[Senate Hearing 105-844]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 105-844
U.S. ANTI-DRUG INTERDICTION EFFORTS AND THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE DRUG
ELIMINATION ACT
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SENATE CAUCUS ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL
AND THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 16, 1998
__________
Printed for the use of the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics
Control and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
51-088 WASHINGTON : 1998
SENATE CAUCUS ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL
CHARLES GRASSLEY, Iowa, Chairman
ALFONSE D'AMATO, New York JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
FRANK MURKOWSKI, Alaska BOB GRAHAM, Florida
JEFFREY SESSIONS, Alabama DIANE FEINSTEIN, California
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
James W. Nance, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Banks, Samuel H., Deputy Commissioner, United States Customs
Service........................................................ 36
Brownfield, William R., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs............ 34
Crane, Dr. Barry D., Project Leader, Institute for Defense
Analyses....................................................... 54
Dewine, Hon. Mike, U.S. Senator from Ohio........................ 5
Hinton, Henry L., Assistant Comptroller General, National
Security and International Affairs Division, General Accounting
Office......................................................... 52
Loy, Admiral James M., Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard.............. 37
Marshall, Donnie R., Acting Deputy Administrator, Drug
Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice.............. 32
McCaffrey, Barry R., Director, Office of National Drug Control
Policy......................................................... 13
Rivolo, Dr. A. Rex, Principal Analyst, Institute for Defense
Analyses....................................................... 55
Sheridan, Brian E., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict...... 31
Appendix
Prepared Statements
Prepared Statement of Samuel H. Banks........................ 61
Prepared Statement of William R. Brownfield.................. 62
Prepared Statement of Senator Alfonse D'Amato................ 67
Prepared Statement of Senator Bob Graham..................... 68
Prepared Statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr.................... 69
Prepared Statement of Admiral James M. Loy, USCG............. 75
Prepared Statement of Donnie R. Marshall..................... 77
Prepared Statement of Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey................ 84
Prepared Statement of Brian E. Sheridan...................... 89
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record by
Members of the Committee and the Task Force
Questions Submitted to Samuel H. Banks....................... 92
Questions Submitted to William R. Brownfield................. 95
Questions Submitted to Dr. Barry D. Crane.................... 97
Questions Submitted to Henry L. Hinton, Jr................... 99
Questions Submitted to Admiral James M. Loy, USCG............ 100
Questions Submitted to Donnie R. Marshall.................... 101
Questions Submitted to the Honorable Barry McCaffrey......... 107
Questions Submitted to Dr. A. Rex Rivolo..................... 112
Questions Submitted to Brian E. Sheridan..................... 113
(iii)
U.S. ANTI-DRUG INTERDICTION EFFORTS AND THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE DRUG
ELIMINATION ACT
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1998
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations and Caucus on International
Narcotics Control,
Washington, DC.
The committee and the caucus met, pursuant to notice, at
9:38 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon.
Paul Coverdell and Charles E. Grassley presiding. Present:
Senators Coverdell, Biden, Feinstein, and Graham. Also Present:
Senators Grassley and DeWine.
Senator Coverdell. We will come to order.
This morning we are holding a joint hearing of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Caucus on
International Narcotics Control to consider the topic of United
States drug interdiction efforts and the Western Hemisphere
Drug Elimination Act, S. 2341.
We are most pleased to have Chairman Grassley, of the
Senate Drug Caucus, and Senator Biden, ranking, of the Drug
Caucus and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, here as
well. We are joined by the original cosponsor of S. 2341,
Senator DeWine.
General, welcome. You will constitute the first panel. I
would hope that you might try to limit your opening remarks to
the 10- to 15-minute range, so that we would have good
interplay with Senate members here.
I have to say that recent data is disturbing again, and I
think underscores, General, on behalf of the Congress and the
administration, a requirement for accelerated and, as you have
heard me say before, bolder steps than we are currently
envisioning. And on August 21, 1998, the National Household
Survey on Drug Abuse, conducted by the Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Administration, was released. That report
indicates that in 1997, 13.9 million Americans 12 and over
cited themselves as current users of illicit drugs, a 7-percent
increase from 1996.
Now, last year, we thought that the fever broke. We saw a
tick down. And I was encouraged by that. But I think, on
review, we have not seen what we thought might be happening.
Current illicit drug use among our Nation's youth continues
to increase at an alarming rate. From 1992 to 1997, youth, aged
12 to 17, using illegal drugs has more than doubled, 120
percent, with a 27-percent increase from 1996 to 1997 alone.
On September 1, 1998, a Back to School 1998, CASAT survey
conducted by the National Center on Addiction and Substance
Abuse, at Columbia University, was released. A majority, 51
percent, of high school students say the drug problem is
getting worse. I can confirm that on my visits, school to
school to school, our youngsters know what is happening, and
they will repeat this over and over, that drugs are their
number one problem, and there is not even a close second.
For the fourth straight year, both middle and high school
students say that drugs are their biggest concern. More than
three-quarters of high school teens report that drugs are used,
sold and kept at their schools, an increase of 72 percent, in
1996, to 78 percent, in 1998. And I saw one figure that
recently suggested a 73-percent increase in 12- to 13-year-
olds. Which, General, you and I have both agreed, the target
audience of this narcotic structure is younger and younger,
more vulnerable, more vulnerable, more dangerous, more long-
lasting.
So I welcome Senator DeWine's work and the work of the Drug
Caucus in any attempt to accelerate, accelerate. I have been
saying, General, I do not think we should recognize the drug
war in 24 months. It needs refitting.
I was in three schools this past week. Everybody knows the
dilemma of a gray-hair talking to 500 middle school or high
school students. They are your toughest audience in the world.
And you wait for the fidgeting, a giggle here and there. Rapt
silence. Rapt silence in the discussion of this crisis. They
are attentive. They are alert.
This is the beginning of a school year, and it is a very
special time for all of us to be communicating to these
students. And with that, I turn to the chairman of the Senate
Drug Caucus, the distinguished Senator from Iowa, Chuck
Grassley.
Senator Grassley. Of course, I want to thank the Co-
Chairman, and, more important, members of the minority party,
in my case, working very closely with Senator Biden, through
the Caucus, but also members of the Foreign Relations
Committee, for their time and their attention to a very
important issue. And also we ought to thank our witnesses for
appearing before us today to discuss our efforts to control the
flow of drugs into our country.
In 1996, when Senator Dole was still leader of the Senate,
he asked Senator Hatch and me to work with the House to review
our drug policy efforts. The subsequent report, called Setting
the Course on National Drug Strategy, noted then serious
declines in commitments by the administration to support
interdiction programs. I am not going to rehash those
shortfalls here.
I want to note, however, that they were serious, and
undermined this country's interdiction program in both source
countries and in transit zones. That report also noted that as
a consequence of a decline in sustained attention to our
counterdrug efforts, teenage drug use was on the rise, after
years of decline. Now, that report came out 2 years ago.
Since then, the level of teenage use has continued to grow.
More kids are using drugs. Kids are starting to use drugs at an
earlier age. And more kids are seeing no harm--that is the
message--no harm to using drugs.
In addition, we have seen growing efforts across the
country, promoting drug legalization. So we have a very muddled
message. We see the results in teenage drug use. I know there
are efforts of publicity, both in the private sector and the
public sector to counteract that. And obviously we hope that
that has a very positive impact. But as it now stands, our
efforts are not having desired effects.
There is good news, but there is also bad news. The bad
news is that our policies and strategies are not working. The
good news is that we have lots of them. And in my view, it is
not sufficient just to have plans; we need to ensure that those
plans are working. Our goal is not to have plans, but to have
results.
At the moment, we seem to be a day late and a dollar short.
What this hearing is all about is what we can do to change
that. So I welcome General McCaffrey before us, as well as our
other witnesses. And obviously I thank General McCaffrey for
his recent endorsement of a resolution that Senator Kyl and I
have been working on. We will be presenting this resolution
later, and I ask for support. And I want to thank General
McCaffrey for his support on the issue.
I also look forward to what he and other witnesses have to
say about next steps in our interdiction effort and what they
should be. I think that we all share the same goal: lowering
drug use and stopping the flow of illegal drugs. Unfortunately,
we are not meeting that goal. We need more and we need better.
And I yield the floor.
Senator Coverdell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I now turn to our ranking chair, Senator Biden, of
Delaware.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General, I want the record to know, just as two colonels do
not make a general, having the hat of ranking member on two
committees does not make a chairman, unfortunately. As you all
know, ranking is a euphemism for having no power. But I have an
opinion, and I have had one for a long time in this area.
[Laughter.]
Senator Biden. Let me commend Senator Grassley and Senator
Coverdell for their efforts here. There is a lot of
partisanship up here on the Hill the last 4 years--an equal
measure on both sides. But in my working with Senator Coverdell
and Senator Grassley and Senator DeWine, I have not found that
to be the case.
I suspect we have, and I think I know you well, General,
and you and I have worked very, very, closely since you have
had this job, on drug issues. I know, I would think it is fair
to say, we have some disagreements with the solutions that they
have offered. But my criticism, to the extent than any occurs,
does not relate to my in any way suggesting that I doubt the
motives or the sincerity of the effort any more than I think
they doubt mine.
The focus in today's hearing, as I understand it, is
legislation to authorize an additional $2.6 billion over the
next 3 fiscal years for interdiction and international
programs. At the outset, let me state my agreement with the
principle underlying the legislation. That is, more
interdiction resources are needed.
Interdiction is not the solution, in my view, to the drug
war, but it is a very key element to any comprehensive
approach. And wisely deployed, as you did when you were running
the show on this issue at the Defense Department, General--at
least the Defense part of it--wisely deployed, interdiction
assets can increase the cost to traffickers by increasing their
uncertainty. And increasing the cost to the traffickers can,
over time--over time--increase the price of drugs on the
street, thereby reducing their availability.
But let us not deceive ourselves about this or any other
legislation which boldly proclaims itself as the Western
Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act. Let us not deceive ourselves
that this is going to lead us to that promised land.
First, the bill--as I said, extremely well intended as we
all know because of the way this place works--has come too late
to have any meaningful effect on fiscal year 1999
appropriations. Nearly all such legislation has moved through
the Senate. I guess the hope is the House had not done much of
anything on appropriations, so maybe we are going to have a
special session or something afterwards and we have a shot. But
in the normal course of events, it is passed us already.
And though Senator DeWine has succeeded in adding some
interdiction funding to various parts of the budget, for which
I commend him, I would note that just 2 weeks ago, the U.S.
Senate reduced funding for the State Department's International
Narcotics Program by $53 million from the President's request,
and $8 million below last year's level.
Second, the bill makes an easy choice--more resources for
interdiction--without making the hard decisions about where the
funding will be found. As my colleagues well know, and you have
come to painfully understand, General, under our so-called
Balanced Budget Act, everything around here is a zero-sum game.
More money for one account means less money for another
account, period. More money for one account means less money
for another account. So it is nice for us to say we are going
to spend this money; we have got to figure where we are going
to cut the money.
The only way to circumvent the budget rules we have imposed
upon ourselves is to declare, quote, an emergency, and thus
exempt the spending from the budget caps we are locked into. I
am ready to discuss that. Because, as the chairman says, there
is an emergency out there. We all talk in terms of emergency.
If this is a real emergency, let us go to the floor, say it is
an emergency, raise the caps, stop fooling around, and get the
money.
Third, I find it bizarre that we would be suggesting that
the Narcotics Bureau be removed from the State Department, and
its International Programs transferred to the DEA. Now, look,
as you know, General, I have been the most outspoken critic of
the State Department over its refusal to put drugs in the same
category of other serious international bilateral and
multilateral relations that we have. The bill does not make
that decision, I acknowledge, but it asks you to study the
recommendations of whether such a transfer should occur.
As I said, I have always questioned the State Department's
commitment to the drug war under Republican and Democratic
Presidents. They would much rather carry treaties in their
briefcases than talk about that dirty business of drugs. And I
understand that. But the Department has made some progress, and
we have to recognize it.
If, however, the responsibility for international narcotics
programs is removed from the State Department, we will no
longer have any questions--the State Department will have no
commitment to the drug effort--mark my words. If we take it out
of State, they will go exactly where they want--have no part of
this deal--none--zero. If divested of the operational and
fiscal responsibility for fighting drugs, the State Department,
I think, will marginalize the issue still further in this
administration and any future administration, leading, in my
view, to a severe de-emphasis of the issue in our foreign
policy.
I do not think this is a result we should look for, we
should welcome, and we should try to avoid. So I look forward
to hearing from you, General, and our other witnesses today,
and state again for the record that I think you are doing one
heck of a job. To be honest with you, I do not think the
President is speaking out enough, and I do not think the
Republican-controlled Congress has come up with the bucks
enough. You have got a tough job. But you are doing the job
well. And I hope you will be, as you always have been, candid
with us.
And I hope you will listen to the advice of your father and
not the advice of anyone else, and be straight-up with us about
whether or not you think what these guys are suggesting makes
sense. Maybe it does. But if you do not think it does, you are
no longer a General. You are in the midst of a political--a
political--maelstrom here. I know you like--you are always
telling me, Joe, I do not want to say that because that will
sound partisan. Say what you think. If you do not like what
they say, tell them. If you like what they say, tell them. If
you do not like what I say, tell me.
Senator Coverdell. He has in the past.
Senator Biden. I know. I am just saying this guy, you have
taken the uniform off, get the mind set out of there. This is a
political battleground as well as a substantive one. Say what
you think. And I am looking forward to hearing it. And, again,
I thank my colleagues for, as usual, putting up with me.
Thank you.
Senator Coverdell. Thank you, Mr. Ranking. [Laughter.]
Senator Biden. And likely to be for some time to come.
Senator Coverdell. I now want to turn to the principal
author of S. 2341 for an opening statement, Senator DeWine.
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE DEWINE, U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO
Senator DeWine. Senator Coverdell, thank you very much.
Let me just say to the General that I am sure he will take
Senator Biden's words to heart. I do not know if the advice is
really needed, though. He has always been rather candid with
me. He has already told me the things he does not like about
the bill. So I am sure we are going to hear that today.
General, welcome. We are glad you are here today. We
appreciate it very much.
Mr. Chairman, let me thank you and let me thank Senator
Grassley for holding this hearing. As you have pointed out, we
introduced a bill in July, along with Senator Graham. A
companion bill was introduced in the House of Representatives
by Bill McCollum and Dennis Hastert. This is a bill that is
aimed at, we believe, restoring the balance in our anti-drug
efforts. This bill would authorize an additional $2.6 billion
investment in international counternarcotics efforts over the
next 3 years.
This investment would allow for a more aggressive and
effective eradication, interdiction and crop substitution
strategy. Bluntly, our objective is to dramatically reduce the
amount of drugs coming into the United States, drive up the
price of drugs, and therefore reduce drug consumption. It is as
simple as that. On a larger scale, this legislation takes a
major step toward correcting what we believe is an imbalance--
an imbalance in our overall drug control strategy, an imbalance
that has emerged over the course of the last decade.
I have stated to you, General, and I have stated it to my
colleagues and I have stated it long before I came to the U.S.
Senate, that I believe we have to have a balanced anti-drug
strategy. And I have felt that some of the debates that we get
into about the importance of one versus the other is not very
helpful. I think you have to have a domestic law enforcement
component. I think you have to have a good treatment component.
I think you have to have education or prevention. And I think
you have to have an international component. It has to be a
balanced drug strategy.
And really, what this hearing is going to be about, in
part, is a discussion, I think, about whether or not we do have
that balanced strategy. I happen to think that it is not. I
think the General has done a very good job. I do not believe,
however, that this administration has given him the resources
and that we have given him the resources to deal with the
international component of this.
What this bill is intended to do is to bring back that
balance, a balance that historically we have had between the
three major components of an anti-drug effort. A balanced drug
control plan is one that makes a strong commitment in three
areas. One, demand reduction, such as prevention, treatment and
education; two, domestic law enforcement; and, three,
international eradication and interdiction efforts.
While this administration has demonstrated support for
demand reduction and domestic law enforcement components, I
believe it has done so at the expense of our international
eradication and interdiction components. As a result, our
overall anti-drug strategy has become imbalanced over time.
Now, this was not always the case. In 1987--just to cite a
few figures--in 1987, a $4.79 billion drug control budget was
divided as follows: 29 percent for demand reduction programs;
38 percent for domestic law enforcement; and 33 percent for
international eradication and interdiction efforts. This
balanced approach achieved real success. From 1988 to 1991,
total drug use was down 13 percent. Cocaine use dropped by 35
percent; marijuana use dropped by 16 percent.
This balanced drug approach ended, I believe, in 1993. Of
the $13.3 billion national drug control budget for 1995, 35
percent was allocated for demand reduction; 53 percent for law
enforcement; but only 12 percent for international and
interdiction efforts.
The fiscal year 1999 budget request is over $17 billion.
And of that amount, 34 percent is allocated for demand
reduction; 52 percent for law enforcement; but only 14 percent
for international and interdiction efforts.
Mr. Chairman, although this administration points to
funding increases for interdiction efforts over the last 2 to 3
years, it is still far short of the kind of commitment we were
making at the beginning of this decade. The result of this
imbalance has been, I believe, devastating: a decline in
cocaine seizures, a decline in the price of cocaine, and an
increase in drug use.
From 1992 through 1997, the proportion of young people,
aged 12 to 17, using illegal drugs has more than doubled, 120
percent, and has increased 27 percent just from 1996 to 1997.
For children 12 to 17, first-time heroin use, which could
be fatal, surged a whopping--just a huge 875 percent, from 1991
to 1996. The overall number of past-month heroin users
increased 378 percent, from 1993 through 1997.
Now, these negative trends have sent shock waves throughout
our communities, our schools and our homes. More children are
using drugs. I find it especially disturbing that drug
traffickers are seeking to increase their sales by targeting
children age 10 through 12. This has to stop. It is a clear and
imminent danger to the very heart of our society.
This is why this bill, I believe, is so timely. We need to
dedicate more resources for international efforts, to restore a
balanced drug control strategy. Now, let me make it very clear
again that I strongly support our continued commitment in
demand reduction and law enforcement programs. The General has
done a great job in pursuing these efforts. In the end,
reducing demand is the only real way to permanently end illegal
drug use. And I think we all know that. However, this will not
happen overnight. And I think we all know that, as well.
Further, effective interdiction can influence demand
through changes in price. Effective interdiction makes it far
more difficult for drug lords to bring drugs to our Nation and
make drugs far more costly to buy. That is why we need a
comprehensive counterdrug strategy, a drug strategy that
addresses all components of this problem.
Our legislation is intended to be a first step to restore a
balanced drug control strategy, by renewing our commitment to
international eradication and interdiction efforts. Today, over
75 of our colleagues, House and Senate, Republicans and
Democrats, are cosponsors of this bill. The House is scheduled
to vote on this bill later today. It is our hope that the
Senate will vote on our bill shortly, as well.
It is also our hope that if Congress approves this
legislation, the President will sign it into law. Since the
introduction of this bill, I have encouraged, time and time
again, I have encouraged the administration, members of the
administration, to provide us feedback, comments or changes
that they feel are necessary. This is a work in progress.
A number of ideas that we have received have been
incorporated into the House version, to be voted on today. And
I am looking forward to hearing more ideas today from our
distinguished panel.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, some can quibble over the
percentage goals as outlined in this legislation, and we can
talk about that. We may quibble about the manner in which it
was drafted or the strategic concepts. But this type of
discussion, frankly, is not a good use for our time and
energies today. What really matters are the resources. Are we
willing to put the resources into this fight?
We are fortunate today to have representatives from the
Drug Enforcement Administration, Customs, Coast Guard, State
and Departments, and the Drug Czar's Office. They are the
experts. They are the ones who are on the front lines. And we
respect that.
This is a great opportunity. This is a great opportunity to
hear from them and get their perspectives on how we can restore
a balanced drug control strategy. If there is quibbling about
how this bill spends the money, then we would like to hear how
they would think it should be spent. That is what we should be
talking about today.
What I want to know and what really matters is whether or
not the investments we provide in this bill, if we provided
them, can in fact make a difference. And let me just point out
that the Senate has already--has already--put in an additional
$143 million for fiscal year 1999 in the appropriations process
as a direct result of this bill: $39.5 million for the Coast
Guard, $15 million additional for Customs, $8 million
additional for crop substitution development programs, and $8
million for Defense. And we hope to continue that.
So this bill has already begun to have some effect. And I
think it should be looked at as we look at any authorization
bill. And that is as a framework for discussion, a framework to
outline what our goal should be, and how we intend, in this
case, to restore more balance to our anti-drug efforts.
I believe that the strong bipartisan support for this
legislation should demonstrate to the administration that
Congress is prepared to do more to reduce the flow of drugs. I
think the votes in the Senate already in the appropriations
bills would indicate that. I think we have a great opportunity
before us today to reclaim the initiative in this effort.
Let us be frank. In our anti-drug effort, Congress provides
the funds. We try to provide some of the vision, but the
agencies represented here are the ones who are on the front
lines every day and the ones who have to carry it out. The
dedicated men and women at these agencies are working to keep
drugs out of the hands of our children. And all we are trying
to do is to give them the additional resources to make that
work, make it do a better job, and to get that actual job done.
This bill is just the first step in our efforts to work
with the agencies represented here today. I expect to do more
in the future. In the past, when given the right amount of
resources, they have made a difference. They have contributed
to a winning effort to reduce drug abuse. I think it is time to
call on them again to make a difference.
Let me again thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to be
here, not as a member of the committee, and I appreciate it
very much.
Senator Coverdell. Thank you, Senator.
I would now turn to the Senator from California, Senator
Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And
let me thank you for holding this hearing. I think you know it
has been a great pleasure for me to work with you on these
matters over the last few years.
Mr. Chairman, I, as a mayor, as a county supervisor for a
long time, have dealt with the problem of drugs. I listened
carefully to the comments of the distinguished Senator from
Ohio. And I must say I agree with him, and I agree with what he
is trying to do. I have one point of departure. I think we
would all agree that the demand problem in the United States is
big and, to an extent, out of control. But demand is usually
met on the local level. The Federal Government can provide
money, but local jurisdictions carry out the prevention and the
demand reduction programs.
The major job, as I see it, of the Federal Government, in
addition to providing those funds for demand, we do not run a
demand program, we interdict. We have a precise Federal role.
And it is to stop drugs in large quantities coming into this
country. Local jurisdictions cannot do that. I could not do
that in the Port of San Francisco, when I was Mayor. I cannot
stop drugs from coming in through the Port of Los Angeles or
over the border, in the southern part of our State.
And this is where we are failing in drug interdiction.
There is no question that ground zero in the interdiction
effort is the Southwest border of the United States of America.
And we have 18-wheel trucks, recruiting drivers in Michigan,
coming in over that border every day, carrying 5 to 7 tons of
cocaine. Customs today has a mixed mission. NAFTA is underway.
Programs are pumping trucks across that border, thousands and
tens of thousands a day and a week.
As General McCaffrey pointed out in San Diego not too long
ago, seizures throughout the Southwest region have declined
precipitously in recent years. Cocaine seizure at points of
entry in 1997 were half of what they were in 1996. Cocaine
seizures as a result of investigations in 1997 were about one-
quarter of what they were in 1995. Cocaine seizures at
checkpoints and traffic stops, in 1997, were less than half of
what they were in 1995.
So as a Senator for California, when I look at this area, I
say our effort in interdicting drugs, the prime responsibility
of the Federal Government, is an abject failure. You cannot
have an arrest in New York City that involves 4 tons of cocaine
and believe that cocaine came in, in backpacks, across the
border. It did not. It is coming in, in big rigs.
One investigation discovered the smuggling of at least 1.5
tons of cocaine a month in crates of fruits and vegetables from
Mexico. At Otay Mesa Cargo Inspection Facility, there have been
24 seizures within the last year of drugs found concealed in
trucks and trailers, including those of two line-release
participants.
I draw two conclusions. One, the mixed mission of Customs
has been a failure. Customs cannot be both a trade expediter
and an enforcer of the law, and fully enforce that law, I
believe. The mixed mission of Customs is not working. And,
second, the General has begun to propose, and I think he is on
the right track, a new unified drug interdiction effort. And I
want to offer my efforts to work with him to develop that and
to support that.
I am absolutely convinced, after nearly 6 years now since I
have been in the U.S. Senate, of hammering about these
programs, that they are not working. In 1996, I asked the GAO
to take a look at Customs. And I have just received four
reports, one dated April 1998, one dated July 1998 and two
dated August 1998. And I want to quickly--these are really more
anecdotal, but I want to quickly just indicate what these
reports have found.
The GAO studies find major problems with Customs' anti-drug
enforcement programs. And these weaknesses include internal
control weaknesses in the program known as line-release. Now,
this program was intended to identify and separate low-risk
shipments from those with higher smuggling risk. These flaws at
all three of the border entry crossing points--that is Laredo,
Texas; Nogales, Arizona, and Otay Mesa, California--these flaws
in all three of these are seriously jeopardizing the security
of the program.
These reports point out incomplete documentation of
screening and review of applicants at Otay Mesa, as well as
Nogales. They point out lost or misplaced line-release
application files and background checklists that serve as
support for approving applications. Otay Mesa officials were
unable to locate 15 of 46 background checklists in the line-
release program.
Now, if you cannot find the background checklist and you
have approved these companies and their trucks just to pour
across the border without being checked, that is a big problem.
No recertification requirement for companies already
approved for the line-release program is present to ensure that
the participants remain a low risk for drug smuggling.
The GAO also found that Customs officials themselves have
little concept of something that they have evolved called the
three-tier targets concept. That was implemented in 1992. And
it was supposed to help identify low- and high-risk shipments
so inspectors could focus their attention on suspect shipments.
The GAO found that this program does not work. And it does not
work because there is insufficient information in the Customs
data base for researching foreign manufacturers.
Now, what this means is that the reliability of the risk
designations given by Customs, which range from little risk for
narcotics smuggling to significant risk for narcotics
smuggling, are questionable, and therefore unreliable.
The GAO also found significant internal control problems
with the Treasury enforcement communications systems, which is
used to compile what is called lookout data for law enforcement
purposes, including identification of persons and vehicles
suspected of drug smuggling. And this system is used by some 20
Federal agencies--INS, DEA, IRS, and BATF. Customs did not have
adequate controls over the deletion of records from the system.
And Customs guidance for the use of the system does not follow
standards set by the Comptroller-General. And that makes it
vulnerable to the deletion of data without checks and balances
by management.
This is not my view; this is what the GAO is saying.
Now, what is the bottom line of all of this? The bottom
line is that cargo shipments are being expedited when in fact
they should be stopped and searched.
Now, the increased trade generated by NAFTA, which we all
support, has resulted in significant expansion of opportunities
for drug trafficking organizations. This is largely because of
the excellent cover commercial trade activity provides. Now,
this is according to a report issued by Operation Alliance,
which is a federally sponsored drug enforcement coordinating
agency in El Paso, Texas.
The Operation Alliance report describes the ways in which
drug smugglers are exploiting increased trade. And I would like
to just cite a few examples of how drug traffickers are taking
advantage of the increased trade generated by NAFTA.
Traffickers are making extensive use of legitimate systems for
moving drugs into the United States by becoming thoroughly
familiar with Customs documents, procedures and processes. And
all anyone has to do is read the front page of the New York
Times today to understand how sophisticated they are and how
difficult it is to even vet law enforcement personnel on the
other side of the border to be certain that we are not giving
security information to drug traffickers.
So the traffickers are making use of legitimate systems for
moving drugs. They are becoming involved with well-known,
legitimate trucking firms that would be less likely targets of
law enforcement security. And some traffickers have even sought
trade consultants to determine what merchandise moves most
quickly across the border under NAFTA rules.
Against this backdrop of traffickers exploiting legitimate
means of transporting cargo across the border for their own
illicit smuggling operations, we now have GAO finding this
disturbing evidence of problems in Customs' drug enforcement
efforts. And as a matter of fact, General McCaffrey points out
in his outline, ``Organizing Counterdrug Efforts Along the
Southwest Border: An Emerging Concept,'' dated August 25th,
that we still have only three truck scanners in place along the
border.
And as he says, traffickers quickly adjust to the
construction of such devices, and shift drugs elsewhere. They
watch. They have got spotters. They know when trucks are being
searched. They know when they are not. They know when the
scanners are operable. They know when they are not. We are
dealing with the most sophisticated drug smuggling and
trafficking efforts at the present time.
I say all of this to indicate to the General that I think
we have got to rethink and re-look at what we are doing. And I
want to support--if you think we should restructure our
agencies, if you think we should have one unified agency that
deals with it, I am certainly willing to be supportive and try
it. I am absolutely convinced that what we are doing today is
inadequate.
And sure, we may shut it down in one area, and they are
smart, and they move to another area, but I make the hypothesis
that the prime role for the Federal Government is Federal
enforcement and interdiction. Provide the money to local
jurisdictions to do the demand programs, the prevention
programs. No problem with it. As a former mayor, it is
important; it has got to be done. But our role is to see that
there are not busts in New York City that have 4 tons of
cocaine recovered or, in Southern California, where you have
800 pounds of marijuana or another drug.
I remember the days when if law enforcement made an arrest
with a pound of cocaine it was a lot. Now they are talking in
hundreds of pounds and tons. The street prices of cocaine
continue to drop. All of this signals to me we need a new
efforts. And I hope you are here today to present that to us.
I thank the chair.
Senator Coverdell. I thank the Senator from California. And
I would turn to our senior Senator from Florida, Senator
Graham.
Senator Graham: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a statement that I would like to enter for the
record. I have just a few comments first.
The Nation is very fortunate to have General Barry
McCaffrey in its service. I have personally had the opportunity
to work with him when he commanded the United States Southern
Command, and now in his position as Director of the Office of
Drug Control Policy. He is a uniquely able and dedicated
person, and I think brings the set of skills that are most
likely to lead us to the destination that we all seek in terms
of an effective national policy on drug control.
Three quick points. One, I believe that we are in a period
of opportunity now, that there are some positive things that
have and are occurring that we can take advantage of. I think
we have, under General McCaffrey, moved toward a more
effective, aggressive policy. We also have some changes outside
the United States. One specifically is the change that has just
occurred in Columbia, with the new President with whom we can
have some normal relations and, I believe, through those normal
relations, encourage a renewed partnership in a critical area
for our success in our drug policy.
Second is that we need to enhance our capabilities to take
advantage of this opportunity. And that is the essence of the
goal of the legislation that Senator DeWine and many others of
us have introduced and have been supporting components of it
throughout the appropriations process.
And, finally, the strategy that is adopted has to be one
that we are prepared to sustain for a significant period of
time. We have had in the past a policy that I would call
chasing the problem. If the problem was in the Caribbean, we
focused on the Caribbean. If the problem was on the Southwest
border, we focused on the Southwest border. And the consequence
of that chasing the problem has been that the people that we
are trying to defend against are not stupid, and they see where
the weaknesses are, and they adjust their strategy to our
vulnerabilities.
So this, again, is an effort to adopt a policy that we are
not going to be adding resources in the Caribbean to the
detriment of our effort on the Southwest border, but rather to
have a consistent, sustained policy of strength across the
border of the United States, to protect us to the maximum
extent possible against the flood of drugs.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Graham appears in the
appendix on page 68.]
Senator Coverdell. General, we are going to turn to you in
just a second.
These presentations were somewhat longer than I had
originally anticipated, but I think they were important. It
underscores a rising interest in the Congress. I think we are
coming to a period of more boldness. And it is clearly
bipartisan, which is I know something that you have diligently
sought to achieve, and I think is eminently expressed in the
presentations that you have just heard.
And so, with that, General, echoing others here who have
commended you for your efforts, I extend to you a hearty
welcome to the Congress on behalf of these two committees that
are increasingly focused on this issue, and I would turn to you
for your testimony.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL BARRY R. MCCAFFREY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
General McCaffrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I truly do
appreciate the opportunity to come over here and testify on
this bill.
It is interesting, as I look at those of you who have come
to this hearing, I owe every one of you a personal note of
gratitude for your support over the last 2 and a half years:
Senator Grassley for his leadership on the Drug-Free
Communities Act; Senator DeWine, who probably has a broader
view of the drug issue than most of us, for his involvement as
a former county prosecutor and on the whole demand side of the
house; you, Mr. Chairman, for your involvement in the OAS and
the hemispheric approach; Senator Biden who created much of
this thinking and has been a source of strength to me; Senator
Feinstein, I applaud your focus on the Southwest border--and I
will go on to endorse your remarks and explain what we are
trying to do to respond to your concerns; and Senator Graham
for being so aware of what is going on in the Caribbean and
Latin America and for being supportive of us throughout this
period.
I brought some important people with me--and you need to
know they are here. They have consulted with me, and I depend
very heavily on their own thinking. Perhaps it would be useful
for you, Senators, to see them:
Brigadier General Howard DeWolf, U.S. Air Force, who is the
Commander of our Joint Interagency Task Force South, in Panama;
Rear Admiral Ed Barrett, U.S. Coast Guard, Commander of our
Joint Interagency Task Force East, in Key West; Rear Admiral
Dave Beltz, U.S. Coast Guard, Commander of Joint Interagency
Task Force West, in Alameda, looking out toward the Pacific;
Brigadier General Dorian Anderson, Commander of Joint Task
Force 6 in El Paso, who coordinates the U.S. armed forces
support for domestic law enforcement; Mr. Frank Schultz, who is
here representing the National Defense Intelligence Center; and
finally and probably most importantly, Mr. Tom Umberg, who is
my Deputy Director for Supply Reduction.
These people are available to you for consultations. I will
keep them for the remainder of the day. We are working with
them to understand their own evolving concerns--and they are
certainly available to talk to your staffs or to respond to
your own interests.
I have some quick comments. Let me just place some markers
in front of you, and then perhaps, during the course of
responding to your own interests, we can develop these ideas. I
will not go through the documents. It is important, though, for
me to suggest again that this has gone from a $15.4 billion
program, involving hundreds of thousands of people, to a $17.1
billion program, with more than 50 U.S. federal agencies
involved, in addition to State and local and NGO activity.
We cannot manage the drug problem with audibles at the line
of scrimmage. I have had a career of managing people,
machinery, and dollars. We must have a strategy, a concept. We
have got to have projected budgets. If we do not do it this
way, if we do not have a 10-year focus on this problem, we will
never make progress. There are arguments that some of our
efforts over the last several decades has not been useful.
However, we do have a strategy. It is a document that you, by
law, have asked me to craft. I submit it for your
consideration. This is the way to evaluate what we are doing--
are we following our strategy or not?
We have a 5-year budget. It is not very good, but it is our
first effort. Frank Raines and I got the nine cabinet
secretaries with major appropriations bills continuing drug-
related funding to express their views for the outyears. It
will be better when I turn it in this year. I encourage you and
the news media, with your debate and your focus, to see if our
budget can be pushed into alignment with our strategy.
Finally--and Senator Feinstein has been very involved in
this--we do have performance measures of effectiveness on the
table. There are 94 of them. Only 39 of them have established
data bases by which we can grade what we are doing. This year,
I hope to come down with annual targets for many of the
performance measures which now exist in 10- and 5-year targets.
Moving down into the operational level of managing this
process, there are some important people involved besides the
departmental secretaries. The Commandant of the Coast Guard is
our interdiction coordinator. Bob Krainek, and now Jim Loy,
have done a splendid job with modest assets, to try and bring
together the thinking and Federal resources upon this problem.
We also have an interdiction committee, which has been focused
on the Southwest Border.
There is a threat analysis detailing what we are trying to
achieve. In my view, we must not appropriate money or start
programs unless we can explain to ourselves convincingly that
they are based on a threat analysis. These are classified
documents, because we have a first-rate effort now ongoing both
by the National Drug Intelligence Center, the El Paso
Intelligence Center, and the CIA operation, CNC, to evaluate in
a way that makes sense, what the drug threat is. In cocaine,
heroin, marijuana, metham-
phetamines, and PCP, we are doing that work and trying to
devise programs.
We do have, out of this interdiction committee, internal
documents in which we have looked 5 years out and said, what do
we need in the way of machinery and assets to construct a more
effective drug interdiction program? We are trying to build our
budget to support that plan.
Finally, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, acting as the
interdiction coordinator, is putting together the resource
requirements; the options and the recommendations. So I am
making the rounds of our government. I have personally met one
on one with about half of our cabinet secretaries to get their
fiscal year 2000 budget and their 2000 to 2004 plan to tie into
what we told you we do in these documents. I want you to
understand these are not words, these are programs. We are
trying to develop a sensible way of going about our business.
Mr. Chairman, I have prepared a written statement and some
charts, which I would, with your permission, submit for the
record.
[The charts referred to by General McCaffrey were not
available for reproduction in this hearing record.]
One of the more useful things that will come out of this
hearing is I think you have encouraged a very intense analysis,
above and beyond our normal dedication to this subject, about
the merits of this bill. The process of writing this statement
and getting it cleared by my colleagues has been very useful.
Let me show you what is up there on the charts. Tiffany, if
you will, take down the first one. The next two charts
demonstrate there is an external drug threat and, by and large,
we do see the shape of it. We know where the cocaine and heroin
is produced. Indeed, we probably know more about growing
regions courtesy of the CIA than we do about heroin abuse in
Baltimore and why people are using drugs.
We have the overhead coverage and the HUMINT to have a
reasonably effective gauge of where people are growing these
drugs.
Next chart.
We have put more resources against this problem, and I will
just show you a few quick illustrative years. You can see a 41-
percent increase. I have given you a breakout by major
department of government. I would also underscore that if you
go back to the 1992 budget, which was a little over $2 billion,
the interdiction raw dollars are just over $1.8 billion. So we
are somewhat below where we were.
We cannot do static analysis of the problem. The bad guys
moved from the Caribbean and air and sea smuggling into
Florida, and then started into Mexico. They are capable of
responding very quickly. We cannot leave the Caribbean
unguarded. We have a major initiative going on there. However,
the raw interdiction dollars had to follow the threat.
This is not to argue that increased interdiction funding is
not needed, but merely to state that we cannot just say, by
year, there has been a reduction and therefore we ought to go
back where we were before.
Next chart, Tiffany, if you will.
This one illustrates the INL budget and the general source
country approach. We are putting significantly more resources
into it. I am concerned--and I think Senator Biden commented on
it--the 1999 budget we have in front of the Congress, has been
cut significantly in one or both houses; this is also true in
many key areas of our interdiction effort.
The Coast Guard funding is not as we asked for it. We are
in danger of imbalancing the U.S. Coast Guard and not giving
them the flexible organization they need to protect the United
States. The INL budget has been cut. I do not know what will
come out of conference, but I just put that in front of you for
you to consider as you go about the appropriations process.
Next chart.
Senator Coverdell. General, is that figure, the one that
Senator Biden referred to, the $53 million? What is the amount?
General McCaffrey. I can give you a matrix of the nine
bills I track and their components.
Senator Coverdell. OK.
[The information referred by General McCaffrey to was not
available at press time.]
General McCaffrey. Right now it is hard for me to gauge
where it is all going. In some cases, I am being reassured it
will get solved in conference and in other cases I am not sure.
Things like the Coast Guard are particularly sensitive. If we
drive their fundamental infrastructure into the ground, whether
we give them money for drug missions is irrelevant, they will
not be able to do what we ask them to do.
Now, we have done a lot of work, George Tenet is one of my
heroes. Tom Constantine and the DIA, who actually owns this
process, have put together a pretty good analysis of how
cocaine moves. We are trying to say: let us operate against the
threat. That is the analysis for the last 6 months and I think
we are finally getting it where it needs to be.
Next chart.
Here is an issue that I am sure will be the subject of
future hearings. We are involved in a very intense debate in
the executive branch. We have completed two initial studies,
one called the Intelligence Architecture Review, which is
mandated by law by both the House and the Senate intelligence
committees, for me to explain who collects drug-related
intelligence and on what automation systems, how is it
communicated, and what should we do to improve it. We finished
that study. We are trying to package intelligence so it
supports the Border Patrol sector commander, the Customs SAC,
the sheriff, and the police chief. It is great intelligence,
but it did not link up. We will try and fix that before we
leave office.
There are other aspects of this Southwest Border
Coordination Plan.
I have submitted an emerging concept paper to many of you.
There is a reasonably detailed plan, a white paper, that is now
out to my 14 cabinet colleagues for evaluation. By the end of
the fall, we owe the President an explanation of how we should
fix the Southwest Border. It is achievable. We can use
technology, non-intrusive inspection systems linked
intelligence, changed manpower, and doctrine to protect the
American people along the Southwest Border.
We have got one of the best law enforcement people in the
country, Ray Kelley, as our Customs Service Chief. To echo
Senator Feinstein's words, this is an experienced, solid police
officer. Last year we inspected 911,000 trucks, found 16 with
cocaine, and found cocaine on one rail car. The magnitude of
the effort--20,000 brave men and women of the Customs Service
worldwide--12,000 Federal people on that border, and we found
cocaine on 16 trucks and one rail car.
In 1997, we inspected 1.09 million trucks out of the 3.5
million that crossed the border. We found six trucks and one
rail car with cocaine. We cannot deter or seize heroin,
cocaine, and metham-
phetamines out of these 82 million cars, trucks, and rail cars
that come across that border unless we give the Customs Service
and the Border Patrol the tools they need to do their job. That
is where we need congressional focus and resources.
Finally, to put the bill you are now considering in
context; a lot of this seems to be aimed at cocaine. It ignores
the biggest drug threats to America--the pot, booze, and
cigarettes consumed by American adolescents--which promote
gateway drug-using behavior. I am on the edge of science when I
use the term ``gateway,'' but it is clear that 12- to 18-year-
olds that smoke a lot of pot and smoke it earlier, along with
using alcohol and cigarettes, are at grave risk of compulsive
drug-using behavior.
Much of this bill, which I welcome as a vehicle for
discussion, focuses on cocaine. Less cocaine is being produced
in Latin America. This is good news. Peruvian cocaine
production was down 27 percent last year and 40 percent in the
last 2 years.
Columbia is a disaster, but for the time in history the
overall cocaine production actually came down 15 percent, from
760 metric tons to 650. The source country strategy can work if
smart cops, sensible alternative economic development programs,
and good interdiction campaigns are used.
We are seizing significant quantities of cocaine in the
transit and arrival zones. In 1997, we seized 85 metric tons.
That is 60 percent more than in 1996.
I have got to be careful about that, because if you back
off and look at it for 10 years, we always seize about the same
percentage of the crop. Regardless of what we did between
American law enforcement, the interdiction zone, and the source
country seizure strategy, we always got about a third of the
crop. We are up in 1997; 1997 was the third consecutive year of
increased transit zone seizures. A lot of that we owe to smart
work by the U.S. Coast Guard, the DEA, the armed forces, and
JIATF's, specifically JIATF South, in Panama.
We have continued the success in the first 6 months of
1998. We seized 54 metric tons in the Mexico corridor, 14 in
the Caribbean, and 13 in the arrival zone.
If I may, Mr. Chairman, let me talk about the bill. The
bill has some good aspects. It is hard for us to disentangle,
though, what I would respectfully suggest includes an awful lot
of micro-tactical details that drag with them a $2.6 billion
tail of specified actions. Some of that detail concerns me.
First of all, though, the goal of the bill--reduce the flow
of illegal drugs into the U.S. by 80 percent by the end of
2001--I would argue is completely unrealistic. You should not
give me a slogan to use when I pull together the interagency
group. These are serious people, the Secretary of Defense, the
JIATF commanders. I would argue that the target is
unachievable. It is only 3 years away. We would have to
conceive a strategy, buy equipment, field it, and implement
operations. We could not do it that quickly. I ask you to not
set this unachievable target.
