[Senate Hearing 105-649]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 105-649
THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 6 AND JUNE 24, 1998
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
----------------------------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1998
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
James W. Nance, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon, Chairman
RICHARD. G LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing of May 6, 1998
DioGuardi, Hon. Joseph, Volunteer President, Albanian-American
Civic League................................................... 29
Fox, John, Director, Washington Office, Open Society Institute,
Washington, DC................................................. 24
Gelbard, Hon. Robert S., Special Representative of the President
and the Secretary of State for Implementation of the Dayton
Peace Accords.................................................. 2
Hooper, James R., Director, The Balkan Institute, Washington, DC. 19
Hearing of June 24, 1998
Abramowitz, Hon. Morton I., International Crisis Group; and
former Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and
Research....................................................... 63
D'Amato, Hon. Alfonse, a United States Senator from the State of
New York....................................................... 48
Dole, Hon. Robert, Chairman, International Commission on Missing
Persons in the former Yugoslavia, Washington, DC............... 51
(iii)
APPENDIX
Hearing of May 6, 1998
Response of Ambassador Gelbard to Question asked by Senator Biden 79
Response of Ambassador Gelbard to Questions asked by Senator
D'Amato........................................................ 81
Response of Ambassador Gelbard to Questions asked by Senator
Biden and Senator D'Amato...................................... 83
THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO
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WEDNESDAY, MAY 6, 1998
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on European Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Gordon H.
Smith (chairman of the subcommittee), presiding.
Present: Senators Smith and Biden.
Senator Smith. Ladies and gentlemen, I will call this
hearing to order. We expect the arrival of some other Senators
soon, when their conferences, lunches, break up, but we welcome
you all.
Today the Foreign Relations Committee is convened to
discuss the crisis in Kosovo and its potential ramifications on
stability throughout the region. Our first panel will consist
of Ambassador Robert Gelbard, Special Representative of the
President and the Secretary of State for implementation of the
Dayton Accords.
After we hear from Ambassador Gelbard, the committee will
welcome Mr. James Hooper from the Balkan Institute, Mr. John
Fox of the Open Society Institute, and former Congressman
Joseph DioGuardi, who currently is the volunteer president of
the Albanian-American Civic League.
I appreciate the willingness of all of our witnesses to
appear before our committee this afternoon. I confess that I am
deeply concerned about the situation in Kosovo today. Since
February of this year approximately 150 people have been killed
in a particularly appalling fashion, and the Serbian police
have attacked and murdered innocent women and children in their
effort to crack down on the Kosovar Albanian separatist
movement.
The Albanian movement in Kosovo has shown remarkable
reserve in their pursuit of the autonomy that was revoked in
1989 and 1990, but as we have all seen, that patience has worn
thin. The gathering strength of the Kosovo Liberation Army and
their quest for an independent Kosovo and their violent tactics
to achieve their goals leads me to believe that things in
Kosovo yet get even worse.
The Serbs have shown in recent months that they are more
than willing to use overwhelming force in response to
separatist activity in Kosovo, and I do not expect that
attitude to change.
I sincerely hope that our administration does not consider
President Milosevic's role in the Bosnian peace process,
however great or small, as justification for leniency with
regard to his abhorrent behavior in Kosovo.
The Contact Group established to coordinate policy on the
conflict in the former Yugoslavia has met several times since
the violence in Kosovo broke out in February. Despite
statements of outrage and condemnation from the Contact Group,
the Serbs have continually ignored its limited demands.
President Milosevic thus far has successfully exploited the
historical and economic interest in Serbia that shade the views
of some of our friends in Europe. Though there are merits to
using the Contact Group in dealing with the situation in
Kosovo, at some point in the future the Contact Group may yet
prove to be an unsuccessful at contributing to the resolution
of the conflict. Then the United States must pursue an
appropriate policy unilaterally.
I realize the policy challenges facing the United States
and the international community in responding to the Kosovo
crisis. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has used strong
words of warning to President Milosevic, but I must say, the
direction of the United States policy on this issue is
unfortunately unclear.
As I mentioned earlier, the Contact Group has been
ineffective at forcing Mr. Milosevic to cease his terrorist
tactics in Kosovo. Given the potential this conflict has to
spread to the rest of the Balkans and beyond, even involving
our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, I think it is critical for
the administration to clearly state its policy on this
question.
In December 1992, then President Bush delivered an
unequivocal warning in a letter to President Milosevic that the
United States was prepared to intervene militarily if Serbia
attacked the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. President Clinton
repeated this so-called Christmas warning after he took office
in 1993. It would serve the interests in furthering public
debate on the issue if, Ambassador Gelbard, you will publicly
state what this warning consists of, and whether this will
continue to be U.S. policy.
I look forward to discussing these issues and other
questions with all of our distinguished witnesses before us.
So, Mr. Ambassador, we especially welcome you and invite your
statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. GELBARD, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE DAYTON PEACE ACCORDS
Ambassador Gelbard. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
would, with your agreement, like to submit my entire statement
for the record and give an abbreviated version of it.
Senator Smith. Without objection.
Ambassador Gelbard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am very pleased to have this opportunity to appear before
the subcommittee again. A great deal of progress has been made
in Bosnia since I appeared last July, which I would like to
outline briefly for you before I conclude my remarks today.
However, we also now are faced with the outbreak of
violence in Kosovo which has the potential, if allowed to
spiral out of control, as you said, to threaten stability not
just in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia but in the region as
a whole.
Therefore, I will focus the bulk of my remarks this
afternoon on developments in Kosovo and our efforts to stop the
violence and get dialog on a political solution for Kosovo
started.
Our interests in dialog are based not only on our concern
for the people of Kosovo, but also on the impact on the
surrounding regions and the need to ensure that our substantial
investment in Bosnia is secure.
We remain deeply concerned about the situation in Kosovo
and the potential for further violence. The escalating conflict
threatens wider regional stability. Albania, which only
recently returned from the brink of anarchy, and the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, are particularly vulnerable.
A parenthetical phrase here. I realize it is a subject
still in dispute, but for brevity's sake in the course of my
statement I would like to refer to the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia as Macedonia. It does not imply any political
decision on our part.
The United States and other members of the international
community have made a significant investment in the stability
of South Central Europe. We are determined to see that these
efforts succeed. Securing a political solution to the problem
of Kosovo is a fundamental objective of U.S. policy toward the
region.
Since the outbreak of serious violence in late February,
the level of tension, interethnic hostility and arms in the
province of Kosovo have continued to rise. In late February, in
retaliation for an ambush of Serb police, an attack which left
a number of the police dead, by individuals believed to belong
to the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army, or UCK, Serb special
police, paramilitaries, were sent in to reinforce the local
police in very large numbers and conduct a cleanup operation,
as they called it.
