[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
TO RECEIVE AN UPDATE ON SELECTED REGIONAL ISSUES TO INCLUDE: COLOMBIA
AND U.S. POLICY; LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN HAITI AND U.S. TROOP
WITHDRAWAL; STATUS OF COUNTER-DRUG FORWARD OPERATING LOCATIONS; U.S.
CUBA COUNTER-NARCOTICS COOPERATION PROPOSAL; CHINESE INFLUENCE IN THE
PANAMA CANAL; POLITICAL EVENTS IN VENEZUELA; AND STATUS OF U.S.
PROPERTY CLAIMS IN NICARAGUA
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
of the
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
__________
SEPTEMBER 29, 1999
__________
Serial No. 106-64
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
60-799 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
DANA ROHRABACHER, California SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PETER T. KING, New York PAT DANNER, Missouri
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South BRAD SHERMAN, California
Carolina ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MATT SALMON, Arizona STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
AMO HOUGHTON, New York JIM DAVIS, Florida
TOM CAMPBELL, California EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
KEVIN BRADY, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BARBARA LEE, California
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff
------
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
ELTON GALLEGLY, California, Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina MATTHEW MARTINEZ, California
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
Carolina JIM DAVIS, Florida
KEVIN BRADY, Texas EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio
Vince Morelli, Subcommittee Staff Director
David Adams, Democratic Professional Staff Member
Kelly McDonald, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Peter F. Romero, Ambassador, Acting Assistant
Secretary of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S.
Department of State............................................ 7
APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
The Honorable Peter F. Romero.................................... 34
Material submitted for the record:
Article Printed by the Washington Post Titled 20,000 Troops
Later, Submit by Honorable Benjamin Gilman..................... 47
Question submitted by Honorable Cass Ballenger to Honorable Peter
F. Romero concerning the untilization of Mexican Helicopters in
Colombia and response thereto.................................. 49
Article printed by the Washington Post titled Choppers to
Colombia, Submit by Honorable Benjamin Gilman.................. 51
Question submitted by Honorable Cass Basllenger concerning
chinese Army involvement in Hutchinson-Whampoa and response
thereto........................................................ 52
Letter, dated October 6, 1999 to Honorable Peter F. Romero,
submitted by Honorable Robert Wexler........................... 53
TO RECEIVE AN UPDATE ON SELECTED REGIONAL ISSUES TO INCLUDE:
COLOMBIA AND U.S. POLICY; LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN HAITI AND
U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL; STATUS OF COUNTER-DRUG FORWARD OPERATING
LOCATIONS; U.S. CUBA COUNTER-NARCOTICS COOPERATION PROPOSAL;
CHINESE INFLUENCE IN THE PANAMA CANAL; POLITICAL EVENTS IN
VENEZUELA; AND STATUS OF U.S. PROPERTY CLAIMS IN NICARAGUA
----------
Wednesday, September 29, 1999
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:33 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elton Gallegly
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Gallegly. If everyone will please take their seats.
Why don't we put the poster over there?
Today the Subcommittee will receive testimony updating us
on several issues facing the Hemisphere and how U.S. policy is
addressing these issues.
When we sent our letter of invitation to the Department we
asked the Secretary to address seven specific issues. Some of
these issues will serve as a follow-up to the recent visits of
Presidents Chavez of Venezuela and Pastrana of Columbia. Others
were added at the request of Members of this Committee.
We are pleased to welcome Acting Assistant Secretary of
State Peter Romero to present the Department's views.
On a personal note, Mr. Secretary, I know the past few
months have been both a little frustrating and disappointing to
you as you have awaited Senate confirmation of your nomination
to be Assistant Secretary. Those of us who know you know of
your high qualifications for this position and appreciate the
information and insights you have provided our Subcommittee
throughout your time as Acting Secretary. I hope the other body
will expedite your confirmation.
That being said, there have been complaints both from
within Congress and from Latin Americans themselves that the
U.S. seems to have placed Latin America on the so-called ``back
burner'' willing only to express our interest in times of
natural disasters or when drugs are concerned.
As you say in your remarks, ``more than anywhere else in
the world, problems in this Hemisphere have a way of intruding
directly and immediately on our lives and livelihood''. Yet,
issues involving the guerrilla war in Colombia, the future of
the Panama Canal, democracy in Haiti, political instability in
Ecuador, political developments in Venezuela and important
national elections in Mexico, Guatemala, Argentina and Peru,
which can have serious and long-lasting impacts on the United
States, do not seem to be a high priority within this
Administration.
It is no wonder, then, that we hear all kinds of
speculations, rightly and wrongly, that nations such as China
and Cuba are telling our neighbors how little we care about the
region hoping to raise their own levels of influence in the
Hemisphere.
Again, Mr. Secretary, we do appreciate your willingness to
appear before the Committee to address some of these issues. I
hope, through this appearance today, the Administration will
signal a renewed interest in the region beyond drugs and
disasters, and that we will continue to recognize the
importance of our neighbors and partners to the south.
Before turning to the Secretary it is my pleasure to defer
to the Ranking Member, Mr. Ackerman, for any opening remarks.
Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your
opening remarks.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to join you this afternoon in
welcoming Assistant Secretary Peter Romero before the
Subcommittee. Peter has served throughout his career with
distinction, playing key roles in the Peru-Ecuador Peace
Agreement and in negotiating the Peace Accords in El Salvador.
I join with you, Mr. Chairman, in the hope that Peter will soon
be able to remove the ``Acting'' from his title so that we can
benefit fully from his expertise.
We are here today to discuss a variety of hemispheric
issues of concern to the United States. While the issues the
Chairman mentioned in his invitation letter are important,
there are other things that are going on that I hope we can
discuss today as well. For instance, there are elections on the
horizon in Argentina, Chile and Mexico. These elections carry
with them further signs that democratic processes are deepening
and opening in Latin America. In Mexico in particular the long
dominant PRI has moved to a primary system to select its
Presidential candidate.
But even as democratic institutions expand there is
widespread discontent with the results of democratization and
economic liberalization. As the article in Monday's Wall Street
Journal noted, many in Latin America are worse off than they
were before economic reforms and, for better or worse, they are
beginning to doubt democracy's promise.
While I don't think there will be movement backwards toward
authoritarian regimes, there has been a noticeable slowing of
economic reforms as the political support for free market
capitalism wanes. I hope that the United States will continue
to be engaged and to do what we can to encourage developing
nations to continue on the path of economic and democratic
reforms. Having a confirmed Assistant Secretary would be a very
nice start.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I look forward to Secretary
Romero's testimony.
Mr. Gallegly. Thank you very much, Mr. Ackerman.
The gentlelady from Florida.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank you, Mr. Gallegly, for holding this
very timely hearing. The issues to be addressed today are
critical items to the U.S.-Hemispheric relations as they impact
upon our foreign economic and security policy toward the
region.
Due to time restraints, I would like to focus on the
Nicaraguan property issue and on the Castro regime's
involvement in narco-trafficking.
There are three areas of claims, Mr. Romero, which I hope
that you will address today; and they require a prompt
resolution: First, the CORNAP cases; second, those cases in
which the property has been returned in name but in which the
owner cannot occupy the property; and, third, where there is an
existing court judgment.
These cases in Nicaragua require the full attention of the
State Department. They need to be raised within the context of
discussions at the international financial and lending
institutions, and they must be resolved expeditiously. American
citizens should be able to depend on their government to defend
their property rights and their right to indemnification and
just compensation.
Just compensation does not include payment in bonds, which
at current levels are valued at about 14 cents on the dollar. I
would like the Secretary to address the Department's position
on this practice and what actions have been taken to raise this
issue with the Nicaraguan authorities and elaborate on the
achievements in the conversion of compensation bonds to a
standardized format, the creation of special courts to deal
with property cases, and the creation of alternatives to the
compensation bonds.
Turning to the issue of Cuba and the drug trade, the
Clinton Administration is making every attempt to justify
cooperation and engagement with the Castro dictatorship, citing
the inability of the regime to interdict the drug trade
supposedly and ignoring the facts and the history of the
regime's complicity and participation in narco-trafficking
networks.
This position of the Administration is outrageous. Given
that the Castro regime exerts absolute control over its
territory, over its people and its ruling structure; given the
attack on the Brothers to the Rescue planes in 1996 by the
Castro air force; given the attack on the 13 de Marzo tugboat
by the Cuban coast guard, the arrest of Cubans trying to flee
the island in makeshift vessels; given the intelligence
resources of the Castro regime which enabled a spy ring to
penetrate U.S. military installations and espionage network
classified as sophisticated and efficient by our very own FBI,
it is unconscionable that anyone could believe that this regime
has neither the knowledge nor the ability to prevent the use of
its land, air and water for the drug trade.
It is beyond logic how the Administration can rationalize
an arrangement which would entail sharing of U.S. information
and intelligence with a terrorist regime which is a declared
enemy of the U.S.
Specifically, I would like to ask Secretary Romero during
his presentation to update our Subcommittee on the status of
the investigation on the seizure of over seven metric tons of
cocaine seized in Cartagena on December 3rd of last year that
was supposedly destined for Cuba. Without divulging specific
details, which we understand, Mr. Secretary, if you could share
any information concerning cooperation with the Spanish and
Colombian authorities and the sharing of data to prove that
this shipment was destined for Cuba.
Has the Department accessed the Cuban police investigation
which contradicts the Castro regime's account of the seizure?
Is the Department working with other agencies on this
investigation? If so, is it all coordinated by the Department
and why?
We welcome the Secretary with us today. We look forward to
his testimony and especially the explanation for the
Department's acceptance of the Castro regime's version of the
events. We welcome him today, especially since he is a south
Floridian. So thank you, Peter, for being with us today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gallegly. I thank the gentlelady.