I would also suggest to you that I am nervous, as I go
through the laundry list of items in the bill and talk to the
various departments of government; we have got in Federal
legislation a million bucks of barbed wire for LaPicota Prison,
in Columbia, and tunnel sensors. Barbed wire is not the problem
in LaPicota Prison. It is corrupt people running the prison.
They are out on the weekends, back downtown in Bogota. The
barbed wire, a couple of million bucks, is not the problem.
It specifies a base in Puerto Maldonado, Peru. We should
not specify to our CINC, to our interdiction coordinator, and
without consultation with a foreign government, where to place
a foreign-based drug interdiction operation. It specifies two
mobile x-ray machines for placement along the Chapare Highway,
in Bolivia. These are $3.5 million machines we need on our
Southwest Border along these 39 ports of entry. If we put them
into the Chapare, it would be the most advanced technology
within a thousand miles of the Chapare. These are backpackers--
ants--that move around these roads, as well as truck travel. I
would argue that placing those two machines there, which are
not coordinated in any way with an Andean Ridge strategy, might
be alleged as a misappropriation of Federal dollars.
There are some huge dollar items in the bill. There is a
$400-million buy to bring P-3B domes out of the desert, rebuild
them, and deploy them into Latin America; to get 10 more P-3B
Slicks, with a $150 million rebuild, and pull them out of the
desert. We now have eight total Customs aircraft. That would be
20 new ones. Where is the air base to support them, the in-
country access, the personnel to man them, and the OPTEMPO in
the outyears.
And who says I would spend $2.6 billion in that manner? The
drugs that are killing kids in Orlando, Florida, come in on
commercial air. And they come in through Puerto Rico and Haiti
in cargo vessels. The P-3B will not address that. The drugs
that are killing kids in California are methamphetamines and
cocaine crossing the border in 18-wheel trucks and rail cars.
They are not in light aircraft, flying in through Mexico and
across the border.
I do not mean to argue against that program, except insofar
as to say that it does not fit the intensive work by Admiral
Loy and his colleagues, acting for me, as the interdiction
coordinator. I would just ask you to be cautious as we look at
this bill. I think it is a good vehicle to focus our attention
on what you believe is perhaps an inadequate energy level on
the subject. However, I think this would be a bad bill to pass.
I am worried that it might provoke supplemental appropriations
that would actually get spent this way. That will cause us
problems.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear in front
of your committee, and I look forward to answering your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General McCaffrey appears in the
appendix on page 84.]
Senator Coverdell. Thank you, General.
Why don't we limit the questions to 5 minutes, if everyone
is agreed, and we can get these machines on.
General, first of all, I appreciate very much your
testimony. It was enlightening, to some extent comforting, but
also bothersome, because I do think I hear you saying there is
a resource deficiency. You are arguing about how to distribute
that. You do not want your hands tied. Which is not unusual for
the executive branch.
You said something that I would like you to elaborate on
during my brief time--the border. You talked about a million
vehicles and six trucks and one train car. It sounded to me as
if you were describing an almost hopeless exercise there--lots
of resources, lots of money, not a lot of return. And then you
have also talked about technology. I have heard you talk about
the technology at one of 39 points of entry and how effective
it has been.
Are we, in your judgment, moving the technology--it seems
to me that technology could be acquired and moved more quickly
than some elements of the plan. Elaborate on the crisis on that
border and the numbers that are coming across and the findings
that are occurring, which suggest the system is not working.
What can we do to improve this, and more quickly?
General McCaffrey. We have done a lot of work on
counterdrug technologies. We have some tremendous studies done
by the Customs Service in particular, but also by the Border
Patrol. We now have a white paper and are starting to develop
the resource implications of it. We have tested some of the
technology. As you know, we have six in place. We are deploying
a back-scatter device. Originally, there were only two in
California. Now we have them in El Paso and others are going
into other places along the border.
The situation is not hopeless. In my professional judgment,
which is buttressed by listening carefully to the professionals
of the Customs Service, the intelligence services, the Border
Patrol, and the DEA, if we give the Customs Department non-
intrusive technology and a linked intelligence system, if we
build selected areas of the border with fencing, lighting, and
an adequate-sized Border Patrol, whatever that is--for
discussion purposes, I have said 20,000 people; it was 3,000
when this administration came into office; it is now 7,000; we
have 12,000 miles of borders--this is not only a drug issue, we
need to put in law and order along our border--we can do that.
Take for example Southern California and El Paso. In El
Paso, we put in 22 miles of fence, some lights, and a few
hundred Customs and Border Patrol reinforcements. We put in the
first of two back-scatter devices. If you look at that 22
miles, where 60 tons of drugs are seized in the sector, only
500 pounds are seized, in those 22 miles.
The Border Patrol, fencing, lighting, and enhancements
essentially have forced this stuff back into the Customs port
of entry. Furthermore, 10 years ago, if you got orders to Fort
Bliss, Texas, your car insurance tripled above anywhere else in
the country. Today El Paso is the third safest city in the
country. If you go to the California frontier, we have 48 miles
of fencing, a few hundred Border Patrol people, and a little
technology. Four years ago there were 60 murders in that year.
Last year there were zero.
Senator Coverdell. General, can this be accelerated?
General McCaffrey. Yes. But we have got to know what we are
doing. This is a big piece of work to do. We have to have a
plan. We cannot call audibles.
Senator Coverdell. I understand your wanting it to be
fitted.
General McCaffrey. Right.
Senator Coverdell. I am just wanting to----
General McCaffrey. We have to get Transportation, Commerce,
Treasury, Justice, Defense, and State to continue their
tremendous efforts.
Senator Coverdell. Well, working off Senator Biden's
comment of emergency status, and in concert with the plan--at
least for this Senator--one of the objectives or one of the
goals should be acceleration.
General McCaffrey. Absolutely.
Senator Coverdell. With in concert of long-term goals.
General McCaffrey. I agree. Yes.
Senator Coverdell. I turn to Senator Grassley.
Senator Grassley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, General McCaffrey, for your testimony.
According to your agency's own figures, in 1987, 29 percent of
the national drug control budget was allocated to demand
reduction, 38 percent for law enforcement, 33 percent for
international interdiction. By 1997, those priorities shifted
to 34 percent for demand reduction, 53 percent for domestic law
enforcement, and 13 percent for international programs and
interdiction. In short, then, programs to suppress or interdict
drug supplies went from 33 percent of the overall budget to
only 13 percent.
As a portion of the overall drug control budget, it is very
clear that spending on interdiction and source country actions
have declined precipitously from that peak. In your opinion,
then, is this because the domestic threat is proportionally
greater now than it was then?
General McCaffrey. Senator, first of all, the raw dollars
spent on the drug issue have gone up enormously during that
time. Between 1987 and the fiscal year 1999 budget request,
total funding devoted to the drug issue was just enormous. And,
in a grand sense, it has worked. Drug abuse in America has come
down dramatically. The number of Americans casually using
cocaine, from 6 million to 1.7 million; the amount of dollars
we spend on drugs about in that timeframe came down by a third;
drug-related murders, down by a third. The money, in my
judgment, in the broadest sense, actually has helped
dramatically.
Having said that, drug interdiction dollars have not gone
down precipitously. They are almost where they were in fiscal
year 1992; $2.1 billion, $1.8 billion--they are in the same
ball park, and the drug threat has moved. I would not want
carrier battle groups, Aegis cruisers, on work-up for the
Mediterrean, doing Caribbean patrols and claiming that was drug
interdiction dollars. It was not a very good way to spend money
in 1987; it certainly would not help today. If we had the same
level of funding, it would not go for an Aegis cruiser in the
Caribbean.
Senator Grassley. Well, are you saying money is being spent
on interdiction, but being spent in a more effective way?
General McCaffrey. The raw dollars, in other words, in
1987, included sort of spasm activity, in my judgment--I was in
the Pentagon at the time--in which we would take an Aegis
cruiser deploying to the Mediterrean, we would put them into
the Caribbean; they would look for light aircraft in the dark
and then deploy to the Mediterrean, and we would say that was a
drug-related function. Of course you can find the light
aircraft with an Aegis cruiser. But if we had that dollar
today, we would not spend it on a Aegis cruiser, we would spend
it at Eagle Pass, Texas, on an x-ray machine.
So, again, the static analysis is very difficult, but we
have got the total interdiction funding back up to only .4
million below the fiscal year 1992 levels.
I think the other thing we really have to do--rather than
look at percentages--is look at the strategy, I have written a
strategy and told the government: you had better explain what
you are doing in terms of this strategy. If you go to goals
four and five, I would ask the Congress to track the issue not
in terms of departmental budget increments, but who is doing
what on this function.
Senator Grassley. OK.
General McCaffrey. I think we are going to be better off in
the long term if we do that.
Senator Grassley. Let me ask you about the closing of
Howard Air Force Base. How important do you believe it is to
find another location base for U.S. drug interdiction resources
in Central America? Does the United States currently have a
location that can effectively relocate the current drug
interdiction assets of Howard? And how will the loss of Howard
affect our current detection and monitoring abilities in the
Caribbean and in the Andean regions?
General McCaffrey. It is a sad situation. The gross number
is we flew 3,000-some-odd sorties a year of counterdrug
operations or support out of Howard. It was in the right place.
It was 2,000 dedicated airmen of the U.S. Air Force supporting
not only military operations but Customs, Coast Guard and
others. It is really too bad. Although we have not closed off
discussion, we are looking at alternatives.
Senator Grassley. So as of now there are not alternatives?
General McCaffrey. We do have an existing base at Roosevelt
Roads, which is first-rate, which will accept some add-ons. We
do have through-put capacity at Sotocano, Honduras, and we are
exploring with our international partners what we will do in
potential transit rights in the region. But the loss of Howard
is too bad.
Senator Grassley. But at least for a period of time the
capability of doing what we do at of Howard will be less?
General McCaffrey. Yes, I think that is probably the case.
Senator Coverdell. All right. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
General, you have in front of you a group that I think can
and will act in a bipartisan way. In our little side discussion
the chairman and I were having here, one of the things we both
have as a goal here, although we may end up disagreeing on the
exact emphasis, is that within your plan, we would like to know
what it is that we could fast-forward, speed up, if we provided
you the dollars, to enable your plan to best be implemented the
quickest.
And since we only have 5 minutes, I would like to just
briefly touch on a couple of points. First of all, back on May
13th of this year, after a discussion with you in my office, if
I am not mistaken--although I am not positive whether this came
before--immediately before or immediately after--I wrote a
letter to Speaker Gingrich. And Speaker Gingrich had introduced
a bill or talked about introducing a bill, which he referred to
as the Drug-Free Borders Act.
And in that I indicated to him, although I had not seen the
Act, he and Congressman Hunter were talking about that, and
that I had met with Customs. And we had gone into detail as to
what their ideal wish list would be of all the things they
would need at the border in order to enhance their ability to
detect transiting of drugs. And I had, back the previous
October, argued that we should speed up this additional
funding.
The bottom line was it was about $100 million for 22 border
crossings, the technology, including mobile x-ray trucks, the
MTXR, gamma imagers, heavy pallet x-rays, rail car
examinations, system high-energy truck x-ray systems, et
cetera. Now, what I asked at that time was that the Speaker--I
strongly supported his effort--I hope he would include not only
the 100--actually it was $100.4 million for this technology to
buy it all, at the time--and that it would be appropriated.
Now, to the best of my knowledge, that has not been
appropriated either in our side of this Capitol, the Senate, or
in the House. My question is this: If you were able to get an
appropriation of $100.4 million now--and I will ask this of the
Border Patrol folks, as well, and the Customs people--would you
be able to, with an efficacious effort here, put it in play?
Would it be helpful for us to speed that up--give you all the
equipment on the wish list--not take it from other places?
If we said to you, hey, we got George Soros, although he
lost a couple of billion bucks, he is going to buy a 100
million bucks worth of this stuff for you; you can have it
immediately, what would be your response?
General McCaffrey. Mr. Senator, when we went into the ISTEA
bill, we had some very intense discussions.
Senator Biden. Yes.
General McCaffrey. Congressman Denny Hastert was the
quarterback in the House, with the Republicans, and we had a
lot of discussions.
Senator Biden. Right.
General McCaffrey. We went after $540 million. We got $30
million. There has been a tremendous disconnect between
rhetoric and voting in the appropriations acts.
Senator Biden. I got that. I am sorry to cut you off on
this, but if we got together, this group right here, and we
said, OK, we are going to go to bat in a bipartisan way and we
are going to make a hell of a ruckus on the floor together to
get you that 100 million bucks, would you want it? Do you need
it?
General McCaffrey. I think there are unfulfilled
requirements, particularly in the Southwest Border and in the
Coast Guard operations. But the President's budget request is
the place to start, because we have a rational analysis there.
Once we are outside that, we are ad-libbing with $100-million
buys.
Senator Biden. No; I understand that. But here my time is
about to be up. I have been doing this job for a long time, and
I have found something real simple. If I can make an analogy
for you. When I introduced the crime bill that ultimately
became law, I tried to get people to vote for prevention money.
I could not get anybody to vote for prevention money. That was
viewed as wasted money.
So then I came up with a very specific thing. I said I am
going to put this money in for Boys and Girls Clubs. That made
it impossible for all these guys and women to vote against
prevention. It was a simple, pure political tactic. A first-
rate operation, but then I told everybody I would go home and
say, you know what, your Congressman or your Senator says they
are for dealing with crime. Guess what? They voted against
allowing you to build another Boys Club. And guess what? All of
a sudden, everybody became a disciple of prevention, as long as
it was Boys and Girls Club.
I am being very, very--these guys are not--not these guys--
and women--we are not giving you what you ask for. It is not
fair, in my view. We are beating the devil out--not this
panel--but we are beating you up for not getting the job done.
You are getting an awful lot of the job done. We are not giving
you the money you asked for. You are asking--we have a bill
here for more money for interdiction. We have cut your
interdiction budget already this year, without even this. So it
is not fair.
So what I am trying to figure out--and I will end with
this, because my time is up--I am trying to figure out is, OK,
I cannot get you what you--I cannot--we cannot get you what you
need apparently, but there is a bipartisan group here that will
say, OK, let us cherry-pick a little bit here. It makes it
awful hard for anyone in California or who goes to visit
California that will say, hey, you know, I voted against the
$100 million which would have provided all those x-ray machines
there. I am being purely tactical here.
And I guess I do not want to do it if it screws up your
overall plan. Do you follow me? If it is taken from other
places in your budget, then it is dangerous.
General McCaffrey. Right.
Senator Biden. It is a mistake. If it is an add-on to what
you have and what you are not getting, then I would like you to
think. You do not have to answer me now. But, for the record,
let us know whether or not, without taking it out of the other
parts of your budget, if we could get that for you, would it be
helpful to you?
I will wait for a second round to go over this.
Senator Coverdell. I think we are talking, what is the plan
for acceleration? What is the plan for acceleration?
Senator DeWine.
Senator DeWine. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Let me just followup on that, General. And I think there is
a lot more we all agree on here today, General, than we
disagree. And I am sure what always is looked at is what we
disagree about, and that is more interesting. But I think we
all agree on a great deal.
I would just encourage you to continue to work with us. I
think, as you have identified, or members here, and there is a
lot more other members in the Senate, frankly, besides the ones
who are just on this panel, who are very interested in getting
you the resources that you need. And we can get down into the
particulars of whether you need this particular resource or
not. I think the bottom line is, at least for this Senator, you
do not have the resources and we have not supplied you with the
resources. You need more resources.
If you just look at the chart that I referenced earlier, we
can talk about percentages or we can talk about raw dollars or
we can talk about programs. I think no matter how you look at
it, we are not putting the resources in interdiction that we
should. If you look at it as a percentage, I just find no
logical reason why we have gone from basically a third down to
about 12 percent. It just does not make any sense to me.
If you look at the raw numbers, as you have----
General McCaffrey. Senator----
Senator DeWine. Let me just finish, if I could, then I will
be more than happy to let you respond. But if you look at the
overall dollars, it is troubling when you say, well, Senator,
we are about where we were in 1992, we are just spending it
better. I understand that. But if you look at some of the
specific changes--and I realize these are not all--the data is
not all up to date--but let me just give you a couple of
examples of how this has played out in the real world.
Department of Defense funding for counternarcotics
decreased from $504 million in 1992 to $214 million in 1995. As
a result, the number of flight numbers by AWACS planes had
dropped during that period from 38,000 hours in fiscal year
1992 to 17,000 hours in 1996. U.S. Coast Guard funding for
counternarcotics decreased from $443 million in 1992 to $301
million in 1995. And we could go on and on and on.
It plays out in the real world, though. It plays out in the
real world. I had the opportunity to, as you know, travel off
the coast of Haiti and off the coast of the Dominican Republic
several months ago, and looked at our Coast Guard and looked at
what they were doing. There is an October 1997 GAO report that
says that of all the cocaine moving through the transit zone,
38 percent is being shipped through the Eastern Pacific.
When I visited JIATF East a few months ago, I was told the
Eastern Pacific is wide open for drugs, in that area right up
there, and we have got virtually nothing going on. That is the
problem. And we can talk about percentages and we can talk
about raw dollars, but the bottom line is we have got areas
that we are not covering at all. Or at least that is what I was
told when I was down there. That is true, is it not, General?
General McCaffrey. Let me start off by saying I in no way
would suggest that we are not receptive to your views on
increased interdiction funding. Yours is a legitimate
assertion. However, the raw dollars are about the equivalent.
The threat has changed.
From 1987 to 1999, we have gone up .4 billion.
International funding has gone from $221 million to $548
million. So it peaked in 1992 and then dropped significantly.
We have brought it back up about where it was.
The total dollars devoted to the drug issue has gone up
dramatically. One reason is we have got 1.7 million people
behind bars today; somewhere between 50 and 80 percent of them
there for a drug-related reason. If you look at the total
fiscal year 1999 package, 52 percent of it is law enforcement
and prisons.
Senator DeWine. I agree. Let me just, if I could----
General McCaffrey. That is part of the dynamics of this.
Senator DeWine. That is true. I want to say something,
though, that Senator Feinstein said. And I wish I had said it.
You know, I guess it is the best compliment, Senator, always to
say when someone says something, you wish you had said it. And
that is, when we look at this division, and the fact that you
just brought up how many people are behind bars, the reality is
that that is predominantly a State and local responsibility and
a cost. When you are talking about what the Federal Government
can do, what our responsibility is as United States Senators,
drug interdiction at our borders, source country, in transit,
that is something that the States really cannot do anything
about. That is our responsibility.
And so what is disturbing to me is that when you look at
the percentages, what you find is the one area, the one area,
where we have a sworn responsibility to deal with this, and
where no one else really--State cannot do it, local cannot do
it, we have to do it--and that one area is the one area that
the percentage of our effort has gone down. And it has gone
down dramatically. That is the only point.
So when you cite how many million people are behind bars,
that is absolutely true, and that is part of our overall
national anti-drug effort, absolutely correct, General. But if
you look at what our responsibility is in the Congress, our
responsibility is to do that which no one else can do. This is
an area that no one else can do.
No one else can send Coast Guard ships out there. No one
else can interdict those drugs. No one else can have AWACS
planes up there. That is our responsibility. And, frankly, we
just want to work with you, and try to increase the resources
you have to do the one thing that only the Federal Government
can do.
General McCaffrey. Yes.
Senator DeWine. It is our responsibility.
General McCaffrey. I could not agree more. But, again, we
have to analyze it by the goals of the strategy. Because if the
drugs move into Mexico, the U.S. federal interdiction effort is
now on the Southwest Border. Those dollars are in Departments
of Justice, Treasury, Interior, Defense, et cetera. There are
12,000 people, a division-sized group of Feds, on the border
today. In 1987, it was a fraction of that.
There is a huge, sensible, aggressive effort to protect the
American people. Our problem is it will not work without
technology and intelligence. So it is not just people and
dollars. It has got to be smarter use of non-intrusive
technology. That is why the interdiction function is not an
adequate judge of goal four and five of the National Drug
Control Strategy. We have got to stop crack cocaine.
If you are in the Eastern Pacific--and I share your concern
that there is not a permanent Navy or Coast Guard presence out
there--but we are trying to get them. When they come into
Mexico on the West Coast--and the Marina and the Coast Guard
are working pretty effectively together, thank God--there is an
active program of, intelligence sharing and interdiction at
sea. They bring the drugs into Mexico and then they have got to
come across one of the 39 ports of entry or hook around the
Pacific. We have programs there that are not under the
interdiction function.
Senator DeWine. And I appreciate that. My time is up,
General. Thank you very much.
Let me just, as a postscript, simply add, though, General,
to think that that whole area of the Pacific is not covered is
just--it is inexcusable. I mean we as a country cannot have
that. That has to be changed.
Senator Coverdell. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Senator DeWine, for your comment. I really
appreciate it.
General McCaffrey, I have a number of questions. So if I
could fire them off, and you try to directly answer them.
How much would it take to have a complete package of high-
tech x-ray scanning equipment, fully adequate, at each of our
three ports of entry on the Southwest Border?
General McCaffrey. There are 39 border crossings and two
maritime flanks. I do not know the answer to that question.
Senator Feinstein. Could I get an answer of what it would
take? You see, one of the problems is you go out there and
people say, oh, we do not have adequate equipment, oh, this is
inadequate, that is not, Congress does not give us the money to
do it right. What would it take to put all of the know-how we
have in terms of this non-intrusive scanning equipment wherever
we need to put it on the Southwest Border? And I think then we
should go to bat to get that money, get it delivered, get the
equipment there, and frankly, end the excuses. We then have the
equipment. May I ask you to prepare that estimate?
General McCaffrey. The executive branch is trying to come
to grips with just that question. The machinery, the people,
and the intelligence.
Senator Feinstein. Is that yes, that you will do it?
General McCaffrey. We are doing it. But I have to get my
nine cabinet colleagues to agree with me.
Senator Feinstein. All right. I am asking you for a number,
with some documentation.
General McCaffrey. I will try and get that number and
documentation to the President this fall and then forward it to
the Congress for funding. That is what we are trying to
achieve.
Senator Feinstein. OK. All right. Next quick question: In
the recent GAO report, dated July, on internal control
weaknesses and other concerns with low-risk cargo entry
programs, they make a number of recommendations, which I went
over in my opening remarks. Treasury has answered. Treasury
said that they have written, in its comments at Customs offices
of field operations, plans to publish the line release quality
standards in the form of a headquarters directive by the end of
fiscal year 1998. Have you reviewed--we are just about at the
end of fiscal year 1998--have you reviewed those line release
quality standards?
General McCaffrey. No, I have not.
Senator Feinstein. May I ask that you do so?
General McCaffrey. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Feinstein. For me. If anybody gives you flack, ask
them to call me.
General McCaffrey. I am sure they will be quite glad to do
it. I am sure it is at the Department of the Treasury right
now. We do have a first-rate professional, Ray Kelley, who is
coming to grips with that problem.
Senator Feinstein. I agree with you, and I appreciate that.
And I know Ray Kelley. And I am delighted he is there. But if
you would do that, I would appreciate it.
Now, with regard to another recommendation made, apparently
Treasury agreed that the three-tier program should be suspended
until more reliable information is developed for classifying
low-risk importations. This was the program that the Customs
people said was not working.
My understanding is that they are suspending it, and that
Customs believes its other targeting methods are better able to
fulfill the narcotic interdiction efforts. Would you take a
look at that? And may I ask you, please, for your evaluation of
that?
General McCaffrey. I will do so.
[The information referred to by General McCaffrey was not
available at press time.]
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much.
Senator Feinstein. And the third recommendation is that
they are currently evaluating the automated targeting system at
Laredo. May I ask you also to take a look at that?
General McCaffrey. I will do so.
Senator Feinstein. Now, may I ask for your comment on this
morning's New York Times' article? And this obviously has to do
with the elite Mexican drug officers that are allegedly tied to
traffickers. The article contends: Officials said at least some
of those investigators whose tests--polygraphs--indicated
collusion with traffickers had been chosen for their posts
after elaborate screening devised by Americans.
Is that statement true?
General McCaffrey. Yes.
Senator Feinstein. Then it goes on to say that most senior
officials in the unit were implicated by the lie detector test.
And it goes on to say: Officials said they feared that much of
the sensitive information that American law enforcement
agencies had shared with the Mexican unit during the last year
might have been compromised.
Is that correct?
General McCaffrey. I read that article this morning. I have
talked to the DEA and the INL. There is an ongoing operation to
look at penetration of this unit for several months. The
Mexicans came to us and identified the problem, and went after
it. We are working with them.
It would be unhelpful to reveal the details of an ongoing
law enforcement operation at this time.
Senator Feinstein. OK. I accept that. But there is going to
be an investigation, and we will get an answer. Right? Right.
Senator Feinstein. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coverdell. We now turn to Senator Graham, of
Florida.
Senator Graham: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to ask questions in two categories. First,
General, I mentioned in my opening statement that I thought we
had an opportunity in Colombia, with the new government, a
government with whom hopefully we will be restoring normal
relations. Could you give me your comments as to how your
strategy or the pace of execution of that strategy would be
affected if in fact there is a government in Colombia with
which we can have positive relations?
General McCaffrey. Senator, it is very encouraging. We have
worked with the new President, prior to his election--and I was
part of the delegation to his inauguration--and his new Foreign
Minister, who is a superb man; his Defense Minister, who is a
very experienced public servant; their new Ambassador to the
United States, General Topias; the new Commander of the Armed
Forces and the other senior members of the military. He has
retained General Sarano, who is a very courageous Colombian
patriot.
They came into office with a commitment to continue the
struggle against drugs. Probably no country on the face of the
Earth has suffered more than Colombia from drugs. There is an
absolute savage internal nightmare that has been going on for
20 years.
We think he is serious about the peace process. General
Willen, the CINC, has been down there and met with their new
military leadership.
What we have told them is we want them to develop a
Colombian strategy for us to analyze and sort out how to best
support. Internally in the U.S. Government, we are having a
deputies meeting in the NSC about it; trying to sort out what
do we do to best stand behind their efforts to promote peace,
confront the drug issue, and produce alternative economic
possibilities for 200,000 people out there growing coca and
opium in a roadless, infrastructure-lacking part of Colombia
where there is no military or governmental control over it.
The armed forces, in the 3 days prior to the inauguration,
was just ending a massive, 17-province, countrywide offensive.
They lost hundreds of their young boys in the police and in the
Army, killed in action that week, fighting against 20,000 FARC/
ELN guerrillas who have better weapons and better pay scales
than the Colombian armed forces. We have a problem. We are
going to work with this new government, but they have to
develop their own strategy and the political will to confront
the issue.
Senator Graham: General, the second question relates to the
issue that you raised. And that is the coordination between
your office and the administration and the Congress in
developing and supporting an effective anti-drug strategy. The
circumstance that you have just raised, of course, is not
without many historical precedents.
During the Civil War, the Congress set up a committee to
assist President Lincoln in developing a very detailed military
strategy, which almost caused the Union to lose the war. We do
not want to repeat that historical precedent.
So my question to you is--the group of folks here, we want
to be your allies and we want to see particularly that you have
the resources to carry out the strategic plan. I think most of
us recognize the fact that we do not have the background, the
capabilities, given our other responsibilities, the ability to
focus sufficiently on this problem to develop that strategic
plan. But we want to be a constructive force in seeing that a
plan that we have confidence in--and I will say I have
confidence in your plan--is adequately supported.
So my question of you is--and I think there is a sense of
urgency on our part--how can we be most supportive? And maybe
you have suggested one way in the terms of the immediate
appropriations bills that are pending before the Congress, or
in conference committee, to support the level of funding that
your strategic plan contemplates for fiscal year 1999. I would
like to ask if you could provide us with your analysis of where
there is a gap between those two.
General McCaffrey. Yes, sir, I will do that.
Senator Graham: So we can have a target list to work
against. And are there other ways in which we could be helpful?
General McCaffrey. I agree. We do have a challenge between
Congress and the executive branch on this issue. I am dealing
with 50 agencies, 9 appropriations bills, and 14 cabinet
officers. The Congress does not match up now on this issue. I
have tried to use the two appropriations committees for my
issue, as a de facto oversight committee for drugs. But it is
not going to work. We should consider how the Congress can have
an oversight role.
Janet Reno did not receive $85 million in break-the-cycle
funding out of the Senate or the House. This program is part of
getting comprehensive drug treatment to 105,000 people behind
bars in the Federal system. Two-thirds of them are there for
drug-related purposes. We have to do break-the-cycle.
The Senate cut $200 million out of the drug treatment block
grant funding. That was finally going to get us up to, for the
first time in history, a $3 billion investment in the 4 million
people who are compulsive, chronic drug users.
We have been cut on the Coast Guard budget. I do not know
how this will come out. Defense got their money. The rest of
them are selectively in trouble.
I will do an analysis and send it over to the relevant
committees. And, Senator, I think that is a very sound
suggestion.
Senator Graham: And would you also send a copy of that
analysis to this panel?
Senator Coverdell. I think this panel would need to see
that information, if they might.
Senator Graham: Mr. Chairman, can I one last question,
which I think may be a yes/no answer?
Again, going back to this issue of Congress/executive
branch relations, the House has passed a bill, H.R. 3809, the
Customs Reauthorization Act. The Senate Finance Committee
reported out its version of that within the last few days. If
you have had an opportunity to review that, I would be
interested in whether you support it. And is it consistent with
your strategic plan?
General McCaffrey. Senator, with your permission, let me
provide an answer for the record. I would feel more comfortable
consulting with Secretary Rubin and Mr. Kelley.
Senator Graham: Thank you.
[The information referred to above was not available at
press time.]
Senator Coverdell. General, we are going to adjourn this
session. But it strikes me that one certain work that comes
from this dialog was posed by the question that has been
repeated by Senators from California and Florida and Delaware,
all of us, trying to get a handle on deficiencies in current
appropriation matters. If we could get that information rather
quickly, because we are in a very tight time zone now, there
might still be room for us to be of assistance.
In the year-plus of hearings like this, it strikes me--and
working off Senator DeWine--that there are some fairly obvious
deficiencies. Now, maybe we are just seeing--the one that was
underscored by the Senator from Delaware, when he was trying to
understand, well, if we can fund it, should we proceed to
accelerate the technology on the border? And a year ago,
Customs said that would take $120 million. And you used the
figure of $104 million. And we are still looking for the
figure.
So it strikes me that that is something we ought to
resolve. Either you tell us no, you cannot, if you had the
money you could not do it, or tell us what you can do.
And the third one, highlighted by the Senator from Ohio, is
it strikes me over and over that the Coast Guard is underfunded
for issues dealing with the Pacific and even the Caribbean. And
if that is an inaccurate observation, then we need to know
that. But these two, technology and the Coast Guard, just
surface and surface and surface.
So if we are under-resourced there--and there may be others
that are less obvious--I think there is going to be continued
pressure. I empathize with your worry about coordinating with
the Congress. That is difficult. It is like herding chickens.
But we will have to prevail. It may get kind of messy, but it
is the best process around.
And I thank the General for his attention.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coverdell. Yes.
Senator Biden. I apologize for being out of the room. Are
we dismissing the General now?
Senator Coverdell. We are dismissing the General.
Senator Biden. I wanted to ask him one more question, but I
will ask him later.
Senator Coverdell. All right, in deference to the next
panel.
General, thank you for what you do. Thank you for your
patience. And thank you for being here today. We appreciate it
very much.
General McCaffrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coverdell. I am going to turn to the second panel:
Mr. Brian Sheridan, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense; Mr. Donnie R. Marshall, Acting Deputy Administrator,
Drug Enforcement Administration; Mr. William R. Brownfield,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; Mr. Samuel H. Banks,
Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs; and Admiral James Loy,
Commandant, United States Coast Guard.
I am going to suggest--you all have been waiting a good
period of time--that you try to limit the opening statement if
we can to about a 5-minute summary, if possible. We will use
the warning lights so you at least can see it. I will not be
banging on the gavel, but given the number and the hour, that
might be useful for all of you, as well as the panel.
So let us begin, then, with Brian Sheridan, again,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. It is good to see you
again.
STATEMENT OF BRIAN E. SHERIDAN, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY
CONFLICT
Mr. Sheridan. Senator, thank you for inviting me here this
morning. It is good to see you again, and Senator DeWine and
Senator Biden. I intend to be very brief in my opening comments
so that we can get to the questions that you are interested in.
Let me just start off by saying, speaking for the
Department of Defense, we view the counterdrug struggle as a
long-term one, one in which we are constantly exploring new
ideas, looking at state-of-the-art systems, looking at ways in
which DOD can use its unique resources and assets to support
law enforcement, provide to them tools and techniques that they
do not have to support them.
And our second point is of course, for us, we are in a
support role. We view the interdiction mission--I think that is
particularly what we are going to talk about this morning--as,
first and foremost, a law enforcement responsibility. And,
again, we are happy to provide whatever support we can. But we
also have a number of other missions and activities which we
have to keep an eye on.
We have a five-part program in the Department of Defense
that corresponds with General McCaffrey's five-goal national
strategy. Let me briefly just comment on goals four and five,
because I think that is our focus here this morning. In 1998,
DOD will spend about $400 million supporting goal four, which
is our interdiction and shielding our borders. It is a
challenge for us, covering a vast area of the Caribbean and the
Eastern Pacific. It is one where we see a very dynamic threat.
The air threat, which predominated in years past, is down.
The maritime threat is up. When you get a change in modes and
types of transport and conveyance, it often calls for a
completely different set of tools to work against it. So we are
trying to keep up with what is a very dynamic threat, and we
try to use the assets we have, again, to support law
enforcement in that area.
Although the threat changes over the years, DOD provides
support that results in the seizure or jettison of about 100
metric tons of cocaine a year. And that number fluctuates and
it takes part in different places. But the DOD contribution to
law enforcement in this area stays around the 100-ton mark.
Senator Coverdell. What percent is that of the total?
Mr. Sheridan. Drug flow?
Senator Coverdell. Yes.
Mr. Sheridan. I would defer to others on that. I think
total production is probably 700 tons.
Admiral Loy. A little less than that.
Mr. Sheridan. A little less than that.
Admiral Loy. About 430 out of the source country this past
year.
Senator Coverdell. Thank you.
Mr. Sheridan. We also have very rigorous programs. We will
spend about $250 million this year on goal five, which is
breaking our sources of supply. We consider homegrown marijuana
a source of supply. So that figure captures our National Guard
programs. But the majority of that are our programs in Latin
America, where we have very extensive C3I programs, training
programs, and a very significant interdiction effort, in
Colombia and Peru in particular.
And I think, in those areas, we have seen some very
dramatic success, which General McCaffrey alluded to earlier,
significantly disrupting the flow of cocaine by air from Peru
to Colombia, forcing them onto rivers. And with very good
support from the Congress, we have gotten the authority to now
stand up some riverine programs in South America, which we are
starting up this year.
I would just conclude by saying again, this is a long-term
problem. DOD is in it for the long term. We strive to achieve
the maximum operational impact we can with the funds available.
And we try to bring resources to bear on a very rapidly
changing threat that law enforcement does not have available to
it.
And I would like to close by saying, in DOD, we have always
enjoyed, I think, a very good working relationship with the
Hill, and we look forward to working with you in the future.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sheridan appears in the
appendix on page 89.]
Senator Coverdell. I thank you, Mr. Sheridan.
Mr. Marshall, Acting Deputy Administrator for the Drug
Enforcement Administration, welcome.
STATEMENT OF DONNIE R. MARSHALL, ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Chairman Coverdell, members of the
subcommittee and the Caucus. Thank you for the opportunity to
appear here today. And I want to also thank each of you for
your support to DEA and the U.S. drug control efforts.
We are here to talk about, I suppose, mostly interdiction.
And I think it is important to understand that interdiction, in
its most narrow sense and in its purest sense, is physically
stopping drugs moving through the transit zone, across
international borders and into the United States. And that
responsibility is really more the responsibility of some of the
other agencies who are appearing here today. But DEA fits into
this role through our primary mission, which is to target the
highest levels of today's international drug trafficking
organizations. And through targeting the command and control
structures of those organizations, DEA makes, I think, a major
contribution to the overall interdiction effort.
We also make significant contributions to drug interdiction
with our law enforcement efforts not only internationally and
at the borders, but within the United States. We must be able
to--law enforcement in the United States--must be able to
attack the command and control structures of these
international syndicates who are directing the flow of drugs
into our country. By focusing our attention on the criminals
who direct these organizations, we, I believe, find the key to
really combatting international drug trafficking.
These groups who direct the drug trafficking into the
United States are really powerful, sophisticated, wealthy, and,
perhaps most importantly, very violent organizations, and they
operate on a global scale. In places like Cali, Colombia and
Guadalajara, Mexico, operational decisions are made on a daily
basis, operational decisions such as how and when and where to
ship cocaine, heroin, other drugs, which cars their workers in
the United States should rent, what kinds of cars, which
apartments should be leased, even what markings should go on
individual packages of cocaine, heroin and other drugs.
So, in other words, things that happen in places like
Bogota, Colombia, and Mexico City really have a direct effect
on what happens in the United States, in places like Los
Angeles, Tyler, Texas, or even Rocky Mount, North Carolina.
Over half of the cocaine entering the United States really
continues to come through Mexico, from Colombia, and across the
U.S. border at border points of entry. Trafficking
organizations from Mexico also produce huge quantities of
methamphetamine and import that into this country. They even
control, to some degree, production of that drug inside this
country.
Drug trafficking in the Caribbean is also a tremendous
problem. And it is overwhelmingly influenced by Colombian
organized criminal groups who smuggle thousands of tons of
cocaine into the United States. We are seeing independent
groups of traffickers from the Northern Valley of Delcauca, and
splinter groups from the Cali syndicates that are responsible
for large volumes of cocaine and, more recently, increasing
amounts of heroin coming into the United States through the
Caribbean.
These organizations, as powerful as they are, they have to
communicate. And the very feature that enables them to control
their drug empire in the United States, which is the ability to
exercise command and control over this far-flung criminal
enterprise, that very feature is the feature that law
enforcement can and is using increasingly against these
syndicates, turning their strength into a weakness and into a
vulnerability that law enforcement can exploit. And that
vulnerability is the communication structure of these
international crime syndicates, operating worldwide.
And therefore that is a prime target for drug law
enforcement efforts in this country. It is also a primary tool
for sharing intelligence information with our interdiction
partners--Customs, Coast Guard and the Department of Defense.
The results of law enforcement investigations actually indicate
the connection between the drug trade within the United States
and these drug trafficking organizations in Mexico and
Colombia.
And Senator Feinstein has already referred in her opening
comments to some seizures in New York and Michigan and other
places in the United States. So I will not get into Operation
Reciprocity and Operation Limelight. But those kinds of
investigations actually show that international connection.
Those are two clear examples that really proves a relationship
between the high-level traffickers in Colombia and Mexico and
their organizations in U.S. cities throughout this country.
The domestic component of our strategy should also be
understood as a part of DEA's contribution to the overall
national strategy to reduce drug smuggling into the country.
But, equally as important, we conduct an interdiction program
inside the United States. Operation Pipeline is a highway drug
interdiction program which is led by our State and local law
enforcement partners, and it is supported by DEA's El Paso
Intelligence Center.
Now, through EPIC, State and local agencies can share real-
time information on arrests and seizures with other law
enforcement agencies. They can obtain immediate results to
record check requests, and receive detailed analysis of drug
seizures to support their investigation.
Now, by identifying and arresting members of the
transportation cells of these drug trafficking organizations,
along with their U.S. customers, U.S. law enforcement
authorities are really better positioned to target the command
and control structure, the leadership, of these organizations.
These seizures and their followup, is really a vital part of
DEA's strategy to attack the organizations. And we also try to
see that that is a vital part of our efforts to share
intelligence gained during these investigations to increase the
effectiveness of interdiction efforts conducted by the other
agencies--such as Customs and Coast Guard.
I see that the time is running out, so I just want to close
by saying that DEA shares the concerns of Congress. We remain
committed to targeting and arresting these most significant
members of these organizations. We remain committed to
providing everyday, real-time, real-world support to the
interdiction effort. And we will continue to work with our law
enforcement partners, Federal, State and local, and, by the
way, throughout the world, internationally, to support their
efforts and to improve our cooperative effort against the
international drug smugglers.
Again, thank you for the opportunity, and thank you for
your continued support.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Marshall appears in the
appendix on page 77.]
Senator Coverdell. Thank you, Mr. Marshall.
We will now turn to Mr. Brownfield, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM R. BROWNFIELD, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
AFFAIRS
Mr. Brownfield. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, at the risk of being accused of special
pleading by my colleagues here at the panel, I note that both
you and Senator Biden mentioned earlier on and asked about the
INL fiscal year 1999 appropriation. You are both correct. Your
numbers are correct. The Senate, before its recess, voted us
out a figure of $222 million, which is $53 million less than
our request level and $8 million less than we have for fiscal
year 1998.
Mr. Chairman, I have a formal written statement, and if you
will allow me, I will submit it for the record and offer a very
brief oral statement.
The draft bill before us, Mr. Chairman, clearly focuses on
interdiction activities. INL's role in our national drug
control strategy is focused more on source countries in the
Western Hemisphere, but interdiction is an essential element of
drug control, and we play a very serious role in interdiction.
We directly support interdiction efforts in source countries
along the Andean Ridge. We train and support foreign law
enforcement forces engaged in interdiction. We provide
assistance and equipment to countries in the transit zone for
interdiction purposes.
INL, and the State Department at large, welcome, Mr.
Chairman, the objectives and the intent behind the Western
Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act. The attention that this bill
and this hearing provide will help all of us here at this table
to do our job and to do it better. We in INL are especially
grateful for the efforts of the drafters to include some
resources of serious importance to us.
But like the other members of this panel, Mr. Chairman, and
like General McCaffrey before us, the State Department has some
problems with this bill that will make it seriously unworkable
for us. If I could outline just a couple.
The bill identifies resources, but does not, as General
McCaffrey said, tie them into an overall, coherent national
strategy. In Mexico, it calls upon us to provide aircraft that,
in our judgment, are beyond the capabilities of the government
at present to maintain and operate. As General McCaffrey
mentioned, it calls for mobile x-ray machines in Bolivia, but
does not tie them into a larger national strategy. And because
the bill would lock in specific resources for specific
countries, it would not allow the flexibility of moving or
reprogramming assets without amending the law.
The bill provides authorities but not appropriations to
support them. And an authorization bill of this size is almost
certainly going to create expectations abroad--expectations
that we would be unlikely to be able to meet.
The bill offers some serious and very welcome support for
alternative development in the source countries. We wish it
would also give us, or USAID, the flexibility to condition and
leverage this assistance to performance or support or co-
funding from foreign governments.
And finally, Mr. Chairman, we do, it will not surprise you,
have some concerns about the bill's attempt to limit the
background of future Assistant Secretaries of INL. We agree,
law enforcement and intelligence experience are essential to
the INL portfolio. But so is knowledge of foreign assistance,
foreign governments, embassy country teams and operations
overseas, the U.S. Congress, and national security. We believe
very strongly that the Secretary of State should select, the
President should nominate, and the U.S. Senate should approve
future candidates for Assistant Secretary of State based on all
criteria, and not just two.
Mr. Chairman, the proposed Western Hemisphere Drug
Elimination Act, as currently drafted, includes some very good
ideas. It would serve as an excellent basis for some serious
discussion between the executive and legislative branches. We
would hope that our own fiscal year 1999 funding and
appropriation request might serve as the vehicle to refine some
of those good ideas. We are ready to join that dialog both here
and on the other side of the Capitol.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brownfield appears in the
appendix on page 62.]
Senator Coverdell. Thank you, Mr. Brownfield.
We would now turn to Mr. Samuel H. Banks, Deputy
Commissioner, United States Customs Service. Mr. Banks.