Supported by attack helicopters and heavy weapons, the
operation lasted for a day. The total number killed by regular
and special police was some 80 people, mostly noncombatants,
including large numbers of children and women.
Though the Serb and FRY Governments described this as a
police action, no democratic country in the world would allow
this kind of behavior by police to go unpunished.
Since that time, the Belgrade Government has tripled the
number of special police, essentially paramilitary units, or
internal troops, as communist countries have called them in the
past, deployed to Kosovo, and have recently deployed Yugoslav
Army, VJ, infantry and armor and artillery units on the borders
and to key hot spots in the interior.
This represents a substantial escalation, and the
deployments on the border with Albania are particularly
troubling. Nations do have a right to protect their borders.
However, Belgrade's stated desire to prevent or stop cross-
border weapons smuggling carried out by small groups of people
through remote mountain passes, does not track with the large-
scale deployment of tanks and artillery to the border.
Moreover, Belgrade has issued a threatening public
statement accusing the Government of Albania of conspiring to
undermine the territorial integrity of the FRY.
We in the Contact Group have warned the FRY against staging
any cross-border operations into Albania or Macedonia. In
response to Belgrade's use of excessive force and the lack of
movement toward unconditional dialog, the U.N. Security Council
adopted on March 31 an arms embargo against the FRY, blocking
planned arms purchases by Belgrade.
This embargo also prohibits the sale or provision of
weapons or other equipment or training for groups engaged in
terrorist activities. Introduction of further weapons into the
region, either to Belgrade or to extremist groups, will only
increase the violence and make it more difficult to bring about
negotiations and a political solution to the already bitter
dispute over Kosovo's status.
Even in the face of provocation, however, Governments have
a greater responsibility for ensuring that the rule of law is
respected and the rights of its citizens protected than any
armed extremist groups. Belgrade's failure and refusal to
uphold that responsibility has made Kosovo an international
problem. They are the ones who have internationalized Kosovo,
and we and our allies have no intention of standing by and
ignoring continued repression and escalation of violence into
war.
Despite repeated warnings, Belgrade so far has blocked
unconditional dialog. Instead, internal security forces have
been reinforced in ways that compound the sense of intimidation
and insecurity on the part of the local Kosovar Albanian
community. The violent activities of the Kosovo Liberation Army
have heightened insecurity among Serbs and Belgrade's heavy
handed use of force and atrocities is producing increased
radicalization.
This will only weaken the moderate Kosovar Albanian
leadership, led by Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, which has advocated
nonviolent political solutions. Meanwhile, the UCK has
continued to carry out attacks against police and clearly is
trying to arm itself and improve its capabilities.
Belgrade's brutal tactics also have helped this formerly
unknown group gain worldwide notoriety and find an increasingly
sympathetic audience in Kosovo among the Albanian diaspora in
Europe and the United States, and among radical groups ranging
from Iran to Chechnya looking to make inroads into Europe.
I want to be very clear. Extremists on both sides are the
only ones who will gain by a delay in getting dialog started.
The violence will increase, and the chances for finding a
peaceful solution will slip away. The biggest losers will be
the citizens of Kosovo and the FRY in general. Support for
radicals will increase the likelihood for an even more violent
crackdown by Belgrade, and the UCK eventually will transform
itself into a full-fledged insurgent group.
Those who argue, the worse the better, are profoundly
mistaken. Neither the Kosovo Albanians, the Serb people, nor
the international community can afford another war in the
Balkans. The problems of the region can only be resolved
through unconditional dialog. We have taken steps to increase
the pressure on Belgrade to engage the Kosovo Albanian
leadership in negotiations.
Starting with the Contact Group ministerial meeting on
March 9 in London we, under Secretary Albright's leadership,
have led international action to impose new punitive measures
against Belgrade, already under the outer wall of sanctions, as
a means of creating greater pressure on the FRY Government to
negotiate.
These sanctions, including a ban on Government financing
for investment or privatization, a financial asset freeze,
denial of visas for Government officials responsible for the
violence, and the arms embargo, have moved Belgrade in the
right direction. If Belgrade continues to block negotiations,
Contact Group countries other than Russia will take action as
soon as this Saturday to ban all new investment in Serbia.
The position of the United States has not changed. We
oppose independence for Kosovo. Further atomization will not
contribute to regional peace and security. Neither can we
accept a continuation of the status quo. The Kosovar Albanians
are denied the basic human rights and political freedoms that
are the foundations of a stable democracy.
Between these two extremes, however, we believe there is a
wide range of possibilities which can only be developed and
articulated through dialog. We firmly support an enhanced
status for Kosovo within the FRY that would provide for
meaningful self-administration. How this is accomplished is for
the parties to decide in the course of negotiations.
There is a significant role for the international community
to play, however, in bringing the parties together. The gap
between the two sides is both side and deep. The trail is
littered with shattered promises and broken commitments. In
Rome last week, the United States and the other Contact Group
countries urged the two sides to adopt a framework for dialog
and endorsed a stabilization package that we believe could help
jump start negotiations if and when the parties agree to
participate.
The framework we have proposed is based on fundamental
principles that the parties must accept, including the
rejection of violence as a tool for achieving political goals,
and international involvement in talks to overcome mistrust and
ensure realistic prospects for success.
The stabilization package must include, at a minimum, first
the return of the OSCE, the three OSCE missions of long
duration to the FRY, including in Kosovo, Sanjak and Voivodina,
the cessation of repression by the authorities in Belgrade, and
a strong condemnation of violence and terrorism by the Kosovar
Albanian leadership.
If President Milosevic begins this process, we are prepared
to work closely with him to begin the process of reintegrating
the FRY into international organizations and institutions. The
agreement to begin talking and concrete progress on key
stabilization measures are the only clear evidence we can
accept that Belgrade is serious about reaching a political
outcome.
A continued stalemate will only ensure continued isolation
for the FRY, as a result of which, together with extremely bad
economic policies, the Serbian economy is already in rapid
decline. The dinar has been devalued about 80 percent, GDP has
fallen precipitously, and the FRY's balance of payments debt
has skyrocketed.
The FRY's international status, and unfortunately the
economic woes of the Serbian people, will not change until
Belgrade has made significant progress in addressing the
legitimate grievances of the Kosovar Albanian community.
The situation in Kosovo is, for the United States, a
central element of the outer wall of sanctions against the FRY.
We have been careful to exempt Montenegro from these new
restrictions.
Reform-minded President Milo Djukanovic's election is one
of the most encouraging developments in the FRY scene. He
recently conducted a very successful visit to Washington and
New York, and is demonstrating his commitment to democratic and
economic reforms that could serve as a model for the FRY.
President Djukanovic currently faces extreme political pressure
from President Milosevic's Government, however, to try to fall
in line with Belgrade's policies.
