demonstration.....................................   498
 Non-FRA Support for Michigan PTC Project........................   497
 NTSB Hours of Service Recommendation............................   698
 NTSB Voice Recorder Recommendation..............................   696
 Number of Open Cases and Penalty Amounts........................   613
 Obligation Rate of Rhode Island Funds...........................   486
Operation Lifesaver:
     FRA VS OLI Outreach Campaign................................   465
     FY 2001 Operation Lifesaver Funding.........................   455
     State Participation.........................................   540
Operation Respond:
     Future Funding for Operation Respond........................   617
     FY 2001 Operation Respond Funding...........................   616
 Operating Costs of NDGPS........................................   509
 Opposition to User Fee Proposal.................................   523
 Options to Alleviate Locomotive Horn Noise......................   706
 Overview........................................................   363
Pennsylvania Station Redevelopment Project:
     Concern Regarding...........................................   492
     Cost of.....................................................   489
     Impact of MTA Plans on......................................   493
     Impact of MTA Plans on Penn Station Users...................   493
     Project Budget for..........................................   490
     Projected Completion Date of................................   491
     Use of TIFIA Loan for.......................................   490
 Phase Two for Rhode Island Rail Project.........................   489
 Political Appointees............................................   529
Positions:
     Attrition Rate for Field....................................   460
     Vs FTEs.....................................................   528
     Recruitment Time for Field..................................   460
     Safety......................................................   458
     Use of New Field Positions for Fatigue Initiative...........   458
 Positions vs. FTEs..............................................   528
Positive Train control (PTC):
     Costs of Systems............................................   520
     Delay in Michigan Project...................................   496
     Interoperability............................................   518
     FY 2000 Funding for Illinois Project........................   494
     Illinois Project Funding....................................   515
     Non-FRA Support for Michigan Project........................   497
     State Match for Illinois Project............................   515
     States Pursuing PTC/PTS Technologies........................   518
     Status of Alaska Project....................................   513
     Status of Illinois PTC Project..............................   514
     Status of Virginia-Pennsylvania PTC Project.................   516
     Steps for Cheaper and Sooner PTC Systems....................   521
     Why Combined Virginia and Illinois Projects.................   517
     Why Increase for Michigan Project...........................   495
     Types of Train Control Technologies.........................   511
 Positive Train Control Interoperability.........................   518
 Positive Train Separation.......................................   510
 Premiums from Non-Railroad Entities.............................   418
Priorities:
     Infrastructure..............................................   367
     Other.......................................................   367
     Safety......................................................   365
 Process for Allocating RRIF Funds...............................   417
 Program Evaluation Studies......................................   469
 Project Budget for Penn Station.................................   490
 Projected Completion Date of Penn Station Project...............   491
 Projected Unobligated Balances..................................   531
RABA:
     Why RABA Funds..............................................   390
R&D:
     FY 2000-2001 R&D Projects...................................   476
     Increase in Car Safety Research.............................   484
     Increase in R&D Facilities..................................   483
     Research & Development......................................   382
 Rail Fatalities.................................................   565
 Railroad Bridge Safety..........................................   702
Railroad Environment:
     Challenge--The Changing Railroad Environment................   363
Railroad Preference Under RRIF...................................   417
Recipients of Rail Capital Improvements Program..................   385
Recruitment Time for Field Positions.............................   460
Regulatory Backlog...............................................   582
Research and Development Cost Sharing............................   524
Results of Corridor Risk Model...................................   510
Results of Passenger Rail Crash Test.............................   485
Rhode Island Rail Project:
    Completion of................................................   489
    Commitments..................................................   487
    Eligibility of...............................................   387
    FY 2001 Request for..........................................   488
    Impact of HSR................................................   486
    Increase in Expenditures.....................................   487
    Obligation Rate of Funds.....................................   486
    Phase Two for................................................   489
    Unobligated Balance..........................................   487
Rhode Island Project Commitments.................................   487
Rhode Island Project Unobligated Balance.........................   487
RRIF:
    Administrative Costs.........................................   419
    And Eligibility of AMTRAK....................................   418
    Calculation of Risk Premium Rates............................   416
    Credit Risks for.............................................   416
    Impact of Delayed Rule.......................................   419
    Interest in Program..........................................   418
    Process for Allocating Funds.................................   417
    Railroad Preference Under....................................   417
