[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HEARING ON THE BALKANS:
WHAT ARE U.S. INTERESTS AND THE GOALS OF U.S. ENGAGEMENT?
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
AUGUST 4, 1999
__________
Serial No. 106-77
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
62-629 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
DANA ROHRABACHER, California SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PETER T. KING, New York PAT DANNER, Missouri
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South BRAD SHERMAN, California
Carolina ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MATT SALMON, Arizona STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
AMO HOUGHTON, New York JIM DAVIS, Florida
TOM CAMPBELL, California EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
KEVIN BRADY, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BARBARA LEE, California
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff
Mark Gage, Professional Staff Member
Marilyn C. Owen, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
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WITNESSES
Page
Mr. E. Anthony Wayne, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Bureau for European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State.. 8
Ambassador Larry C. Napper, Coordinator for East European
Assistance, Department of State................................ 13
Ambassador James Pardew, Principal Deputy Special Adviser to the
President and the Secretary of State for Kosovo and Dayton
Accords Implementation......................................... 14
Mr. Janusz Bugajski, Director, East European Studies, Center for
Strategic and International Studies............................ 32
Professor Janine Wedel, Associate Research Professor, George
Washington University.......................................... 34
Dr. Daniel Serwer, Director, Balkans Initiative, United States
Institute for Peace............................................ 38
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress
from New York and Chairman, Committee on International
Relations...................................................... 48
E. Anthony Wayne, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for European Affairs........................................... 52
Ambassador Larry C. Napper, Coordinator for East European
Assistance..................................................... 66
Ambassador James W. Pardew, Jr., Principal Deputy Special Adviser
to the President and Secretary of State for Kosovo and Dayton
Implementation................................................. 76
Janusz Bugajski, Director, East European Studies, Center for
Strategic and International Studies: Problems of Balkan
Reconstruction................................................. 84
Janine R. Wedel, Associate Research Professor and Research
Fellow, The George Washington University: U.S. Aid to Kosovo:
Lessons From Past Experience................................... 89
Dr. Daniel Serwer, Director, Balkans Initiative, United States
Institute of Peace............................................. 95
Additional material submitted for the record:
Responses to Questions for the Record submitted to E. Anthony
Wayne by Chairman Benjamin Gilman.............................. 98
Newsbyte released June 21, 1999, by the United State Institute of
Peace entitled: ``Moving Serbia Toward Democracy,'' submitted
by Dr. Daniel Serwer........................................... 129
HEARING ON THE BALKANS:
WHAT ARE U.S. INTERESTS AND THE GOALS OF U.S. ENGAGEMENT?
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Wednesday, August 4, 1999
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room
2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Chairman Gilman. The Committee will come to order. This
morning's hearing will help our Committee and its Members to
better understand what America's future role will be in the
Balkans.
As the United States enters its second peacekeeping mission
in the Balkans, with no end to those peacekeeping commitments
yet in sight, that question is going to have to be addressed.
Just last week, the President participated in a summit meeting
on the region to show American commitment to a regional
assistance initiative for Southeast Europe. We need to
understand what that new commitment will entail.
Let me quote an editorial about the meeting from
yesterday's Washington Post: ``Mr. Clinton came to the
conference armed with some concrete promises. The Europeans who
have promised to take the lead in Balkan reconstruction offered
no such specifics. If the Stability Pact is to have any
meaning, Europe will have to ante up and do it soon.''
Since the end of the cold war, our Nation has provided
roughly $7 billion in foreign aid and debt forgiveness to the
15 states of Eastern Europe, plus another $14 billion or more
to the 12 states of the former Soviet Union. That figure does
not include the billions of dollars in peacekeeping costs that
our Nation has incurred and will now continue to incur in the
Balkans. But when we add in these costs, we realize that we
will soon reach and rapidly surpass an expenditure of $20
billion in aid and military costs in Eastern Europe alone, plus
another $15 billion in the former Soviet Union.
The point I am making is that America has done and is doing
its share. Announcements of new American aid for the states of
Southeastern Europe are in fact now made on an almost weekly
basis. We must keep that in mind.
I expect that our official witnesses today will give us a
good estimate of what our Nation will commit to spend as a
participant in the new Southeastern Europe Regional Assistance
Initiative to which the President has pledged our support. News
reports place the cost of the entire Southeastern European
Assistance Initiative at $30 billion over a 5-year period. If
our Nation were to finance only 20 percent of that total, it
would equal $1.2 billion in U.S. aid alone for that region each
year.
I intend to join with my colleagues from New Jersey and
elsewhere, Congressman Smith in particular, in introducing a
bill that would authorize assistance specifically for the
countries of Southeastern Europe, but that would lay out two
important guidelines for our foreign aid to that region.
First, a special authorization would be provided for
funding to help the democratic opposition in Serbia. It is
apparent that without democracy in Serbia there will be no
stability in the Balkans.
Second, that measure will underline the point that the
European Union will have to take the lead in financing the
regional assistance initiative by placing a cap on the U.S.
financial participation in such an initiative. Democratization
in Serbia and the European Union's lead on aid to Southeast
Europe are both things that the President and officials of his
Administration have said they fully support. I hope such
legislation will have the President's support as well.
We have a good roster of witnesses today to help us begin
our review of our role in the Balkans. Our witnesses on behalf
of the Administration include Mr. Anthony Wayne, Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe; Ambassador
Larry Napper, State Department Coordinator for Assistance in
Eastern Europe; and Ambassador James Pardew, Principal Deputy
Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for
Kosovo and the Dayton Accords Implementation.
Our second panel will include Janusz Bugajski, Director of
East European Studies at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies; Professor Janine Wedel, Associate
Professor at George Washington University; and Dr. Dan Serwer,
Director of the Balkans Initiative, at the United States
Institute for Peace.
Before we begin with our first panel, let me ask our
Ranking Minority Member, Mr. Gejdenson, if he would care to
make any opening remarks.
Mr. Gejdenson. Thank you. I just want to say that I
generally agree with the Chairman's approach. I think that the
United States, because of the assets that we have and the
systems that were in place, played the leading role in the
conflict. We expended the most significant portion of the cost
of the war, and I do think the Europeans have to ante up, as
will others in the world.
We have, time and time again, taken the responsibility as
the world leader. We like leading the world. We are ready to
pay the price for that, but we don't want to end up being the
sole economic supporter of these recoveries. I think it is
clear that in putting together strategies in this region, we
need strategies based on regional solutions, not country by
country. Trying to do economic development in this region is
almost, I believe, impossible if we take a nation-by-nation
approach.
When you look at the populations in these countries, you
find that they are in the millions, not in the tens of
millions. Occasionally you have a country that has a population
of 10 million.
I am going to look at my notes here.
Kosovo has 2 million. What's left of Yugoslavia has about
11 million. Montenegro has just under 700,000; Bosnia, 3
million; Macedonia, 2 million; even Bulgaria, 8 million;
Romania, 22 million; Slovenia almost 2 million.
We need to have a policy that starts forcing the region to
work together economically. There is nothing that binds the
peace process like an economic relationship, and I know that in
some ways the most difficult challenges are ahead. A military
victory is a concrete and rather simple goal. To make sure that
we are not in this situation 10 or 50 years from now, we really
need to promote economic development in the region.
I commend the Chairman for holding this hearing.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that the issues we are addressing
in our hearing today are of critical importance.
Obviously, the troubles of Southeastern Europe have had a
tremendous impact on the development of U.S. foreign policy in
the 1990's, following the cold war. While we do have strong
regional interests, the Yugoslav conflict has put us face-to-
face with how seriously we take human rights and humanitarian
issues as part of our foreign policy, even when national
interests may not be otherwise so apparent. Indeed, we
hopefully have learned from the tragedy of the Balkans in the
1990's, what those involved in the Helsinki process have known
for a long time, namely that there is no true peace without
human rights and there is no long-term stability without
democratic government.
In Bosnia and in Kosovo, what we saw was genocide, and
there is no greater moral imperative than to prevent genocide
from taking place. There may also be no greater challenge. Our
challenge now in the region is to bring democracy to places
where it did not previously exist, at least in any durable
form.
In Southeastern Europe, decades of Communist rule have been
followed by an intense, direct and violent assault by extreme
nationalists on innocent civilian populations. The effects of
endless propaganda are hard to reverse. The effects of
witnessing family members being slaughtered are even harder.
However, Mr. Chairman, if we are committed in the long term
to assisting democratic forces in the region and promoting
social tolerance, we can and we will make a difference. That is
why I have been a strong supporter of efforts to support
democratic development in the region. We simply must understand
that some changes could be quick; but not all of those changes
can be quick, and we must remain committed to supporting
democracy for as long as it takes.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, the Helsinki Commission, which I
chair, has for a full decade encouraged democratic development
in each of the republics and provinces of the former
Yugoslavia. Through election monitoring, Congressional visits,
public hearings and briefings and proposed legislation, the
Commission has persistently brought close scrutiny to the
halting transition before, during and after the eruption of
violent conflict.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, early in this Congress, I
introduced both H.R. 1064, the Serbia and Montenegro Democracy
Act and H. Con. Res. 118 regarding the culpability of Slobodan
Milosevic for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
I view both bills as critical and related to each other.
The problems which led to the former Yugoslavia's violent
demise may have historical roots and the region's contemporary
leaders, as well as society as a whole, may all share some
responsibility for perpetuating these problems. However, if it
were not for the presence of Slobodan Milosevic and the
complete absence of even one ounce of goodwill in that man,
these problems certainly would have been resolved without
violence on the scale that we have seen, if at all.
I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing these two
pieces of legislation to move forward. I believe that our
witnesses are familiar with the language of these bills and I
trust that they will comment on these bills. As you know, Mr.
Chairman, tomorrow we plan to introduce a new bill, addressing
a number of issues in Southeast Europe. I support your notion
that H.R. 1064 and H. Con. Res. 118 should move forward in a
more comprehensive way, combined with other regional efforts.
I also wish to thank you for holding this hearing in which
we will hear from Administration views on efforts to promote
democracy in the region, as well as insight from the panel of
experts and I particularly want to acknowledge Janusz Bugajski
and Daniel Serwer, who are each going to be on panels. They
have testified before our Commission twice, Mr. Chairman, and
they do provide excellent insights.
Dr. Serwer, in fact, presented a paper to the Helsinki
Commission last December, which was the inspiration for H.R.
1064. The paper became famous when Serb nationalists in
Belgrade sought to present it as a covert CIA document designed
to overthrow the Yugoslav and Serbian regimes. So I want to
thank Dr. Serwer again for his very fine insights that helped
us draft that bill.
I look forward to our hearing and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Smith.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Payne.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me also
say it is very important that we have this hearing at this
time.
What are the U.S. Interests and goals of U.S. Engagement? I
think that is a very comprehensive question, and I look forward
to hearing testimony from our witnesses.
I think that we certainly won the war in Kosovo. The
question is, can we win the peace? That is going to perhaps be
much more difficult than winning the war.
Under the iron fist of Marshal Tito for 40 years, it
appeared as though ethnic tensions were nonexistent, because
the state became so overpowering there was very little
expression overtly of the difficulties and tensions that have
gone on for decades, for centuries, in that region.
With the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the passing on of
people like Marshal Tito and other tyrants who, I think, did
more damage than good; although the ethnic tensions were sort
of subliminal, there was no work done at educating and breaking
down these decades or these centuries of ethnic tension. With
the new wave of democracy--you know, democracy means a lot of
things to different people--these tensions tend to have
surfaced again. So we certainly have a lot of work to do.
I had the opportunity to visit most of those countries in
the 1960's and very early in the 1970's--Russia, Romania,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, Austria--and the
repression of the government there, as I indicated, kept these
differences from surfacing. But I think we have a challenge
ahead of us.
I think it is in our interest. I think it was the right
decision for President Clinton to take the bold step. War is
always unpopular and it takes courage to do the right thing. I
think the President did the right thing. Now we have to
complete the task.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance
of my time.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Payne.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, the jury is still out on whether or
not we did the right thing in the Balkans, and we will find out
when we examine exactly what the cost of that operation was to
the people of the United States.
I mean, after all, we have a President now who says we
can't afford tax cuts, which means giving billions of dollars
back to the American people; and we have debates as to how much
money we can spend on Social Security, how much money we can
spend on various other things that are important to the quality
of life and to the health and safety of our own people. And we
will do that within the context of having spent whatever we did
spend--and I hope to get into that with you today--as to what
the costs and ongoing costs of the Balkan operation were all
about.
We need to know what has already happened, the short-term
costs, as well as the long-term costs. We also should know
whether or not this has created some type of dependency
attitude by our European allies on the United States of
America.
The armed forces of the United States of America, should
not be looked at as a foreign legion, as a resource for
Europeans who should be shouldering more of the responsibility
for their own stability and peace. And if we have now created a
situation where our European allies don't think they have to
spend more for their own defense and they can rely on the
United States, then the costs will be much higher than what we
have ever imagined for this operation.
Oversight hearings like this will help us determine what
policies our government is following, know what those policies
actually are and what policies we should be following.
I would like to congratulate Chairman Gilman on the
leadership that he has provided during this entire crisis.
One last note: When we talk about oversight--I will make
this very short because we have Administration officials here--
this is one Member of Congress who has tried to have an
oversight over our policy in Afghanistan. For over a year I
have been requesting documents, and the Members of this
Committee understand that. I am a Member of this Committee who
has a special interest in Afghanistan.
At long last, I would like to inform the Members of our
Committee that documents that we requested about diplomatic
decisionmaking about Afghanistan were sent to us and let you
know most of them were newspaper clippings. In other words, the
State Department thumbed its nose at this Committee, thumbed
its nose at our oversight responsibility and has insulted us
after a year-long stonewalling and putting up roadblocks for us
to get the information about what our policy is concerning
Afghanistan and the Taliban.
So with that, I will thank the Chairman for calling this
oversight hearing so we can at least understand what the
Administration's policy is here, even though they are engaged
in a policy of deception in terms of a covert policy of
supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan.
I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you very much,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Hastings.
