[Senate Hearing 105-638]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 105-638
ADVANCED NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before a
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SPECIAL HEARING
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
50-167 cc WASHINGTON : 1998
_______________________________________________________________________
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
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ISBN 0-16-057550-8
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
SLADE GORTON, Washington DALE BUMPERS, Arkansas
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
CONRAD BURNS, Montana TOM HARKIN, Iowa
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire HARRY REID, Nevada
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado PATTY MURRAY, Washington
LARRY CRAIG, Idaho BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota
LAUCH FAIRCLOTH, North Carolina BARBARA BOXER, California
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
Steven J. Cortese, Staff Director
Lisa Sutherland, Deputy Staff Director
James H. English, Minority Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico Chairman
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi HARRY REID, Nevada
SLADE GORTON, Washington ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah PATTY MURRAY, Washington
CONRAD BURNS, Montana HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
LARRY CRAIG, Idaho BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota
TED STEVENS, Alaska (ex officio)
Staff
Alex W. Flint
W. David Gwaltney
Lashawnda Leftwich
Greg Daines (Minority)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statement of Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Ph.D., director, Institute
for Public Policy, Department of Political Science, University
of New Mexico.................................................. 1
Opening statement of Senator Pete Domenici....................... 1
Statement of Senator Harry Reid.................................. 2
Prepared statement of Hank C. Jenkins-Smith...................... 6
Statement of Joe F. Colvin, president and chief executive
officer, Nuclear Energy Institute.............................. 9
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Statement of Corbin A. McNeill, Jr., chairman and chief executive
officer, PECO Energy Co........................................ 14
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Statement of Richard Wilson, Ph.D., Mallinckrodt professor of
physics, Harvard University.................................... 16
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Statement of Senator Larry E. Craig.............................. 29
Statement of Alan B. Smith, graduate student, Nuclear Energy
Department, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.............. 33
Prepared statement........................................... 36
Statement of Stan O. Schriber, Ph.D., LANSCE deputy division
director, Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico........... 40
Prepared statement........................................... 42
Statement of Linden Blue, vice chairman, General Atomics......... 53
Prepared statement........................................... 54
Statement of Charles E. Till, Ph.D., associate laboratory
director (retired), Argonne National Laboratory................ 58
Prepared statement........................................... 60
ADVANCED NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES
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TUESDAY, MAY 19, 1998
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development,
Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:07 a.m., in room SD-124, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Pete V. Domenici (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Domenici, Craig, Stevens, and Reid.
NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESSES
STATEMENT OF HANK C. JENKINS-SMITH, PH.D., DIRECTOR,
INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PETE DOMENICI
Senator Domenici. The subcommittee hearing will please come
to order.
I thank all the witnesses for being here, and thank you for
attending. We do have quite a few witnesses. It will take us a
couple of hours this morning, and I think we may go
uninterrupted and get the hearing handled in a somewhat
appropriate manner.
Good morning, Senator Reid. Thank you for joining us.
Senator Reid. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Domenici. I welcome you as part of this
subcommittee. We work together on several things; I hope we can
on this issue also.
This morning, the Energy and Water Development Subcommittee
will focus on the subject of advanced nuclear technologies; in
particular, we are interested in two aspects: The renewal of
nuclear power in this country and furthering technologies for
the future use of nuclear power.
Electricity from nuclear power plays an essential part of
the daily aspects of life that we take for granted in this
country. To most of us, electricity is invisible. We do not
appreciate that behind that socket in the wall is a huge
complex of transmission lines, distribution stations and
powerplants. These powerplants can be coal, oil, natural gas,
or nuclear.
The renewable technologies so often referred to by the
administration cannot replace the power produced by these
powerplants now or any time in the imaginable future. Even if
the President will not say it because it is not necessarily
politically correct, in order to maintain the quality of life
for Americans, nuclear power is a necessity for this country.
It is not an option.
We need to stop hedging on this issue and acknowledge that
20 percent of the electrically generated power in this country
comes from nuclear powerplants, and it is essential to our
continued prosperity. Nuclear power is the only source of
electrical generation for which we can and do isolate all the
waste products and prevent the pollution of air and water.
Coal, oil, and natural gas powerplants cannot make this
statement. Nuclear energy generates clean electricity. This
environmental value of nuclear power is all too often easily
overlooked. We are only beginning to truly appreciate the long-
term environmental effects of pollution from coal, oil, and
natural gas powerplants. I am uncertain about the existence or
extent of global climate change; however, given the
uncertainties, we would be prudent to limit the use of energy
technologies that release pollutants that accumulate in the
atmosphere.
But make no mistake about it, one fact, no matter what
pollution goals we set as a Nation, we cannot reach them
without the continuation of nuclear power as a major part of
our energy production, as well as the world's. The challenge we
face is to think anew about nuclear power, and to recognize its
environmental values.
The rest of the world has already done so. Even though we
were the originators of it, we led in all of its technological
aspects for decades on end. The rest of the world is, as I
indicated, already have made decisions that they need nuclear
power in their future.
Other countries are already committed to nuclear power,
because without it they face an uncertain future of increase
energy demands and production using fossil fuels, with
significant pollution of their air and their water. Nuclear
power supplies over 75 percent of the domestic electricity in
France, over 60 percent in Belgium, over 30 percent in Germany,
and over 27 percent in Japan. And China is planning a
significant expansion of nuclear power. These are all countries
which do not enjoy the luxury that the United States does in
terms of multiple energy supplies.
Further, countries such as France and Japan have not gotten
themselves into a quagmire over the disposition of nuclear
waste. They have an effective reprocessing program which
ensures the continuing of nuclear power as a vital source of
energy to their people. The case for nuclear power is a
compelling one not only for its environmental value but also
for its economic nonproliferation and energy security
perspectives that support our national and international goals.
With that, I now yield to Senator Reid, who has an opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR HARRY REID
Senator Reid. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I know
this might be surprising to some, but I am really pleased about
this hearing and I look forward to the testimony of our
witnesses. I think you have set an appropriate tone with this
subcommittee in not doing the thing we have done many years
past--just accept what has gone on. You are looking at the
future, and I think that is important. I think this
subcommittee is moving in the right direction.
Mr. Chairman, you have spoken a number of times publicly,
questioning the wisdom of the decisions that we made 30-odd
years ago. And I think it is important that we analyze--and let
me state for the record today that I think it is clear--and I
am speaking for myself today--that nuclear energy finds itself
in an unusual and, some say, an uncomfortable position. With
deregulation going forward and nuclear power being so
expensive, some say that nuclear power is on its way out.
The chairman has outlined clearly why we have to give those
that are advocated of nuclear power every opportunity to see if
there is any way that nuclear power can fit into the new
paradigm that is facing this country. I think that the
disposition of nuclear waste, a substance that remains highly
dangerous for more than human history can be accounted, was not
understood when the industry began more than 40 years ago, and
it is not understood today. Because of that, there is not a so-
called exit strategy if we should conclude that this utility
will not be cost effective. Or if it is cost effective, what do
we do with nuclear waste?
If nuclear energy is ever to have an assured future, its
waste must be managed in an acceptable way. I am not here,
though, Mr. Chairman, today to talk only about nuclear waste. I
think there has been a fine group of witnesses assembled. I
think this will pave the way for more work for us in the
future. My record is clear about nuclear waste, and I am not
going to dwell on that.
You called this meeting for important reasons, and I am not
going to diminish the reasons that you have called this. It was
not for purposes of looking at nuclear waste only.
Let me welcome the witnesses, all of whom have made
significant contributions in their fields. I will be interested
to hear about how we might collaborate to resolve the most
vexing problems of this complex industry.
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much, Senator.
Now, we will start with the first panel. I think they have
you listed there as Dr. Smith. Actually it is Hank Jenkins-
Smith. If you come back, we will correct it.
Dr. Jenkins-Smith. Thank you.
Senator Domenici. Dr. Jenkins-Smith is from the Institute
for Public Policy, Department of Political Science at the
University of New Mexico. It is a very formidable group. It
assesses public opinion from various angles and various
approaches. Dr. Jenkins-Smith is the director of that.
Then we have Mr. Joe Colvin, Jr., the president and chief
executive officer of the Nuclear Energy Institute. Thank you so
much for joining us.
And Mr. Corbin A. McNeill, Jr., chairman and chief
executive officer of PECO Energy Co. And we are delighted to
have you here. You are in the energy business and you have a
novel approach to what kind of energy production your company
would like to own.
And then we have Dr. Richard Wilson, Mallinckrodt professor
of physics at Harvard. And I want to thank you for flying all
the way home from England to be here in time for this hearing.
I very much appreciate it.
Let us start with Dr. Jenkins-Smith, and move across the
table from my left to my right.
STATEMENT OF HANK JENKINS-SMITH
Dr. Jenkins-Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
Senator Reid. I appreciate the opportunity to speak before this
committee.
I will be relying today on the expertise of many of my
colleagues at the Institute for Public Policy, several of whom
are here today--Barry Harrin and Harold Silva--here behind me.
I am also going to be drawing on the views of many thousands of
American citizens who have participated in focus groups or
surveys with us over the last decade, really trying to plumb
the issue of nuclear policy and how Americans think about that
issue, to try to get past some of the surface conundrums that
plaque us, to see what the structure of public opinion looks
like on this question.
And I will start with my punch line, which is from the
standpoint of American attitudes on nuclear policy, where we
need to go now is away from piecemeal nuclear policy to an
integrated, open assessment of what our nuclear technology
options are for the future. In the past, we have chopped
nuclear technology issues into pieces in a way that does
enormous damage to how American citizens and our elected
representatives can debate these sorts of issues.
When we think the segregation of nuclear energy from the
issue of nuclear demilitarization to the issue of nuclear waste
transport or storage or disposal, it makes it almost
incomprehensible to talk about these policies in a sensible
fashion when we cannot put the pieces together in a fashion
that allows people to assess benefits, costs, relative risk
options. We just cannot under the current system.
Now, much of the problem has to be laid at the feet of an
historical legacy that can readily be perceived as high handed,
of ignoring the risks to the public, and imposing substantial
damage in the interest of national security and other concerns.
It has also been the case that historically we have not had
much in the way of open, integrated debates about nuclear
issues. But I think we are now at a position to put that behind
us and look forward. And this hearing is a fine example of how
that might take place.
The problem really is this issue of fragmentation.
Fragmentation leads us to do a number of things that I think
are damaging to the national debate. First off, it leads us to
separate benefits from costs. National security benefits,
energy production, reduction in CO2 emissions tend
not to get integrated into the discussion, for example, of
nuclear waste disposal in the current fragmented policy debate.
Also, due to our regulatory processes, we tend not to make
comparisons. We do not compare current options against
continued temporary disposal. Or we do not compare the options
of alternative modes of storage or disposal. We tend to get
myopic and look at one option.
It is funny what happens when you do that. Essentially, it
forces you into a mode of thinking about absolute risk--the
absolute risk of a single repository. We see that with the
waste isolation pilot plant, we see that with the Yucca
Mountain Repository--in which our Federal program officials are
charged with coming up with a number representing the risk
associated with a single repository and all of the complicated
science associated with that. There is no comparison that takes
place in that kind of a setting except against benchmarks set
by regulatory policy.
It is very difficult in the public mind to come to reasoned
conclusions when you are only thinking about one option. It is
a very tricky problem.
It leads to a risk myopia. Look at the public debate on
this question. All of the discussion associated particularly
with nuclear waste or nuclear materials transport focuses in on
waste or on risk. What is the risk? And look at the
strangulated language we get into when we talk about this
stuff. We talk about risk of 10 to the minus 6, stretched over
10,000 years. These are not reasonable terms for engaging in an
open debate in a society like this.
Well, let me just say that this process of fragmentation,
risk myopia, failure to engage in comparisons, is acutely
damaging to the quality of the public debate in the arena of
nuclear waste disposal, nuclear energy, and other issues. As
you know, when we separate out these issues, we make nuclear
waste acutely exposed to criticism. Essentially the debate is
all about risk.
And when you make the debate about risk you, without the
integration of benefits and without the benefit of comparisons,
we put people in the position essentially of acknowledging that
any policy will impose risk on somebody, and that imposition
will be unacceptable. Because, again, we cannot integrate it.
There is no context for that type of a decision.
This leads to delay, escalation of costs, compounding
distrust, unnecessary political antagonism and a number of
essentially poisoned fruits of the fragmented policies. It has
also led to interesting excursions into stakeholder democracy,
which have been attempts to get past blockage by giving special
consideration to named stakeholders, through such things as
site-specific advisory boards, working groups, stakeholder
forums, and things like that, which are sometimes quite
valuable mechanisms for dealing with policy issues.
On the other hand, there are some problems with these, in
the sense that they can collide with our established
institutions of representative democracy. I have had
impassioned discussions with locally elected officials who
believe that it is simply wrong for representatives of
appointed stakeholder groups to represent their constituencies
when they are not actually elected. They do not have to go home
and be held accountable as their elected officials do.
It also leads to problems with commitment. I believe that
when we create these stakeholder groups, in order to entice
people to participate, we have to give them some real teeth,
something that they gain from this very painful form of
participation, which, in fact, leads them to believe that they
have made authoritative decisions, which can be overridden by
this body and others in a representative republic like the
United States.
It is quite difficult to maintain these experiments in
stakeholder democracy in the face of the larger political
landscape in which we operate. The downside is that we can
generate more distrust through creating these sorts of
experiments than we can alleviate.
Now, where does this leave us? I think that it is time to
look very closely at what the American public do see
structurally about nuclear policy in the future. The American
public sees substantial benefits in nuclear technologies.
Forty-three percent of the public, for example, in a recent
national survey said that they wanted to retain existing
nuclear energy generating capacity, and another 30 percent said
they wanted to increase it. That leaves 27 percent that said
they wanted to decrease it or eliminate nuclear energy
generating capacity.
Large majorities, 80 percent in the United States, no
matter how you put the question, say they would like to at
least consider reprocessing as an option for waste management
issues. And substantial majorities, while preferring to
continue to reduce our nuclear arsenals, do not want to go to
zero. They perceive substantial national security benefits from
maintaining a nuclear arsenal.
And the point is the U.S. public sees large benefits from
nuclear technologies; it does not want to walk away. So where
do we go?
PREPARED STATEMENT
And that is where we get back to this integrated debate and
the importance of this debate for shaping future policy
options. I think all of this has to be on the table for future
discussion. And I think that is why this subcommittee is so
important and its mission is so important.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hank C. Jenkins-Smith
Thank you for inviting me to address this Committee. For my
testimony this morning I will be relying on the expertise of my
colleagues from the University of New Mexico, two of whom are with me
today--Kerry Herron and Carol Silva. I will also be drawing on the
insights, concerns and preferences of many thousands of American
citizens who have participated in our focus groups and surveys on
nuclear issues over the past decade.
I will focus my remarks on the nuclear materials problem facing the
United States. The nuclear problem has several critical dimensions.
These include:
Nuclear energy--where we are faced with an aging fleet of reactors
which currently produce over 20 percent of our domestic electricity. At
present, there are no apparent replacements for these reactors in
sight. Should conventional fuels be used to fill the energy gap, U.S.
dependency on foreign fuel supplies will grow. And CO2
emissions from U.S. energy consumption are likely to rise
significantly, playing havoc with U.S. efforts to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.
Nuclear weapons demilitarization--which has resulted in the
stockpiling of plutonium both at home and abroad, poses critical long-
term security issues. The handling of the dismantled plutonium pits--
and the determination of whether they are to be treated as a waste or a
resource--is a pressing matter yet to be resolved.
Nuclear waste disposal--in which national efforts to develop
interim and permanent repositories have met with passionate opposition,
and about which members of the public express deep concerns about risks
to their families and local economies. Conflict over waste disposal
programs has led to enormous costs, program delays, and unnecessary
political antagonism.
Nuclear energy, demilitarization, and waste disposal are
intertwined problems, and I believe that reaching appropriate technical
and policy solutions will depend on addressing them openly as an
integrated national policy problem.
On many fronts, nuclear materials policy in the U.S. appears to be
hamstrung. Government and industry officials charged with developing
and implementing U.S. policies are frustrated. From the perspective of
many of these officials, a vocal opposition to all things nuclear has
stymied efforts to site facilities or to transport, store and dispose
of nuclear materials in a safe, efficient and timely fashion. Many
opponents of current policies are equally frustrated, arguing that
current policies are merely stop-gap solutions, and that the risks of
these policies are too large and are unfairly imposed.
What are the sources of these frustrations? In part, the problem is
historical in nature. Critics can point to a legacy of high-handed
policies, a failure to engage in an open and meaningful national
dialogue on the risks and benefits of nuclear technologies, and to what
in 20-20 hindsight appears to be a callused disregard for public
safety. But difficult steps have already been taken to move beyond the
historical record and to deal with problems we face today. Our research
leads me to conclude that most Americans are ready to look ahead,
rather than behind, on these issues.
Other sources of policy frustration remain to be faced, however.
The most important is the fragmentation of nuclear policy in the United
States. For reasons that may have been important at the time, we have
for all practical purposes segmented nuclear policy into the areas of
nuclear energy, transportation, waste disposal, and nuclear weapons
demilitarization. This kind of fragmentation has separated
consideration of energy production from nuclear waste disposal, and has
isolated nuclear weapons demilitarization from both. Fragmentation of
nuclear policy seriously hampers meaningful national dialogue on the
benefits and costs of any of these critical policy areas. Nuclear
critics have long complained that U.S. nuclear energy policy ignored
the waste issue--and they were right. We considered the benefits of
nuclear energy without adequately addressing the costs. Now the tables
are turned: we are considering the waste issue in absence of the energy
and demilitarization dimensions of the problem. In any open dialogue on
nuclear waste, we now face what are widely perceived to be the costs of
managing radioactive waste detached from any identifiable benefits. I
think it is time to take the nuclear critics at their word, and
reintegrate the cost and benefit sides in an open nuclear policy
debate.
One of the key implications of the fragmentation of nuclear policy
is that it fosters a ``risk myopia''. By segregating the issue of
nuclear waste we have created a policy context in which the central and
salient issue is risk. To see this, you only need look at the debates
over the proposed waste repositories at the WIPP and at Yucca Mountain.
The debate is fixated on risk, with proponents arguing that risks are
small and manageable and opponents arguing that risks are large and
unimaginable. ``Risk'' permeates the public debate. We make matters
even worse when the discussion of risk is not comparative. Rather than
compare the risks posed by alternative disposal strategies, our
regulatory process leads us to focus on the absolute risk posed by a
given facility. In the process we talk in strange languages, about
risks of ``ten-to-the-minus-six'' spread over ten-thousand year
periods. But by talking about absolute risk, without comparisons to the
risks of other options, and without reference to associated national
benefits, we put ourselves in a situation where any risk can readily be
seen as an unacceptable imposition of harm on somebody. To put it
simply, when risk is without context, any risk can appear to be
unacceptable. We have created a policy debate which, in the eyes of the
public, is about the imposition of risk without context. Should we be
surprised when those who might bear the risk become enraged and ask
``why me?''
The isolation of nuclear waste issues has made efforts to site
nuclear waste facilities and routes easy targets for opponents. Our
political system offers many opportunities to block policy initiatives,
and these have been employed with great success. Because nuclear waste
management policies are so easily blocked, and because of the urgency
of moving forward in waste management efforts, we have witnessed the
proliferation of very creative efforts to gain ``stakeholder''
acceptance of radioactive waste clean-up and disposal programs.
Included are such entities as Site Specific Advisory Boards (SSAB's),
stakeholder forums, various working groups, and many others. These
efforts have in fact constituted an experiment in how citizens are to
be represented in American politics. Let's call it an experiment in
``stakeholder democracy''. The nature of the experiment is to have
direct--and sometimes authoritative--involvement by those deemed
``stakeholders'' in the development and implementation of the affected
program. The implication is that representative democracy, with the
traditional institutions of elections at federal, state and local
levels, has proved unsuited to the task. While some of these
experiments in stakeholder democracy have been notable successes, I do
not believe resorting to stakeholder democracy is a prudent way to deal
with the problems created by our fragmented nuclear policies.
First, stakeholder democracy can--and in some cases does--collide
with representative politics. Elected officials, who are accountable to
their voters, may object to having their constituents ``represented''
by an un-elected stakeholder representative. From a political
standpoint, such a step may undermine the elected official, and reduce
the incentive to raise urgent local issues in political election
campaigns. If we do that, we undermine the whole point of electoral
political processes.
Second, stakeholder democracy can create serious problems of
commitment. In the creation of stakeholder groups, gaining the
necessary commitment of time and energy from participants usually
requires offering them meaningful policy influence. Thus, when
stakeholder groups make decisions, they may rightly believe that they
have acted with some authority. But when national policies change--as
they do when the public elects new leaders--new national priorities may
override the stakeholder decisions. When that happens, those involved
are likely to be even less trusting of the government. In essence,
attempts to gain trust in the short run may actually erode it over the
longer haul.
Third, the implications of nuclear policy are so large and far-
reaching that all Americans are stakeholders. Resolution of the nuclear
problem will require that we bring all Americans, through their elected
representatives, into the discussion.
Experiments in stakeholder democracy have value in many public
issues, but they will not resolve the problems created by the policy
fragmentation and risk myopia that plague nuclear policy in the United
States.
Where do we go from here? Part of the answer comes from listening
to Americans' views on nuclear technologies and materials in a broader
context. Generally speaking, most Americans do not want to walk away
from our nuclear options. Let me illustrate this by three findings from
surveys conducted by the University of New Mexico over the past several
years.
First, Americans do not want to abandon nuclear energy. When a
nationwide sample of Americans were asked whether the current
utilization of nuclear energy in the United States should be decreased,
kept the same, or increased, about 43 percent wanted to keep it the
same and around 30 percent wanted to increase it. Approximately 27
percent wanted to decrease reliance on nuclear energy.
Second, most Americans would like the government to investigate
prospects for reusing spent nuclear fuel rods, even when apprised of
the possible proliferation risks associated with reprocessing. In fact,
whether it is called ``reusing'' or ``recycling'' spent nuclear fuel,
about 4 out of 5 respondents to a random sample of Americans were in
favor of making use of spent fuel to produce more energy.
Third, Americans are increasingly in favor of investing now to
maintain the infrastructure for possible future research and
development in the area of nuclear weapons. Americans believe that, in
today's world, there is an important place for our own nuclear arsenal.
Americans would like to continue to reduce the number of nuclear
weapons we and others hold, but four out of five of our respondents
nation-wide do not want to reduce our nuclear arsenal to zero.
The point behind these examples is that Americans do see
substantial benefits in the use of nuclear technologies, whether they
be for energy or national security. But these benefits are not
addressed in our fragmented nuclear policy discussion concerning
nuclear waste management. When it comes to waste, regardless of who
asks, most Americans are opposed to having nuclear waste shipped
through their communities or disposed of in facilities in their states.
Why is that?
A lot of our research has been focused on why people react as they
do to the prospect of nuclear waste transport and storage. In a
nutshell, when faced with a controversial problem like nuclear waste,
Americans want to hear good and robust reasons for a policy. They want
to see that the solution offered is a long term one. And they want to
be able to identify tangible national benefits from the policy.
How well does the prospect of conventional deep geologic disposal
stand up? Based on repeated tests in our focus groups, not very well.
First, because we have disengaged nuclear waste disposal from energy
generation or national security, we have isolated the perceived
threats, the negatives, and the nightmares from any associated local or
national benefits. Second, participants in our focus group discussions
have generally concluded that, if the repository can't accommodate all
of the current and expected waste, then it is merely a temporary stop-
gap solution. Other repositories will be needed. Most are reluctant to
accept a deep-geologic repository option unless it holds promise of
resolving the long-term problems posed by managing radioactive wastes.
Third, our focus group participants are appalled by the prospect that
we'll have to make a wrenching political decision about the location of
a first repository, only to be faced with having to do it all over
again sometime down the road. In sum, the deep geologic repository
approach to nuclear waste management is a hard sell with the American
public.
How can nuclear materials policy respond to public concerns? First
and foremost, gaining acceptance of nuclear materials management
strategies will require reintegrating the way we address nuclear
issues. The future of nuclear energy in the United States--with the
associated implications for our economy, security and environment--must
be put on the table along with nuclear weapons demilitarization and
nuclear waste management. Only in the context of the full array of
implications do the costs of nuclear waste disposal make sense. Such a
step may seem risky to those fearful that Americans may reject nuclear
power as the price for tolerating nuclear waste disposal. Our surveys
show that to be very unlikely. Recall that most Americans would prefer
to retain or increase our reliance on nuclear energy. And, when asked
whether their support for a deep geologic disposal facility would
change if production of nuclear energy ceased in the United States,
almost as many said abandoning nuclear energy would decrease support
for a repository as said it would increase support. Furthermore, in an
open and integrated debate the implications of nuclear energy for
greenhouse gas emissions would, in all probability, receive substantial
attention. Such attention is badly needed: in a recent nationwide
survey, 43 percent of our respondents thought the generation of nuclear
energy was a cause of greenhouse gas emissions. A more open and
integrated debate would be very likely to change that, which in turn
would be likely to increase support for retaining the nuclear energy
option. More generally, a full and open debate on nuclear policy would
be unlikely to result in the rejection of nuclear energy. All of us can
afford to take the high road on this one.