STATEMENT OF SAMUEL H. BANKS, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, UNITED
STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE
Mr. Banks. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee and the
Caucus, it is a pleasure to appear before you today. And I
would like to thank you for your continued support and interest
in the Customs Service in trying to counter this global problem
of drug smuggling.
The Customs' mission is really two things related to
narcotics enforcement. First, it is to disrupt the flow of
illicit drugs, through seizure and arrests; and, second, to try
to dismantle the drug organizations through investigative
efforts.
The U.S. Customs' foremost priority continues to be
narcotics enforcement and narcotics interdiction. Specifically,
I would like to talk a little on the air program. Our aviation
program consists of 114 operational aircraft today. Our marine
program has 84 vessels. Their purpose, again, is primarily
focused to disrupt and dismantle organizations. The aircraft
operate in both the source zone, the transit zone and in the
arrival zone of the United States.
Our aircraft actually provide close to 80 percent of all
the detection and monitoring that occurs in the source zone. So
we are a very big factor in this whole effort for both trying
to stop drugs coming from the source countries and transiting
through the transit zone.
Our air program, like others, use a three-pronged approach,
which is driven by intelligence, interdiction and investigative
efforts. Our air interdiction resources throughout the
hemisphere detect, sort, intercept, track, and ultimately we
are after apprehending the traffickers and seizing their
contraband.
In 1998, to date, our aviation program has been
instrumental in the seizure of over 42,000 pounds of cocaine,
100,000 pounds of marijuana, and almost 50 pounds of heroin.
Probably the most effective aviation tool that we think we have
is something that we call the double-eagle. It is a P-3 with a
radar dome, coupled with a P-3 without the radar dome.
This double-eagle, we think, provides the best tool that
you can have for this detection and monitoring approach. This
tool, this double-eagle approach, has been endorsed by the U.S.
interdiction coordinator and by SOUTHCOM. General Wilhelm has
on several occasions testified before committees, advocating
this as a principal tool to have an effective approach. He has
also supported our dome expansion program, which is a key
element in SOUTHCOM's efforts.
We believe that this tool also provides what we think is
the most cost-effective means for detection and monitoring in
these areas. The aviation program is critical, because, in the
past, the drug smugglers, their preferred course of smuggling
is through general aviation aircraft. It is the way they can
control it the best. To not have these programs just opens that
corridor again wide open.
I would like to say that we absolutely support the Drug
Czar's strategy, especially strategies four and five. And we
have got performance measures that we tie to our aviation, as
well, to support that.
One thing additionally I would like to comment on is the
technology along the Southwest Border. That has been an issue
that was discussed previously. We do currently have a 5-year
technology plan for the entire Southern Tier, including the
Southwest Border, which I would be very happy to supply the
committee. That plan has been coordinated both with Department
of Defense, because they have provided a lot of the basic
technological support to make it happen, and it has also been
coordinated through the Drug Czar's office.
We currently have four--perhaps five--today large x-ray
systems along our Southwest Border. DOD is also testing two
prototype mobile x-rays, and a gamma ray device that actually
looks through double-walled tankers, which constantly have been
a problem, in addition to a series of high-tech items in the
South Florida. In our 1999 budget, $54 million has been
provided for expanding this technology.
So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude my
statement. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Banks appears in the
appendix on page 61.]
Senator Coverdell. Thank you, Mr. Banks. Admiral Loy, you
are the cleanup batter here.
STATEMENT OF JAMES M. LOY, ADMIRAL, COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST
GUARD
Admiral Loy. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I thank all of you
for your attention to this very, very important issue for our
Nation. And I thank you for the personal opportunity to testify
today on the specific Act in question, and also on our general
interdiction efforts from the Coast Guard's perspective.
I, too, will submit my prepared statement for the record
and just summarize some remarks.
Mr. Chairman, I have been in this business now for 25 years
or so. Sam Banks and I, among others, go back in terms of
policy generation and actually riding ships at sea in the midst
of attempting to deal with this problem for a long, long time.
In my mind, it truly is, as many of you have mentioned this
morning, the most pernicious threat that our national security
has in front of it right now.
I would offer that if there was anything else that was
killing 14,000 Americans on an annual basis and literally
ruining the lives of hundreds of thousands of others, we
perhaps would be finding a heightened priority to that all
around our Nation, with no finger pointing necessary to whether
it is an administration issue or a congressional issue.
I applaud the Act's goal of strengthening our Nation's
counternarcotics effort. It is clear to me that the Congress'
sense here is that there is an imbalance among the three
primary prongs, the three legs of the stool, if you will. And
clearly it is the intent of the Congress at this point to be
strengthening the interdiction leg, which, as many of you have
already mentioned, and Senator DeWine perhaps most discreetly,
you feel it is under-strengthed.
I think it is a good instinct. And, again, I would applaud,
as General McCaffrey has already, the opportunity that it
represents to allow us in the administration, who forge the
kinds of things that compose the guts of his national drug
control strategy to do it well.
The Coast Guard's counterdrug effort is outlined in a
campaign, a theme campaign, that we refer to as Steel Web.
Against the background, the very structured background, of the
President's National Drug Control Strategy, Steel Web attempts
to match the 10-year nature of the length of that program and
the rolling 5-year budget, if you will--current year plus 4--to
accomplish the strategy and do so with accountability that is
now associated with the performance measures of effectiveness
that are beginning to come into focus, as General McCaffrey
testified.
That itemized accountability, in my mind, is something that
we have been missing for a long, long time, as we tried this
and tried that over the course of 25 years of effort. Steel Web
dictates an active and a very strong presence in the arrival
zone and the transit zone, to intercept, seize and deter
traffickers. The ``deter'' verb here, I believe, is something
that is very important.
We have focused on a study that Rockwell has done in the
recent past, to be revalidated by General McCaffrey's work over
the next 12 to 18 months, which offers that if in fact we can
encounter the smuggler about 40 percent of the time, we would
deter his behavior along that path about 80 percent of the
time. It also puts a finite upper limit on the resource
investment that would be necessary, wherein we could learn that
to throw additional assets, once you have reached that plateau,
would be rather foolhardy, without much gain and in fact
potentially a waste of the taxpayers' money.
One of the things that Steel Web also attempts to work with
very carefully is the international engagement effort. We have,
as you know, sir, negotiated about 19 bilateral agreements with
nations in and around the Caribbean, which become leveraging
agents, to allow us to work inside their territorial seas and
air space, on many occasions, and seek the jurisdictional value
that is brought to the table by ship-riders from those nations
that find their way onto Coast Guard platforms.
My operational commanders design and execute operations
like Frontier Shield, which was enormously successful in fiscal
year 1997; Frontier Lance, operated that with DEA; Border
Shield; Gulf Shield; Operation Nancy in the arrival zone; Carib
Venture; and Trident 1 and 2 in the Pacific to operationalize
our effort. All of those operations are interagency and often
international in character.
Steel Web, sir, is designed to meet the Coast Guard's
obligations under the National Drug Control Strategy and to
reduce the drug availability by 25 percent in 2002, and 50
percent in 2007. I see my light is red. Let me just note that I
have picked up very carefully this morning on a couple of
things.
First of all, I think all of us in this room are in a bit
of violent agreement. There may be a bit of different
dimensions from which we are approaching the issue, but we all
have the common well-being of the American taxpayer and the
citizens, and especially the young people of America in our
cross hairs. I think we need a consistent, long-term plan. That
was an evident piece of the testimony that came out in General
McCaffrey's exchange with the panel.
And I think, wherein it is appropriate to accelerate any
elements of that plan, it should be accomplished. The most
obvious place to look for that is inside the 5-year drug budget
that is in fact part of the 10-year plan that the Drug Czar
owns.
Interdiction is an absolutely legitimate cornerstone of the
total drug effort. Frontier Shield proved that. Frontier Lance
proved it again. History shows that when an appropriate
investment is held there, it can be an enormously productive
enterprise.
Last, sir, as I close my remarks, the first and foremost
point of issue for me in front of this panel this morning would
be to gain the funding that is represented in the President's
budget as it came to the Congress. I have heard several other
people mention that this morning.
We stand at the moment, as a prior-to-conference effort, to
be funded at a level that not only would not allow the so-
called drug plus-up that is identified in the House mark to not
be effective, because of the overall cut in that Coast Guard
budget that is in the House's bill at the moment--that is a
serious issue. And because of the multi-mission nature of our
organization, if we are provided the funding level there, we
will be able to focus on counternarcotics as the Senate and the
House have asked us to do.
We have done it in 1997. We have done it again in 1998. And
my intention would be to do it again in 1999, if adequately
funded.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Loy appears in the
appendix on page 75.]
Senator Coverdell. Thank you, Admiral.
I think we will begin with questions to any member of the
panel. I am going to begin with--well, first, a matter of
logistics, the meeting has, for important reasons, been
somewhat longer than anticipated, I am going to turn to the
cosponsor of the legislation. We are discussing to assume a
battlefield commission here and command of the meeting, as I am
scheduled to another session at 12 o'clock. There will be, as I
understand it, a vote at 12:30, and I would advise both my
colleagues of that.
And we will have 5 minutes at least for this round, and
then I will turn that decision over to Senator DeWine.
Mr. Banks, you talked about the 5-year technology plan. Do
the assertions coming from the panel here today, emphasizing
acceleration, offend that plan, or can that plan accommodate an
accelerated pace of moving technology to, say, the 39 points of
entry on the Southwest Border? Is this something that can be
assimilated by Customs?
Mr. Banks. Yes, sir.
Senator Coverdell. It could?
Mr. Banks. We could assimilate it. However, I would like to
caution, on being able to accelerate the plan, it also depends
on the vendors that have to build and provide that equipment.
So before I would give you an absolute commitment as to how
fast it could be accelerated, I would have to go out and talk
to those people, and I would have to work with the Department
of Defense, because they are key components in our technology
development.
Senator Coverdell. Well, I think that is what the panel--
the range of questions--we are looking for how can we be
bolder.
Mr. Banks. Yes, sir.
Senator Coverdell. And without offending the logic and
orderly development of what is already underway. And I would
ask the same question, quickly then, to you, Admiral Loy.
Because I keep sensing that if we emboldened your resources,
that you have the systems and the knowledge from these past
exercises, that you could address the Senator from Ohio's worry
about the Eastern Pacific and other locations. Is that a fair
assumption or not?
Admiral Loy. I think it is a fair assumption, yes, sir. I
think there are some orders first. First, we ought to be as
productive as we can possibly be with the assets that we have.
And that has to do with sensor packages and communications
capabilities and being cognizant of unity of command principles
that might work.
For example, in the bill, the discussion associated with
merging the JIATF process, I think that is very sound when you
think about JIATF East and JIATF South, because it offers us a
singularity of purpose to the cocaine industry in the Western
Hemisphere. I do not think it is as appropriate, for example,
with JIATF West, which principally has an East-West orientation
to the heroin threat coming from the Far East. And I do not
think it has as much sense to do it with JTF 6, as General
McCaffrey mentioned earlier, because they are, first and
foremost, in the business of supporting the Southwest Border
operation.
So given the three dimensions--an East-West orientation to
the heroin trade from the Far East, the Southwest Border
operation, because of its obvious last border to be crossed, if
you will, and the transit zone to the east--there is value to
the unity of purpose thought process that is reflected in the
bill.
Senator DeWine. Mr. Chairman, if I could just insert that
that portion that the Admiral is objecting to is no longer in
the bill.
Admiral Loy. Yes, sir, all right.
Senator Coverdell. Very good.
Senator DeWine. We appreciate your comment on it and your
input. Thank you.
Senator Coverdell. Mr. Marshall, you talked about the
importance of communications. Would you want to elaborate on--
is that capability of law enforcement at risk because of
encryption issues and technology that your adversaries have?
Mr. Marshall. Yes, Senator, I would have to say that that
is at risk. In the law enforcement community, we are quite
concerned about the increasing move of the highest-level
command and control figures to encrypted communications. We
have encountered in our law enforcement operations the major
traffickers, and primarily the traffickers based in Mexico at
the highest levels--we have encountered them using encryption
that law enforcement currently cannot break.
And I think that it is very key for us to preserve and even
hopefully enhance the ability, with all of the new technology
that is out there, I think that we need to preserve that
ability for law enforcement to legally get warrants and then
have the technology to intercept the command and control
communications of these organizations.
It is only through doing that, I believe--since they have
become so tightly controlled by elements that are overseas,
beyond our reach in many cases, they used trusted lieutenants
and, in many cases, family members in the United States--it is
becoming increasingly difficult to infiltrate the organizations
with human sources. And so the ability to intercept those
communications is absolutely essential. And we would suffer a
major setback if we lose that because of the encryption issues.
Senator Coverdell. I suspect that is going to be something
of the future--perhaps the next Congress.
Senator Biden, we have got a 5-minute round going here. And
I just made a battlefield appointment of Senator DeWine to sort
of take charge--it is his piece of legislation, as it is--and
proceed with the balance of the panel. But it is your round.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Marshall, if you do not know the answer to this
question, maybe you could submit it for the record. What
percentage of our consumption problem in America is related to
homegrown substances, whether it is marijuana or synthetic
drugs like methamphetamines, do we know?
Mr. Marshall. To give you an exact percentage, Senator,
would be difficult for me at this time. I will check and see if
I can get you some estimates on that. But I will say that the
homegrown cultivation of marijuana is a major problem. And we
are also seeing a growth in the manufacture of methamphetamine
in this country. LSD has always been with us to a certain
degree. It is not very high on the radar scope, but it is
there, and it is homegrown, a significant problem, and one that
we are trying to get a handle on. Particularly in the case of
methamphetamine, we have those initiatives.
But as far as actual numbers, I will get back to you and
try to provide you those.
Senator Biden. I would appreciate that.
[The information referred to was not available at press
time.]
Senator Biden. I think the most important thing to equip
people with who are not on this committee are the facts. Drug
and crime issues are the one area where no one thinks there is
any need for any expertise. They are entitled to an opinion.
They are entitled, as Senator Simpson used to say--he used to
say that everyone is entitled to their own opinion; not
everyone is entitled to their own facts. And I think people are
entitled to facts. I think it is important to know what the
breakdown here is.
The second question I have is for you, Mr. Banks. You have
five truck x-ray systems, two mobile truck x-ray system
prototypes. You have indicated you have got a 5-year plan out
there. You would have to determine whether or not my suggestion
of giving you the 100 million bucks now or thereabouts would be
able to be used efficaciously. But without getting into that
part of the issue, what is the plan? Next year, how many trucks
do you plan on having--next year? I mean you say you have a 5-
year plan, what is next year's plan?
Mr. Banks. Currently what we have in place is what we are
going to go with--we have actually got a system called the
automated targeting system, which is actually an information
technology thing that Senator Feinstein mentioned--we are going
to go up in 12 additional locations with that. We are going to
go with two large seaport x-ray systems.
We are going to go up with a series--I believe it is in the
vicinity of 15 or 16; it depends on how we can work with the
contractor on this--with a whole variety of technology, not so
much fixed x-ray, we are going to mobile truck x-ray, because
of the flexibilities that provides to us, and the gamma ray
devices--something called VACIS, that allows us to see through
these tanker walls.
The number one focus on this whole effort is to put it on
the Southwest Border first, to go to those 39 crossings.
Senator Biden. Well, it would be helpful for us if you
had--if we had this detailed plan--and we may already have it--
I do not--the staff may have it--of what the 5-year plan is.
And when I used to chair the Judiciary Committee, I used to
always ask the FBI these questions and the DEA. And they used
to tell me, in previous administrations, it is not money. And I
would say, OK, it is not money. Now you are finished with that.
It is not money. If I were going to force you to take money,
where would you spend it?
I want to force you to take money. You should have a plan
for us. That is a formal request by me to submit a plan to this
committee as to how quickly you could reasonably spend $100
million to deal with your 5-year plan. I assume your 5-year
plan is roughly the $100 million that is needed for
technologies. I may be wrong.
Mr. Banks. It is more than that, sir.
Senator Biden. It is more. Well, whatever the number is, if
we gave you the money now, how quickly could you speed it up?
[The information referred to was not available at press
time.]
Senator Biden. Mr. Brownfield, you know I love the State
Department. You know I think you guys hardly do enough on
drugs. You know you do not go to the schools of foreign policy
and these fancy universities the State Department guys go to,
to learn about drugs. I know all that. And you know I am going
to continue to be a pain in your neck for a long time, because
you should be doing more--and not you personally.
But what I want to ask you about is that, on this side of
the Capitol and in the other body, there has been a lot of
people pushing the State Department to provide Blackhawk
helicopters to the Colombians. And I would ask Mr. Sheridan to
chime in here if he would.
I am kind of mystified by this obsession of providing the
Blackhawk helicopters, since the Colombian Army already has
Blackhawk helicopters, and they will not engage them for
counternarcotics purposes. Could you elaborate on--I am told
you are looking for working on some alternative options for the
Colombians, options to Blackhawks--can you elaborate on what
you are doing and what your rationale for doing it is? And my
time is up.
Mr. Brownfield. Sure thing, Senator. And I will be very
brief. Let me make four quick points.
The first and most important is that I graduated from the
University of Texas. [Laughter.]
Senator Biden. Another one of those prestigious schools.
Mr. Brownfield. It is. I will leave it at that. I am sure I
would otherwise be unjustly accused of what Texans are
frequently unjustly accused of.
Senator Biden. Only by people who go to A&M. [Laughter.]
Mr. Brownfield. I have very strong views on that, Senator.
Senator Biden. I knew you would.
Mr. Brownfield. I invite you not to solicit them.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Brownfield. First, our concern with Blackhawk
helicopters is not the helicopter itself. It is a very good
aircraft. In fact, it probably is, for the mission that
everyone in this room has been discussing for the last several
years, probably the best aircraft out there.
Our problem has been one of the simple realities of how
much they cost to purchase, how much they cost to maintain and
service, and whether the recipient or the receiving national
police force and law enforcement agency has the capability to
continue to maintain them and fly them on their own. Our
judgment up to this point, based on all of these factors, has
been that we do not yet have a good match with the Blackhawk
helicopter.
The third point--counting the University of Texas--you have
put your finger on what has been a frustrating situation in
Colombia. And that is we thought, after a lot of prodding,
pushing, cajoling, and discussing, there was an agreement, an
understanding, reached between the Colombian National Police
and the Colombian Armed Forces, who do in fact have Blackhawk
helicopters in their inventory, that would permit the National
Police to use them for law enforcement operations. For whatever
reason, it has not yet worked out.
Now, if you ask the Colombian National Police why, they
will give you one reason. If you ask the Colombian Armed Forces
why, they will give you another reason. But it is indisputable
that, at least so far, the two sides have not reached an accord
that works in terms of using Blackhawk helicopters.
Our alternative, up to this point, has been if we cannot
afford to service, maintain and ensure that, in this case, the
Colombian National Police can operate Blackhawk helicopters, we
should give them something that they have experience with, that
costs less, that we can absorb within our budget and that we
can maintain for them if possible. And our solution up to this
point has been to find them other twin-engine helicopters that
would have the capability to fly at the higher altitudes, where
we want them to fly in the Andes, and that would give them the
greater safety and security that two engines gives them, and
would not, to put it bluntly, bust our budget.
And up to this point, that solution has been Bell 212
helicopters that are running about 10 percent of what we would
otherwise have to pay on a per-unit basis for a Blackhawk.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much for a very concise and
precise Texas answer.
Mr. Chairman, my time is up.
Senator DeWine. Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Thanks very much, Senator.
Let me get my helicopter question answered. And, Mr.
Sheridan, I attended a joint hearing in the House on this
subject in March. And the GAO, at that time, pointed out that
73 Hueys have been sent to Mexico, but they could not fly above
5,000 feet, they were not therefore worth their salt for opium
eradication because most of the opium poppy is grown above
5,000 feet.
I wrote to Secretary Cohen on March 19th. He responded on
April the 16th with a very full explanation, saying that the
Hueys were not really sent there for crop eradication, they
were sent there for troop transport.
Now, it is my understanding that earlier this year the Army
issued a safety of flight message that grounded all U.S. Hueys,
and Mexico responded by grounding their Hueys. Has the Army
taken any corrective action on our Hueys? Have we helped the
Mexicans? And are in fact these helicopters flying? And are
they able to do crop eradication?
Mr. Sheridan. The Army has a short-term fix and an
immediate fix. All of the aircraft have to undergo a vibration
test. Those that pass the vibration test are free immediately
to resume flying. For those that fail the vibration test, the
short-term fix is a new spur gear. The longer-term fix
apparently is a newly designed gearbox.
The production of the spur gears will take some months. And
they will be entering into the U.S. inventory and in other
inventories as they come off production lines relatively soon,
but certainly not today or tomorrow.
We tested all the Mexican helicopters. Forty of theirs
passed, 33 did not pass. So, from a technical safety of flight
perspective regarding the spur gear, 40 of theirs are cleared
to fly. Now whether they can fly or not for other reasons is a
different issue.
As to their utility for opium eradication, again, it goes
back to the original purpose of the transfer of the helos. They
were not intended for that purpose. I think, as Bill indicated
earlier, everybody would love Blackhawks. Blackhawks probably
can do that. UH-1's cannot. They have been around for a long
time. Everybody knows that. No one should be surprised that
Hueys do not perform well at those altitudes. We never told
them they could. They had no expectation that they could.
Senator Feinstein. So, for all-around use by these
countries in terms of whether it is transport or eradication,
the Blackhawk is a superior vehicle; would that be fair to
conclude?
Mr. Sheridan. Yes, the Blackhawk is a far superior vehicle,
I think everyone would agree. But they are also much more
expensive. They are much more difficult to maintain. It is the
difference between an old Jeep and a brand-new, top-of-the-line
SUV someplace. For most purposes, the Jeep will still get them
there. There is no question that the other one is better, but
it is very expensive. And the cost per flight hour is a
multiple of what the UH-1 is.
So I think for many of these folks that we deal with, the
UH-1 is not a perfect solution, but it continues to be pretty
good.
Senator Feinstein. OK. I thank you very much for that.
Mr. Marshall, I am a big fan of the DEA, so I want to thank
you for being here and for DEA's continued efforts. I think you
do a super job.
Mr. Banks, if I may. As you know, I believe very strongly
Customs has an unfortunate mixed mission. On the one hand, it
is a trade facilitation agency; on the other hand, it is a law
enforcement agency. And I have felt for many years now that the
law enforcement has been subjugated and the trade expediting
has been increased.
I asked for those GAO reports. I wrote to Treasury. I have
waited with bated breath. I have had no response. And I am
concerned about that.
Let me ask you a couple of questions. And let me begin with
the TECS system, used by more than 20 Federal agencies. GAO
says you do not have adequate controls over the deletion of
records from the system. If the TECS information is unreliable
and could be tampered with, if you do not have adequate
controls, does that mean that cargo shipments are being
expedited when in fact they should be stopped and searched?
Mr. Banks. That is possible. Usually the TECS records will
primarily focus on things like the carrier and a driver, more
name-type checks. Usually our lookout systems for commercial is
in our automated commercial system.
Senator Feinstein. So we have got a big flaw. What are you
going to do about it?
Mr. Banks. Well, actually, what we have instituted--and
this is one of the things Commissioner Kelley asked me this
morning--to make sure that I conveyed his request that at your
convenience we would like to come up and talk about both the
GAO report on TECS and on line release as soon as possible.
Senator Feinstein. Any time. Any time. I would be happy to
do it. All right.
Mr. Banks. The first thing that we are doing on the TECS
system is we have revised the procedures, and in fact we are
even building in internal controls in the computer system to
ensure that this happens--is if there will be a deletion made,
not only does the officer who wants to delete the record have
to be involved, that officer's supervisor has to be involved.
In addition to that, the person that put in the record has to
be involved with--by this computer notification, the
originating officer is notified.
In addition to that, the originating officer's supervisor
is notified, just in case that officer is not there or is
unavailable at the time. In addition to that, when the deletion
is made, there is a comment field that has been built in to put
in the comments as to exactly why that deletion occurred.
Senator, there are 11 million look-out records in the TECS
system, total. And it is a constant process of changes and
deletions for very legitimate reasons. You are absolutely
right, and GAO's finding was absolutely correct, we needed to
build in better internal controls to ensure that those were
done appropriately and with the appropriate levels of reviews.
Senator Feinstein. Well, I really appreciate that, because
this, as you know, has been a controversial area, because of
the possibilities of corruption within the system and somebody
deleting something that you do not want deleted, and you have
no way of knowing. It is just gone and the truck comes across
the border. So I am happy to hear that.
Now, let us go to another system, the automated targeting
system and the pre-file program. It is my understanding that
they have to be used together, and it is not working. Could you
comment on that?
Mr. Banks. There is no question--first of all, I would like
to say that you were correct on the GAO--when they went out and
looked at the three-tier targeting system, the ports were not
happy with it. And primarily the ports were not happy with it
because even we in the national office were not happy with the
outcome of that. One, there was a tremendous amount of analysis
that had to go in to support the system. And quite frankly, we
just did not have the intelligence to put in that system to
drive it.
The automated targeting system, what it does is actually
rely upon sources of information from different data bases
about the carrier, about the merchandise itself, about the
parties involved in those transactions and their relationships.
And what it does is really a rules-based system. Some people
used to call it expert systems, artificial intelligence, but it
is really a rules-based system, to try to identify those
shipments that might be of the highest risk.
You are absolutely correct, the sooner we get the
information into that system--what you want is you want
information from every possible source in order to give maximum
opportunity to this advanced targeting system. The pre-file
cargo information would be exactly one of those things that we
would like to have in the system. And that is one of the
reasons that we try to provide certain advantages to people
that provide the pre-file information, so that we can run it
through a systematic approach for risk management.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you for being straight with me. I
really appreciate that.
Mr. Chairman, I have a letter, dated September 3rd, from
Union Pacific Railroad. And Union Pacific is currently the
largest rail carrier of goods in and out of Mexico--all types
of commodities. And they have gateways at Brownsville, Laredo,
Eagle Pass, El Paso, Nogales, and Calexico. They indicate that
they are currently committing $3 million for new fencing, new
lighting, new equipment, inspection facilities, police K-9
activities, et cetera.
I would like to make this letter available to the
committee. I would like to commend them for taking this action
as a private company.
And I would like to very quickly ask Mr. Banks, do you feel
that we have adequate--I do not know the word to use, whether
it is surveillance or scanning or security--for these rail
facilities, and particularly now that we are going to have
these big, stacked rail, double-stacked rail cars pumping
across the border, to ensure that contraband is not aboard or
put into the facility, the rail structure of the car?
Mr. Banks. No, not close.
Senator Feinstein. Not close?
Mr. Banks. Not close. And I agree with you, what Union
Pacific has done--and they have even joined us on a carrier
initiative--they are doing tremendous work. It is not enough.
As good as they are being at this point, it is not close to
the investment that they need to make in order to operate
across that border. There is inadequate lighting at their
crossings. We do not have the examination facilities. Part of
this $54 million that we have in our 1999 appropriation will go
toward the gamma ray devices that we need in order to be able
to do the technology capabilities; because rail cars have a
higher density steel wall. We have seized multiple rail cars,
including from Union Pacific, as a result of finding violations
of both empty compartments and actual narcotics.
Now, Union Pacific has been very helpful in terms of going
through the whole investigative process. We actually work
somewhat in partnership with them. But it is not close. We have
a long ways to go with the rail industry.
Senator Feinstein. Well, I thank you for that. And I think
I will write back to them and say, you have got to do more, and
perhaps we can talk about that.
Mr. Banks. I keep telling them I want to own one of their
locomotives. And that will definitely get their attention.
[Laughter.]
Senator Feinstein. All right. You indicated that you are
going to expand the automatic target system?
Mr. Banks. Yes, ma'am, we are.
Senator Feinstein. Can you verify at present the
information that you get from Mexican companies in the pre-file
system?
Mr. Banks. We cannot necessarily verify it except through
actual--we run it through certain edits. We validate it against
previous information that we have gotten, so you have got
certain norms. But then we can actually do examinations to
compare if the information they are giving us is actually
accurate according to what we are seeing. So we can validate it
in that sense.
One of the things that--I understand, it is not absolutely
perfect--we currently have----
Senator Feinstein. Then why would we expand it, if we
cannot accurately verify?
Mr. Banks. I am saying that we can verify certain critical
information. One of the things that we get is that pre-file
information. That is one of the components of information.
There are some things in there we absolutely can verify. Can I
verify? Can I do 100 percent examinations on their cargo that
comes in to verify it? No, I cannot do 100 percent. What I can
do is a statistically based analysis, number one. Two, I can do
it based on risk analysis. And, three, at the judgment of our
officers--and every time we check those, we will validate the
information that they provide to us--completely validate that
information.
What I am trying to be is absolutely accurate with you. I
do not want to convey to you that we are going to do 100
percent validation every time. But yes, we are going to
validate it, including to a statistically valid level. Yes.
Senator Feinstein. Mr. Chairman, I just want to thank you,
and if I may just make one comment.
I think this has shown that we really have a significant
lacking still in our sort of border infrastructure, in terms of
really being able, A, to verify, to know accurately what we are
doing, to have the kind of intelligence that is necessary, to
have the kind of scanning that is necessary.
I, for one, think it would be a terrible mistake if we wait
for 5 years. General McCaffrey said they are about to present a
5-year program. My own view is we ought to just make the
appropriation, do what is necessary so at least we can say that
our border infrastructure is adequate.
And I thank you very much.
Senator DeWine. I appreciate your comments. Those are very
good comments.
Admiral Loy. If I may, Mr. Chairman.
Senator DeWine. Certainly.
Admiral Loy. I would like to offer that General McCaffrey's
5-year budgeted plan does not wait for 5 years to occur. It is
a planned sequence of activity through the course of five
budget years. And the acceleration potential within that is
really where you have been going all morning, sir.
Mr. Banks. And I would like to add that General McCaffrey
personally increased the technology budget in 1999 by $25
million over and above what had been approved through Treasury.
So he is firmly committed to this technological approach on the
border.
Senator DeWine. Admiral Loy, I have seen firsthand the work
that the Coast Guard can do. And I have been on some of your
cutters and seen some of the work and talked to some of your
folks. And they just do a fantastic job. As I think you can
guess from listening through this hearing, I am concerned that
you and some of the other agencies simply do not have the
resources that are needed to do everything that you could do--
to do the things that, frankly, have to be done.
I am particularly concerned, as I have already mentioned,
on the other map that we had up there, in regard to the Eastern
Pacific, that we have virtually nothing out there--nothing out
there. I am concerned with the fact that good programs such as
Operation Frontier Shield, Operation Frontier Lance are gone. I
wonder if you could take a moment and describe for us exactly
what you think was accomplished by Operation Frontier Shield,
how that worked, and Operation Frontier Lance, as well.
Admiral Loy. Sir, as a matter of fact, I think we have a
results poster for Frontier Shield.
Frontier Shield in 1997 was a proof of concept operation
that began on 1 October, 1996 and was a tremendously successful
interdiction operation.
Mr. Chairman, the realities of my experience over a lot of
time with this is that there are two ways that we have been
able to be successful in the interdiction business. When you
are covering the multiple million square miles of effort that
we are trying to undertake in the transit zone there have been
two things that have been proven to be valuable.
One is if we can take an AOR, an area away from the bad
guys. Operation Bahamas Turks and Caicos is probably the best
example of that. In other words, over the course of greater
than a decade, with an adequate resource dedication, we were
literally able to shut down the Bahamian Archipelago as turf
for the bad guys.
The second has been the unexpected pulse and surge kind of
operation such as Frontier Shield and Frontier Lance. These are
partial results over the course of just several of the month's
worth of effort, but the effort is mostly, I think, depicted in
the number of sightings which translates to a target of
interest spectrum which then results in boardings. In other
words, we actually encountered about 43,000 targets out there.
We determined that 4,000 or so of them were interesting enough
for us to pursue. We actually boarded over 2,000 with the
resultant seizures that you see described on that poster.
The reality there goes to what had been the slide that was
up there before, which is to say, the drug-smuggler will find
the path of least resistance, and we fully expected that he
would shift his efforts to the west, and that is in fact why we
then stood up Frontier Lance as a proof of concept operation in
fiscal 1998.
A $34 million plus-up in the drug business for the Coast
Guard in 1998 allowed us to sustain Frontier Shield at a lesser
level than the pulse originally provided, and we took Frontier
Lance, if you will, out of hide to again prove the concept had
merit further to the west, did so prove that, which is to say
interdiction clearly does work. That, again, was a proof of
concept operation for only a quarter, given that we had other
responsibilities.
Senator DeWine. You said for only a quarter.
Admiral Loy. 3 months, sir, a 3-month proof of concept
operation further to the west.
Senator DeWine. What did that prove to you?
Admiral Loy. First of all it proves to me that interdiction
works. The thought process of inside a strategy addressing on a
systematic basis a series of operational activities at the
field commander level can, in fact, make a positive
contribution to the overall drug effort that we are
undertaking.
I have just returned, sir, because of my new
responsibilities as the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, from a
spin through the Caribbean and all the nodes of command and
control there. It is important for this committee to know that
in my estimation the most significant problem we have at the
moment is a lack of surface end game capability in the transit
zone and the arrival zone. We are getting brutalized at the
moment by go- fast vessels in the transit zone and in the
arrival zone.
Senator Feinstein. Could he say what he means by that, the
absence of end game surface----
Senator DeWine. What does that mean, Admiral?
Admiral Loy. We are able to watch the lift-off, if you
will, of a general aviation aircraft out of Barranquilla, out
of Colombia, track it across the Caribbean, perhaps even watch
it transfer across the international air corridor in the Cuban
Island, perhaps drop its load north of the Island of Cuba to a
waiting go-fast boat, and then at speeds of 55 knots or so
deliver that product either back into the Bahamian Archipelago
or perhaps go to the U.S.
Senator DeWine. What is the remedy for that?
Admiral Loy. The remedy in my mind, sir, is a combination
of doctrinal change and I have directed my own staff to begin
the process of thinking about changing the use of force
doctrine from aircraft such that we, not totally dissimilar to
the Colombians and even the Panamanians, have the opportunity
to use a non-lethal disabling warning shot package of activity
to bring that go-fast to a stop.
And at the other end of the day the ultimate answer is
having a surface asset there to actually intercept and seize.
Senator DeWine. Surface asset meaning what?
Admiral Loy. A boat, a patrol boat.
Senator DeWine. Right there.
Senator Feinstein. To intercept and search?
Admiral Loy. And arrest and seize.
Senator DeWine. How long do you anticipate, Admiral, this,
as you describe it, this doctrinal change that you are talking
about--it has at least been talked about, maybe not formally,
but it has been talked about for some time. I wonder, what is
your timing on that?
Admiral Loy. My direction and my staff was to have that--I
am concerned, of course, with force protection implications. I
am concerned with doctrine and tactics being properly put
together. I have asked my staff to have that back on my desk
within 6 months.
Senator DeWine. Six months from now?
Admiral Loy. Six months from a month ago.
Senator DeWine. We await that. We encourage that and look
forward to that.
Mr. Banks, you are shaking your head yes. Whenever I get
someone shaking their head yes, I like to see what they have to
say. I thought it was a yes.
Mr. Banks. It was a yes, absolutely, Senator. We work hand
in glove with the Coast Guard on this end game effort,
especially in the arrival zone around the South Florida area,
and Puerto Rico, and we also have boats. We have got 84 boats
out there doing the same sort of thing in the apprehension, and
we are linked together even on the aviation side and our marine
side, and our boats have gone from--we had 200 vessels in 1990.
We are down to 84 vessels today.
Senator DeWine. Repeat those figures again.
Mr. Banks. In 1990 we had 200 vessels. Today we have 84,
and by the year 2000 we will probably have half of that.
Senator DeWine. That is a shocking figure.
Senator Feinstein. Have they asked for more?
Mr. Banks. Well, there has not been actually an increase in
the marine program over the last 5 years.
Senator Feinstein. But have you asked for more?
Mr. Banks. I believe there is a request. We are currently
designing that request, yes.
Admiral Loy. I could go, if I might, sir.
Part of this USIC review that I have attempted to undertake
since I got the responsibility was to translate not only policy
reviews, but what is the resource shortfall associated with
getting the job done appropriately.
I have done that. We have had a conference with all of the
players, which is a quarterly conference that the U.S.
Interdiction Coordinator runs together with the J-3 in the
Pentagon, and we have compiled that report and offered it to
General McCaffrey as the appropriate person for whom we work
inside the administration.
I am absolutely convinced that that package will be very
much part and parcel of the certification process that he uses
by law to explore the adequacy of each agency's budget request
in the future.
Senator DeWine. It is just to me abundantly clear, after
having traveled in the region, talked to some of your folks
down there, both in Customs and in the Coast Guard as well as
DEA, that the resources simply are not there at this point.
In other words, there are so many things that you can do. I
have frankly a great deal of confidence in both of your
Departments, both of your agencies to get this done, but the
resources are not there.
And Mr. Banks, when you recited those figures, those are
astounding figures, absolutely astounding figures. I mean, they
should be a shock to this Congress. They should be a shock to
all Americans, to hear what those figures were.
Admiral, one of the fringe benefits that I believe you
achieved with both Operation Frontier Shield and Operation
Frontier Lance is the on-going improvement in cooperation with
some of the other countries in the region. I wonder if you
could maybe talk a little bit about that, because that is an
intangible that in the long run I think will pay a great deal
of dividends for us as well as for them in their antidrug
effort.
I mean, I know when you talk about the Dominican Republic
and you talk about Haiti, we are dealing with Coast Guard and
other law enforcement that certainly is not up to the standards
that we would expect to see in this country, but that informal
relationship and working together that you achieved during that
relatively brief period of time with both of these operations I
think is a real fringe benefit, and I wonder if you could just
talk for a moment about that.
Admiral Loy. Yes, sir. I am happy to do that. In both
cases, with respect to Frontier Shield, which has principally a
Puerto Rican-Virgin Islands focus, the active participation of
State and local agencies, the FURA and the PRANG out of Puerto
Rico, and the international wedge of activity that was
associated with it, was very much part and parcel of beginning
the process of leveraging their indigenous capability and
compiling that as a capability that can then be dealt with in
the overall scheme of things.
And Frontier Lance, the same. That was the first operation
that we actually ran out of Hispaniola. We ran that out of the
south coast of the Dominican Republic, terrifically positive in
terms of being a step forward, as you were citing, in terms of
international cooperation. It, too, included U.K. And
Netherlands cooperation in terms of contribution of aircraft
hours and ship days.
So yes, sir, you are absolutely right. I would go further
and state that the President's visit to Barbados just a year or
so ago offered expectations and hope with respect to many of
those island nations. Further, the negotiated bilaterals that
we now enjoy with many of them offers that same leveraging
opportunity for them to grow in their own capability and then
be used well in the total theater effort, if you will.
Last, I would note that in the current 1999 budget on the
Hill there is a request in our budget for a Caribbean support
tender, the idea there being to staff, including potentially
with some foreign nationals as part of the crew even, and make
literally a round robin kind of training and maintenance upkeep
activity centered on that particular hull.
As I last recall the action on the Hill, it was supported
at not quite the President's request level in the House, and
zeroed out on the Senate side, so again, that is something that
I think we could instantly do that would be supportive of
exactly where you are going with the international engagement.
Senator DeWine. I appreciate your comments very much. We
could go on with this panel, at least I could, for a long time.
I have a lot more questions.
But we do have a third panel that has been waiting for some
time. I want to thank all of you very, very much for joining
us. We look forward to continuing the dialog both formally and
informally in the future. Thank you very much.
Let me invite our third panel to come up. We will take a
short break, with the emphasis on short, and I would ask the
third panel to be seated, and I will introduce you in a moment
when we come back.
[Recess.]
Senator DeWine. I would like to welcome our third panel.
Let me introduce our third panel. Mr. Henry L. Hinton,
Assistant Comptroller General, National Security and
International Affairs Division, the General Accounting Office,
Dr. Barry Crane, Project Leader, Institute for Defense
Analyses, Dr. A. Rex Rivolo, Principal Analyst, Institute for
Defense Analyses.
Let me welcome all of you. I apologize for the delay. You
all have been around Capitol Hill long enough to know that
occurs, especially when you are on the third panel.
Mr. Hinton, let us start with you, and we have your
prepared statement, which is a part of the record, and we would
invite you now just to make some opening comments. We are going
to go basically by a 5-minute rule with a little flexibility
there, and we will start with Mr. Hinton.
STATEMENT OF HENRY L. HINTON, ASSISTANT COMPTROLLER GENERAL,
NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Mr. Hinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be
here today to present our observations on the effectiveness of
U.S. efforts to combat the movement of drugs into the United
States.
My statement discusses the challenges of addressing
international counternarcotics issues and obstacles to
implementing U.S. and host national drug control efforts. My
testimony is based on a body of work that we have done at the
request of several congressional committees and Members over
the past 10 years, and some of the recent reports that we have
done concerning U.S. counternarcotics efforts in the Caribbean,
Colombia, and Mexico.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, our work indicates that there is
no panacea, as I think we all know, for resolving all of the
problems associated with illegal drug trafficking. Despite
longstanding efforts and expenditures of billions of dollars,
illegal drugs still flood the United States.
Although U.S. and host nation counternarcotics efforts have
resulted in the arrest of major drug traffickers and the
seizure of large amounts of drugs, they have not materially
reduced the availability of drugs in the United States.
A key reason, Mr. Chairman--we have heard a little bit
about this this morning--for the lack of success of U.S.
counternarcotics problems, is that international drug
trafficking organizations have become sophisticated,
multilbillion industries that quickly adapt to new U.S. drug
control efforts. As success is achieved in one area, the drug
trafficking organizations quickly change tactics, thwarting
U.S. efforts.
Other significant longstanding obstacles also impede U.S.
and source and transit countries' drug control efforts. In the
drug-producing and transiting countries, counternarcotics
efforts are constrained by corruption, limited law enforcement
resources, and institutional capabilities, and internal
problems such as insurgences and civil unrest.
Moreover, drug traffickers are increasingly resourceful in
corrupting the country's institutions.
Some countries, with U.S. assistance, have taken steps to
improve their capacity to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into
the United States. Among other things, these countries have
taken action to extradite criminals, enacted legislation to
control organized crime, money laundering, and chemicals used
in the production of illicit drugs, and instituted reforms to
reduce corruption.
While these actions represent some positive steps, it is
too early to really tell their full impact.
U.S. Counternarcotics efforts have also faced obstacles
that limit their effectiveness. These include organizational
and operational limitations, and planning and management
problems, and over the years we have reported on problems
related to competing foreign policy priorities for operational
planning and cooperation, and inadequate oversight over the
U.S. counternarcotics assistance. We have also criticized ONDCP
and U.S. agencies for not having good performance measures to
evaluate results.
We have made a number of recommendations to improve U.S.
counternarcotics efforts through better planning, sharing of
intelligence, and the development of measurable performance
goals.
Mr. Chairman, in closing I just want to make the committee
aware of three efforts, in addition to those that Senator
Feinstein brought up this morning that we have been working on,
that we have been asked to do by Senator Grassley and also
Chairman Hastert of the Government Reform and Oversight
Committees.
They are to update our work that we have done on Mexico and
Colombia, and to take a specific look at DOD in terms of its
efforts to provide assistance to the law enforcement community,
as well as the assistance that it gives host governments.
That will do it, Mr. Chairman. I stand ready to answer any
questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hinton appears in the
appendix on page 69.]
Senator DeWine. Again, thank you very much. Dr. Crane.
STATEMENT OF DR. BARRY D. CRANE, PROJECT LEADER, INSTITUTE FOR
DEFENSE ANALYSES
Dr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting and Dr.
