[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT: AN ASSESSMENT OF WORKER SAFETY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 22, 1999
__________
Serial No. 106-87
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
61-428 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE
TOM BLILEY, Virginia, Chairman
W.J. ``BILLY'' TAUZIN, Louisiana JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan
MICHAEL G. OXLEY, Ohio HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
JOE BARTON, Texas RALPH M. HALL, Texas
FRED UPTON, Michigan RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
Vice Chairman SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania BART GORDON, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER COX, California PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
STEVE LARGENT, Oklahoma ANNA G. ESHOO, California
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina RON KLINK, Pennsylvania
BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California BART STUPAK, Michigan
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
GREG GANSKE, Iowa THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio
CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland
TOM A. COBURN, Oklahoma GENE GREEN, Texas
RICK LAZIO, New York KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
JAMES E. ROGAN, California DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona LOIS CAPPS, California
CHARLES W. ``CHIP'' PICKERING,
Mississippi
VITO FOSSELLA, New York
ROY BLUNT, Missouri
ED BRYANT, Tennessee
ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland
James E. Derderian, Chief of Staff
James D. Barnette, General Counsel
Reid P.F. Stuntz, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
______
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
FRED UPTON, Michigan, Chairman
JOE BARTON, Texas RON KLINK, Pennsylvania
CHRISTOPHER COX, California HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BART STUPAK, Michigan
Vice Chairman GENE GREEN, Texas
BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
GREG GANSKE, Iowa DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
ROY BLUNT, Missouri JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan,
ED BRYANT, Tennessee (Ex Officio)
TOM BLILEY, Virginia,
(Ex Officio)
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
Page
Testimony of:
Cochran, Thomas B., Director, Nuclear Programs, Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc............................. 305
Fowler, Ronald B............................................. 301
Graves, M. Brad, Lockheed Martin Energy Systems.............. 305
Green, Richard D., Director, Waste Management Division,
Environmental Protection Agency, Region 4.................. 385
Hummer, John J., Director of Corporate Environment, Safety
and Health, Lockheed Martin Corp., accompanied by Richard
J. Leon, Counsel........................................... 345
Jenkins, Garland E........................................... 298
Key, Jim H., Pace Local 5-5550............................... 292
Knapp, Malcolm R., Deputy Executive Director of Operations
for Materials, Research, and State Programs, Nuclear
Regulatory Commission...................................... 388
Logan, Robert W., Commissioner, Kentucky Department of
Environmental Protection; accompanied by John Volpe,
Manager, Radiation Control Branch, Kentucky Cabinet for
Health Services............................................ 391
Michaels, David, Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety
and Health, Department of Energy........................... 376
Miller, James H., Executive Vice President, USEC, Inc.,
accompanied by Robert Moore, Counsel....................... 358
Nemec, Joseph F., President, Bechtel Jacobs Company, LLC..... 349
Material submitted for the record by:
Green, Richard D., Director, Waste Management Division,
Environmental Protection Agency, Region 4, responses for
the record................................................. 408
Hummer, John J., Director of Corporate Environment, Safety
and Health, Lockheed Martin Corp., letter dated November
22, 1999, enclosing response for the record................ 410
Logan, Robert W., Commissioner, Kentucky Department of
Environmental Protection, responses to questions of the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations............... 418
Michaels, David, Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety
and Health, Department of Energy, responses for the record. 423
Miller, James H., Executive Vice President, USEC, Inc.,
responses to questions of the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations............................................. 415
Nemec, Joseph F., President, Bechtel Jacobs Company, LLC,
responses to questions of the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations............................................. 413
(iii)
THE PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT: AN ASSESSMENT OF WORKER SAFETY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1999
House of Representatives,
Committee on Commerce,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
room 2322, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Fred Upton
(chairman) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Upton, Burr, Bilbray,
Whitfield, Bryant, Bliley (ex officio), Klink, Stupak, Green,
Strickland, DeGette, and Dingell (ex officio).
Staff present: Dwight Cates, majority investigator; Amy
Davidge, legislative clerk; and Edith Holleman, minority
counsel.
Mr. Upton. Good morning. Today the subcommittee will review
worker safety and environmental contamination at the Paducah
Gaseous Diffusion Plant located in the congressional district
of Congressman Ed Whitfield. This hearing follows a recent June
hearing where this subcommittee reviewed the Department of
Energy's nuclear safety program for protecting workers engaged
in nuclear activities at DOE facilities as required by the
Price Anderson Amendments Act of 1998. At that hearing, the
subcommittee learned that DOE has not been aggressive in
issuing nuclear safety rules or in holding its contractors
accountable for complying with nuclear safety requirements.
Today, at the urging of Congressman Whitfield, the subcommittee
will assess DOE's effectiveness in enforcing worker safety at
the Paducah site, as well as the Department's current and past
efforts to deal with the enormous wastes that have accumulated
in the course of nearly 50 years of uranium enrichment at
Paducah.
The Paducah site was built in the early 1950's to increase
the government's production of enriched uranium for defense and
nondefense needs. The plant is surrounded by the West Kentucky
Wildlife Management Area which, I am told, is a significant
recreational resource to the Paducah community. Paducah is one
of three gaseous diffusion plants, including the K-25 plant and
the Portsmouth plant built by the Department of Energy's
predecessor agency, the Atomic Energy Commission. The
government ceased uranium production for weapons purposes in
1964. However, Paducah's enriched uranium output was actually
increased in the late 1960's to meet the growing demands of the
U.S. Naval Nuclear Program and the nuclear power industry. The
plant was operated for AEC and DOE under contract by Union
Carbide between 1951 and 1986, and then by Martin Marietta
which became Lockheed Martin between 1984 and 1996. Pursuant to
the Energy Policy Act of 1992, the newly created government
corporation USEC assumed uranium enrichment responsibility in
1993 at the Paducah and Portsmouth plants with Lockheed Martin
continuing as contractor. USEC was privatized last year, and
has assumed control of the plants from Lockheed Martin. The
Paducah and Portsmouth plants are still owned by DOE, and are
leased to USEC, which uses the plants to produce low-enriched
uranium for sale as commercial power reactor fuel.
The DOE retains responsibility for remedial action of past
environmental releases, or legacy wastes at the site, including
nearly 37,000 canisters of depleted uranium. Contaminants found
in groundwater wells around Paducah in 1988 eventually led to a
Superfund site designation for Paducah in 1994. Several
Superfund studies and cleanup actions to contain the spread of
contaminants in groundwater and soil are already underway.
Since October 1998, environmental responsibilities at Paducah
have been managed by DOE's contractor, Bechtel Jacobs
Corporation. USEC employs approximately 1,500 people, and
Bechtel Jacobs employs 400 at Paducah.
There are many issues that we will cover today and they all
stem from the committee's interest in ensuring that the workers
and the surrounding community are safe. On today's first panel
we will hear from three workers currently employed at Paducah--
Mr. Jim Key, Mr. Garland Jenkins, and Mr. Ronald Fowler--and
one Lockheed Martin employee who has worked at Paducah, Mr.
Brad Graves.
I want to express my thanks to each of you and commend you
for your bravery in coming forward to relate your experiences
at this site. I realize that your efforts to reveal the truth
at Paducah have introduced uncertain risks and complications in
your lives but your efforts are truly appreciated. In the past
3 months, the country has learned more about Paducah than the
DOE would have revealed in a period of years. You should also
know if you experience any act of retaliation following your
testimony before this subcommittee, you should notify us
immediately.
Because of your efforts, and the front page press attention
you have generated, the Secretary of Energy is now focused on
worker safety and environmental issues at the Paducah site. Mr.
Richardson visited the Paducah site on October 23, 1998, and
met with the members of the Paducah Site Specific Advisory
Board. According to the minutes of this meeting, board members
expressed serious concerns regarding plutonium emissions from
the site, the health impacts of legacy wastes at the site, and
the fear of being forgotten within the Department's large Oak
Ridge complex. The board's requests were not enough to attract
the necessary attention to these issues.
Nonetheless, the two-phased investigation the Secretary
recently initiated may answer many of the questions the board
sought answers to last year. However, I still remain concerned
that the first phase of DOE's investigation, covering the
period from 1990 to present, is insufficient. Preliminary
findings of the Department's 2-week onsite review of worker
safety and environmental issues at Paducah were released last
Tuesday. Findings include: 1, a failure of DOE to perform
adequate health and safety oversight at Paducah; 2, a lack of
discipline, formality and oversight with respect to Bechtel
Jacobs' radiation protection program; and, 3, significant
onsite hazards from legacy wastes stored onsite. But 2 weeks is
not enough time to get your hands around 10 years of
mismanagement. These preliminary findings do not include
environmental sampling data DOE has collected on and offsite.
The Department has told committee staff that radiation readings
at one offsite stream are high enough to require technicians to
wear protective clothing while taking samples. This
contaminated stream is fully accessible to the public, but
there are no warning signs.
In light of these findings, I should point out that several
State and Federal studies around Paducah indicate that there is
contamination offsite, but not at levels of current health
hazard to the public. However, data recently obtained by the
committee indicate that the levels of plutonium in offsite soil
are higher than what the State, EPA, DOE and DOE's contractors
have been telling the public.
I want to make it clear that this information needs to be
verified and any health issues resolved quickly. This committee
will give close scrutiny to any government agency or contractor
who may have misled the Paducah community regarding offsite
contamination.
It is also important to point out another issue that the
Department's investigation of Paducah has not reviewed.
Radiation protection in areas currently controlled by the
United States Enrichment Corporation is regulated by the NRC.
The NRC has informed the committee that the company is in
compliance with nuclear safety requirements and that workers at
the site are adequately protected from radiation. However,
plant upgrades to protect workers in the event of an earthquake
are still not complete. When the United States Enrichment
Corporation was privatized last year, DOE transferred more than
$200 million worth of uranium to the company to pay for these
NRC upgrades which were supposed to be completed in 1997. This
is a significant safety issue that will be thoroughly
investigated as part the committee's review of the
privatization of the United States Enrichment Corporation.
Clearly there are many issues that need to be closely
evaluated at Paducah. There seem to be new revelations coming
forth every day. The Department's Phase II investigation
covering the period before 1990 has not even started. I expect
that the Phase II effort will take months. It is unreasonable
to believe that we will have all the answers today. However, I
do expect candid answers regarding the Department's surprising
lack of safety oversight and the mistakes made by DOE's
contractors and the management changes that must occur to raise
the level of worker safety and environmental cleanup
performance at Paducah.
I also appreciate and thank the staff for working so hard
on this hearing. I know that it was rather quickly set up and
particularly with the delay last week because of the hurricane
threat to Washington. We appreciate on both sides the good
staff work done by both the Democratic and Republican members
of the staff.
At this point, I would like to make a unanimous consent
request that a number of documents that have been circulated on
both sides be made a part of the record. Without objection, so
ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. Upton. And I would recognize the ranking member of the
subcommittee, Mr. Klink.
Mr. Klink. I just note that we will have additional
documents that we will want to insert in the record as well.
Mr. Upton. Fine.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. Klink. First of all, I want to thank you for holding
this important hearing, and I would applaud the staff for the
work that they have done to help put this hearing together.
The Department of Energy and the Atomic Energy Commission
have a decade-long disgraceful record of denying workers at the
nuclear weapons plants who labor every day with highly
radioactive material, often under dangerous conditions, the
compensation that they deserved when they fell ill. They also
have a long and shameful history of telling their workers that
handling radioactive material is not dangerous and punishing
those that ask questions or who conducted the studies that
determined otherwise.
In many ways this hearing is the latest in a series of
hearings that this committee has been holding for over 2
decades, and it is depressingly similar. In 1978 we heard from
a cancer researcher who was fired by the DOE when he found
unusually high cancer deaths among the workers of the Hanford
Nuclear Weapons Facility.
In 1988 we took testimony about failed safety programs,
plants unsupervised by government owners, safety reports buried
in back cabinets, safety regulations routinely ignored, and
award fees that encourage contractors to hide safety problems
from the government. In 1994 this subcommittee worked with the
GAO to reveal that every year DOE was paying over $40 million
to private law firms to keep from paying workers' compensation
claims and environmental damages that resulted from its
contractors' deliberately negligent behavior. Over the years
probably $1 billion has been spent to avoid liability, and all
of it was taxpayer money.
We had some successes. Admiral Watkins and his tiger teams
changed as much as possible in the DOE culture. The
Whistleblower Protection Act was passed to protect contract
workers who came to Congress to talk about the problems.
Billions of dollars was appropriated for cleanups. Independent
oversight was instituted and hopefully will not be destroyed by
the DOE reorganization recently approved by the House. But this
is not enough. The testimony we will hear today will again
address these historic problems and will show that at Paducah,
workers and the environment are still not being protected. The
workers are not being compensated, and the lack of action I
believe is deliberate.
As far back as 1952, the Department recognized that to
avoid worker exposure to both uranium and small quantities of
plutonium in recycled feedstock when used in the gaseous
diffusion processing system, the material should be maintained
in a closed system, workers should have respiratory protection
and protective clothing. They should never be allowed to work
with open wounds. Every single one of these restrictions was
violated at Paducah. Management was also told to determine
where plutonium would go and whether it would concentrate and
at what levels it would concentrate. They did not.
By the late 1950's the Paducah and Oak Ridge laboratories
were finding cesium, and strontium in the feedstocks, and by
1960 the Biology and Medicine Division of the AEC reported
neptunium contamination at Paducah and resulting worker
exposure problems.
The authors of this memo said that 300 people at Paducah
should be checked for exposure but that the site hesitated to
``proceed to intensive studies because of the union's use of
this as an excuse for hazard pay. I am afraid the policy at
this plant is to be wary of the unions and any unfavorable
public relations.'' That is the end of the quote.
Another memo in 1960, which admitted there were jobs which
produced localized areas of somewhat elevated concentrations of
uranium in air for short periods of time, also worried that any
reduction in exposure would cost money. None of this was ever
told to the workers. The health physics program to check their
exposure was nonexistent in the early days, and we will hear
from two health physicists at the radiation control program at
Paducah it was still nonexistent in the early 1990's.
Management told one of the physicists that Paducah was a
chemical plant. The contractor didn't have adequate staff for
measuring instruments for uranium. Although contamination was
everywhere, there were no posted areas, and workers freely
walked throughout the site. In fact these witnesses, both hired
by Martin Marietta, supposedly to put the plant in order, were
not told by management that plutonium and neptunium were
present.
The environmental side of Paducah was little better.
Contaminated drums and trash have been buried willy nilly on
the site, sometimes off the site; trichloroethylene, TCE, a
toxic solvent was poured onto the ground. Contaminated scrap
and metal were left out in the weather in huge piles, adding to
the contaminated ground plumes leaving from the site. There is
an old pond filled with drums containing uncharacterized waste.
After the pond was full, the barrels were piled on the ground
and covered with dirt. A much larger pile was called drum or
barrel mountain. It also contains contaminated drums and other
refuse covered up by dirt. The two largest groundwater plumes
which contained techtinium 99 and trichloroethylene move one
foot per day.
Despite the expenditure of $400 million in cleanup funds at
Paducah, there is no adequate remediation underway for this
most obvious of waste streams. Dump sites are not even located,
much less characterized. DOE and its contractors have not
bothered to talk to the workers to find out where they dumped
the waste.
What has been Martin Marietta's and the DOE's response over
the past decade? Some upgrades have been made prior to the
transfer of the plant to the U.S. Enrichment Corporation, but
according to the latest DOE investigation, the radiation
control program on the DOE part of the site is still deficient.
Worker training to deal with transuranics occurred once in
1992. Bioassays to determine uptakes of radioactive material by
workers still have not been done. The most contaminated process
buildings were shut down, but they have not been characterized.
For several years they were used as changing rooms; security
personnel sometimes used them for training, going around in the
contaminated dust. Now under DOE's direct control, they are
falling apart because of disrepair, which also releases
contamination.
During the development and manufacture of nuclear material,
many people were injured. Most have now been compensated in
some way only after years of suffering. The soldiers at the
test sites have been compensated. The Marshal Islanders have
been compensated. The institutionalized children that were
subjected to radiation experiment have been compensated. The
uranium miners have been compensated, but the workers have
never been compensated. If they ask questions about their
health and working conditions, they were vilified, threatened
and lied to by the government to which they were so dedicated.
Joe Harding's heirs were told in 1991 that DOE dismissed his
claims of dangerous working conditions and declared the plant
to be safe. DOE said there was no presence of a thick uranium
hexafluoride dust because it was not consistent with the mode
of operation, but uranium was found in Mr. Harding's bones and
today we will hear testimony from two eyewitnesses about the
thick uranium and asbestos dust in the plant that workers were
forced to breathe.
When Joe Harding left the plant in 1972 he was told he
would get a disability pension for an unrelated leg injury. But
when Union Carbide reneged and the DOE, backed by the Justice
Department, fought every claim for workmens' compensation and
wrongful death, Joe Harding finally died in 1980 at the age of
58. And just 2 years ago his widow finally received $12,000 in
settlement of her claims. Just last week, secretary Richardson
called Joe Harding a cold war hero and gave his widow a medal.
Clara Harding doesn't need a medal. She is impoverished and has
lost her home. She deserves the widow's benefit that she has
been denied for almost 20 years.
Today, Mr. Chairman, I am announcing that I am sending a
letter to Secretary Richardson asking him to reopen that
settlement and pay with interest the full amount owed to Clara
Harding. It would be a small beginning to ending this very
disgraceful era, and I would ask unanimous consent that my
letter to Secretary Richardson be included in the transcript of
this hearing.
Mr. Upton. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Commerce
September 22, 1999
The Honorable Bill Richardson
Secretary
U.S. Department of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20585
Dear Secretary Richardson: Last week, you personally awarded Clara
Harding, the 76-year-old widow of Joe Harding, with a medal from the
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). You called her late husband a ``Cold
War hero,'' and honored Mrs. Harding for her ``personal contribution in
reminding us of the human face of the men and women who contributed to
the nation's effort and the ultimate success in winning the Cold War.''
It is true that the injured workers are the forgotten victims of
the Cold War. While the Department has spent billions of dollars to
clean up the environmental damage caused by the negligent handling of
toxic, hazardous and radioactive waste, minuscule amounts have been
spent to compensate workers made ill by the very same materials. In
fact, over the years, the Department has spent tens of millions of
dollars in legal fees to make sure that these workers did not receive
workmen's compensation, medical assistance, disability payments and
pensions. The entire legal establishment of the federal government was
massed to avoid these claims. Sick workers were ridiculed, vilified and
lied to and about.
The case of Joe Harding is a classic example of this treatment.
However gracious and heartfelt this gesture to Mrs. Harding may have
been on your part, it cannot obscure the decades' of shabby, dishonest
treatment and poverty that the Hardings were subjected to by the
actions of the Department, its contractors and its lawyers. Nor can it
obscure the fact that it took Mrs. Harding more than 15 years to
receive a paltry $12,000 settlement for her late husband's workmen's
compensation claims. This payment, which was fought for years by Union
Carbide's and DOE's own lawyers, was received less than two years ago.
Joe Harding worked for 18\1/2\ years at the Paducah Gaseous
Diffusion Plant (GDF). He was a process operator who worked without any
radiation protection in air thick with uranium dust that was also
contaminated with plutonium, neptunium and possibly ruthenium.
Sometimes he did maintenance in pipes that moved uranium hexaflouride
from building to building. He suffered lesions, stomach pain and other
symptoms of radiation illness. But the company told him that his work
environment was safe even though it knew that it was not.
When Mr. Harding left the Paducah GDF in 1971, he was 49 years old
and ill, probably with the cancer to which he ultimately succumbed.
Before he left, he was promised a 100 percent disability pension from
Union Carbide. But he never received that a nickel of that pension. He
lost his health insurance. He never received a retirement pension.
After Mr. Harding died, the Department issued a report said that there
was not enough radiation exposure at Paducah to cause his illness, and
that ``The presence of thick dust in the air which Mr. Harding stated
occurred . . . is not consistent with the mode of operation'' at the
plant. As testimony at the Subcommittee's hearing today will show, the
DOE report writers lied to deny Mr. Harding his compensation. Mr.
Harding's statements were absolutely consistent with the mode of
operation at Paducah. Workers frequently labored in thick uranium dust,
and many were sick. You heard many similar statements from workers
yourself last week.
Mrs. Harding deserves an ``honor'' that she can take to the bank.
By this letter, I am requesting that you direct the Department's Office
of General Counsel and Union Carbide to go back to the court of
jurisdiction in which the Harding settlement was filed and move to
reopen that settlement so that it can be increased to fully reimburse
Mrs. Harding for her years of pain and penury. Additionally, I am
requesting you to investigate what happened to Mr. Harding's retirement
pension. We have been told by DOE officials that he was offered a
pension, but never returned the paperwork. This would be surprising
since Mr. Harding fought many years to obtain some kind of compensation
for his work.
Please respond in writing by Thursday, September 30, 1999, with the
steps the Department intends to take to fully compensate Mrs. Harding
and to investigate the retirement pension. If you have any questions,
please have your staff contact Edith Holleman, Minority Counsel, at
(202) 226-3407.
Thank you for your immediate attention to this very important
matter.
Sincerely,
Ron Klink
Ranking Member, Oversight & Investigations Subcommittee
cc: Rep. Fred Upton
Mrs. Clara Harding
Mr. Upton. At this point I recognize the chairman of the
full committee, Mr. Bliley, for an opening statement.
Chairman Bliley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This hearing
builds on the committee's ongoing commitment to hold the
Department of Energy and its contractors accountable for poor
management practices that compromise worker safety, cause
unnecessary environmental contamination, and waste billions of
taxpayer dollars. The long list of poorly managed DOE projects
and programs has kept the committee very busy over the past
several years. Unfortunately, we do not have the resources to
keep track of all of DOE's mistakes, but it has been necessary
to take a hard, close look at several issues.
The subcommittee's past DOE hearings include the Pit 9
cleanup disaster in Idaho, the spent nuclear fuel project at
Hanford, the troubled Office of Science and Technology, the
radioactive tank waste at Hanford, the questionable funding of
Molten Metal Technologies, misdirected contract reform efforts,
and just recently, a review of the Department's nuclear safety
program. Each of these hearings have informed the committee of
some of the more pressing problems at DOE. Today's important
hearing will review worker safety and environmental
contamination at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant located in
Kentucky.
I have been alarmed by the reports I have read about the
Paducah site. My first priority is to determine whether current
conditions at the site and contamination offsite are
threatening workers and the community. For this information I
must rely on DOE and the Federal and State agencies. The
committee has communicated with each of these agencies and the
picture is still unclear. Last month Secretary Richardson sent
a team of investigators to the site. He has stated that DOE has
not uncovered ``any imminent threat to the public health,
worker safety, or the environment, but we are continuing to
investigate these concerns.''
The Secretary has been quick to react to Paducah's
problems, but only since they have received front page
attention. Where has the Department's health and safety
oversight been? Why does it take a special investigation to
find out whether the workers at Paducah are safe? I have an
answer: It is because the Department's safety oversight
responsibilities at Paducah have been severely mismanaged. The
initial findings of the Department's investigation have
uncovered serious mismanagement by DOE, and several problems
with DOE's contractor, Bechtel Jacobs Corporation, regarding
nuclear safety oversight, radiation protection of workers and
environmental monitoring. However, these findings are not new.
Many of the problems uncovered by the Department's recent
investigation were identified in a July 1990 Tiger team safety
review at Paducah, initiated by former Secretary Watkins.
For instance, in 1990 the Tiger team found DOE oversight
roles and responsibilities have not been well defined,
documented or communicated. A correction plan was put into
place in 1991, and millions were spent for improvements, but 9
years later the same problems persist. Thus, what confidence
can we have that corrective actions from DOE's new
investigation will be implemented? Furthermore, how can we be
confident that DOE's 2-week review is sufficient?
Today's hearing will allow us to review what further
actions need to be taken by DOE, DOE's contractors and the
regulators to ensure the safety of workers and the community.
The Paducah site and its dedicated workers have a proud
place in history. The uranium enriched at the site helped win
the cold war, and today it helps supply 40 percent of the
world's nuclear fuel for electricity. We owe it to the Paducah
community to cut through the culture of silence and deceit at
Paducah, and allow for the truth to come out. The truth and the
answers will start today at this hearing. I thank you for it,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Upton. Thank you. Mr. Strickland.
Mr. Strickland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The subject of
today's hearing is shocking and terribly disturbing. The lives
of thousands of workers and the safety of local communities
depends on our swift and just response to this crisis. I
applaud the Secretary of Energy for this initiative to
thoroughly investigate these recent reports and to take
responsibility to address the needs of past and present workers
who have been placed in harm's way. I represent southern Ohio,
not Paducah, Kentucky. Southern Ohio is the home of the uranium
enrichment plant located near Portsmouth. It is Paducah's
sister plant.
It is totally unacceptable that the current worker
compensation proposal offered by this administration covers
only Paducah workers, leaving Portsmouth workers out in the
cold. In other words, employees charged with carrying out the
same work for this government, who may have been injured as a
result of the work, are being treated differently simply
because they lived and worked in different places. Is this
just? Is it fair? Of course it isn't.
That is why this committee and this Congress should correct
this inequity. Our government must take responsibility for all
of its employees, past and present, who have been injured due
to the exposure to hazardous materials. When the
administration's proposal is sent to Congress for action, I
pledge to do everything humanly possible to ensure equal
treatment for all DOE workers.
Because this crisis demands our immediate attention, Mr.
Chairman, I urge you to join me in working to make this
legislative proposal more inclusive and to see that it is
swiftly passed into law. Further, I am requesting that this
subcommittee hold a similar hearing on the Department of
Energy's investigation of the Portsmouth site at the earliest
appropriate time, and I urge you to join me in working to
rectify our government's abandonment of cold war veterans and
their modern day colleagues.
Finally, our action will demonstrate to the American
citizens just what kind of government they have and what kind
of people we are.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Upton. We certainly appreciate your interest on this
and I assure you we will continue to monitor this and I know
that questions for this site obviously reflect a deep interest
in your site in your State as well.
Mr. Strickland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Whitfield.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I particularly want
to thank Chairman Bliley and Chairman Upton and Mr. Klink for
agreeing to have this hearing and to speed up the process,
particularly regarding the health and well-being of the current
and former workers at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, as
well as citizens in the surrounding area.
And before I read my statement, I would like to announce
that we have been trying to obtain approval for DOE to
reprogram $1.96 million to begin cleaning up uranium
hexafluoride cylinders at the Paducah plant. There are over
37,000 of them there, and we obtained that approval this
morning and so that is a very small step in beginning to
immediately try to address this problem.
I am delighted that Mr. Klink talked about Joe Harding. I
might also say that the Paducah Sun in 1986 ran an article
talking about all of its problems at the Paducah plant, with
the exception of the plutonium. It is tragic that it has taken
this many years to focus on this and to begin to clean it up.
The events of the last month and a half at the Paducah plant
have all the elements of a best selling spy novel--exhumed
bodies with uranium; allegations of missing documents;
coverups; long-term exposure to toxic materials; black
radioactive ooze at landfills. Unlike a great book with a good
ending, this story is still unfolding, and I am determined that
the ending of this story is not a tragic one.
Since my election to Congress 5 years ago, I have worked
with the employees at the Paducah plant to preserve collective
bargaining rights, to protect their pension benefits and jobs
in the midst of privatization, to minimize the impacts of the
declining domestic uranium market and increased Russian uranium
imports, and to obtain funds for the construction of a uranium
hexafluoride conversion facility to convert the depleted
uranium.
But today I am committed to finding answers to important
questions which have been raised by a Federal lawsuit and
subsequent articles.
The first panel of witnesses includes employees of the
Paducah plant who have raised serious allegations of wrongdoing
by former DOE contractors, Lockheed Martin and Martin Marietta,
as well as Union Carbide.
They allege that the contractors knowingly presented false
and fraudulent claims for payment, cost compensation and awards
under contracts with the Department of Energy, and they
endangered the health and welfare of the employees. From this
panel I want to hear the specific allegations and the evidence
to support those allegations.
The second panel is composed of witnesses representing past
and present DOE contractors and the current operator of the
production facility--Lockheed Martin, Bechtel Jacobs, and the
United States Enrichment Corporation. From this panel I want to
know if the allegations raised are true. In addition, we want
to know whether the deficiencies enumerated in the Tiger team
assessment of 1990 have been corrected; what problems exist in
cleaning up the site today; what is the timetable and site
management plan for the cleanup; and was there a calculated
effort to keep workers and the community in the dark about the
presence of plutonium in the materials the plant received, and
what Congress can do to facilitate the cleanup.
The third panel includes the Federal and State regulators
of the plant--the Department of Energy, and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency and
the Kentucky Department of Natural Resources. From this panel I
want to know why supervision of the plant has been so lax, to
explore the Energy Department's proposal for a pilot project to
compensate workers with injuries resulting from radiation
exposure, is the plant safe today and what steps will be taken
to clean up the contaminated sites and to correct mismanagement
of the past.
Mr. Chairman, I represent men and women who have worked and
still work at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. They have
not asked for, nor do they expect much. They do, however,
expect their employers and the government to be honest with
them, to provide them with a safe place to work, to pay them a
fair wage and to compensate them for medical expenses incurred
because of their responsibility by the government or its
contractors.
The entire Paducah community is entitled to answers about
the plant to clean up this area and to correct past wrongs. I
hope my colleagues on the subcommittee will help uncover why it
took an investigative report and a Federal lawsuit to bring
these revelations to light.
Help us separate fact from fiction. We want to know the
truth, and we want a safe working place for workers not only at
the Paducah plant, but at Portsmouth and Oak Ridge and other
DOE facilities around the country. Thank you.
Mr. Upton. Thank you.
We recognize the ranking member of the full committee, a
member of this subcommittee, Mr. Dingell.
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman, I thank you and I commend you
for holding this hearing. Worker safety at DOE nuclear sites
has long been a matter of interest to me and also to the
committee. It was the subject, as members of this subcommittee
will recall, of regular investigative work by this subcommittee
during the 1980's and early 1990's. Back when I chaired the
subcommittee in 1994, I made one observation that still holds
true: One of the largest groups of likely American victims of
the cold war are the workers who labored for years in our vast
nuclear weapons complexes across the Nation.
Unfortunately, last week, Mr. Chairman, the House of
Representatives, when it voted to create an autonomous nuclear
weapons agency within the Department of Energy, turned its back
on these workers and communities around the weapons facilities
and the environment. The House voted to return to the secret
days of the Atomic Energy Commission when so many of these
tragedies began and when the culture was created that we
suppressed public flow of information and didn't give a whoop
about the environment, worker safety and other things.
That created a situation where our employees at these
facilities, whether they be Federal or contractors, were calmly
and serenely irradiated and subjected to other risks of
employment and when the communities found that contamination of
every one of these sites was regular order of business. And I
would observe to you, Mr. Chairman, this was all done under a
culture which was caused because of its secretive character,
the suppression of information to the public at large, the
media, and of course to the Congress which was viewed as a
threat by that agency at that time. And it took us years to
break that attitude on the part of that agency.
Today we are seeing that the Congress has willingly
returned to that in the legislation we passed last week. Worker
safety in these times was knowingly jeopardized in favor of
weapons production, and the safety of people in adjacent
communities was severely risked; and as a result, all of the
sites under the former jurisdiction of the Atomic Energy
Commission, acting under a veil of secrecy, are now
contaminated with hazardous both high- and low-level of nuclear
waste.
Those who had the temerity to ask questions were
systematically harassed, intimidated, and the Congress and
others were stonewalled. When outsiders made inquiry on these
matters, lying was the usual refuge of bureaucrats in that
agency.
Today's hearing is important, and again, Mr. Chairman, I
commend you. What went on at Paducah was outrageous, but what
went on at Paducah was replicated at many other sites run by
the Atomic Energy Commission.
Last week's vote by the House was also outrageous. We do
need many more hearings like this to convince the leadership of
this House to reverse the course and go out for independent and
aggressive oversight of the weapons complex to see to it that
we work to bring about the necessary cleanup and to see to it
that that cleanup involves not only the physical cleanup of
sites, but a cleanup of an attitudinal problem at DOE, which is
the inheritance of the mantle of the Atomic Energy Commission,
and to see to it that we have a situation come about where the
Congress can find out what goes wrong and properly supervise
this matter instead of returning to the veil of secrecy which
caused so many of the problems.
I thank you and commend you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Upton. Thank you.
Mr. Bryant.
Mr. Bryant. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At this time, I would
request to be able to pass and reserve my time.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Burr.
Mr. Burr. I thank the chairman and I also thank the entire
committee and our witnesses, because the postponement of this
hearing allowed many of us to go back to the State of North
Carolina and address what still today is a significant disaster
and will continue to be a problem.
I want to commend Mr. Whitfield for one of the finest
opening statements that I have heard in a long time, and one
that clearly tells me that he has stayed focused on the human
face behind the issue, and that is the workers in Paducah and
the many people that live around this plant.
Paducah does have a long history, a history that goes back
to the 1950's, a history that if this were the book, it would
include the cold war, it would include the need for nuclear
development, and this was at the centerpiece of that effort.
Throughout those 50 years, much has happened. And quite
honestly, questions have been raised about safety and
contamination. Mr. Whitfield alluded to the Paducah Sun article
in 1986. Had we only listened then, maybe we could have started
this process much sooner.
It has been amazing to me after reviewing the documents for
this hearing, my conclusion is why didn't we listen? Why didn't
we listen to the Paducah Sun? Why did it take the Washington
Post and other news outlets finding documents that this
committee and Congress could not obtain through the Department
of Energy because in many cases contractors never filed those
papers with that agency. How is it that for 9 years, an
appendix to the report could be lost and all of a sudden
reappear?
Ladies and gentlemen, I think that raises the question that
we should be here to ask: How hard are contractors and the
Department of Energy working today to solve the problems at
Paducah? Much time has been spent talking about other
investigations, other sites, and clearly that is a
responsibility of this Congress, but I am hopeful that what we
will do today before we leave is that the Department of Energy,
the contractors, and the Congress will commit that we will
clean this site up and assure worker safety.
Let me read you a quote from Dave Michaels with the
Department of Energy that appeared in the Post on September 9.
He said, ``We are most concerned that these problems continue
to repeat themselves and that the laboratory management,
despite commitments made in previous enforcement actions, have
failed to correct identified problems. We have used enforcement
on things that we knew were real and contractors haven't
responded.''
Well, I understand that the investigations are ongoing. I
am concerned that the Department of Energy's preliminary
observations announced September 14 are simply a rehash of
earlier investigations. If in the end DOE does not improve in
the way in which it oversees contract operations, how it
evaluates contractor performance, and the way that it actually
writes its contracts, then none of the other changes it makes
will take hold. If DOE will not make the needed changes in
contract management, I am certain this committee and this
Congress will have a large say in how we proceed in the future.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing, but I
especially thank those media outlets that were able to access
documents that furthered the urgency for this hearing and I
yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Green.
Mr. Gene Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And as a Member of
Congress and an American, it makes me ashamed to read the
documents that we have and that we as a country treated our
workers, or through the contractors we hired, this way.
I want to thank the chairman for scheduling this hearing
and, again, not having the long-term seniority that our ranking
member has, it is frustrating, I imagine, to be here year after
year and be told that something is being done and yet it is
not.
Over and over we hear of lax standards and nonexistent
safety protocols and hazards and dangers that no one should
have to tolerate. Despite action and oversight by this
committee, it seems every time Congress hears how these
problems are fixed, you hear the latest plan for improving the
working conditions at these facilities, we instead have to hear
more problems: our most recent problem at Paducah, Kentucky
where for almost 40 years we have managed to avoid dealing with
clear evidence of radiation hazard for workers.
In one report from 1960, it appears that the people we put
in charge kept the information about the real possibility that
dangers and unsafe working conditions existed secret because
the managers were afraid that they would have to pay hazardous
pay. We will hear testimony from environmental safety officials
at the plant about exposure of workers to plutonium which is so
radioactive that one millionth of an ounce, if inhaled, can
cause cancer.
As early as 1952 we knew that exposure of workers to
plutonium and other man-made metal was dangerous. That did not
stop those who ran the facilities from ignoring the dangers to
workers and failing to protect them from exposure. It seems
that the contractors we hired knew that there was widespread
and systematic and documented failures in their effort to stop
the spread of these materials, but did nothing to try to
correct it.
Our government bears much of the blame for the lack of
oversight which has led to this and other situations. However,
I hope that by now we would have identified the problems and
been far down the road toward solving them, and I hope that the
Department of Energy and the contractors have done a better job
at our other facilities, whether they be in Ohio or Texas, and
I look forward to the testimony today from the witnesses. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Bilbray.
Mr. Bilbray. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and
the ranking member for holding this hearing, and I think the
bipartisan aspect of this hearing is something that we should
encourage more often.
I would like to congratulate the gentleman from Kentucky,
Mr. Whitfield, because ever since he came to this Congress I
know that this issue has been one that he has been doggedly
following and hounding. He knew that it was an issue that was
not going to go away, and he did it in a very organized, to a
degree quiet at times, but very effective way of forcing this
issue out into the light of day. And Mr. Whitfield, I think you
set an example for a lot of us, that you may feel strongly
about things, but screaming and shouting is not the only way to
take care of problems. Actually addressing them is appropriate.
Mr. Chairman, the more I read these reports, I thank my
lucky stars that when I was working around a nuclear facility I
was working under the Department of Defense rather than the
Department of Energy, and I just say that as somebody who has
worked and seen the safety precautions and the employee
protection that the Department of Defense rendered to those of
us working in those environments, and I have to raise up my
hands and shrug my shoulders and say why not here.
But I also have to point out that we can find blame and
fault, and that is really easy for us who are legislators to
point fingers at any administration. The problem is, can we
find answers? And I would ask to take a look at the fact that
all of us bear in some degree responsibility in the past, t we
bear more responsibility to make sure that these situations are
addressed in the future. And I would ask all of us what are we
doing to initiate some answers here.
And just this morning I have heard the statement of cleanup
mentioned countless times, and I would just ask every member
who has ever mentioned the issue of cleanup, at are we doing to
make cleanups safer and more cost effective?
A good example is the problem doesn't stop with the DOE.
The fact is that we just had a situation last year where the
Army Corps of Engineers cleaned up a World War II site, shipped
the material from New York all of the way to California, and
then disposed of it illegally in a facility that is not
supposed to be taking nuclear material. And their reason for
doing it, to save money.
So I think that we need to look around and say there is a
deeper problem here, and I will just ask all of us to remember
that every time we talk about cleaning up a nuclear site, we
should be asking ourselves and the public should be asking us
what are we doing to provide the facilities to cleanup these
sites, cause the material removed has to go somewhere. And I
ask this committee as an oversight committee to take a look at
what happened last year and what we need to do in the future so
that the material can be cleaned up and transferred to an
appropriate disposal site, which is something that none of us
want in our neighborhood, but we all want done somewhere.
We need to learn from the mistakes of the past; let's
change the system but maybe change our own attitudes about
being proactive in nuclear cleanup, and say what is this
committee as the Commerce Committee doing to initiate the
ability for Paducah to be cleaned up in a safe, cost-effective
manner? And I think that this hearing can remind us that doing
nothing is not an option.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Upton. Thank you.
Mr. Stupak.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize that I
will be in and out of this hearing because I have a number of
congressional hearings today. I am very interested in this
hearing because I think it is important that we examine the
safety record of the Department of Energy with respect to its
handling of plutonium and other radioactive materials.
Yesterday the Washington Post reported that radiation risks to
workers were concealed at Paducah because of ``fear of a public
outcry.'' While it is unclear from the news article whether DOE
had knowledge of the contamination, it is clear that their
oversight of the operation was disastrous. This disaster has
caused people to pay with their lives, due to cancer they
contracted while working in that unsafe environment.
The Department of Energy has done a horrendous job of
protecting the public workers and the public in Paducah from
radiation exposure and harm. DOE is now proposing to ship
plutonium through both of our districts as well as that of Mr.
Blunt from this subcommittee. DOE assures us it will be handled
safely by a responsible government contractor. Yet to this
point, the DOE has refused to have public hearings in my
district or anywhere else along the shipment route. Even though
the Canadian Government is having public meetings on the
shipment, DOE is refusing to even hold one hearing in this
country. Are they afraid of public outcry? Does this situation
sound disturbingly similar to the subject of this current
hearing today? I hope not.
I believe DOE and its contractors should be open and
forthright with respect to their responsibility in the
operation at Paducah. I believe they have both a duty and an
obligation to find out who is responsible for these lapses and
ensure the victims are treated fairly.
Furthermore, I believe DOE should quit stalling and begin
hearings on the proposed MOX fuel shipment scheduled to go
through our districts. Enough coverups. We need public
discussion. DOE's track record with Paducah gives us a serious
doubt and reason to doubt the safety of DOE's nuclear weapons
program. Only public discussion and reparation will repair that
lost trust. Let me remind DOE officials here today, last week
the House unanimously passed my amendment to hold public
hearings before you begin shipment of the plutonium and the MOX
fuels.
Four hundred thirty-five Members said hold hearings. I darn
well hope that we have those hearings and have them soon.
Thank you for holding this hearing, Mr. Chairman. I look
forward to working with you on this issue as well as the MOX
fuel shipment issue.
Mr. Upton. I supported your amendment on the House floor
and only a slow subway and the rain stopped me from getting
over there to speak in favor of it.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Bryant.
Mr. Bryant. I want to thank you for having this hearing. My
colleague from Tennessee, Zach Wamp, represents the Oak Ridge
area and for those of you who know him, know how strong he
feels about all issues and certainly will work aggressively to
ensure that the right thing is done in this instance to include
Oak Ridge.
I do want to associate myself with the remarks of Mr.
Strickland and Mr. Whitfield who also have facilities. We have
talked a little bit and as I sit here and listen and review the
materials, I too am very concerned about what appears to be not
negligence but active coverup over a number of years, and for
reasons that are very inappropriate given the risk involved
here.
I do again thank all of you for being here. I look
especially forward to hearing from the workers, both at Paducah
and Oak Ridge, and I don't know if this is their first
opportunity to actually testify, but I welcome that and look
forward to that and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Upton. Thank you.
At this point we welcome our first panel. They include Mr.
Jim Key, Mr. Ronald Fowler, Mr. Thomas Cochran, and Mr. Brad
Graves. It is my understanding that many of you, if not all,
brought counsel with you, which is certainly fine and fits
under the committee rules, but by doing so they need also to be
sworn, in that everything is under oath here. If you would
identify them when you begin your testimony, that would be
appropriate. At this point if you would stand and raise your
right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Upton. By the way, your counsel need to do the same
thing. Identify yourself and then we will swear you in.
Mr. Cooper. Charles Cooper, representing Mr. Jenkins and
Mr. Fowler.
Mr. Egan. Joe Egan, representing Mr. Jenkins and Mr. Fowler
and Mr. Cochran.
Mr. McMurray. William F. McMurray for Mr. Jenkins and Mr.
Fowler.
Mr. Mull. Martin Mull for Mr. Jenkins and Mr. Fowler.
Mr. Lawrence. Mr. Lawrence for Mr. Jenkins and Mr. Fowler
and Mr. Cochran.
Mr. Upton. For counsel, who did not take the oath
previously, raise your hand I will swear you.
[Counsel sworn.]
Mr. Upton. Now you are all under oath. Mr. Key, we will
start with you. We would like you to limit your remarks to 5
minutes. Your statement will be made fully part of the record
in its entirety, if you can stay pretty close to 5 minutes.
By the way, because of the delay in the hearing from last
week due to the hurricane, we very much appreciate getting your
testimony on time so we could review it over the weekend. Go
ahead.
TESTIMONY OF JIM H. KEY, PACE LOCAL 5-5550; GARLAND E.
JENKINS; RONALD B. FOWLER; M. BRAD GRAVES, LOCKHEED MARTIN
ENERGY SYSTEMS; AND THOMAS B. COCHRAN, DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR
PROGRAMS, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.
Mr. Key. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to come
before you today. My name is Jim Key.
Mr. Upton. Could you bring the mike a little closer?
Mr. Key. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and committee members for
allowing me to come before you today. I am Jim Key, an hourly
electrician at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant at Paducah,
Kentucky. I was hired by Union Carbide in 1974 as a laborer and
I have worked for a succession of contractors, including Martin
Marietta, Lockheed Martin, and most recently the privatized
United States Enrichment Corporation. Since 1989 I have also
served as the environmental safety and health representative
for Local 5-550 of the Paper Allied Industrial Chemical and
Energy Workers Union.
At the outset, allow me to clarify for the record that
neither I nor PACE Local 5-550 is a party to any litigation
with respect to health and safety issues at Paducah at this
time. The Department of Energy headquarters oversight staff
have included me in daily outbriefs when they investigated the
Paducah site during the Phase I study between August 17 and
September 3, 1999. It was disturbing to learn, however, that
elements within Department of Energy now want to exclude me
from further participation, apparently based on the erroneous
charge that I had leaked my notes from the outbriefs to the
press. This is wholly inaccurate and appears to be a function
of the Department of Energy looking for a scapegoat to blame
for the publicity associated with the disclosure of the
oversight team report.
If there is one message that I want the committee to
receive from the workers at Paducah today, it is this: The
majority of current and former workers are afraid that they may
have been exposed to substances like plutonium without proper
protection and that they will, as a result, be stricken with a
fatal disease and lose their lives.
Allow me to describe some of the working conditions and I
think you will understand the fear. Shortly after I was hired
in 1974 I joined the group of workers who were directed to take
drum loads of uranium metal shavings from the machine shop and
dump them into deep, onsite pits. The uranium spontaneously
ignited before the metal chips ever hit the bottom of the hole
and a pungent and irritating smoke enveloped us. A coworker
used a front-end loader and dumped soil to cover over the fire.
The reason the uranium metal caught fire is it is hydrofluoric.
During the plant upgrades CIP-CUP project, 20-foot diameter
converters were hoisted by overhead cranes with pipe openings
that emitted clouds of smoke. The smoke was uranium
hexafluoride reacting with moisture in the air. Sometimes the
smoke was so thick, you could not see the overhead crane
operators. Respirators were not required. Between 1977 and 1982
I was assigned the responsibility of grinding asbestos transite
to fit as covers over high-voltage electrical cable. I was not
provided any personal protective equipment or air monitoring.
At the end of the day when I went to the change room, my entire
body was covered with white asbestos dust.
Union Carbide Nuclear Corporation knew in 1952 that the
introduction of plutonium-contaminated reactor tails into the
uranium enrichment process at Oak Ridge, a process similar to
Paducah, may require consideration of certain changes to the
health physics program, including a contamination control
program.
In 1985 DOE identified a need to protect workers from
exposure to transuranics. The report concluded that Paducah
management, in conjunction with DOE, should conduct an exposure
assessment for those workers involved in processing and
recycling material at Paducah Feed Plant.
A similar recommendation was made to conduct an exposure
assessment at the Portsmouth, Ohio Oxide Conversion Facility.
DOE admitted no such exposure assessment was performed for the
first time last week.
Another report in 1990, ``Neptunium Experience at PGDP,''
concluded that the presence of transuranics at Paducah requires
significantly different control procedures. What is clear is
that the government's contractors knew the need to protect
workers from plutonium and other transuranics since 1952. It
took 40 years after the Union Carbide memo cited above to
implement a contamination control program specifically for
transuranics such as neptunium and plutonium. Because the site
didn't have this basic radiation control equipment for almost
40 years, contamination of all types was tracked from building
to building, into vehicles and into workers' homes.
In summary, workers are afraid of what may happen to them
in the future. They have worked in conditions which exposed
them to radiological and chemical contamination that have long
legacy periods. These workers who served our Nation as veterans
of the cold war production era must not be forgotten. The
workers at Paducah and DOE sites deserve more than medical
monitoring. They deserve coverage of the work force under the
Federal workers' compensation system that shifts the burden of
proof onto the Federal Government to demonstrate that workplace
exposures didn't lead to illnesses in light of the Department
of Energy's deceit and failure to monitor workers for radiation
and other types of risk; and, two, health insurance coverage
for all at-risk workers and their spouses.
The harm to humans must be taken as seriously as the
environmental harm to dirt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Jim H. Key follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jim H. Key, Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical &
Energy Workers International Union
I am Jim Key, an hourly electrician at the Paducah Gaseous
Diffusion Plant (``PGDP'') in Paducah, Kentucky. I was hired by Union
Carbide in 1974 as a laborer, and I have worked for a succession of
contractors including Martin Marietta, Lockheed Martin, and most
recently for the privatized USEC, Inc. Since 1989, I have served as the
Environment, Safety & Health Representative for Local 5-550 of the
Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers Union (``PACE'')
and its predecessor the Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Union
(``OCAW'').1
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Local was chartered by the Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers
International Union (``OCAW'') on January 21, 1953.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PACE represents approximately 850 hourly production, maintenance,
environmental restoration, waste management and escort workers who are
employed by USEC, Inc. Approximately 30 PACE workers who are performing
waste management and cylinder management under USEC's direction are
scheduled to be transitioned to the DOE's Management and Integrating
Contractor, Bechtel-Jacobs LLC, on October 4, 1999.
At the outset, allow me to clarify for the record that neither I,
nor PACE Local 5-550, is a party to any litigation with respect to
health and safety issues at Paducah at this time.
DOE Headquarters Oversight Staff has included me in the daily out-
briefs by the DOE Oversight Team when they investigated the Paducah
site during the Phase I study between August 17 and September 3, 1999.
It was disturbing to learn, however, that elements within DOE now want
to exclude me from further participation, apparently based on the
erroneous charge that I had leaked my notes from the outbriefs to the
press. This is wholly inaccurate, and appears to be a function of DOE
looking for a scapegoat to blame for the publicity associated with the
disclosure of the Oversight team report. DOE needs to provide public
assurances that a designated union representative will continue to be
included in all outbriefs as the Paducah investigation continues.
1. A Fundamental Concern of Workers at Paducah
If there is one message I want the Committee to receive from the
workers at Paducah, it is this:
The majority of current and former workers are afraid that they
may have been exposed to substances like plutonium without
proper protection and that they will, as a result, be stricken
with a fatal disease and lose their lives. I have this fear
from my 25 years of work at Paducah.
Allow me to describe some of the working conditions and the site's
historic failures to protect workers from exposure to everything from
asbestos to radiation, and I think you will understand that fear.
2. Brief History of My Personal Working Conditions and Lack of Exposure
Monitoring to Transuranics
URANIUM FIRES: Shortly after I was hired in 1974, I joined a group
of laborers who were directed to take drum loads of uranium metal
shavings from the machine shop and dump them into deep holes behind an
on site (C-746) warehouse. The uranium spontaneously ignited before the
metal chips ever hit the bottom of the hole and a pungent and
irritating smoke enveloped us. A co-worker used a front loader and
dumped soil to cover over the fire. We don't know if the fires were
smothered by the soil, because we were directed to go back and get
another truckload of uranium shavings which also ignited when we dumped
those drums. The reason the uranium metal caught fire is that it is
pyrophoric, which means that, under certain conditions, the uranium
will simply self-ignite and burn. To my knowledge, this dumping ground
has yet to be characterized, and is not included in the DOE's 2006 Plan
for Environmental Cleanup.
URANIUM DUSTS: I worked on the Cascade Upgrade Project (``CIP-
CUP''), removing and installing the large motors that drive the
thousands of compressors in the enrichment process. During the
disassembly process, 20-foot diameter converters were hoisted by cranes
with pipe openings that were emitting clouds of smoke. The smoke was
uranium hexaflouride (``UF6'') reacting with moisture in the air. When
this reaction occurs, uranium becomes airborne. My co-workers reported
that the smoke was so thick, they couldn't even see the crane
operators. Respirators were not required.
ASBESTOS EXPOSURES: Between 1977 and 1982, I was assigned the
responsibility for grinding asbestos transite to fit as covers over
high voltage electrical cable. I was provided no Personal Protective
Equipment (``PPE'') or air monitoring. At the end of the day, I went to
the change room with my entire body covered with asbestos dust.
NO RESPIRATORY PROTECTION: I worked in the C-410 building which,
beginning in 1953 and continuing through 1976, was used to convert
plutonium-contaminated uranium, known as ``reactor tails,'' back into
uranium hexaflouride for introduction into the uranium enrichment plant
at Paducah. I recall having to hold my breath to get through clouds of
unknown fumes in the C-410 building and there was no respiratory
protection required.
TRANSURANICS: In the mid-1970's, I observed operators cleaning up
spills of ``black powder'' (crushed spent reactor fuel that contained
plutonium, neptunium, and technetium-99) in the C-410 Feed Materials
Building. Workers were not advised on the presence of transuranics, or
the need for special health physics monitoring. The first time I ever
learned plutonium or neptunium was used and employees were at risk of
exposure was in 1990, when Martin Marietta advised of the need for
monitoring employee exposure to transuranics.
NO CONTAMINATION CONTROL: There were no formal contamination
control procedures in use at Paducah until 1990. Contamination control
involves the use of radiation detectors that workers pass through to
make sure that they don't have contamination on their clothes, skin or
shoes that they could track outside of the building. Because the site
didn't have this basic radiation control equipment for almost 40 years,
contamination of all kinds was tracked from building to building, into
vehicles, and off-site into workers' homes.
3. DOE and Its Contractors Deliberately Failed to Protect Workers from
Uptakes to Neptunium and Plutonium For Nearly 40 Years
Union Carbide Nuclear Company knew in 1952 that the introduction of
plutonium contaminated ``reactor tails'' into the uranium enrichment
process at Oak Ridge--a process similar to that at Paducah--``may
require consideration of certain changes to the plant health physics
program'', including a contamination control program.
This March 26, 1952 Union Carbide memo, which was declassified in
1995, states, ``[S]ince plutonium has a specific activity approximately
100,00 times that of uranium, it may be noted that a very much smaller
mass of plutonium is required to produce a given surface or air
contamination level than is necessary with uranium.'' The memo added:
``From a radiation standpoint, plutonium is considered somewhat more
toxic than is uranium with the result that the plant acceptable limit
for plutonium air contamination should be lower than is the
corresponding uranium limit.'' Additionally, the memo stated that under
certain conditions it would be necessary to have specific contamination
controls for plutonium, including labeling areas as ``plutonium
contaminated locations'' and tagging equipment accordingly. (Memo
attached)
Again in 1985, DOE identified the need to protect workers from
exposure to transuranics. The Joint Task Force on Uranium Recycle
Material Processing (DOE/OR-859), September 1985 concluded that
``Paducah management, in conjunction with DOE, should conduct an
exposure assessment (to transuranics and fission products) for those
workers involved in the processing of recycled material at the Paducah
Feed Plant.'' A similar recommendation was made to conduct an exposure
assessment at the Portsmouth, Ohio Oxide Conversion Facility. We have
no evidence that these recommendations were acted upon or communicated
to the workforce. (Excerpt attached)
In yet another report, Neptunium Experience at PGDP, K/ETO-30
(September 1990), DOE's contractor concluded that ``[t]he presence of
transuranics [at Paducah] requires significantly different control
procedures.'' (Excerpt attached)
What is clear is that the AEC and DOE contractors knew of the need
to protect workers from plutonium and other transuranics with special
safeguards as early as 1952. The need for exposure assessment to
transuranics was declared in 1985. Finally, 40 years after the Union
Carbide memo cited above, Martin Marietta Energy Systems commenced a
contamination control program specifically for transuranics (neptunium
and plutonium). The Environment, Safety and Health Information Bulletin
(February 29, 1992) states: ``The program demands a higher level of
compliance with Health Physics Practices and lowers the acceptable
limits for air and surface contamination in the plant.'' (Excerpt
attached).