Elsewhere within the FRY and the region, Belgrade has
adopted a hard nationalist line. The recent alliance between
President Milosevic's party and the ultranationalist radical
Vojislave Seselj within Serbia, has already produced increased
intimidation of independent media.
At the same time, in contrast to his earlier support for
moderates in Republika Srpska and Bosnia, President Milosevic
has made moves in recent weeks to try to undermine the
Republika Srpska Government, led by Prime Minister Milorad
Dodik, a blatant attempt, in our view, to distract the
international community from the Kosovo situation.
We and our allies have made extremely clear that the
situation in Kosovo must be resolved, and that meddling in
Bosnia is unacceptable. We are determined not just to maintain
the substantial progress made in Bosnia, but to expand on it.
We will also hold Croatia to its obligations, including for
return of refugees and displaced persons.
Now for the good news, Bosnia. You never thought you would
hear me say that.
We continue to see good progress on Dayton peace
implementation in Bosnia. The election of Prime Minister Dodik
in the Republika Srpska and the more active use of the High
Representative's powers are paying dividends. Recently, there
have been a number of breakthroughs.
These include, freedom of movement has dramatically
expanded, with routine travel between the entities and the
issuance of new nondescript common license plates.
An inter-entity agreement to reintegrate Bosnia's rail
system, a step which will bring substantial benefits to the
Bosnian economy.
Political changes in the Republika Srpska, which should
allow its economy to begin to recover.
Both entities, and the Central Government, have met the
requirements for an IMF stand-by agreement as well as a World
Bank structural adjustment loan, the first step to reintegrate
Bosnia into international financial markets. In fact, there
will be a Bosnia donor's conference beginning tomorrow, which I
will be leaving for this afternoon.
Since the beginning of the year, five indictees have
voluntarily surrendered, and three have been captured by S4 and
brought to The Hague Tribunal.
This brings the total indictees brought to justice to 33,
about 40 percent of the known indictees, including a number on
The Hague Tribunal's most wanted list.
As I have said, Milosevic is putting pressure on Dodik
specifically to bring in hard line radicals and members of
Karadzic's party into his Government to form a nationalist all-
Serb coalition. So far, Prime Minister Dodik has resisted.
Our response is to continue to support legitimate freely
elected leaders like Dodik, and Republika Srpska President
Plavsic, and help them maintain independence from Belgrade. The
assistance that the international community has provided for
Plavsic and Dodik has created political space to follow
pragmatic pro-Dayton policies.
Progress in the Republika Srpska highlights some of the
shortcomings on Dayton implementation in the Federation. The
Bosniak leaders have been too hesitant to genuinely share
power, and there continues to exist a strong hard line faction
among the Bosnian Croats who oppose reintegration and actively
undercut joint institutions.
We continue to press both sides, and there is a consensus
behind strong action by the High Representative against
obstructionists.
As I said, I am leaving tonight for the annual Bosnian
donor's conference in Brussels. We expect new pledges of up to
$1.1 billion for continuing the economic restructuring and
reform of Bosnia. The United States will pledge $250 million in
additional assistance for a whole range of economic
democratization and police reform programs.
Despite all that we have accomplished in Bosnia, there
continues to be a strong need for donor assistance. We have
made a tremendous amount of progress in Bosnia over the last
year, but the gains we have made these past 2 years are
unfortunately still reversible.
On the refugee return front, we expect a major acceleration
of minority returns this year. We are working with S4, the
United Nations, international police task force, the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees, and the High Representative, to
foster better planning to prevent the type of violence we have
seen in recent weeks in Drvar and Derventa.
Perhaps most importantly, national elections will be
conducted in Bosnia September 12 and 13 for virtually all
elected officials at the national and entity levels. These
elections provide the best opportunity to promote pluralism in
Bosnia and help bring new leaders to power.
While much progress has been made, there is still a great
deal of work ahead of us to ensure the gains are consolidated.
The international community will forge ahead with civilian
implementation efforts and will continue to support the active
use of the High Representative's authority to impose decisions
on key issues when the parties cannot or will not agree.
Similarly, S4's mandate will be extended by NATO to ensure
that implementation can continue to move ahead in a stable and
secure environment. S4 has provided critical support to all
these implementation efforts, and a precipitous withdrawal
could well threaten all of this positive momentum.
We are working with NATO to develop benchmarks and criteria
by which to measure the success and completion of S4's mission,
and will conduct periodic reviews of progress designed to
ensure that troop levels continue to reflect the threat on the
ground.
As you can see, we have come a long way in Bosnia since
last July. We cannot, therefore, allow the situation in Kosovo
to unravel further, jeopardizing not only what we have
accomplished in Bosnia, but the security of the entire region.
We are engaged in a vigorous diplomatic effort on the
Kosovo issue to get the two sides to the table, and we will
continue to up the pressure if Belgrade refuses to engage.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Gelbard follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert S. Gelbard
Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to have this opportunity to appear
before the subcommittee again. A great deal of progress has been made
in Bosnia since I appeared last July which I would like to outline
briefly for you before I conclude my remarks today. We also now are
faced with the outbreak of violence in Kosovo which has the potential,
if allowed to spiral out of control, to threaten stability not just in
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but in the region as a whole. I
will focus the bulk of my remarks this afternoon on developments in
Kosovo and our bilateral and multi-lateral efforts to stop the violence
and get dialogue on a political solution for Kosovo started. Our
interests in achieving these goals quickly are based not only on our
concern for the people of Kosovo, but on the impact on the surrounding
regions and the need to ensure that our substantial investment in the
Bosnian Peace Process is not threatened by renewed inter-ethnic
violence in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
Kosovo--Deteriorating Security Situation
We remain deeply concerned about the situation in Kosovo and the
potential for further violence there. The escalating conflict threatens
wider regional stability. Albania--which only recently returned from
the brink of anarchy--and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(FYR Macedonia) are particularly vulnerable. The United States and
other members of the international community have made a significant
investment in the stability of South-Central Europe. And, we are
determined to see that these efforts succeed. Securing a political
solution to the problem of Kosovo is a fundamental objective of U.S.
policy toward the region.
Since the outbreak of serious violence in February, the level of
tension, inter-ethnic hostility, and arms in the province of Kosovo
have continued to rise. In late February, in retaliation for an ambush
of Serb police by individuals believed to belong to the so-called
``Kosovo Liberation Army,'' UCK-Albanian--an attack which left a number
of police dead--ill-prepared, unprofessional Serb police retaliated
immediately, attacking a village where the perpetrators were believed
to live. They essentially went on a rampage, killing entire families in
the Drenica region. Rather than attempt to locate and arrest the
perpetrators of the ambush, Serb Special Police--paramilitaries--then
were sent in to reinforce the local police with 20-millimeter cannon.
