    [House Hearing, 106 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

               THE POLITICAL FUTURES OF INDONESIA AND EAST TIMOR

    =======================================================================

                                 JOINT HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                      SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

                                     OF THE

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                            INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                                    AND THE

                 SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

                                     OF THE

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                               FOREIGN RELATIONS
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                           ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                   __________

                               SEPTEMBER 9, 1999
                                   __________

                               Serial No. 106-68
                                   __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

                          U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
     61-319 CC                   WASHINGTON : 2000
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                       For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
     Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402

                      COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

                     BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
    WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania    SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
    JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa                 TOM LANTOS, California
    HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois              HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
    DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska              GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
    DAN BURTON, Indiana                      Samoa
    ELTON GALLEGLY, California           MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
    CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina       ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California         SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
    DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois         CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
    EDWARD R. ROYCE, California          ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
    PETER T. KING, New York              PAT DANNER, Missouri
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
    MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South     BRAD SHERMAN, California
        Carolina                         ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
    MATT SALMON, Arizona                 STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
    AMO HOUGHTON, New York               JIM DAVIS, Florida
    TOM CAMPBELL, California             EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
    JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
    KEVIN BRADY, Texas                   GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    RICHARD BURR, North Carolina         BARBARA LEE, California
    PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio                JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
    GEORGE P. RADANOVICH, California     JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
    JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
    THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
                        Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
              Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff
                                     ------

                      Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific

                       DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska, Chairman
    JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa                 TOM LANTOS, California
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California         HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
    PETER T. KING, New York              ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
    MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South         Samoa
        Carolina                         MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
    MATT SALMON, Arizona                 SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
    JOHN McHUGH, New York                ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
    RICHARD BURR, North Carolina         JIM DAVIS, Florida
    PAUL GILLMOR, Ohio                   EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
    DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois         GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
    EDWARD R. ROYCE, California          ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
    JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
                    Mike Ennis, Subcommittee Staff Director
             Dr. Robert King, Democratic Professional Staff Member
                             Matt Reynolds, Counsel
                      Alicia A. O'Donnell, Staff Associate

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                                   WITNESSES

                                                                       Page

    The Honorable Thomas R. Pickering, Undersecretary for Political
      Affairs, U.S. Department of State..............................    08
    Ambassador Paul Wolfowitz, Dean, School of Advanced International
      Studies, Johns Hopkins University..............................    31
    Dr. Donald K. Emmerson, Senior Fellow, Asia/Pacific Research
      Center, Stanford University....................................    36
    Ms. Sidney Jones, Executive Director, Asia Division, Human Rights
      Watch..........................................................    40

                                    APPENDIX

    The Honorable Craig Thomas, a U.S. Senator from Wyoming..........    54
    The Honorable Doug Bereuter, a Representative in Congress from
      Nebraska.......................................................    55
    The Honorable Benjamin Gilman, a Representative in Congress from
      New York.......................................................    59
    The Honorable John Kerry, a U.S. Senator from Massachusetts......    61
    The Honorable Alcee Hastings, a Representative in Congress from
      Florida........................................................    63
    The Honorable Eni Faleomavaega, a Delegate in Congress from
      America Samoa..................................................    65
    The Honorable Tomas R. Pickering, Undersecretary for Political
      Affairs, U.S. Department of State..............................    68
    Dr. Donald K. Emmerson, Senior Fellow, Asia/Pacific Research
      Center, Stanford University....................................    77
    Ms. Sidney Jones, Executive Director, Asia Division, Human Rights
      Watch..........................................................    82

               THE POLITICAL FUTURES OF INDONESIA AND EAST TIMOR

                                  ----------

                          Thursday, September 9, 1999

                      House of Representatives,
                  Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,
                          Committee on International Relations,
                      Jointly with U.S. Senate,
        Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
                                Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                       Washington, D.C.
        The Subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in
    room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Bereuter
    [Chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific]
    presiding.
        Mr. Bereuter. The joint Subcommittee hearing will come to
    order. Ordinarily, we would like to wait for our first witness,
    but because there has been a vote called in the Senate, I am
    going to defer to former House Member, Senator Craig Thomas,
    who chairs the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, so
    he can make an opening statement. Thank you, Senator Thomas for
    co-chairing this hearing. The gentleman from Wyoming is
    recognized.
        Senator Thomas. My pleasure. Thank you very much for having
    this hearing and including us in it.
        There is a present crisis in East Timor. I will keep my
    statement brief so we can get on with the witnesses. This is
    apparently only the second time in about 15 years the
    Subcommittees of the House and Senate Foreign Relations have
    held a joint hearing. In fact, the joint hearing was on China
    in 1996. And so I believe that sort of underscores the
    seriousness that we both take at the current situation.
        Indonesia is one of the most important and, regrettably,
    overlooked countries in Southeast Asia. The world's fourth
    largest country, Indonesia is the keystone in the regional
    stability and a guiding force in ASEAN's growing importance.
    Despite tremendous internal economic difficulties, the country
    has undertaken some admirable series of political reforms which
    has culminated in the first democratic election in 40 years.
        On the topic of East Timor, the government has taken a big
    step by allowing a plebiscite with the possible outcome of East
    Timor becoming independent. I have generally been a supporter
    of Indonesia as Chairman of the Subcommittee, have tried to
    recognize not just its shortcomings as some do, but its
    accomplishments as well, but the crisis in Timor threatens to
    put all that Indonesia has achieved in jeopardy.
        To avoid that outcome, the Indonesian government needs to
    act and act now, forcefully, decisively, and unequivocally, to
    quell the violence in East Timor. The Indonesian military needs
    to make it absolutely clear that it is not condoning or
    assisting the militias, explicitly or implicitly, and move
    quickly to restore order. Then both the government and the
    military need to move forward with implementing the outcome of
    the recent plebiscite.
        I believe that Indonesia has the ability to do this. The
    question is whether it has the will. If it does not act and
    soon, then it may be necessary to pursue measures in Congress
    and the U.N. aimed at causing Indonesia to live up to its
    responsibilities. I would support some form of international
    peacekeeping force if Indonesia does not act. I do not believe,
    however, that the United States should be prominently involved
    as we already are shouldering a number of peacekeeping burdens
    throughout the globe. We do not need to add East Timor to this
    list.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have to run, but I shall return
    because I am interested in your panel.
        Mr. Bereuter. Thank you very much, Senator Thomas.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Thomas appears in the
    appendix.]
        Mr. Bereuter. The Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, as
    noted, meets with the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific
    Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today to
    receive testimony on the political futures of Indonesia and
    East Timor in the aftermath of the vote for independence by an
    overwhelming majority of East Timorese. As mentioned by our
    colleague Senator Thomas, it is uncommon for us to hold joint
    hearings between the two Houses, but these are uncommon times
    in Indonesia, to say the least.
        I want to welcome our Senators on their return from their
    vote.
        In the wake of the vote in East Timor, both Indonesia and
    East Timor face a future filled with portent. For Indonesia,
    the referendum comes at a time of very sensitive political
    maneuvering and fragile economic recovery. When the
    Subcommittee last held hearings on Indonesia on May 12, 1999,
    we were anxiously awaiting the June 7 national election.
    Despite some violence, a very slow vote count, and a limited
    amount of election irregularities, that election was,
    nonetheless, judged by the international community to be a
    success. It buoyed optimism about Indonesia's ability to
    overcome its profound political and economic crises.
        However, this election also created new complexities. No
    one party achieved a majority, and, in fact, the opposition
    PDIP, led by Megawati Sukarnoputri, won a plurality of the
    vote. Therefore, for the first time in modern Indonesian
    history, political coalitions will need to be formed to elect a
    new president, to form a new government, to carry out further
    economic and political reforms, to address the subject of
    rescinding the 1976 law which integrated East Timor into
    Indonesia as its 27th province, and to address separatist
    sentiments in other parts of Indonesia such as Aceh. Indeed,
    this is a new experience for these relatively immature
    political forces. How they carry out their responsibilities
    will determine how legitimate the new government will be viewed
    in the eyes of the Indonesian public and of the international
    community.
        Of course, the most obvious and immediate test is the
    crisis in East Timor. After years of Indonesian intransigence,
    President Habibie took bold steps toward resolving this
    longstanding problem. In January, he seemingly brushed aside
    the reservations of the military and surprised the world by
    offering the people of East Timor an opportunity to determine
    their own future through the ballot box. Many of us were
    encouraged by this bold and positive development. There was,
    perhaps, a general sense of guarded optimism prompted by the
    assurances of President Habibie and Armed Forces Chief General
    Wiranto that Jakarta would maintain order and create an
    environment conducive for a fair and safe election. That,
    however, proved not to be a realistic assessment.
        Despite increased violence and intimidation by Indonesian
    military-supported militias in the recent East Timorese
    elections, a record 98.6 percent of registered voters turned
    out to vote, with 78 percent of them apparently choosing
    independence. The will of the East Timorese people is clear,
    and it is overwhelming.
        It is evident by the horrific events in East Timor over the
    past week that the Indonesian government, and in particular the
    Indonesian military, has been deliberately unwilling or,
    perhaps in some cases, unable to uphold its responsibility to
    provide peace and security. I emphasize that this is
    Indonesia's responsibility. Indonesia demanded this
    responsibility from the United Nations, and the international
    community entrusted it to Indonesia. It is reported that the
    United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan has made very
    strong representations to the Indonesian government about its
    obligations and about the negative consequences Jakarta could
    face from the international community for jeopardizing the
    integrity and the subsequent implementation of the expressed
    citizens' desires of this U.N.-sponsored election.
        While reports to date have been negative, we all should
    hope and insist that the recent imposition of martial law in
    East Timor is a sincere effort to restore order. Martial law
    should be used to disarm and disband the militias and to
    provide genuine protection to the people of East Timor. This is
    the obligation of Indonesia until the transition to
    independence is complete and the responsibility for security
    and protection of civil liberties is then transferred to the
    United Nations. Indeed, that is all the more reason for the
    United Nations not to completely withdraw from East Timor and
    thus to ensure that Indonesia fulfills its responsibilities.
        I have just returned from Australia where I participated in
    high-level discussions with the Australian Foreign Minister,
    the Defense Minister, and all of the key parliamentary leaders.
    I want to commend Australia for its willingness to take the
    lead in efforts to appropriately respond to this crisis and for
    its readiness to send military forces under U.N. auspices, if
    necessary, to East Timor. I hope that a U.N. force is not
    necessary.
        While I believe that the United States should work closely
    with her Australian allies and others to address the needs that
    they may have should the deployment of foreign forces to East
    Timor occur, I strongly believe that any effort in the Congress
    or by the Administration to deploy American ground forces in
    East Timor is extremely premature. Given the way that the
    Administration effectively bypassed Congressional involvement
    in its decisions to deploy armed forces to conflicts in Bosnia
    and Kosovo, it is incumbent on the Administration that it now
    consult closely with the Congress before it considers any acts
    to deploy any U.S. military forces in East Timor.
        Unfortunately, it appears that some political forces in
    Jakarta may be trying to manipulate this crisis to strike at
    their political opponents or enhance their political standing
    with a view toward the upcoming November presidential elections
    in the People's Consultative Assembly. It is time for the
    Indonesians to put politics aside. The continuing crisis in
    East Timor is putting the future of Indonesia and its standing
    in the international community at grave risk. They should
    understand that reality.
        While previous Congressional actions focused on East Timor
    have largely had counterproductive results--they have resulted
    in us losing overall access and leverage in Indonesia,
    particularly the Indonesian military--the U.S. nonetheless
    remains a key element in Indonesia's economic recovery
    strategy. One very important point of leverage remains, and,
    accordingly, I join many of my colleagues in warning Jakarta
    that Congressional support for pending and future IMF and World
    Bank resources to Indonesia are at grave risk unless acceptable
    order is restored in East Timor. At risk, too, is the foreign
    investment and capital that Indonesia so desperately needs for
    economic growth and recovery. The leadership in Indonesia only
    needs to look at what the world markets are saying and then to
    focus on the sharply negative drop in the value of Indonesia's
    currency. That should tell the leadership to properly restore
    order in East Timor now.
        While the tragedy in East Timor has dominated the headlines
    and directly affects Indonesia's international credibility and
    status, we cannot let it be the only factor influencing our
    policy toward Indonesia. Since President Suharto resigned 16
    months ago, Indonesia has taken large strides toward the
    establishment of a more open and more genuinely democratic
    political system. The importance of this development is not as
    widely appreciated as it should be in the United States, for,
    among our citizens, it is the least well-known large nation. I
    could go into some detail about its importance in the region,
    its size, and its previous positive actions in the region, but
    I think my colleagues are well aware of those contributions.
        I am pleased today that we will have the opportunity to
    hear from both the Administration and a distinguished panel of
    private witnesses. Testifying for the Administration will be
    the Honorable Thomas R. Pickering, the Under Secretary of State
    for Political Affairs. It should be noted that Ambassador
    Pickering is presently serving as acting Secretary of State in
    Secretary Albright's absence. Ambassador Pickering has a very
    long and distinguished career in the Foreign Service, as all of
    you know in great detail.
        We are honored to have an excellent second panel of
    distinguished witnesses, Ambassador Paul Wolfowitz, presently
    Dean of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns
    Hopkins University, and formerly Ambassador to Indonesia.
        Dr. Donald Emmerson is a senior fellow at Stanford
    University's Asia/Pacific Research Center and a University of
    Wisconsin-Madison Professor of Political Science and Southeast
    Asian studies. He just returned from East Timor, having been
    there to monitor last week's election with the Carter Center.
        Finally, we welcome Ms. Sidney Jones, the Executive
    Director of the Asia Division of Human Rights Watch. Ms. Jones
    is a longtime observer of Indonesia, and her insights are
    invaluable.
        I did think I should first set the atmosphere here and next
    to turn to my colleague, Tom Lantos, the Ranking Member of the
    Asia and Pacific Subcommittee, and then to the Chairman of the
    Full Committee Mr. Gilman for statements that they might like
    to have. Then, I hope that we can proceed, Ambassador
    Pickering.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Bereuter appears in the
    appendix.]
        Mr. Bereuter. Mr. Lantos.
        Mr. Lantos. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
    commend you both for calling this hearing and for the exemplary
    manner in which you have Chaired this Committee on Asia.
        I would like to begin my observations in what I think will
    be a somewhat surprising manner. Whenever we don't deal with
    human rights issues when they first emerge, later on we will be
    forced to deal with them under far less favorable and far more
    serious circumstances. When we of the Congressional Human
    Rights Caucus initially dealt with Kosovo, nobody knew the name
    Kosovo, but we have come to learn the name Kosovo at an
    enormous cost in treasure and in human life.
        May I say that there is a parallel between the lack of
    interest in the Congress in Kosovo 15 years ago and the
    preoccupation with Kosovo in the last year and the lack of
    interest in East Timor in years gone by and the sudden interest
    today. It was the Congressional Human Rights Caucus which held
    the first hearing on the persecution of the East Timorese, and
    I suspect that if we could arouse early interest on the part of
    our colleagues across the spectrum in dealing with human rights
    outrages in the early stages, we will not be confronted with
    these crises.
        Now, what about this crisis? This crisis, Mr. Chairman, is
    of Indonesia's making. I hold the Government of Indonesia fully
    responsible for precipitating this crisis, and I hold Indonesia
    fully responsible for the outrage which is unfolding as we
    meet. It is perfectly clear that the Indonesian military has
    the resources to put an end to the rampaging militias overnight
    if they choose to do so, and I think they need to be put on
    notice that it is their responsibility, and if they don't act
    promptly, there will be long-term and devastating consequences.
    It is their responsibility to see to it that the bloodshed, the
    looting, the pillaging, the burning, the gangsterlike behavior
    must come to an end. The top military leader, Mr. Wiranto, has
    the capability of bringing this crisis to an end overnight. I
    call on him to do so.
        Mr. Chairman, our Administration has been exemplary in its
    attempt to advise President Habibie, the military, and others
    that they need to prevent this outrage from unfolding. It is
    simply not true, as some claim, that we have not cautioned the
    Government of Indonesia to prevent what was a predictable
    outburst of violent behavior.
        You mentioned that 98.6 percent of the people of East Timor
    voted, and this is a tremendous tribute because they were under
    horrendous pressure and intimidation and physical assault not
    to participate in the election. And 78.5 percent of them voted
    in favor of independence. A more ringing endorsement for
    independence you could never get. Yet the militia, supported by
    some elements of the Indonesian military, the official
    military, is now attempting to undo the results of a relatively
    free and open election, and I underscore relatively, because
    the people of East Timor were intimidated and harassed.
        I think it is absolutely critical that the community of
    civilized nations insist that the results of this election
    remain. They cannot be undone by violence on the part of the
    militias and segments of the military. I think it is equally
    important that humanitarian organizations, non-governmental
    organizations, intergovernmental organizations have immediate
    access so they can conduct their humanitarian work in East
    Timor.
        I think it is extremely critical, Mr. Chairman, that the
    Indonesian government take full responsibility for restoring
    order. If, in fact, we should need an international force, I
    want to pay tribute to Australia for its forthcoming stand on
    this matter, and I think we should, in fact, give full support
    to an international force under U.N. auspices.
        I also believe that we need to recognize that the
    overwhelming bulk of the Indonesian people are not responsible
    for this outrage, and I think at this stage to advocate
    terminating aid that help the most needy, the poorest, the
    destitute who have suffered so much in Indonesia would be a
    mistake. There was no social safety net in Indonesia when the
    Asian economic collapse came, and I want to pay tribute to both
    the U.N. and the World Bank for moving in an effective way of
    providing some kind of a safety net. So however well-
    intentioned calls are for immediately terminating all
    assistance to Indonesia, I think saner heads will have to
    prevail. We don't want to punish destitute people in Java and
    Sumatra for the outrages of the militia in East Timor. We need
    to deal differently with structural long-term aid. We need to
    deal differently with IMF funding. But I think the humanitarian
    assistance on which millions of Indonesians outside of Timor
    are depending for their daily survival must be continued.
        I look forward to hearing from Secretary Pickering. I want
    to commend you again for holding this hearing.
        Mr. Bereuter. Mr. Lantos, I thank you very much for your
    strong statement. We may have some minor points of discussion
    on how we use any leverage we have with the IMF, but I think as
    usual, and not surprisingly, we should be able to approach this
    in a strong bipartisan fashion.
        I would like now to call upon the Chairman of the Full
    Committee and then, as a matter of equity, upon Mr. Gejdenson,
    the Ranking Member of the Full Committee.
        Mr. Bereuter. Mr. Gilman.
        Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
    Chairman Bereuter for holding this very timely hearing today at
    this appropriate time. I want to welcome our Senate colleagues
    who are here from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We
    welcome you to the House, and we welcome you to our Committee.
        All of us are very troubled by the deteriorating situation
    in East Timor. I am troubled by the Administration's response
    to this situation. I hope that Secretary Pickering who is here
    with us today will be able to supply answers to some of the
    questions that we have.
        It appears that we are abrogating our Nation's leadership
    in Southeast Asia, and I am greatly concerned by that prospect.
    Some questions that I hope our witnesses can answer will be,
    how is the so-called ``Clinton Doctrine'' going to be applied
    to East Timor, and has our Nation ruled out the use of American
    troops in a peacekeeping force? Is there a double standard for
    Europe and the rest of the world? And why is the Administration
    not taking a more leading role in resolving this crisis which
    occurs in a region of the world enormously significant to our
    national security interests--a nation that has the fourth
    largest population in the world? And why is the Administration
    not calling for an immediate review of current international
    financial assistance to Indonesia? And why hasn't the
    Administration called for the immediate cessation of bilateral
    military assistance to Indonesia? Hopefully our witnesses today
    can help provide some answers to these questions.
        Our Nation should coordinate its approach to the East Timor
    crisis with our allies in the region. It is inappropriate to
    limit American options at this point, particularly economic
    sanctions and American participation in peacekeeping
    operations. The Government of Indonesia should be convinced to
    shoulder its responsibilities in this crisis.
        What is happening in East Timor today is nothing short of
    ethnic cleansing. The scorched earth policy of these marauding
    gangs must be stopped and stopped quickly. Genocide and the
    specter of civil war loom. The Indonesian government must act
    quickly to restore order to the island and end another tragic
    episode in East Timor's history. There could be grave
    consequences for Indonesia's relations with our Nation and the
    international community if the appropriate steps are not
    undertaken to control renegade police militias and the armed
    forces. As a last resort, the international community should be
    prepared to assist in the restoration of order to stop this
    kind of senseless violence against the East Timorese.
        Patience with Jakarta's promises is wearing thin. I call
    upon the Government of Indonesia to abide by its commitment to
    respect the results of the referendum and the rights of the
    East Timorese to a peaceful transition to independence. And
    when the situation stabilizes, I am going to urge the
    Administration to provide ample humanitarian assistance to the
    long-suffering people of East Timor. President Clinton should
    not limit American policy options. It only diminishes our
    ability to lead. East Timor may be a small island in Southeast
    Asia, but the United States does have a moral imperative to
    prevent another genocide in this strategically important part
    of the world.
        Mr. Chairman, I understand you will be taking the lead in
    crafting legislation to deal with this crisis, and I look
    forward to working with you on that. I look forward to the
    testimony of Secretary Pickering and the other distinguished
    panelists who are here today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Chairman Gilman.
        [The prepared questions referred to appear in the
    appendix.]
        Mr. Bereuter. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
    Connecticut, Mr. Gejdenson, the Ranking Member of the Full
    Committee.
        Mr. Gejdenson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join with my
    colleagues, and I know I join with the Administration, in
    urging the Indonesian government to act swiftly. I know,
    contrary to the implication of today's Washington Post story,
    my conversation with Mr. Berger yesterday evening indicated
    that he and the Administration were pressing the Indonesians,
    both the government, military and nonmilitary there, to take
    every and immediate action to bring this violence to an end. It
    will endanger Indonesia's economic recovery and political
    reintegration into the world community if this situation isn't
    resolved immediately. I certainly, again, unlike the story in
    the Washington Post, in my conversation yesterday with Mr.
    Berger, got the indication Mr. Berger felt that it was
    imperative that the Indonesians immediately take this action
    and that the world community needs to respond as quickly as
    possible. I think we have a unanimimity of opinion here that is
    seldom seen in Washington about the situation in East Timor.
        I am glad to see Mr. Pickering here to express the
    Administration's opinion today.
        Mr. Bereuter. I thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.
        Mr. Bereuter. All Members' opening statements will be made
    a part of the record without objection.
        I want to recognize Senator Thomas' statement began this
    session. He has returned for a vote. We have been joined by
    Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska and Senator Paul Wellstone of
    Minnesota. Congressmen Brian Bilbray has also joined us. He not
    a Member of the Committee but has important knowledge and
    personal interest in the area. We welcome all of you gentlemen
    to this joint hearing.
        Mr. Bereuter. Ambassador Pickering, you may proceed as you
    wish.

      STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS R. PICKERING, UNDER SECRETARY FOR
              POLITICAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

        Mr. Pickering. Mr. Chairman, Senators, Members of the
    House, thank you very much for receiving me today and for
    holding this unusual joint hearing to discuss Indonesia and the
    disturbing developments in East Timor. I want to apologize for
    being a few minutes late. Apparently this and other hearings
    are very popular today, and getting into the building is
    somewhat slower than normal.
        I come before you under grave circumstances with the fate
    of the territory of East Timor still very much in question. The
    devastating events of the past few days in East Timor compel us
    to begin today with that very important subject. Because of the
    complexity of this problem, I ask your indulgence in allowing
    me to make a full statement.
        Before turning to the specifics of what is happening on the
    ground, I think it is important for all of us to put East Timor
    in perspective by reminding everyone of where this crisis is
    taking place. East Timor, as you know, occupies half of an
    island in the vast Archipelago of Indonesia at the eastern
    extremity. Indonesia, as we all know, is the world's fourth
    most populous nation and home to the world's largest Muslim
    population. It is resource-rich, spans some of the most
    strategic waterways in the world, and plays a significant key
    role in political and economic stability in Southeast Asia, a
    region in which the United States has great economic and
    strategic interests. What happens to Indonesia thus matters to
    the region, and it matters to the United States.
        This, Mr. Chairman, makes the current crisis in East Timor
    doubly troubling, for it is clear that Indonesia's handling of
    East Timor will have an enormous impact on its ability to
    maintain cooperative relations with the international
    community. But Indonesia's future is solely in its own hands
    right now. This is a crisis of its making, and only Indonesia
    can decide to do the right things right now.
        With that as my preface, let me turn to the events of the
    past week and a half. As is known to the Members of these
    Subcommittees and indeed to the whole world, hundreds of
    thousands of East Timorese defied months of intimidation by
    military-backed armed prointegration militias to express their
    opinion on East Timor's future status in the United Nations-
    administered election on August 30. Over 78 percent of the
    voters rejected Jakarta's autonomy plan in favor of a future
    independent of Indonesian rule. While the balloting took place
    without major incident, prointegration militias fomented
    violence before the vote and reacted even more violently almost
    immediately after the voting ended.
        The situation deteriorated further after the results were
    announced on September 3, with militia groups targeting
    foreigners, including journalists, for intimidation, leading
    most of them to flee the island. They also forced thousands of
    people from their homes or places of refuge, trucking them off
    to locations and fates still unknown, a very worrying
    development for all of us.
        The militias have attacked concentrations of internally
    displaced persons and set siege to the homes and offices of
    prominent community leaders, burning down the home of Nobel
    Laureate Bishop Belo. They are now attempting to drive out the
    remainder of the United Nations Mission in East Timor, UNAMET,
    as well as Australian diplomats and representatives of
    nongovernmental organizations present in the island. As these
    appalling events have unfolded, the Indonesian military, the
    TNI, formerly ABRI, and the police appear to have either stood
    by or indeed supported the militias.
        Through successive stages of the consultation process in
    East Timor, initial deployment and preparations, registration,
    the campaign period and the vote itself, the Government of
    Indonesia has been increasingly unwilling, and perhaps in some
    cases unable, to live up to the commitments it made under the
    May 5 agreements with the United Nations and with Portugal. In
    those agreements, the Indonesians clearly assumed
    responsibility for maintaining security in the territory and
    for the United Nations Mission. Despite these agreements and
    subsequent assurances from Indonesia, Indonesian authorities
    have never firmly controlled the militias and established
    security in East Timor. Moreover, it is now well-established
    that elements of the military have backed, encouraged and
    perhaps even directed some of the barbaric militia activities.
        President Habibie's declaration of a military emergency in
    East Timor on September 6 has not really improved the
    situation. Defense Minister General Wiranto has sent additional
    troops to East Timor, but these reinforcements have failed to
    rein in the militia despite the fact that the militias are a
    far inferior force.
        The United States has frequently and forcefully expressed
    its grave concerns about rampant militia activity and
    repeatedly urged the Indonesian government at all levels to
    fulfill its security obligations. The public record is clear
    and voluminous. Our diplomatic efforts have been equally
    aggressive. President Clinton has communicated American
    concerns directly and personally to President Habibie. He has
    conferred with the leaders of Australia, Portugal and other
    countries. He has talked to the Secretary General of the United
    Nations. Secretary Albright has conveyed our views to President
    Habibie and to Foreign Minister Alatas in several telephone
    conversations and in face-to-face meetings. She has also spoken
    directly to General Wiranto. Secretary Cohen has sent two
    letters to General Wiranto about East Timor. Stanley Roth,
    Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
    Affairs, and our Ambassador in Jakarta, Stapleton Roy, have
    repeatedly and insistently delivered the same unambiguous
    messages to all senior Indonesian leaders. Both General
    Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Vice
    Chairman General Ralston have telephoned General Wiranto
    several times over the course of this crisis. Admiral Blair,
    Commander in Chief of the Pacific Area Command, who questioned
    General Wiranto about the situation in East Timor on his
    initial visit to Indonesia, just met with Wiranto earlier this
    morning to make clear the severe consequences of Indonesia's
    failure in East Timor in terms of its relations with the
    international community and particularly the United States. The
    United States has worked in the U.N. Security Council as well,
    and with the Secretary General of the United Nations, and the
    United States is supporting an early meeting of that body to
    discuss the evolving situation.
        Despite all of these efforts, East Timor is still a
    territory under siege.
        The United States calls for an immediate stop to the
    killing and destruction in East Timor. The Government of
    Indonesia has had ample opportunity and the capability to
    achieve this. The time has clearly come for Indonesia to invite
    international assistance to restore peace and stability to the
    territory. A number of concerned countries have expressed
    willingness to participate in a multinational force under
    United Nations auspices authorized by the U.N. Security
    Council. Such a force would protect the remaining United
    Nations presence, create conditions for return of the full
    United Nations Mission, and provide security for the United
    Nations to carry out its mandate to implement the clear results
    of the consultation, as the referendum is known. United Nations
    Secretary General Annan first proposed this option to President
    Habibie earlier this week.
        We welcome and are grateful for the leadership role played
    by the Government of Australia, which shares our perspectives
    and concerns about the situation in East Timor and Indonesia.
    Our Australian allies have requested that we consider
    assistance to a multinational force, and we are indeed prepared
    to help. While the President has made no decisions as to what
    kind of support the U.S. would be willing to provide, any
    decision would be made in close consultation with you, the
    Members of the Congress. The nature of U.S. participation under
    current discussion was how we could bring our special
    capabilities to bear in providing material support. Among other
    issues, we have been discussing with our friends and allies
    logistical support, lift, planning, communications and other
    areas where we bring significant capacities to the table.
    However, I must emphasize that our discussions are preliminary
    and subject to consultation here.
        Again, let me reiterate that we are prepared to support
    such an effort in a material way. You might ask me if in a
    material way I mean would Americans be present on the ground to
    carry out such tasks as the President might agree to. My answer
    to that would be yes.
        We have made no decisions now, but we expect to work
    closely with you in the Congress as this process unfolds. While
    we are prepared to contribute to this mission, to date the
    Indonesians are still unwilling to accept international
    assistance. Meanwhile, conditions on the ground, as I have just
    noted, have not measurably improved.
        To demonstrate our profound concern, I would like to
    announce that the United States is suspending its military-to-
    military relationship with Indonesia. It would be inappropriate
    to have operational military contact given the TNI's
    culpability in this tragedy. Admiral Blair informed General
    Wiranto of this development when they met earlier this morning.
        As I said at the outset of my testimony, how the Indonesian
    government deals with the challenges of East Timor will have
    implications for the international community's ability to
    engage with Indonesia, including support for Indonesia's
    economic program. The situation in East Timor is already having
    a damaging effect on the confidence that is so necessary and
    important for economic recovery, and will have significant
    implications for the capacity of the international community,
    including the United States, to support economic reform going
    forward.
        Some in Indonesia and within the pro-integration camp in
    East Timor claim that the result of the August 30 vote is
    invalid, blaming United Nations bias and fraud for the strong
    rejection of Indonesia's autonomy plan. Let me take this
    opportunity to make two statements. First, UNAMET has carried
    out its mission with great professionalism and shown
    determination and courage under the most difficult of
    circumstances. Charges of bias and fraud are not credible given
    that the overwhelming majority voted peacefully and openly to
    separate themselves from Indonesia. This strategy of blaming
    the United Nations and crying foul is not legitimate, and it
    will not be accepted or tolerated by the international
    community.
        Second, I understand that the Governor of East Timor,
    Abilio Soares, has made recent statements to the press
    declaring his intention and that of his followers to seek to
    partition East Timor into a western and eastern half in order
    for pro-Indonesia groups to retain control of the western
    portion of East Timor. The August 30 vote has clearly
    demonstrated the will of the East Timorese people. There is no
    legal, historical or moral basis for a strategy of partition.
    Let me state categorically, this strategy is contrary to the
    plans to which Indonesia has agreed and will also not be
    tolerated by the international community.
        Indonesia is a society struggling to transform itself into
    a democratic Nation while recovering from a severe economic
    recession. The United States has a profound interest in
    assisting Indonesia to emerge from its current political and
    economic crisis as a stable, prosperous and democratic nation.
    It will be a tragedy for the Indonesian people as well as for
    the East Timorese if the East Timor situation severely
    constrains the willingness and ability of the international
    community, including the United States, to work with Indonesia.
    If Indonesia addresses the problem of East Timor in the manner
    to which it originally agreed, it will substantially enhance
    its ability to pursue effectively its economic and political
    transformation. Conversely, continued failure to respond to the
    will of the people of Timor in a process undertaken
    independently by the Government of Indonesia and strongly
    supported and financed by the international community will
    substantially impair Indonesia's relations with the
    international community and put at risk these critical
    political and economic objectives.
        Before moving on, Mr. Chairman, to Indonesia and its
    overall political situation, let me take a moment to speak
    about the special circumstances of East Timor. The United
    Nations and the International community have long recognized
    that East Timor had a unique colonial history, that a valid act
    of self-determination would have been appropriate, and that
    such an act did not take place in 1975 prior to Indonesian
    annexation. This indeed makes East Timor different not only
    from other provinces around the world, but also from other
    provinces within Indonesia. While some Indonesian officials may
    be concerned that permitting East Timor to separate could set
    off independence movements in other parts of Indonesia, we
    believe that humane and orderly management of the transition to
    East Timorese independence, in cooperation with the
    international community, could, instead, communicate clearly to
    the various ethnic groups in Indonesia a reason to have a sense
    of confidence in Indonesian leadership.
        As you well know, Mr. Chairman, Indonesia is a society that
    has been struggling to transform itself into a democratic
    nation while recovering from a severe recession. It is a key
    strategic country in the region, and the United States has a
    profound interest in helping it to emerge from this transition
    as a democratic, peace-loving and economically prosperous
    state. It is important that we not lose sight of this context.
        You will recall that after Suharto's resignation in May
    1999, the Administration of President Habibie launched
    ambitious and far-reaching steps toward a more democratic form
    of government by lifting controls on the press, political
    parties, labor unions and nongovernmental organizations. As a
    result, in a remarkably short time civil society has opened up
    in Indonesia to an unprecedented degree. While the foundations
    of systemic reforms are being set by these changes, much
    remains to be done. Entrenched institutions that reflect the
    priorities of the authoritarian past still need thorough going
    reform. These institutions include the military, police and
    judicial systems. Corruption remains an extremely serious
    concern for all of us.
        The most tangible achievement to date in this democratic
    transition was the nationwide elections for a new Indonesian
    Parliament, DPR, which were held on June 7. Over 100 million
    enthusiastic Indonesians participated. The opposition
    Indonesian Democratic Party of Megawati Sukarnoputri gained the
    greatest percentage of votes, and the ruling Golkar came in a
    distant second. Other opposition parties also attracted
    significant popular support in a fundamentally free and fair
    election. The Indonesian people gave clear expression to their
    desire for democratic change and reform. The United States
    provided more than $30 million, joining in international
    community efforts to support the June election.
        We continue to call on President Habibie and other high-
    level officials to ensure that each successive step in
    Indonesia's political transition is taken in a free, fair and
    transparent manner. We have strongly encouraged further
    Indonesian reform through our assistance programs and by
    consistently stressing Indonesia's responsibilities to respect
    human rights, release political prisoners and protect the
    rights and physical security of all minorities, including those
    of ethnic Chinese Indonesians.
        The next major political step for Indonesia will occur this
    fall, probably in November, when the people's consultative
    assembly, MPR, consisting of the 462 newly elected Parliament
    Members, 38 military representatives and 200 appointed
    provincial and functional representatives, will select a new
    President and Vice President. Leading Presidential contenders
    are seeking to build coalitions and form a working
    parliamentary majority. This maneuvering is far from over. This
    MPR will not resemble the almost wholly hand-picked legislative
    bodies in the Suharto era of the past. However, with one-third
    of the incoming MPR seats either indirectly elected or
    appointed, we share the concerns of many Indonesians that the
    process of selection of these Members must be transparent and
    that their actions be considered legitimate by the people of
    Indonesia. The process has strong implications for the future
    stability of the country. Only if the people deem the process
    of choosing the new national leader legitimate will Indonesia
    have taken another credible step toward becoming the world's
    third largest democracy.
        It is important to keep in mind that the question of East
    Timor has now become enmeshed in this larger political
    transition. According to the May 5 tripartite agreements, the
    MPR must endorse the result of the vote in East Timor before it
    can begin its U.N.-administered transition to autonomy. As
    such, various political actors are using the stage for
    political advantage. Some key figures, including Ms. Megawati,
    have made responsible statements accepting the outcome of the
    ballot on Timor, calling on the military to stop abuses on the
    ground, and expressing her willingness to work with an
    independent East Timor. We commend Ms. Megawati's principled
    and admirable stand in this respect.
        The political and economic changes of the last 16 months
    have come in an environment of increased civil disorder.
    Political pressures growing out of rising expectations, the
    economic desperation of the poor, breakdowns in law and order,
    and longstanding sectarian and ethnic tensions have all
    contributed to unrest in many parts of the nation. Popular
    reaction to military abuses in Aceh, East Timor, Irian Jaya and
    elsewhere in the country have sometimes led to violent
    protests. In the past year, the government's record of
    protecting minorities generally and in unique local situations
    has been poor. Grassroots social, ethnic and religious
    pressures exacerbated by continued economic dislocation and
    eroding respect for police authorities remain intense and
    explosive.
        The security forces, the TNI, faced with street rallies,
    demonstrations and riots, have reacted with violent suppression
    in some cases and unresponsive inaction in others. Many
    Indonesians believe that the TNI should cease to play a
    political role under Indonesia's dual function system. Morale
    has suffered. All these factors degrade the government's
    ability to maintain order.
        The causes of civil strife are various, but a significant
    influence on civil order has been the sharp decline in the
    economy. Indonesia was the Southeast Asian country hardest hit
    by the Asian financial crisis. A dramatic economic collapse
    beginning in early 1998 pushed the number of Indonesians living
    below the poverty line from 20-28 million, making food and
    other essential goods increasingly expensive for many.
    Unemployment, combined with rising inflation, dramatically
    reduced purchasing power. The United States responded to these
    crises of a humanitarian character by providing Indonesia with
    several hundred million dollars in food, humanitarian
    assistance and development aid in the last two years.
        The Indonesian government has been working with the
    International Monetary Fund on an economic reform program since
    the autumn of 1997. Indonesia's stabilization package provides
    for unprecedented accelerated structural reforms in every
    sector of the economy and major changes in the trade regime.
    Indonesia has generally complied, but more effective corporate
    and bank restructuring, which will be crucial to resumption of
    sustainable growth rates, is necessary. Corruption and the lack
    of transparency remain very significant problems for companies
    doing business in Indonesia, and the Government of Indonesia
    has stepped up efforts to address these concerns, but the
    recent Bank Bali scandal in particular has shaken confidence in
    the government's ability to make significant progress in this
    area and will clearly impact negatively IMF decisions on future
    disbursements. Indonesia's economy has been making a slow
    recovery from the depths of the crisis last year. After
    shrinking by 13 percent in 1998, GDP rose by 1.8 percent in the
    second quarter of 1999, while in August 1999, annual inflation
    fell to 5.8 percent, the lowest rate since 1997.
        The economic recovery is slow and fragile. In addition,
    Indonesia is faced with internal demands for a redistribution
    of wealth from resource extraction, a concern which is
    complicated by growing separatist sentiment in Aceh and Irian
    Jaya.
        Some make parallels between East Timor and another area of
    separatist activity, Aceh. Sumatra's oil- and gas-rich
    northernmost province is home to a long-standing separatist
    movement that has grown in size and popularity over the past
    year in reaction to past and current military abuses and the
    lack of redress over economic grievances. But unlike East
    Timor, Aceh is seen by all Indonesians and recognized by the
    international community as an integral part of the Indonesian
    state. Aceh has deep historical and cultural ties to Indonesia.
    An independent Aceh threatens the very integrity of the
    Indonesian state. The central government in Jakarta initially
    tried some conciliatory steps, but Jakarta's response has since
    been dominated by military actions which have only inflamed the
    situation. The TNI, frustrated by losses to armed separatists,
    has reportedly targeted civilians whom they claim are helping
    the insurgents and has engaged in fresh atrocities. The United
    States has pressed Jakarta to end the abuses and return to
    dialogue in order to promote a political solution.
        Several groups in the Irian Jaya province are pursuing
    independence for what they term West Papua. They argue that
    despite U.N. brokering of the process, the people of the region
    never approved its incorporation into Indonesia, and the Papuan
    people have been systematically oppressed by the Indonesians.
    There is conflict between Indonesia's people and transmigrants,
    Indonesians moved in from elsewhere in Indonesia. Over the
    years, there have been regular reports of killings and rapes of
    indigenous people in Irian's central highlands and elsewhere in
    the province. Churches and the Indonesian Human Rights
    Commission have documented these credible accounts of
    widespread human rights abuses by security authorities. Irian
    Jaya separatists, who also have economic grievances based on
    low redistribution back to the province of profits from mining
    and exploitation of other local resources, primarily press
    their case through nonviolent means.
        The United States has expressed concerns about human rights
    abuses in Irian Jaya and has urged the Habibie Administration
    to foster dialogue and negotiation. In February 1999, President
    Habibie participated in a meeting with 100 representatives of
    local civic leaders and leading Indonesian political figures in
    accordance with a terms of reference for dialogue negotiated in
    September 1998. The second dialogue meeting which was scheduled
    to be held in July has yet to take place. Indonesian security
    authorities reportedly have harassed the civil society's
    leaders from Irian Jaya who attended the February meeting. The
    government requires travel permits for journalists and
    researchers wishing to visit Irian Jaya, which has delayed
    investigation of reported human rights abuses.
        In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, Indonesia has an historic
    opportunity to transform itself into a democratic country. In
    attempting to do so, it faces manifold and significant
    difficulties. Its tragic handling of East Timor, the failure of
    the Indonesian government to make good on its commitments and
    its responsibility for the present diplomatic and humanitarian
    disaster will have far reaching consequences and most
    importantly for Indonesia itself. The Government of Indonesia
    needs to right this wrong. If they cannot do so themselves, as
    is already abundantly clear, they have a clear alternative, to
    let the United Nations through a multinational force assist
    them.
        Even if the East Timor situation can be put back on track,
    Indonesia's transformation will continue to be complicated. The
    United States hopes to remain fully engaged to help see
    Indonesia on a path to democracy, prosperity and stability. But
    the bottom line is clear. The future is now in Indonesia's own
    hands.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of both
    Subcommittees, for allowing me to make such a lengthy
    statement. I look forward to addressing your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Pickering appears in the
    appendix.]
        Mr. Bereuter. Ambassador Pickering, thank you for your
    forthright and very important statement. I think it will help
    inform the American public about the situation in East Timor
    and about the prospects for Indonesia and American relations.
    It will also provide the basis for some possible questions and
    comments from my colleagues and, perhaps for a common policy
    response to the crisis in East Timor between the Congress and
    the Executive Branch.
        I appreciate your effort today. Chairman Thomas is involved