Opening up the nuclear policy debate would permit changes in
current policy designs that have the potential to substantially
increase public support for nuclear waste management programs. We have
explored how support for a nuclear waste repository would change if the
policy were modified in a variety of ways. In one experiment we asked
how support for a disposal facility would change if, in addition to
storing and monitoring the waste, the facility would be used as a
laboratory to study the material to increase safety. Under this option,
support increases dramatically, even among those who strongly oppose
the facility in the first place. More broadly, ``permanent storage'' in
a monitored facility evokes less fear and opposition than does the idea
of ``disposal''. Benefits are evident as well as risks. In short,
Americans prefer to generate and retain options for dealing with
nuclear waste in the future, rather than foreclosing them now. Thus
even small steps to increase the benefits side of the equation can
generate significant increases in support for nuclear waste policies.
Let me conclude by pointing to some very hopeful signs for the
future of nuclear policy in the United States. One is that the design
for the proposed Yucca Mountain high level nuclear waste repository now
includes the capability to remain open for up to 300 years, permitting
future generations to pursue options other than entombment. Another is
that, after 20 years of often acrimonious debate in New Mexico, a near
majority or respondents in a recent University of New Mexico survey
said they would vote to open WIPP if a referendum on the issue were
held today. Among those who ventured a preference, 52 percent were in
favor of opening the facility. My hope is that, with an open and full
debate on nuclear policy, we can build on these hopeful signs.
I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
STATEMENT OF JOE F. COLVIN, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much. And we will have
some questions later.
Mr. Colvin.
Mr. Colvin. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Reid, thank you very much for
the opportunity to talk about these important issues.
I think it is important, as we look to the needs of our
Nation, moving into the 21st century, and that of the world, to
look at the strategic elements of these issues and how they
come together to ensure that we can address the concerns
related to energy demand, energy security and ensuring that we
have needs that meet the environmental issues that we are
concerned about.
So, as we move forward, we need to take advantage of the
lessons learned that we have had in the past, and ensure that
we do not focus on the short term but rather on the strategic
issues. And as a result, there is a tremendous benefit and
importance of the policy debate on these issues moving forward.
And I would say, Mr. Chairman, your leadership and that of the
committee in this activity is particularly important, and
encouraging certainly for our industry.
I think as we see these issues, we see a convergence of the
policy issues on nuclear energy coming together from many
different forums. And just last week, in San Francisco, Mr.
Chairman, we issued a strategic direction for the 21st century,
which is a shared vision that the industry has on what we need
to do to move forward to ensure that the benefits of this
technology continue to inure to our Nation.
You have a copy of that in front of you, and I might just
point out the scope and dimension of that. The issues, in fact,
we have pointed out--which are just inside the front cover--
really are talking about eight compass points which tend to set
that direction. I will just mention those briefly.
First, an actual energy policy that ensures diversity and
reliability of energy supply. Second, excellence in safe and
reliable nuclear power and powerplant operations worldwide.
Third, an effective safety-focused regulatory framework.
Fourth, an integrated used fuel management system, and
effective low-level waste disposal system. Fifth, the
recognition of the intrinsic economic value of emission-free
nuclear energy. Sixth, business conditions and policies that
position nuclear plants for a competitive electricity market.
Seventh, increased recognition of the strong public
policymakers' support for nuclear energy and, last, really the
next generation of nuclear powerplants.
I would like to talk about two of those issues, the first
issue being really how we take advantage of the tremendous
value and the intrinsic value of emission-free electricity in
the United States. And in that arena, I really want to talk
about clean air--nuclear's role in meeting not only clean air
requirements, but those of the carbon dioxide debate that is
going on in the global climate change arena.
The map that is up here really illustrates nuclear's
tremendous contribution in the Clean Air Act compliance base.
And just on that map, the nuclear powerplants are shown in
pink. The blue and yellow sections represent those areas in the
United States that do not meet ozone attainment under the Clean
Air Act, or will be out of attainment. As you can see, those
are also areas that have dense population and many other
activities that generate pollution.
Those particular regions of the country are really required
to take actions to reduce their emission levels. And those
actions may entail and have entailed reducing industrial
expansion or even in adding increased emission controls for
automobiles. Nuclear energy's role in those areas is
particularly important as we move forward and to how we meet
clean air requirements.
Nuclear energy in the United States has--really, the
powerplants, since 1973--have added 40 percent to our Nation's
energy supply, and have done that without any pollutants to the
environment. CO2 emissions have been reduced by over
147 million metric tons, sulfur dioxide by about 80 million
metric tons, and nitrous oxides by about a corresponding 30
million metric tons from this energy source. And it is ironic
that with this tremendous contribution our administration has
not recognized nuclear's important role in any of its
discussions on clean air attainment or in this context of
global climate change.
Senator Domenici. Mr. Colvin, those numbers you just cited
are quantities that would have been emitted and contributed to
polluted air if the nuclear powerplants that you are describing
were coal burning; is that correct?
Mr. Colvin. Yes, sir; those are the emissions that were
avoided through the use of nonemitting technologies. In this
particular case, that is nuclear, yes, sir.
Senator Domenici. That would be interesting for somebody to
see how far off attainment we would be or where those
pollutants would get us.
Mr. Colvin. Yes, sir; in fact, we are doing some analyses.
We have done some emission avoidance studies for the United
States and for the world. And we are also doing some studies
related to ozone nonattainment that follows up on this
particular graph. We would be happy to share that with the
subcommittee, sir.
Senator Domenici. We would be happy to receive that.
Mr. Colvin. The second issue I would like to talk about,
Mr. Chairman, is the issue of public safety. Dr. Jenkins-Smith
has raised the issue, and I support the comments that he has
made. I would say that in our view and in our analysis, there
is tremendously strong public support for nuclear energy. It is
ironic when you look at this issue--and this is probably the
most disturbing fiction about our industry, and it is a
misconception that has gone unchallenged for a long time, and
in particular I would like to just point out a couple of facts.
We have done, and continue over the years to do, a number
of polls. And two-thirds of the public over these number of
years personally support nuclear energy in the United States.
As this chart shows, a recent national survey conducted earlier
this year determined that 76 percent of the public agreed we
should keep our existing plants, 87 percent support renewing
the operating licenses of these plants that meet continued
safety standards; and, in fact, 73 percent agreed that we
should build new nuclear plants in the future.
Interestingly, on this particular poll, when asked what
sources of energy would be most used in the United States 15
years in the future, they picked nuclear over solar. I think
that is clear that these polls certainly burst the myth of the
public. But the reality is that there is a perception gap. And
I would say, Mr. Chairman, that perception gap exists within
the public and exists within the policy infrastructure in our
country.
In this case, in this particular poll, you can see the
dramatic difference. When you ask people what they believe,
they believe--in this case, 65 percent--we should support
nuclear energy. But when you asked them what their neighbors
think, they think that number drops to 21 percent.
There are a couple of basic reasons for that. And the first
reason, sir, is that the issue is somewhat controversial. The
second issue is they really are not educated well on the issue.
And they would like more information to be able to support that
and debate that.
PREPARED STATEMENT
This perception gap must be closed. And I think this
committee and the leadership that this committee is exercising
in this area, along with the efforts of the industry, Mr.
Chairman, would make a great effort in moving this perception
gap closer to the reality that we see in the public.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joe F. Colvin
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, my name is Joe F.
Colvin. I am pleased to be here this morning on behalf of the Nuclear
Energy Institute, where I am president and chief executive officer. The
Institute is a policy organization for more than 275 companies that
operate U.S. nuclear power plants, along with suppliers, engineering
and design firms, universities, laboratories, radiopharmaceutical
companies, consulting firms, law firms and labor unions.
First, let me thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reid and
other distinguished members of this subcommittee for inviting me here
to speak about the strategic direction for nuclear energy for the
coming years.
As we draw near the 21st Century, the United States and the world
face a series of interrelated challenges concerning energy, the
environment and population growth. But as we know, long-range strategic
issues like these can be easily deferred, and important energy lessons
learned in past decades can be easily forgotten. We cannot allow that
to happen.
Inaction is no longer an option. The days of dormant energy and
environmental policy are a thing of the past. For the coming century,
the energy industry must adapt to a new set of pressures and concerns.
And policymakers will have to adopt a new course of action to
successfully forge solutions on many related issues, such as a
competitive energy market, new air quality controls, and a growing need
to reach global populations without electricity.
A BETTER DIRECTION
These key policy issues are converging in a way that is positive
for society as a whole--and for our industry. Just last week, the
industry unveiled a blueprint for the future at the industry's annual
meeting in San Francisco. This guiding strategy is called ``Nuclear
Energy: 2000 and Beyond, A Strategic Direction for Nuclear Energy in
the 21st Century.''
The strategic direction is an important document for industry, for
policymakers and for electricity consumers. It is designed to inform
and to guide a thoughtful dialogue about deriving the greatest benefits
from nuclear energy. This document was provided to the subcommittee as
part of my testimony, and is also in front of you.
This shared vision for a bright future requires resolution on key
policy issues that this subcommittee can shape. The document has eight
sections, each representing a specific policy area in which we need to
pursue a course of action.
Please turn to the opening page as I describe the eight essential
compass points to a better future for nuclear energy:
1. A national energy policy that ensures diversity and reliability
of energy supply.
2. Excellence in safe and reliable nuclear power plant operations
worldwide.
3. An effective safety-focused regulatory framework.
4. An integrated used fuel management system and effective low-
level waste disposal system.
5. Recognition of the intrinsic economic value of emission-free
nuclear energy.
6. Business conditions and policies that position nuclear plants
for a competitive electricity industry.
7. Increased recognition of the strong public and policymaker
support for nuclear energy, and
8. The next generation of U.S. nuclear power plants.
Today, I would like to emphasize two of those key points. The first
point is the need to recognize how absolutely essential the emission-
free value of nuclear energy is to achieving domestic and international
environmental controls on clean air.
Today, nuclear energy provides the largest source of America's
electricity without compromising the quality of our air.
In the last 25 years, nuclear power plants have met 40 percent of
the new demand for U.S. electricity. At the same time, nuclear energy
has prevented emissions of 80 million tons of sulfur dioxide and more
than 30 million tons of nitrogen oxide that would have been produced by
other energy sources.
Yet the Clinton Administration fails to credit the nuclear energy
industry for its clean air benefits. Nuclear energy is excluded in the
Administration's industry restructuring principals regarding climate
change, and in its discussion of the methods the U.S. will use to
reduce emissions--whether to meet new Clean Air Act restrictions or
worldwide carbon emissions reductions.
Let me illustrate nuclear energy's important contribution to Clean
Air Act compliance. This map to my (right) illustrates the critical
role of nuclear power plants on a local level. The green dots represent
nuclear plants. The blue and yellow sections represent areas that do
not meet ozone attainment under the Clean Air Act or that will be out
of attainment when a new standard is implemented--areas that also have
a dense population and many activities that generate pollution.
These areas are already required to take actions to reduce their
emission levels, such as restricting industrial expansion or increasing
emission controls for cars. The job becomes much more difficult if the
nuclear energy they depend on is not available.
The estimated cost for clean air compliance at the turn of the
century is more than $11 billion. Moreover, these costs do not account
for controls on carbon dioxide emissions proposed in the international
accords from the Kyoto summit.
As these financial commitments to emissions compliance grow, it has
never been more apparent that the United States must maintain its
existing nuclear generating capacity, renew plant operating licenses
and build advanced nuclear plants to meet new electricity demand.
Congress, however, must do more than simply preserve nuclear energy
for its emission-free benefits. There must be broader recognition among
your colleagues in the Senate and House, as well as the administration,
of nuclear energy's environmental achievements.
PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE
That brings me to my second point. There is established strong
public support for nuclear energy.
The idea that the public somehow finds nuclear energy unfavorable
is perhaps the most disturbing fiction about our industry. It's a
misconception that has gone unchallenged for too long and that is
particularly distressing when you consider the following facts.
Industry surveys of opinion leaders and the public consistently
show that two-thirds of those polled personally support nuclear energy.
For example, a national survey earlier this year determined that 76
percent agreed that we should keep our existing nuclear energy plants.
Eighty-seven percent support renewing the operating licenses of nuclear
energy plants that meet federal safety standards. In that same poll,
responders ranked nuclear energy first among electricity sources most
likely to be used in the United States in 15 years--beating out solar
energy.
The findings from these polls certainly burst the myth that nuclear
isn't publicly supported. Yet when asked about the public perception of
nuclear energy, policymakers think that their constituents aren't
supportive.
This perception gap must be closed. I encourage the members of this
subcommittee to recognize that strong public support exists for nuclear
energy, and to exercise the strong leadership necessary to support key
nuclear energy initiatives.
The federal government should clearly and openly articulate a
critical role for nuclear power plants in the nation's energy and
environmental agenda. The industry is prepared to work with the federal
government in a leadership role for nuclear energy.
As we leave the 20th Century, it becomes clear that the premise
underpinning the U.S. government's energy policy is that we have enough
electricity to see us through the next decade or so. This status quo
position, however, does not adequately prepare us for the challenges of
maintaining our energy diversity, economic security and environmental
compliance that lay ahead. Recognizing nuclear energy's valuable
contribution in these policy areas is absolutely key as we continue to
meet important environmental goals and move toward a competitive
electricity market.
Foremost for the remainder of this session, Congress and the
Administration must work together when it comes to nuclear waste
disposal. There is legislation pending to remedy that stalemate. The
Nuclear Waste Policy Act would speed the disposal of used nuclear fuel
and defense high-level waste by providing above ground, temporary
storage until a long-term, underground repository is ready to accept
used fuel. I urge this subcommittee to join the majority of Congress in
supporting this legislation. And to do all you can to move this bill to
the Senate floor now. Enacting this legislation is a critical step to
ensure that nuclear power remains a viable and competitive energy
source.
Here to provide a more personal and in-depth view of nuclear
energy's promise in a restructured electric industry is Corbin McNeill,
whom I have the pleasure of introducing. Mr. McNeill is chairman and
chief executive officer of PECO Energy Company. No doubt you all have
read about PECO's recent decision to join British Energy in acquiring
nuclear power plants around the country. I'll let him tell you why
that's a strong position for his and other utilities as we enter a
competitive marketplace.
STATEMENT OF CORBIN A. McNEILL, JR., CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, PECO ENERGY CO.
Senator Domenici. Mr. McNeill.
Mr. McNeill. Senator Domenici, Senator Reid, my name is
Corbin McNeill. I am chairman and chief executive officer of
PECO Energy Co., an investor-owned utility with headquarters in
Philadelphia. And I thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today to discuss the very important subject of
nuclear energy. PECO Energy operates two nuclear powerplants in
Pennsylvania, and we are part owners of a third powerplant in
New Jersey.
In the interest of time, I will summarize my testimony,
which has been submitted in full for the committee's review.
Pennsylvania, and indeed the entire Nation, is moving
toward competition in electric generation. These changes are
forcing utilities to make critical decisions about their
futures. I and my company believe that nuclear energy must
continue to be an important part of our Nation's generation
capacity. And PECO Energy is committed to nuclear energy. We
formed a joint venture, called Amergen, with British Energy,
the nuclear generating company in Great Britain, to acquire and
operate nuclear plants in North America.
We are doing this because we strongly believe in nuclear
power and that it can, in fact, be competitive when operators
take the following action. First, they must develop a strong
safety culture. Second, they must make investment in plant
reliability in order to sustain high-capacity operation. Third,
operating costs must be reduced to competitive levels. Fourth,
operators must aggressively self-assess for declining
performance and make timely corrective actions as necessary.
And, fifth, units must be consolidated to reduce overhead and
increase the efficiency and economies of scale.
These steps will make existing plants competitive in the
new electric generation marketplace. The entire it, as well as
regulators, must learn that low-cost operation and safety are
not mutually exclusive. Consolidation, process standardization
and a strong performance ethic are keys to success.
Consolidation will reduce overhead and allow expertise and best
practices to be shared among a number of plants. Commonality of
operations will help focus on the processes of operation.
And as noted in the industry's plan for the 21st century,
the NRC has a strong role in sustaining a competitive industry,
by providing an effective, safety-focused regulatory framework.
Currently, nuclear powerplants are regulated to the lowest
common denominator. Plants are evaluated against a scale based
not on public safety but on average industry performance. And
as the industry performance improves, the bar keeps getting
raised higher and higher.
While poor performance should be identified and performance
improved, above-average performers should not be restrained by
inappropriate regulatory standards. What type of regulatory
process is needed?
Well, we believe that the NRC should establish performance
expectations that are directly linked to public health and
safety, and that can be effectively measured. The agency should
also establish a firm safety-based threshold for measuring
plant performance. The Commission should also take guidance
from Vice President Gore's initiative in ``Reinventing
Government.''
For example, during the next decade, a number of nuclear
plants will apply for relicense. And it is estimated that the
NRC will take 2 to 3 years to complete this process for each
plant. I believe that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should
work to put into place processes that, after the first several
plants are relicensed, would permit the completion of
relicensing reviews within 6 months. This would be the
equivalent, at the Government level, of what the industry has
accomplished in recent years in reducing its outage links from
in excess of 100 days to about 30 days.
The energy marketplace is changing very rapidly. All
utilities are repositioning to compete in a new environment.
And the NRC must keep pace with the industry to ensure that
public safety is maintained without jeopardizing the economic
operation of nuclear powerplants.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Thank you very much, and at the end of the presentations I
will be glad to answer any questions that you might have.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Corbin A. McNeill
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, my name is Corbin
McNeill. I am chairman and chief executive officer of PECO Energy
Company, with headquarters in Philadelphia.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
the very important subject of nuclear energy and nuclear regulation in
the United States. PECO Energy operates two nuclear power plants--both
in Pennsylvania.
In the interest of time I will summarize my testimony, which has
been submitted in full for the committee's review.
Pennsylvania, and indeed the entire nation, is moving towards
competition in electric generation. These changes are forcing utilities
to make critical decisions about the future. I believe that nuclear
energy must continue to be an important part of our nation's generation
capacity.
PECO Energy is committed to nuclear energy, and we've formed a
joint venture--AmerGen--with British Energy to purchase and operate
nuclear plants.
We are doing this because we strongly believe nuclear power can be
competitive if operators take certain actions. (1) There must be a
safety culture; (2) Investment must be made in plant reliability to
sustain high capacity operations; (3) Operating costs must be reduced
as much as possible; (4) Operators must aggressively self-assess for
declining performance; and (5) units must be consolidated to reduce
overhead.
These steps can make plants competitive in the new electric
marketplace. The entire industry--as well as regulators--must learn
that low-cost operation and safety can both be achieved. Consolidation,
process standardization and a strong performance ethic are key to
success. Consolidation will reduce overhead and allow expertise and
best practices to be shared. Commonality of operators helps to
eliminate reactionary responses and, instead, focuses on processes.
Currently nuclear power plants are regulated to the lowest common
denominator. Plants are evaluated against a scale based not on public
safety, but on average industry performance. As the industry improves
plant performance, the bar keeps getting higher and higher. Poor
performers should be identified and performance improved. Above average
performers shouldn't be restrained by standards designed to maintain
all plants at a minimum level.
What type of regulatory process is needed? The NRC should establish
performance expectations that are directly linked to public health and
safety and that can be measured effectively.
The agency should also establish a firm, safety-based threshold for
measuring plant performance.
The NRC should take guidance from Vice President Gore's initiative
on reinventing government. For example, during the next decade a number
of nuclear plants will apply for re-licensing. It's estimated that the
NRC will take a year or two to complete this process for each plant. I
believe the Commission should work to put into place processes that,
after the first several plants are re-licensed, would permit the
completion of its re-licensing reviews within six months. This would be
the equivalent at the government level of what the industry has
accomplished in reducing outage lengths to 30 days.
The electricity marketplace is changing rapidly. All utilities are
repositioning to compete in this new environment. The NRC must keep
pace with the industry to ensure public safety without jeopardizing the
economic operation of nuclear power plants.
Thank you and I will gladly answer any questions you may have.
Senator Domenici. Mr. McNeill, maybe you are the right one
to answer this. If you are not, maybe one of the other
panelists would. Japan builds nuclear powerplants. How long did
it take for their last one?
Mr. McNeill. I believe it was on the order of 4\1/2\ years
Kashawazaki No. 4, I believe it was.
Senator Domenici. How long did it take for the last nuclear
powerplant to be built in the United States?
Mr. McNeill. The last nuclear plant in this country was
Wilkes-Barre, which took 23 years.
Senator Domenici. I assume there is a similarity between
the plants?
Mr. McNeill. The technology is very similar, yes.
Senator Domenici. The risks are similar?
Mr. McNeill. I think the risks in Japan may be even a
little bit higher because of the higher earthquake potential
that they have in Japan.
Senator Domenici. Professor Wilson. Again, I want to thank
you personally for joining us. I understand that is a difficult
thing to fly in and come right over here. I did not know I was
doing that to you or I might have held you immune from this.
But I am glad you are here.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD WILSON, PH.D., MALLINCKRODT
PROFESSOR OF PHYSICS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Dr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, Senator Reid, it is certainly an
honor to talk to you today. And I apologize; a copy of my
testimony was first sent by fax and then e-mailed yesterday,
but they got lost somewhere across the Atlantic.
The United States emits 11 percent more carbon dioxide than
in 1990. A Kyoto, we promised to reduce it 8 percent below 1990
levels. If we abandon nuclear power, there will be another
immediate 8 percent increase, not decrease. Can we meet our
international commitments?
Nuclear power, as your chairman has said, is unique in
producing no appreciable particulate air pollution, not
contributing to global warming, and be able to produce power
for 100,000 years at modest cost. But the cost has gone up
threefold in the last 25 years. Twenty-five years ago,
Connecticut Yankee Nuclear Powerplant was producing energy at
55 cents a kilowatt hour, including some payment of the
mortgage. The actual operating cost was probably about 4 cents
a kilowatt hour. Now, it has been permanently shut down because
it costs 3.7 cents a kilowatt, a ninefold increase in operating
costs.
In most technologies, there is a learning curve. In this
one we have an unlearning, or a forgetting, curve. In 1980, the
question was, why should any utility company go nuclear? Now,
the question is, why should any utility company stay nuclear?
Not one unless the costs can come down or the environmental
costs of coal burning can be internalized to keep the relative
costs up.
Why have the costs gone up? What can we do to bring them
down?
Many people suggested that a major problem is the
regulation is more than needed for adequate safety, and this
increases the cost. In particular, regulation is too
prescriptive and not based on performance. Often the response
to regulation is to increase staff. The staff number at the
Dresden Powerplant went from 250 in 1975 to over 1,300 today.
This costs money, and I do not think it increases safety.
Senator Domenici. Would you repeat that statement, please?
Dr. Wilson. This costs money, but I do not believe it
appreciably increases safety.
Senator Domenici. The number, too, please.
Dr. Wilson. According to Wally Banke, the numbers at the
Dresden Powerplant went from 250 in 1975 to 1,300 today.
Mr. McNeill. Those are not unusual.
Dr. Wilson. In 1974, when the AEC was split, the NRC had no
mandate to keep nuclear powerplants in operation, unlike the
former AEC, but only to ensure that they operate without undue
risk to the public. It was left to the Department of Energy to
promote nuclear energy and to provide a balance.
It is important to realize the utility companies cannot
provide this balance themselves. Every regulator has the
ability to keep a powerplant shut down for an extra day, which
costs $1 million. This is an extraordinary power, which few
utility companies know how to cope with.
If there is no one actively from outside promoting nuclear
energy, regulation will inevitably become more strict, and will
force unnecessary price increases, until price competition
destroys the industry.
I think two steps are necessary. The first is to find more
efficient regulation; and the second, to find a group which
will play the active promotional role that is so necessary in
the U.S. system. The first step was already begun by the first
Commission under the astronaut, Bill Anders, 14 years ago.
After 2 years of public hearings, the NRC set radiation safety
goals. The radiation exposure should be reduced if it costs
less than $1,000 per man-REM, now increased to $2,000 per man-
REM. A corollary to this, which was implied but not stated, is
if a proposed dose-reducing action would cost more than this,
it should not be done.
