[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE ETHIOPIS-ERITREA WAR: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
__________
MAY 25, 1999
__________
Serial No. 106-60
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
60-136 CC WASHINGTON : 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
DANA ROHRABACHER, California SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PETER T. KING, New York PAT DANNER, Missouri
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South BRAD SHERMAN, California
Carolina ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MATT SALMON, Arizona STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
AMO HOUGHTON, New York JIM DAVIS, Florida
TOM CAMPBELL, California EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
KEVIN BRADY, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BARBARA LEE, California
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
GEORGE P. RADANOVICH, California JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff
------
Subcommittee on Africa
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
AMO HOUGHTON, New York DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
TOM CAMPBELL, California ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado BARBARA LEE, California
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California
Tom Sheehy, Subcommittee Staff Director
Malik M. Chaka, Professional Staff Member
Charisse Glassman, Democratic Professional Staff Member
Charmaine V. Houseman, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
----------
WITNESSES
Page
Ms. Susan Rice, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, United
States Department of State..................................... 6
Edmond J. Keller, Director, James S. Coleman Center for African
Studies, UCLA.................................................. 17
Melvin P. Foote, Executive Director, Constituency for Africa..... 18
Adotei Akwei, Advocacy Director for Africa, Amnesty International 20
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements
Hon. Edward Royce, A U.S. Representative from the State of
California..................................................... 30
Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman, A U.S. Representative from the State of
New York....................................................... 32
Ms. Susan Rice................................................... 34
Mr. Edmond J. Keller............................................. 43
Mr. Melvin P. Foote.............................................. 47
Mr. Adotei Akwei................................................. 52
Additional material received
Organization of African Unity (OAU) peace framework for Ethiopia
and Eritrea.................................................... 33
Response by Barbara Larkin, Assistant Secretary of State for
Legislative Affairs to Congressman Campbell.................... 63
THE ETHIOPIA-ERITREA WAR: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 25, 1999
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:10 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Royce
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Chairman Royce. This hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa
will come to order. The subject is the Ethiopian Eritrean war
and U.S. policy options.
Again, there is a crisis in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia
and Eritrea have mobilized one half million troops against one
another in a war that has already cost tens of thousands of
lives and threatens the stability of the region. The human
suffering goes beyond those dying in the trenches. Civilians
have also suffered greatly.
Ethiopia has expelled 53,000 ethnic Eritreans, often under
inhumane conditions ostensibly for security reasons. Tens of
thousands of Ethiopians have fled Eritrea. Also, over 300,000
Ethiopians who are mostly farmers in the Badme area, and more
than 120,000 Eritreans have been displaced as a result of the
fighting. Meanwhile, hundreds of millions of dollars are being
spent by both countries on armaments.
To compound this tragedy, these are two of the poorest
countries in the world. Hopes for economic progress that were
fostered over the last several years have been snuffed out. It
is certainly hard to be supportive of debt relief and other aid
for these two countries under present circumstances as each are
involved in an arms buildup.
The outbreak of hostilities last May caught many offguard.
Most observers, including the State Department, assumed that
relations between these two countries were sound. However,
there were all too evident factors, clear with the benefit of
hindsight, that sparked and now fuel the war.
There were real economic tensions between Ethiopia and
Eritrea. Border disputes were allowed to linger, and there is
no escaping the fact that internal political dynamics are at
play.
Both governments have shown indifference toward the
development of democracy, individual liberties, and impartial
justice. These shortcomings undoubtedly have led each country
into this spiral of violence.
Time is running out on the Ethiopian and Eritrean people's
hopes for a better future. A recent Associated Press (AP)
account quoted an Eritrean soldier saying, ``I feel bad because
we were neighbors and in the future we will have to work
together to develop.''
As nationalistic passions are flamed through propaganda and
as battlefield losses mount, this soldier's vision of
development is slipping through his hands like sand. Another AP
story quoted an Eritrean woman who, having had her house
destroyed by bombing, said, ``I never expected this war to last
so long. Maybe my own children will grow up to fight also.''
With every day that passes, the cycle of animosity deepens
and the prospects for peace and development grow dimmer. The
United States should play an active role in attempts to resolve
this conflict. For one, the winner in this conflict is the
Sudanese Government and its further involvement would subtract
from any real investment the U.S. has made in these countries
over the last several years.
With battlefield losses at a hundred thousand now, there is
no excuse for us not to be fully engaged, and the Subcommittee
is looking forward to hearing about the Administration's
efforts. Ultimately, though, assuming there is a desire for a
responsible and fundamental resolution, a resolution and an end
to this conflict will require leadership on the part of Eritrea
and Ethiopia, leadership to temper nationalistic passions and
it will require compromise. Only then will the Eritrean and
Ethiopian leaders have lived up to their high reputations.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Ed Royce referred to
appears in the appendix.]
I will now turn to the Ranking Member, Mr. Payne, for an
opening statement.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
for calling this very important hearing today the prospects for
peace. And let me also thank the Assistant Secretary, the
Honorable Susan Rice, for the work that she has been doing as
it relates to this tragedy early on, spending many days there
at the inception of the conflict attempting to solve it at that
time, and the continued work that she has been doing as relates
to this issue.
Of course, it is certainly clear that we are all extremely
disappointed with this very tragic issue. We are very
disappointed because many of us here know President Isaias and
Prime Minister Meles. Many of us here have visited both
countries on numerous occasions, Mr. Campbell, Mr. Royce.
We are very troubled because these two leaders were persons
that we pointed to. As we said, new winds were blowing across
Africa with democracy coming with a new set of leaders in
Africa. We went through the colonial period with Jomo Kenyatta
and leaders like Mr. Mandela, the persons that moved Africa
into independence, Herman Cohen, but we said we have new
leaders now.
We have young men, who are educated, and interested with a
lot of integrity. And so when this conflict broke out, it
actually was a very troubling and disappointing effort to many
of us who were so pleased at their potential. And so as many
innocent people--the bombing is killing innocent people on both
sides, have engaged in bombing. I think that one agreement that
was made initially said there would be no air strikes, but
there have been.
I am also concerned about the situation in the Horn and the
long-standing impact on Sudan and Somalia. We know that there
are people in Somalia that are friendly with both sides. The
worst thing that we can see happening now is that this conflict
would then start to involve Adeed, Egal, and other members of
IGAD. So that makes it similar to the problem in the Congo
where we see many countries involved in a conflict between two
countries which makes it more difficult to keep and bring this
tragedy to an end.
The fact that we must respect one's sovereignty and the
maintenance of territorial integrity is very important.
However, border disputes have been around for many years.
Especially with Ethiopia and Eritrea it was felt that border
disputes would be something that eventually would be dealt
with, but they were not the primary issues.
It was always acknowledged that the border was still
questionable. For a conflict to begin based upon an issue that
everyone has agreed to was something that we could sit down at
the table. It is extremely troubling. We have had special
envoy, Tony Lake, attempting to work in the region, as well as
many others. But I will submit my entire opening statement for
the record, but I would just like to say that we are hoping,
still hoping, that there can be some way that we can bring
these two leaders, these two great potentials together so that
we can have a cease-fire. Then we can move on to deal with the
problems at hand.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Payne.
Chairman Royce. We will turn now to the chairman of the
Full Committee, Mr. Gilman of New York.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Chairman Royce. I want to thank you
for arranging this hearing.
It comes at an appropriate time for us to consider what is
happening in Eritrea and Ethiopia. This war between Ethiopia
and Eritrea is the largest war in the world today. Most of us
forget that.
With half a million men and women under arms and more than
40,000 have lost their lives makes the crisis in Kosovo pale in
comparison. Of all the conflicts in Africa and around the
world, this war between Ethiopia and Eritrea is one of the most
tragic. It is tragic not just because of the huge numbers
involved, although any conflict in which a single battle
consumes 10,000 precious irreplaceable lives is certainly a
tragedy. It is tragic also because of the aspect of two of
Africa's shining lights, two brothers struggling each other at
the very time they should be building their wealth, their
liberty, and prosperity.
For 30-years people of Eritrea fought a bitter struggle for
independence, and for 13-years people of Ethiopia fought to
overthrow a brutal totalitarian regime. Eventually through
tenacity, courage, and will they succeeded. It is outstanding
now that leaders who already sacrificed so much and who know
what true suffering is cannot find some way to resolve their
differences without massive bloodshed.
It is honorable to fight and die for one's country. Of
course, it is. Is it to be encouraged and gloried in? Most of
us think not. I don't pretend to understand all the
complexities of this conflict. But I do know that Thomas
Keneally, author of Schindler's List and other works of
literature, discovered in the rocky hills of Eritrea of
northern Ethiopia, some of the finest people in the world. To
think that they are murdering each other by the tens of
thousands is a human tragedy beyond measure.