Rivolo and me to discuss our research. We are supported by the
Department of the Defense and do operational evaluation of the
interdiction forces.
We provide a lot of that analysis to Admiral Loy, the USIC,
and we would like to share some of the results. I believe there
are some opportunities, based on our research, that could come
our way that could perhaps help decrease the consumption of
cocaine.
The most interesting operation occurred in Peru and--I am
going to be pretty brief here--the operations in Peru are very
encouraging. In Peru, a very small interdiction force, using
several bases, was able to cause severe damage to the base
transportation structure. Base, because it was interdicted up
the line, dropped to a very low price level, bankrupting many
of the farmers.
Now, this leads to a potential operational concept in the
source regions. If you look at the map there, you can see the
small green growing areas are the source of the cocaine
problem. In Peru coca farms have declined rapidly because of
the unprofitability of the industry, the loss of profitability
of base.
It would be possible to run another operation in Colombia.
You would have to gain air control to force abandonment of a
substantial part of the industry, in our opinion.
Furthermore, there are other types of attacks, for example,
that have been seen to cause substantial damage, though some of
them are transient.
In 1997, for example, there were PNP attacks on several of
the very large production labs. We saw a large response from
that.
Senator DeWine. Large response in what sense?
Dr. Crane. We saw positive test rates in the corporate
sector drop 25 percent. We have many measures of merit. Dr.
Rivolo can discuss them in more detail if you would like. We
are prepared to go through some more detail if you would like
to see some of these things.
But 1997 a production attack was successful, but there were
insufficient forces to follow through with an integrated JIATF
attack in the summer. The plan was an excellent plan in my
opinion--I was asked by Admiral Kramek to independently
evaluate it--but there were not sufficient forces to conduct
the three-prong interdiction in EASTPAC, the Central Caribbean,
and Puerto Rico which was eventually sustained. Currently, they
are still focusing on the north coast operations, attempting to
interdict the air traffickers.
In Colombia you have a situation where thousands of flights
are undetected by either intelligence or radars. There are
substantial efforts, for example, by the Department of Defense
to deploy new technologies to find these flights in an ongoing
effort.
So I believe, if I can summarize, the things that I think
will cause a major impact on the cocaine system, at least in
the nearer term: You have got to gain air control in Colombia.
You do not have that today.
You could follow through with attacks on some of the major
production labs. The history is replete--I have got four or
five examples of that. You can ruin the efficiencies of these
growing areas, and that is a very important concept here, to
help us reduce cocaine.
Senator DeWine. Great. Good summary. Thank you very much.
Doctor.
STATEMENT OF DR. A. REX RIVOLO, PRINCIPAL ANALYST, INSTITUTE
FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES
Dr. Rivolo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As a technician, it is my job to separate the facts from
opinion as was pointed out a little while ago, and in this
business it is very difficult to do.
I am here to bring you some of those facts, and I have
three things to tell you, but before I get to that point, I
would like to point out that facts can be accurate but also
irrelevant; in many of the things we do in the counterdrug
business, there really is only one measure of effectiveness,
and that is reduced use.
All of the other things, the seizures and the number of
people prosecuted, are all irrelevant if they fail to produce a
reduction in use, and I need to emphasize that. When I look for
effectiveness in what we do, the ultimate thing is to look for
that benefit.
I have prepared a bunch of graphics that I am not going to
go through unless you ask specifically, but I would like to ask
for them to be entered into the record, showing the three
things that I came here to tell you.
The first thing, which has already been said elegantly, is
that drug use after a 10-year monotonic decline, has in recent
years reversed. That is universal across all drugs.
The second thing is that interdiction efforts----
Senator DeWine. You say that is universal among all drugs?
Dr. Rivolo. All drugs. All drugs, including alcohol,
tobacco. It is really a social--now, one must look at the right
population to make that statement, because if you simply pool
everyone into a category over 12 years of age you are counting
a lot of 60 and 70-year-old people that dilute the real
measure. The drug problem resides in young people, and it is
there that we need to focus.
Senator DeWine. So your principal statement is what? Say it
again.
Dr. Rivolo. That drug use is on the increase, and that it
is universal across all drugs, as measured where things count,
which is in the young population.
The second thing I am here to say is that interdiction
efforts have been shown to be highly effective when properly
focused, and I wish to emphasize properly focused.
We have seen interdiction essentially stop the rapid fall
of cocaine prices in the 1980's, ultimately arrest that drop,
and actually reverse it. The reversals were significant, and
during those reversals, more importantly, came a large number
of benefits, including reduced deaths, reduced emergency room
visits, reduced number of felons arrested for that drug, and so
on.
So the three basic points are that drug use is on the rise,
and therefore the solutions we need to look at need to be
effective. The only way to measure effectiveness is to measure
a decrease in the prevalence of drugs, or the consequences of
drugs.
We can show, although in technical discussions only, that
interdiction events can actually stop the falling prices, which
are falling basically because of competition, and in some cases
actually reverse them, and when prices reverse there are clear
indications that the consequences of drug use--that is, the
number of new initiatives, the number of people who show up in
emergency rooms, the number of deaths, the number of people who
test positive in our jails--all drop proportionately.
It is really a solid argument from beginning to end that
interdiction, when properly focused, and I again want to
emphasize the focus, does have a benefit which is measurable in
reduced consequences.
That is my statement.
Senator DeWine. Well, of course, that leads to the next
question. What has your research found, or what have you found
in regard to ``properly focused''? For policymakers, what do we
need to know?
Dr. Crane. In 1989, when the--and I am addressing the drug
industry, which is cocaine, which is the one we know most
about. I also might add, probably the biggest drug problem.
In 1989, the basic route was from the producing country of
Peru to the refining country of Colombia, and then out of
Colombia, a straight line through the Caribbean at very, very
low risk, landing into the shores of the United States.
We knew that that was a clear place where we might have an
effect, and when we mobilized, the Coast Guard essentially
closed the Caribbean, closed the Bahamas, and the Caicos
Islands, and we had for the next 18 months an enormous increase
in the price of cocaine.
Along with that price increase came a large reduction in
emergency room visits, the number of deaths, and so on.
We knew that the Caribbean was a place where interdiction
efforts would be well-focused. That machinery remains in place
today. If we go home, they will return to that.
Senator DeWine. If we what? I just did not hear you.
Dr. Crane. If we go home, if we just pack up and leave the
Caribbean, we will go back to what it was in 1989. Since 1989,
the drug industry has found an alternative. They formed a new
industry, which was the transportation cartels, mostly
dominated by Mexico, and the business now proceeds by growing
region, refining region, transportation region, ultimately into
the United States.
But there is a price to be paid for that. The Mexicans
charge 100 percent of the value of the drug for that service,
and thereby the industry now has increased costs, which are
either passed on to the consumer, which lowers the number of
people who use, or they take reduced profits, and both of those
things have, indeed, happened.
We realized that early on, that that was the mechanism.
From 1990 to about 1995 there were a few other events well
understood that we can point out to you in detail, but in 1995,
in March 1995, to be exact, an event evolved which we knew was
going to be very well-focused, and that was the take-down of
the air transportation bridge from Peru to Colombia.
That was the only mode of transportation of raw materials
to refiners. It was wide open, at zero risk.
When the Peruvians agreed to take aggressive action, and
aggressive action is, you ask someone to follow me and land,
and when they do not, you shoot them out of the sky, and that
is what the Peruvians did, within weeks, that bridge was shut
down.
Within weeks, actually within months, the consequences of
that event were showing up in the streets of New York, where
import prices had doubled. California was seeing the same
thing, and in fact across the United States we had seen about a
30 to 40 percent increase in price.
And at the same time, when the data came in, which was
years later, we saw that at that time we had reduced medical
consequences, reduced prison test rates, and we have charts for
all of that.
Today, the Caribbean is shut down, the air bridge is shut
down. Where is the focus? The focus is in Colombia, and I
cannot emphasize that enough. The problem has concentrated into
Colombia, and now, the only weak point that we can obviously
see is in Colombia.
That means either getting our presence into Colombia, or
giving the Colombians a presence, which means air, air assault.
They have neither one of those two capable of operating at the
ranges in which Colombia finds itself. We are talking about
600, 700 miles. The Colombians are not capable of handling that
problem. They need some sort of assistance, either by us
participating or by us giving them the tools and the training
necessary.
If we do that, if we shut down air operations in Colombia,
you will shut down the cocaine industry and the heroin
industry, which is more important at this point, because now we
are seeing that because cocaine has become an unprofitable
industry, heroin is now being substituted, by the very same
organizations, grown right there in Colombia, because it is
much lower risk. It is much easier to take a kilo or two of
heroin than it is to take 500 kilos of cocaine.
That is one place where we can increase risk. The other
place is what Admiral Loy pointed out, that in the Caribbean,
where the pressure is already immense, the risk is very high;
the only way you are going to increase risk is not so much by
putting more ships and airplanes there, but by changing the
rules. If you shoot, not to kill necessarily, but if you shoot
to stop boats, you will have an enormous change in the overall
way the industry operates.
That is what I mean by focused.
Senator DeWine. Mr. Hinton, do you have any comments on
that?
Mr. Hinton. No, sir. I have not seen the results of their
work that they have done that I could be in a position to
comment.
Senator DeWine. You talked earlier about basically the
lesson learned in Peru, and I guess, Dr. Rivolo, extrapolate on
that, or explain that. Is that correct?
Dr. Rivolo. Yes, sir.
Senator DeWine. That is what you were talking about is the
lesson?
Dr. Rivolo. Yes, sir.
Senator DeWine. The change of operation in Peru, the air
bridge.
Dr. Crane. If you would look at the chart, I have got the
prices in Peru of the raw base material averaged over time, and
you can see, if you look around 1995, you see a large price
increase in Peru. You see when interdiction stopped, the
farmers produced a lot of base material, flooded the system, so
you have to put a lot of stress on them.
Once the air bridge was damaged in the interior of Peru and
they were forced to use surface transportation, you can see
that the base price and cost on the chart are about equal. This
forces them to abandon the cocaine fields, and that has been
observed in more recent years by satellite photography.
Now, on top of the graph you see some of the prices in
Colombia. If you were to interdict the Colombian air transport
system, this would cause a large price increase and it would
potentially be able to stop the ever-increasing coca farms that
are being planted.
As you recall on the map, the coca industry that affects
the U.S. is concentrating itself, primarily in Colombia. That
trend suggests that we are going into a smaller and smaller
growing area, but it is also becoming a more and more difficult
problem.
The requirement, really--I think if you were to succeed at
this--in Peru we were quite lucky. The example there was, we
had two critical fighter bases at exactly the right places,
where the traffickers had to exit the country. The results were
achieved with as few as five or six fighter planes. I mean very
modest resources, very good intelligence.
In Colombia we do not have as good intelligence, so we are
going to need surveillance aircraft, we are going to need a
base--probably in the eastern sector that will be hard to
defend.
You do several of these kinds of things, and we should be
able to cause severe damage.
Now, by severe damage, I mean with the current rules of
engagement, intercepting successfully and forcing to land as
few as 3 or 4 percent will substantially damage the system
under the current rules of engagement, so it is not a hopeless
task by any means.
It is not an easy task, however, because none of the
infrastructure resources or assets are really available to do
that.
Senator DeWine. Mr. Hinton, the GAO has done numerous
studies in the past several years regarding counternarcotics
operations in the region. Your October 1997 study focused on
interdiction efforts in the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific.
Can you walk us through the specific decreases in funds for
interdiction since the late eighties and early nineties? Can
you do that? Do you have that information in front of you?
Mr. Hinton. Yes, sir.
Senator DeWine. Can you just talk about which agencies have
suffered the most cuts, maybe?
Mr. Hinton. I do not have it down to that level, but I will
comment basically on the graphic that you had up there this
morning that showed the differences. Our work parallels that.
We would agree basically with the differences after the mid-
nineties, where they dropped down into the teens on
interdiction, and we saw that shift happening right after the
1993 time period. What that really translated to, as to the
Eastern Pacific and the Caribbean, was reduced flying hours,
reduced steaming days and those type of things that did not
allow interdiction to take place.
And as I think about the issue of interdiction, there is no
question that some level of interdiction needs to be
maintained, maybe as a signal of our national resolve, but also
a key part of the national strategy. I think the real test
there is in determining the appropriate level of interdiction.
The level of that effort should be commensurate with the
relative contribution that interdiction is making or expected
to make.
In our work, we have been pushing ONDCP to come up with
performance indices, and we heard the General talk about those
this morning, and I am pleased. I think that is a good step.
What I do not see yet as we look and hear discussion is
whether the investment that we are making, whether it be
enforcement, interdiction, and the other parts of it, is tied
to the agencies' goals, and that we know we are going to get a
return on our investment, and I think the key to that is the
criteria to measure the goals.
Senator DeWine. I lost you there, or you lost me. One of us
got lost there. I guess I am lost. But what do you mean, as it
relates to the agencies, under the performance standards?
Mr. Hinton. Right. We heard the General lay out the goals
this morning, and he said he was going through the budget
process with all of the agencies and the key players, and now
he is in the process of linking the resources to the goals, and
as I look at it, whether it be regional goals or whether it be
country goals, you a coordinated team that is going to
implement them. How do those players interact to meet those
goals? How do we know that we are having success on a
particular region, or a particular country? What is the return
on our investment going to be?
I think that the goals that I have seen coming out of ONDCP
are a step in the right direction. There are several that are
quantifiable, there are several that are qualitative, and I
think that, as he mentioned, that as a next step he hopes to
have a better refinement of those indicators, which I think is
positive.
Senator DeWine. Dr. Crane, any other general
recommendations as far as public policy, as far as knowing what
interdiction is valuable and what is not? I mean, you made a
blanket statement, then you gave a very specific example, but
any other guidance for this committee, for Congress?
Dr. Crane. To summarize the results, I think there are
potential opportunities in the source zone to cause relatively
large effects--that is, a substantial rise in prices and
reduction in use.
If you look at the testing rates, for example, in corporate
America--we gather a lot of this type of data--there were large
drops in positive testing rates when these attacks occurred on
the cocaine system.
So we use a lot of these measures that are much more
refined than those used by ONDCP to look at specific
operational events. They seem to suggest that there are really
just three or four things in the source region that you can do.
The first one, of course, is they require aircraft, and we
should be able to maintain air control over some of these
areas. We have got to do it if we want to have a successful
strategy.
The second thing is, while you are doing that, it forces
them into efficiencies in their production labs. They cannot
have them all distributed because it costs too much, so that
gives you more lucrative targets in the production
laboratories, which you then can strike with air assault
forces.
However, we should not be kidding ourselves here. The
guerrilla forces in Colombia, the FARC, are operating at
company and brigade-size level. We are looking at really
relatively large military operations to survive these strikes.
On the other hand, we have to do it. So if you first cutoff
the air bridge, the money to the FARC gets cutoff. Then the
potential increases to go after these labs, which they have go
to consolidate.
The third part of our research suggests that they have to
consolidate efficiently the growing areas, and so there are
certainly potentials to go after the fields themselves and make
it difficult to plant them.
All of these things have to be done in Colombia, in my
opinion. They would have a significant effect on the cocaine
business.
Now, that said, there are still other operations. They
still have to get it to the United States, and so we continue
to use high technology and other things, and sufficient forces
to cause a lot of damage.
In the early eighties they were using all aircraft to bring
it to the U.S. Very few aircraft, in comparison, are now used.
However, they do adapt, and they do use other means, and so
this always is a challenge to the interdiction coordinator.
Senator DeWine. Gentlemen, thank you very much. This panel
has been very helpful. We appreciate your testimony. We look
forward to working with all of you in the future.
[Whereupon, at 1:12 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Prepared Statements
Prepared Statement of Samuel H. Banks
Mr. Chairmen and Members of the Committee and Caucus, I would like
to thank you for your continued support and interest in the efforts of
the U.S. Customs Service against the global scourge of drug
trafficking.
It is a pleasure to appear before the distinguished Committee and
Caucus today to discuss S. 2341, the ``Western Hemisphere Drug
Elimination Act,'' as it relates to the United States Customs Service,
particularly our air and marine interdiction programs.
As one of the agencies primarily involved in the Nation's drug
interdiction and enforcement efforts, our mission is not only to
disrupt the flow of illegal drugs through seizures and arrests, but
also to dismantle drug organizations via investigations throughout our
assigned areas of responsibility. Customs remains at the forefront of
our Nation's narcotics interdiction and investigative efforts. Our
foremost priority continues to be narcotics interdiction. Our counter-
narcotics efforts are focused in 3 areas: air interdiction, marine
interdiction and interdiction at our land borders and ports of entry.
air program
Comprised of 114 operational aircraft, the U.S. Customs Air Program
is mandated to disrupt organizations that are smuggling drugs and other
contraband into the United States by aircraft. This is accomplished
through the utilization of a three-pronged, intelligence, interdiction
and investigative approach. To this end, the Air Interdiction Division
dedicates its resources throughout the hemisphere to detect, sort,
intercept, track and ultimately apprehend traffickers and seize their
contraband.
Drugs coming to the United States from South America pass through a
six million square-mile area that is roughly the size of the United
States. This area, referred to as the Transit Zone, includes the
Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, and Eastern Pacific Ocean.
Customs Double Eagle missions, a P-3 AEW flying in tandem with a P-
3 Slick, provide the most effective detection and monitoring package
available. Flying together, these aircraft have effectively worked both
air and maritime targets ranging from South American air bridge
movements to high-speed go-fast boats in the Caribbean.
Absent an effective air interdiction program, general aviation
aircraft provide almost an ideal means for smuggling narcotics. Air
transportation maximizes control of the load while maintaining the time
and frequency of exposure and theft.
marine program
Beginning in 1980, the Customs Service implemented a national
marine program in response to the tremendous number of narcotics
smuggling ventures being conducted in the U.S. Coastal waters.
Comprised of 84 vessels, the U.S. Customs Marine Program is mandated to
disrupt organizations that are smuggling drugs and other contraband
into the United States by vessel. Customs has primary responsibility
for interdicting illegal contraband in the arrival zone. Through its
investigative efforts the Customs marine interdiction effort has
targeted and disrupted various well organized and financed
international smuggling organizations smuggling illegal contraband into
the United States.
Although the Customs Service coordinates with the U.S. Coast Guard
and INS Border Patrol in conducting marine smuggling investigative and
interdiction efforts, the Customs Service remains the only federal
agency tasked with the primary goal of disrupting and dismantling
smuggling organizations that are utilizing vessels to smuggle drugs and
other contraband into the 19,943 kilometers of coastline around the
U.S.
In FY 1998 to date, the marine Program has been instrumental in the
seizure of 37,222 pounds of cocaine, 38,211 pounds of marijuana, 39
pounds of heroin and 85 pounds of methamphetamine.
land borders
Technology plays an important role in all Customs counterdrug
activities. It provides new capabilities to allow inspections to keep
up with changing smuggling techniques, acts as a force multiplier,
increases enforcement effectiveness and efficiency and allows us to
cope with growing trade and traffic.
The Administration has developed a comprehensive and structured 5-
year Customs technology plan to deploy counterdrug technology to the
port of entry, subject to budget resources, to significantly increase
the smugglers' risk of detection all along the entire Southern Tier of
the U.S. This technology includes: non-intrusive technologies (e.g.
fixed and mobile truck x-ray systems, gamma-ray inspection systems for
trucks and railcars, and higher energy heavy pallet x-ray systems);
technology for outbound currency and weapons at ports along the
Southern Tier; dedicated commuter lanes which depend on technologies
such as voice recognition biometric identification, ``smart cards" (a
chip on a credit card-sized card which stores information about the
individual), and vehicle movement control technologies along the
Southwest border; investigative; intelligence, and encrypted, digital,
voice communications technology; and automated targeting systems.
Recent accomplishments in the development of new and larger-scale non-
intrusive inspection systems will provide Customs with the opportunity
for unprecedented improvement in the intensity and number of inbound
inspections of cargo and conveyances.
Customs currently operates five truck x-ray systems in El Paso,
Ysleta, and Pharr, Texas and Otay Mesa and Calexico, California. In
addition, prototype mobile truck x-ray systems are operating in Laredo,
Texas and Miami, Florida. One prototype gamma-ray system is in place at
Santa Teresa, New Mexico. The prototype gamma-ray system uses gamma-ray
radiation to penetrate the structure of heavier-bodied trucks, such as
propane tankers, to allow Customs to examine both the conveyance and
some cargoes for the presence of contraband. The first truck x-ray
system became operational in July 1994. This system and the four others
that have become operational since March 1997 have been involved in 315
drug seizures totaling over 70,000 pounds of narcotics. By December of
1998, Customs will have three additional fixed site truck x-ray systems
operational in Laredo and Brownsville, Texas, and Nogales, Arizona.
We believe this type of technology is invaluable in enhancing
Customs narcotics enforcement capabilities without impeding the flow of
legitimate commercial traffic. The fixed site truck x-ray and mobile
truck x-ray can inspect approximately eight full size tractor trailer
trucks per hour. The gamma-ray system can inspect 12-15 tractor trailer
trucks per hour. Both of these systems can inspect any vehicle that is
legal for operation on public roadways. Mobile x-ray systems will also
be available for use at border patrol checkpoints along the Southwest
border. The first mobile x-ray has been responsible for seizing over
6,000 pounds of narcotics in the past year.
This combination of flexible interdiction support will force the
smugglers to utilize other, less desirable, means of smuggling.
conclusion
Once again, Customs remains at the forefront of our Nation's
narcotics interdiction and investigative efforts. Our foremost priority
will continue to be narcotics interdiction.
This concludes my statement for the record. Thank you again for
your continued support of the United States Customs Service and the
opportunity to appear before the distinguished members of the Committee
and Caucus.
______
Prepared Statement of William R. Brownfield
Mr. Chairman, Members:
It is a pleasure to present to these committees the views of the
Department of State concerning S. 2341, the ``Western Hemisphere Drug
Elimination Act.''
general
The Department finds many things about this measure that are very
positive, and very important. The single most important thing about it,
and about these hearings today, is the breadth and depth of truly
bipartisan support for effective measures to reduce the availability in
the United States of illegal drugs that originate in other countries.
The extent of the damage done by illegal drugs to our country is
manifest from the fact that the Administration's requests for funding
of programs and activities by Federal departments and agencies against
illicit drug abuse, trafficking and production have mounted to over $17
billion for Fiscal Year 1999.
Those of us that spend our professional lives implementing some
aspect of those programs realize that the American people want and
desperately need us to succeed. They have a right to expect our utmost
efforts. We recognize that we can do nothing without the strong support
of the Congress. This measure is an important further demonstration of
how strong and broad that support is. We who carry out these programs
cannot help but welcome this.
This measure further reflects the realistic recognition by the
Congress that our overall efforts to reduce the abuse of drugs and its
consequences for the American people, and the specific efforts of the
agencies on this panel to reduce the availability of illegal drugs that
originate beyond our borders, cannot work on will or wishes alone.
These activities take money, and some of the more highly technical and
resource-intensive of them take a lot of money. In light of the
staggering costs of illegal drug abuse and the crime and violence that
attend it, money devoted to these ends is money well spent. But we
must, and this measure does, recognize that money we must have.
The measure further specifies that the activities it seeks to
advance, and the money to support those activities, should not come at
the expense of our existing programs and funding for drug control. This
too is entirely realistic, and important. Within the overall design
provided by our National Drug Control Strategy, the Department of State
and other agencies engaged in drug control activities at and beyond our
borders seek to define and implement balanced, comprehensive and
integrated programs to reduce the production and traffic in drugs.
Additional resources to augment those activities cannot help but
increase our prospects and advance the imminence of our success. Trying
to gain the same end by robbing Peter to pay Paul would only disrupt
and retard our programs, or so unbalance them as to actually reduce our
chances of success.
This measure addresses funding for drug control activities on a
multi-year basis. The Department of State entirely agrees that
strategic priorities for drug control activities, and funding for their
implementation, must be established and sustained in a way that is
persistent over time. The drug addict on the street of an American city
does not go to Peru, Burma or Mexico for his product. He--and she--is
supplied by a huge multinational agro-industrial complex that is as
global, complicated and lucrative as wheat, petroleum, information
technology or any other globally-traded products or services. Like
other multinational enterprises, the illegal organizations that deal in
drugs of abuse seek to diversify, functionally and geographically, to
reduce risk and maximize profits. They invest and operate, adapt to
changing business conditions created by our efforts against them, and
invariably seek to outlast whatever governments do.
We support the objectives outlined in S. 2341. But we must be
realistic in setting our timelines. Is it realistic to expect an
illegal multinational agro-industry with the size and complexity of the
several illegal drug industries to be diminished substantially by
December 2001? The National Drug Control Strategy addresses programs
for the reduction of the supply of and demand for illicit drugs through
comprehensive programs against illicit drug production, trafficking and
abuse, within the United States, at our frontiers and beyond them, in
terms of five- and ten-year timeframes. The Department of State
considers these periods to be realistic timeframes within which such
activities can be expected to provide objective, quantifiable and
measurable outcomes.
interdiction activities indispensable to drug control success
I will turn shortly to discuss in more detail some specific aspects
of the legislative measure under consideration here. It addresses many
aspects of our foreign programs against the production and traffic in
illicit drugs, but strongly emphasizes activities oriented to the
detection and interdiction of illicit drugs as they are smuggled by
air, sea or land toward and across our borders. Our National Drug
Control Strategy clearly recognizes that interdiction of illicit drugs
is an indispensable and integral element of our national efforts. These
programs are an important, visible demonstration of our nation's will
to fight illegal drug trafficking. They have political value as a
demonstration of national will. They have practical value, in addition
to intercepting and seizing illegal drug shipments, by serving also as
a deterrent, increasing the costs and risks of smuggling drugs toward
and into the United States.
The Department of State is not, as such, an interdiction agency. It
does not itself run large interdiction operations. The Department of
State is, however, the inevitable partner to the interdiction agencies
to enable them to carry out those activities which, as so many do,
entail securing the consent, cooperation or independent action by other
governments for activities carried out abroad. The Department has taken
many actions, and operated many programs and projects, that have
contributed importantly to the success of interdiction programs and the
agencies that fund and operate them, and will continue to do so.
International Narcotics Control foreign assistance funding support
has been important to sustain cooperative actions by the Bahamas and
Turks and Caicos Islands under OPBAT, and with other Caribbean nations
and territories. This program sustains the transit zone-wide Joint
Information Coordination Center or ``JICC'' program in cooperation with
the U.S. Government's El Paso Intelligence Center. This support was
instrumental to interdiction success in Guatemala of Operation
``Cadence'', in which Guatemalan authorities in cooperation with DEA
virtually hounded cocaine transit activities out of the country. The
Department of State, in conjunction with DoD, the Coast Guard and DEA,
has promoted establishment of maritime counterdrug agreements in the
Caribbean region which give U.S. enforcement agencies rapid access to
suspected drug trafficking vessels, and encourage cooperation by other
government authorities in these efforts.
These activities, along with our strong support for cooperation
with the Government of Mexico, directly support the interdiction
programs that respond to Goal IV of our National Drug Control Strategy,
to protect our air, land and sea frontiers from smuggling of illegal
drugs. Further from our borders, in countries where the crops that are
the raw material from which the botanical-source drugs of abuse,
cocaine, heroin and marijuana are derived, we are making other efforts
in response to Goal V of the National Strategy, to break foreign drug
sources of supply. To break foreign sources of supply, we must break
the production of these crops at their roots. In the specific case of
cocaine, the only sources of supply are in the three Andean countries
in South America, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. Acting in cooperation
with the governments of those countries to eliminate the production of
coca that is the raw material for illegal cocaine was defined as an
important drug control and foreign policy priority for us by the
President's policy directive on drug control in the Western Hemisphere,
Presidential Decision Directive 14 of November 1993.
In accordance with this directive, the Department of State and the
Chiefs of Missions and U.S. Government agencies represented in the
Country Teams of those three countries have defined and are
implementing comprehensive programs intended to reduce and ultimately
eliminate the cultivation of coca destined for the production of
illicit drugs that will be smuggled to the U.S. These efforts have
included cooperation by the Departments of State and Defense, the U.S.
Customs Service, Coast Guard, DEA and other agencies to extend our
direct support selectively to limited, cost-effective efforts by the
source countries to interdict cocaine exports or movements within or
among them. We note and welcome the fact that one of the largest single
items in the measure now under discussion addresses specifically this
category of U.S. Government programs.
This class of U.S.-supported source country interdiction has a
fundamentally different strategic purpose. Our border and near-border
interdiction programs are the right and responsibility of any
government to protect the integrity of its borders and the security of
its citizens within them. Our support of source country interdiction
efforts is not intended to simply seize or destroy drugs, or arrest
smugglers. It is intended more strategically to attack the economic
activity of the illegal drug industry within the source countries
themselves. These programs, with other drug law enforcement activities
of the foreign governments and concerned U.S. agencies, are intended to
so disrupt the illegal drug industry as to make it possible on a long-
term basis to reduce and eliminate cocaine production at the source.
The Congress has participated directly and importantly in this
aspect of our international efforts in the past, by approving
legislation in 1994 which authorized the President, subject to
appropriate safeguards, to make available to selected source countries
the benefits of U.S. interdiction technology, intelligence and skill.
Since December 1994, this has been the basis for our direct support of
and cooperation with actions by Peruvian and Colombian authorities to
interdict exports of semi-refined cocaine base by air from Peru to
Colombia.
This effort, in the context of the other elements of comprehensive
national plans by each country, has enjoyed success beyond the
expectations of many that advanced it, and entirely out of proportion
to the relatively limited U.S. support involved. Cocaine flown by air
identified as moving from Peru to Colombia dropped to half or less than
the levels of air movement observed in 1994. Drug traffickers'
inability to make ``just-in-time'' export flights created local
oversupplies at the production points in Peru, which caused prices paid
to primary growers to drop precipitously to levels half or less than
half of those of a year or two before. Farmers, no longer able to
anticipate a reliable income, abandoned growing coca in droves. Net
coca cultivation in Peru in 1997 is only a bit more than half the
extent it had when it reached its maximum recorded level, in 1992.
This was not accomplished by interdiction alone. It required many
other elements of a comprehensive, integrated national approach, most
significantly alternative development assistance. Maintaining this
validated successful coca crop reduction concept in Peru, and
establishing and sustaining other concepts appropriate to the greatly
differing circumstances in the other two countries, will require
continued foresight, imagination, careful planning, great
perseverance--and sustained funding. However, in this success, the role
of source country interdiction, and our support of it, was one of the
indispensable elements. Without it, we are utterly certain, the success
could not have occurred. Successes in drug control have not been as
frequent as we would wish. This success was made possible only by the
cooperation of the U.S. interdiction agencies, the Department of State,
other concerned U.S. agencies and the governments concerned. It offers
much promise for the continued imaginative employment of interdiction
capabilities, in the source zone as well as in the transit and border
regions, to attain our long-term national drug control goals.
legal and organizational concern
Before I turn briefly to some specific aspects of S. 2341, I would
like to identify one aspect of that measure that relates specifically
and only to the Department of State, which the Administration considers
infringe unacceptably upon the authority and responsibilities of the
President and the Secretary of State. I refer to Section 206 of S.
2341.
Section 206(a) would legislatively prescribe certain prerequisites
for an individual nominated by the President to serve as Assistant
Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs. As a matter of principle, the Department of State believes
that the Secretary of State's flexibility in personnel matters, and the
President's appointment prerogatives, should be respected and protected
to the maximum extent possible. The Assistant Secretary and Principal
Deputy should have wide experience and expertise in policy development
and implementation, and should be able to work with the Department's
senior management, the regional and functional bureaus, and other
agencies. The particular restriction that would be established by
Section 206(a) would be totally inconsistent with this principle.
Section 206(b) would intrude inappropriately upon well established and
effective procedures for the management and implementation of United
States foreign military assistance programs that have been
cooperatively employed by the Departments of State and Defense. We urge
that in any consideration of legislation on this subject, these
provisions be excluded.
alternative development
Referring to Sections 201, 202 and 203, as I described earlier, we
consider that economic assistance that is delivered to rural
populations responsible for the cultivation and primary processing of
coca for the defined and specific purpose of causing them to abandon
coca cultivation and thereby reduce the net extent of the crop has been
an element as important as that of interdiction programs in the
striking success of reduction of the coca crop in Peru in recent years.
Such ``alternative development'' assistance is recognized by Peru's
national drug control strategy, and that of other countries, as a vital
element in attaining those countries' goals, and ours, of eliminating
the cultivation of coca destined for illicit drug production. Our
efforts to secure participation in these efforts by other donors, and
to ensure that alternative development assistance intended for drug
control is in fact designed to attain the project purpose of reducing
drug crop cultivation, are an important element in our continuing
diplomatic dialogue with other donor nations.
The Department strongly favors the principle of augmenting United
States Government resources available for alternative development and
related counternarcotics programs in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia.
However, we question the prudence of establishing rigid categories in
the law itself that specify the precise use of such resources. In the
absence of opportunity to consult with the foreign governments
concerned, this approach could place the President in a position of
being authorized to use funds for a purpose which the cooperating
foreign government would not accept. S. 2341 makes no provision for
securing from the cooperating foreign governments appropriate
commitments regarding the employment of adequate personnel and other
support resources, the provision of sustainment support beyond the term
of this law, or the manner in which the United States may ensure that
such assistance is effectively and appropriately used.
mexico
Another specific aspect of S. 2341 whose formulation is questioned
seriously by the Department of State is Section 204, relating to
Mexico. The Department considers that references to privileges or
immunities of United States Government officials in Mexico in a United
States legislative measure relating to drug control assistance to
Mexico would almost certainly render it less, not more, likely that the
United States can resolve the matter of assuring the appropriate and
effective protection of its officials in Mexico through continued
consultation with the Government of Mexico. Unilateral legislation by
the United States Congress on this subject could prompt a political
response within Mexico that would constrain the ability of the
Government of Mexico to offer continued cooperation with the United
States on a variety of other drug control issues of common concern.
S. 2341 also calls for providing the Government of Mexico with
additional helicopters. Mexico has in the inventory of its Attorney
General's Office (PGR) Directorate General of Aviation Services, and
Air Force, a number of Bell 212 helicopters which we believe is
sufficient to meet opium eradication requirements at this time. What it
lacks are adequate funds to support the operation and maintenance of
those helicopters. It would thus serves little programmatic purpose
commensurate with their cost, and would not enlarge the total number of
Bell 212 flight hours available for this mission category, for the
United States to offer additional helicopters whose employment would
only further attenuate the resources available to sustain the Bell 212
helicopters now in operation.
international law enforcement academies
Referring to Section 401, the Department in principle favors the
establishment and operation of additional international law enforcement
academies in Latin America, Asia and Africa. The existing International
Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest, serving Europe and Russia/NIS,
operates effectively with funding by the Department of State from
foreign assistance funds provided for international criminal justice,
rather than drug control, as a cooperative activity with participation
and support of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other Federal
law enforcement agencies. We see these activities continuing well
beyond December 2001. We also question the wisdom of setting precise
funding for each that does not take into account their specific needs.
The Department of State therefore suggests that it would be preferable
instead to attain this purpose by corresponding augmentation of the
portion of the foreign assistance authorization that is devoted to
programs in the criminal justice sector.
legislative means inappropriate to purpose
Mr. Chairman, I have discussed the general matter of how
interdiction programs can contribute to our foreign drug control goals
of protecting the integrity of our frontiers and eliminating foreign
drug sources of supply, and I have discussed some substantive aspects
about certain other specific features of S. 2341. The Department of
State considers that such dialogue between the Congress and the
Executive Branch is a vital element in the elaboration and sustainment
of our national drug control programs abroad.
However, I wish to close my presentation with a serious concern
about S. 2341.
Our long experience has shown us conclusively that the
multinational illegal drug industry is highly and rapidly adaptive,
probably outpacing the adaptability of any legal industry I could name.
Illegal international movement of drugs is by definition an itinerant
activity. Criminals engaged in this traffic change operating practices
with great rapidity in response to actions of government authorities to
prevent them. Equally rapid adaptation of government programs,
particularly programs for detection, monitoring and tracking of the
nature addressed here, is indispensable to prevent successful
circumvention by illegal activities.
Moreover, our drug control activities abroad cannot be carried out
without the fullest consultation, coordination and cooperation with the
foreign governments concerned. It is not infrequent that the United
States suggests the use of drug control assistance in a manner or for a
purpose which the cooperating foreign government does not accept.
Further, to effectively protect United States funds employed to assist
other governments in drug control activities, it is necessary through
consultation and negotiation to secure from those governments
appropriate commitments regarding the employment of adequate personnel
and other support resources, the provision of sustainment support
beyond the term U.S. assistance, and the manner in which the United
States may ensure that such assistance is effectively and appropriately
used. The Congress has historically attached great importance to such
monitoring of our assistance abroad, especially with regard to human
rights.
It is unrealistic to expect that every individual aspect of such a
highly complex and specific authorization will prove feasible and will
be recognized as remaining desirable. Yet the absence from S. 2341 of
any provision for reprogramming would make it impossible to reallocate
resources to meet emerging priorities without amending the law itself
on each and every occasion when such an adjustment was observed to be
necessary.
Specification in the law of individual operating points or areas
for specific types of counterdrug activities would provide those
engaged in those activities with a detailed plan, well in advance of
its implementation, as to how the preponderance of U.S. interdiction
and other drug control activities would be carried out. It seems
prohibitively likely that by the time material could be procured,
agreements reached with concerned foreign governments, personnel and
other assets deployed, training and planning conducted, and
implementation of activities begun, the target illegal drug activity
would long since have redeployed itself to an area which the
authorizing law did not address.
Authorization of funds or activities for purposes already addressed
by existing authorities or activities of other departments or agencies
would be confusing, redundant and would attenuate the regime of legal
and policy controls which the Congress has desired the Executive to
implement to provide adequate assurance that United States national
human rights and other policies are observed, and that waste, fraud,
abuse or mismanagement of funds or resources provided by the United
States be prevented on a continuing basis.
In short, while we find very many positive things contained in S.
2341, we consider very strongly that the legislative approach adopted
in that measure would not in fact advance, and in some instances could
actually impede, the effective advancement of those desirable purposes
or activities.
Virtually all of the specific activities that are addressed by S.
2341 are already possible under existing departmental or agency
authorities. Many are already established elements of agency programs,
and are being funded from appropriations now being provided for these
purposes. Congress and the Executive have developed a comprehensive set
of procedures relating to notifications, consultation and continuing
coordination with the Congress in the elaboration of specific plans,
programs and activities for which such funds will be employed, and have
a comprehensive regime of mechanisms, controls and reporting procedures
to account to the Congress for the disposition and use of resources
employed for foreign drug control activities.
The Department applauds the objectives reflected in S. 2341. The
Department considers, however, that the most effective means of
attaining those ends would be to provide defined multi-year
authorizations for appropriations to the International Narcotics
Control element of the foreign assistance program, and to the
established budgets of the other departments and agencies concerned.
The President should be permitted to employ funds appropriated in this
manner in accordance with existing and effective program planning and
financial management systems and procedures, which will ensure to the
Congress a continuing consultative role, without the undesirable and
imprudent particularism, lack of adaptability, confusion and potential
redundancies to which the approach taken by S. 2341 would lead.
In short, the best way to attain the very desirable ends that S.
2341 seeks to advance is for the Congress to first, ensure that
existing programs and activities in this area are fully funded at the
levels now requested by the Administration, and then second, to augment
those levels as may be fiscally responsible, to further enhance our
ability to gain the very desirable purposes that S. 2341 seeks to
serve.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared comments. will welcome any
questions you may have. Thank you.
______
Prepared Statement of Senator Alfonse D'Amato
This hearing on U.S. efforts to eliminate drugs in the Western
Hemisphere comes on the heels of a disturbing report concerning illegal
narcotic use among our young people. I thank the Chairmen for holding
this timely hearing that renews our obligation to the international
eradication and interdiction of illegal narcotics.
Illegal drug use by our children and youth is taking an enormous
toll on families and communities all over the country. A study released
by the National Institute on Drug Abuse found that cocaine and
marijuana use among high school seniors has increased 80% since 1992.
More alarming however is that heroin use among 12th graders doubled.
The effects of drugs are astounding. It is estimated that drug
related illness, death and crime cost the United States approximately
$67 billion a year. That is $1,000 for every man woman and child in
America. The resources we spend to combat the effects of drugs could
have been used for social and economic development. After decades of
trying to combat the scourge of drugs, we must finally put a stop to
it.
New York State is no stranger to the plight created by illegal
drugs. Last year, almost 40% of the heroin seized at our international
borders was seized in the New York metropolitan area. This
disproportionate amount of drugs destined for New York communities
underscores my intentions to do what is necessary to end the flow of
drugs into our country.
An effective counter-narcotics control strategy should be balanced
and coordinated--including interdiction, prevention and law
enforcement. However, one thing is certain, we cannot ignore the
interdiction-side of a drug control strategy, both here in the U.S. and
abroad. Unfortunately, there has been a disturbing trend in recent
years indicating a decline in the importance of interdiction in the
U.S. counter-drug strategy. Since 1987, the percentage of the national
drug control budget earmarked for interdiction and international
efforts has decreased from 33% to just 12%.
In order to obtain a global victory against drugs, we must work to
contain and lessen the damage inflicted by drugs. The Western
Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act of 1998, which I am co-sponsoring, is a
comprehensive eradication, interdiction and crop substitution strategy.
This $2.6 billion authorization initiative will make supply reduction a
priority again--guaranteeing valuable equipment for our law
enforcement, including speed boats at least as fast as those belonging
to the drug lords. Our radars and early warning aircraft must be
improved so that they will detect elusive planes that smuggle tons of
narcotics destined for our streets. It will also allow for extensive
training and crop eradication in drug source countries.
This initiative recognizes that drug availability can be decreased
by operating against every step in the drug process--from the growing
fields to the clandestine laboratories to the trafficking. We must work
with reputable law enforcement in narcotic source countries and invest
in training for counter narcotics programs which eradicate drugs at
their origin.
I would again like to thank the chairmen for calling this hearing
which sheds lights on an urgent deficiency within our national narcotic
control strategy. This initiative will restore balance to the strategy
and make significant inroads towards keeping drugs from reaching our
neighborhoods.
______
Prepared Statement of Senator Bob Graham
Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing to
shed some light on one of the most serious issues facing our nation:
the alarming increase in the number of Americans, particularly
children, who are using illegal drugs. This increase started in 1992
after more than a decade of declining drug use.
We all agree that the statistics on this are very troubling. The
question now before us is what should Congress and the nation do to
reverse this disturbing trend. In recent years, we have approved large
increases for domestic law enforcement and demand reduction, which
together account for more than 87% of our counter-drug budget, leaving
only 13% for interdiction and supply reduction activities.
In order to address this imbalance, we have proposed the Western
Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act of 1998, which will significantly
strengthen our interdiction and supply reduction efforts, without any
reduction in domestic law enforcement or demand reduction. I appreciate
the willingness of our witnesses to provide us with their input on how
to address the funding imbalance, and to suggest ways that we can
improve our legislation.
The goal of our bill is to reduce the flow of cocaine and heroin
into the U.S. by 80 percent in three years. This is accomplished by
providing more funding to those doing the heavy lifting in this fight--
the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, the Drug Enforcement
Administration, and the Department of Defense.
What is needed is a focus on resources in a more comprehensive way
to protect the entire southern frontier, not just the southwest border
rather than south Florida, and vice versa. The previous pattern of
shifting resources from one part of the country to another has achieved
a degree of qualified success, but drug smugglers quickly recognize the
weakness in the area deprived of assets, and they shift accordingly. By
providing improved funding levels, we will enhance our ability to
establish a uniformed degree of coverage across the entire southern
tier.