In the 1980's, the Commission promulgated a set of safety
goals. These were calculated and based on keeping it lower than
the risks of other technologies. A subsidiary safety goal which
I will address here was to keep the frequency of core melt to
less than 1 in 10,000 years per reactor. Safety improvements
must be made to keep the core melt below that amount.
Presumably, steps to reduce the frequency still further were
unwarranted unless particularly cheap.
Studies can be made retrospectively to see whether the
regulations are such that these goals are met. An independent
study at Harvard School of Public Health suggests the rad waste
regulations cost $1 million per man-REM, which is a thousand
times the goal. That seems a waste of money.
A PRA can be used to discuss retrospectively whether the
safety of the reactions, designed and operated under existing
regulations, are safer or less safe. If they do not meet the
goal, they should be tightened. If they do meet the goal, with
a large margin, regulations can be relaxed.
For example, 8 years ago, the NRC had a study of four
typical reactors in new regulation 1150. It was found that core
melt was always less than this amount. Nonetheless, they were
proposing safety improvements. And when I am on a committee I
propose that either the goals were wrong, the calculation was
wrong, or they were being made to save money. Unfortunately, in
a somewhat isolated case, they decided not to push the
movements.
If you have gone too far and you have a structure and you
have deliberate violations then, of course, it is much more
difficult. But even here, I would suggest a graded response. A
powerplant must be shut down, as it was at Millstone in
Connecticut 2 years ago, but only until the NRC could determine
whether the safety goals were exceeded.
Now, several successive administrations have felt it
desirable to tighten up regulations in order to convince the
public they are no pushover. I think it is wrong. Far better it
would be to study, know, understand, and explain to the public
what the problems do to safety.
Now, the NRC recent record in the above respects is, I
think, abominable. Over 2 years ago, I asked the chairman of
the Commission, by fax, what the technical problems at
Millstone Point were, and what effect they had on safety. I
still have not had a reply from the chairman. But after 2
months, I got a reply from the director of regulation, who gave
me a two-page comment on procedural violations, but nothing on
safety.
No one, within or without the Commission, has challenged my
contention, repeated many times since then, the effect of the
procedural violation that caused the shutdown was a change of
about 1 in 100,000 in core melt frequency--less than 10 percent
of the safety goals. Yet, why do they make such a big thing of
it?
Twenty-five years ago, when I started my interest, I sent a
two-page letter to the chairman of the AEC, with about one or
two dozen criticisms. Three days later, I got a personal phone
call from Dr. Glenn Seborg, and I spent 3 days with him and his
staff down at the AEC. He introduced me to all his staff and
answered the questions. These were the secrecy and coverup of
the bad old days. I personally prefer them.
Senator Domenici. Were you more renowned when you were
young?
Dr. Wilson. No. [Laughter.]
But I was probably more competent. [Laughter.]
Senator Domenici. I doubt that, too.
Dr. Wilson. So, it was calculated that the cost of the
overregulation at Millstone was huge. It is about $3 million a
day, or $2 billion so far. The effect on public health is
important to realize. It is absolutely enormous. Because energy
has been produced largely by coal-burning powerplants, there
have been particulants emitted. I calculate, using the numbers
in this book--of which we sent you a copy last year--there have
been 400 deaths so far due to that particular action.
Now, other utility companies have got the message of what
happened at Millstone: Get out of nuclear power as fast as you
can.
It was calculations such as those I have just done here for
you that led the late Senator Tsongas to say that he did not
understand how anyone who preferred coal to nuclear power could
call himself an environmentalist. I urge NRC once again to act
in the public interest and according to their own safety goals
to change regulations in either direction to match those goals.
When there is a procedural violation that has safety
consequences which are within those goals to give a slap on the
wrist rather than an execution.
PREPARED STATEMENT
I think I would prefer them to be like W.S. Gilbert's
Mikado, who made it an object oh sublime to make the punishment
fit the crime. And let us hope that it will be achieved in
time, before the nuclear industry is destroyed.
Thank you.
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard Wilson
Mr Chairman, Senator Reid, ladies and gentlemen. It is an honor to
be invited to talk to you today.
In the USA we now emit 11 percent more CO2 than in 1990;
and at Kyoto we promised to reduce CO2 emissions to 8
percent below 1990 levels in 10 years for a decrease of 19 percent
below today's levels. If all the electricity now generated by nuclear
power were to be generated by coal that would increase CO2
another 8 percent making it more difficult if we abandon nuclear power.
As we ponder whether the U.S. will meet the commitment made at Kyoto,
one fact stands out. That of all the alternate fuels nuclear power is
alone in producing no appreciable particulate air pollution, not
contributing to global warming and, if we develop a breeder reactor
being able to produce power for 100,000 years at modest cost. The
present problem is that both the construction cost and the operating
cost has risen between two and threefold in the last considerably in
the last 25 years. It is more expensive than fossil fuels and begins to
approach the costs of some of the solar energy alternatives.
25 years ago, Maine Yankee nuclear power plant had just been
completed for $180 million, or $200 per day installed capacity.
Connecticut Yankee nuclear power plant was producing electricity at
0.55 cents per kWh busbar cost, some part of which was paying off the
mortgage. The operating cost was perhaps only 0.4 cents per kWh. Now,
25 years later, the most recently completed nuclear power plants cost
at least $2,000 per installed kWe of capacity, 10 times the 1972 cost,
and Connecticut Yankee is being permanently shut down because it costs
3.7 c/kwh, 9 times the 1972 cost even though the mortgage is fully
paid. Yet inflation can only account for a part--perhaps a factor of
2.5 to 3--of this.
In most technologies there is a learning curve and are cheaper as
time goes on. In this technology we have an unlearning or forgetting
curve. Numbers that I have seen from France give an average cost of
nuclear electricity including all costs, of 2.9 cents/kwh, whereas a
similar number in the U.S. averaged over all plants operating in 1995
was 5 cents/kwh (this ignores costs of plants, like Shoreham, which
were abandoned for political or other reasons). More generally, the
operating costs of the best operated nuclear power plants in the USA
are now about 1.8 cents per kwh compared to a coal cost of about 1.6
cents a kwh. Construction costs are much more. In 1980 the question was
``Why should any utility company go nuclear?'' In 1998 the question is
``why should any utility company stay nuclear?''
Not one unless the costs can come down or unless the environmental
costs of coal burning can be internalized to increase the coal price. I
have pointed out this problem before (Wilson 1994, 1996) and note that
if the present trend continues half our nuclear power plants will be
gone in 10 years and we will have no nuclear power plants at all in the
USA by 2017. Yet if Parkinson (1957) is right the regulatory authority
will still be expanding many years later!
Why has the cost gone up? What must we do to bring it down again?
Various ideas include the following:
--In 1970 manufacturers built turnkey plants or otherwise sold cheap
reactors as loss leaders. But this can only account for a small
proportion of the capital cost.
--Construction costs generally have risen in this time.
--It may be that in 1972 we had good management and good technical
people. But why has management got worse when that has not been
true for other technologies?
--It is probable that nuclear power plants are safer today than they
were in 1972. But it would be hard to argue that the actual
safety improvements have cost that much money. Most are a
result of more careful thought using such approaches as event
tree analysis, but without excessive hardware expense.
--Many people have suggested that the problem is that the regulation
is more than needed for adequate safety and this increases the
cost (Towers-Perrin 1995). In particular that it is too
prescriptive and not based upon performance.
--The response to many regulations is to increase staff. The staff
numbers at the Dresden power plant went from 250 in 1975 to
over 1,300 today (Benhke 1997).
--The problem is not unique to the USA. In the UK the Atomic Energy
Authority had to spend a lot of money making the plant as
earthquake proof as an operating reactor--yet the inventory of
dangerous material is far less and the danger of recriticality
remote (Hill 1997).
I want to address here the problem of regulation and the intricate
and complex relationship between regulator and licensee. Although not
an expert, I claim one advantage: I look on the problem from outside
and I keep the three fundamental societal aims in mind.
the fundamental need for balance in regulation
When the U.S. NRC was separated in 1974-5 from the old Atomic
Energy Commission it was insisted that the promotional role of nuclear
energy be separated from the regulatory role. It was already
geographically separated by putting the promotional arm in Germantown
and the regulatory arm of AEC in Bethesda. But unlike the mandate given
to the AEC by the Atomic Energy Act of 1945, the NRC has no mandate to
keep power plants in operation--only to ensure that the power plants
operate without undue risk to the public. It was left to ERDA and now
the Department of Energy to promote nuclear energy and to provide the
balance. It is important to realize that the utility companies cannot
and will not by themselves perform this function of balance. The
utility companies are under close local or regional control, and
historically have shown extreme reluctance to challenge any regulatory
body. There is a great unbalance in power. A regulator often has the
ability to keep a power plant shut down for an extra day--an action
which costs the utility company $1,000,000 per day. There is no
counterbalance to ensure that this power is used wisely and well. The
Nuclear Regulatory Commission has been sued in the courts, (in what
seems to be the preferred procedure in the USA for obtaining balance)
by one or another group opposed to nuclear power, but to the best of my
knowledge has not been sued by utility companies. Any regulator will
automatically adjust his strategy to minimize lawsuits--and probably
that is easiest done by ensuring that the number of lawsuits from each
side is equal. If there is no one actively promoting nuclear energy,
therefore, the regulation will inevitably become more strict and will
force unnecessary price rises until price competition destroys the
industry.
How can we regain the balance in regulation? I submit that two
steps are necessary. The first is a procedure to decide to regulate
nuclear power in a more efficient way (including deciding upon how much
regulation is necessary) and the second to find a group which will play
the active promotional role that is so necessary in the U.S. system and
those patterned after it.
The first step was already begun by the first Commission to take
office some 14 years ago when astronaut Bill Anders was chairman. After
2 years of public hearings started by the AEC the NRC set some
radiation and safety guidelines. (NRC 1975). The Commission proposed
that expenditure on radiation exposure reduction should be made if it
costs less than $1,000 per ManRem, now doubled to $2,000 (Kress 1994)--
a number higher than anyone in the hearing had proposed. A corollary
was implied but not explicitly stated. If a proposed dose-reducing
action would cost more than this, it should NOT be done.
In the 1980's the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS)
made a study that led to the promulgation by the Commission of a set of
SAFETY GOALS. These were appropriately related to the safety of
individuals living near a power plant. The risk must be appreciably
less (10 percent or so) of that of another electricity generating
facility. But it was recognized that such safety goals were difficult
to implement and a subsidiary safety goal was promulgated that the
frequency of core melt must be kept to less than 1 in 10,000 years per
reactor. Safety improvements must be made to keep the core melt
frequency below that amount. Although not stated, it was implied that
steps to decrease core melt frequency still further were unwarranted
and it was not worth the expense to undertake them. For simplicity I
will address this ``intermediate'' safety goal here but the same
argument can be applied to the more fundamental safety goal.
There is a fundamental problem in implementing GOALS as opposed to
issuing or following regulations. There is no definitive way of
proceeding. But studies can be made retrospectively to see whether they
are met. Clearly the $2,000 per Man Rem is a safety goal. An
independent study (Tengs et al. 1995) suggests expenditures in the
nuclear industry for RADWASTE have been 1,000 times this amount. It
seems that either the regulations (in this case probably the Technical
specifications) are stricter than needed, that the industry is spending
more than the regulations call for, or the total amount of money is so
small it is not worth worrying about. The procedure does not, however
suggest how they be relaxed or whether the cost decrease is large
enough to be worth the bother. I suggest that the nuclear plant
operators and the NRC, perhaps aided by IAEA since it is an
international problem, should study the matter with some urgency.
Similarly the ACRS has repeatedly stated that it is not sensible to
regulate on the basis of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). But a
PRA CAN be used to discuss retrospectively whether reactors that were
designed and operate under existing regulations meet the goals. If they
meet them, fine. If they do not regulations must be tightened. On the
other hand if the safety goals are met with a large margin maybe the
regulations can be relaxed. Indeed the important parts of a PRA can now
be put on a small PC or laptop so that the effect of any small change
in procedures can be quickly calculated.
An example of how the use of this concept can prevent unnecessary
regulation occurred some 8 years ago. A very careful PRA was done by
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC 1987) for a number of
``typical'' nuclear power plants including an early Boiling Water
Reactor (BWR). In all cases it was found that the core melt probability
was LESS than one in ten thousand per year. There are uncertainties
about this calculation, and there has been some discussion about
whether one should take the median, the mean or the mode of the
probability distribution. I have argued elsewhere that one should take
the mean, and do so in what follows. An immediate use of this argument
was discussed at an NRC research advisory group meeting. The NRC staff
was suggesting addition of safety devices to BWR Mark I reactors to
improve safety. I, as a member of that advisory committee, pointed out
that these reactors met the safety goal with flying colors. Either the
safety goals were wrong, or the NRC's research program that produced
NRC 1150 was useless, or the staff suggestion was excessive. The
committee agreed with me and so did the director of regulation. In this
case the staff suggestion was dropped. Unfortunately this was an
isolated instance. It was also an instance in which regulation was not
increased rather than an instance in which it was actually decreased.
Reducing regulatory requirements is FAR more difficult. However, I urge
that NRC have a formal and MUCH more rapid procedure for examining
regulations.
Shortly thereafter I was asked to be Chairman of a task force
reviewing the safety of the nuclear power plants in Taiwan on behalf of
the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The director of regulation in Taiwan
told us that he accepted the idea of guidelines but wanted to have the
core melt frequency to be less than 1 in 100,000. I asked why he wanted
it to be so low when the careful studies by NRC thought that 1 in
10,000 was low enough. The reply was that ``industry can meet it''.
Maybe so. In the event, I believe that Taiwan did NOT change the safety
goal. Since the power plants, which were U.S. designed and very well
run meet the 1 in 10,000 goal easily that leaves wiggle room for the
utility company (TAIPOWER) to cope with occasional lapses of their
staff and an occasional overzealous regulator. The ROC AEC can, by
using PRA can easily justify their goal to the public and TAIPOWER can
proudly tell the public that they are doing even better.
Hard though it is to reduce the severity of a regulation, it is
harder to forgive a deliberate violation of regulations even when that
violation does not result in any safety goal being exceeded. But again
I urge immediate and rapid effort in this direction. If there has been
a procedural violation the NRC must of course act in some way because
such violations can escalate. But I suggest a graded response. The
power plant might be shut down, as were the four power plants at
Millstone and Connecticut 2 years ago, but only until NRC can determine
whether or not the violation led to exceeding the safety goals. With
fast computers a PRA can be set up to do such an analysis within a week
or two at most. If a safety goal was NOT violated, it seems a clear
indication that the regulation or technical specification was too
strict and it could be modified and the reactor allowed to restart with
no further ``punishment''.
Of course utility company staffs and in particular utility company
managements are often the most to blame. We have seen in the late
1970's how TVA went in a few years from one of the best utility
companies to one of the worst. In the early 1990's Ontario Hydro went
from having the highest plant availability of any reactors in the world
to being among the lowest. Many observers attribute each of these to a
change in top management. There is less agreement on whether the
management was malevolent (antinuclear) or merely incompetent. The
Ontario hydro board used to have one person who understood nuclear
technology--now it has none. (But the management incorrectly in my view
insist that the only problem is on the shop floor). But the regulatory
structure should be able to cope with this. If it is necessary (and I
do not believe it is) to always have perfect regulators and perfect
management to run nuclear power, there is no hope that costs can be
reduced. Fortunately the PRA confirms for us that light water reactors
are a forgiving technology. Northeast Utilities had clear management
problems. The costs were one of the highest and in an effort to reduce
costs there was, and is a temptation to cut corners. In addition there
are cases of inadequate regulation. That usually comes from inadequate
alertness. There are also occasional ``whistle blowers'' who for
whatever reason raise issues that they feel have been neglected. In
such situations there is a temptation for a regulatory authority to
tighten up all round in the hope of reassuring the public. Indeed
several successive Chairmen of NRC recently seem to have felt it
politically desirable to do something dramatic to tighten up
regulations in an attempt to convince the public that they are no
pushover for industry. I do not believe that it does reassure the
public. I believe it makes matters worse, by implying that the
regulatory action had been too lax. Far better would be to study, know,
understand and explain to the public the effect that such problems have
on safety. As noted above, we now have the techniques of PRA available
to ensure the completeness which is otherwise so difficult. I suggest a
joint approach by utility companies--perhaps through the Institute of
Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)--the NRC and academia (hopefully with
funding from DOE) to study the critical interaction between regulator
and licensee--always with a background of the risks of other energy
technologies as discussed in Comparative Risk Assessment (CRA). Even
though regulatory procedures vary between countries IAEA could also
play an important role.
The above would NOT be promotion of nuclear power. It is less clear
to me how to achieve my second step and who should play the active role
of promoter of nuclear power. Who should constantly call the regulator
to task when he takes actions that exceed his own goals. In the USA
that would have to involve lawsuits because that is where the action
finally occurs in any subject. I suspect that is not politically
possible for the Department of Energy (DOE) and to that extent the
political concept of 1973 when the AEC was broken up was fatally
flawed. Other mechanisms must be found.
In 1987 six Long Island residents started a lawsuit nominally
against Long Island Lighting Company but really against New York State,
(with a supporting brief by a Department of Energy more friendly to
nuclear power than the present department) in an effort to prevent them
dismantling the Shoreham nuclear power plant without filing an
environmental impact statement--and in that statement would have
inevitably had to contradict the comments of Governor Cuomo's staff in
the previous EIS that nuclear power is environmentally advantageous.
This suggests to me that a publicly minded group of scientists, who are
concerned about the three environmental issues with which I began this
paper should form a group to be watchdogs and file suit to enforce fair
regulation when appropriate. Unless something is done, I do not think
that nuclear power in the short term will survive.
The NRC's recent record in the above respects is abominable. I
mentioned above that the radwaste regulations cost 1,000 times too
much. The actions at Millstone point were vastly exaggerated also. Over
2 years ago I asked the Chairman of the Commission by FAX what the
technical problems were and what effect they had on safety. I have had
no reply but after 2 months I did get a reply from the Director of
Regulation, since resigned, who gave me a 2 page comment on procedural
violations. NO ONE within or without the commission has challenged my
contention, repeated many times since then that the effect of the
procedural violation that caused the shut down was a change of perhaps
1 in 100,000 per year in core melt probability. The NRC should have
been able to realize within 2 weeks that this is one-tenth of their
safety goal and that the draconian action was unnecessary.
Although many people, in Congress and in the press talk about the
evils of the old AEC it is noteworthy than in those ``bad old days''
response to criticism was much faster and more substantive. 25 years
ago when I started my interest in energy and environmental matters I
wrote to the Chairman of the AEC a 2 page letter with a dozen or more
criticisms. 3 days later Dr. Glenn Seaborg, not a secretary, telephoned
me and invited me to spend 3 days with him and his staff going over
detailed responses. During the first 3 hours in Dr. Seaborg's office I
was introduced to each of the appropriate Assistant Secretaries who
answered my queries to the best of my ability and directed me to
further sources. That was the secrecy and cover up in the ``bad old
days'' about which we repeatedly hear complaints.
The cost of the over regulation at Millstone is huge and seems to
have been deliberately understated in many reports so far. I take it
here to be the busbar cost of replacement electricity of about
$3,000,000 a day or 2 billion dollars so far. The effect on public
health is also huge. Supposing the replacement electricity to come from
a mixture of fossil fuels and hydro power in the average proportions,
each power plant replacement costs over 50 premature deaths a year from
air pollution, (Wilson and Spengler 1996) or over 400 deaths so far.
Other utility companies have got the message: ``Get out of nuclear
power as fast as you can''.
Indeed it is calculations such as this that led former Senator
Tsongas to declare ``I do not see how anyone who prefers burning coal
to nuclear power can call himself an environmentalist''.
I urge NRC to begin once again to act in the public interest and
according to their own safety goals. To change regulations too, in
either direction, to match these goals. When there is a procedural
violation that has safety consequences that are within these goals to
give a slap on the wrist rather than an execution. I urge each
commissioner to take the approach of W.S. Gilbert's Mikado who made it
``an object all sublime * * * to make the punishment fit the crime''.
Let us hope that it will be achieved in time--before the nuclear
industry is destroyed.
REFERENCES
Benkhe W. (1997) Communication from W. Benkhe, former C.E.O. of
Commonwealth Edison Co. owner and operator of Dresden II and Dresden
III.
CMP (1972) Report from Central Maine Power, Majority Owner of Maine
Yankee. This cost does not include a (later) cost of $20 million to
remove a causeway and improve tidal flow in the coolant estuary (which
many experts thought was unnecessary and certainly would NOT and have
been, and was not demanded of a fossil fuel plant).
Hill, J. (1997) communication to the author by Sir John Hill,
Chairman of the UK Atomic Energy Authority at the time.
Kress, T. (1994) Report to Nuclear Regulatory Commission from the
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards NRC (1975) Rule making RM-30-
2.
NRC (1987) Nuclear Regulatory Commission report NUREG 1150.
NYT (1996) Figures reported in the New York Times.
Parkinson, C.N. (1957) ``Parkinson's Law'' page 12, Heighten
Mifflin, Boston.
Tengs, T., et al (1995) ``Five hundred life saving interventions
and their cost effectiveness'' Risk Analysis 15:369.
Towers and Perrin (1995) report to Nuclear Energy Institute.
Webster W. (1972) Letter from William Webster, President of NE
Electric System to Richard Wilson.
Wilson R. (1994) ``The Potential for Nuclear Power'' in Global
Energy Strategies: Living with Restricted Greenhouse Gas Emissions,
edited by J.C. White, Plenum Press, NY, pp. 27-45.
Wilson, R. and Spengler, J.D. Eds. (1996) ``Particles in Our Air:
Concentrations and Health Effects'' Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA 02138.
Wilson R. (1999) ``Overregulation and other Problems of Nuclear
Power'' Presented at the Global Foundation Conference, Washington, DC,
October 1998.
Senator Domenici. Could I ask any of you who feel most
expert, I am going to go during the Fourth of July recess--
since I have decided that this cause--not just nuclear power,
but the whole issue of nuclear activities--needs to be looked
at, I intend to vote some of my time to that--in fact,
formidable time to it--I am going to go to France, and then I
am going to go to Russia.
In France, we are going to see how they do their system and
what happens to their waste. And then, in Russia, we are going
to talk about their notion of how valuable plutonium, in terms
of reuse, and see if we cannot generate some exciting
conversation between Russia and America on some way to
accelerate the disposition of their plutonium from dismantling
nuclear arms--and ours--through using MOX facilities around the
world. That is just a new concept, but anyway it has gathered a
bit of excitement.
But, essentially, I built my premise that I wanted to ask
Congress, and ultimately the people, to take another look at
things on essentially the proposal and the idea that President
Jimmy Carter came up with, that we would not have any MOX, that
we would not use reprocessing of the MOX kind. We are now going
to have to do some of that in the dismantling process, but we
are going very, very slowly at it.
Could any of you tell me what is essentially the difference
in the way we are treating our nuclear waste from civilian
reactors versus France? My friend from Nevada comes from a
State that the United States has already spent $6.5 billion
exploring the idea of putting a tunnel in a mountain so that we
can put the spent fuel from civilian reactors, high-level
waste, so we can put it in there and feel safe for, what are we
thinking, 200,000 years. And we are asking the computers and
the technology people to be able to give us simulation and
other things to prove it can be done.
Not only have we not started building it, we still have not
proved it to be viable under the conditions imposed for the
safekeeping. Maybe those conditions are too extreme, but,
nonetheless, here we sit. We have a policy, since President
Carter's time, that says we will not reprocess using the MOX
approach because it may produce plutonium and spread it around
the world so that it could be used for nuclear weapons.
The interesting thing is that we did that based on the
proposition that nobody would do it, and that if we set the
standard nobody would do that. But it was a good decision, it
was almost entirely based on that. Other countries have not
seen fit to follow suit and, in fact, are doing that.
So, with that background, what distinguishes what France is
doing wastewise to what America is doing wastewise, in terms of
the cycle?
Mr. Colvin. Mr. Chairman, let me give that a shot. I think
it is important to say by way of background that you have to
remember that the United States pioneered this technology. And
when you compare the United States against a country such as
France, you have to remember that, in fact, the technology that
we pioneered was transferred to the French, and, in fact, they
have operated that exceptionally well. And with that, they have
learned the tremendous lessons of what to do and perhaps what
not to do in the operation of this technology and, in
particular, as it relates to the waste stream.
Basically, the French program takes the waste byproducts
from spent fuel, reprocesses that once, twice, three times;
uses the materials out of the reprocessing and puts that back
into new fuel. In essence, they are reprocessing their fuel.
That leaves you with a smaller waste stream that has a long-
lived activity and that needs disposal.
