[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE STATUS OF NUCLEAR CLAIMS, RELOCATION AND RESETTLEMENT EFFORTS IN
THE MARSHALL ISLANDS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 11, 1999, WASHINGTON, DC
__________
Serial No. 106-26
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Resources
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house
or
Committee address: http://www.house.gov/resources
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
57-451 WASHINGTON : 1999
COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES
DON YOUNG, Alaska, Chairman
W.J. (BILLY) TAUZIN, Louisiana GEORGE MILLER, California
JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey BRUCE F. VENTO, Minnesota
ELTON GALLEGLY, California DALE E. KILDEE, Michigan
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
JOHN T. DOOLITTLE, California Samoa
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
KEN CALVERT, California SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
RICHARD W. POMBO, California OWEN B. PICKETT, Virginia
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
HELEN CHENOWETH, Idaho CALVIN M. DOOLEY, California
GEORGE P. RADANOVICH, California CARLOS A. ROMERO-BARCELO, Puerto
WALTER B. JONES, Jr., North Rico
Carolina ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam
WILLIAM M. (MAC) THORNBERRY, Texas PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island
CHRIS CANNON, Utah ADAM SMITH, Washington
KEVIN BRADY, Texas WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
JOHN PETERSON, Pennsylvania CHRIS JOHN, Louisiana
RICK HILL, Montana DONNA CHRISTIAN-CHRISTENSEN,
BOB SCHAFFER, Colorado Virgin Islands
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada RON KIND, Wisconsin
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana JAY INSLEE, Washington
GREG WALDEN, Oregon GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
DON SHERWOOD, Pennsylvania TOM UDALL, New Mexico
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina MARK UDALL, Colorado
MIKE SIMPSON, Idaho JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
Lloyd A. Jones, Chief of Staff
Elizabeth Megginson, Chief Counsel
Christine Kennedy, Chief Clerk/Administrator
T.E. Manase Mansur, Republican Professional Staff
John Lawrence, Democratic Staff Director
Marie Fabrizio-Howard, Democatic Professional Staff
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held May 11, 1999........................................ 1
Statement of Members:
Faleomavaega, Hon. Eni F.H., a Delegate in Congress from
American Samoa............................................. 35
Prepared statement of.................................... 36
Miller, Hon. George, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California........................................ 2
Prepared statement of.................................... 3
Underwood, Hon. Robert A., a Delegate in Congress from Guam.. 40
Young, Hon. Don, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Alaska.................................................. 1
Statement of Witnesses:
Boyce, Ralph L., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, East
Asian and the Pacific Affairs, Department of State......... 4
Prepared statement of.................................... 6
Campbell, Kurt M., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Asian and Pacific Affairs, International Security Affairs.. 23
Prepared statement of.................................... 24
deBrum, Hon. Oscar, Chairman, Nuclear Claims Tribunal........ 165
Prepared statement of.................................... 168
Letter to Banny deBrum................................... 225
deBrum, Tony A., Minister of Finance, Republic of the
Marshall Islands........................................... 81
Prepared statement of.................................... 84
Hills, Howard L., prepared statement of...................... 133
Maddison, Marie L., Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
Republic of the Marshall Islands........................... 67
Prepared statement of.................................... 70
Mauro, Dr. John, Sanford Cohen and Associates................ 191
Prepared statement of.................................... 193
Muller, Philip, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
Republic of the Marshall Islands........................... 47
Prepared statement of.................................... 50
People of Utirik, The, prepared statement of................. 137
Richardson, Allan C.B., Scientific Consultant to the People
of Enewetak................................................ 182
Prepared statement of.................................... 185
Robison, William, prepared statement of...................... 146
Seligman, Paul J., M.D., M.P.H., Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Health Studies, Department of Energy................... 25
Prepared statement of.................................... 26
Letters to Mr. Muller.................................... 226
Stayman, Allen P., Director, Office of Insular Affairs,
Department of the Interior................................. 11
Prepared statement of.................................... 13
Additional material supplied:
Balos, Senator Henchi, Bikini Atoll Representative, Marshall
Islands Nitijela, prepared statement of.................... 212
deBrum, Hon. Banny, Ambassador, The Marshall Islands, letter
to Mr. Young..............................................214,222
John, Senator Ismael, Mayor Neptali Peter and Davor Z. Pevec,
prepared statement of...................................... 110
Pinho, Kirtley, President, Majuro Chamber of Commerce, letter
to President Imata Kabua................................... 221
RMI Government, response to Mr. Boyce's testimony............ 215
Weisgall, Jonathan M., prepared statement of................. 122
HEARING ON STATUS OF NUCLEAR CLAIMS, RELOCATION AND RESETTLEMENT
EFFORTS IN THE MARSHALL ISLANDS
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 11, 1999
House of Representatives,
Committee on Resources,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 11 a.m. in Room
1324, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Don Young [chairman
of the Committee] presiding.
STATEMENT OF HON. DON YOUNG, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF ALASKA
Mr. Young. The Committee will come to order. The Committee
is meeting today to hear testimony on the status of the nuclear
claims and relocation resettlement in the Marshall Islands
under rule 4G of the Committee rules. Any oral or opening
statements in this hearing is limited to the Chairman and the
Ranking Minority Member. This will allow us to hear from our
witnesses who have traveled so far. If any other Members have
statements, they can be included in the hearing record under
unanimous consent.
Today the Committee on Resources hearing will be focussed
on the status of nuclear claims, relocation, and resettlement
of the four atolls in the Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap, and
Utirik and other radiological rehabilitation of the atolls.
These are complex issues involving scientific research,
logistic engineering problems, financial and social challenges.
However, above all else, the most important to the Committee
are the people of the Marshall Islands who directly or
indirectly were adversely impacted by the nuclear testing
inadvertently.
Congress has oversight responsibility for Federal funds
designated for the brief settlement and relocation of the
people of the Marshall Islands who were affected by the United
States' nuclear testing. Federal funding also provides for
medical treatment compensation for nuclear-related injuries or
damages and radiological rehabilitation of certain atolls.
This funding has been provided by also a series of trust
funds and problematic assistance. The United States and the
Marshall Islands have a special relationship based on decades
of the United Nations trusteeship. Today the U.S. and RMI are
separate sovereign nations in free association in our Compact
of Free Association. Significant portions of the compact relate
to the issues before the Committee today.
In fact, this Committee held over 30 hearings during the
consideration of the compact legislation. Many of those
hearings attempted to identify the extent of the impact the
U.S. nuclear testing program on the people and property of the
Marshall Islands.
Due to the uncertainty of the safety of resettlement in
certain atolls, Congress included a provision that provided for
additional scientific tests, agriculture food assistance, and
the possibility for additional monetary and other assistance in
the future.
It was understood that the settlement, relocation, and
radiological rehabilitation could present unforeseen challenges
that might warrant additional assistance by the United States.
Since the enactment of the compact in 1986, Congress has
provided additional funding for those purposes.
I want to thank the delegation from the Marshall Islands
who have traveled to Washington to participate in the
Committee's hearing and briefing yesterday and the hearing
today. Your presentations yesterday and today will provide
valuable information to Congress regarding the status of
nuclear claims, resettlement, and relocation efforts.
The independent scientific testimony and administration
position statements today will also add to the record regarding
the progress to date of these areas. I also want to thank the
delegation for the fine hospitality shown to myself and to the
Committee as we visited out there.
We are extremely pleased with the visit that we had and it
was very informative.
[The information may be found at the end of the hearing.]
Mr. Young. At this time, I will recognize the gentleman
from California, the Ranking Member, Mr. Miller.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE MILLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Mr. Miller. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and thank
you very much for conducting these hearings. In February of
1994, I conducted a lengthy investigation and held hearings
because it became known to me that many of the facts
surrounding the nuclear weapons testing in the Pacific during
the 1950s had been withheld from Congress, the people of the
Marshall Islands, and the public.
Information I received prior to the 1994 hearings strongly
suggested that many people were affected by the fallout and the
contamination of their homelands, many more than had been
previously disclosed. This information caused me to push for
the release of all pertinent information held by the U.S.
Department of Energy on the testing program and the magnitude
of its effects on the inhabitants of the local islands. This
resulted in thousands of pages of documents being released to
the honor of my government, and today we are here in part
because of what have we have learned from those documents.
I hope the witnesses from the RMI will let us know how that
process of receiving documents from the Department of Energy is
going. Title 9 of the subsidiary agreement of section 177 of
the Compact for Free Association contains language allowing for
a request to the Congress for the compact renegotiations under
what is known as a change in circumstances.
There is a finding that injuries that occurred were not or
could not reasonably have been identified as of the enactment
of the compact, that such injuries rendered the provisions of
the agreement manifestly inadequate. I realize that this is not
an immediate purpose of today's hearings, but I want those who
are here today from the administration or from the RMI to know
that I am very interested in what these newly released
documents show us about what factions of the Federal Government
knew and withheld over a decade during the compact
negotiations.
This morning we will hear from testimony about how the
United States-RMI relationship is proceeding specifically with
regards to nuclear claims tribunal, relocation and resettlement
issues; and I look forward to hearing from the administration
on how the program is set up pursuant to the compact are
working and if they are adequate to meet the needs and the
goals.
Similarly, the Committee needs to know from the
representatives of the Marshall Islands how cleanup and
resettlement are proceeding from their perspective as well as
from the comfort level of the U.S. Government studies and data.
This relationship is a two-way street.
Much responsibility lies with the United States to
compensate the people of the Marshall Islands to provide
adequate health care, rehabilitate lands damaged during the
testing program. The Republic of the Marshall Islands, however,
also has responsibilities, as a sovereign government agreed to
do.
Our two nations are intertwined and as we go into the next
millennium, I look forward to that relationship to continue to
the betterment of both peoples. I welcome both the
administration to this hearing and to my old friends who have
traveled a great distance from the Marshall Islands to be here
today and to share their concerns and their thoughts.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:]
Statement of Hon. George Miller, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California
In February of 1994 I conducted a lengthy investigation and
held a hearing because it had become known to me that many
facts surrounding the nuclear weapons testing in the Pacific
during the 1950's had been withheld from Congress, the people
of the Marshall Islands, and the public. This was not, and is
not, acceptable to me. Prior to that time we had all been told
that only 267 people were exposed to fallout from the BRAVO
tests, and that exposure was an accident caused by a last
minute shift in the wind and failure to anticipate the bomb
would yield so much power.
Information I received prior to the '94 hearing strongly
suggested that many more people were affected by the fallout
and contamination of their homelands. This information caused
me to push for the release of all pertinent information held by
the U.S. Department of Energy on the testing program and the
magnitude of its effects on the inhabitants of the local
islands. This has resulted in thousands of pages of documents
being released to the RMI government. Today we are here, in
part, because of what has been learned from those documents. I
hope the witnesses from the RMI will let us know how the
process of receiving documents from the Department of Energy is
going.
Title IX of the susidiary agreement to Section 177 of the
Compact of Free Association contains language allowing for a
request to Congress for compact renegotiation under what is
known as ``changed circumstances'' is there is a finding that
injuries occurred that ``were not and could not reasonably have
been identified as of (enactment of the compact) and that such
injuries rendered the provisions of this Agreement manifestly
inadequate.'' I realize this is not the immediate purpose of
today's hearing but I want those here today from the
Administration and the RMI that I am very interested in what
these newly released documents show about what factions of the
Federal Government knew and witheld during over a decade of
compact negotiation.
This morning we will hear testimony about how the U.S.-RMI
relationship is proceeding specifically with regard to the
Nuclear Claims Tribunal, relocation, and resettlement issues. I
look forward to hearing from the Administration on how the
programs set up pursuant to the Compact are working and if they
are adequate to meet the needs and goals. Similarly, this
Committee needs to know from the RMI representatives how
cleanup and resettlement are proceeding from their perspective
as well as their comfort level with U.S. government studies and
data.
This relationship is a two way street--much responsibility
lies with the United States to compensate the RMI people--to
provide adequate health care and rehabilitate lands damaged
during the testing program. The RMI, however, also has
responsibilities it has, as a sovereign government, agreed to
do. Our two nations are intertwined and as we go into the next
millennium I look for this relationship to continue to the
betterment of both our peoples.
I welcome my old friends who have traveled a great distance
from the Marshall Islands to be here with us today and look
forward to hearing from you.
Mr. Young. I thank the gentleman. Now we will call the
first panel up. Mr. Ralph Boyce, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State; Mr. Allen Stayman, director of Insular Affairs, Interior
Department; the Honorable Kurt Campbell, Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Asian Pacific Affairs; the Honorable Paul Seligman,
M.D., M.P.H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Health Services,
Department of Energy.
I believe we will go right down the line. Mr. Ralph Boyce
will be the first to testify. I want to remind our witnesses
that I would be somewhat lenient, but try to limit your oral
statements to 5 minutes. You can give as long of a written
statement that you wish to do so. But in respect to the other
witnesses, trying to keep it to 5 minutes is necessary. Mr.
Boyce.
STATEMENT OF RALPH L. BOYCE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE, EAST ASIAN AND THE PACIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Boyce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have a written
statement which I will submit for the record, and I will try to
summarize it in under 5 minutes at this time. As Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State responsible for the freely
associated states as well as the region of southeast Asia and
the rest of Oceania, I am pleased to have the opportunity to
appear before the Committee with my colleagues from Interior,
Energy and Defense.
The United States' relationship with the Republic of the
Marshall Islands, one of the three freely associated states, is
a unique and important part of our posture in the Pacific, and
the political relationship itself is defined in the Compact of
Free Association. The compact established a special
relationship between the U.S. and the Republic of the Marshall
Islands that is distinct from other nations.
In addition to providing U.S. defense for the RMI and
access to U.S. Federal domestic programs, the compact provides
just under $1 billion in U.S. funding through the initial 15-
year period of economic assistance. Mr. Chairman, we are
approaching the 13th anniversary of the compact with the RMI,
and under the terms of that agreement some elements will be up
for renegotiation in October.
We have established an office of the special negotiator in
the Department of State to be led by my colleague, Allen
Stayman, to my left here. As we continue preparations for that
renegotiation, we are reviewing the effectiveness of the
various U.S. programs and activities and assistance in the RMI.
While both sides have learned a great deal over the past 13
years, quite frankly there are some troubling signs regarding
the commitment of the RMI to some of the goals of the compact.
In particular, the RMI has what would have to be termed a
spotty record of reform on the economic side hampered by an
inefficient public sector, rising unemployment, and declining
per capita income.
The government has exhausted its financial holdings and
borrow-
ing capacity. The foreign investment climate is, quite frankly,
not attractive. Controversy surrounds the government's
management of funds established to provide compensation for
claims related to the period 1946 to 1958 nuclear testing
program of the United States.
There are also complaints that there has been some
manipulation of the criteria by which claimants are determined
to be eligible for programs supported by these funds and the
subscriber base has been inflated quite dramatically.
Mr. Chairman, unique to the RMI is the U.S. obligation
regarding the nuclear claims. As you know, the U.S. carried out
66 nuclear tests at Bikini and Enewetak atolls between 1946 and
1958. These atolls were evacuated prior to testing.
However, on February 28, 1954, a thermonuclear device code
named BRAVO was detonated at the Bikini atoll. The energy yield
of this experimental device exceeded predictions; and sudden
wind changes sent the cloud of radioactive debris unexpectedly
eastward over land rather than over open seas to the north.
Consequently the populations of Rongelap and Utirik were
showered with radioactive debris for two to three days before
being evacuated to the Kwajalein atoll for medical care.
The United States has accepted full responsibility for the
health and environmental damage caused by the U.S. nuclear
testing program under the oft-cited section 177 of the compact.
The implementation agreement of the compact with the RMI states
that this is the, quote, ``full settlement of all claims past,
present, and future,'' unquote, related to nuclear testing and
at the time that the RMI agreed to the sum of $150 million.
However, the compact provides that under certain
circumstances the RMI may submit a request for Congress for its
consideration by recognizing, of course, that this provision
does not commit Congress to appropriate funds. So in addition
to the $150 million that is in the compact settlement, the
United States has provided about $300 million in various
compensation, medical care, food supplies, environmental
cleanup, and funds for resettlement.
My written testimony contains a more precise breakdown of
these figures. As I mentioned, the compact allows the RMI to
submit a request for additional compensation to the U.S.
Congress if there are changes in circumstances. We have heard
for some time there may be such a request.
We have given our assurance to the Marshall Islands
government that we will do everything that we can to assist
Congress in considering such a request should it be submitted.
Regarding the relationship between nuclear issues and the
renegotiation of the compact, Mr. Chairman, we believe that the
negotiations should be limited to what the Congress and the
compact call for.
Just summarizing the end here, sir, thank you for the
opportunity to present testimony to this Committee at this
time, and I will gladly answer any questions that you might
have after the other witnesses have spoken on behalf of the
Department of State. Thank you.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Boyce. Again, until I rap the
gavel you don't have to wrap it up. I just meant as sort of a
reminder, those little lights there. I do thank you.
Mr. Boyce. That was close to a wrap, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Boyce follows:]
Statement of Ralph Boyce, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East
Asian and Pacific Island Affairs, Department of State
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to have the
opportunity to appear before the Committee with my colleagues
from the Departments of Interior, Energy and Defense. I look
forward to discussing our bilateral relations with the Republic
of the Marshall Islands, specifically with regards to the
relocation and resettlement of the inhabitants of the four
atolls affected by atmospheric nuclear testing, Bikini,
Enewetak, Rongelap and Utirik. My responsibilities as Deputy
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs include
the Freely Associated States, specifically the Republic of the
Marshall Islands. I have not yet had the opportunity to visit
the Marshall Islands. A trip scheduled for earlier this year
proved unworkable. However, I hope to include the RMI in my
travels, certainly before the end of the year.
Background on Our Unique Relationship
The United States' relationship with the Republic of the
Marshall Islands, one of three Freely Associated States, is
unique and one which is an important part of our posture in the
Pacific. The Freely Associated States (the Republic of the
Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the
Republic of Palau) were formerly part of the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands. These islands were administered by the
United States after 1947 under a United Nations Strategic
Mandate. In the 1970s the United States entered into discussion
with representatives of the various islands on their future-
political status, a process which had different outcomes for
the four island groupings in the Trust Territory. The RMI chose
to become a sovereign nation in free association with the
United States. In June 1983, we reached an agreement with the
RMI--a Compact of Free Association. Approved and enacted into
law by Congress in January 1986, and endorsed by the United
Nations later that year, our Compact with the RMI officially
went into effect on October 21 of 1986.
The Compact established a special relationship between the
United States and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, one
which differs from that with other nations in several distinct
ways. Although the RMI is a sovereign power, the U.S. provides
the people of the RMI access to direct services of over forty
U.S. Federal domestic programs and to U.S. Government funding
for budgetary and technical assistance grants at a per capita
rate greater than U.S. assistance to almost any other foreign
government. We take responsibility for the security and defense
of the RMI in return for foreclosure of third country access to
the Marshall Islands for military purposes--what we have called
``strategic denial.'' Also, we give RMI citizens the right to
work and live in the United States as nonimmigrant residents
within the parameters laid out in the Compacts.
Compact of Free Association to Be Negotiated
We are approaching the 13th anniversary of our 15-year
Compact with the RMI and, under the terms of the Compact, some
elements of the agreement will soon be up for renegotiation.
Under the terms of the Compact, negotiations should begin in
October 1999, two years before the 15th anniversary of the
Compact (October 2001). We are establishing an Office of the
Special Negotiator to be located in the Department of State
which will house the interagency team that will conduct these
negotiations.
Why did we enter into the Compact in the first place and
why are we renegotiating it? The U.S. entered into the Compact
of Free Association, first, because the U.S. was obligated as
administrator of the U.N. mandated Trust Territories, ``to
promote the development of the inhabitants of the trust
territories toward self-government or independence as may be
appropriate to the particular circumstances of the trust
territory and its peoples, and the freely expressed wishes of
the peoples concerned.''
Second, in the Cold War environment of the mid-1980s, the
United States was keen to bolster its security posture in the
Pacific. Within the framework of the Compact, the principle of
strategic denial guaranteed the U.S. exclusive military access
to these countries and their surrounding waterways. Third, our
agreement with the RMI ensured continued access to U.S. Army
Kwajalein Atoll (USAKA)/Kwajalein Missile Range, and our
agreement with the Republic of Palau, the last of the Freely
Associated States to sign a Compact, included the right to
develop a military base should the U.S. need an alternative to
the Philippines.
Kwajalein Missile Range is considered to be a ``national
asset'' and is currently the premier facility in the world for
testing Theater Missile Defense. We have invested over $4
billion in this facility. The lease for Kwajalein Atoll expires
in 2001. However, our Compact with the RMI provides for
automatic renewal rights for an additional 15 years if the U.S.
chooses to do so.
As we move towards renegotiations, we are reviewing the
effectiveness of U.S. programs and assistance in the RMI. While
both sides have learned much over the past 13 years, there are
troubling signs regarding the commitment of the RMI to the
goals of the Compact. The RMI has a spotty record of reform,
hampered by an inefficient public sector, rising unemployment,
and declining per capita income. The government has exhausted
its financial holdings and borrowing capacity. The foreign
investment climate is not an attractive one. Much controversy
surrounds the government's management of funds established to
provide compensation for claims related to the 1946-58 U.S.
Nuclear Testing Program. There are complaints that manipulation
of the criteria by which claimants are determined eligible for
programs supported by these funds has led to a huge inflation
of the subscriber base.
U.S. Responsibilities to the RMI
Regarding U.S. Government obligations to the RMI, we have
fulfilled our responsibility under the United Nations mandate
to prepare the territory for self-governance. The RMI is self-
governing and responsible for its own foreign affairs. We have
exchanged diplomatic representatives with the RMI and the
government of the Marshall Islands has done so with other
nations besides the U.S. The RMI also holds membership in
international organizations including the U.N., IMF and the
World Bank, and regional organizations such as the South
Pacific Forum and the Asian Development Bank.
Under the original Compact legislation, the United States
pledged to help each of the three Freely Associated States move
toward economic self-sufficiency. Our provision of Federal aid
and services has been partially successful in fostering
economic self-sufficiency. For many reasons the RMI has made
slow progress in undertaking the reforms necessary to transform
its economy. As we move towards negotiations, the Congress and
the Administration are faced with the challenge of addressing
past policy failures on both sides in order to improve RMI
economic performance.
U.S. Obligation for Nuclear Claims
Unique to the RMI is the U.S. obligation relating to
nuclear claims. The U.S. carried out 66 underwater and
atmospheric nuclear tests at Bikini and Enewetak atolls in the
Marshall Islands between 1946-58. Two atolls, Bikini, at the
time with a population of 167, and Enewetak, population of 145,
were evacuated prior to testing. On February 28, 1954, a
thermonuclear device, code-named Bravo, was detonated at Bikini
Atoll. The energy yield of this experimental device exceeded
predictions and sudden wind changes sent the cloud of
radioactive debris unexpectedly eastward over land rather than
over open seas to the north. Consequently, the populations of
Rongelap (86 people) and Utirik (167 people) were showered with
radioactive debris for two to three days before being evacuated
to Kwajalein Atoll for medical care.
In Section 177 of the Compact of Free Association (Public
Law 99-239 enacted October 1986), the U.S. accepted
responsibility for compensation owing to citizens of the RMI
for loss or damage to property or person of RMI citizens
resulting from the USG nuclear testing program between 1946 and
1958. The subsidiary agreement implementing this provision of
the Compact constituted the ``full settlement of all claims,
past, present and future,'' related to nuclear testing.