    in a particular amendment right now and will return as soon as
    possible. It is our intention to proceed, and it is the
    Chairman's intention to proceed under the 5 minute rule for
    questions and comments from Members of the Joint Committee. In
    a bicameral courtesy, I want to recognize first the
    distinguished gentleman from Delaware, the Ranking Member of
    the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Joseph Biden,
    first for comments and questions that he might like to make
    under the 5 minute rule.
        Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Since we
    don't have many grazing rights in Delaware, I am able to stay.
    That is the issue we are debating right now. No cattle grazing.
    We have other kinds of grazing rights but not those. I will be
    very brief, hopefully not take the 5 minutes.
        Mr. Secretary, thank you for your testimony. I have one
    question. I have many, but I will limit it to one, and that is,
    is anyone from the Australians to anyone else, including our
    government, talking about an international force without a U.S.
    mandate and without the invitation of Jakarta--the U.N., excuse
    me, without a U.N. mandate--thank you very much--and without
    Jakarta's permission, blessing, invitation?
        Mr. Pickering. Senator Biden, to the best of my knowledge,
    none of the countries in the category that you named is now
    talking about an international force without a United Nations
    mandate or a Jakarta invitation. I happen to think that a U.N.
    mandate would not be possible today, at least without a Jakarta
    invitation.
        Senator Biden. China would veto any----
        Mr. Pickering. I believe that is a significant possibility.
    I don't want to make----
        Senator Biden. You don't want to speak for China?
        Mr. Pickering. I don't want to speak for China. I would
    like to allow them room to make their own decision. I don't
    want to put them in a box where they don't feel they belong if
    I can put it that way.
        Senator Biden. Does the Administration think there should
    be any outside force introduced if Jakarta refuses to invite an
    international force?
        Mr. Pickering. The Administration's view is that an outside
    force is necessary, as I have said. It respects the views that
    have been expressed by the principal participants in this force
    that it can't be done without an Indonesian invitation and a
    Security Council approval and we have therefore been making
    extremely serious efforts to try to obtain that. Politically we
    have cutoff assistance, as you know, today on the military
    side. We believe in effect that any future assistance from the
    international financial institutions is effectively cutoff as
    of now, will not be more forthcoming because of a number of
    factors, including some that antedate the East Timor crisis
    but, I am sure, the East Timor crisis worsens that. Our own
    bilateral assistance is being intensively reviewed. We want to
    continue at least for this period of time to be able to protect
    that assistance that goes directly to the basic human needs of
    Indonesians who will require it and protects democracy, but we
    are looking at it from that point of view to determine whether
    and, if so, how quickly any should be cutoff beyond the present
    programs.
        So I believe we are adopting a posture, if I could call it
    that way, of building maximum strength at this particular time
    in the direction that is outlined in terms of moving ahead, but
    the bulk of the countries would have to participate. If that
    doesn't work, then we will clearly have to seriously re-examine
    additional economic, political, trade sanctions and other steps
    in an effort clearly to bring that about.
        Senator Biden. Thank you very much. Thank you for your
    courtesy, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Senator Biden. The Chair has had
    an opportunity to express his views and will wait till the end
    for questions if necessary. I turn now to the next Republican
    in attendance. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Sanford,
    is recognized.
        Mr. Sanford. I thank the gentleman. I want to go back to
    what the Senator was at least touching on, and that was this
    issue of invitation from Jakarta and sanctioning if you will by
    the U.N. given the precedent that the Administration has set in
    places like Kosovo and the fact there was hardly invitation
    from Belgrade for our involvement in that part of the world,
    how can you have both policies? It seemed to me there would
    be--to the degree they are mutually exclusive, given the fact
    we were involved for humanitarian reasons in Kosovo, how could
    the Administration sit idly by in East Timor?
        Mr. Pickering. I explained, I believe, Mr. Sanford, the
    reasons why or at least the fact that other countries who would
    be principal participants in this particular effort have drawn
    a clear line.
        Mr. Sanford. That is why they have. But my question is for
    the Administration.
        Mr. Pickering. As I said clearly in my opening statement,
    we are prepared to support efforts undertaken under the
    leadership of Australia to have an international force go in
    and that we are supporting Secretary-General Annan's request to
    Prime Minister Habibie. Incidentally, it was a request which
    was originally accepted by Prime Minister Habibie that if he
    couldn't reestablish law and order in a particular short time
    and a Security Council Commission is out there reporting on
    that effect, he let it be known, we believe, to the Secretary-
    General that he would invite such a group in. That is ongoing
    now. There have been other statements from Indonesia but our
    preference, our clear hope, the direction in which we are
    currently moving, all of the diplomatic efforts that we have
    made have been to move in that direction.
        Now, you raised a question of comparisons. In each one of
    these cases obviously what is practical, what is going to be
    effective on the ground, what will work, what is feasible are
    clearly measures that have to be used to judge which is the
    appropriate policy to follow and how far to pursue that and how
    to make it work.
        Mr. Sanford. I understand. But in other words, going back
    to what you just said, you said preference, the
    Administration's strong preference was to act in accordance
    with invitation of Jakarta and in accordance with the United
    Nations. What you are saying, that is a preference. If push
    came to shove, the Administration would act unilaterally?
        Mr. Pickering. I think it is very, very difficult for me to
    address hypotheticals from this particular position right now
    and I would not do it. I think that those are questions that
    are reserved for the highest level decision in the Executive
    Branch after, as I have said, full consultation with all of
    you. That process, in my view, is a viable process. It will
    give us the opportunity to be flexible if that is necessary.
    What it means, as the Chairman has just invited, I hope, is
    that we will be pursuing a bipartisan, bi-branch policy on a
    very difficult issue and at this point I am not here to rule
    things, that are beyond, frankly, where we have just come in
    the clear statement I believe I have made about where we stand.
        Mr. Sanford. One last question because I know my time is
    running short, Mr. Chairman. Some people have suggested that
    the agreement in Rambouillet was that sign this or we will bomb
    you. Could one argue that basically we are going down that same
    route again in that we are cutting off assistance, we are
    disengaging in terms of military contact? Are we increasingly
    isolating them to the point where in either come to agreement,
    sign up with the United Nations, invite us in or we are sending
    people in unilaterally?
        Mr. Pickering. I think that again that is another way of
    asking me the question that I think I just provided you a clear
    answer to and I admire your efforts to try to somehow recast
    this in a different form.
        Mr. Sanford. Fair enough.
        Mr. Pickering. What I would say, however, Mr. Sanford, and
    I think it is extremely important that we are pursuing
    diplomatic efforts, including obviously taking serious actions,
    which we have today and serious actions are clearly a part and
    parcel of the attitude of the international financial
    institutions which we are both interested in and we believe in
    fact, as we have in other crises of this sort, that it is the
    use of diplomatic and related steps to bring about the
    appropriate answer to the question which must be clearly
    explored and thoroughly used by the United States, and that is
    important. The fact that we have begun a series of diplomatic
    efforts and indeed I would say pressures, and I think Indonesia
    is isolating itself in this particular situation and we have
    warned it about isolating itself, doesn't necessarily either
    preclude or prescribe any other set of steps that might be
    taken down the road.
        Mr. Sanford. I thank you, sir.
        Mr. Bereuter. Thank you. The Chair is about to recognize
    the distinguished gentleman from California, the Ranking Member
    of the Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee and then would ask
    unanimous consent and contravention to Committee rules to
    recognize the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts,
    Senator John Kerry, Ranking Member of the East Asian and
    Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, and, next, the gentleman from
    California, Mr. Bilbray. Then we will return to regular order.
    Hearing no objections, that will be the order. Gentleman from
    California.
        Mr. Lantos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First I want to
    commend Secretary Pickering for an extremely eloquent and
    powerful and to my mind extremely reasonable statement on this
    difficult issue. Since I don't have any of the constraints of
    not answering hypothetical questions, I will take it upon
    myself, speaking neither for the Administration nor for China,
    I will take it upon myself to answer my good friend's question.
    I think there is a world of difference between the Kosovo
    situation and the East Timor situation. The difference doesn't
    stem from the suffering of the individuals that are raped or
    murdered, whose homes are looted and set on fire. In that
    context, the two situations are very parallel. But there is a
    world of difference because with respect to Kosovo, we have
    NATO, the world's most powerful military alliance in human
    history, which was able for two generations to prevent the
    Soviet Union from making a move of a single millimeter anywhere
    in Europe, and finally NATO decided that it had to deal with a
    new dictator and they dealt with him effectively and
    successfully.
        Now, it is self-evident that Indonesia, the fourth most
    populous and one of the potentially wealthiest nations on the
    face of this planet, is 200 million plus people, is not a place
    where either the United States or Australia or anybody else
    will begin a war because of human rights violations. In Kosovo,
    we crossed the Rubicon. Kosovo is the first war in human
    history not waged for territory, not waged for oil, not waged
    for power, not waged for colonies, but waged for human rights.
    I for one would love to see the civilized global community have
    the power to do this everywhere but being a realist, I
    recognize that it can do it only in very few places where very
    unique circumstances prevail. That is why I so strongly support
    it, our Administration, with respect to Kosovo, and that is why
    I believe I will so strongly support the Administration in the
    unlikely event that the Indonesian government does not comply
    not to undertake military action against Indonesia, which in my
    judgment would be an absurdity. I don't think anybody in his
    right mind recommends it.
        So to answer you forthrightly and without any qualification
    and speaking not for the Administration, there will be no
    unilateral military action against Indonesia. Indonesia will
    have to invite an international presence if there is to be an
    international presence. Indonesia should take care of the
    problem itself and in the case Indonesia refuses to put an end
    to this outrage, there will be severe economic consequences
    ranging from the very measures that keep Indonesia afloat right
    now. Without the IMF Indonesia is bankrupt. Now, if this
    Indonesian government wants to make its society totally
    bankrupt economically, it can continue to allow or to acquiesce
    in or to support the outrage which is unfolding in East Timor.
        I trust that saner counsels will prevail in Jakarta, that
    the Indonesia military will put an end to this outrage, and
    they will invite an international force and the U.N. under
    those circumstances will approve such a force.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. Under the unanimous
    consent, the gentleman from Massachusetts, Senator Kerry, is
    recognized for 5 minutes for a statement or questions.
        Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
    thank Chairman Thomas also for calling for this joint meeting.
    And I would ask unanimous consent that my opening statement be
    placed in the record. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Hon. John F. Kerry appears in
    the appendix.]
        Senator Kerry. Mr. Secretary, thank you for taking time to
    come up here. I apologize for being late and I apologize I will
    leave a little early, but we have Sandy Berger on the other
    side on this very subject and I would like to spend a minute
    with him.
        Mr. Secretary, it is my sense that the current situation in
    East Timor may well have a great deal more to do with the
    internal politics of the Presidential election of Indonesia
    than it does specifically with just the problem of transferral
    or transition in East Timor. There seems to be a lot of
    speculation behind the scene about General Wiranto's role, the
    military's role, Ms. Megawati's role and so forth. I wonder if
    you might just shed some light. Is it wrong to assume that
    those who are waiting for an invitation to go in may be singing
    the wrong song here because of the way in which this is tied to
    the political situation with the Presidential election coming
    up and the results that the party raises?
        Mr. Pickering. Senator Kerry, I made clear in my statement
    that we believe that the electoral process is having an effect
    and indeed that East Timor may be having an effect on the
    electoral process. I would hope, however, that it not get to be
    seen as totally an adjunct to an electoral process in Indonesia
    on the one hand, or that in order to have it worked out, we
    have to wait for the end of those electoral processes on the
    other. I say this, I think, for the obvious reasons. This is an
    urgent and emergent problem and we have talked of the human
    dimensions and they are extremely serious. Second, I have
    reason at least to be in part optimistic in the information I
    provided on the attitude of a leading candidate for the
    presidency, Megawati and her willingness, which she stated very
    clearly, to see an Indonesia living alongside peacefully and
    fruitfully, an independent East Timor, and I think this is
    important.
        I do believe, however, that there are other causes and
    other actions that are also involved in this situation. There
    are Indonesians who, I think, have failed to understand the
    importance of the arrangements made with the United Nations and
    who have an iridescent view, if I could phrase it that way, of
    East Timor and its role in the future of Indonesia. Some may in
    my view be falsely addicted to the idea that Indonesia can only
    deal with its own internal problems, some of which I mentioned
    by a harsh repressive policy in East Timor and allowing in a
    sense the pro-integrationists to have freedom to overturn,
    indeed to be aided and abetted in overturning the United
    Nations result. Now, I think they are falsely misguided in this
    particular idea. I believe quite the contrary, that an ability
    to carry out its commitments to deal with security, to provide
    the opening for the transition, to allow the process to go
    ahead, to encourage the Indonesian parliament to have the
    appropriate approvals of the election results are the ways in
    which the Indonesian government can assure its own population
    that it is prepared to deal with grievances in an exemplary
    manner, to consider human rights concerns, to recognize that
    abuses and force do not solve the problem.
        Senator Kerry. I want to interrupt you for a moment because
    the light is about to go on and I just wanted to just ask you a
    follow-up question to that. Assuming all of that doesn't
    happen, there seems to be no stomach for anybody to go in
    without an invitation. Therefore, what is plan B if these
    political machinations don't permit the request? What is plan
    B?
        Mr. Pickering. Plan B, I think, is quite clear and I
    addressed the elements of plan B when I spoke to Senator Biden
    when he asked this original and seemingly irrepressible
    question, that plan B is the examination which is ongoing of
    additional steps and measures to deal with the problem of
    Indonesia invitation in the area of economics, trade,
    sanctions, political relations and so on, and I believe it is
    important that we consider these. No decision has been made
    because we believe still that the remaining part of the U.N.
    process has to be played out. The team that went from the
    Security Council which is to visit East Timor on Saturday will
    come back and provide a report. We hope that they will--if they
    are going to report, and that is not certain, that Indonesia
    still is unable to meet its requirements. We will also report
    that President Habibie is prepared to carry through with what
    we understand was his statement to the Secretary-General that
    he is prepared to issue this invitation despite the fact that
    we know other Indonesians are saying quite the contrary. There
    is not a united voice in Indonesia but we look to President
    Habibie to keep this commitment that was made to allow the
    United Nations in to review the situation, to bring in a United
    Nations force to assist Indonesia in the maintenance of
    security and carrying out of their obligations under the May 5
    arrangement to respect the referendum and transform the
    territory to the independent status that it has voted for.
        Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. If I
    could just make a 30 second comment. I am not sure what that
    has to do with anything. What we're seeing there today may be a
    retribution. It may be a reaction but none of your response, it
    seems to me, deals with violence or the humanitarian problem
    per se. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Bereuter. Thank you. The Chair will next call on the
    gentleman from California, Mr. Bilbray, and then in order Mr.
    Faleomavaega, Mr. Hastings, and Mr. Davis. The gentleman from
    California.
        Mr. Bilbray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I have
    got to first apologize to you. Just as there are some Members
    who come with a special insight to Eastern Europe, being the
    only Member of Congress that I know of Australian extraction, I
    come with my own prejudices on this whole issue and I have just
    got to be frank with you. After 10 years of extensive
    discussion with representatives of Australia going back to
    Prime Minister Hawke, members of parliament and just discussion
    with the premier in New South Wales this month, it has just
    given us, those of us, that have discussed with Australia that
    the United States, while it is focused on Eastern Europe
    extensively, has tended to have a blind eye when it comes down
    to the southern Pacific and especially Indonesian problems, not
    just here but Papua New Guinea and other places.
        The real thing I want to get out is that the frustration I
    have gotten from my relatives and from the discussion of
    Australia is what appears to be a mixed signal that has been
    sent to Australia and Indonesia about the human rights issues
    in the southern Pacific. Hopefully to clarify this, what is
    your interpretation of the Australian position?
        I want to just sort of pre-empt that. I find it rather
    refreshing to hear a country that says we don't want America to
    go in and do this; we just want America to back us up if we go
    in and do it. I wish we heard that from NATO more. What is your
    perception of Australia's position about placing peacekeeping
    forces in East Timor? Is your position that unless the U.N.
    makes a proclamation or Indonesia specifically requests it,
    that Australia does not want anybody to consider intervention?
        Mr. Pickering. Let me first put my cards on the table. I
    happen to have an earned degree from an Australian university
    so I join you in appreciation of the special circumstances that
    Australia faces. Second, it is my clear view and I had the
    opportunity personally to discuss this with Foreign Minister
    Downer that Australia is ready to put a force in on the basis
    of an invitation and U.N. Security Council approval. But in the
    absence of that, it is not ready to do so.
        Mr. Bilbray. Are they communicating at all that they will
    not consider under any consideration a multinational force
    intervening in East Timor without an invitation or a U.N.
    Resolution?
        Mr. Pickering. I understand plain Australian and that is
    what the Prime Minister told me.
        Mr. Bilbray. Let me just say this. Do you or does the
    Administration perceive the commitments to Australia and New
    Zealand and the South Pacific Anzac alliances, you perceive our
    alliances and commitments to that part of the world equal to
    our commitment to NATO?
        Mr. Pickering. Yes. I believe that the United States must
    meet its treaty commitments all around the world and our
    security treaty commitments with Australia are important and we
    should both live up to the letter, and I have no doubt that
    either side has any reservations about that.
        Mr. Bilbray. Do you perceive that the offer made by
    Australia may if we are successful--let's just say in a perfect
    world, that Australia is willing to take the lead in its back
    yard, only asks for the United States to be a minor logistical
    supporter. Do you perceive that this, if everything works out,
    could be the prototype, could be the model that we then try to
    initiate not just in South Pacific but also sub-Saharan Africa,
    Latin America, and the rest of the world? Do you see that maybe
    Australia is giving us a model that can lead us into the next
    millennium of our appropriate position in foreign policy not
    doing everything for everyone everywhere but being supportive
    of people taking care of their own back yards?
        Mr. Pickering. I do and I want to say that with you I feel
    very strongly about the importance of Australian leadership in
    this particular effort, and I hope that our Australian friends
    and allies feel that we are working very closely with them
    because we have been on an hourly to hourly basis on both the
    diplomacy and the military side of this effort and of course
    the President will have an opportunity to meet Prime Minister
    Howard and the Secretary Foreign Minister Downer in the coming
    two days in Auckland at the APEC meeting. I believe that we
    have never been closer and I believe that this is a model. It
    may not be the exclusive model but it is one obviously, as you
    know, we longed for in Bosnia years ago and didn't see
    produced. I think we should be very careful in having only one
    model. One size doesn't fit all always, and it is the nature of
    the task, the size of the task, the urgency of the task I think
    that helps to determine how partner states become involved and
    how effective they can be.
        In this particular instance, although he is not here, I
    join Congressman Lantos in recognizing that one of the unique
    elements of our military involvement in Kosovo was that we had
    a large number of our NATO partners with us. Ten or 11 flew
    active air combat missions and some of the others flew air
    support missions and that doesn't arrive merely by having a
    treaty. It arrives through a long process of integrating
    efforts over many years of working out ahead of time how your
    aircraft and their aircraft can be as a military say
    deconflicted in common air space, how we can operate with
    common tactics, how we can operate with common communications.
        So in these kinds of situations, I think the tougher the
    job, often the more the necessity for prior experience, prior
    training, prior planning, prior coordination, prior doctrinal
    arrangements between us.
        Mr. Bilbray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just hope we send
    the message clearly. We heard about Europe, in the last two
    years. A lot of people are watching South Pacific. The
    Australians have been trying to tell us for over a decade that
    this was coming down the road. I hope America sends a clear
    message that human rights in the South Pacific or anywhere else
    in the world is just as important as human rights in Europe,
    and I think we need to make that clear, take the stand that no
    matter what the color of your skin, no matter what your ethnic
    background, no matter what part of the world you are in, human
    rights are still a valued commodity in the United States.
        Mr. Pickering. Could I make just one brief comment, Mr.
    Chairman. The implication has come in this and other questions
    that somehow we didn't know this was coming. I think quite the
    contrary. We spent a long time working on it. There were a lot
    of steps taken some time ago in order to deal with this
    possibility. It is in my view extremely important to understand
    that we have been preparing for this contingency even if in
    fact we hoped against hope that it wouldn't come and our close
    relationship with Australia did not begin a week ago on this
    particular issue. It began some time ago.