The gentleman from New York, the Chairman of the Full
Committee, Mr. Gilman.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Chairman Gallegly, for scheduling
this timely hearing. The broad agenda reflects the fact there
are a number of visible and highly important foreign policy
concerns in our Western Hemisphere. We welcome Acting Assistant
Secretary Romero to come before us once again, and we look
forward to hearing his thoughts as he shares his views with
regard to some of these critical issues.
With regard to Colombia, during his recent visit, President
Pastrana announced a $7.5 billion plan to reinforce Colombia's
military forces to fight drug trafficking and strengthen the
presence of the state in the lives of the citizens throughout
his country.
The outline of his plan makes sense. It is broad-based. It
seeks to rectify important weaknesses that undercut the
legitimate authority of the state. But the Administration has
been so preoccupied with avoiding being involved in Colombia's
counterinsurrgency effort that it has permitted the situation
in Colombia to deteriorate.
The Administration did have some encouraging words for
President Pastrana's plan. Key officials traveled to Bogata to
consult with the Colombia team that wrote the plan. However,
there is no word on when or even if the Administration is going
to send a request for emergency supplemental appropriations for
Colombia to Congress for how much or what will be included in
that request.
As we wind down this session in the last few weeks, I think
it is critically important for our government to expedite the
delivery of assistance which has already been funded and is now
languishing in the pipeline.
With regard to Haiti, Haiti is back on the front pages of
our newspapers once again. The Haitian National Police is being
corrupted by drug trafficking and the manipulation by former
Haitian army officials that are tied to former President
Aristide.
Haiti's legislative and municipal elections face further
delays and some serious challenges, and we are troubled by the
lack of high-level attention from our government to just what
is going on in Haiti.
Prime Minister Preval has become hostile to the electoral
council he appointed and is engaging in stalling tactics.
Street violence fomented by former President Aristide's Lavalas
Family Party threatens freedom of assembly, threatens freedom
of speech and may threaten the elections as well.
The Haitian National Police don't appear to have a
comprehensive plan to provide security during the forthcoming
election. The electoral council faces significant logistical
hurdles to provide critically important voter identification
cards and meet the type of electoral calendar that it has
established.
No progress has been made toward privatizing Haiti's state-
owned telephone monopoly. On Tuesday, the state-owned cash cow
arbitrarily shut down a private Internet provider, Alpha
Communications Network, cutting off Haitian access to the
Internet. I urge the State Department to investigate and
protest that kind of outrageous action.
The permanent deployment of our troops in Haiti will end
and periodic New Horizons exercises are going to take their
place. Our colleague Porter Goss, the Chairman of Intelligence
Committee, published an article in today's Washington Post on
Haiti which refers to our troop withdrawal.
Without objection, I would ask, Mr. Chairman, that it be
included in the record of this hearing.
Mr. Gallegly. Without objection.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Gilman. With regard to Panama, last March, Speaker
Hastert and Senate Majority Leader Lott sent President Clinton
a letter urging him to make a major effort this year to
negotiate an extension of the U.S. military presence in Panama.
In a very disappointing response dated April 19th, the
President said the Administration has concluded that the new
government in Panama will not have time to negotiate such an
extension and win the necessary support of the Panamanian
people for it. His response basically implied that the
Administration wasn't going to do anything in this regard
unless some Panamanians come to us and virtually beg us to
stay.
Since that time, the Administration's alternative to
Panama, the so-called Forward Operating Locations, have proven
disappointing. In addition, there have been some very
encouraging signals from the new government about their
possible interest in working out an extension of our military
presence there. In particular, I believe they may be interested
in the approach suggested by the legislation I introduced last
year, the United States Panama Partnership Act, to give them
various trade and other benefits in exchange for affording our
military continued success in Panama.
I hope you will comment, Mr. Secretary, whether the
Administration will be pursuing their interest on their part. I
will be very disappointed if you tell us that there has been no
change in the Administration's position since last April. It
would be truly reckless to let such an opportunity slip away.
In addition, I note that a growing number of our Americans
are deeply upset that a Hong Kong company with ties to
communist China has been granted leases to ports at both ends
of the Panama Canal. If our government has any evidence that
these leases were influenced or obtained through any
corruption, that information should be provided to the
government of President Moscoso without delay.
So I thank the Chairman for this time. I look forward to
sharing some thoughts with Secretary Romero. We appreciate your
being here today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gallegly. I Thank the Chairman, Mr. Gilman.
Are there any other opening statements?
Mr. Burton. If I might, real quick.
Mr. Gallegly. The gentleman from Indiana.
Mr. Burton. I won't take a great deal of time, but I do
want to discuss with Mr. Romero some statements he made before
the Government Reform and Oversight Committee regarding
developmental assistance to the FARC guerrillas when he
appeared before our Committee.
We believe there are some inconsistencies in what you told
my Committee and what was actually the case. We have before us
today secret documents that I subpoenaed from the White House
and the State Department, and I hope that you will take
seriously, reconsider what you told our Committee when you
testified before it, because we find strong inconsistencies in
your memos and what you told the Committee. If that continues,
there is very likely going to be a contempt of Congress
citation that you will have to deal with.
I am also concerned about Title IV of the Helms-Burton law.
It is your responsibility, I understand, to issue letters of
determination or sanctions again the companies that violate the
embargo. There are 21 plus foreign companies in violation of
the embargo. I guess you have issued advisory letters against
three hotel companies who are in violation of the embargo, but
21 plus are in violation that you have not contacted.
I also would like for you to explain the Cuban spy Fernando
Garcia Belsa--I think I pronounced his name correctly--who
supports terrorism and espionage and who has worked with the
guerrillas in Puerto Rico who were recently released by the
President of the United States.
The last thing I would like to talk to you about is what
the Chairman of the Full Committee, Mr. Gilman, just talked
about, and that is the danger to the Panama Canal and the
United States as a result. The FARC guerrillas are within 100
miles of the Panama Canal, and it is my understanding they
could move in that direction at any time with virtual impunity,
and at the same time we have got the communist Chinese about to
control both ends of the canal. Since it has a direct impact on
the economy of the United States and possibly the security of
the United States, we would like to know what you and the
Administration plan to do about that.
With that, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Mr. Gallegly. No other opening statements.
Mr. Gallegly. Mr. Secretary, your full written text will be
placed in the record, without objection, in its entirety, and
you are welcome to proceed in any manner you see fit. Mr.
Secretary, we welcome you.
STATEMENT OF PETER F. ROMERO, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Mr. Romero. Thanks for the promotion, Mr. Chairman; and I
really appreciate the opportunity to appear before the
Committee. I would like to thank you for your opening remarks
and those of your distinguished colleagues here, and I hope to
get to all of those questions and more. But permit me to at
least frame briefly where I see and where we in the Department
of State see the Hemisphere going and our relationship with it.
While acknowledging the many challenges before us I believe
the countries of the Western Hemisphere are at a very promising
juncture. We have, arguably, the best relationships with our
neighbors throughout the region than we have ever had.
Geography, trade, travel, migration and technology have all
combined to produce an unprecedented level of integration and
interdependence and cooperation. This means that hemispheric
issues, crime or immigration or economic growth or natural
disasters, quickly tend to become domestic U.S. issues that
resonate in our local communities. More than ever, strong U.S.
leadership is absolutely critical.
Organizationally, another manifestation of this deepening
integration is the change in the old Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs. With the addition of Canada, we are now the Bureau of
Western Hemisphere Affairs. The incorporation of Canada into
our Bureau not only reflects an economic and geopolitical
reality but has the beneficial effect of causing us to
regularly rethink how we look at the totality of our
relationships and our goals in the Hemisphere.
Mr. Chairman, the questions that you submitted to me are
very important questions, and I hope to have all opportunities
to be able to engage the Members of your Committee in
discussing them. But often times when you look at the
challenges ahead, you tend to view the glass as half empty, if
you will. What I would like to do is to just briefly go through
the Hemisphere just to talk about some of the high points.
Within the next couple of weeks, Mr. Chairman, there will
be an unprecedented act that will probably go relatively
unnoticed in Uruguay. That is the signing of a multilateral
evaluation mechanism that has been agreed upon by every single
member state of the OAS. And what that will do will be to take
much of what we had accomplished with respect to the
certification process and move it about 15 steps ahead in terms
of having a hemispheric process that will not only evaluate
performance, counternarcotics performance, in each country,
along the full range of counternarcotics issues, but also
provide recommendations and issues that should be supported
internationally. This follows a hemispheric strategy that had
been agreed upon about two years ago, and this really puts the
rubber on the road, if you will, Mr. Chairman, in terms of
hemispheric cooperation on counternarcotics.
Beyond that, we have got excellent cooperation which has
been improving with the Mexican Government on law enforcement
issues but particularly as they relate to counternarcotics.
Virtually unnoticed in the press a couple of days ago there
was a combined U.S.-Mexico law enforcement operation which
resulted in the arrests of 93 Americans and Mexicans and others
both inside the United States and in Mexico. The key component
of that was the fact that this investigation and the operation
was two years in the making. Law enforcement on both sides of
the border kept to a need-to-know strategy, and they were able
to spring this operation on 93 very unsuspecting criminals.
This was an operation that yielded a lot of cocaine and
millions of dollars worth of cash.
In Mexico, in addition to that, you are seeing a primary
process which for the first time has opened up the
Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) of Mexico to a U.S.-
style type primary that will be held before the end of the
year. I think that this shows promise. It shows that democracy
is taking root not just in Mexican institutions but, obviously,
in the political party atmosphere. You can go to Mexico at any
given time, turn on the television set and see debates within
the PRI, candidates who would not have debated publicly the
issues before.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, the President was largely chosen
in a very closed-circle back room before. And now you have got
debate largely on all the air waves in Mexico, on key issues
and you have got a little bit of mud-slinging going on at the
same time. But clearly a turn toward democracy.