On June 22 of this year, I chaired a field hearing in Miami on
behalf of the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control to
examine the flow of drugs into the United States through the Caribbean
into Florida. We held the hearing on the deck of a U.S. Coast Guard
Medium Endurance Cutter called the Valiant; which had just returned
from a seven week counternarcotics patrol in the Caribbean.
We selected the Coast Guard venue to underscore a number of very
important facts which describe the United States' current strategy to
fight the drug war. One of our principal interdiction forces--the
United States Coast Guard--is conducting its mission on vessels such as
the Valiant, a ship that is more than 30 years old, with an equally
antiquated surface search radar. The Coast Guard needs new ships and
newer radars. As I approached the Valiant, I noticed that there were a
number of weapons systems on board, including two .50 caliber machine
guns and a 25mm chain gun. These weapons reminded me that this effort
is indeed a war. Despite the words of some officials who prefer not to
characterize the effort as such, it is indeed. We are fighting a well-
organized, financed, and determined enemy whose objective is to
inundate our Nation with a chemical weapon which demeans, degrades, and
defeats the most precious asset we have-our people. What more do we
need to know to energize ourselves to fight back?
The individuals who testified at the field hearing painted a very
disturbing picture. Consider the following facts:
The United States Southern Command cannot maintain adequate
radar and airborne early warning coverage of the region or
sustain the right number of tracker aircraft to perform its
mission to provide counterdrug support to states in South
American and the Caribbean.
The Joint Interagency Task Force East, located in Key West,
Florida, does not know the extent of narcotics trafficking in
the Eastern Pacific because the Department of Defense has not
provided the necessary assets to conduct the required Detection
& Monitoring mission.
The Coast Guard had to end a very successful counternarcotics
operation in the Caribbean, OPERATION FRONTIER LANCE, because
of a lack of federal funding.
The United States Customs Service is limited in its ability
to capture drug runners in go-fast boats because of a lack of
funds to procure newer and faster boats, as well as a lack of
personnel to adequately maintain those currently in service due
to lack of federal funding.
The Drug Enforcement Administration lacks sufficient special
agents in the Caribbean, as well as accompanying administrative
and intelligence personnel, because the DEA does not have
sufficient funds to hire and retain these individuals.
If there is a trend underlying all these problems, it is the lack
of federal funds being made available to those agencies responsible for
performing the supply reduction component of the drug war. I am
committed to seeing that more is done, and this legislation goes a long
way towards achieving our goals. I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses to get their ideas on how best to restore balance to our
counternarcotics strategy. I believe we can make a difference in this
war, and the time to make that difference is now
______
Prepared Statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr.
Mr. Chairmen and Members of the Subcommittee and Caucus:
I am pleased to be here today to present our observations on the
effectiveness of U.S. efforts to combat the movement of drugs into the
United States. My statement discusses the (1) challenges of addressing
international counternarcotics issues and (2) obstacles to implementing
U.S. and host-nation drug control efforts. My testimony is primarily
based on our recent reports concerning U.S. counternarcotics efforts in
the Caribbean, Colombia, and Mexico.\1\
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\1\ Drug Control: U.S.-Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts Face
Difficult Challenges (GAO/NSIAD-98-154, June 30, 1998); Drug Control:
U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Face Continuing Challenges
(GAO/NSIAD-98-60, Feb. 12, 1998); Drug Control: Update on U.S.
Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific (GAO/NSIAD-
98-30, Oct. 15, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
summary
Our work over the past 10 years indicates that there is no panacea
for resolving all of the problems associated with illegal drug
trafficking. Despite long-standing efforts and expenditures of billions
of dollars, illegal drugs still flood the United States. Although U.S.
and host-nation counternarcotics efforts have resulted in the arrest of
major drug traffickers and the seizure of large amounts of drugs, they
have not materially reduced the availability of drugs in the United
States. A key reason for the lack of success of U.S. counternarcotics
programs is that international drug-trafficking organizations have
become sophisticated, multibillion-dollar industries that quickly adapt
to new U.S. drug control efforts. As success is achieved in one area,
the drug-trafficking organizations quickly change tactics, thwarting
U.S. efforts.
Other significant, long-standing obstacles also impede U.S. and
source and transit countries' \2\ drug control efforts. In the drug-
producing and transiting countries, counternarcotics efforts are
constrained by corruption; limited law enforcement resources and
institutional capabilities; and internal problems such as insurgencies
and civil unrest. Moreover, drug traffickers are increasingly
resourceful in corrupting the countries' institutions.
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\2\The major source countries for cocaine are Bolivia, Colombia,
and Peru. The major source nations for heroin in the Western Hemisphere
are Colombia and Mexico. The major drug transit areas include Mexico,
the Caribbean, the eastern Pacific, and Central America.
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Some countries, with U.S. assistance, have taken steps to improve
their capacity to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United
States. Among other things, these countries have taken action to
extradite criminals; enacted legislation to control organized crime,
money laundering, and chemicals used in the production of illicit
drugs; and instituted reforms to reduce corruption. While these actions
represent positive steps, it is too early to determine their impact,
and challenges remain.
U.S. counternarcotics efforts have also faced obstacles that limit
their effectiveness. These include (1) organizational and operational
limitations, and (2) planning and management problems. Over the years,
we have reported on problems related to competing foreign policy
priorities, poor operational planning and coordination, and inadequate
oversight over U.S. counternarcotics assistance. We have also
criticized ONDCP and U.S. agencies for not having good performance
measures to evaluate results. Our work has identified ways to improve
U.S. counternarcotics efforts through better planning, sharing of
intelligence, and the development of measurable performance goals.
background
Illegal drug use, particularly of cocaine and heroin, continues to
be a serious health problem in the United States. According to the
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), drug-related illness,
death, and crime cost the nation approximately $67 billion annually.
Over the past 10 years, the United States has spent over $19 billion on
international drug control and interdiction efforts to reduce the
supply of illegal drugs. ONDCP has established goals of reducing the
availability of illicit drugs in the United States by 25 percent by
2002 and by 50 percent by 2007.
ONDCP is responsible for producing an annual National Drug Control
Strategy and coordinating its implementation with other federal
agencies. The 1998 National Drug Control Strategy includes five goals:
(1) educate and enable America's youth to reject illegal drugs as well
as alcohol and tobacco; (2) increase the safety of U.S. citizens by
substantially lowering drug-related crime and violence; (3) reduce
health and social costs to the public of illegal drug use; (4) shield
America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat; and (5)
break foreign and domestic drug supply sources. The last two goals are
the primary emphasis of U.S. interdiction and international drug
control efforts. These are focused on assisting the source and
transiting nations in their efforts to reduce drug cultivation and
trafficking, improve their capabilities and coordination, promote the
development of policies and laws, support research and technology, and
conduct other related initiatives. For fiscal year 1998, ONDCP
estimated that about 13 percent of the $16 billion federal drug control
budget would be devoted to interdiction and international drug control
activities--in 1988, these activities represented about 24 percent of
the $4.7 billion federal drug control budget.
ONDCP also has authority to review various agencies' funding levels
to ensure they are sufficient to meet the goals of the national
strategy, but it has no direct control over how these resources are
used. The Departments of State and Defense and the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) are the principal agencies involved in
implementing the international portion of the drug control strategy.
Other U.S. agencies involved in counternarcotics activities overseas
include the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Coast
Guard, the U.S. Customs Service, various U.S. intelligence
organizations, and other U.S. agencies.
challenges in stemming the flow of illegal drugs into the united states
Over the past 10 years, the U.S. agencies involved in
counternarcotics efforts have attempted to reduce the supply and
availability of illegal drugs in the United States through the
implementation of successive drug control strategies. Despite some
successes, cocaine, heroin, and other illegal drugs continue to be
readily available in the United States.
According to ONDCP, the cocaine source countries had the potential
of producing about 650 metric tons of cocaine in 1997. Of this amount,
U.S. officials estimate that about 430 metric tons were destined for
U.S. markets, with the remainder going to Europe and elsewhere.
According to current estimates, about 57 percent of the cocaine
entering the United States flows through Mexico and the Eastern
Pacific, 33 percent flows through the Caribbean, and the remainder is
moved directly into the United States from the source countries.
According to ONDCP estimates, the U.S. demand for cocaine is
approximately 300 metric tons per year.
According to DEA, Colombia was also the source of 52 percent of all
heroin seized in the United States during 1996. The current U.S. demand
for heroin is estimated to be approximately 10 metric tons per year.
drug-trafficking organizations have substantial resources,
capabilities, and operational flexibility
A primary challenge that U.S. and foreign governments'
counternarcotics efforts face is the power, influence, adaptability,
and capabilities of drug-trafficking organizations. Because of their
enormous financial resources, power to corrupt counternarcotics
personnel, and operational flexibility, drug-trafficking organizations
are a formidable threat. Despite some short-term achievements by U.S.
and foreign government law enforcement agencies in disrupting the flow
of illegal drugs, drug-trafficking organizations have found ways to
continue to meet the demand of U.S. drug consumers.
According to U.S. law enforcement agencies, drug-traffickers'
organizations use their vast wealth to acquire and make use of
expensive modern technology such as global positioning systems,
cellular communications equipment and communications encryption
devices. Through this technology, they can communicate and coordinate
transportation as well as monitor and report on the activities of
government organizations involved in counterdrug efforts. In some
countries, the complexity and sophistication of drug traffickers'
equipment exceed the capabilities of the foreign governments trying to
stop them.
When confronted with threats to their activities, drug-trafficking
organizations use a variety of techniques to quickly change their modes
of operation, thus avoiding capture of their personnel and seizure of
their illegal drugs. For example, when air interdiction efforts have
proven successful, traffickers have increased their use of maritime and
overland transportation routes.\3\ According to recent U.S. government
reports, even after the capture or killing of several drug cartel
leaders in Colombia and Mexico, other leaders or organizations soon
filled the void and adjusted their areas of operations. For example, we
reported in February 1998 that, although the Colombian government had
disrupted the activities of two major drug-trafficking organizations,
the disruption had not reduced drug-trafficking activities, and a new
generation of relatively young traffickers was emerging.\4\
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\3\ Drug Control: Revised Drug Interdiction Approach Is Needed in
Mexico (GAO/NSIAD-93-152, May 10, 1993).
\4\ Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-60, Feb. 12, 1998).
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obstacles in foreign countries impede counternarcotics efforts
The United States is largely dependent on the countries that are
the source of drug production and drug transiting points to reduce the
amount of coca and opium poppy being cultivated and to make the drug
seizures, arrests, and prosecutions necessary to stop the production
and movement of illegal drugs. While the United States can provide
assistance and support for drug control efforts in these countries, the
success of those efforts depends on the countries' willingness and
ability to combat the drug trade within their borders. Some countries,
with U.S. assistance, have taken steps to improve their capacity to
reduce the flow of drugs into the United States.
Drug source and transiting countries face long-standing obstacles
that limit the effectiveness of their drug control efforts. These
obstacles, many of which are interrelated, include corruption; limited
law enforcement resources and institutional capabilities; and
insurgencies and internal unrest.
Corruption Permeates Institutions in Countries Involved in Drug
Production and Movement
Narcotics-related corruption is a long-standing problem affecting
U.S. and foreign governments' efforts to reduce drug-trafficking
activities. Over the years, U.S. officials have identified widespread
corruption problems in Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and the
countries of Central America and the Caribbean--among the countries
most significantly involved in the cultivation, production, and transit
of illicit narcotics.
Our more recent reports have discussed corruption problems in the
Caribbean, Colombia and Mexico.\5\ For example, in October 1997, we
reported that the State Department had identified narcotics-related
corruption in various transit zone countries in the Caribbean,
including Antigua, Aruba, Belize, Dominica, the Dominican Republic,
Jamaica, St. Kitts, St. Vincent, and others.\6\ We also reported that
once the influence of drug trafficking becomes entrenched, corruption
inevitably follows and democratic governments may be placed in
jeopardy. In March 1998, the State Department reported that narcotics-
related corruption problems continue in many Caribbean countries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Drug War: Observations on the U.S. International Drug Control
Strategy (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-182, June 27, 1995); Drug Control:
Counternarcotics Efforts in Mexico (GAO/NSIAD-96-163, June 12, 1996);
Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-30, Oct. 15, 1997); Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-
98-60, Feb. 12, 1998; and Drug Control GAO/NSIAD-98-154, June 30,
1998).
\6\ Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-30, Oct. 15, 1997).
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In June 1998, we reported that persistent corruption within Mexico
continued to undermine both police and law enforcement operations.\7\
Charged with corruption, many law enforcement officers had been
arrested and dismissed. One of the most noteworthy arrests involved
General Jose Gutierrez Rebollo--former head of the Mexican equivalent
of DEA. In February 1997, he was charged with drug trafficking,
organized crime and bribery, illicit enrichment, and association with
one of the leading drug-trafficking organizations in Mexico.
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\7\ Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-154, June 30, 1998).
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Despite attempts by Mexico's Attorney General to combat corruption,
it continues to impede counternarcotics efforts. For example, in
February 1998, the U.S. embassy in Mexico City reported that three
Mexican law enforcement officials who had successfully passed screening
procedures were arrested for stealing seized cocaine--illustrating that
corruption continues despite measures designed to root it out.
Inadequate Resources and Institutional Capabilities Limit Arrests and
Convictions of Drug Traffickers
Effective law enforcement operations and adequate judicial and
legislative tools are key to the success of efforts to stop the flow of
drugs from the source and transiting countries. Although the United
States can provide assistance, these countries must seize the illegal
drugs and arrest, prosecute, and extradite the traffickers, when
possible, in order to stop the production and movement of drugs
internationally. However, as we have reported on several occasions,
these countries lack the resources and capabilities necessary to stop
drug-trafficking activities within their borders.
In 1994, we reported that Central American countries did not have
the resources or institutional capability to combat drug trafficking
and depended heavily on U.S. counternarcotics assistance.\8\ Two years
later, we said that equipment shortcomings and inadequately trained
personnel limited the government of Mexico's ability to detect and
interdict drugs and drug traffickers.\9\ These problems still exist.
For example, we reported in June 1998 that the Bilateral Border Task
Forces, which were established to investigate and dismantle the most
significant drug-trafficking organizations along the U.S.-Mexico
border, face operational and support problems, including inadequate
Mexican government funding for equipment, fuel, and salary supplements
for personnel assigned to the units.\10\
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\8\ Drug Control: U.S. Counterdrug Activities in Central America
(GAO/NSIAD-94-233, Aug. 2, 1994).
\9\ Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-96-163, June 12, 1996).
\10\ Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-154, June 30, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Countries in the Caribbean also have limited drug interdiction
capabilities. For example, we reported in October 1997 that many
Caribbean countries continue to be hampered by inadequate
counternarcotics capabilities and have insufficient resources for
conducting law enforcement activities in their coastal waters.\11\ We
reported that St. Martin had the most assets for anti-drug activities,
with three cutters, eight patrol boats, and two fixed-wing aircraft,
whereas other Caribbean countries had much less.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-30, Oct. 15, 1997).
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Insurgency and Civil Unrest Limit Counternarcotics Efforts
Over the years, our reports have indicated that internal strife in
Peru and Colombia have limited counternarcotics efforts in these
countries. In 1991, we reported that counternarcotics efforts in Peru
were significantly hampered because of the threat posed by two
insurgent groups.\12\ Currently, Colombia's counternarcotics efforts
are also hindered by insurgent and paramilitary activities. In 1998, we
reported that several guerrilla groups made it difficult to conduct
effective antidrug operations in many areas of Colombia.\13\ Since our
report, the situation has worsened. For example, during this past
summer the insurgents overran a major police base that was used as a
staging area for aerial eradication efforts.
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\12\ The Drug War: U.S. Programs in Peru Face Serious Obstacles
(GAO/NSIAD-92-36, Oct. 21, 1991).
\13\ Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-60, Feb. 12, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
efforts to improve counternarcotics capabilities
Some countries, with U.S. assistance, have taken steps to improve
their capacity to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United
States. For example, in June 1998, we reported that Mexico had taken
efforts to (1) increase the eradication and seizure of illegal drugs,
(2) enhance counternarcotics cooperation with the United States, (3)
initiate efforts to extradite Mexican criminals to the United States,
(4) pass new laws on organized crime, money laundering, and chemical
control, (5) institute reforms in law enforcement agencies, and (6)
expand the role of the military in counternarcotics activities to
reduce corruption.\14\ Many of these initiatives are new, and some have
not been fully implemented.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-154, June 30, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Colombia has also made progress in making efforts to improve its
counternarcotics capabilities. In February 1998, we reported that
Colombia had passed various laws to assist counternarcotics activities,
including money laundering and asset forfeiture laws, reinstated
extradition of Colombian nationals to the United States in November
1997, and signed a maritime agreement.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-60, Feb.12, 1998).
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obstacles inhibit success in fulfilling u.s. counternarcotics efforts
Our work over the past 10 years has identified obstacles to
implementing U.S. counternarcotics efforts, including (1)
organizational and operational limitations, and (2) planning and
management problems. Over the years, we have criticized ONDCP and U.S.
agencies involved in counternarcotics activities for not having good
performance measures to help evaluate program results. Efforts to
develop such measures are currently underway.
Organizational and Operational Limitations
The United States faces several organizational and operational
challenges that limit its ability to implement effective antidrug
efforts. Many of these challenges are long-standing. Several of our
reports have identified problems involving competing priorities,
interagency rivalries, lack of operational coordination, inadequate
staffing of joint interagency task forces, lack of oversight, and lack
of knowledge about past counternarcotics operations and activities.
For example, our 1995 work in Colombia indicated that there was
confusion among U.S. embassy officials about the role of the offices
involved in intelligence analysis and related operational plans for
interdiction.\16\ In 1996 and 1997, we reported that several agencies,
including the U.S. Customs Service, DEA, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, had not provided personnel, as they had agreed, to the
Joint Interagency Task Force in Key West because of budgetary
constraints.\17\
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\16\ Drug War (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-182, June 27, 1995).
\17\ Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-30, Oct. 15, 1997) and Drug
Control: U.S. Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean Decline (GAO/NSIAD-
96-119, Apr. 17, 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In October 1997, we reported that according to U.S. officials, the
small amount of aircraft and maritime assets hindered U.S. interdiction
efforts in the Eastern Pacific and that their ability to interdict
commercial and noncommercial fishing vessels was limited.\18\ We also
reported in 1993 and 1997 that reduced radar capability was limiting
operational successes in this region \19\
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\18\ Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-30, Oct. 15, 1997).
\19\ Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-93-152, May 10, 1993) and Drug Control
(GAO/NSIAD-98-30, Oct. 15, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We also reported on instances where lessons learned from past
counternarcotics efforts were not known to current planners and
operators, both internally in an agency and within the U.S. antidrug
community.\20\ For example, in the early 1990's the United States
initiated an operation to support Colombia and Peru in their efforts to
curtail the air movement of coca products between the two countries.
However, U.S. Southern Command personnel stated in 1996 that while they
were generally aware of the previous operation, they were neither aware
of the problems that had been encountered nor of the solutions
developed in the early 1990s. U.S. Southern Command officials
attributed this problem to the continual turnover of personnel and the
requirement to destroy most classified documents and reports after 5
years. These officials stated that an after-action reporting system for
counternarcotics activities is now in place at the U.S. Southern
Command.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Drug Control: Long-Standing Problems Hinder U.S. International
Efforts GAO/NSIAD-97-75, Feb. 27, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We have also reported that a key component of the U.S. operational
strategy is having reliable and adequate intelligence to help plan
interdiction operations. Having timely intelligence on trafficking
activities is important because traffickers frequently change their
operational patterns and increasingly use more sophisticated
communications, making it more difficult to detect their modes of
operations.\21\ ONDCP is in the process of reviewing U.S.
counternarcotics intelligence efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-97-75, Feb. 27, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Planning and Management Limitations
Over the years, our reviews of U.S. counternarcotics efforts have
indicated planning and management limitations to U.S. counternarcotics
efforts. Our recent reports on Colombia and Mexico have shown that the
delivery of U.S. counternarcotics assistance was poorly planned and
coordinated.
In February 1998, we reported that the State Department did not
take adequate steps to ensure that equipment included in a 1996 $40-
million Department of Defense assistance package could be integrated
into the U.S. embassy's plans and strategies to support the Colombian
police and military forces.\22\ As a result, the assistance package
contained items that had limited immediate usefulness to the Colombian
police and military and will require substantial additional funding
before the equipment can become operational.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-60, Feb. 12, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We reported a similar situation in Mexico. In June 1998, we noted
that key elements of the Defense Department's counternarcotics
assistance package were of limited usefulness or could have been better
planned and coordinated by U.S. and Mexican officials.\23\ For example,
we reported that the Mexican military was not using the four C-26
aircraft provided by the United States because there was no clearly
identified requirement for the aircraft and the Mexican military lacked
the funds needed to operate and maintain the aircraft. In addition,
inadequate coordination between the U.S. Navy and other Defense
Department agencies resulted in the transfer of two Knox-class frigates
to the Mexican Navy that were not properly outfitted and are currently
inoperable. Further, Mexican Navy personnel were trained in the
frigates' operation, but these personnel may not be fully utilized
until the two frigates are activated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-1 54, June 30, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our work has also shown that, in some cases, the United States did
not adequately control the use of U.S. counternarcotics assistance and
was unable to ensure that it was used as intended. Despite legislative
requirements mandating controls over U.S.-provided assistance, we found
instances of inadequate oversight of counternarcotics funds. For
example, between 1991 and 1994, we issued four reports in which we
concluded that U.S. officials lacked sufficient oversight of aid to
ensure that it was being used effectively and as intended in Peru and
Colombia.\24\ We also reported that the government of Mexico had
misused U.S.-provided counternarcotics helicopters to transport Mexican
military personnel during the 1994 uprising in the Mexican state of
Chiapas.\25\
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\24\ The Drug War: Colombia Is Undertaking Antidrug Programs, But
Impact Is Uncertain (GAO/NSIAD-93-158, Aug. 10, 1993); The Drug War:
Observations on Counternarcotics Programs in Colombia and Peru (GAOT-
NSIAD-92-2, Oct. 23, 1991); Drug War (GAO/NSIAD-92-36, Oct. 21, 1991);
and Drug War: Observations on Counternarcotics Aid to Colombia (GAO/
NSIAD-91-296, Sept. 30, 1991).
\25\ Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-96-163, June 12, 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our recent work in Mexico indicated that oversight and
accountability of counternarcotics assistance continues to be a
problem. We found that embassy records on UH-1H helicopter usage for
the civilian law enforcement agencies were incomplete. Additionally, we
found that the U.S. military's ability to provide adequate oversight is
limited by the end-use monitoring agreement signed by the governments
of the United States and Mexico.
Importance of Measuring Performance
We have been reporting since 1988 that judging U.S. agencies'
performance in reducing the supply of and interdicting illegal drugs is
difficult because the agencies have not established meaningful measures
to evaluate their contribution to achieving the goals contained in the
National Drug Control Strategy.
In February 1998, ON DCP issued its annual National Drug Control
Strategy, establishing a 10-year goal of reducing illicit drug
availability and use by 50-percent by 2007. In March 1998, ONDCP
established specific performance effectiveness measures to evaluate
progress in meeting the strategy's goals and objectives. While we have
not reviewed the performance measures in detail, we believe they
represent a positive step to help gauge the progress in attaining the
goals and objectives.
ways to improve the effectiveness of u.s. counternarcotics efforts
We recognize that there is no easy remedy for overcoming all of the
obstacles posed by drug-trafficking activities. International drug
control efforts aimed at stopping the production of illegal drugs and
drug-related activities in the source and transit countries are only
one element of an overall national drug control strategy. Alone, these
efforts will not likely solve the U.S. drug problem. Overcoming many of
the long-standing obstacles to reducing the supply of illegal drugs
requires a long-term commitment. Over the years, we have recommended
ways in which the United States could improve the effectiveness of the
planning and implementation of its current counternarcotics efforts.
These recommendations include (1) developing measurable goals, (2)
making better use of intelligence and technologies and increasing
intelligence efforts, (3) developing a centralized system for recording
and disseminating lessons learned by various agencies while conducting
law enforcement operations, and (4) better planning of counternarcotics
assistance.
Mr. Chairmen, this concludes my prepared testimony. I would be
happy to respond to any questions.
______
Prepared Statement of Admiral James M. Loy, USCG
Good morning, Mr. Chairman Grassley, Chairman Coverdell, and
distinguished Committee and Caucus members. It is a pleasure to appear
before you today to comment on Coast Guard drug interdiction and the
proposed Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act.
I applaud the Act's goal of strengthening our Nation's counterdrug
effort. This legislation recognizes that the security of our maritime
borders is a critical component of a balanced national strategy to
reduce drug use and its destructive consequences. The National Drug
Control Strategy's supply reduction target looks to reduce drug
availability in the United States 25 percent by 2002, and 50 percent by
2007 as compared to a 1996 base year. The Coast Guard has developed a
comprehensive maritime interdiction strategy, Campaign STEEL WEB,
designed to meet the Coast Guard's portion of these national goals.
This Coast Guard strategy is supported by a 5-year drug control budget
that is submitted to the Office of Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) annually
as required by law. Fully implementing this strategy will require that
adequate resources be provided over the next several years. This Coast
Guard strategy is supported by a 5-year drug control budget that is
submitted to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)
annually as required by law. The Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination
Act includes many policy initiatives and budget authorities that could
be used to increase counterdrug performance. In many instances, the Act
does address valid Coast Guard requirements and identifies the types of
capabilities required to implement STEEL WEB. However, I do have
serious concerns with the legislation as currently drafted. While this
bill authorizes funding
This bill's authorization levels for increased Coast Guard
counterdrug operations in fiscal years 1999, 2000, and 2001, are
inconsistent with the President's budget. First and foremost the Coast
Guard must be able to maintain current services for all mission areas
in fiscal year 1999 as requested by the President. As a 3-year
authorization, this legislation could result in outyear funding risks.
Without adequate outyear funding, I will not be able to operate
additional assets or to sustain the operational increases for assets
now in the Coast Guard inventory. I am also concerned, from a personnel
management perspective, about the potential for a relatively large
increase in work force strength that may only be authorized for 3
years.
I am also concerned about the executability cost effectiveness of
some items specified in the Act. For example, any decision to build new
cutters should be made in the context of the Deepwater Capability
Replacement Project, which is currently in the planning phase. Through
the Deepwater process, we will determine the most cost-effective new
construction of cutters would require long lead-time and significant
personnel increases.way to meet future Coast Guard mission requirements
beyond 50 miles from shore. It may be the case, for example, that
converting retired Navy vessels is more sensible than building new
cutters. Additionally, the goal to reduce the flow of drugs into the
United States 80 percent by the end of 2001 is overly optimistic and is
not achievable.
Finally, we face significant source and Transit Zone interdiction
challenges. The Act does not include some key resources proposed in the
President's 1999 Budget that would be necessary to meet these
challenges. For example, the Act does not address increased
intelligence collection and support or the deployable logistics
required to support expeditionary pulse operations, capabilities that
are critical to interdiction success and can reduce the need for
expensive, single-mission assets.
The task of maintaining a comprehensive overview of activity and
sorting targets of interest from legitimate air and surface traffic is
daunting. Equally difficult is the logistical challenge of supporting
our forces in such an expansive theater of operations, particularly in
the Eastern Pacific. As previously stated, Campaign STEEL WEB is the
Coast Guard's multiyear plan to position the requisite interdiction
forces where they best counter the ever-evolving drug trafficking
threats. The strategic concept is to deny drug smugglers access to
maritime routes by a sequence of operations in which interdiction
forces are concentrated in high-threat areas of the Caribbean and
Eastern Pacific to significantly disrupt drug traffic. Coast Guard
operations in these high threat areas complement and support Joint
Interagency Task Force (JIATF) East and JIATF West operations. Once a
credible law enforcement presence is established, interdiction forces
will be redeployed to other high-threat areas, leaving an enhanced
presence to deter and interdict subsequent smuggling. Ultimately,
successful pulse operations in each high-threat area will
systematically reduce drug flow through the Transit Zone. This concept
was successfully demonstrated during the Coast Guard's Operation
FRONTIER SHIELD.
In addition, STEEL WEB is focused on strengthening ties with source
and transit zone nations to increase their capacities to reduce
internal production and trafficking, and supports interagency efforts
to combat drug smuggling. Continued success of Campaign STEEL WEB
requires resource investments and the flexibility to employ resources
where they can have the most impact.
The Coast Guard received a $34.3 million increase in budget
authority for fiscal year 1998, an investment in the long-term campaign
to satisfy obligations under the National Drug Control Strategy. Fiscal
year 1998 drug funding has allowed the Coast Guard to institutionalize
FRONTIER SHIELD, and continue Operations GULF SHIELD and BORDER SHIELD
to anchor the flanks of the Southwest Border.
The fiscal year 1999 budget request includes operating expenses and
capital investments necessary to maintain the current law enforcement
presence in the transit and arrival zones. As long as more than 400
metric tons of cocaine are moving through the Transit Zone each year,
the value of, and necessity for, agile interdiction forces is
undeniable.
The Coast Guard shields America's sea frontiers from a broad
spectrum of threats and challenges, with the scourge of drugs being
perhaps the most visible right now. The need for effective control of
America's seaward borders, territorial sea, and Exclusive Economic Zone
extends well beyond the drug threat and will become even more essential
in the first decades of the 21st century.
Future threats to U.S. security interests will be even more varied
than they are today. The dangers we face are unprecedented in their
complexity. Terrorism, drugs, illegal migrants, organized crime, and
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are global concerns that
transcend national borders, and environmental damage and rapid
population growth undermine economic prosperity and political stability
in many countries.
Since these challenges to America's maritime security are not
strictly military in nature, they underscore the importance, relevance,
and vitality of the Coast Guard's law enforcement role--a core
competency developed during more than 200 years of service to America--
and a core competency that addresses more than drug interdiction.
The multimission Coast Guard has traditionally provided a high rate
of return to the public. In fiscal year 1997, overall interdiction
efforts resulted in a record year for Coast Guard drug seizures. The
Coast Guard seized (or assisted in the seizure of) 103,617 pounds of
cocaine and 102,538 pounds of marijuana products. Cocaine seizures
easily surpassed the previous record set in 1991--90,335 pounds.
Through effective interdiction efforts last year, the Coast Guard
kept more than 468 million cocaine ``hits'' and 100 million marijuana
``joints'' off our streets, preventing those drugs from poisoning
schools and destroying homes. The estimated street value of these
seizures is more than $4.2 billion--$1 billion more than the Coast
Guard's entire 1997 discretionary budget.
In order to meet future drug interdiction obligations, the Coast
Guard will need the full support of Congress for its budget requests.
As Commandant, however, I have a responsibility to effectively perform
the Coast Guard's many other mission requirements, such as protection
of fisheries stocks and the marine environment. To do this, the Coast
Guard must at least be funded at current services level through annual
appropriations.receive the funding levels requested by the President
for these programs.
As we approach the 21st century, many of our existing assets are
nearing the end of their service lives. Loss of capability and
increased operational costs concern us greatly, as the threats we must
counter are becoming increasingly more sophisticated and capable. In
short, our ability to remain Semper Paratus--Always Ready--to carry out
our many missions is a major Coast Guard concern. We are taking the
necessary steps through our Roles and Missions Review and Deepwater
Capability Analysis to address these concerns. We must be ready to meet
tomorrow's challenges.
In closing, I would like to recognize your leadership and
commitment to strengthening the national counterdrug effort. As America
moves into the next century, the Coast Guard stands ready to meet our
responsibilities in this important effort. Thank you for the
opportunity to discuss Coast Guard drug interdiction concerns. I will
be happy to answer any questions you may have.
__________
Prepared Statement of Donnie R. Marshall
Chairman Coverdell, Chairman Grassley, and members of the
Subcommittee and the caucus: I appreciate the opportunity to appear
today at this hearing on the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act,
which makes a number of proposals intended to increase funding for
interdiction and interdiction- related activities. My testimony will
provide you with an objective assessment of the law enforcement issues
involving international organized criminal groups, drug trafficking
problems associated with these groups, and how DEA participates in drug
interdiction. During my testimony, I will attempt to provide the
members with a full picture of how organized crime groups operate,
harming so many aspects of life in America today, and how the DEA takes
action to counter these groups.
Interdiction, in its narrow sense, physically stopping drugs moving
through the transit zone, across international borders, and into the
United States--is more properly the responsibility of the other
agencies testifying here today. DEA's primary mission is to target the
highest levels of the international drug trafficking organizations
operating today. It is through targeting the command and control
elements of international drug syndicates that DEA makes its major
contribution to the overall interdiction effort. Moreover, DEA makes
significant contributions to drug interdiction with its law enforcement
efforts within the United States. I will, therefore, discuss in some
detail DEA's role in the interdiction of drugs both overseas and
domestically and how those efforts interface and contribute in our
joint efforts to counter these organize crime groups.
international organized crime
It is important to demonstrate at the outset why the threat posed
by international drug syndicates is so ominous. The United States must
be able to attack the command and control functions of the
international syndicates which are directing the flow of drugs into
this country. Focusing the attention of law enforcement on the
criminals who direct these organizations is the key to combating
international drug trafficking. DEA directs its resources against the
leaders of these criminal organizations, seeking to have them located,
arrested, prosecuted, and given sentences commensurate with the heinous
nature of their crimes.
Many phrases have been used to describe the complex and
sophisticated international drug trafficking groups operating out of
Colombia and Mexico, and frankly, the somewhat respectable titles of
``cartel'' or ``federation'' mask the true identity of these vicious,
destructive entities. The Cali organization, and the four largest drug
trafficking organizations in Mexico operating out of Juarez, Tijuana,
Sonora, and the Gulf region--are simply organized crime groups. They
are not legitimate businessmen as the word ``cartel'' implies, nor are
they ``federated'' into a legitimate conglomerate. These syndicate
leaders--the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers in Colombia to Amado Carrillo-
Fuentes, Juan Garcia-Abrego, Miguel Caro-Quintero, and the Arellano-
Felix brothers--are simply the 1990's versions of the mob leaders U.S.
law enforcement has fought since shortly after the turn of this
century.
International organized crime leaders are far more dangerous, far
more influential and have a greater impact on our day-to-day lives than
did their domestic predecessors. While organized crime in the United
States during the 1950's through the 1970's affected certain aspects of
American life, its influence pales in comparison to the violence,
corruption, and power that today's drug syndicates wield. These
individuals, from their headquarters locations, undeniably influence
the choices that too many Americans make about where to live, when to
venture out of their homes, or where they send their children to
school. The drugs--and the attendant violence which accompanies the
drug trade--have reached into every American community and have robbed
many Americans of the dreams they once cherished.
Organized crime in the United States was addressed over time, but
only after Americans recognized the dangers that organized crime posed
to our way of life. But it did not happen overnight. American organized
crime was exposed to the light of day systematically, stripping away
the pretense that mob leaders were anonymous businessmen. The
Appalachian raid of 1957 forced law enforcement to acknowledge that
these organized syndicates did indeed exist. As a result, strong
measures were taken to go after the top leadership, a strategy used
effectively throughout our national campaign against the mob. During
the 1960's, Attorney General Bobby Kennedy was unequivocal in his
approach to ending the reign of organized crime in America, and
consistent law enforcement policies were enacted which resulted in real
gains. Today, traditional organized crime, as we knew it in the United
States, has been eviscerated, a fragment of what it once was.
At the height of its power, organized crime in this nation was
consolidated in the hands of few major families whose key players live
in this nation, and were within reach of our criminal justice system.
All decisions made by organized crime were made within the United
States. Orders were carried out on U.S. soil. While it was not easy to
build cases against the mob leaders, law enforcement knew that once a
good case was made against a boss, he could be located within the U.S.,
arrested, and sent to jail.
That is not the case with today's organized criminal groups. They
are strong, sophisticated, and destructive organizations operating on a
global scale. In places like Cali, Colombia, and Guadalajara, Mexico,
even operational decisions are made, such as where to ship cocaine,
which cars their workers in the United States should rent, which
apartments should be leased, which markings should be on each cocaine
package, which contract murders should be ordered, which officials
should be bribed, and how much. They send thousands of workers into the
United States who answer to them via daily faxes, cellular phone, or
pagers. Their surrogates carry out killings even within the United
States--one day an outspoken journalist, one day a courier who had lost
a load, the next, an innocent bystander caught in the line of fire--on
orders from the top leadership. These syndicate bosses have at their
disposal airplanes, boats, vehicles, radar, communications equipment,
and weapons in quantities which rival the capabilities of some
legitimate governments. Whereas previous organized crime leaders were
millionaires, the Cali drug traffickers and their counterparts from
Mexico are billionaires. They must be located, arrested, prosecuted,
and given sentences commensurate with the heinous nature of their
crimes.
The international drug syndicates who control drug trafficking
today from the source zone, through the transit zones in the Caribbean
and through Mexico, and into the United States, are interconnected. We
cannot discuss the trafficking situation today without looking at the
evolution of the groups from Colombia--how they began, what their
status is today, and how the groups from Mexico have learned important
lessons from them, thereby becoming major trafficking organizations in
their own right.
During the late 1980's the Cali group assumed greater and greater
power as their predecessors from the Medellin cartel self-destructed.
Where the Medellin cartel was brash and publicly violent in their
activities, the criminals, who ran their organization from Cali,
labored behind the pretense of legitimacy, by posing as businessmen
carrying out their professional obligations. The Cali leaders--the
Rodriguez Orejuela brothers, Jose Santacruz Londono, Helmer ``Pacho''
Herrera-Buitrago--amassed fortunes and ran their multi-billion dollar
cocaine businesses from high-rises and ranches in Colombia. Miguel
Rodriguez Orejuela and his associates composed what was, until then,
the most powerful international organized crime group in history. They
employed 727 aircraft to ferry drugs to Mexico, from where they were
smuggled into the United States, and then return to Colombia with the
money from U.S. drug sales. Using landing areas in Mexico, they were
able to evade U.S. law enforcement officials and make important
alliances with transportation and distribution experts in Mexico.
With intense law enforcement pressure focused on the Cali
leadership by the brave men and women in the Colombian National Police
during 1995 and 1996, all of the top leadership of the Cali syndicate
are either in jail, or dead. Since the Cali leaders' imprisonment, on
sentences that in no way matched the severity of their crimes,
traffickers from Mexico took on greater prominence. The alliance
between the Colombian traffickers and the organizations from Mexico
benefited for both sides. Traditionally, the traffickers from Mexico
have long been involved in smuggling marijuana, heroin, and cocaine
into the United States, and had established solid distribution routes
throughout the nation. Because the Cali syndicate was concerned about
the security of their loads, they brokered a commercial deal with the
traffickers from Mexico, in order to reduce their potential losses.
This agreement entailed the Colombians moving cocaine from the
Andean region to the Mexican organizations, who then assumed the
responsibility of delivering the cocaine to the United States. Now,
trafficking groups from Mexico are routinely paid for their services in
multi-ton quantities of cocaine, making them formidable cocaine
traffickers in their own right.
drugs at the source
The international drug syndicates discussed above control both the
sources and the flow of drugs into the United States. The vast majority
of the cocaine entering the United States continues to come from the
source countries of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. According to DEA's
Heroin Signature Program, which provides a chemical analysis of
domestic heroin seizures and purchases to determine the geographic
sources of origin, South American heroin comprised 75 percent of all
heroin seized in the United States in 1997. Virtually all of the six
metric tons of heroin produced in Colombia in 1997 was destined for the
U.S. market. For nearly two decades, crime groups from Colombia have
ruled the drug trade with an iron fist, exponentially increasing their
profit margin by controlling the entire continuum of the cocaine
market. Their control ranged from the coca leaf production in Peru,
Bolivia, and Colombia, to the cocaine hydrochloride (HCl) production
and processing centers in Colombia, to the wholesale distribution of
cocaine on the streets of the United States.
Colombian traffickers continue to dominate the movement of cocaine
from the jungles of Bolivia and Peru to the large cocaine HCl
conversion laboratories in Southern Colombia. An estimated twenty-two
percent of the world's coca leaf is grown in Colombia and the vast
majority of the cocaine base and cocaine HCl is produced in these
laboratories throughout Colombia. Many of these activities take place
in the southern rain forests and eastern lowlands of Colombia. Most of
the coca cultivation in Colombia occurs in the Departments of Guaviare,
Caqueta, and Putumayo. Also, cultivation occurs in areas of high
insurgency that are effectively beyond the control of the Colombian
Government. Cocaine conversion laboratories range from smaller
``family'' operations to much larger facilities, employing dozens of
workers. Once the cocaine HCl is manufactured, it is either shipped via
maritime or aircraft to traffickers in Mexico, or shipped through the
Caribbean corridor, including the Bahamas Island Chain, to U.S. entry
points in Puerto Rico, Miami, and New York.
drugs in transit
Over half of the cocaine entering the United States continues to
come from Colombia through Mexico and across U.S. border points of
entry. Most of the cocaine enters the United States in privately-owned
vehicles and commercial trucks. There is new evidence that indicates
traffickers in Mexico have gone directly to sources of cocaine in
Bolivia and Peru in order to circumvent Colombian middlemen. In
addition to the supply of cocaine entering the U.S., trafficking
organizations from Mexico are responsible for producing and trafficking
thousands of pounds of methamphetamine. They have been major
distributors of heroin and marijuana in the U.S. since the 1970's.
Drug trafficking in the Caribbean is overwhelmingly influenced by
Colombian organized criminal groups. The Caribbean had long been a
favorite smuggling route used by the Cali and Medellin crime groups to
smuggle thousands of tons of cocaine to the United States. During the
late 1970's and the 1980's, drug lords from Medellin and Cali, Colombia
established a labyrinth of smuggling routes throughout the central
Caribbean, including Haiti, the Dominican Republic and the Bahamian
Island chain to South Florida, using a variety of smuggling techniques
to transfer their cocaine to U.S. markets. Smuggling scenarios included
airdrops of 500-700 kilograms in the Bahamian Island chain and off the
coast of Puerto Rico, mid-ocean boat-to-boat transfers of 500 to 2,000
kilograms, and the commercial shipment of multi-tons of cocaine through
the port of Miami.
Our focus on the Calli organization's command and control functions
in the U.S. enabled us to build formidable cases against the Cali
leaders, which allowed our Colombian counterparts to accomplish the
almost unimaginable--the arrest and incarceration of the entire
infrastructure of the most powerful crime group in history. Although
Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela and his confederates continue to direct a
portion of their operations from prison they are no longer able to
maintain control over this once monolithic giant. Now, independent
groups of traffickers from the Northern Valle dal Cauca, and splinter
groups from the Cali syndicate have risen to prominence and are
responsible for huge volumes of cocaine and heroin being shipped to the
United States through the Caribbean. These groups, who have replaced
the highly structured, centrally controlled business operations of the
Cali group, tend to be smaller and less organized, however, they
continue to rely on fear and violence to expand and control their
trafficking empires.
DEA has identified four major organizations based on the northern
coast of Colombia that have deployed command and control cells in the
Caribbean Basin to funnel tons of cocaine to the United States each
year. Colombian managers, who have been dispatched to Puerto Rico and
the Dominican Republic, operate these command and control centers and
are responsible for overseeing drug trafficking in the region. These
groups are also directing networks of transporters that oversee the
importation, storage, exportation, and wholesale distribution of
cocaine destined for the continental United States.
drug trafficking organizations in the u.s.
However powerful these international organizations appear to be,
the very feature of their operations which makes them most formidable--
the ability to exercise effective command and control over a far flung
criminal enterprise--is the feature that law enforcement can use
against them, turning their strength into a weakness. The
communications structure of international organized crime operating in
the United States is, therefore, the prime target for drug law
enforcement. Information on drug flows developed during investigations
of these organizations, which mostly take place in the United States,
underscores the seamless nature of the continuum of international drug
trafficking from foreign sources to markets in the United States.