        We remain committed obviously to work with international
    partners, including close allies like Australia, on this
    particular issue as well as in the United Nations system, but I
    wanted to make that point because I think there is a growing
    sense that somehow this was something that just started a week
    and a half ago and we had just begun to address it.
        Many weeks ago we sent many of our people to participate
    with the U.N. to the maximum that the Indonesians allow to deal
    with the elections, for example.
        Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Ambassador. I appreciate that
    perspective. I want to say that Members of this Committee have
    been very much involved and informed on this issue and have
    been attempting to inform our colleagues, some of whose actions
    occasionally are counterproductive. Unfortunately we are at
    this state today. I want to thank the gentleman from California
    for his perceptions and perspective and certainly appreciate
    the fact he took the time to join us today.
        Mr. Falomavaega, the gentleman from American Samoa, is
    recognized.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to
    thank Senator Thomas for calling this joint hearing this
    afternoon and for the Members of the Committee to raise
    questions concerning this very important issue. I certainly
    want to commend you, Mr. Secretary, for your very comprehensive
    statement concerning the crisis that we are faced with at this
    time.
        I suppose one can say that we planted the seeds and this is
    the results we have produced. I say this sincerely, Mr.
    Secretary, because the relationship that exists between the
    East Timor and Indonesia is not unique. The military of
    Indonesia simply went over and conquered these people and said
    you are now part of Indonesia. I don't consider that as a
    unique relationship. I could also say, Mr. Secretary, we cannot
    talk about East Timor and ignore West Papua New Guinea because
    this is the same thing that the Indonesian military did to
    these people.
        Now, we could talk about the tortures, the atrocities that
    were committed against 200,000 East Timorese for the past 20
    years as well as the 100,000 Melanesians that lost their lives
    are the same actions taken by the Indonesian military, and this
    is what we produce as a result.
        I take this very seriously and also associate myself with
    the comments made earlier by my good friend from California. I
    do have a little prejudice concerning this, Mr. Secretary,
    because I happen to come from this region. I am very, very
    concerned. The fact of the matter is one of the darkest pages
    of United Nations history was partly contributed to the mess
    that we are faced with now in Indonesia not only in East Timor
    but as well as West Papua New Guinea. I am very appreciative of
    the fact that you did make comments in your statement
    concerning Irian Jaya, West Papua New Guinea.
        I am not going to get into that but I do want to raise a
    question. Assuming the Security Council doesn't approve sending
    a peacekeeping force to Indonesia without Indonesia's consent,
    where do we go from here, Mr. Secretary?
        Mr. Pickering. Thank you very much. I believe that the
    answer I gave to that question before I would be glad to repeat
    for you. We go into a next stage of doing all that we can in
    partnership with the international community and the Security
    Council to bring Indonesia along with the United Nations
    process that it was originally committed to, that at the moment
    we have doubts, you and I, I am sure, about whether it remains
    committed because since it is not doing what it is supposed to
    do with respect to security, it has made uncertain noises so--
    --
        Mr. Faleomavaega. My time is short. I know the diplomatic
    route. We go through all this. My next question. I think there
    has been an assurance from General Wiranto that they are unable
    militarily to control these vigilante--these people that are
    doing these killings at this time in East Timor. Is that a
    correct assessment?
        Mr. Pickering. I don't know specifically to which
    expression of opinion of General Wiranto you refer. But let me
    say this. General Wiranto has expressed a number of opinions,
    some on the more positive side. What I am concerned about has
    been a history of saying one thing and apparently doing
    something else, of saying that they were going to control the
    security and aiding and abetting the militias, and so to put
    faith in one or another of the comments of someone who at least
    now appears to be knowledgeable of, if not engaged in that kind
    of activity, is a pretty tough sell.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Secretary, I know my time is coming
    up. I have one more question. We don't have a NATO-like
    regional security organization in Southeast Asia, but I think
    you are aware that recently the foreign ministry or someone
    from the high officium of the People's Republic of China
    visited the ASEAN country nation and suggested why do we not
    have a regional security organization like NATO has among the
    Europeans and answering this very same problem here; what is
    your perspective about a possibility of ASEAN becoming a
    regional security organization similar to what we have in NATO?
        Mr. Pickering. It didn't begin that way. It is not an
    organization of which we are members. It has carefully guarded
    its own decisions in that regard, and I believe this is a
    decision that ASEAN itself would have to make. I do believe,
    however, that there needs to be in this particular case as much
    participation as possible into any force led by Australia that
    might involve itself in helping the United Nations work out the
    problem, and we certainly were very pleased that at the foreign
    ministers meeting yesterday in Auckland to discuss this
    subject, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore were
    represented by their foreign ministers as well as other Asian
    countries because clearly in an Asian problem I believe Asians
    ought to be there very much present in the working out of the
    answers.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Just 30 seconds, Mr. Chairman. I know my
    time is up. I just want to say this, Mr. Secretary. In all the
    Nation leaders that we visited as Members of this Committee
    throughout the Asian Pacific region, there is one common
    response and concern that every one of these countries have
    been giving to us. In the absence of U.S. presence, whether it
    be diplomatically, economically, or militarily, someone else is
    going to take that place and I believe it is going to be the
    People's Republic of China if we don't act.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Bereuter. Thank you. The gentleman from Florida, Mr.
    Hastings, is recognized. I want to commend him on the
    initiative he has already taken on a resolution. We will work
    with him on this issue.
        Mr. Hastings. I thank the Chairman very much for that
    assertion, and thank you for holding this timely hearing and,
    Ambassador Pickering, my good friend, I thank you for your very
    comprehensive statement and forthrightness in responses.
        I urge all of my colleagues to take into consideration that
    this hearing today is taking place at the same time that the
    APEC meeting is taking place in Auckland, New Zealand, and like
    you, Mr. Chairman, previous speaker, my good friend from
    American Samoa, Mr. Faleomavaega, along with Chairman Gilman
    and several other Members of Congress visited Australia and New
    Zealand and, Brian, my colleague from California Mr. Bilbray, I
    would like to say to you that I for one, and I believe the
    Chairman will assert this, have argued continuously on Asian
    matters that Australia should be consulted a great deal more
    actively than I believe they have been in the past. Lest I move
    forward without mentioning New Zealand, New Zealand also has
    indicated a very strong willingness to participate in an
    appropriate peacekeeping force.
        I would also like very much, Mr. Ambassador, to assert that
    all of this is taking place in a very fragile area, as you have
    pointed out, economically and socially with President Habibie
    maybe not being in control of the military. One example of that
    would be that he set forth the self-determination matter
    without apparent active consultation with the military. The
    military patently obviously has been in complicity with the
    militia. Either that or I can't believe my lying eyes. Even on
    the CNN bits and the little bit of journalism that is coming
    out of there, which is frightening, the fact that journalists
    are being excluded allows for transparency not to be as much as
    those of us here in this country would expect.
        I join my colleague Mr. Faleomavaega in calling for us to
    recognize that an Asian, Australian, New Zealand, Portuguese,
    all of the presidents of the Philippines and Thailand, all have
    a vested interest of bringing this matter to a resolution. But
    as we are speaking, people are dying, and so to the person just
    shot, all of this high sounding rhetoric and intellectualizing
    allows that action has to be taken.
        Ambassador Pickering, you will remember that I was the
    first person in Congress to call Rwanda genocide. It took three
    years for this nation, through Secretary Albright, eventually
    to say the -G word. Now, the -G word gives all of us some cover
    to protect human rights, as has been so amply modified and put
    forward here today by my colleagues. I don't know that genocide
    has occurred, but I would like to ask you a series of questions
    and ask just a yes or no answer in spite of what I know is your
    propensity to be prolix. Please, sir, am I correct that on
    September 4, 1999, the people of East Timor overwhelmingly
    voted, at least 78 percent of them or more, for independence
    from Indonesia?
        Mr. Pickering. Yes.
        Mr. Hastings. Am I correct that after the voting was
    concluded, violence broke out in East Timor?
        Mr. Pickering. Yes.
        Mr. Hastings. Is it also true that the violence is being
    perpetrated in East Timor by army backed militias and it is
    unclear who is directing these militias?
        Mr. Pickering. We at least believe that to be true. I would
    have to be a little cautious in saying I know categorically
    without fail, but we certainly believe that to be true. A
    qualified yes.
        Mr. Hastings. Has the government of Indonesia declared
    martial law in East Timor to quell the violence?
        Mr. Pickering. Yes. It has declared a state of military
    emergency. I want to be a little careful about the fact there
    might be a difference.
        Mr. Hastings. The establishment of this martial law in East
    Timor so far as we know has failed to stop the violence?
        Mr. Pickering. Yes.
        Mr. Hastings. It has been reported that hundreds if not
    thousands of people have been killed, certainly hundreds, and
    injured, killed and injured since the violence began in East
    Timor?
        Mr. Pickering. Yes, it is true that has been reported, not
    only that but we believe it probably to be true.
        Mr. Hastings. We do know that many of these Timorese,
    800,000 residents, have been forced to flee East Timor.
        Mr. Pickering. Yes.
        Mr. Hastings. That the United Nations compound in Dili was
    besieged or access to food, water and electricity was
    intentionally cutoff there?
        Mr. Pickering. We believe that to be true.
        Mr. Hastings. The international community has called upon
    the government of Indonesia to either take immediate and
    concrete steps to end the violence in East Timor or allow a
    United Nations-sponsored international force to enter East
    Timor and restore order?
        Mr. Pickering. Yes, through the person of the Secretary-
    General of the United Nations, who was speaking for himself,
    but I think he represents the broad opinion of the
    international community.
        Mr. Hastings. Mr. Chairman, I have substantiated pretty
    much through the Ambassador my very feeble effort at trying to
    address something I think we can do rather than just talk.
        Mr. Bereuter. I thank the gentleman from Florida. Another
    gentleman from Florida, Mr. Davis, is recognized, and then we
    will turn to Mr. Royce for the last word.
        Mr. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Pickering, my
    concern is the price we pay for the passage of time as we allow
    the government in Indonesia to do what we believe is the right
    thing. Let me offer you a painfully clear example of that.
    Sister Judith Supres, who is the provincial of the American
    Order of Salesian Sisters based in New Jersey, has contacted
    Congressman Bill Pascrell and me asking for help. You
    apparently are aware of this. There are eight sisters of that
    order trapped in East Timor right now, at least one of which is
    a United States citizen. Two days ago Sister Supres lost
    communication with them although before she did, she had been
    told that those sisters are going to be evacuated to Baukau,
    which apparently they were not. The sister in East Timor was
    also told the militia was about to burn down the convent that
    was housing these eight sisters as well as the children they
    were taking care of. This United States citizen and others are
    in grave danger as we discuss here today how to pressure this
    country to protect people there.
        So I would like to ask you for your help in reviewing the
    letter I wrote to Ambassador Roy to this effect and also why
    shouldn't we immediately be much more specific and much more
    clear as far as the sanctions you have alluded to in an effort
    to exert maximum pressure on the government to take control of
    the situation immediately?
        Mr. Pickering. We are clearly prepared to look in that
    direction, as I signalled earlier. I think it would be
    premature for me to begin to outline a specific series of
    steps, but I think you know from past experiences we have that
    particularly joined in a multilateral way through the United
    Nations and otherwise sanctions can have a powerful effect on
    the situation. We have begun the process already by the three
    steps that I have previously outlined, the end of military-to-
    military programs, the discussion with the international
    financial institutions, particularly the IMF in which it is now
    clear that there will be no forthcoming IMF steps because of a
    series of factors, I am sure including East Timor, but
    including other questions and the fact that we are rapidly
    undergoing a review of our bilateral assistance to make sure
    that it fits in the categories that we believe ought to be
    continued. Other programs would then of course not be
    continued. So we believe that these particular initial steps
    are steps that we have taken immediately today, ought to have,
    I hope, an effect on the situation but if not, as I have said,
    we are reviewing a wide range of additional steps that could be
    taken and I am not in a position to prefigure those but we will
    consult with you as we do because some of them may well depend
    on the help and cooperation of the legislative branch to
    actually put them in effect.
        Mr. Davis. Mr. Secretary, if you would take the time if you
    could to look at a copy of this letter and direct it to the
    appropriate person to reinforce----
        Mr. Pickering. I will. I do want to say that through both
    Ambassador Roy and directly, we have been in regular and
    constant contact with the four American Salesian nuns who are
    in East Timor and worked very hard to protect them and ensure
    their safety and where they wish to come out, to provide an
    opportunity for them to come out, a decision that they
    themselves of course have to make, and in at least several of
    these cases some have chosen to do that, but we share a concern
    for any American citizen in East Timor and clearly have watched
    and followed that very, very carefully.
        Mr. Davis. Thank you.
        Mr. Bereuter. Thank you. The gentleman from California,
    Vice Chairman of the Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee, Mr.
    Royce, is recognized.
        Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Pickering,
    the outbreak of this violence seems to have caught the
    international community and certainly the United States
    completely off guard. Now we are scrambling. Yet there were
    reports prior to the election that the Indonesian military was
    in the process of organizing an anti-independence militia.
    Looking back over the last several weeks, is there something we
    could have done to preclude this type of violence? Is there
    something, knowing now what was transpiring in terms of the
    training of the militia, some action that could have been taken
    by the United States?
        Mr. Pickering. I recognize that hindsight sometimes makes
    for brilliant pupils.
        Mr. Royce. It might save us the process of going through
    this again.
        Mr. Pickering. Let me be careful. First, we always knew
    that this was a possibility. We looked at a large number of
    contingency plans, possibilities, and options as it unfolded,
    and very early on. We came to the conclusion that a number of
    responses that may make sense were not realistic unfortunately
    without the Indonesian agreement that we are still trying to
    seek for the present response. Indonesian agreement in our view
    would not be forthcoming on a number of those. Some of those
    took us beyond where the United Nations Secretary and other
    concerned countries at the time were prepared to go. Working
    within those realities, we nevertheless pushed very hard, for
    example, for a large on-the-ground presence, including both
    civilian police and military liaison officers, to ensure that
    the process could be carefully monitored. For the campaign
    phase, we supported a UNAMET of 300 civilian police and 50
    military observers. The United States contributed 30 of the
    police and three of the military observers. This required very
    expensive consultations up here, including some reprogrammings
    which wasn't necessarily always easy to get done. For the
    immediate post election period, the United Nations has called
    for 460, almost 500 police and 300 military observers, and we
    supported that in a Security Council resolution, I believe I am
    correct, either last Friday or a week ago Friday. Under the May
    5 agreement that covers the arrangements between the United
    Nations, Indonesia, and Portugal, the government of Indonesia
    insisted on and was given responsibility for security, clearly
    something it didn't take up. As Kofi Annan, the Secretary-
    General of the United Nations, said yesterday, the government
    of Indonesia was able to control the territory for the past 25
    years. The international community had reason to expect that
    Indonesia had the capacity and, since it insisted upon doing
    it, the will to carry out this solemn international commitment.
        Nevertheless, we did everything we could to insist on as
    large a presence to provide the transparency and the monitoring
    of this capacity as we could. I am sure in hindsight we could
    have proposed other things. What I am concerned about since we
    looked at them was the fact that they were nonfeasible. They
    were nonfeasible for three reasons. Indonesia and the U.N.
    weren't going to buy it. The other partners were not prepared
    for it and in some cases we were not able to generate the kind
    of financial support that we thought such a series of steps
    might require in order to be carried out on our own part. This,
    I think, points up the fact that in future such circumstances,
    this kind of a lesson be applied. We felt in fact that there
    were significant enough possibility of this happening that our
    efforts to do larger things, even if they were not workable,
    were the right way to view the problem.
        Mr. Royce. The Indonesian military, as far as the reports
    that they were organizing an anti-independent militia, when we
    became aware of that, did we attempt to broadcast that
    information? Did we attempt to share that information?
        Mr. Pickering. Yes, we did, and it was self-evident and
    apparent and we took it up many times with the Indonesians.
        Mr. Bereuter. The time of the gentleman has expired. I
    thank the gentleman. Despite my assurances, Mr. Secretary, we
    have a Member of the Senate East Asian and Pacific Affairs
    Subcommittee, the gentleman from Wisconsin, Senator Russell
    Feingold, who now is recognized. Senator Feingold.
        Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
    Secretary, I know you have been here quite some time. I was not
    here because I just spent over an hour with nine or 10 other
    Members from both Houses talking to National Security Advisor
    Sandy Berger in great detail about this problem and expressing
    the fact that the Members of Congress, many of us feel great
    passion about this subject and I think it even surprised him
    how many of us feel so strongly that what is going on now in
    East Timor is completely out of control. Yesterday I introduced
    legislation, S. 1568, and Representative Patrick Kennedy has
    introduced an identical bill in the House, I understand, to
    impose immediate suspension of assistance to the government of
    Indonesia until steps have been taken to allow the results of
    the August 30, 1999, vote to be implemented. The bill calls for
    the immediate suspension of all U.S. Military assistance to
    Indonesia, including the licensing of military exports. It
    calls on the United States also to oppose any loans or other
    assistance by international financial institutions and to urge
    other donor countries to do the same and express its support
    for an international peacekeeping mission.
        Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committees, I obviously
    want this legislation to pass or something like it, but
    specifically we need the Administration to make much tougher
    and stronger statements in support of getting Indonesia to back
    off and allow this peacekeeping force to come in now. I do not
    think it is sufficient to have the kind of statements that we
    have had to date. In fact, I would like to see the President,
    and I understand he will be speaking on this in an hour or less
    than an hour and a half or so, I would like to see him ask us
    for this legislation so he can have it on his desk when he goes
    to New Zealand and so that he can be able to actually have a
    credible threat to the Indonesians that if they don't do the
    right thing within a few hours, that something real will
    happen, that we will send a real message to the Indonesian
    power structure, not just to Mr. Habibie.
        I am afraid we are not moving strongly enough on this or
    quickly enough, and I think it would be one thing if we had
    just not engaged the country in a lengthy attempt to convince
    some of the wisdom of the action in Kosovo. The action in
    Kosovo was perhaps premised on security reasons but the reason
    articulated was humanitarian. The reason articulated was
    genocide, and the President of the United States said that he
    regretted that our country did not act in Africa in the case of
    Rwanda and he said he would never let it happen again. But it
    is happening again and it is happening in East Timor.
        So I would urge all Members of the Committees in both
    Houses that the best thing we can do at this point is to
    immediately pass this legislation, place it on the President's
    desk so that when he goes and has this meeting with the
    Indonesian government and the officials realize that we mean
    business and that we don't want to wait for a few days to find
    out that they are going to say no and then after that try to
    figure out what we are going to do. We must raise the stakes
    now as high as we possibly and responsibly can.
        Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate this opportunity so
    late in the day to make my feelings known.
        Mr. Bereuter. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.
        Ambassador Pickering, thank you very much for your
    statement and for your responses to our questions. We wish you
    well in pursuing your activities in this respect. We have
    another distinguished Senior Member of the Foreign Service,
    Stapleton Roy, on the scene as Ambassador to Indonesia, who,
    along with your leadership, gives us confidence. We look
    forward to working with you.
        Thank you for your time.
        Mr. Pickering. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
    Members. I appreciated the opportunity to come up here.
        Mr. Bereuter. Regrettably, the House has a series of two
    votes. We must pursue those, and we are recessed to take up the
    second panel at 4:15.
        [Recess.]
        Mr. Bereuter. The Subcommittee will come to order.
        I would like to call the second panel of witnesses to the
    testimony table. I regret imposing on so much of our
    distinguished second panel's time. What you have to say is
    important to us and, I think, will be important in informing
    the American public about the situation in East Timor and about
    the futures of Indonesia and East Timor.
        As I previously introduced you, I will just simply
    summarize the details about you. First, Ambassador Paul
    Wolfowitz, currently the Dean of the School of Advanced
    International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University. Among
    other important posts in the State Department and Defense
    Department, he was our Ambassador to Indonesia and served with
    distinction.
        Dr. Donald Emmerson is Senior Fellow at Stanford
    University's Asia Pacific Research Center and the University of
    Wisconsin-Madison Professor of Political Science and Southeast
    Asia studies. He recently was in East Timore as a monitor on
    the elections.
        Finally, I introduce Ms. Sidney Jones, Executive Director,
    Asia Division of Human Rights Watch, a welcome and frequent
    witness before this Subcommittee.
        Your entire statements will be made a part of the record.
        I would like to proceed. Ambassador Wolfowitz, we will
    start with you. Please proceed, and thank you for your time.