Throughout the region, beyond the greater cooperation that
we have on counternarcotics, that cooperation has begun to
yield real results. In Peru over the last couple of years we
have witnessed a 52-percent decline in cocoa production. In
Bolivia, the Bolivian people have adhered to a strategy under
the current president, President Banzer, to rid the country of
cocaine by the Year 2002. Not only are they on schedule for
that, but they are ahead of schedule in terms of eradication of
cocoa production in that country.
Elsewhere, we had a very nasty turn of events, Mr.
Chairman, over the last couple of months in Paraguay. Luckily
we and the other friends of Paraguay were able to work together
to continue or to have Paraguayans continue on the course of
constitutional order. There was an assassination of a vice
president there. But the constitution did hold, and a new
president was elected, or assumed office, and was seated. We
are hoping for greater cooperation in Paraguay, but they are
off to a very good start.
As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, we are seeing elections
unfold or campaigns unfold toward elections in Chile and
Argentina. We have spoken in depth on our issues to all major
candidates and believe that we can work with all major
candidates to advance our common goals in the Hemisphere and
bilaterally in both countries. We were able to assist in the
forestalling of economic collapse and chaos in Brazil. We were
able to support President Cardoso in his drive to structurally
reform the state and to avoid dire economic circumstances. The
Treasury, the IMF, State Department, we all worked hand in
glove to prevent that from happening; and, quite frankly, it
was a whole lot better than the most dire predictions before
the Brazilian Government was able to see headroom.
Elsewhere around the region we have begun to see a plethora
of robust regional groupings, whether it be SICA (Central
American Intelligence System) in Central America or Caricom in
the Caribbean or Mercosur in the south. The Andean Pact has
redefined itself and is calling itself the Andean Union. There
is definitely a drive toward free markets and shared views
toward democratic institutions and goals and objectives.
Let me--before I leave that, let me just say that, in terms
of Ecuador and Peru, the United States played a very strong
role in ending a border dispute that arguably went on for about
140-years, and now both of those countries can turn toward more
peaceful pursuits.
Then finally, Mr. Chairman, while the free trade issue gets
debated and perhaps even heats up in the course of campaigns in
the United States, let me just throw out a little fact and that
is that our leading trading partner is a NAFTA partner and our
second leading trading partner is a NAFTA partner. Canada and
the United States do almost $1 billion worth of trade a day.
And Mexico our other partner in NAFTA has superceded Japan as
our second most trading partner. The benefits are manifest of
free trade, Mr. Chairman.
The timing of my appearance here is very opportune. I spent
much of last week and parts of this week in New York in the
U.N. General Assembly where I met with a variety of hemispheric
leaders and discussed many of the same issues that concern all
of us here today.
Colombia
On Colombia, among those I spoke with was Colombia
President Pastrana, who met with President Clinton on September
21st. President Pastrana faces some of the most difficult
internal challenges of any leader in the region, and I say that
with a historical perspective also. In response, the government
of Colombia has unveiled a good, comprehensive plan that
provides a strategic vision outlining how the government of
Colombia intends to address its national challenges.
The Plan Colombia, plan for peace, prosperity and
strengthening of the state, is an ambitious package of mutually
reenforcing policies to revive Colombia's battered economy,
strengthen democratic institutions, and promote the peace
process while more aggressively moving against narcoproducers
and traffickers. The plan covers five critical themes: the
peace process, counternarcotics, the judicial system,
democratization, human rights and social development and
economic policy.
The government of Colombia recognizes the imperative to
regain the confidence of the Colombian people by strengthening
democratic and social institutions, particularly those
assisting Colombian victims of the country's violence and drug
trade. The government of Colombia will promote greater respect
for human rights, assist those displaced by the internal
conflict, implement alternative development programs, combat
corruption, strengthen local government and provide sustainable
development assistance to conflictive areas.
Guerrilla and right-wing militia violence has taken a very
heavy toll on Colombia both in terms of human life and in terms
of the economic losses. Moreover, both the guerrilla and right-
wing militias are increasingly tied to the narcotics industry.
We believe that President Pastrana is correct in making peace a
major priority by folding it into a robust security strategy.
Measures which aid in settling Colombia's internal conflict
will also help in other areas. For example, Colombia's internal
fighting discourages domestic and foreign investment which is
vitally needed to restart an economy currently suffering from
the worst downturn since the 1930's. We intend to support
Colombia's peace process through contributions to alternative
development in areas controlled by the government, strengthen
respect for human rights and measures to promote good
government at the local government level.
We need to help the Colombian Government succeed. The
likely price of a failure would be further disintegration of
the Colombian state, higher levels of paramilitary and
guerrilla violence and a worsened narcotics situation. Such a
failure would have dire consequences for the United States and
the region as a whole.
The status of our Forward Operating Locations
Tracking the narcotics air and maritime operations is an
essential component of our interdiction strategy. With the
closing of our military bases in Panama we have adopted a new
tool called Forward Operating Locations. U.S. counternarcotics
aircraft have been operating out of temporary FOL's in Curacao,
Aruba, and Manta, Ecuador, since last April, under interim
accords negotiated with the Dutch and Ecuadorian Governments.
We are now finalizing negotiations with both governments for
long-term, 10-year-plus agreements.
While there has been some degradation in aerial
counternarcotics coverage, we anticipate that when the third
FOL is established, coverage will likely exceed what we had at
Howard Air Force Base. We plan to establish a third FOL site in
Central America at an appropriate location as conditions
warrant and obviously as funding permits.
U.S.-Cuba Counternarcotics Cooperation
Geography dictates that a narcotics interdiction strategy
include a strong Caribbean component. Cuba's Caribbean location
between South America and the U.S. market means we have to
consider Cuba as we design our strategy and as we refine the
same.
Given that Cuban air space and territorial waters are at
risk of being used by traffickers smuggling drugs into the
United States our law enforcement community has begun exploring
ways to plug these interdiction gaps. Toward that end, we had
technical and exploratory talks with Cuban officials in Havana
last June but did not reach any formal agreements whatsoever.
Directly relevant to our counternarcotics engagement with
Cuba is the issue that was brought up earlier in the
statements: the 7.2 ton cocaine shipment bound for Cuba that
was seized by Colombian authorities in December 1998. The
intelligence community is conducting an all-source assessment
of that shipment and possible Cuban Government complicity in
it. We will consider the results of that assessment as we
determine our future narcotics control relationship and
strategy with Cuba.
The meeting of our working level counternarcotics experts
in Cuba was governed by our desire to address a drug threat.
For many years we have engaged in a case-by-case strategy of
cooperation with Cuba, when it is or when it was in our
national interest to do so.
The counternarcotics talks do not signify a change in U.S.
policy toward Cuba. We continue to press the Cuban regime to
democratize and to respect human rights while seeking to engage
and assist the Cuban people in order to promote the peaceful
transition to democracy. Evidence of this was our successful
effort to score Cuban human rights practices earlier this year
at the Human Rights Commission in Geneva.
Panama Canal and the Chinese influence over it
In 1996, the government of Panama initiated a process to
privatize the operations of ports at both ends of the Canal. We
protested vigorously what we considered a flawed bidding
process which resulted in a port concession being awarded to a
division of the Hong Kong-based company Hutchison-Whampoa.
Since that time, the process leading to the award to
Hutchison-Whampoa has been reviewed by, inter alia, a Senate
Foreign Relations Committee staff delegation and the Federal
Maritime Commission. These studies concluded that though the
bidding process was at best unorthodox, there did not appear to
be discrimination against U.S. companies.
Concern has been expressed over Chinese influence in Panama
as a result of the Hutchison-Whampoa concession, and we have
taken a very close look at this issue and will continue to
follow it very, very closely. We have concluded that the
presence of Hutchison-Whampoa in the ports of Balboa and
Cristobal does not represent a threat to Canal operations or to
U.S. interests this Panama.
The status of U.S. property claims in Nicaragua
Seeking resolution of U.S. citizens' claims for property
confiscation during the Sandinistan regime remains our most
important and most difficult bilateral issue with the
government of Nicaragua. Successive Nicaraguan Governments have
made encouraging progress in stepping up and accelerating the
pace of claims resolutions.
In July, Secretary Albright issued the sixth annual waiver
of Section 527 provisions which, had they not been waived,
would have prohibited most forms of bilateral aid to Nicaragua.
Her decision was based on the fact that Section 527 would have
provoked disastrous results for Nicaragua's economic reform
process, particularly in the wake of the devastation caused by
Hurricane Mitch. Her decision also reflected our sense that the
government of Nicaragua under President Aleman is making good
progress in resolving claims.
While we are making solid progress on the property issue,
we must maintain constructive pressure on the government of
Nicaragua. Americans have been patient in seeking resolution
and deserve a fair shake. Like many of you, and like many U.S.
citizen claimants, I am frustrated with this difficult and slow
process. But with perseverance and insistence I believe we can
eventually find acceptable resolutions of these claims.
The political situation in Venezuela
Following Hugo Chavez' election as president of Venezuela
in December 1998, Venezuelans again returned to the polls in
April and voted overwhelmingly to create a National Constituent
Assembly the ANC, to draft a new constitution. Elected on July
25th, a vast majority of the ANC supports President Chavez. The
ANC was given six months to complete a draft of the new
constitution. However, President Chavez has requested that the
ANC finish its work within the next three months.
The process got off to a difficult start with turf
conflicts between the ANC and the legislature and the courts.
The Assenbly's claim to originating powers (in essence,
establishing its superiority to the existing branches of
government) was indirectly upheld in a Supreme Court opinion,
and the President of the Court resigned in protest. A clash
between the Congress and ANC--with the ANC issuing emergency
decrees limiting Congress's powers--was resolved in an
agreement brokered by the Catholic Church.
