[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
U.S. POLICY TOWARD HAITI
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1999
__________
Serial No. 106-86
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international
relations
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
63-500 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
DANA ROHRABACHER, California SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PETER T. KING, New York PAT DANNER, Missouri
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South BRAD SHERMAN, California
Carolina ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MATT SALMON, Arizona STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
AMO HOUGHTON, New York JIM DAVIS, Florida
TOM CAMPBELL, California EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
KEVIN BRADY, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BARBARA LEE, California
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff
Caleb McCarry, Professional Staff Member and Counsel
Jill N. Quinn, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
----------
WITNESSES
Page
The Honorable Mike DeWine, a United States Senator from the State
of Ohio........................................................ 3
The Honorable Bob Graham, a United States Senator from the State
of Florida..................................................... 6
The Honorable Porter Goss, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida............................................... 10
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress
from the State of Michigan..................................... 13
The Honorable Peter Romero, Acting Assistant Secretary for
Western Hemisphere Affairs, Department of State................ 27
APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress
from New York and Chairman, International Relations Committee.. 38
Senator Mike DeWine.............................................. 40
Senator Bob Graham............................................... 44
Representative Porter Goss,...................................... 48
Representative John Conyers, Jr.,................................ 55
Representative Charles B. Rangel (submitted in lieu of
appearance).................................................... 59
Ambassador Peter Romero, Acting Assistant Secretary for Western
Hemisphere Affairs, Department of State........................ 64
Additional material submitted for the record:
Haiti Trip Report of September 10, 1999, submitted by Rep.
Conyers, Jr.................................................... 72
U.S. POLICY TOWARD HAITI
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Tuesday, November 9, 1999
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m. in room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Chairman Gilman. The Committee will come to order. This
morning we will review the U.S. policy toward Haiti. We called
this hearing to examine what is happening in Haiti today and
shed some light on where we need to go from here to advance
pluralism and foster economic growth in Haiti. Of keen concern
are the prospects for free and fair parliamentary and local
elections that are anticipated to be held on March 19th and
concerns over efforts to undermine and to politicize the
Haitian National Police.
In January, I traveled to Haiti with several of my
colleagues. President Rene Preval had just dissolved
parliament, deepening Haiti's protracted political crisis. We
all agreed that the best way out of that crisis was a sound and
fair election. Several positive developments led us to believe
that a good election would be possible. President Preval issued
a public statement that ``very quick elections under good
conditions are the only solution to the existing political
crisis.''
State Secretary for Public Security Robert Manuel began
negotiations at Preval's behest with the opposition parties. On
March 17th, President Preval created a politically balanced
provisional electoral council. With supporting leverage from
the Dole Amendment restrictions, a transparent settlement of
the disputed 1997 elections was also achieved. Most
importantly, we began to see leaders from Haiti's civil
society, ranging from grass roots to religious to business
organizations, working together across ideological and class
lines.
Our hopes began to fade, however, when a May 28th rally
organized by a broad spectrum of civil society groups was
attacked and broken up by Lavalas Family party protesters. The
Haitian National Police failed to protect the citizens who
gathered that day to exercise their rights to freedom of
assembly and speech.
This year has seen a distressing escalation of common crime
and violent acts. On November 2nd, Amnesty International stated
that ``A series of violent events in Haiti have led to fears
that the climate of respect for human rights which the country
has been endeavoring to promote in recent years is
progressively deteriorating.''
There is a long tradition of undemocratic rule in Haiti.
Recent events led us to fear that Haiti is experiencing a
return to past practices. It will only serve to create violence
and misery in that impoverished nation. The departure of Robert
Manuel raises real concerns about the future independence and
professionalism of the Haitian National Police. The October 8th
murder of Colonel Jean Lamy followed by the October 14th armed
attack on a director of the HNP's Judicial Police, the unit
responsible for investigating Lamy's killing, are very bad
signs.
Our Ambassador to Haiti, Timothy Carney, underscored the
real issue recently, stating: ``What is currently important is
that no one political party, no faction or group gain control
of your police. I emphasize that the politization of the police
is unacceptable.''
We must not abandon our efforts to help the Haitian people.
We should continue to work to alleviate the underlying
conditions that plague Haiti. But Haitian leaders must meet
their responsibilities as well. In order for there to be good
elections which the United States can support in good
conscience, there must be freedom of speech and assembly, and
an apolitical police force to protect those essential rights.
Moreover, the Provisional Electoral Council, which has been
trying to organize the elections, civil society, and political
parties should not be the object of crude, antidemocratic
attacks.
On October 24th, protesters violently broke up an official
function of Haiti's Provisional Electoral Council, the CEP. We
were appalled that the Haitian National Police again failed to
fulfill their responsibility, in this case to protect the CEP.
When former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's government was
overthrown, our Nation, with our support, spared no effort to
restore elected, civil government to Haiti. This unacceptable
outrage was committed in Mr. Aristide's name. That is
disappointing to us all.
I would like to say a word about our Ambassador to Haiti,
Timothy Carney. It is regrettable that the State Department
declined to allow him to be available for this hearing.
Ambassador Carney has earned our respect for his forthrightness
and his professionalism. Among other accomplishments, we credit
him with leading the effort to put good elections on track last
Spring. We would have welcomed his views on how to keep them on
track today.
We thank Senator DeWine of Ohio, Senator Bob Graham of
Florida, Representative Porter Goss of Florida, Representative
Charles Rangel of New York, and Representative John Conyers of
Michigan for accepting our invitation to testify before this
Committee. While we may disagree on some of the issues, each of
these elected representatives has demonstrated a consistent
interest in the welfare of our hemisphere's poorest country.
I would like to ask our Ranking Minority Member, Mr.
Gejdenson, if he has any opening remarks, and then we will
withhold opening remarks in order to enable our Senators to get
back for a roll call that they have waiting for them.
Mr. Gejdenson. I will hold my opening remarks until after
the Senators and our other House Members have given their
testimony.
Chairman Gilman. At this point, I would like to note that
Senator Graham made a special effort to be with us today,
because it is his birthday. Congratulations, Senator Graham.
You look younger than ever. We welcome having you with us. I'm
also pleased to welcome Senator DeWine, from Ohio, and a former
Member of this Committee. Welcome Senator DeWine.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. MIKE DeWINE, A UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF OHIO
Senator DeWine. Thank you very much. It is great to be back
with the Committee on which I served for 6 years when I was in
the House. I want to thank you for convening this hearing
today. The country of Haiti and its people are really at a
crossroads. I thank you for holding this hearing because
although Haiti is not of strategically great importance to the
United States, probably never will be, it is close to us. It is
in our back yard. What happens in Haiti is very, very important
to us as a country, and we need to be interested in Haiti.
I am no expert on Haiti, but I follow the events affecting
this country closely, and have traveled there seven times in
the last 5 years. I believe that there is some good news that
comes out of Haiti. I would like to talk first about the good
news, and then the bad news.
First the good news. Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, the best news
that comes out of Haiti comes from the thousands of individuals
from the private, non-governmental organizations--members of
churches, church congregations, religious people--who are in
Haiti every day trying to make a difference. These are
Haitians, these are U.S. citizens and others. They have helped
the poor; they have helped the orphaned, the starving, the
elderly and the sick. Each time I have visited Haiti, I have
been inspired by their heroic deeds.
Second, the U.S. Government has played a major humanitarian
role in Haiti, and we continue to do so; and we must continue
that. We have been able to continue to feed thousands of orphan
children through Public Law 480. Also, our AID mission in Haiti
is developing a local association to serve as advocates for
Haitian children and to create a network for orphanages to
share ideas and resources, and this must continue.
Third, Mr. Chairman, we have made tremendous progress in
training the Haitian police. We literally started with nothing.
Although the Haitian police have had problems, and will
continue to have problems, these problems were not unexpected.
We have done something that has probably not been done on this
magnitude or scale in the history of the world which,
basically, we took 18-, 19-, 20-year-old kids and turned them
into a police force.
Fourth, Mr. Chairman, I have been encouraged by the success
of some USAID programs to promote growth in Haiti's
agricultural sector. We haven't done this enough, frankly. We
need to do more of it. But what we have done, we have seen some
progress. We have worked directly with farmers to improve
techniques in the fields, where they learn--from our example--
how to improve their farming practices to yield more productive
crops. We have also, just as importantly Mr. Chairman, worked
to help form marketing cooperatives in Haiti to enable farmers
to get their products to the marketplace without having to go
through the traditional Haitian choke-hold that is controlled
by just a few families.
Fifth, Mr. Chairman, Haiti has taken some small steps
toward business privatization--not as much as we would like to
have seen--but we have seen some in the area of flour and
cement and enterprises, and also in the area of cellular
phones.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, we have really not seen the kind of
massive exodus of Haitian refugees that we have witnessed
earlier, and that is good news as well.
But let me now turn to the bad news. The Haitian economy
remains stagnant. Because a significant proportion of economic
activity is really from the underground markets, it is very
difficult to determine exactly where the economy is in Haiti
and to see exactly how far it has fallen. Haiti remains the
poorest nation in our hemisphere. We use the figure of $250 per
capita per year, but no one really knows the real figure. What
growth there is, Mr. Chairman, I believe, from my trips to
Haiti, comes from two sources: one is the underground economy,
and the other is from foreign remittances, which are very
significant in Haiti's economy.
Mr. Chairman, the political situation is even worse. The
phrase ``Haitian government'' is tragically today an oxymoron.
The government has virtually ceased to function. The current
political crisis is rooted in the April 1997 parliamentary and
municipal elections. Since January 1999, President Preval has
been ruling by decree. Elections have been postponed three
times, and now are scheduled for March of the year 2000. With
former-President Aristide running for president, and he and his
followers in the Lavalas Family Party campaigning to hold one
comprehensive presidential and legislative election in November
or December, 2000, it is unlikely, I believe, that March
elections will occur. Political intimidation is definitely on
the rise.
Mr. Chairman, absent a stable and democratic government in
place, Haiti has no hope of achieving real and lasting
economic, political, and judicial reforms. Haiti is finding
itself stuck in a vicious cycle of despair. It is a cycle in
which political stalemate thwarts government and judicial
reforms, which in turn discourages investment and
privatization. Caught in a cycle like this, the economy stands
to shrink further and further unless changes are made.
Mr. Chairman, earlier I noted the limited progress of the
Haitian National Police. However, very real threat does exist
that the police force will become politicized as a result of
the October 7, 1999, forced resignation of Secretary of State
for Public Security Bob Manuel. Since then, supporters of
former-President Aristide have harassed the Police Director,
General Pierre Denize, calling for his dismissal. That has
contributed to the erosion of public confidence in the police
force, which adds to the country's instability. The Haitian
people's confidence in their country's judicial system is also
fueled by their belief that the legal system is corrupt and for
sale to the highest bidder.
It is no surprise that with a law enforcement far from
effective, Haiti has become a popular transit stop for drug
traffickers. This will continue, Mr. Chairman, and frankly what
we have to do is to work outside the borders of Haiti on the
high seas to make a difference there, at the same time that we
work with the Haitian National Police.
