[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
A RECORD TRADE DEFICIT, HOW CAN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT PREVENT A LOOMING
TRADE CRISIS?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 25, 1999
__________
Serial No. 106-95
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
63-185 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
Carolina ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
BOB BARR, Georgia DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas
LEE TERRY, Nebraska THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
GREG WALDEN, Oregon JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California ------
PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JOHN T. DOOLITTLE, California (Independent)
HELEN CHENOWETH, Idaho
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
David A. Kass, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian
Carla J. Martin, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources
JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman
BOB BARR, Georgia PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas
DOUG OSE, California
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Robert B. Charles, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Andrew Richardson, Professional Staff Member
Amy Davenport, Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Counsel
Micheal Yeager, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on March 25, 1999................................... 1
Statement of:
Chimerine, Dr. Lawrence, senior vice president and chief
economist, Economic Strategy Institute; Howard Lewis, vice
president, economic policy, National Association of
Manufacturers; Reginald Brown, director of marketing for
the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association; and Barry
Solarz, vice president for tax & trade, American Iron &
Steel Institute............................................ 44
Copps, Michael J., Assistant Secretary for Trade Development,
Department of Commerce; and Johnnie E. Frazier, Acting
Inspector General, Department of Commerce.................. 108
Letters, statements, et cetera, submitted for the record by:
Brown, Reginald, director of marketing for the Florida Fruit
and Vegetable Association, prepared statement of........... 73
Chimerine, Dr. Lawrence, senior vice president and chief
economist, Economic Strategy Institute, prepared statement
of......................................................... 48
Copps, Michael J., Assistant Secretary for Trade Development,
Department of Commerce, prepared statement of.............. 113
Frazier, Johnnie E., Acting Inspector General, Department of
Commerce, prepared statement of............................ 129
Kucinich, Hon. Dennis J., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Ohio, prepared statement of................... 16
Lewis, Howard, vice president, economic policy, National
Association of Manufacturers:
Prepared statement of.................................... 66
Understatement of Export Merchandise Trade Data.......... 95
Mica, Hon. John L., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida:
Chart on TPCC agencies................................... 4
Prepared statement of.................................... 7
Mink, Hon. Patsy T., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Hawaii, prepared statement of..................... 12
Solarz, Barry, vice president for tax & trade, American Iron
& Steel Institute, prepared statement of................... 79
A RECORD TRADE DEFICIT, HOW CAN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT PREVENT A LOOMING
TRADE CRISIS?
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THURSDAY, MARCH 25, 1999
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:07 p.m., in
room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John L. Mica
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Ose, Mink, Kucinich, Cummings, and
Tierney.
Staff present: Sharon Pinkerton, deputy staff diretor;
Andrew Richardson, professional staff member; Glee Smith,
counsel; Amy Davenport, clerk; David Rapallo and Michael
Yeager, minority counsels; Courtney Cook, minority staff
assistant; Jean Gosa, minority staff assistant; and Andrew Su,
minority research assistant.
Mr. Mica. The meeting of the Criminal Justice, Drug Policy,
and Human Resources Subcommittee will come to order. I would
like to welcome everyone this afternoon for our hearing
entitled, ``Record Trade Deficit: How Can the U.S. Government
Prevent a Looming Trade Crisis?'' I'd like to open with some
comments, and then I'll be pleased to yield to our ranking
member. We'll go ahead and proceed. I think our other members
will be joining us shortly.
I'm pleased again to extend a welcome to everyone today to
discuss what I believe is one of the most critical topics, that
is the U.S. trade deficit. The U.S. balance of trade which has
long been ignored has reached alarming levels. I view this
trade imbalance as one of the most critical issues facing our
subcommittee, which now has oversight jurisdiction of the
Department of Commerce, the U.S. Trade Representative's Office,
the Export-Import Bank, the Trade Development Agency, and the
Overseas Private Investment Corp.
The end of the cold war and the resulting globalization
have created a world in which trade issues have never been more
important and are increasingly defining our global
relationships. With a record high trade deficit, this is
certainly an appropriate time for Congress and this
subcommittee to begin exercising our oversight responsibility
in this critical area.
The news reports of banana wars, beef battles, and steel
dumping cases clearly show the damage that occurs unless the
U.S. Government is vigorous in advocating for U.S. commercial
interests. The United States must reexamine its approach in
order to aggressively promote exports while also taking steps
to ensure complete enforcement of our laws against unfair trade
practices.
This hearing has been convened because I believe the
current wave of global turbulence is beginning to hit our
shores. The crisis of collapsing currencies which started in
Asia has spread to Russia and Brazil. The United States should
be a winner in the global economy, not a loser. Instead, in
1998, the trade deficit reached a stunning all time high of
$233 billion.
This is a 50 percent increase over the previous year's
deficit. Commerce Department officials have predicted that our
1999 deficit could reach $300 billion. These numbers should
serve as a wake-up call for the U.S. Government to do more to
prevent what could be an impending disaster.
Year in and year out, we are consuming more than we
produce. Every year, billions of dollars go abroad and more and
more foreign produced goods capture our markets. I don't
believe this situation can endure without some serious
consequences. Now, I realize that many of the economic
indicators, such as unemployment and inflation, are positive,
but this rosy picture also has some thorns.
Recently, Alan Greenspan issued a warning about our soaring
trade deficit. Let me quote him. He said, ``The widening of the
current account deficits has some disquieting aspects,
especially when viewed in the long term context.'' He then
warned that our own currency is endangered by the continued
deficit.
The United States was once the world's greatest creditor
nation. Now, we are its greatest debtor. In 1998, the American
personal savings rate fell to a post-war World War II low of
half a percent of disposable income. We spend 99.5 percent of
our after tax income, according to a Newsweek article that was
recently published.
Another area of concern is manufacturing. There are now
more Americans in government than in manufacturing jobs. Almost
15 million jobs have been created since 1992, but only 4.3
percent of these 629,000 are in manufacturing. Almost all the
rest are in service industries and government.
Perhaps the most disturbing element of the recent trade
numbers issued by the Department of Commerce is that U.S.
exports have actually fallen for the first time in 13 years. In
the past, exports have been the engine of our economic growth.
In the United States, 1 in 10 American workers owes his or her
job to exports. On average, manufacturing jobs in companies
that export pay at least 15 percent more than other
manufacturing jobs, and also provide better benefits.
In my previous private sector work, I assisted businesses
in pursuing international trade opportunities, and I know how
important these markets are to keeping business healthy and
profitable. This work provided me with a good vantage point for
seeing how competitive the international market is, and how
important it is for U.S. business to know that the U.S.
Government is an effective advocate for their products and
services.
In the 103d and 104th Congress, I joined Senator Roth in
introducing legislation to create a Department of Trade. The
goal of that legislation was to reorganize the 19 different
Federal agencies with trade responsibilities into a single
coherent Trade Department. This department could focus solely
on the business of trade instead of being distracted as our
Department of Commerce is now with the Census Bureau, Weather
Service, and other activities that detract from what I think
should be their primary purpose. Much of that legislation
passed the House during the 104th session of Congress. The
Senate did not pass the measures.
I believe there is still much that can and should be done
to reorganize our Nation's trade functions in an effort to
better assist our U.S. companies as they compete overseas.
[Chart shown.]
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. Mica. I have a chart that I used then to show the
different agencies, 19 different Federal agencies and their
principal bureaus, involved in trade promotion. It is, in my
opinion, a design for disaster. It really doesn't accomplish
what we could with the $2 billion-plus we will spend this year
on this effort. And it is done in a disjointed fashion.
The Trade Promotion Coordinating Council has remedied some
communication problems, but administratively and functionally
this is still a disaster. Without objection, we'll make a
smaller copy of that as part of the record.
Of course, while exporting more will certainly improve our
deficit, we have to make sure that our laws against dumping are
also rigorously enforced. The majority of our machine tools, a
quarter of our steel, a third of our automobiles, and more than
half our textiles are now foreign made. Why? A tidal wave, a
tsunami of imports from Asia has, in fact, been hitting our
shores. When all those cheap manufactured goods pour in, our
own manufacturing base suffers.
This is already happening in the steel industry, which has
recently suffered almost 10,000 lost jobs. Not because the
steel industry is inefficient. In fact, since the 1980's, the
steel industry has poured $50 billion into modernization. The
U.S. steel industry is more environmentally sensitive than its
global counterparts. Yet, their work force shrunk by over two-
thirds during the last 25 years.
Why? Because Russia, Japan, China, South Korea, Brazil, and
Indonesia are all illegally dumping steel into our country to
save their own steel industries. To add insult to injury, four
of these countries are being bailed out of the crisis with IMF
money, International Monetary Fund loans supported by our own
U.S. tax dollars.
Well, I strongly believe in free trade, but I also believe
that free trade must be fair trade. Our two top deficit trading
partners are Japan, with a $66 billion, and China with a $57
billion surplus. These two countries alone represent half of
our entire trade deficit. Clearly, the United States must
develop a strategy to deal with these two countries.
Part of the problem is explained by the fact that both of
these countries erect unfair trade barriers. They are running
huge trade surpluses at the expense of the United States while
denying the United States, its companies and businesses access
to their own markets. Even now, the administration is shaping a
deal to have China enter the WTO, the World Trade Organization,
and under favorable conditions to China. Our trade deficit with
China is $1 billion a week.
China, despite being the most populous country in the
world, shows no signs of becoming a purchaser of United States
goods. While China accounts for less than 2 percent of our
global exports, the United States has been purchasing over 30
percent of China's exports.
January trade numbers demonstrate this problem. Exports to
China in January totalled $779 million. That's down from $1.3
billion in December 1998. This compared to China's imports to
the United States during the same month of $5.56 billion.
In other words, the ratio of United States/China imports to
exports was 7 to 1 in January. We sell less to China than we do
to Singapore which is a very tiny country, a small land area.
We are, in fact, vulnerable to this situation. We get our
competitive clocks cleaned when we conduct business in this
manner with unfair trade practices and allowing one-sided trade
agreements.
The record deficit is certainly a result of imports
outpacing exports. Today, we'll hear what's happening on both
sides of that equation. Clearly, the U.S. Government must do a
better job in addressing these critical issues if we are to
prevent what I consider to be a potential trade meltdown.
Today, we'll hear from Mr. Larry Chimerine, chief economist at
the Economic Strategy Institute, about why the trade deficit
matters and what the implications of a sustained trade deficit
are for our country.
Mr. Howard Lewis, vice president for economic policy for
the International Association of Manufacturers, will comment
about how our current trade situation has impacted
manufacturers, and provide some suggestions about how the
Federal Government can work more closely with the private
sector to promote trade.
We'll also hear from Mr. Reginald Brown, director of
marketing for the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association, and
Mr. Barry Solarz who is vice president for tax trade for the
American Iron and Steel Institute. He will outline how trade
deficits and trade policies have injured their industry.
Finally, we will hear from Assistant Secretary for Trade,
Michael Copps, from the Department of Commerce, about the U.S.
Government's role in promoting U.S. exports around the world.
We'll also hear some recommendations from the Department's
Inspector General, Johnnie Frazier, as to how the Department
could more effectively do its job.
Excuse me for that lengthy opening statement, but I wanted
to get that on the record. I'm pleased now to recognize the
distinguished ranking member, Mrs. Mink from Hawaii.
[The prepared statement of Hon. John L. Mica follows:]
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Mrs. Mink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to join
you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses for this
afternoon. This subcommittee has oversight jurisdiction over a
number of trade-related Federal agencies. It's important that
we exercise this jurisdiction, which the House has granted to
this subcommittee, and do whatever we can to ensure that laws
that have been enacted and agencies that are operating to
enforce these laws to promote our interests are working
effectively. That is the responsibility of this subcommittee.
I would like to yield the balance of my time to my
colleague, Congressman Dennis Kucinich, for remarks he would
like to make at this point in the record.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Patsy T. Mink follows:]
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Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Mrs. Mink. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for calling this hearing.
It's an extremely important topic. And you know, we all know,
that Japan makes cars and that many Americans like to buy them,
right? Well, the fact shows up in the trade deficit data, of
course.