However, the Compact provides that, under certain
circumstances, the RMI may submit a request for additional
compensation to the Congress for its consideration, recognizing
that this provision ``does not commit the Congress of the
United States to authorize and appropriate funds.'' We have
heard for some time that the RMI is preparing to submit a
request for additional compensation to Congress for its
consideration, and we will cooperate with Congress if, as we
expect, Congress asks for our views on the request.
The U.S. has provided over half a billion dollars in
compensation to the RMI for the U.S. nuclear testing program
through congressional appropriations and Federal services, such
as the Department of Energy medical health program and the U.S.
Department of Agriculture surplus food assistance. Compensation
and assistance has included:
--$150 million in 1986 under the Compact to create a Trust Fund
for the health care and compensation for nuclear claims for the
populations of the four atolls affected by the Nuclear Testing
Program--Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap and Utirik. The government
of the Marshall Islands established the trust fund and a
Nuclear Claims Tribunal to adjudicate compensation claims. The
claims paid have totaled approximately $63 million thus far to
some 1,549 individuals.
In addition to the Trust Fund, the U.S. has provided in
compensation, support and medical care:
--For Bikini: $6 million in 1978 and $110 million in 1982 in
trust funds for the people of Bikini; $1.4 million in ex gratia
payment in 1979, $1.754 million in food commodities from 1979-
84 through USDA.
--For Enewetak: $102,000 compensation for removal in 1969; $20
million for clean up in 1977, $129 million for clean up
activities in 1976, $12.4 million for resettlement in 1977, $20
million in agricultural support from 1980-96, $33.895 million
in 1989 for the rehabilitation and resettlement of Enewetak,
and an additional $10 million for the resettlement of Enjebi,
part of the Enewetak atoll.
--For Rongelap: $11,000 to each Rongelapese exposed to fall out
was paid in 1965; $6.42 million added to the Rongelap Compact
Trust Fund in 1996.
--For Utirik: $1,000 to each Utrikese exposed to fall out paid
in 1977; $25,000 to each Utirikese who underwent thyroid
surgery.
All four atolls participate in the following programs:
--$3.8 million in food commodities: from 1988-94 through the
U.S. Department of Agriculture to compensate the four-nuclear
affected atolls for decreased agricultural capabilities
resulting from the nuclear testing program. Present annual
funding is $581,000. Continued assistance over the next five
years is likely.
--$80.4 million from 1980-1997 for special medical care and
treatment of the inhabitants of the four nuclear-affected
atolls, environmental monitoring of the lands and radiological
dose assessment monitoring through the Department of Energy for
the radiation-exposed populations--originally 253 people--of
Rongelap and Utirik. Today the Department of Energy Marshall
Islands Medical Program serves 238 people (130 exposed persons
and a control group of 107) with the cooperative support of the
Departments of Defense and Interior.
--Two million dollars annually under the ``Four Atoll Health
Care Program'' administered by the Department of the Interior
for the people of the atolls of Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap and
Utirik who were affected by the consequences of the U.S.
nuclear testing program, pursuant to the program described in
Public Law 95-134 and Public Law 96-205 and their descendants
(and any other persons identified as having been so affected if
such identification occurs in the manner described in such
public laws).
Additional Compensation Possible
Although, under the Compact, Section 177 constitutes the full
settlement of all claims, it also allows the RMI to submit a request
for additional compensation to the U.S. Congress for its consideration
if
(a) loss or damage resulting from the Nuclear Testing Program
arises or is discovered which could not reasonably have been
identified as of the effective date of the agreement, and
(b) such injuries render the provisions of the Agreement
``manifestly inadequate.''
We have given our assurance to the Marshall Islands government that
the Administration will assist Congress in considering its request
should it decide to submit a request which meets these criteria.
Resettlement of Marshall Islands Atoll Communities
The U.S. takes seriously its commitment to resettle and
rehabilitate those communities injured by the nuclear tests. From a
legal and humanitarian standpoint, the various agencies tasked with
this undertaking have carried out their work with commitment.
Enewetak
The U.S. conducted 43 nuclear tests at Enewetak Atoll between April
1948 and 1958. In April 1980, Enewetak Atoll was returned to the
Enewetak and today more than 900 Enewetakese reside there.
Is it safe to live in Enewetak Atoll? We believe so but that is a
decision left up to the people of Enewetak to make based on the
environmental data collected at Enewetak Atoll by the Department of
Energy monitoring program. This data, coupled with the use of the
latest dose models and international accepted intervention strategies,
provide a sound basis upon which the Enewetak people and local
government councils can make resettlement decisions regarding any
island in the Enewetak Atoll chain.
The U.S. conducted clean up operations at Enewetak Atoll from 1977-
80. Radiologically contaminated soil and debris present on many islands
in the atoll were collected and deposited on Runit Island in a crater
surrounded by a concrete key-wall and covered with a concrete cap. The
crater is known as Cactus Crater and the concrete capped nuclear
container as Runit Dome.
The National Academy of Science in a 1980 report said the Cactus
Crater structure and its contents presented no credible health hazard
to the people of Enewatak, either now or in the future. Subsequent
monitoring of Runit Dome by the Defense Nuclear Agency and the
Department of Energy found the dome to be structurally sound. It is the
consensus of the USG and the people of Enewetak that Runit island
should remain quarantined indefinitely because of the possible presence
of plutonium at subsurface levels which might not have been located and
removed during cleanup. This position stands as a precautionary measure
despite DOE resuspension studies which show that such a quarantine is
not necessary.
Rongelap
Rongelap atoll was showered by nuclear fallout when the U.S.
detonated Bravo at Bikini Atoll on February 28, 1954. The local
population (67 persons) was exposed to the fallout for two to three
days before being evacuated to Kwajalein Atoll by the U.S. Navy.
Nineteen Rongelapese temporarily residing on Ailingnae also were
irradiated. The Rongelapese were returned to their island in 1957 where
they remained until 1985. In 1985, the Rongelapese chose to move their
community to Mejatto Island in Kwajalein Atoll. Following their
evacuation to Kwajalein, Congress appropriated funds for the special
care and treatment of the exposed Rongelap population, which has
continued to this day under the DOE Marshall Islands Program. The
Rongelapese are also eligible to receive medical care under the Section
177 Health Care program for the four affected atoll communities.
In 1965, the Atomic Energy Commission granted a payment of $11,000
to each exposed Rongelapese. In addition, each Rongelapese exposed who
underwent thyroid surgery received $25,000. Under the Compact, Congress
appropriated $37.5 million to the Rongelap Distribution Authority to be
held in trust for the people of Rongelap. In addition, Rongalapese may
request compensation from the Republic of the Marshall Islands Nuclear
Claims Tribunal for personal injury and property damage claims.
In 1994, the National Academy of Sciences found that with
appropriate mitigative measures, the people of Rongelap could return
and live safely in their homeland. In February 1999 the Department of
Energy executed a Memo of Understanding with the Rongelap Atoll Local
Government for an environmental monitoring support plan for Rongelap
Resettlement Activities. We have proposed a similar memo of
understanding with the Enewetak/Ujelang Local Government Council.
Utirik
The 176 persons from Utirik atoll were similarly affected and
evacuated. However, it was found that they had experienced minimal
effects from the fall-out and that further examination was not
necessary. A 1954 Atomic Energy Commission survey team working with the
High Commission of the Trust Territory decided the Utirikese could
return to their homeland and would be furnished with food and water
from outside the area. In May of that year the Utirikese returned.
Department of Energy carries out environmental radiological monitoring
of Utirik and health monitoring of the inhabitants. Today 450 people
reside on Utirik and there is no significant radiation problem on the
atoll that requires any remediation.
Bikini Atoll
The U.S. conducted 23 nuclear tests on Bikini Atoll between June
1946-58. one hundred sixty-seven people were evacuated before the tests
began. One hundred twenty-five returned between 1972-74. Four years
later, August 1978, the USG asked the Bikinians to leave due to concern
that local food consumption was increasing cesium-137 body burdens and
approaching levels in excess of internationally accepted radiation
protection guidelines. (At the time, 500 mrem per year per individual
dose). One hundred forty Bikinians departed.
There are now about 2,000 Bikinians, 650 living on Majuro, 125 on
Ebeye, 1,000 on Kili and others in various locations including the U.S.
The Bikini community held a groundbreaking ceremony on the island
anticipating their resettlement in March 1997. About 25 have returned
to Eneu, one of the islands in the Atoll. The Department of Energy's
funded study by the National Academy of Sciences in 1994 recommends
interventions but notes that the island can be inhabited again without
increased risk to residents from residual radionuclides in the soil, if
certain mitigative measures are taken. An IAEA study published in 1998
supports this.
The existing trust fund, now valued at some $110 million, should be
sufficient for resettlement if the Bikini community decides to employ
the remediation strategy of applying potassium to land area. However,
another option, scraping the island, may be more costly.
The people of the four atolls affected by the nuclear testing in
the Marshall Islands--Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap and Utirik--find
themselves in very different circumstances. In Rongelap, the leaders
co-signed with Interior Secretary Babbitt their resettlement agreement
in September 1996 and have since been able to return to Rongelap
Island. Their restored airfield is in use and public facilities and
homes have been constructed. Most of the people of Enewetak and Utirik
have returned to their home islands. The people of Bikini in April 1998
sought a guarantee from Interior Secretary that the atoll is safe for
resettlement. The answer is that it is for the people of Bikini to
decide. Based on a September 1996 draft International Atomic Energy
Agency Advisory Group report on radiological conditions at Bikini, we
can say that Bikini Island is ready for permanent habitation as long as
certain remedial measures are fully implemented.
Conclusion
We must distinguish the legislated responsibility for the
resettlement of the peoples of Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap and Utirik
Atolls under the jurisdiction of the Department of Interior, from that
of the general responsibility of the Department of State for the
conduct of bilateral relations with the Republic of the Marshall
Islands. Although the agencies have different roles, they must--and
do--work together closely. The issue of resettlement is a sensitive
one, especially to the populations of the individual atolls. Individual
political leaders may take it upon themselves to promote a particular
position outside of the framework of the RMI government. We remain open
to all voices on this important matter and do not underestimate our
responsibility. The U.S. Ambassador to the RMI, Joan Plaisted, has an
ongoing dialogue with representatives of all of the atolls. Our role is
to ensure that all of the people of the RMI receive what they are
entitled to under the Compact without regard to individual or local
political pressure.
To that end, the following issues will have to be addressed by the
U.S. Government in the coming years:
--Changed circumstances: The U.S. Government will have to
assess the circumstances when the RMI submits its request but
we do not want to prejudge the outcome. The RMI has not yet
submitted a request identifying changed circumstances and,
under the Compact, Congress has the lead in considering any
such request.
--Section 177 Management and the Nuclear Claims Commission:
Section 177 is mandated for a pool of people who were exposed
to radiation and their offspring. The Compact, including its
subsidiary agreements, provides the terms for the full
settlement of the nuclear' claims, and disbursements should be
in accordance with that agreement. To the extent that the RMI
considers that changed circumstances justify increasing the
number of people who should be receiving compensation, or
justify more funding for the Nuclear Claims Commission, those
requests should be made to Congress in the process provided for
in the Compact.
--Finally, regarding the relationship between these issues and
Compact renegotiation: The Compact negotiations should be
limited to what Congress and the Compact called for. Issues
involving nuclear claims should remain separate and be dealt
with in accordance with the terms of the Compact, including the
subsidiary agreement and, if appropriate, through a request to
Congress for consideration based on changed circumstances.
Mr. Young. All right. Very good. Next is Allen Stayman,
director of the Office of Insular Affairs, Department of
Interior. Mr. Stayman.
STATEMENT OF ALLEN P. STAYMAN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INSULAR
AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Mr. Stayman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The keystone of the
United States policy regarding the nuclear testing program is
section 177 of the Compact of Free Association. Here the United
States, ``accepts the responsibility for compensation owing to
citizens of the Marshall Islands for loss or damage resulting
from the nuclear testing program.''
In fulfilling this obligation, the United States provided
the Marshall Islands with $150 million to create an independent
nuclear claims fund. Article 2 requires the fund manager to
disperse fixed amounts for health, medical surveillance, and
radiological monitoring and to the four atolls as payment for
claims of injury.
Section 8 of this article obliges the governments of the
four atolls to establish individual subtrust funds with all or
a portion of these proceeds to ``provide perpetual source of
income,'' for the people of the atolls.
Article 4 of the subsidiary agreement requires the Marshall
Islands government to establish a claims tribunal to determine
awards for further compensation. Although section 177 provides
for the full and final settlement claims for this payment of
$150 million, article 9 provides that the Marshall Islands
government may petition the Congress for additional
compensation based on changed circumstances. The Marshall
Islands government has indicated its intent to file such a
petition, and the administration stands ready to assist the
Congress in its consideration of such a request.
In addition to section 177, Congress authorized and funded
several programs including resettlement programs for Bikini,
Enjebi, and Rongelap, a USDA surplus food program, the work of
the Department of Energy, and the Department of the Interior's
agricultural and food program for Enewetak.
My colleagues from the Department of Energy will describe
their program, and I would like to summarize briefly these
other programs' effect on the four atolls.
Regarding Bikini, the Congress appropriated $90 million in
1988 for resettlement which was added to the $20 million
appropriated in 1985. The legislative history notes that
``these funds are provided to the Bikinians so that they and
not the United States government will be responsible for the
management and the decisions involved in returning to their
homeland.''
Representatives of Bikini have sought to know whether the
United States government backs the 1996 report of the
International Atomic Energy Agency on Radiological Conditions
in Bikini. In a 1998 meeting with the Bikini leadership,
Secretary Babbitt emphasized that the IAEA report was credible,
reliable, and detailed and that the people of Bikini needed to
consider the report's findings and then arrive at their own
decision regarding the process and standards for resettlement.
Regarding Enewetak, the nuclear testing program heavily
contaminated the atoll's northern half, and the southern
islands were mostly covered by concrete for facilities used by
the testing program. From 1977 to 1980, the United States
government undertook a cleanup and resettlement program which
included the atoll's revegetation. Revegetation continues under
the Department of the Interior funded program.
For as long as the people of Enewetak need substantial
amounts of off-island food, there will be a continuing need for
supplemental Federal support such as provided by the USDA and
the Department of the Interior programs. The Compact Act also
established a $7.5 million resettlement trust fund for the
Enewetak community of Enjebi island.
Regarding Rongelap, a $45 million agreement to assist the
people of Rongelap with resettlement was signed in 1996, and in
1998 the Rongelap government contracted for phase 1 of
resettlement, which includes establishment of a base camp, the
construction of essential infrastructure, and completion of
remediation recommendations of the independent scientific
management team.
The people of Utrik have the least significant
rehabilitation problems and have secured the highest level of
resettlement among the four atolls. The Congress did not
provide a separate authorization for a resettlement program.
Since 1993, the Office of Insular Affairs has reached a $45
million resettlement agreement with the government of Rongelap,
regularly approved the budgets of Bikini and Rongelap
governments, worked with the National Academy of Sciences and
the Marshall Islands government nationwide radiological study,
and has met regularly with the representatives from the four
atolls.
Together we join our colleagues at Defense, Energy, and
State in the faithful and active implementation of Federal
responsibilities under the compact. Thank you.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Stayman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Stayman follows:]
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Mr. Young. Dr. Campbell. You can wake up now. We are ready
to go.
STATEMENT OF KURT M. CAMPBELL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS
Dr. Campbell. Just writing a last note, Mr. Chairman. I
wanted to have it exactly right.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity. I,
too, will submit my testimony for the record and just make a
couple of general remarks to save time for the panel for
questions. I think, as you know, Mr. Chairman, and colleagues,
that the Department of Defense has an absolutely unique role
and unique responsibilities when it comes to the islands and
the compact as a whole.
My testimony itself deals with the nuclear inheritance
issues, and I will leave you to pursue that further if there is
interest. I just want to say as we approach the renewal of
discussions, negotiations about the compact, I believe that it
is in the strong national security interest of the United
States to maintain the full range of military access and
security engagement with the islands.
It is our view that as we head into a critical period of
testing and development of critical space systems and other
aspects of the theater missile defense program, which both
Congress and the administration feels is in the strong national
interest of the United States and our key allies, that the role
of the nations and the island nations will be absolutely
critical in the next several years.
I must say that in the last several months and years that
we have endeavored to do these tests, and when we have required
more land and more area, that the Marshallese and the
inhabitants of Kwajalein have been very responsible and very
responsive when we have needed further area under short-term
needs.
Let me make one final point, and then I will end before my
time is up. I want to speak for a few minutes, if I can, about
the central air services. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Miller in
his opening statement made, I think, a very generous point that
many members of the delegation, particularly from the Marshall
Islands traveled a great distance to be here today.
They not only traveled a great distance, they traveled also
at great cost, and we must have to acknowledge a great
inconvenience as well. Air lines and air service into the
Marshall Islands are running now between two and three months
booked in advance. It is virtually impossible to fly into the
islands.
We have been involved at the Department in a lengthy and
protracted discussion about the conditions, whereby we would be
able to enlarge the number of stopovers at Johnston Atoll to
allow greater passenger flow from the islands to Hawaii and to
onward destinations of the United States. I am here to report
today, Mr. Chairman and other Members, that we, I think, have
arrived at some responsible steps that the USI can take on the
safety side to assure that we will be able to rapidly begin
discussions with the Marshallese to increase the number of
flights through and into Johnston Atoll.
I will just tell you that this has been awhile in coming. I
want to commend publicly particularly the representative of the
Marshallese government who have been relentless in their
pursuit of their own national and legitimate interest in my
view.
I hope to be able to begin discussions in the weeks ahead
to be able to meet the increase in air service that inevitably
comes in the May, June, and July time frame. We are a bit tardy
in this, but it is better late than never, Mr. Chairman. With
that I will conclude.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Dr. Campbell.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Campbell follows:]
Statement of Dr. Kurt M. Campbell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, International Security Affairs
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I am honored to join this
distinguished assembly of Marshall Island and United States
Government officials to discuss the status of nuclear claims,
relocation and resettlement efforts of the governments of the
four nuclear-affected atolls in the Marshall Islands. My
responsibilities as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Asian and Pacific Affairs include the Freely Associated States,
specifically the Republic of the Marshall Islands. While I have
not visited the Marshall Islands, my staff has, and I have
worked closely with the Republic of the Marshall Islands
Embassy here in Washington.
Background on the Defense Relationship
The Department of Defense has a deep appreciation of the
current significance and past history of our special
relationship with the Freely Associated States; the Republic of
the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and
Palau. We cannot, and should not, forget the price we paid in
liberating these islands from Imperial Japan in World War II
and the role some of the islands and peoples played in
developing crucial U.S. defense programs in the 1950s and
1960s. Our relationship is founded upon the unique role of U.S.
defense responsibilities to the sovereign nations of the Freely
Associated States under the terms of the Compact of Free
Association.
The Compact and subsequent agreements obligate the United
States to provide for the defense of the Freely Associated
States in perpetuity, unless mutually agreed upon to terminate
the arrangement. We are committed to provide security to these
nations and their peoples ``as the United States and its
citizens are defended.'' This level of defense commitment goes
beyond any other U.S. treaty or alliance. In return for this
fundamental security guarantee and other DOD obligations, we
retain the right for certain military uses and access, as well
as the right to veto access to third countries.
In the absence of the Compact or the Security and Defense
Relations Title of the Compact, the Mutual Security Agreement
still provides for defense obligations, military access, and
denial of military access by third countries. Although it may
appear that the termination of the Compact would result in
little change, it is clearly in the best interests of the U.S.
to maintain the full range of military access and security
engagement options the Compact provides. One of the most
important aspects of the Compact is the foundation it provides
for our day-to-day working relationship with the people of the
Freely Associated States.
In preparation for the upcoming Compact renewal
negotiations, the Department of Defense has conducted a study
to determine our defense interests in the Freely Associated
States for the post-2001 era. This study, which will be
finalized in mid-1999, has considered many issues of mutual
concern, such as continued access, current and future threats,
and roles the Freely Associated States may play in future
scenarios.
The overriding defense interest in the negotiations will be
continued use of the Kwajalein Missile Range and the facilities
on Kwajalein Atoll. The requirements of our missile defense and
space surveillance programs combined with the uniqueness of
Kwajalein's location, infrastructure investment, and real world
treaty restrictions, make this an issue of the highest
priority.
Under the Military Use and Operating Rights Agreement,
negotiated subsequent to the Compact, the United States retains
the right to automatically extend the use of Kwajalein for an
additional fifteen years to 2016. However, the Compact and use
of Kwajalein are not that easily separated. While the
agreements may be negotiated separately, proviso's of the
Compact help provide the basis for the support of the
Marshallese, who in turn provide not only much of the labor
force, but also a positive local environment which is critical
for continued success at Kwajalein.
If the goal of the Compact is to maintain a unique
relationship with the Freely Associated States while helping
them become financially self-sustaining democracies, then a
renegotiated Compact, in some form, is in the best interests of
the United States and the Freely Associated States. It will
help the Freely Associated States continue to work toward their
national goals, while serving our national defense interests.
Nuclear Claims, Relocation and Resettlement
As part of the U.S. Government's acceptance of
responsibility ``for compensation owing to citizens of the
Marshall Islands . . . for loss or damage . . . resulting from
the nuclear testing program . . . conducted . . . between June
30, 1946, and August 18, 1958,'' the Department of Defense
participated in the clean up of Enewetak Atoll. Contaminated
matter was deposited in Cactus Crater on Runit Island and the
Army Corps of Engineers constructed a concrete dome over the
crater for containment.
Pursuant to the terms of the Compact of Free Association,
the Republic of the Marshall Islands bears full responsibility
for maintaining and monitoring the dome and Runit Island. Any
issues dealing with Runit dome are best addressed to the
Department of Energy for technical expertise.
The Department of Defense has cooperated with the Republic
of the Marshall Islands' quest for historical data dealing with
nuclear testing and clean up efforts. Most recently, in the
fall of 1997, the Embassy of the Republic of the Marshall
Islands was authorized to communicate directly with the Defense
Special Weapons Agency as a means to refine requests for both
classified and unclassified information. To date, this working
relationship has not been utilized.
The Department of Defense bears no obligations for matters
dealing with relocation or resettlement.
Mr. Young. Dr. Seligman.
STATEMENT OF PAUL J. SELIGMAN, M.D., M.P.H., DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR HEALTH STUDIES, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Dr. Seligman. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Members of the
Subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss the
Department of Energy's Marshall Islands program. My complete
statement is provided to the Committee for the record.
As you know, this program was created in response to
congressional direction to help the citizens and the leadership
of the Republic of the Marshall Islands address environmental
and medical consequences of the U.S. Atmospheric Nuclear
Weapons Testing Program.
Our program currently consists of two parts, which I will
discuss in turn. The Environmental Monitoring Program is
focussed on helping the peoples of the four northern atolls,
Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap, and Utirik, understand how
radiation has affected their environment; develop ways to
mitigate contamination and monitor the effectiveness of these
mitigation strategies especially in resettled communities.