    Status of Rule...............................................   415
    Use of funds to Upgrade Track................................   419
RSAC:
    Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC)....................   374
RSAC Impact on Expedited Rulemakings.............................   577
RSAC Task Completion Dates.......................................   575
Rulemakings:
    Basis for Proposed rule on Location Horns....................   703
    Completion Date for Locomotive Horn Rule.....................   707
    Completed in FY 1999.........................................   580
    Final and Proposed Regulations in FY 1999-2000...............   581
    FRA's Five Key Safety........................................   578
    Options to Alleviate Locomotive Horn Noise...................   706
    Regulatory Backlog...........................................   582
    RSAC Impact on Expedited.....................................   577
    Status of Last Year's Priority...............................   580
SACP:
    Safety Assurance and Compliance Program (SACP)...............   367
SACP Participants and RESULTS....................................   475
Safety Concerns--BNSF/Canadian National..........................   701
Safety Trends:
    Employee Accidents/Injuries..................................   553
    Employee Casualty Rates......................................   549
    Employee On Duty Injuries/Casualties.........................   550
    FY 1999-2000 Grade Crossing Accidents........................   454
    FY 1999-2000 Hazmat Accidents................................   546
    Increase in Rail-Related Crashes.............................   473
    Most Helpful Initiatives in Reducing Accidents.............431, 462
    New initiatives to Reduce Train Accidents....................   458
    Rail Fatalities..............................................   565
    Top 16 States with Most Grade Crossing Accidents.............   443
    Train Accidents............................................560, 569
Safety Positions.................................................   458
 Sealed Corridor:
    Completion Date for Projects.................................   504
    Use and Benefits of Funding..................................   504
    Use of FY 2001 Funds.........................................   504
    Use of Technologies..........................................   505
Spend Out of Unobligated Balances................................   533
Staffing:
    Attrition Rate for Field Positions...........................   460
    Authorized FTES and Onboard Personnel........................   528
    Federal/State Inspection Resources...........................   537
    FY 1994-2000 Safety Workforce................................   539
    Inspector Resources..........................................   460
    Inspectors Authorized/On Board...............................   538
    New Field Positions in Last Five Years.......................   457
    Positions vs. FTE's..........................................   528
    Recruitment time for Field Positions.........................   460
    Safety Positions.............................................   458
    Use of New Field Positions for Fatigue Initiative............   458
State Match for Illinois PTC Project.............................   515
State Participation..............................................   540
State Participation in Operation Lifesaver.......................   455
States Investment in High-Speed Rail.............................   391
    California (California Corridor).............................   394
    Illinois (Chicago Hub Network: Chicago-St. Louis Spoke)......   397
    Indiana and Ohio (Chicago Hub Network: Chicago-Indianapolis-
      Cincinnati Spoke)..........................................   402
    Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Texas (Gulf Coast Corridor).   402
    Michigan (Chicago Hub Network: Chicago-Detroit Spoke)........   399
    Midwest Regional Rail Initiative.............................   396
    New York (Empire Corridor: New York City-Albany-Buffalo/
      Niagara)...................................................   406
    North Carolina...............................................   404
    Pennsylvania (Keystone Corridor, Harrisburg-Philadelphia-(New 
      York City))................................................   408
    Southeast Corridor (Washington, DC-Richmond, VA-Raleigh, 
      Greensboro, and Charlotte, NC).............................   403
    Virginia.....................................................   405
    Washington State (Pacific Northwest Corridor)................   393
    Wisconsin and Minnesota (Chicago Hub Network: Chicago-
      Milwaukee-Twin Cities Spoke)...............................   400
States Pursuing PTC/PTS Technologies.............................   518
States With Completed EIS and Designs............................   409
States with Highest Crossing Accidents...........................   466
Status of 25 Percent Reductions in Grade Crossings...............   420
Status of Alaska PTC Project.....................................   513
Status of ALPS Project...........................................   500
Status of Illinois PTC Project...................................   514
Status of Last Year's Priority Rulemakings.......................   580
Status of Non-Electric Locomotive................................   497
Status of Non-Electric Locomotive Demonstration..................   498
Status of NTSB Recommendations...................................   618
Status of Operation Respond......................................   615
Status of Remaining RTL Trainsets................................   502
Status of RRIF Rule..............................................   415
Status of RTL....................................................   501
Status of the TEA 21 MAGLEV Program..............................   505
Status of Valley Trains and Trails...............................   617
Status of Virginia-Pennsylvania PTC Project......................   516
Steps for Cheaper and Sooner PTC Systems.........................   521
TASC Costs.......................................................   571
Time Line and Costs for HSR Projects.............................   411
Top 16 States with Most Grade Crossing Accidents.................   443
Total Costs to Complete NDGPS....................................   509
Total Travel Funding.............................................   468
TIFIA:
    Use of TIFIA Loan for Penn Station Project...................   490
Train Accidents................................................560, 569
Trespass Prevention:
    Impact of Separating Trespass from Action Plan...............   430
Types of Train Control Technologies..............................   511
Upgrades Without EIS.............................................   409
Upgrades Without Engineering Designs.............................   410
Use and Benefits of Sealed Corridor Funding......................   504
Use of FY 2001 Sealed Corridor Funds.............................   504
Use of MAGLEV Funds for Administrative Costs.....................   507
Use of New Field Positions for Fatigue Initiative................   458
Use of RRIF Funds to Upgrade Track...............................   419
Use of Sealed Corridor Technologies..............................   505
Use of TIFIA Loan for Penn Station Project.......................   490
Use of TRA Funds by Alaska Railroad..............................   527
User Fee:
    Link Between User Fee and FRA's Services.....................   523
    Opposition to Proposal.......................................   523
    Double Tax...................................................   526
    Why User Fees................................................   522
Valley Trains and Trails Project:
    FRA's Participation in.......................................   618
Whistle Bans:
    Communities with Nighttime Whistle Bans......................   705
Why Combined Virginia and Illinois PTC Projects..................   517
Why Expanded Initiative Rail Program.............................   385
Why Increase for Michigan PTC Project............................   495
Why RABA Funds...................................................   390
Why User Fees....................................................   522
Workload of RSAC.................................................   578
Work of Grade Crossing Managers..................................   434

          RESEARCH AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS ADMINISTRATION (RSPA)

Accident Trends..................................................   720
Advanced Vehicle Technologies Program............................   851
Aircraft Cargo Compartments Study................................   919
Budget and Administrative Issues:
    Budgeting for New OET Positions..............................   993
    Business Modernization.......................................   965
    Funding Transfers............................................   960
    Morgan Program...............................................   949
    Program Support FTE..........................................   950
    RSPA's Planned Contracts with Volpe..........................   988
    RSPA Staffing................................................   953
    RSPA Training Costs..........................................   952
    RSPA Travel Per FTE..........................................   950
    Unobligated Balances.........................................   951
Budgeting for New OET Positions..................................   993
Business Modernization...........................................   965
Continuity of Operations-Funding.................................   996
Crisis Management Center Activations.............................   998
Crisis Management Center Maintenance Cost........................   997
Emergency Preparedness Grants Administrative Costs...............   912
Emergency Preparedness Grants Awarded............................   905
Emergency Preparedness Grants:
    Emergency Preparedness Grants Admin. Costs...................   912
    Emergency Preparedness Grants Awarded........................   905
    Emergency Preparedness Grants Registration Fee...............   889
    Registration and Grant Fee Receipts..........................   944
Emergency Preparedness Grants Registration Fee...................   889
Emergency Transportation:
    Budgeting for New OET Positions..............................   993
    Continuity of Operations-Funding.............................   996
    Crisis Management Center Activations.........................   998
    Crisis Management Center Maintenance Cost....................   997
    Emergency Transportation Budget..............................   999
    RETCO Program Funding........................................   994
Five New Positions Needed........................................   991
FTE:
    Program Support FTE..........................................   950
    RSPA Travel Per FTE..........................................   950
Funding:
    Continuity of Operations-Funding.............................   996
    Funding Transfers............................................   960
    Pipeline Safety Authorized Funding Levels....................   719
    R&D Funding Levels...........................................   847
    RETCO Program Funding........................................   994
    Transportation Safety Institute Funding......................  1000
Funding Transfers................................................   960
Hazardous Materials Incidents....................................   946
Hazardous Materials Safety:
    Aircraft Cargo Compartments Study............................   919
    Hazmat Incidents.............................................   933
    Hazmat Inspections...........................................   944
    Hazardous Materials Safety User Fees.........................   913
    Hazardous Materials Safety Staffing..........................   918
    Hazardous Materials Incidents................................   946
    Hazmat Productivity..........................................   947
    Hazmat Rulemakings...........................................   935
    Hazmat Training..............................................   945
Hazardous Materials Safety Staffing..............................   918
Hazardous Materials Safety User Fees.............................   913
Hazmat Incidents.................................................   933
Hazmat Inspections...............................................   944
Hazmat Rulemakings...............................................   935
Hazmat Productivity..............................................   947
Hazmat Training..................................................   945
Human-Centered Systems Research..................................   885
Morgan Program...................................................   949
Non-Destructive Evaluation.......................................   744
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB):