But did you know that the same data show that Americans
like to buy Canadian cars more than Japanese cars, and Mexican
cars somewhat less than Japanese cars? Canadian cars? Mexican
cars? Of course, there are no identifiable Canadian and Mexican
brands of automobiles. So why the trade deficit data shows that
Americans are importing more cars from Canada and Mexico than
we sell to the Canadians and Mexicans? Those cars carry
American brands, but they are now made in Mexico and Canada.
The reason, members of the committee, is NAFTA, the North
American Free Trade Agreement with Mexico. Since the North
American Free Trade Agreement was passed, the United States
trade balance with Mexico has gone from a surplus, where the
United States sold more to Mexico than it bought, to a deficit.
Mr. Chairman, a critical factor explaining this phenomenon,
that this hearing is to probe, is NAFTA. Before NAFTA was
implemented in 1994, the United States had a positive balance
of trade of goods and services with Mexico. According to
Department of Commerce data, in 1992 the United States trade
surplus with Mexico was worth $5.4 billion. In 1997, 3 years
after NAFTA the United States had a trade deficit with Mexico
of about $19.5 billion. According to the United Auto Workers,
three quarters of the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico is
attributable to the auto sector.
Go back to the example, then. What NAFTA did was make it
easier for United States auto companies to close their American
operations and to reopen them in Mexico. Today, U.S. auto
makers frequently make vehicles in this way. An engine is
manufactured in a plant in Ohio, then it is sent to Mexico for
assembly in a truck. That counts as an export from the United
States to Mexico. The fully assembled truck is then sent back
to the United States, and that counts as an import from Mexico.
The value of the assembled truck is greater than the engine, so
balance of trade in this vehicle is in deficit. It adds to the
U.S. trade deficit.
At one time, the engine would have been sent from Ohio to
Michigan where it would have been assembled into a truck in the
United States and the production of the truck would not have
added to the trade deficit.
Now, this raises an important point. When Ohio produces an
engine that is shipped to Mexico, the Department of Commerce
considers that an export. And it is widely believed that all
exports are good. But this case shows the fallacy of that
proposition.
Ohio's export of an engine to Mexico occurs because the
assembly plant in Michigan was closed and reopened in Mexico,
causing a loss in United States jobs. This export represents a
deterioration of the U.S. economy. Auto companies choose to
close their United States operations and reopen in Mexico
because wages are so much lower there, because unions are not
independent, because environmental laws are poorly enforced,
and because NAFTA both lowered the tariff on products produced
in Mexico and sent to the United States, and protected the
investment of United States companies with laws that are
equivalent to American property protection. NAFTA has
aggravated the trade deficit with Mexico.
The trade deficit with Mexico is a component in the overall
United States trade deficit with the world. As is the case with
Mexico, the United States trade deficit with the world is a
drag on the United States economy. According to economist
Charles McMillian,
Trade is a clearly defined and routinely measured component
of the Nation's economy, gross domestic product. By definition,
GDP consists of four components: first, personal consumption;
second, gross private investment; third, government
expenditures; fourth, net exports trade. Statistically,
international trade has been a constant drag on the U.S.
economy since 1982 with accumulated losses to the U.S. economy
of $1.6 trillion over the past 15 years.
Far from accounting for any of the country's GDP growth
during the first 6 years of the Clinton administration, net
trade losses reduced real GDP by an average of--this is a
negative--$126 billion or minus 1.8 percent of GDP per year. By
definition, a trade deficit means that a county's domestic
firms produce less than it's consumers buy. That is, at it's
most basic level, trade deficit's mean that trade is reducing
not expanding the overall market of U.S.-based firms and
workers.
That's the end of the quote from Mr. McMillian.
I would, at this point, submit for the record, with the
Chair's unanimous consent, this report published this month by
this distinguished economist, from which I took that quote. In
conclusion, could we submit this report?
Mr. Mica. Without objection, we will submit that and
include it into the record.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In conclusion, a
growing trade deficit represents a drag on the U.S. economy,
NAFTA has added to the trade deficit. NAFTA is therefore a
problem for the U.S. economy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich and the
report referred to follow:]
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Mr. Mica. I thank you, Mr. Kucinich, for a very interesting
opening statement. The information you have provided, as it
relates to how we calculate exports and imports, particularly
with this question of export for assembly and then reentry, is
something the subcommittee needs to look into further.
I'm pleased to recognize, at this time, the gentleman from
California, Mr. Ose, for an opening statement.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for calling
this hearing. As you know, California has a tremendous interest
in trade. With respect to agriculture, as it affects my
district directly, I am most interested in hearing the
testimony today. This is one subcommittee meeting I would not
miss. So I thank you.
Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman. And I'd like to again
welcome our panel. As you may know, this is an investigations
and oversight subcommittee of Congress, and in that vein, we
have a policy of swearing in all of our witnesses. So, if you
would not mind, please stand and raise your right hands?
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Mica. All of the witnesses answered in the affirmative.
We welcome each and every one of the panelists today. Thank you
for your participation and we look forward to your testimony.
Let me say at the outset that we try to limit the oral
testimony to 5 minutes. If you have lengthy statements or other
materials that you would like made part of the record, we will
do that upon request and unanimous consent. We'll also leave
the record open for an appropriate number of days, at least 10
days to complete that. Without objection, so ordered.
With that, I would like to recognize Mr. Larry--tell me the
correct pronunciation?
Dr. Chimerine. Chimerine, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. Chimerine.
Dr. Chimerine. But it's been butchered before.
Mr. Mica. All right. Even a little name like ``Mica'' has
been butchered, but we're pleased to have you. You are with the
Economic Strategy Institute. Sir, welcome and you are
recognized.
STATEMENTS OF DR. LAWRENCE CHIMERINE, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND
CHIEF ECONOMIST, ECONOMIC STRATEGY INSTITUTE; HOWARD LEWIS,
VICE PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC POLICY, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MANUFACTURERS; REGINALD BROWN, DIRECTOR OF MARKETING FOR THE
FLORIDA FRUIT AND VEGETABLE ASSOCIATION; AND BARRY SOLARZ, VICE
PRESIDENT FOR TAX & TRADE, AMERICAN IRON & STEEL INSTITUTE
Dr. Chimerine. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Since I'm
going to try to stick to your time criteria, let me focus on
two or three issues this afternoon. I'm an economist, I'm not a
trade policy expert. My colleagues here can talk more about
specific trade policy issues better than I can. What I'd like
to cover this morning are the two, I think, central macro
economic issues reflecting trade.
No. 1, does it matter? And I think you made reference to
this in your comments earlier. It disturbs me greatly. Quite
frankly, even a large part of the economics profession, and
other policy analysts, are arguing ``so what?''--that the
economy is doing great anyway and trade deficits are
irrelevant.
Second, even before that issue, many of them say not only
that it doesn't matter but that it's a sign of strength. They
argue that it's good we're running this big trade deficit,
because it reflects the fact that our economy is strong and
other economies are not doing as well around the world, so why
be concerned about it? I think both arguments are not only dead
wrong but very disturbing, and creating a sense of complacency
regarding trade that is very dangerous from a long term
perspective.
Let me start with what causes the trade deficit. It is true
that the trade deficit is now rising--it is essentially going
off the chart, as you mentioned, because of macro economic
conditions around the world, largely, the recessions in Asia
and in other emerging market countries around the world, and
slower growth in Europe. All of this is holding down our
exports.
Second, the overvalued dollar, or the sharp increase of the
value of the dollar against many currencies, is triggering
rising import penetration which is displacing domestic
production in the United States. That combination is pushing
the trade deficit up dramatically. But I think it's important
not to forget the fact that we've had a persistent trade
imbalance now for almost 20 years, regardless of relative macro
economic conditions.
We had large trade deficits even when Asia was thriving and
booming, and even when the dollar was a lot weaker. It does
vary somewhat year to year, but we have been running a large
trade deficit every year now for almost 20 years regardless of
macro economic conditions, oil prices, exchange rates, and some
of these other economic determinants of trade flows. This is a
serious persistent problem.
In my judgment, it largely reflects structural factors
which have caused a persistent structural trade imbalance in
the United States. And periodically, much as now, we get macro
economic factors which add to it. But the real problem is the
structural trade deficit, and without going into a lot of
detail, it reflects a number of factors.
First is the export-led growth strategies that most of Asia
has employed in recent decades, including closed markets, tying
their currencies to the dollar at favorable exchange rates, and
other characteristics of those economies designed essentially
to generate growth by exporting primarily to the United States.
They all subsidize their exports with preferential tax policies
and other subsidies.
Some of them require U.S. companies to produce in that
market to sell there. And they employ a whole variety of other
what we call ``unfair trade practices,'' primarily practices
which limit access to their markets and which give them an
advantage in exporting to the United States and other markets.
These are the factors, in my judgment, that are the root cause
of our trade deficit.
Now, you'll hear many macro economists say that that is not
the case, that we have a trade deficit because we don't save
enough. This is an outgrowth of that famous identity that,
roughly speaking, the trade deficit is the difference between
investment and savings. It is often argued that our low savings
rate is why we have a big trade deficit.
That's like saying the reason a company is losing money is
because their revenues are lower than their costs. It tells you
absolutely nothing about what's going on; whether revenues have
fallen, whether the cost structure is too high, whether they
are losing market share, et cetera.
Similarly, that identity can reflect a number of forces. In
fact, some of our low savings rate, in my judgment, reflects
the trade imbalance which puts downward pressure on wages and
jobs in the United States, thus lowering savings. It is not
automatic that causality goes from savings to trade. It's a
two-way relationship. So it does not in any way undermine the
argument that we do have a significant structural trade
deficit.
These same economists will tell you that the reason that
now we have a trade deficit is that the economies overseas are
very weak. Well, earlier they said that all that matters is how
much we save. Well then, you can't come back 2 days later and
say that the recessions overseas are affecting our trade
deficit. It is a combination of a number of factors, but there
is this large structural component.
They will also argue that, if anything, we should be happy
about the unfair trade practices which exist overseas. They
argue that dumping is good for the United States--it's like a
gift to consumers--without telling us what it does to the
production side of the economy? It's nice to have lower prices,
but if you don't have a job it doesn't really matter very much.
Of course, they also argue that if other countries have closed
markets, it's their consumers that are hurt, not us.
But what about the U.S. companies that cannot sell into
those markets? What about the global economies of scale they
lose by having limited access to foreign markets, and how does
that affect their competitiveness in the long term? So all
those oversimplifications, in my judgment, misrepresent the
real trade problems, or causes of the trade deficit in the
United States.
Does it matter? I think it matters greatly. Admittedly, the
economy is relatively strong right now. Domestic demand is
particularly buoyant, housing activity is at a very high level.
But it is not preordained that the domestic economy is always
going to be so strong, that it's always going to offset the
drag from trade. We have had many times over the last 20 years
when that was not the case. But it's the long term
consequences, some of which you mentioned in your opening
statement, which bother me even more.
As we continue to run these trade deficits year after year,
our foreign debt is piling up, increasingly sucking more income
and dividends out of the system on a long term basis.
Eventually, foreigners are going to decide they have enough
dollar assets.
When that's the case, we'll see sharp downward pressure on
the dollar exchange rate, a sharp increase in interest rates,
and it will slow long term economic growth. And, of course, as
I said a moment ago, it has a significant impact on the
competitiveness of the industries that are directly affected.
It is an important issue that needs to be addressed.
What do we do about it? Very briefly, I think you said so
yourself, Mr. Chairman, in your opening remarks, there is no
one magic bullet. I think it requires a multitude of trade
policies all designed, No. 1, to provide more access to foreign
markets, and No. 2, to limit unfair import penetration in the
United States.
This has to start with trade policies aimed at opening
foreign markets--which this administration, to its credit, has
tried to do probably more than any other administration over
the last five or six decades, I wish with more success, but
nonetheless, they have made the effort.
It means enforcing and tightening existing trade laws in
the United States, particularly anti-dumping, which is more
important now than ever because overcapacity breeds dumping,
and we are awash in overcapacity in most manufactured goods and
commodities around the world because of the crisis overseas.