The operation, supported by attack helicopters and heavy weapons,
lasted for a day and resulted in the massacre of some 80 people, mostly
non-combatants. Though the Serb and FRY Governments describe this as a
``police action,'' no democratic country in the world would allow this
kind of behavior by police to go unpunished.
Since that time, there has been no attack of the same scale, but
the Belgrade government has tripled the number of special police--
essentially paramilitary units--deployed to Kosovo and has recently
deployed Yugoslav Army (VJ) infantry, armor and artillery units, in
depth, on the borders and to key hot spots in the interior. This is a
substantial escalation in light of the signal it sends: that Belgrade
is prepared to use the full force of the military against its own
citizens.
The deployments on the border with Albania are particularly
troubling. We recognize the right of all nations to protect their
borders. That said, it is hard to reconcile Belgrade's stated desire to
prevent or stop cross-border smuggling of weapons--most of which is
reportedly carried out by small groups of men through remote mountain
passes--with the large-scale deployment of tanks and artillery to the
border. This type of force is incompatible with the mission. Moreover,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade has issued a threatening
public statement accusing the government of Albania of conspiring to
undermine the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.
We, along with our Contact Group partners, have made clear to
Belgrade that we consider this a dangerous provocation, and warned the
government in no uncertain terms against staging any cross-border
operations into Albania or FYR Macedonia. In response to Belgrade's use
of excessive force, and the lack of movement toward unconditional
dialogue, the U.N. Security Council adopted March 31, an arms embargo
against the FRY, blocking planned arms purchases by Belgrade. This
embargo also prohibits the sale or provision of weapons or training for
groups engaged in terrorist activities. Responsibility for enforcement
lies with neighboring states and arms-exporting countries. The United
States opposes introduction of further weapons into the region, either
to Belgrade or to extremist groups, as increased violence will only
make it more difficult to bring about negotiations and a political
solution to the already bitter dispute over Kosovo's status.
Even in the face of provocation, however, governments have a
greater responsibility for ensuring that the rule of law is respected
and the rights of its citizens protected than armed extremist groups.
Belgrade's failure to uphold that responsibility has made Kosovo an
international problem, and we and our allies have no intention of
standing by and ignoring continued repression and escalation of
violence into war.
Belgrade's Tactics Produce Increased Radicalization
Despite repeated warnings by the United States, our Contact Group
partners, the European Union and many others, Belgrade so far has
blocked unconditional dialogue. Instead, internal security forces have
been reinforced in ways that compound the sense of intimidation and
insecurity on the part of the local Kosovar Albanian community. The
violent activities of the Kosovo Liberation Army have heightened
insecurity among Serbs, and the heavy-handed Belgrade resort to force
rather than dialogue is producing increased radicalization. This trend
will only serve to weaken, and ultimately undermine, the moderate
Kosovar Albanian leadership, led by Dr. Ibrahim Rugova--which
traditionally has advocated non-violent, political solutions.
Meanwhile, the Kosovo Liberation Army--or the ``UCK'' as it is
known in the region--has continued to carry out attacks against police
and clearly is trying to arm itself and improve its capabilities.
Belgrade's brutal tactics also have helped this formerly unknown group
gain world-wide notoriety, and find an increasingly sympathetic
audience in Kosovo, among the Albanian Diaspora in Europe and the
United States, and among radical groups from Iran to Chechnya looking
to make inroads into Europe.
I want to be very clear. Extremists on both sides are the only ones
who will gain by a delay in getting dialogue started. The violence will
increase, and the chances for finding a peaceful solution will slip
away. The big losers will be the citizens of Kosovo and the FRY in
general. Support for radicals will increase the likelihood for an even
more violent crack down by Belgrade. Such a response will produce still
further radicalization, and the ``UCK'' eventually will transform
itself into a full-fledged insurgency. Those who argue ``the worse, the
better'' are profoundly mistaken. Neither the Kosovar Albanians, the
Serb people, nor the international community can afford another war in
the Balkans. For that reason, the United States condemns the resort to
violence by either side--Kosovar Albanian extremists or Serb
paramilitary police--to seek to resolve the Kosovo question by force.
Urgent Need for Dialogue
We continue to believe that the problems of the region can only be
resolved through unconditional dialogue. Together with our Contact
Group partners, the European Union and others, the United States has
taken steps to increase the pressure on Belgrade to engage the Kosovar
Albanian leadership in negotiations. Starting with the Contact Group
Ministerial March 9, in London, the U.S. has led international action
to impose new punitive measures against Belgrade, already under the
outer wall of sanctions, as a means of creating greater pressure on the
FRY government to negotiate. These sanctions--which included a ban on
government financing for investment or privatization, a financial asset
freeze, denial of visas for government officials responsible for the
violence as well as the arms embargo--are aimed to move Belgrade in the
right direction by denying the FRY and Serbian governments badly-needed
infusions of foreign capital which have been keeping the economy
afloat. If Belgrade continues to block negotiations, as agreed at Rome,
Contact Group countries other than Russia will take action to ban all
new investment in Serbia.
No Support for Independence
The position of the United States has not changed. We oppose
independence for Kosovo. Further atomization will not contribute to
regional peace and security. Neither can we accept a continuation of
the status quo. The Kosovar Albanians are denied the basic human rights
and political freedoms that are the foundation of a stable democracy.
Between these two extremes, however, we believe there are wide range of
possibilities which can only be developed and articulated through
dialogue. We firmly support an enhanced status for Kosovo within the
FRY that would provide for meaningful self-administration. How this is
done is for the parties to decide.
In all of the repeated calls for dialogue, the international
community has made clear that it is not seeking to impose any
particular outcome in negotiations. The future of Kosovo is for the
parties themselves to determine. Neither side should be asked to
abandon their positions in advance of talks.
Although the ultimate responsibility for improving the situation in
Kosovo lies with authorities in Belgrade and the leadership of the
Kosovar Albanian community, there is a significant role for the
international community to play as well. The gap between the two sides
is both wide and deep. The trail is littered with shattered promises
and broken commitments. In Rome, April 29, the United States and the
other Contact Group countries urged the two sides to adopt a framework
for dialogue, and endorsed a stabilization package that we believe
could help jump-start negotiations if the parties agree to participate.
The framework we have proposed is based on fundamental principles
that the parties must accept, including the rejection of violence as a
tool for achieving political goals, and international involvement in
talks to overcome mistrust and ensure realistic prospects for success.
The stabilization package--a series of measures and steps designed to
reduce tensions and build confidence between the two sides--must
include, at a minimum, the return of the OSCE missions of long duration
to the FRY, including in Kosovo, the cessation of repression by the
authorities in Belgrade, and a strong condemnation of violence and
terrorism by the Kosovar Albanian leadership. If President Milosevic
begins this process, we are prepared to work closely with him to begin
the process of reintegrating the FRY into international organizations
and institutions. The agreement to begin talking--and concrete progress
on key stabilization measures--are the only clear evidence we can
accept that Belgrade is serious about reaching a political outcome.