In 1990, Martin Marietta commenced a voluntary program for workers
to provide a simulated 24-hour sample for transuranics. The 30 people
who volunteered, however, were not necessarily those who were most at
risk for transuranic uptakes, i.e. those who worked in the feed plant
buildings or the enrichment process areas. Approximately 16 hourly
workers were included--less than 2% of the hourly workforce.
The results were invalidated, however. On February 11, 1991, Martin
Marietta Energy Systems announced it would ``invalidate'' the sample
results due to ``several concerns and discrepancies'' at the contract
laboratory that performed the work (memo attached). Martin Marietta
asked that employees resubmit new samples, and announced that Oak Ridge
National Laboratories would re-analyze samples. Only 7 workers elected
to participate in the re-test--three of which were hourly. Apparent
mistrust of Oak Ridge National Labs, a DOE controlled operation, was
cited as a reason why far fewer Paducah workers elected to participate
in the follow-up tests. To rectify the concern, the local union
identified independent labs, but Martin Marietta completely rejected
their use.
Results for the 7 workers were reported on July 15, 1991. All 7
reported less than detectable levels of plutonium and other
transuranics. However, the results from the original 30 bioassay sample
results and the written analysis of what went wrong at the contract
laboratory have never been disclosed. Recently, I was told by USEC,
which controls access to DOE's information, that this particular
information about the 30 bioassay samples is ``sensitive'' and
``management is reluctant to release this information due to concern
about how it would be used''.
If management is correct that the contract laboratory simply erred
in its performance, there should be nothing to fear from the full and
free examination of this data. However, such needless secrecy breeds
mistrust. Perhaps, the Commerce Committee could assist in securing this
data for the workers.
DOE claims that it has historically provided whole body counting
machines for detecting internal dose. According to a 1993 NIOSH
Memorandum 2, Paducah used the mobile in vivo monitoring
system from Oak Ridge Y-12 and could only schedule exams infrequently.
The detection system produced results that were ``unreliable and
erratic'' according to NIOSH, and it was not usually possible to
perform an in vivo exam immediately after a suspected uptake by a
worker since the mobile system was either not on site or out of service
being repaired. Since uranium processed at Paducah was typically quite
soluble, ``the lack of an in vivo examination on demand was a serious
deficiency'', according to NIOSH.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Trip Report, Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Henry B. Spitz,
January 29, 1993, attached to Memorandum to File from J.H. Stebbings,
NIOSH, February 8, 1993
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The reality of plutonium contamination in the production process
did not register with the overwhelming majority of the hourly workforce
at Paducah until an article appeared in the Washington Post on August
8, 1999. Why was the workforce in the dark when Martin Marietta had
instituted a voluntary testing for transuranics in 1990? After 1990,
when the term ``transuranics'' was introduced to the hourly workforce,
a listing of specific radioactive elements, such as plutonium, was
rarely included in employee communications, and when plutonium was
mentioned, it was labeled as a ``trace'' quantity. It is true that some
people received limited training on the presence of plutonium. But even
today, the current basic training manuals (General Employee Training,
Radiological Worker I and Radiological Worker II) that every employee
must study to work at the plant do not communicate the presence of
plutonium and neptunium.
5. Workers' Locker Rooms Were ``Hot''
Reactor tails and feed processing stopped when the government was
ordered to buy UF6 from outside vendors in the late 1970's. The so-
called ``feed'' building (C-410) remained in use for 13 more years for
support activities, such as the locker room for changing, and storage
and repair of computers. Surveys of the C-410 locker area in November
1989 found lockers had up to 350,000 dpm (disintegrations per minute)
of fixed contamination. The toilet and shower areas had 175,000 dpm.
The computer storage area had 175,000 dpm. By comparison, the limit for
off site release is 5,000 dpm for fixed contamination. At these levels,
the DOE Radiation Control Manual suggests that these areas should have
been posted as a ``contamination area'' or as a ``high contamination
area,'' and, thus, should not be used as a clean change area. Further,
these surveys do not identify what isotopes were in the buildings. The
reported contamination could have included some amounts of plutonium
The C-410 Feed Building was closed shortly thereafter. The C-410
building, as well as C-420 and C-340 (a uranium metals production and
hydroflouric acid production building), are not adequately
characterized, and no plan or funding exists for decontaminating and
decommissioning. Animals have taken up residence in the C-410 building
and are tracking contamination out of the building.
To the best of my knowledge, the DOE contractors did not require
workers to provide bioassay samples to determine if there had been
ingestion of plutonium, neptunium or other transuranics until 1991. If
any sampling did occur, internal dose or burden results of these
transuranics were not reported to workers. Although the union has
requested it, there has been no epidemiological morbidity or mortality
study at the site.
5. Current Worker Safety Problems Identified by the Oversight Team on
the DOE Part of the Paducah site
The DOE oversight team made a number of observations, including:
the air sampling process used at the site today does not
ensure that air sample results are effectively used to
establish the need for respiratory protection, or that the
respirators now in use provide adequate worker protection.
there has not been adequate radio-isotopic characterization,
adversely impacting the effectiveness of the rad protection
programs.
radiation control procedures are generic and may need to be
tailored to specific jobs and hazards.
radiation control training doesn't adequately address
radiological hazards, such as transuranics, nor do rad work
permits describe the radiological hazards.
If these and other worker safety findings are validated, DOE will
need to take hands-on steps to make sure that the contractor and
subcontractor radiation protection programs are brought into compliance
with the Price Anderson Act regulations.
The DOE team made two additional significant observations:
Release criteria for radiologically contaminated property is
not being consistently used and justified. For example,
fluorine cells were sold to private industry without regard to
the presence of detectable plutonium.
DOE's oversight of contractor and subcontractor activities has
been very limited
The two findings are particularly significant, as DOE has announced
a program to recycle and selling a major part of the 60,000 tons of
radiologically contaminated metals that are stored at Paducah. DOE is
proposing to recycle 9,350 tons of radiologically contaminated nickel
that has become contaminated throughout (volumetrically) with uranium,
plutonium, neptunium and technetium-99.
This proposal is being made by DOE even though the NRC has not
established a de minimus standard for releasing volumetrically
contaminated metals into unrestricted, every day commerce. Every effort
to permit this activity has been met with widespread public opposition
from the public and the scrap-based steel industry.
The oversight team's observations raise fundamental questions about
whether DOE should be trusted to control the free release of massive
quantities of radioactive materials into the scrap metal market that
could result in intimate human contact. This includes everyday items
such as baby carriages, knives and forks, surgical implants such as hip
replacements, iron tonics and eyeglass frames.
The Oak Ridge Operations Office has not conducted an intensive
safety oversight review at Paducah in many years. The Paducah Plant
only has 10 federal employees, and cannot be expected--given its scarce
resources--to carry out a vigorous oversight program. What the
situation demonstrates is that you cannot oversee a plant the size and
complexity of Paducah from 350 miles away by telephone. Yet this is how
Oak Ridge manages Paducah. Congress needs to establish a Paducah
Operations Office with sufficient federal staff, budget and contracting
authority to manage the site.
DOE also found that Bechtel-Jacobs' oversight of subcontractors has
not been visible and effective. Consequently, the DOE observed, many
DOE requirements are not being effectively implemented. This raises a
red flag about DOE's embrace of the Management & Integrating contact
approach--a model that DOE has touted as the wave of the future.
The DOE team found that information provided to the public has been
delayed, is in forms not clearly understood by the general public and
stakeholder groups, and leads to a perception that DOE and the
contractor are withholding information from the public. This
observation validates the experience of PACE, which has been
stonewalled in its efforts to obtain basic health and safety data, such
as requests for data on leukemia incidence, bioassay data, and in vivo
monitoring data for Paducah workers surveyed at Fernald.
6. DOE Headquarters Oversight Efforts Have Been Inadequate
The Department of Energy's Office of Enforcement is responsible for
enforcing the radiation protection regulations that were adopted
pursuant to the Price-Anderson Act Amendments at 10 CFR Part 835. To my
knowledge, they have never conducted an inspection at the Paducah
Plant. DOE has only assigned 4 inspectors to cover the DOE nuclear
complex nationwide. Congress needs to beef up DOE's Enforcement
capacity, because DOE doesn't seem willing to do it on its own.
7. Summary
Workers are afraid of what may happen to them in the future. They
have worked in conditions that have exposed them to radiological and
chemical contamination that have long latency periods and can have
catastrophic results. These workers--who served our nation as veterans
of the Cold War production era--must not be forgotten.
Medical monitoring by independent, certified occupational
physicians is needed today to identify diseases which hopefully can be
caught early enough to be successfully treated. DOE's medical
surveillance program needs to be expanded and funded so that any
nuclear worker who wants a medical exam at Paducah, Portsmouth and Oak
Ridge can obtain one. Monitoring is imperative, but without any other
remedy, monitoring is simply a process to watch people get sick and
die.
The workers at Paducah and other DOE sites deserve more than just
medical monitoring. They deserve:
(1) coverage for the workforce under a federal workers compensation
system that reverses the burden of proof onto the federal
government to demonstrate that workplace exposures didn't lead
to illness, in light of DOE's failure to monitor workers for
radiation and other toxic risks, and
(2) health insurance coverage for all at risk workers and their spouses
through retirement.
The harm to workers must be taken as seriously as is the harm to
dirt. Resources must be committed the human beings who were unknowingly
exposed to these many hazards.
Mr. Upton. Thank you, Mr. Key. Mr. Jenkins.
TESTIMONY OF GARLAND E. JENKINS
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee,
good morning. My name is Garland E. Jenkins. I don't normally
go by the name of Garland. People generally call me Bud. I live
at 2744 Lake View Church Road, Benton, Kentucky. I'm here today
to testify about conditions at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion
Plant in western Kentucky. I've never testified before a
congressional committee or subcommittee before, so I hope
you'll be patient with me. But I think what I have to say is
important. My main concern is the safety of my fellow workers
and the neighborhood.
I have lived in the Paducah area all my life, for over 30
years. The Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant is not a
particularly beautiful place but the area around it is. The
area immediately next to the site is a wildlife refuge and used
frequently for hunting, fishing, et cetera. I've spent a good
deal of time there myself with my family.
I have spent my whole working career at the Paducah site. I
began working there in 1968 after graduating from high school
and getting out of the military. I still work there. I began
working there for Union Carbide. I've also worked for Martin
Marietta Energy Systems, Lockheed Martin Energy Systems,
Lockheed Martin Utility Services, and United States Enrichment
Corporation. So I've got over 30 years' experience at the site
and with its operations and working conditions.
Looking back on my experience at the Paducah site, I guess
you could say it's almost hard to believe. But what I'm going
to tell you is the absolute truth. I worked for a long time as
one of the operators in the C-410 and C-420 plant. This plant
took various kinds of uranium from outside sources, converted
it chemically to black oxide, uranium dioxide, then to
greensalt, or UF4, and finally to uranium hexafluoride or UF6.
The UF6 was the feedstock for the enrichment cascades.
Around 1973, Union Carbide began to resume using uranium
that had been recovered from spent reactor fuel. We called this
stuff RT tails, or rat tails. It was pulverized into a very
fine powder in Building 400 and then it come to the 410 feed
plant. When it was moved to the 410 feed plant, it came to us
in hoppers, with the consistency of flour, but much heavier. I
know that we handled many thousands of tons of these RT tails.
I know now, but didn't know then, that these RT tails were
contaminated with plutonium, neptunium and other radioactive
substances.
The work environment in C-410 and C-420 was awful. The air
was extremely dusty with black oxide, greensalt and chemical
smoke from UF6 releases. Sometimes it was difficult to breathe.
Two exhaust fans blew the contaminated air outside, but as far
as I am aware, these releases were not reported. We didn't use
respirators unless it got so bad that breathing or seeing was
impossible, so we were constantly inhaling the dust and fumes.
There were no devices to measure radioactivity in the air. We
wore no radioactivity protective clothing, just regular white
overalls and work gloves. We ate meals in these contaminated
clothes. Of course we often showered before leaving the plant,
but still these were just regular showers, nothing special. So
often we would still be contaminated when we got home. Bed
linens in the morning would often be green or black from the
black oxide and greensalt.
Waste management practices was pretty bad. Five ton hoppers
of RT tails and yellowcake uranium frequently spilled, and dust
would fly everywhere and eventually settle on the floor. At the
end of the shift we would sweep it into a dumpster along with
the regular nonradioactive trash. All would be taken to a
sanitary landfill, just like regular household trash. I believe
other contaminated materials were also sent to sanitary
landfills. When this contaminated stuff spilled outside, we
hosed it down into ditches, usually at night.
I also worked on recycling metals, such as gold, from
nuclear weapons. To my knowledge, none of this gold was ever
surveyed for radioactivity before it was released. This is even
though the recycling operations took place in the same
contaminated building where plutonium contaminated RT tails
were pulverized.
There was just no effective radiation protection. We were
told that the uranium substances we were working with were safe
and posed no threat to our health or to the health of our
families. We were told we were not getting any dose. We were
even told that materials were safe enough to eat. There were no
health physics professionals present in the workplace. There
were no radiation warning signs or markings, no restricted
areas where entry was controlled, and no radiation maps of the
building. We had film badges but they weren't checked very
often. There was no regular checking for uranium that we might
have breathed or consumed, and it would still be in our body.
Every other year or so, a truck-mounted body counter would
arrive at the site to take whole body counts. I remember the
technicians who ran the counter taking the readings over and
over again, saying they could not believe the numbers. We were
never told the results. I went to a special facility near
Cincinnati once for a whole body count and was assured
everything was okay but was never given the results.
These are just some of my experiences at the Paducah plant.
I am not sure of what radiation dose I received over the years.
I am now sure it was extremely high but I certainly don't
believe the contractor's records. I've always believed what I
was doing at the Paducah plant was important to the national
defense. I'm proud to have played a small part in the cold war
and in protecting this great country from harm. Thank you for
listening to me.
[The prepared statement of Garland E. Jenkins follows:]
Prepared Statement of Garland E. ``Bud'' Jenkins
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, good morning. My name
is Garland E. Jenkins. I don't usually go by the name Garland. People
usually call me Bud. I live at 2744 Lakeview Church Road, Benton,
Kentucky. I'm here today to testify about conditions at the Paducah
Gaseous Diffusion Plant Site in western Kentucky. I've never testified
before a Congressional Committee or Subcommittee before so I hope you
will be patient with me. But I think what I have to say is important.
My main concern is the safety of my fellow workers, past and present,
the safety of their families, and the safety of my neighbors.
I've lived in the Paducah, Kentucky area for over thirty years. The
Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant itself is not especially beautiful. But
the area around it, and western Kentucky, is nice. The area immediately
next to the Site is a wildlife refuge and is used frequently for hiking
and fishing. I've spent a good deal of time there myself with my
family.
I've spent my whole working career at the Paducah site. I began
working there in 1968 after graduating from high school and serving in
the military. I still work there.
I began there working for Union Carbide. I've also worked for
Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Lockheed Martin Energy Systems,
Lockheed Martin Utility Services, and U.S. Enrichment Corporation. So
I've got over thirty years experience at the Site, and with its
operations and working conditions.
Looking back on my experience at the Paducah Site, I guess you
could say it's almost hard to believe. But what I'm going to tell you
is the absolute truth. I worked for a long time as one of the operators
in the C 410 and C 420 feed plant. This plant took various kinds of
uranium from outside sources and converted it chemically to black oxide
(or uranium dioxide), then to greensalt (or UF4), and finally to
uranium hexafluoride (or UF6). The UF6 was the feedstock for the
enrichment cascades. Around 1973, Union Carbide began to resume using
uranium that had been recovered from reactor spent fuel. We called this
stuff RT tails, or ``rat tails.'' It was pulverized into a very fine
powder in Building C 400, where I have also worked. Then it was moved
to the feed plant. It came to us there in 5-ton hoppers, with the
consistency of flour, but much heavier. I know that we handled many
thousands of tons of these RT tails while I was there. I know now, but
didn't know then, that these RT tails were contaminated with plutonium,
neptunium, and other radioactive substances.
The work environment in C 410 and C 420 was awful. The air was
extremely dusty with black oxide, greensalt, and chemical smoke from
UF6 releases. Sometimes it was difficult to breathe. Two exhaust fans
blew the contaminated air outside, but as far as I am aware these
releases were not reported. We didn't use respirators, unless it got so
bad that breathing or seeing was impossible, so we constantly inhaled
the dust and fumes. There were no devices to measure radioactivity in
the air. We wore no radiological protective clothing, just regular
white overalls and work gloves. We ate meals in these contaminated
clothes. Of course, we often showered before leaving the plant, but
these were just regular showers--nothing special. So often we'd come
home still contaminated. Bed linens in the morning would often be green
or black from the black oxide and greensalt.
Waste management practices were also pretty bad. Five ton hoppers
of RT tails and yellowcake uranium frequently spilled, and dust would
fly everywhere and eventually settle on the floor. At the end of the
shift we would sweep it up into a dumpster along with the regular non-
radioactive trash. All would be taken to the sanitary landfill just
like regular household trash. I believe other contaminated material was
also sent to sanitary landfills. When this contaminated stuff spilled
outside, we'd hose it down into a ditch, usually at night.
I also worked on recycling metals, such as gold, from nuclear
weapons. To my knowledge, none of this gold was ever surveyed for
radiation before it was released. This was so even though the recycling
operations took place in the same contaminated building where the
plutonium contaminated RT tails were pulverized.
There was just no effective radiation protection. We were told that
the uranium substances we were working with were safe and posed no
threat to our health, or to the health of our families. We were told we
were not getting any ``dose''. We were even told the materials were
safe enough to eat. There were no health physics professionals present
in the workplace. There were no radiation warning signs or markings, no
restricted areas where entry was controlled, no radiation maps of
buildings. We had film badges, but they weren't checked very often.
There was no regular checking for uranium we might have breathed or
consumed, and would still be on our bodies. Every other year or so a
truck-mounted whole body counter would arrive at the Site to take whole
body counts of some of the workers. I remember the technicians who ran
the counter taking the readings over and over again, saying they didn't
believe the numbers. But we were never told the results. I went to a
special facility near Cincinnati once for a whole body count, and was
assured afterwards that everything was fine.
All this about lack of safety precautions was true, even though, as
I know now, the RT tails we were working with and breathing were
contaminated with radioactive plutonium, neptunium, and technicium.
These are just some of my experiences at the Paducah Site. I'm not
sure what radiation dose I received over the years. I'm now sure that
it was extremely high. I certainly don't believe the contractor
records, but even those show my dose exceeding federal limits. About
five years ago, I had to have the lower part of my esophagus replaced
surgically with a plastic tube because of corrosive damage there. I've
been told by my doctor that there is a 99% chance that the situation
will become cancerous.
I've always believed what I was doing at the Paducah Plant Site was
important to the national defense. I'm proud to have played a small
part in the Cold War and in protecting this great country from harm.
But if I had to do it all over again, I'd be much less trusting of what
my contractor bosses were telling me. I probably wouldn't have worked
there at all, knowing what I now know. Many of my good friends are
dead, or dying. I always wonder whether Plant conditions caused their
sicknesses and deaths.
I want to do what I can to make sure that conditions at the Site
are improved.
You know, we trusted the contractors when they told us everything
was OK, that we weren't getting any dose, and that none of the RT tails
or other stuff was dangerous. We trusted them to record our doses
correctly and tell us if we were in trouble. I'm darn mad that these
big corporations used us to earn huge fees from the Government for so-
called good safety performance. I think we should make them pay some of
this back. The whistleblowers have agreed to give half of any recovery
we get in the qui tam lawsuit to the Natural Resources Defense Council
for protection of the environment.
Thank you for listening to me.
Mr. Upton. Thank you.
Mr. Fowler.
TESTIMONY OF RONALD B. FOWLER
Mr. Fowler. Good morning. My name is Ronald B. Fowler. I am
a Section Manager for Training and an Applied Health Physicist
employed by the United States Enrichment Corporation at the
Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. I have worked at the site
since 1991; most of that time for my previous employers,
Lockheed Martin Utility Systems and its predecessor, Martin
Marietta Utility Systems.
I am a health physicist. Health physics is the profession
responsible for protecting workers and the public from
excessive and unnecessary exposure to radiation. Health physics
is supposed to be a rigorous part of every nuclear facility in
this country. Prior to coming to Paducah, I worked as a health
physicist for several commercial nuclear power plants. I am
certified by the National Registry for Radiologic
Technologists. I have extensive experience and training in
applied health physics. I have trained numerous other health
physicists throughout the nuclear industry. Earlier in my
career, I developed a series of health physics and reactor
training videos that have been widely distributed throughout
the industry. I have received numerous awards, commendations,
and promotions in my work. My resume is attached to my written
testimony.
When I first arrived at Paducah in 1991, I was astounded. I
discovered that there was essentially no health physics program
at this site, and the situation had apparently persisted for 37
years. This was all the more surprising in that the Paducah
plant deals with extremely high levels of radioactive
particulates compared to a commercial nuclear power plant. That
generally means more protection is required, not less,
especially to guard against the inhalation and possible
ingestion. To protect workers and the public, there are certain
things that are part and parcel of any proper health physics
program--in these circumstances, access controls, placarding,
radiation maps, airborne monitors, detailed exposure records,
thermoluminescent dosimeters, effluent controls and monitors,
radiation training, radiation protective clothing, and a
trained health physics staff. These things, however, were
virtually nonexistent or severely lacking at the Paducah
facility.
I was hired to help Paducah develop a health physics
training program. Needless to say, I was not a popular person
among management. I kept pointing out many serious defects and
infractions in the health physics area. For years, it was like
scooping water out of the ocean. I was bucking a management
culture that had told workers for decades there were no health
risks at Paducah, the radiation will not harm you, and that you
could eat radioactive particulate substances commonly used at
the site; that regulations are for other facilities but not
Paducah; that production takes place over precedence, over
health.
What I was not told about at the time, and I only
discovered much more recently, was just how widespread and
significant the transuranic contaminants like plutonium and
neptunium in the environment were in and around the site. I was
unaware of tens of thousands of tons of plutonium-contaminated
feedstocks that had been brought to the site for years for
processing. Had I known this initially, my concerns would have
been compounded manyfold, as they are today.
I became a whistleblower when I was told the plant security
force had begun posting my picture with a bullet hole through
my forehead. Security guards began following me wherever I
went. They intentionally damaged my vehicle. This scared me and
my wife to death. I had already been denied promotions, and
management was taking other actions to harass and intimidate me
for my continuing reporting of defects. I wanted to leave the
facility, but I have a wife and a sick mother-in-law I have to
support.
Last year, I went to a law firm in Washington staffed by
nuclear engineer attorneys. They assisted me in preparing a
complaint to the Department of Labor. This was not a health
physics complaint but a plain white harassment and intimidation
complaint. Ironically, we offered Lockheed and USEC to settle
my complaint with me by my retiring early. They refused,
calling my concerns insignificant. In retrospect, it is perhaps
fortunate for all of the Paducah workers and residents that
they did this, because later on I found documents showing
significant offsite contamination of plutonium. My attorneys
found this extremely curious and they contacted Dr. Cochran of
the Natural Resources Defense Council. They also consulted with
other technical experts. Plutonium was not supposed to exist in
any significant quantities at a uranium enrichment facility.
They visited me with Dr. Cochran and toured the site. They
asked me to attempt to locate other documents showing onsite
and offsite contamination. I searched some of the document
files earlier this year, and I was truly astonished at what I
found.
With the assistance of my colleague, Chuck Deuschle, I
found the results of radiological surveys taken on- and offsite
in the 1990's showing activity levels literally tens of
thousands of times higher than background levels of radiation.
There were dozens of samples of plutonium and neptunium found
in ditches offsite, some more than 100 times the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's release limit. There were radiological
surveys of common work areas showing radiation tens to
thousands of times higher than the prescribed action levels, in
areas like the cafeteria, the kitchen, locker rooms, storage
rooms and the parking lots. There were indications of
radioactive wastes going into sanitary landfills offsite, of
lagoon-like sludge containing plutonium nearly 2,000 times the
level of NRC release limits.
As a health physics training manager, I had never been told
of these very serious radiological conditions. These findings
were squarely at odds with annual environmental reports
prepared by my superiors stating all laws, regulations, and DOE
orders were fully complied with. Needless to say, most of the
workers were also in the dark.
Now, like many of my colleagues and Paducah neighbors, I'm
downright scared. I have shed real tears over the many friends
and colleagues at the site who were deceived and now, like Mr.
Jenkins, suffer real health consequences. I worry constantly
about the recreational users of nearby Kentucky and Federal
recreation areas who continue to engage in activities on
contaminated land and waters. I recently asked for my radiation
dose records from Paducah and received a supposed dose history
reporting that I had received no dose whatsoever for all but
two of the more than 30 quarters I have worked at the site.
These records are clearly fraudulent.
On virtually a weekly basis, even now, I continue to report
health physics and other safety infractions to management.
Those infractions have continued, right up to the present
month. Even last April, I noticed unplacarded trucks with
uranium hexafluoride cylinders parked in downtown Paducah in an
unsecured open lot, with children on bicycles riding freely
among them. It is only recently that I view my reports as
something less than futile.
I would like to thank Secretary Richardson for the safety
stand-down he ordered at the site. It was the very first sign
that somebody in authority is finally paying attention to the
workers and the people of Paducah. There is a long way to go.
In my view, the government owes it to the Paducah workhorse to
demand proper rad controls, to clean up the site and
surrounding environs, and to monitor the workers' health. I
believe those at fault should pay for these efforts and should
compensate the workers.
Finally, the government owes it to the workforce to
participate in the necessary cleanup so as to preserve the
jobs. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ronald B. Fowler follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ronald B. Fowler
Good Morning. My name is Ronald B. Fowler. I am a Section Manager
for Training and an Applied Health Physicist employed by the United
States Enrichment Corporation at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. I
have worked at the site since 1991, most of that time for my previous
employers, Lockheed Martin Utility Systems and its predecessor Martin
Marietta Utility Systems.
I am a health physicist. Health physics is the profession
responsible for protecting workers and the public from excessive and
unnecessary exposure to radiation. Health physics is supposed to be a
rigorous part of every nuclear facility in this country. Prior to
coming to Paducah, I worked as a health physicist for several
commercial nuclear power plants. I am certified by the National
Registry for Radiologic Technologists. I have extensive experience and
training in applied health physics, and I have trained numerous other
health physicists throughout the nuclear industry. Earlier in my
career, I developed a series of health physics and reactor training
videos that have been widely distributed throughout the industry. I
have received numerous awards, commendations, and promotions in my
work. My resume is attached to my written testimony.
When I first arrived at Paducah in 1991, I was astounded to
discover that there was essentially no health physics program at the
site, and that this situation had apparently persisted for at least 37
years. This was all the more surprising in that the Paducah plant site
deals with extremely high levels of particulates compared to a nuclear
power plant. That generally means more protection is required, not
less--especially to guard against inhalation and ingestion. To protect
workers and the public, there are certain things that are part and
parcel of any proper health physics program--in these circumstances,
access controls, placarding, radiation maps, airborne monitors,
detailed exposure records, thermoluminescent dosimeters, effluent
controls and monitors, radiation training, radiation-protective
clothing, and a trained health physics staff. These things, however,
were virtually non-existent or severely lacking at Paducah.
I was hired to help Paducah develop a health physics training
program. Needless to say, I was not a popular person among the
management, since I kept pointing out the many serious defects and
infractions in the health physics area. For years, it was a lot like
scooping water out of the ocean. I was bucking a management culture
that had told workers for decades that there were no health hazards at
Paducah, that radiation will not harm you, that you can eat the
radioparticulate substances commonly used at the site, that regulations
are for other facilities but not Paducah, that production takes
precedence over health.
What I was not told about at the time, and only discovered much
more recently, was just how widespread and significant were the
transuranic contaminants like plutonium and neptunium in the
environment at and around the site. I was unaware that tens of
thousands of tons of plutonium-contaminated feedstocks had been brought
to the site for years for processing. Had I known this initially, my
concerns would have been compounded manyfold, as they are today.
I became a whistleblower when I was told the plant security force
had begun posting my picture with a bullethole through my forehead.
Security guards began following me wherever I went, and my car was
damaged. That scared me and my wife to death. I had already been denied
a promotion, and management was taking other actions to harass and
intimidate me for continuing to report defects. I wanted to leave the
facility, but I have a wife and a sick mother-in-law to support.
Last year I went to a law firm here in Washington staffed by
nuclear engineer-attorneys. They assisted me in preparing a complaint
to the Department of Labor. This was not a health physics complaint,
but a plain vanilla harassment and intimidation complaint. Ironically,
we offered Lockheed and USEC to settle my complaint with me retiring
early. They refused, calling my concerns insignificant. In retrospect,
it is perhaps fortunate for all Paducah workers and residents that they
did. Because later on, I found documents showing significant off-site
contamination of plutonium. My attorneys found this extremely curious
and contacted Dr. Cochran of the Natural Resources Defense Council.
They also consulted with other technical experts. Plutonium was not
supposed to exist in any significant quantities at a uranium gaseous
diffusion plant. They visited me with Dr. Cochran and toured the site.
They asked me to attempt to locate other documents showing on-site and
off-site contamination. I searched some of the document files at the
site early this year. I was truly astounded by what I found.
With the assistance of my college Chuck Deuschle, I found the
results of radiological surveys taken on and off-site in the 1990s
showing activity levels literally tens of thousands of times higher
than background levels of radiation. There were dozens of samples of
plutonium and neptunium found in ditches offsite, some more than 100
times the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's release limit. There were
radiological surveys of common work areas showing radiation tens to
thousands of times higher than the prescribed action levels for the
plant, in areas like the cafeteria, the kitchen, locker rooms, storage
rooms, and in parking lots. There were indications of radioactive
wastes having gone into the sanitary landfills off-site, of lagoon
sludge containing neptunium more than 2000 times the level of NRC
release limits. As a health physics training manager, I had never been
told of these very serious radiological conditions. These findings were
squarely at odds with annual environmental reports prepared by my
superiors stating that all laws, regulations, and DOE Orders were being
fully complied with. Needless to say, most all of the workers were also
in the dark.
Now, like many of my colleagues and Paducah neighbors, I'm just
downright scared. I have shed real tears over the many friends and
colleagues at the site whowere deceived, and who now, like Mr. Jenkins,
suffer real health consequences. I worry constantly about the
recreational users of nearby Kentucky and federal recreation areas who
continue to engage in activities on contaminated land and waters. I
recently asked for my radiation dose records from Paducah and received
a supposed dose history reporting that I had received no dose
whatsoever for all but two of the more than 30 quarters I have worked
at the site. These records are clearly fraudulent.
On virtually a weekly basis now, I continue to report health
physics and other safety infractions to management. Those infractions
have continued, right up to the present month. Last April I noticed
unplacarded trucks with uranium hexafluoride cylinders parked in
downtown Paducah in an unsecured open lot, with children on bicycles
riding freely among them. It is only recently that I view my reports as
something less than futile. I thank Secretary Richardson for the safety
stand down he ordered last week at the site. It was the first sign that
someone in authority is finally paying attention to the workers and
people of Paducah.
There is a long way to go. In my view, the government owes it to
the Paducah workforce to demand proper radiological controls, to clean
up the site and surrounding environs, and to monitor the workers'
health. I believe those at fault should pay for these efforts, and
should compensate all workers. Finally, the government owes it to the
workforce to participate in the necessary cleanup, so as to preserve
jobs.
Thank you for your interest in these matters.
Mr. Upton. Thank you.
Mr. Graves.
TESTIMONY OF M. BRAD GRAVES
Mr. Graves. Good morning. My name is Brad Graves, I'm an
employee with Lockheed Martin Energy Systems. Due to the
timeframe of my invitation, a written statement had been waived
in my case, so I will be reading from notes here. Please
forgive me. It is important to note that I am not a relator in
this particular action, however I am here to provide
information relative to the radiological conditions at the
Paducah site while I was there.
I have been nationally registered by the National Registry
of Radiation Protection Technologists and I'm comprehensively
certified by the American Board of Health Physics in this
practice. As such, a lot of my information that I present to
you will probably be technical in nature. If I use units that
you don't understand or if I say things that you have confusion
about, please ask me to repeat. I will be happy to.
Thank you for your invitation and your time gentlemen,
ladies.
Mr. Upton. Thank you.
Dr. Cochran.
TESTIMONY OF THOMAS B. COCHRAN
Mr. Cochran. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before your committee to discuss the health and safety
problems at Paducah. My name is Thomas B. Cochran, I'm the
Director of the Nuclear Program at the Natural Resources
Defense Council.
After hearing from Mr. Jenkins and Mr. Fowler and the other
witnesses, I don't think you need to hear from me, but I'm
going to take this opportunity in any case. I have four brief
messages I want to leave with the committee. As Mr. Jenkins had
said, we are here because we are concerned about the health and
safety of the workers at Paducah and the citizens living near
the plant.
Second, the problems we are addressing are current. They
are not just problems of the past. While the situation has
improved in recent years, basic worker protection problems
persist. Contractors are violating basic radiation protection
regulations as we speak. The mind-set that has led to the
deaths and illness of workers such as Joe Harding from past
exposures persist at the Paducah plant and unnecessary deaths
and illnesses will continue unless there is a radical change, a
sea change, in the culture of plant management.
Third, the levels of exposure and contamination at the
facility and offsite are not insignificant as some have
suggested. The levels in some cases are well above regulatory
limits. Moreover, it has been a basic tenet of the health
physics profession since 1949 that for prudence, it is an
obligation to keep radiation exposures as low as reasonably
achievable in light of economic and technical and practicality
considerations. This ALARA regulation is embodied in EPA
regulations, NRC regulations, DOE orders, it is a basic tenet
of the profession, and it is not being applied properly at the
Paducah plant today.
Fourth, the Federal Government, the State of Kentucky, and
its citizens and workers at Paducah have been lied to. As a
consequence, we do not know how bad the situation really is. An
independent investigation is needed.
In the Paducah case, the qui tam case under the False
Claims Act and the issues before this committee involve four
categories of health and safety issues. First, excessive
exposure and poor or unlawful control of radiation exposure to
workers; excessive releases and insufficient or unlawful
control of radioactivity released offsite; third, unlawful
disposal of radioactive wastes; and, fourth, improper recycling
into commerce of scrap materials contaminated with
radioactivity.
With regard to the first, there is an appalling lack of
health physics protection for workers at the Paducah plant.
Until the late 1980's, the plant had no professional health
physics program. Workers were neither advised of the hazards of
working with uranium nor monitored for exposure to uranium and
other radioactive isotopes. The workplace was not properly
monitored and lacked the proper controls over contaminated
spaces. Clearly the plant managers were grossly violating DOE
worker safety regulations.
This week I interviewed a former plant worker who left the
site in 1992 after working there for 39 years. He was
completely uninformed about even the most basic health physics
concepts that workers are required to know. He said to me,
``It's all Greek to me.''
Most or some of these deficiencies were confirmed by a
recent DOE audit which led to the Secretary of Energy ordering
a 24-hour stand-down at the plant while the work force received
additional health physics training. Indeed, my review of DOE's
auditors' findings this week led me to believe that the factual
allegations of our lawsuit are being affirmed in most of their
key particulars. The audit also illustrates that the problem is
a current problem and not just a historic one. The worker
conditions would be bad enough had the uranium been the only
significant radioactive element present at the plant. We now
know that 100,000 tons of feedstock contaminated with fission
products and transuranic elements were processed at the plant.
We respectfully request Congress to ensure that a
competent, independent firm systematically search the
historical records at Hanford, Paducah, Savannah River and Oak
Ridge for information on the contamination levels of this
recycled uranium feed, including how the contamination levels
changed over time. We also respectfully request that Congress
immediately demand that DOE order its staff and its contractors
at the Paducah, Portsmouth, and Oak Ridge gaseous diffusion
plants to maintain the integrity of any physical and electronic
evidence at these plants as well as any documentation and
electronic files that could be useful to reconstruct worker
exposure and contractor and DOE culpability.
From my visit to the Paducah plant earlier this year, I
found areas outside the security fence that were contaminated
with radioactivity and not properly labeled. The public had
access to areas that are or may be contaminated with
radioactivity in excess of appropriate levels. These areas
should no longer be used for recreational purposes without a
comprehensive offsite characterization, access controls, proper
placarding and marking and removal of radioactive sources at a
minimum. The lack of protective measures I witnessed offsite,
given what I presently know, was astounding. There is an
inadequate effort by the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant
management to minimize the transport of radioactivity offsite
by controlling the flow of contaminated water offsite via
numerous ditches. We now know from DOE auditors that the
sampling data reported to DOE by the contractors apparently
omitted fugitive emissions from the plant which may have
amounted to thousands of kilograms of contaminated material.
Together with the onsite conditions, these violations
indicate that the contractors at Paducah have been and are
today operating in callous disregard for the basic tenets of
the health physics profession by failing to keep exposures to
radiation as low as reasonably achievable, taking into account
technical, practical and economic considerations. Uranium is a
carcinogen. It is also chemically toxic. It will destroy your
kidneys if you get too much uranium in your kidneys. It is
unwise and unlawful to expose people to uranium unnecessarily,
and one is not permitted to release it into the accessible
environment indiscriminately.
Congress should investigate whether the cleanup contractor
systematically performs and documents ALARA analyses before
undertaking significant decontamination efforts at the site.
According to workers at Paducah, including the other relators,
the contractors illegally buried materials contaminated with
radioactivity offsite, including what has been characterized as
a sanitary landfill. The recent discovery of radioactive black
ooze represents another unlawful offsite dump. Most
importantly, and this is attached to my testimony, a Kentucky
police investigator reportedly found criminal dumping activity
at an around the site in 1991. And DOE contractor personnel
were reportedly told by their contractor bosses that if they
did not dump radioactivity wastes illegally onto Kentucky land,
they would be fired.
This demands a thorough investigation. Was DOE aware of
this? Was the report followed up? If not, why not? Is a new
criminal investigation warranted? With DOE's approval,
radioactive wastes that have been dumped offsite illegally are
apparently now being shipped to a site, EnviroCare of Utah,
that obtained its license to operate and amendments to its
license during a time in which its owner paid the top
regulatory official in Utah more than $600,000 in cash, gold
coins and a ski condominium.
The Department of Energy apparently believes it is
appropriate to continue to enrich this owner with taxpayer
funds so long as he merely declines to participate in the day-
to-day management of his company.
Apparently, enormous quantities of radioactively
contaminated steel, nickel, aluminum and significant quantities
of contaminated gold and possibly silver were recycled by the
contractors into the streams of commerce. This problem persists
today. The Department of Energy is subsidizing--subsidizing--
the recycling of thousands of tons of radioactively
contaminated scrap metal from the former nuclear weapons plant
at Oak Ridge, one of the sister plants to the Paducah plant.
In a recent court decision, a Federal district judge
expressed serious concern that the potential for environmental
harm is great, especially given the unprecedented amount of
hazardous materials the DOE contractor seeks to recycle. The
DOE office responsible for the oversight of the Paducah plant
is also overseeing this Oak Ridge recycling project. The last
thing DOE should be doing is subsidizing the dumping of its
nuclear wastes into commercial products.
I urge you, Congress should pass legislation that precludes
the recycle of radioactively contaminated materials when they
may come into imminent human contact. We have suggested and we
believe the evidence does and will continue to show that DOE,
notwithstanding its own shortcomings, was seriously misled by
the contractors operating the Paducah facility and site. We
hope the government will seize the opportunity to hold the
contractors accountable for what surely will be a massive and
massively expensive cleanup and worker monitoring and
compensation project.
The taxpayers should not have to foot this bill. It is my
understanding that DOE indemnity provisions for contractors do
not apply in cases of contractor misconduct, such as the case
here.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Thomas B. Cochran follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas B. Cochran, Director, Nuclear programs,
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
My name is Thomas B. Cochran. I am Director of the Nuclear Program
and hold the Wade Greene Chair for Nuclear Policy at the Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. (``NRDC''). NRDC is a national
environmental public-interest organization with over 400,000 members
that has been extensively involved in monitoring the environmental
activities of the U.S. Department of Energy's (``DOE's'') nuclear
weapons complex. I am one of four relators in the civil action filed
against Lockheed Martin Corporation, et al. under the qui tam
provisions of the False Claims Act related to these DOE contractors'
operation of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (``Paducah GDP''). A
summary of my qualifications are set forth in the front of my qui tam
disclosure statement, which I submitted to the committee with exhibits
in response to a subpoena duces tecum.
Summary of the Issues Surrounding the Paducah Case
The Paducah case involves four categories of health and safety
issues:
a) excessive exposure and poor or unlawful control of radiation
exposure of workers;
b) excessive releases and insufficient or unlawful control of
radioactivity released off-site;
c) unlawful disposal of radioactive wastes; and
d) improper recycling into commerce of scrap materials contaminated
with radioactivity.
In association with each of these categories of health and safety
issues:
i) the contractors at the Paducah GDP have engaged in systematic
falsification of reports to the Federal and State governments
and to the public; and
ii) the Department of Energy (``DOE'') relied too much on what its
contractors were telling it, and obviously failed to provide
adequate oversight of those contractors.
Finally, there is a need for Federal legislation to prevent similar
abuses in the future.
Next, I will briefly summarize the health and safety issues.
Excessive Exposure and Unlawful Control of Radiation Exposure of
Workers
There has existed at the Paducah GDP an appalling lack of health
physics protection for workers. For many years, the plant apparently
had no professional health physics program. Workers were not properly
advised of the hazards of working with uranium, particularly uranium in
particulate and gaseous form. Workers were not properly monitored for
exposure to uranium and other radioactive isotopes. The workplace was
neither properly monitored nor were there proper controls over
contaminated spaces. Clearly, the plant managers were grossly violating
DOE Orders and the basic health physics tenet to keep radiation
exposures ``as low as reasonably achievable'' (``ALARA''). (See
Appendix A of my Disclosure Statement) This week, I interviewed a
former plant worker who left the site in 1992 after working there for
39 years. He had never heard of the terms ``ALARA,'' ``as low as
reasonably achievable,'' ``as low as practical,'' or ``ALAP.'' ``It's
all Greek to me,'' he said of the concept.
Some of the more telling pieces of evidence of the appalling
working conditions at the plant are:
a) reports that the bed sheets of workers turned green from the
radioactive uranium tetrafluoride (UF4, or ``greensalt'') that
was carried home on their clothing and bodies;
b) reports by workers of conditions in buildings where chemical
conversion activities took place--where they worked without
respirators in rooms densely filled with radioactive dust;
c) extremely high measurements of uranium deposited in the bones of Mr.
Joe Harding, a deceased worker whose bone tissues was assayed
after his death;
d) reports of lunchrooms, locker rooms, computers, and kitchens
significantly contaminated with radioactivity; and
e) reports that uranium concentrations in sanitary sewage at the site
were so high that a special project (Project GLIT) was
instituted to recover uranium from sewage sediment.
While health physics conditions at the plant may have improved
somewhat in recent years, my observations at the site, my review of
documents, and my discussions with the other relators indicate that the
Paducah GDP's managers still are not complying with DOE Order 5400.5,
10 C.F.R. Part 835, or following the rudiments of good health physics
practices. In fact, based on my discussions with the other relators the
following deficiencies are noted:
i) Monitoring of workers for internal exposure to radioactivity is
inadequate. The frequency of urine, fecal and perhaps whole-
body counts is inadequate to reliably establish worker
exposure. Workers are not properly advised of their radiation
exposure, and in any case, historical exposure records would be
erroneous and incomplete because of the failure to adequately
monitor for internal and external exposure. Documents reveal
shocking inadequacies as recent as this month.
ii) Some areas within the security fence that are excessively
contaminated with radioactivity are not properly marked and
secured as radiation-controlled areas, and there is no health
physics program in place to control adequately the movement of
workers into and out of controlled areas.
iii) There is inadequate monitoring and control of personnel and
vehicles leaving the site to prevent or limit the transport of
radioactivity off-site.
iv) Radiation survey instruments are not adequately calibrated.
v) There are insufficient numbers of certified health physicists and
trained health physics technicians on site and inadequate and
in some cases inappropriate supervision of the technicians.
Some or most of these conditions appear to have been confirmed by a
recent DOE audit that led to the Secretary of Energy ordering a 24 hour
stand down at the plant while the workforce received additional health
physics training. Sadly, if the Secretary thinks he can solve the
worker health problems in 24 hours he is being very ill-advised by his
staff, or is offering up a political rather than a substantive fix.
Indeed, my review of DOE's auditors' findings this week lead me to
believe that the factual allegations of our lawsuit are being affirmed
in most of their key particulars. The audit also illustrates that the
problem is a current problem, and not just a historic one.
These worker conditions would be bad enough had uranium been the
only significant radioactive element handled at the plant. A report in
Nuclear Fuel, March 16, 1992, summarizing from a Martin Marietta
report, indicated that 101,268 tons of feedstock were brought to the
Paducah GDP site principally from Hanford, but also from DOE's Savannah
River Site. This feed was separated uranium recovered from processing
at Hanford and Savannah River irradiated production reactor fuel. This
uranium was contaminated with fission products as well as neptunium,
plutonium and other transuranic isotopes.
This material, according to Martin Marietta, was found to be far
more contaminated than commercially reprocessed reactor fuel--which
itself is generally significantly contaminated. For example, the report
notes that between 175 and 700 times the levels of technetium-99 that
are found in commercially reprocessed fuel were found in the Paducah
GDP feedstock material. Concentrations of transuranics (principally
plutonium and neptunium) were measured at 20 to 450 times the levels
normally found in reprocessed fuel.
There were four chemical separation plants (B, T, REDOX and PUREX)
at Hanford. These used at least three separate chemical separation
processes, each of which went through modifications and upgrades.
Therefore, it is safe to assume that over the years there were
improvements in the capability to separate out radioactive contaminants
from the uranium. In fact, the first chemical separation technique did
not even separate the uranium from the fission products. This was only
done later when improved processing techniques became available.
We respectfully request Congress to ensure that a competent
independent firm systematically searches the historical records at
Hanford, Paducah, Savannah River, and Oak Ridge for information that
could shed light on the contamination levels of this recycle uranium
feed and on how the contamination levels changed over time, and who was
responsible for sending highly contaminated and unfit recycled spent
reactor fuel feedstocks to Paducah.
It would also be possible to obtain additional useful information
by sampling the residual contamination in the most contaminated
chemical processing buildings at the Paducah GDP. I was appalled to
learn that Bechtel-Jacobs, DOE's cleanup contractor, may have destroyed
some of the most valuable evidence by recently washing down some of the
contaminated processing buildings' walls in order to avoid the
inconvenience and expense of providing building workers with proper
respiratory protection. Reportedly, outside personnel have recently
been interviewed to assist in destroying some files at the site,
although I do not know the relevance of these files to the issues we
have raised. In any case, we respectfully request the Congress to
immediately demand that DOE order its staff and its contractors at the
Paducah, Portsmouth and Oak Ridge GDPs to maintain the integrity of any
physical and electronic evidence at these plants, as well as any
documents and electronic files that could be useful in reconstructing
worker exposures and contractor and DOE culpability. Congress should do
the same with regard to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (``NRC'') in
its regulatory oversight capacity over USEC.
Excessive Releases and Unlawful Control of Radioactivity Off-Site
I visited the Paducah GDP site earlier this year, on February 24-
25, 1999. This visit revealed the sub-standard circumstances that are
in violation of DOE health and safety requirements. I found the
following:
a) Areas outside the security fence that are contaminated with
radioactivity were not properly labeled and the public had
access to areas that are, or may be, contaminated with
radioactivity in excess of appropriate levels.
b) Significant areas of the off-site environs around the Paducah GDP
are generally contaminated with radionuclides and should no
longer be used for recreational purposes without a
comprehensive off-site characterization, immediate access
controls for radiologically contaminated areas, proper
placarding and marking, removal of radioactive sources, and
remediation of streams, ponds, and sediment banks, at a
minimum. The lack of protective measures I witnessed off-site
(given what I know is present on-site) is astounding.
c) There is inadequate effort by Paducah GDP management to minimize the
transport of radioactivity off-site by controlling the flow of
contaminated water off-site via numerous ditches.
On February 25, 1999, I took radiation measurements and collected
sediment samples in publicly accessible areas outside of the Paducah
GDP security fence. Most of the radiation measurements that I took in
the environs around the Paducah GDP, outside the security fence, were
at or near background levels. A few readings were higher than
background. Inside a section of concrete culvert sitting on top of the
ground in an area accessible to the public, I measured radiation levels
that were between 10 and 20 times background. I did not determine
whether the radioactivity, the source of this radiation, was easily
removable or fixed.
I also collected 12 sediment samples in areas accessible to the
public. An analysis of these samples indicated that the U-238 (i.e.,
depleted uranium) concentration in various ditches in publicly
accessible unmarked areas was found to be between 10 and 80 times
background or between 0.3 and 2.5 times the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's (``NRC's'') draft release criteria for decontamination of
a site. The high end of this range is comparable to the concentration
one might encounter in phosphate ores containing uranium.
The measurements I took are not inconsistent with earlier recorded
off-site readings presented in the qui tam disclosure statement of Mr.
Deuschle (See Deuschle's Exhibits 3 and 4), one of the other relators,
though many substantially higher readings are recorded in past data.
The data indicate contamination levels in off-site sediment (through at
least 1994) that far exceed federal requirements for plutonium,
neptunium, thorium, uranium, and technetium, at a minimum. The data
show plutonium-239 measurements of up to 240 pCi/g, exceeding the NRC
standard by a factor of 127, and neptunium-237 measurements of up to 63
pCi/g, exceeding the NRC standard by a factor of 335.
I regard the soil data for the actinide isotopes as particularly
troubling in one respect, because these heavy isotopes like plutonium-
239 and neptunium-237 are not generally mobile and do not generally
migrate in water as easily as many other isotopes. The high readings
off-site suggest to me that relatively large quantities of such
isotopes must have been deposited through effluent releases. Slow
migration would suggest such contamination may be present for many,
many more years. The isotopes are generally very long-lived as well.
Neptunium-237 has a half-life of 2.14 million years. Plutonium-239 has
a half-life of 24.4 thousand years. While technetium generally passes
relatively quickly through the body, plutonium is one of the more toxic
isotopes, and is a bone and liver seeker in humans.
There is no question that readings of the levels disclosed by Mr.
Deuschle would require immediate posting, and should have led to prompt
removal or remediation in many circumstances. Had the contractors been
in compliance with DOE Order 5400.5 pertaining to ALARA, it is unlikely
that these contamination levels would have occurred. Even if
significant releases had occurred due to some unforseen event, once
detected through an adequate health physics program, immediate steps
would have been undertaken to minimize further releases and obviate
these high contamination levels.
I have reviewed numerous documents prepared by Lockheed Martin or
Martin Marietta for DOE suggesting that the maximally exposed
individual off-site from Paducah GDP operations could expect to receive
no more than 100 millirems, and, indeed, a far lesser number (in some
cases only 2 millirems) in any year. In my opinion, which I believe any
respectable nuclear scientist would concur in, the actual measurements
recorded, though not subsequently reported, suggest that the maximally
exposed public individual could have received over 100 millirems per
year. Moreover, the contractor is required by DOE Orders to maintain
exposures as far below 100 millirems per year as is reasonably
achievable. Lockheed Martin and the previous Paducah DGP contractors
were clearly in violation of this ALARA requirement. We now know from
DOE's auditors that the sampling data reported to DOE by the
contractors apparently omitted ``fugitive'' emissions from the plant,
which may have amounted to thousands of kilograms of contaminated
material.
The risks to the general public due to these off-site releases are
considerably less than the risks to the workers from on-site exposure
to radioactivity. Nevertheless, these off-site releases are in clear
violation of DOE Order 5400.5, which requires that radiation exposures
be ALARA. Together with the on-site conditions these violations
indicate that the contractors at Paducah have been and are today
operating in callous disregard for the basic tenets of the health
physics profession, and are failing to keep exposures to radiation as
low as reasonably achievable taking into account technical, practical
and economic considerations.
Uranium-238, the predominant radioisotope at Paducah, is not the
most hazardous radioisotope either on the basis of mass (i.e., gram for
gram) or specific activity (i.e., curie for curie). However, it is
carcinogenic. It is unwise and unlawful to expose people to uranium
unnecessarily, and one is not permitted to release it into the
accessible environment indiscriminately. Congress should investigate
whether an ALARA analysis was performed and documented, for example,
before contaminated buildings were recently hosed down at the site. How
did Bechtel-Jacobs dispose of the contaminated water? Was it processed,
or dumped into the sewer or ditches?
There is the separate but related issue of off-site atmospheric
emissions of radioactivity. Since I do not have firsthand knowledge of
these matters I place the following in the category of issues that call
for thorough investigation:
a) There are accusations that there were massive releases of
radioactivity to the atmosphere that typically occurred at
night.
b) Reportedly, the air monitoring stations around the Paducah GDP that
were operated by the State of Kentucky were turned off during a
recent period for lack of money. This also calls into question
the adequacy of the State's monitoring of ditches and streams
that received liquid effluent from the Paducah GDP.
c) There was reportedly a high and unexplained reading at an air
monitor at a nearby high school as recently as last fall.
Unlawful Disposal of Radioactive Wastes
According to workers at Paducah, including the other relators, the
contractors illegally buried materials contaminated with radioactivity
off-site, including in what has been characterized as a ``sanitary
landfill.''
In The Washington Post, August 29, 1999, it was reported that just
outside the so-called ``sanitary landfill'' workers recently discovered
radioactive ``black ooze'' seeping from the ground where a drilling rig
had become stuck in the soft earth. DOE denies that this is related to
the landfill. If that is true, it suggests a second unlicensed,
unlawful, radioactive waste dump off-site in the area. There are
probably more. Again, a thorough investigation is needed. The landfill
should be adequately sampled with core samples.
Documents obtained by our attorneys (see Attachment No. 1) reveal
that a Kentucky police investigator reportedly found criminal dumping
activitiy at and around the site in 1992, and DOE contractor personnel
were reportedly told by their contractor bosses that if they did not
dump radioactive wastes illegally onto Kentucky land they would be
fired. This demands a thorough investigation. Was DOE aware? Was the
report followed up? If not, why not? Is a new criminal investigation
warranted?