It means, in my judgment, increasing funding for programs
which will improve U.S. competitiveness and increase our access
to foreign markets. I'm talking about export financing and
promotion programs, which we underfund in this country relative
to our trading partners, and which represent a small part of
our budget. In fact, we could increase these ten-fold and use
up only a small part of our budget surplus.
You know, I think the biggest threat to prosperity in this
country is trade and competitiveness. I think we get much more
bang from the buck with selected tax cuts and expenditure
increases designed to improve our competitiveness and give us a
more fair shake in global markets, than we would with big tax
cuts for example.
And it probably implies looking at a number of other
things. Strengthening the dispute resolution mechanism in the
WTO and a number of other programs designed, in my judgment, to
accomplish the twin goals of equal access overseas and limiting
unfair penetration of U.S. markets. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Chimerine follows:]
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Mr. Mica. Thank you for your testimony. I'd like to
recognize Mr. Howard Lewis, vice president, economic policy of
the National Association of Manufacturers. Welcome sir, and you
are recognized.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you Mr. Chairman, members of the
subcommittee. I have a longer statement which I'd like to have
added to the record.
Mr. Mica. Without objection that will be made part of the
record.
Mr. Lewis. I'll pare down my remarks today to try to keep
it within your 5 minute limit. Let me begin my testimony this
afternoon with a discussion of the U.S. trade deficit.
Right now, as Larry has indicated, the United States is
running U.S. record trade deficits. Last year these deficits
reached $169 billion. This year they expect to exceed that by a
considerable amount. To say the least, the trade deficit is a
complex and large subject.
To a great extent right now the deficits reflect the
difference in growth rates between the United States and very
weak economies overseas. It also reflects some significant
swings in exchange rates that we've seen over the past several
years.
So the first point I really want to make is there are some
very large economic forces at play here. In my testimony today
I'd like to draw your attention to two points about the trade
deficit.
First, in looking at the deficit, people have tended to
concentrate, quite rightly, on the import side of the ledger
and ignore what's happening on the export side. Given the
nature of this deficit that we're running at this time, this is
a big mistake, and let me explain why.
Overall imports grew last year by about 5 percent or $52
billion. At the same time exports actually fell seven-tenths of
1 percent, $6 billion. Well, a lot of people say, ``Isn't that
what happens when you run a record trade deficit? Imports go up
exports go down.'' Not necessarily. You've got to look at the
specific case.
For example, if you go back to 1987, which is the last time
we were running a record trade deficit, in that year imports
grew by about 12 percent or by about $57 billion. But exports
also grew in that year by roughly $45 billion. So in 1987, the
last record trade deficit, you had, and I put this in quotes,
``only'' a $12 billion swing. That is in sharp contrast to what
you've seen this time or this past year where you have a
negative $58 billion swing.
So the importance of exports here is important but I don't
want to be misunderstood here either. There is no doubt that
recent import surges in steel, semi-conductors, and other
industries have had a serious impact on American workers and
firms. This should not be down played for 1 minute.
But it is equally important to recognize the impact that
this decline in U.S. exports have had on American workers and
firms. Export expansion has powered 30 percent of the economic
growth in this country over the last 15 years and this source
of growth has now dried up. What is more, jobs connected with
these exports are precisely the types of jobs that we want to
see more of in this country.
In comparison to non-exporters, plants that export grow
jobs 18 percent faster, are 10 percent less likely to go out of
business, pay on the average 15 percent more, and provide
benefits 40 percent higher. We should pay attention, in other
words, when this type of job begins to dry up and that is
precisely what has happened since mid 1997.
The second point I want to make about the trade deficit may
come as something of a surprise. While there is no doubt that
we are running a record trade deficit, these deficits probably
aren't as big as we think they are. The information on why this
is so has been sitting on the Census Bureau website for 2 years
now.
Basically, we have known for some time that just in the
area of merchandise trade, I'm not even talking about services,
just in the area of merchandise trade we under count U.S.
exports by somewhere between 3 to 10 percent. In 1998, that
would have amounted to between $20 and $67 billion in exports
or would have reduced the U.S. trade deficit by somewhere
between 10 and 40 percent.
The fact that we might be able to reduce the trade deficit
by up to 40 percent by just getting the numbers right obviously
doesn't mean that we don't need aggressive policies that open
markets and promote trade, just the opposite. On the other
hand, anyone who is concerned about the efficiency and the
effectiveness of government, as this subcommittee is, should be
worried by the fact that we don't have the ability to collect
accurate data upon which to make our policy decisions.
Incidently, there apparently is no under counting in the import
area. You get those numbers right.
Let me just skip quickly, Mr. Chairman, to the discussion
of export promotion. I do want to say though that the biggest
point I'm making about the trade deficit right now is the fall
off in our U.S. exports. Some people who are looking at the
trade deficit and looking at these massive macro economic
factors that are driving these deficits may view the issue of
export promotion as relatively unimportant in the scheme of
things. I don't share this view.
What the U.S. Government does in these areas can have a
major impact on U.S. export in specific industries in specific
countries. For example, over the next 2 years the Export-Import
Bank will probably support $6 billion to Korea, in exports to
Korea. That represents a significant share of exports to that
market which is still the 10th largest economy in the world.
Next year, U.S. semi-conductor companies will start selling
a chip for use in ordinary personal computers and laptops that
exceeds the super computer control levels that Congress put in
place last year. Recently, an executive from a high tech
company began his testimony in the Senate Finance Committee by
saying, ``If I had known at my company's founding what I know
today about U.S. international tax rules, I would have advised
that parent company be established outside the United States.''
Finally, when Congress decided last year to require
commercial satellites be placed on the Arms Export Control List
it significantly and, I admit, probably unintentionally raised
taxes on U.S. commercial satellites anywhere in the world, due
to the differences between the tax law treatment of defense and
commercial exports. The point I'm making here is that this
stuff is really important and we should pay a lot of attention
to the policies in this area, not only to the policies in this
area but also to how they are implemented.
Three years ago, Mr. Chairman, and I'll just briefly
conclude here, the NAM's chairman of our Small Business
Committee urged us to get back into the business of running
trade missions. As I point out in my longer testimony, this a
bit of going back to the future for us since the NAM was
founded in 1895 to do precisely this.
However, we weren't sure how to get back to the future, and
we found a lot of help in the U.S. Department of Commerce in
their Matchmaker Program. Through the Matchmaker Program we
basically have created a very effective public-private
partnership. It's an export program. They've got the product,
U.S. Government can deliver a superior product in the way of a
trade mission overseas. We've got the customers. And the trick
is to marry these two up.
We've started these programs in Mexico and Europe and we
hope to do some more later this year and more. They really are
roll-up-your-sleeves trade missions, they aren't vacation
junkets. For example, in our Mexico mission the United States
Commercial Service in Mexico will set up some place between 300
to 400 meetings for our 20 participants that will be going down
there. That's a lot of work.
The more I have worked in this practical side of U.S. trade
policy, the more impressed I have become with the ability of
our Commercial Service to even deliver these products. For
example, when I was in Southeast Asia, I actually talked to
commercial officers who could not make long distance phone
calls, who could not make long distance phone calls from our
Embassy. I have seen the antiquated equipment that people have
in the Government offices.
Just the other day, I was listening to the head of the
Eximbank discuss how to improve his agency. Along with some
complex matters on the Bank's portfolio, he had some straight
forward recommendations, including putting all the export
financing agencies in one building, upgrading Eximbank's
technology and stationing Export-Import Bank officials
overseas.
I was struck by how doable these suggestions were in
comparison to many of the issues we deal with here in
Washington. Making phone calls, using modern technology,
putting staff where they are needed, all steps that are
absolutely essential to the efficiency and effectiveness of any
export advocacy program whether in Eximbank, TDA, OPEC or
Commerce.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I will be glad
to answer any questions.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Lewis. I'll now turn to Mr.
Reginald Brown, director of marketing for the Florida Fruit and
Vegetable Association. You are recognized and welcome, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lewis follows:]
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Mr. Brown. Thank you and good afternoon. We commend you for
holding this hearing. The issues at stake are very intensely
held by our members and we have had some very interesting
experiences with trade over the last 4 or 5 years in our
industry. I'd like to just take an opportunity to walk through
some of those experiences with you this afternoon. And,
hopefully, have the written testimony submitted into the
record, and move forward from there.
Mr. Mica. Without objection, your lengthy statement will be
made part of the record.
Mr. Brown. Florida is geographically located in an area of
the country that allows us to produce many of the commodities
that the American consumer eats in the winter time. Our primary
competitor historically is the Mexican vegetable industry and
primarily the State of Sinola in Western Mexico.
After the North American Free Trade Agreement was enacted,
we fell under the gun, if you will, as the identified
sacrificial lamb or lost soul in the process of trade. We got
into a situation where the Mexican industry was building up
their capacity to produce. They were ready for the lower
tariffs that the treaty offered to the Mexican producers, and
got themselves in position to take a greater share of the
American market away from the Florida production system.
You add into that the fact that immediately after the
passage of NAFTA, the peso fell in half. We ended up with a
great, huge dam that was originally the North American Free
Trade Agreement that suddenly burst under the pressure of the
peso devaluation. We were absolutely submerged under a sea of
imported product.
During the 5 years or 4 years that we've been dealing with
this issue, from about 1991 through about 1997, 1998, I'll give
you some idea of what happened in the shift in competitive
position between the two countries. In the production of
cucumbers in 1990 and 1991, Florida represented about 47
percent of the domestic market during the period that we
competed with each other. Currently, Florida holds about 23
percent market share. It fell roughly in half.
In the production of squash to feed the American public, we
held approximately 27 percent market share and that fell to 13
percent. In the production of eggplants, we held about 48
percent share and that fell to 21 percent. In the production of
peppers, we held a 63 percent share and it fell to 50 percent
during that period of time.
Now, the great tomato wars we've all heard so much about
and we've all been to battle over in various trade remedy
opportunities that we were offered through the trade laws of
this country, that particular industry has fallen from a 65
percent share to a 47 percent share. If the other crops we
talked about just prior to that had the strength that the
tomato industry had, they had a much more pervasive case in
terms of the amount of market share that was lost due primarily
to the peso devaluation and the very favorable anticipated
situation with the North American Free Trade Agreement. This is
a severe problem for our industry in terms of the import surge.
On the export side, we have yet to manage to enter any
fresh citrus into Mexico. They continue to hold up some
artificial barriers in the farm by the sanitary areas that
permit the entry of citrus into Mexico. And we feel very
strongly that being in the fresh produce industry we are
believers in free trade, but we've got to have fair trade.
The issue revolves around the fact that we don't seem to be
able to play the game in both directions as well as we should.
We are currently working on export markets around the world. We
have made some progress with small penetration into the
Japanese market with the United States tomatoes. We are
continuing to try to make penetration into the Chinese market,
but the Chinese are holding very high tariff barriers on the
perimeters of their country, and they are also holding up the
traditional weapon of choice, unsubstantiated by the sanitary
restrictions that prevent the entry of United States products
to China. These are the kinds of problems concerns that our
industry has dealing with trade issues.
The purpose of the meeting today is how can the U.S.
Government more effectively promote trade? Well, being from
kind of the bottom of the pile, down where the producer makes
something from the land and where food is made in this country,
that is on the farm, we just think you ought to do a better job
of negotiating good deals because the deals that we've
experienced to date have not been good for us.
Our negotiators need to be more aggressive in looking out
for the interests of U.S. industries domestically from
countries importing into the United States, and also more
aggressive in opening doors and knocking down product sanitary
barriers in other parts of the world.
The United States needs to look at a system in future trade
negotiations of a request and offer type of approach to tariff
reductions, not a unilateral tariff reduction process. We need
to look very seriously at exemptions for commodities that are
sensitive in the negotiation process that would give those
industries adequate protection from foreign imports.
We need to look at safeguard mechanisms that are crafted
for sensitive items that are functional. We've had some offered
that have been enacted into trade treaties that have not
worked, and we have tested them to the extent we were able to
and found them to be ineffective. We need to look at mechanisms
that deal with ways of dealing in major trade disruptions when
they occur due to currency devaluation and currency
manipulation.