Authorities in Belgrade, particularly President Milosevic, must
understand that there is no alternative to negotiations. The FRY
remains isolated from the international community--it is not a member
of any international organization, it does not have access to
international financial institutions, and it does not have normal
relations with the United States. As a result of this isolation, and of
extremely bad economic policies, the Serbian economy is in rapid
decline. The Dinar has been devalued, GDP has fallen precipitously, and
the FRY's international balance of payment debt has skyrocketed.
The FRY's status--and unfortunately the economic woes of the
Serbian people--will not change until Belgrade has made significant
progress in addressing the legitimate grievances of the Kosovar
Albanian community. The situation in Kosovo is a central element of the
Outer Wall of sanctions against the FRY. In addition, the economic
measures adopted by the international community in response to the
latest outrages in Kosovo will only increase the pressure on this very
troubled economy.
I should note here that we have been careful to exempt Montenegro
from these new restrictions. The election of the reform-minded Milo
Djukanovic as president of Montenegro is one of the most encouraging
developments in the FRY. President Djukanovic--who was recently in the
United States on a very successful visit to Washington and New York--is
committed to democratic and economic reforms that could serve as a
model for the FRY. President Djukanovic currently faces extreme
political pressure from President Milosevic's government, however, to
fall in line with Belgrade's policies.
Elsewhere within the FRY and the region, Belgrade has adopted a
hard, nationalist line. The recent alliance between President
Milosevic's party and the ultra-nationalist radical Vojislav Seselj
within Serbia has already produced increased intimidation of
independent media.
At the same time, in contrast to his earlier support for moderates
in Republika Srpska, President Milosevic has made moves in recent weeks
to undermine the Republika Srpska Government led by Milorad Dodik--a
blatant attempt, in our view, to distract the international community
from the Kosovo situation.
We and our allies have made extremely clear, through words and
actions, that the situation in Kosovo must be resolved and that
meddling in Bosnia is unacceptable. We are determined not just to
maintain the substantial progress made in Bosnia, but to expand on it,
particularly within the Federation, where progress is lagging. We also
will hold Croatia to its obligations, including for return of refugees
and displaced persons.
Bosnia--A Good News Story
Now for the Good News: Bosnia. If anyone had told me last July that
I would be able to say that in less than a year, I would not have
believed it. But we continue to see good progress on Dayton Peace
implementation in Bosnia.
The election of Prime Minister Dodik in the Republika Sipska (RS)
and the more active use of the High Representative's powers are paying
dividends. Recently, there have been a number of breakthroughs. These
include:
Freedom of movement has dramatically expanded--individual
Bosnians can and do routinely travel between the entities, the
new non-descript common license plates that are currently being
issued will further this trend.
RS Prime Minister Dodik and Federation Prime Minister
Bicakcic recently signed an agreement to reintegrate Bosnia's
rail system--a step which will bring substantial benefits to
the Bosnian economy.
The Bosnian economy continues to recover and grow,
especially in the Federation and given the political changes in
the Republika Srpska, its economy will now also begin to
recover.
Both Entities and the Central Government. have met the
requirements for an IMF standby loan, as well as a World Bank
Structural Adjustment Loan. These eventually will amount to
over $100 million dollars in assistance to Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which will spur necessary economic reform and
economic growth. Most importantly, it is the first step to
reintegrate Bosnia into the international financial markets.
We also continue to make progress on bringing war crimes
indictees to justice. Since the beginning of the year 5
indictees have voluntarily surrendered and 3 have been captured
by SFOR. This brings the total indictees brought to justice to
33, about 40 percent of the known indictees, including a number
on the Hague Tribunal's most wanted list.
As I said, Milosevic is putting pressure on Dodik, specifically to
bring in hardline radicals and members of Karadzic's party into his
government, to form a nationalist, all-Serb coalition. So far, Dodik
has resisted.
Our response is to continue to support legitimate, freely-elected
leaders like Dodik and RS President Plavsic and help them maintain
independence from Belgrade. The assistance that the international
community has provided for Plavsic and Prime Minister Dodik has created
political space to follow pragmatic, pro-Dayton policies. For instance,
Dodik recently de-linked the RS from the FRY Dinar, insulating the RS
from further economic decline and devaluation in the FRY. This action
has the concomitant effect of strengthening local support for the new
Bosnian currency, and economic maturity.
Progress in the RS highlights some of the shortcomings on Dayton
implementation in the Federation. The Bosniak leaders have been to
hesitant to genuinely share power and there continues to exist a strong
hardline faction within the Bosnian Croats who oppose reintegration and
actively undercut joint institutions. Over the past several months the
international community has increasingly turned its attention to the
Federation. There is a consensus behind strong action by the High
Representatives against obstructionists. A recent meeting of the
Federation Forum (under the guidance of the United States and the
Office of the High Representative) agreed on a process for dismantling
the illegal war-time shadow institutions and fostering the
reintegration of the divided city of Mostar.
Dayton Implementation: Next Steps
I am leaving tonight for the annual Bosnia Donors' Conference in
Brussels. We expect new pledges of $1.1 billion for continuing the
economic restructuring and reform of Bosnia. The U.S. will pledge $250
million in additional assistance for a whole range of economic,
democratization and police reform programs, among others. Despite all
that we have accomplished in Bosnia, there continues to be a strong
need for donor assistance. We have made a tremendous amount of progress
in Bosnia, but the gains we have made these past two years are
unfortunately still reversible. To disengage prematurely either
militarily or economically would jeopardize our substantial investment
in peace and stability in Bosnia and the region. It is critical that
Bosnia begin to stand on its own as quickly as possible, and we have
developed criteria and benchmarks for a self-sustaining Bosnian economy
which include elements common to the other transitional economies of
Central Europe, plus a heavy focus on reconstruction required by
Bosnia's unique war-time destruction.
On the refugee return front, we expect a major acceleration of
minority returns this year. We are working with SFOR, the UN
International Police Task Force, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees,
and OHR, to foster better planning to prevent the type of violence we
saw in Drvar and Derventa. Perhaps most importantly, national elections
will be conducted in Bosnia September 12-13 for virtually all elected
officials at the National and Entity levels. These elections provide
the best opportunity to promote pluralism in Bosnia and help bring new
leaders to power. We are working actively toward that goal--through
support for independent media, opposition parties, and grassroots NGOs.
It is clear that many of Bosnia's current leaders are not working
effectively in the interests of the Bosnian people--they remain
entrenched, too focused on the past and on personal power to make the
comprises necessary to achieve a lasting peace.