Mr. Hastings. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this
hearing.
I appreciate very much the witnesses that have assembled. I
am sure that the information they impart will be of immense
benefit to all of us.
My good friend, Dana Rohrabacher--and he is my good
friend--continues to amaze me. He and I enjoy a good debate. I
heard you say, my dear colleague, and I agree, that we should
be concerned about the short-term costs and the long-term
costs. There also is a correlative, and that is the short-term
benefits and the long-term benefits. This should not be looked
at just as a cost factor when, in fact, stability in Europe
benefits America immensely. And I can't understand how
everybody does not understand that.
Mr. Chairman, the crisis in Kosovo must lead all of us to
reexamine how we view our place not only in Europe but in the
world. As the world has changed, many of the key institutions,
particularly European institutions, the European Union,
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, NATO, and
indeed the United Nations have changed. Even though we are an
ocean away, Americans know that in today's world of fungible
borders and, Mr. Rohrabacher, the world is in interconnected
conflicts, gross violations of human rights have become
everyone's business.
Having achieved our short-term goals in Kosovo, we must now
establish a set of long-term goals for Southeastern Europe.
Indeed, what we do now will seal the fate of Europe for the
next century. Will there be stability? Will the rule of law be
followed? Will there be peace? Will the waters be clean, the
air breathable, and the rivers passable for commerce? Will
ethnic and religious tensions erode? Will it be possible to
attract investment? Our goals are simple, and I believe the
Administration and others will put forward many of the terms of
those goals: to alleviate tensions, prevent conflicts, promote
the development of stronger civil societies which follow the
rule of law and respect human rights, encourage the growth of
strong and stable economies, raise the living standard for all
Europeans and indeed by that raise our own living standards,
assist economic and environmental regeneration and establish
regional cooperation in the battle against corruption and
crime.
The people of the Balkans have known centuries of war and
fear. This simply cannot continue. We cannot allow insecurity
in Kosovo to engulf her neighbors. Montenegro, Albania,
Romania, Bulgaria, indeed Hungary and others--they are all
threatened by the civil and economic instability which has
enveloped Kosovo. If we do nothing, they may also be consumed.
By working together, we can transform the Balkans from a
historic site of conflict and instability into the fabric of a
stable and successful Europe.
America can and should be a part of that transformation.
And I agree with my colleagues who say that the Europeans
should take not only the lead but the lion's share, and I know
of no Europeans who have said anything any different. When
visiting the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, when I was with Amo Houghton in Ireland, everywhere we
went, in London, we find the Europeans say they understand that
they have that responsibility.
I applaud President Clinton for his efforts to bring about
a resolution to the crisis in the Balkans, and for his
leadership in instigating the Stability Pact for Southeastern
Europe, but the larger burden, obviously, must be carried by
Europe.
All of us abhor violence. The violence must stop, no matter
who the perpetrators are. Our resolve, America's resolve, our
commitment, America's commitment, should not be diminished at
this time. It is time for us to insist that the United Nations
move expeditiously to establish peacekeeping forces on the
ground in Kosovo and appropriate training to establish a system
of justice.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Judge Hastings.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. I think Mr. Pomeroy is next.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Pomeroy.
Mr. Pomeroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Very briefly, I think
the jury is definitely in on the Balkans conflict relative to
Kosovo. Milosevic lost. NATO won. Nothing could be more clear.
The sharp partisan tone of the debate relative to the
Kosovo conflict that unfolded during the months of the conflict
in the House of Representatives did not distinguish this body.
It is my hope that beginning right now, beginning with this
hearing, we can move into the post-conflict debate in a much
more reasoned, sensible way. There is nothing Republican or
nothing Democrat about that--instinctively or naturally arising
from the difficult questions of winning the peace in Kosovo and
the Balkans generally.
We are going to have to work together and fashion
reasonable, thoughtful policy. The American people deserve no
less, and I hope that we can move to a higher plane than the
discussions during the conflict itself. I yield back.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Pomeroy.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would
associate myself with the remarks by Mr. Pomeroy. I would just
make one observation. I would submit that the costs of
instability in the region would simply be too high, and I would
note that this government and this nation for some period of
time has, in the Middle East, supported stability in the form
of assistance to both Israel and to Egypt, and I think the cost
has been well worth it. It is my understanding, and maybe a
colleague could help me, that on an annual basis it amounts to
somewhere in excess of $6 billion.
Mr. Payne indicates yes. And I dare say that nobody on this
panel would say that the costs of stability in the Middle East
is too high, because the perils and the dangers both in the
Middle East and in the Balkans are truly unacceptable. So I
think it is important we have a perspective here. Yes, the war
was costly and the peace will be costly, and again as Judge
Hastings indicated it ought to be--the lion's share ought to be
absorbed by the Europeans, but at the same time we have a vital
interest. And I yield back.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt. We will now take
testimony from our witnesses.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Anthony Wayne had wide-ranging
experience with our Department of State. Before assuming his
current position as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for European and Canadian Affairs, he served as the
Deputy Chief of Mission to the European Union. We welcome Mr.
Wayne.
Before that, Mr. Wayne served over many years at our
National Security Council, the Office of the Ambassador at
Large for Counterterrorism and as Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State at our embassies in France, Morocco, and at
the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. During a leave of
absence, Mr. Wayne worked as a correspondent for the Christian
Science Monitor.
Mr. Wayne, you may summarize your written statement. It
shall be placed in the record. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF MR. E. ANTHONY WAYNE, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, BUREAU FOR EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
Mr. Wayne. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a
privilege to be here today, and I thank you and the Members of
the Committee for this opportunity to discuss in some detail
the basis for and the elements of our policy toward Southeast
Europe. I am very happy to have with me Ambassador James
Pardew, our Deputy Special Advisor for Bosnia and Kosovo, and
Ambassador Larry Napper, the Coordinator for East European
assistance. Each of them will discuss in some more detail,
following my remarks, what our policy is in their area of
responsibility.
But what I would like to try to do is talk a little bit
about the overarching policy and programs, the U.S. Interests
at stake, our objectives and the approaches and tools that we
are trying to use to achieve those objectives and to indeed
achieve maximization of our interests.
I thought what I might do, to open with, is give a succinct
statement of our policy, which came from a speech which
President Clinton gave in San Francisco on April 15, and I will
just quote from that, because I think this is a good clear
overview of what we are trying to do. ``Because stability in
Europe is important to our own security, we want to build a
Europe that is peaceful, undivided and free. We should try to
do for Southeastern Europe what we helped to do for Western
Europe after World War II and for Central Europe after the cold
war; to help its people build a region of multiethnic
democracies, a community that upholds common standards for
human rights, a community in which borders are open to people
and trade, where nations cooperate to make war unthinkable . .
. the best solution for Kosovo, for Serbia, for Bosnia,
Croatia, Macedonia and all the countries of Southeast Europe is
. . . greater integration into. . .Europe. . . .''
I will discuss a bit later this past week's Stability Pact
Summit meeting in Sarajevo. That summit demonstrated our
commitment and the commitment of the leaders of the region and
indeed of the broader international community to make this
integration into a reality.
There are three goals which we are pursuing in Southeastern
Europe: The stabilization of the region; its transformation
into a community of thriving democratic polities and vibrant
market economies; and the integration of the region into the
broader European transatlantic and global, political, and
economic structures.
We are pursuing these objectives in a broad range of
institutions and programs, and let me just briefly list them
because there are a number here: The Dayton implementation
process; the Kosovo peace process; the support for east
European democracy or SEED program, which Ambassador Napper
administers; the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative
known as SECI; NATO's Partnership for Peace and Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council; the Royaumont Process; the EC/World Bank
donor coordination process; the Southeast Europe Defense
Ministers group; and several others.
Finally, and most importantly for the medium and long-term
prospects in the region, we have established with our partners,
as has been mentioned, a Stability Pact for Southeast Europe.
This pact has the promise of providing a unifying framework to
achieve the broad political and economic reform and the greater
integration of the region into Europe, which so many of us
seek.
I would like to present our approach to Southeast Europe,
first by discussing the programs and approaches that are most
geographically focused, and then talking a bit about the
broader and the longer term efforts that are underway;
particularly in that sense, the Stability Pact being the
broadest of these.
First, there are the Kosovo and Bosnia elements which
Ambassador Pardew will address in more detail. Kosovo clearly
presents an immediate security, political, economic and
humanitarian challenge for all of us. KFOR's deployment has
improved the security environment dramatically, but we need to
sharpen our focus on improving internal security.
We must also establish the political mechanisms called for
in the peace agreement and make the transition from meeting
urgent humanitarian needs to laying out the basis for a self-
sustaining and productive market economy.
In Bosnia, local governmental and police institutions are
beginning to gain authority and popular legitimacy, which they
need to ensure domestic security. But the economy still has a
long way to go, and there is much that needs to be done there.
I want to stress the importance of getting the Dayton and
Kosovo process right. These are intensive tests of the
international community's willingness to see peace take hold.
Second, a word about Serbia. It is clear that Serbia
continues to pose a serious challenge to regional stability,
including the democratic government in Montenegro. The loss of
Kosovo to KFOR and the U.N. Civil Administration has left
President Milosevic weakened and discredited domestically.
Milosevic is an international pariah and an indicted war
criminal. As long as he and his regime remain in power in
Belgrade, Serbia and the FRY cannot take their place among the
community of democratic nations, a message that was made very
clear at the summit in Sarajevo last week.
President Clinton has clearly stated our policy. As long as
the Milosevic regime is in place, the United States will
consider providing humanitarian assistance through
international organizations but not reconstruction assistance
to Serbia.
Helping to rebuild Serbia's roads and bridges would funnel
money directly into the pockets of Milosevic and his friends,
prolong the current regime, and deny Serbia the hope of a
brighter future. We are working very closely with our friends
and allies in Europe to coordinate our activities on Serbia and
to forestall any weakening of the existing sanctions regime
against the FRY.
A key aspect of our policy on Serbia is indeed support for
democratic change. We want to support those forces in Serbian
society working to this end. We want to nurture the struggle
for democracy, but at the same time I do not want to
overemphasize our ability to effect change within Serbia.
Milosevic maintains a firm grip on the main levers of power and
the Serbian opposition remains far from united. But regardless,
our support for democratic forces is an investment in Serbia's
future. We look forward to working together with Congress to
bring democracy to Serbia and restore real stability in the
region.
Albania, too, in the region, is a potential source of
regional instability, as was demonstrated by its near collapse
in March 1998. Although we have been obliged to reduce our
presence in Albania for security reasons, we are continuing to
work to address the security concerns and support political
stabilization, economic reform and development in that country.
We are now increasing our presence and our programmatic
support. We are particularly encouraged by the responsible and
restrained approach taken by the Albanian authorities during
the Kosovo conflict and the reception accorded to the hundreds
of thousands of Kosovar refugees. Albania was instrumental to
our success in Kosovo. We feel strongly that its role should
not be forgotten. We are restarting several of our bilateral
assistance programs, largely focusing on combatting corruption
and restoring public order.
We participate actively in the Friends of Albania
Organization, with many of our European allies and partners.
Through that organization, we have established benchmarks for
progress in Albania. We support the actions recently taken by
the prime minister of Albania and the government to establish
an effective rule of law. Progress has been slow, and, due to
the nature of Albania's problems, we are going to have to show
patience and persistence in order to bring about the long-term
change that is desired.
Third, for several years we have sought to address the
problems of Southeast Europe in a broader context. Looking at
the region as a whole, and increasingly since early this year,
we have focused on a post-conflict strategy for renewal of the
entire region. This strategy has many different elements, but
the focus most broadly, of course, is on the three key project
areas: Security, economic development, democracy and human
rights.
First, on the security side, we are working bilaterally
with many of the countries in the region, but we are also
concentrating our work through the NATO framework. At the April
summit here in Washington, the Alliance established a special
consultive forum for the members of the alliance plus the seven
countries of the region on security that has begun to review
regional proposals on crisis management, military-to-military
cooperation, infrastructure ideas, and promotion of a
democratic media. We have also agreed that the summit could
develop mechanisms to better coordinate the security assistance
to the region from the various allies. And we are working with
the allies to implement this and other decisions on a rapid
basis.
The EAPC, that is, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council,
which functions within the NATO structure, also created a
working group on regional cooperation for Southeast Europe,
which is going to look at defense planning, crisis management,
and regional air space management.
We are also supporting the efforts in the region, and
particularly of note here is the Southeast Europe defense
ministerial process that is really something built from the
region up, bringing defense ministers together to look at
regional cooperation, efforts that they can take together to
promote peace, security and military reform.
To encourage democratization, we have worked for many years
now on a variety of programs, including the SEED program, and
with a variety of groups and institutions, including the
National Endowment for Democracy, to promote democracy. That
also has included cooperation with the OSCE and with the
European Union. Economic reform and development, of course,
have also been a long, standard priority of what we have been
trying to do, with the SEED program providing funding to
support policy and administrative reform as well as
infrastructure development.
An important aspect of our post-World War II reconstruction
efforts in Europe was our encouragement of regional
cooperation. The states of Southeast Europe, with U.S. support,
have built this regional cooperation in a number of different
fora. I would like to highlight one, the Southeast European
Cooperative Initiative, where we worked with states in the
region really to have the first overarching coordinated
regional approach to many of the economic troubles which plague
the region. Eleven states have come together with the U.S. and
other partners to pursue cooperative efforts, looking, for
example, at cross-border crime and corruption. The FRY is not a
member of this but Montenegro has attended on a regular basis
now the SECI meetings as an observer. SECI participants have
committed to join in measures to encourage trade and commerce
and to make the region more attractive to private investors.
The first two agreements, which they recently signed, have to
do with harmonizing road transport and providing a sharing of
information to combat cross-border crime.
Mr. Smith.--[Presiding.] Mr. Wayne, sorry to interrupt. We
have about five minutesremaining before we have to report to
the floor.
Mr. Wayne. OK.
Mr. Smith. I apologize to our other witnesses as well.
There are two votes and then the Chairman and many others will
return to hear the conclusion of your testimony. So I do
apologize.
