[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN EAST TIMOR
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
Thursday, September 30, 1999
__________
Serial No. 106-84
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
63-316 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
DANA ROHRABACHER, California SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PETER T. KING, New York PAT DANNER, Missouri
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South BRAD SHERMAN, California
Carolina ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MATT SALMON, Arizona STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
AMO HOUGHTON, New York JIM DAVIS, Florida
TOM CAMPBELL, California EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
KEVIN BRADY, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BARBARA LEE, California
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
GEORGE P. RADANOVICH, California JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff
------
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
PETER T. KING, New York BRAD SHERMAN, California
MATT SALMON, Arizona WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
Grover Joseph Rees, Subcommittee Staff Director
Douglas C. Anderson, Counsel
Gary Stephen Cox, Democratic Staff Director
Nicolle A. Sestric, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
----------
WITNESSES
Page
Hon. Harold Hongiu Koh, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State.............. 11
Hon. Julia Taft, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Department of State.............. 17
Mr. Xanana Gusmao, President, National Council of Timorese
Resistance..................................................... 32
Mr. Jose Ramos-Horta, 1996 Nobel Peace Prize Winner, Vice
President, National Council of Timorese Resistance............. 34
Mr. Allan Nairn, Journalist, former detainee in East Timor....... 44
Mr. Arnold S. Kohen, Biographer of Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo.... 55
Mr. T. Kumar, Advocacy Director, Amnesty International, U.S.A.... 40
Ms. Emilia Peres, escapee of East Timor.......................... 50
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Hon. Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from the
State of New Jersey, Chairman, Subcommittee on International
Operations and Human Rights.................................... 74
Ms. Julia V. Taft................................................ 77
Mr. Arnold S. Kohen.............................................. 81
Mr. T. Kumar..................................................... 84
Ms. Emilia Perse................................................. 96
Additional Material:
Statement by U.S. Defense Secretary William S. Cohen............. 97
Statement by Spokesman James B. Foley, U.S. Department of State.. 98
Statement from the Multinational Humanitarian Mission............ 99
The Washington Post, ``Another Messy Apartment,'' September 10,
1999........................................................... 101
The Tablet, ``Going Home with Bishop Belo,'' by Arnold Kohen,
October 23, 1999............................................... 102
U.S. News and World Report, ``A Plea for Peace From Someone Near
Hell,'' September 27, 1999..................................... 103
THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN EAST TIMOR
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Thursday, September 30, 1999
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on International
Operations and Human Rights,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:30 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Christopher H. Smith
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Smith. Today's hearing is about the continuing
humanitarian and human rights crisis in East Timor, and about
the past, present, and future of U.S. policy toward that
country. I am particularly pleased that one of our witnesses
will be East Timorese independence leader, Xanana Gusmao, who I
first met in Cipinang Prison in May of last year.
We will also hear from the State Department, from our two
distinguished witnesses who will be the lead-off panel, and
from Nobel Peace Prize winner, Jose Ramos-Horta, and from
several other distinguished experts and human rights advocates.
When I visited Indonesia about 1\1/2\ years ago, just after
the fall of the Suharto Regime, I hoped not only that democracy
would come to Indonesia, but also that the people of East Timor
would finally get the chance to exercise their right of self-
determination. But I did not dream this exercise would occur so
soon. Now that the referendum in East Timor is history and the
people have spoken, it should be a time for congratulations and
celebration.
Instead, however, the post-election period has become a
time of mass killings, forced relocations, and other grave
human rights violations. Although these atrocities were
ostensibly committed by anti-independence East Timorese
militias, it is clear that they were assisted and probably
directed by important elements in the Indonesian military.
Nobody knows how high the chain of complicity extends into
the Indonesian military command, and nobody knows, as yet, how
many thousands of people have been killed. Even now, although
the international peacekeeping force is doing great work in
Dili and a few other locations in East Timor, in other places
it appears that the brutal campaign of destruction carried out
by the militias and their Indonesian military sponsors
continues.
The arrest this week in East Timor of a number of KOPASSUS
soldiers is a clear indication of this. I have to wonder
whether any of these killers were trained by our Government. I
hope that Secretary of Defense Cohen will send a strong message
during his visit that there will be no more military training,
no more assistance of the military kind, and no other
nonhumanitarian assistance to the Government of Indonesia until
the perpetrators of these atrocities, however high-ranking they
may be, are held accountable.
In the meantime, the United States must provide whatever
assistance is necessary to get the peacekeeping force in full
and immediate control of the entirety of East Timor.
Specifically, the Administration has requested $140 million for
a contribution to peacekeeping in East Timor.
I understand this amount will be fully off-set by
reductions in various nonhumanitarian accounts. Although this
request has come in subsequent to both the House and Senate
passage of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for fiscal
year 2000, I will work to get it included the conference
report, and I urge my colleagues on the Appropriations
Committee to provide the necessary appropriations.
We also need to step up humanitarian assistance to prevent
people who are still hiding in the hills, as well as those who
have returned to their burned-out homes, from dying of
starvation and disease.
Finally, international humanitarian organizations,
including the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees must be given
immediate and complete access to the refugees in West Timor.
There are, as you know, credible reports that people are being
murdered in these camps by the same militias and the same
Indonesian soldiers who were murdering them a few days ago in
East Timor, and that many of the refugees may be forced to
relocate in other parts of Indonesia.
We must insist that a transparent and secure process be set
up immediately to find out how many of these refugees wish to
return to East Timor and to assist them in returning. I
understand there are also East Timorese living in Jakarta and
elsewhere in Indonesia who are in grave danger.
I hope the United States will assist in arrangements for
the immediate evacuation of these people. It may be possible to
find temporary asylum for them in safe countries in the Asia-
Pacific region. If not, we should offer them a safe haven in
the United States until it becomes feasible for them to return
to East Timor. Every day these urgent measures are delayed,
more people will die. So, our immediate emphasis must be on
addressing these elements of the current humanitarian crisis.
I hope, however, that our witnesses will speak not only to
the immediate present, but also to the past, and to the future.
First, we must analyze and learn from the mistakes we have
made, particularly in our relationship with the Indonesian
military. We armed them, trained them, conducted joint
exercises with them, even gave them honors and awards, on the
theory that this would make them less likely to violate the
internationally recognized and God-given human rights of their
own people and of the people of the captive nation of East
Timor.
It now seems clear that we were wrong. The recent
suspension of U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military relationship
is a positive step. An even more positive step would be for
Congress to enact, and the President to sign, legislation which
would set forth clearly the conditions on which that suspension
will either continue or be lifted, including full compliance
with Indonesia's international agreements regarding East Timor,
immediate release of the refugees in West Timor, top-to-bottom
reform of the military, and accountability for those who have
committed human rights violations.
The Feingold-Helms bill, which should soon pass the Senate,
contains all of these provisions, and I am a co-sponsor of the
companion House bill introduced by Congressman Pat Kennedy,
H.R. 2895. I promise to work for the passage of this
legislation in the House, and I urge the Administration to
endorse it and to work for it as well.
As for the future, we must discuss how to rebuild East
Timor and to set the new country on the road to self-
sufficiency. One benchmark for how much help we should give
East Timor could be the amount of our past assistance,
including bilateral aid, as well as World Bank and IMF money,
that contributed directly or indirectly to suppression and then
destruction in East Timor.
Finally, I want to emphasize that Indonesia is not the
enemy. Individual murderers and thugs, and whatever structures
within the military and the Government of Indonesia allowed
them to remain and prosper, are the enemy. Whatever his
weaknesses, President B.J. Habibie deserves credit for agreeing
to the referendum in the first place.
I am also pleased that Megawati Sukarnoputri, who will
probably be Indonesia's next President, has issued strong
statements accepting the results of the referendum and
condemning the violence. So, it is important to make clear that
the United States should look forward to a continued friendly
relationship with the Indonesian people, and even the
Indonesian Government, but only on the clear conditions that
the killing must stop, the killers must be brought to justice,
and the system must be reformed to ensure that nothing of this
sort ever happens again.
I would like to yield to my good friend, Cynthia McKinney,
the Ranking Member of this Subcommittee, for any opening
comments she might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith appears in the
appendix.]
Ms. McKinney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to open by personally thanking you for your
leadership and concern about this human rights tragedy that has
unfolded in East Timor. I would also like to thank my
colleague, Congressman Patrick Kennedy, who has initiated
several legislative measures on East Timor. I am a very proud
co-sponsor of them all.
Mr. Chairman, I would also like to recognize the courage of
Xanana Gusmao, Jose Ramos-Horta, and Allan Nairn who have all
stood up against the might of the Indonesian military. Through
their ongoing courage, they have revealed the full horrors of
Indonesia's illegal occupation of East Timor. They have told
the world of mass killings, widespread rape, and the systematic
destruction of democracy in East Timor.
These brave men here today are the voice of the voiceless.
Their heroic qualities and personal sacrifice does not go
unnoticed. We are honored to be in their presence.
Mr. Chairman, the U.S. Government has blood on its hands as
a result of our dealings with the Indonesian military over in
East Timor.
Without a shadow of a doubt, the recent events in East
Timor, are like the human rights disasters which unfolded in
Rwanda in 1994, and then Srebrenica in 1995. Mr. Chairman,
under your leadership, this Committee has now conducted two
hearings into these great tragedies. We have heard chilling
evidence against the United Nations, accusing it of
deliberately surrendering the peoples of Rwanda and Srebrenica
to almost certain death.
Despite so much suffering caused by cowardness, callous
indifference, and gross levels of negligence. The world appears
to have learned nothing. We are gathered here once more to hear
allegations that the world has failed to confront mass killing
and other grave human rights abuses. This time, the place is
East Timor. What is also incredible is that the world has stood
idly by for 25 years and allowed Indonesian security forces to
murder an estimated 200,000 East Timorese.
Mr. Chairman, the United States has much to be ashamed of.
Our foreign policy toward Indonesia, and ultimately East Timor,
is simply unconscionable. The American people deserve to know
the truth about our Government's complicity in Indonesian's
subjugation of the people of East Timor. Indonesia was decided
to be of strategic U.S. economic and military interest because
of its location near vital sea lanes used by U.S. military and
commercial fleets.
The world now knows that President Gerald Ford and his
former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, surrendered East
Timor to the Suharto regime. Claiming that intervention was
necessary to restore peace and security to East Timor,
Indonesia invaded on December 7, 1975, 1 day after President
Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger departed from a
Summit meeting in Jakarta.
Mr. Chairman, that action was an explicit green light for
Indonesia to invade East Timor. For 25 years, the U.S.
Government has chosen to ignore Indonesia's ongoing crimes. We
have turned our backs on international law. We have ignored the
United Nations' instruments detailing the collective laws of
nations on fundamental human rights, the 1948 Declaration of
Human Right, the 1948 Genocide Convention, and associated
protocols, and the more recent Torture Convention.
Worse still, we have been directly involved in the crimes
committed in East Timor by the Indonesian military. We trained
the notorious KOPASSUS, the dreaded Indonesian special forces
at the School of the Americas in my own home State of Georgia,
and by special American forces on-the-ground in Indonesia. In
light of the extensive evidence confirming that Indonesian
military forces were murdering and committing grave crimes in
East Timor, Congress voted in 1992 to cut military aid to
Indonesia.
Despite this vote, the Department of Defense used another
program to maintain its support to Indonesian military. We have
every indication that the KOPASSUS is still operating in East
Timor, even as we hold these hearings. Mr. Chairman, what makes
the recent outbreak of violence and killings in East Timor more
egregious, is that once again we knew it was going to happen.
Clearly, Indonesian military forces were preparing the
militia to attack the courageous citizens of East Timor who
chose independence, despite the lurking and ever-present
militia. The U.N.'s decision to insist upon waiting for the
Indonesian Government to invite the international community
into East Timor to stop the murderous campaign it was itself
directing was in fact an explicit invitation for Indonesia to
carry out a scorched dearth policy.
What can we say as Members of Congress to the people of
East Timor? No amounts of apologies from the U.S. Government
can resurrect the 200,000 victims of genocide. No apology can
ever make up for our culpability in the demise of personal
freedom in East Timor, freedom that every American takes for
granted on a daily basis.
Let it be known that there are those of us in Congress who
are working for a responsible arms transfer code of conduct to
prevent the transfer of arms to dictatorial regimes. There are
those of us who want to hold the Department of Defense
accountable when they find loopholes to bypass the wishes of
the American people.
There are those of us in Congress who are calling for the
creation of an international criminal court. Ms. Mary Robinson,
the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights, has called
upon the U.N. to initiate a War Crimes Tribunal to investigate
the gross violations of human rights law in East Timor. I
support her call.
The United States cannot continue to hope to command
respect in the world where, on one hand, we demand that all
nations to help us to prosecute those persons or regimes
responsible for bombing our embassies, attacking our aircraft,
or otherwise harming our National interests, while we continue
to support dictators or regimes guilty of committing genocide
and crimes against humanity against innocent peoples.
The mass murder, the torturer, the ethnic cleanser are
enemies of all mankind and they are repugnant to civilized
society. They can never be our allies or our friends. When we
knowingly aid and abet them to commit their vile crimes, we
become as guilty as they, and we should stand condemned.
Mr. Chairman, we were once a great force in the world,
known for our generosity and courage in the face of adversity.
In two World Wars, we were a leader in their fight to preserve
democracy and ensure that the world was not consumed by evil.
Today, we are fighting to maintain our reputation as a
world leader. Many believe we have lost our moral compass. East
Timor is another test for us. How we conduct ourselves there
will be a good indicator on whether or not we have the ability
or the intention to meet our legal and moral obligations as a
member and leader of the world community.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ms. McKinney appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Smith. Ms. McKinney, thank you for your very powerful
and comprehensive statement.
The Chair recognizes the Chairman of the Full Committee,
Mr. Gilman.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to commend our distinguished Chairman of our
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights, the
gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith, and Ranking Minority
Member, Ms. McKinney, for holding this very important and
relevant hearing today regarding the humanitarian crisis in
East Timor.
I want to take this opportunity to welcome our two
distinguished panelists who are before us right now, the
Honorable Harold Koh, our Assistant Secretary for Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor in the State Department; and the
Honorable Julia Taft, the Assistant Secretary for Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and Migration, who is no stranger to this
Committee.
We thank both of you for being here today. I am still
troubled, as my colleagues are, by the situation in East Timor.
Although the first elements of a multinational force, led by
our friends, the Australians, and supported by some American
troops, have landed on the island.
There are still many challenges ahead. The extent of these
challenges is only now becoming known. First, the Government of
Indonesia must abide by its commitment to respect the results
of the August 30th referendum and the rights of the East
Timorese to a peaceful transition to independence. President
Habibie's comments, although tragically late, ``Indonesia must
honor and accept that choice.''
It is an important step. It is hoped that his words will be
fulfilled by his deeds. Accordingly, the Indonesian parliament
must ratify the popular decision of the people of East Timor at
an early date and set East Timor on its course toward
independence.
Second, the Indonesian military, which participated in the
violence, and aided and abetted the militias, should fully
withdraw from East Timor. This will allow refugees and
displaced persons to return home from West Timor and elsewhere
confident of their safety.
It will also reduce the likelihood of a class with a
multinational force. We have been informed that hundreds of
thousands of East Timorese have been displaced under the gun
and moved to West Timor.
Third, I urge the international community to investigate
the human rights abuses and the atrocities which occurred in
the aftermath of the elections. We call upon the Government of
Indonesia to hold fully accountable those responsible for the
reprehensible acts of violence. We need to have an
international criminal tribunal to begin an investigation into
what is and what has taken place.
Mr. Chairman, finally in the light of these devastating
events, the Administration must reevaluate its military
relationship with the Indonesian armed forces. The Pentagon
should conduct a full-scale review of its military-to-military
relationship with Jakarta, including the effectiveness of the
IMET Program and joint training and exercises and our arms
sales.
The Pentagon should not reinstitute any aspect of the
military relationship without full consultation with the
Congress. Earlier this week, the House passed our resolution,
H.R. 292, and sent it to the Congress regarding the present
situation in East Timor.
Due to the situation on the ground, we need to consider
further legislative initiatives to make certain that our Nation
is doing all that it can to stop the killing and end the
humanitarian crisis. If the Administration does not take strong
measures, there is bipartisan Congressional support for
suspending multilateral and bilateral economic and military
assistance until the following conditions are met:
that the refugees can safely return to their homes, that
terrorizing and murder of innocent civilians and targeting of
local religious leaders have ceased, that the militias in both
East and West Timor have been disarmed and their leaders
prosecuted, and the independence of East Timor becomes a
reality.
In addition, we need full cooperation from the Indonesian
Government for an international criminal tribunal. We look
forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses today. Our
friends from East Timor have fought so courageously with little
but their cause to sustain them.
They have lost family and friends. We hope their suffering
will soon end. While our Nation and the world community has
been slow to respond to their calls for help throughout the
years, we must not lose sight of all that they have
accomplished for future generations of East Timorese.
In addition, that small nation of East Timor, about the
size of Israel in the vast Pacific Ocean, has given hope beyond
measure to those in similar circumstances who are continuing to
struggle for their own freedom. Let us not forget that when
they take their seat at the U.N.
We look forward to hearing from our witnesses today. Again,
I thank our Chairman for conducting this hearing.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Gilman. Thank you for
all your good work you have done for many years on East Timor.
You certainly have been a real leader.
I would like to recognize the gentleman from American
Samoa, Mr. Faleomavaega.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to personally offer my welcome to Secretary Taft and
Secretary Koh for making available their time to come and
testify before this Committee. Mr. Chairman, I cannot thank you
enough for your leadership over the years in conducting
hearings affecting human rights violations throughout the
world. Specifically, we have held hearings on East Timor for
the past 3 or 4 years on this very issue of human rights
violations.
The atrocities that the Indonesian military have committed
against the people of East Timor are certainly unwarranted. I
want to say, Mr. Chairman, that I fully associate myself with
the statements made earlier by my colleague and good friend,
the Ranking Member of our Subcommittee, the gentle lady from
Georgia.
Given this sense of perspective of history, I know that
perhaps we cannot go back and undo the sins of the past, but I
think we have to remember quite clearly that I can well
remember what the poet Santayana once said, that those who do
not remember the past are condemned to repeat their mistakes.
The sad legacy that we can associate with what is going on with
East Timor is the fact that the atrocities did not happen just
2 or 3 years ago.
This has been going on for 25 years. I have to say that the
full responsibility lies with the international community,
whether it be a lack of will, whether it be a lack of political
fortitude or whatever. They were just as much a part of the
complicity, given the fact that until this day, the world
community never sanctioned Indonesia's military, which killed
200,000 East Timorese. Even our own country never officially
sanctioned the Indonesian Government for this military takeover
that was done under the auspices of these two dictators,
Sukarno and Suharto.
Mr. Chairman, one of the things that I find quite
interesting that the media has never publicized, is why so much
interest in East Timor, not only by the Indonesian Government,
but even by some of our friendly Western countries? It is
because of the oil reserves.
Billions of dollars' worth of oil there perhaps contributed
to the reluctance of friendly Western nation to interfere with
Indonesia because of the vast amount of resources and corporate
interests in this area in East Timor. I say this, Mr. Chairman,
with a real sense of congratulations. I want to congratulate
Mr. Horta and Mr. Gusmao, and the people of East Timor, that
they have finally, after 25 years of struggle, been given an
international referendum on independence, where they have
spoken, despite all of the intimidation by the Indonesian
militia.
Over 78 percent of Timorese voted in favor of independence.
I am so happy for them. I want to also say for the record, Mr.
Chairman, I have the fondest love and affection for the good
people of Indonesia, but it is the government policies under
the leadership of these dictators that has caused so much
misery and the sad legacy that we now have come to evidence
with East Timor.
I have said it before, Mr. Chairman, and I am going to say
it again. I want to thank the American people, our fellow
Americans of Portuguese ancestry and the country of Portugal
itself, for bringing this issue to the forefront for the past
25 years until finally it is evident that people of East Timor
they want to be independent.
There is another area too, Mr. Chairman, that I want to
discuss. You cannot talk about East Timor, while at the same
time ignoring the atrocities, the massacres, and the brutality
of the Indonesian army that is currently being targeted against
the people of West Papua New Guinea. We cannot ignore that.
I Humbly submit, Mr. Chairman, that this is going to be the
next chapter to unfold in the coming years. Mr. Chairman, this
is not to suggest, as stated by friendly leaders from some of
the Western countries, that, we should be afraid that this will
lead to Balkanization of Indonesian.
The fact of the matter is, Mr. Chairman, West Papua New
Guinea was also taken over by the Indonesian military at the
cost of over 100,000 West Papua New Guineas who so far have
died, disappeared, massacred the same way, the brutality of the
Indonesian military had taken against the people of East Timor.
Why the interest in West Papua New Guinea? I will tell you,
Mr. Chairman. The largest gold mine and copper operations now
currently going on in West Papua New Guinea are owned by
Western nations. Freeport-McMoran company from the United
States, alone with businesses from Australia and, the United
Kingdom, have vast economic and corporate interests in this
area at the expense of the environment and the lives and the
welfare of the Papuan people. Let us not talk about
Balkanization. It has been proven that East Timor and West
Papua New Guinea had no relationship whatsoever with the
government of Indonesia. Given the fact that these were former
colonies and now is it OK for another country to colonize
another colony? This is ridiculous, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, this is not an Asian issue, but an issue of
humanity. These are human beings. This is not just about East
Timorese or West Papua New Guineans people of a darker
complexion, who can be ignored because this is not Kosovo,
because our interests primarily rest in Europe.
Mr. Chairman, if that is the policy of our Administration
and this Government, then I say shame on America. Mr. Chairman,
again, I want to thank you. I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to applaud the speakers that have gone before. They
have covered much of the ground that I would like to cover.