In addition to the environmental program, we have a special
medical care program that provides for the identification and
treatment of radiogenic-related diseases in the peoples of
Rongelap and Utirik atolls who are exposed from fallout from
the Castle BRAVO test. The environmental monitoring program
began in 1972, but since its inception has been conducted by
the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
The program is led by Dr. William Robison, who, I
understand, is in the Marshall Islands today doing sampling and
will not be part of the panel. This program has sponsored
detailed environmental monitoring and agriculture research to
characterize the current radiologic conditions on those four
northern atolls.
To date the U.S. Government has expended a total of more
than $45 million towards this goal. Scientists have collected
and analyzed more than 48,000 vegetation samples, 8,000 marine
organism samples, 45,000 soil samples, in addition to numerous
other animal, water, and aerosol samples.
Through this work we now have an accurate characterization
and understanding of the nature and extent of radiation
contamination in the northern belt atolls. The scientific data
support a number of scientific and public health conclusions
and recommendations regarding resettlement and land use in the
northern atolls.
The primary conclusions are as follows: first, the Utirik
people can continue to live on their atoll without concern that
their health will be affected by radiologic exposure from
residual contamination from weapons testing.
Second, the Rongelap people can also choose to resettle
without concern that their health will be affected by
radiologic exposure from residual contamination if they do two
things: one, conduct a limited scrape of surface soils in the
village areas; and, two, apply potassium fertilizers to areas
where food is growing. This mitigation technique is called the
combined option and is the basis for the Rongelap resettlement
program being implemented today.
Third, the Bikini people may also choose to resettle
without concern that their health would be affected by residual
nuclear radiologic contamination if they, like Rongelap, apply
the combined option.
Finally, the Enewetak people who have been resettled on the
Enewetak atoll since 1980 can continue to live on their atoll
without concern that their health will be affected by
radiologic exposure.
Bioassay and whole-body counting results have independently
confirmed this conclusion for the Enewetak people. We believe
our studies have provided timely, relevant, and credible
environmental data and have undergone extensive and independent
national and international scientific peer review.
This work, together with independent environmental reviews
supported by trust funds to the Department of Interior provide
a firm foundation from which the Republic of the Marshall
Islands government and their people can make informed decisions
about resettlement and land use.
The environmental sampling and agriculture studies will be
complete over the next two years. My office stands ready to
address the needs, concerns, and questions of the RMI and local
atoll governments regarding radiologic monitoring as
circumstances evolve.
We recently signed a memorandum of understanding with
Rongelap to support monitoring during current resettlement
activities and stand ready to support similar activities on
other atolls and islands as needed.
In conclusion, then, we think our environmental studies
carried out over the years provide the solid information and
firm foundation that the people of the government of the
Marshall Islands need to make informed decisions about how to
resettle and use their lands.
I am not going to talk now because my time is limited about
our medical program, but suffice to say that we have also
through our medical program provided a program that is
responsive to the needs of the community by providing
preventative, innovative health care for the mandated
population, enhancing delivery capabilities, involving the
communities in the design of that program, and ensuring our new
medical program is coordinated with other health agencies to
leverage assets and improve overall health care service.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity to share the
current status of our environmental program, and I would be
pleased to answer any questions.
Mr. Young. I thank the gentleman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Seligman follows:]
Statement of Dr. Paul J. Seligman, M.D., M.P.H., Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Health Studies, U.S. Department of Energy and Captain,
Medical Director, U.S. Public Health Service
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am pleased to
be here to discuss the Department of Energy (DOE) Marshall
Islands program. As you know, this program was designed and
created in response to Congressional direction to help the
citizens of the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) with the
environmental and medical consequences of the United States
atmospheric nuclear weapons testing program. I also appreciate
this opportunity to broaden the dialogue between the U.S. and
the RMI so that we can better address needs of the local
communities, consistent with our budget and within the
framework of our mandate.
The atmospheric nuclear weapons test code-named ``Castle
BRAVO'' was conducted at the Bikini atoll in 1954. The test
inadvertently deposited radioactive fallout on 253 residents of
the Rongelap and Utrik atolls. Medical care was provided for
these individuals in the days immediately following the test by
U.S. Navy physicians. When these physicians moved to Brookhaven
National Laboratory (BNL) in 1956, the responsibility for
caring for this group followed them. Medical care under the
aegis of DOE and its predecessors continued through 1986 and
the Congressional enactment of Public Law 99-239, Section
103(h) of the Compact of Free Association Act which mandated
continuing this special medical program. Additionally, Public
Laws 95-134 and 96-205 require environmental monitoring to
characterize the radioactivity remaining at the four atolls of
Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap, and Utrik. These monitoring
programs began in 1972-73 at Enewetak atoll and continue
through the present.
Under these laws, DOE continues to provide two distinct
services to the Republic of the Marshall Islands: environmental
monitoring and special medical care. The environmental
monitoring program is focused on helping the peoples of the
Bikini, Eniwetok, Rongelap, and Utrik atolls understand the
effect of radiation on their environment, develop methods to
mitigate contamination, and monitor the effectiveness of
mitigation strategies especially in resettled communities. The
special medical care program provides for the identification
and treatment of radiogenic-related diseases that have occurred
in the peoples of Rongelap and Utrik atolls that were exposed
to fallout from the Castle BRAVO weapons test.
DOE Marshall Islands Environmental Monitoring Program
For 27 years, the environmental monitoring program has been
conducted for the DOE by its Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (LLNL). The program has sponsored detailed
environmental monitoring and agricultural research studies to
characterize current radiological conditions at the Bikini,
Eniwetok, Rongelap, and Utrik atolls. Since the inception of
the program in 1972, the U.S. government has expended more than
$45,000,000 toward this goal.
The program is led by Dr. William Robison, Scientific
Director of the Marshall Islands Dose Assessment and
Radioecology Program at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
I will defer to him today to describe the detailed scientific
conclusions of his studies in the environmental area. But I
would like to summarize the Department's views of his work.
Dr. Robison and his colleagues from Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory have assembled an unprecedented team of
international scientific experts from around the globe to carry
out this program. Since this work began, its expressed purpose
has been to answer the difficult questions about radiation
contamination in the Marshall Islands. This work has become the
standard by which dose assessment and radioecology programs are
measured today.
The environmental monitoring process conducted by LLNL
consists of extensive field sample collection and laboratory
analysis. To date, some 48,147 vegetation samples, 8,741 marine
organism samples, 25,632 soil/sediment samples, 586 terrestrial
animal samples, 1,373 water samples, and 61 aerosol samples
have been collected and analyzed by LLNL. Also, agricultural
research studies centered on Bikini Island have provided
important insight into possible mitigation strategies that will
help reduce the uptake of radionuclides in locally grown food
products.
Key Scientific Findings
Through the work of Dr. Robison and his team, we now have
an accurate characterization and understanding of the nature
and extent of radiation contamination in the northern belt
atolls of Bikini, Eniwetok, Rongelap, and Utrik. Dr. Robison's
work, while not yet complete in several key areas, has produced
scientific data that support a number of conclusions and
recommendations. I emphasize to the Committee that these
recommendations are based solely on the scientific data, and do
not consider other factors that will ultimately affect
decisions of the Marshallese peoples.
The Utrik people can choose to live on their atoll
without concern that their health will be affected by
radiological exposure. A final environmental report for Utrik
is scheduled for publication in July 1999.
The Rongelap people could choose to resettle without
concern that their health will be affected by radiological
exposure if they (1) conducted a limited scrape of surface
soils in the village areas and (2) apply potassium fertilizer
to areas where food is growing. This mitigation technique,
referred to as the combined option, is the basis for the
resettlement program being implemented at Rongelap today. We
have recently entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with
the Rongelap leadership to provide radiological monitoring of
the ongoing resettlement activities.
The Bikini people could choose to resettle without
concern that their health will be affected by radiological
exposure if they, like the Rongelap, (1) scrape the village
areas and (2) apply potassium fertilizer to food growing areas.
The Enewetak people have been resettled on Enewetak
atoll since 1980. Bioassay and whole body counting results have
confirmed that radiation doses on Eniwetok Island, where
resettlement has occurred, are at or near world background
levels and present no health consequences to the population. If
the Enewetak people decide to resettle Enjebi Island, DOE
recommends using the combined option as at Rongelap and Bikini
atolls for mitigation.
Credibility of the Science
Since the beginning of the LLNL program, the scientific resultant
studies have undergone extensive independent scientific peer review.
In the mid-1980s, Public Law 97-257 (House Report 90-450) directed
that the Office of Territorial and International Affairs, U.S.
Department of the Interior establish the Bikini Atoll Rehabilitation
Committee (BARC). The BARC was to work with the Bikini people to
determine the feasibility and estimated cost of cleanup of Bikini
Atoll. An interim report was issued on November 23, 1983 which was
followed by their March 31, 1986 report. Copies of both reports will be
provided for the record.
From 1992-1994, DOE funded a study by the National
Research Council of the National Academy of Science to evaluate
the appropriateness of analytical techniques, ingestion and
inhalation models, and proposed remedial actions to support
resettlement of the Rongelap atoll. A copy of their report,
entitled Radiological Assessments for Resettlement of Rongelap
in the Republic of the Marshall Islands, is provided for the
record.
In 1994, the Rongelap local government asked a
distinguished international panel of experts (known as the
Scientific Management Team) to determine compliance with agreed
limits for total annual dose-rate on Rongelap Island and
actinide contamination of soils on Rongelap islands and
neighboring islands. Their report, entitled Summary of First
Phase, is provided for the record.
In response to U.S. Congressional hearings in 1989 and
1990, a committee of renowned scientists, chaired by Henry I.
Kohn, Ph.D., was convened to provide insight and
recommendations on potential resettlement of Rongelap atoll.
Data from LLNL's environmental monitoring program was reviewed
and became the basis for the committee's findings. A copy of
their report, entitled Rongelap Reassessment Project Report, is
provided for the record.
In 1995, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
established an IAEA Advisory Group to provide independent
review of Bikini atoll environmental data generated by LLNL.
The Advisory Group, convened at the request of Bikini Senator
Henchi Balos, examined proposed actions to enable Bikini
resettlement. A copy of their report, entitled Radiological
Conditions at Bikini Atoll: Prospects for Resettlement, is
provided for the record.
Since 1995, Dr. Hertwig Paretzke, Director of the
Institute for Radiation Protection, Neuherberg, Germany, has
consulted with the Bikini people and Dr. Robison to help the
people of Bikini better understand the facts about residual
radioactivity in the environment and in the foods at Bikini.
They have explored numerous options that might best serve
resettlement of Bikini.
I believe that Lawrence Livermore's work has provided timely,
relevant, and credible environmental data. Environmental data from
Lawrence Livermore's work, together with the independent environmental
reviews made possible by trust funds provided through the Department of
the Interior, provides a firm foundation from which the Republic of the
Marshall Islands government and their people can make informed
decisions about resettlement and land use.
As DOE completes the bulk of the environmental sampling and
agricultural studies over the next two years, we will continue to
consult with the RMI and the local atoll governments. We will continue
our record of being responsive to their questions, concerns, and needs,
and hope to continue our part in answering scientific questions about
radiological contamination in the Marshall Islands environment.
The DOE Marshall Islands Special Medical Care Program
In addition to the environmental monitoring program, the Department
funds a special medical care program in response to Congressional
direction. This program provides treatment for radiogenic-related
diseases for the group of people in the Rongelap and Utrik atolls who
were exposed to fallout from the Castle BRAVO weapons test. Public Law
99-239 defines the program as follows:
. . . the President (either through an appropriate department
or agency of the United States or by contract with a United
States firm) shall continue to provide special medical care and
logistical support thereto to the remaining 174 members of the
population of Rongelap and Utrik who were exposed to radiation
resulting from the 1954 United States thermonuclear `BRAVO'
test, pursuant to Public Laws 95-134 and 96-205. Such medical
care and its accompanying logistical support shall total
$22,5000,000 over the first 11 years of the Compact.
The program's primary objective is to provide
Of the 253 individuals originally exposed to fallout from Castle
BRAVO, 130 individuals remain. In addition, 109 individuals who were
residents of the affected atolls but were not directly exposed to the
BRAVO fallout (being elsewhere at the time of the test) are included in
the program. Today, 239 people are covered by DOE's special medical
care program.
Key Program Strategies
Until June 1998 and for the previous 44 years, medical care has
been provided to the Rongelap and Utrik beneficiaries of the program by
a team of U.S. doctors led by Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL). The
BNL team visited the Marshall Islands semiannually for medical missions
lasting four to six weeks. While beneficial, it provided only
intermittent medical care to the mandated patients and had limited
prospects of making sustained contributions to either their health or
public health in general.
Beginning in 1996, DOE, the RMI government, and the local
governments of the Rongelap and Utrik atolls began a process to design
a new medical care program that would be more responsive to the needs
of the beneficiaries. Representatives from each group were involved at
each critical juncture of the process, including the design of the new
program, development of the Request for Applications, and review of the
applications.
This effort led to a new program, implemented in August 1998, that
is run by the Pacific Health Research Institute (PHRI) in Honolulu.
This multi-faceted program has a number of first year strategies and
goals that include:
Providing preventative and innovative healthcare for
the mandated population to improve their health status,
Enhanced continuity in the delivery of healthcare;
Establishment of a community advisory process for the
program;
Delivery of healthcare in a culturally appropriate
manner;
Coordination with other health agencies in the RMI to
leverage assets and improve overall service
PHRI clinics are located on Kwajalein Island and in Majuro. Local
Marshallese physicians and nurse supervisory personnel can see patients
daily. Complementing the Marshallese physicians and nurses are a number
of U.S. trained physicians working with Straub Clinic and Hospital,
Kaiser-Permanente, Wahiawa General Hospital, and the University of
Hawaii John A. Burns School of Medicine. These individuals rotate
through the clinics once a month for a two-week period, and assist the
Marshallese physicians in providing both primary and specialty care to
the mandated population. PHRI also uses senior family practice
residents on monthly rotations from the University of Hawaii John A.
Burns School of Medicine's Department of Family Practice and Community
Health for additional support and assistance.
Even though the new DOE/PHRI medical care program is still taking
root, we feel that it strengthens our ability to carry out the
Congressional mandate and holds great promise to build a Marshallese
health care program with potential for long-term self reliance.
Public Involvement/Openness
DOE has committed itself to be responsive to the questions,
concerns, and needs of the Marshall Islands people. DOE has worked
toward this goal by actively listening to the central and local
governments and their communities, effectively giving them a voice in
determining the future direction of the Marshall Islands program. DOE
routinely publishes the results of its scientific environmental work in
the public domain. DOE is also well underway in honoring its pledge to
disclose all DOE controlled information and documents related to the
nuclear weapons testing in the South Pacific previously unavailable to
the public. Examples of DOE's actions in these regards follow:
DOE maintains a full time presence in Honolulu whose
express purpose is to provide day-to-day operations interface
with the RMI and local atoll government representatives in the
U.S. Embassy in Majuro, M.I.
Since 1990, DOE has engaged the local leadership and
community members from Bikini, Eniwetok, Rongelap and Utrik in
over 30 community meetings to discuss the results of scientific
reports as they were completed. During one such meeting,
community representatives expressed their confusion and
displeasure over DOE's historical use of the term ``exposed''
when referring to persons other than the mandated population
served by the special medical care program. In consultation
with the concerned parties, DOE responded in November 1998 with
a letter clarifying its use of the term ``exposed'' as it
appears on section 103 (h) of the Compact of Free Association.
Since 1993, DOE has hosted an annual meeting between
the Department, the RMI central government, and government
representatives from Bikini, Eniwetok, Rongelap and Utrik to
discuss program strengths and weaknesses and needed corrective
actions. For example, at the 1994 annual meeting, the Eniwetok
local government requested assistance conducting a radiological
survey of Runit dome. DOE conducted the requested survey and
presented the results to the Eniwetok representatives. These
results were subsequently published in the July 1997 special
Marshall Islands edition of the Health Physics Journal.
In October 1998, DOE and representatives from the RMI
Government and the Bikini, Eniwetok, Rongelap and Utrik atolls,
agreed on an action plan to assist the four communities in
their current or future resettlement plans. Coming from that
meeting was the framework for the Rongelap/RMI/DOE
Environmental Monitoring Memorandum of Understanding, now
agreed to and being implemented by the parties to assist in
Rongelap resettlement activities.
To date, LLNL has published 37 scientifically peer-
reviewed reports providing scientific information and
conclusions on the radiological environment at the Bikini,
Eniwetok, Rongelap and Utrik atolls. Each report was provided
to the RMI Government and to each of the affected atoll
communities. Copies are available for the record.
In 1997, DOE sponsored a special edition of the Health
Physics Journal, entitled Consequences of Nuclear Testing in
the Marshall Islands. This publication, a compendium of peer-
reviewed articles by scientists from around the world who have
worked in the Marshall Islands, is the first comprehensive
collection of environmental and medical-related information
related to the Marshall Islands saga.
In 1996, DOE implemented an aggressive program to make
available, through the Department's website, more than
1,000,000 document pages concerning nuclear weapons testing in
the South Pacific. This electronic medium permits direct access
by the RMI and the public to this important information.
In 1997, DOE provided a two-year, $45,000 grant to the
RMI Embassy in Washington to enable Marshallese personnel to
access data electronically on the internet and to access and
use the DOE/Department of Defense Center for Coordination and
Information in Las Vegas, Nevada.
Over the past five years, DOE has provided in hard copy to both the
RMI Embassy in Washington, D.C. and through the American Embassy in
Majuro to the RMI Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 77 boxes of
documents relating to the nuclear testing era.
Conclusions
DOE believes that LLNL's work is providing timely, relevant, and
credible environmental data. This information, together with the
independent environmental reviews made possible by resettlement trust
funds provided through the Department of the Interior and the
Nationwide Radiologic Survey conducted independently by the Marshall
Islands Nuclear Claims Tribunal, provides a firm foundation from which
the Republic of the Marshall Islands government and their people can
make informed decisions about resettlement and land use. As DOE
completes the bulk of the environmental sampling and agricultural
studies over the next two years, we will continue to consult with the
RMI and the local atoll governments. We will continue to be responsive
to their questions, concerns, and needs, and to maintain a presence in
the Marshall Islands as long as we can contribute to addressing
scientific questions about radiological contamination in the Marshall
Islands environment.
Similarly, DOE's new special medical care program begun last year
is breathing renewed life into the healthcare system by providing
preventative and innovative healthcare for the mandated population,
enhancing healthcare delivery capability, involving the communities,
and coordinating with other health agencies to leverage assets and
improve overall healthcare service. Even though the new DOE/PHRI
medical care program is still taking root, it has already shown that it
holds great promise to build a Marshallese health care program with
potential for long-term self reliance.
DOE's Office of Environment, Safety and Health has administered the
Marshall Islands Medical Program since 1990. Our office is unique
within the Department because its staff includes experts in radiation
safety and public health. We have worked hard to carry out a successful
and responsive Marshall slands environmental and medical care program
while balancing our concerns for program efficiency and effectiveness.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity to share the current
status and progress of our environmental and medical care programs in
the Marshall Islands. I would be pleased to answer any questions.
Mr. Young. I want to thank the panel. Mr. Boyce, you
stated, or indicated, the State Department will establish an
office for the special negotiator. When will that begin, and
how long do you expect that to be in existence, and where it
will be housed?
Mr. Boyce. We will have it up and open on June 7, Mr.
Chairman. As I mentioned, my colleague, Al Stayman, will be the
special negotiator to be heading up that shop. We expect that
we will have ten professional staff drawn from the interagency
working group, and the offices will be physically in the
Department of State.
And as far as how long we expect the office to be up, that
really is going to depend on how the renegotiation goes; but
with Al at the helm, I anticipate that should be a speedy and
efficient process.
Mr. Young. Talking about negotiations, isn't that going to
put an imposition upon the Marshallese as far as distances, or
are they going to have to--how is that going to be handled?
The gentleman from the Defense Department talked about the
new air traffic. Is that going to take care of that problem? We
are trying to negotiate from a position period of the State
Department. I guess, in the first place, I can't quite figure
out what we are negotiating yet and what position the
administration will have in this whole program.
It is going to be an awful big imposition, I think, for the
people and the government of the Marshall Islands to be flying
back and forth to Washington, DC. Or will there be a head-
hunter doing the work for them?
Mr. Stayman. Mr. Chairman, as a matter of fact, we also had
some informal discussions. We weren't really anticipating a lot
of meetings in DC or in the Marshall Islands. Perhaps we
could--Hawaii or the West Coast where it would be mutually
convenient and inconvenient and share that burden.
Mr. Young. Okay. Doctor, on the health end of it, other
than the nuclear, are you studying other aspects of the health
challenges and the results of some of our relocation and diets
that have occurred in the Marshall Islands?
Dr. Seligman. No, we have not.
Mr. Young. Are there other agencies within our government
helping the Marshallese in this endeavor?
Dr. Seligman. Mr. Stayman, do you know the answer to that
question?
Mr. Stayman. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Young. Does anybody else want to address that issue?
There are some health problems that have occurred especially, I
believe, on Enewetak and other areas because of the change in
diets. Is that a correct statement?
Mr. Stayman. Yes. I could make a brief comment. One of the
things that we are seeing in the expansion of the radiological
health care programs, we believe, is a reaction to the
generally poor health care available to the general public;
that there is certainly political pressure and pressure
personally to get enrolled in these medical programs. In fact,
there are general public health problems mainly associated with
diet.
Mr. Young. I have been out there twice now. I think the
thing that sort of bothers me the most is the relocation and
the imposition upon these people was the result of our testing
64 times nuclear capability.
Now, a change in the wind was something that was
unforeseen. Like bombing the Chinese embassy, we used old maps.
I had to bring that up. But I want the administration and the
State Department and everybody involved, because this is a
crucial area, to understand that the problems this small group
of people are faced with were basically created by ourselves.
The relocation itself--and now we are talking about they
can go back and live on the island safely, et cetera, et
cetera. But unless we help provide things that they have become
used to, they are not going to relocate. That is something that
is a natural thing.
Electricity is crucially important. The ability to have TV
is crucially important. Things that people become used to are
just not going to pick up and go back as we think they ought to
go back to the way they were prior to the testing. I think that
is part of our responsibility.
We started this mess under the guise of defending
ourselves, and I think that we have the responsibility to do
everything possible to make sure that we encourage, through
additional attractive medical care, electricity capabilities
and those type things. Otherwise you are going to have the same
problem they are faced with right now.
Mr. Boyce? I see you nodding your head.
Mr. Boyce. I concur. In fact, I think that you asked
earlier that you were not quite sure what we were going to be
negotiating or renegotiating. I think the original intent of
the compact was not just to provide for the defense of the
islands and keep the status quo going on forever.
It was also to provide a substantial transfer of resources
to provide for the economic development and hopefully the self-
sufficiency of the islands. As we go into the renegotiation,
obviously we are going to be taking a good close look at the $3
billion that has been spent over the 12 years so far, how much
of that was spent intelligently and how much needs to be
redirected.
Some of the comments you made about providing the kind of
infrastructure and facilities that will be conducive to going
back will be considerations in all of this as well. I very much
take your point.
Mr. Young. My time is up. Mr. Miller.
Dr. Seligman. I just wanted to make a comment, Mr.
Chairman. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman. I believe strongly
that the public health and medical problems and needs of the
Marshall Islands go well beyond those that my office has
focussed on in a fairly limited fashion which are those related
to radiologic exposure.