The Committee stands in recess until the votes are over.
[Recess.]
Mr. Houghton.--[Presiding.] All right. Gentlemen, thanks
for your patience. We would like to reopen the hearing.
And maybe you would like to finish up your statement, Mr.
Wayne.
Mr. Wayne. Yes. Let me quickly finish up the basic point I
wanted to make about the SECI organization that this is largely
a self-help program and has not cost the U.S. taxpayer more
than very modest amounts, but is producing very concrete
results.
Let me just say a little bit about the Stability Pact and
the summit which took place in Sarajevo last Friday. The Pact
itself is a mechanism or, if you will, a process to bring
together all of the many ideas, the many organizations, the
many actors, at work to help integrate Southeast Europe into
the transatlantic and European mainstreams. And so, what we are
really talking about here is a forum to facilitate that can
provide political coordination and a degree of comparative
analysis for these ideas.
We hope it is a process that can make more efficient, more
effective, and more coherent all of the international and
regional efforts that are going underway. The Pact is not a
funding or an implementing agency; indeed it is a fairly lean
international structure. So any proposals that are developed in
the Pact would actually have to be carried out and implemented
by other agencies. We foresee no large bureaucracy being
developed in this context.
The Pact proposals in the economic field requiring funding
would go to the EC/World Bank chaired process, donors process,
where they would be analyzed and assessed there, and we, of
course, are a member of the high-level steering group guiding
that process.
Last week in Sarajevo, if I might go on, President Clinton
and other leaders offered their comments on the future of
Southeast Europe. The President took the opportunity to put
forward several initiatives which we can talk about in more
detail; these included $10 million to aid the efforts for
democracy in Serbia.
They included a proposed investment compact to spur
investment in the region, a number of ideas associated with
that, and the trade expansion initiative. Now on all of these,
of course, as the President made clear, we look very much
forward to working with Congress as we develop these ideas and
as they go forward.
But Sarajevo itself wasn't just about what people were
offering or putting on the table. What was very significant was
the clear commitment of everybody there to work together as
partners to make this long-term process of integration a
success. The clear message from leaders of the region that they
knew they shared responsibility to work among themselves to
undertake reform; the clear message from those outside the
region that they had to respond concretely to those steps by
the regional leaders. This was very important.
In sum, I might just say that few of us could have foreseen
or would have foreseen the depth of our engagement in Southeast
Europe today. But I think few would deny that to engage in the
region, to bring the states of Southeast Europe into the Euro-
Atlantic community of prosperous, secure, and democratic
nations is a task and, indeed, an opportunity that must not
find us wanting.
Thank you.
Mr. Houghton. Thanks very much, Mr. Wayne.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wayne appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Houghton. The next witness is Ambassador Larry Napper,
who serves as Coordinator of Assistance to East Europe after a
long career with the State Department. After service with the
United States Army, Ambassador Napper joined the Foreign
Service and rose to a number of important positions in our
diplomatic core including key positions at the Embassy in
Moscow, Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in Romania and
Director of Department's Office of Soviet Affairs and
Ambassador to Latvia.
So, Ambassador Napper, we are delighted to have you here.
Would you please proceed.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR LARRY C. NAPPER, COORDINATOR FOR EAST
EUROPEAN ASSISTANCE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Napper. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Given Mr. Wayne's detailed statement and our desire to get
to your questions, I just want to make three points really
about the SEED program and the role that it plays in our
overall strategy in Southeastern Europe.
First of all, SEED works; it is a demonstrated performer.
If you look at the program over the past 10 years, we have
graduated eight countries from the SEED assistance program.
That means eight countries that were, at one point, recipients
of our bilateral assistance have now progressed to the point
where they no longer need direct U.S. bilateral assistance.
In fact, SEED graduates are members of NATO and partners of
NATO and aspiring companies for the European Union, so this is
a program with a demonstrated track record. Elsewhere in the
region, in Central and Northern Europe and, if we continue and
if we persevere, in Southeastern Europe, we can achieve the
same results because we can show a demonstrated track record.
The second point I would make is that SEED is flexible. It
allows us to do activities across a range from technical
assistance to support for peace implementation in Bosnia and
Kosovo, to the promotion of regional projects. Mr. Gejdenson's
point about supporting development of the Southeastern Europe
as a region--we can do that through SEED, and we are doing it.
And finally, with small amounts of SEED assistance to these
countries, we can help them create a climate to promote trade
and investment, because the private sector is really the engine
that is going to transform Southeastern Europe. So SEED works;
it is flexible.
My third point is, it is a bargain. Our SEED assistance
program this year for all of Central and Eastern Europe began
at $430 million, 370 of which was dedicated to Southeastern
Europe. With the budget supplemental that the Congress passed
and the President signed in May, we now have a total of $490
million in SEED assistance going to Southeast European
countries.
Mr. Chairman, that is 3 percent of the 150 Account, the
total 150 Account. So it is a minuscule part really of what we
are doing overall in foreign affairs; and if you compare that
to the overall Federal budget at large, you can see what we are
doing here is a program that is modest in size, cost effective,
and I say again it works.
So with that, Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude and be
glad to take your questions. Thank you.
Chairman Gilman.--[Presiding.] We regret the interruption
for voting.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Napper appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. Our next official witness, Ambassador
James Pardew, was appointed to his current position in March of
this year after being appointed to the rank of Ambassador in
1997. Ambassador Pardew has a long record of service with our
military from which he has a number of decorations. Among other
positions, Ambassador Pardew served with the staff of the Joint
Chiefs in the Army General Staff and completed a number of
foreign tours of service. Entering into the risky field of
foreign policy, after that military career, the Ambassador
served as Representative of the Secretary of Defense at the
1995 negotiations on the Dayton Accords for Bosnia and then as
Director of the ``Military Train and Equip Program'' in Bosnia
from 1996 to 1999.
Mr. Ambassador, we welcome you. You may summarize your
written statement and put the full statement into the record as
you may deem appropriate. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JAMES PARDEW, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY SPECIAL
ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR KOSOVO
AND DAYTON ACCORDS IMPLEMENTATION
Mr. Pardew. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will submit a
statement for the record. And I will just highlight its points,
keying on some points that the Members made in their opening
statements.
First of all, throughout this century the stability of
Europe has been of vital interest to the United States; and
ethnic conflict in Southeastern Europe clearly is a direct
threat to European stability and, therefore, is a threat to the
U.S. National interests.
That is why we have invested so much time, energy, and
resources in former Yugoslavia over the past 10 years. That is
why American troops have been in Macedonia since 1993, in
Bosnia as part of a NATO-led force since 1995, and now in
Kosovo as part of the NATO-led force implementing the agreement
that followed the successful air campaign.
These military deployments are not a permanent solution,
however. Long-term regional stability requires active and
robust political and economic development. I will talk about
primarily Kosovo and Serbia and skip over the Bosnian peace.
But in Kosovo, we have to rebuild civil society from the ruins
of the savage campaign which Milosevic waged against the
population.
Our immediate steps to create an autonomous democratic
society were successful in the successful air campaign and the
return of over 700,000 of the 800,000 refugees expelled from
Kosovo. Currently, more than 37,000 troops from 21 nations are
deployed there, including 5,500-5,600 U.S. forces. K-4 is
rapidly establishing a secure environment.
Separately, the U.N. Administration for Kosovo, UNMIK, is
making steady progress in deploying civil administrators,
civilian police and judicial authorities to the field under
extremely difficult circumstances. UNMIK has a very powerful
mandate sufficient to create the foundations of a democratic
society.
And while it is deploying, it still has a very long way to
go. We are doing everything that we can to urge contributing
companies and the U.N. to deploy as soon as possible.
I want to highlight last Wednesday's immediate needs
conference in Brussels, which focused on humanitarian
requirements and where donors pledged to provide nearly $2.1
billion in humanitarian assistance. The United States pledged
$556 million in assistance for urgent humanitarian needs,
subject to clear assessment of the need and a confirmation that
other donors will do their part.
This money comes from the budget supplemental passed by the
Congress and signed by the President on May 21st of this year.
None of this funding will go for reconstruction in Kosovo or
long-term development in Southeastern Europe. The follow-on
donors conference in the fall will concentrate on assistance
for reconstruction for which the Europeans will bear the bulk
of the burden.
An urgent item on UNMIK's agenda is the creation of a
civilian police force. The U.N. plans to deploy 3,100
international police; they will be armed and have arrest
authority. This is a new development for the U.N. We intend to
provide 450 of these police. This is an interim step until we
can train 3,000 indigenous police, and the U.S. is playing a
leading role in that effort in training local police as well.
Further down the road, democratization will require active
and pluralistic political life. Our goal is to hold elections
in Kosovo as soon as feasible. I will skip over the Bosnian
peace only to say that we have obviously had significant
success there, but we still have a way to go on such things as
refugee returns, economic restructuring, and the strength of
state institutions.
Finally, let me speak a moment about democratization in
Serbia, because long-term stability in the region requires
Serbian leadership committed to democracy and the rule of law.
President Clinton has made clear that there will be no
reconstruction assistance to Serbia as long as the Milosevic
regime is in place.
Over the past several weeks, Serbia citizens have shown
their disgust for Milosevic and their hunger for democratic
change through spontaneous demonstrations in the streets and
cities throughout the country. These are positive developments,
and we should nurture them. At the same time, I don't want to
raise expectations that the Milosevic regime will fall easily
or soon.
Over the past two years, the U.S. Government has--and NGO's
like NDR, IRI and NED have spent $16.5 million on
democratization projects. In Sarajevo last Friday, the
President announced he will work with the Congress to provide
10 million this year and more over the next 2 years to
strengthen independent media, NGO's, independent trade unions,
democratic opposition. And we look forward to working with this
Committee, Mr. Chairman, in that regard.
Our democratization programs focus in three areas: first is
assistance to opposition parties; second, in promoting
independent media and the free flow of information; and third,
we give special importance to support for Montenegro. President
Djukanovic and the multiethnic democratic government in
Montenegro have demonstrated courage and determination, and we
want to support them as a model for change in the FOY.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes the summary of my points. I
will be open to any questions you may have.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pardew appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. We will proceed with questions for the
entire panel.
Our nation has appropriated about $400 million annually in
recent years for our SEED Act assistance program, the major
U.S. aid program for Eastern Europe, and, combined with other
forms of aid, U.S. assistance in the entire region has probably
exceeded $500 million per year.
Can our panelists tell us what the Administration will now
be seeking for aid to Southeast Europe in fiscal year 2000 and
what the Administration will commit to provide annually in such
aid to Southeast Europe under a regional assistance initiative?
And will that amount be larger than the current aid provided
annually in Eastern Europe and, if so, by how much? I would
welcome any of our panelists' response.
Chairman Gilman. Ambassador Napper.
Mr. Napper. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I have got it turned on now.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The President's current budget
requests for the SEED assistance program for 2000 is $393
million. In the context of consideration of that on the Hill,
the director of OMB has said that there will be a budget
amendment submitted by the Administration, and we believe that,
in fact, a budget amendment will be required.
Now, I am not in a position today to say exactly what the
level is that we will be recommending. That is still being
developed within the Administration, and we want to work with
you up here on the Hill, this Committee and others, to come to
an appropriate level for seed assistance in 2000.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you. James Wolfensohn, the President
of the World Bank, has stated his fears that aid to the Balkans
may siphon off aid needed to respond to the humanitarian crises
in Africa and Asia, and he specifically cited the hundreds of
thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons who were
forced from their homes by the conflict over the region of
Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan earlier in the decade and who
have been living in abysmal conditions ever since. How do we
respond to that concern?
I welcome a response by any of the panelists.
Mr. Napper. Well, certainly, Mr. Chairman, we recognize
that there are requirements everywhere in the world which do
require our attention. One fact, though, that I mentioned, if
you look at the size of the SEED assistance program, in the
context of the entire 150 Account, the entire foreign affairs
account, which is about 3 percent of the 150 Account, I would
not say that historically our SEED assistance program has been
particularly large--has loomed particularly large in our
overall assistance programs worldwide.
I would anticipate what we are talking about, I would
describe, is fairly modest increases in order to deal with the
situation that we found there and to try to bring stability to
an area which has after all cost us a number of millions of
dollars in terms of fighting military campaigns and conflicts.
We would like to avoid that by a reasonable and modest
investment of assistance funds.
Chairman Gilman. Would any of our other panelists want to
join in answering?
Mr. Wayne.
Mr. Wayne. Just to add that, as you well know, Mr.
Chairman, historically this region has been the source of much
conflict during this past century, and now there is indeed a
strong consensus, as evidenced by the Stability Pact Summit, of
the need for a long-term effort to really integrate this region
so that will not be the case in the future. And certainly we
believe that is worth the investment of time and effort to do
so.
Just to note, Mr. Wolfensohn was present at the summit and
that the World Bank is intimately involved in the thinking and
planning that is going to go on for both Kosovo reconstruction
and the broader reconstruction in the region. Indeed, the World
Bank is one of the co-chairs of the donor coordination process.
We have counted heavily already on their expertise and their
guidance in developing the thoughts that we have so far, and as
we look at the needs for the region, they will be a key player
in pulling that needs-assessment together.
Chairman Gilman. Ambassador Pardew?
Mr. Pardew. I have nothing to add, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Let me move on to another issue. In June,
a spokesman for Carlos Westendorf, the head of the
international effort in Bosnia, stated that corruption there
involves hundreds of millions of dollars annually. Westendorf's
deputy, Jacques Klein, had stated earlier that corruption in
Bosnia was the largest single obstacle to that country's ever
becoming independent of aid programs.
Can you tell us what is being done to halt such corruption,
what plans been made to eliminate that kind of corruption in
Kosovo, and what planning will be undertaken to eliminate such
corruption throughout Southeastern Europe as the new regional
assistance initiative takes hold?
Mr. Pardew. Mr. Chairman, let me speak of Bosnia.
Chairman Gilman. Ambassador Pardew.