While much progress has been made, there is still a great deal of
work ahead of us to ensure the gains are consolidated. The
international community--in the form of the Peace Implementation
Council (PIC) and NATO--will effectively set the agenda for the next
year in a series of meetings in May and June. The PIC Steering Board
Ministers--representing all of the major donors to Bosnia--will meet in
early June, to review implementation progress this year and set agenda
for remainder of 1998. We will continue to support the active of use of
the High Representative's authority to impose decisions on key issues
when the parties can't or won't agree.
Similarly, SFOR's mandate will be extended by NATO to ensure that
implementation can continue to move forward in a stable and secure
environment. SFOR has provided critical support to all of these
implementation efforts and a precipitous withdrawal could well threaten
all of this positive momentum. We are working with NATO to develop
benchmarks and criteria by which to measure the success and completion
of SFOR's mission, and will conduct six-month reviews of progress. This
type of dynamic review process was designed to ensure that troop levels
and composition continue to reflect the threat on the ground, and that
they can be reduced over time as porgies is made.
As you can see, we have come a long way since last July. We cannot
allow the situation to unravel further, or to threaten what we have
accomplished in Bosnia. We are engaged in a vigorous diplomatic effort
on the Kosovo issue to get the two sides to the table, and we will
continue to up the pressure if Belgrade refuses to engage.
Thank you.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I have a
statement provided to the subcommittee from Senator Robert
Dole, former Majority Leader. If there is no objection, I will
include it in the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Dole follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Bob Dole
Mr. Chairman:
I am sorry that I cannot be with you today to discuss the most
pressing crisis in Europe today: the dangerous escalation of violence
in Kosova. However, I hope that you will be able to consider the
following observations during your deliberations on this grave matter.
First, I must say that I cannot help but feel a strong sense of
deja-vu at this moment. Nine years ago, Slobodan Milosovic in a bid to
increase his power and authority, whipped up nationalist sentiments
among Serba and placed Kosova under martial law. Soon after, Slobodan
Milosevic began orchestrating violent attacks in Croatia which were
followed by war against Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. As
the crisis was developing into a full-blown conflict, there was a great
deal of talk among diplomats and leaders about how the situation should
be ``contained.'' However, all this talk was not matched by action, and
the consequences speak for themselves: a quarter of a million people
dead, two and a half million displaced, and a fragile peace secured by
a multi-billion dollar peacekeeping effort. As Chairman of the
International Commission on Missing Person, I have seen the horrors of
war in Bosnia and Croatia up close. There are still at least 20,000
persons registered as missing--most of whom will be found in mass
graves which are in the process of being exhumed. I recently returned
from Bosnia where I visited mass graves with the remains of men, women
and children.
And so today, I am once again gravely concerned that while Western
policy makers discuss the dangers of a new war in the Balkans, that war
is already beginning. In recent weeks, President Slobodan Milosevic has
dispatched thousands of troops to Kosova, where they have literally dug
in to continue their terror campaign against the region's ethic
Albanian population. Just this weekend, more civilians, including women
and children, were killed in attacks led by Serbian forces.
This is disturbing not only on its face, but also in that it
provides demonstrable proof of the woeful inadequacy of the Contact
Group's response to the crisis. In recent weeks, the Group has met
three times to discuss Kosova, but it has yet to formulate a policy
that will deter Milosevic in achieving his goals for the region. Yes,
the Group agreed to immediately freeze Yugoslav assets and
international investments in the near future, but that does not
constitute a policy. Moreover, the demands made of Milosevic fall far
short, namely his acceptance of international mediation. At the very
minimum, the United States and the West must demand that the ethnic
Albanians be provided full civil and human rights, and the ability to
rule themselves--ideally in accordance with international law and as a
full republic.
Mr. Chairman, the developments in Kosova should come as no
surprise. When the international community had the opportunity to try
to resolve the unacceptable status of this ethnic Albanian majority
entity, it did not. Before Dayton, during Dayton and after Dayton,
American and European leaders refused to come to grips with this
problem. As a result, the situation was not resolved--only deferred.
Let us be clear, Milosevic's goals have not changed. He intends to
achieve in Kosova precisely what he has achieved in Kosova. He seeks
absolute control, and he intends to purge at least part of the land of
its non-Serb population. The two million ethnic Albanians in Kosova
understand this. They have lived under police-state conditions for a
decade. Now they are in mortal fear that Milosevic's final onslaught
has begun. Without Western support, they will have no choice but to
defend themselves. Indeed, we should not be shocked that support for
the terrorist group KLA is increasing among this vulnerable population.
In my view, the United States must lead the European powers to
support a credible threat of force. Warnings, asset-freezes, and other
punitive economic measures are steps in the right direction--but as we
saw in Bosnia, they are clearly not enough to stop Milosevic and his
military and police.
Under Presidents flush and Clinton, the United States issued the
so-called ``Christmas warning'' which reflected a clear understanding
that the credible threat of force may be necessary to prevent the
escalation of a conflict in Kosova to a wider war involving neighboring
countries in the region.
Rather than retreating, this ``Christmas warning'' should be
reiterated immediately and publicly by President Clinton himself and
our allies should articulate publicly their support. Of course, this
will require our allies to take a longer term view and set aside their
short term business aspirations. Leaders in France, Britain, Germany,
in particular, will need to recognize that time and time again over the
past eight years, Milosevic has demonstrated that he respects only one
thing: force.
Let us not fool ourselves negotiations not backed by the credible
use of force will not produce anything but more empty promises. The
Dayton settlement would never have been possible had the U.S. Congress
not voted overwhelmingly to lift the U.S. arms embargo and had the
Clinton administration not followed with NATO air strikes. Indeed,
perhaps a better and more comprehensive settlement would have been
achieved had NATO's air strikes been more decisive.
Strong U.S. leadership and resolute Western action are the only
answer to this crisis. The horrors of Bosnia provide an indelible
indication of what is in store for Kosova--and us in the West--if we
fail to act now. Politically, economically and morally, we cannot
afford to fail.
Senator Smith. Mr. Ambassador, before we hear from Senator
Biden, I must ask you, is there a Christmas warning that is a
policy of this Government, and are there any steps being taken
to implement that warning?
Ambassador Gelbard. The United States continues to work on
all possible options that are available regarding our desire to
find a peaceful solution in Kosovo. All options are on the
table and available. We have not ruled anything out. President
Milosevic is well aware of that.
Senator Smith. It seems to me history shows Mr. Milosevic
will respond to force, and that force used early may well
prevent a great deal of difficulty later, as we have learned in
Bosnia. I just wonder if perhaps we ought to be more visible
with preparations backing up a Christmas warning.
Ambassador Gelbard. Well, first, President Milosevic and
his Government I think are very well aware of U.S. Government
policy overall on all these issues and, as I said, we continue
to be prepared to exercise every avenue possible to try to find
a way to get a peaceful solution.