I think you are right on the mark. There are bigger public
health and medical needs and problems that should be and need
to be focussed on in the Marshall Islands that we have not, to
date, focussed on.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Doctor. Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I might just follow up
on that point. I was going to start the other way--let me
follow up on that point. Dr. Seligman, you state really without
qualification on page 2 of your statement that resettlement or
choosing to live on these various atolls can be accomplished
without concern for their health.
I don't want to put words in your mouth, but that is
essentially what you are saying there. You go on to say that
you are--I don't want to use the word comfortable, but with the
peer review that these studies--the conclusion of these studies
have drawn and the peer review of those studies. Is that
accurate?
Dr. Seligman. That is correct. Without concern that their
health will be adversely impacted by radiologic exposure.
Mr. Miller. From time to time I believe it's been raised
with us, I know; but I don't know if it has been raised with
you. There was some concern, I think people had a lot of
confidence in Dr. Robison and the people of Lawrence Lab.
In the collection of data, there was some question of
whether or not the people of the Marshall Islands and leaders
and others were comfortable with the analysis of that. But that
has all been--they may raise that point when they come up. Do
you know if that is a controversy still? Is that still an area
of concern?
Dr. Seligman. The environmental data have been peer-
reviewed by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the
National Academy of Sciences and others. To my way of looking
at it, I think the data are credible, that there is----
Mr. Miller. Let me ask you this. That is what your
statement says. But whatever controversy there has been over
the analysis of that data, has that been put to rest or does
that continue, from what you know?
Dr. Seligman. To be honest, I am not sure what the
controversy is regarding the analysis of the data.
Mr. Miller. Let me ask you--and maybe the other panel can
raise the issue--but let me ask you in the context. As far as
your testimony is concerned, all of the analysis has been
subjected, on which you base these conclusions, has been
subjected to what you consider high-quality critical peer
review. Is that accurate?
Dr. Seligman. That is correct.
Mr. Miller. I think the other panelists may raise some
questions about that. One last point. There was some suggestion
that they wanted yet another independent analysis of this data.
Where would you go that would be different than where it has
been subjected to peer review? How would that be accomplished
if that was to come about?
Dr. Seligman. I think there are numerous experts nationally
and internationally that the Marshallese could turn to to get
advice. I think you will have people on subsequent panels that
they have already turned to to get such advice. I think that
is----
Mr. Miller. Okay. All right. Now, having gone through a
base closure, you are now sensitive to the idea of what is
clean. The people paying for it think one threshold and the
people getting it are thinking of another threshold generating
these base closures.
Are we using the same standards in terms of cleanup of this
facility as we are for nuclear weapons development sites? Is
this a different standard out there, or is this the same
standard that we would use in the United States?
Dr. Seligman. There are, as I am sure that you are aware,
multiple standards out there. There is an EPA standard; there
is an NRC standard; there is a standard that we have used
previously, the IAEA. Our role, essentially, is to conduct the
environmental sampling and monitoring, to provide those data to
the Marshallese, and to let them make a determination as to
what standard they would like to use in making decisions----
Mr. Miller. Is that being done in compliance with the EPA
standard or the DOE's?
Dr. Seligman. The Department of Energy doesn't have a
standard. There are other agencies that have standards.
Mr. Miller. We are learning about a lot of the activities,
but we will let that go, too.
Dr. Seligman. Sure. Are you implying that the Department of
Energy should have----
Mr. Miller. I want to know when we talk, when we collect
the data and we do the analysis, are we comparing or subjecting
the environment of the Marshallese to the same standard that we
would expect our constituents in the continental United States
to be subjected to?
Dr. Seligman. Again, my office doesn't subject the data to
a particular standard. We simply describe----
Mr. Miller. Would one of the other panelists tell us? If we
decided the people in my congressional district have to live
within EPA standard or DOE standards, have we made that same
determination about the people in the Marshall Islands?
Mr. Young. Nobody is saying.
Dr. Seligman. I think the Marshallese are fair to use
whatever standard they wish.
Mr. Miller. No. It is not about what standards they use. It
is about when you draw the conclusion, and you are taking
Rongelap and Bikini and Enewetak and elsewhere; and you draw
these conclusions--I'm asking you based upon what standard was
used as to what is clean and what is healthy environment--is it
the same standard that would be used for my constituents or is
it a different standard? It is not what the Marshallese chose.
You are giving them advice based upon Dr. Robison's work; is
that not correct?
Dr. Seligman. Based upon what we know of the health impacts
of radiologic contamination, that is correct.
Mr. Miller. So now I am only asking is what you know based
upon this--is this based upon standards that we as Members of
Congress would expect if we were under an EPA cleanup or DOE
cleanup? Are they the same?
Dr. Seligman. Or an NIC cleanup? IAEA? I'm not exactly sure
which standard you are applying.
Mr. Miller. You know exactly what I'm saying. I am asking
you whether or not those standards are the same when they are
used in the cleanup in congressional districts in the States.
If we use the standards of IAEA or if we use the standards of
DOE or if we use the standards of the NRC, are those the same
standards that are being used there? Is it simple now?
Dr. Seligman. The same standards upon which I used to
evaluate our data, yes.
Mr. Miller. They are the same. That is what I have been
asking you for 5 minutes. Are they parallel standards and are
they the same? The suggestion has been that, in fact, they are
not. The higher dosages have been accepted, the higher
millirems of residual have been accepted than the standards
that we would use in a similar situation in the United States.
That is not accurate?
Dr. Seligman. Of course not.
Mr. Miller. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Young. The gentleman from California, Mr. Doolittle.
You don't have to ask any questions if you don't want to.
Mr. Doolittle. I will pass.
Mr. Young. The gentleman from American Samoa.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
ask for unanimous consent that my statement be made part of the
record.
Mr. Young. Without objection so ordered. That is automatic
for everybody, so your statements are made----
STATEMENT OF HON. ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM AMERICAN SAMOA
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Chairman, I also want to commend you
for taking a bipartisan congressional delegation recently to
visit the Republic of the Marshall Islands. I think it was a
very important lesson for the Members of this Committee to see
firsthand what we have been trying to deliberate upon and,
hopefully, to provide some kind of resolution for this very
serious problem affecting the health needs of the people of the
Marshall Islands.
I want to thank Mr. Boyce for his statement, certainly
members of the panel, and wish to convey my best regards to
Assistant Secretary Stanley Roth and Secretary Boyce for moving
ahead with the negotiations of the Marshall Islands and I'm
very pleased that our good friend, Mr. Stayman, has now taken
the helm of this important matter to discuss and to negotiate
with the Marshall Islands and the compact.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Faleomavaega follows:]
Statement of Hon. Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Delegate in Congress from
the Territory of American Samoa
Thank you very much for calling this hearing to review the
longterm effects of America's nuclear testing legacy on our
close friends and longtime allies, the good people of the
Republic of the Marshall Islands. Our great Nations owes an
immense debt to the Marshallese people for their tremendous
sacrifices that directly contributed to, and continues to
contribute to, America's nuclear deterrent and ballistic
missile defense.
Today, Mr. Chairman, under your guidance, we examine the
status of the nuclear claims by our Marshallese friends, and
the uprooting, relocation and resettlement of their families
and villages between the atolls and islands of the Republic of
the Marshall Islands.
In support of these crucial efforts, Mr. Chairman, I thank
you deeply for recently leading a Congressional Delegation to
see first-hand the unresolved problems caused by America's
nuclear weapons testing program conducted over many years in
the Marshall Islands.
For those of us who have been working on this issue for
quite some time, we know the seriousness and extent of the
problems, but there just has never been enough attention
brought to the problem to get it adequately addressed.
Mr. Chairman, the actions of the United States Government
have caused the people of the Republic of the Marshall Islands
immense harm which continues to this day. With tens of
atmospheric tests of atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons, we have
made uninhabitable due to nuclear radiation much of these
people's homelands. We have disrupted their lives by removing
them from their homelands and in some cases they have yet to
return out of fear for their physical safety should they
return.
With the recent declassification by the Department of
Energy of previously classified documents, we now know that the
U.S. Government hasn't always been candid and forthright with
the people of the Marshall Islands. Because of what some would
consider callous disregard, and perhaps duplicity, for the
well-being of the residents of the Marshall Islands, they no
longer trust our government to do the right thing by them.
After a preliminary review of the facts, I can understand why
our Marshallese friends feel this way.
Throughout this time, the United States Congress has
provided the Marshalles people their only hope for a just
settlement, and they are again looking to the Congress to
provide proper oversight of the efforts within the Departments
of the Interior, Energy and State to make their homelands safe,
allowing them to return to their native lands.
Mr. Chairman, this whole process has taken much too long
and in this time of expected U.S. budget surpluses from which
the House of Representatives has ad hoc allocated $12.9 billion
dollars for Kosovo and defense concerns--we really have no
excuse for not addressing these serious problems which we have
caused with the good people of the Marshall Islands.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I want to ask Dr. Seligman as a follow-up
of what the gentleman from California was trying to raise here.
Dr. Seligman, am I pronouncing your name correctly? I have the
same problem with my name.
Dr. Seligman. Seligman. Thank you.
Mr. Faleomavaega. If I were exposed--if I know for a fact
that I was exposed seriously to nuclear contamination, let us
say even to this day, and I want the best doctors and the best
hospital in the world to take care of me, where would I go? For
a full examination, high tech, the best experts that I could
find in the world to make sure that they know what the hell
they are talking about as far as my health is concerned if I
have been exposed to nuclear contamination.
Dr. Seligman. I don't think in my mind there is one place
that I would necessarily have you go to. I think there are many
centers and many experts within the United States that would
satisfy that.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I am leading up to that question, Dr.
Seligman. You mentioned that Dr. Robison is currently
conducting a comprehensive environmental and agricultural
sampling, soils and all of that. His report will not be
available--within two years maybe it will be completed?
Dr. Seligman. Our work at Bikini will be completed in two
years.
Mr. Faleomavaega. My question, Dr. Seligman, is we are
doing so much about the substance of the soils, the environment
of the islands, but what are we doing with the people? Are you
aware of the fact, sir, that the people in Utirik are the most
contaminated people that were exposed to a nuclear testing as a
result of the series of the Castle detonations that we did in
the 1950s?
Dr. Seligman. I don't believe that to be correct, sir.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Then correct me.
Dr. Seligman. I don't think they were the most heavily
exposed. I think the people who were closer in Rongelap were
more heavily exposed than those in Utirik.
Mr. Faleomavaega. How far is Utirik from Rongelap?
Dr. Seligman. I would have to rely on some other experts,
but I believe it is two to three hundred miles.
Mr. Faleomavaega. How far is Utirik from the nuclear
testing of the BRAVO test that was conducted in 1954?
Dr. Seligman. Again, I believe it is a similar distance.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Were you aware of the fact that after the
nuclear testing the people of Utirik were taken back again to
their islands to live there as a difference to the fact that
the people of Rongelap were taken off of their islands when
this BRAVO test had taken place?
Dr. Seligman. I am not particularly familiar with that
information, no.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I would like to ask, Dr. Seligman, what
is the Department of Energy doing in finding some way to
comprehensively examine the health needs of these, people
especially those that have been exposed to the testing since
the 1950s?
Dr. Seligman. We do have a Marshall Islands medical program
that has been in existence since 1954 that does provide medical
care and examinations for those who were exposed to Rongelap
and Utirik. That program is still ongoing.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Sir, that doesn't help me, Dr. Seligman.
I am very, very concerned that we have been doing a lot of
flip-flops about providing the best medical health care needs
for these people.
That is the reason why I asked in my previous question, my
first question, if I were to take 600 people exposed to nuclear
testing, as a result of our nuclear testing program, where can
I go to take these people to be fully examined to see if they
don't have thyroid cancer, leukemia, and all of these other
after effects that has happened to these people since we bombed
these islands in the 19950s? Where would I go today to get more
conclusive evidence as to their status? Don't you think that
maybe the Japanese might have better medical care for people
who have been exposed to nuclear testings?
Dr. Seligman. You are asking me about the Japanese medical
care system? I am not in a position to reply to that.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I am sorry I
will have to pass for the next round.
Mr. Young. All right. Mr. Udall. I take that back. Mr.
Gibbons.
Mr. Gibbons. No questions.
Mr. Young. Mr. Udall. Either one.
Mr. Tom Udall. I would like to yield to the gentleman.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you very much. I thank the
gentleman for yielding.
Dr. Seligman, we are just trying to be helpful. If I could
ask all of the members of the panel, would you agree as a
consensus that now due to recently exposed evidence of facts
and materials that have been declassified from the Department
of Energy that there were more people in the Marshalls that
were exposed to nuclear contamination than were thought of
maybe since the 1950s?
Would you agree that due to the evidence that has now been
declassified that more people in the Marshalls have been
exposed to nuclear contamination than were thought of as there
was before in the 1950s?
Mr. Stayman. What the new information allows us to do is to
quantify better the level of contamination. It is fair to say
that we have a better idea statistically of what the exact
amounts of radiation were. I believe that is a fair statement.
Dr. Seligman. I don't think there is any question in terms
of the number of people that were exposed. Not only were the
people of the Marshallese exposed, but the fallout from the
atmospheric testing went worldwide. I would agree with Mr.
Stayman. It has nothing to do with the numbers of individuals,
but actually the quantity of exposure.
Mr. Faleomavaega. It has nothing to do with the number of
individuals as it is to the quantity of exposure?
Dr. Seligman. Right. The number of individuals who were
exposed back then is the same then that we are aware now.
Mr. Faleomavaega. There were 150 people in Utirik atoll
that were brought back to their island after the BRAVO test.
Utirik atoll is approximately the same distance, 100 miles, as
was Rongelap.
For the benefit of my colleagues, the BRAVO test was the
first thermonuclear hydrogen bomb that our country exploded in
the Marshalls for which hours before our officials knew that
the winds had shifted.
And before doing so, we went ahead and exploded this
hydrogen bomb which is 15 megatons, 1,000 times more powerful
than the nuclear bombs we dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
just to give the benefit of my friends here the extent of how
serious this problem was.
And it wasn't just a BRAVO test. It was also the Yankee
test, others, well over 10,000 megatons. So my question here is
150 people were brought back to their atoll; they have lived
there. Now, there are about 500 or 600 of them. My question is
what is our government doing to provide the best medical
attention to these people?
I'm simply asking, Dr. Seligman, do we have a process that
if I were exposed to nuclear contamination can I go to Tripler?
Can I go to Stanford? Where do I go to get me the best medical
knowledge of what is happening to me due to nuclear
contamination?
Mr. Stayman. Let me just interrupt a second because I think
there is a misunderstanding which we need to clarify. Rongelap
and Utrik are down wind of Bikini, where BRAVO occurred. Utrik
is about twice as far. I just want to make sure there is an
understanding there.
Dr. Seligman. I would be happy to get that information for
you as to where you could go to get the best possible care. I
am proud of the program that we have provided for the
Marshallese in terms of medical monitoring for those that were
included in that group of citizens from Rongelap and Utirik who
were exposed most heavily to fallout from Castle BRAVO. We
changed medical contractors in 1998. We have a new program in
place.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Dr. Seligman, if I may, my time--I am
sorry, but we had a hearing in 1994. There were disagreements
even among the scientists who were contracted to go there and
conduct these soil samples as it was in terms of the exposure
that these people were subjected to. You are telling me that
you are satisfied with the way that we have been doing these
examinations?
Dr. Seligman. The soil samples, yes. I am satisfied.
Mr. Faleomavaega. What about the examinations of the
people?
Dr. Seligman. For our program, yes, I have been satisfied.
Mr. Stayman. If I could also jump in here, again, Mr.
Congressman. There may be a bit of confusion about who the
eligible people are for which program. Dr. Seligman is talking
about the DOE program, which treats those who were directly
exposed, not people who moved back.
As you point out under the terms of the Compact, there was
a program specifically extended, known as the so-called Four-
Atoll Program. The Compact provides $2 million a year for that
program.
Just as a point of clarification. I think that everyone
would agree--and you raise very good point--it is not
considered to be a very high-quality program, in part, because
of the inflation of the enrollment. But clearly it is woefully
underfunded to meet the need that you pointed out. That is
certainly one of the things that we are going to have to look
at very closely in the renegotiation.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Stayman, would you look at the
Department of Energy also as a resource that could be helpful
to resolve this problem, other than just doing soil samplings
and testings of the environment?
Mr. Stayman. Yes.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I would appreciate if the DOE could also
be helpful in finding out the status of the health conditions
of these people who were exposed to the contamination.
Mr. Young. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Guam.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT A UNDERWOOD, A DELEGATE IN CONGRESS
FROM GUAM
Mr. Underwood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to thank
you for holding this hearing. I guess we are at some level of
discomfort, at least I am, in terms of the responses by the
Department of Energy on this very serious issue.
One is I want to characterize and hopefully people
understand that it seems to me that the Department of Energy is
concerned about the level of responsibility and the
programmatic responsibility and liability; and the people of
the Marshalls, of course, are being asked to accept at face
value some of the statements that are being made and not
necessarily concerned about the programmatic liability, but are
actually concerned about their lives.
When you make that kind of a comparison, it lends to a
great deal of discomfort and uneasiness and anxiety. What we
have here is I would consider a real crisis in terms of how
much confidence there is in some of the statements that are
coming out of the Department of Energy.
It seems to me the way to resolve that is to in some
instances to call for more independent assessment or to have
some independent assessment going into it. Now, I have talked
to a lot of people, in particular the people that Mr.
Faleomavaega were referring to in terms of some of the people
of Utirik, some who were not directly exposed to it at the time
of the blast but have been living there ever since.
It seems to me that they have--that they should come under
the same kind of program as those that were directly exposed to
the blast, inasmuch as the people who were not evacuated to the
same extent that the others were.
I think what Mr. Miller was trying to get at was the issue
of the standards is that at that time in the 50s in Utirik we
are talking about 24,000 millirems of exposure to
radioactivity. In the 1990s we are still talking about 18. I
think the EPA standard is 15 millirems.
We are trying--I am trying to understand what exactly is
the standard you are using, and is there any objection from the
Department of Energy to independent risk assessment for the
people of these four affected atolls in terms of their health?
[The information follows:]
Dr. Seligman. We would encourage that assessment.
Mr. Underwood. And you will be willing to participate in
that independent risk----
Dr. Seligman. I don't know how we would participate in an
independent one, other than opening up our files and making
sure that all of the data that we have are available for anyone
to look at at any time.
Mr. Underwood. I get a different story sometimes from
representatives of the Marshalls. I get the feeling that there
has not been full disclosure by the Department regarding
radiation exposure.
Dr. Seligman. We have provided 77 boxes, millions of pages
of materials to the Marshallese. If there are still materials
that have not been made available or still classified, we would
like to know about them and we will work to see that they are
declassified.
Mr. Underwood. So this is a full commitment of the
Department of Energy to open up their files for this purpose?
Dr. Seligman. Absolutely.
Mr. Underwood. On the issue, Dr. Campbell, I know that this
is not directly pertinent to the work here, but you mentioned
the role of Kwajalein in the renegotiations of the compact. And
by the way, I want to congratulate Mr. Stayman for having that
position. I expect that the negotiations, even though I have
the fullest confidence in Mr. Stayman, I think they will go the
full term of the expectation.
Could you characterize for the Committee how important
Kwajalein is?
Dr. Campbell. Congressman, you and I have discussed this on
several occasions in the past, and I just want to underscore
again, 2 years ago we did a full assessment of the full uses of
Kwajalein in all aspects of our space program, our satellite
program. And now, most importantly, as we go into intensive R&D
on both TMD systems and potentially in the future on BMD
systems, I have got to say that we view these facilities as
absolutely critical.
And in our ongoing activities on the island, I must say
that we have had to, on short notice, request additional space,
additional area for activities commensurate or associated with
this testing and other procedures, and we have had extremely
responsive comeback from Kwajalein on all aspects of our
testing and our programs.
So I would stand by our earlier statements and perhaps even
add to them as an indication about how important we think this
is, not only for the current programs but for the future as
well. Our department stands fully by our desire for maintaining
the fullest possible defense relationship.
Mr. Underwood. You would character this as a matter of
vital national defense, that we continue to have access?
Dr. Campbell. That is why I am here today. I know this is
on a variety of other issues. This is a testament to our
department's very strong goal of reaching a satisfactory
conclusion that meets our interests and also the interests of
the islanders, and I hope you are wrong. I hope that the
political deliberations will be intense but short, because I
think it is in the interests of both----
Mr. Underwood. Well, maybe it is in his capacity of
negotiating with the FSM that I am referring to.
Mr. Young. Gentlemen, I am going to recognize the gentleman
from America Samoa for about half a minute. Then I am going to
recognize Mr. Doolittle and then Mr. Miller again.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want it clear for the record, I have here excerpts
taken from a January 13-14, 1956, meeting of the U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission Advisory Committee on Biology and Medicine,
quotes taken regarding Utirik Atoll. Utirik is by far the most
contaminated place in the world. Utirik is a very intriguing
place that can be made--a study can be made for the people,
studies to get a measure of the human uptake when people live
in a contaminated environment.
Quote, while it is true these people, the Utirik people, do
not live, I would say, the way Westerners do, civilized people,
it is nevertheless also true that these people are more like us
than the mice, end of quote. People in Utirik were exposed to
24,000 millirems when the Bravo test was taken in 1954. The
Environmental Protection Agency standard regulates a maximum
limit of 15 millirems per year as a maximum dose limit for
human beings.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Doolittle.
Mr. Doolittle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Seligman, or actually maybe it is Mr. Boyce that I
would wish to address this question to first: The issue of the
compact renegotiations, that will commence in earnest this
fall; is that right?
Mr. Boyce. Yes, sir.
Mr. Doolittle. And could you describe the process of the
compact renegotiations? I mean, that extends over a certain
number of months, I guess, and is expected to be completed by
what time?
Mr. Boyce. The scheduled duration is 2 years, Congressman,
and as Al Stayman here to my left who will be the special
negotiator has indicated, we will try to do it in a way that
minimizes the enormous travel requirements and, you know,
budgetary resources on both sides. So we are trying to meet
halfway as much as possible and, of course, working in the FSM
or in the FAS states and in Washington as well.
Mr. Doolittle. So the FAS, their compact is going to be up
at the same time; is that right?
Mr. Boyce. There are actually two separate compacts as a
part of this. Maybe I could ask Al to answer it specifically.
Mr. Doolittle. Okay.
Mr. Stayman. Congressman, there was one Compact, the
Compact of Free Association, which was nested in the Compact
Act, which Congress passed with a number of additions. That
covers both the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the
Federated States of Micronesia. Many of the provisions are due
to expire at the end of the 15th year. The renegotiations will
be focused only on those due to expire. We will begin in the
13th year. If we are not finished by the 15th year, there is an
automatic 2-year extension if negotiations are ongoing.
Mr. Doolittle. And you are the chief negotiator for both of
those?
Mr. Stayman. Yes, I have been elected for that position,
and won't begin for several weeks.
Mr. Doolittle. Okay. Could you tell us what issues you
intend to include in the compact negotiations?
Mr. Stayman. Well, you have put me in a very awkward
position. I not only don't have the job, I don't have
negotiating instructions. But I think just from discussions
today, health care certainly has to be a primary issue of
concern, certainly to the people of the FAS. And I imagine the
Committee, too, would share my concern about making sure that
the level of health care, particularly in the Marshall Islands,
where there is the nuclear legacy, is substantially improved.
Mr. Doolittle. Will these negotiations include additional
money beyond the initial $150 million for the settlement of the
nuclear-related claims?