Mr. Pardew. We are very much concerned about the issue of
corruption in Bosnia and the potential, for that matter, of
corruption in Kosovo. As I have said in my written statement to
the Committee, we are not yet happy with the level of economic
reform in Bosnia. We have put forth to the government, both the
entities and the state government, proposals which would reduce
the potential dramatically for corruption in that area. We are
also working with the police and the international institutions
to tackle this problem. But this is a long-term problem, and it
requires structural reform in Bosnia.
In Kosovo, we are working with the United Nations, the
World Bank, and others to provide the immediate technical
assistance to create the proper institutions that would reduce
the potential for corruption there.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Pomeroy.
Mr. Pomeroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And first of all, I
want to commend you for holding this very important hearing,
clearly the complexities of what we are addressing require this
Committee to learn everything we can and monitor the situation
closely for the foreseeable future.
My first question would be to Ambassador Napper and would
involve your expertise with the former Soviet Union. What are
the ongoing ramifications of the Kosovo conflict for our
relationship with Russia?
Mr. Napper. Well, Mr. Pomeroy, I am not working on Russia
right now, but let me just answer your question the best way I
can. Certainly, the issues surrounding this conflict have been
at the center of much of our dialogue with Russia over the past
few weeks and months. We have not always agreed at every point
during the conflict about what should be done at the time. But
I think at the end of the day, we have been able to cooperate
with the Russians at very important points in the conflict.
Mr. Pomeroy. Do you have a sense in terms of the lingering
ramifications, whether the nationalists are still very much
fueled by our involvement in the conflict? It seems to me that
it is dying down very quickly.
Mr. Napper. I think there is always a range of political
opinions and viewpoints in Russia, that has always been my
experience; and I don't think things have changed since then.
Russia is now a democratic country and there are a lot of
voices that get expressed. But, I think what is important for
us is the policy that is followed by Russia. And at the end of
the day, after a lot of back and forth and pulling and hauling,
in fact, the Russians at key points have been helpful in trying
to find a way to resolve the military aspect of the conflict
and to bring the peace on the ground.
And maybe Ambassador Pardew would like to add to that.
Mr. Pomeroy. I think that answers my question adequately. I
have a question though for Ambassador Pardew. It relates to the
suggestion, and it is an important point, does this make Europe
more dependent upon United States military intervention or does
it indeed humble them and make them rededicated to developing a
more effective European defense force to develop--to deal with
European security matters? It seems to me that the comments--in
particular, Prime Minister Tony Blair, would support the latter
conclusion that, if anything, the aftermath in Europe in terms
of this conflict is that they have got to do a better job of
developing a coordinated military capability and execution.
Mr. Pardew. I think there are two elements to your
question, sir.
First is a technical military one, and you really need to
ask the Pentagon, because I think there is a difference in
basic capabilities that this war may have been between the
forces, and I am really not the right person to address that.
But I think the United States and our European partners
have reached a conclusion through this entire process, this
decade of the breakdown of the former Yugoslavia, that the
United States cannot go too far away from European
responsibilities and the Europeans realize that they need our
help.
So I think we have developed an effective partnership that
was borne out in this particular conflict in which we worked
very, very closely from the beginning with our European
partners on how we could reach an effective political solution.
Unfortunately, it required the use of military force. But,
again, this was the culmination of 19 different countries
focused on the single objective, which is really a remarkable
achievement.
Mr. Pomeroy. It was a remarkable achievement. Mr. Wayne, do
you have a comment?
Mr. Wayne. Just to add that I think you are correct in your
observations about the remarks that Prime Minister Blair has
made, that clearly he and I think several others in Europe (of
course, we don't know how many yet) have drawn the conclusion
that there has to be a focus on developing defense capability
in Europe. And that is one of the lessons that came out of
Kosovo: the unity of purpose and the importance of the alliance
was one lesson; another one was that there does need to be work
on developing the defense capability in Europe. And he
certainly has been vigorously pursuing that.
Mr. Pomeroy. I hope he is reflective of the alliance. My
time is up, but I have got another question.
Chairman Gilman. Go ahead.
Mr. Pomeroy. Thank you. It relates to housing stock. I
represent North Dakota; we know about winter. And it looked to
me, especially at the onset of the conflict, that they have a
pretty severe winter there. How are we coming in terms of
dealing with people who have lost their housing being able to
survive a winter, for the hundreds of thousands of impacted
families?
Mr. Pardew. Well, first of all, this is a very resourceful
population, and this whole situation has placed UNHCR under
tremendous stress. If you look at what has happened here, first
of all, you had the dislocation of 250,000 people inside of
Kosovo and spilling over into the borders. Then almost a
million people migrated out of the country, and now a million
people have migrated back into the country, so the task for
UNHCR has been enormous. And while there have been fits and
starts, I think we have got to conclude that they have been
able to deal with that great tragedy.
It is our understanding now, and we have something like 90
NGO's in Kosovo at this point in time, that basic humanitarian
requirements are being met: medical, food, and shelter. UNHCR
recognizes that they have a limited amount of time, as we do,
to get people ready for the winter. But between the population
and the self-help program and people sharing their own homes,
buildings that have not been destroyed, and materials that are
being provided by the international community, we believe right
now that basic shelter needs will be met and that we will be
able to deal with it.
Mr. Pomeroy. Mr. Ambassador, that is music to my ears.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Pomeroy.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador, thank you very much for your testimony. I
wanted to call to your attention legislation I introduced on
July 30, the Kosovo Burden Sharing Resolution, which was
cosponsored by Mr. Lantos and other original cosponsors, Mr.
Cox, Mr. Ewing, Mr. Green of Wisconsin, and Mr. Toomey. I had
some encouragement from Republican House leadership in
preparing this legislation. I held it several weeks, almost a
month, while we tried to get more information about the cost of
the air war.
It still is sketchy, but we provided most of the aircraft.
We flew most of the sorties; we provided most of the munitions,
by far the majority: logistical planes, about 79 percent. What
this resolution does is say that the U.S. should not pay more
than 18 percent of the aggregate costs associated with
military, air operations, reconstruction of Kosovo, and in
other parts of the Southern Balkans. That 18 percent figure
came from the President in his personal remarks to the Speaker,
but he did not clarify what 18 percent was going to cover.
I took the hard-line approach at a beginning of the
negotiations and covered air war and so on; and in reality, I
think what we spent on air war will be more than 18 percent of
totals, but we can begin the negotiations at that point. It is
my intention not to let the Administration permit European and
other allies pay less than the majority costs for
reconstruction in that area. And by majority, I am talking
about a supermajority. It is important we don't begin to spread
money around in that region.
So this will be my effort to make a statement--get other
people to support it, and then police the appropriation process
hereafter, because Europeans have no history of the United
States really coming down and asking them to follow through on
promises and to pick up the majority of the costs.
The second thing that it does in the way of guidance in the
sense of the Congress element is to suggest that Macedonia and
Albania deserve high priority for the costs--humanitarian,
economic costs that they bore during this period of time in
preparation for the air war, during the air war, and subsequent
to the air war. I wanted to call that to your attention,
gentlemen, and we will see how we progress at this point. But
we are watching very carefully to make sure that the President
doesn't continue to announce large expenditures without
consulting Congress.
I do have a question. I hope you can be candid, Ambassador
Napper, in particular, with me on this. Is it true that you are
having difficulty in the Administration getting approval of
appropriations for Macedonia? What is the situation in that
respect? Is there one Senator, or one Senate staffer, who is
holding up the progress in getting money for Macedonia? If so,
what are the cited reasons that you hear? Why are they holding
up money for Macedonia when they have borne all of those costs
and when they are potentially destabilizable as a result of the
Balkans war, a very fragile democracy in its early stages in
the first place.
Mr. Napper. Mr. Bereuter, thank you very much for your
question. I agree with you, we certainly do--in the
Administration--Macedonia and Albania deserve priority
attention and, in fact, they have received that. In our SEED
assistance program, for instance, the original allocation for
Macedonia in 1996 was $16 million. That has more than doubled
to $32.5 as a result of the supplemental appropriation and
other increments that we have been able to bring to the
account.
In addition, out of the roughly 100 million in ESF
(Economic Support Funds) that was appropriated for budget
support and balanced payments support, 28, 29 million--22
million of that 100 million went to Macedonia, and then another
six that we found in an existing account. So, as you can see,
we tried to do everything we can possibly do to assist
Macedonia and Albania in these circumstances.
We have had dialogue with a number of Members and staff
concerning Macedonia. There is at present no impediment to
providing the assistance to Macedonia. Whatever questions did
exist, and there were some at one point, have been answered so
that the assistance is able to flow. There were some questions,
frankly, about how the Macedonians and the Macedonia security
forces handled the influx of the Kosovar Albanian refugees when
they first came into Macedonia.
There were some reported instances in which the security
forces were not perhaps as welcoming as might have been hoped,
but we did work with the Macedonian authorities, we believe we
saw a significant improvement. And as I say, we have been able
to resolve virtually all of the questions that involve
technical assistance and balanced payment assistance.
There is one remaining outstanding question concerning
foreign military assistance, but by and large all of the
assistance to Macedonia is flowing.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Questions have been
posed relative to burden sharing, and the disproportionate
share in terms of the military action that was undertaken.
Clearly there is a growing consensus, within this Committee and
in Congress and within the Administration, that the Europeans,
our NATO allies, should step up in terms of economic assistance
and development at this point. But in the course of the
exchange, I think it was you, Mr. Wayne, who talked about Prime
Minister Blair in a recognition that they have to increase
their burden when it comes to the security, security capacity.
But if we are successful, if the United States, our NATO
allies are successful in nurturing true democracy in this
region, one can't always foresee the future, but I would
suggest that a viable dynamic democracy within the region would
really, to a substantial degree, obviously obviate the need of
the concern about these security issues.
Any comment? Again, that is why I would say that a priority
at this point has to be examining this question in a regional
context and making the kind of investment, whether it be
substantial or not, that will save us in the long run.
Mr. Wayne. Congressman, if I might take a crack at least at
a initial response.
We agree fully with you that we need to take a regional
view of this situation. That means, of course, sometimes we
will act in individual countries, because they have their
individual needs. We also agree fully, as you indicated, that
the lion's share of the reconstruction and development costs
should be provided by the Europeans. And with every European
that I have talked to, they agree with that and indeed say that
it is their intention, to do so, and that is what they will do.
Ambassador Napper can give some specific figures in the
technical assistance area, to show that in talking about
reconstruction and development, they, indeed, even before the
conflict, were providing the lion's share. And they know now
that they need to provide more.
The European Union is revising its different types of
contractual relations to have more trade access available for
the countries of the region, particularly for Macedonia,
Albania, and Bosnia, where there were different kinds of trade
and commericial regimes. They are looking at all of their
relations to indeed provide more assistance, to have more trade
access, to encourage investment, and this is very important.
Indeed, what you said about democracy, supporting
democracy, it is vital. We need to do that. Democracy has taken
good root in a number of the countries of the region. There are
other places clearly where it needs help, and there is Serbia,
which is a large hole. We need to work on all of those. And
indeed, we can't separate the work on democracy from the work
on the economy, from the work on security. We have to pursue
all three of those baskets, if I could put it that way,
together.
Mr. Delahunt. If I may, Mr. Chairman, my time is almost up,
just an observation. In any society or in region, there are
symbols, I do concur, and really support the Administration's
position vis-a-vis aid to Serbia, as long as Milosevic is still
in power, because I think he has become such a symbol. I think
some of us overestimated his ability to survive. Early on, it
was stated that he would never withdraw without the
intervention of U.S. ground troops; yet he did, and his efforts
to divide the alliance obviously failed.
I think it is fascinating to see the demonstrations break
out in such short order after the conclusion of the conflict.
But I was heartened today to read that an indicted war
criminal, a Bosnian Serb general, was arrested. It is important
to maintain that course, because I think people in the region
are looking toward that end. I think it carries such symbolism
in terms of why we were there in the first place, in terms of
the moral imperative of saving lives and in being there for the
right reasons in terms of defending human rights everywhere.
Mr. Wayne. We agree.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Gentlemen, when I was a young reporter, I
used to ask two questions, and actually I just asked these two
questions over and over and over again of whoever I was
interviewing. People used to think that I knew a lot more than
I knew, because everyone always seemed to be stymied a bit by
these two questions. I think I will just ask you fellows the
same questions, and I am sorry if you may have already answered
them while we were gone for the vote.
The two questions I always asked were, how much is it going
to cost and who is going to pay for it? So maybe you can tell
us specifically how much the Balkan operation has cost us so
far? How much will it cost by the time we have reached a
conclusion? And just who is going to pay for it? Do we have any
specifics for that? I mean, you are here to give us a little
insight on these things.
Mr. Napper. I would like to try to address the nonmilitary
costs. I know you probably are very interested in the military
side of it. But that is something that we----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Does the State Department have any overall
figure for us?
Mr. Napper. If you look at the supplemental appropriation
that Congress passed and the President signed for the Kosovo
Conflict, that gives you a pretty good thumbnail sketch of what
we are intending on doing, and that is roughly just about a
little bit more than a billion dollars in terms of nonmilitary
costs for the Kosovo conflict, which includes a 120 million in
SEED funds, 105 million in economic support funds for a
balanced payments assistance to the front line states and
investigation of war crimes, and the vast bulk--the remainder
of that 1.3 million--is fundamentally humanitarian.
Mr. Rohrabacher. The trouble about analyzing a supplemental
is that we know that funds have been poured in from other
accounts into this specific commitment, because the
Administration, you know, saw this as an emergency situation.
Mr. Napper. Yes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Would I be wrong in suggesting that after
10 years, we may look back and find that $30 billion have been
spent by the United States both in the military as well as the
civilian end of this project?
Mr. Napper. In my view, that figure is probably far too
large, but, you know, it is difficult to sit here and give you
an estimate of what the next few years are going to bring.
Certainly, there is no plan for a $30 billion commitment over
the coming years of that kind.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Do I have any other overall idea of
estimate? Let me ask, please, the next time we have some type
of a briefing on this or some other type of a hearing, that we
have a figure, because I think that it is important for the
American people to understand the costs. And we all know who is
going to pay for it--we are going to pay for it--old Uncle Sam
and then all the rest of the taxpayers.