They covered it very well. I would like to add very little.
East Timor was in the news nationally and internationally in
the mid-1970's when it was conquered.
It was then swept off the front pages. A few people here in
this House, a few people around the United States and around
the world kept the flame alive. We owe a debt of gratitude to
the Nobel Committee, to people here in the United States, but
especially to the courage of the East Timorese themselves, who
have endured for 25 years in a cause that so many thought was
hopeless and that may very well have turned out to have been
hopeless had it not been for a weakness in the dictatorial
regime of Indonesia caused by other factors.
I think we should commend the Government of Australia for
sending, I believe it is, 8,000 of its people into this effort.
Proportionately, that is like the United States sending over
100,000 of our men and women into harm's way. At the same time,
we should show concern for the fact that Japan has once again
chosen not to contribute in any significant way to peacekeeping
efforts. When Japan did not contribute significantly to Kosovo,
they said, that is Europe. This is the Asia-Pacific region and
it is time for Japan not to regard its mistakes and even crimes
of the first half of this Century as an excuse for not doing
its part in the second part of the Century.
Finally, we need to look forward to East Timor acquiring
peace and prosperity. Toward that end, we have to be willing to
extend aid. One thing that may be just as important would be to
reallocate the textile quota, to reduce the textile quota for
Indonesia and to allocate some of that textile quota to East
Timor.
I look forward to the day when we see imports from East
Timor here in the United States. Perhaps starting with textiles
and maybe someday after that it will be computers and higher
priced items.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr.
Crowley.
Mr. Crowley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I, too, will be brief. I want to thank you for holding this
important hearing on the humanitarian crisis in East Timor. The
situation in East Timor deteriorated so rapidly that the
international community, and I am going to be giving the
benefit of the doubt here, was caught off-guard, despite
previous warnings of possible violence by pro-Indonesian
militia, after the historic referendum.
I am pleased and encouraged that the U.N. Security Council
approved the resolution to deploy a multinational force to East
Timor, and that half of the 8,000 troops for the Australian-led
multinational force are currently on the ground in East Timor.
This sorely needed action by the U.N. will provide the security
and hope that East Timor needs to build itself into an
independent nation.
However, food and medical care remains scarce. Hundreds of
thousands of East Timorese are in hiding or refugees detained
in West Timor. Despite the grim reminders of violence that
permeated the area, from every indication I have read, things
are looking a bit brighter.
On Tuesday, the United Nations agreed to form a Commission
of Inquiry, despite the objections of the Indonesian Government
to investigate abuses committed by departing troops and militia
members in retaliation for the vote for independence in East
Timor. I am hopeful that a full War Crimes Tribunal will be
conveyed as soon as possible and that indictments will be
handed down.
Mr. Chairman, despite this positive news, the situation in
East Timor is volatile and will remain so for some time. I am
grateful to you for calling this open hearing so that Members
of this Committee can better understand the challenges ahead
for East Timor.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Crowley.
The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. I think everything has been said that I
would want to say. I particularly want to acknowledge the
leadership of the gentleman from American Samoa. He has been
speaking to this issue for a very long period of time. I think
that we could feel his passion, his commitment, and how
conversant he is with this issue.
I would also pause just to reflect for a moment on the
military-to-military relationship. Recently, I think it was
back in July 1998 when Assistant Secretary of Defense, Mr.
Kramer, argued that, and I am quoting from his appearance
before this Subcommittee, that ``By helping professionalize the
Indonesian armed forces, we can help reduce human rights
abuses.''
That certainly is a policy that has failed and failed
miserably. It is time that this Committee and this Congress
revisit the military-to-military relationships and the training
of foreign troops by our Department of Defense.
I yield back.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Delahunt.
I would like to welcome our very distinguished panel, panel
No. 1, from the Administration. The Honorable Harold Koh was
appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor in 1998. Before that appointment, Mr. Koh
served both as professor of international law and as the
Director of the Center for International Human Rights at Yale
Law School.
This Subcommittee has had a very good relationship with him
in that former job, as well as the current job that he
occupies. Assistant Secretary Koh earned both his B.A. and law
degrees from Harvard University. He has authored numerous
articles on international law and human rights.
Second, the Honorable Julia Taft has served as Assistant
Secretary of the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
since November 1997. Before becoming Assistant Secretary, Ms.
Taft was President and CEO of Inter Action, again, another
organization that this Subcommittee and many of us have had a
lot of cooperation with and have worked very closely with.
Her involvement with refugee issues began in 1975 when
President Ford named her Director of the Interagency Task Force
for Indo-China Refugees. The Resettlement Program, which Ms.
Taft directed, helped to bring more than 130,000 Indo-Chinese
refugees into the United States.
Thank you for being here. Secretary Koh, if you could
begin.
STATEMENT OF HON. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
Mr. Koh. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee,
thank you for this invitation to testify today about the human
rights and humanitarian emergency in East Timor.
I have a written statement, with your permission, I would
submit for the record and summarize here.
Mr. Smith. Without objection, your full statement will be
made a part of the record.
Mr. Koh. Thank you. As Secretary Albright has said, the
continuing humanitarian crisis in East Timor and the growing
tragedy of East Timorese refugees in West Timor are of acute
concern. They demand our attention and, I might add, that of
anyone in the world committed to democracy and human rights.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing at this
critical moment. I commend this Committee for its leadership
role in passing Tuesday a House resolution that condemns the
violence in East Timor, supports the United Nations mission,
UNAMET, and recognizes that U.S. foreign policy will require
both an effective short-term response to the humanitarian and
human rights crisis, as well as progress toward independence
for East Timor.
Mr. Chairman, last November immediately after being sworn
as Assistant Secretary, I traveled to Jakarta where I met
government officials, labor, and religious leaders, and human
rights activists to discuss the immense challenges of curbing
human rights abuses, promoting accountability, and bringing
about a successful democratic transition in what is the fourth
largest country in the world.
This past March, I renewed that dialogue with special focus
on the East Timor situation, when I accompanied Secretary
Albright to Indonesia and met with President Habibie, Foreign
Minister Alatas, Megawati Soekarnoputri, General Wiranto,
Indonesian citizens who were committed to human rights and
independence in East Timor, and East Timorese leader, Xanana
Gusmao, while he was still under house arrest. In recent weeks,
I have met three times with Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Jose
Ramos Horta and, again, with Mr. Gusmao. I have spoken to
numerous Members of Congress, U.S. and U.N. officials, NGO
workers, journalists, and concerned citizens who are dedicated
to bringing this crisis to an end.
Since the violence erupted in East Timor, I have worked
closely with Secretary Albright and supported her intense
commitment to bring about an end to the violence, hold those
responsible accountable, and help East Timor make a successful
transition to independence. During the past 2 weeks, at the
U.N. General Assembly in New York, many people from many
nations have been working literally around the clock to address
the crisis. I can tell you from my personal observation that
the Secretary raised the issue in almost every meeting she held
with her counterparts from all over the world. Just a few days
ago, Secretary Albright and I, met again with Mr. Gusmao, Mr.
Ramos-Horta, and their colleagues, who will be joining us here
shortly. I share the Secretary's deep respect for their
commitment to East Timor and to reconciliation and democracy. I
am particularly pleased to welcome Mr. Gusmao to Washington for
the first time as a free man making his first visit to our
Nation's capital.
I am especially pleased to be here today with my courageous
friend and colleague, Julia Taft, the Secretary for Population,
Refugees, and Migration. You have described her tremendous
accomplishments. But let me say that she has just returned from
the region where she has devoted countless hours toward
addressing problem, and indeed has risked her own personal
safety to do so. Both of us are working closely with our
Ambassador to Indonesia, Stapleton Roy, the incoming
Ambassador, Robert Gelbard, and the Assistant Secretary for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Stanley Roth, who has followed
developments closely, made repeated trips to the region, and
has dedicated himself to finding a solution for East Timor that
preserves human rights and democratic development throughout
Indonesia. Although Mr. Roth could not be here today, Julia and
I represent this Administration's unshakable commitment to
helping the people of East Timor in their quest to secure
peace, establish democracy, and enjoy freedom.
I am also pleased to announce that as further demonstration
of that commitment, Secretary Albright has asked me to travel
to East and West Timor in the next few days.
In a meeting last night, Secretary Albright secured
agreement from Foreign Minister Alatas that I should visit the
region to continue the Administration's work and investigate
the truth about what has happened. During this trip, I will be
working in close consultation and coordination with our
incoming Ambassador, Mr. Gelbard.
Before turning Assistant Secretary Taft, let me sketch the
contours of the unfolding crisis, the international and U.S.
Government response, and the immediate steps to be taken in the
weeks and days ahead.
Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee, you are well
aware of the human rights tragedy that unfolded in the wake of
the U.N.-sponsored consultation of August 30th, in which 78.5
percent of the population voted for independence.
I need not repeat for you the story of how 99 percent of
the East Timorese people, displaying great courage and
determination, cast their ballots despite the violent
intimidation tactics of pro-integrationist militias bent on
disrupting the democratic process.
Nor need I recount in detail the first painful days of
rampage by these pro-integrationist militias in forcing
Timorese people from their homes, torturing and killing them,
and destroying their homes, while at the same time harassing,
wounding, and in some cases killing humanitarian personnel,
religious officials, and journalists.
Let me briefly review what we know about the current
overall situation in East and West Timor. I would like to leave
the specifics and particularly the plight of the displaced East
Timorese throughout Indonesia and in East and West Timor to my
colleague, Julia Taft.
Eyewitness reports from East Timor tell us that as of just
a few days ago, the looting, burning, maiming, and killing was
continuing even as Indonesian military forces were leaving the
area.
The U.S. Embassy in Jakarta has confirmed church and press
reports that several days ago, at least nine church officials
and staff, accompanied by an Indonesian journalist, were killed
while bringing emergency supplies to displaced East Timorese
hiding in the countryside.
Reportedly, these killings were committed by members of the
Indonesian military. These deaths serve as a sad reminder that
the countryside remains unsafe for the people who live there. I
have a statement from the State Department condemning the
murders of these individuals. With your permission, I would
like to submit it for the hearing record.
Mr. Smith. Without objection, Mr. Koh, it will be made a
part of the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kol appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Koh. Equally distressing, humanitarian workers and
journalists continue to be at risk, as witnessed by the brutal
killing of Dutch journalist, Sander Thoenes on September 21st,
and the more recent murder of the Indonesian journalist I just
described.
If the situation in East Timor remains dire, the conditions
of those East Timorese stranded in West Timor is, in Secretary
Albright's words, simply ``appalling.''
As I speak, perhaps as many as 230,000 East Timorese,
possibly over a quarter of the East Timorse population, have
fled or been forced to flee to West Timor. Despite concerted
pressure from the international community, we still have no
evidence that the Indonesian Government has disarmed or
disbanded any of the militias.
Assistant Secretary Taft will describe, in more detail,
what she personally witnessed in the camps, in particular the
heavy militia presence in the camps. While the Indonesian
Government has indicated that the East Timorese in the camps
will be allowed to return home, we have no evidence that they
have been permitted to do so.
To the contrary, reports tell us that the Indonesian
Government is deporting some of these East Timorese to other
parts of Indonesia. As Secretary Albright has made clear,
``this is an unacceptable and a clear violation of
international standards of human rights''.
The current situation in East and West Timor raises three
fundamental human rights and democracy concerns, which will be
the focus of my Bureau's and my attention in the days ahead.
First, we have seen pervasive violence. Pro-integrationist
militias, with the support of Indonesian military have
committed large-scale killings, including reported murders,
torture, involuntary disappearances, rape, and other sexual
abuse and the forced expulsion of possibly one quarter of the
population. Only through investigations now beginning, and the
one that I will be carrying out myself will, we be able to
determine just how many victims this crisis has claimed.
Second, we have witnessed a deliberate campaign by the
militias with their supporters and the Indonesian military to
inhibit, prohibit, and abuse the fundamental human rights of
the East Timorese people. Humanitarian observers and
journalists have also been targets of this effort. We have seen
widespread destruction of property, efforts to block aid to
those in need, and deliberate efforts to squelch the reporting
of ongoing violence by intimidating and attacking aid workers,
U.N. observers, and journalists.
Third, we fear that the militias and their allies in the
military have acted not just to undercut human rights, but to
subvert democracy as well. They have attempted first to
interfere with and then to overturn a freely and fairly
undertaken referendum on the future of the territory. Militias,
acting with the assistance of the Indonesian military, have
targeted those who have supported independence, attacked and
harassed U.N. personnel, murdered clergy and journalists, and
sought to prevent the implementation of a clear U.N. mandate to
which their own President had agreed.
As you know, the international community has responded to
these massive abuses, applying strong diplomatic pressure to
source the consent of the Indonesian Government to allow the
arrival of a multinational force, known as INTERFET, into East
Timor to keep the peace. The Australians, who have led this
force, along with the many other nations who have pledged to
commit troops and resources, deserve our recognition and
support.
As you will hear, troops have already begun to arrive. We
are providing logistical, airlift, communications, and
intelligence support, to INTERFET as well as a Civil Affair
Unit. We have suspended our military-to-military cooperation,
cut off all arms transfers, and are reviewing our assistance
policy for Indonesia.
The international community has also responded decisively
on the human rights front. This past week the Commission on
Human Rights of the United Nations convened an extraordinary
special session in Geneva. The Commission voted by a large
margin, 32 to 12 with 6 abstentions, in favor of a resolution
calling for an International Commission of Inquiry to gather
the facts and establish the truth about these recent, terrible
events.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, the United States voted with the
E.U. in support of that resolution. Its key paragraph called on
the U.N. Secretary General to establish an International
Commission of Inquiry to gather and compile systematically
information on possible violations of human rights and breaches
of international and humanitarian law in East Timor since
January 1999, and to provide the Secretary General with its
conclusions.
This paragraph calls for the Commission of inquiry to
include human rights experts from Asia and to work in
cooperation with the Indonesian National Commission on Human
Rights (known as KOMNASHAM). These elements were added to
address concerns expressed by the Government of Indonesia to
gain their support for the Commission.
In the end, however, of the Government of Indonesia was
unwilling to accept the language and opposed the final text.
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights, to its credit,
recognized that it had an important duty to move forward, and
passed the resolution. It marks an important step in our
efforts to shed light on what happened in East Timor.
To discuss next steps, during the past week and a half, I
have met with many of our own members of our U.N. mission in
New York, including Ambassador Richard Holbrooke and his able
staff, and numerous officials of the United Nations, including
U.N. Under-Secretary General Sergio Viera de Mello, U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, and UNAMET head
Ian Martin. Everyone agrees that all concerned governments,
NGO's, and international organizations must work together to
make the resolution of this human rights and humanitarian
crisis a top priority. We must continue to demand that the
Indonesian military stop supporting militias who are committing
acts of violence and destruction in East Timor, that they
cooperate with INTERFET, and withdraw completely from East
Timor.
We must also continue to make clear, as Secretary Albright
has stated in no uncertain terms, that ``what happens in West
Timor to East Timorese living elsewhere in Indonesia is as
important to United States policy as what happens in East Timor
itself''.
Even as Indonesian civil officials are searching for a
workable solution to the humanitarian problem of feeding and
housing hundreds of thousands of refugees, the militias'
continuing pattern of harassment and intimidation demonstrates
that much more needs to be done.
I will let Assistant Secretary Taft speak more to these
issues. It is clear that the Indonesian Government must disband
and disarm the militias. There must be no tranborder attacks
into East Timor or interference with humanitarian and human
rights operations there.
To support these demands, in the wake of the post-election
violence, we suspended our military cooperation with Indonesia
and initiated an ongoing review of our entire aid package. As
we continue this review, we will, in the words of Secretary
Albright, ``take into account all relevant factors, including
whether a secure environment has been created in the West Timor
camps, whether necessary services are being provided, whether
East Timorese who desire to return home are allowed to do so,
and whether Indonesia's military is preventing the militias in
West Timor from carrying out attacks in East Timor.''
We must also work to facilitate the establishment of the
Commission of Inquiry that the United Nations Human Rights
Commission voted to create and to ensure its work begins
quickly. We are concerned by reports that the Indonesian
Government has reconsidered its decision to cooperate with the
Commission of Inquiry. We have already strongly urged the
Government to revisit this decision.
Finally, we have begun the process of identifying ways that
we can help United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and
Mary Robinson, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, in the effort to form the Commission of Inquiry. Two
nights ago in New York, I met with High Commissioner Robinson
to discuss her initiative in bringing this critical human
rights situation to the formal attention of the United Nations
and to encourage the U.N. to maintain the momentum.
We discussed many items which are mentioned in my written
statement, which I am prepared to discuss in the questioning
period. Mr. Chairman, let me stress that we do not seek a rush-
to-judgment about who is ultimately responsible. There have
been grave losses of life in East Timor, disturbing reports of
human rights violations and other crimes by the Indonesian
military or people affiliated with them, and almost certainly
serious breaches of international humanitarian law.
We remain tremendously concerned about the plight of the
East Timorese people. But we need to document events fully and
completely. That is the purpose of my upcoming trip. That is
the purpose of the Commission of Inquiry: To assemble the
information that will enable the international community to
decide what further action needs to be taken. We are also
providing aid to East Timor, which my Assistant Security Taft
will describe in more detail.
Finally, as Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor, I must make special mention of our efforts
to promote a democratic transition in Indonesia, even as we are
attempting to promote a democratic transition in East Timor. If
the tragic events in East Timor seem all too familiar, it is
because they grow out of nationwide problems that Indonesia has
faced in its own transition to democracy last year.
The Indonesian people have shown genuine enthusiasm for the
democratic process and have begun to create civil institutions,
including press associations and independent human rights
organizations, that will provide the foundation for the growth
and development of civil society.
We believe that a living, growing, and vibrant democratic
institution offers the best hope for the people of Indonesia. A
nation rich in diversity, Indonesia should not fear democracy,
which can only help bind together its many people. The United
States fully supports the people of Indonesia at this pivotal
moment in their country's history.
We are prepared to support this democratic transition in
every way possible. But we are hindered from doing so as long
as East and West Timor remain a human rights and humanitarian
crisis.
The goals toward which we are working are clear. The
Government of Indonesia, and specifically the Indonesian
military, must immediately disarm and disband the militias.
Indonesian military support, organization, training, and
direction of these brutal forces must cease.
The human rights abuses of the militia personnel, police,
and Indonesian military must be documented and the abusers
brought to justice. We must support the Commission of Inquiry
in its work, and support East Timor as it makes its transition
to independence and Indonesia as it makes its transition to
democracy. We simply cannot let ballots be undone by bullets.
Mr. Chairman, we appreciate the strong and constructive
interest shown by Members of Congress, and by you in
particular, throughout this humanitarian and human rights
crisis. We have a tremendous opportunity to help at this
historic moment. We must work together to meet these
considerable challenges.
I would like to turn the podium over to my colleague, Julia
Taft.
HON. JULIA TAFT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF POPULATION,
REFUGEES, AND MIGRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Taft. Thank you, Harold, and Mr. Chairman, and
Committee Members. Thank you very much for this opportunity to
appear before you to discuss the situation of Timor, and the
role of the U.S. Government, and what we are doing, and should
be doing in the humanitarian crisis.
Last week, I organized a multinational humanitarian mission
to East and West Timor comprising of senior humanitarian
officials from the United Kingdom, Sweden, Thailand, Japan, and
the United States. This past Friday, we released our findings
from that mission in Jakarta. I would like to submit that for
the record, along with my full statement.
[Statement from the Multinational Humanitarian Mission
appears in the appendix.]
Ms. Taft. This mission was really shocked by the level of
widespread destruction of homes, commercial facilities, and
public facilities in Dili. We arrived D-plus-2. So, that was 2
days after the INTERFET people arrived. The damage was just
unspeakable.
It was a very sad commentary on the price that these people
have had to pay for their vote of independence. Unfortunately,
we were unable to move beyond Dili because of the security
situation. However, subsequent U.N. assessment missions have
found widespread damage throughout East Timor.
Manatuto, which was previously home to 16,000 people is
completely destroyed and depopulated, and estimates are that
between 60 to 70 percent of the houses in the western region of
East Timor are destroyed. The Port of Suay was reported to be
95 percent destroyed. Much of the damage is by fire, consistent
with the slash and burn approach of the area.
With deployment of the International Force for East Timor,
INTERFET, under the able command of Australian Major General
Cosgrove, and the withdrawal of the Indonesian troops, we
believe the security situation is slowly but progressively
improving. Internally displaced persons who sought refuge in
the hills of East Timor are now starting to return to Dili as
security permits.
When we were there on day 2, it was virtually an empty
city. Dili used to have 130,000 people. It was virtually empty,
except for the military presence. Now, I understand people are
coming back in the tens of thousands. The U.N. agencies,
nongovernmental organizations, and INTERFET are working very
well together under difficult circumstances. I must say that I
believe that the cooperation that I saw when I was there was
the best I have ever seen in terms of international, United
Nations, NGO coordination.
A part of this was because many of them had gone to Darwin,
evacuated to Darwin. They were there to plan how they were
going to come back into East Timor. They are very well-
coordinated and working closely with INTERFET. However,
thousands of displaced persons still remain beyond relief in
Eastern Timor.
We have no evidence of starvation at this point, but there
are clearly people who are in vulnerable situations. The World
Food Program has been conducting food drops with U.S.
Government support. However, food drops, as you know, can only
reach a small proportion of those individuals in need. The
relief agencies now are planning to begin to move by helicopter
and truck to areas where security permits.
I would like to speak for a moment about West Timor, where
we also spent 2.5 days. We face a different humanitarian
challenge in West Timor. While the numbers are not precise,
there may be as many as 230,000 displaced persons in camps in
West Timor, as well as in churches, communities facilities, and
host families. It averages out to about \1/3\, \1/3\, and \1/
3\, a third in the camps, a third in host families, and a third
in various churches and school facilities. These innocent
people sought refuge or were forced to leave East Timor as the
result of the brutal anti-independence campaign of intimidation
perpetrated by the militia gangs, which the Government of
Indonesia did not or could not contain.