I don't believe this vast apparatus of our government can
focus on only one international conflict at a time. We would
like to know why the President, after a stirring and long
overdue trip to Africa last year, has been unable to direct
greater high level efforts to try to pursue a lasting peace in
that part of the world.
So I commend our colleagues and Chairman Royce and Mr.
Payne, Chairman and Ranking Members of our Subcommittee, for
directing their attention to this struggle and perhaps we can
find a way to do more. I believe we should.
Thank you.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Chairman Gilman.
We will turn to Mr. Meeks of New York.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We are here today to discuss viable solutions to a peaceful
end to the Ethiopian Eritrean war. Mr. Chairman, this conflict
is of great interest to me because of the human rights
violations that are taking place by both sides and the impact
that this conflict is and will continue to have on neighboring
countries throughout the continent of Africa.
While I support a peaceful resolution to this conflict,
more should be done to alleviate the impact of these types of
conflicts early on in the process. Africa seems to be put on a
back burner and we have to hold the Administration and the
Members of Congress accountable to end the patterns of double
standards and neglect when it comes to foreign policy in
Africa. Over the past few weeks we have seen just how effective
NATO and intervention can be with respect to the humanitarian
relief effort provided to the refugees in Kosovo.
While compliance by both countries with the proposed peace
agreement--that is a starting point, I respectfully submit that
we can pursue the same kind of relief to the people of Ethiopia
and Eritrea. We need to call upon President Clinton and his
special envoy to step up the peace negotiations in the
Ethiopian and Eritrean war.
Additionally, we should call on the United Nations Human
Rights Commission to step in and provide the requested relief
and observation of human rights violations. I think that if we
use a concerted effort to make a difference, we can make a
difference in this conflict and in other conflicts that are
going on through the continent of Africa.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Meeks. Now we will go to Mr.
Campbell of New York--of California.
Mr. Gilman. He looks like a New Yorker, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Campbell. We Californians have northern California and
southern California. I never had this degree of distance put
between us.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Really particularly personal thanks
to you for holding this hearing. I am so glad that you have. I
believe this attention is beneficial. My comments are personal
so they are equally heartfelt as they are personal.
A year and a half ago, my wife and I and Don Payne spent
Thanksgiving in Asmara. We went up to Kerin, Massawa in
Eritrea. Then in Ethiopia, to Addis, Mekele, Yabelo, Aksum.
Gosh, what optimism we had, didn't we, Don. It was such a
great feeling that folks were making such progress, such pride
and such an accomplishment. I even had favorable words for the
attitude that maybe they didn't need so much assistance from
NGO's. They would do it on their own. That was an attitude I
thought showed some self-reliance.
I know the witnesses today are not going to be from those
two countries. They are going to be Americans. That is as it
should be, but there are representatives of those countries in
the audience. Let me just speak to you from my heart.
You, both countries, have utterly destroyed my efforts to
focus attention of the American people on the good that could
be done through partnership here. You have. And now we are
focused on other parts of the world, aren't we? And I don't
know what it is going to take to get the attention back, and it
was in our hand. It was in our grasp. So I am so sorry, and I
am here because I hope that it can be remedied, but I want you
to know how touched I am, my wife and I are personally that our
dream has been shattered by both countries.
And last, Mr. Chairman, there is no excuse for hate, radio-
hate broadcasts. The building up of the animosities through the
hate propaganda will take decades to remedy. Neighbors have to
live with neighbors.
So thank you for holding this hearing. I look forward to
learning from it, but I do want my colleagues and friends from
the two countries involved to know that this is as close to
personal as anything I have ever dealt with in Congress.
Thanks.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Chabot of Ohio.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you again for
holding this hearing and for your leadership.
I think all of us on the Committee appreciate your efforts
to encourage a peaceful solution to this unfortunate and tragic
situation between two friends of the United States, Eritrea and
Ethiopia. Both of these nations have assisted us in our efforts
to oppose terrorism and radical fundamentalism in the region.
Both have every potential to be shining examples of political
and economic reform on the continent of Africa.
This conflict should indeed matter to us, matter to the
United States. And it should be addressed, I believe, at the
highest levels of our government. I think it is fair to say at
this point that the international efforts and efforts by our
own government to encourage a peaceful settlement have clearly
been insufficient.
I believe, however, that personal involvement by President
Clinton in this matter just might help to bring an end to the
hostilities. I hope that when we conclude this hearing today,
we are able to send a message to the President urging him to do
a number of things.
First, publicly insist on an immediate and unconditional
cease-fire. Second, make it clear that any party to the
agreement that violates the cease-fire would incur serious
consequences such as the suspension of all U.S. assistance.
Third, invite President Isaias and Prime Minister Meles to meet
with him in Washington. Fourth, strongly encourage both
countries to begin immediate negotiations on the implementation
of the OAU framework. And finally, have the Administration set
up a mechanism to followup on all of these efforts.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you personally for
your hard work on this issue and I yield back the balance of my
time.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chabot.
Before our Subcommittee to testify today we have Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice. Dr. Rice
earned her Ph.D. from Oxford University, served as the White
House Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director
for African Affairs among other positions, and we are delighted
that she is with us today.
Mr. Gilman. Dr. Rice.
STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS
DR. SUSAN RICE
Dr. Rice. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for inviting
me to testify today on the conflict in the Horn of Africa. I
would like to thank Mr. Payne for his very kind words about my
personal efforts and those of my colleagues in trying to
resolve this conflict.
The war in the Horn of Africa threatens a broad swath of
Africa as well as United States' interests in the region as a
whole. The Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict which began in May 1998
has substantially damaged the economic growth and development
of Ethiopia and Eritrea and has led to humanitarian suffering
on both sides of the border. Tens of thousands of lives have
been lost and thousands more have been maimed.
The United States and others in the international community
have consistently called for an immediate cessation of
hostilities and speedy implementation of the OAU's framework
agreement. We continue to work with the United Nations and the
Organization of African Unity to secure a lasting peace.
The origins of the war are complex. In the year leading to
the outbreak of fighting, relations between the two former
allies deteriorated, exacerbated by economic tensions. A border
skirmish occurred on May 6, 1998, at Badme. A week later,
Eritrea sent troops and armor into and beyond Badme into
territory administered by Ethiopia. After several weeks of
fighting, several areas previously administered by Ethiopia
fell under Eritrean control.
As the ground fighting escalated in June 1998, Ethiopia
launched air strikes against Asmara airport. Eritrea made
retaliatory strikes against the Ethiopian towns of Mekele and
Adigrat, south of Zela Ambessa and in the process hit a school.
Both sides then agreed to a U.S.-brokered air strike moratorium
and fighting decreased to occasional exchanges of artillery and
small arms fire over a 9-month period.
Both Ethiopia and Eritrea used the intervening months to
acquire new military stockpiles including state-of-the art
fighter aircraft and artillery and to recruit, train, and
deploy tens of thousands of new soldiers. The United States
actively discouraged supplies to both parties and the U.N.
Security Council urged governments not to provide weapons to
exacerbate the problem.
Publicly, Ethiopia continued to demand a complete and
absolute return to the status quo ante of May 6, 1998. Eritrea
insisted that some of the area it occupied after May 6, 1998,
was Eritrean territory. Fighting resumed on February 6, 1999,
when Ethiopian forces attacked, eventually displacing Eritrean
forces from the disputed area of Badme. Ethiopia later launched
an unsuccessful counteroffensive on the Zela Ambessa front in
mid-March. Eritrea failed to retake Badme in subsequent
fighting at the end of March.
In April, Ethiopia struck an Eritrean military training
facility and other targets deep within Eritrea. A week and a
half ago Ethiopian aircraft bombed sites at Zela Ambessa, Badme
and the port of Massawa. Although there has been a lull on the
ground fighting over the past few weeks, press reports
yesterday indicate that there were clashes between ground
forces this past weekend at Badme.
Mr. Chairman, the United States has significant interest in
ending the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea as soon as
possible. The current conflict threatens region stability and
to reverse Ethiopian and Eritrean progress in political and
economic development. The United States has important national
security interests in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia and
Eritrea's neighbor, Sudan, has long supported international
terrorism, fostered the spread of Islamic extremism beyond its
borders, actively worked to destabilize neighboring states,
including Ethiopia and Eritrea, and perpetrated massive human
rights violations against its own citizens.
Since the conflict began last year, Sudan has increasingly
benefited from the hostilities between its former adversaries.
Eritrea recently signed an accord with Sudan to normalize
relations. Ethiopia has renewed air service to Khartoum and
made overtures to Sudan for improved relations as well. And
both sides have moved to reduce support to Sudanese opposition
groups.
Eritrea's President Isaias has made several trips to Libya
for frequent consultations with Colonel Qadhafi and has joined
Qadhafi's community of Saharan and Sahelian states.