And they are currently storing that waste stream, that
byproduct, which is significantly less in volume and, in some
cases perhaps less in longer-lived activities because of that--
they are currently, like we are evaluating Yucca Mountain, the
French have, as I understand, two laboratories that they have
established to evaluate the long-term geologic disposal of
their waste stream.
I must say that in this discussion you have to remember
that the volumes of that waste stream ultimately, in a
reprocessing cycle, will be significantly less than a once-
through fuel cycle that we are using currently in the United
States.
Senator Domenici. Yes; Dr. Jenkins-Smith.
Dr. Jenkins-Smith. Senator Domenici, the other aspect of
it, again, from the public perception side and the public
acceptance side, that distinguishes the French and the American
systems is that in the United States we have approached nuclear
waste as a disposal process. We are taking spent fuel and we
are planning to poke it in a hole and cork it, as it is crudely
often put.
The French approach has been to designate these as
laboratories. In fact, the siting of the repository process
focused on the creation of facilities to explore future
enhancements in safety, reductions in volume and alternative
utilization. So, it was not simply creating a repository or, as
it is often colloquially known in the United States, as a dump,
but it was the creation of a high-tech facility that would
generate benefit streams in the future.
People view that very, very differently. And in experiments
we have done, looking at the public reaction to policy
modifications for repositories and even transport programs,
when people believe that the waste is actually going to be used
for these kinds of beneficial future activities support for the
programs goes up substantially.
Senator Domenici. Yes; please, Dr. Wilson.
Dr. Wilson. Senator Domenici, in response to the question,
I would say that it is important to realize that there is a
different fundamental concept started in much of Europe than
here. Here we had the idea, which I think was an erroneous one,
that you put the waste in the ground in such a way that you can
now forget about it forever. And there they have the idea that
you can do something with it and look after it in a modest way.
There is no doubt in my mind that the waste from a
powerplant is much safer than operating a powerplant. And you
can put it next to a powerplant, as we are doing sometimes,
without appreciably increasing any risk to anybody. So, when
you are monitoring it and keeping it all the time under your
eye, there is, it seems to me, no technical problem whatsoever.
Added to that, of course, as you pointed out earlier, we do
not compare things. There was a waste product of a lot of
activities called arsenic. It comes naturally. Once you dig
something in the ground you dig arsenic up, particularly in the
West and in California. And that arsenic is carcinogenic. It is
very nasty stuff. And in comparison with nuclear waste, it has
one major disadvantage: nuclear waste lasts maybe 30 years for
most of it, a few thousand years for some of it; arsenic lasts
forever.
Senator Domenici. I have two more quick questions here, and
then I will yield to Senator Reid.
I note the presence of the chairman of the full
Appropriations Committee, Senator Ted Stevens. Senator, thank
you very much for joining us. And whenever you would like to
inquire or be heard, it will be your turn.
Let me just ask, what is the comparable risk of the French
and the United States fuel cycle? Is one more dangerous than
the other, more risky than the other? Is one safer than the
other? Can somebody answer that?
Mr. Colvin. Yes; Mr. Chairman, off the top of my head, I do
not know the specific answer. I think that I could say pretty
realistically that when you look at it from a public health and
safety perspective, as Dr. Wilson has indicated, the risk
levels that we are talking about in the disposal and storage or
the reprocessing of nuclear waste are significantly below the
levels that we typically look at from a public health and
safety risk standpoint.
I mean, whether we are talking about automobile or airline
travel or we are talking about other types of public risk, we
are operating at much lower levels. And I do not think if we
did that comparison that there would be a significant
difference. It would probably be in the range, as Dr. Jenkins-
Smith said, of 10 to the minus 6, 10 to the minus 7 types of
numbers. It probably would not be significant from a public
health and safety standpoint.
Mr. McNeill. MOX fuel is used in many locations in Europe,
not just in France.
Senator Domenici. Right.
Mr. McNeill. And MOX fuel is a well-established fuel regime
that, to my knowledge, has no perceptible risk difference
between normal uranium fuel and MOX.
Dr. Wilson. I think it is important that of 35 reactors
licensed in Europe to handle MOX fuel, and I think 22 of them
have MOX fuel in them at the present moment.
Senator Domenici. Have what?
Dr. Wilson. Have MOX fuel at the present moment. And if you
took all the likely reactors now licensed to handle MOX fuel,
you could dispose of all the military plutonium we want to
dispose of within about 18 months. And all you have to do is to
decide to do it.
Senator Domenici. You understand what the purpose of the
trip to Russia is now?
Dr. Wilson. Yes, indeed.
Senator Domenici. Now, let me ask, do the United States or
French nuclear workers, in any of your opinion, and the public
receive higher doses of radiation?
Mr. McNeill. Not to my knowledge.
Senator Domenici. Anybody else?
Mr. Colvin. No, sir.
Dr. Wilson. Approximately the same.
Senator Domenici. Approximately the same?
Dr. Wilson. That is right. It depends on exactly what years
you are comparing.
Senator Domenici. Mr. McNeill, we recognize the tremendous
commitment by a utility to decide to build and operate a
nuclear powerplant in today's climate in the United States.
What would it take to get an advanced reactor designed in this
country built with industry support?
Mr. McNeill. Well, our interest currently is more in
acquiring the operating plants and continuing to operate those.
Because we think that they have a cost basis that is
competitive. I believe that for a new plant in the United
States, in the short term, we would undoubtedly need some form
of governmental support for that. Because the first-of-a-kind
construction of one of the new plants has high upfront costs in
the cycle, and may not be competitive with other forms of
generation right now.
But as those forms of generation--the cost of fuel for gas
plants or the construction costs rise for other forms of
generation, there will be a time in the not too distant future
when the economics of a new nuclear plant will make them
competitive.
Senator Domenici. Senator Reid, I am going to yield to you
now. I just wanted to make the point with reference to an issue
that has been part of your responsibility in behalf of your
State that what we are talking about when we speak of MOX fuel,
we are talking about a mixed oxide [MOX] reprocessing that
takes the spent fuel that we are contemplating moving to your
State by the truckloads and putting in the mountain, we are
talking about reprocessing that. And not all of the residue,
but substantial portions of the residue are then used in
nuclear reactors to produce more energy.
Now, that is typical of what people think when they speak
of reprocessing. But in the United States, we have a policy of
ancient origins, 30 years ago or 40 years ago, that says we
cannot do that. I understand why you would be very interested
in reprocessing in that context, not only because you have
begun to pay close attention to the energy needs of America,
but you have a very real problem that is demonstrable changed
if, in fact, we went in a different direction.
I yield to you.
Senator Reid. Mr. Chairman, that is why I appreciate your
holding these hearings.
No matter how we do the poll numbers, I think
realistically, Mr. McNeill, to get Federal Government support
to build a new nuclear powerplant any place in this country is
farfetched at this stage.
Mr. McNeill. And I did not call for that.
Senator Reid. I know that. And I understand that you were
not advocating it. You were just saying that the industry, to
build a nuclear powerplant, is going to have to get some help.
Mr. McNeill. In the short term, yes.
Senator Reid. That is right.
And I think the way the mindset of the American public is,
as articulated by the Congress, it is not going to happen now.
And that is why I commend Senator Domenici for holding these
hearings. We have to look at doing some of these things
differently.
Dr. Wilson, your statement, I think, said volumes.
Professor, you said--and I would like for you to expand on your
comments about how safe it is to store waste near the plants.
As you know, we have out here at Calvert Hills, in Maryland,
and other places, where they are storing not only in the
cooling ponds, but they have moved it one step further and they
have dry cask storage containment on site.
Now, I would like for you to expand on your comments about
how safe it is to store nuclear waste on site.
Dr. Wilson. I think it is a very safe procedure. And I know
in Europe that was very strongly encouraged, certainly when I
first started thinking about this 30 years or 25 years ago. One
of the main things you need is already in existence. That is to
say a site perimeter where you keep out for their safety
reasons. And that is rather important. If you have them off
site and on a site remote from a powerplant, you do not have
that safety perimeter. So, all you have to do is to keep people
away from the waste, and then you are in good shape.
I suppose the one thing I think would be if a meteor hits
the nuclear waste cask, I think all bets are off. It would be
quite a mess.
Senator Reid. If a meteor hit.
Dr. Wilson. It would be quite a mess whether the waste cask
was there or not.
Senator Reid. It would be kind of a mess, as you have
indicated, whether the casks are there or not?
Dr. Wilson. That is right.
But those are the sort of calculations that people are
doing when they are trying to prove that Yucca Mountain is safe
and trying to imagine what would happen in rather extreme
circumstances. And if those extreme circumstances happened,
there would be a lot of other troubles, too.
Senator Reid. But as you said, Dr. Wilson, these same
calculations about the meteor would also apply to onsite
storage.
Dr. Wilson. Of course.
Senator Reid. Now, Mr. McNeill, what is the average life
expectancy of nuclear power in the country today if there is no
relicensing?
Mr. McNeill. If there is no relicensing, plants were
originally licensed for 40 years.
Senator Reid. And I have been told the average life
expectancy for nuclear power, based upon those calculations, is
about 15 years.
Mr. McNeill. I guess the average remaining life of all
plants is in the 15- to 20-year range, yes.
Senator Reid. How many nuclear powerplants are there in
America today?
Mr. McNeill. Slightly over 100.
Senator Reid. That is my understanding. For $7 billion
which we have spent already at Yucca Mountain, what could we do
to build a--it is my understanding it is called a breeder
reactor, to start reprocessing some of these plants--how much
would it cost to build a breeder reactor facility to start
reprocessing some of our spent fuel?
Mr. McNeill. I have no knowledge of that. It would be
probably be in the single-digit billions of dollars.
Senator Reid. It would not be $7 billion?
Mr. McNeill. I do not know that. I have a two-unit station
that the original cost was $6.7 billion. So, the same
comparable number.
Senator Reid. Dr. Wilson, would you agree?
Dr. Wilson. Well, I think there is an important distinction
here. You do not, in the first instance, need a breeder
reactor. You need a reprocessing plant. And we have had, of
course, reprocessing plants in this country, certainly in the
military sector. In fact, the first use of nuclear fission was
to reprocess the material and make plutonium for military
purposes.
But a reprocessing plant for civilian purposes will be in
the billions, I think, but probably not $8 billion. But I must
say, the Japanese, on the other hand, did spend a lot of money
on their reprocessing plant--close to $20 billion. And
everybody thinks that was much too much.
Senator Domenici. Senator, England spent $3 billion for
their MOX reprocessing.
Dr. Wilson. That is right.
Senator Domenici. And the difference between the breeding
and MOX is breeding is used to produce more plutonium. MOX is
used to make plutonium such that it can be burnt in the kind of
reactors that produce electricity around the world.
Senator, did you have any more questions?
Senator Reid. Not at this time.
Senator Domenici. Senator Stevens.
Senator Stevens. I have no questions.
Senator Domenici. Senator Craig.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR LARRY E. CRAIG
Senator Craig. I came late, Mr. Chairman, and I do not have
questions. I will make a very brief comment, and ask unanimous
consent that my statement become a part of the record.
I thank you for pushing the envelope on the knowledge that
this Senate has to gain as it relates to our nuclear generation
industry in this country. For those who are frustrated by it, I
would only ask them that in areas where we are in search of
reaching attainment in clean air, we are going to build some
more new nuclear plants to get there, plain and simple. We have
got to.
And the environmental community is beginning to awaken to
that simple fact: that our country runs on energy, abundant
energy, and that to clean up our congested urban areas, a lot
of things need to get done. And to get there, we have got to,
whether it is short term, 50 to 100 years, or long term, longer
than that, we are going to need some more nuclear generating
plants, powered by nuclear energy.
Now, having said that, bringing permanency to the issue of
spent fuel is critical, along with all the other advancements
we have to make. Their willingness to push the budget envelope
in this area is critical. This country ought to get smart and
it ought to wake up. It cannot deny its facts. And even 2 weeks
ago, when I journeyed out on the front over here, to look at
all these marvelous new electric car prototypes, I was reminded
by one thing that is inside the battery of those cars. It is
electric energy generated by somebody.
So, even that process is going to require us to have an
abundance of electrical energy. And there seems to be only one
way to get there and still achieve our clean air and climate
change concerns. And I do believe that the country is awakening
to that.
Thank you.
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much.
I have one last question for you, Dr. Wilson. The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission has clearly, as you have indicated in
your brief remarks, a very important role in safety and
oversight and regulation of the nuclear power and related
nuclear licenses. The Louisiana Enrichment Corp. decided, after
11 years of attempting to obtain a license for an enrichment
facility, to quit this effort. How can the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission commit to such an excessive licensing process to
occur? And what can Congress do to ensure such delays do not
occur?
Dr. Wilson. Well, I heard about that particular item last
week, when I was in Vienna. And I thought it was only 7 years
that they had been trying for the license, but that is bad
enough. Because this enrichment facility is much safer than a
reactor. It is one of the more benign things one can have. And
to spend 7 years on licensing it, it seems utterly absurd. And
I do not quite know what one can do about it. I would just urge
the NRC to go at every one of the regulatory actions with much
more speed than they are now doing.
Senator Domenici. Mr. Colvin, do you have some suggestions
in that regard?
Mr. Colvin. Well, Mr. Chairman, that is a tragic example
from our national perspective in two elements. And that is,
first, that the Congress, with the passage of the Energy Policy
Act in 1992, in fact, set up a one-step licensing program to
license this enrichment facility, which I agree with Dr.
Wilson, at those levels, is safer than most other facilities,
certainly chemical plants or other plants that would be built
in that part of the country.
The recommendations that I have for the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission are really to expedite the changes in their
licensing process and their atomic safety and licensing and
board processes that have been, in my view, the problems that
have caused these delays with respect to not only the scope of
those hearings, the depth of those hearings in areas not
related specifically to the safety of the operation of those
facilities, and also in the incentives, in establishing
incentives for those licensing boards to bring those issues to
conclusion within a reasonable period of time.
In order for our Nation to go forth and relicense or
transfer the licenses of any issue, they need to deal with that
in a very expeditious process.
Mr. McNeill. Senator, if I could comment.
Senator Domenici. Mr. McNeill, you look like you wanted to
comment.
Mr. McNeill. I do. Because this will be an important issue
as we move forward to acquire plants, because it will be a
license transfer process. And I think I will be very specific
on this. I think that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission itself
needs to make sure that the issues that are allowed to be heard
are relevant to the license transfer process and that they
provide very strong guidance for their administrative law
judges as to the timeframes in which they reach decisions.
Those two things are going to be very critical in moving
forward on this issue.
Senator Reid. Senator Domenici.
Senator Domenici. Yes; Senator Reid.
Senator Reid. I am going to go to my office for a few
minutes and then come back, but I would like Dr. Jenkins-Smith,
sometime in the next few days, to call me so we can go into
some detail about your work. If you will do that, I will not
take up the time of the committee.
Senator Domenici. Very good.
Senator Reid. Thank you.
Dr. Jenkins-Smith. Yes, Senator.
Dr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, can I make one comment?
Senator Domenici. Sure.
Dr. Wilson. This is partially on the waste question. You
asked about temporary waste storage. Everybody says no one
wants waste in their own backyard. But an Indian tribe in Utah
wants waste in their own backyard. And there are one or two
people who do not want them to have it. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission are estimating the licensing here would last at
least 4 years, when, in fact, it is not a particularly unsafe
business.
I have got together a group called the Scientists for
Secure Waste Storage, which has six Nobel laureates, three
former chairmen of the NRC, two former Ambassadors, a former
astronaut, and an Indian, with some overlap between these, and
we are trying to intervene in support of this licensing
hearing. I believe actions such as this may, in fact, if people
are galvanized into doing these things, public citizens, we may
get somewhere. But unfortunately, so far, the Licensing Board
has voted 2 to 1 not to allow us to do it, and we are appealing
to the Commission.
Senator Domenici. How long did the Southern Nuclear license
transfer take? Who knows the answer to that?
Mr. Colvin. It took about 5 years, Mr. Chairman. That was
to transfer the license for Plant Vogel and Plant Hatch in
Georgia, which is part of the same Southern Co. system, to the
Southern Nuclear Operating Co., one of its subsidiaries.
Mr. McNeill. If I might make a point here. The operators
were no different. These were legal entities, and the people at
the plants were no different before or after the license
transfer.
Mr. Colvin. Exactly.
Senator Domenici. You have probably answered this, but were
there any difficult issues involved in that?
Mr. Colvin. There were allegations that were provided to
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in a number of different
areas. But, in my opinion, none were germane to the issue of
license transfer between the entities, as Mr. McNeill points
out.
Senator Domenici. Did you want to say something, Dr.
Jenkins-Smith?
Dr. Jenkins-Smith. Yes, Senator, just one point on the
issue of obtaining licenses and public support. And that is,
first off, when we get into these debates, what the public
hears are discussions of risk. Is it big or is it small? They
never hear it is zero, of course. And because they have
detached the idea of risk from the national benefits that are
associated with it, any risk that is being imposed upon people
from the outside is going to be seen as unacceptable.
If we do not change the tenor of this debate and integrate
some notion of benefits and what the national gains are, we are
not going to make much headway.
Senator Domenici. That is a very good point.
In closing, I just wanted to share with the four of you,
and as part of this public record, there have been a lot of
complaints and concerns about the Kyoto accords, with reference
to their impact on the United States and how urgent are the
reductions that are contemplated. Professor Wilson, as
Professor Jenkins-Smith alluded to, I wanted to share with you
that I made a major proposal with reference to a whole scheme
of nuclear activities, and delivered it at Harvard University,
and then I circulated it to a number of people.
First, let me say to all of you that our office has been
absolutely amazed at the hundreds and hundreds of Americans who
are knowledgeable in the fields of energy and physics and the
like who have responded, essentially with long letters, but
essentially saying it is about time for America to debate this
issue. We are not on the right wavelength. We are talking about
something that is not real.
But getting back to Kyoto, as a result of that text, I held
a meeting in a number of cities--one in Los Alamos, where some
of the great, great physicists that America has had, and some
Nobel people came. And one of them said, I read with interest
the Kyoto accord, from page 1, all the way through. And I must
conclude that they were a fraud. And that is a pretty tough
word. And so I said, why? He said, because how could you write
in depth on the status of pollution in the atmosphere that
comes from generating electricity and not mention nuclear power
one time in the entire report?
Now, if I had not had such great respect for this
particular gentleman, who I first met 25 years ago and had just
marvelous opportunities to talk to him about what was going on
in Russia when he used to go visit--he was an early on
predictor that they were not as powerful as we thought. I will
tell you one thing, professor, that you will appreciate, he
said, I went to the laboratory of one of their great nuclear
physicists, and I noted that he was the only one around who had
a way to sip tea. And he had produced his own little teapot as
part of a bunsen burner that is used in a laboratory, and that
they did not even supply that--tea, coffee, or anything--to any
of their major scientists in this laboratory. And he started
thinking back from that, that things were kind of different
than we might have expected.
But we have to raise the issue with the people of this
country, that if we are worried about pollution and we are
worried about what is going to happen if, in fact, we have some
big climate changes because of ozone, you know some leadership
is going to be blamed if we do not consider a dramatic way to
avoid that over the next 50 to 100 years by a source of energy
that contributes absolutely nothing to the water and air
pollution of our country and the world. And that is essentially
the big picture idea that is behind what we are talking about.
Thank you, all four of you. And let us have the next
witnesses, please.
Senator Craig. Mr. Chairman, while the next witnesses are
coming up, I am pleased that you noted the relicensing process.
In another committee, I am examining hydro relicensing. Now,
between nuclear and hydro, nonpolluting energy sources, that
represents about 33 to 34 percent of the total electrical
output in this country. And those are the two very areas that
are most impacted by bureaucracy and uncertainty at this
moment.
And, frankly, it is us. It is the Congress of the United
States that has not had the statesmanship, if you will--and
that is no reflection of anybody on this committee, but we have
kowtowed to a myth, and now we are faced with that. And I
notice that in the administration's proposal, when we talk
about climate change, you notice they did not mention nuclear.
And the professor mentioned this. And they did not mention
hydro either as a renewable.
So, I think it is reasonable to say that the reports were a
hoax, because they did not mention, in this country at least,
nearly 35 percent of the electrical output, of the clean
output.
Thank you.
Senator Domenici. Thank you for the comments.
Can we go through the next four witnesses and identify them
right now, and then we will proceed from right to left as we
did before. And I would hope you would keep to your time. We
have gone over a bit.
We have Alan Smith, master of engineering candidate,
Department of Nuclear Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology; Dr. Stan Schriber, deputy division director, Los
Alamos National Laboratory; Mr. Linden Blue, vice chairman of
General Atomics Corp.; and Dr. Charles Till, senior counselor
to the laboratory director at Argonne National Laboratory. I am
delighted you all would come.
We will start with you, Mr. Smith. I am going to be excused
for just 2 minutes. Harry, would you take over for that 2
minutes?
Senator Reid [presiding]. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF ALAN B. SMITH, GRADUATE STUDENT, NUCLEAR
ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT, MASSACHUSETTS
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Mr. Smith. Very well, Mr. Chairman, Senators Reid, Stevens,
and Craig, my name is Alan Smith. I am a graduate student at
MIT. And with me is Dr. Jeffrey Friedberg, the head of the
Nuclear Engineering Department at MIT. And I am here
representing a group of both graduate and undergraduate
students who have spent about the last 6 months investigating
advanced nuclear energy technologies that have the potential to
be developed to address global climate change on a
proliferation-proof worldwide scale. We think we may have an
answer.
This morning I would like to report on this nuclear energy
design project and what I believe are opportunities to get
students interested in pursuing a career in nuclear technology.
This nuclear energy plant design project began as a design
competition sponsored by the American Nuclear Society, aimed at
stimulating interest in nuclear energy at those universities
that still teach the subject. The original title of the
competition was ``The Economic Imperative,'' which challenged
students to think creatively about what could be done to bring
down the cost of nuclear powerplants to a level to be
competitive with new natural gas fired fossil plants.
At MIT we took a broader view, and renamed our effort the
economic and environmental imperative, to incorporate our
belief that it will take more than just an economic advantage
to bring nuclear into the energy mix. Our desire was to develop
a conceptual design of a politically acceptable reactor that
was also economically viable. And the recent developments in
India, for example, reinforce the need to develop a nuclear
energy plant that is more proliferation proof, to take
advantage of the enormous environmental benefits that nuclear
energy offers.
Our goal is to develop an entire package, not just the
technology. Which, you see, in the past we have had wonderful
technology in the nuclear industry. We keep wondering why
people do not get it. It is safe. It is reliable. We have
focused on the technology. We have tried to broaden that, to
look at the design, the fuel, the waste, construction
schedules, final cost of power, and the financing and public
acceptance portions of this.
What we did know is that today's current plants were
expensive to build, are expensive to operate, are very
difficult to keep in current regulatory compliance, and are
perceived by a significant portion of the public as generally
unsafe. And it was our belief that an improved version of the
same old thing would be insufficient. The time is right to
develop something completely new. So, with that framework, we
said we have no preconceived ideas of what is available. What
would the ideal nuclear plant really look like?
We decided it would be naturally safe, transparently safe,
so safe there would be no question. We do not have to talk
about 1 times 10 to the minus 5th or 10 to the minus 7th or
whatever else. The answer is it cannot have a fuel damaging
accident.
We knew that it had to be economically competitive. And we
translated that into being able to be assembled in a factory, a
production line if you will, to crank out these things. It did
have to be politically acceptable, with easy waste handling and
storage. And we looked at 20 other different factors, things
from operating staff size, whatever. Then we researched all the
available plants that are in the world. We looked at advanced
lightwater designs. We looked at heavywater designs. We looked
at the gas plant.
As a matter of fact, we had a representative from Mr.
Blue's General Atomics come and speak to us about the things
they were doing.
We picked the best attributes, in our estimation, from each
of those different things and combined them into one conceptual
idea. And from there we began, this past semester, doing
detailed analysis of could it really be done. Could it really
be made foolproof? Could it be made operator proof? Could it be
made in a factory and shipped by truck, quickly?
And what we found was it can and it can. There is no exotic
technology involved. We decided on a gas-cooled small, pebble-
bed type fuel nuclear plant with gas turbines. And it allows us
a lot of different things. First of all, no meltdown can occur.
And Mr. Blue, I know, will speak on that some more. It can be
factory assembled and shipped by truck to any particular site.
Our particular design has online refueling, which means
that the plant never has to shut down to refuel. Our concept,
with a small, 110 megawatt plant, is that you can tailor it to
any specific energy size demand you need. Perhaps in the United
States, if you want 1,200 megawatts, that is fine; you can
build 11 or 12 of those units. But say, if a developing nation
is looking for a new, environmentally safe energy source, they
do not have the electrical grid to be able to build a 1,300
megawatt plant and distribute the power. But they can build 300
megawatts, 400 megawatts.