In fact, there are credible reports, as Harold Koh has
mentioned, that in many instances the militia were actually
acting in concert with the Indonesian armed forces. Conditions
in the make-shift camps in West Timor are very difficult.
Civilian authorities are making efforts to provide food. There
is little evidence of serious material needs.
However, requirements for water, sanitation, and health
services will intensify with the onset of the rainy season. I
went to four different refugee camp locations while I was
there. I must say, the material needs are not what is the most
pressing. What they need is security, and what they need to do
is to be free of the intimidating environment in which they are
living.
The human rights activists with whom we met on our mission
in West Timor told us of harrowing stories of militia running
rampant in the camps at night, of Indonesian army and police
forces standing by while armed thugs in camps forcibly
recruited young men, kidnaping others, and even murdering with
impunity. We cannot verify those stories.
This is going to have to be the responsibility of the human
rights inquiry and Harold Koh's mission as well. These reports
came to us from very many different sources and really need to
be followed up. In every humanitarian crisis, host governments
have the key role for providing for security and safety of
their citizens or those who seek refuge in their country.
The Indonesian Government is aware of its obligations. The
civilian side appears to be trying to care for and provide for
the camp residents. On our mission, we were accompanied by the
Minister of Social Welfare, Justika Baharajah, who is working
hard to ensure that water, sanitation, food, and shelter are
provided.
In other respects, the Government is also making the right
statements. We do not know if they are making the right
commitments. They have assured us, for example, that they would
not resettle camp residents immediately in West Timor or to
other islands as some have suggested they would. This is in
contrast to some of the statements that early on there was a
forced trans-migration to other islands.
We could not find any validation of that from any of the
NGO's or assistance workers. The Government also told us, and
repeated on Jakarta television and in the newspaper, that the
Government would permit and facilitate returns to East Timor
for all who wished to do so. The coordinating Minister Haryono
told us that the Government would begin this week a public
information campaign explaining to all who fled from East Timor
what their options would be: To resettle permanently in
Indonesia, to return to East Timor, or to stay temporarily in
West Timor and return at some later date.
Last week, President Habibie committed to allow the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees to have access to West Timor and
to setup field offices in Atambua and Kupang. The UNHCR advance
team arrived in Kupang yesterday to begin setting up these
offices and the UNHCR also traveled to Atambua.
These are encouraging steps, but the Government must
continue to provide effective cooperation. In addition, we
believe that the Government should allow the International
Committee of the Red Cross in West Timor to exercise fully its
mandate and assume responsibility for initiating tracing
procedures to reunite families torn apart in the conflict.
As you have seen in the reports, almost all of the camps,
except those that with a strong militia presence, are almost
all women and children. The men are not there. Only time will
tell whether the Government can or will deliver on these
commitments. In the meantime, conditions in the camp remain
tenuous.
The International Humanitarian Community should have full
access to the camps. The Government and the Indonesian army
must ensure not only safe access by relief workers, but also
the safety for the refugees. For this reason, we have called
upon the Government to ensure the civilian character of the
camps. That the militia must be disarmed and removed from the
camps.
Access to the camps by international organizations and
NGO's is absolutely essential. We spent a lot of time trying to
convince local authorities of the seriousness with which the
international community takes the welfare of these people. We
also stand firm on ensuring that those who would violate the
fundamental rights of camp residents know that they cannot act
in secrecy and with impunity.
As I expressed directly to my Indonesian hosts, and as
Secretary Albright, Secretary Cohen, and our Ambassador in
Jakarta have stressed repeatedly, the camps must be off-limits
to armed militias of any and all political persuasions. The
refugee population in the camps represents no threat to outside
forces, but organized groups within the camps do present a
danger to fellow refuges.
We also must be prepared to facilitate the return of
refugees to the East, under the auspices of the UNHCR. At
present, it is not possible to determine how many may want to
repatriate. We are encouraged that the Indonesian Government is
setting forth a policy of repatriation and that they will
coordinate with the UNHCR.
We will stand ready to fund the safe passage back for those
who wish to return, and we will make every effort to help
returnees reestablish their livelihoods with time to plant in
advance of the rainy season. Failure to succeed in the next few
weeks will force people to remain in uncertain and insecure
areas at the mercy of the militias or in a state of complete
dependence on humanitarian aid for another year or more. We
must not fail.
For those desiring to stay in West Timor rather than
repatriate to East Timor, they must do so voluntarily and we
will assist them through NGO's. In closing, let me just say
that our attention is clearly focused on the humanitarian needs
of the displaced and affected populations in East and West
Timor.
We are participating as a Government in the multinational
force, which is the international communities best hope for
ending the humanitarian crisis, restoring security, and
ensuring that the will of the East Timorese people prevails.
The U.S. Government has provided $10 million, primarily,
through aid to support humanitarian needs.
Yesterday, the State Department announced an additional
contribution from my Bureau of $5.1 million to support UNHCR,
ICRC, the World Food Program, and the U.N. Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. These are initial
investments. With the new fiscal year, no doubt, we will be
making more.
In closing, let me thank you for your attention, your
sustained attention, on these issues. This is a very complex
situation. The role that our Office, the State Department, and
I are playing in this is on the humanitarian side, making sure
all donors are aware of their obligation to undergird the
international efforts that need to be made, to work with the
NGO's, and to keep all due pressure on the Government of
Indonesia to allow the access, allow repatriation, and to allow
these people to go back home in safety.
Thank you very much, sir. I will be happy to answer any
questions.
Mr. Smith. Secretary Taft, thank you very much. Secretary
Koh, thank you very much for your excellent testimonies. I have
a number of questions. I will ask a few, submit some for the
record, and then yield to my colleagues.
On Tuesday, and you made some reference to this, Foreign
Minister Alatas said that Indonesia will allow the UNHCR and
the International Committee for the Red Cross to visit West
Timor. How much access has there been. Have we actually seen
people on the ground get in?
Ms. Taft. As of yesterday, the UNHCR did send its teams
in. This morning I called the Governor of West Timor, Governor
Tallo, to find out whether or not he actually allowed them
inside the camps. He said they were allowed in the camps. That
they were proceeding on this.
He said, ``my Central Government has said these people are
going to be repatriated and we must do everything right away''.
I said, yes, sir, you have to do it, but you have to do it
through the UNHCR. So, they have the message. They have started
the campaign.
Our challenge is to make sure that the UNHCR really does
get confidential and expansive access to all of these people so
that there is no intimidation in trying to identify who would
like to be repatriated.
Mr. Smith. Unfortunately, we had invited a representative
from the Department of Defense. Either through scheduling or
for some other reason, they did decline. Perhaps you can shed
some light on this. When Assistant Secretary of Defense
Franklin Kramer, testified before our Subcommittee in July
1998, I had asked him a number of questions about the JCET's
Program, the military-to-military cooperation.
His answer was that, ``By helping to professionalize the
Indonesian armed forces, we can help reduce human rights
abuses.'' Obviously, this optimism was unwarranted, in light of
the deliberate and widespread violence that has been
perpetuated by the Indonesian military in East Timor, and
reports that we had even then.
We had people like Pius Lustrilanang come and testify
before the Committee. He talked of the torture that he endured,
what he believed to be, at the hands of KOPASSUS. He woke up.
He was blind-folded, heard reveille every morning, knew that he
was at a military base, as he was being beaten each and every
day. He testified, as did other advocates of human rights
organizations, that the U.S. ought to cease its cooperation
with this military until that time there was a cessation to
that kind of abuse.
We also understand, as one of our witnesses today, Alan
Nairn, will testify, that Admiral Dennis Blair, U.S. Command-
In-Chief of the Pacific was dispatched to meet with General
Wiranto on April 8th in the wake of escalating violence, such
as the massacre of the church in Liquica in Timor 2 days
earlier.
According to Nairm, rather than telling Wiranto to shut the
militias down, Blair instead offered him a series of promises
of new U.S. assistance. He writes that Indonesian officers took
this as a green light to proceed with the militia operation. Is
that report accurate?
Ms. Taft. There are a lot of reports, a lot of rumors, and
a lot of misinformation, and disinformation. I do not know how
to confirm or deny any of those comments. My suggestion is that
you write the questions down. We will make sure that the
Defense Department has an opportunity to respond to them.
I do know that the JCET students have been withdrawn from
classes in the United States. I cannot comment on what Blair
said. I do want you to be aware, however, that Secretary Cohen
has been in the region. He did meet with Wiranto. He has issued
a very strong statement, which we can have submitted for the
record. This is all annotated.
Ms. Taft. Basically, he warned General Wiranto that the
military of Indonesia is at a critical turning point and urged
them that they permit and participate openly in assisting on
the humanitarian side. He has made these comments to the press,
to the General, and to all with whom he has spoken.
I would like to have his statement submitted for the
record, too, which I think you will find very good.
[The statement referred to appears in the appendix.]
Ms. Taft. We have also been meeting with the military to
find out what they can do to enhance the humanitarian response
here and they are certainly seized with this.
Mr. Smith. Not to belabor the point, but we have had
hearings in this Subcommittee, which were totally bipartisan.
My friends on the other side of the aisle were equally
vociferous in their concerns about our training of KOPASSUS,
the sniper training, and some of the other kinds of training
that occurred.
Our hope was that until there was a clean bill of health,
with regard to the Indonesian military, that we would not have
anything to do with them. It seems to me that we may be doing
some of the right things now. I am very grateful for that. I am
encouraged by that. Many of us saw, maybe not this kind of
massive killing, but we saw this kind of outrage on a smaller
scale in Irian Jaya, in Aceh, as well as in East Timor, as well
as in Jakarta itself.
I would hope that all of us would collectively learn that
when you train forces that have notorious human rights baggage
and abuse affixed to them, you feel the problem. The
Australians apparently just picked up a number of KOPASSUS
soldiers in East Timor carrying their identification cards.
They could have been people who we trained.
We do not know that. I have asked that question of the
Defense Department. Who is it that we have trained? Where is
the list of trainees and what they went on to do or become? I
was told we keep no such lists. So, they indeed could be some
of the people who are now in East Timor. So, hopefully we can
get to the bottom of that. I hope we have learned that lesson.
Again, I think it was in the Washington Post not so long
ago, maybe quite a long time ago, but Secretary Cohen, was
there at a KOPASSUS meeting. There were these members of that
so-called elite military unit with scorpions on them showing
how macho they were. These people have turned out to be thugs.
Many of us thought it. We thought we knew it. The human rights
community raised many red flags about that for quite a long
time.
Regrettably now, it is coming home to roost. I would hope
that we could get a response back from the Administration on
this because it is very, very important. I do have a question
about the targeting of Catholics. There are numerous reports of
deliberate killings of Catholic clergy and religious workers in
East Timor by militiamen and by members of the Indonesian
military.
This past Sunday, nine Catholic workers, including nuns,
deacons, and seminarians were massacred in Bacau by retreating
troops. What does the U.S. know? What do we know about the
deliberate targeting of Catholic Church workers and clergy? Mr.
Koh.
Mr. Koh. Mr. Chairman, as you know, we have submitted our
report on religious freedom, which covers all of the countries,
but has focused on this issue. I understand you are having
hearings with Ambassador Robert Seiple, which would give a
broader context to that issue.
You are correct that, as we pointed out in our statement,
that we have confirmed that nine religious officials and staff,
accompanied by a journalist, were murdered while driving in a
vehicle between Los Palos and Bacau in East Timor. Obviously,
we do not know the motivation or orders behind that. Looking
into that incident will be one of the things that I will be
focusing on when I visit East and West Timor in the next few
days.
Mr. Smith. I appreciate that. It is important, I think,
for us to know and for everyone to know whether or not these
are indigenous East Timorese or this is an orchestrated
crackdown by the Indonesian military who use militias as the
front. In terms of H.R. 2895, does the Administration have a
position on that legislation?
Ms. Taft. I do not think so.
Mr. Smith. Could you provide that for the Committee as
soon as possible? The hope is that we can move on that. If
there is input, obviously all of us would like to and know what
the Administration would like to do.
Ms. Taft. We will get back to you.
Mr. Smith. Let me yield to my good friend and colleague
from Georgia.
Ms. McKinney. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Assistant Secretary Koh, in your testimony you suggest that
we support the establishment of a U.N. Commission of Inquiry.
Could you tell me what the difference is between a Commission
of Inquiry and the establishment of a tribunal?
Mr. Koh. Yes. A Commission of Inquiry is a process which
has been used on a number of occasions with regard to Bosnia
and Rwanda. What was unusual in this case is that the U.N.
Human Rights Commission in Geneva, which ordinarily gathers
every March for about 6 weeks, held a special session to
consider the question.
That session was called by a very close vote at the request
of Mary Robinson, the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human rights. It had two key operative paragraphs. The first
called for the International Commission of Inquiry, which would
have a standing jurisdiction to gather facts. A commission can
be the first step on the way to a tribunal or it could
undertake full-scale investigations.
The view was that it should have international legal
experts onboard, particularly those from Asian backgrounds who
would be familiar with human rights conditions in the region.
The second operative paragraph of note is one which called
for the various thematic rapporteurs that are already
commissioned by the U.N. Human Rights Commission, including
arbitrary detention and extra-judicial killings, to visit East
Timor.
They plan to do so as a group. So, in a way this group of
thematic rapporteurs going in together perhaps to file a joint
report will be another kind of international body. My own visit
will be undertaken from the perspective of someone outside the
system looking at the reports, getting to the bottom of what is
going on.
As I think the Chairman correctly noted in his opening
statement, we have heard many reports. We do not know how high
the numbers are. We do not know who is responsible, which means
that we have to do some full-scale examination of what the
truth is and then take the evidence where it leads.
Ms. McKinney. So, was there a Commission of Inquiry prior
to the establishment of both the Rwanda and Yugoslavia
Tribunals?
Mr. Koh. In the Yugoslavia Tribunal, Professor Basieuni of
DePaul University was a key member of that Commission, which
gathered a massive amount of documentation which was then
turned over to the Bosnian War Crimes Tribunal.
Indeed, it was the very output of that Commission, which I
think created the conviction among the Security Council Members
that there needed to be a War Crimes Tribunal. That was formed
under Security Council mandate. The Commission documents are
very, very massive and have been widely examined.
Ms. McKinney. My next question is about a choice of words.
I recently viewed, for a second time, a BBC documentary on the
Rwanda Genocide. I watched as Christine Shelly, the State
Department spokesperson, was painfully tortured in her exercise
to try and describe why acts of genocide in the Rwandan context
were not actually, did not constitute, genocide. She did not do
a good job, of course.
President Clinton goes back several years later and
apologizes and says that we just did not understand what was
happening in Rwanda at the time. We have had 25 years to
understand what has been happening in East Timor. And 200,000
East Timorese have died, some through starvation.
Are we using the word ``genocide'' or are we still hooked
on ``acts of genocide'' to describe what is happening in East
Timor?
Mr. Koh. As you know Congresswoman, genocide has both a
legal definition as a part of the 1948 Convention on Prevention
and Punishment of Genocide, which the U.S. ratified in 1986,
although it remained unratified for a long period of time. It
also has a popular political connotation growing out of the
holocaust.
Then the question is how should it be extended to other
circumstances? As you well know, the notion of genocide in
political terms is something that I think people carefully
evaluate the parallels and then use that term. For the Genocide
Convention, that includes acts of incitement to genocide and
genocide in part, which means elimination of people based on
their ethnic or religious or racial background in part.
I think one of the complicating factors is that as a legal
term, there may be acts that fall under the Genocide Convention
and hence have a legal significance, which you would not think
of as genocide in a political sense.
Ms. McKinney. So, 200,000 people dead from starvation,
massacres, and torture and we call that ``acts of genocide?''
Mr. Koh. That is both a legally and politically correct
definition of what went on.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Will the gentle lady yield?
Ms. McKinney. Yes.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I just wanted to note that I believe it
was after Milosevic had killed over 250,000 Slovenians,
Bosnians, and Kosovars throughout Yugoslavia that our President
made a declaration that this man was committing genocide.
Another ironic thing that I think most people do not
realize is that Milosevic was duly elected President by the
people of Serbia.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. If you do not have any more
questions, then we will go ahead and go to the Representative
from American Samoa.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, I want to thank Secretary Koh and Secretary Taft for
their statements. I would like to say that I have to personally
congratulate President Habibie for his courage, despite all of
the opposition against holding this referendum. I have to give
President Habibie credit for allowing the people of East Timor
to go through the referendum, the exercise.
The problem I have is that when the crisis occurred after
the election, the first thing that came out from our own
Government representative and Secretary Cohen, as I recall,
immediately was the response ``No U.S. troops in this crisis in
Asia.'' Then the next thing I hear, through the media, that the
President's National Security Advisor, Mr. Berger, likened the
East Timor crisis to how messy his daughter's room is in
college.
Of course, later Mr. Berger apologized for making that
remark, which tells you exactly the sense of indifference of
some of the top leaders of our own Government. It is an Asian
thing. It is not a global issue affecting human beings. Then
some other officials of our Government said, ``East Timor is
not Kosovo.''
Then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of our
Government calls up General Wiranto because they are good
buddies. They are friends. Over the years, this is how the
relationship has been between our military leaders and the
military leaders of Indonesia.
I do not know if it had any effect about General Wiranto's
decision making, but the fact of the matter is these militias
were also a part of the military might of the Indonesian
Government. You cannot change that. Why do you suppose the
Indonesian army or General Wiranto just could not tell his
troops to leave or even to shoot these militias? Because they
are their own people. It is quite obvious.
Mr. Chairman, I have some questions here. Mr. Horta
recently, in a television interview, stated that these 200,000
East Timorese are now currently in West Timor. These refugee
camps are currently being supervised by the militias or
elements of the militias. I would like to ask Ms. Taft, is this
true?
Ms. Taft. They are present. At the camps I saw, they were
present, yes, sir.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Have you offered any strong, strong
recommendation? Obviously you mentioned early in your
statement, they are still being intimidated by the militias.
Ms. Taft. That is right.
Mr. Faleomavaega. For all we know, these 200,000 people
are still being massacred, murdered, or disappear, yet our
whole focus in the media and the international community is on
the troops going to East Timor, with hardly any mention about
these 200,000 refugees, that are being intimidated by the
militias.
Ms. Taft. I am glad you mentioned that because that is the
whole reason we went so quickly as a multinational humanitarian
group. You are right. The attention was on the troops. The
attention was on the politics. We were concerned about who is
focusing attention on the humanitarian dilemma. To be able to
mobilize this and get out there so quickly because we were on
the ground starting to work on September 19th with our
representatives.
Preceding us by 2 days was Mrs. Ogata, the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees who was on the scene and working with
the officials.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Ms. Secretary, I know, because my time
is going.
Ms. Taft. OK.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Is it also true that none of the
international NGO's that do humanitarian services are allowed
by the Indonesian government to help in these refugee camps?
Ms. Taft. There are a number of agencies in West Timor.
Mr. Faleomavaega. But very limited.
Ms. Taft. They are working with host families, some of the
churches, and the outside groups. What they have not been
allowed to do is work in the collective camp areas. That is
because the civilian authorities have said that it is unsafe
for them to have access.
We pressed them very hard on that. We said, make it safe.
Make the military make it safe. Get the militia out. Get the
camps civilianized. We said that. Mrs. Ogata said that.
Secretary Albright has been making that point as well.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Secretary Taft, will it be your
recommendation, in the strongest terms, that the President has
got to make a decision about this situation, where the militia
is still supervising and operating these refugee camps? This is
ridiculous.
Ms. Taft. What President are you talking about?
Mr. Faleomavaega. Our own President.
Ms. Taft. Our own President.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Can we do something about this?
Ms. Taft. Our own President expressed concern about this.
We are doing everything we can. We are not sending--if you are
suggestion is that we try to send in peacekeepers into West
Timor to breakup these camps, that is news and you should talk
to the Armed Services Committee about it.
Let me just say that because it is very difficult in these
situations, and we do not want to have a repeat of what
happened with the Hutus in Eastern Zaire and all of the
problems we had with the militias and the refugees there in
1994, which you know so much about, Congresswoman.
We need to get those people out. The way we get them out is
to get a system for them to repatriate and to get access by the
U.N. High Commission for Refugees, by the ICRC into those camps
as soon as possible to fully do the interview and the out-
placement. We have commitments from the Government to allow
that to happen.
There are people from the U.N. on the ground now trying to
work those modalities. I am sure we are going to see within the
next several days good progress. Everybody is focusing on this.
Security and protection are the key issues.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Reclaiming my time.
Our biggest reason for sending troops to East Timor was
security. Now, 200,000 refugees are now in West Timor and we
are not talking about their security needs. I know you have
expressed concern. I know you brought recommendations.
What I am concerned about is that this is just a lot of
rhetoric. Somebody has got to make a decision. I was just
curious if our country has made a firm decision to the
Indonesian Government that they have got to do something about
this.
Ms. Taft. Yes, sir. We have said this.
Mr. Faleomavaega. How long do you think we are going to be
put on hold, another 10 days, another 30 days before they
finally allow us to bring NGO's to help feed the people?
Ms. Taft. Today, it is starting. I have talked with them.
Starting today, they are getting access. Now, there are not
ships in place to take them from Kupang back to East Timor.
Mr. Faleomavaega. You mentioned earlier that we are
putting in about $15 million in economic assistance.
Ms. Taft. No, humanitarian assistance.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Have you calculated approximately what
would be the total need to give proper assistance, to these
refugee camps? Is it $15 million or $100 million? What do you
see as a good number to give proper assistance to these people?