We are also very concerned by credible reports that Eritrea
has delivered large quantities of weapons and munitions to
self-proclaimed Somalia President Hussein Aideed for the use of
a violent faction of the Oromo Liberation Front. The terrorist
organization Al-Ittihad may also be an indirect recipient of
these arms.
Ethiopia is also shipping arms to factions in Somalia. The
recent upsurge in violence in Somalia is, in part, related to
these new developments.
The security costs of the conflict are matched if not
exceeded by the grave humanitarian consequences of the war.
Tens of thousands of lives have been lost, hundreds of
thousands displaced. Approximately 300,000 Ethiopians and
100,000 to 200,000 Eritrean civilians have been forced from
their homes and fields near the border by the conflict. An
estimated 60,000 Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean descent
have been deported from Ethiopia to Eritrea and an estimated
20,000 Ethiopians have left Eritrea under duress.
We have made clear that we consider the practice of
deportation to be a fundamental violation of individual rights.
Moreover, the nature of these expulsions and the arrangements
made for transfer and holding of property were clearly
susceptible to abuse.
Immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities in May, 1998,
I led two interagency missions to Ethiopia and Eritrea to
facilitate a peaceful resolution of the dispute. Working with
the government of Rwanda, we proposed a series of steps to end
the conflict in accordance with both sides' shared principles
and international law.
These recommendations, endorsed by the OAU and the U.N.
Security Council, later informed development by the OAU of its
framework agreement. These initial missions also resulted in
agreement by the two parties to the air strike moratorium which
remained in effect until February 6, 1998.
Beginning in October, President Clinton sent former
National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, and an interagency
team from the State Department, the National Security Council
and the Defense Department on four missions to Ethiopia and
Eritrea, the most recent occurring early this year. We are
grateful for Mr. Lake's tireless work on behalf of the
President and his Secretary of State.
His intensive efforts which still continue have been aimed
at helping both sides find a mutually agreed basis for
resolving the dispute without further loss of life. Working
closely with the OAU and the U.N. Security Council, Mr. Lake
and our team put forth numerous proposals to both sides
consistent with the OAU framework.
In December, Ethiopia formally accepted the framework
agreement. Eritrea did not at that time, requesting further
clarification on numerous specific questions.
Fighting resumed on February 6, while U.N. Envoy Ambassador
Mohammed Sahnoun was in the region still seeking a peaceful
resolution to the conflict. Following this first phase of
fighting, Eritrean troops were compelled to withdraw from
Badme, an important element of the OAU framework agreement.
Subsequent Eritrean acceptance of the framework agreement was
welcomed by the United States and the Security Council but
greeted with skepticism by Ethiopia. Ethiopia instead demanded
Eritrea's unconditional unilateral withdrawal from all
contested areas that Ethiopia had administered prior to last
May.
On April 14 of this year, Prime Minister Meles of Ethiopia
offered a cease-fire in return for an explicit commitment by
Eritrea to remove its forces unilaterally from contested areas.
He later added that Eritrean withdrawal must occur within an
undefined but short period of time.
Eritrea continues to demand a cease-fire prior to
committing to withdrawal from disputed territories. Ethiopia
insists that a cease-fire and implementation of the OAU
framework agreement can only follow an explicit Eritrean
commitment to withdraw from all territories occupied since the
conflict erupted on May 6. A joint OAU/United Nations effort to
urge both sides to accept a cease-fire and begin implementing
the framework agreement continues. The U.S. Government remains
actively engaged in support of the OAU with both Ethiopia and
Eritrea to secure a peace settlement.
Here, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say in response to some
of the opening statements that have been made, in particular
Mr. Gilman's, that the United States has been active from the
outset, from the very day this conflict began. President
Clinton has personally and repeatedly talked to both these
leaders and has sent letters to them.
Secretary Albright and National Security Advisor Sandy
Berger also have spoken with these two leaders repeatedly. The
decision to involve former National Security Advisor, Anthony
Lake, one of our nation's most distinguished experts in foreign
policy, was a consequence of this Administration's high
commitment to seeing this conflict resolved peacefully.
The President has made clear to both leaders that the
United States is prepared to do its utmost in offering our good
offices to resolve this conflict. And I will say that the
reason this conflict is not resolved has nothing to do with the
United States or the extent of our efforts. We have done and
will continue to do all that we can, but this conflict will not
be resolved unless and until there is the will on both sides
for that to happen.
Let me finally say that there is a need not only to end
this conflict as quickly as possible but also ultimately to
repair over the long term strained relations in the Horn. A
resolution of the border war may be attainable. The task of
rebuilding both countries and mending ties between Ethiopia and
Eritrea to ensure long-term sustained peace and mutual security
will be especially difficult. It will require due attention and
support from the United States in the international community.
Mr. Chairman, other Members of the Subcommittee, I
personally look forward to continuing to work with you and
other Members as we continue to pursue our shared interest in
forging a peaceful resolution to this tragic conflict.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Secretary Rice.
The Prepared statement of Dr. Susan E. Rice appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Royce. One of the questions I would like to begin
by asking has to do with the fact that we see this military
buildup and at the same time the U.S. Treasury Department is
planning to forgive 90 million of Ethiopias debt in 1999. It is
my understanding that the notification sent to this Committee
indicated that this would happen on April 27.
On the symbolic level, is this the right message to be
sending? More generally, how are our bilateral and multilateral
aid efforts towards these two countries being shaped by this
conflict? Do we want to look at the question of forgiving $90
million at a time when several hundred million is being used to
purchase armaments on the world market?
Dr. Rice. Mr. Chairman, the United States Administration,
in consultation with Congress, took the decision many months
back that we would not provide direct financial assistance to
either government in the wake of the outbreak of hostilities.
We have continued assistance through NGO's and project-
based assistance, but we have suspended non-project assistance
for the time being.
On the question of debt relief, we had, prior to the
outbreak of the conflict, planned to provide debt relief to a
number of countries that met the Administration's criteria.
This is bilateral concessional debt. There have been staff
consultations on this issue over the course of the last week.
And the Administration has committed to consult further with
Congress before moving forward on the debt relief that you
described.
Chairman Royce. If we don't see an end to this conflict
soon, I would very much appreciate those consultations. At the
same time, Congressman Campbell and myself have been very
interested in the issue of hate broadcasts.
Hate radio is a tool that was utilized in back Rwanda with
Mille Collines on Congolese radio. The question that I have is
we see a pitched propaganda battle between both governments. Do
we see broadcasting that is approximating hate radio? Is there
an element of ethnic hatred in either side's broadcasting? This
is an issue that we are interested in monitoring, given the
experiences in Congo and given the experience in Rwanda.
Dr. Rice. Mr. Chairman, I am not an expert in either of the
two predominant languages in Ethiopia or Eritrea so I can't say
with confidence that there have not been any broadcasts that
you might consider hate in nature. But I think in general,
while certainly the rhetoric on both sides has been
considerable, I am not aware of broadcasts of the sort that we
would call hate radio in the traditional sense. Certainly I am
not aware of anything that would approach what tragically
occurred in Rwanda in 1994.
Chairman Royce. I would urge that we monitor the
broadcasts, and I would also urge that if we find that this
methodology is being used, that this information be made
available to the Members of the Committee.
The last question I will ask you is will this war, when it
ends, affect U.S. democracy promotion efforts toward Ethiopia
and toward Eritrea?
Dr. Rice. Mr. Chairman, I think there are several
imponderables about the nature of our relationship with these
two countries in the wake of what we hope will be a swift
conclusion of the conflict.
The sooner the conflict ends, the greater our ability to
play a constructive role in helping these two countries rebuild
and reconcile. It is in our interest to have stable growing
Democratic partners in the Horn of Africa, and for that reason
it is my expectation that we will do all we can to promote that
outcome.
Chairman Royce. I thank you, Secretary Rice. We will now
turn to Mr. Payne, the Ranking Member, for questioning.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much.
As Representative Campbell said so eloquently, we have been
very, very disappointed at the momentum that was being
developed for Africa in general. One of the great
accomplishments, to address a black caucus and I and others in
the State Department, felt was a great achievement was to have
President Clinton take a historic 12-day six-country trip to
Africa to highlight the positive things that are going on in
Africa. To get an opportunity to have the U.S. press visit, to
see many of the positive programs, games and achievements that
have been going on. And as I indicated that--as you know,
Ethiopia and--Eritrea, with the ending of the Mengistu regime
and the coming together of Eritrea finally as an independent
country, that country was really on its way.
It has been extremely disappointing to the point where--one
of the things that is very confusing to me is that early on I
thought that we could do some diplomatic work in the office and
would meet often with the Ambassadors and the embassy
Representatives from both Ethiopia and Eritrea attempting to
try to get to the bottom of this. But the problem that I found
was that the two Representatives of the governments here in the
U.S. seemed to interpret everything differently from the point
of Badme itself, who went in, who didn't go in, who was there
first, who was there second.