With DOE's approval, radioactive wastes that have not been dumped
off-site illegally are apparently now being shipped to a site--
Envirocare of Utah, Inc.--that obtained its license to operate during a
time in which its owner payed the top regulatory official in Utah more
than $600,000 in cash, gold coins, and a ski condominium. DOE
apparently believe it is appropriate to continue to enrich this owner
with taxpayer funds so long as he merely declines to participate in the
day-to-day management of the company.
Unlawful Recycling into Commerce of Scrap Materials Contaminated with
Radioactivity
Apparently enormous quantities of radioactively contaminated steel,
nickel, aluminum, and significant quantities of contaminated gold (and
possibly silver) were recycled by the contractors into the stream of
commerce. This was apparently done a) without adequate monitoring of
the radioactive contamination remaining in these recycled materials; b)
without adequate DOE or national radiation protection standards for
limiting the permissible volumetric contamination of the recycle
material; and c) without an ALARA analysis and documentation of the
same.
This problem persists today. As part of a $238 million contract
with BNFL, Inc., the DOE is subsidizing the recycling of thousands of
tons of radioactively contaminated scrap metal from a former nuclear
weapons plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Since last October BNFL has been
recycling radioactive scrap metal and selling it for use in commercial
products such as cookware, orthodontic braces, medical devices, and
children's toys; some 100,000 tons of scrap metal will be recycled.
The DOE contract protects BNFL from fluctuations in market prices
of scrap aluminum, copper, and nickel by requiring DOE to cover 80% of
BNFL's losses when market prices drop below 95% of the contract
baseline price for the metals. According to a BNFL estimate, under
recent market conditions, this would result in a $9 million DOE subsidy
for the recycling of 6000 tons of nickel alone.
DOE's subsidy violates DOE, Environmental Protection Agency, and
Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements that public exposure to
radiation be ``as low as reasonably achievable.'' DOE's artificial
support of radioactive metals recycling not only unnecessarily
increases the public's exposure to radiation--there are other options--
but makes no sense economically. There is no justification for DOE to
subsidize the recycling of nuclear waste into commercial products.
In a recent court decision, a federal district judge expressed
serious concern that ``[t]he potential for environmental harm [from the
BNFL recycling project] is great, especially given the unprecedented
amount of hazardous materials the Defendants seek to recycle.''
The radioactive contaminants in the metals pose a long-term threat,
as they remain hazardous for more than 200,000 years. The BNFL project
poses significant risks because (1) surveying methods for radioactivity
are imperfect and could result in the improper release of contaminated
metals; (2) the recycling method for the Oak Ridge nickel is
experimental and untested for large-scale production; and (3) the
health effects of low-level radiation are the subject of significant
scientific controversy.
The recent revelations about the failed environmental, safety and
health oversight at DOE's facility in Paducah, Kentucky, which like the
Oak Ridge facility is a gaseous diffusion plant, raises further
concerns about the risks of the Oak Ridge scrap project. The DOE office
responsible for oversight of the Paducah facility is also overseeing
the Oak Ridge recycling project. After 50 years of demonstrated chronic
mismanagement of the nuclear weapons complex, DOE claims that it can
safely recycle radioactive materials for use in products for the
general public. With so much evidence to the contrary, the last thing
DOE should be doing is subsidizing the dumping of its nuclear waste
into commercial products. Congress should pass legislation that
precludes the recycle of radioactively-contaminated materials when they
may come into intimate human contact.
The Contractors Have Engaged in Systematic Falsification of Reports to
the Federal and State Governments and to the Public
The heart of the qui tam action against Lockheed Martin, et al., to
which NRDC is a party, is that the contractors were aware of unlawful
activities related to worker exposure, off-site releases, burial of
radioactive waste and recycling of contaminated material, and yet
proceeded to present false and misleading statements about these
activities, representing that they were complying with DOE orders and
all applicable laws and regulations. We assert that the DOE contractors
were willfully, illegally, recklessly, in bad faith, imprudently, and /
or negligently: (1) dumping significant quantities of radioactive and/
or mixed waste in unauthorized locations; (2) exposing workers at the
Paducah GDP site to unnecessary and unlawful levels of radioactivity
through contact, proximity, contamination, inhalation, and ingestion,
failing adequately to monitor worker exposures properly, and failing to
report radiation hazards to the workers and to the authorities; (3)
failing adequately to report accurately to the proper authorities
regarding levels of radioactive contamination; (4) failing adequately
to properly remove contamination in recycled materials, monitor for
radiation prior to shipment of these materials off-site, or inform
recipients of contamination; (5) failing to properly measure off-site
contamination and control public access where necessary; and (6)
failing to meet federally proscribed radiation protection standards.
While engaged in these activities the contractors made numerous false
statements to the DOE, the State of Kentucky and the public. We ask for
Congress' assistance in ensuring that the full compendium of such false
statements is found and preserved.
The Department of Energy Has Failed to Provide Adequate Oversight,
Though This Does Not Excuse the Contractors
We understand that at most times the Department had no more than 6
to 12 personnel on site, to oversee contractor work force of nearly
2000. The improper and illegal activities at the Paducah GDP occurred
throughout its 46 year history of operation. The failure of DOE and its
predecessor agencies, the Energy Research and Development Agency and
the Atomic Energy Commission, to prevent these activities demonstrates
the quality of the Government oversight over the nation's uranium
enrichment enterprise. One cannot of course presume that one's
contractors are lying to you. But the fact that some of these improper
and illegal activities have occurred right up until the present is a
measure of the degree and quality of the DOE oversight even today.
NRDC Notification to DOE
On or about May 27, 1999, we informed the staff of DOE that in a
matter of a few days we would be filing under seal a qui tam action
related to activities at the Paducah GDP. The disclosure statements of
the four relators were provided to the DOE staff at that time, and we
briefed the staff on the technical and legal issues. On May 28, 1999, I
hand-carried a second copy of the four disclosure statements together
with a cover letter to the office of the Secretary of Energy. In the
cover letter, I said,
I am writing to inform you of the serious health and safety
risks at the Paducah, Kentucky, gaseous diffusion plant. These
violations require your immediate attention. Yesterday we
presented our concerns and the facts supporting our proposed
qui tam action against the Paducah contractors to members of
your staff from the Environmental Management, Environmental
Safety and Health, and Nuclear Energy programs and the General
Counsel's office. We are providing you with copies of the
relevant documents to ensure that you are fully informed of the
gravity of the issues at the Paducah facility.We are grateful
that finally, more than 14 weeks later, DOE's auditors have
confirmed our findings and allegations. Sadly, however, the
Paducah Manager of Projects for Bechtel-Jacobs--the contractor
in charge of cleaning up the Paducah site--in anticipation of
the one-day-long safety stand down at the facility last week,
announced to his personnel: ``More to come--I still have
season's tickets to the circus for sale if anyone still needs
one.'' Clearly, far more than a just a day will be required to
change the culture of the Paducah contractors.
Who Should Pay?
We have suggested, and we believe the evidence does and will
continue to show, that DOE, notwithstanding its own shortcomings, was
seriously misled by the contractors operating the Paducah facility and
site. We hope the government will seize the opportunity to hold the
contractors accountable for what surely will be a massive, and
massively expensive, cleanup and worker monitoring and compensation
project. The taxpayers should not have to foot this bill. It is my
understanding that DOE indemnity provisions for contractors do not
apply in cases of contractor misconduct, such as is the case here.
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Mr. Upton. Thank you.
And thank all of you.
At this point we are going to go to 5 minutes of questions
by each of us up here. I am stunned. I have to tell you that I
have two nuclear plants, two nuclear energy plants in my
district. I visit there fairly often. There has never been a
time, whether I have been a Member of Congress or a staff
member or as an interested party who lives pretty close to
these folks, as they have a lot of tours that go through, you
don't have one of those little detectors that they give you,
they do a little readout at the end of the trip, they tell you
what it is and everybody is fine.
As I listened to your testimony, particularly from the four
of you, the first four that actually worked there for a number
of years, I am just stunned that you didn't have anywhere close
to that same type of protection or readout that virtually
anyone involved in the nuclear industry has.
I guess my question for the first four, Mr. Key, Mr.
Jenkins, Mr. Fowler and Mr. Graves, particularly Mr. Fowler and
Mr. Jenkins: How often did you have one of these whole body
radiation counts in the years that you've worked there? I'll
start with Mr. Key. Did you ever have one?
Mr. Key. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I had one during the period of
time that I worked there.
Mr. Upton. You worked there again how many years?
Mr. Key. Since 1974.
Mr. Upton. You had one?
Mr. Key. Yes, sir.
Mr. Upton. Even today do people have those little count--
whatever they call those.
Mr. Key. The whole body counter or the TLD?
Mr. Upton. You put it on your lapel or something like that.
Are there people today, Mr. Fowler?
Mr. Fowler. You're talking about a TLD. That's what
monitors your whole body dose.
Mr. Key. I was confused, Mr. Chairman. I thought you meant
monitoring by the mobile in vivo body counter that used to come
from the Oak Ridge facility to Paducah. Yes, since I have been
employed there in 1974, I have always possessed a TLD dosimeter
or a type of radiation monitoring dosimeter.
Mr. Upton. So you had one all along since you've been
there?
Mr. Key. The dosimeter, yes, sir.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Jenkins, did you?
Mr. Jenkins. Yes, sir it was a film badge in the earlier
years and then they changed it to a TLD.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Fowler?
Mr. Fowler. I've worn a TLD since I've been at the plant
but never have I ever had a whole body analysis done, which at
any other nuclear facility in the country is a standard health
physics practice. A person such as myself who been there for 8
years would probably have had a minimum of eight if not more
whole body counts done at a commercial site. I have never been
offered or given the opportunity to have one.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Graves.
Mr. Graves. Yes, I was issued a TLD when I came onsite.
It's important to note that the TLD, thermoluminescent
dosimeter, is for measurement of external exposure hazards.
It's not for the measurement of internal intakes of radioactive
material. That's done through bioassay methods such as in vivo
counting or in vitro bioassay.
Mr. Upton. Is that the whole body radiation then that
measures?
Mr. Graves. Essentially the TLD measures outside influence
of radioactive material, gamma and beta radiation, but the
bioassays are what is more predominantly used for the
measurement of internal uptakes of radioactive material.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Jenkins and Mr. Key, have you ever had the
whole body count?
Mr. Jenkins. Yes, sir, I've had approximately six in the
time that I've been there. The first several--and the truck-
mounted whole body counter, the technician would take it two or
three times. He just couldn't believe the readings.
Mr. Upton. He never told you what the readings were?
Mr. Jenkins. No, sir. Then I was sent to Cincinnati, right
outside Cincinnati, for a special, one of the people that they
sent up there. We went through it but I never was given my
readings.
Mr. Upton. Is there a way that you think you can find out
your readings today?
Mr. Jenkins. Sir, I don't know.
Mr. Upton. How do we find out what these readings are? As
you all testified to how scared folks still are working there,
it would seem the first line of defense, the first line of some
appeasement is to try and look at what these readings were to
in fact gauge exactly what you were exposed to and whether it
was safe or not, period.
Mr. Fowler. My answer to that is I was doing the initial
posting of the facility in which I found areas that had to be
posted as radiation areas according to the codes of Federal
regulations. I was wearing their TLD. The areas were 10 to 20
millirem per hour. I worked in them for months, yet they gave
me a zero dose. That is why that was fraudulent. If that were
wrong, and I got a zero dose, then why aren't they still
allowing the areas to be posted?
Mr. Upton. Mr. Key, do you want to comment?
Mr. Key. Yes, Mr. Chairman, back to the in vivo body
counting measuring device that was routinely brought up very
infrequently to the Paducah site, I did receive one of those
body counts. At the end of completion of the count, the
material was reviewed by the technician to me, though I was
never handed a copy.
As recent as 2 months ago when the Washington Post broke
the story, I began asking for known documents existing, that
which is the in vivo whole body counting, which we sent 16
selected hourly employees from our facility. I've asked for
those records. I've asked for the documentation concerning the
24-hour special simulated bioassay urine sampling for
transuranics. I've also asked for the fecal sampling results of
the current and involved hourly work force, whereby I can
cross-reference those documents to ensure that all participants
did in fact have the opportunity to participate and that we
could take that data and turn it over to our health physics
individual we have with the international union. As of this
date, I have yet to receive any documents that I have
requested.
I also requested that those documents be forwarded to the
DOE oversight investigative team. I am unsure if they ever
received those.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Klink.
Mr. Klink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's hard to tell where
to begin. First, from what Mr. Key and Mr. Fowler said in
response to your questions, it appears--and I'm going to try
and cover some territory--I ask you to bear with me, in
brevity--it will be greatly appreciated.
What you seem to be saying is, No. 1, you're having a hard
time getting questions answered. Mr. Fowler, you're saying you
don't believe the answers when you get them; is that correct?
Mr. Fowler. That's correct, sir.
Mr. Klink. Mr. Key, you agree as well?
Mr. Key. Yes, sir.
Mr. Klink. Mr. Graves, according to your previous interview
with committee staff, if you disagree with anything I'm saying,
interrupt me if you would. You came from the commercial nuclear
industry to Paducah as a health physicist for Martin Marietta
in 1989. It was your job to get the plant in order so it would
conform with DOE orders regarding worker exposure, radiation
controls, et cetera. You told the staff when you arrived that
there was no radiation control at Paducah. In fact, if I can
quote from my staff's notes during their interview with you,
you said they were noncompliant in all areas. RADCON was brand
new to them. They didn't know what was present at the
workplace.
The health physics program, they had one, but there were
two technicians at the site for over 1,000 employees.
Is that an accurate picture of what you found?
Mr. Graves. I was initially hired by Martin Marietta to
teach employees, the technicians that I spoke of. There may
have been another technician but the staff was very, very
small. I should say that.
Mr. Klink. You think it was an inadequate number?
Mr. Graves. Yes. That was my initial job there, to teach
them, as I had taught in the nuclear power industry where I had
come from. After that I went to the field operations manager
responsibility, and that responsibility was to look at all
aspects of the program and try to determine the compliance
status of that program with regard to current regulations.
Mr. Klink. You say that RADCON or radiological control was
new to them. What about contamination? Did they know what it
was?
Mr. Graves. When I said in the statement that every
fundamental area of the radiological control program at the
time was noncompliant or inadequate, that is a true statement.
Generally once I got to the site, coming from the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, regulated site, it was quite a shock to
me; but as I understood once I got there, that for an extremely
long period of time, and this was inferred to me by employees,
that the plant was considered a chemical plant and that there
was uniform contamination throughout the facility and we just
had a lot of work to do.
Mr. Klink. What does that mean if they treat it like a
chemical plant?
Mr. Graves. Essentially my first impression is they were
unaware basically of what they were working with or the hazards
thereof. That was the thought process that I had. But this was
a uranium facility, and I was aware of that coming in, because
that's why I was brought on board.
Mr. Klink. They were not aware that they were dealing with
radioactive material?
Mr. Graves. No, I can't say that. But the general thought
process----
Mr. Klink. You're saying that you think they may have been
aware but their thought process was not----
Mr. Graves. The overall culture of the facility as it was
operated for a lot of years was that of a chemical processing
facility. That's what was reported to me when I got there. I
use that as an example.
Mr. Klink. But they knew they were dealing with radioactive
material?
Mr. Graves. Yes, sir.
Mr. Klink. You told staff when you were surveyed you found
technical contamination in every area you looked. Were any of
those areas posted?
Mr. Graves. No, sir. There was widespread contamination
across the facility, yes.
Mr. Klink. Were the people at the site capable of
monitoring uranium?
Mr. Graves. To the extent necessary to fulfill the
regulations, no. We didn't have enough staff to adequately
monitor the workplace.
Mr. Klink. Tell me about the instrumentation that you
found.
Mr. Graves. The instrumentation predominantly was beta
gamma monitoring instrumentation.
Mr. Klink. Was that the most modern?
Mr. Graves. The instrumentation that they had was up to
date. It was contemporary in its use. There are some situations
within the facility where alpha radiation is predominant over
beta gamma. There were questions regarding the appropriateness
of some of the instruments used with regard to the source term
in the area, but they were in the process of getting more
instrumentation and trying to eventually get up to speed to
what they needed to be.
Mr. Klink. Did you tell staff during the interview that the
instrumentation was archaic, that the laboratory couldn't read
your samples, that plus-or-minus error was sometimes 100
percent?
Mr. Graves. The instruments that you're speaking of now are
different from the instruments I just addressed in the
conversation.
Mr. Klink. What's the difference?
Mr. Graves. The difference in the instruments are one is a
hand-held type instrument that is used by technicians to
determine the gross alpha beta gamma activity at the site. What
I made mention of to the staff person was that the
radiochemical capability or the ability to discern between
transuranics and uranium appeared to be process-oriented,
archaic. The lower limit of detection was not sufficient to be
of use to a health physicist in this regard.
Mr. Klink. So you couldn't detect the transuranics at the
site; is that correct?
Mr. Graves. We couldn't do that at a number that would be
considered reasonable to provide radiological protection.
Mr. Klink. Did anyone tell you that there was plutonium or
other transuranics located at the site?
Mr. Graves. Not when I first came on board. I first became
aware of the transuranics, I think I made the statement when I
was doing a review of one of the buildings, and I came across
large quantities of technetium 99 that was just identified
through a walk-through. And asking questions as to where this
stuff comes from--I came from nuclear power, I didn't
understand why technetium was at a uranium enrichment facility.
They said they did have processor reactor returns in the past.
Based upon that response, I asked them about some other
isotopes, CCM, being one because it has a relatively long half-
life.
Then I asked the question about transuranics. At that time
I was told that there were a number of drums, eight if I recall
correctly, of transuranic waste at the facility, in a storage
location that was a very well-defined storage location.
Mr. Klink. What was the timeframe from the period you were
told to come in here and fix it--and I assume that you were not
told immediately upon arrival what you were dealing with--and
the period of time at which you found out about the
transuranics at the site?
Mr. Graves. It is important to note from a health physics
concern, what transuranic waste is, is much different than what
transuranic waste is from a CERCLA standpoint. The response
that I got initially was based upon CERCLA standards, which is
a large amount of activity per gram of substance. But from a
health physics concern, minute quantities of transuranics, or
small quantities of transuranics can be a problem or concern in
the radiological workplace.
It wasn't until there had been a spill with a drum of one
of these eight drums that I became aware of the amount of
activity that they were talking about when they told me about
the transuranic waste.
Mr. Klink. Again, what was the period of time between when
you first arrived there and this spill occurred and you found
out about the transuranics?
Mr. Graves. About a year, sir.
Mr. Klink. What was the response of management when you
expressed your concern as a health physicist about these
transuranics?
Mr. Graves. At which time, the time of the spill?
Mr. Klink. Whenever you found out about it.
Mr. Graves. I was surprised at the numbers or the amount of
transuranics in the drum that was spilled. I think the general
thought process of management at the time was that, one, I
didn't feel like they had an appreciation of the seriousness of
this type of isotope in a uranium facility. And second, I think
it was generally felt that true normal CIP-CUP project
maintenance, removal of cascade, that a lot of the material
that hadn't processed in the past had been removed from the
system.
Mr. Whitfield [presiding]. Mr. Klink, I've let you go over
a couple of minutes. I think we better proceed. We have a lot
of questions to ask. Maybe we will have an opportunity for
another round.
First of all, Mr. Key and Mr. Jenkins and Mr. Fowler and
Mr. Graves, I want to tell you how much we appreciate your
willingness to come up here and testify. I know that it is
particularly difficult when you are in this situation. You are
still employees and you are testifying on issues that you deem
very important, and so we thank you for being willing to do
that.
Mr. Key, in your testimony you had referred to a bioassay
analysis study in 1990 conducted on employees at the plant. Did
you indicate that those results were never released, or would
you expand on that a little bit?
Mr. Key. On the initial 24-hour simulated bioassay for
transuranics at the plant, we were able to get approximately 30
volunteers to participate for that. However, the results came
back and the contractor called a meeting and claimed that the
independent laboratory had cross-contaminated all of his
instrumentation and thereby they were going to invalidate the
results. I have since asked specifically for those exact sample
results and as of yet have not received that. In fact, a
management representative discussed with me that management was
very reluctant to release that information because of the
unknown of how it would be used.
Mr. Whitfield. So it has been over 8 years and you still
don't have that information?
Mr. Key. That's correct.
Mr. Whitfield. Now, from all of the newspaper articles on
this, I think there is an attitude out there right now that
offsite or outside the production area that USEC has
responsibility for, there are some real contamination problems,
significant problems, over 90,000 drums out there, for example.
There also seems to be a perception that inside the production
plant today is safe.
Now, all of you have been involved in that plant, you've
worked there now or you've had experience with it, like Mr.
Graves. I would just ask you today, do you consider the
production facility that is operated by USEC to be a safe place
today? Mr. Key? Then go right down the line.
Mr. Key. I believe that safety at the plant has drastically
improved with respect to industrial safety and radiological
control procedures and policies from the early 1990's to the
present day. I believe there is always room every day for
improved safety, including worker involvement. A very recent
NRC internal investigation of USEC policies and practices,
workers were not involved in that investigation, in the out-
briefing. Unlike when OSHA comes onsite, there is dedicated
worker involvement and walk-around with the OSHA inspectors,
and really under OSHA we feel like now we have a voice to be
heard and can any time file a formal complaint.
As one suggestion to the committee, I would suggest that
NRC regulations adopt OSHA standards which include the worker
involvement and participation.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Jenkins?
Mr. Jenkins. Sir, I agree with Mr. Key, but I have a hard
time believing the records after 30 years of being falsified
to. I'll put it that way.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Fowler?
Mr. Fowler. Yes, sir, I know that problems persist to this
day. The problems we are talking about are current still. They
are not just problems of the past. Yes, things have improved
somewhat. But, I'll give you four examples. Approximately 3
weeks ago, it was found that Bechtel Jacobs workers had been
working in cylinder yards for months, nontrained, did not know
what permits were. When this was caught, they sent these
individuals to training. Ten of them failed. They retrained
them. Three of them then failed. I started talking with these
individuals. The problem was functional illiteracy. People were
allowed to work in areas, they couldn't read the monitors, they
couldn't read the permits.
Three weeks ago, a computer was tagged as radiation free
and ready to be delivered to a local school and it was found to
be significantly contaminated. Plant management had proved the
system worked. They said we found it. But it wasn't found by
them. One of the whistleblowers' wives did a second check on
the survey readings and found it to be contaminated. If she had
not done this, a student would be sitting at a computer
terminal getting unnecessary radiation exposure.
Again, about 10 days ago, plant workers were sent into a
contaminated building that required respiratory protection. Yet
they had none. They were told to just wet down the areas and
they could work without a respirator. A member of the safety
department caught this, they halted the job, told the workers
they would have to go to respiratory training. While these
individuals were in that training, they let another group of
workers go in without respirators and finish the job.
In the main cafeteria, to this day, there has never been
any access monitoring, so a contaminated person could enter at
will. In other eating areas around the site, there were some
monitors put in place, but the alarms were going off frequently
and it became a problem for health physics. So these monitors
are taken out. The problems are not only in the past, they are
current, and they affect the workers today.
Mr. Whitfield. Dr. Cochran, I have been told that you are
quite an expert on nuclear issues. You were quoted in a peer-
reviewed journal as saying, ``The situation is as close to a
complete lack of health physics as I have observed outside the
former Soviet Union, which we know is horrible.''
Did you make that statement?
Mr. Cochran. I did. And I stand by it. I had visited the
Chelyabinsk 65 in what is now Russia, which is their Hanford,
and toured a reactor that was shut down. The conditions--we
left an auditorium, put on some smocks, walked around in the
reactor, walked outside, back around through the auditorium,
took the smocks off and hung them on the rack for the next
person.
Based on my conversations with the other relators,
particularly Mr. Fowler and Mr. Deuschle, Mr. Jenkins, I would
say a similar attitude persists at the Paducah plant.
You are going to hear this afternoon, or later this
morning, from the senior person at Bechtel Jacobs. I would urge
you to also examine an e-mail message sent from the Paducah
manager of projects, Mr. Jimmy Massey, on September 8. That is
the day before the shutdown, the Richardson 1-day or 24-hour
shutdown. This memo was sent to the gentleman that is going to
testify before your committee, Mr. Nemec, Joe Nemec. At the end
of his memo, he says, ``More to come. I still have season
tickets to the circus for sale if anyone still needs one.'' He
is describing the events surrounding this case and the shutdown
ordered by the Secretary as a circus. He described in the
Paducah Sun the 24-hour shutdown as a family meeting. He
describes as one of the activities that will be conducted in
this 24-hour period, review and spruce-up of red postings.
When I visited the site in February, outside of the fence
in ditches that I measured, contamination levels in excess of
NRC limits, there were no red postings. That is why I am
telling you there is a need for a radical change in the culture
at that plant. You cannot run--you cannot have senior manager
in the cleanup sending memos to his staff and his superiors
pretending that this is not a big issue when in fact it is.
Mr. Whitfield. We have a copy of that e-mail. We will be
asking about that.
Mr. Klink. Mr. Chairman, can you yield to me for a second?
Mr. Whitfield. Yes.
Mr. Klink. I would ask unanimous consent that we have that
document made permanent in the record. I am told it is in the
packet. We haven't seen it yet. Thank you very much.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61428.283
Mr. Cochran. Mr. Chairman, the DOE, you are going to hear
from a DOE representative who says that the team that went down
there said that they didn't find any imminent hazards to
workers and the public. I think this was a very unfortunate
statement. An imminent hazard would be a nuclear explosion, a
criticality accident or meltdown of a reactor. We're talking
about chronic exposures to workers and those issues persist.
Mr. Whitfield. Dr. Cochran, thank you for answering the
question. We will be following up later on this.
Next is Mr. Stupak.
By the way, this is such an important issue that we are
going to 7-minute questioning instead of 5.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you. Let me again apologize. I have been
up in the Superfund hearings, bouncing back and forth today
here, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, as you know we have had hearings in the short
time I have been on this committee with DOE about Lawrence
Livermore, the spy situation out there. Now west Paducah, now
we have got the transportation of the plutonium. What I am
really concerned about, not just the plants, as the doctor
properly pointed out, but also just the culture, the attitude,
the lack of trust and confidence in DOE in not just running
plants but their whole makeup, their whole environment there.
I'm not sure how we address it. We have really got to get their
attention and not just a lot of assurances from them, but we
have got to see changes in the Department of Energy.
It is not just this administration. When you talk about
Lawrence Livermore, that went back over five administrations.
The west Paducah stuff just wasn't recent, it has been going
on, as we see.
Now we want to transport plutonium through my district and
others, and we cannot even get a hearing on the darn thing. You
wonder about trust and all that. As I listened and read the
testimony, there has been a lot of discussion about what is
happening outside, especially, Mr. Key, to workers, what is
happening outside. But how about internally, biologically, what
is happening when they breathe asbestos or uranium
hexafluoride?
Mr. Stupak. Let me ask you, Mr. Key, what can result from
breathing uranium hexafluoride, do you know, as a worker?
Mr. Key. Of course breathing uranium hexafluoride fumes, it
is irritating to the throat and nasal mucous passages, and can
result in bronchial, upper respiratory ailments. Beyond that I
don't have the expertise to say.
Mr. Stupak. You are basically ingesting uranium?
Mr. Key. Correct.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Key, you also testified to what appears to
be massive exposure to asbestos dust during the late 1970's and
you said the early eighties. And since 1964, since 1964, it has
been common knowledge that working without protection with
asbestos can cause asbestosis, but it takes a long time for
asbestosis to develop. Has DOE or the contractor done anything
to monitor, to track workers for asbestos exposure internally?
Mr. Key. Not to my knowledge. The international union has a
mobile screening unit. When requested, it has came to the
Paducah location twice at the request of the PACE Local Union
President, David Fuller, and the chest X-rays are taken and
they are read by the certified readers.
Mr. Stupak. Is this mobile unit, is this something that the
union does internally for its members, or does DOE contract to
provide it when the union requests it? How does that go?
Mr. Key. To my knowledge it is only a union-involved
program.
Mr. Stupak. Okay.
Mr. Whitfield Mr. Jenkins?
Mr. Jenkins. I would like to respond. Myself, the lower
part of my esophagus, I had to have it surgically replaced with
a piece of plastic. Whether it caused it or not, I can't
testify. My doctor said that there is a 99 percent chance that
it is going to turn into cancer. Whether it does, I don't know.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Jenkins, were you in the area where you
would have breathed this uranium hexafluoride?
Mr. Jenkins. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you.
In your testimony, Mr. Key, you talk about working in
clouds of fumes in the building. Did workers ever ask for
respiratory protection so they could breathe?
Mr. Key. The building that I was referring to was the C-410
and C-420 building which processed the rat tail uranium tails
material. And the clouds of fumes that we walked through, there
were times that I held my breath to get through those.
Respiratory protection was only provided in the form of a
World War II gas mask. It was placed in a box throughout the
building. You could pull it out and it was not necessarily
clean. And because it was general use, if you did not get it
tight enough, the fumes would still permeate around the seal.
One day I took the exhalation valve cover off one of the
respirators, and it had dry rotted to the point that it did not
provide protection.
Mr. Stupak. Did you ask the supervisors for masks?
Mr. Key. No, sir. You have to understand the indoctrination
process that the majority of workers at the plant went through.
When I was hired by Union Carbide, it was frowned upon for you
to ask any questions. If you raised safety issues, generally
you were given the worst job assignments within your
department. You were labeled a troublemaker, lazy,
nonproductive to bring up safety as an issue. That later
transpired into what was termed the ``right to know,'' employee
right to know. I could ask management a question and then
management would decide if I needed that right to know on that
issue.
Mr. Stupak. Did you ask questions under the right to know?
Mr. Key. Yes. In fact there were some general safety issues
in the early and mid-eighties where I went to the safety
department and I would say that OSHA regulation on this
particular issue is this. The response was, We are not under
OSHA, return back to your job.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Jenkins, Mr. Key, has there been any
testing and monitoring to determine radiation exposure to the
workers, do you know? Has there been any testing or monitoring?
Mr. Key. Testing that I am aware of, of course you have
heard testimony in relationship to the in vitro body counter
which was a mobile unit out of Oak Ridge. There is a 1992 NOISH
report which specifically points out the unreliable detection
capabilities of that unit and the numerous mechanical
breakdowns of it. That unit, as I am aware, was only for
uranium and only the group of 30 plant workers that were sent
for nonjelly detectors, commonly referred to as the geranium-
type detectors, has the ability to monitor the body for
transuranics.
Mr. Stupak. That is the only monitoring or testing that you
are aware of?
Mr. Key. That I am aware of.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Stupak, your time is expired.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Bryant.
Mr. Bryant. This is a question for Mr. Fowler and Mr.
Graves.
Were you aware of any occasion where a DOE nuclear safety
inspector ever visited the plant or reviewed the safety
procedures there in Paducah?
Mr. Graves. During my tenure at the site, there was a
tremendous amount of DOE involvement from a Tiger team
standpoint and independent oversight from HHS groups and
program folks and folks out of the House. So yes, there was a
lot of DOE involvement.
Mr. Bryant. You are saying DOE personnel on the site?
Mr. Graves. We had a site office where DOE employees were
housed. In addition to that, there were several different DOE
representatives that came and did audits and assessments as a
function of the new initiatives of Admiral Watkins.
Mr. Bryant. And part of that audit function would be
obviously safety?
Mr. Graves. Yes, sir. There was a lot of influence on
safety.
Mr. Fowler. After Mr. Graves left the facility, I never had
the opportunity to meet one of these individuals in the field.
I did discuss some issues with them in my office regarding
interpretations of regulations, but I never had the opportunity
to meet one again in the field after those days.
Mr. Bryant. Help me distinguish between your office and the
field.
Mr. Fowler. I am the training manager for compliance at the
facility and my office is--I am in charge of the OSHA and
radiological protection training. I have had questions asked in
regards to the regulations. But since Mr. Graves left, I have
not seen a DOE auditor in the field.
Mr. Bryant. On the date that Mr. Graves left, tell me when
that was?
Mr. Graves. Early 1992.
Mr. Bryant. Mr. Key and Mr. Jenkins, Mr. Graves made
mention of a Tiger team review. I think that occurred in the
early 1990's, maybe 1991. Would each one of you tell me, and
Mr. Key, you go first, were you aware of that Tiger team audit
review and if it found any safety concerns?
Second, were any steps taken by the contractor as a result
of that to remedy any of these safety concerns?
Mr. Key. Yes, sir. In my experience with the Tiger team,
both when they were investigating and review of their findings,
the contractor then developed action items for closure of those
Tiger team findings.
Yes, there were a lot of safety findings within that and on
the--on some of the industrial safety findings, I was asked as
a representative of the union to go out and review some of the
exact locations in which the union did sign off on some of the
safety de minimis items. The others, the majority of them have
validation for closure.
Mr. Bryant. Mr. Jenkins, do you have any comments?
Mr. Jenkins. No, sir. Just about the same thing that Jim
said. We worked real hard cleaning the place up. When they came
in and made their inspections and everything, we did get a
feedback on what they found and some of it was fixed.
Mr. Bryant. Mr. Fowler, do you have any follow-up on that?
Mr. Fowler. Yes, I do. I believe even to this day, there is
only approximately 10 Department of Energy employees onsite I
believe full time, and I have never seen an individual, an
inspector out there at night, to this day.
Mr. Bryant. And I know that we have--there is another side
to this and we have witnesses coming in to testify on the
second and third panels, probably a couple of other sides.
Mr. Fowler, you seem to sort of bridge this area in terms
of timewise and in your capacity there at Paducah. From your
perspective, who is to blame here? If you can--I know that you
can probably talk for days on this, but I am concerned about
the Department of Energy as well as the contractor or
contractors and in terms of what I mentioned in my statement
about the possibility of coverup or negligence and gross
negligence and intentional acts and all kinds of things there
from a legal perspective, where would you lay the fault?
Mr. Fowler. I think it is clearly on the contractor. I
didn't see their findings placed in any of the official
environmental reports that I started finding. I don't believe
they told the Department of Energy the real story.
Mr. Bryant. Do you lay any fault with DOE on not having
enough oversight and supervisory control?
Mr. Fowler. Yes, that is an aspect that they were to look
over. But again, the facts that were not given to them were by
the contractor.
Mr. Bryant. Mr. Chairman, I have concluded my questions.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you. Mr. Strickland.
Mr. Strickland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
each of you for coming here and for helping us more fully
understand this.
I would like to take just a moment, if I could, to ask if
there is anything that you have not shared with us this morning
that you would like to share before your time is up, before
this panel concludes? Is there any bit of observation, opinion,
or information that you would like for us to know?
Mr. Key. Mr. Strickland, I do have a concern with the
number of DOE site employees at the site, only 10, and given
its scarce oversight and budget and the capability, I think it
demonstrates that the Oak Ridge office is trying to operate the
Paducah site via telephone. And with the size and complexion of
the plant, I do not believe that is appropriate, and feel that
Congress needs to establish a Paducah site operations office
with sufficient funding, staff and contracting authority in
order to manage it correctly. And they may also include the
Portsmouth into that.
Mr. Strickland. Thank you, Mr. Key. All of the problems
that we are talking about Paducah apply to Portsmouth, and I
have been told that we do not know what materials came to
Portsmouth or what amounts or from whence those materials came.
So I just want to reemphasize once again that all of the
employees need the protection of this government and that we
are going to fail in our responsibilities, if for reasons of
fear of liability or fear of setting a precedent of some kind,
we were simply to limit this program to a pilot project and
exclude hundreds, perhaps thousands of employees, that were
just as faithful to this government and just as important in
winning the cold war as the wonderful workers at Paducah.
In terms of who is responsible and who knew what when, Mr.
Jenkins, did Union Carbide managers or Martin Marietta
managers, to the best of your recollection, ever tell you that
the ore or the recycled reactor tails and other materials that
you were working with were safe?
Mr. Jenkins. Yes, sir. They told us that they were safe
enough to eat. I have been told several times, ``Guys, you
could eat this stuff.''
Mr. Strickland. It would be interesting to gather those
folks and offer them a good meal. I suspect that they would
have a different kind of attitude.
Mr. Fowler, you spoke of having your picture posted on the
wall with a bullet or a target on you. Can you just tell us
briefly what that felt like?
Mr. Fowler. My wife and myself have been extremely
concerned. They used my picture for target practice, which when
I turned in to upper management and they looked at the issues,
they told me they considered that as a joke.
Mr. Strickland. Do you recall the names? You don't have to
give them here.
Mr. Fowler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Strickland. Do you recall the names of individuals who
may have responded to you in that manner?
Mr. Fowler. Yes, sir. I was told that it was a joke but
they planned no disciplinary action for the employee that might
have done it because it was awhile back.
Mr. Strickland. Would you mind sharing the names of the
person or persons who responded to you in that manner and who
they worked for?
Mr. Fowler. Mr. Howard Pulley, USEC; and Mr. Steve Seltzer,
USEC Employee Concerns Manager.
It carried on to have my car intentionally damaged on plant
site in which the ex-plant manager paid for the damages to be
repaired out of his own pocket, writing me a check.
Mr. Strickland. Do you have reason to believe that even
perhaps today there are individuals who may be observing you
more closely than they should or following you or in other ways
trying to intimidate you?
Mr. Fowler. Yes, sir. There is a pattern that when--I have
an access pass for my vehicle anywhere onsite. It is routinely
followed. I will park my vehicle at my office and I am having
security officers to come to me and say, move your vehicle. I
ask the reasons why and they tell me because we want you to. My
vehicle is routinely stopped and searched for no reason. Others
that borrow my vehicle to enter the facility, they will stop it
because it is my vehicle.
Mr. Strickland. Thank you, Mr. Fowler. Mr. Key.
Mr. Key. Mr. Strickland, the only other concern I have is a
lot of documents relating to plutonium and reactor tails are
viewed as trace amounts. There is a 1990, I believe, document
which is put out by DOE and it is entitled Closing the Atom,
``Closing the Circle of the Atom,'' and within that is a very
vivid picture that I feel the committee members need especially
to review. It shows one particle of plutonium inside of a lung
eradicating 10,000 healthy lung cells and causing mutation, and
that was published by the Department of Energy.
Mr. Strickland. Thank you. Thank you all and thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Burr.
Mr. Burr. Mr. Graves, let me ask you, to your knowledge,
did Martin Marietta ever falsify or withhold from DOE the level
or existence of contamination or health hazards at Paducah?
Mr. Graves. I am not aware of that; no, sir.
Mr. Burr. Are you aware of any documentation or knowledge
withheld from the worker or the legal team in this lawsuit upon
their request by current contractors?
Mr. Graves. No, sir, I am not aware of that either.
Mr. Burr. Let me ask you with your degree of experience, in
your opinion is there enough evidence of contamination that the
alarm bells should have gone off and clearly earlier than today
we should have known about the level of contamination at the
Paducah site?
Mr. Graves. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burr. Do you believe that documentation exists today
and did exist back even at your time at Paducah that clearly
showed the evidence of contamination at the levels that are
claimed today?
Mr. Graves. Yes, sir. Several documents existed that
identified the levels of contaminant there.
Mr. Burr. When you raised questions of contamination and
worker safety with your management at the time of your original
employment at the Paducah site, did they approach it and follow
up with the same passion that you displayed the concerns to
them?
Mr. Graves. No, sir. As I said earlier, I don't think that
they had an appreciation for--you have to understand that there
was a lot of change going on at that time. Admiral Watkins came
in and raised the bar, as was mentioned, as to what appropriate
radiological control was. Those of us that entered the complex
DOE-wide, that had experience in the areas of nuclear power, or
the Navy that were used to that level of rigor, were met
obviously with resistance. It was change and when there is
change, it breeds certain conflicts. No, I don't think that
they received my message with as much rigor as I provided it.
Mr. Burr. Mr. Cochran, you certainly have been active at
the attempt to retrieve documents. I think in your document
list, tab 8-A is in fact an executive summary from 1991 and I
will just highlight one thing. I am sure that you are familiar
with this. That the results of that report suggest in a very
clear way that plutonium is not present in offsite sediments.
Are you familiar with that?
Mr. Cochran. Yes, sir. That is so stated in the executive
summary of that Phase I report. There is no plutonium other
than in the water.
Mr. Burr. Not only was it stated in the executive summary,
was it not also stated that there was no plutonium
contamination found in the Annual 1991 Environmental Report on
Paducah?
Mr. Cochran. And in other environmental reports.
Mr. Burr. You have requested for some time, I think since
last spring, or your legal team, documents that pertain to a
reference about appendix 2 B-17 of the 1991 Phase I site
investigation, which it was noted in the executive summary was
to come; am I correct?
Mr. Cochran. That is correct. I think Mr. Fowler mentioned
that earlier. My attorney, Mr. Egan, searched the public
document room at Paducah in Karville for any references to
onsite and offsite contamination. Those appendixes were missing
from the Phase I report.
Mr. Burr. The request for those appendices was to whom?
Mr. Cochran. Well, there were various requests over a
period of 3 months by Mr. Egan, primarily working through the
librarian at the public document room, who was very helpful.
She made inquiries----
Mr. Burr. Which contractor is in charge of the documents?
Mr. Cochran. I don't know who is in charge of the public
document room or whether it is DOE or a contractor.
Mr. Burr. As it relates to offsite, I believe it is Bechtel
Jacobs, am I correct? Based upon that request, when did you
receive the appendix?
Mr. Cochran. I have never received the appendix. I have
heard----
Mr. Burr. You have seen data from it, though?
Mr. Cochran. The other regulators, Mr. Fowler and Mr.
Deuschle, found computer printouts of the data taken by a
company hired by Martin Marietta, a company called CH2M Hill,
and the computer printout data was in the health physics files
at the U.S. Enrichment Corporation spaces, but it was only
later that we discovered that that was the same data that was
in the missing appendices in the public document room, and for
that matter missing in every Phase II report that was publicly
circulated, to the best of my knowledge.
Mr. Burr. Let me ask Mr. Egan to come forward. If you would
just lean toward the mike. Let me just ask you, Mr. Egan, based
upon your request for that appendix, when did you receive it?
Mr. Egan. We have never received it. We pursued it from a
number of different angles, as Dr. Cochran said. The first
request was to the very helpful librarian in Karville, who
herself said she never received a request for it, had never
realized it was missing. She contacted Oak Ridge and apparently
contacted Bechtel Jacobs over a 3-month period. Her final
answer to us was that she was unable to locate it.
Mr. Burr. I have a copy of it. Do you find that surprising?
Mr. Egan. I understand you do.
Mr. Burr. The Louisville paper has a copy of it, but you
don't have a copy of it and you were the first one to request
it?
Mr. Egan. That is correct.
Mr. Burr. Mr. Graves, whose responsibility is it, based
upon a contractor's obligation with a site like this, to make
sure that the reports are fully conveyed to DOE?
Mr. Graves. I am not sure that I know the answer to that
question. There are probably a number of individuals that are
responsible for that.
Mr. Burr. Mr. Cochran, let me go back to you.
Clearly we have entered into the record this document which
you have requested for some time, your legal team. But you have
looked at data that was used to compile that appendix. Let me
ask you, does that data substantiate plutonium contamination
offsite at Paducah?
Mr. Cochran. Yes, it does, well in excess of regulatory
limits in areas that when I visited the site were unposted and,
to the best of my knowledge, are still unposted today in
violation of DOE regulations.
Mr. Burr. When you were there in the 1991-1992 timeframe,
were you aware of plutonium contamination?
Mr. Graves. I was only aware of it to the extent that I am
aware of it today as a result of the spill. My main focus when
I was at the plant was the health and safety of the
radiological worker. In normal activities and duties of the
work going on around the site, yes, I was aware that there was
contamination out beyond the bounds of the site. The levels of
transuranics versus uranium I don't recall right now, but I
knew after research that they were certainly present.
Mr. Whitfield. Ms. DeGette.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cochran, I know that you are one of the relators in the
civil contam action, and I know that the Justice Department is
looking at some of those civil issues. One thing that struck me
hard listening to your testimony was that it was peppered with
references to potential criminal activity at the site,
including your testimony about illegal dumping of uranium waste
offsite on public grounds.
I am wondering if it would be accurate to say that as well
as the civil concerns and the concerns about remedying the
situation for workers onsite, you have concerns about potential
criminal activity as well?
Mr. Cochran. Well, first of all I am not an attorney.
Ms. DeGette. We will still listen to what you say.
Mr. Cochran. My reference to criminal activity derive from
a police report that I attached to my testimony where you have
the Kentucky State Police inspector in charge of investigating
hazardous waste making these allegations of criminal activity
in 1991.
My point is I think this needs thorough investigation to
see whether those allegations were true. We certainly have
evidence that there was illegal offsite dumping. What action
was taken by the Department of Energy, if any, whether they
were notified and so forth.
Ms. DeGette. Do you know whether any investigation was
undertaken?
Mr. Cochran. No. I only became aware of this memorandum
within the last week or 2.
Ms. DeGette. Are you aware of any other instances of
employees, or any of the rest of you, of employees being told
to hide data or other kinds of willful activity that we should
be concerned about?
Mr. Cochran. Yes, I am aware of it from discussions with
the other three relators.
Ms. DeGette. Can you give me some examples of that, sir?
Mr. Cochran. One was--Mr. Fowler can correct me if I'm
wrong--I believe it was Mr. Deuschle when he found the computer
records of the missing data, he was told by his management to
bury the data and that it should not be made public.
Mr. Jenkins has referred to numerous truckloads of
radioactivity that was illegally dumped, much of it at night
offsite.
Ms. DeGette. Mr. Jenkins, do you want to expand on that?
Mr. Jenkins. Yes. I loaded out several trucks of slag, what
is commonly called magnesium slag from the C-340 building and
they were going to the dump. I said, Where are you guys taking
this? He told me offsite to the dump. At that time, I didn't
know if they had a permit for it or what.
Ms. DeGette. Did you later learn that they had a permit?
Mr. Jenkins. A couple of days ago I learned that they
didn't have a permit.
Ms. DeGette. Did he know that they didn't have a permit?
Mr. Jenkins. I don't know. He was doing what he was told
by, I presume, his boss.
Ms. DeGette. So you think that this was coming from high
levels?
Mr. Jenkins. Yes, ma'am, I do.
Ms. DeGette. Dr. Cochran, something else that we were quite
surprised to learn was that apparently a plume of contaminated
groundwater is moving one foot a day toward the Ohio River,
with no effective remediation underway or even planned. I am
wondering if you know who is responsible for that and what we
can do to get that remedied?
Mr. Cochran. I don't know who is responsible for that. And
I don't know how to remedy it.
But I would correct your statement. It is in the river.
Ms. DeGette. Right.
Mr. Cochran. It is not just moving toward, it is into the
river.
Ms. DeGette. It is in the river now?
Mr. Cochran. To the best of my knowledge. It is the
technetium plume.
Ms. DeGette. Mr. Fowler, let me ask you a couple of
questions. When you arrived at Paducah, did you have any
interactions with John Hummer who was in charge of health and
safety for the gaseous diffusion plants for Lockheed Martin?
Mr. Fowler. No, ma'am.
Ms. DeGette. Mr. Graves told us there was no health physics
program in 1989, and from what I hear of your testimony, it was
still true that there wasn't in 1991; is that right?
Mr. Fowler. I arrived at the plant in late 1991. My task
was to develop radiological training for the work force in
health physics. The majority of the work force did not know
what ALARA stood for, and they didn't know how to implement any
practices in radiological control.
Mr. Graves. As a point of interest, when I make the
statement that there was no health physics program, there was
one in place; but one that is reasonably capable of doing what
it is supposed to be doing in a compliant fashion with
regulations, that is a different story. So to say that there
was no health physics program in place is an overstatement, but
there was not one that was capable of dealing with the problems
at hand.
Mr. Whitfield. Ms. DeGette, I am going to give you two more
questions, and then we are going to take 5 more minutes.
Ms. DeGette. I have one more question, and I don't need the
second 5 minutes.
It is almost worse to have a program in place that doesn't
do the job than to have no program, I would think.
Mr. Graves. Well, it is important to understand that
throughout the entire complex--of course, I can't speak
specifically to the entire complex--but in talking with
colleagues over the years, when the new regulations for
contamination control came on board, nobody was ready to
implement that. So you have to understand what the culture was
at the time, and the culture then and what it was changing to.
The problem is if you take an extraordinarily long period
of time to get one in place that knows what it is doing and
that is relative to a function of what you are dealing with
here.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you.
Mr. Whitfield. We are going to go 5 more minutes for anyone
interested, and since I am the chairman, I will go first.
Mr. Graves, at one time you were the health and safety
expert with Lockheed Martin at the Paducah plant. In that
capacity you submitted observations and recommendations
periodically through the annual internal audit of the situation
at the plant. I have some copies of your handwritten notes
during this time which are being shown to you right now.
In these notes, you make several observations that the
current health physicist technician staffing level at Paducah
was inadequate; the current health physicist position staffed
with an individual with substantial operational health physics
experience does not exist. Radiation area postings do not bear
approximate dose rates; the current air monitoring system has
too few locations to characterize work location airborne
concentrations of radioactivity. And then in 1991 you talked
about the work on the converter was performed without a work
permit, the health physics program still not defined and
enrolled by current procedures. And then you recommended a
whole host of things that should be done to correct these
problems.
Do you know at that time when you made those
recommendations whether those were taken care of?
Mr. Graves. Well, from the things that I am reading here,
you have to understand that as I understand this record,
briefly looking at it, I was the company counterpart for this
particular audit. This audit was conducted by Dr. Larry McKay,
and I don't recall the other individual who was with him but I
do remember the audit.
Yes, indeed they basically verified everything that we had
been talking about and described deficiencies in. They pretty
much substantiated all that; yes, sir.
Mr. Whitfield. Did they correct them from your knowledge?
Mr. Graves. Well, the process of change, we want to--
correct them as far as the timeframe, I haven't been at the
site for a very long time. I know that we were only marginally
successful during my tenure at the site to change the inertia
of the overall process.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Fowler has characterized that there was
a culture of lack of concern regarding the problems. Would you
agree with that?
Mr. Graves. Absolutely. There was a culture of doing
business for many, many years and some of us who came from the
Navy or the nuclear power influence when we got to these sites,
it was very difficult to explain or to discuss the fundamental
parts of health physics, controlling contamination at the
source, ALARA. So yes, it was extremely difficult to get the
ball turned in the other direction.
Mr. Whitfield. All of us may very well have additional
questions that we will submit to you all, and I might also say
there will probably be follow-up hearings on this. But at this
time, Mr. Strickland, do you have additional questions?
Mr. Strickland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am just sitting
here listening to this, and I am thinking some terrible things
happened. Some person or persons must be responsible for having
made either terrible judgments or purposeful decisions to
engage in behavior that has caused human harm. And I am
wondering and I assume that the contractors had an obligation
to carry out certain safety procedures. If they did not do that
and if they submitted information that was misleading or
inaccurate or deceptive, it seems to me that that implies
serious criminal behavior.
Like you, Mr. Cochran, I am not an attorney but one of the
things that bothers me is that we oftentimes do not hold people
responsible. And so consequently, there is not the motivation
for appropriate behavior in the future. Someone is responsible
and, Mr. Chairman, I would hope that using whatever mechanisms
this committee has at its disposal, that we would consider
encouraging a criminal investigation into what we have heard
here today, because if decisions were made and contractual
agreements were not kept and lies were told, we need to
identify who is responsible for that and we need to hold them
responsible. And unless we do that, my concern is that this
kind of behavior and the mistrust of government which obviously
this has caused to happen, will continue.
I am interested in those of you who are on the panel
regarding whether or not, based upon your experience and what
you do know, that you would like to see an investigation into
whether or not criminal behavior occurred and if it did,
whether or not it should be pursued?
Mr. Fowler. I definitely would like to have that looked
into, sir.
Mr. Jenkins. I agree, sir.
Mr. Cochran. I share your thoughts completely.
Mr. Graves. I have no comment in that regard.
Mr. Key. The Presidential Report on Human Radiation
Experiments, which I reviewed yesterday, which leads one to
believe that the Atomic Energy Commission purposely starting in
1947 had a mission, and also decisions were made to deceive the
workers and public to keep this information internally. I guess
my question, Mr. Strickland, is when did this stop or has it
stopped?
Mr. Strickland. And just in closing, I would like to make
this comment. There is reference here to some of this material
information was kept from workers because of fear that they may
require or expect hazardous pay. I don't know if it is
possible, but quite frankly I would like to see if we can go
back and identify all of those employees, calculate what the
hazard pay would be, add interest to that and make whoever was
responsible, government or contractor, compensate those persons
and, if they are deceased, compensate their families.
It seems to me that this is just--it is just almost
unbelievable and the frustration that you must feel I think is
felt to probably a much more minimal degree by us but we
appreciate--I appreciate the fact that you have come and you
have shared and that you have been willing to take this step.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cochran. Mr. Strickland, I would urge you to examine
the ALARA requirement. This is a U.S. Government regulatory
requirement to keep radiation exposures as low as reasonably
achievable. The contractor had an obligation to meet that, and
to meet that he has to have an entire program. Just like he has
a financial officer and accountants keeping his business books,
he has to have an entire program, a man in charge or woman in
charge and a whole battery of people whose duty it is to look
for ways to minimize the exposure to workers.
Had that been in place by Union Carbide and by Martin
Marietta and Lockheed Martin and Bechtel Jacobs, you probably
would not have the cancers and illnesses that occurred and you
would not have them in the future and you would not have that
technetium plume.
You are going to hear from Mr. Hummer who makes a statement
in his written statement on page 5, ``With respect to workers'
safety, the radiation protection program at the Paducah plant
during Lockheed Martin's management was developed and
implemented to conform to standards of the International
Committee on Radiation Protection, as well as the specific
requirements of DOE.''
That, sir, is a false statement.
Mr. Whitfield. Dr. Cochran we will be hearing from Mr.
Hummer on the next panel. Mr. Bryant.
Mr. Bryant. I have two additional questions.
Mr. Graves, let me ask you, if I could, an internal
Environmental Compliance Review was done at Paducah by Martin
Marietta in December 1990 and it identified compliance problems
with respect to Martin Marietta's implementation of the
National Environmental Protection Act. According to this
document, the review found no system is in place to ensure that
environmental impact assessments prepared in compliance with
NEPA are honored by plant management.
However, in that same year's environmental report, Martin
Marietta told DOE that ``compliance with NEPA is maintained by
following the guidelines set forth by CET, DOE, and Martin
Marietta.'' Obviously these statements are in conflict. My
question is, do you have any explanation from your position as
to why these statements would be made?
Mr. Graves. Mr. Bryant, again my responsibilities there
were for radiological protection. The construction or the
dissemination of documents relative to NEPA review or any other
environmental regulation, I was not privy to. I must say that I
reviewed some documents from time to time, but as far as the
actual execution of the process, I can't comment to, sir.
Mr. Bryant. You have referred several times today, this was
something in the culture?
Mr. Graves. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bryant. Would this be consistent with that prior
statement, the culture that you found in Paducah?