The organizational structures we target resemble those set up by
the Colombians in the 1980s. The Colombians organized their cocaine
trafficking groups in the U.S. organized around ``cells'' that operate
within a given geographic area. Some cells specialize in a particular
facet of the drug trade, such as cocaine transport, storage, wholesale
distribution, or money laundering. Each cell, which may be comprised of
10 or more employees, operates with little or no knowledge about the
membership in, or drug operations of, other cells.
The head of each cell reports to a regional director who is
responsible for the overall management of several cells. The regional
director, in turn, reports directly to one of the drug lords heads of a
particular organization or heir designate based in Colombia. A rigid
top down command and control structure is characteristic of these
groups. Trusted lieutenants of the organization in the U.S. have
discretion in the day-to-day operations, but ultimate authority rests
with the leadership abroad.
Upper echelon and management levels of these cells are frequently
comprised of family members or long-time close associates who can be
trusted by the drug lords to handle their day-to-day drug operations in
the United States. They report back via cell phone, fax and other
sophisticated communications methods. Drug traffickers continually
employ a wide variety of counter-surveillance techniques and other
tactics, such as staging fake drug transactions, using telephones they
suspect are monitored, limited-time use of cloned cellular telephones
(frequently a week or less), limited-time use of pagers (from 2 to 4
weeks), and the use of calling cards. Organized crime groups continue
to show an active interest in acquiring secure communications
capabilities. The communication systems which make the top-down command
and control of these organizations possible is the exact target for
both intelligence analysis and law enforcement operations against the
organizations, working hand in hand with interdiction efforts.
a hemispheric response
DEA's role in countering the threat posed to the American way of
life by these international drug trafficking organizations has been,
and will continue to be to target the most significant drug traffickers
and their organizations. It is in this area that we make our
contribution to interdicting the flow of drugs into the United States.
Naturally, we cooperate fully with other elements of the United States
government and foreign authorities, that are directly involved in
physically interdicting smuggled drugs and in eradicating drugs at the
source.
Our law enforcement experience shows us that, over time, the United
States has been able to effectively counter organized crime, both
domestic and foreign, by attacking the command and control systems of
the syndicates through the use of court approved intercepts. Successful
investigations against the leaders of international drug trafficking
groups most often originate from investigations being conducted in the
United States. Through what was originally designated our Southwest
Border Initiative, has become a strategy employed throughout the
hemisphere, DEA and our counterparts direct their resources against the
communications systems of the command and control functions of the
organized crime groups in both the Caribbean and South America.
The Continuum of Domestic Investigations and International Drug
Trafficking
Some of our efforts within this Hemispheric response point to the
connection between domestic law enforcement in the United States and
the problems posed by drug trafficking organizations in Mexico.
Operations RECIPROCITY and LIMELIGHT, are two examples of inter-agency
investigations which clearly prove the interrelation between high level
traffickers headquartered in Mexico and their organizations in many
U.S. cities. The Amado Carrillo-Fuentes organization was deeply
involved in a sophisticated drug operation that stretched from Mexico
to New York, Chicago, Grand Rapids, Tucson, and other parts of the U.S.
At one point, several independent and seemingly unrelated
investigations were being conducted in Texas, Arizona, Illinois,
Michigan, and New York. Eventually these separate cases were combined
under the umbrella investigations known as RECIPROCITY and LIMELIGHT.
These operations show, as do most of our investigations, that
arresting the leaders of international organized crime rings often
ultimately begins with a seemingly routine event in the United States.
For example, two troopers from the Texas Department of Public Safety
stopped a van with New York plates on Interstate 30. They became
suspicious when they learned that one man was from New York while the
other was from El Paso, and they were not well acquainted. Neither man
owned the van and their stories conflicted regarding where they were
going and where they had been. The troopers found 99 bundles of money
hidden in the vehicle's walls.
It took three hours to count the $1.3 million they had found. As
the officers continued their search, they discovered another $700,000,
bringing the total to $2 million. On December 3, 1996, after receiving
an anonymous call, the Tucson Police Department and drug task force
officers raided a warehouse containing 5.3 tons of cocaine. On December
13, 1996, the same Texas troopers stopped a northbound tractor trailer
and seized 2,700 pounds of marijuana. Follow-up investigation connected
this interdiction to their previous seizure of money, to the cocaine
warehouse in Tucson, and to ongoing investigations in Texas, Arizona,
Illinois, Michigan, and New York.
All of these investigations provided our Special Agents and federal
prosecutors with the key to investigating the operations of the Amado
Carrillo-Fuentes organization. This powerful Mexican syndicate was
apparently using U.S. trucks and employees to transport huge amounts of
cocaine to various U.S. destinations. The resulting investigation,
Operation LIMELIGHT, secured 40 arrests, the seizure of $11 million in
cash, 7.4 tons of cocaine and 2,700 pounds of marijuana.
A parallel investigation, Operation RECIPROCITY, resulted in the
seizure of more than 4,000 kilos of cocaine, almost 11,000 pounds of
marijuana, over $7 million in cash, and 48 arrests. RECIPROCITY showed
that just one Juarez-based organized crime cell shipped over 30 tons of
cocaine into American communities and returned over $100 million in
profits to Mexico in less than two years. Distribution of multi-ton
quantities of cocaine, once dominated by the Cali-based drug
traffickers, was now controlled from Mexico in cities such as Chicago,
Dallas, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Diego, San
Francisco, and Seattle. The Carrillo-Fuentes organization was also
beginning to make inroads into the distribution of cocaine in the East
Coast, particularly New York City, the traditional stronghold of the
Cali drug cartel.
These operations support the point that the Mexican transportation
groups have added the United States East Coast to their sphere of
influence and now deliver cocaine directly to New York City and other
East coast markets. This role was once reserved for traffickers from
Colombia and the Dominican Republic. These two operations show that law
enforcement can strike major blows against foreign drug syndicates
through the combination of interdiction efforts and by targeting their
command and control functions.
Through multi-agency domestic drug investigations, such as
RECIPROCITY and LIMELIGHT, and with the assistance of our country
office in Mexico, DEA has been able to build cases that have led to the
indictment of the leaders of every major drug trafficking organization
in Mexico. More than one-half of the priority requests for provisional
arrest for extradition filed by the Department of Justice are for major
drug traffickers.
The Hemispheric Response in the Caribbean
As part of the hemispheric response to the threat posed in the
Caribbean, DEA has put a number of initiatives in place. In July 1997,
DEA put into practice the Caribbean Regional Operational Plan (CROP)
which combined the joint law enforcement resources of DEA, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, United States Customs Service, and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service. This plan includes a multi-
agency and multi-jurisdictional effort, coordinating the counter-drug
operations of the DEA offices in San Juan, Puerto Rico, Miami, Florida
with activities of the U.S. Embassy Country Teams, and the law
enforcement agencies of the Caribbean nations. This plan was built on
the successful strategies implemented in Operation BAT, Operation
GATEWAY, and the Southwest Border Initiative. From an organizational
perspective, DEA enhanced its Caribbean Field Division by 25 Special
Agents. In fiscal year 1997, the Caribbean Division arrested 652
defendants, initiated 124 criminal cases and documented over $13
million in asset seizures.
In July, 1997, to disrupt the flow of drug traffic in the
Caribbean, DEA initiated Operation Summer Storm and Operation Blue
Skies. Both operations were coordinated with Caribbean law enforcement
personnel to target air, land, and maritime smuggling networks. More
recently, in April 1998, Operation Frontier Lance began to focus
investigative resources on air and maritime smuggling throughout the
Southern and Northern areas of Hispaniola in an effort to enhance the
interdiction of drug trafficking through Haiti and the Dominican
Republic.
The Hemispheric Response: Domestic Interdiction
There is of course a domestic component to our hemispheric
strategy, which should also be understood as part of DEA's contribution
to the overall national strategy to reduce drug smuggling into the
United States. The United States has initiated a wide range of law
enforcement and intelligence programs that aim to prevent illicit drugs
from entering the country. One of the nation's most effective drug
interdiction programs--Operation Pipeline--has been carried out on its
highways for over a decade, and has been responsible for seizures that
match or exceed those of other, more costly programs. Operation
Pipeline is a highway drug interdiction program led by state and local
agencies, and supported by DEA's El Paso Intelligence Center [EPIC].
Through EPIC, state and local agencies can share real-time information
on arrests and seizures with other agencies, obtain immediate results
to record check requests, and receive detailed analysis of drug
seizures to support investigations.
Beginning in the early 1980s, the rate of seizures and arrests
signaled to State and local law enforcement officers that the nation's
highways had become major arteries for drug transportation. Tons of
illicit drugs were flowing North and East from Florida and the
Southwest border, while millions in drug money returned South and
West--as if traveling through a pipeline. During annual conferences and
other multi agency gatherings, officers shared their experiences in
highway interdiction, which the state and local police communities
termed ``Pipeline'' investigations. DEA retained this name in 1984 when
it established Operation Pipeline, which targeted only private
passenger vehicles. In 1990, Operation Convoy, Pipeline's sister
operation, was created to target the commercial operations of drug
transportation organizations.
Operation Pipeline is now active along the highways and interstates
most often used by drug organizations to move illicit drugs North and
East and illicit money South and West. During the first nine years of
the program, the following seizures were made on the nations highways:
$379,000,000 in U.S. currency; 696,000 kilograms of marijuana; 94,000
kilograms of cocaine; 642 kilograms of crack; 278 kilograms of heroin,
and 1,943 kilograms of methamphetamine. In the last year alone, from
September 1997 through August 1998, Pipeline Seizures totaled:
$451,000,000 in U.S. currency; 801,610 kilograms of marijuana; 104,742
kilograms of cocaine; 724 kilograms of crack; 346 kilograms of heroin;
and 2,975 kilograms of methamphetamine. These increasingly more
effective interdiction results dramatically show the high value of this
interdiction program. The results were achieved with no more than the
initiative of state and local police officers and the cost of training
provided by the Drug Enforcement Administration.
With support from DEA Agents across the country, state and local
highway officers are able to execute controlled deliveries of the drug
shipments they seize, thereby furthering their own criminal
investigations and contributing to federal and international
investigations. By identifying and arresting members of the
transportation cells of drug trafficking organizations, along with the
U.S. customers, law enforcement authorities are better positioned to
target the command, control, and communication of a criminal
organization, and arrest its leadership.
It is important to note that these interdiction operations form an
integral part of DEA's over-all strategy. As was the case with
RECIPROCITY and LIMELIGHT, a seemingly unconnected series of seizures
on America's highways can turn into a major investigation, leading to a
significant blow against an international drug trafficking
organization. With its strategy of mounting strategic strikes on
command and control, DEA is able to degrade the ability of the
organizations to conduct business and impede their ability to import
drugs into the United States. Each time we demolish an organization as
part of this strategy, we will further facilitate the intelligence
collection process which is critical to the interdiction of drugs. DEA
will gain vital intelligence about the rest of the organization to use
both in further strikes and in increasing the accuracy of information
provided to interdiction operations conducted by other agencies.
the problem continues
Recent events highlight the ever-changing nature of drug law
enforcement efforts against international drug traffickers. The
Mexican-Central American corridor has been the primary smuggling
corridor for cocaine destined for the United States since the 1980s.
Events in Mexico and along the border bring emphasis to the fact that
trafficking groups from Mexico are a significant force in international
organized crime. These organizations are no longer simply middlemen in
the cocaine transportation business. With the disruption of the Cali
syndicate, groups such as the Amado Carrillo-Fuentes organization, the
Arellano-Felix cartel, the Amezcua Contreras brothers, the Guzman-Loera
organization, and the Caro-Quintero group have consolidated their power
and now dominate drug trafficking along the U.S./Mexico border and in
many U.S. cities. These organizations can reach even into the very
elements of the Mexican government which are intended to fight drugs,
as the traffickers continue a reign of terror and violence along the
border with the United States.
The violence that is an essential part of these ruthless and
powerful organizations impacts innocent citizens who live in the Untied
States. The traffickers' willingness to murder and intimidate witnesses
and public officials has allowed these organizations to develop into
the present day threat they are to the citizens of the United States
and Mexico. Drug traffickers continue their brazen attacks against both
U.S. and Mexican law enforcement officials and their sources of
information.
For example, on June 3, 1998, as two Border Patrol Agents responded
to a ground sensor detection of a possible illegal entry shortly after
midnight two miles north of the U.S.-Mexico border they encountered
five men carrying backpacks full of marijuana. During the initial
encounter the Border Patrol Agents identified themselves and instructed
the men to sit down. As Agent Alexander Kripnick was preparing to
arrest two of the men, one got up and began running. When Agent
Kripnick turned around, Bernardo Velardez Lopez shot him in the head.
The suspects then fled the scene. Agent Kripnick was pronounced dead
four hours later. Manuel Gamez, one of the smugglers, was arrested by
U.S. authorities several hours later. Mexican authorities arrested
Velardez Lopez in Nogales on June 11th. U.S. officials have begun an
extradition request for him.
The traffickers' ability to corrupt government officials is
highlighted by events during the week of August 9, 1998, when twenty
(20) Mexican military officials assigned to a ``Grupo Armado de Fuerzas
Especiales'' (GAFES) unit were arrested in Mexico City on charges of
drug trafficking and alien smuggling. Among the arrested officials were
several military personnel, captains and majors, all of whom had been
assigned to the Attorney General's Office as anti-narcotics agents of
the Federal Judicial Police. In addition, on August 11, 1998, another
sixty (60) officials were removed from the unit which was based at the
Mexico City international airport and remain in custody for
questioning. The arrests were conducted by elements of the Attorney
General's Office and from the Secretariat of National Defense (SDN).
These officials had been pursing this investigation for several months,
based on information indicating that GAFE officials assigned to the
international airport were involved in protection of drug shipments.
The reign of terror, as drug traffickers use violence,
intimidation, and assassination to protect their turf, continues along
the border. On September 9, 1998, Rafael Munoz Talavera was abducted,
tortured and murdered in Ciudad Juarez, in close proximity to the
residence occupied by Munoz's father. This could have possibly been a
message to other members of the Munoz Talavera organization. Munoz was
a lieutenant of the late Amado Carrillo-Fuentes, and was fighting to
gain control of the ACF organization. Evidently, he was assassinated as
part of the on-going power struggle, the outcome of which will clearly
influence who controls the flow of drugs across the Mexican border
through the Juarez corridor. Munoz' rivals will now seek to divide
control between them.
Not only in Mexico, but in other nations the level of violence
against law enforcement personnel continues to be high, demonstrating
the deadly power of the trafficking organizations that control the flow
of drugs into the United States. Just last month, in Colombia, leftist
rebels handed Colombian authorities another in a string of defeats,
raising concern about the Colombian government's ability to contain
trafficking within its borders. In the final days of the Samper
Presidency, rebels launched attacks in 17 of Colombia's 32 states,
killing an estimated 140 soldiers and police officers and scores of
civilian bystanders. The most stunning attack was that on August 3-4 at
the base at Miraflores (275 miles south of Bogota) used for coca
eradication operations. Three police officers were killed, eight
wounded, and 54 were taken prisoner. Fortunately, no Americans were
based at any of the locations attacked by the rebels, not were any
Americans harmed in Colombia during the attacks. For the Colombians,
however, the terror continues. Only last week, 20 policemen were taken
prisoner in a National Liberation Army (ELN) attack on Las Mercedes, a
small town in Norte de Santander province. According to press reports,
this incident brings to about 270 the number of security force officers
now being held by the ELN and the larger Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC), both of which are closely associated with Colombian
trafficking organizations.
conclusion
The DEA remains committed to targeting and arresting the most
significant drug traffickers in the world today. We will continue to
work with our law enforcement partners throughout the world in support
of their efforts and to improve our cooperative efforts against
international drug smuggling.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I will be happy to
respond to any questions you may have.
______
Prepared Statement of Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey
introduction
Chairmen Coverdell and Grassley, Caucus and Committee members,
thank you for the opportunity to testify on U.S. drug interdiction
efforts. All of us at the Office of National Drug Control Policy
(ONDCP) appreciate your longstanding support and interest in all
aspects of drug control policy, as well as the guidance and leadership
of the Caucus and the Committee. We all appreciate this opportunity to
share our views of the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act.
As you know, goals 4 (Shield America's air, land and sea frontiers
from the drug threat) and five (Break drug sources of supply) of the
ten-year 1998 National Drug Control Strategy focus on reducing the
availability of illegal drugs within the United States. The Strategy's
mid-term goal is to reduce illegal drug availability by 25 percent by
the year 2002; our long-term goal is to reduce availability by 50
percent by the year 2007.
In March, we submitted to you a detailed set of Performance
Measures of Effectiveness. The nucleus of the system consists of twelve
targets that define specific results to be achieved under the
Strategy's five goals. Eighty-two supporting performance measures
delineate mid-term and long-term outcomes for the Strategy's thirty-two
supporting objectives. Our basic aim is to reduce drug use and
availability by 50 percent in the next ten years. These measures of
effectiveness were developed in full consultation with all federal
drug-control program agencies. The Strategy's mid-term Goal 4 objective
is to reduce by 10 percent the rate at which illegal drugs successfully
enter the United States by the year 2002. The long-term objective is a
20 percent reduction in this rate by the year 2007. The Strategy's mid-
term (5-year) objective for goal 5 is a 15 percent reduction in the
flow of illegal drugs from source countries; the long-term (10-year)
objective is a 30 percent reduction. ONDCP also submitted for the
Congress' consideration the first-ever five year federal drug control
budget. It is our view that the Strategy, the Performance Measures of
Effectiveness, and the Budget Summary outline a credible program for
reducing drug use and its consequences and drug availability.
an update on cocaine-control efforts in the western hemisphere
Potential cocaine production declined significantly in 1997. Our
source country strategy has achieved greatest success in Peru,
contributing to a disruption of the Peruvian cocaine economy. Peruvian
coca cultivation declined by 27 percent last year, and is down 40
percent in the last two years. Bolivia has achieved modest decreases in
coca cultivation and potential cocaine production over the last two
years. However, these gains have been partially offset by surging coca
cultivation in Colombia. Colombia now has more hectares of coca under
cultivation than any other country. The area under cultivation has
increased by 56 percent in the past two years. Nonetheless, total
Andean cultivation declined seven percent and estimates of total
potential cocaine production declined by 15 percent--from 760 to 650
metric tons in 1997. This is the lowest figure this decade. An analysis
of the situation in each of the three South American cocaine producing
countries follows:
Bolivia. Bolivia eradicated 3,934 hectares in the first
six months of 1998, compared to 2,858 for the same period in 1997. This
promising outcome underscores the Banzer administration's resolve to
confront the coca trade. Earlier this year, President Banzer released a
national strategy entitled Con Dignidad that establishes the objective
of eliminating illicit coca cultivation within five years. The
Government of Bolivia estimated in their anti-drug strategy that the
total financing requirement to meet their objective of completely
withdrawing from the coca-cocaine circuit between 1998 and 2002 would
require 952 million dollars to support alternative development,
eradication, prevention and rehabilitation. Thirty-five thousand
Bolivian families currently depend on the illegal cocaine trade for
their livelihood. It is unlikely that the international community will
provide Bolivia the support its government believes is required to
attain this ambitious objective.
Colombia. As a result of surging coca cultivation,
Colombia now grows more hectares of coca than Peru or Bolivia. Colombia
also continues to be the world's leading producer of cocaine HCl,
processing much of Peru's coca base. It will be difficult to achieve a
decrease in cocaine production in Colombia in the short term. The
current conditions (weak government, security forces not in control of
substantial areas of the country, increasingly stronger guerrilla and
paramilitary forces, weak legitimate economy, broken judicial system,
and official corruption) are conducive to drug trafficking and will
take time to reverse. The new Pastrana administration has stated its
commitment to tackling these issues, but it would not be realistic to
expect a complete turn around in a short period of time.
ONDCP believes that we will see continued expansion of coca
cultivation, especially in areas outside of the Colombian Government's
effective control. The aggressive aerial eradication campaign being
conducted by the Colombian National Police with the help from the U.S.
State Department will only slow this expansion. Colombian trafficking
organizations appear to be determined to offset declines in Bolivian
and Peruvian coca production with increased domestic production. The
recent national narco-guerrilla offensive and the resulting significant
military defeats suggest that Colombian security forces will not be
able to conduct effective anti-drug operations in regions where
guerrilla forces are dominant and control the ground.
Peru. Through June, Peru's manual eradication program had
met 75 percent of its 1998 target of 4,800 hectares. The overall impact
on production has been limited because efforts have focused on semi-
abandoned fields in national forests. Peruvian Drug Czar Marino Costa
Bauer stated in June that record-low coca leaf prices combined with
continuing eradication efforts would result in the virtual elimination
of illicit coca cultivation in Peru within five years. However, it
would seem unlikely that coca leaf prices will remain low if demand in
consumer nations exceeds the available supply.
1997 saw significant cocaine seizures in the transit zone. Drugs
coming to the United States from South America pass through a six-
million square-mile area that is roughly the size of the continental
United States. This transit zone includes the Caribbean, Mexico,
Central America, the Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific Ocean.
Event-based estimates suggest that perhaps 430 metric tons of cocaine
passed through the transit zone in 1997, and 85 metric tons were seized
there; 60 percent more than in 1996. 1997 was the third consecutive
year of increased transit-zone seizures. Coast Guard supported cocaine
seizures in 1997 totaled 47 metric tons. U.S. interdiction operations
in the Caribbean focused on Puerto Rico with good results. Thirteen
metric tons of cocaine were seized in the Puerto Rico area.
Interdiction operations contributed to a reduction in the flow of
cocaine to the island, forcing traffickers to divert shipments to the
Dominican Republic and Haiti. Drug-related crime in Puerto Rico plunged
by 37 percent.
1998 cocaine seizures are on a par with 1997's levels. An estimated
127 metric tons of cocaine were seized worldwide (excluding U.S.
internal seizures) during the first six months of this year. This
amount is slightly less than the corresponding 1997 figure of 131
metric tons. Transit zone seizures were about 45 metric tons compared
to 43 metric tons during the same time in 1997. Seizures in Central
America totaled 19 metric tons, nearly double the ten metric tons
seized during the same period in 1997. Mexican seizures of 15 metric
tons are below last year's corresponding figure of 24 metric tons.
Seizures in the Caribbean totaled about 14 metric tons, up from 9
metric tons for the same period in 1997. Within the arrival zone, U.S.
law enforcement agencies have seized 36 metric tons, compared with 24
tons during the same time in 1997.
Trafficking trends: January-June 1998. Peru continues to export
most of its coca base to Colombia for processing into cocaine HCl and
subsequent smuggling to consumer nations. Traffickers are exploiting
the plentiful waterways in northern Peru to move cocaine base. They are
also prepared to revert to the use of aircraft as the primary means of
transportation should we let up on the successful airbridge denial
campaign. The movement of cocaine HCl from processing locations to
international departure points within Colombia is mostly undetected. An
estimated 232 metric tons were smuggled out of South America destined
for the United States:
Mexico/Central America corridor. Fifty-two percent (121
metric tons) of the cocaine destined for the United States is estimated
to have been routed along this corridor. Fifty-four metric tons were
seized along this corridor, 34 in the transit zone and 20 in the
arrival zone. Sixty-seven metric tons were estimated to have entered
the United States via this corridor.
Caribbean corridor. Thirty-two percent (74 metric tons) is
estimated to have passed through the Caribbean. Fourteen metric tons
were seized along this corridor, 11 in the transit zone and 3 in the
arrival zone. Sixty metric tons were estimated to have entered the
United States via this corridor.
Direct Transportation. Sixteen percent (37 metric tons) is
estimated to have proceeded directly from South America to the United
States. Thirteen metric tons were seized in the arrival zone. Twenty-
four metric tons were estimated to have entered the United States via
this corridor.
In summary, an estimated 232 metric tons of cocaine departed South
America in the first six months of this year. Forty-five metric tons
were seized in the transit zone, while 36 were seized in the arrival
zone. An estimated 153 metric tons were smuggled into the United States
during this period. One third of the cocaine destined for the United
States was interdicted in either the transit or the arrival zones. This
interdiction performance is consistent with that of previous years, but
it is not good enough. We need to do better.
Smuggling techniques continue to change in response to interdiction
efforts. Traffickers continue to move cocaine via a wide variety of
modes and conveyances and to adapt their methods and routes to avoid
detection and apprehension.
Mexico/Central America corridor. Containerized commercial
cargo is a common method for smuggling cocaine into the Duty Free Zone
in Colon, Panama. Cocaine is transported in smaller quantities in both
commercial and private vehicles along the Pan-American Highway in
Central America to reduce the risk of detection. Cocaine is also
introduced throughout Central America via maritime commerce. Seizure
data along the U.S.-Mexico border suggests that cocaine is evenly
distributed between commercial cargo and private cars.
Caribbean corridor. Traffickers mostly use non-commercial
aircraft and non-commercial maritime vessels to smuggle cocaine into
Caribbean islands. Haiti has become a more prominent transshipment
point despite our efforts to develop capable law enforcement agencies.
``Go-fast'' boats travel with virtual impunity between Colombia and
Haiti. Airdrops off the southern Haitian coast are common. Cocaine
passing through Haiti either is smuggled directly to the United States
and Western Europe or is routed through the Bahamas, the Dominican
Republic, or Puerto Rico. Traffickers also use small aircraft and go-
fast boats to deliver cocaine to Puerto Rico. There are reports that
traffickers track U.S. Coast Guard movements and select the time and
location of deliveries to avoid interdiction. Recent interdiction
operations illustrate how traffickers are operating.
On July 9th, the USS John L. Hall (FFG 32)
intercepted two go-fast boats off the coast of Panama and
seized 2,000 pounds of cocaine.
On July 24th, the Coast Guard Cutter Gallatin
conducted a consensual boarding of the coastal freighter
Apemagu and discovered numerous suspicious items. The Apemagu
was escorted to Guantanamo Bay where a detailed search found
1500 pounds of cocaine.
On August 4th, a Coast Guard aircraft from Air
Station Miami tracked a 42-foot go-fast boat with three 200HP
outboard engines as it rounded the eastern corner of Cuba and
proceeded through Cuban territorial seas toward Long Island,
Bahamas. Two helicopters from Operation Bahamas Turks and
Caicos detected the boat near Long Island and dropped off law
enforcement agents who seized the vessel, a vehicle that linked
up with it, 1600 pounds of marijuana and an undetermined amount
of cocaine.
On August 14th, the USS John L. Hall detected and
intercepted a 35-foot speedboat off the coast of Panama and
recovered forty-one bales of cocaine jettisoned by the
speedboat's crew.
Also on August 14th, the Coast Guard Cutter Valiant
located and boarded a suspected drug smuggling boat (the
Isamar) off the coast of Haiti, detecting numerous indicators
of drug smuggling. Valiant's boarding team requested and
received permission to remain onboard the Isamar until it
docked in the Miami River. A joint Coast Guard, Customs, DEA,
and FBI team boarded the vessel in the Miami River and found
5,100 pounds of cocaine.
Direct Transportation. Commercial cargo (both air and
maritime) and air passengers (human mules) are frequently used to
smuggle cocaine and heroin from South America to the United States.
Traffickers route mules through third countries (e.g. Argentina and
Chile) to minimize U.S. Customs' attention and avoid fitting
``profiles.'' Cargo containers and agricultural shipments are commonly
used to conceal cocaine in commercial vessels.
Interdiction and Deterrence studies. In the Classified Annex of the
1997 National Drug Control Strategy, ONDCP tasked the USIC to conduct
an Interdiction Study to determine what resources are required to
attain the Strategy's interdiction goals. In response, USIC and the
interagency have assessed requirements in both the source and transit
zones to accomplish goals specified in Presidential Decision Directive
14, the National Drug Control Strategy, and the USIC Interdiction
Guidance for 1998 which identifies Southeastern Colombia as the center
of gravity for the cocaine industry. ONDCP, Customs, and the Coast
Guard are conducting a study of the deterrence value of interdiction
operations in the source, transit and arrival zones. Our intent is to
develop models to assist commanders as they decide where and when to
employ interdiction assets.
The need for improved capabilities in the arrival zone. We face
considerable drug-control challenges along our air, land, and sea
frontiers. The Administration has made considerable strides
strengthening enforcement along the Southwest border and the Southern
tier which represents a significant drug-control challenge along the
nation's air, sea and land borders. From 1993 to 1997, the
Administration increased funding by over 40 percent for the Coast
Guard, Customs and Immigration and Naturalization Service to support
border enforcement activities along the Southern tier. This funding
translated into more than 2,400 additional Customs and INS inspectors,
2,800 new Border Patrol agents and force-multiplying enforcement
technology such as x-rays and border sensors and cameras. Despite the
great strides this Administration has made to strengthen our border, we
estimate that only 20 percent of the cocaine crossing the border is
seized.
analysis of the western hemisphere drug elimination act
The focus that members of Congress and their professional staff
have devoted to this Bill reflects our shared commitment to ensuring
our supply-reduction programs are effective. The Bill contains many
useful ideas and budgetary initiatives. However, we have serious
concerns with certain aspects of the Bill, including:
The legislation's primary goal of reducing the flow of illegal
drugs into the United States by not less than 80 percent by December
31, 2001 is completely unrealistic. It is unlikely that the amount of
cocaine departing South America for the U.S. market will decline
appreciably before December 2001. Given that historically combined
interdiction rates for cocaine in the transit and arrival zones have
averaged about 33 percent, it is unlikely that this figure can be
changed so dramatically in the next three and a half years.
Consequently, reducing the flow of cocaine by 80 percent is not
feasible. Furthermore, much of the equipment the legislation would
authorize would not be fielded for several years and could not be
deployed in time to work towards this objective. It is impossible to
develop over the next four years political, criminal justice, and law
enforcement institutions that are capable of standing up to the
pressures exerted by drug trafficking international criminal
organizations in all major source and transit countries. Absent such
essential partners, the United States cannot unilaterally achieve this
success rate. Legislating this goal would place an empty slogan instead
of realistic strategy in front of the American people.
Interdiction success is not the main determinant of illegal drug
consumption. The reason that 50 percent of high school seniors smoke
marijuana before graduation is not because foreign drugs are flooding
the United States. Societal acceptance of illegal drug use, low risk
perception, peer example, and drug availability--much of it from
domestic sources--are all contributing factors. Marijuana usage
accounts for about 90 percent of all juvenile illegal drug use. We are
responding to this problem appropriately with the National Youth Anti-
Drug Media Campaign, by addressing shortcomings in the Safe and Drug-
free Schools program, by supporting community anti-drug coalitions, and
by expanding treatment availability. In the end, we will solve the drug
problem in America principally by decreasing demand for a drugged
lifestyle. Supply reduction is also crucial, but only by taking a
multi-pronged and balanced approach to the nation's drug problem can we
hope to succeed.
The specific legislative enhancements proposed by this Bill are not
tied to a coherent strategy. The Bill fails to develop an overarching
concept. It is neither linked to the existing drug threat nor tied to a
clear strategic vision or operational concept. Instead, it mandates a
series of tactical resource allocation decisions. The drug-control
budgets, which the Executive Branch has submitted for congressional
consideration, are tied to the goals, objectives, and performance
measures elaborated in the ten-year National Drug Control Strategy. In
sum, this Bill is micro-management of drug tactics based on a shallow
analysis of the problem and our available tools.
The legislation lacks flexibility. The Bill would impose inflexible
requirements. Its provisions are too specific. For example:
2 Schweizer observation/spray aircraft (to be
piloted by pilots under contract with the United States).
Acquisition of concertina wire and tunneling
detection systems at the La Picota prison of the National
Police of Colombia.
Forward deployment of 5 riverine operations
maintenance platforms.
Establishment of a third drug interdiction site at
Puerto Maldonado, Peru.
2 mobile x-ray machines . . . for placement along
the Chapare highway. (The locations of such machines should not
be specified by statute but left to the discretion of
commanders on the ground.)
. . . operation and maintenance of 1 J-31
observation aircraft.
Wisely, the Congress never thought to tell General Norman
Schwarzkopf where to deploy his armored forces during operation Desert
Storm or when and how to attack. It would be inappropriate for the
Congress to interfere in decisions that are properly those of duly
appointed leaders, law enforcement officials, U.S. diplomatic
personnel, unified commanders, the Secretary of State, and other
responsible officials within the Executive Branch. This legislative
approach would be bad government.
The Bill proposes authorizations that are far in excess of expected
appropriations and the President's budget without specifying where
these funds will come from. The Bill would authorize $2.6 billion in
appropriations in addition to those already authorized for fiscal years
1999-2001. To date, Congress has not appropriated funds for many of the
Administration's pending anti-drug abuse requests.
The legislation infringes on the authority of the President and the
Secretary of State. The bill infringes on the President's appointment
powers and the Secretary of State's flexibility in personnel matters
and intrudes upon well-established procedures for providing foreign
military assistance.
Transferring the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs from the State Department to the Drug Enforcement
Administration is a bad idea. The underlying assumption is that certain
foreign assistance activities of the Sate Department could be better
carried out by a law enforcement agency. This assumption is neither
substantiated nor soundly based.
Consolidation of all joint interagency task forces (JIATF) would
reduce effectiveness. We are streamlining the existing interdiction
command and control structure and have reviewed the National
Interdiction Command and Control Plan. Planning is underway to
consolidate JIATF East (based in Key West) and South (based at Howard
Air Force base, Panama) as it becomes more likely that all U.S.
military forces will be withdrawn from the Republic of Panama next
year. Closure of JIATF West (based in Alameda, California) would
disrupt DoD support to law enforcement agencies involved in heroin
control efforts in Asia and cocaine interdiction efforts in the eastern
Pacific. Closure of the El Paso based Joint Task Force 6 would also
disrupt military support of drug-control operations along the Southwest
border. ONDCP has presented specific recommendations regarding
accountability and coordination of drug-control efforts along the
Southwest border to the President's Drug Policy Council.
conclusion
We share the Congress' view that drug availability in the United
States can and must be substantially reduced. All of us at ONDCP
appreciate your support of our balanced National Drug Control Strategy
and major initiatives associated with it such as the National Youth
Anti-Drug Media Campaign, the Drug-Free Communities Act, and the High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area program. However, the goals proposed by
the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act are unrealistic. This is a
``ready, fire, aim'' approach. The ten-year Strategy developed in
consultation with the Congress contains realistic goals. It proposes
reducing drug availability in the United States by 25 percent by 2002,
and by 50 percent by 2007 (1996 is the base year for comparative
purposes).
ONDCP believes that the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act
should not contain tactical-level directives to those who have legal
responsibility, experience, and training for deciding where, when, how,
and why to employ equipment and personnel to accomplish the goals of
the United States Government. ONDCP respects the role of Congress to
provide oversight. We understand that Congress must examine specific
aspects of the administration's drug-control efforts anywhere in the
world. Please be assured that we also view this Bill as representing a
clear communication of congressional concern with international aspects
of drug-control policy and U.S. hemispheric efforts. ONDCP will
evaluate such congressional thinking respectfully and use your ideas to
adjust our own actions.
The Administration has submitted a FY 1999 drug control budget that
includes 1.8 billion dollars for interdiction efforts--an increase of
more than 36 percent since FY 1996. Proposed operating expense funding
for the Coast Guard is 19 percent higher than in FY 1996. The 526
million dollars requested for DoD support of interdiction is 27 percent
increase over FY 96 spending. We would welcome the opportunity to
explain in greater detail how each agency is organizing its programs to
attain the objectives established in the National Drug Control Strategy
and to debate the sufficiency of funding for any aspect of our supply-
reduction campaigns.
__________
Prepared Statement of Brian E. Sheridan
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for this opportunity to speak before you today. Our
nation's drug problem is a grave one that affects the lives of millions
of Americans. Crime and health problems associated with illicit drug
use continue to have an adverse effect on our communities and among our
young people. Meanwhile, as the Secretary of Defense has stated,
illicit drug trafficking poses a ``national security'' problem for the
United States.
Addressing this problem, the President's National Drug Control
Strategy articulates five strategic goals for our collective American
effort to reduce illegal drug use and mitigate its consequences. The
Department of Defense's counterdrug program constitutes an important
part of the U.S. Government's multi-national and multi-agency approach
to counter the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.
DoD's counterdrug objectives are to reduce drug use in the DoD
uniformed services and the broad DoD community, to assist international
and domestic law enforcement to disrupt illegal drug traffic into the
United States, and to support domestic law enforcement to interdict
drugs and drug operations in the United States. The Department's
program is designed to employ the unique assets and personnel skills at
its command to complement and support those of other U.S. agencies and
cooperating foreign countries. Authority to accomplish these objectives
includes 10 USC 124, section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for FY 1991, as amended, section 1033 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY 1998, and 506(a)(2)(A) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. In addition a program implementing
10 USC 2576(a) provides excess DoD equipment to federal and state
agencies for counterdrug activities.
While the Department provides support across the National
Strategy's five goals, the focus of the Department's counterdrug is on
two particular goals: Shield America's Air, Land, and Sea Frontiers
from the Drug Threat (Goal 4); and Break Foreign and Domestic Drug
Sources of Supply (Goal 5). DoD also supports the other three strategic
goals: Educate and Enable America's Youth to Reject Illegal Drugs (Goal
1); Increase the Safety of America's Citizens by Substantially Reducing
Drug-Related Crime and Violence (Goal 2); and Reduce Health and Social
Costs to the Public of Illegal Drug Use (Goal 3).
Goal 1 (Educate and enable America's youth to reject illegal
drugs): This fiscal year, DoD will spend $14.5M to conduct DoD family
outreach programs to military dependents. These programs consist of a
mixture of positive mentoring, drug avoidance education, leadership
skill, peer pressure resistance, and counseling services. In addition,
military personnel volunteer in drug abuse prevention programs through
various community-based programs. The lack of appropriate legal
authorities prevents the Department from conducting most outreach
programs beyond the local military communities. Nevertheless, there are
two exceptions to this limitation: the Young Marines program, and the
National Guard State Plan funded outreach programs. These efforts focus
on providing positive role models and drug awareness education for at-
risk youth.
Goal 2 (Reduce drug-related crime and violence, through domestic
law enforcement support): This year, DoD will spend $108.2M to respond
to federal, state, and local drug law enforcement agency requests for
domestic operational and logistical support to assist them in their
efforts to reduce drug related crime. This support is provided by the
National Guard and active duty personnel, and serves as a force
multiplier for law enforcement agencies. I would note that the
Department is not interested in militarizing law enforcement in the
U.S. Since 10 U.S.C. 385 specifically prohibits direct participation by
military personnel in law enforcement activities, DoD is limited to
playing a supporting role for law enforcement. Military personnel do
not engage in law enforcement activities such as apprehension or arrest
of U.S. citizens or seizure of their assets.
With regards to the National Guard support, DoD annually approves
and funds the 54 state and territorial governors' plans for use of the
National Guard in support of law enforcement counterdrug operations.
The National Guard provides a wide range of support to include aerial
and surface reconnaissance, intelligence analysis, linguists,
engineering, and training. In addition, through the National Guard, the
Department funds several training academies for domestic law
enforcement agencies including the Regional Counterdrug Training
Academy (RCTA) at Meridian, Mississippi, and the Multi-Jurisdictional
Task Force Training Academy at St. Petersburg, Florida.
Through Joint Task Force Six, DoD provides coordinated operational
support by active component and reserves to domestic law enforcement
agencies throughout the continental United States (excluding the U.S.
Southwest Border, Southwest Border support is under Goal 4). Our
domestic support efforts are prioritized to optimize the operational
impact in designated high intensity drug trafficking areas. The type of
support that we are authorized to provide includes: aerial
reconnaissance, intelligence analysis, linguists, engineering,
transportation, training and maintenance. DoD also provides domestic
law enforcement agencies with counterdrug training by the U.S. Army
Military Police School, Uniformed Services University of Health
Science, Navy-Marine Intelligence Training Center, and the Civil Air
Patrol. Additionally, DoD operates a military detailee program to
assist Federal drug law enforcement agencies. Finally, DoD transfers
excess personal property to drug law enforcement agencies to support
their equipment needs where possible.
Goal 3 (Reduce costs resulting from illegal drug use, through the
DoD demand reduction effort): This year, the Department will spend
$74.6M on drug demand reduction programs. The primary focus of our
demand reduction program is force readiness. Through this program, the
Department strives to convey that drug abuse is completely incompatible
with military preparedness; therefore, there is no tolerance for drug
abuse within the military forces.
DoD's demand reduction program consists of three components: drug
testing for military and civilian personnel, drug abuse prevention/
education activities for military and civilian personnel and their
dependents, and drug treatment for military personnel. Drug testing
funding supports the operation of the six military drug testing
laboratories which test active duty military members, the contract
costs of drug testing Defense Department civilians, and the contract
costs for reserves and new military entrants. Funding for prevention/
education activities supports Service and Defense Agency-specific
programs aimed at ensuring that military and civilian members
understand the dangers of drug abuse to the individual, the family, and
the broader DoD community. Only limited funding is provided for drug
abuse treatment, as other sources of DoD support are available for this
function.
Goal 4 (Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug
threat): Despite increased efforts to attack the cocaine threat at its
source, drugs continue to flow to the U.S. due to the pervasive nature
of the narco-trafficking business and the geographic immensity of the
threat region. DoD will spend $401 .6M in FY98 on programs that use
cued-intelligence to assist law enforcement and transit nation forces'
detection, monitoring and interdiction operations against the transport
of cocaine through the Caribbean, the East Pacific, Central America,
and across our southwest border.
Because the drug smuggling threat has changed from predominantly an
air threat to a maritime threat, continuing flexibility is essential,
and is incorporated within DoD's transit zone program. Among the
various DoD efforts in the transit zone, the Department maintains a
robust, flexible, and cost effective detection and monitoring
capability that can counter the changing smuggling threat. In support
of Goal 4, the Department operates and two Relocatable Over-The-Horizon
Radars (ROTHR), seven P-3 Counterdrug Upgrade aircraft, E-3 AWACs, four
E-2s, four F-16 fighters, three Navy combatants, and three TAGOS radar
picket ships. These assets provide an exceptional air detection and
monitoring capability throughout the 6 million square-mile transit
zone, and provide a flexible maritime surveillance and interdiction
capability. Additionally, through the Tethered Aerostat Radar System,
DoD provides critical low-altitude radar surveillance of the Caribbean
and southwestern approaches into the U.S. An aggressive research and
development program continues to provide a variety of substantial
technology upgrades to the ROTHR system, greatly enhancing its
detection and tracking performance.
DoD support to Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF)-East provides
the operational command, control, and tactical intelligence for the
transit zone cocaine operations. Moreover, DoD support to JIATF-West
provides important intelligence capabilities to DEA-led efforts to
address U.S.-bound heroin smuggling in Southeast and Southwest Asia,
and has proven instrumental in improving participating nation
counterdrug capabilities.
Improvement of Mexico's drug interdiction capability continues to
be a key interest as approximately 57% of the cocaine entering the U.S.
passes through Mexico. DoD's ongoing cooperation with the Mexican
military is maintained through a military-to-military bilateral working
group process.
A DoD-funded National Guard program provides support to drug law
enforcement agency operations along the US southwest border, in Puerto
Rico and in the Virgin Islands. In support of this goal, the National
Guard provides a wide range of support to include aerial and surface
reconnaissance, and cargo inspection at ports-of-entry to deny illegal
drugs from entering the U.S.
Through Joint Task Force Six, DoD provides support to law
enforcement by active component and reserves along the Southwest
border. Efforts are prioritized to optimize the operational impact on
the Southwest Border to deny the smuggling of illegal drug into the
U.S. The support that DoD provides includes reconnaissance intelligence
analysis, linguists, engineering, transportation, training and
maintenance.