We then went and looked beyond just the nuclear technology.
And we were able to develop, and are still developing, a
concept for an international licensing approach. One of the
goals of this particular plan is it is so simple that a country
does not need a detailed nuclear infrastructure, with a large
number of nuclear laboratories, just to support this. So, an
external organization could be more involved in the operations
of this.
We have developed a rapid construction methodology, and we
have a working model now that shows that the first unit could
be available in just over 2 years from the time a construction
order went in. They would build it in the factory, put it on a
truck, and you could get it.
Finally, we are developing some frameworks for creative
financing alternatives to make it more attractive for
industries to get into this, in some consortium-type ideas,
whereas with our current plans, if you put in an order, it
would then go out to bid. Well, who is going to build the
turbine? Well, let us look at General Electric. Let us look at
Westinghouse. And it continues to change the design. Now, the
turbine manufacturer is an equity owner in this operation so
they can get right into it.
Senator Reid. Mr. Chairman, one brief question.
Senator Domenici [presiding]. Yes; Senator Reid.
Senator Reid. What does being factory manufactured have to
do with it? You keep talking about that. What difference does
that make?
Mr. Smith. To address the fact that the current plants we
have right now are taking anywhere between 7, 8, 9, 10 years to
build. So much can change to project the energy needs for a
particular area 7 to 10 years from now, especially with
deregulation, there is a very big disincentive. Now we can say
2\1/2\ years, or build six of these small units and then, 5
years from now, if you need more capacity, you can add it on
relatively quickly.
A great deal of work remains to be done, obviously. The
inherent safety of this design means that the current
regulatory framework will need to be reshaped. Risk analysis
needs to be further evaluated. But as someone who is personally
convinced of the importance of nuclear power in our national
security, it has been very encouraging to see the amount of
enthusiasm that this project has built. One of the things we
have not heard as we are looking at the future of the nuclear
industry in the United States is who is going to do it.
The people that designed these plants in the sixties and
built them in the seventies are retiring. We just had the new,
incoming class of freshmen at MIT declare their majors and we
only had six say nuclear, which is less than one-half of what
we would typically have. So, it is an issue. And in order to
keep the interest and ensure enough students continue to pursue
this, it is important to support projects of this type with
new, innovative designs, to show there are new challenges.
PREPARED STATEMENT
And I would like to close by thanking the committee for
your interest and hope that as you are talking about pushing
the funding envelope, Senator Craig, that ideas and
developmental projects like this will be an important part of
the mix.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Alan B. Smith
ADVANCED NUCLEAR ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES
Mr. Chairman, my name is Alan Smith. I am a graduate student in the
Department of Nuclear Engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. With me, is Dr. Jeffrey P. Friedberg, the Chairman of the
Nuclear Engineering Department. I am representing a group of both
graduate and undergraduate students who have spent about 6 months
exploring advanced nuclear energy technologies that could be developed
to address global climate change on a proliferation-proof, world-wide
scale. We think we might have an answer. This morning I would like to
report on our nuclear energy plant design project and what I believe
are opportunities to get students interested in pursuing a career in
nuclear technology.
This new nuclear energy plant project began as part of the American
Nuclear Society's design competition aimed at stimulating interest in
nuclear energy at the universities that still teach the subject. The
original title of the competition was ``The Economic Imperative'' which
challenged students to think creatively about what it would take to
bring the cost of new nuclear power plants down to levels that would be
competitive with new natural gas fired fossil plants. Natural gas
plants were chosen as the standard because they are the current choice
of electric generating companies due to their low capital and present
low fuel costs.
At MIT, we took a broad view and renamed our effort as ``The
Economic and Environmental Imperative'' to incorporate the belief that
it will take more than economics to bring the benefits of nuclear
energy to bear in addressing the problems of air pollution and global
climate change. Our desire is to develop a conceptual design of a
politically acceptable reactor that is also economically viable. Recent
international developments in India should reinforce the need to
develop a nuclear energy plant that is more proliferation proof to take
advantage of the enormous environmental benefits that nuclear energy
offers.
The issues confronting reintroduction of new nuclear power plants
into the world energy mix are many. They have to do with public and
political perceptions about safety, nuclear waste, proliferation,
radiation, regulatory stability and financial viability, given the
history of nuclear power to date. We took a broad view to this issue,
to the extent that the acceptability of the technology was as much a
part of the solution as the economics. Our position is that the
acceptability of the technology is as much a part of the solution as
the economics. Our objective was a complete package--the technology,
the design, the fuel, the waste, construction schedules, the final cost
of power, the financing and the public acceptance program.
This project began with a review of the present issues confronting
nuclear energy that prevent its widespread use. The nuclear technology
currently in use across the country has several shortcomings that limit
its desirability as the type of nuclear plant for the future. Most of
the shortcomings stem from the size and complexity of the various
integrated support systems, which have driven up capital costs,
staffing requirements, and regulatory requirements. Today's plants were
expensive to build, are expensive to maintain and operate, and
difficult to keep in compliance in the current regulatory environment.
Due to these factors, extraordinary management attention and skill is
required to keep the plants operating. The high demand for management
attention, far exceeding that of the alternative sources of
electricity, is a serious deterrent to new orders. Prescriptive
regulatory constraints imposed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
stifle innovation, which makes current and even future nuclear plants
hostage to old technologies and approaches.
Despite ample scientific evidence to the contrary, the public
perceives the current generation of nuclear power stations as generally
unsafe. Additionally, existing nuclear stations are faced with an
increasingly critical lack of a spent fuel disposal capacity. Falling
coal and natural gas prices, when coupled with expensive modifications
to nuclear plants following the Three Mile Island accident resulted in
the elimination of much of nuclear power's generation cost advantage
over fossil fuels. Ultimately, the combination of adverse public
opinion, regulatory pressures, and economic challenges that exist today
have resulted in two decades of no new orders of nuclear stations.
As you are aware, worldwide concern over greenhouse gas emissions
is prompting a reevaluation of the role nuclear power should play in
the world's energy generation. Conservation efforts and renewable
resources will simply be unable to meet the growing global demand for
electricity, let alone reduce current dependence on fossil fuels.
Secretary of Energy Frederico Pena recently called nuclear power ``an
important part of our energy mix'' and noted that the Department of
Energy's proposed fiscal year 1999 budget contains $44 million in
funding for nuclear energy research and development. When pressed, even
the most vocal nuclear power opponents are beginning to admit that
emission-free nuclear power will continue to play a vital part in
meeting the world's growing energy needs without accelerating the
greenhouse effect.
In spite of the obvious benefits, the prospect for building future
nuclear power plants in the U.S. is questionable. What is not in
question, however, is that any future nuclear plant must be perceived
as a significant improvement over current designs if it is to warrant
serious consideration. Experience gained after thirty years of
commercial operation has shown that development of a successful design
must address much more than just engineering issues. Political and
economic considerations play just as important a role in determining
the eventual success or failure of nuclear power.
Perhaps the three largest public (political) hurdles facing the
nuclear industry deal with the eventual disposal of spent fuel, the
potential for nuclear proliferation, and eventual plant
decommissioning. The long delayed nuclear waste disposal facility at
Yucca Mountain is becoming a multi-billion dollar monument for why
nuclear power is in decline in the U.S. Additionally, political
instability and the threat of terrorist use of nuclear material, no
matter how remote, make growth of nuclear power unattractive to many
governments. Finally, decommissioning of current nuclear stations is
costing as much as ten percent of the original construction cost. These
issues were not considered during the design and construction of the
current generation of nuclear plants. However, future designs must be
able to effectively address these issues if they are to receive serious
consideration in the future.
Based on the preceding challenges, and even with renewed interest
in commercial nuclear generation, it is likely that problems associated
with current designs will make them unattractive for consideration for
future construction. Public perception, regulatory, and economic
factors that have caused existing designs to lose favor are unlikely to
change. It is therefore apparent that any future commercial nuclear
power plants must be a significant departure from stations built in the
past. In other words, to be ``revolutionary'' rather than
``evolutionary''. To that end, we feel the following attributes are
essential for the new design:
--The plant design must be naturally safe. In other words, even in
the worst-case scenario of having the nuclear plant at maximum
power and simultaneously stopping all coolant flow, there can
be no damage to the plant or any adverse impact on the safety
of the public or the environment. The safety of the plant must
be obvious to both the public and the regulators. The design
must support risk-informed regulation. The safety of the plant
must be demonstrable.
--The plant design must support a much shorter construction time.
Construction costs should be low and predictable. To facilitate
rapid construction, designs should emphasize modular
construction. This will not only reduce total assembly time,
but also offer the improved quality control and economic
advantages of production line fabrication.
--The plant must also be designed with eventual decommissioning in
mind. Sizing and design of systems to facilitate rapid
disassembly, ease of decontamination, and ease of disposal
should be performed so that a decommissioning plan can be
developed before construction even begins.
--In order to reduce operating costs, the plant must be designed to
minimize lost generation due to refueling or maintenance
shutdowns. Accordingly, the design should provide the
capability to refuel and perform maintenance on-line. If on-
line refueling is not possible, the design should allow for
rapid refueling. Components that are expected to require
replacement during the life of the plant should be designed for
ease of removal and installation.
--The plant should be simple to operate (amenable to automation), and
maintain in order to allow for small staffs that require less
technical expertise.
--The design should be able to be used in a country without the
extensive nuclear infrastructure through a turnkey type of
contract for operations and support.
--The design should provide a plant with lower radiation dose levels
and less radioactive contamination than current plants.
--The design should ensure minimal environmental impact.
Additionally, it should be capable of operating at high thermal
efficiencies and allow for the use of waste heat for other
commercial applications if desired.
--The design should use a simple fuel cycle that provides the highest
possible resistance to proliferation, does not depend on
reprocessing have high fuel burn up, and it should support
burning mixed oxide fuels. Additionally, the fuel type used
must offer ease of fuel storage and disposal and good fuel
integrity.
--The design should be acceptable for the international market in
terms of safety and proliferation resistance under a standard
international safety authority.
--The plant should be able to be site assembled quickly using
prefabricated units shipped by barge or by train to potential
sites.
Using these fundamental criteria as to what we thought we would
need, we then proceeded to review the options that are currently
available for construction and those under development to see how they
ranked against our criteria. As you are aware, the nuclear industry has
been developing new advanced reactor designs under guidance documents
prepared by the Electric Power Research Institute and implemented by
major nuclear plant vendors in the United States. Each of these new
designs is under review by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for design
certification. Some have already been granted approval and detailed
first of a kind engineering is underway.
In addition, the issue of nuclear proliferation was explored to
determine what kinds of design features were important to reduce
substantially the risk of the spread of nuclear materials to terrorists
or terrorist states. Presentations of ``new'' technologies were also
heard which included gas-cooled reactors, lead bismuth reactors and
light water reactor breeders. We chose not to consider liquid metal
breeder reactors because the political climate for their acceptance was
not conducive at the present time (although a great deal of work has
been done on them in this country).
Based on these presentations and student research, a matrix of
important factors was developed with weighting factors and each plant
type was subjectively ranked against these criteria. The primary factor
used to judge acceptability was demonstrable safety. Economics was
second. The list of criteria numbered over 20 and included such things
as short construction time, small operating staff, high efficiency,
proliferation resistance, short or on-line refueling, public support,
ease of maintenance and repair, and ease of decommissioning.
Upon completion of this review, we selected a small, modular pebble
bed fuel, helium gas cooled reactor with gas turbines to generate
electricity. We chose a small modular reactor about one tenth the size
of today's large nuclear power plants because of the improved safety,
ease of operation, and ability to be mass produced, which we expected
to yield lower costs. The 110 Megawatt electric size of the plant is
naturally safe with no operator or other passive mechanical action
required, even for the worst contemplated accident in which all cooling
systems are turned off. No meltdown can occur.
Given the small size of the plant, there will not even be any fuel
failure, thus no release of harmful radioactivity. The plant is
specifically sized and designed such that it will naturally shut itself
down with no dependence on active or passive systems. The small size
and improved proliferation resistance is also suitable for developing
nations as they seek to build their electric grids and developed
nations who want to add incremental capacity based on market demands.
Modules in increments of 110 megawatts could be added to each plant to
make up a plant of 1,100 megawatts or larger depending upon the needed
capacity.
The pebble bed fuel design was chosen because it allows for on-line
refueling which will increase the generating potential of the plant.
The gas turbine electric generating cycle is also very efficient with
efficiencies as high as 50 percent possible with less wasted energy.
The electric generation side consists of a gas turbine that is similar
in many ways to those currently used in natural gas burning fossil
plants. Although initial designs would include an intermediate helium
to helium heat exchanger, future designs could eliminate this feature
as fuel performance data is developed. The ``direct'' gas cycle
compares very well with conventional natural gas plants and far exceeds
present nuclear plant efficiencies of 33 percent.
The proliferation concerns are addressed by the fuel type used. The
fuel is contained in carbon microspheres, which provide the containment
for storage and disposal, and is of a form that makes reprocessing
extremely difficult, if not impossible. As all nations attempt to
combat global climate change, proliferation resistance is extremely
important for worldwide deployment of advanced nuclear energy
technologies, especially in developing nations. A key attribute of our
design is that the plant is simple enough such that the need for a
nuclear infrastructure will not be necessary to allow for safe
operation. Our concept calls for an international licensing approach
that will have fuel supplied by international authorities and used fuel
collected and disposed of by the same international consortium that
would have strict fuel accountability.
These plants, because they are so simple in design and naturally
safe, would be sold as turnkey modules as standardized units. The
consortium in charge of design and construction would also provide
training to the operators and maintenance personnel to assure safe and
reliable operation. This plant would truly be an international plant
suitable for use in all countries without the need for these countries
to develop sophisticated research laboratories to support this
technology. The plant's safety and performance would be regulated in
accordance with an international regulatory authority such as the
International Atomic Energy Agency.
The other key factor in the selection of this technology and size
of plant is its ability to be factory assembled. This will not only
enhance quality which can be better controlled in a factory
environment, it will also speed construction time such that we expect
to be able to have a 110 MWe module operating within 122 weeks of start
of construction--just slightly over two years. The key is the small
base units that allow rapid sequential completion of up to 1,100 Mwe or
larger. The factory assembling the modules can ship a module to the
site as soon as it is complete and the next module is still being
assembled.
Our analysis shows that the site preparation to support a ten-unit
station will be completed at approximately the same time that the first
module is ready to be shipped to the site. It is also estimated that a
limited-scope factory assembly operation is capable of assembling a
module and preparing it for shipment within three months of receiving
all necessary components. Therefore, if modules are shipped to the site
as soon as they are assembled and tested, a new module will be arriving
and being installed every three months. Because each module is
completely autonomous, the unit will be capable of operation as soon as
it undergoes fuel loading and final installation testing. This means
that power generation can begin well before the completion of the
remaining units.
This radically new approach understandably presents new economic
conditions and considerations. We believe our design makes it uniquely
attractive to a wide variety of investors. In the U.S., for example,
the uncertainties associated with deregulation, regulation, and future
energy demand have served to discourage construction of nuclear
facilities. The small size of our design allows for prompt, incremental
addition to existing generation capacity at the lowest possible capital
cost. In developing nations or areas that do not have the
infrastructure to support the construction of a large plant, a few of
these smaller units represent the ideal solution to their energy needs.
This past semester was spent performing much more rigorous
engineering analysis to bring our concept to life. Work on the nuclear
plant design was performed to analyze the performance of the nuclear
fuel over the operating cycle. Nuclear plant operating characteristics
were analyzed under various accident conditions to demonstrate that the
design is in fact naturally safe (it is). Equipment dimensions were
calculated in order to determine if components could be shipped from
the factory to the site by truck or rail (they can). Vendors and
consultants were contacted to validate the feasibility of the rapid
construction potential of this design (it is possible).
In summary, we are very encouraged by the potential of this design
to meet some of the world's future energy needs safely, economically,
and without harming the environment. Producing electricity by splitting
atoms is a technical challenge we were able to meet forty years ago. If
we wish to continue to do so, however, many more challenges must be
addressed with the same effort. We believe that this design is uniquely
able to meet the challenges of proliferation resistance, waste
disposal, safe operation, and economic performance that the next
generation of nuclear plants will face. And we are not alone. The
Germans, Japanese, Chinese, and Russians are all doing research into
designs of this type, and the South Africans are moving ahead with
plans to construct a gas cooled plant for commercial power generation.
Of course, a great deal of work remains to be done. Additional
research is needed to further investigate new techniques for safe
handling and storage of waste, improvements in the design of the fuel,
and ways to make the fuel even more resistant to proliferation. The
natural safety of this design means that the current regulatory
framework will need to be reshaped, and risk analysis needs to be
further evaluated.
During the course of our work, a large number of students and
faculty became very interested in the possibilities this design offers.
As someone who is convinced of the importance of nuclear power to our
national security, it has been very encouraging to see the amount of
enthusiasm this project has generated. The enthusiasm however is not
limited to this specific design. Rather, it is generating new
discussions about the future of nuclear energy, waste, proliferation,
and plant safety that will improve the performance of any nuclear plant
design. They are talking about meeting the greenhouse gas emission
goals recently established in Kyoto, and talking about new ways to
safely meet the world's growing energy needs. In short, Mr. Chairman,
there is a spark of optimism about the future of nuclear power that has
been absent during recent years.
I would like to close by thanking the committee for your interest
and hope that you and your committee approve additional funding for
universities to continue this project and others like it.
Senator Reid. Mr. Chairman, I would like to be excused. I
will say that I have read the testimony of the other three
witnesses. It was very impressive, just as with this young man.
I am especially interested in the testimony of Linden Blue,
about the new technology that we are going to have to look at
very closely in this subcommittee.
Senator Domenici. Mr. Smith, I continue to be amazed at
what the students and graduate students in our great
universities can accomplish. And your professor was a very
astute fellow when he asked you, as students, to take this
project on. And I would venture a big bet that your conclusions
are probably fairly close to being correct, without having
large resources to accomplish what you have done. And I
personally am glad that we found you and brought you here.
And thank you very much for your testimony and for what you
are doing. And I hope that we do not let people like you down,
who have these great ideas and want to do these kind of things
by turning the spigot off and saying that we want to hide from
all of this in the United States.
Dr. Schriber.
STATEMENT OF STAN O. SCHRIBER, PH.D., LANSCE DEPUTY
DIVISION DIRECTOR, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL
LABORATORY, NEW MEXICO
Dr. Schriber. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I
am honored to be here to talk to you about an opportunity for
this country in one aspect of our generating energy.
Energy is a strategic commodity for our country, and it has
and will continue to have an enormous impact on our lifestyle
and our ability to remain a great nation. In this context I
would like to make four key points today.
First is that a technical solution to the issue of long-
lived nuclear waste is feasible. Second, the solution can
contribute to nonproliferation goals. Third, the solution can
be economically effective, politically attractive, and has
international support. And last, the solution builds on
developments underway in Department of Energy laboratories with
worldwide collaborators.
The issue I am addressing is disposal of spent nuclear fuel
from our nuclear power reactors. Accelerator-driven
transportation of waste, or ATW as I will call it in this
presentation, is a technology option for assisting waste
disposal in this country. With ATW, a permanent repository is
still necessary, but more efficient use of its capacity is
possible. A key concept in ATW is transmuting nuclear waste,
actually destroying the long-lived isotopes so that the
material to be stored has a lifetime that is short compared to
the time scale of geological change.
We have reached the stage in the development where it would
be prudent to take the next step in technology development: a
5-year plan. The path of ATW technology development can provide
technologies important to future nuclear options and/or
strategies as recommended by the President's Committee of
Advisors on Science and Technology, even if ATW was not added
to the suite of future systems.
ATW design has matured significantly over the years, being
based on elements that have evolved within the international,
as well. The nuclear burner would use liquid lead bismuth
technology based on extensive Russian nuclear reactor work.
Research groups in Europe and Asia are also considering similar
systems.
Operating the ATW burner in a subcritical mode enables the
destruction of actonides and fission products safely without
isolation of weapons-grade material, and without extensive
separations work, all in a single-purpose device. ATW impacts
the need for a second geological repository by increasing
storage efficiency and decreasing long-term risk. In addition,
the ATW system converts the transuranics that were going to be
buried into useful electrical energy. Thus the system could be
energetically self-supporting, providing its own energy and
providing a net power output to the electrical grid.
I will run through a brief scenario. Over a 65-year period,
an ATW system consisting of 20 burners could transmute the
spent fuel accumulated to the year 2015, and enhance the
efficiency of the repository such that a second one would not
be necessary well into the foreseeable future. The 70,000 tons
of spent fuel includes 600 tons of transuranics, mostly
plutonium, with some neptunium and americium.
Output from the system would be 67,000 tons of uranium that
could be considered low-level waste; less than 0.3 tons of
transuranics--that is a reduction by more than a factor of
1,000; 3,000 tons of fission products, with minimal technetium
and iodine, which are really the bad actors--a reduction by
more than a factor of 20 in capacity for the repository. In
addition, you get electricity for the grid, you get 5 trillion
kilowatt hours of emission-free energy over the 40 years.
And, finally, residual activity and radiotoxicity of waste
in the repository after 300 years is less than that of a
nonassisted repository after 100,000 years. The seven
organizations that are part of this official ATW collaboration
are the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory, Westinghouse
Savannah River Co., Bechtel National, Northrup Grumman, and
Westinghouse Electric Corp.
In addition, the University of California, Berkeley, and
the University of Illinois are participating. This is a strong
collaboration, with expertise in the relevant technologies and
large-scale applications. Up to now, all of the funding in
support of ATW studies has come from discretionary funds of the
institutions participating in this collaboration.
With our industrial colleagues, we have determined that the
economics appear favorable for an ATW-assisted waste management
system. And, in addition, a technical path for the development
of this option has been identified, with no show-stoppers.
With industry, we have developed a viable program plan for
ATW and determined rough cost estimates for the above scenarios
and for the development program. The 5-year technology
development program has been estimated at $150 million.
There are important outcomes or legacies that come from
this 5-year program that will have an impact in many other
areas. To give you an idea of the outside view of this program,
we held a review in January by the Nuclear Engineering
Department of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a 2-
day, in-depth review. Their report was positive, and I would
like to just make a couple of excerpts from the report.
One of them was: We see no insurmountable issues or show-
stoppers. The second one was: While we do not judge the merits
of the ATW as an option and to improve the management of
nuclear waste, we acknowledge that it has the potential to
provide added flexibility to the design of the high-level waste
repository and to reduce the uncertainties about its
performance. And last: The R&D program is well designed to
address these concerns.
The ATW collaboration has reached the stage where it is
prudent to take the next step. We have an opportunity to make
significant advances and to enhance the capability of a
repository solution. In addition, the United States would
continue its leadership role in an important area for the
country and for the world.
Finally, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to
speak to you today on ATW and its possibilities, and for your
kind attention to this important issue.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Stan O. Schriber
ACCELERATOR-DRIVEN TRANSMUTATION OF WASTE: AN OPPORTUNITY
Introduction
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, distinguished visitors, I'm
honored to be here to talk to you about an opportunity for this country
in one aspect of our generating energy. Energy is a strategic commodity
for our country, and it has and will continue to have an enormous
impact on our lifestyles and our ability to remain a great nation.
In this context, I would like to make four key points today:
--A technical solution to the issue of long-lived nuclear waste is
feasible.
--The solution can contribute to nonproliferation goals.
--The solution can be economically effective, politically attractive,
and has international support.
--The solution builds on developments underway in the Department of
Energy laboratories with worldwide collaborators, but now needs
your support.
The Issue--Nuclear Waste
The issue I'm addressing today is the disposal of spent nuclear
fuel from our nuclear power reactors. I do not have to lecture you on
the political difficulties in finding a home for nuclear waste that has
a radioactive half-life of tens of thousands of years.
Accelerator-driven Transmutation of Waste, or ATW as we call it for
short, is a technology option for assisting waste disposal in this
country and other countires with nuclear power systems. With ATW, a
permanent repository is still necessary, but more efficient use of its
capacity is possible. The key concept in ATW is transmuting nuclear
waste--actually destroying the long-lived isotopes--so that the
material to be stored has a lifetime short compared to the time scale
of geological change.
A national collaboration led by the Department of Energy
laboratories has made significant technical progress in accelerator
transmutation technology because of an interest in future energy
economies for our country. We have reached a stage in the development
where it would be prudent to take the next step in technology
development--the 5-year plan which I will describe later. The path of
ATW technology development could provide technologies important to
future nuclear options and/or strategies (as recommended by the
President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology) even if ATW
was not added to the suite of future systems. A suitable program to
continue this important activity should be established in the
Department of Energy.