One thing that has disturbed me over the years is that ever
since World War II, it seems when we have had the upper hand we
have been unwillingly to take those final tough steps that will
end a situation and correct it. For example, here it is, 10
years later with Saddam Hussein, we are still in Kuwait and we
are fighting Saddam Hussein today. My father fought in Korea
and 50 years later, one-fourth of the history of our country,
we are still occupying Korea.
Concerning what we are doing in Kosovo, have we at least
decided that Kosovo will have its right to independence and
freedom? By the way, I personally believe that the Kosovars and
all people should have their right of self-determination. Are
we going through all of this cost but still trying to maintain
this charade that Kosovo is part of Serbia and thus leaving the
door open 10 years from now for the Serbs to do exactly what
they just did?
Mr. Napper. First of all let me say something about who
pays. Again, I can't speak as to the military costs, but I can
say that we just had a donor's conference on the immediate
humanitarian needs in which the United States pledged roughly
one-fourth of those costs. The Administration has been on
record over and over and over again that the vast majority of
reconstruction cost is a cost that will be borne, in the large
part, by the Europeans.
The European Union has stepped up to that responsibility
and stated that they will take a leadership role and has taken
over the reconstruction piece of the U.N. force or the U.N.
civil aministration force that is in Kosovo.
So the United States will pay particularly in the
humanitarian area. Right now, that figure is about 25 percent
of the anticipated funding that is going to come in there. We
will participate very little in the reconstruction cost. It
will largely be a European matter.
On the issue of Kosovo, we haven't ruled out independence
in the sense that the long-term status of Kosovo has not been
decided. It is something that should be decided as the civil
society is reconstituted, as people have governments that are
put in place, and that just hasn't happened yet.
We have a situation over there now in which, first of all,
NATO is basically in charge. The U.N. will assume
responsibility for civil aministration, and in that process, we
will develop local institutions, police, local governance and
so forth toward democracy. Once we have a structure in place
that can deal with the long-term issue of Kosovo status, it can
deal with that. But it is premature now to determine the long-
term status of Kosovo.
Mr. Rohrabacher. It would probably be better to determine
that while we have the upper hand, you might say, I did notice
that you were training 33,000 policemen.
Mr. Pardew. If I said that I am wrong.
Mr. Rohrabacher. What was that, then?
Mr. Pardew. It is about 3,000 local police.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I was trying to clarify that.
Mr. Pardew. We are going to have about 3,100 national
police on the interim basis until we can get the police force
built.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. I do believe, again
just for the record, if we have gone through all this and the
people of Kosovo have gone through this, the Kosovars do
deserve their own independence, which would be the long-term
solution. Thank you.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Chairman Gilman. Ms. Lee.
Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just follow up on Mr. Rohrabacher's question with
regard to the costs. I would like to know when or if we will
ever receive these figures, in terms of the costs. In terms of
the nonmilitary costs, I would like to know the accounts that
this billion is coming out of; because from what I remember
during the supplemental appropriation process, we had some
numbers in terms of offsets to food stamps and section eight
housing and community development block grants.
I say that because right now we are facing huge cuts in the
VA-HUD budget, and this impacts senior citizens and low-income
individuals in terms of housing in their communities and in
terms of just their ability to eat. So I would like to know
when we receive those costs, if we will know where those costs
are coming from.
Whether we agreed with the war or not--I certainly did not
agree with it--I think it is our obligation to provide the
support for the Administration in terms of its rationale to not
support reconstruction assistance until Milosevic is out of the
picture. But I guess the question I have is, at what point do
we evaluate this position and look at what impact it is having
or, if it is having no impact on the people of Serbia,
regardless of whatever humanitarian assistance that we are
contributing.
Is there a dropdead point, do we go back and evaluate it?
Do we say to Congress, the lack of our participation in
reconstruction efforts has impacted the people in this way?
Mr. Napper. First, with regard to your first question, the
Kosovo supplemental was passed under emergency designation. It
was not offset, so that there is not a tradeoff between the
moneys that were included in the Kosovo supplemental and the
other program accounts that you are discussing.
With regard to the people of Serbia, we have made it clear
from the beginning that we don't have anything against the
people of Serbia. What we have as a problem is their leadership
at this point. We have not ruled out the possibility of
humanitarian assistance to the people of Serbia; and, indeed,
we have continued to contribute to international organizations
on the ground in Serbia that are providing that kind of
humanitarian assistance. Here I am talking about food and
medicine--that kind of thing.
But we do draw the line at reconstruction and the President
has made that very clear this is our position. And I don't
anticipate that changing until there is a change in the
leadership.
Ms. Lee. I understand that. And I agree, but I am just
saying at what point? For instance, if people need bridges to
go to work and can't go to their jobs because they can't get
there and there is no reconstruction assistance in the mix, do
we ever evaluate what that means in terms of the people? I
fully agree with what you are doing--I am just saying how do we
know its impacts or will we ever know, or does it really matter
until Milosevic is out of the picture?
Mr. Pardew. This is a tough question, because some of the
restrictions--the sanctions regime, and we hold a complete
sanctions regime still in place, new bridges and those kinds of
questions do have an impact on the population. But the basic
rule we are applying at this point is that anything which
strengthens the regime is off limits.
We are willing to contribute to international organizations
that would meet the basic needs of the population, food,
shelter, medicine, those kinds of things; but if it goes into
accounts which then can go to Milosevic or his cronies or
strengthen the regime, even though it may have some impact on
the population, we are, at this point, unwillingly to do it.
And, you know, we can assess that.
Ms. Lee. Are we assessing the impact or will we?
Mr. Pardew. What we are trying to do is work with the
democratic opposition. As you know, the President has sent 10
million this year. We are assessing the needs for the future on
how we can improve the potential to change the regime here in a
way that would be more democratic. I think that is the real
solution here. And then the restrictions which are in place at
this point in time would be reconsidered.
Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Ms. Lee.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have two
questions. How much is it going to cost and who is going to pay
for it? No, I guess that has already been asked.
Seriously, relative to Bosnia, in particular, as you all
remember, this House was led to believe that our troops would
be there for one year and it was going to cost somewhere in the
range of $2 billion or so. It has gone up now, I understand, to
eight or nine or $10 billion, and we have been there for four
years now with no end in sight. I was just wondering what the
latest thinking is, and if you have already covered this in
your testimony, I apologize. We have about three Committee
hearings that we are kind of bouncing around on--most of the
Members. What is the best thinking at this point in time
concerning how long our troops are going to be in Bosnia?
Mr. Pardew. Well, I think that the lesson was learned in
the original projection on giving a specific timeline, that was
probably a mistake.
Having to go back on that, reassessment has been done in
which we are looking for an end state as our way out, not an
end date. So there is no willingness at this point to put any
kind of timeline on this. I would simply point out that when we
went into Bosnia, there were 60,000 U.S. troops. We have set
benchmarks on things that need to be done in order to provide
long-term stability, and that is our interest and objective
here.
As the situation there has improved, we have been able to
reduce the force commitment now down to about half, less than
half of what we had in there to start with, so the troop
contribution or troop levels have gone way down. As other areas
are improving, we can see the international community cutting
back as well.
But there is a set of clear benchmarks that we are looking
at, the President has set 10 of those, and our presence there
will be measured against the benchmarks seeking to achieve
long-term stability.
Mr. Chabot. OK. I appreciate your response. But in essence,
you have said that, yeah, it was one year and that was probably
a mistake to tell us that. It has now been four and there is no
end in sight at this point.
Relative to our commitment in Kosovo, I know that there was
no commitment, and I would assume that the Administration would
not really find it wise to even venture a guess as to how long
the troops might be there either. Is that correct?
Mr. Pardew. Again, the presence there is based on the goals
of the Security Council Resolution 1244, which gives a powerful
mandate to the civil Administration and to the military
presence headed by NATO. As the tasks that are identified in
the Security Counsel Resolution and the objectives are met,
those numbers--that commitment should be reduced.
So we are hopeful Kosovo is a significantly different
situation than we had in Bosnia. We are hopeful that the
presence there can be reduced more rapidly. But, again,
Congressman, you cannot put a specific time or date on that.
Mr. Chabot. OK. Thank you very much.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chabot.
Chairman Gilman. Dr. Cooksey.
Mr. Cooksey. Thank you, and thank you gentlemen for being
here.
You know, I was over there in May and visited some of the
camps. My question is, were the camps kept open? Because it
seems that the peace is failing, and you have just got a
different group of refugees. One group has now gone into the
country and another group is coming out.
So are you keeping the camps intact to take care of those
refugees--the new group, the Serbs that are coming out? There
is an infrastructure there now, or has it all been dismantled?
Mr. Pardew. It is considerably different, Congressman.
First of all, the numbers are vastly different.
Mr. Cooksey. Ten percent, I would assume.
Mr. Pardew. The number of Serb refugees, I think, is
somewhere on the order of less than 200,000, whereas in Kosovo,
we had over a million refugees and displaced persons. Some Serb
refugees are going to Macedonia where camps were established;
they are not going, for obvious reasons, to Albania. There were
large camps, so there is no application to Albania.
It is my understanding that most of them, those who have
gone to Macedonia are simply going back, going to Serbia. Our
goal is to have a multicultural society in Kosovo. We are
extremely concerned about the departure of the Serbs; and we
are concerned about attacks on the Serbs, just as we were
concerned about the terrible tragedies that occurred to the
Kosovar Albanians.
Mr. Cooksey. I would hope you are because they are people,
too. You know, another question, and I don't know who should
answer this, because I assume none of you have a military
background, but is it true that the NATO commander who is an
American general requested the British to intercede as the
Russians were heading toward the airport at Pristina? Was that
command given and is it true that General Jackson failed to
respond to that command?
Mr. Pardew. Congressman, I don't know the answer to that.
Mr. Cooksey. It is a question that should be answered to
find out how strong NATO is and what the command structure is.
I know it is probably not relevant to people that have no
military background, but...
Mr. Pardew. I have that, it is somewhat dated. But I
honestly can't give you the factual answers to that question,
because I simply don't know the facts.
Mr. Cooksey. Tell me about Thaci.
Mr. Wayne. Thaci.
Mr. Cooksey. Thaci, Thaci, short A. Does he have the
potential to be a reasonable leader of Kosovo?
Mr. Pardew. It remains to be seen. He stepped forward at
Rambouillet. He clearly has leadership, natural leadership
ability. He has sort of come up out of the ranks of the KLA. He
has represented them.
Mr. Cooksey. What was his background? What did he do
before?
Mr. Pardew. He was in the KLA, in the military--I don't
know.
Mr. Cooksey. Educational background, professional business?
Mr. Pardew. I can get you that.
Mr. Cooksey. I would like to know, I would be interested in
seeing that.
Mr. Pardew. All right.
Mr. Cooksey. You know the thing that has created a problem
for victims on both sides of the issue, both sides of the front
is that--and this is a general statement with its potential
shortcomings--is in this day and time, if you look across the
full panorama, we have had a lot of leaders in this country and
Canada and Europe and NATO and Yugoslavia that are
narcissistic, that are people who are skilled communicators,
take advantage of television, and they don't always do what is
best for their people.
And Milosevic, if you really look into his background, fits
into that mode. He did a lot of what is good for them at the
time, what made them feel good at the time; Milosevic actually
lived in this country--he worked on Wall Street, as you know,
and is well educated. He is a lawyer, whether that is such a
good education, but anyway it is an education. A lot of people
have fallen victim to these flawed personalities with all the
frailties that go with them.
I hope that we get some real leaders like Churchill and
Thatcher, not to mention any of our great leaders. But are
there any of those on the forefront in the Balkans?
Mr. Pardew. I think there are people with that kind of
potential, but they haven't appeared yet.
Mr. Cooksey. Thank you. Would you like to comment?
Mr. Wayne. I was just going to say, of course, this is one
of the reasons why we have tried to support free media
development in Serbia and the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere--
because it is so important to give news access to people, so
that there is not only one media outlet that can be dominated
by a regime or a magnetic personality.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Dr. Cooksey.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Burr.
Mr. Burr of North Carolina. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have
to make a statement at the beginning. Ever since the issue of
our policy there has come up, I envision those who deal with
policy, with this big kaleidoscope, and every time they look in
it they see the pretty colors. It is always the same,
unfortunately, nothing outside of the kaleidoscope ever affects
the inside of what you see.
I have a real question as to whether we are being realistic
in what can be achieved, or whether our goals are limited to
what we see in that kaleidoscope when I hear the perfectly
multicultural area that we would like to have. I won't get into
the realities of whether we can get there or what the cost is,
both financial or human. Let me just ask, and I will address it
to anybody who would like to answer, did Kosovo come up in the
Dayton talks?
Mr. Pardew. Not in a significant way.
I can speak of that because I was there.
Mr. Burr of North Carolina. Why don't you speak of it ?
Mr. Pardew. OK. There may have been some discussions of
Kosovo, but it was not a major objective in the Dayton talks,
because the Dayton talks were focused on the tragedy in Bosnia
that had caused two and a half million refugees and 250,000
dead. Kosovo was, at that time, relatively quiet. In the
meantime, Bosnia was on fire and it was the requirement and the
belief at that time that what had to be focused on was the
immediate fire that needed to be put out, and that if we got
into larger issues at that point in time, more distant issues,
that it would detract from our ability to bring the Bosnian
conflict to a close.
Mr. Burr of North Carolina. Dayton was not about stability
in Bosnia?
Mr. Pardew. Dayton absolutely was, absolutely about
stability; but it was focused on Bosnia, and we did not feel as
though we could weaken our effort on Bosnia by taking on any
number of other issues. I mean, there is also Montenegro. There
is Vojvodina. There are any number of issues.
Mr. Burr of North Carolina. When did this dissolution of
Yugoslavia start?
Mr. Pardew. Eighty--well, you could probably trace it back
to Tito's death, but it started to come apart in----
Mr. Burr of North Carolina. Certainly in the late eighties,
would you agree?