When you talk to each embassy, it would be just the
opposite. And so after 4 or 5-months, we have simply found that
it serves no useful purpose, I suppose, to meet with either
side because we get very little accomplished.
There was a peace plan drawn up by the OAU that was
presented after they did the study. They had an impartial
group. Could you tell me what the OAU agreement said? It
appears that there may have been misinterpretations by each
country about what the OAU suggested happened, or at one point
I think Ethiopia initially said it would accept it later after
Badme was retaken. I think Eritrea said they would accept it,
but Ethiopia, I believe, at that time said that it was off the
table.
So is there some fundamental difference to the way each
country, to your knowledge, view this OAU doctrine which I
thought would be the way to go since it was an African document
drawn up by African leaders impartial to each country?
Dr. Rice. Mr. Payne, the OAU framework agreement is a
rather extensive document, and I am happy to share a copy with
the Committee for the record if that would be useful.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Dr. Rice. It recommends, in the first instance, the two
parties commit themselves to immediate cessation of hostilities
upon acceptance by both sides of the agreement. It then calls
for an end to use a short-hand statement or other forms of
expression that might exacerbate the conflict.
It then says, in order to create conditions for
delimitation and demarcation of the border, the armed forces
presently in Badme Town and its environs should be re-deployed
to the positions they held before May 6, as a mark of goodwill
and consideration for our continental organization.
It says that the re-deployment would be supervised by
observers deployed by the OAU. It notes that any re-deployment
in this regard would not, should not, and would not be
construed as in any way prejudicing the question of the
sovereignty of this territory. And then it goes on to envision
re-deployment from other contested areas along the common
border within the framework of demilitarization of the border
and then on to delimitation, demarcation.
Now, both countries have now formally stated their
acceptance of the OAU framework agreement as I described in my
testimony. Ethiopia's acceptance first and then followed some
time later by Eritrea's. Both countries continue to maintain
that they accept this agreement. There does seem to be some
difference of interpretation over the question of Badme Town
and its environs.
Nevertheless, we in the U.S. Government think that the
principals of the OAU framework remain sound and remain valid
and can form a basis for a peaceful settlement of this
conflict.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
I see my time has expired. But that is one of the puzzling
positions for me. The first part of the OAU document evidently
is that there be a cease-fire, that be the framework or the
basis. Then to both say, we accept it and bombing continues and
fighting continues. If you accept it, it seems to me the first
premise and then all of the details would follow the cease-fire
would occur.
We accept it, we accept it; then cease and desist the
hostilities and move toward the thing. So it is the confusing
semantics that I have found as I have tried to engage myself
with this issue. If they both agree, it would seem like there
would be no fighting going on and that is a part of, I think,
the frustration I know we, on this side, and I am sure you have
experienced in your work.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Royce. Thank you.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Campbell. Thanks.
Secretary Rice, I have applause for your efforts. I hope
you know that, and I want to say that publicly. I think you are
trying your very best. And I think you are a woman, an
individual, of exceptional skills so your very best is better
than virtually anybody else's. I mean that sincerely. I do not,
therefore, criticize you.
I do have this question, though. I am thinking Rambouillet.
You get all the leaders together in a French chateaux outside
of Yugoslavia. I am thinking Dayton, probably Rambouillet is
more pleasant than Dayton. I hope I don't lose any votes in
Ohio if I ever run there. But you see my point. The Camp David,
bring over the head of Egypt, the head of Israel.
Why has that not been proposed? Again, I am sure you are
doing your best, but why not invite Prime Minister Meles,
President Isaias over to the United States or to a neutral
location and try to broker it with the two of them in the same
place?
Dr. Rice. Thank you, Mr. Campbell, especially for your kind
words of my own efforts and those of my colleagues to try to
bring this to a peaceful resolution. I appreciate them.
I will not want to get into great detail on this in a
public forum. I am happy to brief you and any other Members in
further depth in a closed session if you wish. But I hope you
will take me at my word when I say, as I said in my testimony,
that President Clinton personally, Secretary Albright, and
National Security Advisor Sandy Berger have made it very clear
to both sides that we are committed to doing our utmost in the
use of our good offices to bring this to a peaceful resolution.
We have not been reluctant to make those good offices
available. But both sides need to be ready and willing to take
constructive advantage of those good offices, and we will
continue our efforts but our efforts will bear fruit when and
only when the two sides have come to the conclusion that they
are ready for a peaceful resolution.
Mr. Campbell. I appreciate your answer.
I repeat, I think you are doing your best but take a look
at Rambouillet. Milosevic didn't come. Nevertheless we held a
Rambouillet. We had an empty space for him. So occasionally it
appears as though it is in our diplomatic interest to bring
parties together or to invite them together whether they always
show up or not. Again, I am not asking you to go beyond--I
realize that you are an employee in a large organization.
I have a specific question which I would have given you
advanced warning on had I known myself, but I did not. I hope
this isn't unfair. I just learned of an American named Bruhana
Mikiyel, a U.S. citizen of Ethiopian birth, Eritrean ethnicity,
but apparently an Ethiopian citizen who was detained in
Ethiopia for 2-months, November and December, subjected to
imprisonment, and I am informed tortured as well, all the while
not being the subject of any inquiry by our embassy and Addis.
If you know anything about this, I would like to hear it.
If you do not, I would welcome a letter from you as a follow-
up, with apologies again for not giving you advanced word but I
just heard about it as I was coming into the meeting.
Dr. Rice. I think it would be most constructive for us to
send you a letter as a follow-up. There are two cases, at
least, that Members of this Subcommittee have brought to the
attention of the State Department. The details on both, quite
honestly, are not completely clearcut, and I wouldn't want to
step into the details of those and be mistaken.
So let me simply say that we stand ready in the State
Department and through our embassies to be as responsive as we
possibly can. We have welcomed you and Congressman Royce and
others bringing to our attention some of the facts behind these
cases. In one instance, as the Chairman is aware, our lawyers
in the State Department are looking into it and we will
continue to do our best.
Correspondence and staff consultations on these cases are
continuing between the State Department and the African
Subcommittee. Regarding one of these cases, Mr. Petros
Berhana's father has promised the State Department additional
information about his case. As of August 18, 1999 the State
Department has not received the data. Mr. Petros Berhana's
father is not a U.S. citizen.
Mr. Campbell. Could you kindly send me a letter at your
convenience on that. The gentleman's name is Bruhana Nikiyel.
And last, the expulsions concern me greatly and I will ask
the next panel about it as well. Tell me kindly which--this may
not be constructive. You certainly have freedom to tell me
that, but, if you can, is there a justification--strike that.
Which side is engaging in expulsions of ethnics of the other
side to a degree that you would say constitutes a human right
violation, if any?
Dr. Rice. We have expressed our concern publicly and
privately over the human rights implications of the conflict.
They include both the deportations and expulsions, as I
mentioned in my testimony, as well as the impact of the
conflict on displaced people on both sides of the border.
On August 5, the State Department released a detailed
statement expressing our great concern about the expulsion of
ethnic Eritreans from Ethiopia. That statement went into some
considerable detail about the nature of our concerns. As I said
in my testimony, we estimate some 60,000 Eritreans and
Ethiopians of Eritrean descent have been deported from Ethiopia
and some 20,000 Ethiopians have left Eritrea under duress.
We are obviously concerned about both sets of developments,
but I think your private panel expert from Amnesty
International will be able to shed greater light on this since
Amnesty International having just published a study on the
issue.
Chairman Royce. Thank you. We appreciate the attention to
Petros Bruhana, Bruhana Mikiyel, and others who have been
caught in this conflict.
We will turn now to Mr. Meeks of New York. If we could ask
one question each, and then we will have time to reconvene.
Go ahead, Mr. Meeks.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Rice, just continuing with the theme of trying to have
diplomatic efforts to have peace between both sides, I
understand that not too long ago the President of Eritrea was
to meet with the President of Egypt in Cairo with the President
of Ethiopia to join them a few days later.
I was wondering if you know anything of that meeting and
what, if anything, took place as a result of the meeting?
Did the meeting in fact take place?
Dr. Rice. Mr. Meeks, my understanding is that President
Isaias has had contact regularly with the President of Egypt;
Prime Minister Meles was not long ago in Egypt.
It is my understanding they were not there at the same
time. I am not aware of an effort to bring them together in
Egypt. Egypt has stated publicly that it shares the
international community's interest in bringing about a peaceful
resolution of the dispute on the basis of the OAU framework
agreement, but I am not aware of any further effort by Egypt to
mediate or to push this further on the basis of the mutual
agreement of both parties.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you.
Chairman Royce. Barbara Lee of California, and then we will
come back.
Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me say to Dr. Rice, I thank you for taking the lead to
try to bring peace and stability not only in this war-stricken
region but all over the continent of Africa. You have been a
true leader, and I truly appreciate everything that you have
done, as all of us have said.
Dr. Rice. Thank you very much.
Ms. Lee. I am new to this Committee this term, and I would
like to get a bit of clarity in terms of what the State
Department believes this war is really about. I know some of
the root causes have to do with the fight over currency. From
the U.S. perspective, what is the basic reason for this war?
Dr. Rice. Congresswoman, I wish I had a simple and pat
answer to that, and while I think we could share with you some
elements of our analysis and I think that would be best done in
private, I think at the end of the day only the two governments
of the countries can answer that question definitively.
As the Chairman said in his opening statement and as many
others have echoed, these were two countries with which the
United States had strong relationships, shared strategic
interests, and which were among the more promising success
stories in Africa. No two countries, bilateral relationship
however close they may be, are without complications.
Nevertheless, the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea had
seemed, at least for many years, to be one that would not be
prone to the sort of conflict that we have unfortunately since
seen.
I think it will be sometime after the end of the conflict,
once the dust settles, when both sides are able to look back
and review the developments themselves and ask themselves to
their own satisfaction that very same question. I hope, that
out of it will come the means for the countries to reconstruct
the essence of a once good bilateral relationship.
Obviously, that will take a great deal of time. Our
interest will be in trying to help bring peace to the Horn and,
as I said earlier, to promote growth in security and democracy,
an important area for the United States.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Ms. Lee.
We are going to return to one last question from Mr. Meeks.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My other question was just a concern about the IGAD peace
process with the fact that Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia are
all embattled in their own regional conflicts.
What is the status of the peace process?
Dr. Rice. Well, IGAD is engaged in two peace processes, one
is Sudan and the other is Somalia.
The Sudan one has obviously been the more active of the
two. The IGAD peace process with respect to Sudan has been slow
and complex. We in the U.S. Government and other donors have
recently sought to energize the IGAD peace process by putting
forth a number of suggestions for how to improve the process by
which that peace process works, for example setting up a
permanent secretary to deal with the Sudan issue, setting up
technical Committees that can work full-time on the difficult
substantive issues that divide the two sides and proposing the
establishment or appointment of a full-time envoy from the
government of Kenya on behalf of IGAD to work this issue.
Those proposals have been well received by IGAD, by the
government in Kenya which is chairing the IGAD process. I don't
think that the actual IGAD mediation process has been
particularly dramatically affected by the conflict between
Ethiopia and Eritrea. As I said in my statement, obviously
circumstances in Sudan have been. But I think the peace process
can continue to move forward provided that the IGAD institution
is able and willing to push it and that the two sides are
willing to deal constructively.
Let me just reiterate an important point which I hope
Members of the Committee will take on board. There are many
conflicts in Africa at present and around the world. And I
spend, as do all of my colleagues in the Africa bureau and the
National Security Council, Defense Department, USAID, and
others who work on Africa, a great deal of our time and energy
working on these conflicts. We have the attention and support
of the highest levels of the U.S. Government, including the
Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor, and
President Clinton.
I want this Committee to be assured that even as the United
States focuses on crises and conflicts in other parts of the
world in my judgment, we do not do so, to the detriment of our
efforts to promote a peaceful resolution to any of the
conflicts in Africa. Those resources and that support has been
there, and our principals have been very active collectively
and individually on these issues as we need them.
Chairman Royce. We thank you, Secretary Rice.
I will mention one other thing. Congresswoman Barbra Lee
had the opportunity, along with Mr. Meeks, Don Payne, our
Ranking Member, and myself to lead a delegation to be election
observers in the Nigerian election along with General Powell.
As you know, this is a important country in Africa. The
transition is critical. It is in 4-days, and I would hope that
we have a high level delegation that will be involved in this
historic transition process in Nigeria.
I want to thank you again for your testimony here today.
Dr. Rice. Thank you very much. Thank you all.
Chairman Royce. We will stand in recess through the quorum
call and through the two votes and return in approximately 20-
minutes when our second panel will testify.
Thank you.
[Recess.]
Chairman Royce. We will now reconvene with our second
panel. Dr. Edmond Keller is a professor in the Political
Science Department at the University of California, Los
Angeles. Professor Keller is the author of Revolutionary
Ethiopia: From Empire to People's Republic. He has written
extensively on Ethiopia and Eritrea. Dr. Keller earned his M.A.
and Ph.D. degrees at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. He
is the past President of the African Studies Association.
Melvin Foote is the Executive Director of Constituency for
Africa, an emerging council of organizations, groups, and
individuals with an interest in Africa. He has worked on
development and relief issues in Africa for more than 25-years.
Mr. Foote has extensive experience in the Horn region, having
worked in Eritrea, Somalia, and Ethiopia. He is presently
involved in a peace initiative on the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict
being developed by former Peace Corps Volunteers. Mr. Foote
earned a B.A. in sociology from Western State University in
Colorado. He holds an M.A. degree in public Administration from
the University of Colorado.
Mr. Adotei Akwei, a native of Ghana, is the Director of
Advocacy for Africa with Amnesty International. Mr. Adotei
previously worked on African issues for the Lawyers Committee
for Human Rights, the American Committee on Africa, and the
Africa Fund. Mr. Adotei earned a B.A. in political science from
the State University of New York. He holds an M.A. degree in
government from the College of William and Mary. We will begin
with Dr. Edmond J. Keller. Mr. Keller, please.
STATEMENT OF DR. EDMOND J. KELLER , DIRECTOR
Dr. Keller. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Congressman.
I understand that I have 5-minute so I am going to keep my
comments brief. You have my statement. I am going to
concentrate on the first part of the statement in which I
discuss the policy recommendations.
In the first place, the United States has to recognize that
this is a complicated situation and the United States carries
some baggage that would make it difficult in the long run for
this country to appear to be an impartial, honest broker in the
conflict. Each side claims that the U.S. favors the other.
However, the conflict has such potential to spread in terms of
its scope and intensity that the U.S. must attempt to play a
proactive role, especially in the international diplomatic
arena.
Now, bearing this in mind, let me offer the following
policy actions:
The U.S. should continue to press for an unconditional
cease-fire, a withdrawal of troops from both sides in the
contested area--this would include all of the various fronts
that have opened up since the initial front at Badame--the
creation of a demilitarized zone that would be occupied in a
robust manner by an OAU/U.N. peacekeeping force. This should be
followed as rapidly as possibly by the demarcation of the
disputed territory by an international team of cartographers.
Second, rather than taking a role in mediating and
facilitating the negotiation between the warring parties, the
U.S. should vigorously support the efforts of the OAU and the
United Nations in this regard. It is commonly agreed that
regional and subregional organizations in Africa are going to
have to become more proficient in conflict prevention,
peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace-building. And countries
like the United States, rather than being necessarily directly
involved on the Continent should provide the material and
technical expertise that would ultimately be needed to make
African leadership in this regard happen in an effective
manner.
Third, the U.S. should be praised for speaking out about
the massive amounts of arms being exported into the contested
area. But much more needs to be done. There needs to be a
policy introduced that is very similar to the one that imposes
sanctions on countries that are not making serious efforts to
stem the flow of drugs from and through their countries. U.S.
foreign assistance represents leverage that could be used
against countries like China, Russia, Ukraine, and others who
themselves are involved in arms trade in this war or who allow
their nationals to be involved in that trade. I can't emphasize
strongly enough how important such a policy could be. I shudder
to think what the impact would be for Africa when weapons of
mass destruction that have been recently introduced into the
Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict begin to find their way into other
zones of conflict such as central and southern Africa. I don't
think that the United States should allow this to happen.
Eritrea and Ethiopia are two of the poorest countries in
the world. At the same time, they are countries with enormous
potential. As is made clear by the large numbers of Eritreans
and Ethiopians who are well educated and highly trained
citizens that reside in this country, the human capital that
would be needed to rapidly build the economies of the two
countries are well within reach. What stands in the way, of
course, is war. A return to peace would set the stage for
economic takeoff.
The U.S. should do its best to promote the reestablishment
of trust between the leaders of the two countries. There is
little doubt that this would be difficult, but an effort has to
be made. Thank you very much.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Dr. Keller. We also thank you
for taking the long trek from Los Angeles out here.
Dr. Keller. It is nice to be with you.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, and we will put your full report
into the record.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Edmond J. Keller appears in
the appendix.]
Chairman Royce. Mr. Foote.
STATEMENT OF MELVIN P. FOOTE , EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CONSTITUENCY
FOR AFRICA
Mr. Foote. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great pleasure
to be here and I want to commend you for the outstanding work
you are doing in leading the Africa Subcommittee. I also want
to identify with much that I have heard today from Dr. Rice and
others and Dr. Keller.