        STATEMENTS OF PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEAN, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED
            INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

        Mr. Wolfowitz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
    time that you and the Committee are devoting to this important
    issue. My apologies. I just got back from out of town 24 hours
    ago. I have been trying to do my best to get on top of this
    issue. The result is I have a prepared statement, but you do
    not have a copy of it, so I can't summarize it. I will try to
    be brief, however.
        Mr. Bereuter. I think I know where you have been. In some
    cases I have matched your schedule.
        Mr. Wolfowitz. I know. In fact, I think I last saw you in
    Sydney.
        Let me begin by saying the obvious, which is that what has
    taken place in East Timor over the last few months and
    particularly the last week is appalling. It is appalling in
    character, it is appalling in scale, it is appalling in the
    level of direct involvement by the Indonesian military. I would
    say, too, in the last 24 hours I have had briefings from people
    within our own Defense Department, and it is very dismaying to
    hear what they have to report that confirms what eyewitnesses
    are saying about the involvement of Indonesian military.
        It may seem superfluous to say all of this to this panel.
    It seems pretty obvious perhaps to Americans, but in speaking I
    am also speaking to Indonesians, and I am speaking as a former
    Ambassador. We Ambassadors are sometimes accused of forgetting
    whether we are Ambassadors to a country or from a country. I
    always tried to remember. I was the American Ambassador to
    Indonesia, not the Indonesian Ambassador to the United States.
    But I did develop an enormous affection for Indonesia.
        I would like to speak not only to the Congress, but to the
    millions of Indonesians who feel that the world is biased
    against them on East Timor. I am not biased against them. I
    have no a priori proindependence bias, but I believe one cannot
    ignore the overwhelming vote in East Timor in favor of
    independence or the overwhelming evidence of Indonesian
    atrocities in East Timor. I sympathize with the millions of
    Indonesians who fear that the independence of East Timor might
    lead to a breakup of their country, but the actions of the
    Indonesian military in East Timor can only make the people of
    Aceh and other regions in Indonesia more unhappy about being
    governed by such authorities.
        The key to preserving the unity of Indonesia, which I
    believe is strongly in the interests of the United States, is
    to make the case that East Timor is fundamentally different,
    historically and politically, and for the Indonesians to act
    quickly to regain the respect of the international community.
        I sympathize with the millions of decent Indonesians who
    believe that there has been bias in reporting of events in East
    Timor, that proindependence atrocities are often not reported
    at all. But I would say to them that if even half of what is
    reported is true, or even if one-quarter of it is true, and I
    believe a good deal more than that is true, it is appalling.
        The evidence of complicity by Indonesian military
    authorities is also convincing and appalling. It is a stain on
    the honor of millions of decent Indonesians, and it is
    indefensible. I sympathize with those millions of Indonesians
    who fear for the safety of those people in East Timor who are
    prointegration. It is true it was an overwhelming vote in favor
    of independence, but let's not forget 20 percent of the
    population of East Timor are against independence as expressed
    in that vote, and I am sure those people do fear for their
    lives and their safety, but the present violence does nothing
    to ensure their safety. That safety would best be assured, I
    believe, by accepting the proposals for some kind of
    international security force, but it is certainly not assisted
    by this kind of violence.
        Finally, I do sympathize, although I don't really agree,
    with those who object that the process by which Indonesia got
    here was precipitous, that it lacked political legitimacy and
    perhaps constitutional legitimacy, and that the referendum
    itself should have offered a third, more gradual alternative to
    the stark choice between integration permanently or immediate
    independence. But whatever one says about how we got here, I
    believe, and I think an increasing number of decent Indonesians
    understand, that there is no turning back, that last month's
    vote has created an irreversible situation, and I believe the
    best thing for Indonesia is to move forward quickly and
    smoothly, not to get mired in a backward-looking effort to
    reverse the course of history.
        Finally, I have no sympathy whatsoever for those
    Indonesians who are claiming that what is taking place there is
    a result of some kind of international conspiracy aimed at
    breaking up the country. I would have been enormously happy,
    although I admit I would have been surprised, if there had been
    an 80 percent vote in favor of integration. I have no, as I
    say, a priori bias. But what we are seeing is not the result of
    any international conspiracy. It is a result of a 24 year
    failure of Indonesian policy. Perhaps that policy never could
    have succeeded. Perhaps one can say it did succeed in
    preventing in the 1970's a Cuba on Indonesia's doorstep, but
    that is not a threat any longer. If there is a conspiracy at
    all, it is a conspiracy by those authorities in East Timor and
    perhaps elsewhere in Indonesia who have sought and are still
    seeking to keep the truth from the Indonesian people and from
    the world.
        The immediate needs in East Timor, I think, are clear: to
    restore order, to deal with the humanitarian catastrophe that
    has taken place, and to implement the tripartite agreement.
        What I would like to emphasize for this Committee and for
    the Congress is that I think in addition to East Timor, there
    is a task of at least equal importance, and that is for the
    United States and the international community to support the
    democratic transition that is taking place hopefully in the
    rest of Indonesia. I think a democratic government in Indonesia
    will ultimately provide a solution for many of the problems
    that Indonesia faces today, and also I think it will help the
    problems of East Timor.
        But in the short term it has to be admitted that democracy
    complicates the situation, because it is a fact, and we can
    discuss the reasons why, that I think the overwhelming majority
    of the 200 million or more Indonesians outside of East Timor
    are opposed to East Timor's independence and fear it. And so
    there is indeed a short-term conflict between democracy in
    Indonesia and moving forward on implementing the referendum.
    But I do believe as the knowledge of what has taken place in
    East Timor sinks in, as the recognition that 80 percent of the
    people of East Timor do indeed believe in independence, that
    the actions of the Indonesian military in East Timor have been
    indefensible, that Indonesian opinion will change, and
    particularly the opinion of the important new democratic
    leaders of Indonesia will change as it seems to be changing
    already.
        I have gotten a number of private laments from Indonesian
    friends. Let me just quote from one e-mail that came my way in
    the last 24 hours:
        ``believe me when I say that whether or not most of the
    Indonesian people agree with the referendum on East Timor, most
    are saddened and shocked at what is going on there. Please do
    not let this incident which has had direct and immediate
    consequences for the people of East Timor hinder the progress
    that is made in Indonesia. Habibie has no legitimacy.
    Therefore, the policy is not the policy of the Indonesian
    people. The country is on the verge of finding democracy and
    the foreign community should continue to give their support in
    spite of the situation in East Timor.''
        It would compound the tragedy of East Timor a thousandfold
    if we were to isolate Indonesia in such a way as to drive the
    new democratic forces in that country into the arms of the
    thugs who have orchestrated the present tragedy in East Timor
    and doom the promising but still fragile prospects of a
    democratic transition in Indonesia. Without being starry-eyed
    about democracy solving all the problems of the world, I
    believe that democratic transition is extremely important for
    Indonesia and 200 million Indonesians. I believe it is a key in
    many respects for them to dig out of the present economic and
    social crisis that they face. I think the democratic transition
    is important for the stability of Indonesia, and therefore it
    is important for the whole region and for U.S. interests in the
    region. If one can look beyond the many problems of the present
    and think about the future a few years from now where Indonesia
    might have successfully become the third largest democracy in
    the world, one of the only democracies in the Moslem world,
    then I think Indonesia's success will become very important for
    the rest of Asia and for the rest of the Moslem world.
        I don't believe that Americans understand very well the
    importance of Indonesia. I couldn't say it better than you
    have, Mr. Chairman, on the bottom of page two of your opening
    statement. I would just perhaps summarize it all by saying I
    don't think there is any country in the world as important as
    Indonesia about which Americans remain so ignorant.
        So the question is, how is it possible to square this
    circle? How is it possible to bridge the requirements of
    democracy in East Timor and the requirements of democracy in
    Indonesia, particularly if they conflict, at least in the short
    term? It is a very hard problem. I don't have a magic answer,
    but I would suggest five policy principles that I think would
    be useful in guiding the actions of the Congress as well as the
    Administration.
        The first is I think it is very important in what we do and
    particularly in what we say to distinguish between the
    Indonesian people and those Indonesian authorities responsible
    for what has taken place in East Timor. I was on a USIA
    sponsored program roundtable last night with two former
    Indonesian Ambassadors to the United States based in Jakarta,
    and Ambassador Artin Searagar, who actually had been a minister
    in President Suharto's government, was profoundly critical as
    was his colleague Ambassador Habib of the actions of Indonesian
    authorities in East Timor, and he pleaded for us to distinguish
    between the Indonesian people and those authorities.
        I think part of doing that, though, is also to make clear
    that we understand that East Timor is a special case, that the
    breakup of Indonesia would be harmful to the United States and
    the region, and also that militarized tactics of the kind that
    are being used in East Timor will only hasten the
    disintegration of the country.
        At the same time, I think Indonesians have got to recognize
    that there is no turning back after an 80 percent vote in favor
    of independence. I think they are recognizing it, and I think
    they can recognize it increasingly. I think it is important in
    what we say to speak about facts and speak in a way that people
    can listen, because they need to understand the facts which are
    coming at them, I think, rather fast and rather hard.
        The second principle is I would say more radically
    diversify our contacts with political leaders in Indonesia,
    recognizing that we are now well into the--I guess not well
    into, but beginning the fourth month of a lame duck government.
    It would be as though the United States had held an election in
    early November, and 3 months later we still hadn't decided who
    the President-elect was.
        There is an enormous vacuum of authority in Indonesia.
    That, in fact, has contributed, I believe, to the problem. But
    there are people, and particularly obviously Megawati
    Sukarnoputri, who have achieved important democratic
    legitimacy. I think we need to talk with them about their
    prospective future roles. They are not yet the government, but
    I think we need to treat them as people who may very well be
    the government. And I believe as part of that, if there is
    anything we can do to encourage them to shorten this
    agonizingly long transitional period, the sooner Indonesia has
    a new President, the sooner Indonesia has a legitimately based
    government, the more effectively the military can be brought
    under control, the more effectively the results of the
    tripartite agreement can be implemented constitutionally.
        Third, I don't see in the present circumstances how one can
    continue with generalized economic assistance to a government
    that not only seems incapable of controlling what its military
    does in East Timor, but at best incapable of controlling what
    banks and money goes into. I think there inevitably has to be a
    moratorium on assistance other than that assistance that does
    go directly to relieve the suffering of the many Indonesians
    who have been affected by the disastrous economic crisis that
    country faces. But I think substantial assistance has to wait
    until a new government is formed, or at least until the present
    government and not just the President, who I think would like
    to implement the results of the referendum, but the whole
    government has changed course in East Timor.
        Fourth, I support very strongly what one of your colleagues
    was saying earlier about Australia's unique role. I don't
    believe there is an ally in the world who has consistently
    fought on the side of the United States and supported the
    United States as loyally and faithfully as Australia. We need
    to recognize that for Australia this is a crisis in their
    backyard. I heard one senior Australian official quoted as
    saying that this is the most serious security crisis Australia
    has faced since the battle of the Coral Sea. Even if that may
    be slight hyperbole, it tells us something about how the
    Australians feel about this, and I think it is very important
    that we make clear that we will, in fact, support our faithful
    ally. Indeed, I think we should all be grateful that Australia
    is willing to step up to its responsibilities in the region as
    strongly as it has been willing to do.
        Fifth and finally, I think we should do everything possible
    to relieve the humanitarian suffering in East Timor. Ultimately
    I think it will be the best thing for Indonesia to implement
    the referendum as quickly as possible and turn over the
    responsibility for East Timor, including the security of East
    Timor, to the international community. I believe that
    Indonesians and Americans should be grateful to the Australians
    and others who have indicated a willingness to take on this
    kind of responsibility, but that major change obviously
    requires Indonesian agreement. Until we move that far, I think
    it is very important to do everything possible to limit and
    alleviate the humanitarian suffering. That means doing
    everything possible to keep observers in East Timor. Nothing
    more intimidates, I think, or at least restrains human rights
    violations than the knowledge that they are going to be known
    to the outside world. There are obviously enormous relief
    requirements, and hopefully perhaps there will be the
    possibility of returning refugees.
        Let me just conclude, Mr. Chairman, really by repeating
    what I said earlier. It is very important to try to undo as
    much as possible the tragic consequences of the last week in
    East Timor and to move ahead in implementing the results of
    that referendum, but it is at least equally important that we
    move forward on Indonesia's democratic transition, and I think
    the goal of Congressional action and Administration policy has
    got to be how to figure out how to square that circle and to
    accomplish both.
        Thank you very much.
        Mr. Bereuter. Thank you very much, Ambassador Wolfowitz.
        Mr. Bereuter. Dr. Emmerson, you have submitted a written
    statement. The entire statement will be made part of the
    record. You may summarize as you wish.