Mr. Pardew. Late eighties. Whenever Slovenia----
Mr. Wayne. 1992?
Mr. Pardew. No, it actually--I believe it started in--.
Mr. Burr of North Carolina. So we had concerns about not
only the stability of Bosnia at the time of the conflict, but
we knew then that we had a much bigger stability question,
didn't we?
Mr. Pardew. Well, when Yugoslavia started to come apart,
it, of course, raised stability concerns, that is right.
Mr. Burr of North Carolina. Did anybody at Dayton say,
gosh, we don't have to address Kosovo because that won't be a
problem?
Mr. Pardew. No.
Mr. Burr of North Carolina. In hindsight, do you think we
should have addressed Kosovo?
Mr. Pardew. No. I think it took all the energy that we
could muster to end the war in Bosnia at Dayton. I personally
believe that had we decided to take on other issues at that
time, it would--it may have caused that very difficult
negotiation to fail.
Mr. Burr of North Carolina. The Administration officials
have said they prefer Montenegro to remain with a restructured
Yugoslavia. Can a restructured Yugoslavia work?
Mr. Pardew. With proper leadership, it can.
Mr. Burr of North Carolina. Describe leadership. Is that--
--
Mr. Pardew. Something different than what we have right
now.
I don't want to be glib, Congressman. It is very difficult
to deal with the impulses of independence in Kosovo or
Montenegro or perhaps other places with Slobodan Milosevic
leading the government in Belgrade, because of the repressive
measures and the anti-democratic policies of that government.
I believe that over time, with the change of leadership,
with the hope of economic development and democracy, that the
populations there can look at their situation and make more
rational judgments than perhaps we would make at this point in
time with the terrible leadership that they have in Belgrade.
That is what I believe.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired. Thank
you, Mr. Burr.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know we are
anxious to go, but one question for the good of the world
order. I guess I would address this to you, Mr. Wayne. The
Montenegrins indicate they are going to try to conduct
negotiation with Serbia about new constitutional arrangements
for a looser Federal system. If those negotiations fail--and as
they want the deadline in September, it seems to be likely--and
they take unilateral action to change their status or role
within the federation, the Federal Republic, is the U.S.
prepared for an outbreak of violence in Montenegro?
What specific steps have the U.S. and NATO taken to prepare
for humanitarian assistance and for military intervention in
Montenegro? Why is it, in your judgment, that NATO and the U.N.
have not accepted the Montenegrins' offer to base their
operations for Kosovo in Montenegro in order to establish a
U.N. and a NATO presence in Montenegro, in light of what seems
to be about to happen in September?
Mr. Wayne. Well, let me make a couple of initial comments,
Congressman, and then ask Ambassador Pardew to continue on.
One is that we have worked very hard, indeed, to support
the democratically elected regime in Montenegro as have our
friends and allies in Europe. As you may know, the prime
minister was present in Sarajevo at the Stability Pact summit,
and the President met with him in Sarajevo. He has visited and
been received in a wide range of European capitals, and I think
he is even in Moscow today--and yesterday--being received at a
very high level.
As you also know, NATO issued a policy statement on
Montenegro very clearly saying that any move by Milosevic to
undermine that democratically elected government would--to get
it right--be considered provocative and would be dealt with
appropriately.
Of course--excuse me, I meant President Djukanovic, not the
prime minister, earlier.
So we have all tried to send a very clear message of
support and to make clear that if there were any moves against
that government it would have very, very serious consequences.
Similarly, we have acted concretely to support that
government financially and with technical assistance; and
Ambassador Napper can say more about that.
Right now, we certainly do support the democratic
leadership in Montenegro, which still prefers to seek a modus
vivendi within the FRY. So we are supportive of their efforts
to have these talks. I think we, you know, will continue to
express our support for their efforts to that regard.
As far as looking ahead, I guess I would say, I don't think
right now it would be productive to address the hypothetical
that you posed. But let me ask Ambassador Pardew if he wants to
comment.
Mr. Pardew. Well, just to reinforce the point that NATO has
been very firm on Montenegro; in fact, in their summit
statement in April they said we affirm our strong support for
democratically elected government in Montenegro. Any move by
Belgrade to undermine the government of Djukanovic will be met
with grave consequences.
So NATO is on record as taking Montenegro very seriously.
We have supported and will continue to support Djukanovic as
the democratically elected head of that government, and we want
to work with him as a model for change in Serbia.
As to whether we have NATO there or not, that is a
difficult question. We don't want to put NATO in an awkward
position relative to the FRY and so forth.
We are looking at that, just as we are looking at ways that
we can remove some of the sanctions restrictions on Montenegro
without benefiting Belgrade.
These are important points. They are delicate, however, in
terms of putting NATO or passing NATO through Montenegro, but
we are looking at it.
Mr. Bereuter. Gentlemen, my leading question is your
Capitol Hill warning to be prepared to avert or fight a new
Balkan conflict sometime after December, at the wrong time of
the year.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter.
Again, we want to thank our panelists for being with us. We
regret the interruptions that delayed your testimony.
Without objection, the Chair will submit questions in
writing on behalf of Members of the Committee concerning issues
reviewed in this hearing for an expeditious response in writing
by the Department of State, and there will be three additional
days for Members to submit additional material for the record.
Once again, our thanks go to our official witnesses for
their testimony today.
We will now proceed with our second panel.
Mr. Bereuter.--[Presiding.] As the next panel comes
forward, I would like to introduce them and say a word or two
about them. First, Mr. Janusz Bugajski is Director of the East
European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies here in Washington, D.C. He has previously worked with
Radio Free Europe in Munich and has served as a consultant to
the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Defense
Department, the Rand Corporation, BBC Television, and other
organizations. He has lectured at several universities and
institutes and has published numerous books and articles on
East Europe.
Professor Janine Wedel is an Associate Research Professor
at George Washington University and a Research Fellow at the
University's Institute of European Russian and Eurasian
studies. She has received a number of awards from
organizations, such as the National Science Foundation, the
MacArthur Foundation, the Woodrow Wilson International Center,
the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research.
She is a three-time Fulbright fellow. Her latest book,
``Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to
Eastern Europe,'' was published just last year.
Our final witness of the three, Dr. Daniel Serwer, is
Director of the Balkans Initiative at the United States
Institute for Peace here in the Nation's Capital. Dr. Serwer
has received a Ph.D. from Princeton University, served at the
Department of State as Deputy Chief of Mission and
Charge'd'affairs at the Embassy in Rome, as a United States
special envoy and coordinator for the Bosnian Federation--
director of European and Canadian Analysis, and finally as
Minister Counselor at the Department of the State. At the
Institute of Peace, he has co-authored a number of studies on
the Balkans States and worked on regional security issues in
the Balkans.
Mr. Bereuter. Panelists, we are very pleased to have you
here to share your wisdom with us on the important subject of
the hearings today. I just would note that all of your
statements will be made a part of the record and you may
summarize your written statements.
Mr. Bugajski, we will start with you and welcome.
STATEMENT OF MR. JANUSZ BUGAJSKI, DIRECTOR, EAST EUROPEAN
STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Bugajski. Thank you very much and good afternoon, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you for including me in this important hearing.
I think it is very important for Southeast Europe and I
hope it will enhance the U.S. agenda at this very critical
period in Balkan history.
I would like just to summarize my written statement in a
few comments. I believe that the post-war commitment of NATO,
the United Nations, and the EU to Balkan reconstruction does
offer a unique opportunity to build stable institutions and
market economies throughout Southeast Europe. However, to
ensure success, I think consistent progress must be made in six
key areas. Otherwise, resources will be squandered, and the
region will continue to drift toward isolation from Europe.
These are the six that I would like to outline.
First, political stability. Long-term governmental
stability will remain an essential prerequisite for pursuing
any kind of economic and institutional reforms. Each Balkan
government, I think, needs to ensure programmatic continuity
between different Administrations so that the reform process
does not veer between periods of progress and reversal. Hence,
I would say all Balkan countries require a cross-party
commitment to the goals of economic transformation and
institutional reform, much as we have seen in Central Europe in
the past 10 years.
Second, institution building. Successful political
stabilization requires the consolidation of authoritative
democratic institutions based on firm constitutional
principles. The organs of government need to have public
confidence and the commitment of all major political players.
In this context, extremist parties advocating authoritarian
solutions must be marginalized so that they do not undermine
the Nation's party politic.
Third, civic society development. Each Balkan country must
develop a more effective alternative media and a range of
citizens' interest groups that will significantly enhance the
democratization process. In the area of minority rights, each
Balkan state must pursue policies that comply with
international obligations. Furthermore, development of a
multifaceted civil society will undercut the focus on exclusive
ethnic questions that undermine democratic development.
Fourth, economic progress. A priority for each Balkan
government is the consolidation of a credible market reform
program. All too often in the past, vested interest groups have
stalled this process to their advantage or politicians have
compromised on many essential market components, for example,
by maintaining large scale state subsidies to unprofitable
industries or failing to ensure transparency in privatization.
A serious and far-reaching reform program cannot be held
hostage by any political party or economic lobby.
Fifth, organized crime fighting. Public security organs
must be empowered to deal with organized crime and corruption.
Both an internal but also an international strategy must be
pursued by each Balkan state working in tandem with neighbors.
The pervasiveness of politically connected criminality
threatens to obstruct the region's reform process. It
consolidates the control of special interest groups, encourages
radicalism, dissipates public confidence in the transformation
process and jeopardizes economic progress.
And sixth, regional cooperation. Regional cooperation, I
think, can be buttressed through a range of institutions and a
whole array of arrangements: governmental, military,
parliamentary, political party, local government, as well as
the NGO sector. Economic transformation must also be a region-
wide priority, as the failure of economic reform will directly
challenge all nearby states.
More emphasis also needs to be placed on building economic
networks that enhance the reform process in each country. In
sum, I would say the Balkan countries must take a much more
active role in promoting regional stability and regional
development and not focus only on their domestic concerns.
In conclusion, I would just like to say, reconstruction not
only provides the opportunity for material development,
economic development, but also for representative democracy.
The commitment to reconstruct must be matched by a commitment
to reform. The ultimate objective for all these states must be
inclusion and integration in the major European and
transatlantic institutions based on solid democratic and
capitalist foundations, and I believe the U.S. can clearly
assist in this process. Thank you.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Mr. Bugajski.
Mr. Bereuter. We would now like to hear from Dr. Wedel. You
may proceed as you wish. Your entire statement is a part of the
record.
STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR JANINE WEDEL, ASSOCIATE RESEARCH
PROFESSOR, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
Ms. Wedel. Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak
with you today. My comments today are based on an extensive
study of U.S. assistance to Central and Eastern Europe, Russia
and Ukraine over the past 10 years.
I am not an expert on the Balkans, but my research on U.S.
assistance programs has given me an acute awareness of the
promises and pitfalls of aid to Eastern Europe, many of which
are discussed in my recent book, ``Collision and Collusion: The
Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe,'' and in
previous testimony before this Committee and others.
The following six cautionary lessons arise from my
research:
First, we need to constantly remind ourselves that aid is
by no means just a technical matter. It is not just about
getting the economic prescriptions right. Aid is a complex task
of societal, political and social challenges that must be taken
into account if it is to have the desired stated goals. It must
be well conceived, well planned and implemented systematically,
in accordance with those challenges.
It is important that the beneficiaries of the aid are not
just western consulting firms looking for fat contracts but
also the people and the communities that we want to help.
It would be elusive to think that our aid programs alone
could build democracies and market economies. On the other
hand, poorly conceived and administered aid certainly can do
damage, both to the region and to the image of the United
States there. As Joseph Stiglitz, chief economist at the World
Bank, once suggested, we should adopt, ``a greater degree of
humility . . . and acknowledgement of the fact that we do not
have all of the answers.''
Second, we should avoid the so-called ``Marriott Brigade''
syndrome. The Marriott Brigade was a term the Polish press
coined in 1990-1991 for the short-term ``fly in, fly out''
consultants who were paid to deliver technical assistance to
Eastern European governments and officials. The consultants
stayed at Warsaw's pricey Marriott and hurtled among five-star
hotels across the region, collecting data and advising on
economic and political reform.
Recipient officials, many of whom were new at their jobs,
welcomed the consultants at first but after hundreds of fact-
finding and first meetings with an endless array of consultants
from donor organizations and international financial
institutions, many officials were disillusioned and frustrated.
We must avoid that situation in the current effort. Bringing in
team after team of high-priced consultants, many of whom will
never return, creates a burden for local officials and stirs
resentments against the consultants and the donors.
It is important not to duplicate fact-finding and to keep
``first visits'' to a minimum. As we have seen in Eastern
Europe, local perceptions of aid on the part of officials,
politicians, and citizens matter and sometimes even shape aid
outcomes.
Third, it is crucial to carefully and prudently select our
prospective partners and representatives. We must be careful
not to play favorites among competing local interests and
beneficiaries. The record of U.S. aid to Russia in particular
shows that selecting specific groups or individuals as the
recipients of uncritical support both corrupts our favorites
and delegitimizes them in the eyes of their fellow citizens.
Given the discretion that political functionaries in the region
have to appropriate large portions of state resources and
budget to themselves and to their cronies and the considerable
corruption on all sides, there is an ever-present danger of
diversion of foreign aid. We must also be aware of potential
collusion among consultants and local elites toward that end.
As we have learned, or should have learned in Russia,
putting aid in the hands of just one political-economic group
or clan creates opportunities for the misappropriation of
moneys to private and/or political purposes and very quickly
undermines donor efforts at democracy building.
Further, experience shows that it is simply wrong to think
that institutions can be built by supporting specific
individuals instead of helping to facilitate processes and the
rule of law. Many reforms advocated by the international aid
community, including privatization and economic restructuring,
depend on changes in law, public Administration and mindsets
and require working with the full spectrum of legislative and
market participants, not just one group or clan.