Ms. Taft. The U.N. has done its initial preliminary
assessment for East and West Timor. They say $134 million is
what is required for the humanitarian first traunch. We have
given $15 million in the last week. As soon as we start the
next fiscal year, we are going to get more.
Mr. Faleomavaega. One more question, Mr. Chairman. I know
my time is up. It is ironic. The second most powerful economic
country in the world, who happens to be in Asia, the country
that has the largest investment in corporate resources
throughout Asia, happens to be Japan. Is our Government putting
any pressure on Japan to contribute at least $100 million out
of the billions and trillions of profits that they have made in
the Asian region to give assistance to East Timor?
Ms. Taft. They are being forthcoming in their funding.
They participated in our humanitarian mission. They are coming
up with humanitarian funding. I understand they are going to
make contributions to the Trust Fund for East Timor as well.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Faleomavaega.
Mr. Koh. If I could just add that I have just been at the
U.N. General Assembly. An extraordinarily large number of the
bilateral meetings and the multilateral meetings addressed this
question with our Government, we urged various allies to make
contributions to address the total need, both in bilateral
discussion with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Komorah, and
also in various multilateral settings of regional ministerial
breakfasts and other discussions. These issues were discussed
at great length.
Mr. Tancredo [presiding]. Thank you very much.
The panel is supposed to be here just until 2 p.m. I know
that there are other questions from our members of the
Committee. I am going to try to move to enforce the 5-minute
rule. Let me ask you just one question quickly, Secretary Koh.
There have been reports in the Indonesian press recently
about Australian peacekeeping forces that are allegedly
committing human rights violations themselves in East Timor. I
just wanted to know quickly what your impression is of the
accuracy of those reports.
Mr. Koh. We have heard those reports. We have absolutely
no basis to think that they have any substance whatsoever. We
are very concerned, in fact, about public disinformation in
Jakarta over what is happening with regard to the multinational
force. That is one of the messages I am going to be reinforcing
when I visit in the next few days.
Mr. Tancredo. Thank you. Mr. Delahunt. Do you have
questions?
Mr. Delahunt. Listening to your testimony, Mr. Koh, in
response to a question by Ms. McKinney regarding the tribunal
as pre-cursor, or rather the Commission of Inquiry as a pre-
cursor to an ad hoc tribunal. I was thinking as you were
responding, that if there has ever been a situation that
demonstrates so clearly the need for a permanent international
criminal court, it is exactly what has transpired here in East
Timor. I would encourage you and Secretary Taft to reflect,
continue discussion within the Department of State about the
Administration's position on the international permanent
criminal court.
It is, I think, indeed unfortunate that the United States'
position has been in opposition to an international criminal
court that could address these issues on an ongoing basis, and
may very well, have served as a deterrent to what occurred in
East Timor.
Regarding the question that was posed by Mr. Tancredo on
the press reports about the Australians. On their face, they
are absurd. They are insulting. The comment and observation
that you made, Secretary Taft, about this also implicating or
our need to support the transition to democracy in Indonesia, I
would suggest that those reports are clear evidence of a very
difficult trip, this odyssey, to true democracy in Indonesia.
It seems like nothing really has changed since the days of
Suharto and Sukarno. In any event, I want to get back to a
point that other members have raised regarding the military-to-
military relationship. I understand that there is a lot of
uncertainty, misinformation, disinformation.
I would like to speak to the issue of the militias. Is
there any legal basis for the militias, within the Indonesian
legal system? For example, and I am sure that you are both
aware that at a point in time in Columbia, there was legal
authority for the existence, if you will, for para-militaries.
What later became to be known as para-militaries.
That law was rescinded. Unfortunately, para-militaries
continue to exist and cause great problems in Columbia. If you
can, describe, if you are aware, is there any legal basis for
the existence of these militias?
Ms. Taft. It is my understanding that there was, if not a
written legal base, a practice of having militias in East
Timor, but not in West Timor. This distinction was drawn to our
attention when we tried to find out who were these militias
around West Timor? Were they all East Timorese or were they
disaffected West Timorese that were unhappy about the influx of
people from East Timor?
So, there is a distinction. I think what I would recommend
is that we arrange for a roundtable discussion some people from
the military and from the State Department to talk with you all
about this.
Mr. Delahunt. I do not want to presume motive, but I was
very disappointed to hear that there is not a representative of
our military here, given the quotes that Chairman Smith and
others, including myself, have alluded to about the position of
our military regarding the training of military in Indonesia in
here, and not having the names and lists of those available.
They certainly did not do a very good job in the area of
human rights training. That is, so clear that it cries out for
an answer. What I am concerned about is that this calls in to
question the entire program, not just as it relates to
Indonesia, but in terms of all our military-to-military
relationships, and really deserves to be reviewed and
scrutinized.
We should have answers. I think from what you have heard
here today, this is a bipartisan concern. It is not too long
ago that the President of the United States went to Guatemala
to apologize for what occurred over a period of time, and in
response really to a report that was under the aegis, as you
know, of the United Nations in implicating the United States in
a genocide that occurred there over a period of decades. We
trained that military. I dare say the same thing has occurred
in Indonesia.
Mr. Koh. My response to the points made by Congressman
Delahunt on the military-to-military relationship and democracy
in Indonesia. The two are very much connected. I have visited
Indonesia twice in the time that I have been in office.
Although they are not where you want them to be, this is a time
of tremendous change, and in Indonesia the first free election
in many, many years.
The difficulty will be to make that democratic transition
happen to bolster civil society and to bring the military under
civilian control. That is the key. The military is a very
powerful institution in Indonesian society and has been very
resistant to change. We take for granted in this society that
the military is under civilian control.
It is not something that has been taken for granted in
Indonesia. That is a very difficult thing to change. The
militias then operate under this shady mandate, as you see.
This is a very difficult thing on which to get a hold. I think
the critical goal is to keep the democratic process moving in
Indonesia, focus on the horrors that have occurred in East
Timor, while moving toward and promoting independence in East
Timor at the same time.
It is a very complicated juggling act, and one that I think
requires a lot of working together creatively. I do think it is
a very difficult and complicated situation.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you very much.
Mr. Tancredo. Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to apologize to our witnesses. We have a
simultaneous hearing on the human rights situation in Togo just
across the hall. That is why I could not be with you. I want to
commend both Secretary Koh and Secretary Taft for their
outstanding work on this issue as indeed on so many other
issues.
I have two specific observations. I would be grateful for
your comments. I am putting the finishing touches on a
Congressional resolution which calls on the Government of
Indonesia to accept full financial responsibility for the total
cost of destruction that has unfolded in East Timor.
My resolution calls for the total cessation of all aid and
loans by international organizations and on a bilateral basis,
until the Government of Indonesia accepts full responsibility
for the financial cost of rebuilding and reconstructing East
Timor. It is preposterous beyond belief that the Government and
the military of Indonesia acquiesced in, encouraged, or even
participated in the deliberate destruction of the
infrastructure and the whole physical capital of the eastern
part of that small island.
We cannot bring back to life the people who have been
killed and the human job of rebuilding the large numbers of
people with enormous traumas will be a long, difficult, and
expensive one. We certainly can fix the responsibility for the
physical reconstruction on the Government of Indonesia.
I would like to either ask you to comment on what the
Administration's position will be or if there is no position
yet, to convey the substance of my resolution to Secretary
Albright, with whom I had the pleasure of talking yesterday on
another issue. So, we will know that the Administration is in
tuned with us. My resolution will have a great deal of
bipartisan support.
The second issue I would like to raise relates to Japan. My
good friend and distinguished colleague from American Samoa
raised the question of Japanese financial participation. I am
preparing a letter, and I am inviting all of my colleagues to
co-sign it, to the Prime Minister of Japan calling on Japan to
at long last accept its full responsibility, not just in a
financial sense, of participating in United Nations'
peacekeeping efforts.
I remember the Second World War. I understand the problems
Japan had in terms of its military aggression against the
countries of Southeast Asia. We are now half a Century beyond
that. If German military units can be in the former Yugoslavia
and they are, and they are conducting themselves with great
distinction and great effectiveness, I think the time is long
overdue for Japan to assume its military responsibility in
peacekeeping operations, such as the one in East Timor.
I find it unconscionable that countries as far away as the
United Kingdom should provide military units for the
peacekeeping venture in East Timor, while Japan, the largest
country in the region with a very capable military, should not
even debate or consider the notion of sending an appropriately
sized Japanese military unit to take its place alongside the
Australians and the others who have accepted their
responsibility.
I would be grateful if either of you would care to comment
on my call for Japan to recognize that the Second World War is
a half a Century behind us. The time has come for Japan to
accept her international responsibility, and to recognize that
Japanese ambitions to become a permanent member of the United
Nations' Security Council sound absurd while Japan runs away
from its responsibility in peacekeeping ventures.
Mr. Tancredo. I may ask the panel, please, to condense
your answer as much as possible, as we have another panel
waiting out there. They can only be here until 3 p.m.
Mr. Koh. With regard to the first point, Congressman
Lantos, as you know we have been doing an ongoing aid review
with Indonesia for a number of weeks. As Secretary Albright
made very clear on Sunday night, we will include the following
factors in our review, namely, whether secure environments were
created in the West Timor camps, whether necessary services
were provided, whether East Timorese who want to return home
are allowed to do so, and whether the Indonesian military is
preventing West Timorese militias from carrying out attacks. in
East Timor. We will convey the basis of your resolution to the
Secretary and carefully study the details in reviewing
reconstruction assistance. With regard to the second issue
about the allegations of Japan, as you know, in another life, I
have studied Japanese Constitutional Law. The German
Constitution and the Japanese Constitution do have different
wording in their provisions.
While we make our political views clear at the time in
which the Japanese are seeking expansion and participation into
the Security Council, which was one of the points of discussion
between the Secretary and the Japanese Government at the U.N.
General Assembly. They also make reference to Constitutional
issues that those obligations incur. I am sure that, that will
force reconsideration and examination inside the Japanese
Government.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you, Mr. Koh. Thank you.
Mr. Tancredo. Thank you very much.
I want to sincerely express the appreciation of the
Committee to the Administration's witnesses and ask any other
members of the Committee if they have other questions to submit
them. Again, thank you very much for your time.
Mr. Koh. Thank you.
Ms. Taft. Thank you.
Mr. Tancredo. I would like to bring up the second panel as
quickly as possible.
Xanana Gusmao is the President of the National Council of
the Timorese Resistance, a leader of the East Timorese
Independence Movement. For the past 20 years, Mr. Gusmao was
arrested by the Indonesian military in 1992 and sentenced to
life in prison for subversion. In response to an international
outcry, Indonesia reduced the sentence to 20 years in 1994.
Mr. Gusmao can take a seat.
The Chairman of this Committee met him when he was in
prison. Even in that difficult situation, it was clear that he
was a statesman, a conciliator, and a leader. His country is
lucky to have him and the world is fortunate that an
independent East Timor will be lead by someone of his caliber.
After nearly 7 years in captivity as a political prisoner,
he was released by the Indonesians earlier this month. Along
with him, Mr. Jose Ramos-Horta. He is the Vice President of the
National Council of the Timorese Resistance and was awarded the
Nobel Peace Prize in 1996, along with Bishop Carlos Belo for
his efforts toward East Timorese self-determination. An
outspoken opponent of the Indonesian occupation of East Timor
for the past quarter Century, Mr. Ramos-Horta has served for 10
years as the permanent Representative to the United Nations for
the East Timorese Independence Forces. Welcome.
Mr. Gusmao, please proceed.
XANANA GUSMAO, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE TIMORESE
RESISTANCE
Mr. Gusmao. [Via Interpreter.]
Ms. Interpreter. Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, it is
an honor to be here in the House of Representatives before you,
in this House, the venue of so many decisions regarding the
world and East Timor in particular.
On behalf of the people of East Timor, I wish to express
profound gratitude for the rulings and decisions taken in this
House on East Timor. In particular, I would like to express our
gratitude to all Congress people who played a relevant role and
supported all the bills aimed at putting an end to violence and
destruction in the territory.
Mr. Gusmao. [Via Interpreter.]
Ms. Interpreter. In particular, I would like to express my
gratitude to Congressman Chris Smith who is hosting this
hearing, for his leadership in promoting human rights and the
self-determination of East Timor. I wish also to express my
gratitude and thanks to all those who, in the House of
Representatives, supported Congressman Chris Smith in his
efforts.
Mr. Gusmao. [Via Interpreter.]
Ms. Interpreter. I also wish to express my gratitude to
Congressman Kennedy and all of the other Congress people who
supported his efforts for passing the bills in the House of
Representatives. My gratitude is also addressed to Senator
Feingold for his efforts, too, in the passing of the bill in
the Senate, the East Timor Self-Determination Act of 1999.
These bills are extremely important for the U.S. banning of
military and financial assistance to Indonesia. Also in the
demanding of the withdrawal of Indonesian troops from East
Timor and putting an end to the violence undertaken by the
militias in East Timor.
Mr. Gusmao. [Via Interpreter.]
Ms. Interpreter. Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen,
please allow me to use this opportunity, this historic moment,
both for myself and for my people, to address a few and brief
words on the current situation in East Timor.
The recent violence, which we all witnessed in the
territory in the past few weeks, led to a very, very critical
situation. It is critical because most of the population had to
seek refuge in the mountains. It is critical because tens of
thousands of East Timorese were abducted and taken forcibly
into West Timor.
It is critical because the population is now experiencing a
severe situation of disease and starvation. It is critical
because our families have been broken apart and most of the
members of those families do not know where their relatives are
or if they are alive.
We have decided that the year 2000 in East Timor will be
the year of the Emergency Plan. During and throughout this
year, and from the ashes and destruction provoked by the
Indonesian military and the militias, we will establish an
administration in the territory and help the population
organize itself.
Our population is in great need of assistance, of food, of
medical assistance, but also of psychological comfort to
overcome the suffering and the deep trauma that has been
committed upon it.
Mr. Gusmao. [Via Interpreter.]
Ms. Interpreter. One of our main concerns at this point is
the return of the East Timorese population, which is now living
in a climate of terror and intimidation in the concentration
camps in Kupang, West Timor; Atambua, West Timor; and elsewhere
on other Indonesian Islands.
We urge the Congress to provide assistance and to help
humanitarian agencies in creating the conditions for the return
of the more than 200,000 East Timorese who are presently in
Wast Timor and other Indonesian islands. The East Timorese in
those concentration camps are undergoing a situation of great
fear. They do not know about their families. These 200,000 East
Timorese are mostly women, children, and old people. We request
immediate support to take them out of these concentration camps
and to enable the return of these East Timorese's to East
Timor.
Mr. Gusmao. [Via Interpreter.]
Ms. Interpreter. Equally important for the transition
process in East Timor is this second request that I wish to
address. That is for the Congress to pressure for the
withdrawal of Indonesian troops from East Timor. The presence
of Indonesian troops in East Timor has only led to further
suffering, destruction, murder, and the slaughter of my people.
I therefore appeal to the Congress to use its moral and
political strength to enable the withdrawal of the Indonesian
troops.
Mr. Gusmao. [Via Interpreter.]
Ms. Interpreter. This is but a very brief picture of the
situation in East Timor and the suffering of my people.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Smith. [Presiding] Mr. Gusmao, thank you very much for
your excellent testimony and for the courage that you showed
under incredible duress in your years in captivity. Joseph
Rees, Chief Counsel and Staff Director of this Subcommittee,
and I remember when we met with you, how we had read about you.
We had heard about you. We had read your words. We had
never seen you in person, and how impressed we were by your
courage, and also by your sense of vision that 1 day you knew
there would be freedom in East Timor. It was a matter of when
and not if. While the agony continues, the East Timorese people
could not have a more articulate and more of a persuasive
spokesman for their cause. I want to thank you for your
leadership.
I would like to recognize another man for whom this
Subcommittee, and Congress, and I, personally, have an enormous
amount of respect for. A man who has won the Nobel Peace Prize,
as was pointed out by Mr. Tancredo in his opening, in his
introduction. Mr. Ramos-Horta, we are very, very pleased to
have you here.
When you speak, believe me, we do listen. So, please take
the floor.JOSE RAMOS-HORTA, VICE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
THE TIMORESE RESISTANCE, 1996 NOBEL PEACE PRIZE WINNER, AND
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE, UNITED NATIONS, EAST TIMORESE
INDEPENDENCE FORCES
Mr. Ramos-Horta. Congressmen, first I would like to thank
you very much for your initiative in holding this hearing. I
thank all your colleagues for receiving us here today, to you
particularly for your many years of support to the people of
East Timor.
I would like to start by saying, emphasizing how important
the U.S. Congress has been over the years in attempting to
right the wrong, the tremendous wrong that was done to the
people of East Timor. If ever we, over the years, felt
disappointed or loss of hope because of the indifference of the
world community, every time we came here to this building, to
the many offices, we went back with renewed hope. Do not
underestimate the strength you gave us. Do not underestimate
the influence you have in shaping the events in Indonesia and
in East Timor. It is thanks to you, to Members of Congress,
both Houses, that we have come this far.
I was in Aukland in the midst of the worst crises in East
Timor. As I watched CNN and watched President Clinton's
statement, live, which was seen by hundreds of millions around
the world, when President Clinton said what basically amounted
to an ultimatum, the Indonesian side must invite, and he
emphasized the words ``must invite'' the multinational force to
East Timor to restore order and security. I felt that, that was
going to be a passing of wills between the President of the
United States and the Indonesian army leadership. There is no
way that the West, the authority of the U.S. President could be
discredited. In conversation with my President over the phone,
he was still under house arrest in Jakarta. I said, there is no
way the U.S. can allow the U.S. President to be discredited
because that was an ultimatum. True enough, 2 days later, 3
days later the Indonesian side, which had said repeatedly,
emphatically for many days, that it would not invite a
multinational force, did indeed invite a multinational force.
The multinational force is there in East Timor. My point is
that whenever the U.S. Administration, the Congress wishes to
provide leadership, be it in East Timor or elsewhere, things
happen. In saying this, I want first to express my most sincere
gratitude, our most sincere gratitude to the President, to the
Administration, to you for your leadership that has turned
things around in the last few weeks.
With the multinational force on the ground, the situation
is improving day-by-day in terms of the security level. The
Independence of East Timor is now a matter of fact. There is no
turning back the process that took us 500 years, during
Portuguese rule and, of course, the last 23 years.
However, an East Timorese Jesuit Priest, was telling me in
the midst of the worst crises in East Timor, he was in hiding
in the darkness of the night, talking on a mobile phone. He was
telling me, you will return to a country of widows because of
the extraordinary level of killing in East Timor.
President Xanana will be going back in the next few weeks.
He will go back and all of us will go back to a thoroughly
destroyed country. The first pictures I have seen of East
Timor, in the last few weeks, reminded me of those black and
white pictures of Europe devastated in the wake of Nazi's
Occupation. This is the country we will go back to.
The country has been thoroughly destroyed: Tens of
thousands of people displaced, tens of thousands forcibly
removed from their homes into West Timor where they are
hostages of the military and the militias. Let us not mistake,
these displaced persons are not being held by some unknown
entity somewhere in the jungle, somewhere in the world. They
are being held in Indonesian territory, in an action that is
condoned by the state. An institution of the state, the army,
which is supposed to defend the country from external threats--
or to protect its citizens, is, in fact, an instrument of
hostage taking, of state terrorism. Not satisfied with the
destruction in East Timor, the killings in East Timor, they
take along tens of thousands who are held against their will in
West Timor, and there are thousands more elsewhere in the
country. The Indonesian authorities have the ability to return
these people.
They have the ability because whenever the pressure was
there, they made even more difficult decisions. I started my
comments by saying that when President Clinton stood up and
said, they must invite the multinational force, they did invite
them. An invitation of a multinational force was unprecedented
in Indonesian history.
If anything went against all the public discourse, if
anything goes against Indonesian so-called nationalism, that
was the invitation of the multinational force. He proved that
there is an authority in Indonesia. That when they want, they
can make policies. They can make decisions.
Then why are they not making a decision to disarm the
militias in West Timor, to allow the United Nations' High
Commission for Refugees, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State,
her office dealing with refugees, NGO's, and humanitarian
agencies to provide assistance to the people in the camps, and
return them to their homes in East Timor?
It is not happening because there is no will in Jakarta to
do so. They have proven that when the pressure is there, they
can deliver. We appeal to you, Members of Congress, to use your
utmost influence, together with the Administration, to secure
the early return of the East Timorese in West Timor and
elsewhere in Indonesia to East Timor.
I would like also to say that never once in our history of
23 years has anyone heard from our public discourse any word of
anger, or racial, or ethnic hatred toward Indonesia. Never once
in 23 years of the Timorese Resistance has any one single
Indonesian civilian been killed by the East Timorese
Resistance, even though 200,000 East Timorese were killed by
the Indonesian army. There was never reprisal.
There were never soft targets for the Resistance. Despite
all of the wanton killings of the last few weeks, and our
repeated statements of moderation, flexibility, we continue to
hear, to see, a continuation of violence, of provocation, of
impunity by the Indonesian side.
In spite of all that has happened in the last few weeks,
President Xanana, met with the Foreign Minister of Indonesia. I
must maybe preface this particular event by saying the
following. When I personally met President Clinton just over a
week ago, and with Secretary of State Albright last week, I
said, my mood toward the Republic of Indonesia today is similar
to the mood of the Jews toward Nazi Germany after World War II,
or similar to the Kuwait is the mood of the Kuwaities toward
Iraq after the destruction of Kuwait.
This was only to say--do not expect us to try to think
about even engaging the Indonesians in dialogue. That was our
emotion, but at the same time we realize that we cannot choose
geography. Together, President Xanana and myself, we went to
see the Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas. We had a
constructive, fruitful dialogue with him the other day.