     STATEMENT OF DONALD K. EMMERSON, SENIOR FELLOW, ASIA/PACIFIC
                  RESEARCH CENTER, STANFORD UNIVERSITY

        Dr. Emmerson. Thank you. I would like to begin by
    expressing my thanks to the Subcommittee for inviting me to
    speak today, to the National Bureau of Asian Research in
    Seattle for facilitating my travel to Washington, and to the
    Carter Center in Atlanta for having enabled me to help monitor
    the popular consultation conducted by the United Nations in
    East Timor on the 30th of August.
        Since I was, as it were, on the ground rather recently, I
    hope you will forgive me if I focus just on two questions. The
    first question is: who is, in fact, responsible for the
    violence? The second question is: with what implications for
    U.S. policy?
        Early on the morning of the 30th of August, I and my fellow
    monitor from the Carter Center, Annette Clear of Columbia
    University, were at the extreme eastern tip of East Timor on
    the road from Tutuala to the voting center in Mehara. The
    courage of the East Timorese people and their desire to choose
    their future were immediately evident to us. On the side of the
    road, we passed hundreds of people walking to the polls. At the
    seven different voting centers we visited that day, from Mehara
    westward to Baucau, thousands of Timorese waited patiently for
    hours under a hot sun to cast a ballot, either to accept
    autonomy inside Indonesia, that is, integration, or to reject
    integration in favor of separation leading to independence.
        As we know, the vote went overwhelmingly for separation,
    and then the voters suffered a catastrophe of truly egregious
    proportions. The militias had embarked on a policy that might
    be termed ``political cleansing'', killing independence
    supporters, injuring them, hounding them out of the territory.
    Some of the Timorese staff who facilitated the Carter Center's
    monitoring mission in East Timor managed to escape, but I
    deeply regret to say that some have still not been heard from.
    Meanwhile, the death toll mounts. Of particular concern to me
    is a woman named Mena and her five children. Mena prepared
    meals for the Carter Center Team during our stay in Dili. She
    was last reported with her children to be in the CARE
    compound--before, unfortunately, it was attacked.
        Five main explanations for this paroxysm of violence in
    East Timor are being put forward by various parties. I would
    like to compare them and assess them. The first explanation is
    the one favored by the Indonesian government. It pictures a
    civil war unfolding in East Timor between prointegration and
    proindependence forces, with Indonesian authorities caught in
    the middle, understandably hard-pressed to restore peace. As my
    colleagues and I saw with our own eyes, this account is
    blatantly false. If I may quote from the press release issued
    by the Carter Center earlier this week, ``Carter Center
    observers have on numerous occasions witnessed militia members
    perpetrating acts of violence in full view of heavily armed
    Indonesian police and military personnel who either stand by
    and watch or actively assist the militias.''
        According to the second explanation, the militias' rampage
    has been locally organized and instigated by Indonesian
    military officers and units stationed in East Timor, but
    without the knowledge, or with the knowledge but without the
    approval, of their superiors in Jakarta. This argument crops up
    frequently, for example, in journalistic accounts. But the
    argument is, if I may say so, implausible, for several reasons.
        Anyone who has interviewed high-ranking Indonesian officers
    in Jakarta in recent years will have been struck by their
    reluctance, if not their outright refusal, to let East Timor
    go. Even reformist officers who say they support
    democratization and eventual civilianization for East Timor
    typically draw the line at independence for the territory.
        In the past, senior commanders have been aware of, and have
    supported, military backing for the militias. Since the 1970's,
    when the territory was first invaded and annexed by Indonesia,
    Jakarta's army has been incubating, irregular bands of young
    Timorese men to support its anti-independence war. Furthermore,
    when he was President of Indonesia, Suharto streamlined its
    armed forces. His highly centripetal rule removed the
    possibility that local warlords could arise on the periphery of
    the archipelago to pursue policies opposed by the central
    leadership in Jakarta.
        It is true that, over the years of Indonesian repression in
    East Timor, special forces and intelligence units established a
    proprietary role for themselves in the territory. Indonesian
    dominion itself grew out of covert operations conducted by
    officers with backgrounds in intelligence. In May 1998, the
    commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces, General Wiranto,
    disciplined and ousted from the army a former head of special
    forces, Prabowo Subianto, who had threatened his position. But
    Wiranto did not purge Prabowo's network of allies and
    supporters, who remain to this day active and influential in
    East Timor.
        Perhaps I might share a brief anecdote with you. Because of
    the China Airlines crash in Hong Kong, I was delayed 26 hours
    and had to fly to Kupang (in West Timor) and take a six hour
    cab ride to the border of East Timor. By the time I got to the
    border, it was dusk, and I had been told in no uncertain terms
    by the Carter Center not to travel on the roads at night.
    Furthermore, there was no one who would take me across the
    border at night. The drivers were all terrified of the
    roadblocks that they knew had been set up by the militias just
    a few kilometers down the road, inside East Timor, on the way
    to Dili.
        There was, however, one driver who came to me and said, ``I
    will take you. In fact, I already have a passenger. He's an
    Indonesian army intelligence officer, in the back seat, and I'm
    taking him to Dili. Would you like to join us? '' The driver
    went on to say that many of the militias were personal friends
    of his, and that therefore he could guarantee my security.
    Needless to say, I opted not to become a passenger in that
    taxi, but it struck me as curious that an Indonesian military
    intelligence officer would seek that route, at night, into East
    Timor.
        Some say Wiranto is too weak to order the local commanders
    in East Timor to arrest and disarm the militias. But he was
    strong enough to remove Prabowo last year, and since then
    arguably Wiranto has consolidated his position. Indeed, he is
    often discussed as a possible candidate to be elected vice
    president of the country by the People's Consultative Assembly
    in November. Perhaps he is reluctant to discipline the Timor
    command lest doing so jeopardize the intramilitary support he
    will need to pursue higher political office.
        Another reason to suspect high-level military complicity in
    what is going on in East Timor is the desire of army leaders to
    prevent events in East Timor from entraining the dismemberment
    of Indonesia. By ratcheting up the violence immediately after
    the vote, the military may be sending an intimidatory message
    to Aceh, Irian Jaya and other restive outlying provinces. That
    message might be summarized thus: Do not go for independence.
    The Timorese did, and look what it got them.
        For these reasons, I am inclined to accept this third
    explanation: that ultimate responsibility for the catastrophic
    conditions prevailing in East Timor must be assigned to the
    Indonesian military, not only local units but also their
    superiors in Jakarta who by action or inaction have encouraged
    or tolerated the present frenzy of destruction.
        The fourth explanation is that the killing, burning, and
    looting in East Timor were ordered by Indonesian President BJ.
    Habibie himself. I doubt this. It was, after all, Habibie who
    initiated the process of self-determination last January when
    he proposed consulting the East Timorese on their fate, and he
    took that radical step without first obtaining army approval.
    Army leaders, never close to him before, were furious that he
    had gone over their heads to innovate an act of self-
    determination in their, that is, the army's, territory, even
    though the event was billed as an advisory consultation, not a
    binding referendum. That army units could instigate so
    blatantly the thwarting of Habibie's plan shows, I think, how
    little control over them he has. Indeed, it is possible that
    his presidency may not survive this crisis.
        The fifth and final explanation attributes the depredations
    in East Timor to Suharto, who resigned his presidency in favor
    of Habibie in May 1998 and returned to private life. But
    Suharto is seriously ill, too ill to be directing events in
    East Timor by remote control. The recourse to official violence
    that characterized his authoritarian regime did create a
    climate and an apparatus conducive to repression, including
    repression in East Timor, but the militias are not being
    manipulated by Suharto himself.
        If I am right to place responsibility for the mayhem in
    East Timor on the Indonesian army including its leadership, it
    follows that American policy should pay particular attention to
    that institution and that leadership. In this context I was
    delighted to learn just now from Ambassador Pickering that the
    U.S. government has cut all military-to-military relations with
    Indonesia, for that is exactly what I recommended when I wrote
    this draft early this morning before flying to Washington. By
    singling out the military in this manner, the United States has
    also sent a message to the civilian leadership in Indonesia
    that we are not--I repeat not--trying to make an enemy of their
    country.
        By this same logic--the need for selectivity--I would think
    twice before trying to cancel all foreign assistance to
    Indonesia as punishment for what is happening in East Timor. In
    this regard, perhaps, I differ with Senator Feingold. Take the
    World Bank's effort to provide a social safety net to
    Indonesia's many poor people, including those impoverished by
    last year's double-digit shrinkage in GDP, or USAID's and the
    congressionally funded Asia Foundation's efforts to support
    NGO's, civil societies, democratic governance, the rule of law.
    One may wonder at the consistency of a policy that in the name
    of democracy, self-determination, for 850,000 East Timorese
    threatens to terminate programs to help bring democracy to 220
    million Indonesians.
        Depending upon the behavior of Indonesia's government, it
    may well be appropriate to delay the next installment on the
    IMF-led package of structural loans. We should realize,
    however, that actually slashing such support could cause budget
    and subsidy reductions that could lead to higher prices for
    basic commodities and services, food, kerosene, bus fares, and
    so on. That could cause more violence, especially in already
    volatile urban areas. A growing number of Indonesians already
    believe that Australia, the United States, and other foreign
    countries are scheming to break up their nation.
        Whatever else it does, the U.S. government should
    substantially increase the pressure on President Habibie to
    allow an armed peacekeeping force to stop the violence in East
    Timor and restore order there if Jakarta cannot do so. Such an
    intervention should be coordinated with Australia and Asian and
    other countries, the prospective members of a ``coalition of
    the willing'', that is the phrase being used, that would assume
    this responsibility with the approval, or at least the
    acquiescence, of the Indonesian government and the United
    Nations.
        I can understand the reluctance of Defense Secretary
    William Cohen to commit American troops to such an undertaking.
    Asians and Australians can and should take the lead. But
    American support, at least in the form of logistics such as
    airlift capability, would send an appropriate signal to
    Indonesia and to the world that the United States cannot stand
    passively by while a legitimate act of self-determination is
    drowned in blood and flames.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Bereuter. Dr. Emmerson, thank you very much for your
    excellent statement.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Emmerson appears in the
    appendix.]
        Mr. Bereuter. Ms. Sidney Jones, we will be pleased to have
    your testimony. You may summarize as you wish.