Mr. Graves. I suppose that they could be looked at like
that; yes, sir.
Mr. Bryant. I know that there are other witnesses that will
follow on other panels that can more adequately address that
question.
Let me ask, Mr. Fowler, if you know this answer. USEC made
a commitment to the NRC to complete seismic upgrades at the
Paducah uranium enrichment plants by December 1997 and this is
a high-priority public health and safety project because the
Paducah plant is near a fault line. However, USEC has pushed
the completion date back and is not close to finishing the
work.
According to the most recent update of the NRC--and this is
September 15--the schedule for completing these upgrades
slipped back to September of the year 2000. Apparently DOE has
transferred more than $200 million to USEC to complete these
upgrades. Do you have any knowledge of this?
Mr. Fowler. I know that they are bringing in a massive
amount of subcontractors to complete the project. I know that
it is ongoing, but the reasons for the delay, I can't explain.
Mr. Bryant. Again, I think we have other members of the
later panel who will be able to address that issue. In the
event that question is not asked, I would hope that they would
address that question.
Mr. Whitfield. Ms. DeGette.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Strickland and I
were kind of wondering what some of the employees of the plant
think about this statement. ``With respect to worker safety,
the radiation protection program at the Paducah plant during
Lockheed Martin's management was developed and implemented to
conform to standards of the International Committee on
Radiation Protection as well as the specific requirements of
DOE. Plant workers were advised of radiation hazards and other
safety hazards associated with their work, both in general and
for specific activities.''
Mr. Key?
Mr. Key. During that period of time there was a lot of
change going on inside the plant. There were implementations of
the contamination control program now. There were personal
protection for workers that in order to perform their job had
to adhere to. The whole work force was trying to absorb all the
knowledge being thrown at them from various angles and some of
that training that they received was not efficient or we had to
go back and retrain on particular issues.
So to answer your question, some of the changes were viewed
by the workers themselves as requirements that were needed by
DOE and implemented, but as far as their knowledge of the
international radiological committees and stuff, it was
nonexistent because it was a complete culture change for us.
Ms. DeGette. Mr. Fowler?
Mr. Fowler. The work force--at that time I was involved in
direct development of training. They were not always informed,
and I will make a reasoning, due to the management culture to
support health physics. That was not there. They did not
support it.
Ms. DeGette. Mr. Jenkins?
Mr. Jenkins. I agree with both Jim and Ron. Everything was
in turmoil then. Some of it was never gotten out, I will put it
that way.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you, Ms. DeGette.
Mr. Burr, 5 minutes.
Mr. Burr. Mr. Cochran, there has been a tremendous amount
of interest not only by the Department of Energy but by EPA and
State environmental regulators as well as HHS to determine
worker safety, and I think DOE has done a preliminary report.
HHS also finished a public health assessment done by the Agency
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry which was completed
last month. It is still in draft form, I'm sorry. Let me read
one of the areas of the draft form to you and I will ask a
question about it.
``This means that although members of the public near the
site may be exposed to low levels of contamination in the
environment from the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant
facilities, concentrations are not at a level that would cause
harm to humans.'' Based upon some of the new documents that we
have seen about the level of contamination, how can an
assessment be made in line with what we are reading in this
draft?
Mr. Cochran. I think that is an inaccurate statement that
you just read.
Mr. Burr. Let me ask you if you are aware of how in depth
DOE, HHS, EPA, State environmental agencies, are at their
reassessments? Are they actually going in, doing the testing,
or are they using documentation that is available to come to a
conclusion that has been provided by the contractors?
Mr. Cochran. I don't know. I do not have firsthand
knowledge of their activities other than, for example, the 2-
page DOE auditor statement or summary of the auditor--of the
DOE audit and the public statements made by DOE officials and
EPA and so forth.
I think there needs to be a change in the culture of these
organizations as well. First there are levels--there are levels
of contamination offsite that are above regulatory limits. The
hazard to the public is less than the hazards to the workers.
The main focus of your investigation I think should be on
workers and culpability.
It is incorrect, though, to say that the levels offsite,
for example, are at a level that would not cause harm.
Mr. Burr. Let me take you back through some of the
documents that you and I have been through. We had an executive
summary in 1991. We had an annual environmental report on in
1991 that was actually completed in October 1992. The executive
summary was completed on March 22, 1991. That executive summary
at that time stated that there was an appendix missing, that it
was yet to come. That is the same appendix that your legal team
has asked repeatedly to be produced. It has now been produced
for the local paper and for the Congress but not for you. Let
me draw your attention to the date of the appendix, January 4,
1991.
Clearly this Phase I site investigation was completed and
printed in January 1991, 2 months prior to the completion of
the executive summary that said site investigation to come and
clearly a year, almost 2 years prior to the annual
environmental report. Both the executive summary and the
environmental annual report were written. The contractor had to
have known of the existence of the Phase I site investigation
written and completed on January 4, 1991. What would you
conclude from that?
Mr. Cochran. My conclusion is that the contractor was aware
of the contamination and covered it up and proceeded to make
numerous false statements in environmental reports and reports
to the DOE and the State of Kentucky with regard to the levels
of contamination.
Mr. Burr. Clearly if the appendix had been included in the
executive summary or the annual environmental report, those
reports would have spelled out something totally different,
would they not?
Mr. Cochran. If it had been in the executive summary, it
would have been harder to lie in the annual reports, yes.
Mr. Burr. I thank you and I thank the rest of the
witnesses. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Whitfield.
Mr. Whitfield. I would like to make one statement, Mr.
Chairman. This panel has provided us with some shocking
revelations and under your leadership it is our intent to
obtain all of facts and correct this problem once and for all.
Mr. Upton. As I excuse the panel, I want to thank you for
your hours of testimony this morning and this afternoon. I can
assure you that it is our intent to assure that all of the
workers in all of the sites feel that they are safe as they go
to and from their job and that the community that they live in,
that those folks too will be proud of the operation that is in
that community. We will accept nothing less. Thank you very
much. You are formally excused.
Panel 2 includes Mr. John Jay Hummer, Director of Corporate
Environment, Safety and Health for Lockheed Martin; Mr. Joseph
Nemec, President of Bechtel Jacobs; and Mr. James Miller,
Executive Vice President of USEC.
I would like to proceed with Panel II as we are close to
having some votes on the House floor. As I understand, each of
you also have counsel, as we had with the first panel. No? Mr.
Hummer, do you have counsel?
If you could all rise and identify your counsel and have
your counsel rise as well.
Mr. Hummer. My counsel is Mr. Leon.
Mr. Miller. Mr. Moore.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Upton. Thank you very much. You are now under oath. As
you saw with the first panel, we would like to limit your
remarks to no more than 5 minutes. Your entire testimony will
be made certainly part of the record.
Mr. Hummer, we will start with you. Thank you.
TESTIMONY OF JOHN J. HUMMER, DIRECTOR OF CORPORATE
ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY AND HEALTH, LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP.,
ACCOMPANIED BY RICHARD J. LEON, COUNSEL; JOSEPH F. NEMEC,
PRESIDENT, BECHTEL JACOBS COMPANY, LLC; AND JAMES H. MILLER,
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, USEC, INC., ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT
MOORE, COUNSEL
Mr. Hummer. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, on
behalf of Lockheed Martin Corporation, I appreciate the
opportunity to provide testimony and answer your questions
regarding safety at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant during
the period that Lockheed Martin operated that facility. After
nearly 3 decades in the nuclear field, 20 years of which was an
as an officer in the Navy nuclear submarine program, I was
hired in 1991 by Martin Marietta Energy Systems as the Director
of Safety and Health in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, with duties
including programmatic responsibility for safety at the Paducah
plant. Since 1994, I have served as a Director of
Environmental, Safety and Health at Lockheed Martin's corporate
level, with programmatic responsibility for the facilities it
operates for the Department of Energy.
Owned by the Department of Energy, the Paducah facility was
built in the early 1950's to produce enriched uranium for the
Nation's nuclear weapons program. In the mid-1960's, its
mission changed to include production of fuel for commercial
nuclear reactors. Between 1964 and 1977, enriched uranium from
reprocessed reactor fuel was introduced into that process. This
reprocessed reactor fuel was known to be contaminated with
small amounts of transuranic elements, including plutonium.
Lockheed Martin operated the Paducah facility from 1984 to
1989. Although introduction of the contaminated reactor fuel
had ceased in 1977, some transuranic contamination remained.
The worker and environmental protection programs that Lockheed
Martin took over in 1984 were viewed by DOE as effective to
address that contamination as well as the other safety risks
inherent in the facility. In the late 1980's, however, the new
Secretary of Energy, Admiral Watkins, instituted enhanced
safety standards and programs at all DOE facilities in order to
meet the ever-increasing expectations of the American people
for protection of workers and the environment. Lockheed Martin,
in coordination with DOE, improved the health, safety and
environmental programs at Paducah.
Throughout the 15-year period that Lockheed Martin operated
the Paducah facility, it worked very closely with the
Department of Energy to fulfill DOE contract requirements and
to ensure that DOE was fully informed of plant circumstances.
To the best of our knowledge, the corporation did not mislead
workers or DOE as to the state of worker safety, environmental
protection or any other matter at the Paducah facility. To the
extent that lawsuits have been filed to date which raise new,
unresolved allegations of wrongdoing by present or former
Lockheed Martin employees, Lockheed Martin intends to look into
those allegations and deal with them appropriately.
In the meantime, however, Lockheed Martin will defend these
suits vigorously and with every confidence that it will
ultimately be vindicated in the courts of law. Lockheed Martin
also remains committed to allay the concerns of the workers at
the Paducah facility and their families. We will cooperate to
the fullest extent possible with DOE and the Congress in their
effort to protect the health and safety of these workers and
their community.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of John J. Hummer follows:]
Prepared Statement of John J. Hummer, Director, Corporate Environment,
Safety and Health, Lockheed Martin Corporation
Mister Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to address this important matter on behalf of Lockheed
Martin Corporation.
introduction
I appear here today having worked in the nuclear field for nearly
four decades. I graduated from the US Naval Academy in 1958 and from
the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program in early 1962. I later earned a
Master of Science degree from the University of Southern California. I
served 23 years on active duty in the Navy, principally operating
nuclear submarines, but also commanding a major submarine training
center. After retirement from the Navy as a captain, I spent ten years
consulting and providing management support for nuclear public
utilities. In 1991, I was hired as Director of Safety and Health for
Martin Marietta Energy Systems in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. I served in
that capacity for three years and had programmatic responsibility for
safety at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. Since 1994 I have been a
Director on the Martin Marietta/Lockheed Martin Environment, Safety and
Health staff at the corporate level with programmatic responsibility
for the numerous DOE facilities operated by Lockheed Martin.
Lockheed Martin Corporation has been asked to appear here today to
provide information to the Committee regarding its management of the
Paducah facility from 1984 to 1999. We are pleased to do so. However,
it is important to note from the outset that as a result of lawsuits
that have been filed against us and other private contractors who
managed the Paducah facility--two of which having been filed so
recently that we have not had an opportunity to even answer them yet in
court--there are legal and practical limitations to how much we can
say, at this time, regarding our performance under the contract with
the Department of Energy. Nevertheless, because of our ongoing concern
for the health and peace of mind of those in the Paducah area and our
desire to dispel as many as possible of the inaccurate and false
impressions that have been advanced to the public, I am here today to
help answer your questions. Before doing so, I believe some background
information would be useful.
management history
The Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant is an important part of our
national nuclear infrastructure. The plant was built for the Atomic
Energy Commission (``AEC'') in the 1950's. It is still owned by the
Department of Energy, the successor to the AEC. From its initial
operation until 1984 the Paducah plant was operated by Union Carbide
Corporation for the DOE. In April 1984 Martin Marietta Energy Systems
Inc. succeeded Union Carbide as the plant operator. In 1993, pursuant
to legislation from the Congress, the United States Enrichment
Corporation (``USEC'') was formed and leased the Paducah plant uranium
enrichment facilities from DOE for operation. Martin Marietta Utility
Services Inc. (later Lockheed Martin Utility Services Inc.) operated
the plant for USEC from 1993 to 1999. DOE retained responsibility for,
and control of, the remainder of the Paducah plant, including
environmental management. Lockheed Martin Energy Systems continued as
DOE's operating contractor for those activities. In early 1998,
Lockheed Martin Energy Systems was succeeded by the Bechtel Jacobs
Company as the DOE contractor. In May 1999 USEC took over direct
operation of the production facilities, ending Lockheed Martin's direct
involvement with the Paducah plant.
Located in western Kentucky, the Paducah plant sits on a 3500-acre
site owned by the DOE. About 740 acres around the operating facilities
are fenced, with the remainder forming an uninhabited buffer area. The
buffer area is accessible to the public and is adjacent to a wildlife
preserve. The uranium-enrichment facility includes huge multistory
buildings with hundreds of electric motors consuming more than a
thousand megawatts of power to move the process gas through the
diffusion enrichment process. Support facilities for the plant are
functionally equivalent to a small city. The plant employs about 2000
men and women, including about 10 DOE personnel.
uranium enrichment process
Although this hearing is not the place to describe in detail the
scientific process for uranium enrichment, there has been considerable
public discussion and concern about the presence of plutonium at the
Paducah site and its hazardous potential to the employees and the
public. Some additional background might help explain how plutonium was
introduced into the Paducah facility and how safeguards implemented by
contractor Lockheed Martin together with DOE helped protect workers and
the environment against the hazards posed by plutonium and uranium.
The Paducah plant uranium-enrichment facility was initially
operated as part of our country's nuclear weapons program. For more
than three decades it has also played a critical role in enriching
uranium for the commercial reactors that provide electricity to
communities around the country. Both weapons and reactor uses of
uranium require that the concentration of uranium 235 be increased from
naturally-occurring levels. At Paducah, the initial step in the
enrichment process, the principal input or feed to the process is
natural uranium in a gaseous fluoride state. As a result of the Paducah
process, uranium 235 concentration, or enrichment, is increased to
about 2%.
During three extended periods from the early 1950's to the late
1970's, enriched uranium from reprocessed DOE reactor fuel was
introduced into the enrichment process at the Paducah plant, as part of
a DOE effort to make the best use of the unused enriched uranium. These
``reactor returns'' contained small amounts of transuranic elements
such as plutonium and neptunium, and fission products such as
technetium. Although the transuranic elements were present in very
small proportion to the uranium, they posed special challenges to the
radiation protection program at Paducah because by comparison they were
far more radioactive. These challenges were recognized from the early
days of the reactor return activities, and certain controls to limit
worker exposure and radiation dose were in place when I joined Martin
Marietta in 1991. The introduction of plutonium and other transuranic
elements, however, had ended in 1977. Nevertheless, as a result of
their earlier introduction between 1954 and 1977 Martin Marietta and
Lockheed Martin and their successors have had to work with DOE to
monitor and protect the workers and community against the residual
presence of small amounts of those transuranic elements.
worker safety programs
To address the safety hazards at the Paducah plant, operating
contractors developed and implemented programs based on DOE safety and
environmental requirements. These programs were reviewed and approved
by the DOE, and subject to periodic evaluation by the contractor and
DOE. The worker protection and other safety programs in place in 1984,
when Martin Marietta Energy Systems took over operation at Paducah,
were considered appropriate by all parties at that time.
With respect to worker safety, the radiation protection program at
the Paducah plant during Lockheed Martin's management was developed and
implemented to conform to standards of the International Committee on
Radiation Protection as well as the specific requirements of DOE. Plant
workers were advised of radiation hazards and other safety hazards
associated with their work, both in general and for specific
activities. Orientation and refresher general training included a
discussion of plant radiation hazards, radiation warning and
information signs and requirements to obey posted warnings, and
information about the radiation monitoring program. Individuals who
worked in certain areas of significant radiation received additional
training and met special qualification requirements before being
assigned and performing the work. Employees were cautioned and trained
to work in ways that minimize the radiation exposure, particularly to
minimize the time spent in the radiation area, to stay as far from
radiation sources as possible, and to use available shielding whenever
possible.
Employee concerns programs were also instituted to offer an
opportunity for workers to voice safety concerns and have them
resolved. Concerns could be raised anonymously, and any retaliation
against individuals raising concerns was strictly against our
requirements. Potential safety issues that were identified by workers,
DOE, external agencies or internal management assessment were
investigated and resolved to the best of our ability, most in
conjunction with the individual who raised the issue.
It is important to emphasize that radiation protection and some
other health programs require monitoring to determine individual
exposure levels and frequent area monitoring to determine levels of
radioactive contamination. Radiation exposure monitoring serves two
principal purposes: to assure that individuals are not exposed to
amounts of radiation above established limits; and to help identify any
need for additional controls. Limits for radiation exposure are
implemented at administrative levels significantly lower than ICRP
limits as part of the plan to limit exposures.
The potential for internal contamination of radiation workers was
monitored through a bioassay program. Bioassay was a routine part of
the radiation protection program at the Paducah facility (and the other
gaseous diffusion facilities) because of the presence of uranium. Data
on the bio-assays of personnel engaged in particular activities or
working in areas with the potential for internal exposure is in DOE
records.
In the late 1980's Admiral Watkins, the Secretary of Energy,
recognized that safety standards and programs at all DOE facilities
needed to be enhanced in order to meet the ever-increasing expectations
of the American people for protection of workers and the environment.
He instituted an aggressive audit program to identify and correct
shortcomings, including shortcomings in the radiation protection
programs. Improvements in DOE programs now include more detailed safety
and environmental program direction and guidance, standardized training
for radiological workers, and nuclear safety requirements enforceable
under the Price Anderson Act.
In response to the increased safety standards, Lockheed Martin
developed and implemented enhanced safety and environmental programs at
the Paducah facility.
Indeed, when Admiral Watkins, in early 1990, advised Norm
Augustine, then CEO of Martin Marietta, that the radiation control
practices at its DOE facilities operated by Energy Systems were not
satisfactory, Mr. Augustine responded with a description of actions
already taken to improve the programs and a commitment to continue to
provide his personal attention to the issue. He also provided a more
detailed action plan to the DOE Manager of the Oak Ridge Operations
Office.
managing environmental hazards
The standards for control of releases of radioactive materials to
the environment, whether into the air, soil or water, from DOE
facilities, including the Paducah plant, were established in DOE Orders
and by the EPA. The Commonwealth of Kentucky authorities additionally
oversaw compliance with environmental requirements established in
permits issued through the Cabinet for Natural Resources. To assess
radiological emissions from the plant, DOE elected to require Lockheed
Martin to collect and analyze samples from the water, soil and air at
the plant, and to compare the results to the standards established in
DOE Orders. In addition, a number of off-site surface water sampling
locations were established. Airborne emissions were regulated under the
Clean Air Act through a permit system administered by the KDEP. To
assure compliance with the Clean Air Act permits from the State of
Kentucky, stacks were sampled, ambient monitoring was conducted at
various off-site locations, and on-site meteorological data was
collected. In addition, external gamma radiation was measured at a
number of off-site locations, radiation surveys were conducted
throughout and around the plant site, and periodic aerial surveys were
conducted.
Data collected from the liquid and gaseous effluent monitoring
programs described above were compiled, analyzed and reported each year
in an annual environmental monitoring report for the Paducah plant.
This report was distributed by DOE to the news media and the public. In
many years a press conference was called to review the report and
answer questions for the public and various environmental groups.
conclusion
Lockheed Martin (previously Martin Marietta) operated the Paducah
plant for 15 years, with responsibility for protection of employees,
the public and the environment from hazards associated with the plant.
Throughout that period the corporation worked very closely with DOE to
fulfill DOE contract requirements and expectations, and to ensure that
DOE was fully informed of plant circumstances. To the best of our
knowledge, the corporation did not mislead workers or DOE as to the
state of worker safety, environmental protection or any other matter at
the Paducah plant. To the extent that the lawsuits that have been filed
to date raise new, unresolved allegations of wrongdoing by present or
former Lockheed Martin employees, Lockheed Martin intends to look into
those allegations and deal with them appropriately. In the meantime,
however, Lockheed Martin will defend these suits vigorously and with
every confidence that it will ultimately be vindicated in the courts of
law. It also remains committed to allay the concerns of the workers at
Paducah, and their families. It will cooperate to the fullest extent
possible with the Department of Energy and the Congress in their effort
to protect the health and safety of those workers and their community.
Mr. Upton. Thank you.
Mr. Nemec.
TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH F. NEMEC
Mr. Nemec. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am Joe Nemec,
President of the Bechtel Jacobs Company. We are the management
and integration contractor for environmental restoration work
at Paducah at Portsmouth, Ohio and Oak Ridge, Tennessee. We are
a relatively new contractor, been there about 18 months. Our
role began in April of last year. We are there specifically to
clean up the site, to stop the migration of contaminants, to
clean up contaminated areas both on and off the site, dispose
of wastes from past operations, to maintain these inactive
facilities until they can be decommissioned, and to manage the
inventory of depleted uranium hexafluoride, the surveillance
and maintenance on the cylinders. Our role does not include the
conversion of that material to another form. We have 94
employees at Paducah and about 275 subcontractor employees.
In January 1998 through March 1998 we went through a phase-
in period, a 3 month phase-in period where we reviewed existing
programs and placed the transferring Lockheed Martin people at
the appropriate point in our organization. With respect to the
safety programs, we found an adequate set of procedures and
process and programs in all elements of safety. However, we did
find five separate programs for the five different sites that
we oversee. And so we developed an integrated safety management
system using the patterns that the Department of Energy had
been developing over the previous few years. That system has, I
think, two important components for these discussions:
One, worker involvement. Every task we do, we get the
workers who actually have to do the work involved in the
planning of that task. That is a key to our success. That is
only way that we will really improve our safety record.
The second is management ownership of safety. It isn't the
safety department's responsibility. It is my responsibility and
those people who report to me, right down through our site
manager and to the first line supervisors.
It is also important that we have a system where we can
continuously improve our safety through continuous feedback on
all the tasks. That is an important element of our entire
safety program. A few weeks ago, we had a fairly large DOE team
visit the site to look at a variety of things, including some
of our operations. They identified some preliminary concerns,
and as a result the Secretary of Energy called a 1-day stand-
down and we conducted that stand-down; gave us an opportunity
to discuss with the site personnel again our safety program and
to elicit any suggestions or any concerns that they had.
We expect that we will get a final report from DOE. We will
read and understand that report, develop a corrective action
plan and get on with any changes that are required.
I think it is important to recognize that that
investigative team found no imminent hazards to the workers,
the public, or the environment and in fact we have what we
believe is a fairly good safety program at Paducah. On average,
the radiation exposure to our workers is less than 1 percent of
the regulatory guideline, about the same as you would receive
by two transcontinental flights across the country. We have had
no environmental notices of violation, and our employees have
worked for more than 500 days without a recordable injury.
I want to thank the chairman and the committee for inviting
me here. I will be happy to answer your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Joseph F. Nemec follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph F. Nemec, President, Bechtel Jacobs
Company LLC
My name is Joe Nemec, President of Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC, the
management and integration (M&I) contractor for the Department of
Energy's (DOE's) environmental management and uranium programs work at
Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Paducah, Kentucky; and Portsmouth, Ohio. About 80
percent of our work is at Oak Ridge, with about 10 percent each at
Paducah and Portsmouth. Our role at Paducah is to restore the
environment, dispose of the legacy waste in storage, and manage the
stockpile of depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF6). We are
not responsible for operation of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant
(PGDP). That operation is the responsibility of the United States
Enrichment Corporation (USEC). Bechtel Jacobs Company has 94 employees
and about 275 subcontractor employees at Paducah, while USEC has about
1,600.
Recent events have focused attention on worker and public safety
issues at the Paducah site, and I will discuss those issues today.
Bechtel Jacobs Company is a relatively new contractor at Paducah.
We were selected through the competitive process as the M&I contractor
in December 1997 and began a three-month phase-in on January 1, 1998.
Eighteen months ago, on April 1, 1998, we assumed full responsibility
for the DOE activities at the site from the predecessor contractor,
Lockheed Martin Energy Systems. We took over cleanup activities that
had been in progress at Paducah since the discovery of off-site
contamination there in 1988. We have been making measurable
improvements in all areas of that activity, including its associated
safety and health program.
While we have made significant progress to date, I'll be the first
to acknowledge that there is much left to do and always room for
improvement. The safety review recently initiated by DOE, and last
week's one-day stand down ordered by Secretary Richardson, provided
additional focus on safety.
It is our understanding that this review team did not find any
imminent threats to the health of workers, the public, or the
environment. However, they have spoken to us about some areas for
improvement, and we've initiated actions to address the issues they
identified.
My remarks today will cover three major areas. First, I'll describe
Bechtel Jacobs Company's role and tell how it differs from that of
previous contractors. Second, I'll describe the environmental
management and uranium programs work at Paducah for which we are
responsible. And third, I'll review our safety and environmental
programs, including actions we are taking in response to what we
learned during the stand down.
role of bechtel jacobs company
The scope of our work involves environmental management and uranium
programs.
The environmental management portion of this assignment involves
investigating, planning, and performing cleanup of numerous facilities,
disposal sites, and waste materials that are left on-site from prior
DOE operations; we refer to these wastes as legacy wastes. The uranium
programs task involves managing 63,000 cylinders of DUF6
stored at Oak Ridge, Paducah, and Portsmouth, with almost 38,000
cylinders at Paducah.
Our contract represents a major change in DOE's contracting
strategy for these environmental management and uranium programs. Our
predecessor had operated the DOE facilities for many years under a
management and operations contract, which meant they performed most of
the work with their own forces. Bechtel Jacobs Company was hired to
complete the cleanup of the facilities as an M&I contractor. We plan,
manage and integrate the work using primarily subcontractors to
accomplish discrete individual tasks with a focus on project
completion.
Our contract with DOE allowed us to bring in some new personnel and
a new management approach, but it also required that we hire the
majority of the Lockheed Martin Energy Systems workforce at
substantially equivalent pay and benefits. The former LMES workforce is
to be moved to subcontractors during a two-year transition period. We
are 18 months into that two-year period. In another six months we will
have completed the transition, at which time about 90 percent of the
work will be performed by subcontractors.
By bringing us in as a new contractor, DOE has created the
opportunity to review and revisit the way cleanup work is conducted at
Oak Ridge, Portsmouth and Paducah. We have taken the opportunity to
make changes where we can improve safety and efficiency. I will discuss
some of these changes in greater detail. By keeping a substantial
number of the prior personnel, however, DOE continues to receive the
benefit of these employees' site experience and knowledge.
overview of environmental management and uranium programs work at
paducah
DOE owns the 3,556-acre PGDP reservation and leases the uranium
enrichment facilities to USEC. DOE leases 290 buildings and facilities
to USEC and retains 152 as ``nonleased.'' The nonleased facilities
include:
inactive facilities under surveillance and maintenance
waste storage and treatment facilities
a permitted solid waste landfill
storage yards for cylinders containing depleted uranium
hexafluoride
burial grounds and scrap yards designated for environmental
cleanup
closed landfills
DOE material storage areas
two groundwater extraction and treatment systems
office and laboratory facilities
roads and grounds both inside and outside the perimeter
security fence on the DOE Reservation
A range of contaminants have been detected over the years in the
DOE facilities at Paducah and in the environmental media around these
facilities. Some of these contaminants are common to American
industrial facilities, including trichloroethylene (TCE), a common
industrial solvent, and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), commonly used
in oils in electrical systems. Others contaminants are found primarily
at facilities dedicated to nuclear applications, such as uranium,
plutonium, technetium and neptunium. The contamination that DOE is in
the process of investigating and remediating resulted from historical
operations and past practices no longer in use at PGDP.
The risks to workers, the public and the environment posed by these
contaminants depend on both the toxicity of the substance and the
quantity, form, distribution and mobility of the material. Thus,
although low levels of plutonium are present at the site, it does not
pose as much risk to workers, the public or the environment as does the
uranium, which is present in much greater quantities, and TCE and
technetium, which are both mobile in groundwater.
Bechtel Jacobs Company is responsible for planning and executing a
variety of environmental restoration activities at Paducah. These
activities are being planned and executed through the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)
process, which provides for federal [U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (USEPA)] and state regulatory oversight, and extensive public
notification and participation. CERCLA remedies are being developed and
will be implemented to address 211 solid waste management units,
approximately 60,000 tons of scrap metal and approximately 50,000 drums
of legacy waste. In addition, interim actions are already under way to
address two groundwater plumes, and innovative technologies are being
evaluated as potential final remedies for all groundwater contaminants.
The regulatory framework for environmental restoration at Paducah
is the Paducah Federal Facility Agreement (FFA)--a triparty agreement
among DOE, USEPA Region 4, and the Commonwealth of Kentucky--that
became effective on February 13, 1998. For several years before this
date, Paducah environmental restoration was implemented pursuant to an
Administrative Consent Order under Sections 104 and 106 of CERCLA, as
well as the corrective action requirements of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) permit. The FFA coordinates the CERCLA-required
activities, which are administered by USEPA, with the RCRA corrective
action program administered by the Commonwealth of Kentucky. PGDP was
placed on the USEPA's National Priorities List on May--31, 1994.
Prior to the commencement of our contract, DOE, the Commonwealth of
Kentucky and USEPA had identified 211 Solid Waste Management Units, and
grouped these units into 30 Waste Area Groups. Most of these areas are
on DOE property, either within the security fence or on the DOE
Reservation. Historical contamination has affected groundwater between
the plant and the Ohio River to the north, and two streams that receive
surface water discharges from DOE property.
Our recent efforts have focused on streamlining the approach to
remedial decision making by consolidating the Waste Area Groups based
on affected environmental media. This approach will reduce the number
of documents required to make cleanup decisions and will promote a
comprehensive and coordinated approach to cleanup. The time and
resources saved by streamlining the process will accelerate the cleanup
process.
Under CERCLA, results from environmental investigations are
submitted to the state and USEPA and maintained as the Administrative
Record, which documents the environmental decision-making process.
Since 1993, site environmental information and a duplicate
Administrative Record have been available to the public at the
Environmental Information Center in Paducah. Starting in 1989, public
meetings have been held on approximately a yearly basis to inform the
public of the status of environmental investigations and cleanup.
In addition to public meetings required by CERCLA, approximately 40
other public meetings and more than 100 other special events, tours and
workshops have been documented since the late 1980s at which
information was provided about contamination and related environmental
cleanup activities at the site. As a further communications tool, an
Environmental Advisory Committee was established in 1986 for quarterly
updates about environmental issues. That group disbanded in 1996 when
the Paducah Site Specific Advisory Board was formed under the Federal
Advisory Committees Act. The SSAB monthly meetings are noted in the
Federal Register and are open to the public.
As we move forward, the regulatory agencies and the public
(including on-site workers) will continue to be fully informed of all
identified environmental conditions and afforded the opportunity as
required by CERCLA to participate in the cleanup decision-making
process.
Environmental Restoration
In these days of limited federal resources, efficient use of
available resources is being promoted by prioritizing cleanup actions
based on risk. To facilitate efficient resource allocation and promote
a logical environmental remediation of PGDP, five major factors for
prioritizing environmental restoration have been identified by DOE:
Mitigate immediate risks, both on- and off-site.
Reduce further migration of off-site contamination.
Address sources of off-site surface water and groundwater
contamination.
Address the remaining on-site contamination.
Final decontamination and decommissioning of DOE facilities
With regard to environmental contamination, interim actions have
been taken to address the known imminent threats, including providing
an alternative water supply to affected residents, conducting off-site
residential well monitoring, and implementing other institutional
controls such as fish advisories and posting and fencing of creeks. In
addition, several interim actions had been taken to help reduce off-
site migration of contaminants. These included the construction and
ongoing operation of two groundwater extraction and treatment systems
to address the high concentration areas of the northwest and northeast
TCE plumes, which have jointly treated approximately 600 million
gallons of contaminated groundwater water since 1995. Several interim
actions had also been taken for surface water such as using an enhanced
treatment system for Tc-99 prior to discharge and rerouting plant
effluent to control migration of contaminated sediment in on-site
ditches.
However, while the site had undergone various degrees of
characterization and there has been a strong emphasis on implementing
interim actions to address imminent threats, it was apparent that
limited actions had been taken at the source areas. There was a need to
further integrate and assess existing data on a site-wide basis to
support long-term solutions. Therefore, as part of our initial
transition plan, the existing cleanup strategy has been revised to
reflect a more aggressive focus on source areas and cleanup on a site-
wide basis, with emphasis on long-term solutions. This new approach is
projected to result in considerable efficiencies and expedite remedial
actions for groundwater by approximately six years and surface water by
approximately three years.
Additionally, fieldwork for the final characterization phase for
groundwater was recently completed. A key technology demonstration is
planned for FY 2000 to test an in situ, passive reactive wall for
treatment of groundwater contamination. This information will be used
to finalize the feasibility study and support the selection of a final
cleanup action for groundwater in FY 2001. If this technology
demonstration is successful, its use in conjunction with other source
treatment technologies currently under consideration may prove to be
considerably more effective and efficient than the existing groundwater
pump-and-treat systems currently being used for the northwest and
northeast plume.
During the first year alone, Bechtel Jacobs Company has made
significant progress in the areas of both waste management and remedial
action at Paducah. Examples include the disposal of approximately 982
tons of waste in the on-site DOE solid waste landfill, shipment of more
than 81 tons of waste for off-site disposal, and on-site treatment of
more than 19 tons of wastewater. Additionally, under the remedial
action project, we treated approximately 200 million gallons of TCE-
contaminated groundwater.
Scrap Metal
The approximately 50,000 tons of scrap metal currently stored at
PGDP were generated as a result of numerous cascade upgrades and other
activities conducted at the plant over the past 45 years. This scrap
material is surface contaminated with uranium tetrafluoride, uranium
hexafluoride, and trace elements of technetium. In addition to this
scrap metal inventory, DOE also has approximately 9,700 tons of
volumetrically contaminated nickel ingots in storage at PGDP. These
radioactive nickel ingots are the result of cascade improvements and
cascade upgrade programs conducted at the Oak Ridge and Paducah cascade
facilities.
Cleanup at the scrap yard units has been delayed in the Accelerated
Cleanup Plan due to funding reductions. This delay has impacted cleanup
of the surface soils in the scrap yards, the buried radiological waste
under the scrap piles, and the related surface-water units that receive
runoff from the scrap yards. These units have been identified as
potential sources of off-site surface-water contamination. Removal of
these materials is necessary before scheduled FFA actions can be
achieved. A listing of the scrap metal by metal type is:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Totals
Scrap Metal (tons)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aluminum....................................................... 3,277
Nickel......................................................... 9,700
Copper......................................................... 43
Iron........................................................... 31,516
Stainless steel................................................ 29
Classified Scrap............................................... 15,713
Total.......................................................... 60,278
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Bechtel Jacobs Company initiated an engineering evaluation/cost
analysis (EE/CA) in FY 1999 to support an action memorandum to address
the scrap metal inventory
Waste Management
Wastes managed by Bechtel Jacobs Company at PGDP include legacy
wastes that were generated prior to the leasing of production
facilities to USEC July 1, 1993, and wastes generated from cleanup
activities. These are classified into five major categories:
1. Mixed low-level waste (MLLW)
2. Low-level waste (LLW)
3. Hazardous waste
4. Sanitary/industrial waste; and
5. Transuranic (TRU) waste
As of 1999, PGDP legacy waste inventory includes 2,953 cubic meters
of MLLW, 6,499 cubic meters of LLW, and 4.3 cubic meters of TRU waste.
With regard to waste disposal, the site has completed
characterization of approximately 12,000 containers of waste to support
waste classification and evaluation against various waste acceptance
criteria in preparation for disposal. Additionally, an EE/CA for scrap
metal disposition was also recently completed. A final decision
selecting the preferred alternative is expected in the first half of FY
2000, with fieldwork proposed to begin during the second half of FY
2000. The Paducah FFA requires removal of all scrap metal by the end of
FY 2003.
Decontamination and Decommissioning
A routine surveillance and maintenance program has been conducted
at the DOE facilities since 1995. Currently, 74 Solid Waste Management
Units (SWMUs) awaiting remediation, 68 active facilities, and about 107
off-site and 53 on-site monitoring wells are routinely inspected under
this program. Maintenance consists of activities designed to ensure
safe and compliant conditions.
The inactive facilities included within C-410 Feed Plant Complex
and the C-340 Metal Reduction Plant comprise about eight acres of
multi-story floor space. Both complexes were shut down in 1977. Both
are contaminated with various levels of PCBs, asbestos, and uranium,
transuranics, and uranium compounds. The Surveillance and Maintenance
(S&M) program consists of activities necessary to minimize
environmental, safety, and health vulnerabilities until actual
decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) of the facilities takes place
(currently scheduled to begin 2014). Current activities are limited to
routine inspections of waste storage areas and facility inspections to
identify needed maintenance and monitor facility integrity.
The Long Term Surveillance and Maintenance (LTS&M) Program
maintains facilities and programs following interim or final remedial
actions, and performs environmental and well sampling in compliance
with the Paducah DOE environmental monitoring program.
These post-remedial actions include:
maintenance of the Water Policy which provides city water to
approximately 100 residents within the area affected by the
contaminant plumes;
operation and maintenance of the two active pump and treat
facilities (Northwest Plume Groundwater System and Northeast
Plume Containment System) operating to contain the high
concentration zones of the respective plumes;
maintenance of the eight institutional control fences and
signs which provide public warnings of contamination affecting
usage of Little Bayou Creek in off-site areas;
maintenance of the approximately 4,000 feet of scrap yards
silt fence; and
operation and maintenance of the North-South Diversion Ditch.
Uranium Programs
In the uranium programs, Bechtel Jacobs Company is responsible for
almost 38,000 cylinders of DUF6; maintenance of
approximately 400 acres of grounds and roads inside and outside the
security fence; support of the lease agreement between DOE and USEC;
S&M of inactive facilities; and management of approximately 16,000
troughs that collect oil drips contaminated with PCBs from the
ventilation systems within the operating gaseous diffusion plants.
The uranium program is responsible for the management of all the
DUF6 generated since the start of enriched uranium
production in 1952. Bechtel Jacobs Company also supports both DOE and
USEC in maintaining the inventory of all uranium through the Nuclear
Material Control and Accountability program and with receiving Russian
uranium feeds in support of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation program.
Management of the DUF6 program is monitored by the
Commonwealth of Kentucky and operates in accordance with the Safety
Analysis Report for the cylinder storage yards. Negotiation of an
Agreed Order with the Commonwealth of Kentucky for the management of
the DUF6 inventory at Paducah is under way.
The management of 38,000 DUF6 cylinders requires that
cylinder integrity be maintained by a program of periodic inspections;
movement to prevent ground contact, which contributes to accelerated
corrosion; grit blasting and painting of severely corroded cylinders to
arrest further corrosion; construction of concrete yards to support
improved storage conditions; and radioactive contamination monitoring
to protect employees and the environment.
DOE is aggressively pursuing a program to convert the existing
DUF6 inventories from its current uranium hexafluoride form
to an oxide form. This program will eliminate the chemical hazard by
removal of the fluorine component and result in a more stable uranium
form suited to long-term storage or disposition. The Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement was completed in July 1999, and the
final Record of Decision was issued in August 1999. Award of a contract
by DOE for the design and construction of uranium conversion facilities
is scheduled for early 2000.
Facilities managed by uranium programs at Paducah are all in the
inactive category and are being monitored to ensure structural
integrity, adequate access control, maintenance of fire protection
systems, and containment of contamination until the facilities can be
transitioned to the Decontamination and Decommissioning program. All
inactive facilities are periodically monitored and routine maintenance
conducted to ensure protection for personnel and the environment.
The internal ventilation ductwork installed to cool the process
electrical motors in the gaseous diffusion plant building were
originally constructed with PCB-impregnated gaskets. Over time, PCBs
leached from the gaskets, requiring installation and management of a
PCB drip collection system and spill containment program. The PCB drip
collection system and spill containment program will continue as long
as USEC or its successor operates the gaseous diffusion plants.
overview of bechtel jacobs company environment, safety and health
programs
The terms of our contract required us to hire about 1,600 incumbent
Lockheed Martin employees performing the scope of work at Oak Ridge,
Portsmouth, and Paducah. Bechtel Jacobs Company brought in a management
team with experience in the commercial sector and at other DOE sites.
We brought in our own, non-incumbent Environment, Safety and Health
(ESH) managers, including our overall ESH program manager and
discipline managers for Industrial Safety, Industrial Hygiene,
Radiation Protection, and Environmental Compliance. We also designated
an ESH manager to focus solely on the ESH programs of our
subcontractors. During the three-month phase-in period of our contract,
these managers reviewed the existing ESH policies, procedures,
practices, and environmental permits. They also assessed and
interviewed the incumbent Lockheed Martin ESH staff to satisfy Bechtel
Jacobs Company that they were qualified. In general, we found that
existing policies, procedures, and personnel qualifications were
adequate to ensure safe continuity of operations when we assumed full
responsibility for operations at the Oak Ridge, Paducah, and Portsmouth
sites in April 1998.
We also determined that a number of significant changes were needed
to accomplish the full transition to an M&I contract over a two-year
period. I'll highlight two of these: Radiation Protection and
Environmental Protection.
Radiation Protection
Our review of the radiation protection procedures revealed that, in
effect, five separate programs existed at the five separate sites
(three sites at Oak Ridge, plus Paducah and Portsmouth). Our Radiation
Protection Manager determined that it would not be efficient for one
company to operate with five separate sets of procedures. We also
determined that the procedures needed to change because of the
fundamental differences between a management and operations approach
using in-house workers, and an M&I approach where the work is done by
subcontractors. Because it would have been disruptive and unnecessary
to implement an entirely new program on the first day of our contract,
we made appropriate changes in the existing radiation protection
procedures so we would be able to operate on April 1, 1998, and began a
process of evolving to an integrated program.
From April 1, 1998, through September 30, 1998, a single set of
Bechtel Jacobs Company radiation protection procedures was developed.
Suggestions for improvements were solicited from the workers using the
procedures. The staff was trained to the procedures, and the newly-
developed radiation protection procedures were fully implemented by
October 1, 1998.
We are currently revising both these procedures and our Radiation
Protection Program Plan to reflect the November 1998 changes to 10 CFR
835, ``Radiation Protection for Workers.''
We conduct our radiation protection program using the procedures,
an operations manual, and technical basis documents for external and
internal dosimetry. The operations manual contains guidance needed by
radiation protection personnel to authorize entry and work in
radiological areas; to properly post radiation warning signs on areas
and labels on containers; to conduct surveys for radioactivity on
buildings and equipment; to conduct air monitoring for radioactivity;
to control use of industrial radioactive sources; to maintain radiation
exposures of personnel as low as reasonably achievable; and to conduct
the routine radiation monitoring in active and inactive work areas to
ensure personnel are appropriately apprised of the radiation hazards in
their work space.
Our technical basis document for external dosimetry describes the
types of radiation fields expected to be encountered in the work place,
which ensures that the proper types of radiation monitoring badges are
being worn by the workers. Our technical basis document for internal
dosimetry describes the technical rationale for testing individual
workers for any radioactive material they may have inhaled or ingested.
In 1998 and 1999 (through June 30) at Paducah, 530 and 311 workers,
respectively, were monitored for external radiation exposure. The
average exposure in each year was less than 10 millirem (mrem),
equivalent to the radiation exposure received in one or two
transcontinental airplane flights. The maximum individual exposure was
459 mrem in either year, which is about one-and-one-half times the
amount of radiation received by a member of the public from natural
background radiation, and well below the applicable Federal regulatory
limit of 5,000 mrem.
In 1998 and 1999 (through June 30) at Paducah, 163 and 107 workers,
respectively, were monitored for internal radiation. We found that for
both years only one person had a dose above 10 mrem from uranium. This
dose (12 mrem) is well below the applicable Federal regulatory limit.
In 1998 and 1999, we also checked for plutonium, americium, and
neptunium in six Bechtel Jacobs Company subcontractor workers. We
checked these workers because, based on available characterization
data, they performed work in areas where these radionuclides could
possibly have been present. We found no positive results.
The preceding data covers only employees of Bechtel Jacobs Company
and our subcontractors, since USEC performs monitoring for their
employees.
As work is transitioned to subcontractors, Bechtel Jacobs Company
will require that all subcontractors work under our radiation
protection plan. All radiation safety monitoring will be done by a
single radiation protection subcontractor to ensure consistency
throughout our projects.
Environmental Protection
During the early months of our contract, a due diligence assessment
and management review was conducted to assess existing environmental
conditions, regulatory compliance, and cleanup strategies. The
evaluation included a review of all existing environmental permits and
agreements, the compliance history, current status, adequacy of
environmental actions taken to date, remedial priorities, and cleanup
schedules.
Based on the results of that effort and information collected to
date, the environmental permits and agreements were determined to
adequately address the scope of site conditions. While the facility did
have some limited history of minor violations, none were considered to
be associated with imminent threats to human health and environment,
and all have been resolved to date with only one Notice of Violation,
which involved administrative record keeping, issued at Paducah since
1995.
bechtel jacobs company es&h program improvements
Our work during the phase-in and transition periods of the contract
also resulted in the identification of several overall ESH program
areas for improvement that I would like to briefly highlight.
First, Bechtel Jacobs Company embraces a Zero Accidents Policy.
This means that we believe all accidents are preventable. Our goal is
an injury- and illness-free workplace, zero unpermitted discharges to
the environment, and no noncompliance with environmental permits or
laws. While we have yet to reach the zero goal in all areas, we believe
that our policy reinforces to our workers that accidents or unpermitted
releases to the environment are unacceptable. One measure of the impact
of this policy is that since we became the M&I contractor, we reduced
the lost workday away case rate by 37% and the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) recordable injury/illness rate by 47%. Our
current rate for OSHA recordables is 70% below the published Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) rate for private industry. Our lost workday case
away rate is 76% below the published BLS rate. At Paducah, the Bechtel
Jacobs Company staff has worked more than 500 consecutive days without
a recordable injury case. Since April 1998 at Paducah, there have been
11 first aid cases, and six radiation contamination cases, one
radiation uptake case above 10 mrem, no environmental Notices of
Violation, and one nonconformance with the Kentucky Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System permit.
Second, we have made it clear that line management is accountable
and responsible for ESH performance. Our ESH managers establish the
policies and procedures, but the people who manage the work are
accountable for performing the work safely. To ensure safe performance,
we have deployed our ESH subject-matter experts to the projects so that
they are directly involved with work planning and execution in the
field. We have also implemented a safe work operations training course
for first-line supervisors and ESH safety leadership workshops for our
project managers. The safe work operations course is scheduled at
Paducah within the next 30 days.
Third, we recognized our workers as being in the best position to
identify the hazards of a job and as having the training, skills, and
experience to safely mitigate those hazards. As a result, we routinely
involve our most skilled workers in the ``work planning'' process and
obtain final reviews and feedback from affected crew members during
pre-job briefing prior to work execution. We also monitor our
subcontractors' work planning processes to ensure compliance with
requirements for worker involvement.
Finally, I have made it clear that each and every worker is
empowered to stop work, without fear of reprisal, if he or she believes
that safety, health, or environmental protection will be compromised by
a work activity. We initially experienced some worker skepticism about
this empowerment, but several discussions between DOE staff and our
workers during the recent stand-down at Paducah confirmed that my
message has been heard.
All of these improvements are consistent with our Integrated Safety
Management System, our system by which each work activity undergoes a
rigorous five-step process by both workers and management team. These
steps are:
1. Define scope of work.
2. Analyze hazards.
3. Develop and implement controls to mitigate the hazards.
4. Perform work within the established controls.
5. Collect feedback for improvement.
subcontractor es&h performance
With our contract goal to subcontract more than 90 % of the work,
the safety and environmental protection performance of our
subcontractors is critical. Before subcontractors can bid on our work,
they must meet a safety and environmental protection criteria based on
their past performance. Ten percent of potential subcontractors have
not met our criteria, which are rigorous. In fact, there have been a
few complaints about how rigorous they are from the subcontracting
community. But we know that safety and environmental excellence exists
in the subcontractor community because there has been no lack of
qualified bidders meeting our safety and environmental protection
criteria. We are fully committed to selecting subcontractors who have
demonstrated the ability to perform work in a safe and environmentally
sound manner.
Once on the job, the qualified subcontractors continue to perform
safely and compliantly, in accordance with approved ESH plans, using a
graded approach based on job hazards, adhering to their contractual
requirements, and under our observation. Failure to perform safely and
compliantly is grounds for subcontract termination for cause. Because
we want our subcontractors to be successful, we have implemented a
Safety Advocate program under the direction of a Bechtel Jacobs Company
ESH Subcontractor Manager. Each subcontract is assigned a Bechtel
Jacobs Company Safety Advocate (a professional ESH subject-matter
expert) who works directly with the subcontractor's ESH staff to ensure
that expectations and requirements are understood and met.
continuing improvements in safety and environmental protection
We believe our actions in the areas of industrial safety, radiation
protection, industrial hygiene and environmental protection are
effective in protecting our workers, the public, and the environment.
We also recognize that there is always room for improvement.
A few weeks ago, a DOE Environment, Safety and Health team
performed a review at Paducah. The team did not uncover any imminent
hazards to the workers or the public but did have some preliminary
verbal comments related to opportunities for improvement in
radiological protection, procedures and conduct of operations. The team
shared these comments with us at a meeting on September 3.
Based on the team's input, Secretary Richardson ordered a one-day
safety stand down at the Paducah Site on September 9 to strengthen and
enhance safety programs. He noted that while significant improvements
have been made over the last several years, the stand down affords an
opportunity to further build upon existing safety programs. The
Secretary also said the stand down would give employees and managers an
opportunity to raise any concerns they may have, get questions answered
and make suggestions for improved operations. My General Manager for
operations and our company ESH Manager participated in the stand down.
Over the years, the DOE and its contractors have found that stand
downs are an excellent management tool to reinforce the importance of
safety. By stopping all but the most essential activities, we have been
able to focus on one very important subject. We have also found that in
the course of stand downs, employees usually come up with several
excellent suggestions for improvement.
The agenda for the one-day stand down included:
Distribute and review an information sheet on plutonium and
other transuranics at Paducah with each Bechtel Jacobs Company
and subcontractor employee.
Emphasize use of safety suggestions program as a mechanism to
relay anonymous concerns or suggestions.
Distribute and review fact sheet on rules (dos and don'ts) for
DOE Material Storage Areas to each Bechtel Jacobs Company and
subcontractor employee.
Survey the site for degraded, missing, or inappropriate
postings and barriers.
Survey all standing Radiation Work Permits for accuracy,
compliance, and currency. Inventory those that should be
cancelled or modified.
Dedicate a team of subject matter experts to work exclusively
on resolving the DOE Material Storage Area nuclear criticality
concerns.
Walk down and review each ongoing Bechtel Jacobs Company or
subcontractor project. Ensure presence of proper permits and
other safety documents such as Radiation Work Permits, Hot Work
Permits, Lock Out/Tag Out, Job Hazards Analysis, etc. and re-
emphasize requirements for compliance and conduct of operations
for each project with the project staff, both salaried and
hourly.
We believe the stand down met its intended purpose. All the agenda
items were completed successfully with good involvement by the
workforce. In the process of discussing the stand down with our
employees and subcontractors, we heard:
Workers wanted more frequent information on dosimetry and air
monitoring.
Workers understand that they have stop-work authority.
Workers feel they can change the system and be part of safety
success.
In summary, since taking over the environmental management and
uranium programs at Paducah 18 months ago, Bechtel Jacobs Company has
made measurable improvements in safety, radiation protection, and
environmental protection, but continuous improvement is our goal. The
recent visit from the DOE Headquarters ESH review team, and last week's
stand down, are an integral part of making those improvements. No
imminent hazards were identified, but we noted several areas for
improvement and we're taking action. We will continue to work with DOE,
our employees, and our subcontractors to ensure that we protect
workers, the public, and the environment.
Mr. Upton. Thank you.
Mr. Miller.
TESTIMONY OF JAMES H. MILLER
Mr. Miller. My name is James H. Miller. I am the Executive
Vice President of USEC Inc., and am responsible for the
operations at the gaseous diffusion plants located in Paducah,
Kentucky and Portsmouth, Ohio. USEC leases and operates certain
portions of the plants in Kentucky and Ohio from the U.S.
Department of Energy and employs approximately 4,000 people
with headquarters located in Bethesda, Maryland. I am pleased
to have the opportunity to provide the subcommittee with
information concerning USEC's operations.
We are committed to ensuring that USEC maintains a safe
work environment for our employees and that our operations
protect the public and the environment. We have committed
significant resources to improve the operation of the gaseous
diffusion plants, and we believe that our efforts thus far have
been successful.
You have been provided with advance copies of my complete
testimony. My intention today is to provide you with some brief
introductory comments on that testimony and to give you an
opportunity to ask any questions about USEC's operations that
you may have.
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 established the U.S.
Enrichment Corporation as an interim step to the privatization
of the uranium enrichment enterprise. In accordance with that
act, USEC leased portions of the GDPs from DOE and assumed
responsibility for the management of uranium enrichment
activities at the GDPs commencing July 1, 1993.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission assumed regulatory
jurisdiction over USEC operations from the Department of Energy
on March 3, 1997. In accordance with the 1996 USEC
Privatization Act and the Energy Policy Act, the U.S.
Government privatized USEC on July 28, 1998. In 1993 USEC
initiated programs to upgrade nuclear safety, radiologically
characterize he leased areas at the GDPs, reduce the potential
exposure of workers to radiation, improve worker safety,
implement pollution prevention and mitigation activities and
ensure proper treatment and disposal of wastes.
Our nuclear safety upgrade program consisted of many
projects to bring GDP equipment and programs into full
compliance with NRC requirements and to enhance safety at the
GDPs. USEC initiated a comprehensive site radiological
characterization project which was completed in 1998. This
project surveyed all accessible areas of the GDPs leased by
USEC to obtain complete information on the extent and the level
of contamination that might be present. As the survey was
completed for each area, the postings for the area were
reviewed in light of the survey results and were adjusted as
appropriate. USEC also decontaminated areas throughout the
site. We now conduct routine radiological surveys to ensure
radiological hazards are identified and communicated to
employees and that areas are properly posted. Procedures and
training are in place to ensure proper protection of
individuals entering radiological areas.
Our radiation protection program is designed to achieve the
goal of keeping exposures to radiation from all sources as low
as reasonably achievable. The doses received by USEC workers at
the GDPs are in fact very low.
USEC also undertook immediate action to address industrial
safety problems. Since taking over the operation of the GDPs,
we have reduced worker injury rates and lost workdays due to
injuries to less than half the 1993 rate. USEC has fully
characterized its waste streams at the GDPs and instituted new
pollution prevention initiatives. We also initiated waste
minimization efforts and achieved significant reductions in
low-level radioactive and hazardous and mixed wastes. We share
your concern for the health and safety of our workers, their
families and our community.
USEC is prepared to assist the committee in any way we can.
I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may
have.