Tens of thousands of young combatants on both sides of this
conflict have already been sacrificed in the border war.
Sluggish economies have now become even more stagnant and hard-
won political capital has been severely compromised. I fully
associate myself with the many friends of Ethiopia and Eritrea
in the U.S. who cannot understand why these great people have
decided to settle their differences through force of arms. Not
only has this conflict done harm for the east Africa region as
a whole, but it has already damaged the unprecedented goodwill
and commitment that had been building between the United States
and Africa during the 6-years of the Clinton Adminiatration. In
no uncertain terms we must do all we can to bring this truly
unnecessary conflict to an end.
I am also a part--I spent many years in Africa, about 7-
years total--I am part of a group of former Peace Corps
volunteers who served in Ethiopia or Eritrea who are working to
end the war and bring peace between the two countries. Tomorrow
we are holding a forum at Howard University with many
recognized experts and leaders from both countries to explore
the path to peace. We are hopeful of coming out of this meeting
with a number of creative ideas and viewpoints which we would
like to pursue on our upcoming mission to the region, which we
expect would take place in the very near future.
Perhaps the time has come for a multitrack approach toward
seeking diplomatic solutions to this problem. In addition to
the efforts of the U.S. Government, OAU, the United Nations,
and other concerned nations, it seemed to us to be a
constructive role for groups like our former Peace Corps
delegation, non-governmental organizations and eminent
personalities in promoting the road to peace.
I want to emphasize here that while our group is pursuing
our effort independent of the U.S. Government, including the
Peace Corps, still we are making every effort to seek our
government's counsel and also keep them well informed of our
activities.
While the Clinton Adminiatration, under the astute
leadership of Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Dr.
Susan Rice, has done much to seek an end to the war, it is
clearly not the time for a let-up from the U.S. Government. The
situation is very explosive. Tensions remain extremely high on
the war front and throughout both countries. Obviously
fratricidal war cannot be allowed to continue.
Generally, the U.S. should work closely and in a
partnership with the organization of African Unity and the U.N.
to mediate this tragic dispute and to seek lasting solutions.
The OAU's December report is an excellent framework for
mediation and contains much that both sides could agree with.
This report contains an important 11-point proposal that has
received a strong endorsement from the international community.
The OAU proposal calls for an immediate cessation of
hostilities so that a peaceful resolution of the conflict may
occur through the elimination and demarcation of their common
border. In connection with the cease-fire, I understand that
the OAU requires a withdrawal of forces from Badame and other
areas in Ethiopia to the position held before May 6, 1998.
While it can be argued and debated as to who did what to start
the war, I sincerely believe that the best posture for our
government is to maintain friendly ties with both countries and
to find ways to provide additional support to the OAU framework
in order to resolve the immediate border issues and other
pressing issues which have been spawned as a result of the
border conflict.
Once border hostilities are ceased, the U.S. should give
serious consideration to holding a ``Dayton-style'' conference
in which President Clinton is fully involved, as Representative
Campbell has suggested. I fully endorse that. That not only
paves the way for a peaceful and longstanding settlement of
this dispute, but also sends a powerful message to other
African countries and to the American people that Africa truly
matters. Holding this conference in the U.S. would provide an
appropriate environment far away from the area of conflict to
lessen the tension and bluster which now exists in the region.
It would also allow American political scientists such as Dr.
Keller, scholars, and political policymakers and others the
opportunity to play a constructive role in bringing an end to
the war and set the basis for economic development.
In the region, the U.S. should be prepared to provide
financial and technical assistance to the two countries to
formally define the borders. Beyond that, the U.S. should
embark on a strategy in cooperation with such nonprofit groups
as the Corporate Council in Africa and the Constituency for
Africa to encourage American and other investment in the region
as a way of ``jump-starting'' economic development. Many
American companies were in fact prepared to enter into the
business relationships in the region but have since shied away
because of the instability. Investor confidence cannot be
restored so long as the war continues.
Thank you again for having me as part of this hearing.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Foote.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Melvin P. Foote appears in
the appendix.]
Chairman Royce. Earlier I missed a vote. So I am going to
take the opportunity to recess for a minute, if I could, so
that I could catch this vote. Thank you, Mr. Payne. I am going
to turn the gavel over to you at this point.
Mr. Adotei, thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF ADOTEI AKWEI, ADVOCACY DIRECTOR FOR AFRICA,
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
Mr. Akwei. Thank you, Mr. Payne, and thank you, Congressman
Royce, for allowing Amnesty International to take part in these
proceedings. Like my colleagues, I am going to be very brief
because we have been here a while and I think quite a lot of
what we would have stated has already been said by a number of
people. Our testimony accompanies our latest report which was
released last Friday. I would just ask that that report be
entered into the record.
Mr. Payne [Presiding.] Without objection.
Mr. Akwei. What I would like to do basically is just
restate what is in the short testimony. We looked at the human
rights condition in both Eritrea and Ethiopia which we feel
will have to be addressed for long-term resolution and the sort
of consolidation of democracy in both countries. Then we also
looked at the human rights violations that resulted as a result
of the conflict. I would just like to read the conclusions
again and the recommendations, and hopefully we will have a
question and answer period.
Amnesty International is not here to endorse one country or
to condemn the other as being guilty of more heinous abuses.
All human rights violations are unacceptable, even those
committed during a conflict situation. Both Eritrea and
Ethiopia have used the allegations of human rights abuses
against their nationals in the other country as justification
for their own actions in this conflict. However, both countries
have a responsibility to protect human rights within their
jurisdictions and to ensure that the protection of human rights
is a part of any negotiated settlements between the two
countries. It is imperative that the steps to redress the
issues of human rights violations by both sides be established,
as both sides have widely publicized allegations against their
own citizens. Amnesty International believes that unless this
is done, the tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea will
continue, with the possibility of further conflict and human
rights violations even if this current border dispute is
resolved satisfactorily.
Amnesty International is also aware of the energy and
effort that has been expended by the United States to try and
resolve the conflicts peacefully by both the Clinton
Adminiatration and Members of Congress like yourselves who have
appealed, implored, and begged both governments to resolve the
conflict peacefully. You should be commended, but you should
also be encouraged to do more because the bottom line is that
we have not succeeded.
Until we do succeed, reports like ours and hearings like
this will be, by necessity, focused on wasted potential as
opposed to documenting positive change in Ethiopia and Eritrea
or the region in general. It is past time for maximum
diplomatic and political pressure to be brought to bear on both
governments. Pressure is needed from foreign governments with
links to either country, from institutions which both countries
are a member to, and perhaps, most importantly, from their
support bases outside of Africa.
It is essential that the Ethiopian and Eritrean communities
living here in the United States--who seem to be waging an even
more vociferous war against each other than are the Asmara and
Addis Ababa--be reminded of the lives that are being lost, the
resources that are being wasted, and the suffering of the
people in the region. Perhaps when there is no more support for
the fighting and when there are stark costs to pay, both
diplomatically and politically, both sides or even one side
will have the courage to say enough is enough and stop
fighting. In that regard we would make the following
recommendations:
We call upon the Clinton Adminiatration and Congress to
insist that human rights be at the top of any agenda to
negotiate an end to the settlement. The U.S. Government should
insist that both governments give full and unrestricted access
to the International Commission of the Red Cross to visit all
prisoners of war, not political prisoners. The Administration
should also publicly call on both governments to publicly
announce that Ethiopians and Eritreans who were forced to leave
each country as a result of the conflict will be free to return
to their former homes and places of work and that an
independent review panel to address issues of ownership,
property disputes, will be established and, where appropriate,
compensation for Ethiopians resident in Eritrea and Eritreans
resident in Ethiopia at the time will be addressed.
Finally, we urge and appeal to Congress and Senior Members
of the Administration to speak out forcefully against all human
rights violations, be they internment of civilians,
deportations and expulsions, or indiscriminate bombings. In
particular, crackdowns against civil society, including the
independent press which could have acted as a break in the
slide into war, should be publicly challenged and condemned.
The United States has close ties with both governments and
both governments look to it for leadership, but that doesn't
preclude it from condemning actions and policies that are
wrong. Both countries are waiting for leadership and looking
for inspiration to resolve the conflicts. Thank you.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much for your testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Adotei Akwei appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Payne. And now we will hear from Mr. Mel Foote? Oh, you
did? The entire panel. Well, very good.
First of all, let me thank each of you for coming here to
testify. It is good to see you again, Dr. Keller. And, of
course, the other Members I see more regularly. They are local,
and so we really appreciate it.
Let me perhaps ask just some questions and perhaps any one
can attempt to answer that. As you have already heard and I
know all of you, especially the two of you that spent time in
Ethiopia, and of course Amnesty International also, were all
very, very disappointed, because we looked to Ethiopia and
Eritrea as the new leaders of Africa with the democracy coming
into South Africa and now into Nigeria. We were just under the
opinion that Ethiopia and Eritrea would be further ahead.