Why do we care about Haiti, Mr. Chairman? We care because
this tiny country lies roughly 550 miles from the U.S. coast of
Florida. It is part of our hemisphere, and what happens in this
hemisphere affects us; and we should care about it. We cannot
ignore Haiti. Let's not forget that we already have a lot of
money invested in Haiti. The price we pay for failing to pay
attention will take several forms. One may be another massive
refugee crisis, and certainly we will see drug trafficking
continuing through Haiti. That is why we must care about Haiti.
Mr. Chairman, the planned withdrawal of the U.S. military
forces from Haiti should not represent an end to our
involvement in Haiti. Our Nation can still play a constructive
role, in partnership with the Haitian people, to ensure that
the many troubles inflicting this small island do not pass a
point where they can not be reversed.
Mr. Chairman, first we must continue efforts aimed at
democracy-building in Haiti. This means we must promote free
markets and the rule of law. That also means that we must
provide Haiti with electoral assistance so that free and fair
elections can take place. However, Mr. Chairman, the United
States must not support any election, either politically or
financially, if certain criteria are not met.
We must insist that the parliamentary elections are held
separately from the presidential elections this year. We must
pressure the Haitian government to allow the international
community and a delegation of world leaders to take a lead role
in the upcoming election. We must urge the Haitian government
to reform the electoral and political party laws to level the
playing field. We must insist that they have voter registration
lists, voter cards, access to state media, and access to state
financial resources. We must also ensure that the police do not
become politicized in favor of certain factions or parties at
the expense of others. Finally, we must provide funding to
continue with the political party-building process in Haiti.
Mr. Chairman, we must make it clear that our financial
assistance for these elections is truly contingent on the
above.
Second, until a functioning government is in place, any
assistance we provide needs really to go through the private
sector. This is the only way that we can ensure that aid gets
directly to the people. Third, we must fight drug trafficking
through Haiti with a continued offshore U.S. presence as well
as working with the Haitian police. Fourth, the United States
should expand agricultural assistance through nongovernment
organizations.
We have seen some success with these USAID programs, and I
have personally visited a number of them myself, Mr. Chairman.
Efforts aimed at teaching the Haitian farmers about land
preservation, natural resource depletion, and efforts to work
directly with the farmers have the most hope of preventing
Haitians from abandoning agriculture for urban areas like Port-
au-Prince.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, a U.S. role in Haiti must ensure
that humanitarian and food assistance continues to reach people
and especially the children. We have, I believe, a moral
obligation to not let the orphan children and other needy
children in Haiti, the elderly, and others starve.
To conclude, Haiti cannot progress until its political
leaders and the elite class take responsibility for their
situation and commit to turning things around. I truly believe,
Mr. Chairman, that we will not see Haiti turn around until two
things happen: First, the political leadership of the country
decides that it is in their interest to make things happen; and
second--and maybe this is even more important--the political
elite in Haiti, the 1 or 2 percent, the educated people, the
people who have truly, historically been the elite, they must
decide that it is in their best interest that Haiti change.
They must decide that it is no longer in their interest to see
chaos, to see uncertainty, to see the status quo.
I truly believe that there are many people in Haiti in the
elite who believe that that is the only ocean they can swim in,
and that they will be better off if there is chaos,
uncertainty, and no change. Until this elite in Haiti changes
its perception and truly understands that Haiti needs to
change, it will be very difficult for change to really take
place in Haiti.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your indulgence with my time. I
appreciate you giving us the opportunity to be here. Thank you
for holding this hearing on Haiti.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Senator DeWine, for your
extensive and very thorough remarks.
[The prepared statement of Senator DeWine appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. We now turn to Senator Graham.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. BOB GRAHAM, A UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman
Gejdenson, and Members of the Committee. Before I start, Mr.
Chairman, I would like to take the privilege of commenting on
the magnificent portrait of our friend, Congressman Dante
Fascell. It was 40 years ago this year that I was an intern for
Congressman Fascell. Most of the values and concepts of what it
means to be a legislator I gained from that great man, and his
wisdom still pervades this Committee and this Congress; and it
is so reassuring to see his presence with us today.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Senator Graham. We certainly
miss our former Chairman, and he made a great contribution to
our Nation and to this Committee. Please proceed.
Senator Graham. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to join my
colleagues in appearing before you today to testify on the
current political situation in Haiti. I appreciate the long
efforts that you and the Members of this Committee have focused
on the situation in Haiti and your efforts to bring democracy
and prosperity to that country.
Mr. Chairman, I am very troubled by recent events in Haiti,
particularly the disruption of the meeting of the Provisional
Electoral Council, the CEP, on October 24th of this year. On
that date, factions associated with the Fanmi Lavalas broke up
a meeting by throwing urine on members of the Provisional
Electoral Council. No democracy can function with this type of
direct assault on its fundamental institutions.
In light of these events, some suggest that the situation
in Haiti is without hope, beyond our ability to influence. I am
here to say that turning our backs on Haiti is not an option.
We have learned this lesson repeatedly during this century. We
will always be drawn back to Haiti by a combination of
historical ties, humanitarian instincts, and our own national
interest. Although it is difficult to remain engaged, as the
country that has the greatest influence on Haiti the United
States must use that influence in a positive way.
I remember, as do you, the scenes of Haitian refugees awash
in the seas in their small boats. I remember the scenes of
Haitian ships being searched and found to be laden with illegal
drugs destined for our Nation's streets. These are the images
of reality that we will once again be forced to face if we
ignore current events in Haiti.
I am an optimist. I have known the quality of the Haitian
people--their strong, strong family values, their dedication to
personal, family and community improvements, the beauty and
value of their art and culture. These are the foundations for
democratic reform on which a stable society with economic
opportunity and prosperity may be built.
Mr. Chairman, as a Senator from Florida, I know first--hand
the importance of strengthening democracy and economic
development in Haiti, as well as the consequences of failure in
these regards. Indeed, the United States has been committed to
this objective and has led international efforts to help Haiti.
Since 20,000 U.S. troops landed to restore democracy to Haiti
in 1994, we have provided significant humanitarian, economic,
and security assistance. In spite of our efforts, Haitian
democracy again finds itself at a crossroads. Parliamentary and
municipal elections that can resolve the political crisis in
Haiti, originally scheduled for later this month, have been
postponed until March of 2000. I cannot overstate the
importance of holding these elections in the Spring of 2000,
and assuring that they are open and credible elections.
Violence, election fraud, and low voter turnout have
plagued Haitian elections in the past. In fact, there were
problems with the 1997 elections--in which voter turn out was
about 5 percent--that escalated the current political crisis in
Haiti. Only by holding free and fair elections in a secure
environment where all parties are able to participate openly
can Haiti move beyond its current stalemate. Ending this
stalemate will also allow for additional economic assistance
from the United States and the international community. It is a
prerequisite of improving the life of ordinary Haitians.
Let me suggest several steps that I believe must be taken
to ensure that the upcoming elections can take place in an
environment that will engender trust in the system and allow
Haiti to move forward. First, during the period leading up to
the elections in Haiti, although our permanent military force
is small and will soon transition to an expeditionary presence,
we should continue military efforts to help the Haitian people.
This force should be engaged in worthwhile civic projects such
as construction of schools, roads, and medical clinics
throughout the country.
Second, we must do what we can to assure that there is a
secure environment in which these elections can take place.
Providing a significant number of international observers will
help accomplish this objective. It is important that these
observers be deployed early in the electoral process, not just
arrive a couple of days before the election itself.
Third, the international community must provide support for
these elections. I know that the United States and other
nations have already provided significant funding to prepare
for the elections. Additional assistance will be available only
if the conditions for a free and fair election exist. As I
mentioned at the outset, there have been several very troubling
incidents over the last few weeks and months that lead me to
question whether these conditions do, in fact, exist. Some
would suggest that, under current conditions, we should not be
a party to an election in Haiti, but we cannot afford to walk
away. The world, in particular the United States, stands ready
to help the Haitian people build their democracy.
Fourth, the Provisional Electoral Council has done an
excellent job of resolving the disputed 1997 elections. During
my recent visit to Haiti, I met with several of the members of
the CEP. They have proven that they are willing to do what is
right, what is courageous, what is best for the people of
Haiti. They deserve our support and the support of the Haitian
political parties. The reassuring and compelling statements of
our Ambassador to Haiti, Tim Carney, emphasized the importance
of the CEP.
Political parties are taking risks to participate in this
election, and they deserve our support. Without it, they will
be forced underground. We need to find ways to assure that they
are able to assemble freely and have their platforms heard. The
United States and the international community must help the
political parties directly. I applaud the efforts of the
National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican
Institute, and the National Democratic Institute as they have
worked to advance democracy in Haiti. Their efforts are good
examples of how non-governmental organizations become engaged
in promoting democratic reform where direct involvement by the
U.S. State Department and other agencies would be
inappropriate.
Mr. Chairman, I would suggest these would be important
steps that the United States and the international community
can take to assure that credible elections will be held. But
the Haitians themselves have the greatest responsibility to
assure that this occurs. All political parties should publicly
commit to denouncing political violence, including allowing all
parties to publicly campaign without intimidation. This
commitment must include actively restraining any elements or
supporters from participating in violence or intimidation.
President Preval and former President Aristide have a special
responsibility to use their status and trust that the Haitian
people have placed in them to restrain the forces of evil. I
call on them to work with the international community to ensure
that these elections go forward in a secure environment. Mr.
Chairman, in many respects their credibility depends on this,
and they will be held accountable for their success or failure.
It is essential to the Haitian democratic process that
there are indeed two separate elections in the coming 14
months. We have already witnessed considerable delays. Any
additional delay will put international support at great risk.
Credible parliamentary and municipal elections must occur to
provide confidence in the electoral system for the presidential
elections in November of 2000 to be viewed as credible. It is
also important that Haiti develop a strong and independent
legislative branch of government. This can help it to survive
through periods of instability and provide an outlet for those
who may disagree with an elected executive.
Some have argued that the March election should be delayed
and folded into the presidential election. This would have
ominous and negative implications. It would mean for almost 3
years the country has been without a stable parliament. It will
mean that the economy of the country will continue to be denied
international financial aid that requires legislative action by
the Haitian Parliament before it can move forward.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate your indulgence,
the United States has developed a very effective military, a
military that has proven its ability to intervene in conflicts
and provide a secure environment. We have done this in Haiti,
Bosnia, and now in Kosovo. Unfortunately, we have not been
equally successful in providing long-term political and
economic stability following our military interventions. The
military's success is the result of many years of thoughtful
planning, training, and resourcing. The follow-up economic and
political activities have none of these qualities. They are
characterized by their ad hoc nature and lack of sustainable
and credible initiatives, and a particular lack of emphasis on
carrying out an effective economic recovery plan.
These comments are by no means limited to Haiti. In the
current issue of Foreign Affairs, there is an article, Mr.
Chairman, entitled ``A European New Deal for the Balkans.'' I
would just read one sentence from the second paragraph, ``The
basis for long-term stability and non-nationalistic politics in
southeastern Europe lies in its economies, and here the picture
is bleak.'' Exactly that same sentence could be written
substituting Haiti for southeastern Europe.