We hope that the new Indonesia that is in the process of
being shaped, following the elections, will be able to repair
the damage it has done to itself, to East Timor, receive the
olive branch that Xanana Gusmao and all of us have extended to
them. One condition for that is a gesture of good will on their
part, to return all East Timorese forcibly taken to the other
side.
As far as our relationship with other countries of the
region, we are deeply grateful to Australia for taking the
burden, the leadership of the multinational force. The
Australian people, as a whole, have been on our side, as have
many other countries around the world, but also has been--as
the former colonial partner of East Timor--has shown an
extraordinary commitment in standing up and living up to its
historic and moral responsibilities.
What we see here, Members of Congress, is a truly universal
movement in support of a small nation. Maybe the tragedy of
East Timor will turn out to be an inspiration and a strength
for the United Nations, for the world community, to be always
inspired to come to the rescue of small nations, no matter
where they are.
When it comes to human rights, there is no domestic
jurisdiction of states. When it comes to human rights, there
are no boundaries. We are all part of this community of
nations. Human lives are as valuable anywhere, be it in Asia,
be it in Africa, Europe, or Latin America. So, what the
multinational force is doing, they are all of the United
Nations, is indeed in response to these very sacred principles
of the universality of human rights.
I thank you.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Ramos-Horta, thank you very much for your
powerful words and your leadership. I understand that both of
you will have to depart at 3 p.m. I will restrict my comments
or questions to just a few of those that I would hope to have
asked. Hopefully, we can get through the entire panel.
I do want to concur and reiterate what you said about the
Australian commitment and how grateful all of us are that
Australia stepped up to the plate, and was really earnest to
provide protection for those innocent civilians who were being
slaughtered.
I think it is good that we all recognize Australia again
and again because no one else really was doing the job until
they took the lead. Let me ask you about peacekeeping. We keep
hearing militia leaders in West Timor who are making public
threats to mount an armed insurgency into East Timor to provoke
what they call a civil war.
Are we doing enough? Is the international community doing
enough, Indonesia doing enough, is to mitigate that threat?
Second, will you just tell us what is it that the international
community is doing right? More importantly, what needs
improvement right now?
I remember, Mr. Ramos-Horta, when you met with me--and I am
sure you met with many other Members of Congress on both sides
of the aisle--during a visit months ago and warned of the
carnage that you felt was imminent if the right steps were not
taken. Regrettably, insufficient numbers of people heeded your
call. What now do you see that we need to do forthwith in order
to preclude additional misery?
Mr. Ramos-Horta. It is as a first step, and it is crucial,
that pressure is there on Indonesia. We have seen that there is
an authority, whatever it is, that when the crunch comes, when
their interest is at stake, they respond. We are certainly
obviously very, very pleased. with the leadership provided by
the Secretary of State, who made a very forceful statement on
Sunday with regard to the refugees, the displaced persons in
West Timor and with the visit by the Assistant Secretary Julia
Taft to the camps in West Timor. For us, the absolute priority
at this stage, beyond the security situation in East Timor that
needs to be stabilized, is the safe return of the refugees, the
displaced persons in West Timor.
It is also absolutely necessary that INTERFET be deployed
more expeditiously. So far, less than half of all of the forces
committed to INTERFET have been available and have been
deployed. We are pleased with the roll of the Australian
command. We are pleased with the progression, but we hope that
other countries make a greater commitment.
We were pleased to hear, to read in today's news that the
United States has committed an additional number of personnel
to INTERFET, now numbering about 500 from the initial 200
committed. We are very grateful for that. On the other hand, it
is necessary that U.S. leadership, the United Nations'
transition administration in the territory be established as
soon as possible, because there is a total breakdown of
services in the territory.
However, we must also emphasize that as the U.S. and the
United Nations' transitional team design and execute the
transition authority in East Timor, they do not lose sight of
the fact that there is an organization, the National Council of
Timorese Resistance, which led the people for 23 years, and
under the flag of the National Council of Timorese Resistance,
the people voted massively for independence.
We view the transition in East Timor as a partnership
between the East Timorese Resistance led by our leader, Xanana
Gusmao, and the international community. We are pleased with
the statements by the U.N., that the U.N.--led transition in
East Timor is not going to be a colonial situation,
relationship, between the U.N. and the East Timorese people,
but rather a partnership.
Mr. Smith. Ms. McKinney. Thank you very much.
Ms. McKinney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am humbled to be here with these very brave witnesses. A
generation ago, men in Washington, D.C. decided that the East
Timorese should not be free. That access to oil and winning the
Cold War were more important. Twenty-five years later, 200,000
East Timorese have been killed by massacre, torture, and
starvation.
U.S. policy has supported the continued violation of the
rights of the people of East Timor. Since 1975, the U.S. has
supplied more than $1 billion worth of U.S. weapons to Jakarta.
Even until last week, our Government continued to provide
support for the Indonesian military.
Mr. Chairman, mass murderers, torturers, and ethnic
cleansers should never be our friends, but in East Timor, in
Latin America, in Africa, sadly, that is our legacy. Saying, I
am sorry, is not good enough. We must be a part of the
correction of the problems of the wrongs of the past.
To our witnesses, I would just like to pledge that I will
be a part of any movement in this Congress to help set right
the things that this Government, over the years, has done
wrong. An independent East Timor will have to struggle for
self-sufficiency and we should be there with you, with our
hearts, our heads, and most importantly with our money.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Ms. McKinney. Mr. Faleomavaega.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Chairman, I realize in the essence
of time that our good friends have to leave. So, I just want to
say that it is a deep and a tremendous honor for this Committee
to have received Mr. Gusmao and Mr. Ramos-Horta, to listen to
their eloquent statements. I have so many questions I wanted to
ask, but I realize the shortness of time. All I can say, Mr.
Chairman, is that as someone who comes from the Pacific, I feel
a close kinship with these two gentlemen and the outstanding
leadership that they have demonstrated to the fine people of
East Timor.
It is a miracle that these gentlemen are still alive. But
maybe in a later time period, we will have them testify before
this Committee to learn more of their experiences and the
brutality of the Indonesian military. I suspect these 200,000
East Timorese that died were killed were by M-16 rifles, not by
AK-47's.
It is a sad legacy of our government, given the fact that
our country sells more military equipment than any other nation
in the world. This is something that should be taken into
account in the formation of our foreign policy both in the
short and long term.
This is the kind of results that we produce. Again, I am
honored to receive our two friends representing the good people
of East Timor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. I would just echo the sentiments expressed
by my colleagues. On behalf of all of us, let me just simply
say thank you for your example. Thank you for your courage. You
have done much, not just for East Timor, but you have done much
for America with that courage and with that moral authority,
and being so clear, and forceful, and powerful in terms of your
words, and particularly reminding us that human rights have no
boundaries. It does not involve geography. It involves all of
us.
Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Goodling, the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. Goodling. I would like to point out that we have a
misconception in this Country quite often. We call it
peacekeeping missions. Often times, they are nation building
missions and we cannot nation-build. They have to do that from
within.
I happened to be there in East Timor in 1977. I saw a lot
of slaughtering that was not being done by outside. I saw
slaughtering that was being done inside with three factions.
Unfortunately, I also saw the Portuguese leave, as they usually
did, leaving the situation in very difficult straights, having
done nothing really to help the East Timorese during the entire
time they were there.
My concern is now, I guess, have the three factions joined
together? Are they working together? As I said, at that time,
in fact, it was not the safest thing. I was young enough to be
foolish to come in at that particular time. But the three
factions, at that particular time, were certainly killing each
other.
I might ask personally, then also a young chap that I spent
time with, at that time, Lopez DeCruz, is he still living? Is
he still working toward peace? What has happened to him? Again,
we can only help nations if they, themselves, pull together. I
would hope that we do not have those three factions. Those
three factions, I suppose, allowed the Indonesians to come in
and do what they have done ever since.
That is the end of my statement. I do not know whether
there are any responses to particular a question or two. If we
are first in arms, then the French have to be close behind.
They do not care where they send them, just so they get money.
Mr. Smith. I know our two witnesses have to leave, but if
you wanted to respond or make any final statement before this
Subcommittee, again, we are honored to have you here.
Mr. Gusmao. [Via Interpreter.]
Ms. Interpreter. Mr. Chairman, Members of Congress, ladies
and gentlemen, thank you for this opportunity and for the warm
words of solidarity you have expressed to us. We are indeed a
tiny people, but you are listening to us.
Congressman Goodling, we recognize our weaknesses, the
weaknesses that we had 25 years ago. They are now lessons to
all of us, and they were a major lesson to our people who
struggled for 25 years and tried to resist and survive just
because they had the right to self-determination. That same
right is now recognized by the whole world, by all of the
international community.
We all learned from our mistakes. This one has been inside
me, with me, for the past 25 years. It is in my mind. I thank
the Congress and I thank the people of the United States of
America for giving us this opportunity.
We need your help and we need your assistance. But we are
also sure that with your help and assistance, as politicians,
as a body which decides on issues which influence the whole
world, we are sure that with you, we will build a new East
Timorese nation, based on values such as democracy, justice,
and human rights, the very same values that have shaped the
Nation of the United States.
Thank you.
Mr. Smith. No words can really add to that. That was a
wonderful vision. Thank you. I would point out to my colleagues
that we are going to take a 3- to 5-minute recess, as our
distinguished witnesses depart. Then we will invite the third
panel up.
I do hope that Members will stay on because we have three
experts who will speak to the issue in our third panel. Thank
you.
We are in recess for 5 minutes.
[Recess]
Mr. Smith. The Committee will come to order.
Our third panel consists of Mr. T. Kumar, who is the
Advocacy Director for Asia and the Pacific, for Amnesty
International U.S.A. Next, we will hear from Mr. Arnold Kohen,
President of the Humanitarian Project and author of ``From the
Place of the Dead: The Epic Struggles of Bishop Belo of East
Timor''.
Our next witness on East Timor is a former investigative
reporter with NBC News. Allan Nairn is a widely published
investigative journalist who focuses on U.S. foreign policy in
overseas operations. His coverage of the November 1991 massacre
of East Timorese civilians by the Indonesian military won
numerous journalism awards. Formerly banned from entering
Indonesia, Mr. Nairn has twice been arrested by the Indonesian
military, including earlier this month in East Timor. After
significant international pressure on his behalf, the
Government of Indonesia deported him approximately 10 days ago.
Finally, Emilia Peres was born in East Timor, and, at the
age of 14, fled East Timor with her family. For the past 15
years, Ms. Peres has been an international advocate for the
plight of her people. She has appeared before the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights on behalf of the people of East
Timor, and is a Board Member of the East Timor Human Rights
Center. Ms. Peres currently lives and works in Australia. We
are very grateful that she is here as well.
I would like to begin first with Mr. Kumar, if he would
begin his testimony.
STATEMENT OF T. KUMAR, ADVOCACY DIRECTOR FOR ASIA AND PACIFIC,
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL U.S.A.
Mr. Kumar. Thank you very much.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for inviting Amnesty
International and for holding this important hearing at this
crucial time. The reason why I mentioned crucial is that there
is a general feeling that since peacekeepers are moving in,
everything is fine and well in East Timor and to the people of
East Timor.
Other reports show that things are not so fine. Still East
Timorese in West Timor and other parts of Indonesia, including
Jakarta, Bali, and other places, have been harassed and abused
by the Indonesian military and the militias. I would like to
draw your attention to that issue, Mr. Chairman.
When I was listening to the hearing testimonies during the
last 2 or 3 hours, I was taken aback by the enormous
responsibility that human rights organizations and people like
you who are in power carry to protect and promote individuals
who have been abused, and killed, and slaughtered in large
numbers with total impunity. We, as an organization, have been
working on abuses around the world for the last 38 years. This
is the first time we were compelled to issue an urgent action.
That means, it is a crisis situation that we alerted 1.1
million members around the world that the whole population of
East Timor was in danger or fear of being killed or abused.
In that note, we can certify to you that the abuses that
occurred, until the international community put its act
together, was beyond belief even to organizations like us who
monitor abuses around the world. We are grateful that President
Clinton took a strong step, but we wish that he took those
steps at least a week before.
If he would have taken the same steps, at least a week
before, we could have saved hundreds, if not thousands of
lives. We could have saved children who are left orphans today.
We could have saved thousands who were forced to be kidnaped to
West Timor. This may be a lesson that we all have to look back.
When there is a crisis, when there is slaughter going on,
act immediately, whether it is your friend or foe. The history
of East Timor tells us only one thing. That tragedy did not
start 2 months ago or 6 months ago. In 1975 when the
Indonesians invaded, 1/3 of the population was wiped out.
The entire world, including ours, Mr. Chairman, kept
silent. It is OK to keep in silent to some extent, but they
were rewarded with military training and weaponry. Our
corporations lined up to profit from the natural wealth of that
country, looking the other way of the abuses that is being
perpetrated against innocent civilians.
If history says anything to us today, one thing we have to
learn is never, never keep silent whenever there are abuses.
Indonesian military got this courage and strength to slaughter
with total impunity ever since they slaughtered half a million
to a million Indonesians in the wake of coup-de-ta.
It was looked upon as an anti-Communist issue and the world
at large. Especially our Country kept quiet. That was the
mistake that was made. We are seeing a country which has the
military which has been used to abuse its citizens for the last
30 years. The victory, so-to-speak, that we are seeing today is
not totally the victory for East Timorese.
It is a victory for Indonesians. Indonesians are the people
who suffered most. They were the people who were slaughtered
under this military, for total impunity, for 35 years; Aceh,
Irian Jaya, even Java, there are seven political prisoners
still in prison in Indonesia; Gudiman and six other people.
They have been completely and conveniently forgotten by
everyone. When I met with Gusmao yesterday, I asked him how is
Gudiman doing, even though I do not know him. I just asked him.
The answer was, he is taking the lead now. Gusmao is taking the
lead to make sure that these people are released.
So, in a nutshell, what we are seeing today is a victory
for the Indonesian people and justice to the Indonesian people
if the International War Crimes Tribunal is setup. On that
note, Mr. Chairman, I would like to bring to your attention
what was brought to us from London this morning, that Jakarta
may not accept the tribunal that is going to be setup.
If it is true, then the Clinton Administration and you, in
the leadership positions, have to make a very strong and clear
statement and stand against this international institution that
is going to be formed.
In closing, for Amnesty, the people of East Timor have been
very close to us ever since their suffering started. In 1974,
we had a major campaign called, Free the Coats of Suffering and
Terror in East Timor. This is the report we published.
In fact, Gusmao is being portrayed here with his picture. I
also would like to urge you to include my full statement in the
record. Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman. Amnesty International
is pleased to testify.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kumar appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Kumar for your excellent
statement and for your strong appeal. Your full statement will
be made a part of the record. The full statements and any
addendums by all of our witnesses. Thank you.
I would like to ask Mr. Kohen, if you would proceed.
Mr. Kohen. Mr. Chairman, excuse me for getting here late.
I wanted to make sure that I was able to speak with Bishop Belo
to send a special message to the Committee. He just arrived now
in Portugal from Germany. When I finally reached him and I told
him I was coming here to testify, he said, what is your
message?
The message is that the Clinton Administration, the
Congress, all of the political parties in the United States and
all of the candidates should be united behind the goal of
ending the violence in East Timor and making sure that the East
Timorese people and the churches there are able to rebuild.
That is exactly the message I would like to send. Please
tell them I would like to come there myself when I have an
opportunity, and, for the moment, if you could convey certain
things for me. I intend to make a very brief extemporaneous
statement. I will have a slightly longer one for the record.
I spoke with Bishop Belo just before his house was attacked
on September 6th. At that time, he was, as he always is,
skeptical that there would be such a full scale assault on his
residence. It had never happened before. He was quite surprised
that such a thing would take place. He is somebody who hates
exaggerations.
To illustrate this point, the bishop had even said that the
attack on the Diocses the day before was not actually an attack
on the heart of the Diocses, it was an attack on the garage.
So, despite threat of an assult, he remained at home. I said,
are you going anywhere? He said, where could I possibly go? I
have 4,000 people taking refuge here. He said, I cannot just go
running around.
What ended up happening was that militias with actually a
handful of Timorese forced to go in front, led by Indonesian
special forces, came into the bishop's home and started
shooting. Six young men who live in his compound gathered
around to protect him from harm. Militia accomplices told him,
sit down. But the Bishop refused.
The reason that he refused to do so is because, and I (will
hold this bloody photo up) is what took place during the
Liquica Church Massacre in April of this year. What happened
there is that people were told to sit down and they never got
up: They were essentially massacred. So on September 6, the
Bishop just got up, walked out of his office, walked out the
front gate, went to the police, insisted on protection. The
next day he left East Timor because he knew that he had to go
and speak with the Pope in Rome and tell him about this and
other things.
Essentially, the last barrier had been broken. I had stayed
in the Bishop's house on a number of occasions. This was one
place where people could go for refuge. This was one place
where you would not see these kinds of assaults. It did not
make what was going on outside any nicer, but at least people
felt some security that they could go there.
This ended on September 6th. Quite unfortunately, I have to
say that when the Liquica Massacre took place, there were
certain communications made to this Administration by people in
Congress, by people in churches. The response that they got
back, particularly from people in the Pentagon was, if we
restore military aid to Indonesia, perhaps we will have more
influence on them.
Unfortunately I think what happened as a result of that is
that Indonesian military people, and I have this from a number
of sources, I am a trained investigative reporter. I used to
work for NBC News, I have it from a number of sources that the
way that the Indonesian military interpreted this message from
our military is that, in effect, what had happened in Liquica
and what these militias were doing, rather quietly out of the
view of television cameras and reporters in the countryside of
East Timor, was of no great consequence to the United States.
Effectively, that led not only to the assault on the
Bishop's house and the assault on the ICRC, but also the
assault on East Timor as a whole. I am somebody that over the
years, and I have to say this because I think that there are
witnesses here with me today that would attest to this, that I
have not been automatically one who would have said in the
past, let us cut all aid.
Sometimes communications between our military and the
Indonesian military have proven to be useful. After the Santa
Cruz Massacre, for example, and on a few other occasions. But
on this occasion, that did not work. It simply did not. This
relationship was abused. I really feel that something more
could have been done.
As Mr. Kumar just said, a lot more could have been done to
dissuade the Indonesian military. I think that even, until
recent days, they did not quite get it. I think that there was
a sense that they would pay no great price for what they were
doing I think that what took place in recent weeks, and indeed
the killing of church workers the other day, might have been
prevented.
I happened to have known the Italian Sister who was killed
and the Timorese Sister who was killed. These people were
delivering aid to people in the countryside. They had hurt
nobody. Militias instigated by the Indonesian army just started
shooting. They have done it in other places, not only to
religious workers, and not only to Catholics. Others have been
threatened. Just yesterday, I received a communication from
religious Sisters in Australia who were in touch with the
Sisters in Timor. They said the militias right now, that is as
of yesterday, were given license, they said, by elements of the
military to go around and start killing priests and nuns.
I do not know if this will happen. I sure hope it does not.
I think that if we put enough pressure on the Indonesian
military, maybe it will not come to pass, but this is the type
of atmosphere I think was created by trying to restore military
aid to Indonesia after something like the Liquica Massacre took
place.
I will end my statement there and take any questions later.
There is a lot more to say, but that is the essence, I think,
of what I would like to communicate.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kohen appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Kohen. I appreciate
your work. You mentioned Bishop Belo. I would just say for the
record, Joseph Rees, our Staff Director and Chief Counsel, was
actually in the church when the announcement was made that
Bishop Belo had received the Nobel Peace Prize, which certainly
was a great moment. Thank you for conveying his thoughts and
sentiments to the Committee, and, by extension, to the American
people. Mr. Nairn.
ALLAN NAIRN, INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALIST, NBC NEWS
Mr. Nairn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have had a lung problem that flared up. So, it is a
little difficult to talk. It is a special pleasure to be here
today, having been in the same room with Xanana and Jose Ramos-
Horta, Kumar, Emelia, and Arnold Kohen, who is a tireless
campaigner for human rights.
Today, as we are meeting here, Dili is in ruins. Half of
Timor is, in effect, held hostage. They are finding the remains
of decapitated bodies, as AFP reported yesterday. They are
finding police file photos of dead torture victims with their
hands bound behind their backs.
Uncounted thousands of Timorese are still in hiding,
surviving on roots and leaves. General Wiranto's militias are
threatening further terror. Yet, this is a great day because
East Timor stands on the brink of freedom. It is hard to
imagine really. They said it could not be done.
Back in December 1975, when the Indonesian military began
consulting with Washington about a possible invasion, they
promised that they could crush Timor within 2 weeks. General
Ali Mortopo came to the White House and met with General Brent
Skowcroft. President Ford and Henry Kissinger went to Jakarta
and sat down with Suharto.
Then 16 hours later, the invasion was underway. The
paratroopers dropped from U.S. C-130's. They used new U.S.
machine guns to shoot the Timorese into the sea. In 1990, when
I first went to Timor, the Intelligence Chief, Colonel Wiranto
confirmed that by that time, their operation had killed \1/3\
of the original population.
On November 12, 1991, when the troops marched on the Santa
Cruz Cemetery, they carried U.S. M-16s. They did not bother
with warning shots. Amy Goodman and I stood between them
futilely hoping to stop them from opening fire, but they opened
systematically and they kept on shooting because as the
National Commander, General Swtcisno, explained, East Timorese
are disrupters. Such people must be shot.
That was army policy. That is army policy. At no time
during these years of slaughter, did the U.S. Government's
executive branch ever decide that the time had come to stop
supporting the perpetrators. President Carter and Richard
Holbrook sent in OV-10 Broncos and helicopters. Presidents
Reagan, Bush, and Clinton sent in weapons, multilateral
financing, and sniper trainers. But now they say circumstances
have changed. President Clinton has announced a military
cutoff. There is even a Clinton doctrine under which the United
States will intervene to prevent mass slaughters, like
genocides, pogroms, and ethnic cleansing.