    NTSB Recommendations-Hazmat..................................   921
    NTSB Recommendations.........................................   829
NTSB Recommendations-Hazmat......................................   921
NTSB Recommendations.............................................   829
Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund...................................   777
One Call.........................................................   747
Pipeline Accidents...............................................   729
Pipeline Safety:
    Accident Trends..............................................   720
    Non-Destructive Evaluation...................................   744
    Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund...............................   777
    One Call.....................................................   747
    Pipeline Accidents...........................................   729
    Pipeline Inspections.......................................768, 820
    Pipeline Safety Authorized Funding Levels....................   719
    Pipeline Safety Grant Funding................................   762
    Pipeline Safety Reserve Fund.................................   746
    Pipeline Safety Rulemakings..................................   838
    Pipeline User Fees...........................................   774
    Risk Management..............................................   731
Pipeline Inspections...........................................768, 820
Pipeline Safety Authorized Funding Levels........................   719
Pipeline Safety Grant Funding....................................   762
Pipeline Safety Reserve Fund.....................................   746
Pipeline Safety Rulemakings......................................   838
Pipeline User Fees...............................................   774
Positions:
    Budgeting for New OET Positions..............................   993
    Five New Positions Needed....................................   991
    RSPA Staffing................................................   953
Program Support FTE..............................................   950
Research and Technology:
    Advanced Vehicle Technologies Program........................   851
    Human-Centered Systems Research..............................   885
    RSPA's Research Priorities...................................   849
    University Marine Transportation Research....................   883
R&D:
    Human-Centered Systems Research..............................   885
    R&D Funding Levels...........................................   847
    Transportation Infrastructure Assurance R&D..................   881
R&D Funding Levels...............................................   847
Registration and Grant Fee Receipts..............................   944
RETCO Program Funding............................................   994
Risk Management..................................................   731
RSPA's Planned Contracts with Volpe..............................   988
RSPA's Research Priorities.......................................   849
RSPA Staffing....................................................   953
RSPA Training Costs..............................................   952
RSPA Travel Per FTE..............................................   950
Transportation Infrastructure Assurance R&D......................   881
Transportation Safety Institute (TSI):
    Transportation Infrastructure Assurance R&D..................   881
    Transportation Safety Institute Funding......................  1000
    TSI Work for DOT.............................................  1005
Transportation Safety Institute Funding..........................  1000
TSI Work for DOT.................................................  1005
University Marine Transportation Research........................   883
Unobligated Balances.............................................   951
Volpe Backlogged Projects........................................   988
Volpe Center:
    RSPA's Planned Contracts with Volpe..........................   988
    Volpe Backlogged Projects....................................   988
    Volpe's Largest Jobs.........................................   967
    Volpe's New Obligational Authority...........................   978
    Volpe Staffing...............................................   989
    Volpe's Unobligated Balance..................................   987
    Volpe Work for DOT...........................................   966
    Volpe Workload by Sponsor....................................   990
    Volpe Work Outside of DOT....................................   980
Volpe's Largest Jobs.............................................   967
Volpe's New Obligational Authority...............................   978
Volpe Staffing...................................................   989
Volpe's Unobligated Balance......................................   987
Volpe Work for DOT...............................................   966
Volpe Workload by Sponsor........................................   990
Volpe Work Outside of DOT........................................   980

                      SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD

Abandonments.................................................1079, 1081
Accomplishments..................................................  1011
Acquisition Proposals............................................  1078
Availability of Data to the Public...............................  1102
Background.......................................................  1009
Board Members and Terms..........................................  1049
Board Reauthorization........................................1057, 1077
Board's Top Priorities...........................................  1099
Budget Request:
    Comparison of Budget Requests................................  1020
Burlington Northern Santa Fe/Canadian National Merger:
    Effects on Shipper Service...................................  1054
    Merger Filing................................................  1052
Carryover Language...............................................  1027
Caseload.........................................................  1085
Case Processing Timeframe........................................  1086
Comparison of Board's and President's Budget Requests............  1020
Comparison of Recent User Fee Schedule Updates...................  1029
Cost Accounting System...........................................  1037
Earnings:
    Class I Railroads............................................  1093