Fourth, we should help to build administrative and legal
structures at the level of cities, regions, and towns. In
general, the lower the administrative level of our efforts, the
better. Any donor efforts must depend on not just speaking with
politicians at the top but on working with an array of local
people and communities. U.S. officials and advisors need to
establish contacts with a wide cross-section of the regional
and local leadership--politicians, social and political
activists, and community workers. For example, some aid-funded
programs to develop the economy from the bottom up have been
useful and have created goodwill.
Fifth, we should be clear-eyed about the real potential of
the so-called ``independent sector'' and nongovernmental
organizations or NGO's. Donors often invest high hopes in the
ability of NGO's to build democracy. They often assume that
NGO's are similar to their western counterparts, despite the
very different conditions under which they developed and
operate. But in Eastern Europe, the officials, the individuals
and groups charged by the west with public outreach--often the
most vocal local players--were not always equipped for that
role. At least in the early years of the aid effort, NGO's
often distributed western perks to themselves and their peers
on the basis of favoritism rather than merit. Here again, there
can be no substitute for donor knowledge of local politics,
conditions, and culture. The challenge for the donors is in
enlisting the expertise of people sufficiently informed,
intuitive, and committed to aid efforts in the new environment
and in designing assistance to foster those efforts.
Mr. Bereuter. Dr. Wedel, I am sorry I am going to have to
interrupt you because I have just a couple of minutes to get to
the vote. I know we haven't come to your last concluding
remarks and we will pick that up when we come back. One of my
colleagues may take the Chair in five minutes or so. If not, we
will be back at it in about ten. So at this point, hold your
thought for the final conclusion, and the Committee stands in
recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Cooksey.--[Presiding.] Professor Wedel, if you would
proceed, we are passing the baton.
Ms. Wedel. Thank you. I won't reiterate my first five
points.
My sixth and final point is that the United States should
embark on a broad-based policy to encourage governance and the
rule of law. To foster reform, I have learned from my study in
Eastern Europe that donors need to work with a broad base of
recipients and support structures that all relevant parties can
participate in and effectively own, not just one political
group or clan or faction.
This is, admittedly, not an easy task. The major challenge
is how to help build bridges in a conflicted environment with
historical distrust and many competing groups and very few
cross-cutting ties among them.
Although by no means easy, the task of aid workers is
precisely to build contacts and to work with all relevant
groups toward the creation of transparent, nonexclusive
institutions and against the concentration of influence and aid
in just a few hands.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Cooksey. Just before we move to the next witness, you
are an anthropologist by education, are you not?
Ms. Wedel. I am.
Mr. Cooksey. In ten words or less, what do you think of the
prospects of achieving this last, this sixth goal, about the
broad-based policies and about the aid workers being able to
accomplish it, viewed in light of the history that has occurred
in this area?
Ms. Wedel. I began my statement by saying that I am not an
expert on the Balkans, but my experience in looking at aid
programs in Central Europe, Russia and Ukraine is that there
are competing political, economic, financial groups at the very
local level. Russia by the way, is a very difficult environment
to work in even though the historical animosities aren't nearly
as much at the forefront and the country has not been wrecked
by war as have been the Balkans. The task is to begin to create
incentives for diverse groups to work with each other. It is
critical not to play favorites by giving one group aid
resources over others--that is a very destructive aid policy.
My experience is that can be done. It is not easy to do. It
requires a lot of local knowledge, but money can provide an
incentive, and if you find experts who know the local
situation, they can help put together programs that will
provide incentives for people to do reasonable projects. It can
be done but it is not easy. It requires a lot of local
knowledge.
Mr. Cooksey. And this gets back to your third point about
prudent selection of the partners that you would be doing this
with?
Ms. Wedel. Absolutely.
Mr. Cooksey. What model do you think exists for this having
been done successfully? Where in Europe or any other part of
the world? Can you think of a particular place?
Ms. Wedel. Yes. I would point to several kinds of programs.
One that I looked at very closely was a program that was in
part sponsored by the Congressional Research Services and some
of the congressional Committees, and that operated effectively
in Poland and, I believe, in some countries further east.
That program was to build an institution to provide
information and infrastructural support to the Polish
Parliament--to everybody in the parliaments. At first, in 1990,
1991, 1992, this was an absolutely revolutionary idea. ``You
mean you are going to work with those guys, not just us? ''
That was a revolutionary idea. But eventually people saw that
it made sense. They saw that independent information, that an
infrastructure, a system could be built that everyone could
use; that it wasn't just about politics--just for me and my
group--but that the benefit would go to all groups.
We eventually saw in Poland the value of having such an
independent institution modeled after the Congressional
Research Services, and aid from the United States played a
major role in helping to create that.
As I said, it was really a different concept at the
beginning because people were not interested and certainly not
accustomed to sharing information with a different political-
economic group. It was a foreign idea, but it could be done if
you had the right people on the ground who understood the
problems and had the right resources.
Mr. Cooksey. Can you come up with another example? Because
really Poland is a rather homogenous group with one religion
and they have done very well there, but the Polish people have
a lot more structure than anyone in the Balkans, it seems.
Ms. Wedel. Well, that is what it may look like from the
outside, but, in fact, there were many groups that were
competing on the ground for resources. And when you come in
with foreign aid, quickly you find that you have a lot of
competitors for that money. I think in that respect, the
Balkans will be very similar. The animosities may be longer
lasting, deeper.
Mr. Cooksey. From an economic standpoint?
Ms. Wedel. Sorry?
Mr. Cooksey. From an economic standpoint? From the fact
that they are all looking for this aid, this economic aid, and
you think they can overcome their ethnic, religious, racial
diversity then?
Ms. Wedel. As I stated in my fourth point, I think that it
is very important to emphasize local administration and legal
structure and to help to build those infrastructures. Without
those infrastructures in place, there is probably not much hope
of overcoming those animosities. The only choice we have is to
help develop those infrastructures. That is the only choice we
have. If we come in and say we are going to support this group
or another, we are, at the outset, doomed to failure.
Mr. Cooksey. Thank you.
The Chairman is back.
Mr. Bereuter.--[Presiding.] Dr. Cooksey, thank you for
filling in; and, Dr. Wedel, for concluding your testimony.
We would like to go back, though, to hear from Dr. Serwer
to make his presentation. Your entire statement will be made a
part of the record. You may proceed as you wish, and then we
will open it up for questions for all three of you.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL SERWER, DIRECTOR, BALKANS INITIATIVE,
UNITED STATES INSTITUTE FOR PEACE
Dr. Serwer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to start
by thanking Mr. Smith for his kind opening remarks about
previous testimony before the Helsinki Commission.
My name is Daniel Serwer. I direct the Balkans initiative
at the U.S. Institute of Peace, which takes no positions on
policy issues. The views I express here are my own. But the
Institute is well-known for its efforts to promote democracy in
Serbia, reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a
regional approach to the Balkans, one that emphasizes
preventive diplomacy and peaceful conflict resolution.
The main U.S. Interest in the Balkans is stability.
Instability there cannot be ignored, because of its effect on
our European allies and on American public opinion. There are
no vital resources at risk. Transportation routes through and
near the Balkans are not critical to the United States and no
Balkan country threatens U.S. or Allied territory.
The United States has nevertheless found itself leading the
NATO alliance twice into air wars in the Balkans, followed by
expensive ground interventions.
Why? What we have seen in Bosnia and in Kosovo is the
failure of preventive diplomacy. By not undertaking early and
relatively cheap efforts to prevent conflict, we have been
forced to intervene after conflict has begun at far greater
cost. The exception proves the rule: in Macedonia, early
deployment of a small U.N. peacekeeping force and an energetic
mission from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe has so far allowed a healthy democracy to develop in
that ethnically divided country, preventing a conflict that
many thought inevitable.
Are there other predictable conflicts that could break out
in the Balkans? Yes, is my answer. Are we and our allies doing
what is necessary to prevent them? ``No.'' There are a number
of laudable efforts under way, but we need to be doing more.
The main threat to Balkans stability today is the same as
10 years ago: The Milosevic regime in Belgrade, which has used
conflict against non-Serbs as a means of staying in power.
Milosevic will strike again, perhaps in Montenegro or in
Sandjak, an area almost evenly divided between Muslim and
Orthodox Slavs, or in Vojvodina, where there are Hungarian and
Croat minorities. In each of these areas, the international
community should be undertaking preventive efforts aimed at
promoting inter-communal understanding and ensuring that
Belgrade cannot exploit ethnic strife.
The regime may also strike next against discontented Serbs,
who are today the most serious threat to Milosevic's hold on
power. Courageous people have been demonstrating against the
regime throughout Serbia since the end of the war, but until
last week U.S. assistance for democratization there was frozen.
There is still an urgent, immediate need for small amounts of
money to support those seeking democratic change in Serbia.
Friday in Sarajevo, the President announced a $10 million
program for Serbian democratization, doubling the pre-war
amount. This is a step in the right direction, but still short
of the resources the Institute's Balkans working group has
recommended and far less than the amount Senator Helms has
advocated. The President's program is a good first step, but a
major increase will be needed next fiscal year.
Mr. Chairman, conditions in Serbia do not favor the
development of democracy. Poverty, disillusion, and resentment
could create a volatile situation this winter. I believe it is
important for the West to provide humanitarian assistance to
Serbs and even to repair essential humanitarian infrastructure,
provided the resources and credit cannot be diverted to the
Milosevic regime. This would mean providing assistance through
opposition-controlled municipalities, nongovernmental
organizations, and the Church.
At this point, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit for the
record an institute paper called Moving Serbia Toward
Democracy, which includes a number of ideas along these lines.
Mr. Bereuter. Without objection, that will be the order.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Dr. Serwer. Thank you. We should also be supporting fragile
democracies in Albania and Macedonia that could collapse under
pressure of their own internal problems. The main issue in
Albania is security. A small NATO presence could go a long way
toward helping Albania buildup its own security forces. I have
been informed this morning, Mr. Chairman, that the North
Atlantic Council on Friday has approved the continuation of a
small NATO force in Albania.
In Macedonia, the issues are both economic and inter-
ethnic. Small resources invested now could prevent future
interventions a thousand times more costly.
Bosnia and Kosovo will, of course, continue to attract the
bulk of U.S. and Allied resources. Failure of either
intervention would not only destabilize the Balkans but also
create big problems elsewhere. But in the rush to intervene, we
have all too often failed to exploit indigenous capacities.
This is especially damaging in Kosovo, where before the war an
extensive civil society existed. Indigenous Kosovar
institutions should be empowered rather than swamped.
In Bosnia, the missing ingredient is reconciliation, which
is impossible so long as indicted war criminals are at large
and their associates occupy positions of power. NATO should
arrest Radovan Karadzic and any other indictees still at large
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It will then be possible to mount a
serious effort to enable people who want to do so to return to
their homes.
No less important is the right of Serbs to return home,
especially in Croatia and in Kosovo. Neither should enjoy the
full benefits the United States and its allies have to offer
until they are prepared to establish a rule of law that
protects all people, as well as the open media and transparent
election processes required in a democracy.
Mr. Chairman, the President went to Sarajevo last week to
launch a Stability Pact that should give a sense of direction
and commitment to all allies and to the democracies in the
region. That pact must now fill its political, economic, and
security baskets. Empty promises will not do the trick. It is
especially important that the European Union accelerate its
opening toward the Balkans, forming a customs union and
encouraging monetary stabilization through the use of the Euro.
Europe, because of its proximity, is vulnerable to Balkans
instability and should bear most of the burden of bringing
peace and prosperity to the region.
But without U.S. Commitment and leadership, the task will
not get done. As we enter the 21st Century, the Balkans must
not be allowed to generate the kinds of conflict and
instability that have marred their history in the 20th.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you very much, Dr. Serwer.
Mr. Bereuter. I would like to begin with a few questions. I
will turn to Mr. Cooksey then.
Mr. Bugajski, you talk about the institutions of the civil
society as a part of your statement. I am wondering if you
would tell me what your thoughts are about us overcoming the
ethnic/religious hatreds that have existed in so many parts of
Yugoslavia and have been reignited in Bosnia, in Kosovo. Is it
possible, in the shorter term for the next generation or two,
for these people who have seen atrocities committed against
each other, renewing memories of the atrocities committed in
World War II by one group against another and in some cases by
both sides, is it possible for these people to live together
and to begin to restore in the short term the elements of a
civil society?
Mr. Bugajski. Thank you. Well, let's put it this way:
Inter-ethnic reconciliation is a long-term process, but I think
very concrete steps in that direction can be made; first of
all, by the ouster or replacement of the very political forces
that have promoted ethnic division, ethnic conflict. Ethnic
conflict was not inevitable in the Balkans, just as it isn't
anywhere in Europe. It was deliberately promoted by communist
politicians in order to stay in power.
Second, I think justice needs to seem to be done. That is
why I completely agree that war criminals such as Karadzic,
Mladic, as well as Milosevic and his people need to be
arrested, need to be tried. Justice needs to be shown to be
done as well as being done.
Third, I do think there needs to be much more work at a
local level. I think this has been part of the problem in
Bosnia, why refugees haven't returned, because some of the
nationalists who promoted the war are still in power. They
still control the local economy; they control the local
political system.
So I think a lot more work needs to be done at the local
level to build the very institutions that can promote at least
ethnic coexistence, if not ethnic harmony, but it will be a
long-term process.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you.
Mr. Bereuter. Professor Wedel, I was very pleased to hear
some of your categorization of the mistakes that had taken
place in our assistance programs and other international
assistance programs for eastern and parts of Central Europe.
Not to belittle your research, but some of them seem too self-
evident and predictable, but I like the way that you apparently
have categorized them. I want to read your book.
The Marriott Brigade syndrome, for example, caught my
attention. It seemed to me, from the beginning, that there was
kind of an executive branch pork barrel that took place with
incestuous relationships between people in government: in AID,
above AID in State, with the people that they knew and had
worked with in other institutions here and in other kinds of
elite educational institutions, with people in the beltway
bandit organizations today. Just an incredible amount of money
spent, as you said, making first-time visits all the time with
great resentment.