In recent weeks, commentators have criticized the U.S. for
failure to intervene. For not sending in foreign troops fast
enough to stop the Indonesian army's final burst of Timor
terror. Mr. Chairman, I want to make the point today that
intervention is not the issue.
The Clinton doctrine, and the questions flowing from it, do
not apply in Timor or Indonesia because the killing is being
perpetrated with the active assistance of the United States.
The U.S. is not an observer here. It is not agonizing on the
sidelines.
It has instead been the principal patron of the Indonesian
armed forces. The issue is not whether we should step in and
play policeman to the world, but rather whether we should
continue to arm, train, and finance the world's worst
criminals. I think most Americans would say, no, we should not
do that. I know that many in Congress, from both parties, would
agree.
As of this moment, U.S. policy is still, the temporary
cutoff notwithstanding, to restore as soon as possible its
support for the Indonesian armed forces. On March 3, Admiral
Dennis Blair, the U.S. Commander-In-Chief in the Pacific told
Congress that the Indonesian armed forces was the main
instrument for order in Indonesia.
He was speaking, as he and the world knew, after 34 years
of army terror, which has claimed perhaps a million Indonesians
and 200,000 East Timorese. In most people's eyes, such violent
behavior is the antithesis of order. But for the U.S. Executive
branch, it has been the basis of a policy.
In dozens of countries, unfortunately, the U.S. has chosen
to use killer armies. From Guatemala City, to Bogota, to
Beijing it has embraced the enemies of freedom. But today in
Timor, we can rejoice because, for once, that policy has been
defeated. In Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan, on the streets of the
fourth largest country in the world, brave Indonesian students
and working people are demonstrating against the army.
They demand that it get out of politics. That it dismantle
its feared police state. They are risking their lives for real
democracy. The United States should be on their side, but it is
not, Mr. Chairman, at least not yet. That is why we are here
today. Congress needs to act to reverse the fundamental course
of U.S. policy.
The bill, H.R. 2895, which you and others are backing, is a
good start to ending support for terror in Timor, but Congress
needs to go further in at least two basic respects. First, the
cutoff should be conditioned not just on Timor issues, but also
on an end to Indonesian army terror everywhere.
The army should not be able to win back U.S. support by
choosing new targets. Severe repression in Aceh, West Papua New
Guinea, and elsewhere is already underway. Congress should not
be supporting it simply because the army has finished with
Timor.
Second, although this cutoff may be the most comprehensive
ever attempted, there are still many lines of support for TNI
and the Indonesian national police that the legislation does
not cover. Last year, there was an uproar in Congress when it
was disclosed that the Pentagon's JCET Program was training the
army in urban warfare, syops, and sniper techniques.
Congress, like the press and public, had thought that
military training was cutoff when Congress canceled Indonesia
IMET training to Indonesia after the 1991 Dili Massacre. Today,
it is again the conventional wisdom that the U.S. no longer
trains the Indonesian military, and that U.S. material support
for TNI is now at a token level.
It is indeed the case that due to public pressure, a
bipartisan coalition in Congress has cut many lines of support,
including bans on small arms, armored vehicles, and the use of
U.S. weapons in Timor, and the cancellation of deals for F-5
and F-16 fighters.
It is also the case that contrary to Congress'
understanding with the executive branch, the U.S. has, through
1999, been intensifying its links with TNI, even as Timor
militia terror and repression in Aceh have escalated. It is
also the case that there are many complex lines of support for
Indonesia's armed forces that, to this day, remain largely
unknown to even the most engaged Members of Congress.
For the past 5 months, I have been in Indonesia and
occupied Timor trying to investigate these lines of support. It
would take many hours to lay out the facts in detail. I will
just mention a few brief examples to give an idea of the scope
of the problem.
A couple of weeks ago, I reported in The Nation magazine on
internal Pentagon cables, classified cables, issued 2 days
after the Liquica Massacre, which Arnold so graphically
described, that horrific church massacre in which the militias
backed up by uniformed troops, went into the church, in the
rectory, and hacked dozens to death.
Two days after that meeting, the senior U.S. uniformed
officer in the Pacific, Admiral Dennis Blair, sat down with
General Wiranto, the Indonesian commander. Blair had a mission
from the State Department and others to tell Wiranto to shut
the militias down.
In fact, as the classified cable summarizing the meeting in
great detail shows, Blair did the opposite. He offered Wiranto
new U.S. military assistance. He offered to join Wiranto in
lobbying the U.S. Congress to reverse standing U.S. policy to
get the IMET military training restored.
He offered Wiranto the first new U.S. training program for
the Indonesian security forces, since 1992. This is a crowd
control and riot control program that was focused on precisely
the unit that 2 days before had helped stage the Liquica
Massacre. He even invited Wiranto to be his personal guest at
his quarters in Hawaii.
Wiranto and his people were delighted by the meeting. They
took it as a green light to proceed. I can now report to the
Committee, Mr. Chairman, that there was an additional meeting
after the Blair-Wiranto session, which had perhaps even more
significant implications.
This one took place on July 14th in Jakarta. It involved
Admiral Archie Clemens, the Commander of the U.S. Pacific
Fleet. Admiral Clemens came in to make a presentation to Senior
ABRI leadership, including the Naval leadership.
Now, at this time, the militia campaign was in full swing.
The Liquica Massacre had happened. The assault on Dili had
happened. This is the assault in which the militia staged a
rally in front of the Governor's office. It was broadcast live
on the official state radio station, Radio Republic Indonesia.
Enrico Gutierrez, the militia leader, stood up and issued a
public death threat against the Carrascalao family.
The militias then proceeded to trash the Carrascalao house,
killed the son of Manuel Carrascalao, killed dozens of refugees
who were hiding in the rear of the house, rampaged through
Dili, shooting people on-sight. This all happened after a
ceremony that had been presided over by the Indonesian
occupation Governor and General Zacki McCarrum, the Indonesian
military coordinator of the militia operation, as I will
discuss in a minute, a long time protege and trainee of U.S.
Intelligence.
This was after the Dili rampage, after countless other
militia killings. On July 14th, Admiral Clemens came into
Jakarta. According to Indonesian officers who were present, and
according to Admiral Clemens' own presentation notes for the
meeting, he offered the officers an increase, a step up in the
U.S. military relationship with Indonesia.
He said, ``Reengagement is crucial to maintaining the U.S.-
Indonesia relationship.'' He referred to the Siabu Range in
Medan, where Indonesia had given the U.S. rights to stage air-
to-ground firing exercises, and he made a politically crucial
proposal. He proposed that in Surabaya, at the Indonesian Navy
Eastern Fleet Headquarters, training facilities be established
for the U.S. military.
Anyone who follows Indonesian military politics knows that
there are few hotter issues than the prospect of U.S. military
bases in Indonesia. Some in the military are for it. Some are
against it. It is a highly charged issue. Here, Admiral Clemens
was going to the military leadership and proposing what he
called ``possible training sites'' to train U.S. troops
directly in an ongoing permanent basis on Indonesian soil.
Admiral Clemens went so far as to say that the U.S. goals
for the Asia-Pacific Region depend on maintaining our strategic
partnership with Indonesia. This, at a time when the State
Department and the White House were publicly threatening to
cutoff the Indonesian army because of the militia terror and
the terror in Aceh.
He then went on to urge the Indonesian military to, as he
put it, ``Maintain access to advanced technology.'' He
specifically was talking about new large scale purchases of
high tech electronics which would allow the Indonesian navy to
integrate their command and control and surveillance facilities
directly with those of the U.S. Navy.
He went on to discuss, in some detail, the FDNF IT-21
installation. These are U.S. Naval electronics, which he was
urging the Indonesian military to link up with. If you would
like, Mr. Chairman, I could make available to the Committee
some of the slides that the Admiral presented in this meeting
and some of the Admiral's own notes.
Mr. Nairn. As this was going on, and as the militias were
rampaging on the streets of Dili, the U.S. was continuing to
ship in ammunition to Indonesian. Last year, Representative
McKinney, the Chairman, and others made a special effort to try
to cutoff the influx of U.S. ammunition and spare parts. At the
time it did not succeed.
This year, we could see the consequences. A few weeks ago,
as Dili was burning, and as the U.N. evacuated, as foreign
journalists had left, I had the opportunity to be, one of the
last foreign journalists, left on the streets of Dili.
I was walking around in the early morning going from one
abandoned house to another. You could hear the militias coming
around the corners with their chopper motorcycles. They would
fire into the air and honk their horns as they were about to
sack and burn another house.
You also found littering the streets hundreds upon hundreds
of shell casings. They came from two places. One from Pendad,
the Indonesian military industries which have joint ventures
with a whole list of U.S. companies, and the other from Olin
Winchester of East Alton, Illinois.
These cartridges had been recently shipped in to Battalion
744, one of the territorial battalions in Timor, and then
issued to the militiamen. As you can see from these photos,
they come in the new white Olin Winchester boxes, 20 cartridges
to a box. These were among the bullets that they were using to
terrorize Dili.
The units on the ground that were specifically running the
militia operation included some of those most intensively
trained by the United States. This includes Group 4 and Group 5
of KOPASSUS, BRIMOB, the KOSTRAD Infantry Units, the individual
officers coordinating the militia operation, including General
Zacki Mckarrim, Admiral Yost, Nanko, General Shafri Siamsuden,
Colonel Wudutomonegroho, who was the on-the-ground coordinator
for the militias in the initial months of their operation.
They are all graduates of U.S. IMET and Intelligence
training. I will just end by citing one dimension that I would
suggest Congress look into. Many in Congress believe that they
have cutoff U.S. training for the Indonesian military and
police. As far as I can tell, that is not the case.
There are several other training programs going on, besides
IMET, besides JCET. Admiral Sudomo, the long-time Chief of
Suharto's Secret Police, a man who was presented with the
Legion of Merit by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, told me, in
a series of on-the-record interviews, that for years the CIA
has been providing intelligence training to intelligence
operatives from the Indonesian armed forces. He said that this
training involved 10 to 15 Indonesian officers, per year, who
were brought over to the U.S. for a 2- to 3-month intelligence
course. He said that as he understood it, this training
continues to the present.
Last year, when I was arrested by the Indonesian armed
forces and interrogated, the man who was interrogating me, who
identified himself as Major Dodi Wuboa, at the end of our
interrogation session, he leaned over to me and said, ``I am a
member of U.S. Intelligence''.
I said, ``What do you mean? What are you talking about?''
He then went on to describe in detail training that he said he
had received at the Cheeputat Police Camp in Jakarta and in
Quantico, Virginia. As Wuboa described it, this training
involved instructors from the FBI, DEA, and CIA. It included a
training in subjects such as indoor pistol technique,
surveillance, and interrogation.
Over the ensuing year in speaking to many Indonesian and
U.S. officials, I have finally been able to confirm all the key
elements of Wuboa's story. Indeed, there has been ongoing
training at Quantico. Indeed, the FBI, to this day, has its own
special training program for the Indonesian police.
Many are brought to the FBI Academy. Others receive
training onsite in Indonesia, often in intelligence and weapon
handling techniques. There are several different strands of so-
called anti-terrorist training. Just 1 month ago, according to
U.S. military sources in Jakarta, a U.S. Intelligence team was
due to come in and provide what they call counter-surveillance
training to the Indonesian security forces.
The Pentagon has been providing new advanced equipment to
IMIA, the Indonesian Military Intelligence Agency, including
special radios for use in operations in Irian Jaya West Papua.
There is a whole strand of links involving training and
material supply that is not even covered by the Pentagon, not
even covered by the relevant legislation dealing with the
Pentagon.
It involves the FBI, CIA, the DEA, Customs, and the U.S.
Marshals. It is a very intricate series of connections.
According to Indonesian police documents I have seen, their
recent training includes explosives and explosive
countermeasures. According to a former chief of the SGI, that
is the Special Intelligence Unit in East Timor who I spoke to,
the KOPASSUS has received training from U.S. Special Forces
troops in techniques including the assembly of explosives.
What this colonel, this SGI colonel' claimed was torture
resistance. These are sessions in which he said torture
techniques are discussed and practiced, to a certain extent, on
trainees. The theory being, if you get caught by the enemy,
this might happen to you. So, you ought to know what the
techniques are. He said that this training was not very
impressive to the KOPASSUS, since they already knew all of the
torture techniques. He even claimed, he even gave me the names
of some individual KOPASSUS officers whom he said had died in
training as these counter-torture techniques were practiced. He
said it was a part of the curriculum that the U.S. forces had
given.
I will stop there. One more thing, one more interesting
side note. Even as the militia terror was rising to its height,
there was another strand of training going on involving what
you might call localization or privatization. A number of
Indonesian police and intelligence officers were being sent for
training with individual U.S. police departments.
One crew was just up at the New York City Police
Department, the NYPD Police Academy, just about a 1\1/2\ months
ago. I know contacts have been made with the departments in
Virginia and in California as well. These training sessions are
technically not under the auspices of the State Department or
Pentagon.
Apparently, they are arranged with the help of the local
CIA station in Jakarta, and, they say, with approval from State
Department officials in Washington. A related type of training
is happening right now at Norwich University in Vermont where,
at this moment, at least nine KOPASSUS, special forces
soldiers, are being trained. This is a program that was set up
with assistance from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency.
Again, it is not technically under the current State Department
or Pentagon umbrella, but it is yet another way in which the
U.S. Executive branch manages, by hook or by crook, to provide
support for the Indonesian armed forces.
The short answer to what has the U.S. role been with the
Indonesian military in the months of the militia terror, it has
been deep. It has been extensive and many key officials have
been attempting to intensify it. I believe it should stop. I
believe that many in Congress have clearly shown the will to
stop it.
It is a matter now of tracking down all of these lifelines
that run into Jakarta. It takes a lot of work. Then it takes
going around and systematically cutting them off one-by-one
because that is the only thing that will work.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much for your extensive
testimony. You just may find it of interest, on a recent trip
to Jakarta when I met with our U.S. military attache, I had two
of your articles. I had all of those documents as well. When I
shared it with him and with others in the embassy, he just
dismissed it completely.
You had pointed out the training of KOPASSUS and the
allegations, which the record clearly bears out, of their use
of torture against innocent people. He also said that the
JCET's Program had been looked at by human rights organizations
and had been given the green light, to which I said, ``name
one. Give me the names of the organizations''. I got nothing
but a vacant and blank stare. We do thank you for your
investigative work. I would like to ask Ms. Peres if she would
present her testimony.
EMILIA PERES, INTERNATIONAL ADVOCATE FOR THE PEOPLE OF EAST
TIMOR
Ms. Peres. Thank you.
I just wanted to say, first of all, the reason why I am
here in America, my company--is my own part of a technical
team. Before I came here, I was in Jakarta. About 2 month ago,
I went to Jakarta to help in development plans for East Timor.
We were thinking that everything was going all right and we
were preparing for the ballot and then what was coming after
the ballot. Unfortunately, after the ballot and after the
warnings, not only of my leaders to the international
community, to UNAMET itself, I remember speaking to members of
UNAMET in Australia, asking them what would happen after the
ballot. Would forces be in place after the ballot because we
felt it was very dangerous period, and this period after the
ballot to the Phase III.
We were told, do not worry. We will be there. We will not
abandon the East Timorese people. Unfortunately, we all know
what happened. So, after the ballot and after the announcement
of the results, the destruction started to happen in East
Timor. I stayed behind in Jakarta to actually help the other
East Timorese who became targeted by the Indonesian special
forces and some militias.
At the beginning it was like a number of people started to
contact us to ask for protection to get out of the country
because they were harassed. It started with some of the
leaders. In our limited way, we managed to get them out of the
country. Then students started to come to us. Then the list
started to increase.
So, after awhile, not long, within a week, we had about 700
people registered with us. That was myself and another two
Timorese in the team. I started to put the list together.
Within about 2 weeks, the list went up to 2,000. We knew we
could not help. So, we started to approach embassies. We
started to approach the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees for them to do so, the Red Cross, because people
started to seek refuge in private homes, seeking refuge in
convents, religious orders, and NGO's for protection. But even
so, they did not seem to actually get the protection they were
seeking. We took upon ourselves to actually plead with
governments to see if we could evacuate these refugees.
My leaders before already attacked on the issue of the
refugees, not only in West Timor, but those ones that were in
other islands of Indonesia. The reason why we concentrated on
the other islands of Indonesia was because we felt that at
least we could help those people, because in West Timor access
was very hard, especially for people like us.
The international community themselves could not actually
access the concentration camps while I was there. That was mid-
September when I was still organizing the beginning of this
evacuation. When I actually came out, when I was called to come
out from Jakarta and come here, we were at the stage where the
United Nations' High Commission for Refugees were already in
the process together with UNAMET representatives, the Red
Cross.
They were all trying to help and a lot of the embassies in
Jakarta. We got the green light from the Indonesian Government
that our people could get out of Indonesia, but we needed to
organize transportation, etcetera. So, we did that.
Unfortunately today, it is already about 10 days after,
nothing has happened. The people are still there. I keep in
constant contact with them. The situation is becoming worse.
People have moved from house-to-house. My own group, when I was
in Jakarta, we were already on the fifth hotel because every
time we got detected, we felt we were not secure anymore. We
had to move to another hotel.
Then the colleague that I left behind is now in the sixth
hotel because the other hotel was recently, there were
demonstrations. New faces started to hang around the hotel and
they felt, they got information that any time they would have
been discovered. The responsibility they covered was just too
big.
At that time when I spoke to her, we already had 3,500
people on our list. Now, these people are mainly students that
were in Indonesia before the voting, as well as workers, people
who were living in Indonesia, studying in Indonesia, and with
the voting, they became exposed.
The students actually undertook the campaigning. The
workers came out from remote villages in Indonesia, itself, to
the main centers where there was the polling booth for voting.
So, they were exposed and now they were targets. Houses have
been ransacked in there.
Death threats have been given to our people. At the moment,
I believe that there is not, the people on our list, not one
single one of them that is living openly. They are actually in
hiding. Now, some people, for example in Bali, they were hiding
in the church grounds. We were told that even the Bishop's
house, and this is not the Timorese Bishop, the Bishop in Bali,
was visited by the head of a military.
He was questioned, how many Timorese went through the
house? How many stayed? Nuns were becoming nervous about
housing Timorese. Some individual families that gave some
protection to the Timorese families became also nervous because
after there were people, Indonesian people, dressed up in
civilian clothes, but you could clearly tell that they were
from either TNI or KOPASSUS, questioning the families.
Where is this person? Where is this family? They keep
coming, once, twice, three times. At the fourth time, the
Indonesian families, themselves, could not handle it anymore
and would ask the Timorese family, could you please find
another place? They used to come to us seeking our help to find
alternative accommodations, alternative refuge.
On the 26th of September when I rang Jakarta, I was told
that in South Jakarta there was a center, a training center
named K.V. Paulry in Selanbeck. There were 20,000 people being
trained there. They consisted mainly of soldiers from East
Timor, Indonesian soldiers, some members of the militia groups,
ITARAK and BESIMERAPUTI, and some other 2,000 East Timorese
that were forced, the ones that they took to West Timor, then
the young males. Two thousand of them were taken to Jakarta to
this training center to be trained. Apparently, the aim of the
training center was to actual train these people as militias so
that they could go back to East Timor from West Timor to fight
against INTERFET. However, when the militia army had agreed
that the force could withdraw from East Timor, so we were told
that they changed their objective, their aim.
Their aim became to actually hunt all East Timorese in
Jakarta, Bandung, Sulatiga, Dimpatha, and Surabaya. To target
all of them. We were also told that this is their plan, to
actually, they called it Clean-up Operation. To clean-up all of
these Timorese in Indonesian. When I was there, I was actually
worried myself because I am also a member of the CNRT and we
were evacuating nearly all the CNRT leadership, but I was still
there.
One of the Timorese people who has contact links with the
Indonesians, I asked him have we got, the plan was to be taking
place from the 17th of September onwards because they were
planning when the multinational forces landed in East Timor,
that is when they will start their operation in other parts of
Indonesia.
I was asking him, what was his analysis of the situation.
Did we really have enough time or not to plan my own existing
of the country. He said, look, as soon as the forces land, it
will be dangerous. Just keep low. However, we may still have
some time. However, no Timorese should be hanging around in
Indonesia from the end of October onwards or before the MPR,
the decision.
I asked why? He said, because they are going to clean-up.
However, before they clean us up, they will clean-up the other
people, their own people inside, people inside the house. I did
not really understand what that meant. Later on I got the list
of people who they were, they had a list of people who they
were going to kill first.
On that list the names of people like Francisco Lopez
DeCruz, Rouie Lopez, all those pro-integration people high up
were listed on that list because they just knew too much. That
was after Mrs. Mary Robinson had visited Jakarta and spoke
about this business about international war crimes. When she
announced that, we were told that the military had a secret
meeting and that is when this list was drawn up to clean-up
these Timorese who knew too much.
If you ask me where are these Timorese, you will find out
that quite a few of them, at least Francisco Lopez, Rouie
Lopez, and Clemente Normeral are already out of the country
because they accessed this information. They went out. These
are pro-integration people.
Pro-independence people, it is taken for granted that they
will be cleaned up. On the 16th of September, three were killed
in Jakarta itself, three workers. Now, they do not spare
anybody. I met one of the young boys. His name was Julius. We
call him Julius of the lost generation because he was one of
those Timorese who went in the early 1970's or should I say
late 1970's.
They took them out to Indonesia and they were brought up as
Indonesians. So, they do not know their parents. They do not
know their families. Around the voting time, we found all of
these Timorese and they were all brought back for the voting.
They actually joined the pro-independence group.
Julius' house was ransacked. So, now Julius is actually
living in hiding. When his house was ransacked, they left
threatening notes to say that if you do not leave, we will drop
a grenade into your house. These are people like Julius who
actually lived there for the last 20 years or led very much
Indonesian lifestyles. Julius is even a Muslim.