Effects of BNSF/CN Merger on Shipper Service.....................  1054
Effects of Merger Filing on Capital Investment...................  1053
Effects of Merger Filing on Staffing.............................  1055
Fee Waivers:
    Activity.....................................................  1040
    Requests.....................................................  1039
Funding:
    Feasibility of Funding by User Fees..........................  1022
    FY 2000 User Fee Collections.................................  1028
    Implementing Action for Full Fee Funding.....................  1024
    Travel.......................................................  1104
    User Fee Funding Alternatives................................  1023
    User Fee Policy..............................................  1025
Goals............................................................  1010
Geographic Rail Service Problems.................................  1056
Managerial and Supervisory Positions.............................  1046
Mergers:
    Burlington Northern Santa Fe/Canadian National Filing........  1052
    Class I......................................................  1051
    Effects of Filing on Capital Investment......................  1053
    Effects on Shipper Service...................................  1054
Objectives.......................................................  1010
President's Budget Request.......................................  1020
Public Access:
    Decisions and Pleadings......................................  1102
Railroad:
    Acquisition Proposals........................................  1078
    Abandonments.................................................  1079
    Abandonments Trends..........................................  1081
    Class I Mergers..............................................  1051
    Earnings, Class I............................................  1093
    Geographic Service Problems..................................  1056
    Rate Complaints..............................................  1082
    Rate Regulation Cases........................................  1088
    Return on Investment.........................................  1092
    Revenue Adequate.............................................  1091
    State of Industry............................................  1056
    State of Industry Hearings...................................  1055
    Workload.....................................................  1084
Railroad-Shipper Transportation Advisory Council:
    Members......................................................  1100
    Policy Recommendations.......................................  1101
Rates:
    Complaints...................................................  1082
    Regulation Cases.............................................  1088
    Workload and Staffing........................................  1084
Reauthorization of Board.....................................1057, 1077
Replacement Employees for Retirees...............................  1044
Retention of Knowledge Base Due to Retirements...................  1046
Return on Investment Rates.......................................  1092
Retirement Eligibility...........................................  1041
Revenue Adequate Railroads.......................................  1091
Rulemakings:
    Estimated Completion Dates...................................  1096
Salaries and Expenses............................................  1017
Staffing:
    Additional Staffing..........................................  1043
    Compliant Staffing...........................................  1084
    Current Level................................................  1041
    Effects of Merger Filing on Staffing.........................  1055
    By Function..................................................  1049
    Managerial and Supervisory Positions.........................  1046
    Replacement Employees for Retirees...........................  1044
    Retention of Knowledge Base Due to Retirements...............  1046
    Retirement Eligibility.......................................  1041
State of Rail Industry...........................................  1056
    Hearings.....................................................  1055
Statement of Chairman Morgan:
    Accomplishments..............................................  1011
    Background...................................................  1009
    Budget Request...............................................  1009
    Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001...................................  1013
    Goals........................................................  1010
    Salaries and Expenses........................................  1017
    Summary......................................................  1016
    Workload.....................................................  1019
Top User Fee Generators..........................................  1026
Travel...........................................................  1104
User Fees:
    2000 Collections.............................................  1025
    Average Collections per Month................................  1028
    Carryover Language...........................................  1027
    Collection Schedule......................................1026, 1038
    Comparison of Recent User Fee Schedule Updates...............  1029
    Cost Accounting System.......................................  1037
    Feasibility of Funding.......................................  1022
    Fee Waivers Activity.........................................  1040
    Fee Waivers Requests.........................................  1039
    Funding Alternatives.........................................  1023
    Implementing Action of Full Fee Funding......................  1024
    Policy.......................................................  1025
    Top User Fee Generators......................................  1026
    Updating Schedule............................................  1038
Working Within DOT...............................................  1102
Workload:
    Caseload.....................................................  1085
    FY 2000 and FY 2001..........................................  1013
    Pending Cases................................................  1085
    Priorities...................................................  1099
    Summary......................................................  1016

                                
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