Mr. Chairman, operations in Bosnia and Kosovo have been
characterized by successful military as the first chapter,
followed by failed economic and political chapters which left
us in situations no better than those which we originally
encountered. Mr. Chairman, I would recommend to the Members of
the House of Representatives as a step which might be taken to
strengthen our economic influence in Haiti and other countries
in the Caribbean basin--the Caribbean Basin Initiative
legislation which was passed by a 3 to 1 vote in the Senate
last week--I would hope that favorable and expedited attention
could be given to that in the House of Representatives. I
believe this would be a significant step toward the United
States overcoming this history of failed economic response
after successful military intervention.
Mr. Chairman, during my last visit to Haiti in June of this
year, I flew over the north coast and observed scores of small
boats under construction. These boats could be a warning of
things to come, or simply a reminder of past problems. We
already know the price of failure in Haiti because we have paid
it for most of the 20th Century. We must use this opportunity
to enhance democracy in Haiti so that our children and
grandchildren will not have to continue paying the price of
failure into the 21st Century. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Graham appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Ballenger. [Presiding.] Senator Graham, I would like to
thank both you and Senator DeWine for being here. I don't know
how much time you have.
Senator Graham. Mr. Chairman, unfortunately we have already
had a bell for a vote that commenced at 10:30, and I am afraid
that I am going to have to join my colleague in absenting
myself from the balance of the hearing.
Mr. Ballenger. We thank you kindly for being here this
morning, and I am sorry for the tight schedule that you have
run into.
Congressman Goss, we will turn it to you now.
Mr. Goss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have a
lengthy, closely typed, single-spaced multipage statement which
I would like to submit for the record.
Mr. Gejdenson. We would love to hear all of it.
Mr. Goss. I would like to summarize, and I would like to
have unanimous consent to submit the full statement.
Mr. Ballenger. Without objection.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. PORTER GOSS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Mr. Goss. Thank you. I will proceed to say that I also want
to congratulate the Committee for making this effort. Lord
knows Haiti needs all the help it can get from its friends. I
think everybody here, as I look around, are people that have
either traveled there or are very familiar with it and are
trying to find a solution for a difficult problem.
I could point out, in terms of my own credibility about
Haiti, I have been involved with that country one way or
another with government efforts since the 1960's. I can point
out that Port-au-Prince is a lot closer to my district than
Washington, D.C. I can point out that I have a lot of Haitian
Americans in my district. I have to point out that I have a
steady stream of visitors, parliamentarians, and businessmen
from Haiti, and I basically seem to spend a large part of my
official life dealing with the Haitian problem.
I also, as the Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, deal
a lot with facts that go on in the world, troubling facts, that
affect our national security and our well-being and our
American interests, and we also try very hard in the
Intelligence Committee to distinguish between facts and wishful
thinking. One of my criticisms--and I have been harsh on the
Administration about this--is that they failed to distinguish
the facts from the wishful thinking over the past several
years.
Let me start by saying where we are in Haiti today. By any
measure I would say--in fact by all the measures--I would say
that we are generally backsliding badly. The economy is in
shambles. There is corruption in the business world, the
official world and every world. It is very hard to get a
business loan from a bank in Haiti. It is very hard to get any
kind of security guarantees at warehouses. Payoffs are a part
of business. Things just are not going forward in a way that
would pass muster in this country, and in fact it is getting
worse.
Crime is rampant. I have been getting calls from people who
say that once the sun sets, the HNP in many of the cities just
simply go indoors and they don't come out, and you are at your
own risk until the sun comes up again. Unfortunately, we are
seeing a considerable increase in crime going on throughout the
country.
The judiciary is, in fact, non-functional. The parliament
is shattered, as we know. Power is concentrated in the
executive branch, with even the local officials in the country
serving at the presidents' pleasure. When I say
``presidents','' I use the word in the plural sense. I would
also point out that there is, among international observers in
the community now, increasing concern about this backward
drift, or back slide.
Election security is going to be a critical issue. From the
point of view of competency, the HNP probably is not going to
be able to do the job sufficiently to give people the
confidence to run, that is, the opposition out there to run, or
the people to vote, to be concerned about their safety in the
voting process. We have to overcome those areas, and that means
a huge effort, because as people have testified already, the
two Senators have testified and others who know the situation
there know, getting elections to happen in Haiti is not going
to be easy, and getting full, fair, free, and transparent
elections is a huge task.
I think it is telling that former-President Aristide has
been silent on the disruptions we have seen so far to the
initial kickoff sessions of the CEP and the opposition
politicians who have tried to gather around. There has been
calculated violence meant to disrupt the democratic process. It
is associated, or at least alleged, that former-President
Aristide is responsible, in part, for this. I understand that
there has been no word forthcoming from him.
I think the question that is often asked about, gee it is
going to be such a huge effort in terms of educating the
Haitians relative to the security question of the atmosphere to
vote, is a false issue in some ways. The Haitians know how to
vote. I have been there, as many of us have, for elections to
observe the Haitians. I was there in 1990, and I was there
again for the parliamentary elections thereafter; and the
Haitians go about their business very well. They understand how
to do it, notwithstanding the high illiteracy rate. The problem
is that they don't feel motivated to do it now because of the
corruption, and ``democracy'', has brought them nothing, has
not brought food to the table. They see the authoritarianism
continuing, and the destabilization and the elitism that was
spoken about earlier in the testimony rampant in the country.
So, I think that the idea of know-how is not the issue. I
think the idea of atmosphere is rather critical. In the area of
atmosphere, one cannot overlook all of the very significant
evidence in recent days that there is increasing politization
of the HNP. Not only is it a competency question realistically
asked, but the politization question is one that needs to be
resolved.
In a couple of other areas that have been spoken to
briefly, I would like to talk about immigration, the economic
immigration, looking to the megapolis of Miami as the way out
of the troubles in Haiti if you are in economic despair, which
almost everybody in the country is; we need to have a
repatriation agreement. It is extraordinary to me that we have
negotiated two repatriation agreements with Fidel Castro, and
none with Haiti, which is thought to be a more friendly
country. It does give us a need to address that issue.
Speaking of Cuba, I am concerned, and would ask the
question and try and direct to this Committee's attention, what
exactly is the Cuban interest in Haiti these days? There seems
to be a greater manifestation of Cuban presence, allegedly or
assertedly under the guise of medical help, but from observers'
testimony that I have talked to and have called me, it is more
than that. There appear to be what I would call young thugs who
are militant types out and about doing I don't know what, but
apparently doing it without any concern for whether the HNP
cares what their activities are about. It appears to me that is
an area that needs to be pursued in addition to the question of
the increasing drug trade which is obvious, well known,
understood, and is seriously a setback for us on the war on
drugs, and without again overlooking the problems of the
immigration flows that Senator Graham is so aware of and spoke
so articulately about.
I believe where we are in Haiti now is the need for a
realistic appraisal, and I stress the word realistic. I believe
that we need to identify the Haitians in Haiti who are willing
to be powerful, strong, courageous leaders, and assist them in
their opportunity in Haiti to lead Haitians.
I think the problem is that we have been calling it not as
it is, but as we wish it were in Haiti, and that is a formula
for deceiving ourselves.
I basically would associate myself with the ideas that have
been put forward by Senators DeWine and Graham. The one
exception would be that I do not believe it is useful for our
combat troops to be down there doing civilian projects when I
believe there are other NGO's that can do that. But that is a
small point. In terms of drawing a line about will the United
States lend its credibility to these elections, I think we have
to answer the question is it possible to have full, fair, free,
friendly transparent elections where there will be good
opposition opportunities, where the Haitians will willingly go
forth and vote because there is opportunity for them. I think
that is going to be the test, and if Haiti fails that test, I
do not think that we should lend the aura of credibility to
elections that are not credible.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Goss appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Goss. I hope
you can stay for some questions.
Mr. Goss. I would be very happy to stay.
Chairman Gilman. We are now pleased to have Congressman
Conyers, representing the State of Michigan, Ranking Minority
Member on the Judiciary Committee. Welcome, Mr. Conyers. We are
pleased to have been able to go to Haiti with you on several
occasions.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. JOHN CONYERS, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Mr. Conyers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to my good
friend, the Ranking Member, Mr. Gejdenson Members of the
Committee, Mr. Payne and Mr. Hastings, and Mr. Delahunt, who
serves with me on the Judiciary Committee, have been very
helpful in the one area of foreign affairs that I have spent as
much time on, this subject, perhaps more than any other. I am
delighted to be here to share with my colleagues some of the
impressions of where we are in the very important issue around
restoring Haiti to some prominence, both economically and
politically.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you, because you have been working
with me on this issue for many years. I have been to Haiti with
everybody that has been at this table, and many of the Members
of the Committee. I have followed the subject closely; I travel
there frequently. Today's hearing provides an excellent
opportunity for us to openly discuss some of the challenges
that are still facing Haiti, and what we can do about them.
I may be the one that knows the first democratically
elected president as well as, or better than anybody in the
Congress. I remember President Aristide before he was a
president. He was here in Washington and I got to know him. He
traveled with the Cranbook Institute in Michigan. I am deeply
impressed by him as a human being, a spiritual leader, and a
person who is trying to bring order to his country under
incredible circumstances. I think Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the
man, deserves some examination of his life and his career and
his designation, based on the principles of the religion out of
which he came. I think we can easily demonstrate that the
former-President, Mr. Aristide, has denounced, in a regular
way, all of the activities, the unfortunate incidents that have
happened, the public disruptions; and I can remember one of our
meetings in which we delivered the same kind of message that we
are delivering to ourselves, we delivered to him. As soon as I
finished he said what do you want me to do? I said we want you
to go on the radio and denounce these events. He said, I will
do it. He said, I am prepared to do it and I want to do it. And
he did it. He still does it. He has not been silent. He has
publicly denounced and condemned these activities.
While we are thinking about that, we ought to examine the
motive for him to be deliberately fostering the disruptions for
a country in which he is the lead contender for election, I
don't think that would make good sense. He would not benefit
from any of this disruption.
The other matter that I think we need to get on the table
right away is his--he and the current President's commitment to
two elections. That was a very important aspect of our visit.
Now, the elections were delayed but it wasn't--it was through
administrative difficulty of printing ID cards for a million
Haitians that, if you know the terrain, as I know the Chairman
does, it is impossible. Nobody gets up there, period, except
the people that live there. So to imagine that we could bring
in some entrepreneurs who would quickly take a photo of
everybody for the election, which was a worthy idea, it is just
simply impossible. So the election was delayed. But the first
commitment we got from both President Preval and former-
President Aristide was that we get out, we make it clear, we
get out to the public that there would be two elections and no
further delay. That has been the commitment and still is.
Now, a word about the police. Pierre Denize, the head of
the Haitian National Police, has been one of the most able,
committed, and open members of the whole government. They have
abolished their army, something that has never happened before.
They are moving ahead in a very excellent way. His credibility
has never, ever been brought under question. Every
investigation that we have asked him to look more carefully at,
every issue that we have ever raised to him, I think, has been
very important.