As directed by Congress, DoD is successfully completing the non-
intrusive inspection technology research and development program with
all major systems being completed by FY00. In FY99, DoD counterdrug
research and development program will focus on technology to support
non-intrusive inspection systems, detection and monitoring,
interdiction, tactical operations on the Southwest border, and
intelligence collection supporting interdiction.
DoD participation, in the form of detection and monitoring assets,
personnel, and operational support to cooperating nations in the
transit zone continues to result in the successful seizure and
trafficker jettisons of over 100 metric tons of cocaine each year--
preventing that cocaine from reaching the U.S. for consumption by drug
abusers.
Goal 5 (Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply): This
year, the Department will spend $249.0M in support of this goal. A
major component of DoD's effort in this area is to provide critical
intelligence collection and support to the interagency Linear Approach,
whose focus is the dismantling of cocaine cartels and the disruption of
the cocaine ``business.'' In addition, DoD carries out a focused
program to improve participating nation air, land, riverine, and
maritime interdiction and end game capabilities of cocaine source
nations. Such DoD training, logistics, intelligence, and communications
support are intended to assist source nation counterdrug forces in the
move toward self-sufficiency in their counterdrug efforts. The
Department's objective is to provide the maximum, effective support
possible within the legal constraint that prohibit direct U.S.
participation in actual field operations.
When combined with in-country counterdrug efforts supported by the
State Department and other agencies, this program has the potential to
substantially curtail the cocaine ``business'' in the cocaine source
countries of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. Such end game support for
Peru over the past two years has been instrumental in a dramatic 40%
decrease in coca cultivation which resulted from an inability to move
coca base out of Peru. Similar complementary efforts in the bordering
countries (i.e., Ecuador, Brazil, and Venezuela) are also included in
the program.
In response to the traffickers increasing use of the source
region's vast river network to move their product, the Commander-in-
Chief the U.S. Southern Command has worked closely with U.S. embassy
personnel to assist participating nation law enforcement organizations
in developing a credible riverine interdiction capability in Peru. As
part of this effort, the U.S. Marine Corps and Special Operations
Forces personnel provide critical training to host nation forces
assigned to the riverine interdiction mission. Moreover, under the
auspices of Section 1033 of the National Defense Authorization Act of
FY98, the Secretary of Defense was given 5-year authority to purchase
and transfer riverine patrol boats, maintain and repair equipment, and
perform other associated types of support specified in the legislation.
The program also supports enhancements to Colombia's existing riverine
program by providing equipment and maintenance support.
There is a clear and continuing opportunity to disrupt the cocaine
``business,'' coca-growing areas of Peru and Colombia. Capitalizing on
this opportunity, DoD provides support to Peru's ground-based
interdiction operations. This is a critical program since Peru remains
the primary source for the cultivation of coca, although production has
decreased dramatically from the FY95 levels. Our support in this area
is designed to enhance the Peruvian counterdrug forces' mobility in
remote trafficking areas and their effectiveness in interdicting coca
product movement. Through extensive training, both in Peru and at U.S.
military facilities, and minor construction work to enhance jungle
operating base infrastructure, this program strives to improve the
operational mobility, flexibility and response capability of Peruvian
counterdrug forces.
A significant portion of DoD source nation support is devoted to
the use of assets to detect and monitor the movement of cocaine and
coca products within South America. Specifically, source nation support
involves the use of E-3 AWACs patrols and ground radars which detect
suspected narcotrafficking aircraft. The detection information is
handed off to U.S. or participating nation tracker aircraft and
participating nation end game aircraft. Additionally, the Department
deploys both Tactical Analysis Teams to assist U.S. embassies in source
nations with intelligence and target analysis and Special Operations
Forces-manned Joint Planning Assistance Teams which work directly with
participating nation drug law enforcement leadership on operational
planning. Lastly, the Department will oversee the construction and
operation of the third Relocatable Over-The-Horizon Radar (ROTHR) in
Puerto Rico with a surveillance range capable of effectively covering
the Peru/Colombia/Brazil Airbridge Region as well as the operation of
the Caribbean Basin Radar Network.
As you can see, the Department continuously strives to apply our
unique assets and personnel skills to improve the effectiveness of our
Nation's counterdrug efforts. We strive to ensure that the maximum
operational impact is achieved with the funds available. While DoD's
support to law enforcement alone cannot solve the Nation's drug
problem, we have made steady progress in running a cost-effective,
high-impact program against a quickly changing threat. Over the years,
we have worked closely with our authorizing and appropriating
committees as well as others as continue to pursue high-impact ways to
support the work of law enforcement agencies both at home and abroad.
We look forward to our continued collaboration in this important
effort.
Thank you.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record by Members
of the Committee and the Task Force
Questions Submitted to Samuel H. Banks
Question. U.S. forces cannot remain in Panama beyond 1999 unless an
agreement is reached with Panama to let them stay; efforts to negotiate
such an agreement have foundered. Right now there are several U.S.
Customs airplanes stationed out of Howard that do work in Andean and
Caribbean airspace. What back-up plans has Customs developed to
substitute for Howard Air Force Base in Panama as a platform for U.S.
anti-drug activities in the region? Will these alternatives be more
costly than operating from Panama or will these alternatives impact on
the effectiveness of anti-drug operations?
Answer. U.S. Customs is dependent on the Department of Defense to
coordinate and establish a forward operating location similar to Howard
AFB, Panama. U.S. Customs is working diligently with the U.S. Southern
Command to survey and identify a forward operating location that will
not impact our mission effectiveness. Based on our past experience,
U.S. Customs prefers Curacao as a suitable forward operating location
for our C-550 and P-3 interdiction aircraft supporting the Andean and
Caribbean airspace. In order to be effective in Southeastern Colombia,
Venezuelan overflight would be required when operating out of Curacao.
In the event a forward operating location similar to Howard AFB
were not established in a reasonable amount of time, U.S. Customs P-3
operations would continue out of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Puerto Rico and
Curacao, respectively. Deployments similar to those conducted in the
past would more than likely be scheduled out of Guayaquil, Ecuador, and
Lima, Peru. Citation deployments, on the other hand, could conceivably
be conducted out of Curacao, Netherland Antilles and Barranquilla,
Colombia. Final disposition is predicated upon favorable site surveys.
USCS personnel will conduct the requisite site surveys in the month of
December 1998.
Question. What specific plans do you have to address the go-fast
boats that smuggle drugs and evade capture through the shallow waters
in the Bahamas?
Answer. U.S. Customs sponsored the accomplishment of Operation Plan
Nancy, Mod C, which is the current interdiction plan for the Bahamas.
Operating within the guidelines of this plan, U.S. Customs, in
conjunction with U.S. Coast Guard marine assets and the Drug
Enforcement Administration, routinely provides P-3 AEW, PA-42 CHET and
C-550 interceptor tracker support to Bahamian interdiction operations.
Participation by Customs aviation resources in Bahamian interdiction
operations has resulted in numerous seizures of aircraft, boats and
contraband. Since October 1991, we have chased approximately 40
airborne targets of interest (ATOI) that were destined to the Bahamas
or Haiti. Of these 40 targets, only 2 resulted in a successful end-game
in the Bahamas. In addition to these two end-games, there were some
seizures made in Colombia after the suspect aircraft had either aborted
its airdrop due to high law enforcement presence in the drop area or
had made a successful drop to awaiting vessels. The major reason that
only 10% of the targets detected resulted in an end-game is the
desperate need for shallow-water go-fast type vessels to intercept the
waiting fast-boats after the drop has been made. U.S. Customs will
continue to provide a high level of support to Bahamian interdiction
operations.
Question. Some experts say that the best way to disrupt the
production and supply of drugs is to raise the risk that the
traffickers run. Isn't it logical that our best hope of raising those
risks is by focusing our limited resources in the relatively smaller
target area in the producing zones rather than the huge transit zone,
border, or on every American street corner.
Answer. Stopping drugs at the source is a valid concept; however,
the effectiveness of this plan is dependent on the geopolitical
environment in key source zone nations. Unfortunately, insurgent forces
have successfully intertwined drug trafficking and production in areas
where heavy insurgent activities exist. This unfortunate situation has
made it difficult, if not impossible, to effectively interdict and
eradicate the drug traffickers in the source zone, particularly in
South Eastern Colombia. During the past year, approximately 100
airborne and marine targets were detected and tracked by U.S. Customs
into and adjacent to the South American landmass. Of these 100 targets,
approximately 20 resulted in some type of end-game.
The most difficult obstacle to conducting effective ``Air Bridge
Denial'' operations is in ensuring that detection and monitoring
missions are undertaken in areas where participating nations have the
resources and capability to respond. To date most operations continue
to emphasize ``sustained operations.'' We lack the resources to
effectively conduct these type of operations. More emphasis must be
placed on focused operations. We need to identify weaknesses in the
source zone drug transportation infrastructure and conduct intense,
short-term, focused operations in concert with our foreign partners
against those weaknesses.
Question. The Brazilian government recently has made an
extraordinary commitment to fighting drugs. What specific assistance is
the US Customs Service prepared to provide to assist Brazil in these
efforts? Has any of these services been requested?
Answer. Most of the cocaine base and HCL leaving Peru for Colombia
transits through Brazil. Most agencies estimate that Peruvian smugglers
will increase their use U.S. Government assets, including the U.S.
Customs Service P-3 AEW and P-3 Slick aircraft, are not allowed to
enter Brazil airspace. There is currently no mechanism in place to
request ``hot pursuit'' overflight. This affords drug smugglers a
significant tactical advantage. Brazilian officials have routinely
refused to allow USC aircraft to overfly their territory. To the best
of our knowledge, this refusal is based on sovereignty concerns
specific to overflight of U.S. military aircraft.
U.S. Customs is prepared to provide expert law enforcement advice
to Brazilian law enforcement personnel. At this juncture, the Brazilian
government has not requested any type of assistance from the U.S.
Customs Service. Our current commitment to Colombia has exhausted our
available detection and interdiction resources. Once our additional P-3
aircraft become available, Customs will be able to provide this type of
support to Brazil if requested.
Question. The United States has provided extraordinary resources
(helicopters, technical assistance, etc.) to support Mexico's anti-drug
efforts. In addition, extraordinary Customs and Border Patrol resources
have been deployed on the U.S.-Mexican border in the last several
years. What results do we have to show for this investment? Are cocaine
seizures up or down in the last 12 months, and by how much? Have any
Mexican kingpins been prosecuted and sentenced for drug crimes? Have
any criminals been extradited to the United States?
Answer. The Government of Mexico has made progress in their fight
against drug trafficking in spite of corruption problems within their
own government.
Drug kingpins have been arrested and many are now awaiting trial.
As for extradition, Mexican law prohibits extradition of Mexican
citizens who have legal charges pending against them; such individuals
will not be considered for extradition until Mexican charges have been
prosecuted. One member of the Gulf Cartel, Oscar Malherbe De Leon, has
been arrested in Mexico and is subject to extradition. The only Mexican
kingpin extradited to the U.S. was Juan Garcia Abrego, leader of the
Gulf Cartel, who was extradited in 1996.
The Mexican Attorney General's Prosecutor (PGR) reports 34.3 tons
of cocaine seized in 1997 and 17.2 tons cocaine seized through July
1998. While seizure numbers are slightly down from the previous year,
some of this decline in seizures can be attributed to poor weather and
the economic decline of Mexico during this last year.
In 1997 there were 7 major cartel members sentenced to a total of
161 years. Seven members of Arellano FELIX Cartel and eight members of
the Juarez Cartel were arrested or killed.
Question. As a portion of the overall drug control budget, spending
on interdiction and source country actions has declined precipitously
since the peak. In your opinion, is this because the domestic threat is
proportionally greater now than it was then?
Answer. The drug trafficker's proliferation of our borders and the
source and transit zones has increased proportionally. Since 1995, the
U.S. Customs overall budget and spending on interdiction activities has
been relatively flatlined. The Customs aviation program's strength was
reduced and a significant number of our interdiction aircraft was
placed in storage. Also, the Customs marine program was reduced.
Through the most recent efforts of Congress via an emergency
supplemental, the United States Customs Air Interdiction Program was
appropriated an additional $162.7 million in operations and maintenance
for source and transit zone initiatives. In addition, $7 million was
appropriated for a new P-3 hangar facility to accommodate additional P-
3 aircraft. However, an additional $16.3 million appropriated for
additional air interdiction staff has been restricted through
apportionment to overtime costs only. The aforementioned appropriation
will enhance the overall effectiveness of the drug control strategy.
The United States Customs Service deeply appreciates Congressional
support of its programs.
Question. Interdiction funding has been flat since 1992. If more
interdiction resources were to be made available, do you think they
could make a substantial difference? Or is the US interdiction effort
at the saturation point, where additional resources would do more to
complicate existing efforts that provide any benefit?
Answer. As demonstrated in the 1980's, a significant increase in
interdiction resources would make a substantial difference in
decreasing the flow of drugs into the United States. Due to the
tremendous appetite the American people have for illegal drugs, an
increase in supply reduction resources is necessary to attack this
problem with a balanced approach, which includes demand and supply
reduction. This increase in supply reduction resources would make it
more difficult for traffickers to deliver their contraband and
significantly decrease the drug trafficker's profit margin. This result
along with demand reduction should bring a significant decrease in drug
use in the United States.
Question. Over the past few years, Congress and Customs have worked
hard to increase Customs presence and enforcement capability along the
Southwest border. Some of these resources have come from other areas of
the country. Do you believe Customs current resources along the SW
border are adequate? Overstaffed? Should some of these resources be
shifted back to locations such as Miami or New York, where they were
taken from?
______
Questions Submitted to William Brownfield
Question. What do you consider the most cost-effective use of the
anti-drug dollar: domestic demand-reduction activities or international
programs to suppress or interdict supply? Isn't it much more difficult
to interdict small amounts of drugs throughout the vast areas in which
they are transited or sold than it is to suppress its production and
interdict it in the relatively smaller areas where they are produced?
Answer. In order to deal effectively with the problems of drug
abuse and narcotrafficking we must use all of the tools at our
disposal: demand reduction, domestic law enforcement, international
programs, and interdiction. Only by maintaining a sustained effort on
all fronts will we make progress; each aspect of this assault on
narcotrafficking complements the others. Ultimately, however, the most
effective way to reduce permanently the availability of drugs derived
from illicitly grown narcotics-producing crops is to eliminate the
crop. Drug-producing crops tend to be more concentrated and detectable
than other narcotics trafficking targets, making them more vulnerable
to a range of suppression programs. INL therefore believes that the
source country strategy now being implemented is a cost-effective use
of counternarcotics dollars.
Question. U.S. troops cannot remain in Panama beyond 1999 unless an
agreement is reached with Panama to let them stay: efforts to negotiate
an agreement have foundered. What back-up plans has the Administration
developed to substitute for Howard Air Force base in Panama as a
platform for U.S. anti-drug activities in the region? Will these
alternatives be more costly than operating from Panama or will these
alternatives impact on the effectiveness of anti-drug operations? For
example, aren't cost and effectiveness adversely affected if we have to
build a new facility or if we have to use a site further away from the
operating area, which is principally in the Andean region?
Answer. The Department of State and the Department of Defense are
working together in a search for forward operating locations (FOLs) to
provide counternarcotics support in Latin America. As part of our
search for forward operating locations, we have been in contact with
several strategically located governments in the region which may be
interested in hosting these facilities. Obviously, there are
sensitivities in the region to hosting USG Military facilities.
It is my impression that the change from Howard Air Force Base will
impact both the cost and effectiveness of anti-drug operations. On the
issue of effectiveness, our goal is to establish an FOL structure that
will provide the most responsive support possible. The degree to which
effective support can be provided will depend on the location, or
combination of locations, of the FOLs and the local support services we
are able to obtain at each of them. On the question of cost I
respectfully refer you to the Department of Defense.
Question. In what ways could the U.S. military be more effective in
its smuggling detection and monitoring role? Is the Defense Department
adequately committed to carrying out this role as a priority mission?
Answer. We believe that the Department of Defense is committed to
supporting USG counternarcotics efforts through its detection and
monitoring role. According to DOD, approximately 88% of suspect aerial
traffic comes under DOD detection and monitoring scrutiny. The
equivalent figure for maritime tracking events is 33%. Given the vast
area that must be covered, only continued improvement in USG and host
country intelligence programs will allow DOD assets to be positioned
more accurately.
Question. What specific plans does the Administration have for
controlling the illicit flights carrying drugs from producing zones in
Colombia to the northern coast (which is the staging area for transit
to the United States)?
Answer. The Administration is working to address this problem in
several ways. First, the Government of Colombia is successfully
instituting a civil airplane registration program, with fraud resistant
stickers which must be applied to all aircraft within Colombia. The
program will make it easier to identify drug planes, confiscate them
and arrest their owners. Building on the success of this ongoing
program, we hope to institute a program to install electronic beacons
on all civil aircraft to provide a further means of identifying and
tracking illicit traffic.
Successful interdiction of drug flights depends heavily on
intelligence to tip the authorities to impending drug flights. State
and DEA are working to improve the technical intelligence gathering
ability of the Colombian National Police by providing additional
equipment and training.
Once drug flights have been identified, end game capability is
required. DoD has the responsibility within the USG for providing
detection and monitoring assets to assist the Colombians in this task.
We are also working with the Colombian Air Force to develop the
capability to safely interdict drug flights. We are providing night
vision goggles and training in their use, and are working to improve an
airfield in southern Colombia for interceptor use. Future plans include
expansion to another base in eastern Colombia to address the problem of
traffic diverting through Brazil to avoid the successful Peruvian
aerial interdiction program.
Question. The Brazilian government recently has made an
extraordinary commitment to fighting drugs. What specific assistance
are we prepared to provide to assist Brazil in these efforts?
Answer. The Government of Brazil's (GOB) willingness to cooperate
with the U.S. in the areas of counternarcotics (CN) and law enforcement
has increased significantly in the past year. Given the nature of the
threats to U.S. counternarcotics and law enforcement interests, our
main objectives with the GOB are to:
(1) help the Brazilian authorities gain control of the Amazon
region by denying drug traffickers in the air and on the water;
(2) assist the GOB to bring order to the Brazil, Argentina,
Paraguay ``tri-border'' area by asserting control over their
borders and thwarting the efforts of smugglers, money
launderers, and other criminal elements; and
(3) encourage the GOB to assume a leadership role in the
region in the areas of counternarcotics and law enforcement by
dismantling international drug trafficking organizations.
Specifically:
--In August, we offered to receive a team of Brazilians to
examine border control procedures along the U.S.-Mexico and
U.S.-Canada borders. We also proposed bilateral meetings on an
annual basis to plan and evaluate our cooperative efforts
regarding counternarcotics and law enforcement.
--On September 25, we signed a bilateral agreement to provide
$1,562,000 for support of a vetted counternarcotics federal
police unit; and a combination of counternarcotics/law
enforcement assistance which includes federal police
enforcement projects, Administration of Justice/judicial task-
force, money laundering, and arms trafficking control training,
organizational operations that provide public information, and
other drug education, treatment and demand reduction programs.
--In FY 98, we designated $2 million in 506(a) drawdown
authority for provision of patrol boats, equipment and
communications gear to assist the Brazilian Coast Guard and
federal police counternarcotics division for interdiction and
law enforcement purposes.
--In FY 98, we provided $150,000 in criminal justice training
programs through the Department of Justice.
Question. What plans does the Administration have for the
replacement of anti-drug facilities in the Guaviare region in the coca-
producing zone of Colombia?
Answer. We fully support the expressed desire of the Colombian
National Police to reestablish a permanent base in or near Miraflores,
a major narcotics trafficking center. We have money identified in our
FY98 budget for construction projects and for security improvements,
which can be drawn upon to help share the costs of building a new, more
secure base. We will have an identical line item in our FY99 budget,
once approved. We are currently engaged in discussions with the CNP as
to where exactly this base should be and what it will look like.
Question. Interdiction funding has been flat since 1992. If more
interdiction resources were to be made available, do you think they
could make a substantial difference? Or is the US interdiction effort
at the saturation point, where additional resources would do more to
complicate existing efforts than provide any benefit?
Answer. Although State/INL does not conduct interdiction
activities, our programs complement those of the interdiction agencies.
For example, INL programs, including those that train judicial and law
enforcement personnel in the Western Hemisphere source and transit
countries, prevented approximately 125 metric tons of cocaine from
entering the U.S. in 1997. In addition, INL's support of eradication
efforts in Peru and Bolivia led to a net reduction of 27,900 hectares
of coca under cultivation.
International drug and crime control efforts, including
interdiction, can always use additional funds. Additional funding,
however, must be provided within the context of our ability to sustain
operations and consistent with our overall strategy. That strategy
emphasizes elimination of narcotics production at the source. In the
coming year INL will expand eradication programs in Latin America where
overall coca cultivation is clearly on the decline. We will also
continue to upgrade our aviation assets, and we will allocate more
money towards international organizations and Asian programs to
confront the worsening opium and heroin problems originating in Burma
and Afghanistan.
Question. There is a continual debate about the volume and kind of
support we provide Colombia to aid their actions in their fight against
narcotics traffickers. What do you feel would be the one most important
item we could provide the Colombians that would make the biggest
difference?
Answer. Our support to the Government of Colombia in the fight
against narcotics traffickers is a comprehensive package. It involves
aerial eradication, interdiction, judicial reform, and training. We
work through an interagency process that involves ONDCP, DEA, DOJ, CIA,
DOD, Treasury, and the Coast Guard. This allows us to bring together
the best minds in the Federal Government to produce solutions to the
narcotics problems in Colombia.
We believe our combined interagency efforts are working to provide
the Government of Colombia with the best comprehensive counternarcotics
package within our fiscal resources. We do not believe there is one
single, big-ticket item, which will have a major impact in Colombia.
This impact is achieved through consistent and aggressive application
of solid programs. The emphasis should be, and is, to fund training and
operations, not acquisitions.
Question. The State Department--and INL in particular--has received
a lot of criticism in the past about the speed in which equipment that
has been authorized and purchased is delivered to the host country. Are
there any recommendations that you would make to Congress to speed up
or smooth out the current process.
Answer. The problems INL has from time to time encountered in
delivering equipment and materiel to host nations have resulted from a
number of circumstances outside INL's control. Delivery of mini-guns
for helicopters has been delayed because the required items have not
been available from DOD stocks. The return to service of CNP UH-1H
aircraft grounded because of engine vibration problems has been delayed
because INL is only one of many customers in need of limited production
replacement parts. Deployments of C-26 aircraft have been delayed by
slow host nation responses to INL bilateral agreements and
legislatively required Section 505 agreements. The resolution of legal
and funding issues raised by the Department of Justice delayed delivery
of a seized DC-3 to Colombia. The nature and condition of drawdown and
surplus equipment complicates its delivery. INL has not encountered
similar problems when the need has been simply to procure and ship
required equipment.
______
Questions Submitted to Dr. Barry Crane
Question. What do you consider the most cost-effective use of the
anti-drug dollar: domestic demand reduction activities or international
programs to suppress or interdict supply?
Answer. Within the uncertainties uncovered by our analyses \1\ and
the general results of previous demand analyses, I believe that supply
and demand programs have about the same theoretical cost effectiveness,
if executed effectively. Actual cost effectiveness, however, depends
upon the results of specific and well-understood operations.
Fortunately for interdiction, the types of successful operations are
reasonably well understood, equipment can be specified in detail, and
proven empirical performance measures can be compared to past data. In
1997, our most important theater-wide operation failed because only
half of the resources were available to execute the interdiction plan
against all critical axes simultaneously--such resources had been
available 5 years ago, but the intelligence and successful operational
concepts were not.
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\1\ ``An Empirical Examination of Counterdrug Interdiction Program
Effectiveness,'' Jan 1997, IDA.
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Anti-drug dollars should not be placed into the general demand or
supply areas, without specifying proven programs to reduce use that are
independently measurable. Since interdiction resources were
substantially reduced in 1993 and the balance of the effort was shifted
away from interdiction programs, the number of new users in all drugs
has grown dramatically. With rapidly increasing incidence, prevention
measures and reduction of supply are most likely to reduce incidence.
Serious researchers can clearly demonstrate empirically that many types
of interdiction operations substantially reduce use.
We should spend the anti-drug dollar on programs that work to
reduce incidence and use measurable criteria to evaluate results. Clear
empirical evidence from past interdiction operations in Peru indicated
that severely curtailed international base transportation flights
caused large reductions in use. Attacks on the larger cocaine
production laboratories have also caused significant, but shorter term,
reductions in use. Interdicting a modest number of illegal coca
transportation flights within Colombia can cause a very large reduction
in cocaine use (more than 50 percent). Reasonable resources are
necessary to accomplish this: approximately three bases within Colombia
spread out in three critical locations; a half dozen operational
trackers that are forward deployed; and about 18 interceptors to
intercept, inspect, and force down illegal flights. Fewer than 20-30
percent of these illegal flights need to be detected and only 2-5
percent need to be forced down. Our early research about operations in
Peru predicted that interdiction of the base supply leaving Peru would
yield a large US price increase and an approximate 25 percent reduction
of use. With US assistance these operations were actually conducted by
the Peruvian AF in 1995 and the predicted price rises and reductions in
use occurred. Careful analyses using past lessons in Peru show that
interdiction forces are too small by at least a factor of two--even if
the interdiction operations are ideal.
Question. Isn't it much more difficult to interdict small amounts
of drugs throughout the vast areas in which they are transited or sold
than it is to suppress its production and interdict it in the
relatively smaller areas where they are produced?
Answer. It is more difficult to intercept many drug loads in kilo
or metric ton sizes than to disrupt large fractions of the cocaine
production or transportation systems. Interdiction of the cocaine air
transportation systems or production laboratories has been observed to
cause large increases in price and reductions in usage and purity. Coca
raw products come from small growing areas, are heavily dependent on
air transportation, and need efficient production laboratories. A
substantial percentage \2\ of disruption from attacks on major
production laboratories and transportation nodes of the cocaine
industry is passed up to the domestic market as large price/purity
changes and subsequent reduction in usage. Operations against Colombian
production laboratories in the last 15 years have demonstrated
increased prices and reduce use, but the most dramatic successes come
from interdiction of coca raw material coming out of Peru. Only the
sustained air interdiction of coca base out of Peru has caused
sustained reductions in purity and use (estimated from the SmithKline
Beecham Clinical Laboratory reductions in positive test results). While
large reductions in use are possible from severe disruptions of coca
growing and production complexes, I am mindful that US law enforcement
agencies seize about a third of the total finished cocaine. To continue
to be effective, no letup in our current domestic and transit zone
activities can be accepted. When the source zone is put under severe
pressure, the traffickers must take more risks, which will likely
increase their losses relative to today's results.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ ``An Empirical Examination of Counterdrug Interdiction Program
Effectiveness,'' Jan 1997. We showed that large disruptions of coca
base were well correlated to substantial domestic price increases and
inferred at least a 25 percent drop in positive testing rates from
corporate casual users.
Question. According to the Office of National Drug control Policy
figures, in 1987, 29 percent of the national drug control budget was
allocated to demand reduction, 38 percent for law enforcement, and 33
percent for international interdiction. By 1997, those priorities
shifted so that 34 percent is for demand reduction, 53 percent for
domestic law enforcement, and 13 percent for international programs and
interdiction. In short, pro grams to suppress or interdict drug supply
went from 33 percent of the overall budget to only 13 percent. In light
of recent data that show an increase in drug use incidents since 1992-
93, do you think it is logical for us restore the balance in our
strategy to greater emphasis on fighting drugs before they reach our
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shores?
Answer. Restoring balance is important, but concrete programs
executed effectively are what are needed. Our research is at a stage
where interdiction forces can specify the numbers, technical
capabilities, and locations of forces to execute specific operations.
These programs are based upon past proven effective programs against
trafficker production and transportation axes from the last 15 years.
Because an imbalance of resources has occurred, many interdiction
opportunities \3\ have had to be sacrificed for lack of resources. In
1990, there were sufficient resources to engage simultaneously the four
major transportation axes to the US on both the surface and in the air.
Today, there are hardly sufficient forces to engage two of four
critical axes in the Caribbean and even fewer axes in Colombia. Today
our intelligence is better and the interdiction commanders know just
what kinds of operations are necessary to achieve success.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The first theater-wide integrated operation of all Joint
Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) in 1997 was begun by successful
production lab attacks in Colombia, shield around Puerto Rico by
Operation Gateway, and Frontier Shield in the Eastern Caribbean. But,
no forces were available to execute Caper Focus in the Eastern Pacific
and Carib Shield in the Western Caribbean. The sad result of this
shortfall in forces allowed the traffickers to adapt and build
formidable transportation axes in the Central and Western Caribbean,
relying on many go fast boats, as well as in the Eastern Pacific.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Trafficker avoidance tactics must be overcome to successfully
suppress the cocaine industry. There are insufficient surveillance
capabilities in Colombia because current capabilities provide no more
than 8 of 24 hours of coverage per day and the traffickers easily avoid
detection as much as 90 percent of the time. There are insufficient
tracker, endgame resource, and forward bases in desirable locations. It
is hard to envision a successful source zone strategy without the
minimal forces necessary to control trafficker flights within Colombia.
These forces, when provided in Peru, devastated trafficker
transportation of base, forced abandonment of about 50 percent of the
illegal fields in Peru (to date), and will eventually lead to the
removal of the illegal coca growing in Peru.
______
Questions Submitted to Henry L. Hinton, Jr.
Question. Explain the relationship, if any, between our anti-drug
programs over the last decades and the price of cocaine on the streets.
In light of the relationship that is well documented by experts--as
well as the relationship between price and use--is it fair to conclude
that supply reduction efforts are a relatively better investment of
anti-drug dollars?
Answer. According to the most recent DEA data, the price and
availability of cocaine has remain fairly stable since 1990. To our
knowledge there have been no comprehensive studies demonstrating a long
term correlation between supply reduction efforts and the price and use
of drugs in the United States. A number of studies have recently been
conducted, but they all have limitations primarily due to weak data. A
recent review by the Institute of Medicine concluded that additional
research is needed to resolve the relationship between price and
consumption of cocaine. In recognition of the limitations of earlier
studies, the National Academy of Sciences is currently studying
research on the cost-effectiveness of interdiction activities and plans
to issue a report in March 2000.
Question. U.S. troops cannot remain in Panama beyond 1999 unless an
agreement is reached with Panama to let them stay; efforts to negotiate
such an agreement have floundered. What current counter-drug assets
will have to be relocated because of the closure of Howard. To the best
of your knowledge, has there been any planning conducted on what to do
with these resources if the United States no longer has a base in
Panama?
Answer. According to U.S. Southern Command officials, all major
counterdrug activities operating out of Howard Air Base in Panama will
cease as of May 1, 1999 unless an agreement is reached with Panama to
stay. Prospects of such an agreement are currently low. Officials of
the Southern Command are currently reviewing the operational
consequences of the impending move from Howard, and are searching for
other possible forward operating locations. They indicated that moving
air assets will significantly impact on current air operations over
Colombia. The Southern Command has also recently announced that it
plans to combine JIATF-South and JIATF-East into one JIATF to be run
out of Key West.
Question. As a portion of the overall drug control budget, spending
on interdiction and source country actions have declined precipitously
since the peak. When examining all of the different reports that GAO
has done related to both drug trafficking patterns and the response to
this threat, has there been a change in threat or transit methods that
would justify this shift in resources?
Answer. As we have noted in our work over the past 10 years, drug
traffickers have demonstrated considerable adaptability in thwarting
U.S. and host country efforts to reduce the flow of cocaine and heroin
available in the United States. The level of resources devoted to
interdiction and source country efforts has not altered the price and
availability of drugs over time. However, drug experts generally agree
that supply reduction efforts have value because some illegal drugs are
destroyed and/or seized and the potential cost to drug traffickers
increases. Our work suggests that combatting illegal drugs requires a
balanced approach involving both demand and supply reduction efforts.
______
Questions Submitted to Admiral James M. Loy, USCG
cost-effective use of anti-drug dollar
Question. What do you consider the most cost-effective use of the
anti-drug dollar: domestic demand-reduction activities or international
programs to suppress or interdict supply? Isn't it much more difficult
to interdict small amounts of drugs throughout the vast areas in which
they are transited or sold than it is to suppress its production and
interdict it in the relatively smaller areas where they are produced?
Answer. The National Drug Control Strategy calls for a balanced
approach to reducing drug use in this country and its destructive
consequences. The Strategy focuses on reducing demand, through
treatment and prevention, and reducing the supply, through law
enforcement and interdiction efforts. The Coast Guard's drug
interdiction efforts are part of the overall effort to reduce the
supply of drugs in this country and complement demand reduction
efforts.
Clearly, attacking the supply of illegal drugs in the source zone
is a strategically sound concept and a critical part of the continuum
of activity, through the source, transit and arrival zones, required to
reduce the availability of drugs in this country. The effectiveness of
interdiction operations depends not only on the size of the load, but
other factors such as detection of the conveyance, route of movement,
and search difficulty. While interdiction in the source zone may seem
to provide the best opportunity for interdiction, interdiction in the
transit zone often occurs in international air and seas, allowing for
operations that are not constrained by issues of sovereignty, national
interests, or political and economic realities.
The Administration has placed special emphasis on demand reduction,
based on research showing that it is the most cost-effective strategy
for reducing drug use.
restoring balance to strategy funding
Question. According to ONDCP's own figures, in 1987, 29 percent of
the national drug control budget was allocated to demand reduction, 38
percent for law enforcement, and 33 percent for international and
interdiction. By 1997, those priorities shifted so that 34 percent is
for demand reduction, 53 percent for domestic law enforcement, and 13
percent for international programs and interdiction. In short, programs
to suppress or interdict drug supply went from 33 percent of the
overall budget to only 13 percent. In light of recent data that show an
increase in drug use incidents since 1992-93, do you think it is
logical for us to restore a balance in our strategy to put greater
emphasis on fighting drugs before they reach our shores?
Answer. It is imperative that we have a balanced National Drug
Control Strategy. Supply and demand reduction programs attack distinct
aspects of the drug problem and are mutually supportive. However, the
balance among drug control strategies is not measured by their relative
shares of the drug control budget.
The Coast Guard's counterdrug strategy, Campaign STEEL WEB, calls
for successive surge operations in high threat trafficking regions of
the transit zone, each followed by a long term maintenance level of
operations intended to prevent a resurgence of drug activity. The
largest such operation to date, FRONTIER SHIELD, yielded a large
increase in drug seizures around Puerto Rico.
It should not be overlooked that since 1985, past-month use of
illicit drugs has dropped by 43 percent. Since 1988, the number of
casual cocaine users has been reduced by half. These results speak well
of the Federal drug control program.
increasing detection and monitoring effectiveness
Question. In what ways could the U.S. Coast Guard be more effective
in its smuggling detection and monitoring role? What additional
resources would assist the Coast Guard in carrying out this mission?
Answer. The Department of Defense is the lead agency for the
detection and monitoring. The Coast Guard is the lead agency for
maritime interdiction and the co-lead for air interdiction. Coordinated
interagency and international operations, increased intelligence
collection and support, focused pulse operations in high threat
trafficking areas and increased sensor/communication capability on
current Coast Guard assets are all factors in improving interdiction
effectiveness.
The 1999 President's Budget was designed to maintain the Coast
Guard's special interdiction operations in the Caribbean and along the
Southwest Border, as well as to leverage technology to improve
interdiction efficiency.
plans for go-fast boat interdiction
Question. What specific plans do you have to address the go-fast
boats that smuggle drugs and evade capture through the shallow waters
in the Bahamas?
Answer. As part of the surface endgame system, the Coast Guard is
using current resources to explore the use of non-lethal force from
aircraft to stop go-fast boats and the use of fast pursuit boats to
intercept the go-fasts. The Coast Guard is also using improved sensors
to classify and track suspect go-fast boats and leveraging improved
intelligence to better cue interdiction forces.
impact of additional interdiction resources
Question. Interdiction funding has been flat since 1992. If more
interdiction resources were to be made available, do you think they
could make a substantial difference? Or is the U.S. interdiction effort
at the saturation point, where additional resources would do more to
complicate existing efforts that provide any benefit?
Answer. The Coast Guard's STEEL WEB campaign has been designed to
address the requirements of the National Drug Control Strategy. In
particular, the Coast Guard has developed five-year planning
requirements in support of targets identified in the Performance
Measures of Effectiveness. Operation FRONTIER SHIELD seems to have
reduced the observed noncommercial maritime smuggling activity around
Puerto Rico.
In the long term, successes in interdiction support the goals of
the National Drug Control Strategy and can increase the risk to drug
traffickers, their cargoes and resources, forcing them to adopt new and
more costly transportation modes and routes.
______
Questions Submitted to Donnie R. Marshall
drug interdiction efforts
Question. What would you consider the most cost-effective use of
the anti-drug dollar: domestic demand-reduction activities or
international programs to suppress or interdict supply? Isn't it much
more difficult to interdict small amounts of drugs throughout the vast
areas in which they are transited or sold than it is to suppress its
production and interdict it in the relatively smaller areas where they
are produced?
Answer. We defer a substantive reply on this question to other
agencies, since DEA does not set multi-agency priorities within the
administration.
DEA's primary mission is to target the highest levels of the
international drug trafficking organizations operating today. Moreover,
interdiction, in its narrow sense,--physically stopping drugs moving
through the transit zone, across international borders, and into the
United States--is more properly the responsibility of other agencies.
It is through targeting the command and control elements of
international drug syndicates that DEA makes its major contribution to
the overall interdiction effort. Moreover, DEA makes significant
contributions to drug interdiction with its law enforcement efforts
within the United States.
My prepared testimony was, therefore, limited to an objective
assessment of the law enforcement issues involving organized crime and
drug trafficking problems. It would not be appropriate, therefore, for
me to comment on the relative merits of demand reduction as opposed to
interdiction. It would seem that the issue should be properly framed in
terms of how cost effective is each dollar spent in either area, not in
terms of a trade off between international and domestic efforts.
Question. According to ONDCP's own figures, in 1987, 29 percent of
the national drug control budget was allocated to demand reduction, and
38 percent for law enforcement, and 33 percent for international
interdiction. By 1997, those priorities shifted so that 34 percent is
for demand reduction, 53 percent for domestic law enforcement, and 13
percept for international programs and interdiction. In short, programs
to suppress or interdict drug supply went from 33 percent of the
overall budget to only 13 percent. In light of recent data that show an
increase in drug use incidents since 1992-93, do you think it is
logical for us to restore a balance in our strategy to put a greater
emphasis on fighting drugs before they reach our shores?
Answer. We would defer any discussion of ONDCP figures to ONDCP.
The Drug Enforcement Administration is not responsible for setting the
relative priorities within the counter drug effort, as this is both an
interdepartmental issue addressed by the Administration as a whole, and
an issue much broader than law enforcement. Likewise, it would not be
helpful for the DEA to comment on whether certain balances in resources
would be logical or not.
Question. Explain the relationship, if any, between our antidrug
programs over the last decades and the price of cocaine on the streets.
In light of the relationship that is well-documented by experts--as
well as the relationship between price and use--aren't supply reduction
efforts a relatively better investment of anti-drug dollars?
Answer. DEA believes that the price of illegal drugs does not
generally respond to the usual economic laws of supply and demand. The
prices of drugs are what they are because the traffickers set them that
way. Factors such as relationship of the buyer to the organization,
whether the purchase is one time only or part of a large series,
location within the country, or efforts by the organization to move
into new territories with aggressive marketing all have an effect on
the price of drugs. Interdiction operation may have an effect on the
availability of quality of drugs in a given region for a short time,
but there is no evidence of a consistent trend increasing in price
which can be attributed to interdiction operations. The DEA cannot,
therefore, support the contention that there is a clear relationship
between interdiction and the price or availability of drugs. We would
not, therefore, want to comment on the relative efficiencies of
interdiction as opposed to law enforcement or demand reduction efforts.
We would defer comment to ONDCP.
Question. In what ways could the U.S. military be more effective in
its smuggling detection and monitoring role? Is the Defense Department
adequately committed to carrying out this role as a priority mission?
Answer. DEA does not participate directly in drug interdiction,
and, as such, is not in a position to benefit directly from the U.S.
military's detection and monitoring efforts which support interdiction
forces. Nor are we in a position to evaluate the effectiveness of these
efforts. Other agencies, which rely of military information to carry
out their interdiction operations, may be in a better position to
comment. DEA would certainly not want to comment, one way or another,
on the level of commitment or priorities of another agency in the war
on drugs.
Question. What specific plans do you have to address the go-fast
boats that smuggle drugs and evade capture through the shallow waters
of the Bahamas?
Answer. As mentioned earlier DEA's role in interdiction is limited
to developing actionable intelligence and through cooperative inter-
agency command and control investigative efforts, provide this
information to those agencies directly involved in interdiction.
Through this type of interagency cooperation and exchange of
intelligence DEA would agree that the Bahamas remains a central conduit
for both air and maritime shipments of drugs moving through the Western
and Central Caribbean to the Southeastern United States. Transportation
groups located in the Bahamas utilize a variety of methods to move
cocaine from the islands to the United States. Colombian traffickers
airdrop shipments of cocaine off the coast of Jamaica, or utilize boat
to boat transfers on open seas. Jamaican and Bahamian transportation
groups then use Jamaican canoes to smuggle their payloads into the
Bahamas, frequently using the territorial waters of Cuba to shield
their movements. The cocaine is then transferred to pleasure craft
which disappear into the inter-island boat traffic, or to go-fast boats
able to evade interdiction forces.
Trafficking groups use ``go-fast'' boats, fishing vessels and
pleasure craft to enhance their transportation capabilities. The speed
of the ``go-fast'' boats greatly assists the traffickers in evading law
enforcement. The other vessel types are less attractive due to slow
speed, although they do have the advantage of easily concealing
themselves among the other legitimate vessel traffic in the region.
Traffickers also use twin-engine turbo-prop aircraft, with long
range capability and Global Positioning Systems, which pinpoint drop
zones in mid ocean. Cellular telephones are used to minimize their
exposure to interdiction assets and ensure the smooth transfer of their
cargo of cocaine for shipment into the United States.
To counter the drug threat in the Northern Caribbean, the United
States Government initiated Operation Bahamas and Turks and Caicos
(OPBAT) in 1982. This joint interdiction operation comprised of
Bahamian and Turks and Caicos law enforcement, DEA, U.S. Customs
Service, U.S. Coast Guard and Department of Defense personnel is
headquartered in Nassau, Bahamas. DEA is responsible for liaison with
other participating agencies and governments. The 24-hour operations
center is manned by U.S. Coast Guard Personnel. OPBAT has had enormous
success over the years, seizing thousands of kilograms of cocaine and
literally driving transportation groups out of business in the Northern
Caribbean.
OPBAT has been successful, even considering the host country lack
of capability to perform successful interdiction operations. Air
interdiction, primarily with helicopters operating out of the U.S.
Coast Guard Station in Clearwater and from Fort Stewart, Georgia, is
becoming insufficient without adequate surface interdiction capability.
Countering the threat from go-fast boats is a primary focus of an
ongoing effort to keep apace of trafficking in the region.
In order to effectively counter drug trafficking, law enforcement
and interdiction forces should have resources comparable to the
resource available to traffickers. Making ``go fast'' boats available
to OPBAT, to be operated by either the U.S. Coast Guard or by the
Bahamians, would be a monumental enhancement to interdiction. DEA would
not be involved in the operation of these vessels, because, as
previously stated, we lack either the mission or the capability for
maritime interdiction.
Question. Some experts say the best way to disrupt the production
and supply of drugs is to raise the risk that traffickers run. Isn't it
logical that our best hope of raising those risks is by focusing our
limited resources in the relatively smaller target area in the reducing
zones rather than the huge transit zone or on every American street
corner?