I fully agree with what you said in your opening statement,
Mr. Chairman, about the way this appalling situation has
escalated. In my frequent visits to Belgrade and to Preshyna
over the last several months I have been trying and
representatives of other Governments have been trying to make
every effort to bring the two sides together. We are continuing
to do so, and we continue to try to find every way possible to
get this to happen.
There are some sensitive aspects to U.S. policy, and I
would be happy to talk with you and other Members of the Senate
privately about some of these.
Senator Smith. I appreciate that. It is not U.S. policy to
support the creation of a Kosovo State, opening up many
boundary issues all around, I suppose, if we were to do so, but
are there some conditions where, if this gets out of control
and there is territory occupied, at what point would we be
prepared to recognize Kosovo as a State?
Ambassador Gelbard. As I said in my statement, Mr.
Chairman, we feel that independence should not be an option.
There has been too much fragmentation already. We worry about
further fragmentation that could occur if this were to happen,
and based on the fundamental principles of the U.N. Charter,
the OSCE Charter, and other documents, we accept and support
the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.
We also expect Yugoslavia to support the territorial
integrity of their neighbors, including the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia and Albania.
What we feel has to be accomplished is, with real urgency,
the two sides have to drop any kind of preconditions, and they
have to be in a position where there are no conditions for
dialog.
Obviously, in terms of any talks, they are free to state
any positions they have and, of course, Belgrade has stated
repeatedly that they feel a solution has to be inside of
Serbia. Dr. Rugova has said it has to be--he is talking about
independence. That is part of a negotiation.
We do not have a position as to a final outcome, except to
say, as I mentioned in my statement, that we do not support the
status quo, and we do not support independence, and I cannot
envision accepting the idea of independence either.
Now, what is truly worrisome are the increasing stories we
are hearing that what Belgrade may have in mind is the idea of
partition of Kosovo. That is something we would oppose too.
That has a ring of ethnic cleansing to it, and this goes back
to a story that came up in the late eighties, when the Yugoslav
Academy of Sciences did a study in which they proposed such an
outcome, and there are increasingly people, both in Yugoslavia
and outside Yugoslavia who talk about this as something that
Belgrade has in mind. I think that would prove to be an
absolute disaster.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I would invite
you to talk with me privately, Senator Biden I am sure would
also appreciate it, privately if necessary, as to whether or
not there is a Christmas warning, if it is in effect, the
policy of this Government, and what we are going to do about
it. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much. It is good to see you
here. I think the last time I saw you we were in Bosnia
together, and you have done a great job, you really have.
I was saying to the chairman, it is ironic that a witness
would spend more time talking about Bosnia than this subject,
because Bosnia is easier to deal with now than the other
subject. That is progress.
I want you to understand--and I am being a bit facetious,
but it is interesting that in a bizarre way, that what are in
my view part of Milosevic's tactic and strategy relates to the
success we are having in Bosnia, but that is another question.
Let me speak to Bosnia for a second, then get to Kosovo.
You have personally, and the administration has generally,
and I have specifically been pushing in every way we could in
Bosnia to give nonnationalists of any stripe or denomination an
equal chance of footing and opportunity to participate in the
social and political and cultural life of a country still one
entity, although it is divided into the Republic of Srpska and
the Federation.
I read with interest and some dismay--and I know this is
not totally your all,by any stretch of the imagination--RFERL
May 6 broadcast today, ``A spokesman for the OSCE, which is
supervising the September general elections, said in Syria that
only the new parliament will be able to change the rules for
the election of the three-member joint presidency, RFERL South
Slavic Service reported.
``Several NGO's and representatives of nonnationalist
parties have suggested that the OSCE change the rules now so
that each of the three is elected at large, and not just by one
ethnic constituency. Recent polls suggest that such changes
would sweep the current three members of the presidency from
office and replace them with nonnationalists.''
Why is that not a good idea?
Ambassador Gelbard. I actually think it is a very good
idea. We have, of course, striven to try to support multiparty
democracy inside Bosnia between the entities inside the
entities. The great irony right now, as you know, Senator, is
that in the Republika Srpska we have a multiethnic coalition
that is governing, led by Prime Minister Dodik.
When I last met with him in Banjaluka, in fact, in the face
of the threats that they have been receiving to try, as I
mentioned in my statement, because of Belgrade's pressure to
reform his coalition into what they call a Government of Serb
unity, he has maintained firmness, and he has a significant
group of Bosniak members of his coalition as well as Croats.
We are continuing, through NGO's, particularly the National
Democratic Institute, to help train political parties, and I
have got to say, of course, Prime Minister Dodik's party was
one of the ones, as well as President Plavsic's party, that
have received campaign help, and we are going to continue to do
that among all the various groups.
One of the really interesting pieces of good news I have
seen is that there are multiethnic coalitions coalescing now in
the Federation as well as in Republika Srpska leading toward
the September election. We want to support that, and I have
been very pleased that High Representative Westendorp has been
actively supporting this, too.
Senator Biden. Well, that is a great answer, but a
nonanswer.
Ambassador Gelbard. I was going to get to that.
Senator Biden. I agree with everything you said, but----
Ambassador Gelbard. Obviously, because this is today's
news, I have not seen this, but I will be in Brussels tomorrow.
I am sure the OSCE people will be there. I am going to be
seeing Carlos Westendorp, and this is a subject I would like to
raise with him.
Senator Biden. I guess the question I have, Mr. Ambassador,
I do not expect you to answer it now, but maybe you can answer
it for the record, and that is, is there a legal impediment to
having at-large elections rather than the way they are now
slated for the presidency?
There is, and I see your staff shaking his head there is.
Ambassador Gelbard. Yes. As I thought, it is in Dayton they
would be elected that way, and I think it is built into the
constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, so it would, I think,
require some kinds of significant parliamentary reaction, but
what I will do is research this and get you an answer for the
record.
Senator Biden. Maybe your staff behind you, who seems to
know the answer, can before he leaves come up and tell me, and
I am not being facetious, because I am not sure. I do not know
the answer to the question. I should know it. I do not know the
answer to the question.
But if there is any way, it would seem to me what an
incredible positive signal it would send if the polling data is
correct, that the body politic, including all--including
Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs, all, a majority believed that, and
that is a question I do not know the answer to. I am just
reading you this one clip from the radio broadcast.
It seems to me that would be certainly very strong evidence
that your evidence are taking some root here if that was a
consensus view of the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I do not
know that it is. All I am reading you is this. So I would like
to at some point return to that. I mean, after the hearing,
return to that issue with you all, if I may.
You also said that it is the administration's position that
we are opposed to an independent Kosovo, yet you indicated that
the idea of everything being on the table, including
independence--and I assume that's what it means--in upcoming
negotiations, in any negotiations, was basically a good thing.
Is that correct?