     STATEMENT OF SIDNEY JONES, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ASIA DIVISION,
                           HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

        Ms. Jones. Thank you very much. I just learned that this
    morning when the Security Council delegation that is now in
    Jakarta was meeting with Xanana Gusmao, who is likely to be the
    leader of an independent East Timor, they were informed that
    militias had just killed Xanana's father. I spoke to a member
    who was present at that meeting. He said it was the most
    wrenching meeting he had ever attended and that both Xanana and
    members of the Security Council delegation were in tears by the
    time it was over.
        I believe that what we are seeing in East Timor today is
    part of a deliberate military plan to thwart independence, and
    that plan began in January 1999 just after President Habibie
    announced that he would give East Timorese the option of
    leaving Indonesia. It involved establishing a network of armed
    anti-independence militias and trying to intimidate
    independence supporters into not registering and not voting in
    the referendum that was held on August 30. When that strategy
    failed, the fallback, which many diplomats in Jakarta were
    aware of as a fallback, was to do exactly what the militias are
    doing now, have the losers challenge the vote as unfair and
    unleash such violence that further moves toward independence
    would become impossible. That plan has gone exactly according
    to script.
        I think the militias should have been stopped much, much
    earlier, and I believe what we have to do now is look at five
    very difficult measures, but we have got to look at all of
    them.
        I strongly support the idea of a multinational peacekeeping
    force, although I do agree that you have to get Indonesian
    permission for such a force, and I believe that the United
    States should contribute to that in a very significant way. But
    one thing that hasn't been mentioned thus far is that the
    political climate in Jakarta now is very tense and increasingly
    anti-U.N. and anti-Western. There is a real backlash in Jakarta
    now to what has happened in East Timor. As Don said, the
    message being conveyed to the public by the Indonesian press is
    not that the violence in East Timor is a murderous, one-sided
    rampage, but that it is a civil war between proautonomy and
    proindependence forces. Moreover, it is portrayed utterly
    unfairly as having been sparked in large part by a U.N.
    operation that was biased from the beginning and designed only
    to further the strategic interests of Australia and the United
    States, and the Jakarta press mentions the strategic interest
    and machinations of Australia and the United States on a
    repeated basis. There is more of a backlash against Australia
    than against Americans, but the anti-Western backlash is
    growing.
        In this climate agreeing to an international force led by
    those same powers would be political suicide for either Habibie
    or Wiranto, and they both know it. This means that even
    relatively explicit warnings of the economic consequences of
    letting this violence continue are not going to have an effect,
    so the only option is to act, not threaten.
        We believe that all nonhumanitarian assistance, and
    especially direct budgetary support to the Indonesian
    government, should be suspended immediately, together with any
    pending sales or deliveries of military equipment, including
    spare parts. If the Indonesian government agrees to an
    international peacekeeping force within days, some nonmilitary
    assistance should be resumed, but full economic and military
    relations should not be restored until three conditions are
    met: UNAMET is able to fully resume its functions in all 13
    districts of East Timor, the displaced are able to return home
    safely, and militia commanders responsible for acts of violence
    are arrested and prosecuted.
        We also believe that for maximum impact, this suspension of
    military and economic aid must be coordinated with Japan,
    Germany, Australia and other members of the donor consortium,
    called the Consultative Group on Indonesia, or CGI, which in
    July pledged $5.9 billion to Indonesia to assist in its
    economic recovery.
        The second measure that the United States should take is to
    get relief workers and aid agencies back into East Timor as
    soon as possible. All health and humanitarian workers in East
    Timor without exception have now been evacuated. There are no
    witnesses to what is happening on the ground.
    Telecommunications were cutoff as part of Habibie's martial law
    decree of September 6 and have only been partially restored.
    There were reports from one humanitarian agency forced to
    evacuate on Tuesday that hospitals and clinics were being
    systematically destroyed. Just as when Indonesia invaded East
    Timor in 1975, the majority of deaths may come less from
    killing than from the inability of a huge and growing displaced
    population to find food or get medical care.
        As discussions take place with the Indonesian government
    over a multinational force, one consideration should be how
    this force can assist with the return and protection of
    humanitarian agencies to address this looming disaster. Without
    such a force, East Timorese will be left at the mercy of the
    Indonesian Army, and the Indonesian Army has shown no mercy
    thus far.
        The third measure is to press Indonesia to remove all
    restrictions on relief and humanitarian work in West Timor as
    soon as possible. East Timorese today were pouring into West
    Timor at a rate of 3,000 people per hour, according to the
    International Committee of the Red Cross, and there were
    believed to be some 60,000 there as of yesterday. Some had been
    forcibly expelled with the direct involvement of Indonesian
    military and police.
        This morning I called the town of Atambua, the West
    Timorese town on the border with East Timor, and learned that
    members of the Dili based militia called Itarak were
    accompanying truckloads of refugees into town, and some of
    these were taken directly to the district military command and
    police headquarters. Numerous eyewitnesses report that militia
    members have a presence in some of these refugee camps.
        I actually learned today that militia members are now in
    control of the Kupang airport, although I haven't verified
    that. Those fleeing or forced out by militia violence have no
    protection against assault, nor are they likely to get any at
    all unless international agencies are able to have a full-time
    presence in the camps in West Timor, we are not even talking
    about East Timor, carry out a full range of humanitarian
    services and have enough confidence in local authorities to
    know that reports of abuses against refugees will be thoroughly
    investigated. But instead of cooperation from local
    authorities, relief workers are being denied access to the
    refugees and told that they blame foreigners for what has
    happened to them and that their own security is in danger.
        It is not only critical that forcibly expelled refugees are
    protected and have access to assistance, it is also essential
    that their stories get out so that the world understands how
    and by whose hands they got to West Timor. In discussions on
    East Timor at the APEC meeting in New Zealand, the
    Administration should give high priority to this issue and work
    out with other APEC members a strategy for persuading the
    Indonesian government to lift restrictions on access.
        Fourth, the results of the August 30 referendum have to be
    protected. The East Timorese defied the guns and machetes to
    turn out in such overwhelming numbers. The army that created
    and backed them must not be allowed to do to independence what
    the Burmese government did to democracy in 1990. They are
    trying to do this now by the scorched earth policy and forcible
    expulsions of people and by a smear campaign going on against
    UNAMET, and the statements made repeatedly by Indonesian
    officials, including Foreign Minister Alatas, that the U.N. was
    biased, allowed major fraud in the referendum and only half
    heartedly investigated allegations of irregularities in the
    registration and polling process.
        This scorched earth policy and these expulsions will leave
    the militias in charge of large parts of East Timor unless they
    are disarmed and pushed out. The militias have publicly
    rejected the results of the referendum, and there is a concern
    that they will have tried to effectively partition East Timor
    with the western districts refusing to join an independent
    state.
        The countries that encourage the formation of UNAMET and
    helped finance it, including the United States, cannot let this
    happen. It is for this reason that it must work to see that
    Indonesia ensures the safe return of refugees and arrests the
    perpetrators of violence. The smear campaign against the U.N.
    means, I think, for the first time that there is a real
    possibility that the MPR, the People's Consultative Assembly,
    which meets in November, may refuse to ratify the results of
    the referendum on the ground that it was not fairly conducted.
    And even though Megawati has given different signals on this, a
    senior official of her party said yesterday that the PDI might
    refuse to endorse the results of the referendum. So U.S.
    officials need to use every opportunity to remind Indonesian
    officials and opposition leaders that they are on record as
    promising to respect the results of the referendum, and that
    both President Habibie and senior members of the Cabinet
    acknowledged on the day of the vote that it had been orderly,
    free and fair.
        Finally the United States needs to press Indonesia to end
    the martial law that was just imposed. We do not believe that
    martial law is either justified or desirable. The army could
    have stopped the violence with the troops it had on the ground,
    and it had 15,000, at least. If some militia leaders are saying
    today, as they are, that they have declared a cease-fire, it is
    not the result of a new military commander or the increased
    powers granted to the military under martial law. It is because
    an order given by Jakarta was made that could and should have
    been given 6 months ago.
        Violence is still likely to continue when and where the
    army sees fit. The fact that soldiers operating under martial
    law and accompanying a UNAMET convoy to its warehouse on
    Wednesday, yesterday, did nothing to stop the militias from
    attacking is all the evidence one needs that new troops will
    not necessarily be guarantors of peace.
        We fear that martial law will be used to keep restrictions
    on communication to ensure the army's work takes place out of
    public view. We fear it will be used to mount operations
    against the guerillas, who, it should be noted, between January
    and the referendum largely refrained from the use of violence,
    and against members of CNRT, the proindependence political
    organization. Today we received reports that at least one
    senior leader of CNRT, Mouhodo, was arrested in East Timor and
    brought to Kupang, West Timor, where he is believed to be in
    police detention. That may be the beginning of a pattern.
        Finally we fear that martial law will be used as a cover to
    find, quote, evidence, unquote, that the August 30 referendum
    was unfair, such as allegedly uncounted proautonomy ballots
    found today. With no impartial witnesses to document how this
    evidence was uncovered, any claims of such discovery should be
    treated with the greatest skepticism.
        I should also point out there is no indication of how long
    martial law will endure or who other than the military will
    decide when order has been restored. The United States should
    make clear to the Indonesian Army that arrests of key military
    leaders would be a key test of the army's will to restore order
    and that martial law should be lifted.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Bereuter. Thank you for your powerful statement. Among
    all the other distressing things, I am particularly distressed
    to hear reports about Mr. Gusmao's father.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Jones appears in the
    appendix.]
        Mr. Bereuter. I will start with questions under the 5
    minute rule and then turn to my colleagues.
        One thing that I have noticed over a period of time is that
    the amount of U.S. assistance to a country--be it Mexico or
    Indonesia--is always overestimated by our colleagues and by the
    American public. When we were proposing to cut off aid to
    Mexico, we had no foreign aid to Mexico. We have a relatively
    small amount of leverage in terms of a bilateral aid sense to
    Indonesia at this point. The military aid is minuscule. It has
    no impact whatsoever except in a symbolic sense. Mr. Lantos and
    I had a brief discussion about the next tranche of money, the
    IMF funds, for part of the $43 billion assistance, to
    Indonesia. Do any of you at this panel believe that such aid is
    inappropriate to hold in abeyance the next payment?
        Ms. Jones. No, I don't believe it is inappropriate at all,
    but I also believe that the relatively small amount of American
    aid could be vastly enhanced in its power if it were joined
    with Japanese economic assistance, and I believe the U.S. has
    some leverage there.
        Mr. Bereuter. Yes.
        Dr. Emmerson. Could I also agree? I don't think it is
    inappropriate to withhold or delay that tranche.
        Mr. Bereuter. You do?
        Dr. Emmerson. I do not think it is inappropriate. Actually,
    I should say it is appropriate.
        Mr. Wolfowitz. I believe it is also not only appropriate
    but essential. There is obviously a caveat, as Don Emmerson
    said earlier, that one has to be careful about creating an even
    more serious economic crisis in Indonesia from which even more
    innocent people suffer, but I think clearly withholding the
    next tranche of IMF lending I think is essential.
        Mr. Bereuter. The markets are indicating the possibility we
    may withold aid along with all the other national and
    international actions is having an impact on Indonesia's
    currency. In some ways, witholding aid may have a greater
    impact than anything else we do in a direct sense. I think that
    is an appropriate kind of leverage.
        I think it is particularly important that United Nations
    forces not be forced out. I am not unsympathetic or unconcerned
    about the danger such forces face, but I think we need to do
    whatever we can to continue their presence and activities of
    U.N. officials at this point.
        Mr. Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, if I just might say, the best
    thing that has happened for strengthening the Indonesian
    currency in the last 12 months was the successful democratic
    election on June 7. The thing that has done the most damage has
    been the atrocity in East Timor in the last week.
        Mr. Bereuter. I think that is absolutely right. Bearing in
    mind what I was saying about the United Nations, is there
    anyone among you who has some ideas about U.N. action against
    Indonesian membership? Do we have any precedent for a deferral
    or partial abatement of the privileges of membership in the
    United Nations since they are acting against a United Nations
    force at this point? Can we suspend membership in the United
    Nations of a member or suspend any of the rights and privileges
    of a member?
        Mr. Wolfowitz. Well, certainly we can't.
        Mr. Bereuter. Not we, but ``we'' meaning a part of the
    international community.
        Mr. Wolfowitz. I don't think the U.N. would do it. I think
    there is this terrible danger that we end up taking actions
    that appear to be so anti-Indonesian that people in Indonesia,
    who are horrified by what their own military have done, begin
    to be more horrified of what the world is doing to Indonesia. I
    think that is the kind of symbolism that probably is harmful.
        Ms. Jones. I also think that because we want UNAMET to stay
    there, and because we want to rely on Security Council approval
    for any peacekeeping force that was sent in, we can't toy with
    Indonesia's membership there. But I think there is a lot we can
    do on the bilateral, multilateral side aside from that.
        Mr. Bereuter. Do all of you agree that stopping bilateral
    assistance at this point except for humanitarian purposes is
    appropriate?
        Ms. Jones. Yes.
        Mr. Bereuter. Does anyone disagree?
        Dr. Emmerson. In my statement I commented that in the case
    of the United States, we provide assistance to Indonesia of a
    variety of kinds. One kind of assistance, for example, is to
    strengthen the process of democratization. I don't think that
    should be cut.
        Mr. Bereuter. And part of that, of course, does go to the
    government?
        Dr. Emmerson. Right. But a lot of it goes to
    nongovernmental organizations.
        Mr. Bereuter. You make that distinction. I take that point.
        Ambassador?
        Mr. Wolfowitz. If I could backtrack a minute on your
    question about the U.N. I think a better way to try to use
    sentiment in the United Nations would be to have the kinds of
    resolutions from the United Nations, and actually if possible,
    I don't know if it is possible, even more from the General
    Assembly than the Security Council that will convince
    Indonesians that this is the whole world that is concerned and
    not just the United States and Australia. I think the U.N.
    really could be a very important vehicle of informing public
    opinion in Indonesia if it is used properly.
        Dr. Emmerson. I am skeptical on this one. I would like to
    remind the Committee that the United Nations presence in East
    Timor was going to go through three phases. Phase Two was going
    to begin after the popular consultation, and Phase Three was
    going to begin after the meeting of the Assembly coming up
    presumably in October or November. I don't think that just for
    the sake of using the United Nations as a club with which to
    beat Indonesia, we should abandon the prospect that a UNAMET
    presence in East Timor could perhaps continue to pursue a plan
    that would help to implement the vote on the 30th of August.
        Mr. Bereuter. As I said, I certainly want to do everything
    possible to keep the U.N. presence there and to continue their
    activities, being pursued in conjunction with the original
    plan.
        We may have a time for another turn, but I turn to my