[The prepared statement of James H. Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement of James H. Miller, Executive Vice President, USEC
Inc.
My name is James H. Miller. I am the Executive Vice President of
USEC Inc. and am responsible for USEC's operations at the gaseous
diffusion plants located in Paducah, Kentucky, and Portsmouth, Ohio.
USEC Inc. is the world leader in production and sale of uranium fuel
enrichment services for commercial nuclear power plants. With
headquarters in Bethesda, Maryland, the Company leases and operates
portions of the plants in Kentucky and Ohio from the U.S. Department of
Energy and employs approximately 4,000 people.
I am pleased to provide the Subcommittee with information
concerning USEC's operation of the gaseous diffusion plants (the
``GDPs''). USEC is committed to ensuring that it maintains a safe work
environment for its employees and that its operations protect the
public and the environment. To that end, USEC has committed significant
resources to improve the operation of the GDPs. As I will point out
during this testimony, the record demonstrates that our efforts have
succeeded.
My testimony today is comprised of four parts. First, I will
provide some background describing the transition from a government
enterprise into a private corporation regulated by NRC, OSHA, EPA and
other federal and state agencies. Second, I will generally describe the
state of the GDPs on July 1, 1993, when USEC as a government
corporation took over management of the uranium enrichment enterprise.
Third, I will outline the actions taken by USEC from 1993 until today
to improve and enhance the operation at the plants in the areas of
worker safety, radiological protection, nuclear safety, and
environmental protection. Finally, I will describe the results of these
actions to date.
background
Built in the 1950s to produce enriched uranium for national defense
and, later, for nuclear fuel for commercial reactors, the GDPs were
operated by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and its predecessor
agencies. DOE and its predecessors contracted with private companies to
manage and operate the GDPs under the agency's direction and regulatory
oversight. In June 1993, the GDPs were managed and operated for DOE by
Martin Marietta Energy Systems, a subsidiary of Martin Marietta
Corporation.
The Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-486, established the
United States Enrichment Corporation, a wholly owned government
corporation, as an interim step to the privatization of the uranium
enrichment enterprise. In accordance with the Energy Policy Act,
commencing July 1, 1993, USEC leased portions of the GDPs from DOE and
assumed responsibility for the management of uranium enrichment
activities at the GDPs. USEC, as a government corporation, contracted
with Martin Marietta Utility Services, later to be Lockheed Martin
Utility Services, to operate and maintain the GDPs. The Energy Policy
Act mandated that the GDPs be independently regulated by the U. S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA), in addition to the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and applicable state agencies.
The NRC assumed regulatory jurisdiction over USEC operations on
March 3, 1997. Prior to that time, USEC operations were regulated by
DOE under a Regulatory Oversight Agreement between DOE and USEC which
was based upon the existing nuclear safety, safeguards, and security
requirements of DOE.
In 1996, the USEC Privatization Act, Pub. L. 104-134, was enacted.
In accordance with the USEC Privatization Act and the Energy Policy
Act, the U.S. Government privatized USEC through an initial public
offering of stock on July 28, 1998. After privatization, USEC initiated
steps to assume full and direct responsibility for the operations of
the GDPs. Accordingly, on November 18, 1998, USEC provided notice to
Lockheed Martin Utility Services as required by contract that USEC was
terminating its contract to operate the GDPs. On May 18, 1999, USEC
assumed direct control of the operations of the GDPs.
the state of the gdps on july 1, 1993
The Energy Policy Act directed that DOE complete an environmental
audit of the GDPs prior to the July 1, 1993, transition to USEC. DOE's
environmental audit documented that the GDPs were contaminated by a
number of hazardous and radioactive materials including polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs); organic compounds such as Trichloroethylene; metals
such as lead, nickel and chromium; asbestos; and radionuclides
including uranium and technetium. The GDPs were also undergoing cleanup
and environmental remediation activities under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Paducah GDP was listed on
the National Priorities List under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), also known as
Superfund. The presence of contamination from transuranics was known as
a legacy of past operations at the GDPs and the lease with DOE
specifically indemnifies USEC for any liabilities as a result of
contamination from transuranics such as plutonium.
On July 1, 1993, there was incomplete information concerning the
extent or level of contamination that might be present in the process
and support buildings or in outside areas. There also was only limited
characterization of wastes generated. It was assumed that all process
buildings and most support buildings were potentially contaminated. In
general, it was also assumed that wastes generated and stored on site
were mixed wastes, both hazardous and radioactive.
In addition to the environmental audit, DOE also performed an
assessment of the condition of the GDPs with respect to industrial
safety. Under DOE, the operations of the GDPs were not subject to OSHA
regulation. DOE's assessment identified many problem areas related to
industrial safety. In 1993, the worker injury rates at both GDPs were
above industry norms.The USEC Privatization Act provided that any
liabilities associated with the operation of the uranium enterprise
(including the operation of the GDPs) prior to July 28, 1998, would
remain direct liabilities of the U.S. Government and DOE.
usec's actions since july 1, 1993
USEC has made protection of our workers, the public and the
environment a priority and has committed significant resources to
improve and enhance the operation of the GDPs. In 1993, USEC initiated
programs to upgrade nuclear safety, radiologically characterize the
leased areas at the GDPs, reduce the potential exposure of workers to
radiation, improve worker safety, implement pollution prevention
activities and ensure proper treatment and disposal of wastes.
USEC initiated a comprehensive Nuclear Safety Upgrade program to
bring the GDPs into full compliance with NRC requirements and to
enhance safety at the GDPs. DOE funded approximately $220 million of
this Nuclear Safety Upgrade program.
USEC also initiated a comprehensive site radiological
characterization project which was completed in 1998. This project
surveyed all accessible areas of the GDPs leased by USEC to obtain
complete information on the extent and level of contamination that
might be present. The survey included outside areas with miles of
roadways, millions of square feet of building walls, floors and
lockers, over a million tools and parts, and millions of document
pages. As the survey was completed for each area, the postings and
markings for the area were reviewed in light of the survey results and
were adjusted as necessary. USEC decontaminated areas throughout the
site including over 5.5 million square feet of building floor space.
This project significantly reduced workers' potential exposure to
radioactive materials.
USEC undertook immediate action to address the industrial safety
problem areas. DOE funded $35 million to correct problem areas
identified in DOE's assessment and other potential safety issues
identified by USEC. USEC also initiated an effort to improve work
practices and procedures bringing them in line with industry best
practices.
USEC fully characterized its waste streams at the GDPs and
instituted new pollution prevention initiatives to reduce the amount of
waste generated and to change waste streams to more benign forms. USEC
identified and approved commercial licensed offsite waste treatment and
disposal facilities and began shipping low-level, hazardous and mixed
wastes off site for proper treatment and disposal at licensed
commercial facilities.
results to date
USEC's radiation protection program is in compliance with NRC
regulations. The radiation protection program is designed to achieve
the goal of keeping exposures to radiation from all sources including
transuranics as low as reasonably achievable. The effectiveness of
USEC's program is demonstrated by data showing that the average annual
dose for all GDP monitored personnel is less than 5 millirem per year
compared to the federal limit of 5000 millirem per year. The doses
received by USEC's workers at the GDPs are also well below the averages
for other NRC licensees. Procedures and training are in place to ensure
proper protection of individuals entering radiological areas. USEC
conducts routine radiological surveys to ensure radiological hazards
are identified and communicated to employees and that areas are
properly posted. All employees are provided training regarding the
potential hazards associated with exposure to radioactive materials.
USEC continually assesses its radiation protection program to
assure that it is effective and to seek opportunities for improvement.
USEC's Health Physics organization conducts periodic reviews of the
radiation protection program. USEC's Safety, Safeguards and Quality
organization, which is independent of the radiation protection program
and production, also conducts an audit program of the radiation
protection program, reviewing different elements of the program
throughout the year.
Most recently, during the week ending September 3, 1999, NRC
conducted a confirmatory inspection of the Paducah plant's radiation
protection program, specifically examining measures used to protect
workers and the public from hazards of transuranics. NRC has provided
USEC with preliminary information that it has found that our program
adequately protects workers and the public.
USEC's commitment to protect its neighbors and the environment is
equally clear from the results it has achieved. USEC monitors its air
emissions and water discharges to assure that it meets all applicable
regulatory limits. USEC maintains a number of air monitors offsite and
conducts additional portable sampling and monitoring onsite. Air
emissions from USEC's operations at the GDPs have been well below the
regulatory limits for radionuclides. During USEC's operation of the
GDPs, air emissions each year typically have resulted in a total of
less than one-tenth of the EPA standard. Water discharges are monitored
for uranium, technetium and transuranics either weekly or quarterly
depending on the nature of the discharge. All USEC water discharges
have been below regulatory limits.
USEC's efforts to reduce other industrial safety hazards and
improve practices also has succeeded in improving worker safety. In
July 1995, the Paducah GDP reached a significant milestone with two
million man-hours worked without a lost workday case. Since taking over
the operation of the GDPs, USEC has reduced worker injury rates and
lost work days due to injuries to less than half the 1993 rate and well
below the national average for our industry. USEC also has an
aggressive pollution prevention program. Low level radioactive waste
generation was reduced by 36% at the Paducah GDP and 32% at the
Portsmouth GDP between FY 1996 and FY 1999. USEC achieved similar
reductions in the amount of hazardous and mixed waste generated. The
Paducah GDP achieved a 42% reduction in generation of hazardous and
mixed waste between FY 1995 and FY 1999, and the Portsmouth GDP reduced
generation by 70% between FY 1994 and FY 1999.
In 1998, the National Safety Council recognized the Paducah plant
as successfully improving production processes while achieving
significant safety gains.
Finally, as you know, NRC is required to prepare periodic reports
to Congress on the GDPs' performance. The NRC provided Reports to
Congress in December 1997 and in January 1999. Both reported that
USEC's operation of the GDPs has provided adequate protection of the
public health and safety and the environment and generally has been in
compliance with NRC regulatory requirements. On January 29, 1999, the
NRC renewed the GDP Certificates of Compliance for a period of five
years--the maximum period permitted by the USEC Privatization Act.
conclusion
Congress provided USEC with the mandate to improve the operation of
the GDPs and to enhance the protection of its workers, the public and
the environment. USEC is committed to carrying out that mandate. Safety
is paramount at USEC. We believe that safety and business success are
intertwined--safe workers and safe facilities are necessary to achieve
quality performance. USEC has committed significant resources and has
taken significant strides to ensure safe operation of the GDPs. The
record demonstrates that our efforts have succeeded. We are proud of
the dedication and hard work our employees and the results we have
achieved. We are committed to building upon our success and
continuously striving to improve.
Mr. Upton. Thank you.
You heard those buzzers. We have a series of votes on the
floor. I know Mr. Burr has a speech at 1:30. I am going to let
him go first with 5 minutes of questions. When he is done, we
will adjourn temporarily until 2 o'clock.
Mr. Burr. I thank the chairman.
Mr. Nemec, let me ask you, I think it was Mr. Egan who was
the attorney who had requested documents, specifically the
Appendix 2B-17 from Bechtel. That has since found its way to
this committee and also the Louisville paper. Can I ask you as
a representative of Bechtel, has that been provided to Mr.
Egan, or do you plan to?
Mr. Nemec. Congressman, I am not aware of any request that
Bechtel Jacobs received from the attorneys regarding that. We
did receive a request from the committee and we did--and we
were notified that the appendix was not in the document room.
We found it, we put it in there, we provided a copy to the
committee. I'm not aware that we received any request from the
attorneys.
Mr. Burr. I'm sure if you didn't, they will follow up with
you.
Mr. Nemec. I'm sure they will and they will get a copy.
Mr. Burr. Mr. Hummer, if I may spend a second with you. To
your knowledge has DOE ever asked Martin Marietta or a
representative of Martin Marietta to alter or to lose data as
it related to contamination or worker safety at the Paducah,
Kentucky plant?
Mr. Hummer. To my knowledge, that has never happened, Mr.
Burr.
Mr. Burr. Has Martin Marietta ever falsified or withheld
documents from DOE or any regulatory agency with oversight over
Paducah?
Mr. Hummer. No, sir.
Mr. Burr. Has DOE ever requested the appendix missing from
the 1991 executive summary from Martin Marietta when they were
the main contractor?
Mr. Hummer. I don't know the answer to that question.
Mr. Burr. Are you familiar with the appendix 2B-17?
Mr. Hummer. Only in the most general terms as it has been
referred to in this hearing.
Mr. Burr. As a representative of Martin Marietta, do you
find it unusual or strange that an appendix that was completed
in January 1991 was not included in the executive summary
produced in March of the same year or in the annual
environmental report that was completed in October 1992 for the
year encompassing 1991?
Mr. Hummer. On its face, yes, I do find it strange. I would
have to look into it further to see if there were reasons for
it.
Mr. Burr. You don't have an explanation or a reason as a
representative of Martin Marietta today?
Mr. Hummer. I do not.
Mr. Burr. What is Martin Marietta's position as it relates
to their contractual obligation to the Department of Energy in
1991 as it relates to their assessment of contamination, worker
safety? Were you the sole contractor responsible for it?
Mr. Hummer. Martin Marietta was the sole contractor at that
time, yes, and we were responsible for providing a
comprehensive report on an annual basis.
Mr. Burr. To your knowledge, did any of the annual
environmental reports ever include the existence of plutonium
contamination at the Paducah facility?
Mr. Hummer. Yes, sir, they did.
Mr. Burr. As it related to offsite sources?
Mr. Hummer. Yes.
Mr. Burr. When was that included?
Mr. Hummer. I personally have seen a 1996 report that
included that. I haven't seen others.
Mr. Burr. Clearly you wouldn't question the existence of
appendix 2B-17 produced by Martin Marietta that in 1991 found
offsite contamination of plutonium?
Mr. Hummer. No, sir.
Mr. Burr. Do you find it odd that it would take until 1996
for any official report to the Department of Energy to conclude
that there was contamination?
Mr. Hummer. I don't know that there was not--that that
contamination was not reflected in earlier reports. I do know
that I saw it in a 1996 report. I did not look at earlier
reports to determine if it was in those.
Mr. Burr. Well, I know that all the members have votes to
get to. My plans are to be back for some point of this. I
appreciate the witnesses' time. I would yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Upton. Thank you. We will come back at 2 o'clock.
[Brief recess.]
Mr. Upton. We are ready to start.
I just want to apologize to all the witnesses that we have
today, because we had to change the--Congress was not in
session last week on Thursday, I know that it changed your
plans. It changed our plans, too. At the time the decision was
made, the eye of the hurricane was expected to pass right down
Pennsylvania Avenue. That is why I thought it would be best to
delay the hearing until this week, but obviously we all had
full schedules as well, and so we are all jockeying things,
including other subcommittees that are meeting. That is one of
the reasons why members are in and out. Normally that doesn't
happen to the degree that it is happening today. We apologize
in advance. Blame it on Mother Nature and me.
We will resume with the 5 minutes. I know that the
Democratic side will be back soon. I know that Mr. Whitfield
has questions. I know Mr. Burr had a speech. Because of the
votes it was delayed. But he intends to come back for this
panel before we start the third one as well.
Mr. Miller, it is my understanding that a number of years
ago, the DOE had transferred more than $200 million to USEC to
prepare the site in Paducah for the event of a possible
earthquake. And it is my understanding that the work that was
intended to be done is still--initially the seismic upgrades
were promised to be done by 1997? It is my understanding that
you all have delayed the seismic upgrades until next year,
September of next year, 2000? Seismic upgrade?
Mr. Miller. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I might make one
clarification. The $200 million that was funded by the
Department of Energy was to cover in their entirety all nuclear
safety upgrades to make the transition from DOE regulation to
NRC regulation. A portion of that funding, specifically $23
million, was designated for the seismic work.
Mr. Upton. At Paducah?
Mr. Miller. At Paducah.
Mr. Upton. $23 million of the $200 million?
Mr. Miller. That is correct, sir, for the seismic project
at Paducah.
Mr. Upton. What has happened to that money?
Mr. Miller. That money has been expended. The project is
ongoing, with the expected completion date as you have
indicated, September of 2000. In addition to that $23 million,
USEC has been funding the additional funding required to
complete that seismic upgrade project.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Nemec, in DOE's testimony, they state, a
little bit later, that in order to address the gaps in the
company's radiation protection program, DOE will initiate an
independent and detailed review of Bechtel Jacobs company's
radiation protection program and its implementation at Paducah.
Do you believe that the radiation program is broken?
Mr. Nemec. No, I do not.
Mr. Upton. And needs to be fixed?
Mr. Nemec. No, I do not, Mr. Chairman. I believe we have a
good radiation protection program. But we welcome the review. I
am sure that through that review, we will find some
opportunities for some enhancements. But we believe we have a
good program.
Mr. Upton. In the earlier panel, a number of the folks that
testified talked about the full body review--the full body
count. They had a feeling that, in fact, the readings were
never given to them. Who has access to that? Do you have those
records or does DOE?
Mr. Nemec. I have no knowledge who has those records.
Mr. Upton. Would you know, Mr. Hummer?
Mr. Hummer. In general, Mr. Chairman, those records are
Department of Energy records. Frequently they are maintained by
the contractor as part of the contract, but the records belong
to the departments of energy.
Mr. Upton. But they are Martin Marietta's studies, right?
They conducted the review. Would they not have been provided up
the line from the years before?
Mr. Hummer. I had thought that you were referring
specifically to the individual results of whole body counts,
which is an ongoing process. The specific volunteer studies
that were referred to by the earlier panel, yes, the results of
those studies would have been provided to the Department of
Energy. The studies should be in Martin Marietta, Lockheed
Martin records as well as Department of Energy records. But
fundamentally since--from this Congress, the Department of
Energy funds all these activities at these facilities,
essentially all records, reports, surveys, that sort of thing,
all belong to the Department of Energy.
Mr. Upton. Do you know why they would not have been
provided to the individuals at the time that they were tested?
Mr. Hummer. No, sir, I do not. During the period I was at
Oak Ridge as the Director of Safety and Health for Martin
Marietta Energy Systems, it was a standard practice to discuss
the results of whole body counts and bioassay results which
also were for internal contamination with the individual at the
time those results were received.
Mr. Upton. Were you aware at all that in fact the counts
might have been misrepresented or denied to the folks who
actually undertook the tests?
Mr. Hummer. No, I was not.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Whitfield.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hummer, Martin Marietta, of course, was the successor
company to Lockheed Martin. When did Martin Marietta become
responsible for the offsite part of USEC, of the plant?
Mr. Hummer. When Martin Marietta became the contractor in
1984, it had responsibility for both the operation of the
facility and the environmental management aspects of the
facility.
Mr. Whitfield. Now, in 1990, the Tiger team came in and did
an assessment, setting out deficiencies for the facility. They
were pretty explicit in those deficiencies. Then the Department
of Energy came in with their Phase I assessment which went back
to 1990, and they set out deficiencies in the facility. And
down in Paducah when we asked Mr. Sadler the question, had the
deficiencies set out in 1990 been corrected, I don't want to
put words in his mouth, but he said there were many things that
had not been corrected. In fact, I remember him inferring that
most things had not been corrected. But why, during that
period, when your company was responsible, were those
corrections not taken care of?
Mr. Hummer. Martin Marietta and Lockheed Martin were
responsible for the environmental management aspects at the
Paducah plant until the spring of 1991 when Bechtel Jacobs was
awarded the contract--I am sorry, the spring of 1998 when
Bechtel Jacobs was awarded that contract. During that period,
essentially all of the findings from the Tiger team report were
corrected. My understanding is that of the almost 200 findings
from that report, all but one have been corrected. I'm not sure
of the specific nature of that one.
Mr. Whitfield. So out of the 200 deficiencies, your
testimony is that all but one of the deficiencies was corrected
by the time that Lockheed Martin relinquished its
responsibility?
Mr. Hummer. Yes, sir. The long duration, talking in years,
to correct what might seem like fairly specific deficiencies
may be a little hard to understand at first, but many of these
deficiencies required additional funding through the budget
process to provide resources in the form of either people,
equipment or even facilities. Many of them required extensive
rewriting of program documents, retraining of individuals to
understand the issues that they were dealing with and what
their specific responsibilities were. These were not simple
things to fix.
Mr. Whitfield. But it's your contention that all of them
were taken care of except that one?
Mr. Hummer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Whitfield. We have heard a lot of testimony today and
in the newspaper and with individuals personally that indicates
that there was a culture within the management of this facility
that I would describe as lackadaisical, lapsing in judgment
sometimes, not being as up to date on the issues as they should
have been.
Would you say it is correct that even though management
changed in name--Union Carbide, Lockheed Martin, Martin
Marietta, Bechtel Jacobs--that some individuals just
transferred from one company to the other? Would you say that
is correct?
Mr. Hummer. Absolutely. The vast majority of the people
were the same people. And in fact the people who operated the
operational plant for the United States Enrichment Corporation
were the same Lockheed Martin people that transferred from
Energy Systems.
Mr. Whitfield. So it would be correct that even though
companies changed, individuals were the same?
Mr. Hummer. Absolutely.
Mr. Whitfield. When you relinquished responsibility for
your company, who was the project manager for the cleanup at
Paducah?
Mr. Hummer. I'm sorry, I'm not sure I understand the
question.
Mr. Whitfield. When Lockheed Martin lost its contract for
cleanup, who was the project manager at that time?
Mr. Hummer. I'm not sure. Mr. Nemec is indicating it might
have been Mr. Massey.
Mr. Nemec. The site manager at Paducah at that time was
Jimmy Massey. Jimmy is also the site manager at Paducah today.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Chairman, my 5 minutes is up.
Mr. Upton. I will let you have some more time at the end.
We will go to Mr. Strickland. Are you ready?
Mr. Strickland. Yes, sir.
Thank you, gentlemen, for trying to help us understand what
is happening here.
I have a memo, I don't know if anyone has asked about this
or not because I arrived just a moment ago. It is a memo from
Jimmy Massey. It was sent to a number of individuals, regarding
the safety stand-down. It says, We anticipate that DOE will
announce a day-long safety stand-down, and on and on. The kinds
of activities we will do during that day include review and
spruce up rad postings in DOE areas both on buildings and on
land masses and so on and so forth. It concludes by saying, I
need to meet with the project team this afternoon at 2 in the
small conference room to discuss, and so on and so forth, but
it concludes with this statement:
``and more to come. I still have season tickets to the
circus for sale if anyone still needs one.'' That last
statement is very puzzling to me. I'm not sure what it means.
Is it the Barnum and Bailey circus? I'm just not sure what they
are talking about there. What I hope it doesn't imply is that
this matter is being taken lightly, and the implication being
we're engaged in some kind of frivolous activity with this
stand-down. Would anyone have any insight into what that may
mean?
Mr. Nemec. Congressman Strickland, that statement was an
inappropriate statement by Jimmy Massey. We take this stand-
down very seriously. We take this investigation very seriously.
I personally discussed that statement with Mr. Massey after I
received it. He received--he agrees that it was an
inappropriate and it won't happen again. We do take it very
seriously.
Mr. Strickland. Thank you, Mr. Nemec. I very sincerely
appreciate that response from you and thank you for your
opinion. I concur with it certainly.
There seems to be differences of opinion between some of
the witnesses that we heard earlier and some of the statements
that are contained in the testimonies that have been submitted
to us. I suppose it is possible that there are just legitimate
differences of interpretation. But some of this seems to be
material that would be rather difficult to interpret and have
such a broad difference of opinion.
For example, in the statement by Mr. Hummer, there is this
comment:
``The potential for internal contamination of radiation
workers was monitored through a bioassay program. Bioassay was
a routine part of the radiation protection program at the
Paducah facility and the other gaseous diffusion facilities
because of the presence of uranium.''
Then there are others who indicate that this was not a
routine activity, that there may have been very limited numbers
of employees that were ever monitored or tested in this way.
And so the discrepancy between that statement and this other
information is troublesome to me. I guess I would like to ask,
was there routine bioassay monitoring? If so, how many
employees were involved and during what period of time? Could
you answer that for me, sir?
Mr. Hummer. Yes. During the period of time that I was
Director of Safety and Health for Energy Systems, routine
bioassay programs were in place for workers who had significant
potential for ingestion of radioactive contamination. I can't
tell you exactly how many people were involved. I can get that
information for you if you like. That program had been in place
for some time before I arrived. Exactly when it started and how
it evolved, I would have to get additional information. Some of
the witnesses this morning, I believe, were responding to
questions related to whole body counting, which is a support
system for bioassay. But bioassay is the actual collection of
biological samples from the individuals and their analysis for
contamination.
Mr. Strickland. But that information regarding the number
of individuals, who they were, when the testing was done, what
the results were, would that be available to us or would that
be data that you could put your hands on and make available to
the committee?
Mr. Hummer. We should be able to get them from the
Department of Energy.
Mr. Upton. Thank you.
Mr. Hummer, it was alleged, it was indicated in the
testimony from the first panel from at least two of the
witnesses, that your companies or subsidiaries knowingly
disposed of radioactive contaminated waste in offsite landfills
that were not permitted for such waste. Do you know if your
company--can you affirm or deny whether that happened?
Mr. Hummer. Mr. Chairman, to the best of my knowledge, that
did not happen. These are new allegations to the company. To
the extent that this and other allegations are raised by the
lawsuits and other activities that are current, Lockheed Martin
will do everything in its power to fully investigate these
matters and resolve them appropriately.
Mr. Upton. Could you keep us posted of that activity?
Mr. Hummer. Yes, I will.
Mr. Upton. There was no way that DOE would have approved
such a transfer. I can't believe that that would have happened.
Mr. Hummer. And to the best of my knowledge, there is also
no way that plant management, Martin Marietta or Lockheed
Martin plant management, would have approved that activity.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Miller, we heard from Mr. Fowler sort of an
ongoing saga of retaliation and harassment. You heard--I think
you were here for his assessment?
Mr. Miller. That's correct.
Mr. Upton. Do you plan on doing anything--even today, I
think he indicated that he still was followed from stop to
stop. Are you planning any directive, any meeting? Is there any
help that you can provide us? What were your thoughts as you
listened to his riveting testimony?
Mr. Miller. Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Upton. I know it disturbed a lot of us up here.
Mr. Miller. I think first and foremost, speaking for our
corporation, it is totally appropriate to state in total
sincerity that our corporation does not tolerate, I do not
tolerate and will not tolerate harassment, intimidation of any
nature, whether it be nonmanagement or management employees.
USEC has pursued these issues, as any corporation should and
would, vigorously through its tenure taking over these
facilities wherever and whenever it was found. We have
administered disciplinary action up to and including discharge.
I think certainly in this instance, which dates back prior to
any of these relevant issues that are being raised here today
by the committee, there are some differences in opinion
regarding the facts pertaining to vehicle searches. We have
vigorously researched these issues. The vehicle searches were
at no greater frequency than other vehicle searches which are
mandated on our site for security reasons. And we investigated
the sources of the alleged utilization of pictures, ID
pictures, in the wrong fashion and have found them not to be
substantiated, but by an employee in an inappropriate, joking
manner, and that employee was in fact reprimanded for that
conduct. I might add, that goes back significantly in time
during his first years of tenure in the facility.
But I think it is totally appropriate to say that any type
of behavior along those lines is not tolerated by our
corporation and will not be tolerated.
Mr. Upton. We may just put in the record a number of
current whistleblower complaints. I guess they are in the
record. A person alleged he was removed from management, I
don't know if you know about these or have any comment on these
that are open. Investigator indicated he is in settlement
negotiations. We might ask you to respond to these in writing.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61428.284
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61428.285
Mr. Upton. Mr. Whitfield, do you have additional questions?
Mr. Whitfield. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Miller, we have heard testimony this morning from Mr.
Fowler and also Dr. Cochran that they today do not consider the
plant totally safe, that they view it with some significant
problems still at the production facility. How would you
characterize the workplace today?
Mr. Miller. We would definitely not agree with the
characterization that the employees in the work force today are
not protected safely and adequately. We feel very comfortable
and confident that we have very vigorous health and safety
programs, both from radiological controls, utilizing the ALARA
program which was referred to earlier, keeping the dose rates
to our employees as low as reasonably achievable. We have made
documented, significant improvements since 1993. We have
essentially cut the average dose rate of our radiation workers
in half, down to less than 4 millirems on an annual basis
against the Federal standard of 5,000 millirems as an annual
limit.
We have additionally lowered the number of workers that at
any one point in time received greater than 10 millirems and
have cut those numbers basically in half since 1993 to 1998.
We have focused heavily on contamination control. We have
surveyed all accessible leased areas of the facility and
implemented not only dose rate control but contamination
control which was required under our transition to the
regulations under 10 CFR 20 for NRC certification.
So I think, Congressman Whitfield, in a very brief, concise
summary, the programs that we have in place we feel very
comfortable, do protect our workers. At the same time we
constantly look for areas of improvement. We can always improve
and will continue to carry forward with that attitude.
Mr. Whitfield. Is there plutonium in the plant today?
Mr. Miller. I think the answer to that would be there are
certainly trace amounts as a result of the past practices of
reprocessing reactor tails. So yes, there would be trace
amounts.
Mr. Whitfield. Do you consider that harmful to the workers?
Mr. Miller. Not when we implemented and have implemented
our protective measures. We take it very seriously, as we do
take any radiological emission source and, where necessary, we
have people placed into respirators if the need arises. If
there is a posted area or a radiological work area where an
employee is going to enter, the postings are designed to
understand--so that the individual understands the type of
activity and the protective equipment necessary to work in
that, and that the monitoring that is done exiting the
facilities and in combination with our monthly bioassay or
urinalysis that is done on all rad workers, we feel very
comfortable that we have protected our employees and will
continue to do so in the future.
Mr. Whitfield. When USEC assumed responsibility for the
production facility, it is my understanding that an assessment
was
done of the facility to determine deficiencies and that 55,000
square feet was decontaminated at that time because of what
turned up in the assessment. Now, if that is true, that would
indicate, at least at the time USEC assumed responsibility for
it, that there were serious problems there. Would you agree
with that or not?
Mr. Miller. It is very difficult for me to speak to
practices and conditions that existed prior to USEC coming on,
but I do--it is correct that when we implemented our
contamination control programs and our surveys that there were
significant areas that required immediate attention.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Nemec, back in April, you conducted some
readings when workers were around the cylinders with the
uranium hexafluoride. The readings were quite low. Then when
the assessment was conducted by the Department of Energy, they
came in in August and did readings there and there was quite a
discrepancy in the readings. In fact, they noted that that was
a significant problem for them at that time. I know that Mr.
Massey was quoted in the paper as saying that he wanted an
answer to how that discrepancy occurred. So how did it occur?
Mr. Nemec. In actuality, the readings that were taken in
April were consistent with the Department of Energy readings in
August. They both indicated a level of radiation dose that were
consistent with one another. Those levels, then, and those
readings in April were used as a basis whether the employees,
the subcontractor in this case, would be required to wear a
dosimeter. We concluded that they would not be required to wear
one because they would get less than 100 MR of dose during the
lifetime of the project.
We revisited that decision after we got the DOE readings,
because at that time we were not sure as to the accuracy of our
April reading, and we decided--we set the job down immediately
and we decided that it would be a prudent approach to put all
of the workers in dosimeters since we were unsure of what went
on, and to launch an investigation into what had happened. I
had our health physics manager, certified health physicist from
Oak Ridge, come up to the site the day after the incident. I
happened to be there the night of the incident and was involved
in making these decisions. He started the investigation which
ultimately concluded that our initial readings were consistent
with the DOE readings. But a prudent measure here would have
been to put the people in dosimeters and we did.
We have since changed our procedures to not allow that much
flexibility in the field with regards to use of dosimeters.
Mr. Whitfield. I understand you to say that your readings
were consistent with DOE?
Mr. Nemec. Yes, they were.
Mr. Whitfield. May I ask one other question, Mr. Chairman?
Then I will be finished here.
There has been a lot of discussion about the D&D funds for
the cleanup. We all recognize that there is not enough money
there, but out of the $240 million appropriated each year for
D&D funds, the largest portion of that goes to Oak Ridge, of
course. In fact, more goes to Oak Ridge than what you add up
for Portsmouth or Paducah together.
It is my understanding that of the money that goes to
Paducah, $37 million a year, that maybe $25 million a year, is
simply meeting compliance standards, doing testing, and that
that money does not actually go for cleanup. I know that is
because of various environmental regulations. But is it
possible that more money would go for cleanup if you were
exempted from some of these requirements, assuming you could be
exempt and still not further endanger the community?
Mr. Nemec. I suppose it might be possible, but I certainly
couldn't quantify it. I think many of the things we do under
our compliance program, we would have to continue in any case.
We have to monitor our offsite releases and surface water. We
have to understand the groundwater plume and where it is going
and continue our pump and treat operations. We have to do the
surveillance and maintenance on the facilities and the upkeep,
whether the regulation is there or not, to prevent the spread
of contamination.
So I'm not convinced that trying to remove some regulations
would solve the issue. I think we can, however, work within the
regulatory environment to streamline some of the up-front
decisionmaking process and thus use less time and money on that
which we can then use for cleanup. And we are working on that
with the regulatory bodies.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Chairman, if we have additional
questions, we can obviously submit it.
Mr. Upton. All members will have that opportunity here.
Mr. Strickland.
Mr. Strickland. Yes, sir. I have basically two questions.
One I would want to direct to Mr. Hummer. According to
testimony from Mr. Key, in 1990 there was a voluntary program
established to test volunteer employees for transuranics, some
30 people volunteered. As you know, those results were analyzed
by a contract laboratory, a decision was made that they were
invalid, and then there was an opportunity for employees to
resubmit. According to his testimony, only seven elected to
participate in the retesting. Those results were looked at by a
DOE-controlled operation. The results were that there was no
problem, I guess, with contamination of these employees.
The question I have is, some employees have indicated to
me, and I think to others, that they are rather suspicious,
they have lost some faith, some confidence, that their records
were handled appropriately. According to his testimony, the
results from those original samples and the written analysis
and an explanation as to why they were rejected and what the
findings were have not been forthcoming.
And then he has this paragraph, and I would like to share
it with you. ``If management is correct that the contract
laboratory simply erred in its performance, there should be
nothing to fear from the full and free examination of this
data. However, such needless secrecy breeds mistrust.'' And
then he says, ``Perhaps the Commerce Committee could assist in
securing this data for the workers.''
I guess what I would like to ask you is: Is there a reason
why this data is not made available so that we can look at the
difference which may have existed and so that we can determine,
based upon objective observers, whether or not the contract
laboratory that did the initial analysis erred in their
results?
Mr. Hummer. There is no reason that I know of, Mr.
Strickland. The reports should be available, although this was
somewhat before my time. Basically the reports should be
available and the report of the quality assurance review to
determine that that reported information was not accurate
should also be available.
Mr. Strickland. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that we request
this information be made available to the committee.
Mr. Upton. I think that is a very good idea. We will do so.
Mr. Strickland. The second and my final question has to do
with the testimony of Dr. Cochran. He alleges in his
testimony--and I will direct this to you, Mr. Nemec--that
Bechtel has been interviewing outside contractors to assist in
the destruction of files at the Paducah plant. I don't know
what kind of files he may have been alluding to. But I would
like to ask you if this is true, and if so, what kind of files
may he be talking about?
Mr. Nemec. I'm not familiar with what Dr. Cochran was
referring to. We may have hired a contractor to shred paper
that we generate in our operation and recycle it. But there is
no intention to shred any documents or destroy any documents
that pertain to this or to any other, future or past.
Mr. Strickland. Mr. Chairman, I would like to request that
the committee contact past and future contractors and DOE and
ask that no documents which may have any relevance to this
investigation at all be destroyed until such time as the
investigation is completed.
Mr. Upton. That is fine.
Mr. Strickland. Thank you. I yield back my time.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Burr.
Mr. Burr. I thank the Chair.
Mr. Hummer, Martin Marietta did a number of internal audits
on their state of compliance. One that specifically sticks out
is the compliance as it relates to the National Environmental
Protection Act. The internal audits as I understand those
within Martin Marietta said, and I quote, No system is in place
to ensure that environmental impact assessments prepared in
compliance with NEPA are honored by plant management. Under the
current structure, NEPA assessment documents can be altered by
plant management under a conflict-of-interest situation. Yet
the 1990 environmental report for the Department of Energy
stated that Martin Marietta was in compliance with all NEPA
guidelines.
Do you care to comment on that?
Mr. Hummer. Yes, sir, Mr. Burr. I don't find those two
statements in contradiction. One of them says that there was no
system in place to ensure that the assessments were honored by
plant management. That does not say that noncompliances were
found. It says that there was no system in place to ensure that
they were honored. Our contention is that the requirements of
NEPA were being met and we were in compliance during 1990 and
other years.
Mr. Burr. Let me go on in the October 1992 internal audit,
and I quote your auditors. The auditors found, quote, The NEPA
program is headed in the right direction but all programs have
not been implemented to keep projects' activities from not
getting proper NEPA review. Some projects have been initiated
without NEPA review.
I would suggest to you that that part of the audit suggests
that you are not in compliance.
Mr. Hummer. That says that; that activities not in
compliance were identified, yes.
Mr. Burr. What currently does Lockheed Martin have in the
way of DOE cleanup contracts?
Mr. Hummer. Lockheed Martin has a contract to operate the
river protection program for the River Protection Office of DOE
at the Hanford facility formerly known as the tankways
remediation system.
Mr. Burr. That's in the form of a subcontractor at Hanford,
isn't it?
Mr. Hummer. No, sir. Right now it is. As of the October 1
we will be a prime contractor to the River Protection Office.
Mr. Burr. It is a little over $300 million to Martin
Marietta currently on that contract?
Mr. Hummer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burr. Where else?
Mr. Hummer. We do environmental cleanup work at Sandia
National Laboratory as part of our M&O contract there. We do
extensive environmental management and cleanup activities in
Idaho National Engineering Environmental Laboratory as part of
our contract which ends on the 30th of this month there.
We also participate with Bechtel Jacobs in the
environmental management in making sure that things are
properly identified at the Oak Ridge facility, Y-12 and ORNL so
when materials are turned over to Bechtel Jacobs for further
disposition, they are properly identified.
Mr. Burr. To your knowledge, did Martin Marietta ever
receive a performance bonus based upon any of the years that
they represented Paducah under a DOE contract?
Mr. Hummer. We received award fees during those periods for
those operations.
Mr. Burr. Were those award fees ever based upon safety?
Mr. Hummer. Safety was one of the several evaluation
criteria used by the Department of Energy to determine the
award fee, yes, sir.
Mr. Burr. Given the documents that have made their way to
the forefront in the last month, as a representative of
Lockheed Martin, do you believe that Martin Marietta was
entitled to the qualification of those performance bonuses?
Mr. Hummer. Yes, I do. None of those performance bonuses or
award fees was predicated on 100 percent perfect performance.
Therefore, there is no reason, based on what I have heard, to
suspect that these particular individual items would drive that
assessment significantly lower.
Mr. Burr. I would tell you, Mr. Hummer, in any way, shape
or form, anybody ever finds that there was an intentional
effort to withhold documents, that without reading specifically
that contract with DOE, I think that it would nullify not only
the performance bonus, but it would probably nullify the
contract, and I would certainly ask that we look at that
contract that was in existence then to see if in fact with the
information we have today it was breached.
I thank all of our witnesses. This is an extremely
important process for us to go through, and once again as it
relates to cleanups that deal with DOE, an extremely difficult
hearing to present all of the facts.
I am not yet convinced, Mr. Chairman, and colleagues, that
in fact we have all of the documents that are available. I only
hope that Mr. Strickland's request is in fact one that can be
honored and in fact has not already happened in the case of
some of the documents that I think exist. I thank the chairman
and I yield back.
Mr. Upton. Thank you, panel. As I noted earlier we have
other members that were not able to be here and we would like
to have the opportunity to submit additional questions in
writing to you. If you could respond to that in a fairly prompt
way, that would be terrific.
I appreciate your time regarding the delay that we had from
last week. You are excused, thank you.
Our final panel includes Dr. David Michaels, Assistant
Secretary for Environmental Safety and Health at the Department
of Energy; Mr. Richard Green, Director of Waste Management
Division, EPA, Region 4; Mr. Malcolm Knapp, Deputy Executive
Director of Operations for Materials, Research and State
Programs from the NRC; Mr. Robert Logan, Commissioner of the
Kentucky Department of Environmental Protection, accompanied by
Mr. John Volpe, Manager of the Radiation Control Branch at
Kentucky Cabinet for Health Services.
Do any of you have counsels or colleagues that are going to
be helping you in this? If you can identify them by name at
this time and we will have them sworn in as well.
Mr. Michaels. This is Mr. Jimmy Hodges who is the manager
of the Paducah site office for the Department of Energy. This
is Mr. Jim Olendorf who is the Deputy Assistant Secretary in
the Environmental Management Office of DOE; and this is Dr.
David Statler, who is senior manager for the ongoing DOE
investigation conducted by my office in Paducah.
Mr. Upton. Anybody else?
Mr. Richard Green. This is John Johnston who is chief of
our Federal Facilities Branch at EPA Region 4.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Knapp?
Mr. Knapp. This is Mr. Robert Pierson who is chief of the
responsible branch within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for
the Paducah facility.
Mr. Logan. This is Mr. Michael Haynes and Mr. Downs with
our Office of General counsel.
Mr. Upton. At this time if all witnesses and identified
counsel would stand and raise your right hand.
[Witnesses and counsel sworn.]
Mr. Upton. Dr. Michaels, we will start with you. You know
the order here. Your entire testimony will be made part of the
record, and if you can limit your remarks to about 5 minutes as
timed by this fancy timer, that would be terrific.
TESTIMONY OF DAVID MICHAELS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY AND HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; RICHARD
D. GREEN, DIRECTOR, WASTE MANAGEMENT DIVISION, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, REGION 4; MALCOLM R. KNAPP, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS FOR MATERIALS, RESEARCH, AND STATE
PROGRAMS, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION; AND ROBERT W. LOGAN,
COMMISSIONER, KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN VOLPE, MANAGER, RADIATION CONTROL BRANCH,
KENTUCKY CABINET FOR HEALTH SERVICES3
Mr. Michaels. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss the
actions being taken by the Department of Energy in response to
allegations of current and historical environment safety and
health problems at Paducah and other DOE gaseous diffusion
plants.
I am joined here by Jimmy Hodges, Jim Olendorf and David
Statler. My complete testimony has been provided to the
committee for record.
To begin, I would like to associate myself with the opening
remarks of the members of this committee. I have spent much of
my career raising safety and health concerns of Department of
Energy workers, and before coming to DOE, I was one of its
strongest critics. In the past year, Secretary Richardson and
senior management have worked very hard to change the safety
culture at DOE facilities, and we greatly appreciate the
bipartisan support the committee is giving us. Clearly though,
they have a lot of work to do.
Let me also say at the outset that from the time these
concerns were brought to his attention, Secretary Richardson
has made it clear that he would get to the bottom of the issues
and do what is needed to be done to resolve them. We are
especially concerned that until 1990, workers at the gaseous
diffusion plants may not have been fully aware of transuranics
nor trained in work practices designed to protect them from the
potential health impacts from exposures to these materials.
When the Secretary was in Paducah last week, he spoke
directly with workers and community members. He listened to
their concerns and apologized to members of the community who
felt that in the past the government has not been forthcoming
about the health risks they faced. The Secretary also announced
that the Clinton administration will propose legislation to
establish a pilot program for compensating current and former
workers at Paducah who have cancers caused by job exposures to
radioactive contaminants.
As the Secretary said when announcing a proposal to help
DOE workers who have disease, this administration believes that
if our workers are ill because of exposure to hazards at the
workplace, they deserve fair and equitable compensation. I
understand that there is concern that the proposed program at
this point is limited to workers at Paducah, but I want to make
clear that the Secretary's overall commitment applies to all
DOE workers. It is the intent that it will be a pilot program
and inform our understanding of possible health impacts at
other gaseous diffusion plants. The details of the proposed
pilot are actively being discussed within the administration
and we expect a legislative proposal will be finalized shortly.
We look forward to working with members of this committee as we
develop final legislation.
The independent oversight team is conducting its
investigation in Paducah in two phases, the first phase focused
on environment and health safety practices at Paducah over the
past decade; the second on historical issues. The team has
completed its initial Phase I assessment. Their preliminary
observations were released last week and identified that some
improvements need to be made in the areas of radiation
protection, environmental management and oversight.
In the area of radiological protection, the team observed
that the Paducah radiological protection program had been
significantly improved in the early 1990's. At the same time,
they found that a greater degree of discipline, formality and
oversight is still needed to ensure that worker exposure is
maintained as low as reasonably achievable.
With regard to environmental protection, the team reviewed
progress under the compliance agreement and examined potential
sources of continuing groundwater and surface water
contamination which have not been fully isolated or effectively
mitigated.
To address these concerns, the Department hopes to sit down
with its regulators to reexamine the priorities and pace of
cleanup activities as called for under the compliance
agreement. The team will return to Paducah this October, early
October, to begin the second phase of its investigation. This
will focus on historical issues at Paducah and will rely
largely on interviews and review of documents. We will be
looking to current and former workers and supervisors who have
specific knowledge of plant operations between the 1950's and
1990. The team will begin its work in Portsmouth in mid-
December, to be followed at an investigation at Oak Ridge in
early 2000. This investigation is being supplemented by two
other assessments of past practices.
One will try to clearly identify the flow and
characteristics of recycled uranium within the DOE complex over
the last 50 years and help us understand exactly where and how
much of these materials were at various DOE sites and at what
times.
The second will seek to establish potential worker
radiation exposures at the gaseous diffusion plants, especially
where records are less than complete or where worker exposure
has not been well characterized.
Another important part of the Secretary's plan is support
for expanded medical monitoring for current and former workers
at all three gaseous diffusion plants in the program managed by
the workers' union. Over the next year we expect to provide
complete medical exams for 6,000 workers in Paducah,
Portsmouth, and Oak Ridge. To support these actions, Secretary
Richardson announced that the administration will propose a
$21.8 million amendment to the fiscal year 2000 budget. This
will include $7 million for expanded medical monitoring and
$10.7 million to accelerate environmental cleanup activities at
Paducah and Portsmouth.
It also includes $4.1 million to accelerate cleanup of
inactive DOE facilities at Paducah and Portsmouth in order to
reduce or eliminate chemical hazards, radiologically
contaminated material, and exposure to workers.
In addition to these activities, the Secretary has
indicated that he will hold all DOE contractors, past and
present, responsible for their actions. To help make that
determination, the DOE Office of General Counsel is assessing
the contractual responsibility of DOE's contractors in the
areas of environment safety and health.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, our actions to date serve notice
that the DOE, under the leadership of Secretary Richardson,
will not tolerate unresolved concerns about worker health and
safety or unfair treatment to sick workers. I know the
Secretary is committed to righting any wrongs that may have
been committed in the past to the work force at this plant, and
your support of these efforts is critical to our success.
We appreciate the opportunity to be here today and would be
pleased to answer any of the committee's questions.
[The prepared statement of David Michaels follows:]
Prepared Statement of David Michaels, Assistant Secretary for
Environment, Safety and Health, U.S. Department of Energy
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss
the Department of Energy (DOE) response to allegations of current and
historical environment safety and health problems at the Paducah plant
in Paducah, Kentucky. Let me say at the outset that from the time these
concerns were brought to his attention, Secretary Richardson has made
it clear that he would conduct a complete and independent investigation
to determine if any of these concerns were true. He further committed
to determine if workers were made ill because of inadequate worker
protections, and that if they were, to seek to provide them with fair
compensation.
As the Committee knows, DOE is currently responsible for
environmental cleanup from waste generated prior to lease of the
facilities to the Uranium States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) in 1993
and for the management of the inventory of depleted uranium
hexafluoride stored at the gaseous diffusion plants, including the
Paducah plant. This work involves approximately 94 employees of
Bechtel-Jacobs, the DOE current contractor for cleanup at the Paducah
site, a transient subcontractor work force of up to 300 workers, and a
small number of workers for USEC that support site cleanup or
management of the inventory of depleted uranium hexafluoride.
Because Paducah is a designated Superfund site, cleanup of
hazardous substances other than uranium hexafluoride is being conducted
in accordance with a Federal Facilities Agreement among DOE, the
Environmental Protection Agency, and the Commonwealth of Kentucky. This
agreement establishes milestones and a schedule for meeting them.
Uranium enrichment activities were transferred to USEC in July 1993 in
accordance with the Energy Policy Act of 1992. Uranium hexafluoride and
worker safety issues are covered under the authority of the Atomic
Energy Act with appropriate oversight by DOE. Additionally, USEC
currently operates under a Nuclear Regulatory Commission certificate
and is subject to NRC regulation.
In May 1999, the Department became aware that a qui tam case would
be filed under the False Claims Act in U.S. District Court. This suit
alleges fraud on the part of contractors at the Paducah Gaseous
Diffusion Plant, based on current and past environment, safety and
health violations. Once the case was filed, it was placed under a court
seal that prohibited DOE from acknowledging or discussing the case with
any party outside the federal government. While the allegations could
not be discussed, the Secretary felt it important to ensure that there
were no imminent threats to the environment, public health or safety.
From June 18 to 21 of this year, a technical team of health physicists
and environmental engineers, led by the Oak Ridge field office and
supported by my staff, conducted an on-site review of the areas
currently under DOE's control. This team concluded that there were no
imminent health or safety threats to DOE's workers. No public dialogue
could be initiated at that time because of the restrictions imposed by
the court seal.
In August, many of the allegations became widely reported in the
national media. Shortly thereafter, Secretary Richardson called for a
comprehensive response to the public allegations. Subsequently, the
court seal was lifted allowing the Department to proceed with that
response. My testimony today will describe these activities and our
progress to date in meeting the Secretary's commitments.
Many of the concerns regarding worker safety and health that have
been reported to DOE stem from the presence of plutonium and other
radioactive materials at Paducah, and the question of whether workers
were adequately informed or prepared to handle such materials. These
materials resulted from the recycling of uranium from weapons
production plants to toxic gaseous diffusion plants during the 1950s,
1960s, and 1970s. After irradiation in a reactor, spent fuel containing
unused uranium, fission products and transuranics was reprocessed at
the Hanford, Savannah River, or Idaho sites to separate the plutonium
and remaining uranium from the fission products. The uranium was
converted to a transportable form, and was recycled for use at the
gaseous diffusion plants at Paducah and Portsmouth. Preliminary
analysis also indicates that recycled materials may have also been
transferred to the Fernald Feed Materials Production Center and the Y-
12 Plant at Oak Ridge. The gaseous diffusion plants converted the
incoming uranium to uranium hexafluoride for enrichment in the cascade.
The concerns that have recently been expressed focus on the transuranic
elements and fission products that were and are present in this
recycled uranium. It is estimated that approximately 100,000 tons of
recycled uranium was fed to the Paducah plant.
Environmental concerns alleged in the suit include both on-site and
off-site contamination from legacy radioactive or hazardous materials,
and potential for harm to workers or public health and safety. Issues
raised include:
possible improper disposal of hazardous or radioactive
materials both on- and off-site in publicly accessible areas;
apparent inappropriate release of materials that were
radioactively contaminated, release of contamination into site
streams and drainage ditches, claims of inadequate control and
posting of offsite contaminated areas, and
suspected exceedences of radiological air emission standards.
Independent Investigation
The comprehensive investigation into environment, safety and health
concern, at Paducah is being conducted by a senior team of
investigators and technical experts from my staff in the Office of
Environment, Safety and health (EH). The investigation is being
conducted in two phases. The first phase, now underway, is focused on
the adequacy of levels of protection provided to workers, the public
and the environment today and over the past ten years. The second phase
will focus on the longer-term, more complex environment, safety and
health issues over the plant's entire history. This phase will involve
a comprehensive document review as well as interviews with former
workers. The team will also conduct investigations at the gaseous
diffusion sites in Piketon, Ohio and Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
The team of investigators arrived at the Paducah site on August 17
to begin the first phase of the investigation and to examine
information on health and safety programs. Over a two-week period, team
members reviewed documents, conducted numerous interviews with
officials and workers, conducted radiological surveys, inspected the
site and collected extensive environmental samples. Samples were
collected from onsite and offsite groundwater, surface water, and soil
and sediment, as well as buildings onsite. The samples are being
analyzed by an independent laboratory to determine the full range of
chemicals and radionuclides that may have been released into the
environment as a result of site operations. Some of these samples have
been split with the Commonwealth of Kentucky. The efforts are being
closely coordinated with both the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Additionally, Secretary Richardson has directed that this
investigation be conducted in close coordination with current and
former workers and their union representatives. Concurrent with this
investigation, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission conducted a review of
radiation protection in the USEC-operated areas and the State of
Kentucky has increased offsite monitoring.
The DOE investigatory team is currently in the process of analyzing
and validating its initial findings and preparing a final report to the
Secretary. After being briefed on the team's initial observations,
Secretary Richardson ordered a one-day safety stand down at the Paducah
Site. While the team found that there had been safety improvements in
recent years, some practices needed to be further improved and the
Secretary felt that the cessation of activities would provide an
opportunity for both workers and managers to focus on safety, raise
concerns and make suggestions for improved operations.
In its initial observations, the investigatory team verified
earlier findings that DOE operations at Paducah do not present imminent
hazards to the workers or the public. As is the practice in the
Department's Safety Management Evaluations conducted by the EH
Oversight staff, the team also identified areas which would benefit
from improvement in radiological protection, procedures and conduct of
operations.
In response to the on-site investigation's preliminary results, DOE
field and program management has identified initial actions to respond
to these concerns.
Preliminary Phase One Findings
Radiological Protection. The team observed that the Paducah
radiological protection program was improved in the early
1990s. At the same time, a greater degree of discipline,
formality and oversight is still needed to fully protect
workers to assure that worker exposure to legacy radiological
hazards is maintained as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).
For example, the team found that 25 subcontractor employees
working on a project in the uranium hexafluoride
(UF6) cylinder yard since May could be subject to
radiological exposure of greater than 100 millirem in one year
and should have worn dosimetry badges. While this level of
exposure is not a health hazard in itself, DOE ALARA
regulations require that such workers wear personal dosimetry
badges at this level of exposure. As a result of this finding,
the site stopped work, conducted appropriate training, and
issued dosimetry badges to the workers.
The team also identified a number of radiologically contaminated
areas on DOE property that were not adequately controlled in
accordance with DOE requirements. Workers have not received
training on the hazards associated with working with
transuranics since 1992 and such training is not part of the
site safety training courses. Workers were also seen handling
drums that contained uncharacterized waste and quantities of
concentrated Technicium-99. Finally, the team observed
weaknesses in the controls that are essential to radiological
protection, such as radiation work permits, procedures and
procedure adherence, and air monitoring.
To address these findings, DOE field management will initiate an
independent and detailed review of the Bechtel Jacobs Company radiation
protection program and its implementation at Paducah. They will also
work with the State of Kentucky and EPA Region IV to assure that site
postings of contaminated areas, as called for in approved CERCLA or
RCRA decision documents, are adequate.