The other matter that I think should be brought to your
attention, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee, is the
whole question of our expectations. We have to get a management
under these--our expectations. Haiti was in ruins after largely
U.S.-supported governments for several administrations--in
ruin. There was no department of anything. I mean, we are
talking about creating a nation from the ground up in a few
years, and of course we are impatient. We want more to happen.
But we have got to get some management over our own
expectations. We have to be a bit more realistic about what we
expect of Haiti at this point.
The transition to democracy in 1990, and again in 1994, was
difficult. Thousands of Aristide supporters were murdered. We
still have problems going on. The President's own sister has
been injured. These aren't activities promoted by people that
are supporting the present administration or the past
administration. Haiti has abolished its military and begun
building a new professional police force with 5,000 members
today, with our help.
I talked with former-Police Chief Kelly and his successors
down there, and they and we were pleased at the quick training,
which is not yet completed by far. We have got a lot more to
do. So, I think it would be inaccurate to suggest that
President Aristide, or his supporters, or any other political
group are dominating the police when the few facts that we do
have make it clear that the sources of violence are so diverse.
We should avoid any over-simplification that any one group
of supporters carries a disproportionate responsibility for
disruption. The strength of a democracy is measured by how well
it functions under adverse circumstances, and the economic and
social environment in Haiti places tremendous pressures on the
political system. Our U.S. Agency for International Development
just reported that even though we have delivered thousands of
vaccinations for children, increased access to microcredit for
entrepreneurs, and improved environmental conditions, only 39
percent of the population has access to clean water, and only
26 percent have adequate sanitation. I meet with the
businessmen regularly too, and am supportive of their efforts.
They are great and doing a wonderful job.
I am here to urge that our investigation be tempered with
caution and patience; that we don't expect too much too quickly
from a nation that is literally rising from the ashes. It is in
that spirit that I am very pleased to join you here today and
ask that my report from my latest visit to Haiti, of September
10, 1999, be put in the record along with my colleagues that
were there: Representatives Campbell, Payne, Hilliard,
Faleomavaega, and Delegate Donna Christian-Green.
Chairman Gilman. Without objection that will be made part
of the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Conyers appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Conyers, for your
testimony. Regretfully, Congressman Rangel of New York is
detained in a Committee markup. He will not be able to be with
us this morning. Without objection, we will include his
statement in the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rangel appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. Let me address a question or two to our
panelists. The attack on Haiti's electoral authorities on
October 24th was unacceptable. What should we do to oppose this
kind of action at this time? Mr. Goss, Mr. Conyers, or either
one.
I am pleased Senator DeWine was able to return.
Senator DeWine. Mr. Chairman, just very briefly, I think
that this country, as I said in my prepared statement, must be
very strong in regard to the elections. I set forth criteria in
my prepared statement. I think we have to insist on this
criteria. That is pretty much it. This is an area where I think
we have to draw the line.
As far as U.S. assistance--if U.S. assistance is going to
be in there, we have to have certain things required in regard
to the election. One of the things that we constantly monitor
and look at, not just in Haiti, but in many countries, is
whether or not the police are becoming politicized. That is
something we just constantly have to worry about. I think we
have made very, very significant progress with the police in
Haiti. It is an underreported, untold success story that we all
should be very proud of; that the Haitians should be very proud
of. But insisting that the police remain nonpolitical, I think,
is one of the main keys to ensuring that democracy will
continue to develop in Haiti.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Senator DeWine. Mr. Goss.
Mr. Goss. Mr. Chairman, one of the problems that we see
with that, as disgusting and disruptive as those incidents
were, and again remember that this is--we make these comments
with the backdrop of the United States being disinvited to have
its troops present anymore as a stabilizing factor, or any
other factor--is the fact that the HNP did not respond. They
were not responsive to calculated organized violence. There was
a disruptive effort made. The HNP was notified these events was
going to take place. Their protection was requested, as would
be normal in a democracy, and they failed to show up for
whatever reason.
I certainly would give the United States of America, and
its taxpayers and citizens, an A-plus for a good idea in trying
to strengthen the HNP, but in terms of the measure of
effectiveness, I would have to call it a failure at this point.
I think we saw that failure in these demonstrations. I think
this is the type of thing we will continue to see, and in fact
it is only a part of a continuum that we are seeing in Haiti
which is regrettably getting worse rather than better.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Conyers.
Mr. Conyers. Might I just observe that crowd control is one
of the most difficult areas of police enforcement. We have
problems right here in our own country in terms of that sort of
thing, and for a newly trained force to be able to sweep in
very effectively in the way that we know that police can and
should operate, may be a bit of a stretch for a police force
that is still coming out of 6 to 9 months of training, and has
no long record of being able to deal with this sort of thing.
But more importantly, the next day, October 25th, Fanmi
Lavalas issued their press release, strongly condemning and
denouncing the violence that occurred on Sunday, October 24th,
during the opening of the civic education campaign. They were
right there because, why? We go to motivation again. There is
nothing for them to gain by encouraging lawlessness around
electoral activity when they have the most to benefit from it.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Conyers. Just one last
question. Of course we all recognize that freedom of assembly
and freedom of speech are essential to free and fair elections.
Do you recommend anything more we can be doing to assure that
those kinds of elections in the spring will be held in that
manner of free and fair election?
Mr. Conyers. Yes, sir. I would like to recommend that we
send in not only an international delegation of observers for
the election, so that we can make sure that the elections are
conducted as they are supposed to be, and have been promised,
but that we here in the Congress send a delegation ourselves.
It is my personal hope, my duties in Congress permitting, to be
there to make sure that all the promises are fulfilled. I think
that many of the parties begin to realize that the only way
that they can gain credibility is to minimize any disruption.
That disruption operates not just to our anger and disagreement
and dissolution, but it also operates against their own best
interests politically. So it is my hope that the observer
system, which has been worked to a pretty fine point these
days, will be operating in full swing, so that everybody knows
that there will be independent observations coming out of any
election.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Conyers. Senator DeWine.
Senator DeWine. Mr. Chairman, the only thing I would add is
that, not only for these elections, but for the long-term
development of democracy in Haiti, we should do what I think
many times we do best, and that is export democracy and work
through our private sector, through our private political
parties in this country, to help develop the political system
in Haiti. This is something that we can do on a people-to-
people basis. I think our government needs to be involved in
that. That is something that, in the long term, will pay
dividends for the stability of Haiti.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Senator. Congressman Goss.
Mr. Goss. Mr. Chairman, I think it is important to take a
step back and say, who is inviting us to come to Haiti to do
what. I think we want to be a little careful we don't fall into
the trap that Mr. Conyers alluded to in his testimony, that
Haiti was in ruins somehow because of former U.S. Government
policies. It is a sovereign nation, and it is in charge of its
own destiny. To the degree we can be useful in the system, to
the degree that we are accepted and are wanted to come down and
play in that playing field under those terms, I think it is
very important to draw those lines first. I know there are
well-meaning people in Haiti; I know there are hard working
people in Haiti trying to accomplish those goals. I know that
those people are interested in having a bona fide international
observation force there.
But if that is going to be frustrated by a duplicity, or
behind-the-scenes disruptions by other powers that are there,
then it has got to come out yet again, as it has in the past.
So my concern is, before we commit to anything, we find out
what the invitation is, what is expected, what the ground rules
are going to be, who is going to be held accountable, and
identify the people who are asking us. Because as I pointed out
earlier, we have been disinvited in some ways from
participating.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you very much, Mr. Goss. Any further
comments by any of our panelists? If not, Mr. Payne.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and I commend
you for holding this hearing--very important, I think, that
those of us who are here are certainly very concerned about
Haiti. I also look at the problems there, and with the
disbanding of the military that has probably been an
institution that has been in Haiti longer than any institution,
and to attempt to create a police department, I think that we
are kind of expecting too much too soon.
Unfortunately, you need to have an effective police
department. But when I look at the numbers of police in Haiti,
less than 5,000 maybe--it is about 4,800 police for the entire
country--trying to recruit new people from scratch, I compare
the population of Haiti to the population of New York City,
probably the total miles of that not too far off, when you take
the five boroughs; New York has 45,000 police. You have 4,800
in Haiti. We look at it as saying, well now, we ought to
compare what is happening there with what happens in our major
cities. You can't even compare.
As a matter of fact, I take exception. I think the crime
rate in Haiti is very low. Now, there may be political violence
which is higher than what we have here, but overall crime--
although people don't go out at night--if you take the number
of actual crimes compared to the crime in the cities of this
Nation, in spite of the fact that we have 25 percent of the
population of Haiti in prison in our jails, I am just looking
at 4,800 policemen as compared to the 45,000 policemen in New
York, and we are looking for miracles.
Second, it is difficult, as Mr. Conyers said, if Aristide
is so popular and the Lavalas Party is so strong, why would you
need to disrupt election processes that are going on? The ones,
it would seem to me, that would want to be disruptive would be
those who would like to derail the popularity of the majority.
It would be the ones in the minority that would not want to
see--the anti-Aristide people, it would seem, would be the ones
who would have more to gain by disrupting a process which is
moving forward.
So I am a little bit confused, too, that when an Aristide
confidante is killed, that is possibly drug related, but if
someone opposed to Aristide is killed, it is political, without
a question, because Aristide's people will kill their
opponents. But if an Aristide person gets killed, not that the
opponents might have killed him, it is the fact that it must be
some other reason.
So there is no question that there is a lot of prejudging
or maybe prejudice that goes on on that level with many people
seeming to have an anti-Haiti position.
Now, of course, I have 5 minutes to ask the question, but
since I wasn't here for an opening statement, I thought I would
roll that in. Let me just ask the panelists, I believe that--
and we all agree that the election should be separate. I think
Mr. Conyers indicated that everyone agrees that that is the way
it should be. I just wonder and maybe those of you, Mr. Goss,
and Senator DeWine, the process by which the elections were
supposed to be held in December, with polling places having to
be gotten, with candidates having to be certified, with
election workers having to be trained--and I think the number
is closer to 3 million photo ID's that were going to have to be
taken in order to have the December election--I was just
wondering if anyone feels that that election could have been--
the election has been postponed--but does anyone believe that
could have been pulled off?
I heard our U.S. Embassy say it could have been pulled off.
I totally disagreed with that when I was there in September or
October, because I couldn't see that all that would be done by
December. I wonder if anybody there might have any views on the
election, and whether that December 8th date was realistic,
especially in light of the new photo ID business that was
brought in--whether it would have been possible to have it take
place. I wonder if Mr. Goss or the Senator, or Mr. Conyers
could respond.