Mr. Stayman. As far as money in connection with nuclear
claims settlement, the procedure set forth in the Compact is
the so-called changed circumstances provisions of Article 9 of
the 177 Subsidiary Agreement. We expect the Marshall Islands
will be submitting a petition for further compensation under
those provisions. So at this time we expect, because the
procedures laid forth in the law are different, that specific
compensation for nuclear claims would be handled, you know,
through the Article 9 changed circumstances petition.
I would just note, however, that there is a generic blanket
authorization for Congress to provide additional money at any
time, section 105(c) of the Compact, and it has been exercised
from time to time by Congress.
Mr. Doolittle. It was my privilege to visit the Marshall
Islands with the congressional delegation that went there a few
months ago, and that has never been exactly clear to me, how
they--once the people of Bikini were sent back, went there to
live, and then they sent them away again after they reversed
their position that had previously been determined that it was
safe to live there. And I guess they are now asking for, which
is reasonable in light of their history, I think, for some sort
of a guarantee from the administration that it is safe for the
people to resettle there. Could you tell us what the
administration's position might be on that?
Mr. Stayman. Yes. In fact, the leadership of Bikini met
with the Secretary of the Interior several months ago asking
for such a guarantee. The Secretary's response was really two
part. The first is that, in light of the mistake, if we can
call it that, in the earlier resettlement--that is, the U.S.
Government said it was safe to go back, they went back, data
showed that because of their consumption of local food, their
dose was going above what had been predicted and they had to be
moved off--when Congress did the Compact, there was a great
awareness of the problem in having the islanders rely upon
assurances from the Federal Government.
That is why the resettlement agreements, if you look at the
legislative history there, empower the locals to hire their own
experts and exercise their own judgment with respect to going
back, and that doesn't mean that the U.S. is not going to be
there. The Department of Energy has an aggressive program in
monitoring.
It is really more a question of are we going to be a
partner in this process or are we going to be directing this
process. Our concern was that having the U.S. direct
resettlement had not been a successful policy and that this
policy of partnership, which is now working, I think, much
better, or certainly it is working very well in the case of
Rongelap, and Bikini not far behind.
A second point that the Secretary made was that you really
couldn't say very much about resettlement until the remediation
recommendations had actually taken place. Now, what is
happening in Rongelap is they have signed a contract, and they
are implementing these remediation recommendations that, you
know, DOE, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and their
own experts all agree on. So, when they complete that process
and are able to verify that scientifically, then it is time, I
think, for individuals to make a decision as to whether or not
they are reassured personally enough to go home.
Mr. Young. Mr. Stayman, I love your dissertation, but that
is enough right now.
Mr. Stayman. Okay.
Mr. Young. Mrs. Christensen.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Many of my
questions have been answered, but I was champing at the bit on
the health issues. So I just wanted to sort of make a comment,
and maybe I can get a response if you feel one is indicated.
But I am concerned about the scope of the health care that
is provided, and we heard some comments like criteria may be
manipulated or that the people who are covered, the numbers
have been inflated, and maybe some doubt about what changed
circumstances could be brought to bear on the negotiations. And
I realize that the Department of Energy has provided care for
those who are directly exposed in this funding, although not
enough for those who have been relocated.
But as a family physician for more than 20 years, I cannot
discount what Congressman Underwood talked about in terms of
the anxiety and the effects that that has on the health of the
people of the Marshall Islands, and it extends beyond those who
were exposed or the families of those who were--the progeny of
those who were exposed. That has a terrific effect on a broad
number of health issues.
And in addition to that, there was some discussion prior on
the loss of the vegetation and the normal and traditional diet,
and there have been many studies that have demonstrated how
that affects the health of people adversely and produces many
chronic illnesses.
So when we talk about providing health care and as we look
to negotiating a new compact, we can't draw a line with those
who were directly affected or those who are related to those
affected because it is really far-reaching. And since it sounds
as though we knew that the wind had shifted, that there might
have been time to not have that nuclear testing take place, we
have a serious responsibility here. And it sounds like all of
the health care needs of the people, you know, may be related
to this event because it sets off a series of health events,
and it is very difficult to distinguish where it ends.
Mr. Stayman. I think you raised an excellent point,
Congresswoman. The Compact structured health care in a way that
there are essentially three layers of programs, and what we are
seeing is certainly a desire by people to get themselves into a
more sophisticated program. We have to go back in the context
of renegotiation and look very carefully at these concerns you
talk about, the health concerns of changes in diet and also the
need to reassure people and deal with the anxiety caused by
living in an environment in which there has been testing.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. All right. I thank the lady.
Mr. Miller, you had a couple more questions.
Mr. Miller. Just to follow up. Let me state, and I just
want to put this on the record at this time because I may not
be here when they testify, but the testimony of John Mauro is
that the criteria used in resettlement, the criteria differ
markedly from the cleanup criteria of 170 millirems for the
average individual cited by Lawrence Livermore Lab:
``The results of our analyses revealed that if the
Marshall Islands were a State in the United States,
resettlement of the northern island of Enewetak Atoll
would not be permitted under EPA criteria without
extensive remediation and/or institutional controls.''
And I just put that in the record because apparently that
is where this concern has been raised about the analysis of the
data, and I want to raise that point here so hopefully the
other panels can respond to it.
I also want to--you mentioned in response to Mr.--I think
to Mr. Faleomavaega, that if the Marshallese knew about
additional classified documents you would be happy to know
about it. The burden is not on them. The burden is whether the
department knows about additional classified--have all the
documents been declassified and disseminated?
Mr. Seligman. I doubt that all of the documents have been
declassified. No, they have not.
Mr. Miller. So the answer isn't whether or not you have
given 170 boxes. The question is, has all the relevant data put
out into the public as was promised? Where are we in that
process?
Mr. Seligman. I will have to get an answer for you. I don't
know.
Mr. Miller. Mr. Stayman, do you know where we are in the
declassification of all this information?
Mr. Stayman. I know that the DOE did an extensive review in
response to their annual meetings with the communities. I don't
know if that review has been concluded.
Mr. Miller. So we haven't had a summation done of what has
been released, what hasn't been released or anything to date,
do you know?
Mr. Stayman. Well, I am sure there is a record of what has
been released. Your question of what is left, I don't know
whether it is an ongoing process or----
Mr. Seligman. We have a summation and inventory of
everything that has been released.
Mr. Miller. Can you make--do you have a summation of what
is yet to be released?
Mr. Seligman. Yes, we do.
Mr. Miller. Can you provide that for the Committee?
Mr. Seligman. Absolutely.
Mr. Miller. That might be helpful. If I might, just one
quick question, Mr. Chairman. The status of the $150 million
trust fund is what today?
Mr. Stayman. It is paying out, you know, the health, the
payments to the four communities, the tribunal administration,
and then the remainder is paid out for individual and community
claims which are filed and adjudicated by the tribunal. So I
don't know what the balance is now, but it is continuing its
work.
Mr. Miller. Is that a trust fund where the core can be--the
principal can be invaded?
Mr. Stayman. Yes.
Mr. Miller. So it is not just a question of what the trust
fund spins off, it is a declining balance in the trust fund?
Mr. Stayman. Right. In fact, at the end of year 15, the
Compact requires that any residual be transferred to the United
States Treasury.
Mr. Miller. So it is sort of a trust fund. It is a trust
fund that can be invaded, and the expectation is that at the
end of 15 years it will be exhausted or there will be some
small residual there to be returned.
Mr. Stayman. Right. The provisions require that the
payments be made out essentially on a pro rata basis, and if
more money is available, then you would pay more.
Mr. Miller. So it is not just out of earnings, so to speak?
Mr. Stayman. Right. There is a schedule to make sure that
earnings cover key programs but not necessarily cover all the
claims.
Mr. Miller. Is that happening?
Mr. Stayman. Yes, that is happening. They have only paid--
they can tell you--it is about 60 percent or 50 percent on
claims so far, and that number may decrease.
Mr. Miller. Thank you.
Mr. Young. I want to thank the panel for your testimony.
There will probably be some written questions. Mr. Stayman, I
want to congratulate you, and we will be watching you very
carefully in these negotiations.
Mr. Stayman. Thank you.
Mr. Young. And I would also suggest that one other thing,
this is not off the record, but it concerns me, we are talking
about $150 million, a very small amount of money for a great
many people that were displaced, and when this disaster, if it
ever comes to an end in Europe, it will be $200 billion
rebuilding a country that we tore down.
I think we ought to put this in perspective and say we also
have done some things that we ought to be willing to bite the
bullet for. Under the guise of humanitarian principles and
defense, we ought to really address the issues that affect
these people, and I want to thank the panel.
Mr. Stayman. Thank you.
Mr. Young. You are excused.
The gentleman from Guam.
Mr. Underwood. Mr. Chairman, I remember that Mr. Stayman
said he had no instructions for negotiations. Perhaps we can
have a hearing and help him get some.
Mr. Young. I am confident before Mr. Stayman is through
with these negotiations there will be a lot of input from
individuals on this Committee.
Mr. Underwood. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Young. The next panel will be the Honorable Philip
Muller, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of the
Marshall Islands, Majuro, Marshall Islands; the Honorable Marie
L. Maddison, Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic
of the Marshall Islands, Majuro, Marshall Islands; H.E. Tony A.
deBrum, Minister of Finance, Republic of the Marshall Islands,
Majuro, Marshall Islands.
And I would like at this time, all the honorable people, to
extend my thanks to yourselves, and of course the president,
and our reception we had and the exposure that we had to your
fine people and your parliament. So, again, you are welcome.
Mr. Muller, you are first up.
STATEMENT OF PHILIP MULLER, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
TRADE, REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS
Mr. Muller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, before I
get to the serious issues in front of the Committee, I would
just like to let you know I am still feeding your marlin.
Mr. Young. Thank you, sir. The one I didn't catch and you
did.
Mr. Muller. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the
House Committee on Resources, it is an honor for me and my
colleagues to appear before you today on behalf of the Republic
of the Marshall Islands Government. In addition to those of us
seated in the front, I have with me the speaker and the vice-
speaker of Nitijela, as well as representatives from the four
atolls, including Minister Johnsay Riklon, Minister Hiroshi
Yamamura, Senator Henchi Balos--Senator Ishmael John and
Senator Henchi Balos from Kwajalein.
First of all, allow me to convey the greetings of President
Kabua and the people of the Marshall Islands, as well as our
sincere appreciation to you, Mr. Chairman, members and staff,
who joined this Committee's CODEL to the Marshall Islands. We
also thank you for convening this important hearing to consider
the complex radiological conditions in the Republic of the
Marshall Islands.
Before I begin, I want to extend our congratulations to Mr.
Allen Stayman as the U.S. Government's compact negotiator. Mr.
Stayman is well respected in the Marshall Islands and
knowledgeable about our bilateral relationship. We look forward
to working with him. However, because the prices of this
upcoming renegotiation is still unclear to the Marshall
Islands, we hope to receive assurances that the position has
full authorization to negotiate on behalf of the U.S.
Government.
My testimony today focuses on the unique and important
bilateral relationship between the U.S. and the Republic of the
Marshall Islands. Secretary Maddison will summarize where the
four atolls are in terms of their progress in addressing
various radiology issues. Mr. deBrum will shed light on the
national impacts of the testing program, as well as the
successes and failures of the section 177.
Mr. Chairman, it is gratifying for the RMI government to
know that the U.S. and the RMI Governments share the same
commitment to our bilateral relationship, as this Committee has
demonstrated both in the Compact of Free Association and in the
corresponding resolutions recently forwarded by the House of
Representatives and the Nitijela.
As you know, the Marshall Islands provide the U.S. with a
buffer zone between the U.S. and potential threats from Asia.
The Compact also provides the U.S. with sole military access to
approximately 1 million square miles of the Pacific Ocean where
no other foreign military can enter. The Marshall Islands
supports U.S. activities in relation to the testing of its
missile defense programs at the Ronald Reagan Strategic Defense
Initiative Test Site at Kwajalein Atoll.
On many occasions, the RMI Government has promptly
accommodated the Department of Defense requests to utilize
additional islands in Kwajalein, as well as islands in the
northern parts of the Marshall Islands to expand these
activities. The RMI Government is pleased to support the
strategic needs of the United States. We are all familiar with
the nuclear legacy in the Marshall Islands and the Marshallese
people's contribution to the end of the Cold War.
My main point today is that it is imperative to assist the
communities adversely affected by the testing program. In
addition to being a moral and legal obligation, raising the
needs of the nuclear-affected communities is essential to
maintaining the strategic partnership.
While the RMI Government is committed to its bilateral
relationship with the U.S., we believe that the U.S. Government
must address the lingering needs of communities affected by the
U.S. military objectives, including communities displaced by
the missile testing program.
Communities in the Marshall Islands suffer from the
hardships of displacement, radiation-related health and
environmental problems, and a variety of social and economic
problems that my two colleagues at this table will expand upon.
The RMI Government knows that the assistance provided in
Section 177 of the Compact is manifestly inadequate to respond
to our complex radiological needs in the Marshall Islands. We
request that this Committee address the inadequacies of section
177.
Fortunately, Congress provides a mechanism in the Compact
for our nations to consider the need for additional assistance
to address the consequences of the U.S. nuclear weapons testing
program. This mechanism is Article 9 of section 177 of the
Compact, the changed circumstances provision. The RMI
Government will submit a changed circumstances petition for
Congress to consider in the very near future. This petition
demonstrates that injuries resulting from the U.S. nuclear
testing program have arisen and been discovered in the RMI
since the Compact took effect, that could not reasonably have
been discovered in the RMI prior to the effective date of the
Compact.
The RMI Government looks forward to working with Congress
in consideration of the RMI's petition on changed
circumstances. As strategic partners, we will continue to
extend into the future the RMI Government hopes to gain the
cooperation of this community in considering this petition.
Mr. Chairman, the RMI Government also requests this
Committee's assistance to address the difficulties the RMI
Government is having in implementing the economic provisions of
the Compact. One of the fundamental tenets of the Compact is
the notion of mutual security. This principal is expressly
stated in the mutual security agreement, and I will quote:
``The Government of the United States and the
Government of the Marshall Islands recognize that
sustained economic advancement is a necessary
contributing element to the mutual security goals
expressed in this agreement.''
The concept of mutual security is premised on the shared
security resulting from the Compact. The U.S. gains military
security and the Marshall Islands gain economic security.
Specific provisions in the Compact are intended to foster
economic development in the Marshall Islands, a condition
necessary to support the security requirements of the United
States.
Although there are many provisions of the Compact intended
to boost the RMI security and economic development, the RMI
Government is having great difficulty implementing these
provisions. Unfortunately, these provisions provide some of the
most basic services to the Marshallese people. These
provisions, which I detail in my written statement, include
economic benefits to offset large economic incentives,
essential air services, and the rights of Marshallese to seek
employment benefits.
Regrettably, the RMI notes that the U.S. has locked in
security rights under the Compact, and it enjoys those on an
ongoing basis, some in perpetuity, and yet when it comes to
performing U.S. corresponding obligations to support economic
development, the RMI Government encounters stalling and excuses
from the administration.
With regard to the RMI's economic development, I am pleased
to report that although the RMI receives very one-sided
criticism of the RMI's economic initiatives by the Department
of State, we have made tremendous strides in the last year.
Some of our progress includes lowering taxes, adopting
legislation to establish an intergenerational trust fund and to
attract foreign investment, unprecedented cooperation with the
business community, and increased transparency in the
government.
Mr. Chairman, I find it outrageous that we would hear from
the State Department without recognizing some of the positive
efforts that we have taken to make our economy more viable and
more vibrant. We will have a chance to respond to some others.
I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Muller follows:]
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Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Muller, excellent testimony.
The Honorable Marie Maddison.
STATEMENT OF MARIE L. MADDISON, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND TRADE, REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS
Ms. Maddison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I make my
statement, I would like to note for the record the written
statement submitted by the four atoll delegations, and I also
have a summary of the written statement for detail.
Mr. Young. It will go in, without objection.
Ms. Maddison. Chairman Young, distinguished members of the
House Resources Committee, representatives of the U.S.
Government, ladies and gentlemen, I am honored today to relate
to you a story, a story of four unique Marshallese communities
who, more than forty years after the United States concluded
its nuclear testing program in the Marshall Islands, continue
to live with a nuclear legacy that shapes their daily
existence.
It is important to understand the valuable relationship
that exists between land and community, community and the
ecosystem, the ecosystem and the sustainability in the Marshall
Islands. It is very important because we are talking about
communities that were uprooted, torn apart, scattered and
contaminated.
To address the road to recovery, therefore, government
measures should help the affected communities to grow roots,
mend and cement the tears, bring together the segments and
clean up or get rid of the contaminants. The Governor of the
Republic of the Marshall Islands supports each of the four most
affected communities, Enewetak, Rongelap, Utirik and Bikini, in
their respective efforts to recover themselves and rebuild the
lives of not only their communities but also individual members
of their communities.
The price of reconstruction requires accessibility to
noncontaminated land. Thus, land and contamination are two
long-standing issues that are yet to be fully or properly
resolved.
I recognize congressional outreach in supporting
radiological efforts of Enewetak, Bikini and Rongelap. However,
additional support is sorely needed in the following areas.
Moneys generated by trust funds for cleanup are an
essential element to the recovery price of these atolls. While
trust funds cannot replace the lasting value of land, it can be
the next best thing, as we have seen demonstrated by existing
trust funds. Enewetak's claims are minimal, $160 million,
minimally sufficient to clean and rehabilitate its northern
islands, while Rongelap requires the full $45 million, and
Bikini finds its $90 million resettlement trust fund barely
adequate. Contamination of Utirik is yet to be assessed.
These figures may sound large, but please compare them to
the $147 billion estimate for the DOE program of cleanup in the
United States. Compared to these billions, RMI figures are
modest and reasonable.
The availability of trusted scientific expertise to guide
cleanup and recovery steps is just as important. While the
collection of scientific data may not be an issue, the
interpretation of data is a major concern. We do not want to
repeat the mistake of a premature resettlement. Chronic
exposure to radiation, the related health problems, and the
psychological and social stress of repeated removals is the
legacy left to the Enewetak, Rongelap and Bikini communities
that were prematurely resettled.
Recognition of an agreed-upon cleanup standard is essential
to ensure safety in an affected environment. The EPA standard
of 15 millirems has been adopted by the Nuclear Claims
Tribunal. We believe that RMI citizens deserve to be protected
to the same standard as U.S. citizens, the collaboration of
expertise among those in fields related to nuclear radiation,
health, agriculture, ecoculture. The food chain and the human
body are complex systems that require a coordinated range of
services. The communities will continue to need the
availability of the USDA food programs and related technical
support at this stage of recovery.
The recovery process also requires accessibility of the
people to quality education and health care services. Again,
earnings from the trust fund mechanism have supported the
education of the members of these respective communities in the
form of additional teachers, better school facilities and
scholarships.
One aspect of the recovery, an additional need that is yet
to be addressed, is the advancement of the people in radiation-
related fields. Additional assistance should be provided toward
the promotion of such a knowledge in these communities.
The availability of the 177 health care program and the DOE
medical monitoring program has not been appropriately
established and linked to make quality health care accessible
to the community members. It is thus important that additional
support should be provided to the 177 health care program, and
that the medical team in the DOE program treat all members of
the community it serves.
Availability of needed support infrastructure in the areas
of transportation, power generation and communication are
needed to fully access recovery and sustainability of these
communities. The cost expended by the communities to address
transportation needs such as shipment of USDA food commodities,
transport of drivers, et cetera, are major drains in the budget
of these communities. While Utirik had experimented with solar
powered community lighting systems, much is yet to be done to
improve such technology and other energy-related areas to
support the efforts of the communities.
As it is with the transportation and power generation,
communication is necessary to bring persons and communities
together, and it is a priority area of need, particularly for
all the outer islands of the Republic.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the needs of the people of
Enewetak, Rongelap, Utirik and Bikini should be truly and
adequately assessed and addressed in a coordinated and
comprehensive manner.
It is quite obvious that, one, cleanup is still an issue
and should be addressed properly. Cleanup efforts should
complement and supplement the development of knowledge and
expertise in nuclear exposure related fields within the
Republic, particularly in the affected communities. In
addition, a cleanup standard must be agreed upon.
Two, equitable fund adjustments are needed under the trust
fund mechanism for all the communities to improve their
resource base and address community needs.
Three, USDA food programs and technical expertise from the
U.S. Government need to be extended to complement, supplement,
enhance the efforts, the recovery efforts of the communities.
Four, expansion of the scope of the DOE medical monitoring
program to include all residents of the affected communities
will lead to a better collaboration with the existing 177
health care and other national health care programs.
Five, provision of additional assistance toward
transportation, power generation and communication are just as
needed to fully implement and enhance the recovery and
development of strategies of these communities.
I thank you for your attention and support.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Maddison follows:]
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Mr. Young. I thank you, Marie, and you do notice that I
have been letting you go over time, because anybody flies as
far as you, you can have half the day if you want to.
Ms. Maddison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. I am going to listen to Mr. Tony deBrum,
Minister of Finance, Republic of Marshall Islands, and I am
going to have to excuse myself. Mr. Doolittle will take over
the Chair after I listen to your testimony, and then there will
be some questions, as I have to go to another meeting. You are
up.
STATEMENT OF TONY A. deBRUM, MINISTER OF FINANCE, REPUBLIC OF
THE MARSHALL ISLANDS
Mr. Tony A. deBrum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I join the Foreign Minister in thanking you
and the Committee for visiting with us. We thoroughly enjoyed
the visit, and we hope you will be doing another one very, very
soon.
I am going to concentrate my remarks on the inadequacies of
the 177 program and probably some of the reasons why it is
inadequate.
As you know, the Compact provisions for the nuclear
problems, the 177 agreement was based on a study done by the
Department of Energy called the 1978 Radiological Survey of the
Northern Marshalls, which was presented to us as the definitive
study on the full extent of damages in the Marshalls. Based on
that, we agreed on the Compact and the subsidy agreement. Had
we known what we know now about the full extent of the damages,
I do not think we would have approved the Compact. I think for
sure we would have had to have a radically different 177
agreement.
Since the 1994 hearings and since the Department of Energy
released additional information previously classified, we have
discovered to our satisfaction and we now conclude that
information was withheld not only from us, from the Marshallese
negotiators, but perhaps from the American negotiators as well,
and certainly from Congress, because Congress would not have
approved of this arrangement had it known the full extent of
the damage. We are convinced of that now.
The definition of legally exposed people, that 174 people
that were actually on island during the Bravo test, is also a
very erroneous basis upon which to program the medical care.
The reason for that is that people were exposed all over the
Marshalls through 67 shots, not just to Bravo. The cumulative
doses that can be calculated now backwards demonstrate that all
the people of the Marshall Islands were exposed.
What happens is that you have a multimillion dollar program
sponsored by Congress to deal with the so-called legally
exposed 174 people, while the people surrounding those people
are not eligible for the same care. They are tendered the 177
health program, which is much more poorly subsidized. The
remaining population on the Marshalls must be taken care of by
our government, which has even less resources to deal with the
program--with the problems of medical and other monetary
requirements. These all need to be expanded.
It has been alluded that all the classified information
that we need to make even better judgments on what happened to
us have been released. They have not. And you are right, Mr.
Chairman, the onus is on the Department of Energy to present us
with what really needs to be known. We don't know what is
classified and what is not. They are the ones who know it, but
what has been released has been most helpful and we continue to
study them.