Enviromental Protection. The cleanup of Paducah is covered
under a legally enforceable agreement with the Commonwealth of
Kentucky and the EPA Region IV. The agreement assigns cleanup
priorities and schedule for completing work. Over the last
several years, work has been performed in cooperation with the
State and EPA to address the immediate risks to public health
and environment, and the site is currently in compliance with
that agreement. Activities have included providing an alternate
water supply to off-site residents and the construction of
groundwater collection and treatment facilities to control
offsite groundwater contamination. The investigatory team
reviewed progress under the agreement and focused on numerous
potential sources of continuing groundwater and surface water
contamination covered under the agreement that have not yet
been fully isolated or effectively mitigated. These include
unlined contaminated landfills, scrap yards, burial grounds and
spill sites.
Under the requirements of the cleanup agreement signed in 1998,
characterization and cleanup of hazardous facilities and
materials has been ongoing at the site in accord with a
prioritized schedule that contemplates completion of cleanup in
2010. Nonetheless, the team has identified potential hazards
that it believes should receive greater priority. For example,
material storage areas (DMSA) contain significant volumes of
uncharacterized scrap equipment and materials that are
potential hazards to workers. Further, process buildings that
have been shutdown for more than 20 years contain significant
amounts of uncharacterized hazardous materials including
uranium in ventilation ducts and piping, receiver ash, and
transuranic contamination. Although surveillance and
maintenance is conducted, these buildings continue to
deteriorate and are not included in the 2010 cleanup schedule.
The team recommended that the hazardous materials should be
removed, and that these buildings be maintained in a condition
that protects workers and the public and minimizes the risk and
cost of eventual decommissioning.
As observed in previous site reviews, many of the 30,000 55-
gallon drums of low-level waste onsite are stored outside in
the elements or on unpaved ground while awaiting shipment.
Because of the need to address competing priorities, the
planned disposal date for these wastes is not until 2012. As
also previously identified, the nearly 37,000 uranium
hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders are also stored onsite
in the open, and constitute long-term radiological and chemical
exposure hazards to workers and the public.
The team reviewed detailed sample results from cascade-processing
equipment that was transferred to private industry in 1997 and
1998. Approval of these transfers was based on the site policy
of using DOE's uranium release criteria, rather than DOE's more
restrictive criteria for release of transuranic-contaminated
material. Samples indicated that the equipment contained very
small, but detectable, quantities of plutonium, neptunium, and
americium. The team noted that had appropriate criteria been
applied, the release might not have been approved.
Pending completion of the final investigation report, the
Department officials responsible for the Paducah site have identified a
number of steps they will take immediately in response to these issues.
First, the Department will examine existing State of Kentucky and USEC
site air monitoring systems to confirm that these systems would record
any significant DOE contribution to overall site emissions. Second, the
roofs of several shutdown but yet to be decontaminated buildings will
be sampled to support fugitive-emissions calculations. Third, as
required under CERCLA and the site's cleanup agreements, regulators are
now reviewing the Engineering Evaluation and Cost Analysis for the
scrap metal piles and Drum Mountain. Characterization and concurrent
disposal of these materials are scheduled to begin late in the summer
of 2000. Finally, additional sampling and analysis of off-site areas
will be carried out.
As a further step to address hazards, the Bechtel Jacobs corporate
``Safe Work Operations Workshop,'' initially developed for the Oak
Ridge site, will be adapted for Paducah-specific issues and presented
at Paducah. Bechtel Jacobs will also delelop and present a detailed
radiation safety and environmental protection program training module
to all personnel who oversee the safety performance of subcontractors.
Finally, DOE will station two full-time Facility Representatives at
Paducah to oversee field activities that affect environment, safety and
health.
The investigation team will present its full report to the
Secretary by September 30. In the meantime, DOE managers will continue
to identify responses to the team's findings. We expect to complete the
second phase of the Paducah investigation by the end of the year. The
team will initiate its work at the Portsmouth plant in mid-December, to
be followed by the investigation at Oak Ridge.
Determine Flow of Recycled Materials Through the DOE Complex
DOE and its predecessor agencies produced more than 100,000 metric
tons of recycled feed or waste streams containing trace quantities of
fission products and plutonium. This material was sent not only to
Paducah, but also to other sites in the DOE complex. Today, our
understanding of where that material went is limited. Secretary
Richardson requested a study that would provide a clear understanding
of the flow and characteristics of this recycled material.
The first figure attached shows the historical flow of recycled
uranium throughout the Department of Energy complex, as we currently
understand it. Typically, the spent fuel from the production reactors
was reprocessed in separations facilities that recovered the plutonium
and uranium, while also separating out almost all of the fission
products. The separated uranium was converted to uranium oxide
(UO6) and shipped to Paducah or other sites. The figure also
shows an interaction with foreign military and commercial sources.
We are concerned not only with the flow of this material, but also
its characteristics such as the level of residual plutonium and fission
products. Past DOE studies have suggested that no consistent or
generally-accepted specification existed for the maximum allowable
amounts of transuranics and fission product elements in the recycled
material, although specifications were generally low (i.e. in the range
of 10 parts per billion (ppb) plutonium). Occasionally, specifications
could be exceeded, and for certain other recycled uranium bearing
materials, we know that level of plutonium was higher.
The figure also shows that Paducah would send uranium-bearing ash
to Fernald for recovery. A 1985 DOE review revealed that in June 1980,
the level of plutonium in some of the ash was between 67 ppb and 7,757
ppb (average about 1123 ppb). Other processes associated with the flow
of recycled uranium may have also contained higher concentrations of
transuranics, e.g. plutonium, neptunium and americium. One of the waste
streams on the figure is shown in color to reflect that the operation
of washing uranium feed cylinders produced waste that may have been
higher in transuranics. The material mass flow review we have initiated
will look into this aspect of the uranium stream.
The second figure shows the operating periods of the facilities
involved in recycling uranium. As you can see, recycle activities began
in the early 1950s, and there were many sites and facilities involved
in this work. Among these 13 sites, several facilities have been
decommissioned, making records retrieval more difficult. The data on
this chart is preliminary. We will have a more complete and accurate
picture as the mass flow project progresses.
The mass flow project will address the flow and characteristics of
recycled uranium over the last fifty years. The specific goals are to:
Identify the mass flow of recycled uranium throughout the DOE
complex from early production to mid-1999 and create a
publicly-available unclassified inter-site flowsheet.
Identify the characteristics of, and contaminants in, the
major uranium streams, including the technetium, neptunium,
plutonium or other radioactive content of concern to worker or
public health and safety.
Conduct site mass balance activities to identify any
significant concern for potential personnel exposure or
environmental contamination.
We expect this work to be complete by June 2000.
Worker Exposure Assessment Project
An important paint of the Secretary's response to concerns at
Paducah is to fully address health concerns of current and former
Paducah workers, especially where records are less than complete, or
where worker exposure to plutonium and other materials has not been
well characterized. To address this gap, an aggressive and exhaustive
search of records will be conducted at Paducah for the time period
ranging from the early 1950s to the present. Assessments will then be
performed by analyzing the exposure records of current and former
workers to determine the extent and nature of exposures, focusing on
exposure to transuranics. The activity will include identifying,
retrieving and reviewing exposure records. Should records prove to be
poor or non-existent, DOE would perform detailed reviews of relevant
plant process and monitoring data as well as extrapolations based on
available exposure information.
The goal of this effort, managed by the DOE Office of Environment,
Safety and Health and conducted by a team from the University of Utah,
is to establish the potential ranges of worker radiation exposures and
identify, document and communicate the radiological issues that may
have affected worker health at the Paducah site since its opening. This
work will help inform Paducah workers of their potential radiation
exposure and will help determine whether there may be any potential for
adverse worker health impacts from radiation exposure while working at
the Paducah plant.
The project began the week of September 13, 1999 when the
University of Utah team began to interview workers and conduct an on
site records search. The project is expected to take six months and
consists of the following subtasks:
Mapping the various processes conducted at Paducah and
identifying the associated potential radiological hazards, over
time. This will include identification of any events, such as
equipment modernization, accidents, etc., that may have
presented potential radiological hazards to the workers;
Identify, retrieve and evaluate radiological and worker
exposure records to determine what the available records tell
us about radiological conditions and worker radiation exposure
data at the site;
Establish the feasibility of conducting a bioassay program for
workers that would measure actual individual radiation dose
taken in the person;
Establish the feasibility for and possibly conduct a
radioassay, of residual materials at Paducah that would
determine the radiological content of those materials and be
useful in determining hazards workers were exposed to.
Develop occupational exposure profiles. This subtask will
compile all information gained in previous subtasks to develop
``bounds'' or ranges of possible radiation exposures of workers
at Paducah.
Conduct a worker communication program to ensure that workers
understand and accept the process use and the results obtained.
With the possible exception of the bioassay program, this project
is expected to be complete by April 2000.
Medical Monitoring for Current and Former Workers
Under an ongoing DOE program being conducted at a number of DOE
sites, medical monitoring is being provided to 1200 former workers at
the gaseous diffusion plants (400 workers per year per plant). As part
of the Secretary's action plan, the program will be expanded to include
additional former employees at each site as well as current worker at
each site. The program provides an objective, independent and expert
evaluation of the health status of workers. The accompanying
educational program will help workers understand prior exposures and
current health risks.
As in the current program, medical screening will be conducted for
health hazards associated with exposure to a wide range of hazards
related to a participant's work at the facility. The actual screening
tests conducted will be tailored to a worker's exposure history and
will generally include a physical examination, blood tests, and chest
x-rays. Where warranted by a worker's exposure history, specialized
tests and other specialized screenings will be conducted. Physicians
will review individual test results from the screening program and
communicate results to program participants. They will call patients to
communicate any urgent findings based on examinations and inform them
of any need for follow-up. Project personnel will also advise
participants whom need medical follow up about possible sources of
health care.
The DOE-funded medical monitoring program will be independently
implemented by a consortium of organizations and staffed by highly
qualified physicians and other health professionals specializing in the
field of occupational health.
Compensation for Sick Workers
Although the use of recycled reactor tailings was discontinued by
the 1970s, plutonium and other transuranic residues are still present
in small quantities at each facility. Concerns have been expressed
that, until 1990, workers may not have been adequately informed about
the contamination or trained in work practices designed to protect them
from the possible health impacts of such exposures. Enhanced worker
protection programs for the protection of workers from the hazards of
plutonium and other radioactive materials were required after 1990.
Secretary Richardson recently announced that the Administration
would propose legislation to establish a targeted pilot program to
provide compensation for Paducah workers who have cancer as a result of
job-related exposures. It is the intent that this be a pilot project
that will be able to inform our understanding of possible health
impacts at the other gaseous diffusion plants. At the same time, the
White House National Economic Council is leading a study of the
relationship between occupational disease and work at all DOE sites and
the adequacy of workers' compensation programs. The details of the
proposed Paducah pilot are being discussed within the Administration
and we hope to propose legislation shortly.
Conclusion
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to emphasize that Secretary
Richardson, on behalf of the entire Administration, takes the concerns
that have been raised seriously and is committed to investigate and
resolve them. The investigation is both independent and comprehensive.
As you have seen, it has already begun to serve to get out the facts
and correct any current safety shortcomings. The existing environmental
compliance agreement that guides remedial actions and schedules at the
site has been agreed to by DOE, the State of Kentucky and the
Environmental Protection Agency. Where the investigation team's initial
observations suggest that modifications to this agreement, including
adjustments in priorities, may be warranted to protect the public and
worker health and safety, we will pursue them.
We need to determine whether the Department has known of the
presence of plutonium and other transuranics at Paducah and other
sites. We also need to determine how well the workers knew of the
hazards they were working with, and how well they were protected from
these hazards--even in very small amounts. We will learn much more as
our investigation moves ahead and seeks to confirm--in today's
regulatory environment--whether the presence of these materials
represented a potential health risk at Paducah or any other DOE plant.
We will continue our efforts in a manner that is forthright and
responsive to the public's need for timely information, while at the
same time being careful that our answers are correct. We will also
continue to work in a cooperative and transparent way with the workers,
their representatives, the public, and the Congress. Secretary
Richardson has made it clear that the days of secrecy and hiding
information are over. We are committed to getting accurate information
and doing so in a responsible manner. We are also committed to treat
the veterans of the Cold War with dignity and with fairness.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I would be happy to
answer questions from any of the Subcommittee members.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61428.286
Mr. Upton. Thank you, Mr. Michaels.
Mr. Green.
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD D. GREEN
Mr. Richard Green. Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to talk about
Paducah today. I am Richard Green, Director of EPA's Waste
Management Division in EPA's Region 4 office in Atlanta. I am
responsible for our programs dealing with hazardous substance
regulation and cleanup, primarily under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response Compensation Liability Act, CERCLA, or
Superfund, and the Resource Conservation Recovery Act, or RCRA.
EPA's role at DOE's Paducah plant and my remarks focus on
EPA's oversight role as overseers of DOE's cleanup. EPA also
has regulatory responsibilities for facility compliance with
permits for its industrial operations which are governed by a
variety of other environmental laws which did not apply until
relatively recently in the plant's operation history.
The Commonwealth of Kentucky is authorized as the primary
environmental regulator in lieu of EPA under many EPA statutes
and we work closely with Kentucky in providing oversight of
DOE's activities pursuant to those authorities.
I want to preface my comments about the cleanup at Paducah
by saying that EPA takes the concerns of current and former
workers regarding possible exposures in the DOE workplace very
seriously. My focus on the cleanup program does not imply any
disinterest in those concerns whatsoever. Personally, I was
moved by testimony that we heard earlier today on Panel I.
However, my remarks will address efforts under EPA's
authorities to effect cleanup and to protect nearby
populations.
I continue to follow the news reports about Paducah and the
efforts by DOE's team investigating health and safety issues.
There is so much to do at the site that it was difficult to
even determine where to start several years ago. We have been
actively working to require cleanup to take place. In fact, EPA
Kentucky and DOE facility representatives are ready now to
reprioritize cleanup activities to address issues such as the
removal of the scrap metal piles. We welcome the opportunity to
work with DOE and Kentucky to identify other cleanup activities
that can be accelerated.
In November 1988, EPA issued a CERCLA 104/106
administrative consent order by which DOE agreed to protect
nearby homeowners from contaminated groundwater and to clean up
any related contamination serving as the source for that
problem. Under this order, DOE has supplied drinking water to
private residences, continues to conduct monthly sampling of
drinking water and has completed an initial investigation to
determine all sources of the contaminants, including
radionuclides which exceed Safe Drinking Water Act
requirements. The DOE immediately agreed to provide bottled
drinking water to nearby residents. Working with EPA and
Kentucky, DOE extended water lines to homes in the area of
contamination and initiated an environmental study to determine
the nature and extent of the contamination that caused the
offsite release as well as to identify other problem areas.
The outgrowth of this initial work under the administrative
order resulted in two key Superfund Records of Decision or RODS
having to do with the northwest plume and the northeast plume,
the two major groundwater contamination plumes which are
advancing from the site to the Ohio River reportedly at about a
foot a day. These decisions require the Department to extract
and treat the most contaminated groundwater that is underlying
the site. They represent EPA's requirement for early action
under Superfund whenever possible, and they are operating right
now but they are not the final remedy.
While these initial cleanup actions were underway, the site
was proposed for the National Priorities List, the Superfund
list in 1993, and finalized on that list in May, 1994. Here is
a summary of what we have required under the order and the NPL
listing so far: EPA Kentucky and the facility have identified
areas of known or suspected contamination. We have set
priorities for study and cleanup and implemented detailed
studies of the highest priority sites. These include additional
areas of groundwater contamination that have been identified,
water and sediments of streams near the facility, soils onsite
and across the plant for disposal. Six remedial actions have
been selected and implemented addressing groundwater, sediments
in ditches, and surface soil at areas within the industrial
complex. Two removal actions have been taken, one for a
radiologically contaminated rubble pile off the complex and a
second for PCB contaminated soils within the complex.
Several detailed remedial investigations are underway and
more are set to begin as early as this month. We signed a
Federal facilities agreement with DOE and Kentucky in February
1998. It helps coordinate the actions of the three parties and
sets milestones. It requires the three agencies to coordinate
with the public about cleanup efforts and to participate in a
site-specific advisory board which consists of 18 or 20 local
representatives.
The actions taken thus far, while significant and
appropriate, are by no means sufficient to address all of the
known or potential contamination associated with the facility.
EPA's context for approaching its oversight of the facility's
cleanup is that Paducah, just as the rest of the nuclear
weapons complex, was self-regulated throughout much of its
operational history. That leads us to expect to find additional
areas of contamination, such as the landfills referred to by
Mr. Garland in the Panel I testimony.
Setting priorities between response to known problems and
searching for unknown or suspected problems is a challenge but
it must be done. We take the community's concerns extremely
seriously, and we are pleased that DOE has expressed interest
in developing a strategy to investigate offsite areas that may
contain hazardous waste.
The environmental priorities at Paducah should be
reconsidered in light of new concerns being raised. EPA
supports a differently balanced response to known problems as
well as a broad-based search for any areas that may be
contaminated but not presently known. We have done a lot here,
but a lot remains to be done. Paducah has been constrained not
only by the DOE budget, but in our opinion by DOE's allocation
of that budget, particularly regarding cleanup funding. Indeed
we have been told by DOE that they will not be able to meet
even the baseline commitments in the FFA beginning in about the
year 2001. EPA does not accept this explanation and we have
refused to renegotiate the FFA down. DOE and Kentucky are ready
to reallocate priorities, add additional actions, and
accelerate response at the site. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Richard D. Green follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard D. Green, Director, Waste Management
Division, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region IV
Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to be here today. I am Richard D. Green, Director of EPA's
Waste Management Division in the Agency's Region 4 office, Atlanta,
Georgia. I am responsible for our programs dealing with hazardous
substance regulation and cleanup, primarily under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. EPA's role at the Department of
Energy's Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Kentucky, and my remarks,
focus on EPA's oversight role as overseers of the Department of
Energy's cleanup. EPA also has regulatory responsibilities for facility
compliance with permits for its industrial operations governed by a
variety of other environmental laws. The Commonwealth of Kentucky is
authorized as the primary environmental regulator in lieu of EPA under
many EPA statutes, and we work closely with Kentucky in providing
oversight of DOE's activities pursuant to those authorities.
I want to preface my comments about the cleanup at Paducah by
saying that EPA takes the concerns of current and former workers
regarding possible exposures in the DOE workplace very seriously. My
focus on the cleanup program does not imply any disinterest in those
concerns. Rather, my remarks will address efforts under EPA's
authorities.
I continue to follow the news reports about Paducah and the efforts
by the DOE's team investigating health and safety issues. The cleanup
of Paducah is a large and complex task and has been receiving priority
attention. In fact, EPA, Kentucky, and DOE facility representatives
stand ready to reprioritize cleanup activities to address issues such
as the removal of the scrap metal piles. EPA welcomes the opportunity
to work with DOE and Kentucky to identify other cleanup activities that
can be accelerated.
On November 23, 1988, EPA issued a CERCLA 104 /106 Administrative
Consent Order by which DOE agreed to protect nearby homeowners from
contaminated groundwater and to cleanup any related contamination
serving as the source for that problem. Under this order, DOE has
supplied drinking water to private residences, continues to conduct
monthly sampling of drinking water, and has completed an initial
investigation to determine all sources of the contaminants, including
radionuclides, which exceed Safe Drinking Water Act requirements. The
Department immediately agreed to provide bottled drinking water to
nearby residents. Working with EPA and Kentucky, DOE extended water
lines to homes in the area of contamination and initiated an
environmental study (known as the Phase I study) to determine the
nature and extent of the contamination that caused the offsite release,
as well as identifying other problem areas.
The outgrowth of the initial work required by the Administrative
Order resulted in two key CERCLA Records of Decision: Interim Remedial
Action of the Northwest Plume, and the Interim Remedial Action of the
Northeast Plume. These two cleanup decisions require the Department to
extract the most contaminated groundwater underlying the site. While
these initial cleanup actions were underway, the site was proposed for
the National Priorities List in 1993, and in May 1994, EPA finalized
the addition of the facility to the Superfund National Priorities List.
EPA, Kentucky and the facility have identified areas of known or
suspected contamination, set priorities for study and cleanup and
implemented detailed studies of the highest priority sites. These
include additional areas of groundwater contamination, water and
sediments of streams near the facility, soils on-site, and areas the
Plant used for disposal. Six remedial actions have been selected and
implemented addressing groundwater, sediments in ditches, and surface
soil at areas within the industrial complex. Two removal actions have
been taken, one for a radiologically contaminated concrete rubble pile
off the industrial complex and a second for PCB contaminated soils
within the complex. Several detailed remedial investigations are
underway and more are set to begin as early as this month.
While these actions were being planned and implemented, a Federal
Facility Agreement pursuant to CERCLA Section 120 was negotiated and
signed February 13, 1998. The FFA helps coordinate the actions of DOE,
EPA, and Kentucky and sets milestones for DOE's cleanup program. The
Agreement also requires the three agencies to coordinate with the
public about cleanup efforts and to participate in the Site Specific
Advisory Board formed in August 1996.
The actions taken thus far, while significant and appropriate, are
by no means sufficient to address all of the known or potential
contamination associated with the Paducah facility. EPA's context for
approaching its oversight of this facility's cleanup is that Paducah,
just as the rest of the nuclear weapons complex, was self-regulated
throughout much of its operational history. That leads us to expect to
find additional areas of contamination, both on and off-site. Setting
priorities between response to known problems and searching for unknown
or suspected problems will always be a formidable challenge. The
community's concerns regarding additional unknown areas of
contamination are taken very seriously by this Agency.
The environmental priorities at Paducah should be reconsidered in
light of new concerns being raised. EPA supports a differently balanced
response to known problems as well as a broad-based search for any
areas that may be contaminated but not presently known.
Mr. Whitfield [presiding]. Dr. Knapp.
TESTIMONY OF MALCOLM R. KNAPP
Mr. Knapp. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the
NRC's responsibilities regarding Paducah. I will briefly
summarize our responsibilities, the risks posed to workers and
the public, and our current regulatory actions.
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 assigns the NRC
responsibility for regulating the safety, safeguards and
security of the gaseous diffusion plants, and we take these
responsibilities very seriously. We certified the plants in
November 1996 and assumed regulatory responsibility in March
1997. As stated in our reports to Congress in 1998 and 1999, we
have determined that both plants are operating safely and in
accordance with our requirements.
Under the USEC lease agreements, certain areas are not
included within the leased areas and these remain under DOE,
not NRC regulatory responsibility.
In the figure posted at my left, the blue areas in the
Paducah plant remain under DOE's authority and responsibility.
The cream areas are the responsibility of USEC, regulated by
NRC. The light olive areas are areas of shared responsibilities
by USEC and DOE for access, and NRC regulates the USEC
activities in those areas.
Prior to our assumption of regulatory oversight in 1997,
USEC performed a site-wide survey of indoor and outdoor areas
of the plants to identify any contaminated areas. They placed
placards in those contaminated areas which USEC was releasing
from DOE to identify them clearly, and they control these areas
in accordance with their radiation protection program.
Based upon our review of their records since 1997, worker
radiation exposures at Paducah in NRC-regulated areas are very
low and in compliance with NRC requirements. With respect to
the public and the environment's exposure, the report which
USEC provided as part of its application for certification and
a subsequent report in 1997 show that with respect to USEC
responsibilities, concentrations of transuranic radionuclides
in airborne emissions, water samples, soil samples and sediment
samples are within regulatory limits.
With respect to current NRC regulatory actions, we maintain
a staff of 2 full-time onsite resident inspectors at each plant
who are tasked with monitoring day-to-day plant operations,
including radiological control practices in the area of the
facility for which we have responsibility. In addition,
inspections by both headquarters and regional specialists are
conducted on about a monthly basis to assess performance of
plant operations.
An NRC inspection team comprised of health physics
specialists conducted a confirmatory inspection of USEC's
radiation protection program during the week of August 20 at
Paducah. While the team is reviewing the results of that
inspection, it tentatively concluded that the USEC radiation
protection program at Paducah is effective in identifying and
controlling worker exposure to contamination. The team did
identify two areas that require further investigation: the
methodology USEC uses to assess transuranic uptakes, and the
methodology USEC uses to determine the percentage of
transuranics in the sites' contamination.
To conclude, USEC is operating the Paducah Gaseous
Diffusion Plant safely and in accordance with NRC requirements.
Nevertheless, the recent series of articles has prompted
additional scrutiny by the NRC to ensure continued protection
of workers and the public from exposure to uranium and other
radioactive materials.
Although our ongoing inspection at Paducah raises several
issues which require additional information and assessment,
based on our reviews to date we have found existing exposures
to USEC workers are well within NRC regulatory limits.
That concludes my prepared testimony. I will be happy to
answer questions.
[The prepared statement of Malcolm R. Knapp follows:]
Prepared Statement of Malcolm Knapp, Executive Assistant, Office of the
Executive Director for Operations, Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Good morning, my name is Malcolm Knapp and I am an Executive
Assistant in the Office of the Executive Director for Operations. Thank
you for providing me the opportunity to discuss the NRC
responsibilities regarding the Paducah gaseous diffusion plant and
associated current issues. I will briefly summarize these
responsibilities, risks posed to workers and the public, and NRC's
current regulatory actions related to the Paducah plant.
NRC Responsibilities
The Atomic Energy Act (AEA), as amended by the Energy Policy Act of
1992, assigns NRC the responsibility for regulating the safety,
safeguards, and security of the gaseous diffusion plants, which are
owned by the Department of Energy (DOE) but leased and operated by the
United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), now a non-Government
corporation. The NRC takes this responsibility for worker and public
health and safety very seriously. NRC promulgated requirements in 10
CFR Part 76 on September 23, 1994, that provide the regulatory basis
for NRC certification and inspection of USEC's operation of the gaseous
diffusion plants. A 1997 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between DOE
and NRC further clarifies NRC's and DOE's interactive roles for safety,
safeguards, and security in those areas leased by USEC.
NRC certified the gaseous diffusion plants in November 1996 and
assumed regulatory responsibility in March 1997. As stated in NRC's
reports to Congress in 1998 and 1999, the NRC has determined that both
plants are operating safely and in accordance with NRC requirements.
Areas Not Under NRC Responsibility
Under the USEC-DOE lease agreement, certain areas within the plants
are not included in the leased areas, and these areas remain under DOE,
not NRC, regulatory responsibility at Paducah. These are areas
containing material from operations conducted by DOE to support defense
program activities (also known as legacy material) and areas containing
significant quantities of high enriched uranium. DOE retains
responsibility for environmental protection, safety, safeguards, and
security for these excluded areas, and DOE retains responsibility for
environmental restoration activities and waste management of the legacy
material. Some areas within USEC leased buildings are not part of the
leased USEC space, these areas were retained by DOE and are used to
store or contain DOE legacy material. These areas are physically
delineated as DOE space and are not subject to NRC regulation. Under
the Atomic Energy Act, unless expressly stated otherwise by statute,
the NRC does not regulate DOE activities.
Contamination
Prior to NRC's assumption of regulatory oversight in March 1997,
USEC performed a site-wide survey of indoor and outdoor areas of the
plants to identify any contaminated areas. USEC placed placards in
those contaminated areas which USEC was leasing from DOE and which were
to be under NRC jurisdiction to identify clearly these contaminated
areas. In addition, any USEC areas which become contaminated as a
result of USEC operations, for example, maintenance activities, are
decontaminated or marked by USEC as contaminated areas. In each of
these cases, USEC controls these areas in accordance with its Radiation
Protection Program as described in the Safety Analysis Reports.
Areas under NRC jurisdiction are routinely surveyed for
contamination. USEC surveys the lunchrooms and breakrooms in the
cascade building area control rooms daily during the work week to
verify that any contamination levels are below limits that ensure
public and plant staff safety. In addition, onsite NRC resident
inspectors regularly assess contamination controls to determine the
effectiveness of the plant Radiation Protection Program. In general,
these assessments which are reported by the resident inspectors in
their monthly reports, have found that USEC's contamination controls in
place on USEC leased space are consistent with the plant Radiation
Protection Program and are, therefore, acceptable.
Worker Exposure
Worker exposure occurs from the inhalation or ingestion of
radioactive material (internal dose) and exposure to radiation from
sources outside the body (external dose). Both doses are added together
to calculate total dose.
Based on NRC review of USEC records since 1997, worker radiation
exposures at Paducah in NRC-regulated areas are very low and in
compliance with NRC requirements. The program uses personnel dosimetry
(badges) for monitoring and recording external radiation exposures and
analysis of urine samples to monitor and estimate worker internal
radiation exposures. Radiation doses are reported in units of rem or
millirem (1000 millirem equals 1 rem). The NRC annual dose limit for a
worker from NRC licensed operations is 5 rem.
In 1997, those Paducah workers who did receive a dose had an
average annual total dose of 0.051 rem, while the average annual total
dose at an NRC-licensed power reactor was 0.202 rem and at an NRC-
licensed fuel cycle facility was 0.236 rem. The largest total dose
recorded in 1997 for any worker at the plant was 0.365 rem. Less than
2% of that dose was estimated to be from internal radiological
contamination.
For 1998 the largest total dose recorded for any worker at the
Paducah plant was 0.382 rem. Again less than 2% of that dose was
estimated to be from internal radiological contamination. To put these
doses into perspective, the average dose from natural sources to a
person in the United States is 0.300 rem per year and, as noted
previously, the NRC annual limit on total dose from NRC licensed
operations to a radiological worker is 5 rem.
Public/Environmental Exposure
USEC provided to NRC and other regulatory agencies an environmental
compliance status report containing then current environmental and
effluent monitoring data as part of its application for certification.
The report for 1997 is publically available and shows that
concentrations of transuranic radionuclides in airborne emissions,
water samples, soil samples, and sediment samples are within regulatory
limits.
Since NRC assumed regulatory oversight of the gaseous diffusion
plants on March 3, 1997, NRC is not aware that any disposal by USEC of
radioactive waste from Paducah has occurred at other than authorized
disposal facilities. Although portions of the USEC-leased areas are
contaminated with radioactive materials and will remain contaminated
during enrichment operations, these areas will be decommissioned by DOE
after the USEC lease is terminated and prior to release of the site in
accordance with criteria established by DOE.
No Current Activities Involving Recycled Uranium or Precious Metals
The reactor tails program, which enriched recycled uranium
recovered from reprocessed defense reactor fuel, was conducted by the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and DOE before USEC took over plant
operations and before NRC assumed regulatory oversight of the gaseous
diffusion plants on March 3, 1997. The recycling of precious metals
also was conducted at Paducah by the AEC and DOE before NRC assumed
regulatory oversight of the gaseous diffusion plants. Although both the
reactor tails and precious metals recycling programs were completed
before USEC took over plant operations, USEC's worker protection
programs are required to assess the potential impacts of contaminants
from both historical and current operations that may impact the work
environment.
Current Regulatory Actions
The NRC maintains a full-time staff of two onsite resident
inspectors at each plant who are tasked with monitoring day-to-day
plant operations, including radiological control practices, in those
areas of the facility for which NRC has regulatory responsibility. In
addition, inspections by both Headquarters and Regional specialist
inspectors are conducted on about a monthly basis to assess performance
of plant operations.
An NRC inspection team comprised of health physics specialists
conducted a confirmatory inspection of USEC's Radiation Protection
Program at the Paducah plant during the week of August 30, 1999, and
conducted a similar inspection at the Portsmouth plant the week of
September 13, 1999. Following a review of the results, the team expects
to close the inspection in mid-October. The objectives of the
inspection are to confirm the adequacy of USEC's: (1) understanding of
the radiological contamination on site; (2) controls for worker
protection for transuranics such as neptunium and plutonium, technetium
and uranium radionuclides; (3) internal and external dose assessment
program for these radionuclides; (4) characterization methodology for
measuring these radionuclides; and (5) environmental and effluent
monitoring practices for these radionuclides.
Although the NRC inspection team is still reviewing the results of
the Paducah and Portsmouth inspections, they have tentatively concluded
that the USEC Radiation Protection Programs at Paducah and Portsmouth
are effective in identifying and controlling worker exposure to
contamination. Air sampling and work controls in areas where workers
could possibly get exposed to plutonium contamination are effective and
no internal exposures were indicated. The team identified two issues
which require further investigation: (1) the methodology USEC uses to
assess transuranic uptakes; and (2) the methodology USEC uses to
determine the percentage of transuranics in the site's contamination.
USEC is preparing information to respond to these issues, and some
members of the NRC inspection team returned to Paducah this week to
follow up. Although the methodology used by USEC to assess internal
dose is being evaluated further, the NRC has not found any indication
that the annual dose to any worker or member of the public has
approached NRC safety limits in portions of the facility that are
regulated by NRC. Inspection exit meetings which are open to the public
are anticipated to be held near the two sites in early October 1999.
Conclusion
In conclusion, USEC is operating the Paducah gaseous diffusion
plant safely and in accordance with NRC requirements. Nevertheless, the
recent series of articles has prompted additional scrutiny by the NRC
to ensure continued protection of workers and the public from exposure
to uranium and other radioactive materials. Although our ongoing
inspection at Paducah raises several issues that require additional
information and assessment, based on our reviews to date, we have found
that existing exposures to USEC workers at the plants are well within
NRC regulatory limits.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Logan, I didn't have an opportunity to talk
to you, but I am delighted to see you and Dr. Volpe here and
appreciate you taking time to come. You may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT W. LOGAN
Mr. Logan. Thank you. My name is Robert Logan, and I am
Commissioner of the Department for Environmental Protection in
Kentucky, and with me I have Dr. Volpe who is Manager of the
Radiation Control Branch in the Cabinet for Health Services. We
appreciate the opportunity to speak before the committee about
Kentucky's efforts to address environmental issues at the
Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant.
The Commonwealth is deeply concerned about the worker
exposure to citizens in the area, but today my comments are
focused on environmental issues.
The Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant is situated in western
Kentucky, located in McCracken County, approximately 9 miles
west of Paducah and 3 miles south of the Ohio River on a 3,422-
acre Federal reservation. DOE has had exclusive regulatory
authority for radionuclides on their property. From 1952 until
the mid-1970's, DOE has had exclusive control over the waste
generated and disposed at the facility. The Kentucky Cabinet
currently has regulatory authority for air quality, water and
waste management. The State authority to regulate these
concerns comes from the delegation of Federal environmental
programs including the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, the
Resource and Conservation and Recovery Act, RCRA.
The NRC, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and the
Cabinet for Health Services has primary jurisdiction for
radioactive air emissions. EPA did not grant authority to
address radioactive emissions to our air program until July 14,
1999. Based upon this grant authority, Kentucky has adopted
subpart H of the Radionuclide Emission Standard for Hazardous
Air Pollutants. The Cabinet is currently reviewing the USEC
Title 5 operating air permit application.
In water, Kentucky began permitting the facility for water
discharges in 1984 after delegation of the national pollution
discharge elimination system.
Under the NPDS program, the Cabinet has issued two permits.
One permit focuses on discharge associated with plant
operations, cleanup of groundwater plumes and contaminated
soils and stormwater runoff from the storage areas and multiple
landfills. This permit is issued to DOE and its operating
contractor.
The second permit is issued to USEC and addresses the
process water from uranium enrichment, stormwater runoff from
processing and storage areas, cooling water and sanitary waste
water.
The DOE and USEC permits contain monitoring requirements
and limitations for toxicity, metals, organics, radioactive
materials, including uranium, technetium-99 and alpha beta
particles and conventional pollutants. Kentucky performs
quarterly inspections of both discharge permits. DOE performs
monthly monitoring for conventional and quarterly monitoring
for radionuclides. We have issued six Notices of Violations on
these permits. These NOVs, as we call them, have been obtained
for the corrective actions for the violations, and subsequent
inspections of the plant have revealed that corrective actions
were completed.
In the area of waste, Kentucky has issued four waste
management permits to the facility. In 1991, a hazardous waste
permit was issued under subtitle C requirements under RCRA to
DOE. This permit requires DOE to characterize and remediate
contamination at over 200 contaminated areas at the facility.
In April 1991, Kentucky's Cabinet issued a solid waste disposal
permit for the disposal of residential waste generated at the
facility. In February 1985, we issued a solid waste disposal
permit for the disposal of inert solid waste generated at the
facility. The residential and inert landfills were capped in
1995 and 1992 respectively.
In November 1996, Kentucky issued a solid waste disposal
permit for the disposal of solid waste generated at the
facility. DOE has appealed certain conditions contained if the
permit. DOE is challenging Kentucky's ability to require
characterization of DOE's solid waste prior to disposal and
challenges the Cabinet's authority to set limits on the level
of radioactivity associated with solid waste that can be
disposed of in a solid waste landfill.
These challenges are currently pending in State and Federal
court. These three permits were issued under subtitle D of the
Solid Waste Disposal Act. Quarterly monitoring was required at
these subtitle D landfills. This monitoring has identified
chromium, technetium-99 and TCE as contaminants of the
groundwater. Kentucky has required DOE to increase the
frequency of its groundwater monitoring and to provide an
assessment of the source of the groundwater contamination. DOE
has advised Kentucky that contamination is not coming from
these landfills.
In addition to its regulatory authority, in 1991 the
Commonwealth entered into an Agreement in Principle with DOE in
which the Commonwealth conducts oversight of environmental
remediation. Under the Agreement in Principle, Kentucky has
conducted 18 separate studies at the facilities concerning the
fate and transport of contaminants and their associated
environmental impacts.
Under health and safety, the Cabinet for Health Services'
efforts at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant have been
redirected toward radiation monitoring and oversight of the DOE
activities in order to ensure protection of public health and
the environment. The Cabinet of Health Services provides
technical advice for onsite and offsite radiation issues at
Paducah.
For example, in CHS's activities during the period 1995 to
1999, they include the collection of over 4,500 samples from
surface water, groundwater, soil sediments and vegetation in
the vicinity of the plant.
CHS has regulatory authority over radiological issues
outside the facility boundary. The Department of Energy has
regulatory authority under the Atomic Energy Act with respect
to nuclear safety issues, including worker health and safety.
We have also entered into Federal facilities agreement, a site
management plan. In May 1994 the facility was placed on EPA's
Superfund national priority list under CERCLA. Therefore, as a
result of this listing, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, the
Department of Energy and U.S. EPA have entered into a Federal
facilities agreement in 1998 which addresses the overlapping
responsibilities of the U.S. EPA under the State and RCRA and
CERCLA. This establishes a cleanup time line for the facility
of 2010.
Kentucky has concerns about DOE's ability to meet this
deadline considering its current funding levels. The State is
also concerned about the extent of remediation that DOE has
proposed for the facility, and in previous correspondence
Kentucky has expressed these concerns to DOE management and
members of the congressional delegation. We have placed
correspondence in the record, and we want to note that on
September 14, the Department of Energy press release has
acknowledged our concerns. We hope DOE will in turn acknowledge
this into action.
Soils at the site are collected and analyzed by DOE.
Kentucky ensures the quality and accuracy of sampling by a
protocol to split samples with the Department of Energy. Over
5,000 soil samples have been collected by Kentucky and DOE
since 1990. The samples were tested for over 400 chemicals on
the hazardous waste constituent list.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Logan, we have your entire statement. If
you would summarize.
Mr. Logan. In summary, Mr. Chairman, Kentucky has several
major issues that it wants to discuss. First and foremost is
concern over soils contamination at the site. We have concerns
about the groundwater contamination in the plume. We want to
make sure that all of the information that has been developed
we have received, and we are very concerned regarding the
recent allegations that radioactive waste may have been
disposed of at locations previously unknown to the State, and
we continue to urge DOE to provide full accounting of its past
disposal practices. And Kentucky is concerned that DOE is not
receiving the funding necessary to conduct the cleanup in a
timely manner.
Mr. Chairman, we believe Congress must provide adequate
funding to DOE to ensure the protection of the citizens and the
environment of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
[The prepared statement of Robert W. Logan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert W. Logan, Commissioner, Kentucky
Department of Environmental Protection
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee my name is Robert W.
Logan. I am Commissioner of the Department for Environmental Protection
in the Kentucky Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet
(NREPC). I have with me today Dr. John Volpe, manager of the Radiation
Control Branch in the Kentucky Cabinet for Health Services. We are here
to speak before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
concerning the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP). The PGDP is a
large, industrial complex situated in western Kentucky. It is located
in McCracken County approximately nine miles west of Paducah and three
miles south of the Ohio River on a 3,423 acre federal reservation.
Seven hundred forty-eight acres are fenced and contain most of the
areas used by the PGDP. Surrounding the plant is the West Kentucky
Wildlife Management Area, composed of 2,781 acres and managed by the
Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources. The PGDP is a
uranium enrichment facility owned and operated by the U.S. Department
of Energy (DOE) from 1952 until 1993. On July 1, 1993, United States
Enrichment Corporation (USEC) assumed operations at the plant. The main
function of the plant is the enrichment of uranium.
regulatory authority
DOE historically and currently has had exclusive regulatory
authority for radionuclides on their property. From 1952 until the mid-
1970's, DOE had exclusive control over the waste generated and disposed
at the facility.
The Kentucky NREPC currently has regulatory authority for air
quality, water, and waste management. The state authority to regulate
these areas comes from the delegation of federal environmental programs
including the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).
Air
Kentucky does not have complete authority for Title V of the Clean
Air Act, however, Kentucky has issued a series of 21 permits to DOE and
its contractors since March 18, 1980. Air permits have generally not
regulated radioactive emissions. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), and Kentucky Cabinet for
Health Services (CHS) have had primary jurisdiction over radioactive
emissions. USEPA did not grant authority to address radioactive
emissions to air until July 14, 1999. Based upon this grant of
authority, Kentucky adopted Subpart H, the radionuclide National
Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPS). The NREPC is
currently reviewing the USEC Title V operating permit application.
Water
Kentucky began permitting the facility for water discharges in 1984
after delegation of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permitting program to Kentucky in September 1983. Under the
NPDES program, Kentucky NREPC issued two permits. One permit focuses on
discharges associated with plant operations, cleanup of groundwater
plumes and contaminated soils, and storm water runoff from storage
areas and multiple landfills. This permit is issued to the DOE and its
operating contractor. The second permit is issued to the USEC and
addresses process water from uranium enrichment, storm water runoff
from processing and storage areas, cooling water, and sanitary
wastewater.
The DOE and USEC permits contain monitoring requirements and
limitations for toxicity, metals, organics (PCB and TCE), radioactive
materials (Uranium and Technetium-99 and Alpha and Beta Particles), and
conventional pollutants.
Kentucky performs quarterly inspections of both discharge permits.
DOE performs monthly monitoring for conventional pollutants and
quarterly monitoring for radionuclides. Six Notices of Violations
(NOVs) have been issued by Kentucky on these permits. These NOVs
contained corrective actions for these violations. Subsequent
inspections revealed that corrective actions were completed.
Waste
Kentucky issued four waste management permits to the facility. In
1991, a hazardous waste permit was issued under the subtitle C
requirements of RCRA, to DOE. This permit requires DOE to characterize
and remediate contamination at over 200 contaminated areas at the
facility.
In April 1981, Kentucky NREPC issued a solid waste disposal permit
for the disposal of residential waste generated at the facility. In
February of 1985, Kentucky NREPC issued a solid waste disposal permit
for the disposal of inert solid waste generated at the facility. The
residential and inert landfills were closed in 1995 and 1992,
respectively. In November of 1996, Kentucky issued a solid waste
disposal permit for the disposal of solid waste generated at the
facility. DOE has appealed certain conditions contained in the permit.
DOE is challenging Kentucky's ability to require characterization of
DOE's solid waste prior to disposal and challenging the Cabinet's
authority to set limits on the levels of radioactivity associated with
solid waste that can be disposed in a solid waste landfill. These
challenges are currently pending in state and federal court. These
three permits were issued under Subtitle D of the Solid Waste Disposal
Act.
Quarterly monitoring is required for the three subtitle D
landfills. This monitoring has identified chromium, Technetium-99 and
trichloroethylene (TCE) as contaminants of groundwater. Kentucky has
required DOE to increase the frequency of its groundwater monitoring
and to provide an assessment of the source of the groundwater
contamination. DOE has advised Kentucky that the contamination is not
coming from these landfills.
Oversight
In addition to its regulatory authority, in 1991 the Commonwealth
of Kentucky entered into an Agreement in Principal with DOE in which
the Commonwealth conducts oversight of environmental remediation. Under
the AIP, Kentucky has conducted eighteen separate studies at the
facility concerning fate and transport of contaminants and their
associated environmental impacts.
Health and Safety
The Cabinet for Health Services' efforts at the PGDP have been
directed toward Radiation Monitoring and Oversight of DOE activities in
order to ensure protection of public health and the environment. CHS
provides technical advice for on-site and off-site radiation issues at
PGDP. For example, CHS's activities during the period of FY1995 through
FY1999 included the collection of over 4500 samples from surface water,
groundwater, soils, sediment, and vegetation in the vicinity of the
PGDP. In this time frame, CHS conducted 13,094 radiochemical analyses
on the samples collected at PGDP and 15,773 quality control analyses to
ensure the accuracy and precision of PGDP sample results.
CHS has regulatory authority over radiological issues outside the
facility boundary.
The DOE has regulatory authority under the Atomic Energy Act with
respect to nuclear safety issues including worker health and safety.
Federal Facilities Agreement--Site Management Plan
In May of 1994, the facility was placed on USEPA Superfund National
Priority List under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Therefore, as a result of
this listing, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, the DOE and the USEPA,
entered into a Federal Facilities Agreement (FFA) in 1998 which
addresses the overlapping responsibilities of USEPA and Kentucky under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and CERCLA.
The FFA established a clean up time line for the facility of 2010.
Kentucky has concerns about DOE's ability to meet this deadline
considering its current funding levels. Kentucky is also concerned
about the extent of the remediation DOE has proposed for the facility.
In previous correspondence Kentucky has expressed these concerns to DOE
management and members of our congressional delegation. We would like
to place this correspondence into the record today. We want to note
that a September 14 DOE press release has acknowledged our concerns. We
hope DOE will turn its acknowledgements into action.
site contamination
Soils
Soil samples are collected and analyzed by the DOE. Kentucky
assures the quality and accuracy of sampling by a protocol to split
samples with DOE. Over 5,000 soil samples have been collected by
Kentucky and DOE since 1990. Over 400 chemicals on the hazardous waste
constituent list, as well as gross alpha and beta particles, PCBs,
Technetium-99 and other radioactive elements.
Over 200 waste management units have been identified in the RCRA
permit. Contamination at these units includes inorganics, metals, and
radionuclides. The FFA requires DOE to submit a report detailing the
overall soil contamination at the facility by November 1999.
Characterization and remediation of the soil is one of Kentucky's
highest priorities.
Surface Water
The USEC facility withdraws approximately 10 million gallons of
water from the Ohio River daily for the uranium enrichment process.
Process discharges are to Little and Big Bayou Creeks through permitted
outfalls. These outfalls from the facility are monitored monthly by the
NREPC and by the facility. Surface water and sediment samples are
collected semiannually along Little and Big Bayou Creeks. Soil in the
discharge water (sediment) and process water are contaminated with low
levels of PCBs, metals, and radionuclides. DOE has been notified about
these contaminants.
Further, CHS performs a risk assessment of the radionuclides levels
and where elevated levels are identified, DOE is notified by CHS.
Groundwater
Approximately 9 billion gallons of groundwater are contaminated in
three groundwater plumes. Trichloroethylene (TCE) was detected in off-
site residential wells in 1988. Trichloroethylene (TCE) and Technetium-
99 (99Tc) were discovered in private water wells north of the plant in
August 1988. Kentucky notified potentially impacted residents and DOE.
This prompted DOE to provide municipal water service to residences and
businesses within the projected area of migration of the contaminated
groundwater. Ensuing investigations confirmed that TCE and Technetium-
99 (Tc99) were traveling off-site via two massive groundwater plumes,
the Northeast Plume and Northwest Plume. The Drinking Water Policy Area
was recently enlarged to accommodate a new plume (southwest plume).
Most of the groundwater contamination is confined about 60 to 100 feet
below the surface. Actions have been taken to monitor the progression
of the groundwater plumes and to assure that no one is drinking and/or
using impacted groundwater: (1) sealing and capping groundwater wells
within the Drinking Water Policy Area, (2) converting residences to a
municipal water supply, (3) conducting door-to-door surveys, (4)
publishing a newsletter, (5) conducting well-record searches, (6)
sampling outside the Drinking Water Policy Area, (7) notifying local
drilling companies about the Drinking Water Policy. DOE is also
monitoring outside the Drinking Water Policy Area and has installed
pumps. They are treating wells to slow the progression of the plume.
Since 1991 over 250 groundwater wells located at various depths
have been monitored on a biweekly basis. Over 400 chemicals on the
hazardous waste constituent list, as well as gross alpha and gross beta
particles, Technetium-99 and other radioactive elements such as
Uranium, are routinely monitored. Other radioactive elements such as
Thorium, Plutonium and Neptunium have been detected in a few
groundwater wells at extremely low concentrations on an irregular
basis. These include wells located on DOE reservation and property off-
site. Over 10,000 groundwater samples have been collected by Kentucky
and DOE since 1990.
Interim corrective actions have already been implemented to slow
down the progression of the Northeast and Northwest Plumes
To effectively clean up the groundwater, all sources of groundwater
contamination must be identified and remedial actions designed to
address the dense nonaqueous phase liquids (DNAPLS). Remediation of
groundwater is also one of Kentucky's highest priorities.
Air
The CHS installed and calibrated eight (8) continuous air samplers
in the vicinity of the PGDP during FY 1997 to FY 1999. The CHS operates
the eight air samplers to monitor airborne radioactive emissions from
PGDP activities. Seven air monitoring stations are located on the DOE
reservation in the vicinity of plant. One air monitor is located
approximately 5 miles southeast of the PGDP to determine background
activity.
The CHS began collection and analyses of continuous air samples in
January 1997 following a start-up and calibration period during which
field operational problems with the samplers were corrected and
laboratory methods for analyzing the sample filters were developed.
Filters from continuous air samplers are collected on a weekly basis.
In excess of 300 samples have been collected from January 1997 to
present. The CHS conducted 645 radiochemical analyses on the samples.
Analytical results from all continuous air sampler locations
indicated that radiation activities were less than the maximum daily
allowance, MDA, and, therefore, were below the background levels. In
the event of exceedences, DOE is notified.
Fish and Wildlife
The West Kentucky Wildlife Management Area (WKWMA) surrounds the
facility. The NREPC and Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife have
worked since 1992 to evaluate any adverse impact on the environment or
wildlife in the WKWMA.
Kentucky currently monitors deer, fish, and other wildlife in the
WKWMA for contamination from the facility. PCBs found in fish collected
and analyzed from the Little Bayou Creek prompted Kentucky to issue a
fish consumption advisory in 1988. Low levels of plutonium were found
in two samples of deer taken from the WKWMA in 1994. The levels did not
pose a threat to health. Since that time, subsequent sampling has not
revealed the presence of plutonium contamination in deer. Low levels of
PCBs, metals and radionuclides have been found throughout the ecosystem
in all levels of the food chain. Remediation of the site will be the
only cure for these problems.
Community Relations and Outreach
Since 1993, the NREPC, DOE and EPA produce a quarterly newsletter,
``Kentucky Environmental Oversight News.'' Over 2,300 individuals
receive copies of the newsletter statewide. However, outreach is
focused on the Paducah area.
The NREPC, DOE and EPA began the process of development of a
citizens' advisory board in January 1995. The site specific advisory
board (SSAB), created in 1996, is composed of 12 board members from the
community and five state and federal regulatory agency representatives.
The board meets periodically to discuss issues related to the
permitting and corrective action.
Additionally, in response to recent allegations about the facility,
Kentucky has established a toll free number for citizens to obtain
information about the facility and to voice their concerns.
Summary
Kentucky is concerned with the recent allegations that radioactive
wastes may have been disposed at locations previously unknown to the
NREPC. Therefore, we continue to urge DOE to provide a full accounting
of its past waste disposal practices. As noted Kentucky is concerned
that DOE is not receiving the funding necessary to conduct the clean up
in a timely manner. Therefore, we believe that Congress must provide
adequate funding to DOE to ensure protection of the citizens and
environment of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you, Mr. Logan.
Dr. Knapp, in your opening statement toward the end, you
were talking about the safety of the production facility
operated by USEC. In closing, you said several other issues
have been raised which we are looking at in more detail. What
issues are you referring to there?
Mr. Knapp. I was principally referring to the two that I
mentioned in the latter part of my testimony. They have to do
with the methodology that USEC is using to assist transuranics
uptakes and the methodology that they are using to determine
the percentage of contamination which is transuranics.
In both cases, the percentages are low enough that we are
very comfortable that workers are properly protected. That is
contamination--that is, uptakes in general, as you heard from
USEC earlier, are very low. They are less than 10 percent of
NRC's limits for worker exposure. A small fraction of those
exposures result from transuranics.
We want to better understand the methodology they use to
calculate that fraction. So these are not significant issues
but we simply want to pursue them. It is an area where we want
more comfort with what is going on. We anticipate having this
resolved by the time we formally close our inspection in
October.
Mr. Whitfield. Since USEC has had responsibility for the
production facility, have they been cited or fined by NRC?
Mr. Knapp. They have received a number of violations. They
have received, I believe, 38 noncited violations, 62 Level 4,
that is our lowest level of violation. They have been involved
in 4 of what we call Level 3 violations, one of which did
result in a civil penalty of $55,000.
For perspective--and this is a comparison that it is
difficult to make, this is a somewhat higher level of violation
than we might find, say, for a 2-unit commercial plant
regulated by the NRC, but I think it is also fair to say that
this is a different kind of plant and they are coming under NRC
regulation, which tends to result in a somewhat higher number
of violations than we would expect after a few number of years.
Mr. Whitfield. Is there a significant difference between
NRC's and DOE's health and safety requirements?
Mr. Knapp. They are fundamentally identical. The bottom
line, the requirements that we have for exposures to workers
and the public, full body dose, dose to parts of the body, are
identical.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Green and Mr. Logan, if the site at
Paducah was owned by a private company with the same problems,
would you be treating them the same way?
Mr. Richard Green. Congressman, we probably would have done
things similar to the way we have done them. We entered into
early action with DOE. We asked them to provide bottled water.
We do that on the private side regularly. We asked them to take
interim action on the groundwater. We do that, too. They did
it.
We have an enforceable--we entered into an order with them,
yes. Of course, the main difference in treating a Federal
facility is we really cannot say to them on the commercial--as
we would to a commercial polluter and Superfund, if you don't
do this, we will do it and then we will send you the bill and
we will cost-recover the money. However, sites this big are
rare. We have nothing on the commercial side, at least in
Region 4 that approaches this in terms of size or really
seriousness.
Mr. Whitfield. Would you have any ballpark figure of what
you think it would cost to clean this up?