I really don't think that the leadership of either country
realized the damage, not only for Ethiopia or Eritrea, but as I
was mentioning earlier when we finally got the Administration
focused on Africa, we had newspapers writing positive stories.
We saw elections happening. We saw democracy coming on, but
both Prime Minister Meles and President Isaias, have done more
to set Africa policy back in this country than any two people I
know of in the recent past.
There was not a positive attitude towards Africa. We found
two great leaders because, as you know, Africa policy has
always been on the back burner. The Administration did not care
about Africa. We could tell by the lack of assistance, the lack
of attention. Finally, we had Secretaries of State, Presidents,
the First Lady, Vice Presidents, people going to Africa
continually.
Then these two men we talked to as the future of Africa,
the ``poster men,'' so to speak, the trailblazers, had done
more to the 700 million Africans. So those of you from each of
those countries, be sure that you say that, that's what I said,
Congressman Payne, who has been visiting Ethiopia for 35-years,
has said. Those two men have set Africa back. It would be all
right if it was just their own country, but Africa has been set
back by us pointing to them and having high hopes for them and
for them turning their backs and destroying everything that has
been built up. It is wrong. They don't have the right to do it.
And I really don't understand who they really think they are to
be able to do that to the continent.
Let me ask you,--I have heard you give recommendations, but
what do you think different or what more could have been done,
since what we have done up to now has not worked? Is there
any--I know that you made conclusions, but is there any
conversation that you may have or, second, can any of you try
to put your finger on the real problem? It is not Badame, that
is for sure. If it was awarded to one or the other and there
was no dispute, I am sure they would argue about--well, let me
just say, let me just ask you, do you know what the real issues
may be in any of your opinions since you all have been
associated with both countries?
Dr. Keller. Well, this is a very delicate question. I am
going to try to be as diplomatic as I possibly can. In the
first place, it is complex. The reason that it is complex is
because this particular war did not need to happen, but it
happened because of what I consider to be an accident in a
border zone. That happens in many places. You could go back to
Sarajevo, way back to the period before the First World War.
It seems to me this thing has gotten out of hand. We have a
government in Addis which is predominantly comprised of people
from the Tigray region. There are other ethnic groups there,
some of whom feel that government does not represent their
point of view. There is tension there. But there are some
Ethiopian nationalists who really feel that this minority
government sold them out when it agreed to a referendum in
Eritrea.
So when a dispute erupts between Meles Zenawi and Isaias
Afworki, because there is the prospect of getting Eritrea back
or paying Eritrea back, there is a groundswell of support for
the war effort. But still underneath it all, there is a great
deal of tension and it has to do with the internal politics of
Ethiopia but also it has to do with the personalities.
Both leaders are very proud men. You and I have been in
situations where we have seen that. And it is a matter of
national honor for both sides. It seems to me that Eritrea
feels that it is justified in building up this massive
capacity, military capacity, simply because it feels like the
very survival of the Eritrean nation is at stake. On the other
hand, there are Ethiopians who feel that Ethiopia must
recapture its lost pride. I think that is the political
underpinning of it. But, of course, you can talk about
economics too.
Mr. Foote. I just want to add to that. I have always felt
that there was a culture of war and a culture of tension in the
region. There is pride in being the victor. In some respects
this war goes back to Haile Selassie. It goes back to really
hundreds if not thousands of years.
Somehow the issue of how you resolve conflict has not been
dealt with there. It is very easy and very quick to pick up a
gun and very easy to pick up a stick, very easy to find as your
first response to a problem.
I would also add that poverty certainly plays a role in all
of this and I think the lack of opportunity for individual
people and groups also exacerbates greatly the potential for
conflict in the region.
Mr. Akwei. I think it is ironic that many people were
referring to the two leaders as role models for democracy for
Africa in the next millenium because both of them didn't come
to power from the ballot box. That is something that people
need to be very conscious of when they look at what was going
on internally in both countries prior to the conflict. Whether
it was because of economics, whether it was because of a sense
of national pride and honor, or whether it was, as my colleague
Mel just said, because of a culture of violence, all of which
are debatable.
But the question of whether there were institutions in both
countries that could have applied brakes to the outbreak of
conflict, as happens in other countries--like, for example here
in the United States, you have dissent, you have questions
about policy, you have challenges. I guess the axiom is that
democracies don't go to war or they don't go to war often,
because there are checks and balances that they need to go
through. Both countries still haven't developed that. If there
had been perhaps more of a focus in developing institutions as
opposed to making allegiances with the individuals, no matter
how charismatic they were, we might not be in this situation.
Mr. Payne. That is true. There was an attempt in Ethiopia.
Dr. Keller was the chair of the elections monitoring group, and
there were institutions that were developed in Ethiopia, for
the election. It was a multiparty election. It was relatively
fair, although there was a group that decided during the latter
part, near the election date, that they were going to boycott
the election. There seemed to have been attempts.
At least in Ethiopia we tried to work on Eritrea on this
single party state we were sort of having discussions about.
But Uganda, that has the single party. Mr. Museveni says it is
no party rather than the single party.
But I do think there were beginnings that had started, at
least as I said in Ethiopia. Some of the discussion that we had
with both of them were certainly about the fact that
institutions needed to be developed. They were both well read
persons. I think the Prime Minister had read more books about
John Kennedy and I had never finished the first one. He had
three or four of them on his desk. It is not that there was an
absence of the right stuff, the right material, the right
direction to go. So that is probably why it was more
disappointing.
In the new wave, it wasn't so much the individual, but the
fact that there is a new group of leaders that have been
emerging, who are relatively young for African standards. As I
mentioned, the Kenneth Colanders and the Jomo Kenyatta, and the
revolutionary people had sort of left the scene or were leaving
the scene. So these were the younger, and relatively educated.
The West and Europeans thought was the right thing to do in
order to have positive relations.
Actually, the growth in the GDP in Ethiopia had started to
move to 6, 7-percent annually. Eritrea was moving forward with
public works projects that rolled from the airport into the
city that were redone. There were so many visible signs of
progress that I think that is where the hope was. I could agree
with you; institutions should build on institutions not
individuals.
I yield back to the Chairman. We certainly apologize for
this unusual kind of event that we have today with votes being
called so closely together. I am glad that we were able to keep
it going. Mr. Chairman, I would yield back to you.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Payne. We will turn to Mr.
Meeks if he wishes at this time to ask some questions.
Mr. Meeks. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Since I missed the
testimony, I am going to refrain.
Chairman Royce. Will continue because I have some questions
that I was going to ask. Mr. Adotei, you mentioned in your
testimony that 53,000 people of Eritrea origin were deported
from Ethiopia between June 1998 and today. This is being done
in the name of national security. The government in Ethiopia
early on announced that officials of the ruling party in
Eritrea, or those found spying or mobilizing resources for the
Eritrea war effort, would be deported. Clearly 53,000 people is
a large number of people to put into this category. Should I
take it from your testimony that you believe these deportations
were illegitimate?
Mr. Akwei. Yes. The Ethiopian Government has since
acknowledged that in the process of trying to keep families
together, spouses, dependents, children, were all shipped out.
But we certainly feel that the--first of all, the deportation
process itself violates international law to which the
Ethiopian Government is a party to. As we mentioned here, the
International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights basically
has a very clear procedure under which you appeal to be able to
derogate from your responsibilities. We feel that did not
happen. But we also would think that the people who were
detained did not necessarily meet all of these categories or
criteria for deportation.
That is why one of our key recommendations is that all of
those that were deported be given the right to return home and
the right to regain their property.
Chairman Royce. I appreciate your observations. Mr. Foote,
in your testimony you referred to ethnic friction and
longstanding vendettas. Is there an ethnic dimension to the
present conflict, and what do you mean by longstanding
vendettas?
Mr. Foote. I think in the case of the war, like in the
border war, it didn't start with Badame. I think it goes way
back. I think Dr. Keller touched on it in terms of internal
politics of Ethiopia which fostered an environment for
conflict. I am sure the same thing could be said in Eritrea.
But I think the end of the war, the official war, the 30-year
war, was not completely ended by everybody. Some people felt
bad about that and would love to see another conflict in which
perhaps the Ethiopia regime would be toppled and another regime
would come in. It is so complex as to be almost amazing.
I think one has to look beyond the surface to see who
called for this war. I think that this whole inference of
trying to resolve conflict and reduce the friction must be a
permanent part of the discussion. I personally think that
Ethiopia and Eritrea, for instance, must learn to work
together. They are dependent on each other economically,
politically, and otherwise. It is dumb to have two countries,
quite frankly. We need to be talking about several countries
regionally coming together economically and politically. The
rest of the world is grouping up; why is Africa becoming
smaller and smaller? And so those are my remarks.