What is ATW?
ATW is based on three major building blocks. These are:
1. A nuclear assembly where radioactive waste is transmuted by an
intense neutron flux without using or creating a self-sustaining
nuclear reaction.
2. A chemical extraction process to separate elements for recycling
and eventual disposal, based on work underway at Argonne and Los Alamos
to enhance proliferation-resistance and minimize environmental impact.
3. A high-power linear accelerator being developed under other
programs within the USA.
ATW design has matured significantly over the years, being based on
elements that have evolved within the international community as well.
The nuclear burner would use liquid lead/bismuth technology based on
extensive Russian nuclear reactor work. Research groups in Europe and
Asia are also considering similar systems.
The accelerator provides high energy protons that produce copious
neutrons from the lead/bismuth spallation target. These neutrons assist
the nuclear burner in transmuting transuranics by fission, and fission
products (especially technetium and iodine) by absorption. Operating
the burner in a subcritical mode (possible because of the accelerator
drive) enables the destruction of actinides and fission products
safely, without isolation of weapons grade material, and without
extensive separations work: all in a single-purpose device.
High level waste can be treated using an ATW system, whether that
waste is staged to be placed in an operating geological repository or
temporarily stored in a monitored retrievable storage facility. A
deployed ATW system will likely eliminate the need for a second
geologic repository by greatly increasing the high-level waste storage
efficiency through transmutation. Transmutation would change the
inventory of the types of materials stored, reducing long term risks.
In addition the ATW system produces useful electrical energy as a
byproduct. Thus the system could be energetically self-supporting,
providing its own energy, and providing a net power output to the
electrical grid.
ATW System Scenarios
We will have about 70,000 tons of spent reactor fuel accumulated in
this country by the year 2015. This fills the repository as presently
conceived. If we continue with nuclear power generation in this country
after 2015, then a second repository will have to be considered unless
some efficiency improvements are instituted within the repository plan.
Three scenarios that have been investigated are described in the
following:
1. Over a 65 year period, an ATW system consisting of 20 burners
could transmute the spent fuel accumulated to the year 2015 and enhance
the efficiency of the repository such that a second repository would
not be necessary for the foreseeable future. Why was 65 years chosen?
It was a reasonable compromise between the number of ATW systems,
electrical output, infrastructure and a desire to stay within a logical
human time frame up to a quarter filled before ATW starts to have an
effect. Again the repository capacity is enhanced significantly and one
can decide at that time whether it is appropriate to remove the stored
material for treatment within an ATW.
Program and Plans
The seven organizations that are part of the official ATW
collaboration are Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, Westinghouse
Savannah River Company, Bechtel National, Northrup-Grumman, and
Westinghouse Electric Corporation. In addition, the University of
California--Berkeley and the University of Illinois are participating.
This is a strong collaboration with expertise in the relevant
technologies and large-scale applications. Up to now, all of the
funding in support of the ATW studies has come from discretionary funds
of the institutions participating in the collaboration.
With our industrial colleagues we have determined that the
economics appear favorable for an ATW-assisted waste management system.
In addition, a technical path for development of the option has been
identified; with no show stoppers. The no show-stopper situation has
been verified independently by a MIT review that is mentioned later. A
proposed 5-year engineering and development program that addresses key
issues provides direction for the program and would provide logical
exit criteria for decision makers based on the program developments. If
successful, this assisted repository option would have many positive
environmental and/or societal impacts.
With industry we have developed a viable program plan for ATW and
determined ``rough'' cost estimates for the above scenarios and for the
development program. Part of the five-year plan is to complete a more
comprehensive study of costs and benefits. The five-year technology
development program plan has been costed at $115M total assuming
funding levels at $15M, $20M, $25M, and $30M for each successive year.
These levels have been determined on the basis of significant
deliverables and demonstrations, and would provide adequate information
for decision-makers to make an informed (retirement ages and expected
human lifetimes). Input to the system would be the 70,000 tons of spent
fuel mentioned earlier, which includes 600 tons of transuranics (mostly
plutonium with some neptunium and americium). Output from the system
would be: 67,000 tons of uranium that could be considered low-level
waste (a much smaller quantity than what we have from the mining of
uranium) or a resource to be used in reactors again in the future; less
than 0.3 tons of transuranics (a reduction by more than a factor of one
thousand) that would have to go to the repository; 3,000 tons of
fission products with minimal technetium and iodine (the ``bad''
actors), that would have to go to the repository--for a reduction by
more than a factor of 20 in capacity; electricity for the grid (5
trillion kilowatt hours of emissions-free energy over the 40 years);
and residual activity and radiotoxicity of waste in the repository
after 300 years that is less than that for a non-assisted repository
after 100,000 years.
2. Assume that we continue with about 100 power reactors in this
country for another 40 years beyond the 2015 time frame. For this
scenario another about 70,000 tons of spent fuel would be produced.
With an accompanying infrastructure of ATW's, as in the above example
also producing electrical energy, the spent fuel material is converted
while it is being produced; but with one ATW for every four power
reactors on the assumption that they are of the present-day light-water
reactor (LWR) type. If improved nuclear reactor concepts are realized
then the support ratio could be one ATW for every ten power reactors or
even maybe up to one for every twenty. This scenario produces
electrical energy from the power reactors with a minimized high-level
waste stream going to a geologic repository that has the possibility
for a much reduced operation lifetime.
3. Assuming that an ATW demonstration would not occur until about
2015, means that the repository would begin accepting spent fuel for
about 5-10 years prior to an ATW being introduced into the overall
nuclear system. In this scenario, the repository may be decision on
future program direction. These development costs, while substantial,
are small on the scale of national electrical energy economics.
The five-year program focuses on essential technology development
and evaluation necessary for a technically and economically sound
concept for the first implementation. Critical technologies include
mass flows, pyrochemistry, materials verification, technology transfer
and integration, liquid lead/bismuth cooled cores with integral target,
system studies, costing studies, solid fuel development and preliminary
tests, repository interfaces and nuclear data experiments for improving
computer modeling. Much of the technology development has broader
applications.
Spin-offs
There are important outcomes or legacies from the five-year
program. These include liquid lead/bismuth for future advanced nuclear
systems, nuclear data and code improvements for basic science advances,
high power neutron production targets for basic science research, waste
disposition processes for environmental management, and system studies
providing advanced fuel cycle information and a basis for future
decisions and/or directions.
ATW Board
As mentioned above, we have a national collaboration involved in
the ATW studies. We have formed an ATW advisory board from the members
of this collaboration, a board to provide Los Alamos with advice on
program's activities.
MIT Review in January
The Nuclear Engineering Department of the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology held a two day in-depth review of the ATW technology in
January. Their report was positive for the ATW program in general.
Excerpts from their report include the following comments:
--``* * * we see no insurmountable issues or show stoppers. While the
proposed technologies are in several instances extrapolations
of existing experience to untested conditions, they represent
reasonable targets for development over the next 5 to 10
years.''
--``While we do not judge the merits of the ATW as an option to
improve the management of nuclear wastes, we acknowledge that
it has the potential to provide added flexibility to the design
of the high level waste repository and to reduce the
uncertainties about its performance.''
--``* * * the main technologies to be developed * * * are all
worthwhile technologies for other applications beside the
transmutation of wastes. We see the spin-offs from the
development efforts as equally important reasons for the
undertaking of the proposed development program in the next few
years.''
--``As detailed in the following sections there are several
commendable attributes but also questions and caveats to be
addressed. * * * The R&D program is well designed to address
these concerns.''
Megascience Forum
The Nuclear Physics subgroup of the Megascience Forum for the OECD
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) included ATW as
one of the applications for investigation. I believe that this spring
they will state that the nuclear physics community could assist the ATW
program with useful nuclear data experiments and with improvements to
the models and codes that are used in studies of nuclear systems. These
advances would be useful in many areas other than ATW.
Summary
The ATW collaboration has reached a stage where it is prudent to
take the next step in technology development--the 5-year plan. We have
an opportunity to make significant advances and to enhance the
capability of our repository solution. At the same time, ATW holds the
promise of making nuclear power more acceptable to the general populace
by minimizing the amount of material that has to be stored in a
repository and by reducing the length of time over which a geologic
repository must be licensed. In addition, the USA will continue its
leadership role in an important area for the country and for the world.
Finally, I'd like to thank you for the opportunity to speak to you
today on ATW and its possibilities, and for your kind attention to an
important issue.
Separately we have provided copies of an October 1997 presentation
to the Swedish Royal Academy of Engineers at their request in order to
assist them in discussions they were going to have with the Swedish
Government relative to policies in effect for nuclear power within
Sweden.
______
Accelerator-Driven Destruction of Long-Lived Radioactive Waste and
Energy Production
Abstract.--Nuclear waste management involves many issues. ATW is an
option that can assist a repository by enhancing its capability and
thereby assist nuclear waste management. Technology advances and the
recent release of liquid metal coolant information from Russia has had
an enormous impact on the viability of an ATW system. It now appears
economic with many repository enhancing attributes. In time, an ATW
option added to present repository activities will provide the public
with a nuclear fuel cycle that is acceptable from economic and
environmental points of view.
introduction
The nuclear waste disposal issue for spent fuel from nuclear
reactors is one that has a large impact on public acceptance of nuclear
power generation and of long-term storage options. To a lesser degree,
this issue has an impact on the costs of generating electricity, and
the shipping, handling and transport of highly radioactive materials.
Various options for long-term storage are being considered by different
countries, but most schemes result in a geologic repository that has to
be licensed and certified for a lifetime in excess of 100,000 years.
Much investment has been made in repositories and their capabilities,
with significant progress and rational solutions. Many individuals
state that a geologic repository is a good solution and one that can
work well. Others express concern over the time needed to protect such
facilities from overt or covert actions, either from natural effects or
by planned intrusions. Some express concerns about passing a serious
legacy to future generations and about the loss of an energy generating
resource from the heavy elements in the stored spent fuel. These are
all difficult issues to consider and require well thought-out solutions
to effect a win-win outcome for a country, its leaders, industry and
the populace.
The Accelerator Transmutation of Waste (ATW) system is a repository
enhancing option that should be considered because of the benefits it
provides; no matter where the repository is located and no matter its
status. The ATW option can be employed whether the spent fuel is fully
buried, monitored and retrievable, or in interim storage ponds at
nuclear installations. ATW supports the premise that a repository is a
very good solution and assists this solution by making more efficient
use of the capacity. A comparison can be made of flying across the
Atlantic Ocean from North America to Europe in a propeller driven plane
versus a modern jet aircraft. A traveler spends less time getting
across, the higher flight path is usually less impacted by the weather
and the turbulence, and the economics are better because of
improvements in technology; even though the propeller driven aircraft
is safe and gets to the destination. Both are acceptable solutions, but
the jet aircraft is preferred by most individuals because of economics,
technology enhancements, time spent and other associated benefits.
Successful development work on jet engines and associated technologies
allowed the introduction of this option into air travel.
Estimated benefits to be accrued for an ATW assisted repository
include the following:
--Radiotoxicity and radioactivity are significantly reduced. An ATW
assisted repository has a lower toxicity (and activity) after
300 years than an unassisted repository after 100,000 years.
--Because of the above improvement, it may be possible to license a
repository for 300 years rather than the present anticipated
100,000 years plus.
--The amount of transuranic material introduced into a repository is
reduced by more than three orders of magnitude. In the USA this
means that the 600 tons of transuranics, contained within the
70,000 tons of spent fuel estimated to be handled by 2015, is
reduced to less than 0.3 tons.
--At the same time that the transuranic material is being transmuted
in the ATW system, it is generating useful energy that can be
coupled to the electrical grids.
--At no time during the operation of the ATW cycle are weapons
materials separated or made available in the processing
streams. In that sense, the processes are proliferation
resistant.
--Two of the most worrisome fission products, Tc and I, are
transmuted and minimized to the point that they are no longer
major concerns for repository licensing.
Over the past decade many technology alternatives for an ATW system
were studied. It is intriguing and interesting that the international
community has evolved to the same three basic components for an ATW
system. These three components are pyrochemistry for the chemical
processing, the liquid lead bismuth eutectic (LBE) used for both the
target and the coolant, and the high-power linear accelerator that
provides the protons for the spallation process in the target. Other
common features used in the design of an ATW include solid fuel, fast
neutron spectrum and a sub-critical assembly. Previously studied
elements that are no longer considered include molten salt, thermal
neutron spectrum, liquid fuels and centrifuge separations.
We have reached the stage in the development for an ATW system
where it makes sense to take the next step--to start significant
funding over the next five years to develop and test the concepts to
the point such that an informed decision could be made by policy makers
on whether this technology should be taken to the next stage, a
demonstration ATW plant of the 1,000 MWt class.
An outcome of the five year development program would not only be
the concepts and the feasibility of an ATW system, but would include
the technology that could be used in other applications. The
pyrochemistry, the LBE target, a LBE-cooled fast reactor concept and
the accelerator technology could all be of benefit to programs which
have as part of their infrastructure items such as spallation neutron
sources and targets, future nuclear stations, and high-power proton
accelerator applications including radio-isotope production, muon
colliders and neutron scattering. Some have even suggested that the
technology developments in LBE and pyrochemistry could be the bridge to
future nuclear systems that may have the following advantages:
simplified operation, minimal waste streams, more efficient use of
heavy element resources and reduced costs.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
As mentioned above, an ATW system consists of three major building
blocks. These are the high-power proton accelerator, a liquid LBE
target and cooling system, and pyrochemistry processing. Our studies
and those of our international colleagues indicate that economics for
an ATW-assisted repository appear to be favorable. This economic
indication has been verified by industrial partners who have completed
simple systems studies; not detailed economic analysis based on item-
by-item component lists, scheduled deliveries and supplier quotes. We
have not reached the state in our studies to be able to provide such
detailed information. Information of this nature would be part of the
outcome from the five year technology development program planned for
the future.
Choices for the three major building blocks are based on the
following information. The subcritical burner uses liquid LBE and is
based on solid fuels and extensive Russian nuclear reactor work with
liquid LBE. The pyrochemical processes are based on significant work at
ANL and LANL on efficient processes that have the potential for
proliferation resistance and low environmental impact. The linear
accelerator is based on work underway within the USA for an Accelerator
Production of Tritium (APT) accelerator (170 MW of continuous beam
power), and the innovations and developments achieved earlier under the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) ion beam programs. These three
recent developments have revolutionized the ATW capabilities and have
made it possible to consider significant advantages for an ATW-assisted
repository.
ATW assists waste disposal options by transmuting waste. The
process starts by accelerating protons to about 1 GeV in an efficient
linear accelerator. Accelerator economic studies using real hardware
costs have shown that 1 GeV is an optimum energy for this application,
within a rather large minimum cost band. These energetic protons
produce copious neutrons from the spallation process when they impinge
on a high atomic number spallation target. At the proton beam energies
and LBE target of interest, each proton produces about 30 neutrons.
Having this source of neutrons allows an ATW system to operate sub-
critical and thereby assist the nuclear system in transmuting
transuranics by causing them to fission, and transmuting fission
products (mainly Tc and I) by neutron absorption to other isotopes.
Subcriticality and pyrochemistry enable the destruction of actinides
and fission products safely, without isolation of weapons-grade
material, without extensive separations and in a single-purpose device.
Aspects of handling and transportation are minimized by having most of
the activities completed at the ATW site. The proton beam impinges on a
liquid LBE target that is also the coolant for the nuclear system
consisting of transmutation solid fuel assemblies. The choice of liquid
LBE for the target and coolant is based on the more than 75 reactor
years of experience in Russia for liquid LBE-based nuclear reactors
that were mainly used for their ``Alpha-class'' submarines. The solid
fuel assemblies are made from first decladding spent fuel and then
performing several stages of pyrochemistry involving direct oxide
reduction, electrorefining and electrowinning of the materials. Fuel
assemblies are then fabricated from the material coming from the
electrowinning process and from the Zr that was declad from the spent
fuel.
Transmutation assemblies spend about a year within the
transmutation burner core, being shuffled between the three zones of
the core during this period. After this shuffling cycle is completed,
the rods are allowed to ``cool'' and then go through a similar process
as for the spent fuel to provide separations and material streams that
eventually lead to a reduction of three orders of magnitude in the
transuranics that would be put into a repository.
Operational parameters for the liquid LBE coolant (340 deg.C inlet
and 540 deg.C outlet with 400 deg.C to the steam generator) permit
efficient conversion of heat to electrical power. About 10 percent of
the power generated would be fed back to the accelerator to provide the
necessary power to operate it and its ancillaries.
REPOSITORY ENHANCING SCENARIO
A scenario has been developed using information available at this
time for the performance of the ATW system described in this paper.
This scenario is based on the 70,000 tons of reactor spent fuel
expected to be accumulated within the USA by the year 2015. Assuming
that this material should be transmuted within a reasonable time-frame
and that the number of ATW systems shouldn't be too complex or costly,
the following attributes are possible. No optimization of the
transmutation complex has been completed, nor has any inference been
made about continuing ATW-type systems after the campaign--this
scenario is provided only to give an indication of possibilities that
can be accrued. Over a 65 year period it is possible to convert the
70,000 tons of reactor spent fuel (with 600 tons of transuranics) to:
--67,000 tons of uranium (could be considered as LLW (Low Level
Waste)--radioactivity of natural U) which would be a small
addition to the present LLW uranium.
--Less than 0.3 tons of transuranics.
--3,000 tons of fission products (with minimal Tc and I).
--560 GWe-year of electricity generation assuming an overall 35
percent plant efficiency (including thermal conversion). Even
at 20 mils per kW/hr this represents a sizable return on the
investment--about $100 Billion over the 65 years.
--No significant Pu or Np.
Because of this conversion only about 3,000 tons of material needs
to be transferred to the repository (a reduction of a factor of 20 from
the initial 70,000 tons), a situation that seriously impacts the needs
for additional repositories in the future. This impact is realized
because the repository storage efficiency is improved by the
transmutation process, by the types of materials to be stored, and by
the changes in the heat load and radiotoxicity--all leading to
decreased long-term risks.
The 65 year scenario involves the commissioning and installation of
twenty 2,000 MWt transmutation burners, staggered over a 25-year period
and each with a 40-year lifetime, such that the transmutation campaign
ends after 65 years. This scenario could be realized by utilizing three
locations with seven transmutation burners at each of the locations,
with only one location functional for the last ten years of the
campaign. A very rough investment cost of this three location scenario
for the 25 years is in the ``ball park'' of $60 B with average
operating costs ``guesstimated'' at $2 B per year. Much work needs to
be done to refine these ``ball park'' numbers and their implications.
TECHNOLOGY CHOICES
As stated above, the three major choices for the accelerator,
subcritical assembly and the chemical processing were made on the basis
of recent technology developments and information releases, all of
which make the ATW system a very interesting option to be considered
for assisting repositories in the future. Development work is still
needed to bring this technological application to a state of maturity
such that reasonable decisions could be made on whether this option
should be pursued further.
Chemistry And Fuels
Based on significant work at ANL and at LANL in pyrochemical
processing and because of difficulties encountered with waste streams
from aqueous processing, pyrochemistry was chosen as the appropriate
method for processing reactor spent fuel and the transmutation
assemblies. Some of the pyrochemical processes are interpolations of
systems that have been demonstrated, whereas the majority involve
extrapolations which appear to be within reasonable bounds. Although
within reasonable bounds, they still need to be demonstrated on a
larger scale than at present. This is part of the five year development
program planned for the future. We are using process models and
simulations that have been verified with data from systems that have
operated at ANL and LANL.
The pyrochemical process is considered to be proliferation
resistant because the transuranics are separated as a group to be
transmuted within an ATW burner. At no time are weapons-grade materials
made available during the processing. Obviously, international controls
will have to be employed to ensure that chemical processes are not
altered in a significant manner.
Figure 1 shows a chemical processing flow chart for reactor spent
fuel on the left and transmutation assemblies on the right. Within the
processes, secondary wastes are minimized and waste materials destined
for the repository are segregated in a manner that assists preparations
necessary prior to repository transport.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TSPEC.003
The spent fuel decladding process provides the feed material for
the direct oxide reduction process. Zr from the cladding is used as
feed material for fabrication of transmutation assemblies. Within the
oxide reduction process, Sr and Cs are left in the molten salt, oxide
fuel is converted to a metal for further treatment and offgasses are
collected as in the decladding process. Electrorefining accomplishes
uranium separation in a manner to ensure no other actinides are
transferred with it. Electrowinning provides the feed material for
fabrication of the transmutation assemblies. A reductive extraction
process is used to remove the rare earths from the molten salt. At
most, three plants would be required to accommodate the 65 year
transmutation scenario described above and each of these could fit
within a 5,000 square foot building.
In a similar manner, the spent transmutation assembly chopping
provides the feed material for the electrorefining process. Here the
electrorefining process separates the U, transuranics and the fission
products. These processes could fit within the building mentioned
above.
The high melting point transmutation assemblies consist of non-
fertile actinides (15 percent) and Zr (85 percent) with 316 SS
cladding, and are compatible with the pyrochemical processes mentioned
above. There are many issues that need to be addressed for the
assemblies including swelling, bonding compatibility, and other
irradiation effects.
Liquid Metal Coolant
Using the same fluid for the spallation target as well as the core
coolant results in many improvements including elimination of a target
cooling system and associated mechanical assemblies. Liquid LBE is an
excellent spallation source because of the high atomic number, very
``hard'' neutron spectrum generated and very low neutron absorption.
Russian advances in the use of liquid LBE for nuclear reactor
cooling showed the importance of oxygen control, and the
instrumentation for monitoring oxygen to the levels required has been
developed by them. Liquid LBE is an excellent coolant for this
application, as well as for future fast reactors, because liquid LBE
has the following properties: Maintains the ``hard'' neutron spectrum;
has a very low neutron absorption, which can lead to core design
improvements; is a very effective radiation shield for the outer walls;
has the potential to enhance natural convection; has no violent
reactions with water or air; has low melting and high boiling
temperatures; and has a potential for self-plugging leaks.
Accelerator
Using a high power proton accelerator to drive a subcritical
assembly enables effective nuclear waste disposal. The accelerator-
produced spallation neutrons allow much flexibility for a system that
needs to handle many types of nuclear waste forms. This frees the
designer to concentrate on advantages for the transmutation core
without invoking constraints that could lead to specific designs for
specific spent fuel assemblies or severely constrain end-of-life
inventory burn down. Advantages for a subcritical system include the
following:
--Power control is linked to accelerator drive, not to control rods,
reactivity feedback and delayed neutrons.
--Fertile materials are not needed for the core. Pure transuranic
cores ensure a minimum of further transuranic production.
--The burner operates independent of fuel composition to first order.
--End-of-life inventory is not limited by criticality criteria.
--Neutronics and thermohydraulics are effectively decoupled.
Design for the ATW accelerator driver invokes a number of design
constraints including high conversion efficiency of electrical power to
beam power, current variable by a factor of two, extremely low beam
loss, minimal length, minimal operating and capital costs, and high
availability and reliability. Maximum proton beam power required for
each 2,000 MWt burner is 40 MW at 1 GeV.
The accelerator design constraints have led to selection of a
modest linac, 355 m in length, which employs superconducting structures
to accelerate the proton beam from 21 to 1,000 MeV. The ``front-end''
employs conventional room-temperature structures and injectors for
which all of the necessary performance characteristics will have been
demonstrated when the ``front-end'' Low Energy Demonstration
Accelerator (LEDA) operates with proton beam before CY 1999 as part of
the APT program. Work on the ``spoke'' cavities employed for
acceleration from 21 to 100 MeV will be required as part of the five
year development program. Table 1 lists the parameters for the linear
accelerator. Combining benefits of room-temperature and superconducting
technology exploits the advantages of both systems for the maximum
benefit of the ``driver''. Room-temperature technology is employed to
21 MeV in order to provide excellent emittance control and minimize
halo generation. After this, superconducting technology is employed to
minimize rf cavity losses, provide large beam apertures, reduce
accelerator length, and provide flexibility for rf phasing, error
tolerances and beam current variations.