In fact, attached to my statement, which I hope will be in
the record, if I didn't ask for it already, one of the
attachments is a document we recently discovered that indicates
that DOE was aware that there were a lot more problems, medical
problems, including iodine-related thyroid problems in the rest
of the Marshall Islands, and they were quite prepared to set up
surgery arrangements for these people once the requirement was
made by someone or once the administration agreed to include
these people. When this was not included in the Compact, that
plan was abandoned.
Included in that document is a very clear statement that
shows that, that betrays really the research as opposed to the
medical nature of the program that DOE conducted over these
years. We are hopeful that more information can be provided so
that we can be more informed as to what the true exposure
levels of the Marshalls might be.
Included in my statement are the following requests to the
Committee: One, that an ex gratia payment to supplement the
Nuclear Claims Tribunal payments be made as soon as possible;
that there be institutional and infrastructure support for the
Republic of the Marshall Islands public health sector; that we
seriously consider the expansion of eligibility for the DOE
medical program to include more people, people that really,
truly deserve it in the Marshalls; that there be an inflation
adjustment for the four atoll health care programs; and that a
directive be sent to the U.S. Public Health Service to provide
resources, doctors, to the Marshall Islands. We are eligible
for another Compact, but which we have found impossible to
implement because of monetary requirements.
Six, we should begin training and education programs for
Marshallese in the fields of environmental science and
radiation health, in order to transfer this technology to
people who need it most. We cannot continue to depend on
outside doctors and outside expertise to take care of our own.
We want to learn how to take care of our own. I think we can
learn, too, if you can help us.
A directive to DOE should be sent to conclude an agreement
on cleanup standards and worker safety standards that more
closely match those standards that you set for American
citizens. I think we deserve the same standard.
There should be a nationwide cancer registry program in the
Marshalls. Right now, there are bits of information being put
together from different studies conducted by different agencies
over many years, but no one has actually put one of these
registries together that would show the true extent of the
cancer problem in the Marshalls.
We should also enjoy continued committee--your Committee,
Mr. Chairman--representation at our annual DOE-RMI
consultation. We think that is very important and is very
helpful.
Finally and most importantly, prompt consideration of the
RMI's changed circumstances petition which, as the Foreign
Minister indicated, we will be submitting shortly.
I will be happy to answer questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. deBrum follows:]
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Mr. Young. I thank you. I have one. Who is going to be in
the negotiating team on your behalf? Do you have any idea who
is going to be set up?
Mr. Muller. I will be, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. You will be. Very good.
Mr. Muller. And a couple other members of our cabinet.
Mr. Young. Mr. Muller, especially, and Marie, you made some
suggestions which I deeply appreciate, because we are going to
be directly involved with you in these negotiations or at least
watching to see what happens as time goes by.
I happen to agree with you, Mr. Muller. I don't believe--
because I was here when that Compact was signed. We did not
have the information ourselves, and I am going to officially
request that information be made available, because I can't
figure out what in the world it is classified for now other
than to protect someone's behind. There is certainly no
military significance to what those tests did. That is pretty
common knowledge that is being advanced by other countries now,
so that information should be made available to you so you can
analyze it.
But I am very much interested in your presentation and what
we can apply it with, and as time goes by, Mr. Mansur has been
directed and I am sure this young lady has also been on site,
we will be watching this very closely.
With that, Mr. Doolittle, I hope you will conduct this
meeting, and I thank you very much for your testimony. I will
try to get back for the third panel.
Mr. Doolittle. [presiding] Maybe I will just continue with
and take my time now, serving as the acting chairman.
I understand that the RMI has passed laws affecting the
awarding of nuclear claims by the Nuclear Claims Tribunal.
Would one of you be able to identify those laws and describe
their purpose and impact on the Nuclear Claims Tribunal?
Mr. Tony A. deBrum. Mr. Chairman, there is a Nuclear Claims
Tribunal Act which was enacted by our parliament establishing
the Nuclear Claims Tribunal, giving it the authority to do all
those things that we agreed in the 177 Agreement with the
United States that it must do in order to function. There are
also cases where at the direction of cabinet, the parliament
would also pass the necessary legislation to include certain
conditions, for example, that the Veterans--United States
Veterans Administration holds for their own people, photogenic
diseases, conditions that are considered compensable, et
cetera. I would hope that some of this more detailed
information about those can be given when our tribunal chairman
joins the next panel and gives you more information on that.
Mr. Doolittle. That would be fine. Thank you.
Can you tell us what is the status of the nationwide
radiological study, and could a copy be provided to the
Committee?
Mr. Muller. Mr. Chairman, we would be more than delighted
to provide a copy of the study. We in the Marshall Islands had
some concerns in the way that the study was done and the way
that the information and data were collected, and we still
continue to question some of the conclusions that the study had
come up with, and we certainly will provide all of that to your
Committee.
Mr. Doolittle. Okay. Thank you.
For Secretary Maddison, you indicated that the Marshall
Islands support the Bikini Island's request for 3 percent
distribution from the trust fund. Has this request been raised
to the administration, and do you know what is preventing the
distribution?
Ms. Maddison. Yes. According to the information that we
have received, these arrangements have been made.
Mr. Doolittle. I am sorry, the disbursement has been made?
Ms. Maddison. The arrangement.
Mr. Doolittle. The arrangement----
Ms. Maddison. Yes.
Mr. Doolittle. [continuing] to disburse the 3 percent has
been made? Okay.
If I had had time, I would have asked the previous panel
this question, but maybe one of you can tell me the answer.
They were talking about how to get a commercial airline ticket
into the Marshall Islands is like a 2- or 3-month waiting
period. Is that what I heard?
Mr. Tony A. deBrum. That is right.
Mr. Doolittle. And is that because airline service has been
scaled back, or because there is some increased demand to go
into the Marshall Islands or out of the Marshall Islands?
Mr. Tony A. deBrum. If I may answer that, Mr. Chairman, the
service--the level of air service into the Marshalls now is
half of what it was prior to the effective date of the Compact,
1986. We used to have four flights a week in from Guam and four
flights in and out to Honolulu. It is now two. We have tried to
get Aloha Airlines in Hawaii to provide a supplemental service
and have agreed with them for this service, but had some
difficulties with approval that Dr. Campbell indicated earlier
this morning have all been granted, and would expect that
service to start soon.
Mr. Doolittle. Oh, good. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from American Samoa.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to say my welcome and thank you, and if I
could repeat it in a very nice way, iakwe, kommol tata. To Mr.
Muller and Mr. deBrum and Ms. Maddison, we are very happy that
you are able to come and testify before this Committee, for
which I am also happy that the chairman and the Ranking Member
on this side of the aisle is very much interested in the
problems affecting the people of the Marshall Islands.
Minister Muller, you had indicated in your testimony that
there are basically two aspects of the whole negotiations
process when your people negotiated this Compact with the U.S.
Government. One, basically, our interest was strategic. It was
not for the love of the Marshallese people. It was basically
strategic, and the reason why the U.S. unilaterally declared
the whole Micronesian area as a strategic trust, without even
consulting the Trusteeship Council or anybody in the United
Nations, we just went ahead and grabbed you guys and said you
are now a part of the strategic trust of the United States.
You indicated you have some very serious problems in this
equation. You have given the U.S. somewhat of a free hand in
terms of maintaining or sustaining our strategic interests.
What about your economic development? What seems to be the
biggest problem that you have? Is it lack of money? Is it lack
of guidance? What seems to be the problem that you have
encountered the last 13 years?
Mr. Muller. Let me, Congressman, try to answer that
question by saying first of all that the Compact agreement was
entered into to benefit both of our countries, and as I say
that in my testimony, we have lived up to all of our
obligations under the Compact. At the same time, we feel that
as the Compact comes to a close, the 15 years, there are a
number of issues and provisions that have not been developed
the way the administration expected.
Specifically, we are looking at section 111(b), which is a
provision that was put in to replace the tax incentives that
were originally agreed to, and this is the authorization of $20
million that would have helped in our economic development and
economic programs. That has not materialized, only $2 million
of that.
Essentially, health services has been allowed to lapse
since September of 1998. We continue to ask that your Committee
look into ways to reinstate the essential air services because,
after all, air transportation is very important to the economic
development of our country.
At the same time, we have got our own effort to move our
economy forward. As I say in my testimony, we have introduced
legislation to provide incentives to our local businesses to
grow. We have lowered taxes. We have provided more transparent
legislation that would allow for easier foreign investment to
come into the Marshall Islands.
So, despite all of this, I think it is very important that
before we commence negotiations on a new economic package, that
some of these outstanding issues must be taken care of.
Mr. Faleomavaega. As you know, Mr. Muller, at the height of
the Cold War we, or the government, the U.S. Government,
decided as part of the negotiations in approving the Compact
that the U.S. Government was to provide approximately $2
billion for a 15-year period, not just to the Marshall Islands
but also for the Palau as well as for the Federated States of
Micronesia.
It was about a year or two years ago, former U.S.
Ambassador to the Marshalls, William Bodie, made a statement
that we have failed to the extent that we have given to the
Marshalls, I gather, too much money; that we have not done a
good job in providing assistance, for whatever that assistance
might be. Do you agree with Ambassador Bodie's observation
about this?
Mr. Muller. I totally do not agree with that, Congressman.
First of all, let us remember that the bulk of that money that
comes under the Compact is earmarked for radiation compensation
to the four atolls and to land leases for Kwajalein Atoll. Only
a certain percentage of that fund comes to the operation of
government and for projects.
Second, when the government came into being, we entered an
infrastructure that was really not there. There was no power,
there was no road, there was no good health care system, no
education system, and we needed to spend funding on some of
those projects to bring up the level of infrastructure
requirements for the people.
So I do not agree with that assessment.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I will wait
for the next round.
Mr. Doolittle. The Chair recognizes Dr. Christensen for her
questions.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have two
questions. I guess I would direct it to Mr. deBrum.
The first one, how much additional money is being requested
to complete the compensation program, the $22.9 mllion?
Mr. Tony A. deBrum. Mr. Chairman, the $22.9 million cited
in the petition filed by the Nuclear Claims Tribunal will only
enable it to pay for current unpaid personal injury claims. It
does not include any claims that are stemming from land damage
or other damages that may be filed. We don't have that figure
yet, and I think the government's position is that we all
remain open to a later determination as to what that figure
might be. But the immediate requirement, as I understand it,
and the next tribunal will be here, the next panel, I
understand that to be the figure, yes.
Mrs. Christensen. Okay. I had a two-part question and you
answered both parts.
Mr. Tony A. deBrum. Thanks.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you. Secretary Maddison, you talked
about the types of difficulties that displacement causes, and
in your statement, in your presentation you said that land is a
lifeblood, and I suspect that you mean more than just that it
provides food, that it must have some spiritual context, and
could you elaborate on that for the record? What does the land
have--what relationship is there between the land and the
people?
Ms. Maddison. Thank you, Congresswoman. We are trying to
explain how important land is in the Marshall Islands. Land is
very scarce, and yet it is the foundation where you pass on to
your children your inheritance. But when I talk about
difficulties, I am talking about everything that they have, the
communities have to do, like for example the communities that
were displaced, they have to relearn the land.
If the children do not know their land rights, they don't
know their clans, it is very difficult for them to have
identity, root, which is really very important. Unless they
have their identity and they are well-rooted, they are self-
confident, it is very difficult for them to move in any way,
whether it is health, education. So they have to relearn the
land.
They have to rebuild their homes, and homes and land are
also very synonymous. Skills have to be taught because you are
living in a different environment than when you were displaced.
For example, you go from Rongelap to Najap. Well, Najap is a
very far island within Kwajalein and it is very difficult to go
to, very isolated in a way. Same as with the Bikinians when
they were moved from an atoll to a small island which was
surrounded by harsh conditions, big waves. So they have to
learn new skills and how to fish, for example.
They also have to reform their schools. Building schools,
that is another thing, and they are doing very well, for
example, as I cited that--the example from Enewetak where they
are spending their money to bring in teachers, to build
schools, and the others are also setting aside money for
scholarships.
But before they can even think of education, they have to
think of basic needs. So, unless they have been able to manage
their basic needs, then they can spend time on education, and
they have to restore their community life. You have communities
that are in different places. As I said, they are scattered in
different parts of the Marshall Islands, even in parts of the
United States. So how can you bring all these communities
together? You have a saying that is, ``out of sight, out of
mind,'' which is very, very classic in this kind of example.
Mrs. Christensen. I thank you, and I just wanted to thank
you also for the kind hospitality that was extended to me and
my husband when we visited, and it was really a pleasure to be
there. I am glad I had an opportunity to come and visit and see
the Marshall Islands firsthand. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Doolittle. Thank you.
Mr. Jones is recognized.
Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I regret that I have
only been here for about 10 minutes and have to leave in about
5 minutes, but I wanted to say to the panelists that are here
today that I, as one Member of Congress, appreciate your being
here.
Recently I had the pleasure of meeting with the Ambassador
from the Marshall Islands, and we had quite an extensive
discussion regarding these issues, and I look forward to
reading your testimony also. But I wanted to say, Mr. Chairman,
that I think that this is a sad chapter in America's history,
the way that we have not met our commitment and obligation to
these people who have been exposed to our nuclear testing
during the Cold War.
And I want to say to the citizens of the Marshall Islands
that as one Member of Congress, I look forward to working with
members on this Committee on both sides of the political aisle
to do what needs to be done to make sure that we as an
honorable Nation keep our commitment that we have made in the
past and do everything that we can to enhance the lives of the
citizens of the Marshall Islands, and particularly those who
have developed a disease from the exposure to this nuclear
testing.
So, Mr. Chairman, with that I want to thank you, Chairman
Young, for bringing this hearing to the Committee and letting
us work together in a bipartisan way to help the citizens of
Marshall Islands. Thank you.
Mr. Doolittle. I thank the gentleman. Let me inquire of my
Members, is there the desire for Members to have a second round
of questioning? The Chair recognizes Mr. Faleomavaega.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have a
couple of more questions that I would like to ask the
panelists, if I may.
Mr. Muller, as you know, one of the most hotly debated
issues right now before the Congress is the issue of theater
missile defense. Do you consider the Kwajalein missile range an
important aspect of our strategic interests as far as the
theater missile defense in the Pacific, as well as in other
regions of the world?
Mr. Muller. I think it is one of the most important sites
to the strategic defense. As I have stated in our statement, we
continue to make the commitment to make that available to the
United States. At the same time we must look at some of the
negative effects that have resulted from the presence of the
military there.
Mr. Faleomavaega. These missiles when they are fired from
the United States, are they from California, Vandenberg as I
recall?
Mr. Muller. Vandenberg.
Mr. Faleomavaega. These are ICBM's, right, and they are
fired from California; and they get to Kwajalein in about one
hour's time period?
Mr. Muller. In seconds.
Mr. Faleomavaega. In seconds? I see. We have been doing
this for what, almost 50 years?
Mr. Muller. Forty.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I would like to ask Minister deBrum, as
you know, we have had a very interesting dialogue with Dr.
Seligman of the Department of Energy. It is his considered
opinion that as far as he is concerned the Department of Energy
is doing a real fine job in providing proper and medical
examination, not only to the environment in these atolls, but
as well to the people. Do you take--do you agree, Minister
deBrum, with that assessment?
Mr. Oscar deBrum. Congressman, we do not agree with that
assessment. As our statements will show you, we are indeed at
odds on that. We hope that the testimony that some of the
individual atollees and nuclear tribunal and some of the
scientists that have been hired by Enewetak and Utirik will
shed more light on that.
On that note, also, Congressman, if I may at this time
enter into the record our intention to provide written answers
to some of the remarkable concerns raised by the State--
Department of State representative earlier. We think that that
record ought to be settled.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Chairman, I would like unanimous
consent that the members of the panel do offer statements for
the record in response to some of the comments made earlier by
the officials of the State Department as well as the other
agencies represented.
Mr. Doolittle. Without objection so ordered.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. deBrum, I
noticed also in your statement that there was a legal
classification. I assume the Department of Energy--they said
that the least amount of radioactive atoms--in other words,
people who shouldn't even be examined among the Marshallese
people, and yet looking into this portion of the whole
examination process, these so-called--the least amount of
radioactive people exposed to radiation, actually when they
were examined, they were 250 times more exposure than if I were
a U.S. citizen being exposed to the same contamination.
This is in reference to your earlier statement that as far
as you are concerned all of the Marshallese people have been
exposed because of this.
Mr. Oscar deBrum. That is correct, sir. We consider all of
the Marshallese people to be exposed. There are cases also
where American citizens who lived in the Marshalls during this
period have come down with radiogenic diseases but have nowhere
to go for claims because they fall between the cracks. They
were not in Utah. They were in the Marshalls. They cannot claim
for radiogenic diseases because they are American citizens.
That has to be looked at as well.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I know there was a national association
of veterans. There was some 24,000 members nationwide, veterans
who were exposed to our nuclear testing program, not only in
the Pacific but also in New Mexico.
Believe it or not, we didn't do a very good job in
conducting medical examinations for these sailors and soldiers
who were also exposed to nuclear contamination as part of this
test.
I notice my time is up, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank
members of the panel for their fine statements. Again, as our
good friend Congresswoman Christensen said earlier about the
hospitality, please extend our fondest aloha to President Imata
Kabua and the members of the good people of the Marshalls for
their hospitality and the beautiful reception we received when
we visited these beautiful islands. Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
and thank you.
Mr. Doolittle. Thank you. And I thank the members of the
panel for appearing today. I would join in the comments of the
others. The gracious hospitality that was extended to us was
very much appreciated. The opportunity to visit the Marshall
Islands and actually see some of the places mentioned and to
understand better, it was a great opportunity. It certainly
aided me as a member of the Committee. We will now excuse this
panel and ask you to go-- oh, yes. Sorry, Mr. Underwood.
Mr. Underwood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I know that
many of the issues have already been discussed, and I won't
take the Committee's time to do that except again to express my
most sincere Komol tata for the hospitality and the good
relationships I know that we have with the people of the
Marshalls and also trying to attempt to bring some resolution
to the issues that are surrounding this.
I certainly appreciate all of your commentary and I
appreciate the idea of trying to develop the expertise locally
within the RMI. That is an excellent suggestion. It is a shame
that no one ever thought of that before. I am sure it has been
thought of before. I mean, I have never heard it framed that
way.
This is a matter of great concern because I still think
that the anxiety caused by this and the way that it affects the
lives of people every day cannot be measured in the millirems.
It takes an enormous cost in terms of the human experience and
the human condition and it is most regrettable that our country
is responsible for that and I would like to also acknowledge
that there are many people both in the Department of Energy and
the Department of Interior, as well as Members of Congress that
are obviously interested in seeing a resolution of this issue
once and for all.
I certainly want to maintain my lines of communication open
and to try to make as many documents or all the documents, not
as many, all of the documents available to you in a
comprehensible way so that you don't have to get a Ph.D. in
engineering in order to understand them. We will have to wait
for a few years for that, but I wanted to take the opportunity
to express my thanks for the hospitality and the courtesies
that was extended during the recent CODEL. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Oscar deBrum. Thank you very much.
Mr. Doolittle. We will have, no doubt, further questions
and we will hold the record open and ask for your timely
response. With that we will excuse this panel and call up the
final panel, panel number three.
While the members of this panel are assembling themselves,
I would just announce that we have certain statements submitted
for the record, the first being by Senator Ismael John, Mayor
Neptali Peter, and Davor Z. Pevec. So that is one statement.
Those three have joined in that.
[The prepared statement of Messrs. John, Peter, and Pevec,
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Mr. Doolittle. And the statement by Howard L. Hills.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hills follows:]
Statement of Howard L. Hills*
In 1982 President Reagan's Ambassador for Micronesian
political status negotiations was instructed, as a result of a
National Security Council interagency policy review, to seek
the earliest possible termination of the U.N. trusteeship under
which the U.S. had administered vast island territories in the
mid-Pacific since 1947. This was for reasons the most important
of which included the increasingly significant role of the U.S.
Army's missile testing range at Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall
Islands in U.S. national security planning and programs.
While the international trusteeship regime gave the U.S.
the legal authority to continue its strategic programs in the
islands, it also gave the Soviet Union a platform in the
Security Council and Trusteeship Council for propagandizing
against and attempting to meddle in U.S. national security
affairs, including what came to be known as the Strategic
Defense Initiative. These considerations reinforced Reagan
Administration determination to end the trusteeship in favor of
a treaty-based relationship with a self-governing Republic of
the Marshall Islands (RMI).
The single greatest obstacle to termination of the
trusteeship with respect to the Marshall Islands was the
difficult legacy of U.S. nuclear testing program carried out at
Bikini and Enewetak from 1946 to 1958, and the unresolved
question of U.S. responsibility for measures to address
resulting injuries to persons and damage to lands. Following
the establishment of constitutional government in the Marshall
Islands, difficult negotiations regarding political status and
the nuclear claims issues ensued. Although the final agreements
reached in this process were imperfect and faced criticism in
the RMI as well as in the United States, the RMI national
government ultimately adopted a clear and unequivocal policy in
support of the U.S. with respect to trusteeship termination and
establishment of a bilateral strategic military alliance under
the Compact of Free Association.
This enabled the U.S. to continue its strategic programs in
the RMI, and the RMI achieved national sovereignty while
preserving a close economic, social and political relationship
with the United States. Rather than allowing the nuclear claims
issue to persist in a state of legal and political controversy
preventing succession of the RMI to separate sovereignty, the
RMI entered into a settlement under Section 177 of the Compact
under which legal proceedings in U.S. courts were terminated
and mechanisms to address the testing claims in the future
through bilateral political measures were instituted. The legal
effects of this settlement and the intentions of the parties
regarding such future measures are discussed below.
After approval of the Compact of Free Association by the
U.S. Congress, including the nuclear claims settlement reached
under Section 177 of that treaty, the RMI acted in concert with
the U.S. in the Security Council, the Trusteeship Council and
the General Assembly of the United Nations to sustain and win
international acceptance of the measures taken by the U.S. in
those bodies terminating the trusteeship. In the face of
aggressive and high-visibility efforts led by the Soviet Union
to prevent U.N. recognition of the legitimacy of the new status
of the RMI and the bilateral relationship between our nations
under the Compact, the RMI leadership and their diplomatic
representatives stood boldly by the U.S. without wavering in a
complex but successful effort to win international acceptance
of this new American and RMI strategic alliance.
With RMI support and leadership in this effort a factor
critical to U.S. success, the international community soon
moved to recognize the relationship defined by the Compact,
including the nuclear claims settlement. The U.S. goal of a
successful transition from the U.N. trusteeship to a treaty-
based bilateral relationship was achieved, and the SDI program
activities at Kwajalein were vital to the success of U.S.
global strategic policy in the 80's and 90's.
----------
* From February of 1982 until April of 1986, Howard Hills
served as Legal Counsel and Department of Defense Advisor to
the President's Personal Representative for Micronesian Status
Negotiations. During this period he was assigned to the Office
for Micronesian Status Negotiations (OMSN), an interagency
office within the National Security Council system responsible
for negotiating the Compact of Free Association and
representing the Executive Branch before Congress with respect
to its ratification.
Subsequent to approval of the Compact, Hills served as
Counsel for Interagency Affairs in the U.S. State Department's
Office for Free Associated State Affairs. That office was
responsible for establishment of government-to-government
relations under the Compact.