We also need to look at domestic trade relief statutes that
give adequate protection for regional or crop-specific
seasonality issues so we can use our current trade laws, under
201 and 202 and our dumping cases, for those industries that
are very narrowly based and very much focused in the targets of
importing countries. We do appreciate the effort the Department
of Commerce has given to the industry in the suspension
agreement with the Mexican tomato producers in dealing with our
industry in Florida, but we look forward to hopefully having
more success with trade agreements.
Hopefully, if we can have some success, we will not see a
future in which the ability to produce many of these products
is no longer available in this country. I thank you for the
opportunity to speak.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brown follows:]
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Mr. Mica. Thank you for your testimony, sir. Now, I'd like
to recognize Mr. Barry D. Solarz, vice president for trade and
tax at the American Iron and Steel Institute. You are
recognized, sir.
Mr. Solarz. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Given the time limits,
I will summarize my remarks and ask that the full text of my
statement be submitted into the record.
Mr. Mica. Without objection, the full text will be made
part of the record, thank you.
Mr. Solarz. Thank you. I will first summarize the steel
trade situation, the key lessons to be learned from the case of
steel. Then I will focus on what, for us, is the single most
important thing the Government can do in both the short and
long run to address this country's large, and as Larry
Chimerine has correctly pointed out, persistent trade deficit--
and that is to improve the effectiveness of U.S. trade laws and
trade law enforcement.
In 1998, U.S. steel imports exceeded exports by a record 36
million tons and the U.S. steel trade deficit was a record
$11.7 billion, or nearly 7 percent of our total record trade
deficit last year. As a result, America's steel trade crises is
now at the center of our public debate about the future of U.S.
trade policy and the case of steel deserves close review in any
examination of our overall trade deficit.
Since 1980, U.S. steel producers have reduced inefficient
capacity by 30 percent, reduced employment by 60 percent,
invested nearly $60 billion in modernization, more than doubled
labor productivity and emerged as a world class industry once
again.
Yet, what has occurred in U.S. steel trade over the past
year turns free trade theory on its head. In what some might
call a triumph of inefficiency, dumped and subsidized imports,
often from less efficient, heavily polluting foreign
competitors, have caused serious injury to technologically
advanced, internationally competitive, environmentally
responsible U.S. steel companies and their highly skilled
employees.
So instead of these being the best of times for our new and
world class America steel industry, U.S. steel import market
share hit an all time record 37 percent in November 1998. This
is happening because major foreign competitors have not made
the kind of hard and painful adjustments that U.S. steel
companies and employees have made.
Foreign steel cartels, closed markets, currency
manipulation, government subsidies and dumping have remained
pervasive in world steel trade. A number of key steel producing
countries abroad have experienced a collapse of their currency
and domestic steel demand. These countries have all tried to
export their way out of trouble, at the same time.
Due to the collapse of Asia and other major export markets,
they've all simultaneously targeted the large, strong and open
U.S. market with record imports at cutthroat illegal prices.
The result is a supply driven crisis that has caused the United
States to become the world's steel dumping ground.
Accordingly, the case of steel does hold important lessons
for the future of U.S. trade policy. The case of steel shows us
that we need to ensure, as Larry Chimerine has been pointing
out, two way free and fair trade.
We also believe that we need to establish a new consensus
on U.S. trade policy. We need to ensure more burden sharing by
other major industrial nations, especially the European Union
and Japan. We need to ensure that the IMF focuses on increasing
domestic demand in countries in crisis and not just on
encouraging them to export their way out of difficulty.
We need, as Larry has mentioned, to treat our trade deficit
as though it matters because it's costing thousands of good
manufacturing jobs and, over time, is a recipe for industrial
stagnation and decline. We need to address the import as well
as the export side of the trade ledger in our policies.
In some contrast to what Howard Lewis has said on this, we
do feel that there has often been a greater focus put on export
promotion than on what is going on in terms of unfair trade in
the U.S. market.
That, Mr. Chairman, brings me to my final point. Mr.
Chairman, most important of all, we need to ensure that U.S.
trade laws are as strong as the World Trade Organization allows
and that U.S. trade laws and trade agreements are vigorously
enforced. The case of steel shows once again that even the most
competitive U.S. industry can be destroyed by foreign unfair
trade.
It shows that even when demand is strong, as it is, world
class U.S. mills can suffer significant lay offs, short work
weeks, severe price depression, production cuts, and lost
orders. It shows why the United States needs to ensure that
trade is fair and rule based. It shows why the United States
needs to negotiate forcefully with other governments engaged in
unfair trade.
It shows also, unfortunately, in the recent announcement of
bilateral agreements giving dumped steel from Russia a
guaranteed United States market share over the strong objection
of United States trade law petitioners, that U.S. trade policy
principles and the health of key U.S. industries can still be
sacrificed to, ``higher foreign policy interests.''
It shows one more thing. Where the rules are not being
enforced, and the trade laws are not as effective as they
should be, Congress should take immediate steps to strengthen
our trade laws in WTO consistent ways. My written statement
contains attachments that provide additional information on
this critical issue for steel and the U.S. economy. AISI
appreciates this opportunity to provide comments on the U.S.
trade deficit and the case of steel.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Solarz follows:]
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Mr. Mica. Thank you for your testimony. I'll lead with some
questions, if I may.
Mr. Chimerine, I was particularly interested in the opening
statement by my colleague, Mr. Kucinich, from Ohio, who talked
about what he labeled improper trade accounting. He described
one particular situation dealing with the manufacture of
automobiles.
Do you feel we properly count today, and should we take a
look at how we calculate our trade deficit? Then, based on his
statement, it sounds like the trade deficit could be even worse
than what is reported, is that correct?
Dr. Chimerine. It's very hard to say, Mr. Chairman. I think
it could go either way. I think Howard Lewis has earlier
indicated that in some sense, in some ways, we're probably
understating our trade deficit. We probably do miss some
exports and do not count some exports that we actually make.
But I must tell you, I don't think I would change the
equation very much. If we added $50 billion or took $50 billion
off the reported trade deficit, it's the same story. The
fundamental trend is we have a huge and persistent trade
imbalance. It is largely structural, at least on an average
basis. Sometimes, there are short term forces that make it
larger or smaller.
To me that's the overriding issue. While I'm not the first
to advocate measures to improve the quality of our statistics,
and I agree that the trade statistics in particular tend to be
inaccurate and very erratic, I think the real issue is the fact
that under any circumstances, no matter how we measure it, we
have serious trade problems that are going to have sizable long
term consequences. I think that ought to be our primary focus.
Mr. Mica. My next question deals with the consequences. Mr.
Lewis testified that for the first time since 1987, we've seen
this huge explosion of, I think you've described it, in 1987 a
different situation but in 1998 we ended up with not only----
Mr. Lewis. A negative trade, $1 billion swing in our----
Mr. Mica. Right. The drop, or the increase in our trade
deficit but a decrease in exports. What's going to happen if
that continues? You can both comment. You are the economist, we
want to give you multiple answers.
Dr. Chimerine. I don't know if that's good or bad, Mr.
Chairman, but I'll answer it. Clearly over the last 30 or 40
years, in fact, probably the entire post-war period, world
trade has grown at a rate faster than overall economic growth,
probably close to double the rate of GDP growth on a global
basis.
So there has been a consistent trend where both the level
of exports and the level of imports in most countries,
including the United States, have been rising relative to our
GDP. That's even happened in prior recessions.
What happened in prior recessions, particularly overseas
recessions, is that the trend in exports continued but it was
temporarily dampened by the recessionary conditions in some of
our trading partner countries. But that wasn't large enough to
completely obliterate the trend, it just slowed the process.
Now we have such extraordinarily depressed conditions in
Asia, which was the most rapid growth region of the world, and
it's spreading to other parts of the world, as you yourself
mentioned, particularly Latin America. Those pressures have
been so huge that we actually have negative growth in exports.
But as Howard mentioned, it's a relatively small decline, which
tells you how powerful the upward movement, the upward trend
is, given how serious the economic recessions are currently in
other parts of the world.
With respect to the increase in the trade deficit over the
last several years, the last year and a half in particular,
while some of it is coming on the import side, for reasons
Barry Solarz mentioned, clearly the export part of the equation
is being dramatically dampened by overseas economic conditions.
When you add that to what was already a baseline $100 or $150
billion a year trade deficit, we're already up to $250 or close
to $300 billion.
So, clearly, the drop off in exports is troubling. Some of
it, hopefully, is temporary as a result of the recessionary
conditions overseas.
Mr. Mica. Did you want to respond, Mr. Lewis?
Mr. Lewis. Yes, I think two points. One is something that
Larry brought up in his testimony, the impact of this if we
continue to see this lack of growth in exports. The impact is
that right now the economy is being carried by consumer
spending, construction, and so on. That's not going to go on
forever. At some point, this important source of growth that
we've seen in the past is going to really--or the lack of it is
going to really hit home. So that would be the sort of big
macro economic point on exports.
If I could just comment. I would be glad to submit the
report on the under counting of U.S. exports. It seems to be an
ideal topic for this subcommittee. But just to give you one
illustration of why this is taking place, the Government
doesn't actually count exports under $2,500. They use a model
that is either 10 or 15 years old, I forget, and basically try
to estimate how much is happening.
Well, I don't know how many Fed Ex trucks and UPS trucks I
probably passed in the taxi cab on the way up here, but they
are an illustration of exactly why we have this problem. It's
that business and the way we do business around the world has
vastly changed. Just-in-time inventory means that you have
millions of shipments under this threshold level of $2,500.
It's the way people do business now. It's the type of thing
where there are clearly, as Larry points out, really big
problems we need to deal with. But we also should get the
numbers right so that we know what's going on. I'd be glad to
submit this report if it would be of interest to the committee?
Mr. Mica. I think it would be of interest, and we would be
glad to make it a part of the record, without objection. I want
to be fair to my colleagues. I'd like to yield to Mr. Kucinich.
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Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
to all the panelists for your participation. I've read your
testimony. It's critical for this discussion that the chair has
facilitated.
For Mr. Solarz, you've correctly said that foreign steel
exporters have violated U.S. trade law. Preliminary
determination has been made, as you know, by the Department of
Commerce, but I'd like you to comment on the effect of
devaluation of foreign currencies and what that's had on making
cheaper steel made in Korea, Brazil, Japan and Russia.
First of all, what I'd like to know is this: if Korea,
Brazil, Russia, Japan, did not illegally subsidize their steel,
wouldn't it be true that a devaluation of the currency of those
nations by 60 or 80 percent would cause their steel to be able
to greatly underprice American steel?
Mr. Solarz. It's actually a slightly more complicated
question than maybe even you are assuming in asking it. I'll
give you one example which is Russia, where nobody can figure
out what the costs and what the prices are, and the workers
aren't paid for months at a time. You have trading companies
going in there and taking 10 cents on the dollar, taking steel
by the boat load from that country and essentially dumping it
at prices that haven't been seen in the U.S. market in decades.
Russia came into the U.S. market as a price leader. What
then happened was that the Japanese came in and the Japanese
announced that ``We will meet the Russian prices. And steel
consumers, you can have Japanese quality at Russian prices,''
which broke the back of this market and essentially created
anarchy in it.
Now, we do have some experience with this issue of the
relationship between exchange rate changes and unfair trade
case findings. However, it might be better to put this question
to Mr. Copps. After all, this was an issue at the very
beginning when cases were filed against Japan, which at the
time had a weaker currency against the dollar than it has now.
A lot of people were expressing the point of view that with the
yen to dollar exchange rate, it would be very difficult to find
a significant dumping margin vis a vis Japan.
But as we've seen in the recent preliminary margin
determinations by the Department of Commerce, significant
dumping margins were found in the case of Japan. Russia, of
course, is a very different situation because of its non-market
economy nature. The Department of Commerce has to look to a
surrogate free market producer in order to come up with dumping
comparisons.
Mr. Kucinich. Well, let me do a followup question. Isn't it
true that export-led growth policies are helped by devalued
currencies because exports are made cheaper when the currency
is devalued?
Mr. Solarz. Absolutely. We and others at this table have
expressed concerns about the exchange rate issue. I know at
least two of us at this table, if not three, have mentioned the
term ``currency manipulation.'' I believe there has been a long
history----
Mr. Kucinich. I saw that in your testimony.