Mr. Richard Green. We have identified over 200 solid waste
management units. We don't have a handle yet on the extent of
contamination offsite, and not even all of it onsite, as recent
newspaper reports showed.
Based upon what we know, however, DOE is saying--and we
have no real reason to dispute it--that the total cost could
reach over $200 billion.
Mr. Whitfield. $200 billion?
Mr. Richard Green. Yes, sir.
Mr. Whitfield. Is that DOE-wide or is that just Paducah?
Mr. Richard Green. No, sir, I believe it is just Paducah.
Let me confer with Mr. Johnston. (Mr. Owendoff comes forward
and states that $200 billion is the estimated cost of cleaning
up the entire DOE complex.)
Mr. Whitfield. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Owendoff. I am Jim Owendoff. It is for the entire
complex: Oak Ridge; Ridgeland in Washington; and Rocky Flats in
Idaho.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Logan, do you want to respond?
Mr. Logan. Had this been a private corporation or private
business, we would have not been as sensitive to the budget
requirements and the financial impact. We would have entered
into similar agreements and a plan of action for
characterization and remediation and a timeframe for cleanup,
but we would have probably accelerated the schedule.
Mr. Whitfield. Dr. Michaels, we have talked a little bit
today about the Tiger team report and you have just completed
your Phase I assessment back to 1990; and at least my memory
was that some of the same problems today were there back in
1990. A significant number of them were the same; is that
correct?
Mr. Michaels. It is correct, and at the same time it is not
correct. They can be characterized the same way, but the
severity is quite different. You heard about a situation that
is some ways is out of control. What we saw in a recent
investigation on which I presented the preliminary findings, we
found some concerns that we take very seriously, but they were
in the area of discipline and ALARA, the lowest allowable
exposure that we can reasonably achieve. And we want to reach
that, and that is why we took it very seriously. You can't say
that it is the same extent of problems that the Tiger team saw.
Mr. Whitfield. More severity than anything else?
Mr. Michaels. Yes, but the areas in health physics or
environmental contamination certainly were the same.
Mr. Whitfield. Did you agree with Mr. Nemec's statement
that his reading and DOE's reading on the cylinders were
consistent with each other?
Mr. Michaels. I haven't looked at that carefully. I don't
think that they were necessarily inconsistent, but we took it
seriously enough that we thought that people should be badged.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Logan--well, to be fair about this, you
have 5 minutes, Mr. Strickland.
Mr. Strickland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Michaels, I have lots of questions to ask you and I
will try to ask them succinctly, and if you can give me an
abbreviated response.
First of all, I have a document here sent by the Deputy
Director of Naval Reactors, T.J. Glothier, regarding the pilot
project, and it troubles me greatly. It argues against this
effort. It says it would set a precedent for compensation of
occupational radiation injury claims. The draft pilot program
could establish an inappropriate precedent for other DOE and
DOD activities where plutonium is handled. It says that the DOE
proposal sets a precedent without identifying the full
potential scope of the problem.
And what this sounds like to me is an attempt to avoid
responsibility and a fear of setting a precedent and accepting
liability.
Now I understand the need for caution, but we are talking
about human lives and human health and safety, and it really
troubles me that any part of our government would take such a
cautious approach. The benefit of the doubt ought to go to
workers who have been inappropriately exposed to dangerous
materials. That ought to be the position of this government.
I have written the White House saying that the workers at
Portsmouth and the workers at Oak Ridge should not be excluded
from this. I know that there was a facility that operated
briefly at Portsmouth--for I don't know how long. It was shut
down because they couldn't contain the contaminants. Could you
tell me how long that conversion facility at Portsmouth was
operational?
Mr. Michaels. I am sorry, I didn't come prepared with that
information. I don't think any of our staff here has it either.
Mr. Strickland. Can you provide that?
Mr. Michaels. Yes.
Mr. Strickland. So you can't tell me how much radiation was
not contained and for how long it was not contained?
Mr. Michaels. That's correct. Even knowing how long it
operated, knowing what our records look like, I don't think
that I would be able to give you those answers.
Mr. Strickland. So you can't tell me what level of exposure
workers at Portsmouth may have received while that plant was
operational?
Mr. Michaels. That is correct. We have this large
investigative study that will look at that issue, among the
other issues, but the best we will do is try to estimate what
the exposures were.
Mr. Strickland. I understand, and I have confidence in your
efforts. But I am just trying to get some things on the record
here.
Now, material came to my plant that was dangerous. Workers
handled it. There was exposure. The operational facility was
shut down, and yet apparently this administration is prepared
to send to this Congress legislation asking that workers at
Paducah be covered and that the workers at Portsmouth and Oak
Ridge not be covered. Is that your understanding?
Mr. Michaels. That is my understanding. The Secretary's
commitment is to make sure that every affected worker is
covered. We are just trying to figure out how to get there.
Mr. Strickland. I have total confidence in the Secretary's
efforts. My statement is directed toward the administration and
the fact that they are prepared to send to this Congress
legislation that would exclude workers who have been exposed
potentially to the very same conditions as the workers at
Paducah. I do not see how that can be justified.
Can any of you there at that table give me a rationale for
why such behavior should be undertaken by this administration?
Mr. Strickland. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of
my time.
Mr. Whitfield. That's the first time I have ever seen a
panel speechless.
Mr. Bryant, you have 5 minutes.
Mr. Bryant. Thank you. I don't think I can say it any
better than my colleague Mr. Strickland has said it, but
certainly in terms of Oak Ridge, which is not in my district,
but I do know that our congressional delegation from Tennessee
is extremely concerned that any exposure--and certainly there
appears to have been some--that we go in through all these
locations and make sure that the workers are adequately
treated.
I had a couple of more immediate concerns beyond the
workers, off the site. I would ask Mr. Knapp, I had asked the
question earlier to one of the first members of the panel about
the work that you are doing in terms of improvements to the
site in the event there were an earthquake there. And my
understanding, they were 3 years behind schedule. And my
question was essentially why is it taking so long to get these
improvements made? In the event there were an earthquake, you
know, you're risking an awful lot of people around the Paducah
area.
Mr. Knapp. I can't give you all the reasons for the time
that it takes, but I'll try to say a few things. I have visited
the site. The improvements are extensive. They involve putting
a great deal of steel in to brace the structures at two of the
buildings which are susceptible to earthquakes. The NRC
received an application from USCC to extend that deadline.
We looked at it with considerable care. We did a risk
analysis of it based on, among other things, the fact that they
have derated the cascade in those buildings to run them at
below atmospheric pressure which will reduce the consequences
should a severe earthquake occur. Based on the amount of time
it would take them to do the work that they have to do, we
considered that it was acceptable for them to extend that
period through June 30, 2000.
We now understand informally, they may come in for a few
months beyond that and we are considering whether it will be
acceptable to continue further this delay. I don't have an
answer to that.
With respect to other reasons why it is taking so long, a
part of this, as I mentioned in the early part of my testimony,
there are areas even within the buildings which USEC has which
remain under the control of DOE because they have legacy
material in them. And in some cases, the presence of this
legacy material, we understand from USEC, makes it difficult
for them to get into parts of the buildings to be able to
complete the construction of this bracing.
And at this time, we understand that when DOE is able to
release some of these areas, may have an effect on when the job
will be done. We understand that DOE is working on it
aggressively. That's the best answer I can give you.
Mr. Bryant. Thank you.
Mr. Green, you or Dr. Knapp mentioned this water that's
going toward the Ohio River. Dr. Cochran, on the first panel,
indicated it had already arrived. Were you the one that
mentioned it just a few minutes ago between the two of you?
Mr. Richard Green. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bryant. Why is there this disagreement?
Mr. Richard Green. I noted what Dr. Cochrane said earlier
and we have no evidence that it has reached the river, haven't
seen any data to say that it has. We have slowed the migration
of the plumes significantly. And I am told that there is a
chance that based on what we see so far, that we could
intercept them completely. The EPA has not seen any data that
says they've reached the Ohio.
Mr. Bryant. That's encouraging. Because certainly I think
we all agree that what needs to be done there--is it that big a
problem?
Mr. Richard Green. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bryant. Is it being overstated?
Mr. Richard Green. No, sir, it's not being overstated.
Mr. Bryant. It seems to me it would be a big problem.
Mr. Richard Green. It is. We don't want it to reach the
river. I do want to emphasize that these remedies that are in
place, that we're calling pump and treat remedies, extraction,
physically extracting water and treating it and discharging
treated water, these are interim remedies to stop or slow the
plume. This is not the final remedy.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Burr.
Mr. Burr. Mr. Green, I honestly think from your comments
that you are engaged in this in a very positive way, and I
thank you for that and for the EPA. And you said something that
piqued my interest just a little bit. You said when you got
involved in the site, and I quote you, ``There is so much to
do, we didn't know where to start.''
Mr. Richard Green. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burr. When was that?
Mr. Richard Green. Well, that was in the mid-eighties,
actually, when the site was no longer--well, it lost its
sovereign immunity really, and became subject to the Federal
Facilities Compliance Act. And then we, State Health
Department, saw the data and issued the order. And it's not
that we issued the order on high to DOE; DOE was very
cooperative in implementing the order. And that's how we--
that's the beginning of our involvement.
Mr. Burr. The appendix that we've talked about today in the
executive summary was in fact part of a Superfund
investigation, am I correct? Or it was a requirement under
Superfund? Later I guess, 1994, it officially was a Superfund
site, correct?
Mr. Richard Green. Later it was, yes. In 1994 it was final
on the NPL.
Mr. Burr. That executive summary required EPA approval
prior to its release, did it not?
Mr. Richard Green. I need to know, Mr. Burr, if you mean
the worker health and safety appendix?
Mr. Burr. It's the Phase I results of site investigation,
Phase I, done by Martin Marietta, March 22, 1991. It's my
understanding that to release that, it required EPA approval.
Mr. Richard Green. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Mr. Burr. To your knowledge--were you involved in it in
this site at that time?
Mr. Richard Green. No, sir.
Mr. Burr. Okay. Given that that required EPA approval, do
you have any knowledge of EPA ever going back to request that
appendix 2B-17 that has been missing for 9 years?
Mr. Richard Green. I personally don't.
Mr. Burr. Has EPA requested of the current contractor,
Bechtel, 2B-17 appendix?
Mr. Richard Green. I don't know, Mr. Burr.
Mr. Burr. I would take from that, that you don't currently
have a copy of the appendix 2B-17.
Mr. Richard Green. That's correct.
Mr. Burr. Would you like a copy?
Mr. Richard Green. I would.
Mr. Burr. I think our good friends in the front row are
probably making that note as we go through.
Dr. Michaels, does DOE have a copy of 2B-17 appendix?
Mr. Michaels. I'm told we do.
Mr. Burr. When did you receive that?
Mr. Michaels. Let me request Jimmy Hodges, manager of the
Paducah site, to answer this.
Mr. Hodges. We have a copy of the appendix B that you
talked about and I don't know the exact date that we actually--
it was received. But when we did note that it was missing from
the reading room, we were able to find that within a day's time
and put that back in the reading room. So it did exist. It was
available. It was just not in the reading room at that time.
Mr. Burr. You were at the site; am I correct?
Mr. T4Hodges. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burr. Was this document really missing for 9 years?
Mr. Hodges. In my opinion, it was not. It did not appear in
the reading room, I can't give you an explanation for that. But
the data was available. It was used in the production of other
reports that were generated as a result of that site
characterization. So the data did exist. Why it was not in that
particular document in the reading room, I don't have a good
explanation for it.
Mr. Burr. As a matter of fact the data did not exist in a
report until 1996 is I think the first indication that we were
given by Martin Marietta. Can you shed any light on how that
appendix could be completed in January 1991, the executive
summary was then completed on March 22, 1991, approved by the
EPA, and a year later in October 1992, the annual environmental
report required by DOE was compiled by Martin Marietta and
neither one, the executive summary nor the annual report,
referenced to a plutonium contamination?
Mr. Hodges. I don't know the answer to that sir. I can
certainly research that and give you a better opinion of what
might have happened there.
Mr. Burr. Mr. Logan, does the state of Kentucky have a copy
of 2B-17 appendix?
Mr. Logan. Yes, sir we recently received a copy of that on
a request to DOE. We didn't have, until we read in the paper
that it was missing. We made a request for it and we did
receive a copy of it.
Mr. Burr. I'll be very quick, Mr. Chairman. In that
document, it states that as much as 240 picocuries per gram of
soil of plutonium contamination was found. Mr. Knapp, I have no
idea about this stuff. Is that a lot of plutonium
contamination?
Mr. Knapp. Sir, I'm not a health physicist. I'll be
delighted to provide that answer for the record, but I don't
know off the top of my head. Let me check quickly with my
staff. I'm just not sure we know that right here.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Burr, I think what we'll do is we'll
each take another round not to exceed 5 minutes.
Mr. Burr. Can we reverse the order we were in?
Mr. Whitfield. Do you have to go out somewhere?
Mr. Burr. Mr. Bryant and I have another hearing downstairs
that we've patiently--I will wrap up in----
Mr. Whitfield. Are you asking unanimous consent that----
Mr. Burr. I would be happy to ask unanimous consent that we
go in reverse order.
Mr. Strickland. Can I take 1 minute to ask a question? Then
I'll be finished.
Mr. Burr. If the gentleman will allow Mr. Knapp the answer
to this one, I'll be happy to yield.
Mr. Knapp. According to my staff, that concentration is
approximately 10 times allowable release limits by the NRC.
Mr. Strickland. Go ahead.
Mr. Burr. Let me ask it this way.
Mr. Whitfield. We're going to give you another 5 minutes,
Mr. Burr.
Mr. Burr. If this amount of plutonium contamination was
found onsite, which you have responsibility for, correct--NRC
has oversight on----
Mr. Knapp. If it were found onsite, yes, within the USEC
areas, yes, we would be responsible for it.
Mr. Burr. Would you require it to be cleaned up?
Mr. Knapp. Yes.
Mr. Burr. Would it be a worker safety issue?
Mr. Knapp. At a concentration that low, I'm not sure I
would call it a worker safety issue, but an environmental
protection issue, and it would have to be cleaned up to NRC
standards.
Mr. Burr. Mr. Logan, several times in the press, I think
the Commissioner of Public Health has recently stated, and I
quote, ``Exhaustive State tests did not show a health threat to
anyone living in the area around the plant,'' end quote. Now
that you have available to you appendix 2B-17, is this
something that the State of Kentucky is going to look at a
little more seriously as it relates to offsite contamination?
Mr. Logan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burr. In most cases, can this committee assume that a
lot of the investigations that have happened in the last
several years are investigations that have used the prior data
available to determine contamination?
Mr. Logan. I would think a number of the investigations
that have been submitted have relied on historical data, but
also there has been State data that has been generated
concurrently with that, sir.
Mr. Burr. And Mr. Green, my last question: Would the EPA
agree that this level of plutonium contamination is in fact a
threat?
Mr. Richard Green. Yes, sir. I'm not--ordinarily I would
have to consult other people to say yes, but I have a chart in
my briefing book that leads me to say yes.
Mr. Burr. I thank all of you for your willingness and
openness to be here and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you.
Mr. Strickland.
Mr. Strickland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Michaels, you went through in your testimony some
information that I would like to make sure that I have recorded
accurately. Did you say that you would be at the Portsmouth
site to begin your investigation by mid-December?
Mr. Michaels. Sir, we plan to begin the scoping of it in
November, and we'll be onsite in January.
Mr. Strickland. Onsite in January. And then you indicated a
figure of 6,000 workers would be medically monitored or
screened. And could you tell me where those workers would be
from?
Mr. Michaels. That--that's a budget request. The budget
amendment that the Secretary has asked is for additional money
to support the expansion of our former working screening
program to include current workers as well as more former
workers at the three gaseous diffusion plants, and that would
be in Portsmouth, Paducah and Oak Ridge.
Mr. Strickland. And more specifically, my understanding is
that at Paducah the Department is going to conduct medical
screenings which are likely to be helpful in detecting early
health effects from potential exposure to radioactive
materials, thereby extending the lives of those who may be
discovered to have problems at an early stage.
Mr. Michaels. We certainly hope that will be the outcome.
Mr. Strickland. And that being the case, do you plan to do
such screening, these lung examinations, for example, at
Portsmouth and Oak Ridge as well?
Mr. Michaels. It's my understanding we'll use the same
protocol at three sites, with variation based on what we know
about exposure histories. But any expansion to Paducah would be
the expansion to Portsmouth and Oak Ridge as well, sir.
Mr. Strickland. Has the Department requested the necessary
funding in order to make sure that this rather costly operation
will be adequately funded?
Mr. Michaels. I believe we've announced the request. I
don't know if the amendments--yes, I'm told the amendment has
been sent by the White House to Congress. And we look forward
to your support on that.
Mr. Strickland. You have it. I'm looking forward to your
coming to Portsmouth.
Mr. Michaels. And as far as you know, I'll be coming to
Portsmouth before the investigation as well to meet with the
workers as I promised you.
Mr. Strickland. Thank you, Dr. Michaels. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Whitfield. Yes, sir. Mr. Bryant.
Mr. Bryant. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As Mr. Burr said,
we're shuttling back and forth between this hearing and another
hearing. And I know this has been a long day. I spent most of
my time in here. And I too want to thank all of you, especially
on this third panel for being so patient and waiting for us.
Dr. Michaels, same questions in terms of Oak Ridge, and you
mentioned Portsmouth, and you have the same protocol in line
for both of the facilities that you would have for Paducah.
What kind of timeframe are we talking about for Oak Ridge?
Mr. Michaels. Mr. Bryant, we haven't set a schedule for Oak
Ridge. We'll be going to Portsmouth next. As we complete that,
which we see completing in late winter, we'll then go to Oak
Ridge to look at the specific issues around the transuranics.
However, at the same time, I didn't really address this in
terms of Portsmouth directly, but there's a process that
President Clinton has requested in the memo in July to have us
look at--have the White House and all the agencies look at
occupational illness across the DOE weapons complex. And we'll
be going out, and I specifically will be going out to both Oak
Ridge and to Portsmouth as well as to other sites to gather
data about the potential health effects of our exposures there
to report to the White House in order to understand how we can
best provide compensation to workers across the complex.
We have been tasked to finish that entire investigation by
the end of March. We'll be coming to Oak Ridge probably within
the next few months to gather more information on that as well.
Mr. Bryant. It would seem to me in the overall plan by the
President, Oak Ridge and Portsmouth and Paducah would be very
high priority since there probably is known damage there. I
think one of the--Mr. Green mentioned earlier about trying to
weigh the balance between the known onsite versus the unknown
offsite and knowing that there's probably something out there,
but you have to look for it. But we know--we know there are
things there in Oak Ridge and Portsmouth and Paducah. And I
would urge you to make that your highest priority as opposed to
going elsewhere and finding out what the situation might be.
Let me go back to--and you may have been asked this
question earlier--but back to Kentucky, I know offsite--when
your folks first went there, they had to wear protective
clothing on some of the offsite areas. Are there warnings for
the general public out there now in those locations? I think
they were tested and actually some indication of radiation was
found and the workers did need--not have, but need--protective
clothing. Is that premise true?
Mr. Michaels. Dr. David Statler, he's our Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Oversight who's heading the team down there.
Mr. Statler. It's important to note the definitions that
define offsite and onsite at Paducah. You have an area inside
the secured fence that belongs to DOE. You have almost as large
or a larger area outside the fence that belongs to DOE, that is
really DOE property but outside the fence. And then beyond
that, you have public property or offsite property that borders
that. There's no fence between that and the DOE property.
We found through our surveys, we took both surveys,
radiological surveys as well as independent groundwater
sediment and surface water samples, and those samples are not
analyzed yet. They're in the process. But the surveys, we found
contamination on DOE property beyond the security fence, not on
public property, that exceeded the limits in 835--10 CFR 835
for posting, and they were not properly posted. In some cases,
there were signs of contamination, the levels were not posted.
There are contaminated ditches and lagoons and properties. And
in one case where the team went in to a small creek or stream
to take a sample, they did a survey first, and it required
booties and gloves and it was not posted as such. So we contend
that 835 should be applicable to DOE property beyond the fence
and the postings place.
Mr. Bryant. The bottom-line question on this is, is there
any property, whether it's government-owned or public property,
that the public has access to that would be dangerous that's
not posted?
Mr. Statler. The public does have access to that DOE
property offsite. In most cases it's not fenced. There are a
few signs saying DOE property, but they have access.
Mr. Bryant. Is that posted warning?
Mr. Statler. Not posted adequately in our----
Mr. Bryant. That's something I'm sure our folks from
Kentucky will be aware of. Thank you.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Upton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Sorry that I--lots of meetings. It all telescoped, our
schedules, now we have votes that are going on. I have two
questions.
One, Dr. Michaels, it's my understanding that your nuclear
safety inspectors have never conducted a comprehensive
compliance inspection at Paducah; is that right? Comprehensive,
everything.
Mr. Statler. The Office of Nuclear Safety, between 1991 and
1995, conducted investigations or assessments there, including
in 1994 a radiological assessment that identified many of the
same concerns. We had also performed event investigations at
that locality in Paducah. Since the transition to NRC and DOE
of the USEC facilities, other priorities, staffing have
prevented us from sending a team there. So we have not actively
done a complete assessment of Paducah since 1995.
Mr. Upton. But that's going to change now, is that not
right?
Mr. Statler. It's already changed. We're doing an
investigation, yes, sir.
Mr. Upton. Are we going to see posting--I've known about
this recreation area that's close by, and I think Mr. Bryant
was just touching on that now in terms of his question. Is that
going to change pretty quickly in terms of the warning signs to
all residents of Paducah not to--and what will those signs say?
Mr. Statler. The requirements on DOE property on- or
offsite are defined by 10 CFR 835 and how they should be
posted. I believe the site has submitted a corrective action
plan and they are reviewing those postings. We identified more
than just signs that needed painting. We identified areas
onsite and offsite on DOE property that were contaminated and
not posted, or posted improperly. And so I would hope that
those would be fixed rather quickly, if not already.
Mr. Upton. Well, again, I apologize for being in and out
during this hearing but I guess, Mr. Whitfield, if you have no
further questions.
Mr. Whitfield. I do. Just one.
Mr. Upton. I yield back my time.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Logan, there was a quote from you or Mr. Volpe in the
Paducah Sun on August 11, 1999 that said if you followed the
effluent ditch from the plant, ``it leads to Little Bayou Creek
toward the Ohio River. We have an automatic sampler that
samples the creek every 6 hours and we have never found
plutonium.'' Is that correct?
Mr. Volpe. That's correct. Since we've had that in place,
it collects a sample every 6 hours. There's detection of
plutonium at this offsite location.
Mr. Whitfield. And how long have you had that?
Mr. Volpe. We have had that in place, I believe it's about
2 years. We've had to take it out because of vandalism and then
we put it back in in cages.
Mr. Whitfield. At any of the other locations, have you
found traces of plutonium at a level----
Mr. Volpe. Not with our automatic samplers.
Mr. Whitfield. Okay. Dr. Michaels, it's my understanding
that there is some new technology now in which you are able to
detect lung cancer by using CAT scans. As we go into this
monitoring program--and I know that dollars are an important
part of that--I would urge the Department and I would like to
work with you to see if we can include this CAT scan screen as
a part of this monitoring process. I hope that you all would
work with us at least in exploring that.
Mr. Michaels. Yes, sir. It's certainly one of the things
under consideration right now. We would be pleased to work with
you.
Mr. Whitfield. Well, I want to thank all of you. This has
been a complex subject and I thank the staff for the tremendous
job in the short period of time in putting this all together.
As you know, there may be follow-up hearings on this on the
House side. We know there will be on the Senate side. And we
will be following up with some questions for you to answer as
well. But thank you for your time. Thank you for coming up
here. And we look forward to working with you and solving the
problem. Thank you. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Additional material submitted for the record follows:]
Responses for the Record of Richard D. Green, Director, Waste
Management Division, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 4,
Atlanta Georgia
Question 1. Based on current institutional controls at the Paducah
gaseous Diffusion Plant (Paducah), are visitors, workers and residents
surrounding the Paducah site adequately protected from radiological and
chemical releases from the Paducah site?
Response: The protection of area residents and visitors to the
perimeter of the facility, until such time as remedial actions for past
releases are completed, is in part accomplished by access restrictions
and postings of warning signs. These postings have been improved and
expanded since September 1999, but cannot provide a level of protection
equivalent to removal of the source of the hazard. Threats to residents
from drinking water contamination have been controlled by requiring the
Department of Energy (DOE) to provide clean water to residents in the
area of the DOE's groundwater releases. Institutional controls on
withdrawal of contaminated groundwater are currently adequate to
protect residents. All such institutional controls will be regularly
reviewed by the EPA, the Commonwealth of Kentucky (KY) and the DOE for
adequacy.
Worker safety and the protection of visitors within the perimeter
of the facility is the responsibility of the DOE for non-production
areas and of USEC for areas leased from DOE for the production of
enriched uranium.
Question 2. During its recent Phase I investigation at the Paducah
site, the Department of Energy (DOE) sampled environmental media for
chemical and radiological analysis. Did DOE plan this sampling effort
with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), or share these data
with EPA in a timely fashion?
Response. DOE did not plan this sampling effort with the EPA, nor
did DOE submit the standard pre-investigation work plan to EPA. EPA
received a copy of this report just prior to its public release. After
the September 22, 1999 hearing held by the House Commerce Committee,
EPA requested sampling results from the investigation team. Upon
Completion of the analysis of most samples and the assessment of the
data by the investigation team, sampling data was provided to EPA
Region IV by the State of Kentucky staff on October 8, 1999. An EPA
project manager was briefed on the final results of the investigation
on October 14, and the investigation report was published formally on
October 20. EPA has contacted Dr. David Michaels and Dr. David Stadler,
of DOE's Environmental, Safety and Health Office of Oversight, who have
pledged full cooperation with EPA in any subsequent work they undertake
at the Paducah facility.
Question 3. Please explain why plutonium contamination in offsite
sediments was not identified in the Executive Summary of the DOE report
``Phase I Results of the Site Investigation, March 22, 1991.''
Response. This Report was prepared as required by EPA's consent
order, and was reviewed and approved by the Agency. The Executive
Summary noted those contaminants that were determined by risk
assessment to pose the principal threat to human health and the
environment. Because the risk assessment of offsite contamination was
based on a recreational rather than a residential exposure scenario,
plutonium was not a principal threat contaminant. Therefore, it was not
included in the Executive Summary. Its presence was included in the
text of the Report.
Question 4. At the hearing, DOE indicated that areas offsite have
been identified with radiological contamination high enough to require
sampling technicians wear protective clothing. Why have these
contaminated areas remained uncontrolled for public access? Are there
other areas offsite with similar amounts of contamination that are also
uncontrolled?
Response. The area in question is one of the outfall ditches at the
boundary of the fenced perimeter of the facility. The area is known to
be contaminated and was posted with warning signs prior to the
investigation. Other areas offsite that are contaminated are also
posted with seaming signs, primarily along Big and Little Bayou Creeks.
If DOE had submitted a work plan before the sampling, EPA would have
informed them of the need for adequate worker protection measures in
these areas. Postings in the areas in question have been expanded since
the hearing, and were inspected by personnel from EPA on November 10,
1999. DOE is reviewing the adequacy of its postings at all areas of
contamination, and EPA is participating in that effort.
Question 5. Please describe how the public around Paducah could be
impacted from contaminated surface waterways around Paducah.
Response. The public may be exposed to contaminated surface
waterways through recreational uses, such as fishing and swimming, of
Big and Little Bayou Creeks. Risk assessment based on such recreational
use assumes frequent use over a long period of time. Fish have been
found to be contaminated with levels of PCB's that are not safe for
human consumption, and those areas of the Creeks have been posted with
advisories against such consumption.
Question 6. In light of DOE's recent findings, please describe what
efforts the EPA is taking to fully characterize offsite contamination
and ensure the public is adequately protected from offsite releases.
Response. The Agency sponsored a meeting on November 8-10, 1999
with DOE, KY and site contractor Bechtel-Jacobs to set priorities for
response actions in FY 2000, 2001 and 2002. Removal or control of known
areas of offsite contamination was set as a priority for DOE.
Investigation of any reports of further offsite contamination was set
as a priority for all participants. EPA has inspected the DOE postings
at areas of known offsite contamination for adequacy, and will require
further postings if necessary. Each participating agency is represented
on a work group that will prepare a site management plan to remediate
all areas of contamination by 2010. This Site Management Plan will be
used in developing DOE's annual budget submittal for cleanup of Paducah
as required by the Federal Facilities Agreement. All participants
agreed to streamline their procedures for documenting, submitting and
approving response actions while still allowing full participation by
the public.
Question 7. Why has DOE failed to adequately assess sediments,
soils, surface water, and other environmental media in areas outside
the security fence to ensure public safety in these areas?
Response. Priorities for response at Paducah have been balanced
between assessment and response to known hazards within a constrained
budget. Highest priority has been set on groundwater contamination
beneath the facility and within the Water Policy Area and removal of
the areas of highest soil/sediment contamination onsite to prevent
further offsite migration of contamination.
Question 8. Please list and describe any enforcement actions EPA
has taken against the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) for
non-compliance with environmental regulations.
Response. The Commonwealth of Kentucky is fully authorized to
implement environmental programs in lieu of EPA. EPA is not aware of
violations of permits by and has thus not taken enforcement action
against the USEC.
Question 9. What efforts are currently underway to control ``hot
spots'' contributing to groundwater contamination around Paducah.
Specifically, please include a description of your efforts to remove
TCE stored in the C-400 building. Please also identify any proven
technologies that may address the problem more effective[ly].
Response. Trichloroethene (TCE) is not stored in the C-400 building
to the best of EPA's knowledge. Releases and spills within the building
in the past have resulted in TCE contamination underneath the building.
In response to EPA's order, two groundwater withdrawal systems are in
place within the on-site hot spots to recover TCE. DOE, KY and EPA are
participating in a panel to evaluate innovative technologies and test
them on-site, particularly to address ``deep'' contamination of
geologic strata with TCE. Deployment of these and other technologies,
such as iron filing ``gates'' to remove TCE as groundwater flows
through them, are a high priority for FY 2000 and 2001 at the facility.
______
Responses for the Record of John J. Hummer, Director of Corporate
Environment, Safety and Health, Lockheed Martin Corp.
Question No. 1: Please explain why plutonium contamination in
offsite sediments was not identified in the Executive Summary of the
Department of Energy (DOE) report ``Phase I Results of the Site
Investigation, March 22, 1991.''
Response: The report entitled ``Results of the Site Investigation,
Phase I'' at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant was prepared by CH2M
Hill in accordance with the August 1988 Consent Order between the
United States Department of Energy (DOE) and the United States
Environmental Protection Agency, Region IV (USEPA), and pursuant to a
contract with Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. (MMES).\1\
Environmental sampling, laboratory analysis, and reporting of test
results were performed by and/or on behalf of CH2M Hill. MMES, DOE,
USEPA, and the Commonwealth of Kentucky were given the opportunity to
comment on the draft report. To my knowledge, the report provides an
accurate summation of CH2M Hill's findings and the Executive Summary
highlights issues considered significant by CH2M Hill. CH2M Hill has
responded to a number of questions from Congressman Bliley about the
information in the Report and its Summary, and I have nothing to add to
their response.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Now, Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc. (LMES). Hereafter, I
will refer to the company as MMES/LMES.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question No. 2: According to the October 1999 Phase I Independent
Investigation report, DOE identified radioactive ``black ooze'' in
areas close to offsite landfills that were not permitted for
radioactive wastes. These offsite residential and sanitary landfills
were managed by Martin Marietta pursuant to its contract
responsibilities with DOE.
a. Did Martin Marietta at any time dispose of radioactive wastes at
offsite landfills, including the C-746-S residential landfill and the
C-746-T industrial landfill?
b. Did Martin Marietta know that DOE Orders require that
radioactive waste only be disposed of at licensed facilities?
c. Did anyone from DOE ever approve the disposal of radioactive
wastes in facilities not licensed for such wastes?
Response: Both the ``black ooze'' described in the DOE Phase I
Independent Investigation and the C-746-S landfill to which it is
adjacent are on the DOE property, and it is my understanding that they
are considered onsite for purposes of CERCLA cleanup and for state
permitting purposes. MMES/LMES was not operating the Paducah facility
at the time the so-called ``black ooze'' was discovered. It is my
understanding, however, that the ``black ooze'' may have emanated from
certain roofing materials which were used as fill for a drainage ditch
relocation project, prior to MMES assuming responsibility in 1984. I do
not know the extent to which DOE approved and/or participated in the
disposal of such materials. With regard to the specific questions
above, I offer the following responses:
a. I have no information indicating that radioactive wastes
(meaning wastes with radioactive contaminants above limits allowed by
DOE) were placed in either the C-746-S residential \2\ landfill or the
C-746-T industrial landfill. The C-746-S and C-746-T landfills were
managed by MMES/LMES from 1984 until their closure in 1992 and 1995.
The landfills are located onsite--meaning that they are on DOE
property. As far as I know, these landfills were operated by MMES/LMES
in accordance with state requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Although the C-746-5 landfill is referred to as
``residential,'' this is probably because it was used for sanitary
wastes. The landfill is on DOE property and to my knowledge has only
been used for DOE wastes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. MMES/LMES was certainly familiar with the DOE orders that were
applicable to it through its contract with DOE. Further, my
understanding is that DOE requires that the disposal of any radioactive
waste, as defined by DOE, at a location that is off DOE property must
conform to applicable state and federal regulations.
c. I am not aware of any DOE approval to dispose of radioactive
waste off DOE property at facilities not licensed for such waste.
Question No. 3: According to the internal Environmental Compliance
Audit Report by Martin Marietta dated October 1992--and discussed at
the hearing--Martin Marietta auditors found ``the NEPA program is
heading in the right direction, but all programs have not been
implemented to keep projects/activities from not getting proper NEPA
review . . . some projects have been initiated without NEPA review.''
However, Martin Marietta informed DOE in its 1992 Paducah Environmental
Report ``compliance with NEPA is maintained by following guidelines set
forth by the CEQ, DOE, and Energy Systems.'' Please explain why Martin
Marietta reported to DOE it was in compliance with NEPA requirements in
1992 if Martin Marietta auditors found projects ``initiated without
NEPA review.''
Response: Based upon my review of the relevant environmental report
and audit report to answer this question, the statement regarding NEPA
compliance presented on page xvi of the 1992 Paducah Environmental
Monitoring Report appears to be a general program description of the
guidelines used to implement NEPA requirements. It was not intended to
be a statement of compliance status. The audit report to which you
refer was an observation regarding weaknesses in implementation of the
internal NEPA review procedure, which, if not corrected, could have
resulted in failure to review a project or activity. It was not a
finding of non-compliance with NEPA.
Question No. 4: Was the health physics program in place at the time
Martin Marietta and later Lockheed Martin were operating the Paducah
site fully adequate? Did the health physics program provide workers the
type of protection required by as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA)
standards?
Response: It is my understanding that the health physics program in
place when MMES took over the management of the Paducah facility in
1984 was considered adequate under the DOE expectations at that time.
As DOE expectations changed, the health physics program underwent
changes to bring it into conformance with changing expectations.
However, based on the information that was available to MMES, the
health physics program was fully adequate to maintain radiation
exposures well below established limits.
It is also my understanding that the radiation doses at Paducah
were historically low in comparison to other facilities within the DOE
complex. As a result, the ALARA program at Paducah at the time MMES
took over the facility management was considered consistent with that
expected for a low dose facility. However, when the DOE expectations
changed, the ALARA program also changed.
Your question about the health physics program providing the type
of protection required by ``ALARA standards'' suggests that specific
standards are associated with the ALARA principle. To my knowledge,
ALARA does not set standards, rather it is a principle: to maintain
radiation doses as low as reasonably achievable. Thus no specific
standards are associated with ALARA. It is up to an organization
implementing ALARA to identify sources of radiation in their
facilities, determine the reasonably achievable methods to limit the
radiation exposure to workers from those sources, then implement those
methods. Continuous review and improvement are implicit in implementing
ALARA. As described in the preamble to 10 CFR Part 83 5, DOE does not
intend to establish ALARA as a duty of care for purposes of tort
litigation.
Question No. 5: Did ALARA protections extend to eating areas within
the plant? Were employees routinely monitored for contamination before
they were allowed to enter eating areas? Were the eating areas
routinely monitored?
Response: As the ALARA principle was introduced into DOE
directives, it was implemented at all areas in the Paducah plant.
Again, radiological control requirements and practices instituted to
keep radiation doses ALARA evolved with time. At one time, hygiene
practices (i.e., handwashing, showering, changing clothes) were thought
to be sufficient to minimize the spread of contamination. When DOE
established requirements to monitor employees leaving potentially
contaminated work areas, those requirements were implemented over time
at the Paducah plant as funding and resources allowed. Associated with
this action, workplace monitoring, to include eating areas, was
increased to ensure that contamination was not being spread from
radiological areas into non-radiological areas.
Question No. 6: Did Martin Marietta keep full and adequate records
of the individual exposure of every plant worker for whom such records
are required?
Response: To my knowledge, MMES/LMES generated and maintained the
necessary records for those employees for whom monitoring was required
by DOE during the time MMES/LMES managed the Paducah facility.
Question No. 7: Please describe the monitoring system Martin
Marietta and later Lockheed Martin had in place to detect contamination
on people and vehicles leaving the Paducah site?
Response: The monitoring activities to detect external
contamination on people and vehicles evolved during the time MMES/LMES
managed the Paducah facility. To my knowledge, little monitoring to
detect external contamination was done when MMES began managing the
facility. Over time, as part of the upgrades to the site contamination
control program, more monitoring for external contamination was done.
Vehicles were characterized to determine their radiological status.
Vehicles with loose contamination were supposed to be removed from
service and decontaminated prior to returning to service. Once the
initial characterization was complete, a routine monitoring program was
established consistent with the potential for becoming contaminated,
and contaminated vehicles were marked to facilitate control. Once a
routine monitoring history was established, along with increased
contamination control at the source, the marking was stopped. The
monitoring program for items, material, and equipment/vehicles being
released from radiological areas became the primary method for ensuring
that no contamination was being spread to non-radiological areas.
As stated in an earlier response, the radiological control program
evolved so that those employees in areas where contamination could be
present were monitored before leaving the potentially contaminated work
area. I am not aware of any monitoring of individuals upon leaving the
facility.
Question No. 8: Was Martin Marietta and/or Lockheed Martin cited
for health and safety violations while operating the production and
environmental programs at the Paducah plant?
Response: Lockheed Martin Utility Services, Inc. (LMUS) was cited
by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) for health
and safety violations while operating the production programs at
Paducah. MMES/LMES were not subject to OSHA regulation, and thus not
subject to OSHA citation.
Question No. 9: When did Martin Marietta know that transuranics
were contained in the recycled spent nuclear fuel sent to Paducah from
Hanford and the Savannah River Plant?
Response: I have no reason to believe, and consider it unlikely,
that DOE or the prior contractor provided information to MMES during
the 1984 contract transition that transuranics were contained in the
recycled spent nuclear fuel returns. I also have no reason to believe,
and consider it even more unlikely, that this type of information was
given to potential bidders for the contract at the time the request for
proposals was issued back in the 1980s. Given the information I have
seen since the transuranic issue was raised in these proceedings, the
presence of transuranics was clearly known to the managing contractor
and DOE employees when the materials were sent to Paducah in the 1950's
and in the years that followed. By the time MMES took over the
management of the site in 1984, the shipments had ceased, and a
facility upgrade had been finished which was thought to have removed
most of the transuranics from the processes. Most of the employees of
the prior contractor transferred to MMES, with some either retaining or
assuming management positions with MMES. In addition, in 1985, DOE
produced a Report Of The Joint Task Force On Uranium Recycle Materials
Processing, which discusses the presence of transuranics at Paducah, as
well as at other DOE facilities. One MMES employee was a Task Force
member, and MMES was on distribution for that report. Thus, MMES
probably knew in 1984 and certainly knew in 1985 that trace
transuranics had been contained in the spent nuclear fuel processed in
the Paducah plant years earlier.
______
Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease LLP
December 14, 1999
Mr. Dwight Cates
Investigator
U.S. House Commerce Committee
316 Ford House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Mr. Cates: I am writing in response to your recent inquiry
seeking clarification regarding Jay Hummer's letter of November 22,
1999 to Chairman Upton.
We have reviewed the responses in the letter carefully and can
verify, as I indicated when we first spoke, that Mr. Hummer answered
the Chairman's questions both individually and in his capacity as a
representative of Lockheed Martin Corporation, and past and present
affiliated corporations, which had responsibilities at the Paducah
Gaseous Diffusion Plant. The responses, therefore, also represent the
knowledge Lockheed Martin has to date on the matters in question, but
as you know, Lockheed Martin is currently engaged in an ongoing process
of investigating the issues. Nevertheless, we have tried to provide you
with answers that are as complete and responsive as possible at this
time.
I hope this adequately responds to your concerns. Please do not
hesitate to contact me at your earliest convenience if you should have
any questions. Until then, I remain,
Very truly yours,
Richard J. Leon
______
Responses of Joseph F. Nemec, President, Bechtel Jacobs Company, LLC,
to Questions from the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Question 1. According to the Department of Energy (DOE) Phase I
Independent Investigation at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant
(independent investigation), there is an ``absence of DOE or Bechtel
Jacobs oversight of radiological work practices.'' Why has there been
an absence of Bechtel Jacobs oversight at Paducah?
Response. Bechtel Jacobs provides oversight to work activities at
Paducah. This is accomplished by our line managers, subcontractor
technical representatives, safety advocates, as well as independent
oversight by Performance and Quality Assurance, and Environment,
Safety, and Health. In the M&I approach, oversight is expected and
enhanced by each subcontractor's responsibilities for oversight of
their work activities. This combination provides a defense in-depth
approach to oversight and managing safety activities for work planning
and performance.
The Bechtel Jacobs Company Management and Integration (M&I)
contract requires us to perform the majority of work utilizing
subcontractors. It also dictates that we ``flow down'' DOE requirements
to our subcontractors, including provisions for them to be responsible
for complying with those requirements, including self-assessment and
oversight. Accordingly, oversight of work practices is accomplished by
both Bechtel Jacobs staff, as well as subcontractor Environment,
Safety, and Health (ES&H) staff. In addition, we are implementing, as
required by contract, our Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS).
The ISMS places more emphasis on ``up front'' worker involvement in
planning and hazard analysis. This approach builds in safe work
practices to the planning process by those performing the work and
reduces reliance on ``back end'' oversight to ensure compliance.
Collectively, the increased responsibility of subcontractors for
performing their own oversight, the implementation of ISMS, and
oversight of the subcontractors by the Bechtel Jacobs Company provides
equivalent oversight when compared to a self-performance management
approach. Bechtel Jacobs Company is committed to providing the
appropriate level of oversight to our subcontractors and ensuring that
they, in turn, are living up to their responsibilities and contractual
obligations to perform their own measure of oversight for all ES&H
areas.
Question 2. According to the independent investigation, ``Bechtel
Jacobs radiological work permits (RWP) lack information required by
procedure to control radiological work effectively.'' Please explain
why Bechtel Jacobs RWPs lack adequate safety information.
Response. The RWPs referred to were originally designed to be
generic in nature to support routine work. Bechtel Jacobs Company has
implemented appropriate action to ensure that the procedure governing
RWPs is followed rigorously. We have already undertaken the following
actions:
All RWPs identify the training requirements to enter the area as
required by procedure. Radiological survey data are attached to the
permit, or the permit identifies where the data are located.
Job specific RWPs are based on the work to be performed, the
contaminants and levels of contaminants, and existing data. Work scope
is provided to the health physics department by the task lead. This
information is reviewed by the health physics dosimetry group and RCT
supervisors during a pre-job as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA)
review. Information from the pre-job ALARA review is used to develop
the RWP. This information is reviewed with the RCT by the RCT
supervisor. Information on the RWP is reviewed by the work crew during
a pre-job briefing. All workers must sign the RWP prior to entering the
work location.
Question 3. According to the independent investigation, a Bechtel
Jacobs employee received a 24 mrem dose in 35 days at the cylinder
yard. Why are Bechtel Jacobs dose rate measurements two to three times
lower than the dose rate measurements the investigation team has
observed in the cylinder yard?
Response. The cylinder yard is a large area, approximately 4.5
acres. Based on this work activity, a worker normally receives an
exposure typical of the average from the entire yard. The dose rate
readings collected by the independent investigation team were obtained
in areas with higher dose rates. Subsequent to the investigation teams
survey, the Bechtel Jacobs Company performed a study consisting of 54
measurements taken systematically at grid points over the entire
cylinder yard. The Bechtel Jacobs measurements in the higher dose rate
areas were similar to those taken in the same areas by the
investigation team and in the April 1999 Bechtel Jacobs Company
measurements taken prior to the job. The Bechtel Jacobs measurements in
their totality are representative of the average dose rate on the
entire yard and are therefore representative of the exposure conditions
for workers. Despite these facts, the degree of conservatism applied in
this case was not consistent with my expectations. As a result,
additional controls will be established to require an independent
review by our Environment, Safety, and Health manger or designee
whenever radiation exposure rates could result in a worker exceeding
the approved monitoring threshold in 10 CFR 835, regardless of the
duration of the job.
Question 4. According to the independent investigation, ``Bechtel
Jacobs cannot adequately demonstrate that the unconditional release of
equipment from the site is consistent with DOE requirements.'' Why is
Bechtel Jacobs unable to demonstrate unconditional release of equipment
consistent with DOE requirements?
Response. Bechtel Jacobs Company has an established program for
unconditional release of excess equipment and materials including
technical basis and guidance that is rigorous, detailed, and complies
with DOE requirements. The Bechtel Jacobs Company program requires a
Survey and Release Plan to be prepared for equipment release. The
Survey and Release Plans are used to document how material is surveyed
for unconditional release to demonstrate consistency with DOE
requirements. The independent investigation report noted this on page
38: ``While Bechtel Jacobs does have a procedure for unrestricted
release of equipment, they did not apply it during the process of
releasing the fluorine cells.'' What the independent review team found
was that the required plan for the release of the fluorine cells was
not prepared in accordance with the unconditional release procedure and
all approvals for release were not obtained.
Radiation surveys were performed by Bechtel Jacobs Company on the
fluorine cells and samples of the solution in the cells were collected
and analyzed. The results of the radiation surveys demonstrated that
the DOE requirements and appropriate release limits (uranium versus
transuranic) were used. The results of samples of the solution in the
cells were used to demonstrate that the exposure to the solution would
not be harmful to health or the environment. DOE approval from the
Paducah Site Office was obtained for the release, however, DOE
Headquarters approval was not obtained in accordance with requirements.
Line management has been directed that an additional independent review
will be conducted prior to unconditional release of excess equipment
and materials to ensure required Survey and Release Plans and all
required approvals have been completed in accordance with requirements.
Question 5. The independent investigation found several problems
with subcontractor safety practices. How will Bechtel Jacobs correct
these deficiencies?
Response. The Bechtel Jacobs Company subcontract language in
Exhibit G--Environment, Safety and Health, holds the subcontractors
fully accountable for ES&H and DOE requirements. Prior to commencement
of work, all subcontractors are required to prepare and submit a
comprehensive ES&H plan that includes a crosswalk of all activities in
the subcontract to the DOE requirements in the Bechtel Jacobs Company
prime contract and applicable environmental regulations. We agree that
in a number of instances, some procedures have not been followed by
subcontractors. Bechtel Jacobs Company has filed occurrence reports
indicating that we have been vigilant in overseeing subcontractor work
and in self-reporting. Further, there have been several follow-up
formal and informal discussions with the involved subcontractors'
senior management to reinforce the importance Bechtel Jacobs places on
ES&H compliance and the safety of all workers. We have clearly
communicated to our subcontractors that poor performance in the ES&H
arena is grounds for termination.
The Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC Management and Integration (M&I)
contract requires implementation of an Integrated Safety Management
System (ISMS). Bechtel Jacobs Company has implemented the system and
provided a description of the process in BJC/OR-87, Revision 2,
Integrated Safety Management System Description, September 1999. A
further definition of the flow-down of requirements to the work
execution level, including subcontractors, is discussed in the BJC/OR-
146, Revision 1, Integrated Safety Management System Supplement, July
1999. As mandated by regulation, we have placed the responsibility for
the safety and health of their employees directly on subcontractors and
will maintain an oversight role to ensure compliance. The requirement
to include qualified ES&H staff as part of the subcontractor project
team is included in our Exhibit G subcontract language. Subcontractors
may adopt our health and safety plan or work to their own equivalent
plan. All subcontractors work to the Bechtel Jacobs Company Radiation
Protection Plan. Oversight, including the use of radiation control
technicians under contract to Bechtel Jacobs Company, is an integral
part of the Radiation Protection Program.
The ISMS process defines the oversight role of the Bechtel Jacobs
Company Subcontract Technical Representative (STR), the Safety
Advocate, and the Bechtel Jacobs project team ES&H members. These
personnel work directly to review subcontractor programs and
performance and provide feedback and direction. The STR provides day-
to-day direction to subcontractors and ensures that they comply with
all of the terms and conditions of their subcontracts, including
requirements for ES&H performance. The Safety Advocate function was
specifically created by Bechtel Jacobs Company to assist our
subcontractors in understanding and implementing DOE ES&H requirements.
The Safety Advocate provides an additional ``set of eyes'' on
subcontractor safety performance and augments the presence of the
Bechtel Jacobs Company ES&H subject matter experts who provide project-
specific oversight working with subcontractor ES&H personnel.
In addition, we implemented on November 1, 1999, additional
awareness training for our Safety Advocates to enhance their knowledge
of radiation safety, environmental protection, industrial hygiene, and
industrial safety. This training will be completed at Paducah by
December 31, 1999.
Question 6. To date, has Bechtel Jacobs been cited for any
violations of DOE orders or regulations governing health and safety at
the Paducah plant?
Response. No.
Question 7. You currently provide radiation exposure data to
employees only once a year. During the stand-down, those employees
indicated that they wanted to receive the data more often. Have you
agreed to their requests?
Response. Yes. Bechtel Jacobs Company will develop and implement a
communications initiative to provide more frequent exposure data to
employees and subcontractors.
______
Responses of James H. Miller, Executive Vice President, USEC, Inc., to
Questions from the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Question 1. Please describe the current status of each outstanding
issue with respect to the United States Enrichment Corporation's (USEC)
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Compliance Plan for the Paducah
site (Compliance Plan).
a) Please identify the original completion date for each
outstanding issue in the Compliance Plan.
b) For those outstanding issues that have missed the original
completion date, please provide an explanation of why a delay has
occurred, as well as an explanation of when each outstanding issue will
be completed
Response. The NRC issued the initial Certificate of Compliance
(Rev. 0 of GDP-1) for the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP) in
September 1996 and assumed regulatory oversight of PGDP in March 1997.
In connection with the initial certification, NRC approved Revision 3A
of the Compliance Plan, dated August 1, 1996 that was prepared by the
Department of Energy. The Compliance Plan identified 57 issues that
required actions to bring PGDP into full compliance with NRC
regulations, established a plan of action and schedule for completion
and established the parameters for continued operation until the
actions were completed. To date, actions have been completed for 51 of
the 57 issues identified in the Compliance Plan. The following provides
the information requested for the six outstanding issues:
Issue 2--Upgrade the Application Safety Analysis Report
Original Completion Date: August 17, 1997
Current Approved Completion Date: August 17, 1997
Status: On February 14, 1997 DOE provided USEC with the updated
safety analysis report. On August 18, 1997 USEC provided a portion of
the information required by Issue 2 to the NRC and submitted the
remainder by October 31, 1997. NRC review has been ongoing since that
time.
Reason for Delay: The two month delay in USEC's submittal to NRC
was due to the unanticipated complexity involved in the review of DOE's
updated safety analysis report. This Issue will remain open until NRC
review is completed.
Issue 8--Exceptions for Criticality Accident Alarm System
Original Completion Date: Submitted on April 9, 1996 prior to
approval of Compliance Plan
Current Approved Completion Date: Not Applicable
Status: USEC has provided criticality accident alarm coverage in
all areas of the plant required by NRC regulations to have such
coverage. Prior to approval of the Compliance Plan, USEC submitted
technical analyses required by the Compliance Plan to demonstrate that
areas identified in the Compliance Plan do not require criticality
alarm coverage. NRC review has been ongoing since that time. This Issue
will remain open until NRC review is completed.
Reason for Delay: Not Applicable
Issue 27--Procedures Program
Original Completion Date: March 3, 2002
Current Approved Completion Date: March 3, 2002
Status: USEC has completed all actions for this Issue except for
the action which requires that the Plant Operations Review Committee
(PORC) complete a review of all In-Hand and liquid UF6 handling
procedures within 5 years from the date that the NRC assumed regulatory
authority for PGDP (March 3, 1997). This action is on schedule to be
complete prior to that date.
Reason for Delay: Not Applicable
Issue 36--Seismic Capability of Buildings C-331 and C-335
Original Completion Date: December 31, 1997
Current Approved Completion Date: June 30, 1999
Status: USEC submitted a certificate amendment request in January
1999 to request an extension of the completion date until June 30,
2000. Although NRC has not yet approved this extension, they did issue
a Notice of Enforcement Discretion on June 30, 1999 which permits USEC
to continue plant operations until such time as they complete their
review and issue a certificate amendment. More recently, USEC, DOE and
NRC met to discuss the issue of removing material from certain DOE
Material Storage Areas (DMSAs) to support completion of the seismic
modifications in those areas. USEC is currently on schedule to have all
the seismic modifications completed by June 30, 2000 except for those
DMSAs which have not been cleared sufficiently to allow work to be
completed. USEC has informed NRC that additional time past June 30,
2000 will be necessary to complete the seismic modifications in areas
affected by the DMSA issue. USEC, DOE and NRC are currently examining
this issue and USEC hopes it will be resolved shortly
Reason for Delay: The Seismic Upgrade Project is a large scale
steel construction project. The overall project involves 723 steel
installation locations, 2,530 tons of steel, and 12,000 individual
steel pieces. In order to install this steel, the demolition of 4,000
pieces of steel are required. Initially, three Unreviewed Safety
Questions associated with the installation of the proposed
modifications were identified, which required NRC review and approval
prior to beginning actual construction work. Once work was begun in the
buildings, additional factors delayed the project. The temperatures
inside the cascade buildings had a greater impact on worker
productivity than initially projected. In addition, the process of
removing the existing concrete and steel in preparation for the
installation of the new steel bracing was much more labor intensive
than expected. Further, the original design did not identify all of the
interferences with existing equipment which needed to be relocated or
resolved. Finally, it has taken much longer than expected to begin
removal of material from the DMSA locations which must be cleared in
order for the modifications to be completed.
Issue 46--Criticality Accident Alarm System--Horn Audibility and Issue
50--Criticality Accident Alarms for Nearby Buildings
Original Completion Date: December 15, 1998
Current Approved Completion Date: January 18, 2000
Status: This project is on schedule to meet the current approved
completion date. The upgraded CAAS system has already been placed into
operation in several facilities on site.