Understanding the Nuclear Claims Settlement
At the time the Reagan Administration undertook its policy
review of unresolved issues preventing the termination of the
trusteeship, there were strongly held views by some in Congress
and the Federal agencies concerned that a settlement of claims
arising from the testing program was untenable if not
impossible. This was due to the fact that the full extent of
injuries to persons and damage to property was either not yet
known or not public due to national security classification
policies at the time. However, it had become obvious that the
measures that had been taken by the U.S. to address the effects
of the testing up to that point, including ex gratia assistance
to the affected peoples as authorized by Congress, were
manifestly inadequate.
For example, Congress limited compensation to individuals
from four atolls and provided such measures as $25,000
``compassionate payments'' for individuals who developed
thyroid tumors and had to have these organs removed. Medical
treatment was provided by Federal agencies and contractors, but
there were dual treatment and scientific research purposes
behind much of these services, and much of the available
information about the medical condition of individuals, as well
as radiological conditions and related health risks in the
islands, remained either classified or unavailable to the
islanders in a form they could comprehend.
In the face of these and other troubling circumstances, the
Carter Administration had agreed in principle that the U.S.
should accept responsibility for the nuclear testing claims and
terminate legal claims based on a negotiated political
settlement. But an early draft of the Compact initialed by
negotiators in 1980 left unanswered the question of how a
settlement of claims arising from the testing program was to be
structured. The Reagan Administration's policy review confirmed
the need to negotiate a nuclear claims settlement based on
recognition that the Marshall Islands could not emerge from
trusteeship to self-government without first replacing the
somewhat ad hoc measures that had been taken unilaterally by
the U.S. up to that point with a more comprehensive program
implemented bilaterally.
However, the legal position of the U.S. as represented in
court submissions by the Department of Justice was that
sovereign immunity, statute of limitations, political question
doctrine and other legal defenses precluded U.S. courts from
exercising jurisdiction or adjudicating liability in the
nuclear claims. Since Congress had never extended the
constitutional rights of U.S. citizens to the trusteeship
territories in any form binding upon the United States, the
U.S. did not acquire sovereignty under the trusteeship, and
Congress did not choose to legislatively waive U.S. legal
defenses so the cases could be adjudicated in the Federal
courts, a negotiated bilateral settlement that provided other
means to address the claims presented itself as the only
available alternative to the somewhat random scheme of ex
gratia payments previously authorized by Congress in the
exercise of its political discretion.
The Carter Administration efforts to come up with a
solution were stymied by strong and very explicit Congressional
opposition to any settlement that expanded the compensation
program beyond the four atolls identified as eligible for ex
gratia assistance in Federal statutes (e.g. Public Law 95-134
and Public Law 96-205). At the same time, leadership of
Congressional committees with jurisdiction made it clear that
any settlement which ended Congressional authority to determine
the adequacy of past, present or future compensation would face
committed opposition in the ratification process. To address
these concerns, the Reagan Administration proposed to structure
the settlement in a manner consistent with existing statutes to
the extent practical. In addition, to preserve the residual
authority of Congress over these claims a changed circumstances
provision was included under which at the request of the RMI
the Congress is to consider information and injuries discovered
after the settlement enters into force to determine the
adequacy of measures implemented under the settlement.
The settlement reached attempted to accommodate the
competing forces described above, and was then included in the
Compact of Free Association signed by the United States, the
Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of
Micronesia and Palau in the 1982-1983 period. The Compact was
approved by the U.S. Congress in 1985 and took effect in 1986
(Public Law 99-239). The nuclear claims settlement concluded
pursuant to Section 177 of the Compact was expressly
incorporated into the Compact, as approved by Congress in the
form of a treaty and Federal statute law. As reflected in
Section 177(b) of U.S. Public Law 99-239, under the final
Compact the U.S. agreed to make ``provisions for the just and
adequate settlement of all claims which have arisen . . . or
which in the future may arise'' from the nuclear testing
program.
Thus, one way to understand the Section 177 Agreement is as
a substitute mechanism to replace the programs instituted by
Congress acting unilaterally with a structured process for
continuing on a bilateral basis a program of political measures
to compensate and address the legacy of the nuclear tests. In
accordance with the end of trusteeship status and the
termination of U.S. authority over the nationals of the new
republic, under this bilateral mechanism the RMI would act as
sovereign on behalf of its citizens in carrying out the
settlement.
In addition, the settlement provided for a 300 percent
increase over the funding which Congress had previously
established for making ex gratia payments under a series of
statutes cited in Appendix A of the settlement agreement.
Specifically, from 1946 to 1980 the ex gratia payments Congress
had authorized totaled approximately $50 million for support to
dislocated communities, scientific and medical programs, and
cash payments to individuals. Under the Section 177 Agreement,
$150 million was paid to the RMI to finance further
compensation and measures through a trust fund established for
that purpose.
However, it is imperative to a legally and politically
correct understanding of the settlement to recognize that the
amount of funding provided under the Section 177 Agreement was
a political determination by the parties and was not based in
whole or in part on an effort to assess or compute actual
damages or just compensation for specific injuries or damage to
property. Indeed, the amount provided was based on a U.S.
political judgment as to the level of resources the U.S. should
offer to establish and sustain the settlement politically in
the RMI and Congress.
If the U.S. Congress or Executive Branch believed that
litigation in the Federal courts would have resolved the legacy
of the nuclear testing program in a satisfactory way, allowing
the claimants their ``day in court'' to seek damages would have
been one way to end, as opposed to fulfill, U.S. responsibility
for the claims. But the U.S. believed litigation brought by
Marshallese citizens in the U.S. courts would not result in a
remedy, or might produce remedies unsatisfactory to the
claimants and the RMI. At the same time, this would have
reduced or eliminated political support in Congress and the
Executive Branch for funding to establish a bilateral program
to address the claims based on a continued U.S. role agreed to
by the RMI under the Compact.
This, however, meant that the RMI and U.S. would have a
continuing responsibility to evaluate and determine the
adequacy of the political measures being taken to address the
effects of the nuclear testing program based on all available
knowledge and information, and on the results of the measures
taken under the settlement. Thus, it would be wrong to conclude
that the purpose of the Section 177 was to make the nuclear
testing claims ``go away'' so that the Federal Government would
never have to revisit the question of the adequacy of the
measures implemented under the initial terms of the settlement.
To the contrary, the termination of legal process was
predicated on continuation of the political determination of
the adequacy of the settlement by both the RMI and the U.S.
Congress. Indeed, the Preamble of the settlement states that
the purpose of the agreement is to ``create and maintain, in
perpetuity, a means to address past, present and future
consequences of the nuclear testing program.''
I personally addressed these issues in statements submitted
to Congress on behalf of the Reagan Administration during
Congressional hearings on the Section 177 Agreement. For
example, my statement for the record of the Hearing on S.J.
Res. 286, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S.
Senate, May 24, 1984, included the following explanation:
``. . . the Marshall Islands Government may seek further
assistance from Congress should changed circumstances render
the terms of the agreement clearly inadequate . . . In brief,
the Section 177 Agreement does not foreclose further measures
for the benefit of the claimants, and they will have access in
the future to an impartial claims tribunal for the purposes of
obtaining payments in addition to those provided under the
agreement. The only requirement is that they be able to prove
their claims in accordance with the procedures and standards
promulgated by the tribunal in accordance with the Section 177
Agreement.''
Thus, the RMI and Congress are faced in 1999 with the same
questions they faced in 1982. Are the politically determined measures
carried out in lieu of a legal process to adjudicate claims arising
from the nuclear testing program adequate legally and morally to
sustain the political, economic, and social relationship that exists
between the U.S. and the Marshall Islands? Will the existing measures
sustain the relationship between our peoples in the future, or do
additional measures need to be taken as a result of the information and
knowledge gained as a result of our experience under the Section 177
Agreement?
Currently, Mr. Hills has a law practice in Washington D.C. that
includes representation of the people of Rongelap regarding the program
to resettle their islands in the RMI. Rongelap resettlement is not
funded or governed under the terms of the Section 177 Agreement.
Mr. Doolittle. And then finally here the statement of the
people of Utirik to the House Resources Committee. So without
objection those statements will be admitted into the record.
[The prepared statement of the People of Utirik follows:]
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Mr. Doolittle. I also understand that we have a statement
submitted by Mr. William Robison, who, I guess, was invited to
be present but could not be. Anyway, without objection his
statement will be submitted for the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Robison follows:]
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Mr. Doolittle. We have three witnesses on this panel. The
Honorable Oscar deBrum, chairman of the Nuclear Claims
Tribunal, Majuro, Marshall Islands; Dr. John Mauro from Sanford
Cohen and Associates, McLean, Virginia; and Mr. Allan C. B.
Richardson, scientific consultant to the people of Enewetak in
Bethesda, Maryland.
Gentlemen, we welcome you and Mr. deBrum, you are
recognized for your statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. OSCAR deBRUM, CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR CLAIMS
TRIBUNAL
Mr. Oscar deBrum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning
members of the Committee. On behalf of my fellow judges and
officers and staff of the Nuclear Claim tribunal, I would like
to express our gratitude to you for conducting this oversight
hearing on the status of nuclear issues in the Marshall
Islands.
I am honored to have been asked to testify before this
Committee and its predecessor for many years, but I am now
among the rapidly dwindling group of men and women whose
experience with Americans spans the entirety of our people's
association with you.
I was a young man, young boy, 15 years of age, attending
Japanese school in Jaluit in 1944 when I beheld the sight which
I will never forget as long as I live. The arrival of an
enormous fleet of new American warships the size of which I
could never have imagined in my wildest dreams.
With the American administration which followed the defeat
of the Japanese forces in the Marshall Islands, I quickly came
to learn firsthand of the American spirit of generosity and
kindness as well as the courage of American servicemen who came
from all walks of life, from all parts of your country, great
country, to fight the distant war to preserve your democracy
and expand your democratic principles to the world.
It has been my profound conviction since your countrymen
came to our shore over a century ago that America's intentions
are honorable and its motives are noble. But to us, a phrase
used frequently in this setting and I quote, ``mistakes were
made.'' And as a result of that most notorious law, the law of
unintended consequences, our people became the victim of
American policies which were meant only to develop a deterrent
to and to prevent future wars.
Mr. Chairman, if you were chairing a hearing of our
tribunal instead of chairing this hearing today, you would find
it as difficult as I do to explain unintended consequences, a
policy to a family which has experienced real suffering as a
result of those policies. These real human stories are what I
am here today and I hear also every day, day after day, as the
tribunal is charged with the responsibility of making final
determination of Marshallese claims related to the nuclear
testing program.
The challenge has been to address these claims in a manner
which is both fair to the claimants and rational and
justifiable in view of the evidence available. Throughout its
existence, the tribunal has sought information and expert
advise about the testing program and its effect on human health
from a wide variety of sources.
In late 1990 the tribunal became aware of U.S. legislation
known as the Downwinders' Act, which had been passed into law
by the Congress earlier that year. In that Act the Congress
established a program of compensation on a presumptive basis
for specified diseases to U.S. civilians who were physically
present in any affected area during the period of nuclear
testing in Nevada.
The tribunal saw that such a presumptive approach reflected
both the needs for an efficient, simple, and cost-effective
program and a recognition of the difficulties of individual
proof of causation associated with the injuries due to the
exposure to ionizing radiation.
Between 1946 and 1958, the United States conducted 67
nuclear tests in the Marshall Islands, all of which were
atmospheric. The most powerful of these tests was the BRAVO
shot, a 15-megaton device detonated on March 1, 1954, at Bikini
atoll. That test alone was the equivalent to 1,000 Hiroshima
bombs that ended the second world war.
While the BRAVO shot is well known, 17 other tests in the
Marshall Islands were in the megaton range and total yield of
which was--of the 67 tests was 108 megatons, the equivalent of
more than 7,000 Hiroshima bombs and 93 times the total of
Nevada atmospheric tests.
Further, the U.S. Center for Disease Control in July 1998
estimated that 6.3 billion curies of radioactive iodine-131 was
released to the atmosphere as a result of the testing in the
Marshall Islands. That amount is 42 times the 150 million
curies released as a result of the testing in Nevada.
The tribunal's Personal Injury Compensation Program was
established by regulation in 1991 and includes the diseases
identified in the Downwinders programs and additional diseases
for which there was credible evidence from the research
findings of the studies of the Japanese atom bomb survivors
conducted by the Radiation Effects Research Foundation and from
the conclusion contained in the 1990 report of the National
Academy of Science Committee on Biological Affects of Ionizing
Radiation.
Also pending before the tribunal are many claims for damage
to property. A major category of damage in the class-action
property claim is for cleanup of these areas. In December, the
December--the tribunal issued a written decision in which it
adopted the policies and criteria set out by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency for dealing with certain sites
with radioactive contamination.
In 1997 the EPA directed that if a dose assessment is
conducted at the site, then 15 millirems per year effective
dose equivalent should generally be the maximum dose limit for
humans. To date, no compensation has been awarded for property
damage, but the first such award should be made within the next
few months.
One of the main issues that I wanted to address in my
testimony today is the immediate shortfall of funds for payment
of personal injury award. As of April 30, 1999, a total of
$67.7 million has been awarded on behalf of 1,613 individuals
for personal injuries. This compares to a common total
agreement--total agreement--excuse me, sir--1,509 award
totaling $75.4 million that had been made under the
Downwinders' program.
But the tribunal is now nearly $23 million short of being
able to fully compensate all of the justified claims of
physical effects of the test. It particularly pains me that our
tribunal continues to fall short of its ability to ease our
people's suffering from financial compensation because our fund
is manifestly inadequate for this purpose because we are
obliged to make payment in installments rather than make full
payment on award.
Six hundred and thirty two people have already died without
receiving full compensation for their personal injuries. The
situation makes it necessary to make this appeal to you
personally on behalf of the awardees who believe that the best
solution is to request a lump sum payment from the U.S. so that
the award to the deceased people and others who are suffering
from terminal medical conditions may be paid in full quickly as
possible.
As detailed in my written submission, the amount clearly
needed is approximately $22.9 million. In short, Mr. Chairman,
we need your help, and I hope that the Committee will provide
guidance in how to formally request for this amount and how we
can best pursue it effectively and efficiently.
In conclusion, there was much that was proper and
appropriate in the 177 agreement, but time and experience have
demonstrated that the funding of the activities and the program
specifically provided for in the agreement was inadequate.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman for hearing our testimony. We will
be very happy to answer any questions you might have. Thank
you, sir.
Mr. Doolittle. Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. deBrum follows:]
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Mr. Doolittle. Dr. Mauro, you are recognized for your
testimony.
Mr. Mauro. I would like to suggest that Mr. Richardson
proceed first. The information that he will be covering sort of
precurse the information that I will be covering.
Mr. Doolittle. All right. That will be fine. Mr.
Richardson, you are recognized, sir
STATEMENT OF ALLAN C.B. RICHARDSON, SCIENTIFIC CONSULTANT TO
THE PEOPLE OF ENEWETAK
Mr. Richardson. Thank you, Representative Doolittle and
other members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity
to provide testimony today. My name is Allan Richardson. I am a
consultant to the people of Enewetak and Bikini. I have
submitted a written statement for the record. I will just
summarize that statement here.
By way of introduction, I would like to point out that I
spent almost 30 years at EPA establishing standards for
radiation before retiring a little over a year ago, as well as
many years as the U.S. representative on various matters to the
International Atomic Energy Agency and to the International
Commission on Radiation Protection.
This morning I would like to address a narrow topic: what
standard should apply to the cleanup of the Marshall Islands, a
standard that would define what is needed to adequately protect
future health of the Marshallese. This question obviously must
be answered before one can address what needs to be done and
what the cost will be.
I will address three points: The first is What standard
applies to similar cleanups in the United States, a question
that Congressman Miller asked earlier. Second, should this same
standard apply in the Marshall Islands; and then, third, I will
touch briefly on what the key provisions of the recommended
standard are.
First, to the question of what standard applies in the
United States. The Marshall Islands testing was the final
element of a massive U.S. weapons development program, as we
all know. Almost all of the rest of that program was conducted
at sites in the United States that are now under jurisdicion of
the DOE. Those sites provide the appropriate model for similar
cleanup situations in the United States because they involve
the same kinds of materials, manmade radioactive materials.
This nuclear weapons complex in the United States is now
undergoing a massive cleanup. Just to give you some idea of the
size of that cleanup, 99 percent of all soil contaminated with
manmade radiation in the United States is located on sites that
are involved in the U.S. nuclear weapons program.
In my written testimony there is a chart that details
radioactively contaminated U.S. sites and associated volumes of
soil. By comparison, the amount of contaminated soil in the
Marshall Islands is much less than 1 percent of that total
amount.
The applicable law for the cleanup of the Department of
Energy sites is CERCLA, the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act, otherwise known as
Superfund. It applies to all of the DOE sites involved here.
And as you probably know, the exercise of the Superfund
authority involves a cooperative relationship between the
contaminater, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the
State in which the site is located.
EPA sets the rules, the States are involved in the
selection of the remedy, and in this case the Department of
Energy is responsible for the cleanup. There have been
established, by regulation, general rules for the level of
cleanup that is required.
The relevant rule in this case is that the residual risk to
the most exposed individuals that are expected to be on the
site in the future should be less than 1 in 10,000 over their
lifetimes. That standard was set in 1990. It applies to all
kinds of hazardous contaminants, not just to radiation.
In 1997, the agency established a standard specific to
radiation, based on that general criterion. That standard is
the number that you have heard several times today, 15
millirems per year. Clearly, this is the standard that is
applied in the United States to situations like that in the
Marshall Islands. It applies to well over 99 percent of all
such contamination in the United States.
The second question was: Should the U.S. standard apply in
the Marshall Islands? The relevant international authority on
radiation matters is the International Atomic Energy Agency. It
was established in 1957 at the urging of President Eisenhower,
and the United States has strongly supported it ever since.
The IAEA enunciated the applicable principle for this case
in 1985, many years ago. What they said--and I will quote them
here--is that: ``As a basic principle, policies and criteria
for radiation protection of populations outside national
borders . . . should be at least as stringent as those for the
population within the country of release.''
The U.S. has consistently followed this position in the
Marshall Islands over the years, although sometimes hesitantly
and in a changing way, as standards in the U.S. have evolved.
The U.S. also observes this principle in more general ways.
An example is the Basel Convention, which forbids the disposal
of domestic toxic and hazardous materials in foreign countries
unless the standards of the country of origin are met. There is
a similar provision for radioactive waste by the International
Atomic Energy Agency that we also espouse.
For this case the important point is that if the Marshall
Islands were in the United States, the standard that applies to
all of the DOE complex, 99 percent of U.S. manmade
contamination, would apply.
I think the conclusion, therefore, is inescapable that,
under both international and U.S. precedents and practice, the
Marshall Islands are entitled to the same level of protection
from the radiation contamination caused by U.S. weapons
programs that we provide our own citizens.
The Nuclear Claims Tribunal, as Mr. deBrum just mentioned,
came to the same conclusion and adopted the U.S. standard as
the basis for adjudicating claims on December 31 of 1998.
Finally, a few brief observations about the standards
themselves. The risk under the standard is 1 in 3,000. This
risk lies at the extreme upper end of the acceptable risk range
under Superfund. The risk of 1 in 3,000 is approximately the
risk that you would project for an atoll in the Marshall
Islands, because the rough size of the population that you
expect to see on a single atoll is about 3,000.
The standard is not without burdens. There is regulatory
flexibility in the application of the standard that allows the
use of ``institutional controls'' to reduce environmental
damage and costs--if the affected population agrees to this.
Institutional controls are measures that do not remove the
contamination, but instead reduce exposure through methods that
require continuing intervention by man. A good example for the
Marshall Islands is the proposal to use potassium to suppress
the uptake of radioactive cesium in foodstuffs.
The benefit of using this measure is that much less soil
needs to be removed and much less environmental damage and cost
is incurred. The cost of using the measure--the burden--is the
burden of maintenance of the control measures for many, many
decades and, of course, the risks that accrue if the control
measure fails to be maintained.
That concludes my testimony. I would be pleased to answer
any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Richardson follows:]
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Mr. Doolittle. Thank you. Dr. Mauro, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN MAURO, SANFORD COHEN AND ASSOCIATES
Dr. Mauro. Thank you for inviting me here today and thank
you to the people of Enewetak for asking me to come. I work for
Sanford Cohen and Associates. This is a small company in
McLean, Virginia, that specializes in risk assessment.
My background is specifically in the area of health,
physics, and radioecology. This is the study of radioactivity
in the environment and its effects on people. I have been
performing analyses of the type that I will be summarizing here
for about the past 25 years at hundreds of different sites
throughout the United States.
This past September the people of Enewetak retained SC&A to
peform an independent evaluation of the radiological conditions
on Enewetak atoll, specifically, and to assess what needs to be
done to remediate the atoll so that it would comply with the
clearance criteria, or the acceptance criteria, for cleanup
that was summarized by Mr. Richardson.
We started our investigations in October, and we completed
them in April. In April we appeared before the tribunal
presenting testimony on our findings. The 12-page summary that
I provided you with there summarizes this, but I also have a
full copy of our report that I would like to leave with the
Committee. It details our findings.
What we basically did was collect all of the data that the
Department of Energy has collected since the 1970s, literally
tens of thousands of measurements. We did not perform any
measurements of our own. We used that data to perform
mathematical modeling of if the people of Enewetak were to
return to the northern islands--by the way, some of the
questions that were raised earlier, as I proceed I would like
to respond to some of those questions because I think they are
important.
The people of Enewetak are currently living on the southern
islands, Enewetak island. But the northern islands such as
Enjebi, homeland for many of the Enewetak people, are currently
not being occupied because of radiologic concerns.
What we did--what I did as part of a team of people at SC&A
was to gather all of the data and evaluate the radiation doses
that might occur to people who would relocate to the northern
islands tomorrow and assess what kind of radiation doses they
would receive and what needs to be done to correct the problem.
What we found out is that the radiation doses, if the
people of Enewetak should return to Enjebi, for example, one of
the many islands north, in the year 2000, the doses would be 10
to 100 to 500 times higher than the current radiation
protection standards we are using in the United States, an
unacceptable situation.
We then proceeded to ask what could be done about that. We
evaluated a broad range of alternative remediation strategies.
We actually costed out 30 different approaches to remediate the
problem. And in doing so, we used five criteria to sort of
score or evaluate the merits of all of the alternatives to fix
the problem.
First, whatever the remedy, it should allow the people of
Enewetak to return to their homes in the northern islands as
soon as possible. If you were to wait for the radioactivity to
decay, it turns out the important radionuclide, the cesium 137
with a 30 year half life, it would take over 100 years to decay
down to levels that were acceptable.
Second, the cleanup has to be protective. That means
achieve the cleanup criteria of 15 millirem per year. Third and
very important, whatever strategies that are adopted it
minimizes the ecological damage and incorporates measures that
restores the ecosystem to a self-sustaining condition.
Fourth, cost effective; and finally, permanent, that is,
whatever solution or remedy strategy is selected, it should be
a permanent solution. Based on our investigations, we
identified a strategy to recommend, and it consists of five
elements.
First, scrape away the soil that is contaminated at the
elevated, the higher levels. That represents an area of about
550 acres and 223,000 cubic meters of soil. We considered a lot
of different ways of getting rid of that soil, disposing of it
as low-level waste, shipping it to the United States and
disposing of it in one of the low-level waste facilities.