Most Venezuelans believe that profound change is needed to
save their democracy. We agree with that. And they have tasked
the ANC with that responsibility. We recognize the importance
of that undertaking. At the same time, we have cautioned that
changing the rules of democracy, must, itself be done
democratically in the context of open, inclusive debate and
that, that process respect checks and balances and fundamental
democratic principles.
In addition, we believe that the current focus on political
and institutional issues has obscured the dire need for
Venezuelan Government engagement on economic policy. Pressing
economic problems must be addressed forthrightly and quickly
even as the ANC continues its work on the proposed new
constitution.
Haiti
Finally, Mr. Chairman, on Haiti, the elections and the
status of U.S. and U.N. forces there. September marks the fifth
anniversary of the U.S.-led effort that restored elected and
constitutional government to Haiti. And although Haiti's
political and economic progress has been impeded by a prolonged
and devisive political impasse, we in the Administration remain
committed to helping the country achieve sustainable democracy,
and a level of economic growth that will lift the Haitian
people out of abject poverty.
The U.S. military support group has contributed
significantly to U.S. objectives in Haiti and provided
outstanding assistance to the Haitian people. Plans are under
way for the redeployment home in early 2000 of the nearly 400
strong U.S. military support group in Haiti. However, we will
continue to be engaged militarily and are currently reviewing
proposed activities including temporary training exercises
under what Chairman Gilman mentioned earlier and that is the
New Horizons program.
The four year-old Haitian National Police, despite its many
defects, and some of those defects were catalogued in an
article in The Washington Post yesterday, is the best police
force that Haiti's ever had. The U.N. International Civilian
Police Mission, or MIPONUH, has been critical in helping Haiti
develop an increasingly credible police force. MIPONUH's
mandate is due to lapse in November of this year, November
30th, and we are currently working with the U.N. and other
donors to obtain passage in the United Nations General Assembly
of a new mandate for a smaller and restructured U.N. police
assistance mission, one that would mentor and monitor at the
same time, combine both functions.
In a few months from now, Haiti will hold legislative
regional and local elections. These elections are critical to
fully restoring the Parliament that lapsed January 11th of this
year. We are urging the Haitians to hold these elections as
soon as possible in a free, fair and transparent manner. We
appreciate, Mr. Ackerman, your concerns about preparations for
those elections and I would be happy to address that later.
The U.S. and international community are actively engaged
in helping Haiti prepare for the upcoming elections and will
continue to remain engaged in that preparation.
Mr. Chairman, I have attempted to respond to the seven
areas that you have asked me to address. I look forward to
answering any questions that you or other Members of the
Subcommittee might have and thank you for this opportunity.
Mr. Gallegly. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Romero appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Gallegly. The Chairman has a previous commitment and if
there is no objection I will defer to him as he has one or two
questions he would like to ask. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have to go to
another meeting, and I appreciate this opportunity. I just have
two brief questions.
We thank Secretary Romero for his oversight of all of the
major issues that he is aware of.
President Pastrana has come and gone with his plan in
Colombia that the Administration asked him to develop. Our own
drug czar, General McCaffrey, describes the situation in
Colombia as critical and the proliferation of illegal drug
trafficking a disaster.
Congress is going to be leaving town soon, hopefully. Time
is running out for an emergency supplemental for Colombia. Can
you tell us when and if ever the Administration is going to
send up its Colombia emergency supplemental aid request?
Mr. Romero. Mr. Chairman, let me just say that my sincerest
hope would be that it would be very soon. But let me just talk
a little bit about some of the work that needs to be done.
The Pastrana Administration has put a price tag on the Plan
Colombia of about $7.5 billion. We helped in the construction
of much of that plan, particularly as it related to
counternarcotics and as it related to the social development
side. It is the intention of the Pastrana Government to reach
out to all potential international donors. They believe that
they have the wherewithal, notwithstanding an incredible
contraction of their economy and, of course, the revenue of the
government that falls as a result of that, to fund about $4
billion, which would leave about $3.5 billion for the
international community to fund.
What we are doing right now, Mr. Chairman, is talking to
them in an effort to determine where they believe other
international assistance will come, whether it be on
alternative development or whether it goes to reforms, and all
kinds of other things that will be needed to regain ground in
Colombia. Once we have worked out with them, what they will be
funding--and they want to bear the lion's share of this, which
I think is a very good prognosis--but they also want us to be
able to work with them in helping to coordinate an
international donor appeal on this. Once we have worked through
what, where, they will plug in where we the U.S. can plug in
and obviously where others can. Then we will be better prepared
to talk a little bit more in terms of numbers. But Mr.
Chairman, we are more than prepared to talk with you, any
Members of this Committee, any members of your staff in terms
of your concerns about where money and resources and attention
and focus should be placed.
Mr. Gilman. Well, Secretary Romero, we are interested to
know just what the Administration is proposing, where the money
will come from, and for what purposes it will be used. I
understand the IMF is about to approve a $3.5 billion loan for
Colombia. Is that correct?
Mr. Romero. I am not sure about the figure, but I know the
IMF is working on a loan.
Mr. Gilman. I thought we were asking our delegation to be
the leaders in that loan for Colombia.
Mr. Romero. We are. I don't know what the dollar figure,
sir, Mr. Chairman, is to that loan, but I do know that
Undersecretary Larson is working very closely with folks in the
Treasury and at the IMF.
Mr. Gilman. I just want to remind you, Mr. Secretary, we
have very limited time, if you are going to try to do something
before we wind up this session. Otherwise, it will have to go
over to January or February.
Mr. Secretary, why aren't you talking to the Panamanians
about maintaining a U.S. security presence at key facilities in
Panama after 1999? Again, we are running out of time. When are
we going to start talking to the new government that is
interested in re-establishing our presence in Panama?
Mr. Romero. Mr. Chairman, if you would allow me just to
finish or close the loop on your question relative to Colombia.
Mr. Gilman. Yes, please.
Mr. Romero. I think that it is very important to look at
Colombia and what has happened in a very deliberate, careful
way. I appreciate your need for speed, and we are working as
fast as we possibly can in support of the Colombia Government
on this. The Colombia Government has been able to put a
strategy together, Mr. Chairman, in about three weeks, which I
think is astounding when you look at the breadth and scope of
what they have begun to put together. We will be working with
them.
The issues are deep and go very, very wide, and they have
to do with focusing on the southern part of Colombia and not
just a police, not just a military, and not just a civilian
presence but all of them combined, with alternative development
strategies toward village banking, to win back these whole
chunks of Colombia some of which have never really been within
the grasp of the Colombian Government in terms of local
government and others in other times have been lost to
narcoguerrillas who operate in those areas.
On Panama, Mr. Chairman, let me just say that the
assessment of our military planners, those engaged in
counternarcotics planning, is that with the possible
introduction of a third FOL, Forward Operating Location,
somewhere in Central America, that we could probably be up, as
I mentioned earlier, to about 120-percent of our coverage and
our time on station as it related to our operations out of
Howard before we were forced to close those down.
Mr. Gilman. Do we have any Central American proposal?
Mr. Romero. I think that there are a number of
possibilities with respect to the case of Panama. We haven't
discarded the possibility. We have spoken to the Panamanian
Government, the new government of President Moscoso, about
this. And, Mr. Chairman, what we have begun to put into motion
is a more intensive bilateral mechanism whereby we talk about
lots of bilateral issues with respect to things that they are
really looking for in terms of housing and other kinds of
things, but particularly focus on law enforcement issues and
the kinds of things that the Panamanians will need over the
years to better secure Panama.
I broached that subject a couple of weeks ago with the
Panamanian foreign minister when he was here. We are set to
begin those talks probably in Washington, but they will begin
within the next couple of weeks. Those kinds of issues,
security issues, law enforcement issues, and then of course the
FOL issue in conjunction with our counternarcotics policy
through the region will be discussed.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Romero. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gallegly. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Menendez.
Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good afternoon, Mr. Secretary.
Let me ask you in two different veins, first on Colombia,
what benchmarks--I asked President Pastrana when he was here,
and I really didn't get a sense from his answer, so now I want
to know from our perspective, from our government, what
benchmarks are we establishing for our decisionmaking in the
context of what will very clearly be a very significant
participation, notwithstanding what you said about Colombia and
the other international partners, clearly we will have a rather
significant participation. What benchmarks are we establishing
for ourselves internally to decide whether or not we are going
to participate in these endeavors?
As we do participate in these endeavors, I happen to be one
of those who believe that it is in the interests of the United
States to work with Colombia in terms of these issues for both
national security and other national interests. Nevertheless, I
question myself when we are looking at these large amounts of
money what type of benchmarks are we establishing to determine
whether or not true progress is being made in the context of
good negotiations by the FARC and the ELN and others.
Mr. Romero. Thank you, Congressman Menendez. Excellent
questions.
Let me just say that the benchmarks are still a work in
progress in terms of what it is we would be asking the
Colombians to do with whatever amount of resources we are able
to apply to the problem. Let me just sketch broadly what those
benchmarks would be.
First of all, we would insist that there be greater
integration of forces, both the police but also military and
other forces, toward the increasing threat in southern
Colombia.
If I might, if you look at the map, essentially we have
been working in this area of Guaviare over the last several
years, and most of the work that we have been doing has been
aerial eradication. Much of Guaviare and northern Caqueta has
been sprayed with very good results.
Notwithstanding excellent results there, notwithstanding
excellent results in Peru and in Bolivia, narco-production or
cocoa cultivation has mushroomed in the areas south of there in
the Putamayo and southern Caqueta areas. Unfortunately, that
has coincided with a very big guerrilla presence in just that
same area. So, consequently, what we are looking for is a focus
in that area which is a major area of cocoa production, an
integrated approach using police and all branches of the
military, an effort to put a civilian government presence on
the ground.