Mr. Conyers. I just wanted to quickly observe that it was a
noble and appropriate attempt for the December elections, that
is, when it was scheduled. But on a CODEL--two CODEL's--that we
were in, it became clear that there might be difficulty, and it
would require a postponement. Now we have cleared the crisis of
the absence of a prime minister, we are seeing progress. One of
my CODEL's unanimously recommended postponing the elections to
make sure that there was adequate time to have excellent
preparation. Now, we are making sure that these preparations,
including the measures intended to increase voter confidence
and reduce fraud, are implemented. I think our country must
show a strong commitment for these elections, and let me just
say that our Ambassador is doing an excellent job. I would like
to just put in a word for Ambassador Carney, who was able,
while we were there, to bring OPL and Fanmi Lavalas together,
and even the dissidents, for the first time. So, the U.S. was
doing a great job in moving us out of this necessity to
postpone the election.
Senator DeWine. Congressman, I don't have the expertise to
tell you whether, if carried out, that election would work from
a technical point of view. I think at this point that is water
over the dam for all of us, and certainly for Haiti. I think
the important thing is that we push forward, and they push
forward, and they have the will to have these elections. I
think everybody I have heard today agrees with that.
Mr. Goss. My view is that, technically, it could have
happened, and I base that on the previous two elections that I
was down there for. But I don't think there is a will to have
an election in Haiti, among the people, that is sufficient.
There is lack of confidence about their safety. There is lack
of confidence among the people who would run that their safety
can be guaranteed to survive the election. There is some
feeling by the voters that voting doesn't get you anything. I
have talked to voters who say, why do we vote? We don't
understand this democracy; it doesn't put food on the table. I
think the status that--Mr. Payne--that you alluded to about
people killing each other is part of what is off-putting the
will. I think that there is motive for Aristide's forces
wanting to disrupt the process. I think the motive of that is
to delay the elections into one election later in the year.
Aristide is already the de facto power in Haiti, as everybody
knows. The question then of wrapping it up with the formality
of an ``election in one election'' sometime next fall, when the
presidential elections are called for, and the parliamentary
elections, where a puppet parliament would be brought along
with them, I think, is a scenario that is much discussed by
people who know about Haiti.
Mr. Payne. My time has expired. First, I don't see what
difference you are going to have in having two elections in
one, Mr. Goss, if Aristide is the only name in town and whether
it is eight elections, they are going to win all eight. So, to
have them in one, I really don't think it is a prime mover. As
a matter of fact, I would think that Aristide would want them
separate, so people wouldn't think that he wanted to have them
all at one time. But there is no question that I would be
shocked if Aristide's party does not overwhelmingly win.
Second, I do want to disagree with you. The difference, Mr.
Goss, between the election this time, in December, when we were
there almost in October, and what happened when we were both
there 4 or 5 years ago in the previous election, is that they
weren't talking about taking 4 million pictures and having them
put in nice little frames and have everybody there when they
went to vote. The other election was just a fingerprint. Now
you have to have your photo ID and the fingerprint too. That
was the big difference. That is what Mr. Conyers alluded to.
They didn't have the photo ID. I don't even know who came up
with this great idea to go to Canada to get people to take
pictures of 4 million people so they can vote. We don't even
have photo ID mandatory in New Jersey for drivers licenses, as
a matter of fact. But someone says, in our Embassy, we can do
these 3 or 4 million pictures and have everybody ready in a
month. It absolutely, in my opinion, would have been even
difficult in New Jersey. We have 8 million people, too.
Mr. Goss. If you want a response to that, Mr. Payne, I will
tell you we use motor voter in Florida, and we have concerns
there as well. The point, I would say, is I was there in 1990,
and I have said publicly many times that I thought that
election was an absolutely bona fide expression of the will of
the people of Haiti. It was a very well done election. Now, it
wasn't perfect in technical terms by the way everybody
registered and so forth, but it was a clear expression for
President Aristide's victory. I have said so. That was a
democratic election. I think that was really the last truly
democratic election in Haiti, and it may have been the first
one. They did it without photos.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr.
Ballenger.
Mr. Ballenger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a couple of
questions. The first one is, Senator Graham was the only one of
you that spoke out about the need for some economic stability
to grow a real democracy there. I am specifically talking about
CBI, which is either hung up between the House and the Senate,
or somewhere, but it just appears to me that without some sort
of economic stability, or the ability for the country to create
jobs, the whole thing is going to fall apart, as a personal
opinion.
I would like to ask that, but I would also like to throw
out something that a group of Haitians gave me last week, just
this suggestion. They said that the major difficulty that they
felt the police had was that they were scared to take sides. As
somebody said--I think one of our Members here said--that their
numbers are so small that they are afraid to get involved,
because they might end up being brutalized themselves.
The suggestion was--and I didn't even realize this
existed--that there are substantial numbers of Haitian American
police in this country today, in New York City and Chicago, in
various and sundry areas like that, that they thought would be
able to volunteer to go down--maybe there would be 300, 500,
whatever it is, to go down--and the addition of trained
policemen who have lived in a democracy would put backbone into
the Haitian police. First, I would like to ask the question
about CBI, and the second one, is that second suggestion even
practical?
Senator DeWine. Let me start if I could, Congressman
Ballenger, with your second point. One of the success stories
that I have seen in Haiti is the U.N. CIVPOL that contains a
number of Haitian-born U.S. citizens, big city cops, who are
working down there on a contract basis, who care about Haiti,
who have a background from Haiti, many times have relatives in
Haiti. They are down there with a very specific purpose and
role of training of Haitian police, and really training the
trainers. They are actually mentors. That has been, I think,
very successful.
I think it is important for us to try to do what we can to
see that that program continues. I am concerned that it may not
be continuing. So it goes right along with your points. We have
resources in this country--in most of our major cities we have
Haitians who are policemen who are very good and very talented,
and many of whom have been willing to go down to Haiti on a
limited basis. I think we need to keep that going.
The second point you made on the economy of Haiti, a lot of
things have to happen before we get the investment that we need
to see in Haiti. The assembly industry that we used to see in
Haiti in the time period when baseballs were assembled there--
all kinds of products came out of the assemblies--is back up,
but it is certainly not near what it was before the embargo.
That is something that is--the plants are still there, the
buildings are still there, the Haitians are still there--but I
think that the instability in the country is keeping some
companies from making a decision that they want to go back and
relocate back into Haiti.
The fact that the port is the most expensive port in the
hemisphere is a real problem. You have experienced that
yourself, and I have, when we try to get humanitarian shipments
through that port. I had a situation just a week ago, we were
working to get some humanitarian things through the port and it
just boggles the mind the red tape you have to go through, and
all the problems you have to get it through the port.
Privatization needs to continue. There are eight or nine
government-owned industries that, frankly, need to be
privatized. They have made some progress on that--flour,
cement--but they need to go further. There are just so many
things to talk about when you talk about the economy. But
clearly what we have to have, what Haiti has to see, is
investment. Foreign money has to come in there to invest in
Haiti.
The other thing that I mentioned in my prepared statement
was agriculture. One of the biggest problems Haiti has today is
how many people are leaving the countryside and going to one of
the major cities. It is not just Port-au-Prince; it is several
other major cities. They are coming in there, they have no way
of making a living, they have no way of eating. So we have to,
I think, encourage them; and we have the technical expertise at
USAID and through the American universities, we have that
expertise to help them not only develop their own agriculture,
but many times the most important thing is to market their own
agriculture so they don't have to go through the families that
have control and the choke-points that have been there in
Haiti, so they have their own cooperatives, principles we see
in the United States in agriculture, and developed in the
beginning of this century.
So there are a lot of things that can be done. But part of
the problem is the feeling by people that there is that
political unrest, the stability is not yet there in Haiti. I
think having elections and getting a government that really
does function will go a long way to restoring people's
confidence.
Mr. Ballenger. Before I pass that onto Mr. Goss, let me
just say one thing. If you are a businessman and you are
thinking of investing somewhere, would you put your money in
any place that automatically says you are going to be less
competitive than the Mexicans? That is the reason I throw the
CBI out there.
Senator DeWine. I totally agree with you, Congressman. We
need to do it. We need to pass it, we need to get it done.
Mr. Ballenger. Porter.
Mr. Goss. Thank you. I certainly agree with Senator DeWine
on the CBI issue. We have been working on it for a long time,
and it matters a great deal in my part of the world. But the
issue you raise about the economy is clearly true. We have to
have the economy. But it is very hard to get anybody to invest
because of the unusually high risk involved, the great amount
of corruption, and the lack of guarantees.
In fact, I was told by one American businessman--and this
is a little bit anecdotal, but it nevertheless is the
atmosphere--they would like to have reopened the business that
they had previously in Haiti, before the embargo went on, and
they could not get a bank loan from the bank because the bank
said that the bank examiner would not allow an unsecured loan
in Haiti because it is too risky. That is the kind of problem
that small American businessmen are having there. It obviously
is a huge damper on investment.
I agree with you on the economy. The problem with all of
this--and going to your second idea--I think it is a great
idea. But it is only a great idea if Haitians in Haiti want to
have that happen, want to invite those people in to provide the
stability. Because, for every time one group in Haiti gets a
good idea, another group decides to derail it. The problem
remains among Haitians in Haiti. We haven't learned the concept
of opposition. We haven't learned the concept of middle class.
We have got a huge group of non-elite and a small group of
elite, and the power shifts back and forth in different areas;
but the fact of the matter is the great mass of the country at
this point is in economic depravity that probably doesn't exist
anywhere else in this hemisphere, if in the world, it is so
bad. It is an absolute outrage this can be, when there is so
much opportunity. But unless the Haitians who have the capacity
to lead in Haiti are willing to lead, and these decisions are
made in Haiti, all the good will, good intentions, and good aid
we can throw at them will come to naught. That is what we have
seen, regrettably, in the past couple hundred years.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr.
Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have enjoyed the
testimony from everybody this morning. It has been very
informative. I hope Senator DeWine comes back because I think
many of the points he makes are really on the mark. I do agree
that, for many reasons, it is important for the United States
to insist on two elections. I think if that occurs, it will
hopefully alleviate some of the concerns expressed by Mr. Goss
and those who share his perspective. I would also observe the
comments by Mr. Conyers in terms of his conversations with the
former President making a commitment to that particular
premise, that particular reality. Now we shall see. Now we
shall see, Mr. Goss.
Earlier you mentioned the incidents, and you've reached a
conclusion that they were at least instigated, if not
encouraged, by members of the Fanmi Lavalas. Again, Mr. Conyers
submits to us a press statement to indicate that, in fact, the
Fanmi Lavalas condemned publicly this conduct of the actions of
those who claim to be followers of President Aristide. I
certainly don't know what happened. I wasn't there. I have some
reservations about the reliability of the information that we
receive from Haiti.
But I would also point out, I think it was just this week,
that there was another incident where militants who claimed to
be Aristide supporters attacked a speaker at a political rally
from members of the ESPASE Coalition. We had some good news.
The Haitian National Police actually intervened and effected an
arrest of one of the militants. I would be interested if we
could develop some intelligence as to the whereabouts of that
particular so-called militant, and what his perspective and
motives may be. I find it, maybe because of my naivete, just
simply hard to accept the fact that all those claiming to be
followers of Aristide are foolish enough to be proclaiming it.
As my friend from New Jersey, Mr. Payne, indicated, it really
doesn't make a lot of sense; but then again you know Haiti. It
is tough to read the tea leaves, isn't it, Mr. Goss?