Answer. DEA does not set the relative priorities in the multi-
agency counter drug effort. Nor are we in a position to comment on the
relative merits of different resource allocations. We would defer to
ONDCP for a direct answer to this question.
From the perspective of drug law enforcement, however, DEA views
drug trafficking as a seamless continuum. The domestic and
international aspects of the trafficking organization are inextricably
woven together. Therefore, DEA believes that the United States must be
able to attack the command and control functions of the international
syndicates on all fronts which are directing the flow of drugs into
this country. Focusing the attention of law enforcement on the
criminals who direct these organizations is the key to combating
international drug trafficking. DEA directs its resources against the
leaders of these criminal organizations, seeking to have them located,
arrested, prosecuted, and given sentences commensurate with the heinous
nature of their crimes.
Question. The United States has provided extraordinary resources
(helicopters, technical assistance, etc.) to support Mexico's anti-drug
efforts. In addition, extraordinary Customs and Border Patrol resources
have been deployed on the U.S.-Mexican border in the last several
years. What results do we have to show for this investment? Are cocaine
seizures up or down in the last 12 months, and by how much? Have any
Mexican kingpins been prosecuted and sentenced for drug crimes? Have
any drug criminals been extradited to the United States?
Answer. The Drug Enforcement Administration is not in a position to
comment on the results of Border Patrol and Customs Service efforts. As
to seizures, we can report that the Center for Drug Control Planning
(CENDRO) of the Mexican Attorney General's Office (PGR) has provided
seizure and eradication statistics for calendar year 1998.
According to these figures, when compared to CY-97, seizures for
the first seven months of CY-98 were down for cocaine by 42%, opium gum
by 47%, and marijuana by 14%, but up for heroin by 30%.
Unfortunately the Government of Mexico has made very little
progress in the apprehension of known syndicate leaders who dominate
the drug trade in Mexico and control a substantial share of the
wholesale cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine markets in the United
States. During the last twelve months, there has been no significant
progress by the Government of Mexico in developing investigations which
would lead to the prosecution and incarceration of any leaders of the
Mexican drug cartels. In January 1998, the Government of Mexico
indicted sixty-five persons associated with the notorious Amado
Carrillo-Fuentes organization, under the new Organized Crime Bill. To
date only seventeen (17) lower-echelon associates have been arrested in
Mexico. Mexican authorities have been unable to locate and apprehend
any of the principal associates named in this indictment. In June 1998,
the Government of Mexico arrested the leaders of an important
methamphetamine trafficking organization, Jesus and Luis Amezcua-
Contreras. However, all charges against these defendants were soon
dropped by a Mexican judge. The Amezcua-Contreras remain incarcerated
only because of a Provisional Arrest Warrant issued at the request of
the U.S.
During the last twelve months, the Government of Mexico has
returned three (3) U.S. citizens on drug trafficking charges. However,
there have been no extraditions to date of Mexican nationals from
Mexico to the U.S. pursuant to provisional arrest requests for drug-
related charges.
Question. As a portion of the overall drug control budget, spending
on interdiction and source country actions have declined precipitously
since the peak. In your opinion, is this because the domestic threat is
proportionally greater now than it was then?
Answer. DEA does not set the levels of resources within the overall
drug control budget, and, therefore, cannot speak to why the portion
spend on interdiction has declined. We would defer such an answer to
ONDCP.
From DEA's perspective, as mentioned earlier, we view drug
trafficking is a seamless continuum. The domestic and international
aspects of drug the trafficking organizations, which are our primary
target, are inextricably woven together. We address the threat from
these organizations by coordinating our domestic and foreign operations
into a unified effort. Domestic and foreign efforts are not mutually
exclusive.
The highest levels of the international drug syndicates are
directly connected to the street level dealers in American
neighborhoods. The borders of the United States are essentially
invisible to these syndicates, allowing them to penetrate into the
heart of the country and undermine our way of life. Our law enforcement
efforts must be up to the challenge posed by the syndicates. We must be
able to attack the command and control functions of the international
syndicates which are directing the organized drug trafficking
activities in this country.
We confront the seamless continuum of international drug
trafficking with a seamless continuum of law enforcement. By attacking
the drug trafficking organizations' command and control function, DEA
is able to arrest the leadership of these organized crime groups in the
U.S., including the surrogates who act as their wholesale outlets, and
will be able file provisional warrants for the arrest of the
organizations leadership hiding in foreign countries. With this
strategy of mounting strategic strikes on command and control, DEA will
be able to degrade the ability of the organizations to conduct business
and impede their ability to import drugs into the United States.
Question. Interdiction has been flat since 1992. If more
interdiction resources were made available, do you think they would
make a substantial difference? Or is the U.S. interdiction effort at
the saturation point, where additional resources would do more to
complicate existing efforts than provide any benefit?
Answer. Since DEA does not have an interdiction mission, as
strictly defined, we are not in a position to answer this question
directly. We would defer to the agencies that do have an interdiction
mission We can tell you how we would employ such additional resources
as those earmarked for DEA in the Western Hemisphere Bill.
MERLIN--$8,272,000 in special program funding
Installation of the MERLIN classified computer infrastructure
throughout DEA offices in the source and transit countries is
the single most important enhancement that can be made to
enable the flow of critical intelligence to and from these
regions and the United States.
Present funding limits expansion of this critical system to
only the DEA Mexico City Office. To date, DEA has invested a
total of $1,000,000 in MERLIN expansion to overseas locations.
The $8,272,000 would cover accelerated installation of MERLIN
into 10 source and transit country offices.
Narcotics Enforcement Data Retrieval System (NEDRS)--
$2,400,000 in special program funding
The purpose of this computer-based data mining software is to
search substantive data information systems automatically in
order to retrieve certain data elements, such as key names,
words, specific locations, geographic names, phrases, etc.,
associated with telephone numbers and drug trafficking events.
Initially, NEDRS will continually search GESCAN message traffic
for telephone numbers and associate the telephone numbers to
specific cables. Once a positive link has been identified, it
will determine if the telephone numbers have been cited in
previous case reports, and if so, which ones. NEDRS will
develop into a more sophisticated program by adding word/phrase
searches until it evolves a capability to search for event-
driven and location related scenarios. A total of $350,000 has
thus far been dedicated to this project. DEA would use the
additional $2,400,000 for continued project development.
Special Agent and Investigative Support Personnel--169
positions (110 Special Agents) and $40,213,000, including
$2,000,000 in special program funding
This funding would support 100 additional Special Agent
positions, 9 Intelligence Research positions, 7 Diversion
Investigator positions 2 Chemists and 41 support positions DEA
international offices. The Special Agent positions would be
allocated as follows:
Allocation of DEA Special Agent Positions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Location Number of Positions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mexico.................................... 25
Colombia.................................. 10
Bolivia................................... 7
Peru...................................... 2
Brazil.................................... 5
Argentina................................. 3
Chile..................................... 1
Paraguay.................................. 2
Venezuela................................. 3
Belize.................................... 1
Panama.................................... 1
El Salvador............................... 1
Nicaragua................................. 1
Haiti..................................... 1
Dominican Republic........................ 3
Domestic Posts in Support of International 33
Programs.................................
-----------------------------
Total................................. 100
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 33 positions requested for domestic posts of duty will be
assigned to those cities (other than the big 5 of New York, Los
Angeles, Miami, Houston and Chicago) that have been identified
by our Special Operations Division as being utilized by the
major crime syndicates from Mexico and Colombia as bases for
their command and control operations or as regional warehousing
and distribution points.
The seven diversion investigators will be deployed in the
following countries to address the flow of precursor chemicals
to Mexico and the source countries in South America: Peru;
Peoples Republic of China; Vienna, Austria; San Jose, Costa
Rica; Panama; Mexico and Guatemala. These positions will play a
critical role addressing the methamphetamine problem affecting
our nation.
Our operations throughout the source and transit zones are
anchored in our overall strategy of building cases against the
organized criminal groups that control the flow of heroin,
cocaine and methamphetamine to the United States. For example,
the 10 additional agents for the Bogota Country Office will be
tasked specifically with working with the Colombian National
Police (CNP) to fully identify and build cases on the new
groups who have replaced the Cali Syndicate in controlling
cocaine production in Colombia and the shipment of cocaine to
Mexico and the Caribbean. In Bolivia, the additional agent
personnel will be assigned to work with Bolivian police teams
to further exploit our wire intercept program and arrest major
Bolivian and Brazilian traffickers who are becoming
increasingly involved in the movement of both cocaine base and
HCL out of Bolivia and through Brazil. Brazil is a very active
conduit for cocaine base shipped from Bolivia to Colombia and
for cocaine HCL shipped to the Untied States and to Europe.
Wire Intercept Equipment--$4,500,000 in Special Funding
To augment our wire intercept programs in the source and
transit zones, $4,500,000 would be used for the purchase of
wire intercept equipment. The switch to digital communications
and the sophistication of traffickers in their efforts to
conceal their communications, as well as the expansion of our
intercept programs in all of the source countries, has
significantly increased our demand for this equipment. This
appropriation will also provide us with a limited, mobile
capability to address our demand for wire intercepts world
wide.
Technical and Aviation Equipment--$3,515,000 in Special
Program Funding
Over the course of the past year, there has been a
significant increase in the quantity of cocaine and heroin
transiting the Caribbean Basin. Many Colombian groups,
particularly those who have risen to power since the fall of
the Cali syndicate, have returned to traditional trafficking
routes in the Caribbean to move their product to market. DEA
has identified four major organizations based on the Northern
Coast of Colombia that have deployed command and control cells
in the Caribbean Basin to funnel tons of cocaine and heroin to
the U.S. each year. As these Colombian groups re-establish
their ties with their Caribbean confederates, increasingly
larger shipments of drugs, bound for the U.S., are transiting
the region. Seizures of 500 to 2,000 kilograms of cocaine are
now common in and around Puerto Rico and the Dominican
Republic.
In an effort to address this growing threat, DEA received a
significant enhancement for the Caribbean Basin in its FY 1998
appropriation, including 60 Special Agents and $34.2 million.
In FY 1999, the DEA is requesting an additional 42 Special
Agents and $5.6 million to target Caribbean based traffickers
operating in major cities along the East Coast of the United
States. Even with the positions and funding provided in last
year's appropriation and resources requested in FY 1999, there
is still a growing need for advanced technical and aviation
equipment for use in regional operations.
Current unfunded equipment requirements for the Caribbean,
which would be addressed by this bill, include:
Technical Equipment--$265,000
--$150,000 for 20 DoD-compatible portable radios (with water
resistant packages and program loaders) to provide Op BAT
personnel with communications capability with support aircraft
while on deployments to remote islands or aboard vessels.
--$65,000 for three rigid inflatable boats with motors to be
deployed from larger military vessels allowing quick response
and maneuverability during chase scenarios.
--$25,000 for three INMARSAT mini satellite telephones (one
marine model with stabilized antenna) for use while on remote
islands.
--$25,000 for six sets of night-vision goggles for use on
maneuvers.
Aviation Equipment--$3,250,000
--$2,000,000 for two WestCam with low light capabilities for
installation on existing aircraft to provide surveillance
support for operations in the Bahamas and Puerto Rico.
--$1,000,000 to upgrade Southeastern Airwing's communications
equipment to SATCOM.
--$250,000 to install floats on the two helicopters provided
in the 1998 budget for Puerto Rico.
Question. Over the past few years, Congress and Customs have worked
hard to increase Customs presence and enforcement capability along the
Southwest border. Some of these resources have come from other areas of
the country. Do you believe Customs current resources along the SW
border are adequate? Over staffed? Should some of these resources be
shifted back to locations such as Miami or New York, where they were
taken from?
Answer. DEA would not be in a position to comment on the adequacy
of U.S. Customs resources to their mission. While we believe that the
war on drugs cannot be fought entirely from a static defensive line
along an International Border, but rather must be fought from a
Hemispheric perspective, we would defer to the Customs Service for
comment on the relative effectiveness of Customs resources along the
border as opposed to other posts.
______
Questions Submitted to the Honorable Barry McCaffrey
Question. In light of recent data that show an increase in drug use
incidents since 1992-93, do you think it is logical for us to restore a
balance in our strategy to put greater emphasis on fighting drugs
before they reach our shores?
Answer. Just about every aspect of the nation's drug problem has
remained stable since 1992-93 with the exception of juvenile drug-use
rates, which have increased by 50 percent. Increasing cocaine and
heroin availability, however, is not the driving force behind the
increase in juvenile drug-use consumption rates. According to the
latest Monitoring the Future survey, just 0.6 percent of seventeen-
year-olds were using cocaine in 1997. Marijuana smoking accounts for
more than 90 percent of all juvenile drug use.
Question. Explain the relationship, if any, between our anti-drug
programs over the last decades and the price of cocaine on the streets.
In light of the relationship that is well-documented by experts--as
well as the relationship between price and use--aren't supply reduction
efforts a relatively better investment of anti-drug dollars?
Answer. The objective of the National Drug Control Strategy is to
reduce U.S. drug consumption through both demand-reduction and supply-
reduction. Supply-reduction efforts increase cocaine production costs
by raising the cost to traffickers by seizing drugs and assets and
incarcerating dealers and their agents. The increased production costs
raise retail cocaine prices and thus indirectly reduce consumption.
Demand-reduction programs reduce consumption directly without going
through the price mechanism.
Each of these approaches is included in the National Drug Control
Strategy because neither is the perfect answer; each approach has
specific constraints. Supply-reduction efforts are limited by our
dependence on foreign-government cooperation and the case with which
traffickers can shift operating methods and locations to avoid
effective law enforcement action. Demand-reduction efforts are limited
by locating the user, linking each user with a treatment program,
deterring new-users, and sustaining abstinence.
The National Drug Control Strategy focuses on demand-reduction
programs, because these more directly reduce consumption than supply-
reduction programs. Supply-reduction programs do produce local effects
such as cocaine shortages in Columbia due to the Andean air bridge
operation, but it appears that the distribution system as a whole,
compensates over time for these perturbations through shifts in
cultivation, production and smuggling patterns and depletion of
stockpiles to continue to meet the user's demand.
Effective supply reduction programs restrict availability and
ensure high prices for illegal, harmful drugs. Over the last decade,
supply reduction programs have kept prices high enough that the money
addicts pay for their drugs weighs more than the drugs themselves.
Restricted availability and high prices help hold down the number of
first-time users; prevent aggressive marketing of illegal drugs to the
most at-risk population by criminal drug organizations; and reduces the
human, social, and economic costs of drug abuse.
At the same time, experience has shown that powerful criminal
organizations with global reach can react rapidly to effective law
enforcement operations and quickly alter their operating locations and
methods to still meet market demand over the long term. Demand
reduction programs are critical to the long term reduction of drug
abuse and its consequences.
A number of studies have purported to establish the relative cost
effectiveness of various drug control programs. ONDCP believes that
none of these studies are definitive. A balanced strategy that includes
both supply and demand reduction programs is our best investment in
drug control for our communities.
Question. U.S. troops cannot remain in Panama beyond 1999 unless an
agreement is reached with Panama to let them stay; efforts to negotiate
such an agreement have foundered. What back-up plans has the
Administration developed to substitute for Howard Air Force Base in
Panama as a platform for U.S. anti-drug activities in the region? Will
these alternatives be more costly than operating from Panama or will
these alternatives impact on the effectiveness of anti-drug operations?
For example, aren't cost and effectiveness adversely affected if we
have to build a new facility or if we have to use a site further away
from the operating area, which is principally in the Andean region?
Answer. The Department of Defense (DoD) is working the post Panama
counterdrug issue. In coordination with the Department of State, DoD is
surveying forward operating locations (FOLs) as alternatives to Howard
Air Force Base in Panama (which could close as early as May 1999). No
single FOL can replace the ramp space, runway, and facilities available
at Howard AFB. The final operational and cost impacts on counterdrug
operations cannot be determined until specific FOLs are identified.
Additionally, there will be costs for relocating units currently based
in Panama and for merging Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South
with JIATF-East in Key West, Florida. The costs associated with
relocation of units and merging of the JIATFs cannot completely be
determined until all relocation plans are finalized. It is important to
the success of the National Drug Control Strategy that DoD and other
drug control agencies provide continued and uninterrupted support to
the counterdrug effort in the region.
Question. Some experts say that the best way to disrupt the
production and supply of drugs is to raise the risk that the
traffickers run. Isn't it logical that our best hope of raising those
risks is by focusing our limited resources in the relatively smaller
target area in the producing zones rather than the huge transit zone or
on every American street corner?
Answer. Yes. Indeed, this is the logic we lay out in the National
Drug Control Strategy. The theory that raising the risk traffickers run
will disrupt production and supply is being demonstrated by the U.S.-
coordinated air bridge denial campaign in South America. We have
succeeded in disrupting Peru's cocaine economy by raising risk and
transportation costs and depressing wholesale coca prices in Peru.
However, source country programs have limitations. First, political and
economic concerns often prohibit large scale interdiction or
eradication campaigns. Second, drugs seized and destroyed in source
countries are relatively inexpensive to replace; for this reason,
source zone seizures have less impact on U.S. street prices than
transit zone seizures. We must vigorously pursue traffickers at every
link in the drug cultivation-production-transportation chain. Our
collective efforts in the source, transit, and arrival zones, and
within the U.S. result in the seizure of more 250-300 metric tons of
cocaine each year.
Question. What specific plans does the Administration have for
controlling the illicit flights carrying drugs from producing zones in
Colombia to the northern coast (which is the staging area for transit
to the United States)?
Answer. DoD continues to work with the Colombian Air Force to
improve its air interdiction capabilities. The emergency supplemental
bill provides funding to upgrade Colombia's fleet of A-37s, the
aircraft used for air interdiction. Additionally, the U.S. government
is in the process of extending the runway at the Tres Esquinas Base in
southern Colombia to accommodate the A-37s, making it possible to base
the air interdiction assets closer to the problem areas and improve
operational capability.
DoD continues to operate two ground-based radars in Colombia and
plans to install a third in the Guaviare region in the near future.
Information from these radars is shared with the Colombians. The
relocatable-over-the-horizon radar (ROTHR) in Puerto Rico is scheduled
to come on line in 1999 and will provide enhanced detection and
monitoring capability of Colombian airspace. DoD and U.S. Customs also
provide detection and monitoring overflights in coordination with the
Colombian Air Force.
DEA and the Colombian National Police (CNP) continue to implement
and expand their successful aircraft control program which requires all
non-commercial aircraft to be inspected and registered every six
months. The CNP have already seized many trafficker aircraft using this
mechanism.
These initiatives, combined with the general effort to regain
Colombian government control over the coca-growing regions in southern
Colombia will negatively impact the traffickers' ability to move
cocaine by air within Colombia.
Question. What plans does the Administration have for the
replacement of anti-drug facilities in the Guaviare region in the coca-
producing zone of Colombia?
Answer. In the wake of the destruction of the anti-narcotics base
in Miraflores, Guaviare, the government of Colombia and the National
Police must now decide if they want to reconstruct that base, construct
a new base, or provide security upgrades to other existing bases in the
region. The U.S. government is sending security survey teams to
Colombia in November and December 1998 to help the Colombians plan what
they want to do. There is funding in the Fiscal Year 1998 INL budget to
support security upgrades in regional bases.
Question. The United States has provided extraordinary resources
(helicopters, technical assistance, etc.) to support Mexico's anti-drug
efforts. In addition, extraordinary Customs and Border Patrol resources
have been deployed on the U.S.-Mexican border in the last several
years. What results do we have to show for this investment?
Answer. Both the U.S. and Mexican governments have invested
considerable financial, material and personnel resources to combat drug
trafficking, production, and abuse. Although U.S. support constitutes
only a small percentage of the overall anti-drug effort there, it has
brought about significant positive results. The fight against drug
trafficking is not limited to prosecuting cartel leaders nor increasing
eradication and seizure statistics. This is a complex problem that
necessitates long-term solutions aimed at building sustainable
capacity. Institutional capacity building implies the remodeling of law
enforcement bodies, the legal system, the educational bodies, and the
kind of cooperation that enhances rather than inhibits political will.
The U.S. inter-agency is working with Mexico to build these
institutions, as well as improve communications and cooperation between
the two governments.
Various coordination mechanisms, including the Binational
Commission, the High Level Contact Group, and the Senior Law
Enforcement Plenary, as well as cooperation between Mexican and U.S.
law enforcement counterparts, have helped to further a working
relationship. This relationship has fostered cooperation in law
enforcement training, information exchange, legal issues of mutual
concern, chemical control, anti-money laundering, and asset forfeiture.
Aided by these relationships and ongoing consultations, the Mexican
government has enacted a forceful Organized Crime Law, Anti-Money
Laundering legislation, and asset forfeiture reform, as well as
established a chemical control regime.
Countemarcotics assistance to Mexico is also provided by the DoD
and is used mainly by Mexico to strengthen eradication capability. The
U.S. government has made a concerted effort to support Mexico's
eradication program through technical assistance programs. The 73
helicopters provided by DoD to Mexico were a significant part of this
effort. While the helicopter support package to the Mexican Secretariat
of National Defense (SDN) had the highest cost estimate associated with
U.S. counter-drug support, it should be noted that the aircraft and
parts were provided as a drawdown from existing DoD stocks, not from
new funding. The helos are part of an extremely effective eradication
program which has reduced potential heroin production in Mexico from 6
tons in 1995 to 4 tons in 1997 and kept 2500 tons of marijuana from the
US market in 1997. Mexico has successfully integrated the helicopters
into its Air Force and has employed the aircraft for eradication
operations, reconnaissance missions, and the transport of troops in
support of its comprehensive counterdrug efforts. DoD has also
conducted extensive training and technical assistance programs, which
are the focus of most of our bilateral program and account for the
majority of our funding. The U.S. has trained hundreds of Mexican
police and military personnel for counternarcotics support missions.
The U.S. and Mexico have both been working to improve their
national capabilities to combat international drug trafficking and
transborder smuggling, as well as to improve communications and
cooperation between our personnel along our shared border. The increase
in U.S. Customs personnel and resources in the southwest border area
over the last year has contributed significantly to interdiction
capability and resulted in a higher rate of drug seizures. Stopping
drugs and other illicit contraband from crossing the border is a
daunting challenge. While inspecting every vehicle that crosses the
border would lead to more seizures of illicit drugs and other
contraband, it would also inhibit legitimate commerce. U.S. Customs is
working to employ more technical equipment along the border that will
serve to enhance our inspection ability without disrupting the vast
majority of cross-border traffic involving legitimate trade.
The increase in U.S. Customs personnel along the border has also
boosted investigations in this area. The primary investigative goal of
the agency is to target the drug organizations' ``kingpins'' that are
ultimately responsible for orchestrating and smuggling the
transportation of narcotics. In Fiscal Year 1998, six individuals
identified as Mexican drug ``kingpins'' were indicted in the United
States as a result of U.S. Customs investigations. An extradition
request has been filed with Mexico on one of those individuals and an
extradition request is pending on another.
Question. Are cocaine seizures up or down in the last 12 months,
and by how much?
Answer. From January to August of 1998, cocaine seizures in Mexico
were higher than seizures for the same periods of 1994, 1995, and 1996,
but are lower than seizures for the same period of 1997. Mexican
seizures of heroin, however, are up 23 percent.
Cooperation along the border has been augmented by the deployment
of additional U.S. Customs resources to the Southwest border, which has
resulted in a significant increase in the amount of narcotics seizures
and arrests made in that area. Cocaine seizures made by Customs along
the border during Fiscal Year 1998, as well as seizures of every type
of drug, have increased. This year so far there has been a 27 percent
increase in the total number of seizures.
Question. Have any Mexican kingpins been prosecuted and sentenced
for drug crimes?
Answer. Law enforcement cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico has
led to the arrest in Mexico for prosecution of several leaders and
other members of the major Mexican trafficking organizations including:
Juan Garcia Abrego and Oscar Malherbe of the Gulf Cartel; Luis and
Jesus Amezcua and Jaime Ladino of the Amezcuas Methamphetamine Group;
Arturo ``Kiti'' Paez Martinez of the Juarez Cartel, and a top
lieutenant of the Juarez Cartel, Noe Brito Guadarrama. The Amezcua-
Contreras remain incarcerated due to a Provisional Arrest Warrant
issued at the request of the U.S. We are concerned, however, that the
pace of drug prosecutions in Mexico has not increased over last year.
Increased law enforcement cooperation may lead to more arrests but does
not necessarily lead to convictions and sentences. This is due in part
to a provision of Mexican law, the ``amparo'' system, which allows a
defendant to indefinitely appeal a charge. It is also due to a
judiciary that is largely independent of law enforcement and cannot be
relied upon to provide consistent and informed findings. For this
reason both the State and Justice Departments emphasize training for
the Mexican judicial system through the Administration of Justice (AOJ)
Program and the International Criminal Investigative Assistance Program
(ICITAP).
Progress was made in January 1998, when the government of Mexico
indicted sixty-five persons associated with the notorious Amado
Carrillo-Fuentes organization, under the new Organized Crime Bill.
Seventeen lower echelon associates were also arrested. Mexican
authorities have not yet located and apprehended any of the principal
associates named in this indictment.
Between September, 1997 and March, 1998, the Mexican counterdrug
effort managed to dismantle one of Mexico's most infamous drug
trafficking criminal organization's in Tijuana known by their alias,
``Los Gueros.'' Other arrests this year include:
Hugo and Rene Ambriz Duarte on January 10, weapons suppliers
to the Juarez cartel;
General Jorge Mariano Maldonado and Captain Rigoberto Silva
Ortega on January 18, associated with the Juarez cartel;
Juan Alberto Zepeda Novelo on March 19, money launderer for
Amado Carrillo;
On May 27, Ismael Higuera Jr., son of Ismael Higuera Guerrero
``El Mayel,'' a lieutenant in the Arellano Felix Organization,
was apprehended;
On June 7, Angel Salvador Gomez Herrera and Oziel Cargenas
Guillen, members of the Gulf cartel, were apprehended.
There have been individual cases where ``amparos'' are overturned
and defendants punished according to the gravity of their crimes.
Prison sentences for arms and drug trafficking by Pedro and Oscar
Gerardo Lupercio Serratos were confirmed and they will remain in jail
eight years and six months. Imprisonment orders were also confirmed for
Rodrigo Bon Villegas, a.k.a. ``El Roque,'' associated with the Arellano
Felix Organization. On September 19, appeals presented by former
Mexican drug czar General Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo and his assistant,
Captain Javier Garcia Hernandez were denied.
In May, nine members of the Juarez cartel were sentenced on charges
based on the Organized Crime Law with prison terms ranging from 11 to
21 years. In July, General Alfredo Navarro Lara, who was associated
with the Arrellano Felix Organization and charged with offering a $1
million per month bribe to an Attorney General's Office official, was
sentenced to 20 years and seven months of imprisonment. Finally, in
August Hector Luis Palma Salazar, a.k.a. ``El Guero Palma,'' received a
prison sentence for drugtrafficking offenses. He will serve his 33
years in a maximum security prison.
Question. Have any drug criminals been extradited to the United
States?
Answer. During the last twelve months, the government of Mexico has
returned three U.S. citizens on drug trafficking charges. However,
there have been no extraditions to date of Mexican nationals pursuant
to provisional arrest requests for drug-related charges. A total of 15
individuals have been extradited by Mexico to the U.S. on narcotics
crimes, and 28 individuals have been found extraditable by Mexico but
are pursuing legal appeals.
Question. As a portion of the overall drug control budget, spending
on interdiction and source country actions have declined precipitously
since the peak. In your opinion, is this because the domestic threat is
proportionally greater than it was then?
Answer. Administration requests for spending on interdiction and
source country actions have been closely paralleled by congressional
appropriations in the past six years. This is reflective of the close
consultation between the executive and legislative branches on national
drug control policy. The National Drug Control Strategy calls for a
balanced approach for reducing drug use and its destructive
consequences. However, the balance among drug control strategies is not
measured by their relative shares of the drug control budget. Recently,
the Administration has placed special ephasis on demand reduction based
on research showing that is the most cost-effective strategy for
reducing drug use. The federal drug control strategy has produced some
good results. Since 1985, past month use of illicit drugs has dropped
by 43 percent. Since 1988, the number of casual cocaine users has been
reduced by half.
Question. Interdiction funding has been flat since 1992. If more
interdiction resources were to be made available, do you think they
could make a substantial difference? Or is the U.S. interdiction effort
at the saturation point, where additional resources would do more to
complicate existing efforts that provide any benefit?
Answer. Interdiction funding has not been flat since 1992. Between
Fiscal Year 1992 and Fiscal Year 1995, interdiction funding declined
from $1.96 billion to $1.28 billion. After Fiscal Year 1995 budgets for
interdiction funding increased to $1 .805 billion as requested in
Fiscal Year 1999.
The President's international drug control strategy and programs
have been quite successful over the last two years. Source Zone
programs contributed to a 40 percent reduction in coca cultivation in
Peru from 1995 to 1997 and up to a 15 percent reduction in global
potential cocaine production in 1997. In the Transit Zone, U.S.
supported programs achieved record cocaine seizures (86 tons) in 1997.
As a result of these programs, less cocaine is available today in the
United States than two years ago.
Despite these successes, we face significant source, transit, and
arrival zone interdiction challenges. Traffickers continue to move
significant quantities of illegal drugs into the United States using a
great variety of routes and methods. Their use of fast boats and
commercial maritime traffic continues to increase. The expansion of
cultivation in Colombia offers both international drug control and
national security challenges to the United States.
Accomplishment of our national drug control goals and performance
targets in the source and transit zone requires long term commitment of
resources to support a unifying strategic vision. We can substantially
reduce the availability of drugs in the United States over the next ten
years. In the cocaine source countries, we currently enjoy proven
programs supporting host governments with the political will to inflict
long term damage to the illegal cocaine industry. We should continue to
build on this source country success through bipartisan support of the
resources needed to implement the President's National Drug Control
Strategy.
Question. There is continual debate about the volume and kind of
support we provide Colombia to aid their actions in the [sic] their
fight against narcotics traffickers. What do you feel would be the one
most important item we could provide the Colombians that would make the
biggest difference?
Answer. There are no silver bullets to deal with the supply side of
the drug problem because drug trafficking is a lucrative business, and
it's worth the traffickers' efforts to work around any single
initiative we could come up with. Only through a comprehensive,
coordinated, balanced approach that includes eradication, interdiction,
alternative development, successful investigations and prosecutions,
precursor and essential chemical controls, asset forfeiture,
extradition, and anti-money laundering and anti-corruption measures
will we, working cooperatively with the Colombians and others in the
region, be able to defeat the narcotraffickers and keep them from
simply changing their methods to evade our counterdrug efforts.
That being said, the new government of Colombia has just developed
a comprehensive national drug policy as well as an evaluation of
resource requirements to enable the military to become fully engaged in
Colombian counterdrug efforts. The Pastrana Administration has said on
several occasions that they would like the U.S. government to balance
its counterdrug assistance because the current imbalance towards the
police is causing interservice rivalry and impeding their ability to
implement a truly coordinated joint counterdrug effort. Given the
substantial support to the Colombian National Police in the Emergency
Supplemental bill and the regular Fiscal Year 1999 INL budget, ONDCP
believes that we should consult with our Country Team in Bogota and the
Government of Colombia to prioritize the military counterdrug resource
requirements in accordance with goals and objectives in their new
national strategy and ours. This will enable us to focus our assistance
on high-impact items, and will avoid the problem of having people in
Washington define the Colombian counterdrug force structure and
resource requirements.
______
Questions Submitted to Dr. A. Rex Rivolo
Question. What do you consider the most cost-effective use of the
anti-drug dollar: domestic demand reduction activities or international
programs to suppress or interdict supply? Isn't it much more difficult
to interdict small amounts of drugs throughout the vast areas in which
they are transited or sold than it is to suppress its production and
interdict it in the relatively smaller areas where they are produced?
Answer. Empirical evidence and basic economic theory clearly
support the hypothesis that interdiction of illegal drug production and
transportation nodes within the source nations is a very effective use
of anti-drug dollars. This is particularly true in an environment where
drug use incidence is rising, as it is today. Many demand-reduction
programs, such as treatment, even if highly effective (which they are
not) cannot effect incidence whereas interdiction efforts can. This
alone argues in favor of interdiction programs during times of high
incidence and in favor of demand reduction programs during times of low
or declining incidence. It must be emphasized that compiled government
and non-government data clearly show incidence rates rising for all
drugs since 1993 and in the case of heroin, the rate is now at an all
time high.
Evidence supporting the hypothesis that source country interdiction
can be highly cost-effective can be found in the records of the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Department of Health and Human
Services, the Department of Defense drug testing program, and civilian
drug testing programs. The evidence derived from these sources clearly
shows that direct physical intervention at the source acts to create
risk within the production and transportation infrastructure of the
illegal drugs industry resulting in immediate and considerable benefits
within the U.S. The first of these benefits is a lower purity of
illegal drugs available on the streets. This results in fewer medical
emergencies and associated deaths. A second benefit is significantly
increased street prices. This acts to reduce both prevalence and
consumption through economic forces thus further reducing the medical
consequences. A third benefit is a significant depression of farm
prices for the agricultural raw materials in the growing regions. The
reduced agricultural prices serve to induce growers in those regions
toward alternative development programs.
This is not academic speculation based on the sophistry of the
econometric models now popular in much of the anti-drug research
community. All of these effects mentioned have been observed
empirically. From mid-I 989 to the beginning of 1991, the aggressive
interdiction efforts focused within Colombia and in the Caribbean
resulted in a 50 percent reduction of street cocaine purity and an
effective price increase of 100 percent. During this time, hospital
emergency room visits linked to cocaine use decreased by 50 percent as
did the number of deaths linked to the drug. At the same time both the
military and civilian drug testing programs saw a systematic drop in
the cocaine positive test rate of comparable magnitude. A second
example began in early 1995, when the Peruvian government, with
assistance from U.S. agencies, began a systematic attack on the illegal
traffic flying between Peru and Colombia. Within 6 months of the start
of the Peruvian interdiction policy, street cocaine purity dropped,
street prices increased and prices for coca leaf in Peru's growing
regions plummeted. The commensurate decreases in medical consequences
and drug testing positive rates were also clearly observed across all
communities in the U.S. In fact, these consequences were fully
predicted well in advance of realization thus providing evidence that
the mechanisms for the effectiveness of source interdiction are
straightforward and well understood.
It is essential to understand that for interdiction efforts to be
successful they must be properly focused where the illegal drug
industry is most vulnerable. Currently, this is in the growing and
refining centers within Colombia. As a result of previous source county
interdiction successes, both the cocaine industry and the budding
Colombian heroin trade are concentrating in remote areas of Colombia
making them more dependent on air transport. It is here that future
interdiction efforts must be focused. Part of the source interdiction
strategy must be to assess where and when the pressure must be applied.
The effectiveness of the strategy comes from striking when and where
the drugs are concentrated before they are dispersed to a large number
of ``middle men'' in an ever-expanding geographic area.
Question. According to the Office of National Drug control Policy
figures, in 1987, 29 percent of the national drug control budget was
allocated to demand reduction, 38 percent for law enforcement, and 33
percent for international interdiction. By 1997, those priorities
shifted so that 34 percent is for demand reduction, 53 percent for
domestic law enforcement, and 13 percent for international programs and
interdiction. In short, pro grams to suppress or interdict drug supply
went from 33 percent of the overall budget to only 13 percent. In light
of recent data that show an increase in drug use incidents since 1992-
93, do you think it is logical for us restore the balance in our
strategy to greater emphasis on fighting drugs before they reach our
shores?
Answer. A balanced three-axes approach to U.S. drug policy
encompassing demand reduction, law enforcement, and supply reduction
programs is considered by most scholars and lay persons alike to be
both prudent and optimal. However, this is not correct under all
circumstances. During times when drug use incidence rates are high, or
increasing, both law enforcement and supply control methods such as
source country interdiction can have an advantage in that they both are
capable of directly decreasing incidence through economic forces
whereas treatment programs can not. During such times both supply
reduction and law enforcement programs should be favored over demand
reduction programs such as treatment. At times when incidence rates are
low, or decreasing, treatment should be favored as any success in this
mode has long-lasting consequences which eventually can reduce
prevalence to a nominal zero. It must be noted however, that this
statement assumes treatment programs have some modest level of
effectiveness.
It must be pointed out that in 1993, after a monotonic 10-year
decline, the incidence rates for cocaine, heroin and marijuana all
reversed and are now growing at almost record pace. The rate for heroin
is now twice the previous all time record high. The reversal in
incidence rates can be directly attributed to the reduced emphasis on
interdiction efforts before the conditions warranted it. Since that
time, the incidence rate for all three drugs has continued to grow as
the emphasis on interdiction has continued to decrease. I believe it is
imperative at this time to acknowledge our strategic error and move
back toward the balanced approach until conditions in the U.S. drug
situation warrant a change.
______
Questions Submitted to Brian E. Sheridan
Question. U.S. troops cannot remain in Panama beyond 1999 unless an
agreement is reached with Panama to let them stay; efforts to negotiate
such an agreement have foundered. What back-up plans has the
Administration developed to substitute Howard Air Force Base in Panama
as a platform for U.S. anti-drug activities in the region? Will these
alternatives be more costly than operating from Panama or will these
alternatives impact on the effectiveness of anti-drug operations? For
example, aren't cost and effectiveness adversely affected if we have to
build a new facility or if we have to use a site further away from the
operating area, which is principally the Andean region?
Answer. The Secretary of Defense, through the Commander-in-Chief of
U.S. Southern Command, is pursuing a concept of alternate basing
designated as Forward Operating Locations (FOL). These sites are
expected to serve as staging locations for the variety of U.S. aircraft
conducting counternarcotics missions. The characteristics of an FOL
include the basic infrastructure required to operate aircraft,
including an adequate parking ramp, runway, fueling and security. FOLs
are not envisioned to replicate the substantial and robust capability
we enjoyed in Panama. Among the sites under consideration are Ecuador,
Peru, Honduras, Puerto Rico, Curacao, and Costa Rica. US Southern
Command has already sent a site survey team to Manta, Ecuador to
evaluate the conditions. The cost of any one of these sites or a
combination of multiple sites cannot be fully determined until
negotiations are complete with all prospective host nations. The
military Services are developing the best estimate possible of the
incremental costs required to sustain the Department's current level of
counterdrug operations in FY99 and beyond. However, at this time, a
rough order of magnitude for these costs is approximately $35M to $50M,
which excludes any relocation costs. If more than one nation agrees to
host an FOL, the cost will be substantially different than that of only
a single FOL. The variables in this determination include FOL location,
existing infrastructure and force protection requirements. Ideally, the
location of any FOL will be as close to the intended target zone as
possible. The closer the site, the greater the available on-station
time, and hence reduced transit fuel costs associated with each
mission. We are striving to obtain access to sites as close to the
Andean region as possible that not only have the necessary
infrastructure, but also the level of security and force protection we
demand for our personnel.
Question. In what ways could the U.S. military be more effective in
its smuggling detection and monitoring role? Is the Defense Department
adequately committed to carrying out this role as a priority mission?
Answer. Secretary Cohen and the Department are absolutely committed
to carrying out our role in this extremely important mission. At this
time, a significant number of suspected narco-trafficking flights are
detected and monitored. However, a lesser number are interdicted due to
an insufficient number of available interdiction assets. In the 3rd
quarter of FY98, 88% of the known air tracks were detected and
monitored while only 12% were interdicted. Of the maritime events, 33%
of the known tracks were detected and monitored in the 3rd quarter of
FY98 while only 12% were interdicted. To improve on this record,
additional end-game assets should be devoted to the areas identified as
high transshipment zones.
Question. When will the new ROTHR be on line to provide additional
coverage to the Andean region?
Answer. The ROTHR is scheduled to be on line in September 1999.
Although preliminary reviews of the damage incurred after Hurricane
Georges indicate a 1-2 week delay, a program manager assessment will be
completed by the end of October to determine if the timeline will be
further impacted.
Question. What specific plans does the Administration have for
controlling the illicit flights carrying drugs from producing zones in
Colombia to the northern coast (which is the staging area for transit
to the United States)?
Answer. The Secretary has viewed with pleasure the reduction in
illicit flights from the source zone nation of Peru. The success of the
Peruvian ``airbridge denial'' program led to over a 40% reduction in
the level of coca growth in Peru and a diminished price for coca leaf
in the marketplace. The government of Colombia has discussed
establishing a similar ``airbridge denial'' program, where narco-
traffickers' aircraft can be intercepted and brought down if they don't
respond to queries by Colombian Air Force interceptors. While Colombian
law allows for the use of force when dealing with aircraft, until
recently their policy had been to not use force in these situations.
However, at a recent meeting of officials from both governments, the
Colombians expressed their willingness to explore a more aggressive
``airbridge denial'' program. DoD is also working with the Colombian
Air Force to improve their night operations and intercept capabilities.
Question. What plans does the Administration have for replacement
of anti-drug facilities in the Guaviare Region in the coca-producing
zone of Colombia?
Answer. Both DoD and DoS are working with the Colombian government
to insure adequate counterdrug facilities are available after control
of the area is appropriately restored.
Question. There is a continual debate about the volume and kind of
support we provide Colombia to aid their actions in their fight against
narcotics traffickers. What do you feel would be the one most important
item we could provide the Colombians that would make the biggest
difference?
Answer. The one area that would aid Colombia's battle against
narco-traffickers would be to increase the mobility of the counterdrug
forces to move quickly into areas where illicit crops are cultivated
and narcotics are processed. This quick-strike capability would allow
the Colombian forces to strike in a number of areas simultaneously and
with little warning, dealing a serious blow to drug traffickers and
their supporters.
Question. The State Department--and INL in particular--has received
a lot of criticism in the past about the speed in which equipment that
has been authorized and purchased is delivered to the host country. Are
there any recommendations that you would make to Congress to speed up
or smooth out the current process?
Answer. There are myriad programs in place to distribute equipment
to foreign nations. I am hesitant to characterize the lack of
responsiveness of any of these programs without first examining the
details of the case. I do know that in the past, the distribution of
equipment identified in a Section 506(a)(2) drawdown was delayed due to
the host nation delaying the signing of an End Use Monitoring (EUM)
agreement, as required. Generally, equipment identified in the Section
506(a)(2) drawdown is issued from the U.S. government supply system and
delivered to a freight forwarder under the employ of the receiving
nation. Other equipment, such as aircraft stored in long term
preservation status at Davis-Montham Air Force Base, require
refurbishment to an operational status prior to delivery to the host
nation. This refurbishment is occasionally a lengthy process. I
reiterate that without specific case information, I am unable to
address equipment delivery delays by any other Department within the
Administration.
Question. I understand that Blackhawk pilots that had been
stationed in the Bahamas as part of OPBAT were some of the best
prepared and most experienced pilots the United States had during
Desert Storm, especially for night missions. Can you please highlight
some other examples where the training and experience our armed forces
receive because of their participation in counter-drug activities have
enhanced their performance in other areas of their responsibility?
Answer. The most notable area of training benefiting forces of the
United States are in the Special Operations Forces area.
Counternarcotics deployments are frequent in the drug producing and
trafficking regions of Central and South America. Members of the
diverse units that make up the U.S. Special Operations Command travel
throughout the year for training deployments, instructing the
counterdrug forces of the host nations in the skill sets that are most
useful in detection of drug laboratories, patrolling techniques,
riverine operations, and night operations. Some of the finest
operational training our Special Operations Forces personnel receive is
the type they derive as they deploy to the field to instruct others.
Additionally, our intelligence support personnel gain valuable
experience that is readily transferable to intelligence collection
during situations of low intensity conflict.