We know from Central America, we know from other kinds of
insurgencies that police and military are not enough. You need
to have--you need in this case to bring the fabric of those
societies and those small towns and villages back into the
national fabric, under government control.
As a result of that, there is going to have to be a
combined set of benchmarks which includes continued improvement
on human rights. The military has shown great improvement on
human rights, better integrated intelligence and operations,
joint operations in this southern--southeast Colombian area,
but also putting the machinery in place on the civilian side to
ensure that there is alternative development, that there is
work generation, that there is access to credit in terms of
village banking, and that all of this is woven tightly.
Mr. Menendez. If I can interrupt you, just because my time
is returning out. I have other questions. But none of what I
have heard, and I understand all that, and I appreciate it as
well, but none of it is interrelated with the response by the
guerrillas in any of these attempts at negotiation, and so none
of our benchmarks will focus on the response by the guerrilla
movements in the context of the Colombian Government's effort
to negotiate with them, we are not going to judge any
benchmarks in that regard?
Mr. Romero. I think the negotiations are up to the
Colombian Government to pursue. We have supported them in many,
many different ways in terms of what has worked and what has
not worked in the context of places and other negotiations with
guerrilla groups. We continue to be there for advice and
recommendation on this.
But let there be no mistake, this is an issue that they are
leading. Quite frankly, they have told us that they want to
leave the door open to negotiations, and they have. I think
that they have been exceedingly forthcoming and some would say
even too forthcoming, but they have reflected the fact that the
Colombian people, after 38 years of bloodshed, want peace; and
they are adopting a policy that enables them to work smarter,
and at the same time keep the door open to the prospects for
peace.
Right now the peace is bogged down in issues related to a
commitment by the largest guerrilla group, the FARC, to an
international observer presence in this safe haven zone that
the government has extended to them at least temporarily, and
their unwillingness to allow observers to come in.
Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have other
questions. If there is a second round, I would appreciate it.
Mr. Gallegly. We will have a second round. I would like to
move to Panama just for a minute if we can, Mr. Secretary. What
authority, if any, has Panama granted the Hutchison-Whampoa
company to operate or control the operation of the canal?
Mr. Romero. Well, Mr. Chairman, the entry of Hutchison-
Whampoa into Panama was by virtue of part of the Panamanian
Government's privatization program, privatization of facilities
and installations at the canal. Our Embassy and the U.S.
Government has characterized that privatization process,
particularly that bidding process in the case of Hutchison-
Whampoa, as at best irregular. It seemed to be what those in
the business call a ``semi-blind auction'' rather than a true
bid, and it disadvantaged some of those who were bidding.
Essentially what happened was Hutchison-Whampoa, as I am
told, put a full-page ad in a Panamanian paper, essentially
saying that they would outbid by a long shot all other bidders
in this thing. I don't know whether there was inside
information or what. They came in millions of dollars above the
next highest bidders and subsequently got the bid.
We are told that the reason why Hutchison-Whampoa wanted to
operate ports on both sides of the canal was for business
reasons. They have a container port, I am told, in the Bahamas,
and this complemented their activities in the area.
I know that there was a Senate Foreign Relations staff,
though, that went down and took a look at the situation. I am
told that our Federal Maritime Commission went down and
investigated, and essentially their findings were that while it
was an irregular process, there doesn't seem to be anything
about that process and the winner of that process which would
challenge U.S. security interests.
Mr. Gallegly. Mr. Secretary, to your knowledge, does
Hutchison-Whampoa's Chairman, Li Ka-Shing, have ties to the
Chinese Communist Party or the People's Liberation Army to your
knowledge?
Mr. Romero. Mr. Chairman, I know that he is or was a Hong
Kong businessman. Hong Kong is now part of PRC. This company
has been in operation, I am told, since the middle 1800's, and
while it was a Hong Kong company--now it is obviously a PRC
company, and I cannot describe nor do I know anything about any
kinds of contacts he might have with high-ranking PRC
government and military officials.
Mr. Gallegly. OK. In the Department's view, does the Panama
Canal Treaty ensure that the United States can intervene in the
canal if its operation is jeopardized by internal or external
threats?
Mr. Romero. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. I believe
written into the language of the Canal Treaty itself, there is
a neutrality clause and also one that provides for the free
movement of ships through the canal without prejudice, and I
believe also that there is a part of that agreement which talks
about the use of the canal during a time of need by U.S.
warships, a preferential use of that canal by U.S. warships.
In terms of Hutchison-Whampoa, just to reiterate, we will
be looking--I have asked the intelligence community to use all
sources to look at any threats to the canal and where those
threats might be coming from. There is a classified report, Mr.
Chairman, and I can't get into the details of that report, but
it essentially concludes that the business arrangement, this
particular business arrangement of Hutchison-Whampoa, does not
constitute a threat to canal operations. We continue to watch
very closely.
Mr. Gallegly. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. The gentlelady from
Florida Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Secretary, I would like to get you and the State Department on
the record regarding the Cuba drug issue, and I have a 5-part
question I would like for you to answer.
Do you agree or disagree that the Castro regime exerts
absolute control over its territory and activities inside its
territory?
Do you believe that senior Cuban military officials, as was
alleged by the Castro regime with the General Ochoa case and
the de la Guardia brothers could actually be involved in
narcotrafficking, yet be acting independently, and without the
knowledge of the regime?
Do you believe that senior regime officials could be
involved in the drug trade, as was reported in the rumor
concerning former Cuban Foreign Minister Robaina without Fidel
or Raul Castro's knowledge?
Also, given the attack on the Brothers to the Rescue,
international flights of humanitarian nature in 1996, the
shootdown by the Castro Air Force, do you believe that Cuban
air space can be used by narcotraffickers without the knowledge
and the consent of the Castro regime?
Given the attack on the tug boat by the Cuban Coast Guard
and the arrest of the Cubans who were trying to flee the island
in makeshift vessels, do you believe that narcotraffickers can
use Cuban territorial waters without the knowledge and the
complicity of the regime?
Finally, given the intelligence resources of the Castro
regime which enabled, as you know, a spy operation to be
penetrating a U.S. military installation, an espionage network
which was classified by our FBI as sophisticated and efficient,
do you believe that the regime is unaware of the trafficking
that is using its own territory?
Mr. Romero. Let me just say that for a long, long time,
Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen, and growing up in Miami, I have
often thought about your question, even before I entered
government, about how absolute the control is of the Castro
regime over every facet of life in, over, and around Cuba. I
have to say that while we can sit here and others can debate
Marxism and Leninism and all the rest of it, that really what
we are talking about when it comes to Cuba is Castro's control
over his people. There is very little that resembles a Marxist/
Leninist paradise in Cuba except for Fidel Castro's
authoritarianism, but there is very little that resembles it on
the economic side and that sort of thing when you look at how
Fidel Castro has tried to accommodate his loss of benefactors
from the Soviet Union and elsewhere to what has become part of
the Cuban economy.
That having been said, I think it would be a stretch to say
that the Castro regime knows everything that happens in Cuba or
every vessel that passes around or inside or skirts its
territorial waters or perhaps even flies over its country or
skirts the country. We are looking at the latest target of
opportunity, if you will, and that is the 7.2 metric ton
shipment that was shipped from Cartegena, Colombia, to Cuba or
through Cuba. We don't know the answer to that yet to determine
whether there was any high-level Cuban involvement in that, and
we will adjust our policies and our strategies accordingly,
depending on the outcome of that assessment.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Romero, just related to that seizure,
where does most of the cocaine that is coming to the U.S.
transit through? Isn't it through Mexico? Mr. Mica just had a
Subcommittee hearing yesterday where Mr. McCaffrey testified
about the trade going through Mexico. Isn't it true that, as to
the December 1998 seizure of those tons of cocaine Colombia
cosigned to Cuba, that there is a possible Mexico link?
Mr. Romero. Well, there is no doubt that there is a major
trafficking route that starts in southern Colombia and works
its way up the Central American isthmus into Mexico and then
subsequently into the United States. There is no question about
that.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Are you questioning the Mexican officials
about the Cuba link, the Colombia, the three transit points?
What information can you share with us about these discussions
about the Cuba-Mexico-U.S.-Columbia links?
Mr. Romero. I think that in this particular case of this
shipment, and that is really pretty much what we are keying off
of right now, we are looking at a shipment that went from
Colombia to Cuba. We are continuing to engage the Colombian
people or, pardon me, the Colombian Government, particularly
law enforcement authorities, in an effort to determine what
they knew and what they know about this particular shipment,
and to do all that we possibly can to help the Colombians
investigate this in Colombia.
Obviously, we will be using all sources of information. I
can't characterize how the intelligence community is conducting
its investigation, since I have neither the results of that
investigation or a recent readout as to where it is even going,
but we are expecting a report. I expect one on my desk within
the next couple of weeks in terms of this particular shipment,
and we will adjust our policies accordingly.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Gallegly. Time of the gentlelady has expired.
The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton.
Mr. Burton. Castro knows everything that is going on down
there. They have got a block cap system set up, and they have
got informants on every block to watch out. So when you say it
is a stretch for him, knowing everything that is going on in
Cuba, that is not a stretch, and you know that.
As far as those containers, the drugs were not sent to
Cuba, the 7.2 tons. One of the containers was earmarked for
Mexico. It had it on the container. So we have a pretty good
idea that those drugs weren't going to Spain. They were going
to a company in Mexico, and then going to be shipped up further
to the United States of America, but that is not the issue I
want to start with.
The issue I want to start with are these property claims.