Mr. Goss. It is very tough.
Mr. Delahunt. I just wanted to point that out. But you were
there in 1990. I think it is really important that we speak to
this issue in terms of the context of where we were in Haiti. I
mean Senator DeWine made some very good points about the good
news and the bad news. I think, realistically, he is pretty
much on the mark. But the violence that occurred during the
coup years, from 1991 to 1994, clearly exceeded anything that
we see today in Haiti in terms of systematic political
violence. Would you agree with me, Mr. Goss?
Mr. Goss. I would say that, measure for measure, the
capacity for brutality hasn't changed, the number of incidents
have changed. The trend line is to more incidents rather than
less at a time when it should be the other way around. But in
measuring the absent quantity, there is no question that there
were more knocks on the door at night and people disappearing
under the tension of the Cedras--it was the military
government, and the Aristide government at that particular
moment.
Mr. Delahunt. It is my understanding that during the coup
years there was in excess of 4,000 political assassinations
that occurred. I mean, in terms of magnitude and scale, that
is--that does not exist today.
Mr. Goss. There is no question that there was a spike
period at that time, as there had been other spike periods in
the history of Haiti. What I think we are all concerned about
is that we are heading toward more authoritarianism and another
spike period where the stabilizing factors that we started out,
with good intent, will be captured by an authoritarian arm, and
we will have the new Tonton Macoute. I think that, as the
people who watch the cycle in Haiti say, here we go again.
Mr. Delahunt. It certainly isn't to that degree of
magnitude, and I agree we should be vigilant on that. I think
the point you make, in terms of vigilance, is a very valid one.
We agree on that.
But at the time--as you said you were in Haiti back in the
1980's and this goes to the credibility of the information we
all receive from Haiti--did we have intelligence at that point
in time that there was going to be a coup overthrowing the
former President?
Mr. Goss. I simply am not aware of any, but I would not
have been at that particular station of my life.
Mr. Delahunt. Just given your own familiarity with the
situation, how could our intelligence community have blown that
one back in 1990 and 1991?
Mr. Goss. I am not sure that there was any mistake by the
intelligence community. What I am not sure of is whether the
policy people in the executive branch did anything with the
information that was available. I just have no knowledge of
exactly what was available or how the policy people treated it.
We often, in my experience in the intelligence community, and
this goes back a lot of years, provide information that says
there is an 80 percent, or whatever percent chance that there
is going to be a coup by such and such a time. Now that is----
Mr. Delahunt. So we really don't know what happened back in
1991, as far as the intelligence community or as far as what
the then--Administration, the then--Bush Administration did to
in any way deal with the information.
Mr. Goss. I personally do not know. I am happy to try and
get the information.
Mr. Delahunt. I think it is important. Because I think a
lot of what occurred back there we have to remember--I know you
will agree with this--it was during the coup years that this
economy, which was fragile to begin with, really went into the
hopper. It went down 30 percent in terms of the GDP. So we are
starting in 1995, 1996, with total devastation. I mean, those
generals that were running the show back then, from 1991 to
1994, created a situation where there was a negative decline in
GDP by 30 percent.
Senator DeWine talks about the economy that has stagnated,
and for all intents and purposes it has. The World Bank shows
that it has grown by 2, 3, or 4 percent; but I would suggest
those numbers are significant. But really what has happened is
that we have had a real problem based upon what happened in the
early part of this decade in terms of moving Haiti forward. I
yield back.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr.
Hastings.
Mr. Hastings. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Mr.
Chairman, as you well know, on this Committee I have tried to
offer creative suggestions. As I sit here and I listen to our
colleagues, who have made brilliant presentations, and I hear
all of us, I think as I look in this audience and I know
several of the members in the audience, there are about 20
people in the audience that know a hell of a lot more about
Haiti than any of us do. I know in the future, one thing that
we might be able to do, while we can't open up our hearings to
the public, so to speak, we might invite them to submit one-
page statements or something, which any of us that were
interested could look at.
That said, I regret very much that Senator DeWine had to
leave. I understand his leaving, but he made several
provocative statements in my view, one being that Haiti is not
a strategic interest of the United States, now, or in the
future. I would urge him to understand that it was at one point
in the past, and evidently, with the significant number of
Haitian nationals living in the United States, it is likely to
be again in the future. But I will quarrel with him
ideologically when he and I have an opportunity to get
together.
Let me ask you, Mr. Delahunt, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Conyers
or Mr. Goss, tell me what is magical about two elections? I
don't understand that. While I have agreed and I have supported
the two elections, I don't know the magic in it. If there--and
especially in light of your statement, Mr. Goss, that Haiti,
being a sovereign nation, is in control of their own destiny.
If they want to have one election, what is the problem?
Mr. Goss. In my view, Haiti should be in control of its own
destiny. What we are talking about here is what is the interest
for the U.S. taxpayer and the United States of America in this
Haiti. I think we naturally put out our hand in a gesture to a
friendly, neighborly country, trying to be of assistance, in
good will, without interfering in their sovereign decisions.
They can take their own actions, and they accept the
consequences of their actions.
Mr. Hastings. What is our leverage to accomplish that,
aside from just saying something?
Mr. Goss. To accomplish what?
Mr. Hastings. To accomplish two elections, for example,
since that is what all of us seem to agree that they should
have. Do we have any leverage to cause that to happen?
Mr. Goss. Yes. We have expertise, financial support, and
good will. I think we can do it in a way that would assure them
that we are not interested in interfering with their
sovereignty; we are only interested if they are interested in
proceeding on the path of democracy and helping them go down
that path. That is our leverage. They know that we are here. If
they want it, it is available. If they don't want it, we
shouldn't jam it down their throats.
Mr. Conyers. Mr. Hastings, the very famous Delatore
brothers, Lionel Delatore and his brother Leslie Delatore, who
regularly visit us--probably well known here on the Hill,
hardly a few months go by with business delegations--they have
urged upon me that we support the notion of two elections. It
was for that reason that I urged it upon President Preval and
former-President Aristide, and they all agreed. So in a way,
there seems to be a unanimity that there can be no political
name calling or attributing motives insincere if they were
collapsed into one. But I think, and I hope and pray, that we
are past that.
Mr. Hastings. I, for one, just don't see any particular
magic in it or, particularly as it pertains to the fact that
they have had elections that were--even if you take Mr. Goss'
statement, at least one that was for all intents and purposes
fair and transparent, I see no reason why they could not hold
another at either March or December or whenever there may be an
election.
I want to move or respond, since there is a record, to
Senator DeWine's other view about how foreign investment has to
go into Haiti. One thing that needed to go into Haiti
immediately following the military operation that was
successful there in 1994, was the promises of donor countries
who indicated that they were going to do things, the United
States included, that they did not do.
Now we come to an election, and the one organization that
has conducted itself admirably, MICIVIH, is one of the few that
is now without funds to carry on under the banner of the United
Nations. I would be curious to understand how we bring it to
that. But regarding foreign investment and privatization, one
of the reasons private investors go into the areas is because
of cheap labor and industrious people. If there is any cheaper
labor anywhere in the hemisphere and any more industrious
people than Haitian people, then I would like to see them step
forward. If it is because of the unstable government, then I am
curious why we take oil out of Nigeria, Iraq, Kazakhstan, do
business in Indonesia and Russia, if instability is the
barometer. So I am not so sure, again, I will quarrel with
Senator DeWine when I have an opportunity to get with him.
But let me ask you, Mr. Goss, what will we do if, according
to our views there should be two elections, and if there are
not two elections, what then should America do about Haiti,
since Haiti ain't going to go away?
Mr. Goss. The question of our foreign policy to Haiti or to
any other country is obviously for the administrative branch to
deal with. My view is that we should continuously try and
recognize the fact that we have a very good Haitian-American
association. We have the opportunity for business, and we
should continuously try and encourage that and make that known.
But we are not going to be able to overcome the tragic flaw
that exists in Haiti, which is that a bunch of leaders down
there, for the past couple hundred of years, have been looking
out more for themselves than they are for the people. You can't
have a democracy under those ground rules. I hope we can
identify those leaders and bring them along and say look, it is
to everybody's advantage to go toward democracy rather than to
keep going back to this authoritarian idea where you take
revenge on the guy who was trying to take a piece out of your
hide last week. We do it pretty well in this country. Sometimes
people say we squabble too much up here, but I think that is
the lesson we have to share.
Mr. Hastings. John.
Mr. Conyers. I am optimistic. When you say 200 years, that
was 200 years without a democratic system. That was the
problem. The problem was resolved successfully, thanks to U.S.
help, by the election of the first democratic President in 200
years there, with Jean-Bertrand Aristide. What we are trying to
do now is continue that, and I think that it can be done. I
think that we have a two-election agreement. The economics and
the--you referred to some very important parts of it. We have
got 3 percent economic growth. From a country that came from
the ashes, 3 percent is maybe not much in a Western situation,
but there it is great.
We have got new agricultural projects with bananas. We now
have from zero factory employment to 40,000 factory workers.
The USAID program for microenterprize loans is being undertaken
by a major Haitian bank. They are checking out cruise lines.
They are getting ready to put $12 million into a cruise line.
These don't demand headlines, but this is the way that you
slowly build up, and I see it happening. I don't think this is
sheer optimism, both in their politics and their economy.
Mr. Hastings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. Ackerman. I would like to yield to Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. I just have one question. I would ask both
Mr. Conyers and Mr. Goss their position in terms of the
Administration's refusal to release the so-called FRAPH
documents. Do you have an opinion on that, Mr. Goss?
Mr. Goss. I will let the Administration speak for itself.
Mr. Delahunt. You don't have an opinion on that.
Mr. Goss. I have an opinion about a lot of things about
this Administration. I share them publicly. But I think that
the problem I have with the Administration is they have not
been realistic, and they have tried to steer a picture of Haiti
which is not an accurate picture of Haiti as it is today.
Mr. Delahunt. But you don't have a position on whether we
have an obligation to release to the Haitian government,
allegedly--and you use that word ``allegedly''--160,000 pages
of documents and video tapes, some allegedly involving torture,
et cetera, during the coup years?
Mr. Goss. I would suggest, on that subject, that we have an
Administration that handles those matters on a case-by-case
basis. We have several such countries around the world where
there are requests for documents. I think the handling of those
documents carefully and fairly should be left to the
Administration. If there is a problem in our oversight of that,
then I think we should jump in. But right now, I am not aware
of a problem.
Mr. Conyers. Mr. Delahunt, this has been a very sensitive
point. Our U.S. military confiscated documents when we entered
into Haiti that now have been redacted so much it is hard for
me to figure out what utility they may have. But for us to say
we are not going to turn them over to the democratic government
because we are sensitive that it may involve some of our
intelligence operations with the Cedras Junta is really a
rather bald violation of the respect that nations should have
for one another. It is in the past, but I think that if they
were revealed it would make everyone feel a lot better; and if
it embarrasses the U.S. a little bit, I don't see where that is
going to turn our status in the world into something different.