Extremely expensive.
We feel that the most prudent and cost-effective use of
that soil is to use it as a causeway, to construct a causeway
between Enewetak island and its neighboring Medren island. The
reason we believe this to be acceptable is the problem with
cesium in the soil on the northern islands is that if plants
are grown, coconuts, pandanus and other locally grown foods, it
accumulates in the food.
So it is the food pathway that is the problem. If it is
used as a fill material for a causeway, that problem goes away.
In about 100 years, the radioactivity itself will go away. We
feel that is the most cost-effective and productive use of that
material.
By the way, that aspect of our analysis is where we differ
significantly from DOE. We think a lot more scraping needs to
be done to achieve the cleanup criteria. The second thing where
we do agree with DOE is that, yes, on areas where the
contamination is at a lower level and after you have scraped
away the higher levels, the use of potassium to suppress the
uptake of cesium in the coconut and pandanus, et cetera, will
be very effective in controlling exposures; but under a
carefully monitored program, this is a type of institutional
control that Mr. Richardson mentioned, the areas that are
scraped will need to be rehabilitated and the agriculture
properties will have to be restored when you scrape away soil.
There is another element that makes up the program. There
is also a special unique problem in one of the northern islands
called the Runit island that has an area called the Fig/Quince
Area where there are some elevated levels of plutonium.
This is the only area that our review of the data reveals
that has a problem in addition to cesium and that requires a
special cleanup. That is part of our proposed strategy. Based
on that recommendation, we have estimated the cost. Including a
15 percent contingency, the cost of that program, the
combination program, would be $115 million. That concludes my
statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mauro follows:]
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Mr. Doolittle. Thank you very much. Mr. deBrum, did I
understand you to say that the fund is going to be $23 million
short in order to compensate the people the law provides for?
Mr. Oscar deBrum. I think it was $29 million. Yes, sir.
Mr. Doolittle. But there is some discussion now, isn't
there, about whether it should be--the law should be changed
and applied to anyone affected, not just to people in those
four northern atolls? Is that correct?
Mr. Oscar deBrum. Well, yes, Mr. Chairman. We consider that
all of the people of the Marshall Islands got affected by the
radiation. But those directly affected by the four atoll--
people--essentially have been people who are dying without
receiving full compensation. This is the reason why we are
asking for the additional $29 million so that we----
Mr. Doolittle. Just to deal with the ones with the
initial--the standard that is in the law now, the four atolls?
Mr. Oscar deBrum. Right.
Mr. Doolittle. Just out of curiosity, since you grew up in
the Marshall Islands, do you remember seeing any of these
experiments?
Mr. Oscar deBrum. What was the question, sir?
Mr. Doolittle. Were you able to visually see any of these
bombs exploding?
Mr. Oscar deBrum. From a distance, yes. I was in Kwajalein
when BRAVO shot was----
Mr. Doolittle. So you could see the----
Mr. Oscar deBrum. Oh, yes. No one could have missed it. It
turned night--early morning into daylight. That is how bright
it was.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Chairman, do you yield?
Mr. Doolittle. Yes.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I just want to note the gentleman from
Hawaii, Mr. Abercrombie, testified earlier in a subcommittee
meeting that even those living in Hawaii literally saw the
whole sky light just like noonday when one of our nuclear
detonations took place in the Marshalls.
So to the extent of he being exposed--even those of us in
Samoa also saw this. You are talking about 6,000 or 7,000 miles
away from the detonation point. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Doolittle. Remarkable.
Mr. Oscar deBrum. Mr. Chairman, we stand corrected on that.
The figure was $22.9 million.
Mr. Doolittle. Thank you.
Mr. Oscar deBrum. Thank you.
Mr. Doolittle. Are you going to raise during these
negotiations with the United States government--are you going
to raise this issue of whether the area deemed to be affected
should be broadened from what it presently is in the law?
Mr. Oscar deBrum. Mr. Chairman, I brought an attorney from
my office for a question such as this. With your permission, I
would like to have his opinion.
Mr. Doolittle. Certainly.
Mr. Oscar deBrum. Mr. Jim Plasman.
Mr. Plasman. Mr. Chairman, James Plasman. I am also a
member of the tribunal.
Mr. Doolittle. You can take a seat right down there at the
end, if you would like.
Mr. Plasman. To the extent that that question involves
negotiations between the U.S. and the government of the
Marshall Islands, the tribunal will not be formally involved in
that matter; and I think that question you should probably be
addressing to the government itself.
Mr. Doolittle. Well, let us see. I think that the panel has
passed us by already. We will submit it in writing. How is
that? I would be interested in the opinion.
There is still a lot of cleanup left to do. Do we sprinkle
potassium on places in Nevada and Utah to be able to grow food,
or is that something that we just do in the Marshall Islands?
Dr. Mauro. There is no plan to occupy the contaminated
areas at the Nevada test sites. However, the use of potassium
has been demonstrated to be effective. If, in fact, you plan to
grow material in soil that contains slightly elevated levels of
cesium, it will get the levels down in the plants that grow
there. The work that we performed, it is safe and effective to
the limited extent that it can achieve what you are trying to
achieve.
Mr. Doolittle. I have heard about the deaths from cancer.
Is there any problem with passing on the problems to the babies
that are born, or is it just pretty much limited to cancer and
those kinds of things to the affected individuals?
Dr. Mauro. What we did in terms of looking at this problem
was, in addition to calculating the radiation dose that would
occur to people if they were to return without any additional
remediation, we also estimated the collective health impact on
the population that would live there in the future for the next
several hundred years would also bear a potential health burden
of adverse health effects which includes primarily cancer but
also some genetic effects.
We estimated that the collective health burden on the
population would probably be about 10 additional serious
illnesses, including cancer and birth defects if there is no
additional cleanup.
Mr. Doolittle. I realize my time is up. Indulge me in one
further question here. I guess Nevada and the Marshall Islands
and the only other place that these weapons have actually been
used is in Japan; is that right?
Dr. Mauro. I believe so.
Mr. Doolittle. What does the data show about there in
Hiroshima and Nagasaki where similar weapons were used? Do they
continue to have problems until this day?
Mr. Richardson. Practically all of our risk estimates for
radiation damage are based on the follow-up of the people that
were exposed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. That is the world's
largest and most long-continuing epidemiological study.
It still continues today and involves many hundreds of
thousands of people. It provides one of the best-documented
bases for risk estimates of a carcinogen that we have--the most
recent review by the National Academy of Sciences of the risks
that were demonstrated in Hiroshima and Nagasaki places a
factor of only two or three--uncertainty at the 95 confidence
level. These are the risk estimates generally used in radiation
protection today.
Mr. Doolittle. Actually, there are more places. The French
have done some testing and the Soviet Union. I guess there are
others, aren't there?
Mr. Richardson. Yes, but there are not good records on the
exposures in most of those places.
Mr. Doolittle. Okay. Thank you. Mr. Faleomavaega is
recognized.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. deBrum, I
just wanted to follow up on your statement. You mentioned in
reference that Congress enacted the Downwinders' Act of 1990.
And the fact that those who were affected during the Nevada
testing program that the total--you are talking about kiloton
or megaton levels was about 1.16 megatons, compared to what the
Marshallese were exposed to is 93 megatons.
I didn't get the gist of your statement, Mr. deBrum, how
much compensation that Congress gave to those that were exposed
to the Nevada test sites. What was the total appropriation? Was
that--well, anyway, we will get that for the record, as my time
is running out.
You also indicated, Mr. deBrum, that on a comparative
basis, those who were exposed to iodine-131 in measurement in
curies, the Marshalls, 6.36 billion curies; the Nevada test
site 153 million curies; Chernoble disaster was 40 million
curies; and the Hanford operation was only 739,000 curies.
Dr. Richardson, can you explain what this iodine-131 does
to human beings in a comparative analysis made of Mr. deBrum's
statement?
Mr. Richardson. The effect of iodine exposure is thyroid
cancer as well as thyroid nodules. The current estimates on the
rate of lethality for thyroid cancer, in portions of the world
where there is good hospital care immediately available, easily
available, is about one tenth. In areas where good medical care
is not nearly as well available, the prognosis is not so good.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Dr. Richardson, I had raised an earlier
question with Secretary Seligman, and I am still not satisfied
with his response. If I were a nuclear victim being duly
exposed seriously to nuclear contamination as a Marshallese
citizen would be and if I wanted to get the best medical advice
for examination, where would I go today?
Mr. Richardson. I would hesitate to answer that question.
There are many experts in this country. It would depend on the
type of radiation damage or sickness or cancer that was
involved.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Let us say iodine-131 exposure.
Mr. Richardson. The interesting thing about cancer that is
caused by radiation is that it is no different from cancers
that are caused by other agents. It is cancer. And so the best
places to go if you have radiogenic cancer are places that are
well known generally for cancer treatment in this country.
There is no special place to go for a radiation-induced cancer.
Mr. Faleomavaega. So cancer I get from nuclear detonation
is no different than the cancer that I get from other sources?
Mr. Richardson. That is correct.
Mr. Faleomavaega. What about if the frequency of the cancer
happens to be from nuclear contamination?
Mr. Richardson. I am not sure I follow the question.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Let us say that the whole community in
Rongelap were exposed seriously to nuclear contamination and
that the frequency of thyroid gland cancer, leukemia and all of
these things simply because they have more direct exposure than
any other people, if I really wanted to seriously take care of
these people as best can--this is why I get very upset because
I didn't get the answer. I didn't get the answer. Where would I
go today?
The reason I raise Japan was they seem to be the only ones
that are very serious about taking care of the human beings
that were subjected to Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Mr. Richardson. What I would suggest is a very careful
monitoring program be established in the population for early
detection of any possible cancer which should then be treated
in the normal way.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Which we didn't do a very good job. Would
you agree or disagree?
Mr. Richardson. I would agree.
Mr. Mauro. I want to put a pitch in for New York University
Medical Center where I received my doctorate. They had an
extensive program and had the world's best epidemiologist and
radiobiologist. That is where I would go.
If I received an elevated dose of radiation, I would go to
NYU Medical center, and I would consult with Dr. Arthur Upton
and Dr. Roy Shore. And Dr. Roy Shore deals with epidemiological
issues, and Dr. Upton deals with medical issues.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Dr. Mauro, the problem we have--we had a
hearing in 1994. We had nuclear scientists disagree even among
themselves, one holding up the facts and information simply
because he wasn't going to get paid. That to me is just absurd,
and I just could not believe that this happens. Mr. Chairman, I
would really like some more time.
Mr. Doolittle. Go ahead and take it.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Dr. Richardson, I am glad you mentioned
the fact that you were formerly involved with the international
agency--is it the IAEA?
Mr. Richardson. Yes, the International Atomic Energy
Agency.
Mr. Faleomavaega. You were directly involved with that
agency?
Mr. Richardson. I served on a series of consultant groups
that wrote many of their safety standards.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I am totally confused at this point in
time, Dr. Richardson, in terms of the standards that we apply
for those who are exposed to nuclear contamination. You seem to
suggest here that EPA has a different standard from DOE as far
as U.S. standards are concerned?
Mr. Richardson. DOE doesn't actually have a standard that
applies to CERCLA sites. DOE cites other authorities'
standards. The standard that is applied in the United States--
in the vast majority of cases--is the standard that I
mentioned, the 15 millirems per year.
Mr. Faleomavaega. You mentioned also that we should apply
the international standard to the Marshallese?
Mr. Richardson. No. What I said was that when you ask the
question what standard should apply to the Marshallese, given
that 15 millirems applies in the United States, the IAEA has
provided the answer in the form of a principle which says that
when a country exposes foreign nationals, it should apply to
that situation the same standard that it would apply to its own
people.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Unbeknown to many Americans, the French
Government conducted over 200 nuclear tests in the South
Pacific in French Polynesia. You know what happened when Chirac
broke the moratorium and continued the testing.
Now, after all of these years of concerns, they literally
made Swiss cheese out of this one atoll that they kept putting
3,000 meters in depth of these nuclear detonation devices. Now
the latest admission by the French Government just came out
this week, I believe, that there begins now to be cracks or
fissures within this atoll where these nuclear explosions took
place.
Do you have an opinion in terms of what might be happening
if this fissure, or these cracks, of these 200 nuclear bombs
that were exploded in this atoll, what might happen to the
environment of the Pacific region?
Mr. Richardson. That is really not a question that I am
prepared to answer. That is a question for a geologist or an
oceanographer.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Well, let us say that if you were a
closer advisor to the IAEA, what would be your recommendation
for IAEA to do at this point in time because of this admission?
Mr. Richardson. Quite frankly, I am not sure the IAEA would
have any idea of what to do.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Dr. Richardson. My question
this time is for Dr. Mauro. You mentioned that you made a study
of Enewetak. Is this strictly an environmental study, or did
you also do anything in terms of the people?
Of the 67 nuclear bombs that we exploded in the Marshalls,
44 were conducted in Enewetak. Are you aware of that, Dr.
Mauro?
Dr. Mauro. Yes, I am.
Mr. Faleomavaega. How many people were exposed to this?
Dr. Mauro. I didn't look into that. To answer your
question, strictly environmental, our mandate was very narrow:
collect the data, characterize the radiological conditions, and
evaluate what the radiation doses and health risks would be if
people were to return to those islands and what are some
plausible ways of remediating that problem. No, I could not
answer your question.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Your recommendation as a result of this
study that you conducted from October to April?
Dr. Mauro. My recommendation is what I call a combined
approach where you scrape away the contaminated soil that is
above a given level, specifically 1.7 pico curies per gram and
areas where the contamination that is remaining is above .37
pico curies per gram use potassium.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Your company doesn't do anything about
conducting feasibility studies of nuclear storage programs, do
you?
Dr. Mauro. No. Most of our work we do for EPA and the
organizations that regulate to the Department of Energy, as
opposed to the Department of Energy.
Mr. Faleomavaega. We did a nuclear storage thing in the
Marshalls in this one atoll. Forgive me, Mr. deBrum. What was
the name of the atoll?
Mr. Oscar deBrum. Runit.
Mr. Faleomavaega. About the size of three football fields.
It is my understanding now there begins to be leakages
underneath this beautiful storage facility that we provided.
Dr. Mauro. Yes, I am familiar with that.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Do you think your company might be
contracted to go down there to find out if this thing is
leaking?
Dr. Mauro. There is no doubt that it is leaking. The
question is is it substantially changing the inventory of
radioactivity that is already in the sediments in the lagoon?
We reviewed a lot of work that was done on that subject to see
if, in fact, that could result in a significant public health
issue.
Part of our recommendation is that from the data that we
looked at it appears that, yes, there is a very good likelihood
that the material that is contained in the dome is continuing
to leach and find its way into the lagoon.
However, the additional curies that would be added is small
compared to the curies that are there already. Based on the
data that we are looking at, it appears that the fish are not
accumulating the radioactivity. For all intents and purposes,
the fish that have been sampled in the lagoon and in the nearby
ocean contain levels of radionuclide that are well below the
criteria.
So on that basis, we consider the limiting pathway by far
is cesium 137 in the soil and not the marine environment.
Nevertheless, part of our recommendation is to include a
comprehensive environmental measurements program around the
Runit dome to confirm these findings.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I don't know, Dr. Mauro, if you are aware
that that sigitary poisoning, which is a very deadly toxin as
it comes out of the reefs in the Pacific not only in the areas
where these nuclear tests were conducted in French Polynesia,
but this same level of toxin, sigitary poisoning, is also true
in the Marshalls. Are you aware of that?
Dr. Mauro. No, I am not.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Chairman, I submit that--all I can
say, Mr. Chairman, is the Marshallese people are good people.
They are not here for handouts. They are just simply asking us,
as they have been trying for how many years now, Mr. Chairman,
for our government to meet and to measure up to what we have
committed honorably to do for these people, and we have failed
miserably.
I sincerely hope, Mr. Chairman, that in the course of the
coming months that we will give the Marshallese people their
due. They are not asking for handouts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
and I want to thank the members of the panel.
Mr. Doolittle. Thank you. I too thank the members of the
panel. I would ask you to respond expeditiously to any
supplementary questions that we may tender to you. With that,
we will excuse the members of this panel and the hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
[Additional material submitted for the record follows.]
Statement of Senator Henchi Balos, Bikini Atoll Representative,
Marshall Islands Nitijela
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
With me are Mayor Tomaki Juda, Speaker Kessai Note, Councilman
Lucky Juda, Council advisor Johnny Johnson, Trust Liaison Jack
Niedenthal and legal counsel Jonathan Weisgall
As you know, the U.S. Government moved us off our atoll in
1946 and conducted 23 atomic and hydrogen bomb tests there over
the next 12 years, including the largest bomb tests in U.S.
history. Meanwhile, our people were moved first to Rongerik
Atoll, where we nearly starved to death, then briefly to
Kwajalein, and then finally to Kili in 1948.
Sadly, Kili remains home to most Bikinians more than 53
years after the testing began, and life there remains
difficult. Kili is a single island. It has no lagoon. Bikini,
with its 23 islands and 243-square mile lagoon, is thousands of
times bigger. Kili has no sheltered fishing grounds, so the
skills we developed for lagoon and ocean life are useless on
Kili. This drastic change from life centered around fishing and
canoeing to life on an isolated island with no fishing area
continues to take a severe toll on our people.
Let me briefly review the issues facing our people today:
Radiological cleanup: We are using a Nuclear Claims
Tribunal proceeding to get an accurate cost estimate for the
radiological cleanup and resettlement of Bikini. We do not yet
know the exact price tag, but it will greatly exceed the money
in the Bikinians' Resettlement Trust Fund.
You will be hearing today from the other atolls about the
huge costs of the legacy of the U.S. nuclear testing program in
the Marshall Islands, ranging from health care costs to
property damages. These costs add up. In considering whether--
and how--to pay for them, I would like to make three points.
First, the money appropriated by Congress for Bikini cleanup
took into account only the cleanup of Bikini and Eneu, just two
of Bikini Atoll's 23 islands. Second, permit me to quote
Representative John Seiberling of Ohio, a former member of this
Committee, who in 1984 said that ``there will be a question as
to whether we should go as far as some of us think we need to
go, including the restoration of Bikini.'' His answer: ``I
would only say that the costs of this program are a tiny
fraction of the costs of that nuclear testing program.''
Third, I believe that the additional funding needed to
complete the cleanup of Bikini should come not from the
Interior Department budget, but rather from the budget of the
Department of Energy's Environmental Management, which is
earmarked for cleanups in 23 states that were involved in the
U.S. nuclear weapons testing program. That program is estimated
to cost $147 billion, and for the last three years Congress has
appropriated an average of $5.75 billion for the program, This
is where the cleanup costs for Bikini should come from. And
while the $90 million already appropriated sounds like a lot of
money, more than double that will be needed to complete the
job. But let me remind you that the U.S. Government has spent
more than $10 billion--billion--at just one U.S. nuclear
weapons site--Hanford--without removing any contaminated soil.
Worker safety: As the cleanup of Bikini occurs, we have
asked our experts to design a radiation protection plan that is
at least as low as occupational radiation exposure limits. The
cost estimates for Bikini cleanup will include a separate
number for worker radiation safety.
Guarantee of Bikini Atoll's safety: In 1968, President
Lyndon Johnson, relying on a report from the Atomic Energy
Commission, announced that Bikini Atoll was safe and that our
people could return home. That report proved to be wrong.
Thirty years later, scientists from around the world, including
the United States, are telling our people once again that it is
safe to go back home under certain circumstances. The Bikini
people, for reasons I am sure you can understand, do not trust
U.S. Government scientists, and there is no one in our
community with the expertise to tell us whether or not Bikini
can be safely resettled. lf we return home we want the U.S.
Government to guarantee Bikini's safety.
When our leaders raised this issue last year with Secretary
Babbitt, he said the decision was up to us, not the United
States, and he urged them to turn to our own experts for
advice. He also said that a written guarantee went against the
spirit of trust that is assumed by the Compact. Our response is
the same as President Reagan's to the Russians in the 1980s:
Trust, but verify. We still want a guarantee of Bikini's safety
if we return home.
Health care: The 177 health care program, which is
supported by a $2 million annual grant under the Section 177
agreement has proven to be inadequate, due in large part to the
huge and unexpected enrollment of individuals in the four-attol
health care program. For example, in just 13 years, from 1983
to 19996, the number of people in the program rose from 2,300
to nearly 11,500. Moreover, this funding has not been adjusted
for inflation, so the value of the $2 million annual payment,
which began in 1988, is now less than half that.
As a result of the failure of this program, the Bikini
community has been forced to spend more and more of its
resources on health care. Health care costs have, risen from
$350,000 in 1994 to $850,000 for this fiscal year. After Bikini
cleanup, it's the largest expenditure in the Resettlement Trust
Fund.
U.S.D.A. food: We thank the Congress for extending the
U.S.D.A. food program for another five years. This program will
be needed for Bikini people until we are living safely at
Bikini Atoll, its soil has been restored and the people are
able to eat safely a local diet. We urge that this be included
in the extension of the Compact, but without a five-year
limitation and with directions to reflect the changes in the
population.
Continuation of the Compact of Free Association: Although
this is a government-to-government question, I want to remind
you that the radiation at Bikini will last well after 2001. The
United States has a legal responsibility and moral obligation
to assist the people of Bikini until they are living safely
back on all their islands. That responsibility should not be
shifted, to the Government of the Marshall Islands. It did not
create the nuclear problem and it lacks the resources and
expertise to care for our needs. We hope this Committee will
echo the words of Interior Secretary Babbitt, who told us just
one year ago that ``the United States won't walk away from you
or from this obligation, I feel very deeply that we have a
moral commitment to you.''
Changed circumstances: This hearing may not be the place to
debate this issue, but let me leave you with one black and
white example. For years we thought the only islands at Bikini
that were vaporized were the ones near the 1954 Bravo shot. We
now know from a 1968 AEC document that the area of one island
in the Aerokoj-Eneman group was reduced from 67.1 acres to 25
acres. Forty-two acres were vaporized, nearly two-thirds of the
entire island. The destruction to this island was more than
twice as much as the destruction caused by the Bravo shot, but
this document was not made public until last year. If it been
made public during the original Compact negotiations, it would
have had an impact on those negotiations.
3 percent Distribution From Resettlement Trust Fund:
Lastly, we seek your support for a 3 percent distribution from
the Resettlement Trust Fund. Congress appropriated funds in
1982 and then again in 1988 to establish this trust fund, which
is used both for the cleanup of Bikini and for the ongoing
needs of the Bikini people. Thanks to our excellent money
managers and our voluntary restraint on the use of these funds,
the corpus is still there and the fund has grown by almost 14
percent annually. While the income is not enough for our needs,
I am proud to report that for 17 years, every dollar has been
accounted for, annual audits are prepared, and monthly
financial statements are sent to the Interior Department.
We now know that the cost of cleaning up Bikini will
greatly exceed the amount of money in the trust. As a result,
it is certain that many Bikini elders, who have not been back
on their home islands for more than 53 years, will probably die
on Kili without returning home. In light of the strength of the
trust and regular audits, the lengthy time a cleanup and
restoration will take, and the special circumstances of the
elders, we urge you to support a one-time 3 percent
distribution from this trust fund, It will not require an
appropriation of funds by Congress and it will not diminish the
original corpus of the trust.
Thank you. I would be pleased to answer any questions you
may have.
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