There are still 1,000 U.S. citizens who are being denied what
is rightfully theirs, their property, in Nicaragua. The Supreme
Court has ruled twice in favor of several of the claimants, and
even though the Supreme Court has made their decision, nothing
has been resolved. We granted a fifth waiver, and I know the
hurricane is a tragedy down there, but we granted them a fifth
waiver and they still aren't making restitution on a lot of
these claims that are very important, and I just hope that the
State Department will take a close look at that because I think
it is very important. A lot of these people have come to the
United States and are suffering. Some aren't but some are, and
those claims need to be resolved.
Now, I want to talk to you about an issue that I feel very
strongly about. You appeared before one of my Subcommittees and
you were asked questions about whether or not the State
Department was negotiating with the FARC guerrillas last
December. I asked you four times, and I have got a list of the
questions I asked you. In fact, I will read them to you real
quick.
``did you talk about alternative developmental aid?
``Ambassador Romero. This was a component of the
conversation that the Government of Colombia wanted us to talk
to them about, that the government could in no way enter into
an agreement that would impede those counternarcotic operations
or suffer loss of USAID, and the Government of Colombia wanted
us to tell them and we did.
``so you didn't talk about alternative development aid,
though?
``not to my knowledge, no; but our line on alternative
development is that it cannot go to guerrillas in the absence
of significant movements toward a peace agreement.''.
This is me again. ``and there was no alternative
development aid discussed?
``not to my knowledge, no.''.
So on four separate questions you said that you didn't
discuss developmental assistance. Do you stick to that
statement?
Mr. Romero. I think if you went back, Mr. Chairman, and you
looked at the record, you get a very clear sense for the fact
that I began that statement by saying I don't have the
memorandum of conversation in front of me, and I am at a loss
to characterize it. I would like to say that I don't have the
memorandum of conversation in front of me right now, and I am
not going to characterize it.
But let me just add something here, Mr. Chairman, if I
might. As soon as I left for my office, I went back, I started
a process to declassify the memorandum of conversation so that
you could get access to it as soon as possible so that you
could see for yourself the record on this thing. You are taking
a piece of what was discussed and essentially making it appear
that, that was the central part of the conversation that I had
or, pardon me, that my folks had----
Mr. Burton. Let me just interrupt here, because, Mr.
Romero, lying to the Congress of the United States is something
that is not going to be tolerated. I am about to move to hold
you in contempt of Congress because you answered four separate
questions, and I have three secret memos before me that I can't
go into, and you know that, it took us five months to get them
from you and from the State Department. If you are not going to
tell us the truth now, I will move in our Committee to hold you
in contempt of Congress.
Now, did you talk to the FARC guerrillas about
developmental assistance or did any of your contemporaries do
that?
Mr. Romero. I believe that they talked about alternative
development in the context of a much larger discussion related
to the welfare and whereabouts of American citizens who have
been missing in Colombia for over three years and the necessity
of the accountability of those Americans before we would be
able to have further conversations.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Romero, I said to you clearly, ``and there
was no alternative development aid discussed,'' and you said
not to my knowledge, no. Now, is that a correct statement? Did
you know about developmental assistance being discussed?
Mr. Romero. I did not recall alternative development.
Mr. Burton. I have three separate memos, two from you; one
to the Secretary of State from you, talking about developmental
assistance; one from you to the Secretary; one from Romero to
Pickering; and one from Chicola to Romero. You don't remember;
is that what you are saying?
Mr. Gallegly. Pardon me, Mr. Burton. The text of the issue
that you are discussing, you can't go into detail.
Mr. Burton. I am not going into detail.
Mr. Gallegly. I understand that, and I think in fairness to
the Committee, since you can't go into detail regarding that,
you have pretty well gone on record as it relates to--you both
seem to know what each other is talking about. It might be more
appropriate to meet one on one, since we can't make it----
Mr. Burton. Well, let me just finish, Mr. Chairman, and I
will wind up. If we don't get a straight statement from Mr.
Romero, I will go back to the Government Reform Committee, and
we will hold a Committee hearing, and I will move to hold you
in contempt of Congress.
Now, all I want you to say today is that you knew about the
negotiations with the FARC guerrillas on developmental
assistance.
Mr. Menendez. Mr. Chairman, a point of inquiry.
Mr. Burton. Did you know? Let me finish with my time.
Mr. Menendez. I am asking a point of inquiry, Mr. Chairman.
Is it appropriate for Members of this Committee to threaten the
witnesses without the Committee having any basis of
substantiation for which such threats would be made? I mean, I
have a great deal of respect for the distinguished gentleman,
but it is impossible for me because in essence what he is doing
to the Secretary is impugning his credibility, not only on that
issue but on everything he has testified, because if he lied
once, ostensibly then he would lie again. It is impossible for
me to sit here in the Minority and expect that in fact we could
have such accusations made without a substantiation to the rest
of the Committee for the Committee to understand the validity
of whether or not his charges are warranted.
Mr. Burton. He interrupted. Let me finish, Mr. Chairman,
please.
Mr. Gallegly. First of all, let me respond to the inquiry.
As the Chairman of your respective Committee, you have the
right to say what you are going to do in your Committee.
However, I do think it is difficult for us to participate in
this dialogue here when we don't have the actual document to
which you are referring.
Mr. Burton. I am not asking anybody on the Committee to do
anything. Mr. Chairman, I am not asking anybody on the
Committee to do anything, and if you want to see the documents
we have them here. They are Top Secret. I will be glad to share
them with anybody. But what I am trying to do today is to get
Mr. Romero to give us a straight answer about this issue
because it bears upon our foreign policy. That is all I am
asking for, and I will ask him one more time. Did you discuss
developmental assistance with the FARC guerrillas?
Mr. Romero. I did not.
Mr. Gallegly. The time of the gentleman has expired, and
the Secretary has on the record answered the question.
The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Ballenger.
Mr. Ballenger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have got a couple
of real quick questions I would like to try out on helicopters,
which I have been involved in for about two or three years.
First of all, Mexico returned 50 of their old Hueys to this
country. Is there a possibility that those old Hueys can be
used to be upgraded into Huey IIs? I don't know who owns them.
Does Mexico still own them or do we own them, or what?
Mr. Romero. I think they are part of a fleet of over 100 or
so helicopters that through the years have been shipped down to
Mexico. The Mexican Government has had a hard time with finding
the expertise and spare parts, et cetera, to maintain those in
an appropriate fashion in terms of readiness, and I think that
what we have attempted to do is to try to use the spares from
some of those that are really not in terrific shape, to
cannibalize them to use with others in order to get a greater
number of these up and running.
Mr. Ballenger. What I am wondering is, you know, to upgrade
into a Super-Huey or a Huey II, you have got to have an old
Huey to start with, and there are 50 of them that they sent
back. If we cannibalize 50 and produce 10 old Hueys, that is
all you have got, you have got 10 old Hueys. But is there not a
possibility those 50 can be used and upgraded quickly because
of their ability, since they exist, to get them back to
Colombia?
Mr. Romero. I think that in terms of lift, there have been
a number of Blackhawk helicopters, both purchased by the
Colombian Government and----
Mr. Ballenger. Really I am talking about the 50 Hueys.
Mr. Romero. Right. But what I am saying, Congressman
Ballenger, is that there are a number of helicopters that have
been delivered over the last couple of months, more that will
be delivered, including 18 UH1Ns that we are purchasing from
the Canadian law enforcement or Canadian military. I can't
assess, Congressman Ballenger, whether the ones that the
Mexican Government, the helicopters that the Mexican Government
will not be able to fly, whether they will be applicable or
even usable in a Colombia context.
Mr. Ballenger. Well, could I ask you to look it up and see
if it is possible?
Mr. Romero. Sure.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Ballenger. Let me ask you another question. The
delivery system for the helicopters that are being rebuilt in
Alabama or Mississippi, one of those places, I forget which
one, is based on the fact that you can't ship any until you get
six. Then you take all of them apart and put them on a big
plane and fly them to Colombia and take them back out of the
thing and put them all back together again. As it occurred the
last time, one of them didn't get quite put back together
properly. Is there no way to fly those things down there?
Mr. Romero. I can't answer that, Congressman Ballenger. I
do know that we have gotten a lot of experience shipping these
aircraft and even more experience shipping them to Colombia,
but I just don't know the mechanics behind it.
Mr. Ballenger. A couple of things, Mr. Chairman, I have got
a request here from Chairman Gilman. In last week's Washington
Post, Chairman Gilman laid out a plan of action for Colombia
that is worthy of both the Administration as well as the
Pastrana Administration, and I ask unanimous consent for that
to be included in the record of these proceedings if that is
proper.
Mr. Gallegly. Without objection.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Ballenger. Now, having been down to Venezuela and
having met with Mr. Chavez and knowing the overflight
situation, have we found out anything? Where do we stand on the
overflight situation?
Mr. Romero. As you and perhaps other Members of the
Committee will recall, a couple of months ago President Chavez,
in response to a press statement or press question, responded
that he is in charge of essentially who and where and how--he,
Chavez, who and where and how other governments fly over
Venezuela in terms of their own aircraft.
We have been working with the Venezuelan Government over
the last couple of months to try to put together what we
consider and they consider obviously a good formula for
overcoming the issue related to sovereignty. We have offered a
number of formulas, and there has been some progress,
particularly as it relates to issues of hot pursuit. In other
words, when our aircraft are chasing aircraft, narcoaircraft,
and they happen to duck into Venezuelan air space, what have
you, there has been a workable agreement that has been
established in that case. In terms of just normal transit, we
haven't gotten there yet, and we are still continuing to work
with the Venezuelan Government and hope that we can get there
very soon, but it is a high priority.
Mr. Ballenger. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gallegly. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Menendez.
Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, one
last comment on Colombia so I can move on. For myself, as one
of those people who is generally supportive of assisting
Colombia--and we have heard anywhere between 500 million to
$1.5 billion--I think some of us are going to have to see some
form of benchmarks established beyond those which you describe,
particularly if any of our aid is used in pursuit in the
negotiations with La Guerrilla toward accomplishing some of
those negotiated goals, assuming that any of them can actually
be negotiated successfully.