If we keep saying we are trying to recognize them as a
nation like us in the Western Hemisphere, we really should turn
those over. It has now become a sore point that is not going to
go away. So I know their demonstrations, their requests, their
petitions; and yet we still have a kind of stonewalling that
makes other people tend to argue that we create world
agreements that are for everybody else but not for us, when
they are inconvenient or potentially embarrassing.
Chairman Gilman. Would the gentleman yield on that? My
staff informs me that the bulk of these documents are available
to the Haitian government at the present time. I thank the
gentleman for yielding. Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. Ackerman. I thank the panel. I look forward to hearing
the next panel. I yield back.
Chairman Gilman. I want to thank our panelists and their
indulgence in our time factor. We thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you for holding these hearings.
Chairman Gilman. We now proceed to our final panelist,
Ambassador Peter Romero, the Acting Assistant Secretary for
Western Hemisphere Affairs. We welcome Ambassador Romero.
Ambassador Romero, you may put your full statement in the
record and summarize. Without objection, your full statement
will be accepted in the record.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR PETER ROMERO, ACTING ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Romero. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I had a statement the
size of a small town telephone book, but I think I will forego
that, with your indulgence please, and just make a few
comments, if I might.
Chairman Gilman. The full statement will be made a part of
the record. Please summarize.
Mr. Romero. September marked the 5th-year anniversary of
U.N.-sanctioned military intervention that restored elected
government to Haiti. Had we and the international community
failed to act, Haiti's nightmarish repression would have
continued, along with flotillas of fleeing refugees. While
deep-seated problems remain, and progress is less than we had
hoped or Haitians had reason to expect, the reality is that
Haiti has experienced the longest period of democratic
government in its history.
Human rights problems continue to be a serious concern. The
kind of political violence of the de facto military regime or
the Duvalier era has ended. The roughly 380 extra judicial and
suspicious killings in the first 8 months of 1994 stand in
stark contrast to 38 reported police killings in 1998. However,
no police killings are acceptable; they are diminished
substantially. Haitians today enjoy an unprecedented level of
freedom of expression and press, and a range of political
parties and civil society groups operate openly.
The United States' goals in Haiti remain unchanged: To help
Haitians reverse the conditions that for nearly two centuries
have mired the Haitian people in poverty and impeded the
development of democracy. To succeed, our policy needs
bipartisan support. Only with such a consensus can we work
effectively with the Haitian authorities and people to meet the
manifold and intractable challenges to reaching our common
goals. We seek to modernize the Haitian state in all its
aspects, construct a nation rooted in the rule of law, and
create a foundation for sustained economic growth.
At the request of Haitian authorities, we and our
international partners have diligently worked together and
bilaterally to help build a professional and apolitical Haitian
National Police.
Some of our efforts in this regard were inhibited this year
by the effective closure, due to lack of funds, of the OAS
component of the UN/OAS International Civilian Mission in
Haiti, or MICIVIH, that has successfully served as the eyes and
ears of the international community in both monitoring and
reporting on police abuse and other human rights violations. We
are currently working with the U.N. and other bilateral donors
to ensure the continuation of U.N. police and human rights
assistance after the November 30th termination of the current
mandate for the U.N. International Civilian Police Mission in
Haiti, MIPONUH, and the December 31st termination of the
MICIVIH mandate.
Continued international engagement is essential to help
train and mentor new police recruits, address continued
management problems among the middle ranks of the HNP, and
promote the strengthening of Haitian institutions in civil
society to ensure improved respect for human rights.
The HNP faces a number of challenges, including a distinct
rise in attrition among the ranks, and an apparent increase in
incidents of human rights abuse and corruption. We are very
concerned about physical attacks in the past month on senior
police leadership that have weakened police moral and pose a
serious threat to police neutrality. We continue to press for a
full investigation of the attacks, and have made clear to
Haiti's leaders that U.S. law enforcement assistance requires
their continued deep commitment to an apolitical security
force.
The U.S. and international community are assisting Haiti in
preparing for elections scheduled for March 19, 2000, to
restore fully the parliament and independent local governments
that lapsed on January 11th of this year. Despite some
organizational difficulties, the Provisional Electoral Council
(CEP) continues to operate in a credible manner, and remains
acceptable to a wide range of political parties. We are very
concerned about the October 24th violent disruption by self-
professed supporters of former-President Aristide at a CEP
rally inaugurating the voter education campaign. This directed
attack was against grass-roots political organizations,
something very vital to the process.
The government of Haiti cannot let actions by a band of
thugs deter Haitians from advancing civil society and voter
education. In addition to possible steps in a bilateral
context, we are urging the political parties participating in
elections to sign and abide by a nonviolence pact presently
being developed by the CEP. We are also urging the CEP and HNP
to improve coordination and communication to prevent a replay
of the October 24th incident.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, Haiti remains by far the poorest
country in this hemisphere, and with one of the most violent
and politically repressive histories. Without U.S. and
international assistance in 1994, Haiti would have remained
under brutal dictatorship. Without continued international
help, there is a real danger Haiti will slip backward. We
cannot retreat from our responsibility to advance prospects for
democracy in Haiti. We must remain engaged in helping Haitians
achieve their goals of strengthening democratic institutions
and sustainable economic growth.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I hope that we can
continue to rely on the bipartisan support from Congress that
we continue to enjoy in this effort. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Romero appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Secretary Romero. I will try to
be brief. Ambassador Carney's good strong statement on the
police suggests that someone, or some group, is seeking to
politicize and seize control of the leadership of the HNP
against the interests of the United States. Who exactly is
involved with this? How should we propose to counter their
efforts?
Mr. Romero. Mr. Chairman, we have heard that through the
years that various people would like to politicize the police
to get them to indulge in one particular political view or
another. We have just recently heard that the government is
considering establishing an informal group to advise the
President on the police. We just heard that a couple of days
ago.
Chairman Gilman. Secretary Romero, we were informed that
President Preval told a recent visiting Canadian delegation
that the elections will not be held in March. What is your
assessment?
Mr. Romero. Through the last several months, President
Preval has not been certain that elections can be held on time.
Of course, they have slipped from December to March 19th now,
with the second round scheduled for the end of April. But let
me just say there were some issues related to why have two
elections; and Congressman Conyers and Congressman Hastings and
Congressman Payne talked about that. I think it is absolutely
vital, in the Haiti context, that small, grass-roots political
parties can organize themselves around an event, field
candidates, have the security of knowing that they can engage
in political activity without reprisals--the single most
important catalyst for democratic development. Certainly the
small parties are no match for the Fanmi Lavalas, the largest
most established party, but they need to have the experience of
being able to contest elections at the grass-roots level. I
think the two elections are absolutely critical to Haiti's
democratic development.
Chairman Gilman. Secretary Romero, the Committee received
an affidavit from a member of the Haitian National Police
stating that witnesses to the killing of Mr. Jean Eddy Lamy saw
a police car with a license plate 302 on it at the scene of the
crime. According to that affidavit, fingerprints recovered from
the police car belonged to a mechanic who was hired by the
police on a recommendation of Danny Toussaint. Have you
received that kind of information?
Mr. Romero. Mr. Chairman, this is the first we are hearing
of this, but I would be happy to look into it.
Chairman Gilman. I wish you would, and we will be pleased
to supply the affidavit to you.
The last question. At our December 1997 Haiti hearing, Mr.
Hamilton, our Ranking Democratic Member at the time, asked
Ambassador David Greenlee for his frank appraisal of Mr.
Aristide, and I recall Ambassador Greenlee was reluctant to
answer his questions, permit me now to pose to you this
question with the same request for your frank assessment: From
an American national-interest standpoint, is Mr. Aristide, at
this point, being helpful or unhelpful?
Mr. Romero. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for saving that
question for me. I think that----
Chairman Gilman. You are welcome.
Mr. Romero. I think that we Americans are people who are
concerned more with deeds than words, and I think that Mr.
Aristide--ex-President Aristide, has an opportunity to
demonstrate his democratic vocation, and that is through his
signature as the leader of the Party Fanmi Lavalas on a
document that the CEP is drafting up right now, that is,
essentially the rules of the game, the decorum, a nonviolence
pact, if you will, among and between political parties in terms
of these elections. Ex-President Aristide has an opportunity to
sign that. I think that one of the major issues related to
these elections is the security surrounding them, particularly
for candidates, and if he signs them, that will, I think, go a
long way in convincing us that he would be a democratic
president.
Chairman Gilman. Secretary Romero, what is the most
important thing that we should be doing to help in the
forthcoming elections?
Mr. Romero. Mr. Chairman, I think we need to keep the
course, or stay the course. I think that the progress is being
made with CEP preparations, and in a positive, fluid way.
Certainly, members of the CEP have had experience on previous
electoral tribunals. They remain widely acceptable to all the
political parties and non-governmental organizations and civil
society. They have begun to branch out regional and municipal
offices in terms of preparations--certainly the electoral card
is one of those manifestations of their organization--and we
believe strongly that they can get it done with good leadership
and the experience that they have on that panel.
Chairman Gilman. Just one last question, Mr. Secretary. The
attack on the head of the Judiciary Police, Mario Andersol,
reported in the Haitian press was very disquieting. In
addition, Police Director General, Pierre Denize, reportedly
was forced to leave Jean Lamy's funeral. Are key members of the
police still being harassed and intimidated, and if so, what is
the source and purpose of that kind of harassment and
intimidation?
Mr. Romero. Mr. Chairman, I went down to Haiti back in May
specifically for the purpose of trying to talk to people about
harassment and intimidation of the police. I have to tell you
that I was not able, I was not successful. But neither has the
virtual parade of Administration folks and Members of both
houses of Congress on that same issue. It is hard to figure out
where this stuff is coming from. Haiti is not easy when it
comes to getting to the bottom of things.
But there were a couple of statements made by Congressmen
Conyers and Payne earlier regarding what motive the Lavalas
Party would have to try to disrupt the elections since ex-
President Aristide basically is the strongest person, at least,
going into the elections later in the year 2000. I guess my
answer to that would be, in the hypothetical, that ex-President
Aristide leads the strongest party in Haiti. That party
basically enjoys, or has contested elections with a turnout of
about 5 to 10 percent.
If we are talking about the types of grass-roots efforts
that happened back in May with the Chamber of Commerce, which
tried to occur at the end of October, in terms of getting out
the vote and voter education and that sort of thing, then there
would be a whole lot more voters out casting their ballots when
it came to March 19th or the second round at the end of April.
Perhaps there are those in the party that don't want that kind
of uncertainty of a bigger voter turnout.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Secretary Romero. Mr. Payne?
Mr. Payne. Thank you. Once again, with the small group of
U.S. military there, talking to some Haitian business people
and American business people on our last trip, there was a
desire, of course, to have this small contingent there. Of
course, I think the Congress voted that they should leave. The
MICIVIH, how do you see them being there? What sort of
positiveness is done, if any? What do you think, or won't it
make any difference whether there is only a handful of them?
When I was there, they had a big softball game going on so I
don't guess there are necessarily very key decisions being made
there. But the fact that they are there, some people felt there
was kind of a reassuring thing. What do you think about them
coming out or staying there?