Reason for Delay: The conceptual design to satisfy the requirements
of these Compliance Plan actions originally required installation of
additional air powered CAAS horns and upgrading the existing air system
to supply the air necessary to power these additional horns. During the
detailed design process, further reliance on the existing plant air
system to support the CAAS system was determined to be undesirable. As
a result, a new system was designed to improve CAAS horn reliability by
providing a dedicated air system and air accumulators to supply the new
CAAS horns. To enhance reliability of the sitewide CAAS system, this
same concept is being applied to all CAAS air horns on site. The change
in design and increase in scope required a delay of approximately one
year to complete the entire upgrade but will result in an improved
system.
Question 2. Please explain why DOE material storage areas at
Paducah have not been characterized, analyzed or resolved even through
they were identified more than two years ago.
Response. DOE is responsible for characterizing, analyzing or
resolving the DOE material storage areas (DMSAs) at Paducah. USEC has
limited responsibilities with respect to the DMSAs as set forth in the
agreement, ``USEC and DOE Agreement for DOE Material Storage at the
Gaseous Diffusion Plants'' which was signed by DOE and USEC in May
1996. This agreement specifies that, to the extent required by NRC,
USEC will perform the following tasks: (1) visually inspect process
equipment to identify enriched uranium deposits, (2) segregate
equipment containing such deposits, (3) establish and maintain DMSA
boundaries and signage, and (4) maintain necessary documentation
concerning such activities. USEC has met its responsibilities to the
extent permitted by DOE. Because of an unreviewed safety question (USQ)
raised by DOE's subcontractors in early 1997, access to the DMSAs for
further visual inspections has not been permitted until the USQ is
resolved by DOE.
In addition, as requested by DOE, USEC performs services for DOE on
a reimbursement basis. DOE from time to time has requested USEC to
perform some services in connection with the DMSAs. In order for DOE to
resolve the USQ and safely remediate the DMSA areas, the appropriate
Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) and associated procedures
required development. USEC began this work for DOE early in January
1998. NCSE development was a complex effort requiring significant
engineering development work. This NCSE to support DOE DMSA work was
completed and delivered to BJC in November 1998. DOE/BJC Readiness
Assessment Team Approval was received in May 1999. DOE/BJC are
responsible for scheduling the remaining work to address the DMSAs.
Question 2 (continued) Please explain what schedule or cost impacts
may occur with USEC's effort to complete seismic upgrades at Paducah
due to DOE'S failure to characterized, analyze, and resolve DOE
material storage areas.
Response. The Seismic Upgrade Project is a large scale steel
construction project. The overall project involves 723 steel
installation locations, 2,530 tons of steel, and 12,000 individual
steel pieces. In order to install this steel, the demolition of 4,000
pieces of steel are required. Total project cost will be on the order
of $70 million.
The Seismic project has been planned and scheduled in an assembly
line fashion to gain efficiency and maintain project control of the
contractor. The DMSA delays have caused the Seismic project to ``skip''
locations. These ``skipped'' locations have been added to the end of
the project schedule due to uncertainty as to when the DMSA areas would
be free of DOE material to allow construction work to occur. The
``skipping'' of locations requires rescheduling, duplication of Health
Physics surveys, duplication of welding and burning permits,
scaffolding construction, etc. In addition, working skipped locations
later in the scheduling is far less efficient due to the loss of
assembly line construction techniques.
The current estimate as to the cost impact of these delays is
approximately $11 million. The current estimate as to the schedule
impacts of these delays is approximately 3 months. These estimates were
formulated prior to the most recent DOE concern with criticality safety
and therefore are likely to change. Schedule revisions are in process
to determine the optimum integration of seismic work and required DMSA
work. The goal is to complete Seismic work in the shortest period of
time.
An important decision point will occur in February 2000. Up until
this point, other Seismic construction work will be available for
USEC's contractor. Beginning in February 2000, if the DMSA areas are
not available for work, initial demobilization of the contractor work
force (approx. 25% to 50%) would begin. Remobilization of this skilled
work force (i.e., hiring, training, clearances, etc) would add
significantly to the DMSA schedule and costs.
Question 3. Is USEC responsible for funding the characterization
and movement of DOE material storage areas? If so, what is the
estimated cost of this effort, and how will USEC provide the necessary
funds to complete characterization in a timely manner?
Response. No, USEC is not responsible for funding the
characterization and movement of DOE material storage areas (DMSAs).
DOE and USEC responsibilities are described in an agreement, ``USEC and
DOE Agreement for DOE Material Storage at the Gaseous Diffusion
Plants'' was signed by DOE and USEC on May 28, 1996. DOE is responsible
for ensuring that DMSAs are maintained in accordance with DOE
requirements. This agreement specifies that, to the extent required by
NRC, USEC will perform the following tasks: (1) visually inspect
process equipment to identify enriched uranium deposits, (2) segregate
equipment containing such deposits, (3) establish and maintain DMSA
boundaries and signage, and (4) maintain necessary documentation
concerning such activities. USEC has met its responsibilities to the
extent permitted by DOE. Because of an unreviewed safety question (USQ)
raised by DOE's subcontractors in early 1997, access to the DMSAs for
further visual inspections has not been permitted until the USQ is
resolved by DOE. In addition, as requested by DOE, USEC provides
services to DOE on a reimbursable basis. DOE has from time to time
requested services from USEC in connection with the DMSAs. USEC has
performed these services as requested.
Question 4. According to testimony provided by Mr. Key, USEC's
training manuals for employees make no reference to plutonium and
neptunium in the workplace. Is this true, and, if so, why is there no
such reference?
Response. Formal training modules regarding transuranics were
developed and presented to the site personnel in 1992. The training was
not, however, incorporated into the new employee training and the
continuing training for site personnel until 1999. The training did
address the hazards associated with exposure to radioactive material
and the precautions and procedures to minimize exposure to radioactive
materials as required by 10 CFR 19.12, Instructions to Workers. The
activity levels of transuranics in the work place are below the
thresholds requiring their inclusion in radiation exposure assignment.
Never-the-less, the current site training programs have been revised to
include transuranics.
Question 5. Will the delay in completing seismic upgrades cause a
delay with USEC's request to NRC to increase uranium enrichment assay
levels at Paducah from 2.75 percent to 5 percent?
Response. No. The increase in enrichment assay level to 5 percent
at PGDP can be accomplished independent of completing the seismic
upgrade. In a meeting with the NRC on August 3, 1999, USEC informed the
NRC of its plan to request an increase to the authorized assay limit at
PGDP in early-2000. USEC has developed a detailed project plan and
currently intends to submit a Certificate Amendment Request (CAR) to
increase the assay limit at PGDP by May 2000. NRC must approve the CAR
prior to USEC implementing changes in operations to support higher
assay production.
______
Responses of Robert W. Logan, Commissioner, Kentucky Department of
Environmental Protection to Questions from the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations
Question 1. At the hearing, DOE indicated that areas offsite had
been identified with radiological contamination high enough to require
sampling technicians wear protective clothing. Why have these
contaminated areas remained uncontrolled for public access? Are there
other areas offsite with similar amounts of contamination that are also
unposted?
Response: As a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Agreement State,
Kentucky's posting requirements can be found in 902 KAR 100:019,
Sections 23, 24 and 25. In addition, Radiation Dose Limits for
Individual Members of the Public (902 KAR 100:019, Section 10), and
Compliance with Dose Limits for Individual Members of the Public (902
KAR 100:019, Section 11) are identical to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission regulations.
Kentucky has a Field Sampling and Analysis Plan (FSAP) for
Environmental Monitoring Activities which includes a Health and Safety
Plan and a Quality Assurance Program Plan.
All Kentucky activities are conducted according to these plans.
Monitoring staff are required to have the proper dosimetry and all are
subject to bioassays. Personnel monitoring data for Commonwealth
employees are well within the requirements of 902 KAR 100:019.
Question 2. Why has DOE failed to adequately assess sediments,
soils, surface water, and other environmental media in areas outside
the security fence to ensure public safety in these areas?
Response: DOE's progress in complete characterization of
environmental media outside the security fence is directly related to
available funding from Congress. To the best of our knowledge, U.S.
DOE/PGDP has sampled and characterized those areas outside the
industrial boundary sufficiently to determine if imminent threats to
human health and the environment exist. Those areas that the Cabinet
believes to be a potential threat to public safety were posted with
warning signs. The Cabinet is aware that contamination exists outside
the security fence. These contaminated areas and the sources that feed
contaminants to the surface water system will be investigated under
review by the Commonwealth and U.S. EPA.
Question 3. What is the State of Kentucky doing to identify
radiological contamination at other offsite areas accessible to the
public?
Response: The Commonwealth reviews all data and reports provided by
DOE to determine potential restricted areas, as well as on-site and
offsite impacted areas. In addition, as indicated above the
Commonwealth has a FSAP which it utilizes to sample impacted areas.
The FSAP was designed based upon known release patterns from the
facility. The FSAP is a dynamic document that can be modified based on
suspected or known areas of contamination.
The Commonwealth's efforts are documented by the more than 4,000
samples collected since 1995.
Question 4. Based on current institutional controls that inform the
public and restrict access to offsite contaminated areas, are visitors,
workers, and residents surrounding the Paducah site adequately
protected from radiological and chemical releases from the Paducah
site?
Response: Based on the information to date, the Natural Resources
and Environmental Protection Cabinet believes that, adequate
institutional controls and/or removal actions have been implemented
outside the security boundary to assure adequate protection of visitors
to the wildlife management area and residents surrounding the PGDP. The
Cabinet has not evaluated worker health and safety since the Cabinet
has no regulatory authority over that issue. U.S. DOE and the USEC are
obligated to assure worker health and safety.
Question 5. Illegal dumping activities were reported in Spring 1991
by Kentucky police investigator Mr. D.W. Senf in memoranda sent to
Kentucky policy captain J.W. Pennington. Please explain what the State
of Kentucky did with this information, and whether Mr. Senf's findings
were resolved.
Response: Kentucky collected surface soil samples from the area of
concern in May 1991. The soil samples were analyzed for gamma emitting
radionuclides and \99\Tc. All radionuclides analyzed for were below
detection limits.
In June 1991, a gamma ray dose rate survey was conducted for the
area of concern in the presence of Mr. Senf. No ``hot spots'' or levels
above background were observed during the gamma ray dose rate survey.
Based on the results of the gamma ray dose rate survey and the soil
sample data, no further action was taken. Mr. Sent did not provide any
information to suggest further action was necessary. The investigation
is summarized in a June 17, 1991 memorandum.
Question 6. The State is authorized or delegated the authority to
administer several federal environmental laws, including the Clean
Water Act and the Solid Waste Disposal Act. In addition to permitting
and monitoring requirements with respect to these programs, does the
State of Kentucky have any financial obligations with respect to clean-
up activities at the Paducah site?
Response: No.
Question 7. In your written testimony, you indicate Kentucky has
collected over 4,500 samples of surface water, groundwater, soils,
sediment, and vegetation around the Paducah Plant between 1995-1999. In
addition, over 13,000 radiochemical analyses and over 15,000 quality
control analyses have been conducted to ensure the accuracy of DOE and
contractor results. Based on all the tests the State has performed at
Paducah, do you think the workers at the Plant and the people who live
and recreate on lands outside the Plant are safe?
Response: The Commonwealth as a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Agreement State does not have regulatory authority in regard to DOE
worker health and safety.
DOE under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is self-regulating for
radioactive materials.
Based on available data, there is no immediate threat to public
health from releases from the site.
This conclusion is supported by the results of DOE's Phase I
investigation.
Question 8. Please list each environmental permit violation
administered by the State of Kentucky at the Paducah site. Please also
describe how each violation was corrected.
Response: See attachment.
Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant--Hazardous Waste Violations
resolutions of violations post 1990 hazardous waste violations ky8-890-
008-982
I. 8/22-24/1990 NOV issued, 6 violations written.
Violations documented were: Insufficient employee training,
manifests incomplete, restricted wastes stored beyond 1-year period,
three drums of hazardous waste over 90-day accumulation period,
facility not operated to prevent releases (based on high number of
spills).
Manner in which violations were resolved: All but one violation
were resolved during an inspection conducted on June 23, 1992. The
violation involving restricted wastes was resolved with the issuance of
a Federal Facilities Compliance Agreement that listed guidelines for
handling waste streams at TSDs.
II. 11/27/91 NOV issued, 11 violations were written.
Violations documented were: The wastewater stored at building C-733
from the sump of the same building did not have a ``Waste Container
Label''. The field inspection log used for buildings C-733 and C-746-R
Storage Facilities were not consistent with the Part B Permit, Part
II.B.4, Attachment V, Section F. The inspection log for the Lime
Precipitation Unit C-400-D lacked the time of inspection in violation
of 401 KAR 35:020, Section 6. Waste D002, D006, D007, D008 was stored
beyond 90 days at the Nickel Stripper Unit in violation of 401 KAR
32:030, Section 5, and KRS 224.866. Weekly container inspections and/or
daily tank inspections were not conducted during storage of the D002,
D006, D007, D008 hazardous waste at the Nickel Stripper Unit in
violation of 401 KAR 35:180, Section 5 and/or 401 KAR 35:190, Section
6. The C-400-C waste location logs did not describe the storage of the
D002, D006, D007, D008 hazardous waste in violation of 401 KAR 35:050,
Section 4. Employees were not completely trained in violation of 401
KAR 35:020, Section 7, 401 KAR 34:020, Section 7, and the Part B Permit
Part B.Il.B.5. Manifest Document Number 140 dated 8/22/91 did not have
a handling code on it in violation of 401 KAR 32: 100. Arrangements of
response actions during an emergency were not made with the State
Emergency Response Team in violation 401 KAR 35:030, Section 7. A copy
of the Contingency Plan was not distributed to the State Emergency
Response Team in violation of 401 KAR 35:040, Section 4. The Land
Disposal Restriction Forms accompanying Manifest Document Number 133
and 135 states that the waste D008, D009 has a capacity variance until
May 8, 1992, which was not correct due to the presence of D008, lead,
which was restricted from land disposal as of August 8, 1990. This
constituted a violation of 40 CFR 268.7.
Manner in which violations were resolved: Inspection completed on
June 23, 1992. This inspection also served to resolve all but one of
the August 22-24, 1990 violations.
III. 6/9/92 NOV issued, 2 violations were written.
Violations documented were: Waste soil contaminated with dioxins
was stored at an inappropriate location.
Manner in which violations were resolved: A June 16th and 17th
inspection documented that the waste soil was containerized and that it
had been moved to an acceptable location. All violations corrected.
IV. 10/30/92 NOV issued, 1 violation was written.
Violations documented were: Wastes were stored in an underground
storage tank in excess of the 90-day allowed holding time.
Manner in which violations were resolved: Underground tank was
certified closed on January 4, 1993.
V. 10/7/93 NOV issued, 3 violations were written.
Violations documented were: Failure to develop and implement a
written schedule for inspecting monitoring equipment, safety, and
emergency equipment important to detecting and responding to
environmental or human health hazards. Failure to document monitoring,
safety, and emergency equipment maintained by Chemical Operations and
the Fire Department Failure to test and maintain all Contingency Plan
equipment.
Manner in which violations were resolved: A financial penalty was
assessed which was paid on 6/8/94.
VI. 2/22/95 NOV issued, 2 violations were written.
Violations documented were: Failure to manage waste mercury from
line recorders removed from the enrichment process. Storage of waste
mercury over 90-days without a permit.
Manner in which violations were resolved: There was a disagreement
in regulatory interpretation between DOE and the Commonwealth. DOE
agreed to accept the Commonwealth's interpretation of the regulations
and the matter was dropped.
VI. 8/30/99 NOV issued, 1 violations were written.
Violations documented were: Failure to provide notification of
activity to be performed inside a Solid Waste Management Unit (SWMU).
Manner in which violations were resolved: Sampling of
uncharacterized soil was completed in accordance with the
Commonwealth's sampling plan. Results were submitted to the
Commonwealth within the prescribed time limit.
Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant--Solid Waste Violations
Chronology of NOV's at the #073.14 Landfill
08/08/90 Noted Violations--NOV Issued 09/04/90. Communication system
not operational (401 KAR 47:120-1); interim cover eroded (401
KAR 48:090-7); litter (401 KAR 48:090-9); inadequate daily
cover (401 KAR 48:090-3).
12/12/90 Re-inspection: Communication system repaired, interim cover
erosion repaired, daily cover applied to working face. All
violations resolved.
01/30/92 Noted Violations--NOV Issued 02/13/92. Entrance sign didn't
indicate operating hours (401 KAR 48:090-14); erosion and
ponding water observed in ditch.
02/26/92 Re-inspection: Entrance sign corrected, erosion repaired,
ponding water and drainage problems corrected.
01/27/93 Noted Violations--NOV Issued. Failure to notify within 48
hours of receiving groundwater sample results which indicate
contamination; failure to arrange for a split sampling event;
failure to sample for all required parameters. All violations
are of 401 KAR 48:300.
05/19/93 Letter sent discussing notification requirements. DOE
submitted revised method of dealing with ground water sample
results. NOV resolved.
08/31/93 Noted Violations--NOV Issued. 401 KAR 40:010-4--Failure to
comply with instructions to demonstrate compliance with
groundwater maximum contaminant levels.
09/09/93 Letter sent rescinding violation due to DOE submitting
adequate data and results.
Chronology of NOV's at the #073.15 Landfill
08/08/90 Noted Violations--NOV Issued 09/04/90. 401 KAR 48:060--
Communication system inoperative; waste not spread or
compacted; waste not covered within one week; interim cover is
eroded; water ponding in one area.
12/12/90 Follow-up Inspection. Communication system operable, waste
compacted and spread, interim cover erosion repaired, and
ponded water area regraded. All previous violations corrected.
05/07/91 Noted Violations--NOV Issued 05/20/99. 401 KAR 48:060--Interim
cover eroded; water was ponded in interim area.
06/26/91 Follow-up Inspection. Interim cover repaired, ponded water
area regraded. All previous violations corrected. No violations
noted.
01/30/92 Noted Violations--NOV Issued 02/14/92. 401 KAR 48:060--Water
ponded east of interim area; entrance sign did not contain
operating hours, both violations.
02/26/92 Follow-up Inspection. Re-inspection: Ponded water regraded,
entrance sign corrected, All previously noted violations have
been corrected.
09/02/93 Noted Violations--NOV Issued. 401 KAR 40:010-3--Failure to
comply with written instructions to prove non-contamination.
09/09/93 Same letter sent for 073-014. NOV resolved.
Chronology of NOV's at the #073.45 Landfill
11/08/94 Noted Violations--Inspected by Donna Shartung: NOV issued 11/
08/94. 401 KAR 40:020--Failure to notify the cabinet prior to
well drilling.
11/24/94 Letter sent to DOE noting regulation requires notification.
NOV considered resolved.
Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant--Water Quality Violations
KPDES PERMIT NO. KY0004049 AND KY0102083
Numeric violations of KPDES permit limits for conventional
pollutants have generally been corrected by process control changes
which resulted in more effective treatment. Corrections of numerical
limit violations have generally occurred quickly, so there has not been
formal Quarterly Non-Compliance Report (QNCR) action since 1994, other
than the issuance of a Notice of Violation (NOV). Normally, if the
problem persisted, a Demand Letter would be issued for the subsequent
quarter, unless the problem were successfully addressed. (In 1997, for
example, a Total Residual Chlorine exceedance was cited in one quarter
and corrected before the next quarter. That was the most recent
violation of a permitted effluent limit.) Currently, the facility is
conducting a Toxicity Reduction Evaluation (TRE), to address toxicity
problems which were identified in 1998.
Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant--Air Quality Violations
1. May 24, 1999 NOV from May 18, 1999, Inspection
May 24,1999 NOV for noncompliance with 401 KAR 58:040 Section 3(1)
mailed to United Thermal Industries Incorporated a
subcontractor engaged in asbestos removal for USEC. NOV
required written response from contractor within fifteen days
stating actions taken or to taken correct and prevent future
violations.
United Thermal Industries, Inc. failed to have a current KY
certification before engaging in the removal of asbestos. Reply
to NOV received June 2, 1999, from United Thermal Industries,
Inc. Application submitted to Kentucky Division for Air Quality
for certificate did not contain requests for Supervisor
certifications.
United Thermal Industries, Incorporated submitted applications for
Supervisor Certification on May 18, 1999. The Kentucky Division
for Air Quality issued Supervisor certifications 1500 hours on
the same day.
NOV reply and actions taken by United Thermal Industries Incorporated
were sufficient to resolve violation. No further enforcement
action deemed necessary. No further violations cited against
company.
2. NOV issued on August 28, 1997 from August 7, 1997 Inspection.
NOV issued to USDOE on August 28, 1997 for noncompliance with permit
conditions as follows.
USDOE did not record pressure drops for the baghouse that controlled
particulate emissions at the uranium hexafluoride cylinder grit
blasting operation on September 9, 1996 and October 28, 1996.
USDOE did not promptly notify the Kentucky Division for Air Quality of
the above deviations from the permit.
USDOE did not submit notification of start of construction of the
vitrification of low level radioactive soil project to the
Kentucky Division for Air Quality within thirty days.
NOV required written response from contractor within fifteen days
stating actions taken or to taken correct and prevent future
violations.
Reply from DOE received on September 11, 1997. DOE will specifically
address the permit conditions in new contractor contracts after
June 5, 1997. DOE states that they had notified the Cabinet
that construction started on October 3, 1996. The Permit
condition clearly states that the Kentucky Division for Air
Quality is to be notified in writing. No such notification was
received by the Division until after the NOV was issued. DOE
requested that the violations be withdrawn. Violations were
valid and were not withdrawn as requested. Inspections made in
1998 and 1999 found no further violations of these permit
violations. No further enforcement action was taken as the
violations did not repeat.
3. April 5, 1996 inspection report cites possible violation of 401 KAR
50:035 Section 5 for operating the northwest plume air stripper
without a permit. Possible violation cited as DOE claims CERCLA
exemption from permitting. More information requested.
April 26, 1996 letter from USDOE states that the project is subject to
CERCLA and exempted from state permitting.
Letter of August 16, 1996 from Mr. Roger Cook, of the Kentucky Division
for Air Quality Permit Review Branch to Jimmy Hodges, Site
Manager, stating no permit is required for the NW plume
project.
4. NOV issued on July 27, 1993 to USEC for violations of 401 KAR 61:015
and 401 KAR 5 0:06 Sections 2(2) and 4(1). Noncompliance with
regulatory and permit opacity emissions limitations for #2 coal
fired indirect heat exchanger.
NOV required written response from contractor within fifteen days
stating actions taken or to taken correct and prevent future
violations.
Reply received on August 18, 1993 from USEC. Number two indirect heat
exchanger taken out of service on July 28, 1993. To ensure
future compliance PGDP will switch to alternate indirect heat
exchangers fuels when opacity is in excess of the standards.
Letter of September 1, 1993, from Ken Frye, Regional Supervisor,
Kentucky Division for Air Quality, to Mr. Charles W. Martin,
USEC, stating that August 18, 1993, reply was not totally
satisfactory. Taking the #21 indirect heat exchanger off line
was the proper action to take but more information on problems
with the emission control units was required.
Problem ultimately resolved through repairs and improved operation of
the heat exchanger and its control equipment.
5. NOV issued based on August 19, 1992 inspection cited denied access,
refusal to release coal samples, and fugitive emissions.
Through several meetings with cabinet management, credentials and
access problems were satisfactorily resolved. Coal samples were
ultimately received after the cabinet asserted its authority to
require them. Fugitive emissions were reduced through better
controls, including more thorough and frequent watering of
stockpiles and haul roads.
6. NOV issued June 7, 1991 for fugitive emissions from a coal
stockpile.
Problem ultimately resolved through enhanced controls, mainly wet
suppression.
______
Responses for the Record of David Michaels, Assistant Secretary for
Environment, Safety and Health, Department of Energy
questions from committee on commerce
Question 1: Please provide one copy of the Department of Energy's
(DOE) Phase I independent investigation report (independent
investigation).
Answer: A copy of the independent investigation is provided for
your information and use.
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Question 2: During its recent independent investigation, DOE
sampled media for chemical and radiological analysis. What was the
purpose of this sampling effort, and what are your findings?
Answer: Environmental samples were collected and analyzed by the
investigation team in an effort to confirm that the current analytical
results being reported by the site are accurate and representative of
actual environmental conditions. This effort was not intended to
characterize the site for remediation purposes. Remedial Investigations
studies are conducted by the Department's Environmental Management
Program and are reviewed and approved by environmental regulatory
agencies.
The results of the independent sampling were generally consistent
with historical environmental monitoring results produced and published
by the site. There also was general agreement between the independent
sample results and the results of the analysis of split samples by the
site. Those matches provides, additional confidence that DOE site
contractors are producing accurate environmental monitoring results.
In a few cases, sediment sample results identified contaminants at
levels not previously identified by the site. These transplant were
taken at the North-South Diversion Ditch (between Ogden Landing Road
and the site security fence), and outfalls K011 and K015. These
discrepancies are likely to be related to the lack of homogeneity of
contaminants in the soils.
Question 3: Did DOE plan its independent investigation sampling
effort with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)? If not, please
explain why. Also, prior to the release of the independent
investigation report, did EPA request or receive environmental sampling
data. If not please explain why.
Answer: DOE did not plan the sampling effort with the EPA. The team
was directed to conduct an independent investigation of the site, and
operated under strict deadlines established by the Secretary of Energy
for the completion of the initial phase of the investigation. In
planning the independent environmental sampling effort, the team
evaluated the results of past Remedial Investigations that were
performed by DOE contractors and overseen and approved by EPA and the
Commonwealth of Kentucky. These reports described the nature and extent
of environmental contamination from past releases from the Paducah
plant. The team utilized these reports, as well as routine
environmental monitoring results produced by DOE site management, to
plan the most effective and efficient sampling strategy for the
independent investigation. Onsite representatives from Kentucky
participated in the sampling effort by collecting several split samples
of groundwater, surface water and soils/sediments. The EPA Project
Manager for Paducah was consulted on the initial conclusions of the
investigation team immediately following the completion of field
investigations.
The EPA did request sampling results from the investigation team.
Upon completion of the analysis of most samples and the assessment of
the data by the investigation team, sampling data were provided to EPA
Region IV and Commonwealth of Kentucky staff on Friday, October 8,
1999. An EPA project manager was briefed on the final results of the
investigation on Thursday, October 14, 1999. The investigation report
was formally published on Wednesday, October 20, 1999.
Question 4: At the hearing, DOE indicated that areas onsite had
been identified with radiological contamination high enough to require
sampling technicians to wear protective clothing. Why have these
contamination areas remained uncontrolled for public access? Are there
other areas onsite with similar amounts of contamination that are also
un-posted?
Answer: The investigation team noted areas of contamination that
exceed Bechtel Jacobs radiological posting criteria in outfalls K011,
the North South Diversion Ditch, and along little Bayou creek on DOE
property but outside the site security fence. The Bechtel Jacobs health
physics procedures require that such areas be posted as soil
contamination areas and/or contamination areas, and that appropriate
measures be taken to prevent inadvertent entry. Some of these areas
were posted with signage and wording that were the result of CERCLA
Records of Decision or interim corrective measures, but these postings
were not consistent and, in some cases, did not specify the presence of
a radiological hazard. Neither DOE nor Bechtel Jacobs site
representatives was able to provide a sound basis for not controlling
such areas in accordance with the Bechtel Jacobs radiation protection
program.
The investigation team noted that the most significant areas of
contamination have been identified during past investigations, but, the
full extent of radiological contamination both inside and outside the
security fence has still not been characterized by a sitewide survey
and sampling program.
The Department subsequently made changes to improve the sign
postings for radioactively contaminated areas on DOE property. Site
personnel have, for example, posted signs that clearly identify the
presence of radiological contamination on both sides of the North-South
Diversion Ditch, and at several outfall ditches and culverts associated
with Little Bayou Creek.
questions from chairman upton
Assessment of Environmental Media
Question 5: Why has DOE failed to adequately assess sediments,
soils, surface water, and other environmental media in areas outside
the security fence to ensure public safety in these areas?
Answer 5: The Department has worked with regulators in the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Commonwealth of Kentucky
to ensure that assessments are done in areas outside the security fence
to identify contamination in sediments, soils, surface water, and other
environmental media, as described below. In addition, on November 8th
and 9th, 1999, representatives from DOE field offices and Headquarters,
EPA, and Kentucky met to review strategies and priorities for
assessment and remediation to maximize cleanup within available
resources.
DOE regularly assesses conditions, both inside and outside the
security perimeter, and reports results of environmental monitoring at
the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant in the site's Annual Environmental
Report. In addition to the environmental monitoring reported annually
in this report, the Department has conducted environmental assessments
and investigations since the discovery of off-site groundwater
contamination in 1988 to assess conditions outside the security
perimeter, or contamination inside the security perimeter which could
migrate beyond the fence boundaries. I would like to provide for the
record a listing of investigation activities the Department has carried
out from 1989 to the current time.
The information follows.
Environmental Assessments Conducted at Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant
(PGDP)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assessment/ Report Title/
Date Investigation Number
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1989-1991....................... Phase I Site Phase I Site
Investigation. Investigation
Work Plan DOE/OR/
07-1203. Volumes
1, 2, and 3
Results of Site
Investigation
Phase I at the
PGDP KY/F-R-4
1991............................ Public Health and Results of Public
Ecological Health and
Assessment. Ecological
Assessment KY/SUB/
13B-97777CP-03/
1991/1
1990-1992....................... Phase II Site Phase II Site
Investigation. Investigation
Work Plan KY/ER-3
Results of the
Site
Investigation,
Phase II at PGDP
KY/SUB/13B-97777
P03/1991/1
1993............................ Northwest Plume Characterization
Investigation. of the Northwest
Plume Utilizing a
Driven Discrete-
Depth Sampling
System KY/ER-22
1994............................ Northeast Plume Field Sampling
Investigation. Plan for the
Northeast Plume
DOE/OR/07-1222&D2
1993-1995....................... Waste Area Groups Remedial Facility
(WAG) 1&7. Investigation
Work Plan for
WAGs 1&7 and
Kentucky Ordnance
Works SWMUs 94,
95, and 157 DOE/
OR/07-1147
Remedial
Investigation
Report for WAGs
1&7 at PGDP,
Paducah, KY DOE/
OR/07-1404
Remedial
Investigation
Report for SWMUs
94, 95, and 157
DOE/OR/07-1405
1994-1996....................... WAG 17............ RCRA Facility
Investigation
Work Plan for WAG
17 at PGDP,
Paducah, KY DOE/
OR/07-1202&D2
Remedial
Investigation
Report for WAG 17
at PGDP, Paducah,
KY DOE/OR/07-1404
1995-1999....................... WAG 6............. Integrated
Remedial
Investigation/
Feasibility Study
Work Plan for
Waste Area Group
6 at the PGDP DOE/
OR/07-1243&D4
Remedial
Investigation
Report for WAG 6
at the PGDP,
Paducah, KY DOE/
OR/07-1727
Volumes 1, 2, 3,
and 4
1996-1999....................... WAG 27............ Integrated
Remedial
Investigation/
Feasibility Study
Work Plan for
Waste Area Group
27 at the Paducah
Gaseous Diffusion
Plant, Paducah,
Kentucky DOE/OR/
07-1518&D3
Remedial
Investigation
Report for WAG 27
at the PGDP,
Paducah, KY DOE/
OR/07-1777
Volumes 1, 2, 3,
and 4
1997-Current.................... WAG 28............ Work Plan for
Waste Area Group
28 Remedial
Investigation/
Feasibility Study
and Waste Area
Group 8
Preliminary
Assessment/Site
Investigation at
the Paducah
Gaseous Diffusion
Plant, Paducah,
Kentucky DOE/OR/
07-1592&D2
Primary
1998-Current.................... Data Gaps......... Sampling and
Analysis Plan to
Support a Site
Wide Current
Remedial Strategy
for DNAPL DOE/OR-
07-1719
1998-Current.................... WAG 8............. Work Plan for
Waste Area Group
28 Remedial
Investigation/
Feasibility Study
and Waste Area
Group 8
Preliminary
Assessment/Site
Investigation at
the Paducah
Gaseous Diffusion
Plant, Paducah,
Kentucky DOE/OR/
07-1592&D2
Primary
------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a result of these data collection and assessment activities, a
number of actions have been taken to protect the public's health and
safety outside the plant security fence. I would like to provide for
the record a summary of the actions taken.
The information follows.
Actions Taken at Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant to Protect the Public
Health & Safety
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Project/Event Action Taken
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Off-site Groundwater Contamination Identified and sampled local
Controls (1988-89). wells
Provided interim bottle
water to anyone who wanted
it
Initiated routine
residential sampling
Provided water tanks to any
residents with contaminated
wells
Initiated health surveys of
residents with contaminated
wells
Identified radiological
contamination in Little
Bayou Creek, North/South
Diversion Ditch, and KPDES
Outfall 011. Posted ``No
Trespassing'' signs.
Contaminated Rubble Pile at Ballard County Removed rubble pile
Wildlife Area and Related Controls. Performed systematic search
for other rubble piles
which resulted in
identification of several
additional rubble piles
which were grouped into WAG
17
Performed expedited health
physics surveys of piles
Subsidence Control at the Sewage Treatment Fenced sewage treatment
Plant. plant to protect
recreational users of the
area from physical hazards
(i.e., subsidence)
Elevated levels of PCBs in fish........... Commonwealth of Kentucky
issued a fish advisory for
the Little Bayou Creek and
KPDPS Outfall 011
C-750-A and B Underground Storage Tanks... Removed tanks in 1991 with
partial soil excavation
Excavated additional soils
and closed in 1998
C-746-K Sanitary Landfill Interim Installed a low permeability
Corrective Measures (Initiated in 1992). cap to repair subsidence
and restore a 5% slope to
the top of the landfill to
assist in precipitation
runoff
Implemented a surface water
monitoring program
Maintenance of a previously
installed leachate
containment dam and filter
trap
Tricliloroethylene (TCE) Use at PGDP...... Use of TCE was discontinued
at PGDP on June 30, 1993
Sludges/sediments from large
degreaser were
containerized and placed in
waste storage
RCRA Closures (1993-present).............. Closed the following units
in accordance with RCRA: C-
400-B&C Nickel Stripper, C-
409 RCRA Pilot Plant, C-720
Large Degreaser, and C-746-
R RCRA Storage Pad
Closed C-404 Uranium Burial
Ground in 1987
Institutional Control of Off-Site Installed fencing at 13
Contamination in Surface Water Interim sites outside the PGDP
Corrective Measures (Initiated in 1993). security perimeter along
the KPDES outfalls 001 and
011, C-616 lagoons, the
NSDD, Big Bayou Creek, and
Little Bayou Creek to
restrict casual public
access
Posted warning signs at C-
616
Posted warning signs at the
Outfalls and NSDD
Posted a Fish Consumption
Advisory for Little Bayou
Creek
Containment of Scrap Yard Sediment Runoff Installed sill fences around
Interim Corrective Measures (Initiated in the scrap yards to filter
1993). the contaminated silt which
could be mobilized during
rainfall events
Installed gabion type silt
traps with nonwoven
geotextile material in two
ditches draining the scrap
yards to contain
contaminated sediments
Water Policy Engineering Evaluation/Cost Provided municipal mater
Analysis (Initiated in 1993). supply to residents with in
the area that could
potentially be affected by
migration of groundwater
contamination
Established agreements with
residents which restricted
use of their wells
Established agreements with
residents which allowed
access for sampling or
testing
Ongoing payment of
associated water bills
Locked and capped affected
residential wells
North/South Diversion Ditch (NSDD) Record Installed ion exchange
of Decision (Initiated in 1994). system in C-400 to reduce
radionuclide concentrations
in effluents prior to
discharge into the NSDD
Established the target
treatment level as the
Maximum Contaminant Levels
(MCLs)
Installed (by USEC) settling
lagoons at the C-600
facility to remove fly ash
from effluents prior to
discharge to the NSDD
Installed two lift stations
in the NSDD which
discharged to a pipeline to
transport permitted
effluent discharges and
storm water runoff from the
southern end. This system
bypassed approximately 50%
of the NSDD inside the
security perimeter, thereby
reducing the potential for
mobilizing contaminated
sediments in the vicinity
of NSDD
Installed a gabion type rock
structure with nonwoven
geotextile material secured
to the upstream side near
the ditch 001 lift station
to mitigate the potential
for contaminant transport
from the bypassed portion
of the NSDD to offsite area
Installed warning signs on
both sides of the NSDD to
give notice that elevated
levels of radionuclides,
metals, and PCBs are
present in the area
Interim Remedial Action for the Northwest Installed a total of four
Plume (Initiated in 1993). extraction wells at two
locations (two at each
location) and associated
piping to extract
contaminated groundwater
from the highest
concentration area of the
Northwest plume and pump
this water to a treatment
system
Installed a treatment system
consisting of air
strippers, ion exchange,
and activated carbon to
treat the contaminated (TCE
and Tc-99) groundwater to a
target treatment limit of 5
ppb for tricliloroethene
(TCE) and 900 pCi/g for Tc-
99 prior to discharge to
Outfall 001
Outfall 011 (1995)........................ Lined ditch with bentonite
and installed rip-rap to
reduce transport of PCB-
contaminated sediments
Interim Remedial Action for the Northeast Installed a total of two
Plume (Initiated in 1995). extraction wells at one
location to extract
contaminated groundwater
from the highest
concentration area of the
Northeast plume
Installed a collection and
piping system to collect
and pump contaminated
groundwater to an existing
cooling tower for
volatilization of TCE and
1,1-dicholoroethene
WAG 22 Solid Waste Management Units (SWMU) Implemented a groundwater
2 and 3 Record of Decision (Initiated in monitoring program in the
1995). uppermost aquifer, the
Regional Gravel Aquifer, to
detect any release of
contaminants from SWMU 2
Implemented institutional
controls (signs and deed
restriction) at SWW 2
C-746-S&T Landfill Closures............... Closure was initiated in
accordance with Kentucky
Solid Waste Regulations in
1995
WAG 17 Removal Action (1996).............. Removed contaminated soils
124 under DOE removal
action authority
Properly packaged and stored
material as waste
WAG 17 Record of Decision (1997).......... Established that no further
remedial action was
necessary to protect human
health and the environment
WAG 23 Removal Action (1997).............. Excavated approximately 115
cubic meters from SWMUs 1,
56, 57, 80, and 81 to
reduce PCB levels to below
25 ppm and dioxin levels to
less than 1.3 ppb
WAGs 1 and 7 Record of Decision (Initiated Deferred investigation and
in 1998). action on SWMU 38, C-615
Sewage Treatment Plant,
until unit ceases operation
Upgraded groundwater
monitoring system around
the C-746-K landfill
Installed institutional
controls (signs and fences)
around C-746-K
Implemented deed
restrictions on C-746-K
Transferred responsibility
for SWMUs 94, 95, and 157
(all located in former KOW
area) to the Corp of
Engineers
Established that no further
remedial action was
necessary to protect human
health and the environment
for the following SWMUs:
130, 131, 132, 133, 134 and
136
SWMU 91 Record of Decision (Lasagna TM) Completed design of Lasagna
(Initiated in 1999). TM treatment system
Abandoned three wells
located within the SWMU
Removed a cold bath pit used
in testing UF6 cylinders
Construction scheduled for
treatment system September
1999
Radiological Postings (Ongoing)........... Post areas of radiological
contamination which exceed
limits defined in 10 CFR
835.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the activities identified in the two proceeding
listings, three major remedial investigations remain to be completed in
accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement. These include
investigation of the surface water in FY 2000-2001, investigation of
surface soils in FY 2001-2002, and investigation of burial grounds in
FY 2004-2005.
Radiological Contamination
Question 6: What is DOE doing to identify radiological
contamination at other offsite areas accessible to the public?
Answer 6: The Department has conducted a number of investigations
to identify possible radiological contamination at offsite areas around
the Paducah, Kentucky site. Where we have identified contamination, we
have taken steps to mitigate risks to public health and safety.
Actions taken to identify and address offsite radiological and
chemical contamination have included routine sampling of residential
water supplies; provision of alternative water supplies when
contamination was found in residential wells; removal of deteriorating
tanks and excavation of contaminated soils; improved treatment of waste
streams to decrease possible offsite releases; installation of
additional fencing to restrict access to possible contaminated areas;
posting of warning signs to prevent use of contaminated water,
including fishing and recreational use; installation of extraction
wells to remove contaminated groundwater from various areas around the
site-, and implementation of a groundwater monitoring program to ensure
that any releases are detected. A detailed listing of the assessments
conducted at the Paducah site, and actions taken to protect health and
safety, was provided for the record in response to the preceding
question. These listings show, by year, the various Departmental
actions taken to mitigate the spread of contamination offsite and to
prevent public access to unsafe areas.
Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant
Question 7: What was the assessed value of natural uranium DOE
transferred to the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) in 1998
for the purposes of completing nuclear safety upgrades at Paducah?
Answer: In 1998, the Department transferred 3,803,610 kgU of
natural uranium and 44.276 Metric Tons of low-enriched uranium to the
United States Enrichment Corporation for settlement of nuclear safety
liabilities at the gaseous diffusion plants and other liabilities. The
value of these transfers was assessed at $220 million.
Question 8: What portion of the assessed value of the natural
uranium transferred to USEC was intended to pay for the completion of
seismic upgrades at Paducah?
Answer: The Department transferred natural uranium and low-enriched
uranium valued at $220 million under the Department-negotiated
agreement with the United States Enrichment Corporation related to
nuclear safety upgrades costs at the gaseous diffusion plants. That
agreement settled a number of Departmental liabilities, including
completion of seismic upgrades at Paducah, which the Department
estimated would total $34.6 million.
Question 9: Please explain why DOE material storage areas at
Paducah have not been characterized, analyzed or resolved even though
they were identified more than two years ago.
Answer: There are 148 DOE Material Storage Areas (DMSAs) at the
Paducah Site. Based on inspections and records review, enough is known
about the materials and equipment in 70 of these DMSAs to conclude that
they do not present a criticality hazard. However, there are 78 DMSAs
in which additional information is needed. Of the 78 DMSAs, 13 present
the highest priority for near-term characterization and disposition
because fissile material could be present in quantities that could
present a hazard under certain conditions.
Over the last year, the Department had been developing nuclear-
grade procedures and controls for the characterization and disposition
of DMSAs with a potential for accumulation of fissile materials.
Because of the nuclear safety aspects of this work, it proceeded at a
slower pace. For example, we have taken the time that was needed to
develop procedures to govern this work, to conduct the necessary
criticality safety evaluations and safety assessments, and to perform a
readiness assessment--all of which provide the basis for DOE's approval
to proceed with characterization and disposition actions for the DMSAs.
Until recently, the priority for DMSA characterization and
disposition was focused on portions of 24 DMSAs that contain materials
and equipment that must be moved in order for United States Enrichment
Corporation's (USEC) seismic upgrade to proceed. However, a recent
investigation completed by DOE's Office of Environment, Safety and
Health identified 11 DMSAs that possibly contain fissile materials,
presenting a criticality hazard--consequently, these areas must also be
characterized and dispositioned on a priority basis. Subsequent review
by the DOE contractor identified an additional 2 areas of potential
concern. About half of these 13 DMSAs that are of concern to DOE are
the same DMSAs that are a priority with USEC--but some of them are not.
This has caused the Department to re-examine the priority and schedule
for characterization and disposition of the DMSAs that are a priority
for DOE and those that are a priority for USEC. In the interim, until a
final plan is complete, we have proceeded to characterize and
disposition/move materials in one DMSA that does not present a
criticality concern. By doing so, this allows work required by USEC to
proceed while providing an opportunity for workers to gain more
experience before handling a DMSA that presents a potential criticality
hazard.
We are currently working with the USEC and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to develop a consolidated plan for accelerating the
characterization and removal or disposition of the DMSAs in a manner
that meets the needs of both USEC and the Department. It is essential
that DOE and USEC work closely together on this as the work depends on
a limited number of properly trained and security-cleared USEC Inc
employees at the site. Once issued, the final plan will be provided to
the House Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.
Question 10: Please explain what schedule or cost impacts may occur
with USEC's efforts to complete seismic upgrades at Paducah due to
DOE's failure to characterize, analyze, and resolve DOE material
storage areas.
Answer: The Department is presently working with the United States
Enrichment Corporation (USEC) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) to determine the schedule and cost impacts associated with plans
to remove materials and equipment located in DOE Material Storage Areas
(DMSAs) to support USEC's seismic upgrade project. However, a recent
investigation by the Department of Energy (October 1999) identified
several other DMSAs not related to the seismic upgrade project that
also require expeditious removal. At present, plans are being developed
that would allow for timely removal and disposition of all materials
and equipment in the DMSAs that are adjacent to areas in which seismic
upgrades are planned, as well as for timely characterization and
disposition of the additional DMSAs that were identified as potential
areas of criticality concern in the recent DOE investigation.
We are working together to develop a comprehensive plan that meets
the objectives of USEC, which are to complete the seismic upgrades, and
the objectives of DOE, which are to address DMSAs that may have
criticality safety concerns on an expedited basis. Once the plan is
finalized we will be able to provide you the impact on cost and
schedule.
Question 11: Is USEC responsible for funding the characterization
and movement of DOE material storage areas? If so, what is the
estimated cost of this effort, and how will USEC provide the necessary
funds to complete the characterization in a timely manner?
Answer: Generally, the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC)
is not responsible for funding the characterization of materials and
equipment contained in the DOE Material Storage Areas (DMSAs). However,
since 1997, USEC has been funding and conducting non-characterization
work associated with the DMSAs in accordance with the agreements signed
on June 23, 1996, and December 31, 1996. Both of these agreements have
been previously submitted to the Subcommittee. In addition, to support
their seismic upgrade project, USEC has also agreed to fund and provide
manpower for equipment and materials that must be removed from DMSAs in
order for USEC to complete seismic upgrades.
The total estimated costs of completing the DMSA removal actions
for the seismic upgrade project and for the remaining DMSAs where
potential criticality concerns exist are currently under development by
the Department and USEC.
Plutonium Contamination
Question 12: Please explain why plutonium contamination in offsite
sediments was not identified in the Executive Summary of the DOE report
``Phase I Results of the Site Investigation, March 22, 1991.''
Answer l2: The Executive Summary discusses chemical and
radiological contamination off site, but does not specifically identify
plutonium contamination, although other radiological contaminants were
identified in the summary. However, the body of the Phase I Site
Investigation Report, March 22, 1991, does discuss plutonium
contamination. The full report received DOE, Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), public, contractor, and State review. It is unclear why
the plutonium contamination was not mentioned in the Executive Summary.
Prior to the Phase I report, plutonium contamination had been
identified and reported. For example, the 1980 Annual Site
Environmental Report contained a table showing that transuranic
elements (plutonium and neptunium) had been detected in fish, apples,
milk, and deer. The 1980 report was submitted to various State
agencies, the U.S. EPA Regional Office, and local news media.
The Department also identified the presence of plutonium
contamination and elevated radiation exposure readings in documents
reporting the results of a Phase I investigation survey, including a
September 18, 1990, Occurrence Report and a DOE media advisory issued
on October 1, 1990. The local newspaper, the Paducah Sun, carried a
story in its October 2, 1990, edition that discussed the presence of
uranium and ``transuranic elements such as plutonium, neptunium and
technetium.'' The regulatory agencies in the Commonwealth of Kentucky
and U.S. EPA were also informed of these findings through the monthly
reports.
Question 13: Please explain whether soil sample SS-2--measured as
part of DOE's independent investigation--is consistent with data
obtained in the March 22, 1991 Phase I report.
Answer: The independent investigation team collected a sample in
the North South Diversion Ditch between Ogden Landing Road and the site
security fence (sample SS-2). This sample was determined to contain
elevated plutonium 239/240, neptunium 23.7, and thorium 230 levels. The
1991 Phase I report and supporting data dated January 4, 1991, contains
survey and sampling results for soils and sediments in the North South
Diversion Ditch. The results of these samples in the vicinity of the
location of SS-2 also showed elevated levels of plutonium, cesium and
thorium. While the reported levels of plutonium and cesium from the
1991 samples are consistent with the results of the independent
investigation team associated SS-2, the level of thorium-230 reported
in 1991 is significantly lower than the level recently identified by
the investigation team at that location.
Institutional Controls
Question 14: Based on current institutional controls that inform
the public and restrict access to offsite contaminated areas, are
visitors, workers, and residents surrounding the Paducah site
adequately protected from radiological and chemical releases from the
Paducah site?
Answer ]4: The Department has installed institutional controls that
restrict access to offsite contaminated areas on DOE property
surrounding the operating facilities at the Paducah site. The
Department installed postings, fences, and signs agreed to by the
Commonwealth of Kentucky and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
as measures that would protect the public and workers. In addition, in
response to the observations of the investigation team led by the
Department's Office of Environment, Safety and Health, the Department
has completed additional postings on DOE property outside the security
fence that identify radiologically contaminated areas.
Contaminated Water
Question 15: When contaminated wells were discovered in 1988, EPA
ordered DOE to provide safe drinking water to private residences and
the extension of municipal water lines to the homes in the area of
contamination. In addition, a comprehensive water monitoring program
was put into effect. The current ``sump & pump'' method for dealing
with the contaminated water does not appear to be addressing the
problem at the source. Please explain what efforts are currently
underway to control ``hot spots'' that are contributing to this
groundwater contamination. Specifically, please include a description
of your efforts to remove TCE stored in the C-400 building. Please also
identify any proven technologies that may address the problem more
effectively.
Answer 15: The Department's programmatic strategy for site
remediation, which was developed in conjunction with, and approved by,
both EPA and the Commonwealth of Kentucky, utilizes a risk-based
approach consisting of four phases. The Department will first address
imminent threats, including both on and off-site conditions; then
reduce further migration of off-site contamination; then address
sources of off-site contamination; and lastly address remaining areas
of on-site contamination.
Providing municipal water to affected residents and installing
groundwater pump-and-treat systems were intended to address imminent
threats and reduce the further mitigation of the high concentration
portion of the off-site contamination plumes. However, these two steps
are only intended to serve as interim measures until a more
comprehensive solution can be developed. DOE recognizes the limitations
of the existing pump and treat system and acknowledges that any
comprehensive solution for groundwater must include actions at the
source areas (i.e., the ``hot spots'' in the vicinity of the C-400
Building) to be effective.
The ``hot spots'' in the vicinity of the C-400 Building (Waste Area
Groups, WAGS, 3, 6, 27, and 28) are the sources of the contaminated
groundwater migrating from the site. These source areas are
contamination from past activities; there are no trichloroethylene
(TCE) materials currently stored in the C-400 Building. DOE recently
completed remedial investigations for several of the major TCE source
areas (WAGs 6 and 27) and expects to complete characterization of the
southwest plume and remaining TCE sources (WAGs 3 and 28) in early FY
2000. Upon collection of this additional data, the Department will have
sufficient information to complete a site-wide feasibility study that
will lead to the selection of a final remedial action for the
groundwater contamination. The draft feasibility study is scheduled to
be issued in June 2000.
To support source remediation, DOE recently completed a successful
demonstration of the ``LASAGNA'' Technology, which removes TCE from
soils, and is in the process of full-scale deployment at the TCE test
pit area. DOE is also conducting a pilot field demonstration of another
promising new technology in FY 2000. This new in-situ reactive barrier
technology, when used in conjunction with other source treatment
technologies, may prove to be significantly more effective than the
traditional pump and treat systems. In addition, DOE is working to
identify technologies at Paducah through the Innovative Treatment
Remediation Demonstration Program (ITRD), which provides outside
technical expertise to help find solutions to complex remediation
problems at DOE sites and works with stakeholders to gain acceptance of
promising technologies. At Paducah, the ITRD is working to identify
proven technologies to address ground water and soil contamination
problems.
Question 16: DOE has proposed a plan to compensate workers at
Paducah that have demonstrated adverse health effects due to
radiological exposure. Please explain how causation will be established
between exposure to radioactive contaminants at Paducah facilities and
adverse health effects pursuant to the proposed compensation plan.
Answer: The Department considered a number of options for
compensating workers at Paducah who have illnesses that may be
associated with radiological exposure. Because of the lack of exposure
monitoring data for these workers, it is not possible to accurately
determine the doses they received. Therefore, in consultation with the
National Economic Council, the Department elected to adopt the
Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA) model in developing Title
III of the legislation. RECA has a compensation program for workers who
were on site during atmospheric nuclear weapons testing. To be eligible
for compensation, workers must establish that they were (1) onsite at
the time of weapons testing and (2) have one of the cancers listed in
the statute.
In the Administration's proposal for Paducah workers, criteria are
that (1) workers must have worked on site for one year during the time
period winch recycled reactor tailings were processed, (2) worked in a
position where they were badged for radiation exposure (or should have
been badged), and (3) have primary cancer of the bone or the lung or
one of the radiogenic cancers listed in RECA.
Question 17. Was radiation exposure to workers monitored and
documented prior to 1989? How could anyone actually prove causation if
no records were kept?
Answer: DOE has radiation protection standards and requirements in
place that include monitoring thresholds, documentation, and reporting
requirements. At Paducah, DOE has found a lack of exposure monitoring
data and is currently investigating the adequacy of worker exposure
records at all three gaseous diffusion plants, including Paducah. While
it may be difficult to prove causation from these records, causation is
not the only criteria used in compensation systems. In the program
established by the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, workers are
eligible for compensation is they establish that they were (1) onsite
at the time of weapons testing and (2) have one of the cancers listed
in the statute. This was the model used in the Administration's
proposal for Paducah workers.
Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant
Question 18: Was DOE aware of illegal dumping activities reported
in Spring 1991 by Kentucky police investigator Mr. D.W. Senf, and
referenced in Dr. Tom Cochran's written testimony? If so, what did DOE
do with this information?
Answer: Based upon our review, it does not appear that DOE was
aware of a report of illegal dumping made in 1991 by Mr. Senf. In
recent discussions with the Kentucky Cabinet for Health Services, we
have been told, in response to that allegation, the cabinet had the
area in question surveyed and no elevated levels of contamination were
found.
Question 19: During Secretary Richardson's most recent visit to
Paducah, he said DOE would take whatever legal action is necessary to
``make all former operators at the plant responsible for their roles in
keeping workers in the dark about plutonium.'' He later commented that
those actions could impact not just the most recent contractors, but
Union Carbide as well. Please explain what actions DOE is taking to
hold former contractors at Paducah responsible for nuclear safety
deficiencies.
Answer: The Department's actions include: the investigation of the
current (since 1990) and prior (before 1990) environment, safety and
health procedures and practices; evaluation of concerns related to
operations prior to 1990; examination of relevant site records;
evaluation of potential liability for civil penalties (applicable to
activities after January 1996); and assessment of current and prior
contractual responsibilities and liabilities.