In Jakarta, we use some embassies to actually escort our
people to the immigration point so that we can actually get out
of the immigration without being stopped and face problems. I,
myself, was escorted out by an embassy there. The problem is
that the embassies are also being not yet targeted, but
noticeable.
Some of these embassies have already asked us and said,
look, we cannot keep carrying on helping you because otherwise
we will be noticeable. You have to share. Go to other embassies
and ask the other embassies to take your people out because
they will notice.
For example, they are still in an embassy in Jakarta. We
cannot even access that because a part from the demonstrations
in front of the embassies, there is also militia people, plus
the police just hanging around there to try to identify with
Timorese are coming with passports to get visas to get out.
One day while I was actually trying to get some people out
of the country, I sent this boy to the embassy. I was not even
aware of what was happening. The poor boy actually delivered
the passports to the embassy, but then had to actual get into a
taxi and run because the other guys actually came after him.
So, he had to go around Jakarta for quite awhile before he made
them lose trace of him.
This is the situation in Jakarta. Meanwhile, we also,
because we were there, were starting to get phone calls from
Timorese all over, even outside and abroad asking us to locate
their families in West Timor. We started to do that. So, before
the 23rd, or on the 20th of September, a friend of ours, a
religious person, went and visited West Timor, mainly Kupang.
He actually sent me a report. I am just going to read bits
and pieces out of this. He says here that, OK, like for
example, in West Timor, to obtain protection, shelter and food
rations, many families have to pretend to be related to the
militia and pro-integration faction.
The city is teaming with refugees, and police, and soldiers
from East Timor. He says, in the outskirts of Kupang and even
further away, there are refugee camps that are in pitiful
conditions. Journalists are discouraged to enter and the
entrances are swarming with belligerent men wearing militia-
like clothes.
Taking pictures is very risky. In some camps, the militias
just enter and go around searching for young men and Timorese
leaders during the day and even at night. Members of the
militia and special forces are hunting down persons who can be
potential witnesses in the pending war crimes investigation of
the United Nations.
Other Timorese are also running away from those who are
forcing them to join the militia. There are all of these things
happening in East Timor. The situation is very bad. I will not
take any longer so that you can ask any question.
So, thank you.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Ms. Peres, for your
excellent testimony and for the great work you have been doing.
I do have a couple of questions. I think we will be getting to
a vote very shortly. So, I will ask one or two and then yield
to my colleagues, just so that we are sure to get everyone's
questions in.
It seems to me that there may be one big subterfuge
underway with regard to the militias trying to deceive the
world, that somehow this is some indigenous force that just
rose up spontaneously. Where the truth probably is more
accurately to say that this is an Indonesian army orchestrated
effort, very carefully master-minded and planed out, going
right to the very top, right to Wiranto.
Regrettably, much of the media coverage has been that this
is some local uprising that just systematically kills people.
I'm interested in your comments, Mr. Nairn. I did ask the
Administration witnesses earlier. We had invited a Department
of Defense spokesman and Assistant Secretary. For whatever
reason, they were unable to be here.
We will reinvite them to ask very specific questions. I did
read to Secretary Koh and Secretary Taft excepts from your
Nation article where you point out that Blair, rather than
telling Wiranto to shut the militias down, instead offered him
a series of promises of new U.S. assistance. You just added to
that, talking about Clemens and the July 14th meeting.
Hopefully, that whole game, that brinksmanship, will be put
to an end soon, if not today. We will see that it is the
Indonesian military, first, second, and last that has been a
part of this, and the day we want to turn off the killing
fields, it will happen.
It suggests, I think, to all of us--and maybe you want to
respond to this--that we need to be much more aggressive in
cutting off IMF loans, cutting off assistance of any kind.
Absolutely cutting off military assistance until all of the
abusers of human rights, and killers, and murderers, whether it
be in KOPASSUS or anyone else, are vetted and held to account
and justice is meted out to them.
Perhaps you would want to speak to that, any of our
witnesses? Mr. Kohen.
ARNOLD KOHEN, PRESIDENT, THE HUMANITARIAN PROJECT
Mr. Kohen. I would like to say that Bishop Belo issued
about 10 or 15 warnings in this year alone. One after another
they were transmitted through church wire services. They were
transmitted to the Congress and each and every one of them was
ignored by the highest levels of the Clinton Administration.
Bishop Belo would say time and again, you have to tell the
Pentagon, have the American Bishops tell the Pentagon.
They would tell the Pentagon, but with little effect. The
Pentagon would come back with some nonsensible story. Really,
at this stage of the game, there is a pattern. The pattern is
that the Indonesian military felt that what they would do would
be without any consequence. What we are seeing now are the
chickens really coming home to roost.
It is very sad. The only way that this could be stopped is
if the Indonesian military understand that this is going to
cost them and it is going to cost them big time.
Mr. Nairn. Yes, I completely agree with that. I think you
are absolutely right, Mr. Chairman, that this is entirely
controlled from the top. Two weeks ago, when I was arrested by
the military on the streets of Dili, I was held at the Korem
Military Headquarters. That is the main occupation headquarters
for all of East Timor.
The Headquarter's general is Kiki Shianoqueri. It is called
the Committee for the Restoration of Peace and Stability. That
was the martial law authority in Timor. The entire back half of
the base was filled with uniformed Aitarak militiamen with
their black Aitarak t-shirts and their read and white
headbands.
You would see them leaving the Korem base on their
motorcycles and their trucks, holding their rifles and pistols
to go out and stage their attacks. I asked one of my
interrogators there, Lieutenant Colonel Willum, are those
Aitarak guys in the back there? He said, ``oh, yes. They live
here. They work out of here''.
``We have them here so we can control them'', he said. They
do indeed. I was later brought over to Polda for interrogation.
That is the main Dili Police Headquarters. At Polda, it was the
same story. In the operations room and the intelligence room,
you would see the uniformed Aitarak men going in and out. That
was where they worked out of.
Then the following day when they flew me back to West
Timor, for further interrogation, it was on a military charter.
Aside from my two military escorts, the rest of those on the
plane were uniformed militias, some of whom I recognized from
the streets of Dili as being some of the most threatening
characters. They had their guns, their rifles on the plane.
These were actually all members of police intelligence. My
military escorts explained to me that they were being rotated
back after having served their 1-year tour. These were the
militiamen. Incidently, for those who say that Wiranto does not
have control, that is nonsense.
The only official, under the current organizational
structure, the only official to whom both the military and
police report is Wiranto. Military and police involvement in
running these militias. Only a total cutoff will send the
strong message has been extensive.
Mr. Smith. Again, I think it should be stressed in the
strongest terms, this Subcommittee, and particularly this
Chairman, has tried repeatedly to get information from the
Pentagon. We have written extensive letters to the Pentagon and
have gotten back zilch in terms of the questions that we have
raised.
When we do get answers back, they are not all that
enlightening. The Pentagon does answer to a chain of command.
That goes right to the White House. That goes right to the
Commander-In-Chief. I mean, we do have a chain of command.
Congress appropriates money and authorizes programs, as we all
know, and exercises oversight.
The clear line of authority goes to the White House. Now,
Blair, Clemens, and all of these others--on whose behalf are
they carrying these messages? The President of the United
States? Secretary Cohen? We need to know where the buck stops
here as well.
As you said, Wiranto certainly can say yes or no to these
activities. How much complicity do we have? How many mistakes
have we made as a country with regards to this? Mr. Kohen.
Mr. Kohen. One important point, I was told by someone on
the Senate side the other day that as they were considering a
bill on the Foreign Relations Committee, there was someone from
the Defense Department going around talking about sea lanes,
how important Indonesia is. Granted, they are.
But the notion that the Indonesian military can prevent the
United States of America, prevent our fleet from using those
sea lanes is absolutely ludicrous. This is something that is
told to people who do not know anything and just get scared
very easily by the slightest bit of information that seems to
be wrapped in national security terms.
The fact of the matter is that the Indonesian military has
to be told, in no uncertain terms by our military, that is
behavior is unacceptable and it has to be cleaned up completely
and totally. The notion that they would even try to engage the
United States of America, try to stop us from using those sea
lanes is so ludicrous, it is to be unimaginable.
Mr. Smith. I appreciate that insight.
It seems to me the moral equivalent with Wiranto and the
Indonesian military is like us aiding and abetting Milosevic
and the Bosnian Serbs. There needs to be an accountability.
That is where the War Crimes Tribunal comes in, going wherever
those leads may take one, to hold to account those who have
killed.
Mr. Kohen. What really scared me was the events in the
weeks that the Liquica Massacre took place, then the attack on
the Carrascalao house, in Dili by Indonesian-led forces at the
time that the Irish Foreign Minister was there. A lot of people
were killed in Liquica. Pilio Manuel Carrascalao's son, who I
happened to have met when I was there in March, who was
basically an aid worker. He was an 18-year-old kid. He was
killed. They slashed him, I believe, as a way of sending a
message to Manuel Carrascalao and to former Governor of East
Timor, Mario Carrascalao, who had been the Indonesian Governor,
that you people are turn-coats. You are going to pay for this.
What scared me was this was the height of the war in
Kosovo. At the very moment that the Pentagon was talking about
humanitarian considerations in Kosovo, they were effectively
backing Indonesian forces in East Timor. I really was worried
about that discrepancy because that type of signal seemed to
say to the Indonesians that they are living on a different
planet than Milosevic. That whatever they do, it is fine and
dandy. Milosevic is just in another world.
Mr. Delahunt. Would the Chairman yield?
Mr. Smith. I would be happy to yield.
Mr. Delahunt. I find this testimony astounding, absolutely
astounding. I would encourage the Chair of this Subcommittee to
communicate with the Department of Defense in a way that is
very clear and unequivocal, and I know I speak for myself as
one member.
I would be happy to, sign a letter requesting that members
of the Department of Defense come forward and explain
themselves. I think that is absolutely essential, given what we
have heard here today.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Would the Chairman yield?
Mr. Smith. I agree, Mr. Delahunt. Now, Mr. Faleomavaega.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I want to associate myself with the
statements made earlier by my good friend from Massachusetts. A
petition, a letter, or even a subpoena to have officials of the
Department of Defense to come and testify about what we have
just heard from these gentlemen and our good friend the lady,
Ms. Peres. I am going to reserve my time for questions, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Delahunt. I think it is very important not just to
have Mr. Koh here, but I think it is incumbent upon the U.S.
Government to bring before Congress those army personnel, from
whatever branch they may be, who have served, who have been in
those camps so that they can be inquired of as to what they
observed.
As I said earlier, I think you heard my remarks, Mr. Smith,
this is deja vu all over again, as Yogi said. I do not think
that we want to have on our hands the responsibility of being
criticized in a report that was done under aegis of the United
Nations that demonstrated, in rather very clear terms, that the
genocide that occurred in Columbia, we did nothing about. I am
very, very concerned about what I have heard here today.
Mr. Smith. Just reclaiming my time.
I appreciate the gentleman's comments. Just to reiterate
for the record, we did invite the Department of Defense to be
here. We wanted to ask a series of very specific questions of
them. We will do so and re-invite them to give an account. In
the past, our efforts which have been bipartisan, have been
unavailing.
Cynthia McKinney and I have tried repeatedly to get this
information on collusion with KOPASSUS, training them in urban
guerrilla warfare. We were raising issues when Indonesians were
being killed in Jakarta. I went over there, along with Mr.
Rees, within the same week that Suharto passed the baton,
however involuntarily, to Habibie, and raised these questions
with the military command, with our own Stapleton Roy, who was
then our Ambassador, and a number of others, including Habibie.
So, it is a major problem. We have got to get to the bottom
of this rotten situation.
Mr. Nairn. Mr. Chairman, I think Mr. Delahunt's suggestion
is very important, if you could actually get some of the
uniformed officers here and question them under oath. The only
response I know of is that Admiral Blair did do a Pentagon
press briefing.
He was asked specifically by the press about my Nation
article, and about the cables, and so on. If you read the
transcript, he did not deny anything. He did not deny the
authenticity of the cables. He just, in essence, said,
everything I do is consistent.
``My message is always consistent''. He referred to his
conversation with Wiranto as a private conversation. It is not
private. He was there representing the U.S. public, the U.S.
taxpayers. There is the full transcript of the discussion in
the cables that you can look at. I think he was probably
correct in saying he is consistent. The problem is the message
is consistently a bad one.
Mr. Smith. To the best of your knowledge, were Blair's
promises to Wiranto conditional? If you back off, if you get
out of there, we will give you more?
Mr. Nairn. They were not conditional in shutting down the
militias. I can search for the exact language. It was something
to the effect of, we expect that you will continue to make
progress toward democracy in Indonesian, that kind of thing.
But he, at no point, even though the State Department had urged
him to do this, said you must shut down the militias.
This was 2 days after Liquica. He did not even raise
Liquica. I mean, you could not have had a more graphic,
shocking moment. He later had a follow-up phone conversation
with Wiranto because people at the State Department were so
upset, they sent an eyes-only cable to Jakarta saying, this has
to be corrected.
The same thing happened in the phone conversation. That
phone conversation was then immediately followed by the Dili
rampage, the attack on the Carrascalao house and so forth. One
point I want to make about the constant Pentagon argument. The
argument for training is, when you train officers it gives you
access to them. It teaches them good values and so on.
Those arguments are summarized in this cable. This is a
cable from Ambassador Roy to SINCPAC. This happens to be a 1996
cable. I will give it to the Committee and I would urge the
Committee to----
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Chairman, will that be made a part
of the record? I would like to request that it be.
Mr. Rees. I have to ask a question here, I am sorry. Is
that an unclassified cable?
Mr. Nairn. Yes, it is. This one is unclassified.
Mr. Smith. OK, we can take unclassified things into the
record.
Mr. Nairn. It makes all of the arguments about how when we
train officers they get good values. They rise in the ranks.
Then to clinch the argument, it cites examples of the best and
the brightest of the Indonesian officers who have been trained
by the United States.
These are the examples they cited: General Faisel Tungung,
who became the Commander-In-Chief of the Indonesian armed
forces, one of the most notorious hard-line repressive
officers.
General Hendrill Priono, one of the legendary authors of
oppression in Indonesia who was involved in Aceh. He is the man
who commanded Operation Clean-up in Jakarta, prior to the 1994
APEC Summit. This was the operation in which they swept through
the streets, picked up street vendors, petty criminals,
prostitutes, and executed many of them, according to human
rights groups.
Colonel C. Honding, a long-time Intel man who became Deputy
Chief of the secret police.
Brigadier General Agus. Actually, he has a less egregious
human rights record than the others. His main distinction is he
has bought a lot of U.S. weapons for the Indonesian military.
Then their final example of the best and the brightest is
General Prubowo, the most notorious of all the Indonesian
officers. Also, one of the most extensively U.S. trained
officers, famous for his personal participation in torture in
Timor, West Papua, Aceh, for the kidnappings last year in
Jakarta. I will let you read what they say about Pruboa.
These are the examples they use to say that when we do
training, these officers become instruments of U.S. policy. I
take them at their word when they say that. The problem is it
is the wrong policy. The careers of these men that they have
chosen illustrate that.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much.
I am looking forward to reading that cable. It will be made
a part of the record. Ms. McKinney.
Ms. McKinney. Yes. I think we all are looking forward to
reading the cable. I just find it outrageous that we can have
witnesses come from East Timor and Australia, and we cannot get
the DOD to come across the street to respond to these very
important questions.
This is not unlike a similar situation that I experienced
when we tried to hold a hearing on Rwanda, 1 million people
dead. We had witnesses come from Africa, come from Asia, but
the State Department could not come across town to testify
either.
Everybody clams up when we start asking questions that
nobody wants to answer. It is no wonder that this Government
would be against the international criminal court because they
would be perpetual defendants at it. There is an evil strain in
our international conduct from assassination, to
destabilization, to fomenting war.
That is our legacy around the world, particularly with
people of color. There is an evil strain in our conduct. The
American people do not even know what is happening. Congress is
lied to. I am wondering how high up does this go? Who is the
one that is giving Blair and Clemens their orders? Is it
directly from the White House?
I am also wondering if we got witnesses from the
Administration to come here on this particular issue, we would
have State Department tell us one thing, DOD tell us another
thing. They can come here and tell us just about anything,
unless they are compelled to tell the truth and there is a
penalty for them lying to us. So, under what circumstances can
we get them here with a penalty, if they do not tell us the
truth?
Mr. Smith. Are you asking me?
Ms. McKinney. Yes.
Mr. Smith. The Full Committee has the power to issue
subpoenas, although we could do it as well. We could put
witnesses under oath and there would obviously be a penalty if
they lied under oath. What has been the problem in the past is
that we get evasive answers or no-shows.
Again, we get excuses, sometimes they are plausible, as to
why they could not be here. For example, DOD suggested that
they are all very busy with Secretary Cohen's trip to Indonesia
as we speak. So, I mean there is some plausibility to that.
Ms. McKinney. Pat, we do not even know what message he is
going to be delivering when he gets there.
Mr. Smith. But it has been an ongoing stall to this
Subcommittee with regard to the training of KOPASSUS. Again,
Mr. Nairn's previous, writings which I used and circulated to
U.S. embassy officials in Jakarta officials. It was met with
eyes opened by several of the people. By the military attache
and others. It was like nonsense. So, it is very, very
troubling and beguiling.
Ms. McKinney. Mr. Chairman, we, through the work of these
witnesses, have some very real evidence. I do not think we need
to let the Administration off the hook on this one. I think we
need to do anything and everything that is within our power to
get to the bottom of what is going on.
Mr. Smith. You might recall, if the gentle lady would
yield, Secretary Taft, earlier in this hearing, suggested that
we write up our questions and submit them to the Department of
Defense. Secretary Taft has a very responsible, very strategic
position as head of PRM, and Secretary Koh, is the Clinton
point person for the Democracy, Labor, and Human Rights. I
mean, these are very responsible people. They should know. They
should want to know, and should want to get to the bottom of
any complicity inclusion with the Indonesian military
themselves.
Mr. Kohen. I feel compelled to read into the record
something from U.S. News and World Report last week because the
question was how high up does this go in our Government?
Ms. McKinney. Yes.
Mr. Kohen. I am reading to you from the bottom of this
piece. ``While acknowledging the danger of more massacres,
President Clinton dismissed comparisons with 1994's genocide in
Rwanda.'' In East Timor he said, ``Not everybody has a
machete.'' It says here at the end of the U.S. News Report
here, ``For those who have already felt the blade's edge, and
for those who will be cut down in the days to come, that
thought is cold comfort.''
The kind of language that was used from the beginning,
Sandy Berger comparing East Timor to his daughter's messy
college room. President Clinton saying not everybody has a
machete. These are two of the top, National Security officials
in this Administration. So, where does the buck stop?
Ms. McKinney. Obviously, it stops with them. That is
appalling.
Mr. Kohen. I mean, this is the kind of language they are
using. This is the tone that is being set.
Mr. Nairn. My understanding of the political role the
White House plays in this is that for years the Pentagon, the
State Department and the CIA were unanimous in lock step in
supporting Suharto and in supporting the Indonesian military.
It was a very deep institutional commitment from all of them.
Then after the 1991 Dili massacre, as public pressure
increased, and as Congress and many of the members here got
involved in the issue, there were some changes in U.S. policy.
There were various weapons cutoff and various training programs
cutoff. Within the past, say, 6 to 8 months, that pressure from
Congress finally did start to affect State Department policy.
Better late than never, but it did.
Some people, like Ambassador Roy, were quite resistant. He
remained one of the old-line Suharto supporters. But others in
the State Department did start to change. The Pentagon,
however, has continued to pursue the old line. Therefore you
have incidents like Admiral Blair just sluffing off the State
Department's directive to him, policy directive to tell Wiranto
to shut down the militias.
I point out the White House's role in this. Of course this
is the American system, as opposed to the Indonesian system
where Habibie is completely powerless to stop the militias, if
he wants to. I think Habibie would like to stop the militias,
but he is only the President of Indonesia. Wiranto is the one
who holds the strings. Here, the President is in charge.
If Clinton wanted to, he could bring Admiral Blair and
Admiral Clemens in line in a second. But he sees this and
chooses to let it play out. It is a familiar, we have seen it
in many other places, a two-track policy where you have on one
track the public admonitions, all of those great words from the
State Department, and occasionally from the White House itself.
On the other, track you have the Pentagon going in and doing
business with the training, the weapons, and the so on. That is
Clinton, and Berger's, decision in the end. They have to be
held accountable for that, but first it has to be exposed.
There is a false debate going on now.
This is kind of a diversionary debate where people are
saying, was Clinton too slow to act in backing an international
peacekeeping force? Should we do more to intervene? That is not
the issue here. This is not a case like with Milosevic.
When you are talking about Milosevic, you are not talking
about someone whose killers are armed, trained, and financed
from Washington. Milosevic got his backing out of Moscow and
other places. You cannot blame the Pentagon, and the CIA, and
the State Department for Milosevic, at least in terms of
backing his killer forces, but you can in the case of
Indonesia. It is not a question of the U.S. failing to
intervene.
It is a question of the U.S. all along having intervened
and continuing to intervene on the wrong side, backing the
perpetrators. That is an entirely different matter. We have to
be clear about that. It is much worse, but it is also much
easier to stop. You do not have to invade Jakarta. All you have
to do is pull the plug.
Mr. Kohen. One thing of relevance, as this is the Human
Rights Subcommittee. In June 1997, Bishop Belo met with
President Clinton and Sandy Berger in Sandy Berger's office.
President Clinton said we will try to be more helpful. Bishop
Belo was happy about that meeting.
When he got back to East Timor, within a couple of weeks of
that meeting, near the Salesian Training School in the eastern
part of the territory, there were a number of young people who
were detained. Bishop Belo said specifically, please tell the
White House about this.