So some of us are going to have see that, or we may be very
well withdrawing our support, and I just want to commend it to
your attention.
Let me turn to Cuba, and I want to echo one comment by
Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen. It is impossible to believe, even
though I see all of the statements, both in your statement and
the Administration, about we are not normalizing relationships
and we are in fact committed to our policy.
I believe that consistently we undermine that policy in a
variety of ways, and when I hear that in fact we are not
willing to make a very clear and transparent statement that
when Castro can clearly shoot down U.S. civilian planes in
international air space, when he can sink a civilian tug boat
who is simply looking to leave its coastline in search of
freedom, when he can in fact have some of the most
sophisticated spying facilities that both the Russians and now
the Chinese are seeking to use for U.S. commercial as well as
military intelligence, it is impossible for some of us to
accept that the overflights over his air space can be accepted
as something that just happens and he can do nothing about it.
He must have unique technology that can zero in on U.S.
civilian aircraft but that can consistently let overflight take
place from what is clearly narcotics trafficking.
What I would like to ask you, and if you could give me a
yes or no because my time is limited: Do we have as a
government any independent verification system when the Cuban
Government actually has a seizure? Do we have any independent
verification of what they do in terms of disposing of that
seizure?
Mr. Romero. I am sorry, Congressman Menendez, I don't know
that. I would assume that the intelligence community has
sources and methods that would be directed toward confirming or
not Cuban Government seizures, but I just don't know.
Mr. Menendez. This is part of our problem. Everybody who I
have asked who has appeared before the Committee one way or
another, who has had relationship to this issue, cannot tell
the Committee that in fact there is an independent way in which
to verify seizures. Therefore, we wonder what happens to the
substances once they are seized.
Second, can you tell me the working group that meets in
terms of Cuba and that particularly pursues Title II of Helms-
Burton with reference to our efforts to develop civil society
and promote human rights and assist dissidents inside of Cuba?
I sense, as the author of that provision, I sense that there is
a continuing movement by the working group to fund exchanges,
and the problem with that is everything I have seen of these
exchanges to date are no more than junkets. They have very
little itinerary.
They have, to a large degree, no real communication at the
level of those in civil society that we seek to create, as we
did in Poland with Solidarity, as we did with Vaclav Havel in
his country. Is this the focus now of the State Department, to
use all of these Title II moneys for these type of exchanges?
Finally, so that you can answer this question for Mr.
Ackerman who asked me to ask it on his behalf, in the context
of Bolivia, with all this talk about assisting Colombia, there
is a concern that Mr. Ackerman has. Do you think Bolivia will
meet its goal of being coca free by 2002, and will the
additional assistance that we intend to provide to Colombia
have an impact on the assistance levels we are able to provide
to Bolivia?
Those are Mr. Ackerman's questions he asked me as the
Ranking Democrat to ask you.
Mr. Romero. Congressman Menendez, what I would like to do
is take the Bolivia question first, and that is, I think that
Bolivia has been an enormous success story when it comes to
counternarcotics and just generally good stewardship of their
economy and investment strategies. Over the last couple of
years, there has been huge foreign investment in gas pipelines
in Bolivia. There is a general sense that the Banzer Government
wants to make Bolivia kind of the center of energy in the
southern cone of South America, and they are off to a very,
very good start. Obviously, there are things that need to be
done.
In the context of all of that, what President Banzer and
Vice President Quiroga have done is to put together a strategy
that has been really bought and accepted by the Bolivian
people, and that is not to eradicate coca or to interdict or
move against narcotraffickers or cultivaters because of foreign
pressure, but because Bolivians want to get out from under the
reputation of being considered coca producers. They have come
up with the plan for national dignity, and not only has the
government been able to vigorously move out in terms of
eradication and interdiction and score some magnificent
successes over the last couple or two years, but more
importantly, they have been able to bring in the Bolivian
people in terms of getting a buy-in and getting the Bolivian
people as stakeholders, that they want more for their country
than to be considered or to have been considered the coca
capital of the world.
They are on track. I just met with the Bolivian Foreign
Minister yesterday, and he really did impress me with not only
their determination but their track record in terms of even
being early on eradication.
Your question is a good one with respect to how any kind of
Colombia supplemental would impact on Bolivia. Certainly any
component that you would request for Colombia would have to
have a component for its neighbors, even if it were small and
over an extended period of time. That would have to include not
only Venezuela and Ecuador, who border along or who are on
borders that are pretty delicate and fragile, but also places
like Bolivia. There would have to be consideration, better
consideration, more consideration given to Bolivia, largely
because you don't want the spillover to then just go south
again and repeat the problems that we faced in the eighties in
Bolivia.
In terms of Cuba, your question, Congressman Menendez,
related to?
Mr. Menendez. The working group and this predisposition now
to fund, instead of civil society efforts, independent
journalists, independent economists, human rights activists, to
now fund exchanges where we are actually going to pay for
junkets for people to go down with very little of an itinerary,
no feedback of any consequence, and not meeting the people who
Title II is intended to do.
Mr. Romero. As you know, Congressman Menendez, this has
become part of our people-to-people measures that began after
the Pope's visit in Cuba and to which we have announced
additional measures in January 1999. In terms of the actual
exchanges, my understanding of the process is that there needs
to be a request made, that request goes to the Department of
Treasury.
In many cases, if not most cases, it is reviewed by our
folks on the Cuba desk in my bureau, and one of the tests of
all of that is that they need to show that, if this is a U.S.
group or organization going down to Cuba, that they are meeting
with counterparts and that this is a principal part of their
visit down there.
Mr. Menendez. You have got my question wrong, and I just,
with the indulgence of the Chairman, just to finish on this
point. I am talking about funding that we are providing under
Title II, AID's Cuba Project, where as part of the inter--
whatever you call it.
Mr. Romero. The people-to-people?
Mr. Menendez. No, no. The State Department, NSC, Treasury,
the interworking group, Interagency Working Group, there now is
a focus, as I understand, because I follow this very carefully,
of using those Title II moneys that the Congress specifically
set aside, about $2 to $3 million for the purposes of trying to
promote civil society inside of Cuba--independent journalists,
independent economists, political dissidents, human rights
activists--and instead, of using that funding, official funding
of the United States, for exchanges.
Now, exchanges that others want to do with their own money
through their own organizations is one thing, but to use the
money of the U.S. Government for these purposes is clearly
beyond every intention that the Congress had both in the law
and in the Committee report language, and certainly the
intention of this author, who authored it.
So I want to commend to you that we will raise holy hell
about it because that is not why we provide funds, to send
people on junkets to Cuba that have no civil society connection
whatsoever.
Mr. Romero. Point taken, Congressman Menendez, and I will
look into that. I am a little at a loss for words here in terms
of these exchanges because I don't think we have even begun to
look at this kind of exchange yet, as far as I know, but I will
keep your words in mind.
Mr. Ballenger. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. That word ``yet'' is
worrisome.
Mr. Secretary, to followup on two issues that you discussed
in your statement: Nicaragua property claims resolutions and
true electoral reforms in the upcoming elections in Haiti.
For those of us in south Florida, as you know, those are
not international concerns but very real domestic issues. I
think we have moved beyond some of the more simple cases, and
now we are doing the more difficult resolution of those
property cases. There are many cases that have been supposedly
resolved through the court system, yet the property owners, the
American property owners have not been properly compensated.
What action would you be taking to make sure that those
claims are respected and honored and that the resolution is
actually more than the check is in the mail, that these owners
will be compensated?
On the second part, on the electoral reforms, we have many
American lives that have been dedicated to the reform of
Haiti's Government and a lot of manpower went in there, a lot
of U.S. funds. We have a lot invested in Haiti, and it is of
ongoing concern to us that with those elections around the
corner, they actually be honored and internationally supervised
and true reforms take place.
How optimistic are you that with the substantial U.S.
investment that we have already made in Haiti that something
real will come out of these elections?
Mr. Romero. Thank you, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen. If I
might just take a step backwards and look at the Nicaraguan
property claims issue somewhat in the aggregate, that is, that
over the last two years where we have issued waivers for the
Government of Nicaragua, they have resolved over 900 U.S.
citizen claims. The pace of claims resolution has accelerated
under the Aleman Government. As of August 1999, last month,
there were 894 pending claims as registered by our Embassy
Managua data base, and of these, only 276 were filed by
claimants who were American citizens at the time their property
was confiscated.
I mention that largely because the universe--I was around
back when this all started and property claims were being
registered--and the universe of those claimants who are
registering now as American citizens has expanded and
mushroomed over the years. We do think that the Government of
Nicaragua is not only doing its job but an even better job in
accelerating the pace of these adjudications over the last
couple of years.
I can't think of a meeting that I have been in or have had
others prepare for where the issue of Nicaraguan or U.S.
property claims has not been a central focus and feature of
those discussions. We continue to press the Nicaraguan
Government. We will continue to do that, and we will continue
to push for even more acceleration in the adjudication process.
In terms of Haiti, of course you know very well that the
elections in, I believe it was March 1997, were disrupted; some
of the outcomes unclear, particularly on some of those Senate
seats. We believe it is very important for the renewal of
democracy in Haiti that they hold elections as soon as
possible, and we are also very, very mindful over the fact that
you need adequate preparations for elections. We have sponsored
various NGO's through our aid programs down there that have
worked on elections and elections preparation and all of the
other kinds of things that go into them, and we are hoping to
see elections the first part of this coming year because we
believe they can be held in a peaceful environment and be held
with a certain degree of integrity to that process.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Ballenger. [Presiding.]--Mr. Burton, I hope you can
keep it cool. Pardon me, I am sorry.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This information I
have received indicates that the property settlements in
Nicaragua have been, the properties--granted. It is a
substantial number, but as far as monetary settlements, it is
very small compared to the outstanding settlements that are
still waiting to be settled. So, you know, it is kind of
misleading when you say, well, they have settled almost 1,000,
there are only 800-and-some left. The major ones are the ones
that are left.