Mr. Solarz [continuing]. There has been a long history of
that certainly in the case of South Korea and other countries
as well. We did express, in both the oral and written
testimony, significant concerns about the position that the IMF
took with respect to a number of countries in crisis, at least
at the beginning, with these really counterproductive austerity
measures----
Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Solarz just put his finger
on what I think is part of the core problem here. Would you say
it's true then that these so called structural adjustment
policies and austerity mechanisms promoted by these
international financial institutions such as the IMF were meant
to promote or they lead to export-led growth.
Mr. Solarz. Yes, Congressman Kucinich. We and many other
manufacturers have expressed concerns about this and the
agricultural sector probably did as well. When we expressed our
concerns about this, we did it in the context of a supporter of
the IMF aid packages.
We were a supporter of the IMF aid package for South Korea,
for example, and actually saw in that aid package the possible
seeds for the first time in decades of eliminating some of
those structural barriers and anti-competitive practices in the
South Korean economy that United States trade policy for the
last several decades has had no success at all in chipping away
at.
Mr. Kucinich. I understand. There is a conundrum here and I
just wondered, you know, it seems to be true that the U.S.
trade deficit, at least the recent surge in imported steel,
could be aggravated by export-led growth policies promoted by
the IMF? You know, we're looking at the same mechanisms here.
Would you agree with that?
Mr. Solarz. Yes. We would agree that in this kind of
environment it certainly made things worse for our industry and
it really does no favor for the county in crisis either because
it is our view, and I know that Dr. Chimerine shares it, that
these countries descended into crisis essentially because they
followed that ``Japan, Inc.'' model of over-investing and over-
exporting, and they all turned to exporting at the same time,
and the whole thing was not sustainable for the long run.
Mr. Kucinich. So as we look at this, would you say that
export-led growth policies promoted by the IMF can cost the
United States in the form of import surges and trade deficits?
Mr. Solarz. Yes.
Mr. Kucinich. And would you recommend to Congress--and, Mr.
Chairman, this is how, I mean, this hearing is so important--
before it gives the IMF more funding as it did last year, that
Congress demand that the IMF stop promoting export-led growth
at the expense of U.S. manufacturing?
Mr. Solarz. We certainly felt that the IMF should have put
greater stress on trying to rebuild domestic demand in the
countries in crisis. Just as we believe that----
Mr. Kucinich. Instead of propelling export-led growth.
Mr. Solarz. Absolutely. Just as we believe that ultimately
the only long term solution for the Russian economy is to
rebuild domestic demand. I wish I could show you now a chart
that would show what domestic steel production and consumption
was around 1990 in the former Soviet Union.
You had about 165 million tons of production and about 170
metric tons of consumption. Today, you are looking, in Russia
alone, steel consumption in the order of 17 million tons. There
has been a complete collapse of that economy and domestic steel
demand, and ultimately, to rebuild it has got to be the
solution.
Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Chairman, here you see in this one panel
you know American manufacturing which we're very proud of,
which has been the mainstay of this country's growth in so many
ways, through two world wars and more, and the steel industry
which has been the core of that along with automotive and
aerospace, and of course this part of agriculture, the fruit
and vegetable industry, and they all have been in trouble
because of these trade policies.
Each testimony presented here by the gentlemen has been
very valuable and it points out the importance of this hearing.
I want to tell the chairman how much I appreciate that he has
taken the time to address this issue.
Mr. Mica. Thank you.
Dr. Chimerine. Mr. Chairman, can I make a comment?
Mr. Mica. Yes, go ahead.
Dr. Chimerine. I think several of us have pointed this out
already. When the history of this recent crisis, the economic
and financial crisis in Asia is written, I think it will become
clear that the fundamental cause of the crisis is the way these
economies have been structured, or the economic strategy
they've had in place in some cases for several decades and
others for 10 or 15 years which, as Congressman Kucinich
mentioned, is essentially to structure their economies to
generate export-led growth.
They are all trying to copy the Japanese model in one way
or another. The cause of the crisis in my judgment is that not
everybody can grow by exporting at the same time. Somebody has
to buy something and it can't always just be us. They are all
targeting the U.S. market. When Japan did it by itself, it was
successful. There isn't enough in the United States to support
everybody at the same time so it led to overcapacity and over
investment, and so forth.
Where the IMF has entered, in my judgment, is over the last
18 months in the way they addressed the crisis. They made it
worse by insisting on huge austerity measures as a condition
for the financing programs they put in place, which created
more downward pressure on economies that were already
collapsing, and which No. 1 has aggravated the global over
capacity problem in steel and just about everything else.
Second, because their domestic economy has been squeezed
down even further by IMF insistence on high interest rates, and
tax increases, and whatever, it's forced them even more to look
to exports for growth. Now luckily, a little too late in my
opinion, the IMF has backed off and is now trying to be more of
an instrument of growth in that region instead of austerity.
But what we should have insisted on when we debated the IMF
funding issue here in the United States was, No. 1, that they
back away from austerity and, No. 2, that they insist on
meaningful long term reforms that will give us more access to
those markets and move them away from just exporting their way
to economic growth.
Now, again, this is gradually happening but had it been
recognized sooner, I think the crisis would have been far less
severe than turned out to be. And it wouldn't have spread as
much to other parts of the world, and some of the negative
effects on U.S. industries and U.S. trade probably would have
been considerably less.
Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Chairman, if you would yield just for a
second, and think about this in these terms. When one of our
constituents, who is perhaps a steel worker, gets a notice at
work telling him that he's laid off in a steel mill that has
invested $40 to $50 million or more in improving its ability to
produce but has already had reductions in work force, but
everybody is ready to go and sell their product, and then I
mean you start to see how this whole system kind of unravels.
Mr. Mica. If you want to see your constituent unravel, tell
him that his tax dollars have gone to Washington to support
policies that help unravel his economic status.
Mr. Kucinich. Exactly.
Mr. Mica. And that would upset him or her. I appreciate the
gentleman's comments. I would like to recognize the gentleman
from Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your remarks and
Mr. Kucinich yours. Members of the panel, thank you for joining
us and sharing with us your views today. I would like to shift
gears just a little bit, if I could, and talk about offsets.
I notice, Mr. Chimerine, in your testimony you alluded to
the impact that the requirement of some governments that we
shift technology to them in return for our ability to sell over
there, causes us some pain, not only the technology but in the
aerospace industry in particular, shipping and training of
labor in order to build the project--sometimes building a
facility in another country for them and that's only with
regard to the direct offsets, we talk about the indirect
offsets and the havoc that's been reaping.
You made a comment on page 13 of your testimony that I
thought was interesting. One of the things you said we had to
do was that the U.S. Government had to prevent foreign
countries from insisting on technological transfers as a
condition for selling in their markets. How do we do that?
Dr. Chimerine. That's a good question.
Mr. Tierney. No, no, no. You've got to give us answers
here.
Dr. Chimerine. Since I've dominated the time up here, I'm
going to suggest you ask my three colleagues. And all of them,
quite seriously, are probably better able to be more specific
on that than I am. But I find it an extremely serious problem,
particularly with China. China is very clever, as all of us
have mentioned, or several of us. They insist that you shift
some production to those markets as a condition of selling
there. They force you to take on partners, they force you to
transfer technology.
I don't know the specific best way to deal with this, but I
must tell you that increasingly I've become of the opinion, I'm
a free trader, I believe strongly in two-way free trade, but--
----
Mr. Tierney. But you are fast becoming a fair trader,
right?
Dr. Chimerine. No, but the problem is that we have one-way
free trade. And the reason support for free trade in this
country is eroding despite the strong economy, is I think most
people, maybe not the academic economics community, but I think
most other people, realize this is not right, it's not fair,
and it's not in our national interest.
I'm becoming increasingly of the opinion, like we're now
doing in the case of, you know, bananas, and the beef hormone
situation with Europe, that in order to bring about equal
access overseas, to stop the unfair trade practices you are
talking about, we're going to have to limit access to our
market. That's the only thing they seem to understand.
And whether you put offsets in, or strengthen anti-dumping,
negotiate individual trade agreements with the Japanese or
others, which we don't even have the staff at USTR and Commerce
to monitor and enforce, I'm not sure it's even worth it any
more. I think the only thing that seems to work is when we
limit access to our market to force them to back away from some
of the trade practices that are onerous.
But whether that's something we could do with offsets, or
tightening anti-dumping laws, or all of these things, all of
which I support, I don't know the precise best way to do it nor
do I know whether they are going to really work anymore.
Mr. Tierney. I would like to share that with the rest of
the panel since----
Mr. Lewis. I would like to make one comment about how to
deal with this problem of basically trade-related investment
measures. You want to invest here, you've got to bring over
such and such technology, you've got to export so much out of
this country, et cetera. I mean that's been going on a long
time, it's been going on in Mexico.
In fact, I think one of the stronger points of NAFTA was
the TRIMS provision which prohibits the use of trade-related
investment measures. If we could have a similar strong trade-
related investment measures around the world, we probably would
begin to address your problem.
Mr. Tierney. Of course we exempted aerospace from some of
the agreements----
Mr. Lewis. And I think that too we've got to distinguish
between offsets in the military area and offsets in the
commercial area. I was primarily talking about what goes on in
the commercial area. But I think it's a very serious problem.
The other point that I'd like to just touch on here, and again
it seems to me very relevant to this subcommittee, and Mr.
Brown and Mr. Solarz raised it, and that's implementation of
trade agreements.
Basically, we go out and negotiate these treaties over 8,
10 years. Everybody is exhausted at the end of them. We drag
back here, we go through a big fight in Congress, we get it
ratified, everybody is collapsing, and then we go onto the next
one. I'm kidding around a little bit here, but I think the need
to pay attention to how these things are implemented, not only
by the United States, but also how we could strengthen the
international trade systems monitoring of the implementation.
I've recently become more and more fascinated with this
question after talking with some colleagues who simply have
discovered in certain countries tariffs that should have been
reduced weren't reduced, simply because nobody made them,
nobody checked.
Now, admittedly, you can't go around the world checking a
zillion tariffs, but there are certainly ways that you can do
this in terms of, at the risk of sounding boring, standard
accounting procedures. You don't go in when you are doing an
audit and count every single sale that ever took place. You
take sampling and you examine.
So if you go in and you find out that country ``X'' has not
reduced their tariff in 500 out of 1,000 cases, then you've
probably got a problem. And the implementation is really
critical. And I know the Department of Commerce has been taking
some steps to strengthen their work in the trade compliance
area here that I think this subcommittee should probably look
at. Thank you.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Solarz, so you have any comments you want
to share on that issue. I'm not forcing you to do it, but if
you had something I didn't want to prevent you from doing it.
Mr. Solarz. Well, I certainly agree with the comment made
about ultimately, for better or worse, the U.S. market, this
wonderful large market, is a point of leverage. But in making
that comment, I would not suggest at all that we need to do
anything that would in any way violate our WTO or international
commitments.
What we are saying in our testimony is, we've got laws on
the books, they can be improved, and they can be improved in
ways that are consistent with existing international trade
rules. And one of the big problems is that these rules and laws
in the United States are not always strictly enforced.
And, again, the most recent example of our concern in this
regard are these agreements on steel, these bilateral
agreements on steel with respect to Russia. Yes, the Department
of Commerce talks about significant declines, tremendous
declines from 1998 levels, in terms of these agreements.
But we would point out and so would the petitioners, both
the unions and the companies that filed the Hot Roll Case
against Russia, that Russia currently, and you see it with
these preliminary anti-dumping margins, is in no position to be
selling any of this steel in the United States market. It
cannot sell this steel at a competitive fair price consistent
with our laws and international trade rules.
Unfortunately, for foreign policy reasons, our Government
has decided that the law in this case was not good enough in
terms of application of anti-dumping law, and so they took
advantage of another aspect of the law and have announced this
agreement to at least provide them some guaranteed market for
dumped, and I will underline again ``dumped'' steel.
And that's one way, Mr. Chairman, that we can reduce the
trade deficit--and that is to prevent future occurrences of
suspension agreements in trade cases over the objection and in
this case over the strong objection of U.S. petitioners.