Mr. Romero. We lost about half of the contingent of MICIVIH
that is there to promote respect for human rights and monitor
the progress. We lost about half of them, about 40, when we
lost funding several months ago. The other 40, approximately,
are there. I think that we are scheduled to lose the police
monitoring entity by the end of November, this month,
approximately about 300 of them. Hopefully, we will be able to
at least keep a semblance of a presence in Haiti. I think it is
very, very important that there be an international presence. I
think that in terms of the reconstruction of police force,
democratic institutions at large, we are still at a very
fragile period, and an international presence is indispensable
for being able to enable those institutions to strike and to
move on under their own weight.
Mr. Payne. I have a question. I am trying to get a picture.
There are a number of people who of course have been opposed to
Haiti, opposed to the intervention of the U.S. military, have
decided that Haiti is a failure even before Aristide was
restored, just some HH'ers I call them, Haters of Haiti. Now,
we look at the fact that people say that Aristide's people are
intending to control the police. They seem to somehow be
leaning toward him. On the other hand, 38 policemen have been
killed; and Aristide is supposed to be--anything that happens
bad, Aristide does it. So you know, I kind of get confused when
these theories--they are all theories that come out, the police
they think are supportive of Aristide, and they should be
independent, and then if an election comes up and the police
are favorable to Aristide that is bad.
On the other hand, 38 policemen have been killed. Of course
Aristide's people wouldn't kill their friends. You see, there
is a lot of disconnect. You say Jean Lamy was killed. When
anyone opposed to Aristide is killed--I am not defending--I
have been down there about a dozen times in the last 7 or 8
years, but it is clearly, and this--and this is around the
House of Representatives--the HH'ers--Aristide did it. On the
other hand, when an Aristide person is killed, it has got to be
drug related.
It appears that there is just a continuing case built up
against Aristide that anything wrong is done by him; anything
that may be going in the right direction, he is opposed to. I
just wondered, is that the general feeling around? Because like
I said, I get confused. There have been some people like the
FRAPH who are not choir boys. I am sure that some of them are
still around. They were not necessarily pro-Aristide, even the
Tonton Macoutes back in the old regime. So I guess my point is
that there seems to be enough tough people to go around for
everyone, but the conclusion is always that if it is wrong or
bad or conspiracy against progress, it is Aristide, no one
else. Can you--have you seen that, or maybe, it is just I have
gotten a one-sided picture, or could you kind of sort it out
for me a little bit since that is your job?
Mr. Romero. I wish I could sort it out better for you,
Congressman Payne. I think there is just--there is probably a
whole lot more that we don't know when you talk about violence
and political assassination in Haiti than what we know. But I
think there are a couple of givens here. One is that President
Preval could exercise a great deal of leadership in showcasing
and reinforcing the public dimension of support for the police.
I think there is a lot to be done that has not been done.
Hopefully, with Bob Manuel's departure and the somewhat
antagonistic relationship between the President and Bob Manuel,
the President can come forth, Vice President can come forth,
and demonstrate their very strong support for an apolitical
police force, effective police force in Haiti. I think the
other part of the equation too is certainly the Lavalas folks
do not have a premium on violence in Haiti. But I do think that
ex-President Aristide has an opportunity to take a big bite out
of the violence by this nonaggression pact that will be on the
table shortly and that I hope he signs.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Payne. Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you. Along those lines of confusion--
and I think it is really important that we are clear that the
information that we receive from Haiti is vague and nebulous at
best.
Mr. Romero. Clear.
Mr. Delahunt. There are some who would suggest, as Mr.
Payne just articulated very well, that everything bad is the
responsibility of ex-President Aristide, and that anything good
is clearly just mere happenstance. Now, I don't know, and I
don't think that you know, Secretary Romero; but I do agree
that the former-President does have an opportunity to exercise
some leadership here. He clearly is well respected by a
majority of the Haitian people. I think it was Mr. Goss who
indicated that his election in 1990 was a valid election. He
secured, I think it was 67 percent of the vote at that point in
time.
I take this opportunity to--and I mean this sincerely,
through you to the Haitian government, to whatever contacts we
might have with the former-President--I think it is important
for him to sign this particular nonaggression pact, if you
will. Because I think it is a statement, and I think, given his
stature in Haitian society, it is important. I think many
friends of the former-President have indicated some
disappointment in his lack of clarity on this issue, and I
would put myself in that particular category.
The former-President had an opportunity to put himself in a
position in terms of Haitian history, which has been a very sad
history--over 200 years of brutality--to really accomplish what
President Mandela has done in South Africa. I think we are at a
very critical juncture here in terms of where Haitian society
goes or where this country goes. I think the reality is there
is an opportunity here for the former-President to achieve a
role in his nation's history that is clearly dramatic in terms
of bringing it to and nurturing a nation's democracy that you
mentioned.
I just give you that opinion to transfer it. Maybe I will
have an opportunity to convey it myself. But it is such a bad
mistake to completely reach conclusions about incidents. I am
aware of two or three different incidents.
Let's put this in context. Would you agree the most recent
incident, which was November 6th, the police did intervene and
made an arrest? There haven't been any political assassinations
that I am aware of in the past several months that are
conclusively determined to be political assassinations. We are
making some progress. It is not what I would like to see; it is
not what anybody would like to see, but we have got to
understand the reality of Haiti at this point in time.
You know that I opposed, on the Floor, the amendment that
reduced the funding, or rather I have opposed the reduced
funding for MICIVIH. I would encourage the Administration,
given the tenuous nature of the next 4 or 5 months, to reopen
negotiations with the appropriate Members of Congress to see
whether, on an emergency basis, that we could not just simply
restore that funding, but to increase it, at least for a period
of time.
Many allegations have been made about the police. What we
have done is we have reduced the funding for that agency which
provided a mechanism to inform the world about the conduct of
the police. It is just counterintuitive. It just doesn't make
any sense. It is not a lot of money. If we talk about democracy
and we talk about our concern about the police, this is
probably the most opportune time we will ever have. So I would
make that request through you to the appropriate officials in
the Administration to reopen discussions with those to see that
if, not only can we restore the funds, but to raise them to a
level so that we can hopefully assist in assuring the integrity
of the elections on March 19th.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, could
you tell us how much electoral assistance in dollars we now
provide to Haiti.
Mr. Romero. Congressman Ackerman, I think what we are
talking about is approximately $16 million for the conduct of,
to the work up and then the actual elections, and counting two
rounds, and approximately $2 million of that would be earmarked
for the police, equipment, other kinds of things related to
security, including renting two helicopters.
Mr. Ackerman. Is that, in your judgment, sufficient so that
we could guarantee fair and free elections?
Mr. Romero. I think the sum is sufficient, Congressman
Ackerman. I think what is deficient is the amount of policemen
on the ground in Haiti, and when you are talking about
approximately 5,500 policemen, more or less, you are talking
about the ability to put probably about 4,000 cops in the
various voting precincts, various voting centers, of which
there will be about 13. Certainly the cops will be sent to
those places where one would expect to have some potential for
disruption. But you begin to see the magnitude of the
differences between what law enforcement has at its disposal
and the elections themselves.
Mr. Ackerman. So the number of police are insufficient?
Mr. Romero. Absolutely.
Mr. Ackerman. Is there a way that we can help with that?
Mr. Romero. Yes. But over the short term there really is no
easy fix.
Mr. Ackerman. Is that a function of dollars or policy?
Mr. Romero. It is a function of absorption. It is a
function of the attrition rate of the police whereby the long
hours, 12 hour days, 6 days a week, the relatively low pay
compared to other places in the economy is causing an attrition
rate that is equal to, and I think may even begin surpassing,
the intake rate.
Mr. Ackerman. If people leave the police force, where are
they going?
Mr. Romero. There are just all kind of jobs, as security
guards and other kinds of things in the economy.
Mr. Ackerman. So security guards are paying more than
police?
Mr. Romero. Apparently.
Mr. Ackerman. In 1995, Aristide reneged on his commitment
that he had made to privatize many government enterprises.
International assistance basically came to not a grinding stop,
but it was reduced enormously. If he were to be elected again,
what do you think his approach to economic reforms would be?
Mr. Romero. It would be hard to say, Congressman Ackerman.
I think there is at least a rhetorical commitment to economic
reform, to include privatization. But ex-President Aristide has
mentioned his intention to talk about the issue of reform and
privatization in the context of a national dialogue, and I
think it still remains to be seen whether that would mean an
acceleration of the process or a further paralysis of the
privatization process.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. The Congress has basically
prohibited DOD from maintaining a continued presence there
beyond the end of May of this coming year. In view of the
political violence and the impending elections, problems in the
police that you have cited, many believe that a U.S. presence
should continue there. What would your response be to that, and
what do you think the effect would be if we removed the U.S.
troops?
Mr. Romero. Congressman, I think, without the slightest bit
of hyperbole, that the U.S. military presence there has had a
very important symbolic value, and that is that we care, we are
engaged as a people, and that essentially we are behind those
Haitian democrats who want to move ahead on a democratic
agenda. But by far, the more important entity on the ground, in
terms of law and order, is obviously the Haitian police and
also the international organizations that we have established
with the Haitians to advance human rights practices and
monitoring the police. Those institutions will face essentially
an end to funding by the end of November, and the end of
December, respectively. We are hoping to stand up another
organization that will fold all of these functions into one,
and hopefully would be sufficient enough. But that is really
where the support must come.
Mr. Ackerman. You have come back to the police on a couple
of these questions now. Do we have a specific program or a
policy? Have we engaged them in discussions on raising the
salaries of police to help reverse that rate of attrition?
Mr. Romero. I am not so sure we have had a recent
discussion on salaries, but we have had repeated discussions on
issues related to supporting, publicly supporting, the police,
enhancing their stature, enhancing their morale. I worked in El
Salvador as a Chief of Mission in 1992 and 1993. We created a
10,000 man police force from nothing, and it was only because
of the strong leadership of then President Freddie Cristiani
that that was able to be done. I don't see that strong
leadership as it relates to the police, at least not yet.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. I yield back my time, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman. One last question
before you leave, Mr. Secretary. The list of major drug
producing and major transit nations was due to be submitted on
November 1st to the Congress. It is now a week late. The
designation of Cuba on the major's list is one that many
Members have been following very closely. I hope that you
aren't waiting until Congress leaves town before sending us a
list. The head of the Spanish National Police told my staff
last week that, as to the 7\1/2\ tons of cocaine from Columbia
intended to transit Cuba last December, that all the Spanish
authorities know it was headed for Cuba, and not Spain.
Secretary Romero, can you tell us when we could expect to
receive the list?
Mr. Romero. Mr. Chairman, as you well know, I don't have
responsibility, direct responsibility, for the list since I
only deal in the Western Hemisphere, and it is a worldwide
list.
Chairman Gilman. I recognize it is out of your----
Mr. Romero. But that having been said, I would hope that
you would get it in the next couple of days. I know that we are
putting our finishing touches on it, both the State Department,
and White House a few days ago.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you for
being here today. We thank you for your patience.
Mr. Romero. Thank you.
Chairman Gilman. The Committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
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