Chairman Royce. I appreciate that. Dr. Keller, we haven't
seen troops amassed behind trenches and this type of infantry
assault into machine gun nests and through mine fields since
the first world war. The type of slaughter that we are seeing
is divisions just being mowed down like we read about in the
paper. There are 500,000 men lined up on this border engaged in
this trench warfare.
What are the domestic political consequences of this many
deaths occurring and this type of horrific carnage that we read
about in the newspapers and which you also reported on in your
paper?
Dr. Keller. The domestic consequences are quite apparent,
but you have to look beyond what the domestic consequences
might be. It is not as if this battle was taking place in
Louisiana and you could flip on the TV and see on CNN what
happened on this front or that front. I don't think that we
will see the consequence, the domestic, the true impact of it
until this war goes on longer. I am afraid that it seems to me
that this war will go on longer.
The kind of tactics that are being used now are the ones
which were traditionally used, and it is just that the two
sides have not been able to gear up in a high-tech sense fast
enough to begin to use all of these other weapons that they
have. That is what I am more concerned with. If this war spills
over, and arms that were brought in for this conflict get to
central Africa or southern Africa, we could really be in a fix.
I am very concerned about that.
I would just like to say one quick thing about the ethnic
dimension. In Ethiopia in 1995, Ethiopia after this new
government came in created these ethically based states. Many
people objected to that. They said that compromised Ethiopian
national unity. But the government was committed to working
with it. But what the government put in place were elements of
procedural democracy rather than a democracy based upon the
legitimacy of the strategy that it had chosen.
This continues to be a problem. You have elections that are
ostensibly free and fair, but there are so many people and
groups that are left out of these elections until the tensions
continue. And that is feeding the sort of arms buildup in
Somalia with opposition groups in Kenya, in Sudan. We are yet
to really see the true dimensions, and that is why we need to
try to urgently try to stop the conflict right now and begin to
work on peace-building and peacemaking.
Chairman Royce. Dr. Keller, I thank you for testimony, and
Mr. Foote and Mr. Adotei. We have a question from Mr. Meeks.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was trying to find
out, I didn't want to be repetitive, but I know that we had
asked Dr. Rice when she testified and she was really perplexed
as to what was the cause of the conflict. In other words, to
get a diplomatic resolution, generally you need to know what is
the cause of the conflict. I have heard some say it is
stubbornness, I have heard some say that it is trying to prove
that one's army is stronger than the other. One wants access to
water, et cetera.
Can either one of you give us your opinion what is at the
heart of the conflict so that we can try to figure out what we
are trying to resolve here?
Mr. Foote. My view is that the cultural war is one major
factor. These are real proud people. When you look at the
people of the world and the tougher folks and the ones who are
really, really on top of their game, you find some of the
sharpest people in the world in the Horn of Africa. I find them
very resilient but very, very proud. I was saying I wish that
African-Americans would have a certain sense of that pride. But
it almost goes overboard to a certain extent that this creates
a negative: When it comes down to a fight, I am going to fight
you to the finish; I don't care whether it is over a popsicle
or over a gold mine. We are going to fight. That is one area
that has got to be dealt with.
I think also this overall poverty in the region plays a
problem because you have got lots of people out there.
Unfortunately, a lot of people who are dying in the war are
peasants from rural areas who have very little going for them
anyway economically, so it is almost as if they are expendable
or they are being perceived as expendable by these governments.
I think the culture of war and poverty are major factors
exacerbating this problem.
Dr. Keller. I would like the Congress, this Committee, to
really think about Ethiopian politics in sort of a nuanced way.
You have a government headed up by Meles Zenawi from the EPRDF.
He is trying to pursue a policy or sets of policies which other
people don't agree with. There is no way for them to express
themselves except in bellicose language and whatnot. So you
have tensions that develop as a consequence of that.
I have on many occasions in Addis since 1991 heard people
refer to the EPRDF as being a puppet of Isaias Afworki. And so
in a situation like that, there is a lot of warlike tendencies
that are in a society to begin with. Then if you have a
precipitant incident like the one at Badame, you could see how
this thing could quickly get out of hand.
What I have been amazed at is the level of buildup, not
only in terms of military personnel but in terms of the amount
of money being spent on this conflict. I am really afraid of
this. I am afraid of it for Ethiopia and Eritrea, but afraid of
it also for Africa.
Mr. Akwei. I would just like to say that without offering a
definitive answer, I don't think that you will get one, I think
there are three key elements that are important in trying to
solve the problem, in trying to solve the conflict, and that is
pride, trust, and respect. My colleagues have already referred
to the fact that the region has an enormous heritage and a
great pride in itself. That is why I think the recommendations
for high-level interventions by the President or a Dayton-type
conference or a Rambouillet-type conference are extremely
appropriate. If that is what it is going to take, that is what
we need to get.
At the same time, respect for the opposing side, for the
country on the other side of the border. Eritrea is going to
exist. The Ethiopians, who are not happy with it, must learn to
live with it and that means respect for it, the Eritrean
existence, just as the Eritreans must learn to respect that
Ethiopia has its own legitimate interests and its sense of
sovereignty over the areas that are being fought over.
The final thing I think will be trust. Any kind of
agreement is going to have to get the buy-in not only of the
leadership and the military but of the people on both sides of
the border who have been fed massive amounts of information,
falsely accusing the other of being the worst demons in the
world. Until you actually get that, get to the root of that--
and I think Congressman Royce was touching on that. It may not
be hate radio yet, but it is very bad.
When we were there, there was an absolute fear and terror
of the opposing side. That is going to take years to correct.
So there is going to have to be some kind of mechanism that
ensures trust. That is where you get into the whole issue of
human rights. How do you make sure that people are accountable
for what they did; how do you establish an accurate record of
what they did; and how do you build from there? Those are the
elements that should be part of any U.S. policy.
Chairman Royce. I wonder what the people of both these
nations would think of their respective governments if we were
broadcasting all of the information from both sides into the
people and they had the full information. What would the people
of Ethiopia and Eritrea think of their respective governments
not resolving this conflict, but instead wasting these
resources that are so necessary for health and education and
infrastructure on a military buildup which is going to cost,
another 100,000 lives?
I know that you had something to close on, Mr. Foote, and I
believe Congressman Payne had one last question. So we will go
to you, and then Congressman Payne will ask his question.
Mr. Foote. I just wanted to add that the Ethiopians and the
Eritreans who are in the United States, who are outside of the
region, have a unique opportunity to also play a role in
fostering peace for their own countries back home and also help
mobilize us over here. I find that the same friction over there
seems to permeate among the Ethiopians and Eritreans who are
here. They also need to be challenged to be more constructive
in helping to bring about a peaceful----
Chairman Royce. I think that is a fair criticism. I will
say that I have been approached by both Ethiopians and
Eritreans who have decried their respective governments for
doing this. I think that it can be observed inside both
communities here in America that they wish this had never
happened, and that they fault their respective leaders for not
being able to avoid this conflict. That is based upon
conversations that I have had both back in my district and out
here with quite a few people. But, Mr. Payne----
Mr. Payne. Just the involvement by both the leaders in
Somalia is really what concerns me a great deal. I am made to
understand that they have picked sides. If these newly acquired
weapons get into Somalia, with the lack of a government in
Somalia already, it certainly is going to create more of a
problem.
I do have a question about Sudan, which once again Sudan
being involved in the north of Uganda with the Lords Resistance
Movement, Uganda being allied with Rwanda; the question even
moving over into the other side of that conflict with Angola
and Namibia and Zimbabwe, Urundi indirectly, and Zambia, also.
These connections, it becomes almost a world war in Africa.
Could any of you explain to me why both sides have sort of gone
to Sudan for better relations?
Dr. Keller. My answer would have to do with the fact that
when you are fighting a war, Mengistu did it when he was
fighting Aideed. If he was having internal problems and having
border problems, that meant that he had more fronts than he
could adequatly cover. It seems to me that Sudan would like to
shore up its borders by making peace with Ethiopia and Eritrea
so that rebels would not be threatening Sudan from those
regions. It makes perfect sense to Bashir. I would think that
is only temporary. I would think also that it is probably not
very enforceable. I think that the SPLA is stronger than it has
been in years and that conflict will continue. I guess that we
should be having a hearing on that at some point because that
is really a tragedy.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much.
Chairman Royce. Again, we are going to thank our witnesses
and the Members of this panel. We are going to adjourn at this
time. Thanks for coming all of this way.
[Whereupon, at 4:21 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
May 25, 1999
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.008
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.009
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.012
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.013
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.015
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.003
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.004
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.005
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.006
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.007
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.016
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.017
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.018
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.019
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.020
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.021
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.022
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.023
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.024
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.025
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.026
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.027
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.028
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.029
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.030
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.031
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.032
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.033
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.034
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.035
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.010
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0136.011