Mr. Tierney. Let me get back to the offsets for 1 second,
if I may, Mr. Chairman? The comment was made that we have to
take some action, that maybe we have to use the fact that we
are a big market to do that. Whenever I mention that to the
aerospace industry types they get apoplectic.
Mr. Solarz. I know.
Mr. Tierney. You can't do this, you go down the line. And
yet they talk about being in a prisoner's dilemma. That they
don't really want to do the offset business but, my God, these
companies demand it. Negotiations haven't gotten us very far,
frankly.
It's the European nations, the Netherlands, and countries
like that are probably more problematic in this area than the
Asian countries. So if we're not going to have much success at
negotiating, do we have to do something a little bit more
harsh? Do we have to move in that direction? What do we say to
these industrialists who want to keep telling us about their
prisoner's dilemma but don't really want to make any other
recommendations?
Dr. Chimerine. Well, I think obviously many of them are
concerned. I'm sure in the case of commercial aircraft, that
our major aircraft manufacturer worries that if we push this
too hard the business will go to Airbus because they don't
fight them as hard on technology transfer and other issues,
there is that risk. And this is probably why we haven't
addressed the issue.
Every time we do something like this, somebody objects
because they feel they are going to be hurt by it or lose
something by it. For example, there are steel users in this
country who are fighting strengthening the dumping laws to help
the steel industry or other measures that would help the steel
industry.
Mr. Tierney. Do we have something to counter that with, do
we have----
Dr. Chimerine. Well, you know to me it really comes down to
what's in the national interest. And over the long term, we
have to address the issue of the trade deficit. It's going off
the charts, it's going to cause serious problems. As my
colleagues mentioned, it already affects the composition of our
output. We lose high paying jobs, even when the economy is
strong, and in the long term it's probably going to weaken the
economy. To me that has to be the overriding objective.
And if somebody gets hurt in the short term as a result of
the strong measures, if it strengthens the economy in the long
run, we're all better off. But it's a very difficult political
issue, and if it was easy we'd have done it by now. I don't
have any brilliant new insights, unfortunately.
Mr. Tierney. I want to thank all of the panel members, and
thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. Thank you. One of the problems we seem to have is
that we no longer have clear U.S. interests in the various
industries or activities. U.S. interests have been plummeted by
foreign interests and have become part and parcel to the
foreign interests--whether it's Florida growers, or I remember
the days in which we had pure Florida orange juice or fruit and
vegetable operations.
Now those folks are investing overseas and they no longer
are interested in preserving U.S. interests. Steel has now
become internationalized. In just about every activity, we see
some U.S. investments, and there is no longer the clear outcry
for any action. If you take some action, you don't have the
support for sustaining or following through with it, which is
part of the problem.
I think the testimony of this panel boils down to three
areas--we need tougher trade negotiation, we need tougher
enforcement of existing laws on trade, and then enhanced
promotion and support for U.S. activities. Plus, I think we may
need to revisit some of the policies that now finance
international financial organizations that undo our position,
which is an interesting new phenomena.
Dr. Chimerine. Mr. Chairman, can I make one other point?
Mr. Mica. Yes.
Dr. Chimerine. I think there is one other issue that all of
us here would agree with, and that's tightening the WTO.
Mr. Mica. China, if you look at this chart up here the
second one you can't see, China is now No. 2 after Japan. They
are part of the problem and they are also asking for admission
into WTO. Do you want to comment?
Dr. Chimerine. Yes. My concern really is that a lot of the
trade practices that everyone here today mentioned, including
you, Mr. Chairman, and Congressman Tierney and others on the
panel, are really not under the WTO's jurisdiction. I mean,
they are good at looking at tariffs, but they've got very
limited jurisdiction over some of these other unfair trade
practices. That has to be changed.
And, second, in my opinion, there has to be a mechanism so
that if the WTO finds Europe or somebody else in violation of
WTO rules, there are strong penalties imposed by the WTO. Right
now, it's probably not working toward U.S. interests because it
doesn't address a lot of these issues, it doesn't have the
power. The Europeans are now ignoring the findings. So I think
we ought to work in that direction, in addition to everything
else.
And, last, to your point, and I know Howard mentioned this,
and I guess I did too, we need to beef up our trade monitoring
and enforcement group here in the United States. We negotiate
all these trade agreements. I can remember all the agreements
we negotiated with Japan on an industry by industry basis as
part of the framework talks.
They haven't done half or more of the things that they
promised to do. And nobody seems to monitor them, nobody seems
to do anything about it. So beefing up that aspect, which is
not expensive, would be a very good starting point, I think.
Mr. Tierney. I think the chairman covered this, thank you.
Mr. Mica. I want to thank you. This is the first of our
hearings to look at this problem. We appreciate your providing
us with testimony and look forward to working with you as we
pursue this matter, we think it's very important. This panel is
excused.
I'd like to call our last panel. We have two people
testifying, Mr. Michael J. Copps, Assistant Secretary for Trade
Development in the Department of Commerce and Mr. Johnnie E.
Frazier, Acting Inspector General of the Department of
Commerce.
We're pleased to have both of you gentlemen join us, and
hopefully respond to the topic that we have at hand that's so
important, dealing with the record trade deficit the United
States is experiencing. As I mentioned to our other panelists,
this is an investigations and oversight subcommittee of
Congress and we do swear in our witnesses.
So, if you wouldn't mind standing, please raise your right
hands?
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Mica. Thank you. We welcome both of you. Let the record
reflect both of the witnesses answered in the affirmative.
We're pleased, again, to have you join us, to have your
testimony. And we do have a policy of allowing lengthy
statements being submitted for the record.
We ask you that you try to use your open time of 5 minutes,
we give a little where there are only two witnesses on a panel,
and we will put lengthy statements in the record. Mr. Copps,
you are recognized.
STATEMENTS OF MICHAEL J. COPPS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR TRADE
DEVELOPMENT, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE; AND JOHNNIE E. FRAZIER,
ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Mr. Copps. Thank you very much for inviting me here today
to talk about the compelling necessity to encourage American
exports. It's always good to come home, and as someone who
worked on Capitol Hill for nearly 15 years I'm grateful for the
opportunity to be with you. I share your concern about the
level of the trade deficit for 1998, and the prospect that it
will go even higher this year.
My job is not so much to analyze trade deficits as to do
something about them. My job is to work day in day out with the
private sector to grow American exports in the global
marketplace. I spend my time not debating whether America
should be part of the global economy--that decision was made
irreversibly long ago--but working to ensure that America does
well rather than poorly as a participant in that global
economy.
Mr. Chairman, my prepared remarks do delve briefly into the
trade deficit problem, and I ask permission at this time to
include that statement at the conclusion of these remarks.
Mr. Mica. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Copps. But let me use these precious few minutes I have
to tell you about how we at the International Trade
Administration at the Department of Commerce are trying to get
that deficit down. Trade promotion is an effective tool to
shrink the deficit. Can it do it by itself? I think I prefer to
let the economists debate that one.
What I do know is that if we as a Nation can mobilize our
resources to take advantage of the opportunities of world
commerce, that deficit will shrink significantly. And I would
deem that a substantial contribution to the Nation's well
being. In its early days the Clinton administration developed
and began implementing a coordinated National Export Strategy
in pursuit of increased exports.
The National Export Strategy is continuously updated by the
interagency Trade Promotion Coordination Committee which was
given new life and vitality by the administration to unify
previously fragmented and duplicative Government export
programs. Secretary of Commerce, William Daley chairs this
important group.
The TPCC combines the resources of some 20 cabinet,
independent, and White House organizations to initiate creative
export promotion programs. This effort is not just desirable,
it is imperative to counter the aggressive export promotion
programs of other countries, programs targeted to put U.S.
exporters at significant disadvantage and to put U.S. workers
out of jobs.
The Department of Commerce is the lead agency in carrying
out most of the export promotion elements of the strategy with
the notable exception of the large agricultural export program.
Commerce's activities are relatively low in cost because we
rely heavily on the expertise of the ITA country and industry
experts in advising, assisting and advocating for our
exporters, but they are important and critical nevertheless.
Our export promotion strategy aims to match the
aggressiveness of our competition, and it is marked by personal
involvement at the highest level. In fact, I'm appearing before
you because my boss, Secretary of Commerce Daley is in Korea
today on one leg of a trade mission through Asia. And my
immediate superior, Under Secretary for International Trade,
David Aaron, is similarly engaged in Central America. Their
mission objective is to advocate on behalf of U.S. business.
These are just two of a number of missions either completed
or planned during this year, and designed both to promote
exports and to remove impediments to our exports. Secretary
Daley has been to 35 countries championing U.S. business in the
2 years that he has been our Secretary of Commerce.
Let me take just a moment to provide a broad overview of
the Department of Commerce's International Trade Administration
because I believe we are well organized to play the lead role
in implementing the Nation's National Export Strategy. I often
liken ITA to four legs on a table. One leg is our United States
and Foreign Commercial Service, a globe spanning operation of
1,400 employees dedicated to helping U.S. business,
particularly small or medium-size business, export.
Here at home the Commercial Service has 105 Export
Assistance Centers counseling U.S. firms on the steps needed to
enter the export market and to succeed in it. These are one-
stop shops. That is, they offer access not only to the
resources of the Department of Commerce but to those of the
Small Business Administration, the U.S. Export-Import Bank, and
a range of other U.S. Government agencies. And they work with
and are often located near State and private groups charged
with the same mission.
Overseas the Commercial Service has 140 international field
offices. The commercial officers stationed abroad advise U.S.
companies on opportunities, help them with project bidding,
arrange meetings, provide interpreters, collect valuable market
information. Last year the Export Assistance Centers helped to
bring about export sales worth nearly $2 billion.
My shop is Trade Development a second leg of the ITA table.
And it's a unique place in our Government that deals every day
with the private sector--with U.S. companies and trade
associations--to identify opportunities for the full range of
U.S. businesses. We make sure that America is putting its best
foot forward. We deploy the coordinated strength of the private
and public sectors in a world where other countries learned
that lesson long ago. Our industry expertise spans the gamut
from basic industries to high tech.
And we're also the home of the Advocacy Center. And I'm
proud of that Advocacy Center because advocacy is really a
hallmark of the administration's National Export Strategy. Your
government and mine, far more than ever before, is directly and
aggressively advocating on behalf of U.S. business. There is
not a time when the President, the Vice President, or a Cabinet
member goes out of the country to meet a foreign potentate or
trade minister, or whatever, that that Cabinet member doesn't
have in his or her briefcase a list of specific U.S. business
projects, commercial projects, that they are expected to
advocate for when they get there.
The Advocacy Center works with the Government agencies and
the private sector to get its job done. This is a startling
change in attitude, and I don't say that as a partisan
statement because I've been in this town long enough, and I've
watched enough administrations of both parties come and go,
standing blithely off on the sidelines while leaders from other
countries aggressively promoted their home products and walked
off with the contracts and walked off with the jobs too. U.S.
business suffered and U.S. jobs were lost. That doesn't happen
any more.
And over the 5 years that we've had our little Advocacy
Center down at the Department of Commerce, we can count some
420 competitions in which our efforts assisted--and business
will acknowledge our efforts assisted--their successful winning
of the contracts. Those awards translated into $60 billion of
U.S. content and support, probably somewhere on the order of
800,000 U.S. jobs. It seems to me that in this time of soaring
trade deficits, advocacy is more important than ever and we
ought to be putting more effort into advocacy.
We also have in Trade Development, where I work, the Trade
Information Center, that's the 1-800-USA trade number where
small and medium-size businesses can call to take the first
step in accessing the global economy. We've received 85,000
telephone calls last year, 90 percent of them from small
business. We had 475,000 inquiries.
Market Access and compliance is another leg of the ITA
table. And this follows up the discussion you just had with the
private sector because this is where we are trying to focus on
identifying and eliminating trade barriers, and in making sure
that we have compliance with our trade agreements. And this is
really the high priority of Secretary Daley and Under Secretary
Aaron.