Table 1.--Accelerator Parameters for 1 GEV ATW Proton Linac
Injector................................................. 0.075 MeV
RFQ...................................................... 0.075 MeV-6.7 MeV
CCDTL.................................................... 6.7 MeV-21.2 MeV
S/C Spoke Cavities....................................... 21.2 MeV-100 MeV
S/C Elliptical Cavities.................................. 100 MeV-1,000 MeV
Maximum Gradient......................................... 4.4 MV/m
S/C Cryomodules.......................................... 5/26
Cryoplant Load........................................... 15 kW
Maximum Beam Power....................................... 40 MW
Total RF Power........................................... 42.3 MW
Linac AC Power........................................... 95 MW
Peak Coupler Power....................................... 200 kW
1 MW Klystrons........................................... 3-350 MHz/53-700 MHz
Aperture Radius.......................................... 1/4/7.5 cm
Focusing Lattice......................................... FODO
Room Temperature Quadrupoles............................. 210
Superconducting (S/C) Quadrupoles........................ 165
Nuclear System
A schematic for a 2,000 MWt nuclear transmutation burner is shown
in Figure 2. The proton beam impinges on the liquid LBE (44.5 percent
Pb/55.5 percent Bi) from the top with the transmutation area consisting
of transmutation assemblies surrounding this target area. Liquid LBE
cools the burner with pumps and heat exchangers co-located in the
nuclear system. LMR experience is used in the design of the nuclear
system incorporating hexagonal canned assemblies. The core is about 3 m
in diameter and 2 m in height fitting into a nuclear system with an
overall diameter of 10 m and an overall height of about 17 m. Maximum
keff is 0.967 and maximum power density is 0.34 MW/1. A three zone
concept is envisioned with fuel assemblies being moved from the outer
zone to the center and then to the inner zone during burnup fuel cycle
changes.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TSPEC.004
ATW Development Program
With industrial input, a five year development plan has been
determined that will provide the technical support for large-scale
integration and deployment of ATW technologies. This $115 M program
over five years focuses on issues of importance to enable a logical
decision to be made at the end of the five year development program as
to whether a further five year program should be pursued. This second
five year program would focus on construction and operation of a 5 MW
Subcritical Test Facility to be driven by a 1 MW proton beam, design of
an ATW Processing Facility geared toward full scale pyrochemical
processing and design of a 1,000 MWt Demonstration Plant that could be
located at some strategic location.
The first five year program plan focuses on materials verification
studies and experiments, liquid LBE performance verification including
spallation product measurements, nuclear design, chemical database,
chemical processes at up to 10 kg scale, mass flows, accelerator
design, system studies and some design work to determine
characteristics necessary for a future Demonstration Facility.
COLLABORATIONS
Considerable interest in ATW has developed within laboratories,
institutions and industries around the world, not only because of ATW
but because of technologies spinning-off from this program which have
many other applications. Within the USA we have formed a team
consisting of LANL, LLNL, Sandia, Savannah River, Bechtel, Northrup-
Grumman, Westinghouse-STC, UC-Berkeley and U. Illinois. Funds to this
point have been forthcoming from each institution participating, with
LANL recently investing $1.7 M for each of the three years ending in
1999.
A common technical approach has emerged within the international
community and this common approach has assisted collaborations in a
significant manner. Europe and Asia are investing considerable amounts
of manpower and money in order to put ATW technology on a firmer
foundation than at present. Within Europe, countries including the
Czech Republic, France, Italy, Spain and Sweden have shown considerable
interest and within Asia, S. Korea and Japan have started
investigations. Collaborations exist between Russia, CERN, CEA, KAERI,
Sweden and the USA team.
CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY
An ATW system could assist a repository by enhancing its
capability. An ATW-assisted repository has many other worthwhile
features that need to be investigated in more detail. Work on
repository solutions should not be stopped. However, options that could
make a repository even better in the future should be investigated to
the point that logical decisions based on complete information can be
made. For this reason it is suggested that a five year development
program should be vigorously pursued. Enough information is available
at this time to indicate that there are no known ``show-stoppers''.
Some development work will lead to further technology selections, but
this does not appear to indicate that ATW is not possible, nor that it
isn't within the economic ``ball park''.
The major components of an ATW system are based on proven
technology or on those that will be demonstrated very soon by other
programs. Performance drivers that have been used in determining the
present ATW system are safety, proliferation resistance, low
environmental impact, fast burn rates and low inventories. All of these
goals are met in the system described above.
A logical path has been shown for developing an ATW system with
opportunities to make future decisions for continuing or stopping.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Many people have been working in the ATW area for the past ten
years and they have made significant contributions to the needed
technology base and understanding. Their legacy will allow others in
the future to build on this strong base--one that is well documented
with many international connections. This program is truly an
international effort and one that requires international collaborations
to succeed. Resources from the many laboratories, institutions,
universities and industries around the world have played an important
role in advancing the technology to the point that it makes sense to
take the next steps requiring modest government funding. It is
difficult to acknowledge everyone who has had an impact on making this
ATW option more visible within the world community. However I'd like to
express my grateful appreciation to Carlo Rubbia, Massimo Salvatores,
Yuri Orlov, Waclow Gudowski, Curt Miliekowski, Vladimir Kazaritsky, and
Edward Arthur for their foresight and willingness to push hard against
what appeared to be ``closed'' doors. We have come a long way on this
ATW journey and many new individuals have joined the throng. Although
we are of differing opinions, Charlie Bowman needs to be singled out
because he has had a significant influence on the program and the
understanding of the technology choices.
Within the USA, I am particularly indebted to the ATW team led very
ably by Francesco Venneri. This team has put together the promising
technology and a system that has many exciting attributes. I am
grateful for contributions from members of that team: Mark Williamson
(chemistry), Ning Li (LBE), Mario Carelli (nuclear system), Mike Houts
(nuclear design), George Lawrence (accelerator), Tim Myers, Tom
Wangler, Keith Woloshun, Valentina Tscharnotskaia, Michael Bjomberg,
Joey Donahue, Steve Wender and Ann Schake. Others that I would like to
thank are Sam Harkness, Bob Taussig, Mike Kreisler, Arthur Kermin, Pete
Lyons, Nestor Ortiz, Pete Miller, Tony Favale, Reed Jensen, Rulon
Linford, John Ireland, Mike Cappiello, Edward Heighway, Bill Bishop,
Greg VanTuyle, Paul Lisowski and John Browne for recognizing the many
implications of this program.
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much.
Senator Stevens, I might say that one of the reasons this
now appears feasible, whereas it was not so feasible in prior
years, is that the idea of the accelerator is an American one,
but we always had trouble with what kind of a reactor would you
use. And the Russians have submitted a subcritical lead bismuth
reactor. Subcritical, if you understand what that means, it is
very important.
And it is around those concepts that they are building this
possibility, which 5 or 6 years ago they could not have done.
Dr. Schriber. That is right.
Senator Domenici. Let us proceed now.
Mr. Blue.
STATEMENT OF LINDEN BLUE, VICE CHAIRMAN, GENERAL
ATOMICS
Mr. Blue. Mr. Chairman, Senator Stevens, just a little over
12 years ago my brother and I bought General Atomics. And we
did it voluntarily. You can say that the last 12 years have not
been great years for nuclear energy. But I have to say that in
spite of the fact that that decision was made 12 years ago, we
would do it again today, and, in fact, we would do it much more
adamantly than we did then for two basic reasons.
First of all, we believe strongly in the importance of
nuclear energy for abundant energy without environmental
effects. We still do. And as this hearing has bore out, you
almost cannot get to the future with a proper environment
without nuclear energy. The second reason was that we believe
strongly that nuclear energy could be done better; that science
was making advances that would make it even better than it has
been in the past 40 years or so.
And, very interestingly, 40 years ago, when General Atomics
was founded, the likes of Freeman Dyson and Edward Teller were
gathered around very similarly to probably the conferences they
have had at MIT, and they sort of took an empirical look at it,
and they said, well, how should nuclear energy be done
properly? And they had many of the criterion that Mr. Smith
suggested. And they said, and then, sometime far in the future,
we will be able to hook it to a gas turbine and then get the
ultimate in efficiency. And essentially that is what Mr. Smith
and the people at MIT are concluding now, that the time is
right.
Well, we at General Atomics saw a fundamental capacity in
the gas reactor for changing the safety equation. And by so
doing, you also can change the economics equation, because you
can save the efficiency. And when you drive up efficiency, you
dramatically reduce waste and proliferation.
And I would like to just show you how basically and
fundamentally we think that the safety equation can be changed.
Mark, if you would just turn that one around. [Chart.]
In order to get the kind of safety that Mr. Smith was
describing, you really should have no possibility of a
meltdown. And it is simple. You have to have a low-power
density. It has to be combined with proper geometry. And you
must have fuel that is tolerant of high temperatures. And that
is ceramic fuel.
And if you put those three things together you are not
going to have enough decay heat to have a meltdown. And that is
what MIT is after, and I believe what they should be after. It
is very basic; it is very simple. And people are going to say,
well, why hasn't it been done before? The short answer is that
because the reactors that have served the world so well these
past 4 years, most of it came out of submarine technology,
where space was at an absolute premium and power density was
terribly important.
Well, as good as those reactors have been, it is time to
move on, time to have low-power density cores that are tolerant
of the high temperatures and with fuel that can increase the
efficiency.
Now, on the efficiency side it is fundamental that you must
increase temperatures. And ceramic fuel is tolerant and makes
an increase of temperatures possible. And when you combine the
increase of temperatures with a gas turbine, you come up with
much higher efficiency.
And, Mark, would you show the next one, please. [Chart.]
The first generation water reactors have been up in the 33
percent thermal efficiency range, and we are clearly going to
get above 47. And that assumes operating temperatures of 850
degrees centigrade. And the Japanese will next month go
critical on their test reactor that will move up to 950. When
you get to 950, efficiencies up in the mid-50's are clearly
indicated.
Senator Domenici. What does the efficiency mean in this
context?
Mr. Blue. Thermal efficiency essentially drives everything
else. The amount of energy you get from a given number of
fissions in the amount of heat generated. And when you drive up
that efficiency, all good things happen, particularly in the
waste arena.
So, again, MIT is on the right track here. You want the
higher temperatures, and you want the gas turbines. [Chart.]
And this graph shows it pretty basically. If you start with
24 megawatt hours of electricity in both cases, both for a
lightwater reactor on the top and a gas reactor on the bottom,
you essentially need 3 grams of fissionable material in the
lightwater and 2 in the gas reactor. And you get the result,
out to the right, where you have twice as much reject heat with
the lightwater reactor, you have 50 percent more high-level
waste and you have four times as much plutonium 239, which was
the bad weapon stuff.
So, to summarize, may I have the next one? [Chart.]
As Dyson and Teller, and now MIT, have concluded, if you
start with the right basis, if you start with helium as a
coolant, you get away from stress corrosion, the Achilles heel,
if you will, of first-generation nuclear. If you use ceramics,
you can have the higher temperatures and, therefore, the higher
efficiencies and a much better waste picture. You can get to
the ultimate in safety, which is no meltdown. And, finally,
with the modularity that Mr. Smith is talking about and the
simplicity, you get to the lowest possible capital costs. And
that means low-cost electricity. And that is where I think we
ought to be going.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Linden Blue
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
allowing me this opportunity to discuss the Gas Turbine-Modular Helium
Reactor (GT-MHR). The GT-MHR represents a major technical breakthrough
in power production that addresses several important issues affecting
nuclear power: it is almost 50 percent more efficient than first
generation reactors, produces about 50 percent less waste and
essentially eliminates the potential for melt down. In addition, it has
some distinct advantages for destroying WPu.
During the last few years, development of the GT-MHR has been
sponsored under a joint venture between General Atomics (GA) of San
Diego and the Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) of Russia. Framatome
and Fuji Electric are also participants. Prior to this, the U.S.
Government invested about $1 billion in the technology over a period of
many years.
The GT-MHR, the only second generation nuclear reactor currently
under active development, takes advantage of four recent, and very
significant, technical advancements. We are also positioned to take
advantage of the historic opportunity to complete this technology in
Russia at a very low cost. Cost for completion of the detailed design
will run about $240 million--about one quarter the cost of completing
the design in the U.S. Russia has agreed to match all design funds
coming to Russia. The first operating unit would have the additional
benefit of destroying Russian weapons grade plutonium (WPu) by using it
as its fuel. Indeed, at the Vancouver summit, President Yeltsin
requested that the U.S. share this energy technology to enhance
Russia's conversion from weapons production.
GA and Russian scientists and engineers have been working together
in this project for three years. This partnership is a natural
extension of nearly forty years of joint GA and Russian cooperation on
nuclear fusion research and development.
Mr. Chairman, I will briefly describe some of the characteristics
of the GT-MHR and some related issues.
Market.--Electricity is the fastest growing segment of the energy
market: it is portable, flexible, low cost and environmentally benign.
However, when it is generated by burning hydrocarbons, it has adverse
environmental effects. Nuclear power has the potential for eliminating
adverse environmental effects if reactors are meltdown proof and waste
is reduced and properly handled. The world market for electricity
generating plants is estimated at $100 billion per year. GT-MHR
represents an excellent new technology for fulfilling world energy
requirements at low cost, without environmental degradation.
Technology.--The GA developed GT-MHR is the culmination of 40 years
and $6 billion of R&D world wide. The four enabling technologies
combined in the GT-MHR are the modular helium reactor, high performance
gas turbines, highly effective recuperators and magnetic bearings. All
of these technologies are state of the art now in other applications.
They were not available a few years ago.
Safety.--GT-MHR is the only reactor design that is melt down proof.
It is melt down proof because its power density is 20 times less than
current reactors. The reactor power density and geometry mean that
there is simply not enough energy density to raise reactor temperatures
to the point which would melt its high temperature ceramic fuel.
Efficiency.--High temperature helium gas goes directly from the
reactor to a gas turbine which directly drives an electric generator.
The laws of physics mandate that higher gas temperatures mean more
efficient energy conversion. Helium direct drive is also more
efficient, allows utilization of higher temperatures and eliminates
costly equipment. The result is thermal efficiency of 47 percent which
is about 50 percent greater than other reactors. Future GT-MHR's will
allow efficiencies of close to 60 percent. The GT-MHR opens the door to
quantum efficiency improvements for nuclear energy.
Environment.--Higher efficiencies mean less thermal discharge to
the environment, less high level waste. The GT-MHR will produce 50
percent more electricity for a given amount of thermal discharge and
waste creation.
Proliferation.--The GT-MHR is the most proliferation resistant
reactor design. It's fuel is engineered to achieve high burn up in a
once through fuel cycle. This means no reprocessing. Because of the
high burn up, its waste fuel is extremely low in plutonium 239 (4 times
lower than other reactors). It would be virtually unusable for weapons
production.
Cost.--50 percent greater efficiency assures substantially lower
costs of electricity. After learning curve effects, a plant should cost
less than $1,000 per KWe and produce electricity for 2.1 cents/KWh.
Also, GT-MHR is intended to be factory built in modules with factory
cost and quality control. Electricity capacity can be added in
digestible bites of about 285 MWe as electricity demand increases.
Modularity.--The ability to add electricity generation capacity in
modules of 285 MWe allows more conservative capacity planning, reduces
developmental carrying costs, allows more flexibility in maintenance
schedules, reduces backup power requirements, is adaptable to areas
where power grids have low capacities, allows better distribution of
generation capacity, and reduces transmission losses in low demand
power markets.
WPu destruction.--GT-MHR uses 100 percent Pu fuel compared to 5
percent Pu in MOX fuel. This means MOX fuel requires something like
twenty times more fuel manufacturing throughput to dispose of an equal
amount of WPu. Starting with the same amount of WPu, the residual Pu-
239 in once-through MOX spent fuel would be five times greater than in
GT-MHR spent fuel. A plant suitable for production of Pu particle fuel
has been estimated to cost $50 million. This is about one-tenth the
cost of a MOX plant processing the same amount of WPu. It would be
possible to convert WPu to GT-MHR particle fuel on whatever schedule
was expedient. Once converted to particle fuel, it would be
substantially proliferation resistant and can be stored for later use
in GT-MHR's.
Technical Challenges.--Further fuel tests must be run to prove the
fuel for the GT-MHR has characteristics similar to fuels used
successfully at the Peach Bottom, Fort St. Vrain, AVR, and THTR
reactors rather than the fuel proposed for the NPR which had an
inherent design flaw. Design confirmation testing must be done on
recuperators, seals, and magnetic bearings. The power conversion module
is large and complex and will experience substantial thermal growth
during its heat up. All of the systems must be proven to work together.
Balance of Payments and International Ramifications.--The U.S.
currently burns about $1 billion per week in imported oil. This is by
far our largest import and accounts for about half of our entire
balance of payments deficit. Installed in the U.S., GT-MHR will reduce
U.S. reliance on foreign oil. Installed in Russia, it will free up
natural gas supplies to earn foreign currency and create a new export
industry.
Attached are some additional details on the issues discussed above.
GT-MHR: TECHNOLOGY BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW
The GT-MHR plant design has evolved from the experience of
operating more than 50 gas cooled nuclear reactors worldwide and recent
technological advances in fossil-fired Brayton (gas turbine) cycle
systems.
Five helium cooled reactors, which operated in the 1960's, 1970's,
and 1980's demonstrated the inherent characteristics of helium cooled
reactors. In the 1980's, modular helium reactor (MHR) designs were
developed, both in Germany and in the U.S. in response to the general
public's safety concerns. These designs had inherent passive
characteristics for meeting stringent safety goals without relying on
active safety systems or operator action. The major drawback of these
passively safe designs, which employed the Rankine power conversion
cycle, was they were evaluated to be non-competitive economically.
By the early 1990's, because of advances in industrial gas turbine
technology, highly effective recuperators and related equipment, the
potential emerged for coupling the unique high temperature capability
of an MHR with a gas turbine in a closed Brayton cycle for the
achievement of high efficiency and competitive economics.
The GT-MHR couples an MHR, contained in one vessel, with a high
efficiency gas turbine energy conversion system contained in an
adjacent vessel. The reactor and power conversion vessels are
interconnected with a short cross-vessel and are located below grade in
a cylindrical silo.
The MHR employs a graphite moderator and TRISO-coated particle
fuel. TRISO fuel contains a spherical kernel of fissile or fertile
material, as appropriate for the application, encapsulated in multiple
coating layers. A low-density carbon (buffer) layer surrounds the
kernel to attenuate fission recoil atoms and provide void volume to
accommodate fission gases. Surrounding the buffer is an inner
pyrocarbon coating (IPyC), a silicon carbide (SiC) layer, and an outer
pyrocarbon coating (OPyC). The IPyC, SiC, and OPyC layers together form
a miniature, highly corrosion resistant pressure vessel and an
essentially impermeable barrier to the release of gaseous and metallic
fission products. Extensive tests in the U.S., Europe, and Japan have
proven the excellent performance characteristics of this fuel.
The overall diameter of standard TRISO-coated particles varies from
about 650 microns to about 850 microns. For the MHR, TRISO-coated
particles are bonded with a graphitic matrix to form cylindrical fuel
compacts approximately 13 mm in diameter and 51 mm long. Approximately
3,000 fuel compacts are loaded into a hexagonal graphite fuel element,
793 mm long by 360 mm across flats. This is the same type of fuel
element which showed excellent performance at Fort St. Vrain. One
hundred and two columns of the hexagonal fuel elements are stacked 10
elements high to form an annular core. Reflector graphite blocks are
provided inside and outside of the core.
TRISO-coated particle fuel remains stable to very high
temperatures. The coatings do not start to thermally degrade until
temperatures approaching 2000 deg.C are reached. Normal operating
temperatures do not exceed about 1250 deg.C and worst case accident
temperatures are maintained below 1600 deg.C.
Helium, heated in the reactor, expands through a gas turbine to
generate electricity. From the turbine exhaust, the helium flows
through the hot side of a recuperator transferring residual heat energy
to helium on the recuperator cold side which is returning to the
reactor. From the recuperator, the helium flows through a precooler
where it is further cooled. The cooled helium then passes through low
and high-pressure compressors with intercooling. From the compressor
outlet, the helium flows through the cold, high-pressure side of the
recuperator where it is heated for return to the reactor.
The gas turbine power conversion system has been made possible by
four key technology developments during the past decade in: large
aircraft and industrial gas turbines; large active magnetic bearings;
compact, highly effective plate-fin heat exchangers; and high strength,
high temperature steel alloy vessels. Demonstrated gas turbine
technology is available for turbines with power ratings that match the
requirements of the passively safe modular helium reactor. Indeed, the
high pressure (and density) helium working fluid actually provides
higher output (i.e., the GT-MHR gas turbine is actually smaller) than
an equivalently rated fossil fired gas turbine. The gas turbine system
eliminates extensive and expensive equipment required for the century-
old Rankine steam cycle technology used by other nuclear power plants
for conversion of thermal energy to electrical power.
Not only does the elimination of steam plant equipment reduce
capital and operating costs, but also the plant efficiency is markedly
increased. The GT-MHR achieves a net thermal conversion efficiency of
approximately 47 percent as compared to current nuclear plants that
have efficiencies of about 33 percent.
GT-MHR advantages include:
Unique Reactor Safety.--The GT-MHR is meltdown-proof and passively
safe. The overall level of plant safety is unique among nuclear reactor
technologies. This is achieved through a combination of inherent safety
characteristics and design selections that take maximum advantage of
these characteristics. These design selections and features include:
(1) helium coolant, which is single phase, inert, and has no reactivity
effects; (2) graphite core, which provides high heat capacity and slow
thermal response, and structural stability at very high temperatures;
(3) refractory coated particle fuel, which allows extremely high burnup
and retains fission products at temperatures much higher than normal
operation; (4) negative temperature coefficient of reactivity, which
inherently shuts down the core above normal operating temperatures; and
(5) an annular, 600 MWt low power density core in an uninsulated steel
reactor vessel surrounded by a reactor cavity cooling system. Power
level and geometry together enable passive heat transfer from the core
to the ultimate heat sink while maintaining fuel temperatures below
damage limits. These safety design features result in a reactor that
can withstand loss of coolant circulation or even loss of coolant
inventory and maintain fuel temperatures below damage limits (i.e., the
system is meltdown proof).
High Plant Efficiency.--Use of the Brayton Cycle helium gas turbine
in the GT-MHR provides electric generating capacity at a net plant
efficiency of about 47 percent, a level that can be obtained by no
other nuclear reactor technology. This high plant efficiency results in
low power generation costs. The high efficiency also results in
significantly less thermal discharge to the environment, than other
reactor technologies, and significantly lower waste generation per unit
electricity produced.
GT-MHR Fuel Cycle.--Per GWe-Yr, the GT-MHR requires more U3O8 but
achieves 2.5 times the burnup of the comparable PWR. The GT-MHR thermal
discharge is about 50 percent less and the actinide production is about
60 percent less per unit electricity produced.
Superior High Level Waste Form.--Coated particle fuel provides a
superior spent fuel waste form for both long-term interim storage and
permanent geologic disposal. The refractory coatings retain their
integrity in a repository environment for hundreds of thousands of
years. As such, they provide defense-in-depth to ensure that the spent
fuel radionuclides are contained for geologic time frames and do not
migrate to the biosphere.
Effective Plutonium Destruction.--For the disposition of weapons
grade plutonium (WPu), the GT-MHR provides the capability to consume
more than 90 percent of the initially charged plutonium-239 and more
than 65 percent of the initially charged total plutonium in a single
pass through the reactor. The performance of plutonium coated particles
to burnup levels of 750,000 MWd/MT has been demonstrated by irradiation
tests in the Dragon and Peach Bottom 1 gas cooled reactors. The level
of plutonium destruction is well beyond that achieved by other WPu
disposition alternatives. By achieving this high level of plutonium
destruction, the GT-MHR extracts a substantially higher portion of the
useful energy content from the material than other reactor options
without reprocessing and recycle. Because the plutonium fueled GT-MHR
uses no fertile fuel material, all fissions in the core are plutonium
fissions, and no new plutonium is produced by the operation of the
reactor. Comparable results would apply to the utilization of reactor
grade plutonium.
Diversion/Proliferation Resistance.--The GT-MHR is particularly
well suited for international deployment for plutonium disposition.
Both the fresh fuel and the spent fuel discharged from the GT-MHR have
higher resistance to diversion and proliferation than other reactor
options for plutonium disposition. The plutonium content of the fresh
fuel is very diluted within the fuel element graphite. In addition to
having the self-protecting characteristics of other spent fuel (high
radiation fields and spent fuel mass and volume), the amount of
plutonium per GT-MHR spent fuel element is very low and there is
neither a developed process nor capability anywhere in the world for
separating the residual plutonium from GT-MHR spent fuel. Furthermore,
the discharged plutonium isotopic mixture is severely degraded (well
beyond light water reactor spent fuel) making it particularly
unattractive for use in weapons.
CONCLUSIONS
The GT-MHR represents a second-generation, meltdown proof, nuclear
power solution.
--The GT-MHR is the best nuclear energy source for the next century.
The design addresses many of the current concerns with nuclear
power with regard to safety, economics, proliferation
resistance, and high level waste disposal.
--The GT-MHR is highly attractive for the disposition of weapons
plutonium. High levels of plutonium destruction are achieved, a
high portion of the useful energy content from the material is
obtained without reprocessing and recycle, and the fuel is
highly diversion and proliferation resistant.