I did convey this information to the White House in
writing. I also conveyed it to Congressman Frank Wolf and Tony
Hall who are very involved in this. Frank Wolf wrote a number
of letters to the White House about this situation. People in
the White House said to me, what is there to these Wolf
allegations?
But the indication that I had is that they never did
anything about the allegations themselves. They were more
concerned about Frank Wolf's letter and his persistence, than
they were about the specific allegations. I went back to Bishop
Belo about this information. Of course, other things had taken
place in the interim. It was not entirely clear what had
finally happened to the detainees, but what we did know was
that a lot of people had been picked up during that period.
This situation is described in the first couple of chapters
of my book. It is very disturbing when you have a situation
where the Clinton Administration is more interested in trying
to prove a dedicated man like Frank Wolf Wrong or Tony Hall
Wrong than in doing something about the situation. Hall and
Wolf were partners in all of this. This is bipartisan. This is
not a partisan issue. But some in the White House were more
concerned with proving Mr. Wolf Wrong than they were about
pursuing human rights issues.
Ms. McKinney. Mr. Chairman, I will allow the other members
to ask their questions, but I do want to register my outrage. I
do not know how to do it.
Mr. Smith. You are doing it.
Ms. McKinney. I want to do it on the record.
Mr. Smith. Again, this will be part of the series of
hearings. This is not the end of it. We will continue this
inquiry very aggressively. Mr. Faleomavaega.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do have some questions, but certainly I would first like
to commend our speakers or witnesses this afternoon for their
very eloquent and profound statements. I was interested to hear
from Mr. Kumar, who gave a sense of historical perspective
about what had happened to the good people of East Timor.
I seem to be the only one always knocking on the door. I
always equate East Timor with West Papua New Guinea for the
simple reason that these people, the 100,000 West Papuans, were
likewise murdered and slaughtered by the Indonesian army in
1963 under Sukarno. Then when Suharto came into power after the
coup, that was in 1965, after proclaiming that they needed to
get rid of the Communists, he continued the subjugation of West
Papua.
There were approximately 3 million people in Indonesia as
communists, supposedly, resulting in the killing, genocide, and
murder of hundreds of thousands of Chinese, and another half a
million Indonesians that were also slaughtered in the name of
fighting communism.
In 1969, the United Nations took an infamous act to
recognize the military occupation of Indonesia of West Papua,
letting only 1,000 people, with the barrel of Indonesian guns
to their heads, vote on behalf of 800,000 West Papuans to
associate themselves with Indonesia.
Then, another Indonesian military occupation happened in
1975, in East Timor. So, for 25 years, Mr. Chairman and our
good friends here, our military through the Department of
Defense has been associating with the Indonesian military, as
has been indicated by Mr. Nairn's most interesting testimony.
This is not something that just happened 2 years ago.
This has been going on from the very beginning, even
earlier in the 1960's. Why? Because our first, foreign policy
was to get rid of the Communists, containment, the domino
theory. So, now even after the fall of the Soviet Union's
Empire, we find ourselves in this situation with a policy that
continues. We continue to support military dictators like
Suharto and Sukarno, no differently than what we have done with
Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somozou.
By the way, I understand Somozau was educated at West Point
Military Academy. What else is new? We have been doing this for
years. It is interesting and I commend you, Mr. Chairman, for
taking the leadership in examining these affairs. I want to ask
a question of our friends here.
Is it a cop-out to say another country's problems are an
internal matter and within the sovereignty of that country to
resolve, and that we really have no business in getting
ourselves involved?
That was probably one of our main pillars of our policy
toward Indonesia. Whether you are talking about Aceh, or East
Timor, or even West Papua New Guinea, they were all deemed
internal matters. Now, at what point should our government
change this policy, saying it is no longer an internal matter
belonging to that country? We have got to do something about
it?
Do you think East Timor is a good example to change this
internal matter policy, which I think is hypocrisy, as we are
not willing to take responsibility to stop clear atrocities? I
was just wondering your thoughts on this?
Mr. Nairn. East Timor is a special case since Timor was
recognized by the United Nations as a separate territory, which
was illegally invaded by Indonesia. The invasion was in
defiance of two Security Council Resolutions. The U.S. had
blocked enforcement of those resolutions. As you have said, the
U.N. played a very shameful role in West Papua and so legally
did recognize the annexation there in a way it did not done for
East Timor.
That whole argument they make that it is an internal
matter, it is an irrelevant argument because the U.S. is
already involved with the Indonesian military. Through the IMET
Program, more than 3,000 officers were trained. At one point,
through the 1980's and early 1990's, a majority of the senior
staff officers of the Indonesian army had been U.S. trained.
The logistics of the Indonesian army are organized entirely
along U.S. Pentagon lines. It is U.S. military contractors who
have given them the electronics and the surveillance equipment.
It goes on and on. We are already involved, involved on the
side of that repressive military.
Mr. Smith. Would my friend yield? I am sorry.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Go ahead.
Mr. Smith. I would ask, Mr. Faleomavaega, if he could take
the Chair. Mr. Delahunt, and I, all of us, we have back-to-back
votes. It is probably another 25 minutes or so. If you would
take this chair and ask whatever questions you have, but if we
could yield to Mr. Delahunt now so he does not lose his
opportunity, and then you come back and carry on.
Mr. Delahunt. Yes. I will be very brief.
I think that, Mr. Nairn, you are on the mark. I have to
tell you what today has really done is raised my concerns, not
just about Timor. This goes far beyond East Timor. This is
about programs like IMET, which I am sure we have supported.
What I am hearing is we have had this ongoing relationship
with the Indonesian military, but what are we teaching them?
What does the training consist of? It sounds to me like we are
not even putting forth democratic values, human rights. Those
issues seem to be absent from that training. Are we just simply
teaching them how to shoot guns? Is that what is occurring?
Mr. Nairn. In some of the courses, they do have human
rights units where they say, you should not kill civilians. You
should respond to civilian authority. The thing is, when the
officers being trained are members of a military dictatorship,
which survives through repression and which has an
institutional policy of repression, it does not matter what
human rights platitudes you tell them because they are
officers.
They are trained to follow orders. The more professional
you make them, the more skillful and able you make them at the
job. You make the situation worse because they are from an
institution that has a bad mission in the first place.
Mr. Delahunt. I understand that. It has become very real.
One quick question to Ms. Peres. You testified earlier about
folks in East Timor who are in grave danger elsewhere in
Indonesia. Have you communicated this to the U.S. Government?
Have you given names? Have you submitted names to any division
or branch of the Executive?
Ms. Peres. In here in America?
Mr. Delahunt. In America.
Ms. Peres. No. We have given it to the United Nations.
Mr. Delahunt. I would suggest respectfully that you
provide the Chair of this Subcommittee a list of those
individuals. I am sure the Chairman would, along with other
members on the Committee, forward that to the appropriate
agency so that we can be of maybe some value in terms of
securing their personal safety.
Ms. Peres. Fine.
Mr. Delahunt. I think obviously that should happen rather
quickly.
Mr. Delahunt. Again, let me say thank you to all of you.
Your testimony was very informative, and I think particularly
you, Mr. Nairn, since you have had the experience and was there
as a first-hand observer. It really was not hearsay. You know,
99.9 percent of the time when we hear witnesses, it is double,
triple hearsay.
Out of fairness, we have to question the validity, if you
will, of that hearsay. But in your case, you saw it. You saw it
first-hand. I think that you have done a great service to your
Country today.
Thank you.
Mr. Faleomavaega. [Presiding] I thank my good friend from
Massachusetts for his questions and statement. We have all
kinds of opinions about the media, but sometimes I also say
thank God for the fourth estate of governance. Sometimes the
Legislative and the executive branches seem to have failed in
their responsibilities.
To have Mr. Nairn, Mr. Kohen, Mr. Kumar, and Ms. Peres this
afternoon giving their testimonies has been a real education
for the members of this Committee. One of the questions that
was raised earlier concerned Mr. Gusmao and Mr. Ramos-Horta's
statements categorizing these refugee camps as concentration
camps.
Somehow, I seem to be getting a different indication from
our friends from the State Department. They keep calling them
refugee camps. Now, you and I know what a concentration camp
is. Maybe, Ms. Peres, if you could maybe elaborate a little
further on the difference. My sense of what a refugee camp is
that you have the humanitarian organizations from all over the
world, the NGO's, pitching in and helping out.
A concentration camp is literally like what we remember
from the holocaust. If that is the status that these refugees
are currently living under, then we really are not doing our
duty as far as our government is concerned. Secretary Koh from
the State Department is going to be going there in a couple of
days.
There seems to be a lot of shuffling of paperwork and
visits, but I am not hearing a greater sense of commitment and
responsibility on what to do with the militias that are
watching these so-called refugee camps. Can you comment on
that, Ms. Peres?
Ms. Peres. I believe it is all right. Our people are in
there as hostage, really. They have been forced to go into West
Timor. Even now, only to say it, last night when I was speaking
to my colleague in Jakarta, she was telling me that now when
they distribute rice, this is for the people there, they are
given two types of cards. One red and one blue.
The blue card, the Timorese would have to say that they
want to stay in Indonesia, stay, become trans-migrant. The red
card is for those that want to go back home. But this is in
another race to identify those people who do not want to be
there. Originally the plan, the Indonesian plan, was actually
to show to the world that more than 200,000 people were
supposed to have been voting for the autonomy.
That is why they forced all these people to go into West
Timor, at gun point. I am not sure. I did not catch the earlier
session when my leaders were speaking, but when they, one of
them mentioned that they killed a Nun and a Priest in Bacau,
between Bacau and Los Palos, at the same time they found in the
eastern side of East Timor, 5,000 of our population about to be
forced into the votes to go to West Timor. That was found by
INTERFET. That was as recent as 3 days ago when the killed the
Nun.
Mr. Faleomavaega. So, 5,000 East Timorese are forced to go
to West Timor, and no one makes any reports or any accounts of
this as to their status, as to what happens with their
separation from family members.
Ms. Peres. The people in West Timor, according to the
friend of mine, the religious person that went into West Timor,
there were camps that you could not access. Some camps you can
access. Other camps, you cannot access. It is closed for you.
There were camps controlled by the Government and they made it
in such a way for visitors.
So that when you go there and visit, you think it is OK. Of
the people who live there, they have food. They have water. But
other camps, no food, no sanitation, nothing. It is really bad
conditions. We have had contacts with some of our people in
there. They are just waiting for help from the international
community.
When I came out from Jakarta, the international community
was not accessing those camps. Yesterday, when I was at the
World Bank meeting, a member of UNPD said that they were about
to go into West Timor. Then I asked, do you know how many camps
there are? Are you going to assess all of them? They did not
know.
Mr. Faleomavaega. About how many East Timorese live in
Jakarta currently?
Ms. Peres. At the moment, our list that is in Jakarta and
other islands.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Or just in the Island of Java or other
places outside of East Timor.
Ms. Peres. Outside of East Timor and West Timor, outside,
we had a list of 3,500. That is recorded only with us. By now
there should be more because some are trying to manage to
escape from West Timor.
Mr. Faleomavaega. It is my understanding that top
corporate and business leaders currently that have a lot of
wealth in East Timor are also former military officers of the
Indonesian army. Is that correct?
Mr. Nairn. Mr. Chairman, there is an estimate recently
that about 40 percent of the land in Timor is controlled by the
Suharto family and enterprises linked to that family. One of
those investors in some of the Suharto enterprises is Colonel
Tono Suratman, until recently the military commander for Timor.
With that said, especially now, that they have burnt the
place down, there is not a whole lot of wealth in Timor. It has
been more of a killing field than a place of business. As the
Indonesian military exited, they made a point of destroying
whatever they could.
There was a confidential memo that leaked about 2 months
ago, now, out of the Office of General Faisal Tunjung. Tunjung
is one of those IMET best and brightest that I mentioned. He is
currently the Minister for Politics and Security in the
Habibie-Wiranto Government.
His ministry is in charge of coordinating the activities of
other ministries to bring them in line with army policy. In
this memo, they described a plan for what they would do with
Timor if they lost the election. One of the points was destroy
key facilities on their way out.
Mr. Faleomavaega. That is exactly what happened.
Mr. Nairn. They have done that, to say the least. I mean,
take Dili, if you are someone who knows Dili and you go back
now, it is absolutely shocking. The entire central business
district is burnt to the ground. Entire neighborhoods are
vacant. The Diocese, the ICRC, the Bishop's house are all gone.
On the relocations, refugees is certainly not the correct
term, I think, for the vast majority. Starting in the lead up
to the announcement of the vote results, there were systematic
operations where uniformed police, uniformed BRIMOB, uniformed
army infantry, and uniformed militias would go house-to-house
and tell people, OK, you are moving.
You are moving to Kupang. You are moving to Atambua. You
are moving to wherever we choose to take you. They were just
forced out of their homes, put on trucks and boats, and taken
away.
[Witness is coughing throughout testimony.]
Mr. Faleomavaega. Sorry, I do not have any cough drops to
give you.
Mr. Nairn. When I was being questioned at Polda, the
police headquarters, it was kind of a chaotic scene there
because they were getting ready to shutdown and withdraw from
Timor. They were burning many of their documents. In the midst
of that, I was able to see a police intelligence document,
which described an operation called ``Hynerwene Lauro Sydua''
in which they laid out in detail how they would round up and
relocate Timorese. This document, which was written about 2
weeks ago now, gave a precise figure. It said 323,564 Timorese.
That means nearly 40 percent of the population that will be
relocated pursuant to this program.
Mr. Faleomavaega. What is the total number of the
Indonesian military forces, Army, Navy, and Air Force combined?
Any figures on that?
Mr. Nairn. It was in the range 20,000 to 30,000.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Nationwide?
Mr. Nairn. In East Timor, yes.
Mr. Faleomavaega. No, I mean nationwide. The entire
Indonesian army, what are we looking at?
[Witness unable to answer due to coughing spell.]
Mr. Kohen. Congressman, as long as you mentioned about the
economic end of things, I saw something in Business Week, I
think, the other day saying that there is currently a coffee
crop worth tens of millions of dollars, most of which goes to
Starbucks here.
It was actually one decent program of USAID where the East
Timor coffee has been bought for higher prices from local
farmers and ends up in Starbucks. It is quite good quality
stuff. Anyone who has been to Timor knows that this is some of
the best in the world. What it said in Business Week, however,
is that this coffee is not going to be picked this year because
the military is destroying the crop, really out of spite. If is
nothing else, we should try to stop this destruction from
happening.
I know if I were a Member of Congress, I would ask some
very hard questions about why this USAID-funded project is
suddenly being sabotaged by the very people that we have been
giving U.S. military aid. This is one thing that should be on
the table right now so that at least the Timorese have the
coffee to help their economy recover.
Mr. Faleomavaega. There were recent media reports, and I
wanted to know if this is accurate in that the Suharto family
has accumulated a wealth well over $8 billion. this includes
the personal wealth of this family, relatives, their different
businesses, not just in East Timor, but throughout Indonesia.
How would you rank Indonesia's army, as far as its
effectiveness and its military prowess? Would you say that they
are just as good as our army, as far as preparation of fighting
soldiers?
Mr. Nairn. That is a very interesting question. I think
the best comment I have heard on that is from Parmoedya, the
famous Indonesian novelist and political prisoner of many
years. He recently took a tour of the United States. He is
considered a leading contender for the Nobel Prize in
Literature, and really a great cultural voice in Indonesia.
He has made the comment that if you look at the history of
the Indonesian army as a fighting force, they do not do very
well when they have to fight an armed opponent. In the various
confrontations they have had over the years with outside
forces, they usually lose.
The Timorese, although it was mainly through political
means, defeated the Indonesian army. I think if accurate
history is written, this will go down as one of the great
victories for the weak over the strong: This country \1/200\
the size of Indonesia driving out this army backed by
Washington.
What Parmoedya remarked was that when it comes to internal
repression, there the Indonesian army is extremely effectively.
That is their real business. That is their real mission. That,
plus military business. The Indonesian army is remarkable in
that it is not just a repressive force.
There are various repressive armies around the world, many
of which the U.S. has had very close ties with. The Indonesian
army adds an extra dimension in that they also operate a the
sense like an economic mafia. Nobody really knows precisely
what the real military budget in Indonesia is.
It is often commented that, in accounting terms, per capita
the Indonesian military budget is rather low, and it is, if you
look at what is written on the books. But estimates say that
budget probably understates the real military funds by anywhere
from 30, 40, to 50 percent, because the army has hundreds and
hundreds of businesses that it runs on its own. KOPASSUS, for
example. Right outside the KOPASSUS Headquarters in Sejantung,
when you go into the KOPASSUS Headquarters, you see this gate
where they have these two gigantic sculptured knives that meet
over the entrance. Right outside that is this beautiful modern
shopping center, which is owned by KOPASSUS.
That is the KOPASSUS shopping mall. The other branches have
similar operations. Many of them have criminal extortion
businesses. They are very heavily into prostitution, rackets,
for example. A former U.S. military attache acknowledged to me
that the Marines specialize in running prostitution in many of
the Indonesian cities. It is that kind of mafia-style operation
which is an integral part of Indonesian military operations.
Mr. Faleomavaega. There is a very strong parallel, and
similarly to the People's Republic of China. Its army also has
businesses. In fact, it is very, very similar in its operations
with the way the Indonesian army operates.
Mr. Nairn. Yes. That would probably be the closest
parallel.
Mr. Faleomavaega. The closest parallel?
Mr. Nairn. The closest parallel economically. Probably the
one difference would be that the PRC army is more in the big
business mode, in terms of their style, like these vast
conglomerates. Whereas, the style of the Indonesian army is
more like the street extortionist.
You hear just constant complaints about this from, say,
local business people, local merchants, anyone who is trying to
do an honest business on the street level. In Indonesia, you
have to contend with the army shakedowns. It is just a part of
life.
If you happen to be ethnic Chinese, you have the added
burden when times are tough, and when there is political
tension in the air, the army will often turn on those very
merchants they have been extorting. They will lead the mobs
that will go in and sack the stores, and sack the warehouses,
So you can see, there is tension. The people hate the Chinese.
Therefore, you need the army there to protect the Chinese.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I just have one more question. One of
the issues that is debated constantly, not only here in the
Congress, but also in the Administration, concerns sales of
military equipment. Do you know our Country currently ranks as
the number 1 seller of military equipment to other countries of
the world?
Do you not think that there should be a global policy
limiting arms sales because who happens to be the ones that
purchase most of this military hardware? It is third World
countries, countries whose budgets are very limited, yet whose
dictators and governments commit military rather than to
meeting the economic needs of the given countries.
I suppose the current policy in our government is that if
we do not sell our military hardware to these other countries,
then the French, the British, and the Russians are going to
take over. So, we have got to continue doing this. Do you think
this is ever going to change?
Mr. Kohen. Economics changed a bit regarding the French.
Realize that most of the church in East Timor has been leveled.
The French have taken actually a fairly strong position
recently relative to what they used to. I did not mean to
cutoff Allan, but I think we may be faced with a rather
different situation.
There has never been a case like this where church
buildings wholesale have been knocked down where Priests and
Nuns have been killed. So, I think the position of various
would-be arms salesmen may be a little different now than
before. Allen.
Mr. Nairn. Yes. I think it is absolutely crucial. Congress
has to take the lead in this. The executive branch is never
going to do it on their own, the U.S. mission of trying to
peddle arms overseas. The Clinton Administration has been
notable among military contractors for being the most vigorous
Administration, in terms of pushing U.S. weapons overseas.
They will all tell you that. They love the Clinton
Administration because it has gone to greater lengths than its
predecessors. As you say, in those situations when the U.S. is
pushing these weapons, the best case, the best you can hope
for, is that it is just a waste of money.
That some poor country gets their treasury drained and the
weapon just rusts in the warehouse, that is the best case. The
worst case, which often occurs, as in Indonesia, is that those
weapons are actually used for internal repression, or to fuel a
regional conflict, or to otherwise cause deaths. It is just
something that has to be stopped.
The rationale for it is always, it creates jobs. Any
economist will tell you, and this is not a controversial
question in economics, one of the least efficient means of job
creation is this kind of high tech military weapons investment.
If you really want to create jobs, you take that same
amount of money and put it into other kinds of industry, other
kinds of service, agriculture, whatever.
Any other channel you put it in, you will end up creating
more jobs back home. Finally, one thing I forgot to mention and
this is very much related to the economic front. This is quite
important. It so happens that today, September 30th, is the
implementation date for some military budget transparency
legislation that was passed by the Congress 3 years ago.
This has been under study in the Embassy in Jakarta. I do
not think it has gotten any public attention to this date. What
this legislation says is, I will just read you the relevant
section.
It says, ``Beginning today, September 30, the Secretary of
the Treasury shall instruct the U.S. Executive Director of each
international financial institution to use the voice and vote
of the U.S. to oppose any loan or other utilization of the
funds of their respective institution, other than to address
basic human needs, for the government of any country which the
Secretary of the Treasury determines: First, does not have in
place a functioning system for reporting to civilian
authorities, audits of receipts and expenditures that fund
activities of the armed forces and security forces, second, has
not provided to the institution information about the audit
process requested by the institution.''
In other words, if a country's military is not transparent
working on a sound accounting basis, completely accountable to
the civilian authorities, then that country cannot get
international financial institution funds. That is what is
mandated. That goes into effect today. There is no way
Indonesia can pass this test.
They have actually been agonizing about this in the Embassy
for months. Since it starts today, I think it is now time for
Congress to take a look at getting this implemented.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Ms. Peres, gentlemen, I know it has been
a long afternoon. I cannot thank you enough for making the time
to come in and testify.
I ask unanimous consent that whatever records, materials,
or statements that you wish to submit to be made a part of the
record. It will be so, without objection.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Again, thank you very much.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
September 30, 1999
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