    colleagues now. The gentleman from American Samoa is
    recognized.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I do want to thank the Members of the panel for their
    comprehensive statements. I have been listening to the comments
    that have been made, and I am sure that some of you have
    probably also heard what Secretary Pickering had said and some
    of the concerns expressed by both Senators and Members of this
    Chamber. We seem to have taken a blind eye in terms of the
    history how this whole thing came about. The East Timor crisis
    did not just happen yesterday. This was a situation, a crisis
    that has been brewing for the past 20 years. Over 200,000 East
    Timorese have been tortured, murdered, killed by the military.
    The East Timorese did not ask the Indonesians to come and make
    them a democracy. The East Timorese military simply took over
    militarily. It was not a peaceful annexation.
        Please forgive me if I am wrong on the history. This was an
    outright unilateral move by the Indonesian military 20 years
    ago to take over East Timor when Portugal decided to get rid of
    its colony. The same thing is also true with West Papua and New
    Guinea. I think we are looking at the situation as if all of a
    sudden this is a crisis, and I am a little interested in the
    fact that our Ambassador, Secretary Pickering, said the
    Administration has been preparing for the options of what was
    to come about as a result now that we are in with the militia
    and the military supporting this. As a matter of fact, it seems
    to me that we really are just--and I have a very famous
    expression in the Hawaiian language called ``waha.'' it means
    just a bunch of hot air with no real substance in terms of what
    we really have to do, as a point of fact, substantively to
    handle this situation.
        I noticed also that there was some mentioning of the fact
    that this place is so isolated all the way on the other side of
    the world that really the United States should have no real
    national interest. My understanding of elementary history as I
    took it in elementary school is that some prince in Serbia's
    assassination started the whole World War I. That was as
    isolated a case as I could remember, how World War I started.
        So East Timor now comes in to bear, and as a matter of
    history we have not had a very good relationship with the Asia
    Pacific region when it comes to military.
        I would just like to ask the question, China has recently
    proposed to the ASEAN member nations that it would be nice if
    we could also set up a regional security organization similar
    to what the Europeans have set up. They call it NATO. Would you
    support this kind of a thing? Because now--and understanding
    that the United States will not unilaterally move in to stop
    this atrocity--do we prefer the People's Republic of China Army
    go in to prevent this atrocity from happening? What is your
    thinking on this?
        Ms. Jones. I could just say that I don't think there is any
    prospect whatsoever that even if a regional security
    organization were formed in Asia that any member would have any
    desire to go in and resolve in East Timor or in Irian Jaya or
    in Aceh at all, and the human rights problems that we have in
    all of those places are not going to be solved by such an
    organization.
        Dr. Emmerson. My comment would be this. I think you put
    your finger on a sore spot. Unlike Europe, where you have NATO
    and other networks of security cooperation, the situation in
    East Asia is not as promising. There is the ASEAN Regional
    Forum (ARF), as I am sure you are aware, but it is a very young
    organization and has yet to prove itself.
        I do feel that the United States must come to terms, if you
    will, with this dilemma. On the one hand we want to reserve the
    right to act unilaterally. We are nationalists, too, in our own
    way. At the same time we are interested in getting others to
    contribute their share, share the responsibility. That is in a
    multilateral setting. I think there is ambiguity in U.S.
    policy. To what extent do we support, let's say, the ARF as
    opposed to reserving our right to intervene? I think there has
    to be a combination of the two.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. I agree with you, Dr. Emmerson.
        Mr. Wolfowitz. I guess I would just say, Congressman, quite
    a few multilateral organizations are designed for inaction, not
    for action. If you had one in which China played the leading
    role, I don't believe if it acted, it would act on behalf of
    human rights. The one country in the region that has taken a
    leadership role is Australia on this. Australia is an ally that
    deserves American support. I believe in the right
    circumstances, that is to say if there were a consensus that
    included Indonesia to bring in an international force, other
    countries in the region have indicated a willingness to
    participate. I don't know if I like the term ``coalition of the
    willing,'' but I don't have a better one. I think that is the
    best way to try to put something together. I think it is
    absolutely right that other countries should be encouraged to
    lead, and when other countries are willing to lead, the United
    States should follow, not feel we have to lead all the time.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Chairman, if I may, just for 30
    seconds more, I would like to share with Members of the panel
    and the Subcommittee an article written by Mr. Walter Shapiro
    that appeared in the Washington Times, I believe yesterday. It
    says, quoting his comments, ``Having blessed the independence
    referendum, that is, our Nation, the United States, it would be
    a cynical betrayal of East Timorese aspirations for freedom for
    America to now turn its back on Indonesian-sponsored brutality.
    Adopting an ostrich-like isolationist policy in East Timor
    would run counter to every moral imperative that buttresses our
    foreign policy.''
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Bereuter. If the gentleman would yield on his
    nonexistent time, in light of the comments we heard about anti-
    West and anti-U.N. sentiment, it would seem to me that if we
    had any kind of multilateral force, it ought to involve
    Southeast Asian countries and ASEAN countries, in particular,
    as a part of that force so that it is not strictly an Anglo/
    Australian/American or some such force.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Would the Chairman yield?
        Mr. Bereuter. I would yield.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. I would strongly advocate that we ought
    to organize a similar NATO-type organization in the Asia
    Pacific region with the United States as a full participant. I
    think it is good and in our national interest.
        Mr. Bereuter. I am pleased to yield now 5 minutes to the
    gentleman from Florida Mr. Hastings.
        Mr. Hastings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I came
    back to learn, and learn indeed I did. I respect so very much
    the Chair and Mr. Faleomavaega, who I believe have few peers
    that could rival them in their understanding of the dynamics
    that are ongoing there. Our three panelists, the portions of
    Dean Wolfowitz' comments that I did hear and the other two,
    were most enlightening and leave me with as many questions as I
    believe they afforded or anyone else have afforded us answers
    today.
        Mr. Chairman, I come to this as perhaps the least
    knowledgeable of all the remaining persons that are discussing
    this issue, but I also come with a fair grip on street life,
    and that is something that I think does not rise always when we
    are discussing a matter. Ms. Jones' propositions that she put
    forward I am in thorough agreement with, as I am with the
    statements of everyone else. What bothers me is Senators--and
    all of us give forth with ruminations about cutting off money,
    and rightly we should, but cutting off the money isn't going to
    cutoff the killing. Therein lies the dilemma that we have.
    Thugs don't respect but one thing, and that is force. The
    people that are conducting themselves in a thuggish manner, in
    the militia especially and perhaps more than likely with the
    complicity of the military, they don't care about the
    International Monetary Fund or the United Nations peacekeeping.
    That isn't what is on their mind until they see something hit
    the ground.
        Thus, I raise the proposition that if anything is going to
    solve this problem, it is going to be an international
    peacekeeping force, period, and that has to be done with or
    without, at some point, the Indonesian government's consent.
    Ideally we should move diplomatically, as we are. Ideally we
    should legislate along the lines that we as policymakers can,
    and the Executive Bbranch should do everything that it can to
    be persuasive. But how can you persuade, for example, Ms.
    Jones, if Habibie and Wiranto would be committing suicide if
    they agreed to let the international community come in as you
    proposition, and I agree with, then you don't expect that they
    are ever going to agree. And if they are the controlling agents
    at this point to a relative degree, then I don't know how we
    communicate with all of these other people, Dean, for example,
    that we should be communicating with.
        I do believe that we should separate the people of
    Indonesia from military persons who act in complicity with
    thugs and make that very clear, but it is a difficult thing.
    But understanding what genocide is not difficult.
        Now, I don't know whether genocide has occurred here, but I
    am willing to go on record as saying that before long we will
    begin using that term. It is a term of art that is given to us
    under the United Nations treaty that allows for the
    international community to act. I don't understand why when
    people are being killed indiscriminately, that we cannot, under
    that aegis, act.
        I don't know how you modify genocide. I have read that
    treaty over and over again. It doesn't say little genocide. It
    doesn't say big genocide. It doesn't say pretty genocide. It
    doesn't say ugly genocide. It defines the terms that I believe
    these actions fall under.
        And so I ask you all, I beg all of my colleagues to begin
    paying attention to that. Otherwise, all of the executive
    actions, all of the actions of APEC in New Zealand, all of
    Clinton's using the bully pulpit, all of our resolutions that
    we pass, are not going to stop the killing until we put some
    people on the ground to stop the killing. I don't know whether
    that should be United Nations or states' troops, but I do know
    we are going to have to undertake to do something and if you
    wake me up at 4 o'clock in the morning, I will tell you how I
    really feel.
        Mr. Bereuter. I thank the gentleman. I do have one point I
    would like to ask in a second round here. Dr. Emmerson, in
    pointing to his five possible explanations, and No. 3 as I have
    marked it down, said responsibility for the recent turmor must
    be clearly assigned to Indonesia military. I recognize what you
    said, but I am going to ask a question, nevertheless, that
    seems to fly partially in the face of that.
        It is my understanding that there was a concerted effort to
    recruit Timorese--East and West Timorese--to the military units
    that were involved and assigned in that region as a positive
    feature for dealing with the difficulties there. In the
    military forces on the island of Timor, it is my understanding
    you have a disproportionate number of Timorese as compared to
    the overall military. I guess my question--and right now it
    would seem to me that might have been a counterproductive step
    at this stage--is as follows:
        Is there an element in the Indonesian military, in your
    judgment, that could effectively be deployed by Wiranto or
    President Habibie that could be expected to implement an end to
    the terrorism that is prevailing there? Is there an element
    that can be rapidly deployed within the military--Is there a
    force within it that can be counted upon to do the job that the
    current forces are not doing?
        Dr. Emmerson. My answer is yes, there is.
        Mr. Bereuter. What is that?
        Dr. Emmerson. Kostrad, to cite just one example. The
    Indonesian military is a broad and manifold organization. It
    has many units with a variety of functions. Kostrad would be
    one possibility--the Army Strategic Reserve, which has the
    capacity of being airlifted to various parts of the
    Archipelago.
        I think you are quite right to point out the issue of
    recruitment from local sources. If you had a unit that came in
    strictly under top command with instructions to arrest the
    militia and end the killing, and if that unit were recruited
    from somewhere else in the archipelago and did not include
    Timorese with an interest in maintaining ties with the militias
    and with Indonesia, or Indonesian officers that own land in
    East Timor, or who have married Timorese wives--if you have a
    unit, if you will, that comes from outside of that context,
    yes, the answer is quite clearly yes, with firm Indonesians to
    do so, it could in fact end the killing.
        Ms. Jones. I would like to differ a bit because I think out
    of the 15,000 people that I mentioned, the troops in East
    Timor, there are 2,000 East Timorese. There are only two
    battalions of East Timorese. All the rest are non-East
    Timorese. So that it is not just a question of people being
    caught up in the emotion.
        Second, there are Kostrad battalions on the ground now. It
    is precisely those Kostrad battalions that let this U.N. convoy
    go through and be attacked by the militias.
        Mr. Bereuter. I don't want to confuse East Timorese with
    Timorese. I am talking about Timorese in part now being a
    problem, whether they are from East Timor or West Timor. Could
    you give me statistics that relate to the Timorese as opposed
    to just the East Timorese, because the East Timorese recruits
    into the army are not the whole problem, if they are a problem.
        Ms. Jones. That is true, but I don't think the West
    Timorese recruited are a significant portion of the other
    battalions.
        Mr. Wolfowitz. There may be a problem in having Timorese in
    the forces, but the real problem is the orders that they are
    all getting. Until they get orders to do anything, nothing will
    happen. You asked if they got orders to do something, would
    Timorese carry them out.
        Mr. Bereuter. No, I really asked is there a unit within the
    military that would respond to orders.
        Mr. Wolfowitz. I think there are. I think there are many. I
    think there are two different kinds of orders. I think it would
    be much easier to find many units who would respond to orders
    if they got them to protect UNAMET, for example, and to protect
    civilians. The hardest part will be getting units to actually
    go after militias and arrest them, because then I think you
    begin to find people saying more these are the people we
    created. These were our allies and now we are supposed to put
    them in jail. That is why I think the Indonesians ought to see
    the offer of international force as a great blessing to
    Indonesia. The sooner they hand over the security
    responsibilities to someone else, the better off the Indonesian
    military will be.
        Mr. Bereuter. I understand your point. I am still looking
    for a specific alternative if in fact they do not go. Dr.
    Emmerson gave me a very specific one.
        Dr. Emmerson. Let me also be specific in responding to
    Sidney. I couldn't disagree more. If Sidney is correct, then
    the Indonesian military is simply incapable of ending the
    violence even if Wiranto wanted to. That is absurd. I was in
    Ambon in June for the Indonesian elections, monitoring that
    event. It was Kostrad troops that were able to separate Muslims
    and Christians that previously had been killing each other. I
    don't believe for a moment that the entire Indonesian military
    is so corrupted by Timor that they are incapable of following
    authority a true instructions to end the killing. That is not
    the case.
        Ms. Jones. What I was saying is that you can't just take a
    unit and assume that because it is Kostrad and because it is
    well trained and specially trained and elite, that therefore
    that background gives it somehow a greater ability than other
    units if, in fact, you are not getting the appropriate orders
    from the top. I do think if you did get orders from Wiranto,
    everything would be very different.
        Mr. Bereuter. I understand. There are two elements. One is
    the commitment and the orders that follow it. The second one is
    a force that will implement it. Both can be and is currently a
    problem.
        Thank you. The gentleman from American Samoa for a round.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. I have about 501 other questions I want
    to raise. I know we can continue the dialogue for the next five
    hours very--quite easily; but I do want to commend you for
    calling this hearing which I think has been very purposeful. I
    sincerely hope that not only the Members of the Committee but
    the American public will have gotten a little more education
    about where this place is and the importance of this crisis and
    what impact it will have not only for our own national
    interests but especially for this region of the world.
        I also want to commend our good friends here for their very
    fine statements and their participation in the hearing. I want
    to thank you again.
        Mr. Bereuter. Thank you. The gentleman from Florida have
    another statement?
        Mr. Hastings. I don't have a question. I just have a
    request of Ms. Jones if she would be kind enough to provide me
    a copy of your paper publication in the Australian journal,
    that is in your biography, ``Regional Institutions for
    Protecting Human Rights,'' I would just like to read it.
        Ms. Jones. I will.
        Mr. Hastings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
    hearing. Thank you all so very much for your enlightening
    testimony.
        Mr. Bereuter. I join my colleagues in expressing our
    appreciation to the panel for your exceptional assistance here
    today. We appreciate the fact you have taken so much of your
    day to do it. Thank you very much.
        The Subcommittees are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 5:25 p.m., the Subcommittees were
    adjourned.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                               September 9, 1999

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