--The GT-MHR small modular size coupled with its safety, economic,
environmental, and proliferation resistant characteristics make
the GT-MHR an ideal system for responsibly meeting the
burgeoning electricity demand in developing countries. The GT-
MHR's passive safety characteristics reduce the need for a
developing country to have an elaborate nuclear infrastructure.
--An international team is actively working on the design to (1)
complete the deployment of a prototype in Russia, with an
initial mission of plutonium disposition, and (2) marketing
uranium fueled GT-MHR plants to the world for electricity
generation.
--Technical issues are solvable.
--Support of the U.S. Government will accelerate completion of the
project and early destruction of Wpu.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES E. TILL, PH.D., ASSOCIATE
LABORATORY DIRECTOR (RETIRED), ARGONNE
NATIONAL LABORATORY
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much.
Dr. Till.
Dr. Till. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Stevens, for
having me here today. I am Charles Till.
For 17 years, until January 1 of this year, I directed the
reactor development program at Argonne. And, with my
colleagues--in particular, my successor, Dr. Chang--I was the
initiator of the IFR concept at Argonne and was responsible for
its development. So, when I was asked by your very competent
staff to talk about the IFR today, it should not be expected,
although I will try to be as neutral as I can, it should not be
expected I will say unkind things about it. Where opinion slips
in, it is my own.
The what, where, why of the IFR: First, the what. What was
the IFR? The IFR is the integral fast reactor. It is a type of
reactor, an advanced reactor concept is actually a whole
reactor system--the reactor, the fuel, the new reprocessing
scheme, and the new waste form, the whole entity, for a
complete reactor system--that has a range of unusual and
valuable characteristics. It was invented at Argonne in 1983.
It saw intensive development from 1984 through 1994. It was
a program funded at about $100 million a year, including the
operation of the necessary facilities. And it was terminated,
incomplete, in 1994, following the President's 1993 State of
the Union Address, where he stated no further need for advanced
reactor development.
Now, the why. Why was it undertaken at all in the 1980's,
not a favorable environment for nuclear any more then, than it
is today? Simply, by the early eighties, several things were
clear. The path to long-term sustainable nuclear power was
blocked, and increasingly so. In part, it was because the
reactors in place at the time do not have the characteristics
necessary to change that. The characteristics that are
necessary are pretty easily identifiable. They are not the ones
that were the basis of the choice for the present reactors.
And, finally, the new reactors that do have these
characteristics were now possible.
The when: It was first put together as a complete in 1983.
The idea was a new reactor type that had inherently safe
operational characteristics, a new fuel which allowed a
radically different reprocessing scheme, and new short-lived
waste form. It was not out of the blue. It was based on the
discoveries mainly at Argonne, going back 40 years.
As to where: It was carried out at Argonne, IL, the
analytical work, but largely Argonne in Idaho, where the
necessary facilities were, the reactor, the safety facilities,
the chemical hot cell facilities and so on.
And where did it stand when it was terminated? It was
largely proven as a concept, some parts more than others. It
was sufficiently promising that the Japanese had either
invested or promised $100 million, part of which was cancelled
then when the administration cancelled the program. And two
large American utilities had also put money in it.
Mr. Chairman, in the moments I have, I think it is
important to describe the characteristics of this. It is not so
important--it is in my testimony--the technical reasons why
these characteristics are possible. But the principle
characteristics are inherent safety, proliferation resistance,
reduced waste, and fuel resource efficiency. Those four things.
That is what this reactor was aimed at.
Now, in inherent safety, fundamentally--you can define it a
number of ways--but, fundamentally, what you are trying to do
is protect against overheating. Every reactor accident involves
overheating. And a reactor that will regulate its own
temperature naturally is an inherently safe reactor. The IFR
would do that.
In proliferation resistance, any proliferation threat from
a commercial reactor simply means, can you get pure 235 or
weapons plutonium from it in an easier way than you could get
it by some other path. Weapons plutonium is normally the focus
of this, and it is not a radioactive material. As you know, it
is adequately shielded with a piece of paper. But if you have
fission products and it remains highly radioactive even after
processing, that product is self-protecting and it does not add
in any material way to proliferation threats.
Reduced waste--what do I mean by that? I mean the goal in
reducing nuclear waste is twofold. One is the volume. The IFR
did that by a factor of about three. The other is the longevity
and the importance of the longevity of the radioactivity
associated with the waste. The important radioactivity as far
as groundwater and so forth is concerned comes with the
actonide elements. The IFR removed the actonide elements. That
reprocessing scheme did that. The present reprocessing schemes
do not. And that is a difference.
In uranium resource efficiencies--and that is the most
important point for future reactor development in my view--is
that you have got to use the U238. Only one-half
percent of the uranium mined is used today. You can do a simple
calculation, and that limits the life of nuclear power. You
have got to use the 238. The IFR did that.
So, in summary, all of those things have to be done. The
IFR had all four of those characteristics. But they have to be
done without increases in cost. They have to be a natural part
of the system. The IFR did that, too.
So, it is important that advanced technology, if it is to
be developed, be the right technology. And, Mr. Chairman, I
think those are the characteristics that are required. The IFR
had those. And I think it is useful to have another look.
Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles E. Till
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I thank you for the
opportunity to speak to you today on the possibilities for reactors of
the future.
I am Charles Till. For seventeen years, until my retirement on
January 1st this year, I was in charge of reactor development at
Argonne National Laboratory, the principal laboratory in the DOE system
for civilian nuclear reactor development.
With my colleagues, and, in particular with my successor, Dr. Yoon
Chang, I was the initiator of the Integral Fast Reactor, or IFR,
concept at Argonne National Laboratory. In the early 1980's, it became
very clear that nuclear reactors could and should be designed which
would have significant improvements over today's nuclear plants. It was
also clear that the time was right to include the full fuel cycle in
the new plant design--for to not do so would mean a continuation of
intractable problems with nuclear waste and resource efficiencies which
could eventually preclude any further use of nuclear power.
Nuclear reactor systems, and the problems associated with them, are
best thought of in terms of the whole of the fuel cycle--everything
from mining the uranium ore to producing the waste products. The IFR is
a reactor which incorporates each step of the nuclear power fuel cycle
into one complete system treated as a whole. We knew that the IFR must
be an efficient system, that it must utilize the uranium resource
properly and completely--if not, it would not be a long-term energy
option, and probably not worth spending tax dollars for it's
development.
Begun in 1984, the IFR was a $100m per year development program at
Argonne in which the entire system--a reactor, a new fuel cycle and new
waste process were all being developed and optimized as a single
nuclear plant system, each part complementing the other. Its rationale
was based on resource use, ultimate safety, and waste content, improved
proliferation resistance, with revolutionary improvements to be
expected in each of four areas. These are:
--It is self-protecting against overheating, and therefore is
passively safe;
--It's fuel is self-protecting against diversion, and therefore is
proliferation resistant;
--It both burns more of its fuel and includes a simple recycle
procedure, and therefore is nearly 100 percent fuel efficient;
and
--It burns material that would be waste in other reactors, and
therefore produces far less waste.
Reactor system characteristics are established fundamentally by the
choice of basic materials used for coolant and for fuel, primarily, and
somewhat so for structural materials. Water, oxide fuel and zircaloy
cladding, for example, define the current generation Light Water
Reactor used in the United States and throughout the world for
commercial power production. Helium and graphite define the High
Temperature Gas Reactor; sodium, oxide fuel and stainless steel define
the traditional Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor.
Reactor material choices made 40 years ago did not recognize the
importance of characteristics that are now seen as vitally important to
a reactor system. The materials must be chosen and exploited
specifically to achieve the characteristics being sought. The IFR is
defined by liquid sodium metal as coolant and metallic uranium/
plutonium alloy as fuel. It is the fundamental, natural properties of
these materials which give the IFR the ability to achieve the four
characteristics I outlined above.
Mr. Chairman, allow me please to give you and the committee an
overview of how these characteristics are achieved.
INHERENT SAFETY
Every reactor accident has to do with overheating. To achieve
inherent safety, the reactor must be able to regulate its own
temperature. To be inherently safe, this must be done without depending
on any engineered system or operator intervention because both
engineering and operation can fail. The IFR regulates its own
temperature through the natural physical phenomena of thermal expansion
and convection flow.
Like most metals, the metallic fuel is quite responsive to changes
in temperature. It stores very little excess heat. When a disruption in
cooling occurs, even at full power, there is ample margin in the sodium
coolant to safely remove the heat and protect the fuel from melting.
The reactor simply shuts down.
This phenomenon is supported by the liquid metal sodium coolant and
its natural properties. Sodium has a boiling point in excess of 1600
degrees Fahrenheit. The reactor operates between 700 and 900 degrees
Fahrenheit. This means the coolant does not have to be pressurized.
Which in turn means you can have a large pool of coolant. A current
generation water cooled reactor, by comparison, has to be pressurized
to about 2,200 pounds per square inch to avoid boiling off the water.
The high boiling point of liquid sodium allows the IFR to have large
pools of coolant which run at low pressure and are easy to build and
maintain. Currents naturally develop in this large pool just as they do
in an ocean or lake. These currents, produced by a natural phenomenon
called convection flow, serve to further cool the reactor core as the
metal fuel properties shut down the reactor in any off-normal event.
I wish to note that what I describe is neither conjecture nor a
computer model. It has been demonstrated and proven. In 1986 we
produced accident conditions more severe than both Three Mile Island
and Chernobyl. In all cases, the IFR prototype reactor regulated its
own heat and shut itself down with no damage to the reactor or its
fuel. The IFR is passively safe. It has an unprecedented degree of
inherent safety.
PROLIFERATION
The need remains to assure that the nuclear material used for the
peaceful purpose of generating electricity is never diverted to a
military purpose. This concern was at the forefront in the conception
and design of the IFR.
The IFR addresses this in two ways. First, as I will discuss in
more detail in a moment, the IFR is extremely efficient in its fuel
use. What this means for proliferation and diversion concerns is that
the IFR burns as fuel the plutonium used to make weapons. And it does
so with great efficiency. Further, it can burn as fuel, with great
efficiency, the material taken from dismantled warheads. It is the
ultimate swords-to-plowshares machine.
The second way the IFR is proliferation resistant is in how it
protects against the improper diversion of its fuel material. As the
fuel comes out of the reactor to enter the recycling process I will
describe shortly, the fuel is highly radioactive. So much so that
exposure to it for even a few seconds would be lethal. This requires
special remote handling techniques performed behind walls and windows
that are five feet thick in special rooms called hot cells. The
recycling process is chemically incapable of separating pure plutonium
from the fission products that are emitting this lethal radioactivity.
Weapons plutonium in its pure form, as I know you know, Mr. Chairman,
is not highly radioactive at all. In fact, this piece of paper in my
hand provides enough shielding to keep me safe if some were on this
table now. But the plutonium in the IFR process in always, and I
repeat, always, mixed with fission products which render it immediately
deadly to anyone who would try to remove it from the hot cell. Any
attempt to use fuel from an IFR for weapons purposes would require
applying other, separate, well known and established chemical processes
to extract the pure material.
The IFR therefore, does nothing to add to any proliferation risk.
In fact, it has the ability to reduce proliferation risk by tying up
existing stores of plutonium with highly radioactive fission products,
and by burning the plutonium.
EFFICIENCY
The efficiency of the IFR comes from the nature of the reactor
physics--which is driven by the choice of fuel and coolant. I'll not go
into detail here except to say that the sodium coolant and metal alloy
fuel allow much higher energies in the nuclear reactions with the
result that the IFR system could utilize uranium fuel 100 percent--
instead of the 1 percent or so that today's reactors can do. But that
isn't the whole story--the IFR could fully use weapons plutonium, the
reactor waste plutonium and other, similar elements found in spent
fuel.
Let me give you a rough feel for the economics of burning nuclear
fuel--and this includes waste and weapons materials. One ton of
material fissioned in a reactor will result in a revenue stream of
about $350 million if the electricity generated is sold for 4 cents per
kilowatt/hour. Economics really does matter. Burning waste and selling
power is better than burying waste and collecting taxes. By the way,
the example is about what a large IFR plant would consume in a year--to
produce power at the rate of 1,000 Megawatts for a year.
WASTE
As with all the major goals for the IFR, waste reduction is
integrated together with all the other goals. To reduce the amount of
waste per unit of energy produced, you must recycle fuel until all the
usable fuel is fissioned. To further improve the waste stream, the
majority of materials in waste which have long radioactive lives must
be removed. In the IFR, both goals were met by recycling the fuel and
the long-lived materials like plutonium, americium, and related
materials with very long radioactive lives are simply used as reactor
fuel.
The bottom line for waste for the IFR is that the quantity is small
compared to the amount of power produced, and compared to what is
produced by today's reactors. In addition, the waste that is produced
has a shorter lived radioactivity. It decays to less than the original
uranium ore in about 300 years. That means that the toxicity rapidly
becomes less than if the uranium were not removed from the ground in
the first place.
The purpose, then, in initiating IFR development was precisely that
implied by today's hearing--to define the best advanced nuclear reactor
options for the nation. The Integral Fast Reactor program began with a
reexamination of the aims of advanced reactor development, to redefine
the characteristics of a successful reactor system according to today's
knowledge. In the IFR we sought to develop a new reactor, a new fuel, a
new fuel cycle, and a new waste process--all building on the old. But
for the first time, really integrating our knowledge into a coherent
system--something which had not been done before. No single
characteristic promised by the IFR makes the IFR unique, but taken
together, the characteristics constitute a revolutionary improvement in
reactor technology.
The reason was simple. The old path that the nation had taken in
nuclear development, the Light Water Reactor; or LWR, could even then
be seen to be blocked. LWR orders had stalled, the Clinch River Breeder
Reactor project had been canceled, reprocessing was blocked, and
progress on the repository was difficult. But it was equally obvious
that a viable long-term system to replace fossil fuels would still be
needed.
The basic purpose of advanced reactor R&D should be the same today
as it was then. Such R&D must provide the means for substitution of
uranium-based fuel for carbon-based fuels on a massive scale in the
next century. Simple arithmetic shows the need to use all the uranium
resource. Today's reactors just use one-half of one percent of the
total uranium resource.
In addition to resource utilization, tomorrow's reactors need
improvements in other characteristics as well. Although there is
temptation to call nuclear's problems ``institutional,'' technical
improvements that address the public concerns are essential. Safety,
safeguards, transportation and waste; all these are now critically
important reactor system characteristics. And, in the long term, it
will be increasingly clear that uranium is a scarce resource too, so
resource efficiency for the next-generation system is important to
long-term success.
During its decade of development, IFR progress was rapid. The
status in the key areas of fuels, safety, and fuel and waste processing
can be summarized as follows: The fuel is largely proven. Remarkable
safety characteristics have been demonstrated, most dramatically by
demonstrations of passive safety from full power in EBR-II. In the
experiments, the IFR prototype easily survived both TMI and Chernobyl-
type accidents. The highest priority remaining in the program when it
was canceled was the demonstration of the entire fuel-cycle in EBR-II.
In summary, the improvements that were promised by the IFR included
passive, simple safety, proliferation resistance, much more efficient
use of resources, and a decrease in the amount of waste produced, as
well as it's long-term toxicity.
The IFR program was an R&D program that was aimed at making
feasible a huge new energy source for the next century, and well
beyond. It was based on, and related to, present nuclear power but
differed in significant ways so as to eliminate, or at least
ameliorate, present problems with nuclear power. In the magnitudes of
energy possible, it is comparable in importance to the 19th century
exploitation of oil for our century. The development--undertaken on
every element of the nuclear reactor system--reactor, processing, and
waste product was pushed far along before being terminated in 1994, for
stated lack of need.
Mr. Chairman, I can supply any further information you might want
on any aspect of this subject, and I wish to thank you and your staff
for giving me this opportunity to discuss this with you.
Thank you.
Senator Domenici. Well, you can tell what we are trying to
do here today. And obviously this chairman is interested in
taking another look at some technologies that we might have
passed over or even defunded. We are going to have to do them
in a way that is practical and acceptable around here and out
there in the countryside. And I am very much appreciative of
what I have heard. Obviously our staff people have to do a
little more work with you all, in terms of what we might
recommend. And I thank you very much for that.
Let me talk a minute with you, whomever feels comfortable,
Mr. Smith or Mr. Blue. Incidentally, Mr. Smith, how far away
are you from a Ph.D.?
Mr. Smith. I have just finished my master's degree, sir;
and that is enough for now. [Laughter.]
Senator Domenici. Enough for now. Well, just keep on this
work and somebody will give you one for free. You will not have
to do any more. They will call you Doctor. [Laughter.]
The MHR, which you spoke of, and you, Mr. Blue, consumes
more than 90 percent of the initial plutonium 239, the weapons
material. That is a lot more than a conventional reactor. And
that is a big plus. I understand that the MHR effectively burns
or uses weapons plutonium fuel far more completely than a MOX
approach and conventional reactors.
Can you provide some specific examples of this increased
destruction of plutonium? And can you discuss the proliferation
potential of spent fuels in an MHR fueled with plutonium versus
a reactor fueled with MOX? How much weapons plutonium can each
module of MHR destroy in a period of time, a year, say?
Mr. Blue. Well, I imagine Mr. Smith has been more oriented
toward the pure commercial reactor, so I will go with that.
First of all, there is an inherent advantage that we have
with the gas reactor. It does burn down the 239 to a five times
greater degree than the MOX does. But it also, because it burns
100 percent of plutonium as compared to 5 percent of plutonium
which is in a MOX system, it effectively allows us to produce
plutonium fuel for destruction at a much more rapid rate--like
20 times.
So, one of the things that is very interesting to the
Russians--and I should mention that we have a very significant,
ongoing program with the Russians. We completed the conceptual
design of the reactor last October and we are continuing with
it. One of the primary reasons the Russians are interested in
this is because of its ability to destroy their weapons
plutonium. And I think we should be very, very pleased about
that prospect.
The first thing you do is convert the weapons plutonium to
fuel. And then you can feed it into reactors at whatever rate
you want. The difference being that you are dealing with 100
percent plutonium instead of 5 percent plutonium. And that is
good if the objective is destroying plutonium.
Senator Domenici. Did you want to comment, Mr. Smith?
Mr. Smith. Sir, although the fuel we are going to use is a
slight variation of that ceramic fuels in the way that it is
fabricated, we looked at that from a proliferation standpoint.
And the studies that the Germans have done particularly shows
that it is much, much more difficult, if you had one of these
reactors, to try to extract any kind of weapons-grade material.
So, it is a very complicated process, and we could not see it
happening.
Senator Domenici. Dr. Schriber, I did not ask you, nor did
you mention, the dollar figure that you think would be
necessary now for this 5-year plan to be carried out with the
players that are involved.
Dr. Schriber. The 5-year to carry out the program would be
$150 million total. And that is on the basis of a 5-year
program, and for each subsequent year, of 15, 20, 25, 30.
Senator Domenici. So, in 1999, 15 would get the program
going, in this 5-year plan?
Dr. Schriber. Yes, sir.
Senator Domenici. Mr. Blue, did you summarize the extent of
the international interest in the MHR and the kind of
agreements that are in place?
Mr. Blue. Well, I would like to amplify. We have a 50/50
joint venture going with the Russians now. It has been
operational now for about 3 years. Progress has been excellent.
The Russian physicists and engineers, we have the highest
respect for. We have been working with them in the fusion
program for nearly 40 years. They are extremely competent.
Their product is excellent. I have a model of the reactor that
I brought with me, which you might like to see.
The work has been superb. They have done more work for less
money, faster than the program called for.
In addition to the Russians, the French and the Japanese,
Framatome and Fuji Electric, have joined our consortium. The
French are looking at it. They see a limited time for the first
generation technology. With 75 percent of their electricity
coming from nuclear, it is terribly important. They have gone
further than anybody else. They want to continue that into the
future, because they do not have options. So, that is why they
are interested in it.
The Japanese also look far ahead. And as I said, the
Japanese are going active with their test reactor just next
month. They will be loading fuel and going critical soon after
that.
Senator Domenici. Did you want to comment, Mr. Smith?
Mr. Smith. Well, just one more thing, sir. Also, the South
Africans are taking a real lead in the gas-cooled reactor
design. As a matter of fact, SCOM, which is the major utility
in South Africa, has got plans underway to construct a full-
size commercial nuclear powerplant using ceramic, pebble-type
fuel, and gas turbines. And they are estimating completion in
2001 or 2002. And in talking with them, they are estimating
their generating costs, total, of 1.2 cents per kilowatt.
If you look at long-term natural gas futures in today's
Washington Post or the Wall Street Journal, just to buy the gas
would be 3.4 cents. So, the high efficiencies, the high
operability of these plants really have a big economic
potential.
Mr. Blue. If I might add something.
Senator Domenici. Please.
Mr. Blue. The fact that the Russians have agreed to match
whatever funds we bring to Russia in the design effort, and the
French and the Japanese are involved, it is a great opportunity
for the United States to keep its costs at an absolute minimum.
Senator Domenici. Yes; and we do not put anything in now.
Mr. Blue. No; the U.S. Government does not; General Atomics
does.
Senator Domenici. Right. Of course.
Dr. Till, let me raise one issue with you. First, I want to
congratulate you and the laboratory for all the work you have
done, not only in the IFR, but the many exciting things that
you do as part of the laboratory system. And I must confess
that I have visited more and more of the laboratories as I
undertake this job. Some people think that I do not do right by
them all because I have two of them in New Mexico, the big
ones, but I am trying to get around and I am trying to
understand what is going on.
I just wanted to ask you a question. This IFR would be
sodium cooled.
Dr. Till. That is correct.
Senator Domenici. And sodium can be very difficult to work
with. Are you certain you have resolved that issue?
Dr. Till. Yes; I believe so. First of all, let me say you
would be most welcome at our laboratory, particularly in Idaho,
where the sodium facilities are.
We had, of course, operated the sodium-cooled reactor, EBR-
II, that we operated from 1964 to 1994. We had occasional
spills. We had occasional small fires. What happens? You put
them out.
Much has been made of the dangers of sodium. Much more
should be made of what a wonderful reactor coolant it actually
is. It is better than water in thermal ways, and it allows a
room pressure system. Too much can be made with its interaction
with air.
Senator Domenici. Do you think those incidents that you
have referred to could be tolerated in commercial plants?
Dr. Till. No; I think if it happened in a commercial plant,
they would deal with it perfectly sensibly, as happens. You
know, what happens, Senator, I mean, if you get a small leak,
you do not have water rushing out at 2,200 psi. What you have
is a small coil of smoke which announces the fact that you have
got a leak. And in a commercial plant it would be fixed, the
same as in the experimental plant, EBR-II.
My point in EBR-II was it was one of a handful of first-of-
a-kind, and a lot of the things were done experimentally there
that would allow such spills. You would not have those things
happening commercially.
Senator Domenici. I was telling my staff--they were
discussing the characteristics of sodium--and I said that I
vividly remember my one-half year of getting ready to teach in
junior high and high school and science--was to go to a high
school and run a chemistry class, which included a laboratory.
And one of the most prominent young kids in that school, in
that laboratory session, left sodium without any liquid around
for just a little while, and all of a sudden we had smoke and a
little bit of flames. And that was the last time I ever taught
kids in a laboratory. [Laughter.]
I am not sure if I would have done it again. But I ended up
teaching algebra and then going to law school. So, I do not
remember much about it.
I note the presence of Sam Gibbons, a former Member of the
House, a longtime Member, and former chairman of Ways and
Means. I welcome you. I was not aware of your interest, but I
am delighted to have you here.
Mr. Gibbons. I am deeply interested in what you are doing,
and we will talk later.
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much.
It is 12 o'clock, and we have had a lot of testimony in our
2 hours. And there have been no obstructions, which is very
good. I want to thank all of you. Our staff may be back in
touch with you. We are going to do something in some of these
areas--I do not know what yet--in this year's appropriations
bill. And then we will have to defend it with some of the
exciting testimony you have given it, and maybe some more that
we will have to get.
I look forward to the debate. And I hope we can find some
issues where the debate is properly framed. And I believe our
pollster and public opinion director that testified first today
has it right. I do not know that we can do it, but you cannot
let the debate center around a problem with risks. You have got
to have it in a broader arena of what is the overall situation
versus America's future and energy in its totality, including
all the others that we might have to use. I do not know that we
can get that done, but I am learning. And I am hoping that
people like you will give us good examples of how minimal the
risks really are, even as we have to discuss risks, which we
will have to.
CONCLUSION OF HEARING
Does staff have anything further to put in the record?
[No response.]
We stand recessed. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:01 p.m., Tuesday, May 19, the hearing was
concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene
subject to the call of the Chair.]
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