Let me get to the issues at hand. We talked to Jack Leonard
and Phil Chicola, and those two diplomats told us that so-
called alternative development aid was discussed in December
with the rebel leaders. When I talked to you before our
Committee, you insisted that these were meetings and not
negotiations. Now, when I read the documents that were finally
delivered to me after five months, it was clear that there were
memos to you and from you that clearly indicate these were
negotiating sessions. It is very clear, and when I talked to
you before our Committee, I was talking about--and I can get
the entire transcript, if you like--I was talking to you about
the State Department's discussions, the people who were down
there from the State Department discussing alternative
developmental aid.
You said when I asked you the question, ``So you didn't
talk about alternative developmental aid, though,'' meaning the
State Department people who were down there, you said, ``Not to
my knowledge, no.''.
Then I went on to say, ``And there was no alternative
development aid discussed,'' and you said, ``Not to my
knowledge, no.''.
The memos that we have before us indicate that you did
know, you did know that alternative development aid was being
discussed. Now, this is very, very important because we are
talking about a narcoguerrilla group that occupies an area
about the size of Indiana as a demilitarized zone, that is
killing people all over the place down there, and they are
terrorists, they are known terrorists. We acknowledge they are
terrorists, and we are not supposed to negotiate with
terrorists. What I was trying to find out at our hearing and am
still trying to find out is, were we negotiating with them?
Now, if we were talking about developmental assistance, and
if you read these memos, and I can't make them public, but if
you read these memos, it is clear we were talking about if you
do this, we will do this. There were negotiations taking place.
So I want to ask you one more time. To your knowledge, was
developmental aid discussed in those meetings?
Mr. Romero. After review of the memorandum of conversation,
I can say to you now that the issue of alternative development
was discussed. It was not in any way negotiated. It was
discussed in the context of many other issues.
Mr. Burton. And did you know that before you appeared
before my Committee?
Mr. Romero. I did not recall it. As I mentioned to you at
that time, and as you, Mr. Chairman, have just reiterated, I
said ``not to my knowledge.'' I did not recall every facet of
that conversation.
Mr. Burton. Developmental assistance is a pretty important
thing when you are talking to these FARC guerrillas, and the
memos were prior to our hearing, some of them. So it is kind of
disappointing that you just failed to remember. That is what
you are saying.
Mr. Romero. I don't think we are talking about
developmental assistance as much as alternative development
which is a little bit different. Those memos that you have
before you are internal deliberations, none of which were part
of what was actually discussed with the guerrillas.
The memorandum of conversation which I declassified and
which was sent to your office now several weeks ago is, I
believe, an accurate rendering of the exact language of what
was used, and there is no way that I can see that anyone
reading that language in that memorandum of conversation, Mr.
Chairman, can construe the exchange as in any way a
negotiation. Since that memo has been declassified, I think
anyone here would be available to have you read the passage to
us.
Mr. Burton. Oh, I will be happy to, if you would like.
Sure. We have three separate memos if you like.
Mr. Romero. I am talking about the memorandum of
conversation from the one meeting that was held.
Mr. Burton. You don't want me to read these then?
Mr. Romero. There is an unclassified--we declassified the
document. You have had it for several weeks, and if you would
like to make reference to what you consider to be a negotiation
on alternative development, I would like to see what the
language is that disturbs you.
Mr. Burton. I will be happy to show it to you, but the fact
of the matter is, the things you declassify don't shed light on
this as much as the classified documents, and you know I can't
go into those.
Mr. Romero. But the memorandum of conversation, Mr.
Chairman, that you have in your hand is an accurate rendering
of what transpired between two State Department representatives
and a FARC member in the context of a much wider conversation
over American citizens. Now, you can read the unclassified
version of what was actually said, and if you have problems
with some of the language that was used by our people, I would
be happy to entertain what problem you had.
Mr. Menendez. Would my friend yield? And I would simply
ask, Why don't you include the declassified memo into the
record so we can all read it?
Mr. Burton. I will do that, and I will be happy to read it,
but the classified version is also very important because it
goes into more detail, and I think it makes the case that I am
making, and I will read it.
It says, ``Participants also revisited''--revisited--``the
issue of agrarian reform and alternative development.
Reinforcing the FARC's basic position, Hernandez explained that
in the past GOC infrastructure, development had followed the
cash crops.'' .
So they did discuss alternative development, and they went
into more detail in the classified versions which I can't go
into.
Mr. Menendez. But that was the FARC speaking. Would the
gentleman yield? I know your time has expired, but since the
Chair is being gracious, that is the FARC speaking that you
just read.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman is very--he can come down and
read the classified version. You are cleared for Secret. I will
let you read them. Both sides were discussing it, not just the
FARC.
Mr. Menendez. But what you just read was the FARC, was it
not?
Mr. Burton. That was the unclassified version. They
declassified that because they knew it didn't cause them any
heartbreak.
Mr. Romero. If I might clarify this, what you have before
you, Mr. Chairman, is the totality of what was discussed with
the FARC.
Mr. Burton. On both sides.
Mr. Romero. As best we rendered it immediately after when
that memorandum of conversation was written, and all of that
has been declassified. So there wasn't anything else that
occurred other than what is in that one piece of paper.
Mr. Burton. Let me finish. Mr. Romero, I am not going to
belabor this point. I just want you to know when you appear
before my Committee, I don't want you hedging in the future. If
I subpoena you to come before our Committee, as a Member of the
Congress and Chairman of one of our Committees, I want you to
be very clear and very forthright, and what you did before our
Committee I think is very clear, and I hope that never happens
again. Thank you.
Mr. Romero. Mr. Chairman, let me just say that I very much
regret not being able to recall that this was a component of
that conversation, but I hope that you have an accurate
rendering now of what was said by both sides in that
conversation.
Mr. Ballenger. If I may, just a couple of quick ones before
we adjourn, unless you have another. Earlier this year, the
former Andean desk officer, David Passage, testified that
Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act prohibited the U.S.
from providing training for police forces. Does our U.S.
Government have the authority now to train and support the
Panamanian National Police for counterinsurgency and
counternarcotics activity on the border with Colombia?
Mr. Romero. I don't know of any provision, Mr. Chairman,
that would prevent us from working with police along the whole
facet of law enforcement issues. Indeed, as I mentioned
earlier, my sincerest hope through this consultation with the
Panamanian Foreign Minister would be to develop a much closer,
more cohesive relationship between our law enforcement and
their law enforcement over the years ahead as well.
Mr. Ballenger. Does that include military assistance as
well?
Mr. Romero. There is no military in Panama. Certainly, if
they needed certain kinds of equipment, we could look into
that, yes, sir.
Mr. Ballenger. Let me ask you, in 1997 Nicaragua witnessed
a protest by farmers over property titles and debts. Later that
same year, the FSLN and the Aleman Administration reached a
compromise on the issue of disputed properties that culminated
in Nicaraguan Property Law Number 278. Under the provisions of
this law, were settlements of U.S. property claims made more
complicated and would the settlement of U.S. property claims,
would they provoke further strife according to this regulation?
Mr. Romero. The property law, Property Law 278, has made it
more complicated to settle some of the U.S. citizen claims. The
law was intended to make it easier for the government to take
property away from occupants and hopefully return it to the
original claimants who are not paying taxes or who were
otherwise in violation of the agreement by which they came to
occupy that particular property. However, it contains clauses
which grant certain legal protections to occupants who hold a
national agrarian reform title. It also reduces the documentary
requirements to prove that one holds such a title, which in
some cases has made it more difficult for legitimate claimants
to win cases in court.
Mr. Ballenger. If I may, we have heard that the government
may have made a $1 million cash payment which no one is talking
much about, is that true, the Nicaraguan Government?
Mr. Romero. To whom?
Mr. Ballenger. I guess to the Cernas.
Mr. Romero. To whom?
Mr. Ballenger. Cernas.
Mr. Romero. A $40 million payment.
Mr. Ballenger. No, 1 million.
Mr. Romero. I have heard that figure but I can't verify it.
Mr. Ballenger. Let me just ask one more thing. Since
Hutchison-Whampoa is a traded stock, is there any way--I mean,
if it was a United States listing and so forth, you would know
who the owners were and what percentage of the ownership and so
forth. Since it is Hong Kong, is there any way to know who
actually controls that operation?
Mr. Romero. Hutchison-Whampoa is a fairly well-known
company worldwide, and their establishments are well-known to
U.S. Government, U.S. Embassy people. Our folks in our
consulate in Hong Kong have known Hutchison-Whampoa people for
a long, long time, and I think that their view and our view is
that this is straight business transaction and that there was a
need that the company had expressed for a presence in the area,
the Panama Canal, for container purposes, and this gave them a
leg up in that regard, and that when it comes to the actual or
perceived threat to the canal, that it doesn't come from this
particular commercial venture.
As I said, we will have the intelligence community continue
to look very closely at this, but the treaty does call for a
free navigation, free transit in the canal, but more
importantly, even the neutrality of the canal is guaranteed.
Mr. Ballenger. Again, I ask the question, since they are a
traded company, is there any way to know if the Chinese Army,
or whatever you want to call it, actually owns control of that
company?
Mr. Romero. I am told from our embassy reporting, that is
not the case, but I would have to get back to you on that.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Ballenger. Well, as far as I am concerned, we thank
you--whoops, here we go. Oh yeah, I would ask unanimous consent
for Mr. Wexler to submit a statement for the record, and
without objection, so done. And again, thank you very much.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
September 21, 1999
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