Whenever we discover restrictions on our access to a
foreign market, we try to move aggressively. We have a new
Trade Compliance Center in ITA. We have put together a far
reaching data base so that there will be a place where all the
trade agreements are available for business. And if a business
has a complaint, or a trade association, or has knowledge of
where a trade agreement is not being adequately enforced, then
they work with the Trade Compliance Center.
We work to try to solve those problems. And if enforcement
becomes necessary, we coordinate with USTR. Now, this is a
relatively new effort in the past couple of years, but as I
said I know of no higher priority that the Secretary and Under
Secretary Aaron have.
The Market Access and Compliance Center also, let me just
mention for 1 minute, has a regional focus. Where our Trade
Development has a sector focus. Trade Development deals with
different business sectors. Market Access and Compliance has a
regional focus so they have specific commercial knowledge on
Russia, China, Latin America, Europe, what have you.
Then the fourth and final leg of the ITA table--and these
legs are all necessary to support ITA--is the Import
Administration. The Import Administration enforces laws and
agreements to prevent unfairly traded imports. The most
prominent recent example has been the determination that
certain countries were dumping rolled steel products and a
countervailing duty should be imposed to safeguard the U.S.
steel industry. That's a high visibility issue. Secretary Daley
was up here the day before he left on his trip testifying
before Congress as he has done many, many times before.
At the core of the National Export Strategy is a commitment
to involve particularly America's small and medium-sized
businesses in exporting. We are part of a global economy, as I
said before. We're not going to make a decision whether we're a
part of it. That decision was made for us. The decision is: do
we get in there and participate well or do we drop the ball and
participate poorly?
SMEs are the locomotive of this country in creating jobs,
in creating opportunity. And if our future is indeed in that
global marketplace, we have to make darn sure the small and
medium-sized enterprises are given the tools to go there and
compete. Some of the most dynamic exporters we have in this
country, and about 30 percent of our goods overseas are
accounted for by SMEs, are the SME exporters really pushing the
edge of the envelope in accessing foreign countries.
Let me conclude with just a quick comment, talking up
public sector and private sector partnering. I want to talk
that up because it works. I've worked in the public sector for
close to 20 years. I've worked in the private sector running a
Washington office for a major corporation and as a senior
official of a trade association. Having worked in the private
sector, I know that the private sector cannot get the job of
trade development done alone in a world where investment
climate and procurement decisions and all the rest are made by
government. Government has to be part of the equation.
Having worked in Government for a number of years, I know
that Government can't solve the problems alone. You need the
innovation, the creativity and the expertise of the private
sector. The reason I came back to Government and joined this
administration 5 years ago was to bring the public sector and
the private sector partners together in some innovative and
creative ways, get everybody around the table, leverage off one
another's strengths, so that when decisions are made overseas
about business deals and trade agreements that everybody is
there, everybody has an input, and that the strategic decisions
of the United States are informed by a good strong commercial
perspective.
I hope you can tell I feel very strongly about that because
I do. I'm a true believer that the only way this country is
going to prosper and progress in the global economy is by using
all of our resources. And I include in that the active
cooperation with Capitol Hill, the executive branch, the
States, the local governments and the private sector too.
I could go on. You've already been very generous in
according me this much time. So why don't I cease and desist at
this point, but I will look forward to having some further
discussion with you in a couple of minutes. Thank you.
Mr. Mica. Thank you. We will defer questions until after
we've heard from Mr. Frazier, the Acting Inspector General of
the Department of Commerce. He will probably be commenting on
the report released, I believe last week, on the International
Trade Administration and it's efforts to improve and be better
prepared for export challenges of the 21st century. Mr. Frazier
you are welcomed and recognized.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Copps follows:]
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Mr. Frazier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and
members of the committee, I am pleased to be here this
afternoon to discuss some of the Inspector General's work
related to the effort by the Department of Commerce, primarily
the International Trade Administration, to promote U.S.
exports.
Much of our work within ITA has concentrated on the United
States and Foreign Commercial Service, the Department's largest
and most visible export promotion unit. My testimony will also
include IG observations relevant to export promotion efforts by
other parts of Commerce. And, finally, I will briefly highlight
some of our observations on how certain trade promotion
activities are or should be coordinated among various Federal
agencies with trade promotion responsibilities.
International trade is vital to the health of our Nation's
economy as reported in the Trade Promotion Coordinating
Committee's 1997 export strategy, our exports support 11
million U.S. jobs. In 1998, the United States exported $931
billion in goods and services. However, the Nation's 1998 trade
deficit, as reported by the census Bureau, was $469 billion.
More recent figures suggest that the Nation's trade deficit
continues to climb.
Obviously, there are many economic and other factors that
have an impact on the trade deficit. While leaving that debate
to expert economists, policymakers and others, I do believe
that we in the Office of Inspector General have seen more than
enough to convince us that notwithstanding some significant and
lingering concerns, the Department of Commerce is aggressively
promoting U.S. exports.
As we conduct our reviews of ITA operations and activities,
we routinely ask questions geared to determining how ITA can
more effectively and efficiently pursue its export promotion
responsibilities. The answers we find are varied, sometimes
complex, but always insightful. For example, one long standing
concern of ours is that ITA's organizational structure, as it
has been managed, has allowed fragmented and duplicative
approaches to providing trade promotion services. Realizing the
agency's organizational problems, both the previous and current
Under Secretary have prepared reorganization proposals in
response to these problems.
The United States and Foreign Commercial Service is the
Department's principal and most visible promotional
organization, with a global network of offices strategically
located in more than 220 cities worldwide. It has long been
clear to us that both congressional and executive branch
officials recognize the need for the Department to concentrate
its efforts on helping individual U.S. exporters, primarily the
smaller ones.
This direction is clearly stated in the Trade Act of 1988.
Given the specificity of the act's objectives, it is no
surprise that much of our work is concentrated on how well
United States and Foreign Commercial Service is fulfilling its
trade promotion responsibilities.
One specific example, No. 4, and I'll point to the chart
here [indicating visual aid on tripod] gets to the substance of
what many U.S. firms need and want, actual trade leads and an
introduction to key contacts in a foreign country. The United
States and Foreign Commercial Service fulfills this requirement
in a variety of ways, most notably through its gold key
service, agent distributor services, and matchmaker program.
During our various reviews of United States and Foreign
Commercial Service offices many clients have told us that these
services are some of the most valuable export assistance
services available. Other exporters have told us how these
services can work better.
And, finally, although ITA is clearly the lead Commerce
agency in the area of trade promotion, it is not the only
Commerce agency that plays a role in the advancement of U.S.
exports. For example, Commerce's National Institute of
Standards and Technology plays a key role in ensuring that U.S.
firms have a competitive opportunity, if not an advantage, in
the global marketplace through its work on measurement and
standards issues.
NIST currently has representatives in Saudi Arabia,
Belgium, Mexico, Brazil, and India. Commerce also has the lead
for the Government's Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee.
The committee was first created in 1990. The Secretary of
Commerce was designated as the chairman of the committee, which
included senior level representatives from 18 Federal agencies,
now expanded to 20.
The committee's mission is to ensure that the Federal
Government is doing all that it can to help U.S. companies
export. The committee has made some progress toward
establishing a governmentwide strategy for export promotion
activities.
In an earlier report on the Department's trade promotion
efforts, we reported concerns about the lack of adequate
interagency coordination. Since that review, the committee has
established a secretariat to improve the coordination between
the U.S. Government agencies on Federal trade promotion
efforts.
We believe that the Coordinating Committee can be an
effective tool for better addressing coordination problems
between the foreign affairs agencies located in missions
overseas, problems that we have too often seen. This completes
my summary statement, and I'll be very glad to answer any
questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Frazier follows:]
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Mr. Mica. Thank you for your testimony. I do have several
questions. First, part of your report, and I'll just read from
some of it, states that ``many of the problems in ITA's
management of its programs and operations point to periodic
voids in leadership and general direction of the individual
units.'' Is this something that has been remedied, or is this
something you have identified and are continuing to resolve?
Mr. Frazier. I'd surely like to think that the
reorganization proposals that are currently being explored by
the Department will address this issue. This is something that
GAO raised as early as 1990. In 1991, they raised it again, I
think. And we raised it in 1993 as a problem, saying,
basically, that the way that agency is structured and has been
managed has allowed many of the units to virtually compete with
one another.
And that could be healthy on many occasions, but at the
same time, if it's not very clear as to who has the lead
responsibility in a given area, we think that the competition
can be unhealthy and counterproductive.
As we completed our most recent work, the report that you
are holding there, we interviewed most of the senior managers
in ITA, again, asking the question, ``How can we make the
organization stronger, better suited, better prepared to help
U.S. exporters?'' And one of the things that we constantly
heard was ``to make certain that it was clear as to who had the
primary responsibility in the area of trade promotion.'' In
ITA, Trade Development and the United States and Foreign
Commercial Service had the primary responsibilities along those
lines.
And my understanding is that they are moving now to make it
very clear that MAC, the Market Access and Compliance Unit will
primarily concentrate on policy issues as opposed to competing
with TD and with the United States and Foreign Commercial
Service. So, with a little luck, Mr. Chairman, the new
proposals, some of the changes that are being discussed, should
address a lot of those long-standing problems.
Mr. Copps. Could I add just a comment?
Mr. Mica. Yes, go right ahead.
Mr. Copps. I think that a lot of the challenge in making an
organization like ITA run efficiently is management rather than
simply organization. And I think for various reasons over the
past few years we have had some long management intervals
between Assistant Secretaries.
One of them was killed with Secretary Brown, as you may
remember. Others left and I say this non-partisanly, because it
takes a long time to get nominations through the White House
and through the Congress too. But I think right now we have a
management team in ITA that's the best that I've seen in the
5\1/2\ years that I've been there.
We have team players heading Market Access and Compliance,
the Foreign and Commercial Service, Trade Development, and
Import Administration, all working under Ambassador Aaron. So I
think that some of the management challenges are in the process
of being met. And with the modest organizational realignment
that is being contemplated, I'm optimistic about where we are
going.
Mr. Mica. Well, there are always two questions. One is--can
personnel make the administrative changes that are necessary to
accomplish the goal? The second is, should the structure be
changed organizationally to accomplish the goals?
From the testimony of Mr. Frazier, I believe he said, this
seems to be a recurrent problem, whether we've had Republicans
or Democrats in charge in the Department. And he cited, as I
recall from his testimony, 1990 and 1993 problems, that this
has been looked at. In his testimony and also in his summary,
he cites, ``ITA's current organizational structure as it has
been managed has encouraged fragmented and often duplicative
approaches to providing trade promotion services and support to
U.S. firms.''
So Congress also has a responsibility and an oversight
requirement to see that there is a structure in place that will
accomplish our objectives. Mr. Frazier, it does not appear that
has occurred. What is your comment and the point you are making
here?
Mr. Frazier. Let me add a couple of things here. One, we go
back to 1993 when we issued a similar report to the one that
you have, where we first surfaced this issue, reported on it.
As I indicated, GAO had previously raised the issue as did
consultants brought in by ITA.
One of the problems that we found back in 1993 was that
there were many, many political appointees throughout ITA who
came and went with such frequency as to not provide in our
judgment the kind of continuity needed. It was almost like a
revolving door on many occasions. One of the things that I'm
aware of that Secretary Daley did last year was to reduce the
number of political appointees occupying some of the positions
in ITA. And I think that has made a big difference because you
aren't going to have those kinds of voids that we were
experiencing in the early 1990's. So I'm hopeful that that will
make a difference.
The other thing is that I think that the Secretary has said
that he and Ambassador Aaron are working to come up with some
kind of a modified structure that will deal with these issues.
And, again, part of it is the commitment of the various leaders
in ITA to agree to work together. But, again, I would point to
the one caveat that we put in our statement, ``as it has been
managed.''
A lot of this has to do, as I think Mike points out, with
management. If you get the kind of leadership that is necessary
to make people do what they are supposed to do, make it very
clear what you expect of them, and hold them accountable for
those responsibilities, then I think that some of these
problems can in fact be addressed without a major
reorganization, per se.
Mr. Mica. Well, again, you talk about personnel. In your
recommendations you say that, at a minimum, we should aim to
reduce the overlapping administrative and programmatic
functions and remove organizational barriers that inhibit
internal coordination and cooperation. Now, that is one aim.