We knew that wouldn't work. We knew that was a waste of
resources. We knew it wasn't the best use of resources in any
case, but how do we keep people who make those decisions from
engaging in this kind of pork barrel activity?
That is really what it is. Not by the legislative branch
but by the executive branch. There was very little earmarking
of money for particular programs or institutions by Congress in
this time that went by, but that was not the case in the
executive branch. How do we avoid doing something that is
obviously not the most efficient use of our resources?
Ms. Wedel. What you are describing is at least in part a
symptom of the fact that the aid effort was very scattershot,
not very well planned, and not exactly high level.
Rhetorically, it was always compared to the Marshall Plan, but
that was a fallacious comparison, not only because there was so
little capital assistance available in comparison but also
because it was not a particularly high level effort and it was
constructed so that lots of different groups got a piece of the
pie. Once you have that setup you are naturally going to have
many people who are going to be vying for contracts.
So the first thing is to have a very well-planned, well-
conceived aid effort, which isn't set up so that everybody gets
something. It must have a higher level of leadership so it can
have a higher promise and potential.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you. I would ask Dr. Serwer a question
or two and then turn to my colleague.
As you point out, the emphasis of the United States should
be on stability in this region. You talked about the need for
preventive action; and I think you are absolutely right, that
it is self-evidently important. I know there was a high
official ministry in the Federal Republic of Germany who looked
at the situation, eventually resigning because he felt so
guilty about the decision that had been made to recognize the
independence of Slovenia, knowing full well what that would
lead to in Croatia. Despite all of the advice from other
countries to the contrary, Germany took a very unconventional
step for them in going out front on something. One of the
lessons I draw from this, which is tough for an American to
conclude, is that there are some things more important than
self-determination and one of them was to focus on stability
for the region. Perhaps you heard my comments about Montenegro
and the invitation to the U.N. and NATO and the kind of talks
in which they hope to be engaged in September with Belgrade
relating to a looser Federal structure in Yugoslavia, and the
likelihood of the lack of success for that effort.
What do you think we should be doing now, speaking of
preventive action, in Montenegro to keep that from degenerating
into the next Balkan conflict? And, what do you think perhaps
we could have done when we had the first engagement of Croatian
and Serbian troops in eastern Croatia?
Was that a time when we could have militarily engaged if
the U.N.--excuse me, if NATO was ready in this post-cold war
era?
Dr. Serwer. It is difficult, Mr. Chairman, to second-guess
people about things that happened in Croatia that long ago, but
your question about Montenegro is a very current and difficult
one, I will say that.
I believe that we should be establishing as much of an
international presence in Montenegro as we possibly can at this
point, and I find ambiguous--dangerously ambiguous--the
Administration's statements about what it will do if Montenegro
is attacked. I think we know from the past that ambiguity with
Mr. Milosevic leads to a continuous raising of the threshold
for action; and raising the threshold for action leads to the
need for greater and greater responses.
One British magazine has counted 44 final warnings to Mr.
Milosevic since 1991. I am not advocating one more final
warning about Montenegro, but I do believe that the
Administration has to think hard about what it will do if
Montenegro is attacked. I think they have to recognize that
within the Alliance there is not a great deal of support for
going to war again over Montenegro. They also have to realize
that the best prevention is deterrence in this case; the
Montenegrins are going to have to be strong and the
international presence in Montenegro should be strong.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Dr. Serwer.
I would like now to turn to Dr. Cooksey for questions he
may have.
Mr. Cooksey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I don't know whether you heard my comments on my impression
that most of the world leaders of this generation are
narcissistic whimpy-type guys; and Milosevic was that way in
his youth in his high school--poor health. And yet once they
gain some position of power, they suddenly become warriors.
Maybe they are too young to be cold war warriors, but warriors
they are in their own mind, and so forth.
What lessons do you think that we should have learned in
Bosnia that we can translate into avoiding mistakes in this
area in Kosovo and dealing with what remains of Yugoslavia, Dr.
Serwer?
Dr. Serwer. My view, Mr. Cooksey, is that there are several
lessons that should be learned. The first lesson is that in
these international interventions, we can't afford a divided
command. We need a unified command, not only of the military
but of the civilians as well.
Mr. Cooksey. Can I ask a question? Would you elaborate on
the question that I asked in the first meeting about stopping
the Russians on their way to the airport? Was that a
manifestation of what you are talking about?
Dr. Serwer. It was a manifestation on the military side of
a lack of unity of command, both in Bosnia and in Kosovo; and I
think it was a dangerous moment and an edifying moment. But I
was referring to something different.
I believe that the pattern we followed in Bosnia of
dividing the military from the civilian command and having a
military commander who is not responsible for civilian
implementation and a civilian commander who can't command
military forces was a mistake in Bosnia. It was done to satisfy
the United States, which wanted to maintain intact the NATO
chain of command.
Mr. Cooksey. You are referring to Bosnia now?
Dr. Serwer. Yes, I am referring to Bosnia now.
Now, in Kosovo, in theory, the civilian and military
commands have, again, been separated, and I think that was a
mistake. In practice, however, as somebody indicated already
this morning, the military is in charge in Kosovo at this
moment.
Why is that? The reason is that there is no preparedness on
the civilian side. The military worries when its preparedness
falls a couple of percentage points off 100 percent, as rightly
it should. There is no concept of preparedness on the civilian
side, except perhaps among the NGO's who do humanitarian relief
work, but the U.N. essentially has to go out and hire all of
these folks every time there is an intervention. There is very,
very little sense of preparedness. I think we are seeing some
of the negative consequences of that in Kosovo today in the
truly tragic treatment of the Kosovar Serbs.
So I believe in unity of command. I believe the command
should have been unified in Kosovo under the military
commander, a NATO military commander, at least for the first
six to eight months of the intervention. I think the ambiguity
about who is really in charge is most unfortunate in Kosovo.
I think there are other things we should have learned from
Bosnia, including that there are indigenous organizations that
can be used in the peace process. And in Kosovo you had a very
extensive array of nongovernmental organizations, including a
whole educational system which was nongovernmental because it
existed independently of the Serbian educational system.
One of the incredible things about Kosovo today is that the
kids are back in school; that alternative educational system
has enabled children to go back to school almost immediately.
Yet the international community is depending very little on
these indigenous capacities and has to some degree even avoided
allowing them access to the U.N. and to the international
structure being created. This is clearly an error. Kosovo is
liberated territory. It is not conquered territory. It should
be treated the way liberated territory is treated, which
includes the most rapid turnover possible of functions to local
organizations.
Now, there is a big problem, because those local
organizations are, of course, ethnically based for the most
part, and that is where the U.N. and the NATO forces have to
play a role in insisting on the ethnic integration of those
institutions. You cannot have, in Kosovo, a true democracy that
treats Serbs as badly as they are being treated today.
Mr. Cooksey. When you referred to these indigenous
organizations in the education system, you are telling me there
is an educational system outside of the government's
educational system; it is like private schools or parochial
schools?
Dr. Serwer. They were schools that were created, Mr.
Cooksey, by the Albanians when they were excluded from the
Serbian educational system.
Mr. Cooksey. From the public education system?
Dr. Serwer. Yes. So they are private in a sense. They were
run mostly in people's homes. They weren't run in school
buildings, and they have been reopened almost immediately with
the return of the refugees and displaced people.
Mr. Cooksey. Sounds similar to some of the debates we have
had in this body.
Thank you, Dr. Serwer.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you very much, Dr. Cooksey.
I would like to announce and introduce Elmer Brok, who is
the new Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the
European Parliament, an old friend of this Member and many
Members of the House of Representatives.
Great to have you here, Elmer.
Dr. Cooksey, would you see if Mr. Engel has any questions,
and then would you conclude the hearing for me so that I can
proceed with Mr. Brok?
I want to thank all of our witnesses for their effort
today. It was very helpful to us.
Dr. Cooksey, I turn it over to you so that you may close
out the hearing.
Mr. Cooksey.--[Presiding.] Mr. Engel.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
I just want to ask a couple of, I think, relatively quick
questions. I have been perhaps the leading advocate in the
House for independence for Kosova. The reason I have done it,
and I am more convinced than ever that nothing else long range
will work, is because I think that, first of all, the Belgrade
regime has lost any kind of right that it ever had to govern in
Kosova because of the ethnic cleansing that went on and all the
other horrible things. I think that if NATO wants to treat
Kosova as a protectorate forever and occupy it forever, then we
can continue to do that. But, I think if we don't want to do
that, we don't want U.S. troops on the ground forever, then
independence is the only solution. I have often said that when
the former Yugoslavia broke up, the other citizens of the
former Yugoslavia, the Bosnians and the Croats and the
Slovenians and the--who am I leaving out?
Mr. Bugajski. Macedonia.
Mr. Engel. The Macedonians, all had the right to self-
determination. I believe that the Kosovar people should have
the same right, as well. I would like to hear what the panel
thinks about that.
I want to also add that as someone who, again, is very
sympathetic to what the Kosovar Albanians have gone through for
many, many years, I, as strongly as anyone else, condemn
atrocities committed on both sides. I think that the killing of
the 14 Serbian farmers was unfortunate, as the killing of any
innocent civilian is unfortunate. One of the things that I
think we have to resist, though, is to put them both on a moral
equivalency as if somehow the atrocities have been equal on
both sides.
While we must condemn them on all sides, and I condemn
every atrocity, be it committed by a Serb or an Albanian, I
think that we have to understand that the ethnic cleansing that
went on--I heard one of my colleagues on the floor the other
day say, well, it wasn't 100,000 ethnic Albanians that were
killed during the NATO bombing campaign; it was only 10,000--
and I thought, well, you know, if I had a family member who was
one of the 10,000, that is no solace to me that it wasn't
100,000. So, I think we need to be careful about putting the
atrocities on a moral equivalency. But, I am convinced more
than ever that independence is the only solution.
So I would like to hear some of the comments. I know, Mr.
Bugajski, we have had some discussion about this in the past. I
would be interested in hearing what you have to say about this
and the other Members as well.
Mr. Bugajski. Thank you. I completely agree that without
independence for both Kosovo and Montenegro, we are going to be
faced with continuing instability, because Milosevic will
continue to manipulate those differences, both ethnic and
republican, within the remaining Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia is
finished, and if we do not take appropriate action, if we do
not have a clear objective, two or three years down the road we
will be faced with a major policy problem, how to deal with a
semi-independent Kosovo Administration and a Serbia that
demands Kosovo back.
I think now is the time to decide on Kosovo's future
status, not in two years, not in three years' time, and the
only people who can decide are the population of Kosovo.
The other question as far as expulsion of Serbs or the
fleeing of Serbs, I don't think there is any equivalence. The
attacks on the Albanian population were government ordered,
systematic, orchestrated, and planned well in advance and
carried out with incredible brutality. What we are now
witnessing in Kosovo is somewhat different. Quite frankly, I am
surprised at the low level of revenge of a lot of returning
Albanians. The number of deaths, I think, are under 100, on
both the Albanian and Serbian side.
It is terrible, of course, that Serbs are fleeing,
particularly the innocent ones, but I don't think it is
systematic, this is not ordered by any Albanian organization.
These are local, sporadic revenge attacks. All the more reason
that we need a systematic system of justice in Kosovo, both to
try the war criminals that are present, but also to prevent new
crimes.
And, third, there is a third wave of expulsions which has
not really been reported in the press, which is a continuing
expulsion of Albanians from Serbia proper into Kosovo. Between
5,000 and 10,000 have already been forced out of their homes.
We have been focusing on the Serbs that are leaving Kosovo.
There is also a huge Albanian community within Serbia proper
that is currently experiencing what is probably similar to what
some of the Kosovo Albanians faced just a few weeks ago. Thank
you.
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Bugajski. Dr. Serwer.
Mr. Serwer. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could also respond
because I disagree with Mr. Bugajski on this point. I think,
yes, that the question of Kosovo's future status will have to
be taken up. I don't believe for a moment that there is an
equivalency between the dimensions of the horrors that were
committed against the Albanians and what is going on with the
Serbs today.
But I also believe that no people can claim independence
under the circumstances that exist in Kosovo today. It is
absolutely critical that we not embark on independence for
states that do not have a rule of law, that do not have a
democratic system in place. There is no question, quite apart
from the question of equivalency, that the current vendetta
against the Serbs in Kosovo is going to set back the cause of
those who seek self-determination for Kosovo.
Mr. Engel. I understand my colleague has to go. So I will
accede to that, and I thank him.
Mr. Cooksey. Go ahead. Do you have another question?
Mr. Engel. I want to talk about the prisoners, the Albanian
prisoners that were taken out of Kosovo into Serbia. We
understand there are many, many Albanians, ethnic Albanians
from Kosovo now in jails in Belgrade and in Serbia. I think
that that is an issue that the West needs to raise. We,
unfortunately, did not raise that issue when we negotiated the
withdrawal of the Serbian forces.
And I just wonder if anybody has any comments on that.
Mr. Cooksey. Yes, Dr. Serwer.
Dr. Serwer. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Engel, I think this is really
a disaster story. I think we need to raise the diplomatic level
of our protests on this issue. I was informed yesterday that
Professor Bardhyl Caushi, whom I know personally from some
Institute activities, was among those arrested and is now in
prison in Serbia.
I find it outrageous that more has not been done on this
issue, and I think we simply have to raise our voices and
insist that these people be released.
Mr. Engel. Thank you. I will turn back the chair. I just
wanted to say that I had an amendment which was passed
unanimously by the House in a recorded vote, there wasn't one
negative vote, demanding the release of these prisoners and the
accounting for them.
I thank my colleague for his time.
Mr. Cooksey. Surely. We want to thank our witnesses for
coming today for their testimony, and, most importantly, for
their patience with interruptions that we have. We still have
to vote casionally, you know.
The Committee may followup with additional hearings on this
subject. This, I am sure, will be an ongoing issue and subject
of discussion, and yet I feel that your testimony gave us and
provided a really good foundation for where we need to go.
Giving us good background and you have impeccable credentials,
we are glad to have people of your caliber here. The Committee
stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:33 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
August 4, 1999
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