I'd like you to address a second. First, can these be done
administratively? Second, are there any legislative remedies
that should be examined?
Mr. Frazier. I think that all of them, quite candidly, can
be dealt with from a leadership management perspective. Part of
it is that you are going to annoy a few people as you take away
certain responsibilities and tasks that people have always
enjoyed doing.
It's interesting because we find that if we talk to trade
specialists in one part of ITA who are very excited about the
work that they do helping exporters, they like the idea of
working directly with exporters. But if that's not their
primary duty, somebody has to tell them ``You cannot
concentrate on it.'' You can get a lot of satisfaction from
seeing people have success.
The people in Market Access an Compliance, that's not their
primary responsibility. They have to move away from that. That
has been difficult for some people to accept. So, again, I
think that these are all issues that if properly managed, with
the proper leadership, can be handled.
Mr. Mica. Further beyond the internal operation of ITA,
your report touches upon some of the activities between various
U.S. agencies operating to promote U.S. exports. You do talk
about some instances of overlapping--failure to communicate on
projects, inefficient operations, you call it ``embarrassing
overlap.'' Do some of these uncoordinated activities that are
legislatively mandated need to have the attention of Congress
as far as reorganization?
Mr. Frazier. Mr. Chairman, in theory the Trade Promotion
Coordinating Committee can play a major role here, if they lay
out certain basic guidelines, if you will, requiring agencies
to take certain simple basic actions when they are working
overseas. You know, we spend a lot of time inspecting our
commercial operations overseas. And as part of that process, we
invariably go and meet with representatives from other foreign
affairs agencies that are overseas.
For example, the Foreign Agricultural Service, USIA, and
others. And if we go in and find out that they are working on
various projects and they have not coordinated with one
another, we think that that is such a disservice to U.S.
exporters. If we find, for example, folks who are working with
the Foreign Agricultural Service and yet not working with our
people to sell farm equipment and other things that would
support what the FAS is doing, that's a problem.
And I guess the thing that makes it all the more
significant is that when we find examples of where it's working
exceptionally well, and we see how beneficial that can be, it's
all the more reason that it's essential that this cooperation
exists overseas.
Mr. Mica. Assistant Secretary Copps, we heard in the other
panel some recommendations for some simple implementation of
minor conveniences, such as being able to make long distance
telephone calls. Can those things be addressed?
Mr. Copps. I was not here to hear what the specific
suggestion was about long distance telephone calls, so I'm not
aware of that.
Mr. Mica. Again, the inadequacy of some of the equipment. I
visited one of our--I always try to visit our embassies, our
Foreign Commercial Service operations, if I can get past the
massive security and even as a Member of Congress I always feel
like I've accomplished something. But then you see sometimes
the inadequately equipped offices. One office did not have a
telephone modem.
The witness testified that the office wasn't permitted to
make long distance calls. Seeing that they are dealing with
international trade promotion, don't you think that would be
considered a bare necessity to conduct business?
Mr. Copps. I think they would not only be desirable but
that they would be essential. And I would be happy to raise
this with Assistant Secretary Awilda Marquez. She is the
Director General of the United States and Foreign Commercial
Service. They have a large commitment, just as we all do in
ITA, to become the digital department and the modern
communications department.
We are looking right now at trying to make much more
massive use of technology such as video conferencing, and the
Internet, and e-commerce. We have to do that just to continue
on doing the job that we're doing. Our budgets for travel and
things like that are constantly tight so we have to find new
and more effective ways to reach out to do things.
Mr. Mica. Do our Foreign Commercial Service operations in
the various countries now all have websites?
Mr. Copps. I'm not aware of the fact if each office has
one, but I know that the Foreign Commercial Service has an
extensive commitment to websites, as do we all in the
Department of Commerce.
I think if you will go to the ITA Home Page and look at the
resources and the information that is there on every industry,
on every country, an market analysis for every country, that
you'd be quite impressed by what you see.
Mr. Mica. Would it be possible to check back with the
committee and provide us with information on the number of our
posts, where we have posts or a Foreign Commercial Service
officer, and if they have webpages in those countries? I think
one of the most important things in conducting business is
having basic information.
Probably the easiest way to access that information today
is through existing technology, particularly for medium and
small businesses. Usually the large businesses can hire their
own research or acquire the basic knowledge. But I would
appreciate if you would report back to us on that.
Mr. Copps. I will be delighted to do so and get the
information from the FCS and I know I can report from our shop,
in TD, that all of our offices have their own websites, their
own industry sector information, and how to's on exporting.
Mr. Mica. What about the 105 U.S. centers, do they all have
websites?
Mr. Copps. I would think so but I will check on that----
Mr. Mica. In the not too distant past, unfortunately, we
did find that there were offices that did not have websites,
and did not have sufficient computer equipment. When the
earlier witness spoke of the concern about going into an
overseas post that could not make long distance phone calls
because they had exceeded their budget, if you will, they were
running out of money and they could not return calls. We
reported on some of that probably 18 months ago. I would like
to think that a lot of that has been addressed, but it was
clearly one of the problems.
If you go to our report on the Export Assistance Center,
that's the 105 centers that you were just referring to, in that
report, and again that was 3 years ago, we were very troubled
by the fact that many of the sites did not have the information
technology capabilities, websites, and things that were
necessary. We could not believe going into an office that could
not access the Internet, for example. So it was something that
we were concerned about.
In the report that you have, one of our recommendations is
that ITA get a better handle on its information technology
issues even with the possibility of consolidating some of
those. You would go in one part of ITA and they would have
state-of-the-art equipment, then you go down the hall and there
would be something less desirable, we'll say. And the other
thing is that we were concerned that many of the systems were
not interactive. And, again, that's some of the things that can
be fixed in house.
I am pleased to report we have assurances from ITA
management that all of the recommendations in our report are
being addressed. I think there was one recommendation in there
that they disagreed with, and we are going to pursue it also.
I have further questions and I'll be submitting them to you
and also the Secretary. I'd like to yield to the gentleman from
Ohio, Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have two questions
for Mr. Copps. But welcome to both of you gentlemen. Thank you
for the work that you are doing for the country and I'm very
grateful for your participation.
Mr. Copps. Thank you.
Mr. Kucinich. The administration had repeatedly defended
NAFTA and advocated for NAFTA's expansion to the Caribbean and
Africa by citing the growth of United States exports since
NAFTA was enacted. I don't know if you were here, Mr. Copps,
when I was making my remarks. But I pointed out in my statement
that Ohio's export of an engine to Mexico occurs because the
assembly plant in Michigan was closed after NAFTA and reopened
in Mexico, causing a loss of United States jobs. This export
represents a deterioration of the U.S. economy.
Furthermore, when the truck assembled in Mexico comes back
to the United States, it adds to the trade deficit. Therefore,
the trade deficit reflects a deterioration of the U.S. economy.
If the administration had advocated the passage of NAFTA by
claiming it would increase the trade deficit, my guess is that
Congress would not have passed it. My question is this: with 5
years of experience now with NAFTA, don't you have to agree
that a growing trade deficit with Mexico is causing the
opposite reaction in the United States economy than the net
growth the administration promised?
And if the administration promises economic growth and
Congress passes NAFTA expansion to the Caribbean and Africa,
why should the Congress believe the administration based on
NAFTA's track record in causing a growing trade deficit, if you
could give a stab at that?
Mr. Copps. Well, I think we would probably have a small
element of disagreement on the overall thrust of NAFTA. I
realize when you get a devotee and an opponent of NAFTA
together, it's sometimes difficult to find common ground. But--
--
Mr. Kucinich. Well, you could stick with the facts and see
where it takes you.
Mr. Copps. All right. My conclusion is that NAFTA is
working for America. It is leveling the field of play that was
previously tilted toward Mexico. In 1993, the United States
faced some pretty significant tariff barriers and non-tariff
barriers. In 1999, most of those tariffs are gone. A lot of the
licensing requirements and other non-tariff barriers are gone
too. In 5 years our U.S. exports have gone up something on the
order of 92 percent. Even last year, up another 11 percent.
When the Asian crisis came along, I think thanks to NAFTA,
Mexico was not in a position to raise tariffs against the
United States which it might otherwise have done. You know,
I've seen reports like one from the Dallas Federal Reserve
which did a study concluding NAFTA actually reduced our trade
deficit with Mexico. I'm not an expert on that report, but I
know that there is some lively discussion that's----
Mr. Kucinich. Actually, I have that available, Mr. Copps.
Before NAFTA was implemented in 1994, the United States had a
positive balance of trade on goods and services with Mexico.
Now, according to the Department of Commerce data, this is
where we get it from, in 1992 the United States trade surplus
with Mexico was about $5.4 billion. In 1997, 3 years after
NAFTA, the United States had a trade deficit with Mexico worth
$19.5 billion.
Based on the facts that I get from the Department of
Commerce, I would take issue with the assertion that NAFTA has
been good for the United States with respect to its balance of
trade or imbalance of trade with Mexico.
Mr. Copps. Well, I understand what you are saying. And,
again, I think we would have to go back to some of the
fundamentals and what it is that caused the massive
dislocations and difficulties that Mexico had. My
interpretation is that NAFTA probably helped us weather those
and was a positive contribution. Your interpretation of that is
obviously very different.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much.
Mr. Copps. Thank you.
Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman. I was just relaying to
staff that when I came to Congress in 1993 from the private
sector, I had been involved in international trade. I visited
many of our embassies and our Foreign Commercial Service
offices around the world in that capacity, and one of the first
things I did upon taking office was to, I think, write all of
the Foreign Commercial Service offices and Ambassadors around
the world with my own little inquiry.
It wasn't quite as detailed as the IG's reports, but just
trying to assess what we were doing and where we were on
assisting trade promotion. After the State Department contained
itself from an apoplectic fit about my unilateral action, we
were able to agree on how the information could be gathered,
which we did gather. I found our efforts, as I suspected, just
from the samples that I had been involved in personally
observing, that there were some serious deficits.
Unfortunately, it does not appear that we have made a whole
lot of progress even on some simple matters. We have changed
some faces. I do, before I close however, want to become
complimentary. I rarely do this of the Clinton administration.
You might listen to this, Dennis, but I will say at the highest
levels the administration has attempted to inject itself in the
trade promotion and I commend them for that. They have done
that very well on repeated occasions. Even, I remember, in the
private sector, when we couldn't get the Republican top folks
to do the same thing, so I am very complimentary in that
regard.
However, it seems that we are still in a bit of chaos,
disorganization, and a lack of reforms at lower levels. And I
think the IG's report does detail some of that. I am not
interested in bashing the agency, but in our capacity we are
going to conduct some rigorous oversight.
We would be glad to sit down with the Department and others
and look at these reports and see what we can do to bring about
some corrective measures. So that's the intent of this first
hearing, and what we will be seeing in the coming months and 2
years.
Mr. Copps. Could I just respond to that for 1 second?
Mr. Mica. Yes.
Mr. Copps. I have over the years very much welcomed your
open-minded approach to this. You may not recall, but I recall
that we had the opportunity to have some discussions on ITA
reorganization during the great dismantlement debates of a few
years back, and I appreciated your willingness to listen and we
have very much appreciated the suggestions you made.
I'm not here to suggest that our organization is perfect or
that the implementation is perfect. And we depend on my
colleague, Mr. Frazier, and on the oversight of subcommittees
like yours, and as much as anything, on the creative input of
our partners in the private sector to critique both our
performance and our organization. But I just want you to
understand that when all these debates go on, as Teddy
Roosevelt said, ``We're in the arena.''
And we are in one heck of an international competition
right this minute and we are out there doing our job. And I
want to reflect on all of the employees of Department of
Commerce who I think, by and large, are committed to getting
the job done, are working hard, are making a contribution to
public service and are I think aware of the very high stakes
involved for the American people and the American worker and
American industry as we try to succeed in the global economy.
Mr. Mica. I thank you both for your testimony and for your
participation. As I said, we will leave the record open for at
least 10 days for any additional comments. We look forward to
working with you in a cooperative effort to see how we can all
do a better job. Thank you. There being no further business
before the subcommittee, this meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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