Ambassador Gelbard. Well, I think that is the essence of
any negotiation, but what there cannot be--what there has been
so far on the part of Belgrade has been preconditions
established before they are willing to sit down at the table.
Once people sit down at the table, obviously they can argue any
position they want, but we cannot accept, we reject totally the
idea that there would be any preconditions on either side
before they sit down and start negotiating.
Senator Biden. We are about to hear from a very
distinguished former Congressperson, and a person who is at his
present status is a spokesperson for Albanians in the diaspora,
Albanian-Americans here, ostensibly others as well, and one of
the things that I am going to ask him is what I would like to
ask you now.
There is a letter I received, and it asserts the following:
The national question, which calls for the liberation of
occupied Albanian lands, national identity, and self-
determination. Now, that sounds to me like a Greater Albania.
If we start off with this as an assertion, that these are
occupied Albanian lands, I am not sure where all this goes.
Actually, I am fairly sure where it all goes.
But have you had much contact, or has the administration
had much contact with Albanians in Kosovo in terms of a sense
of what their agenda is?
Now, obviously, I take no back seat to anyone in terms of
my speaking out and calling for the use of force against the
atrocities of Milosevic. I have said to his face and I say
again I think he is a war criminal. I have not the slightest
bit of empathy, sympathy, or any positive--I see no social
redeeming value to the man, and that is me, and I make no bones
about it.
But--but, I think Kosovo is a very different circumstance
than Bosnia, very different circumstance, and so one of the
things that I would like to know is, what is your assessment of
the size, the capabilities, the resources, the organization of
the UCK, and does the administration view it as the legitimate
political bargaining unit, or does it view it as a terrorist
organization, or what do you think of its political leaders?
Do we have a formal position relative to--as opposed to--as
opposed to the Democratic League for Kosovo?
Ambassador Gelbard. First, we do not accept the idea of
Greater Albania. We respect the territorial integrity, as I
said earlier, of Yugoslavia, just as we do Albania and
Macedonia.
The elected leaders of Albania have said that they oppose
independence for Kosovo, too, and they support the territorial
integrity of Yugoslavia.
We work with Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, with other democratically
oriented Kosovar Albanian leaders, we have a wide range of
contacts, including me, with people in Kosovo. I go there
frequently. We have an embassy presence there through a USIA
cultural center, and have had for quite some time, and there
are people from the embassy who visit Pristina and other parts
of Kosovo constantly, and I mean constantly.
We feel that Dr. Rugova, as the person who has been elected
by about 85 percent of the Kosovar Albanian population, is the
legitimate representative of the Kosovar Albanian people. He
has put together an advisory group of 15 people who represent a
wide range of opinion. They do not necessarily--first they are
not all part of his party and, second, they do not necessarily
share his ideological beliefs, but they represent a good,
strong cross-section of views within Kosovo.
From that, he has formed a negotiating team which he says
are prepared to negotiate with a team that President Milosevic
designates.
Senator Biden. Is the UCK represented on that negotiating
team?
Ambassador Gelbard. Not that I am aware of, unless there
are people who have affiliations other than those which I
believe they have.
Senator Biden. To state the obvious, I mean, it is fairly
transparent, my concern here, and that is, is the good doctor
able, does he have the legitimacy----
Ambassador Gelbard. Well, he does----
Senator Biden.[continuing]. to negotiate or is this Kosovo
Liberation Army, has that essentially usurped----
Ambassador Gelbard. Senator, what has happened is, this
group, which was very small and had a very small base of
support, has now achieved significantly greater status within
Kosovo and worldwide because the Yugoslav Government has
handled this in the worst way imaginable.
Everything we know about counterinsurgency theory,
doctrine, policy, goes 180 degrees in the opposite direction
from the way they have been handling this, whether it is
militarily, politically economically, socially. The Government
has played right into the hands of the UCK, and I have to
wonder, in my pessimistic moods, whether there is some kind of
intrinsic alliance between the two sides of wanting to polarize
the situation and wanting to weaken the moderate leadership of
Dr. Rugova and others inside Kosovo.
But as a result of what has happened, particularly since
February, I do believe that the UCK has received dramatically
greater support both inside Kosovo and outside. We have seen a
huge increase, in terms of people, weapons, and money flowing
in, and the problem now is to create circumstances where we can
have a serious, legitimate negotiation between the two sides to
try to resolve this with urgency to achieve a serious political
result.
Senator Biden. Well, I, speaking only for myself--the
chairman may have a different view. We have not discussed this.
But as one who you know probably was the most consistent voice
the last 5 years for us to intervene in Bosnia, I want to say
to anybody who is listening if the UCK thinks that the move for
independence is likely to find support here in the Congress I
think they are making a tragic mistake, a tragic mistake.
I may be wrong, but I think that to reinforce the point you
made, that it seems like this is an unholy alliance to enhance
the prospect that we do not do anything, that they cannot gain
a consensus here in the Congress to support the administration
efforts, because nobody I know of is talking about the
independence of Kosovo as a separate entity, as part of a
Greater Albania, and I just think that--again, I speak only for
myself, but I think there is going to be a tragic strategic and
tactical miscalculation to think that there would be any help.
The one thing that is likely to allow those who do not even
want to be involved anywhere in the Balkans to be able to say
that this is a civil war of independence, and you will find
everybody walk away here--I think. I could be dead wrong.
Ambassador Gelbard. If I could just add a point to that, we
also worry about the imitation effect this would have in
Macedonia, too.
Senator Biden. That is why everyone would walk away.
Ambassador Gelbard. Twenty-three percent of the population
in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are also ethnic
Albanians, and there are some, including in the United States,
who envision the idea of cutting off part of Macedonia along
with Kosovo to create this kind of new country.
This is a recipe for real regional instability.
Senator Biden. Woodrow Wilson is dead, and his idea was not
so hot in the first place.
I just think--I really get a sinking sense, as this goes
on, that the more people like me and the chairman and you and
the President and others who speak up about the atrocities that
are being waged by Milosevic in Belgrade, the more we may be--
and there is no alternative but to speak out against that, so I
am not suggesting that be silenced.
But I think some people are reading the wrong message from
that, that that means that we believe that there should be an
independent State of Kosovo, or some changed statutes as it
relates to sovereignty within Yugoslavia, and it seems to--I
just hope that message is not one that--I think it would be a
misreading of our revulsion of Milosevic and his policies to
conclude that those of us, speaking again for me, that I think
that means there should be an independent State of Kosovo.
I do think autonomy--I do think the status,
predisintegration of the greater Yugoslavia, is important, and
I do think we should participate in providing a fora, or at
least indirectly through the Contact Group of bringing about a
change in the behavior on the part of Belgrade, but I again
suggest the one thing that will probably curtail any consensus
on that effort would be if, in fact, the statement that I read
was viewed as the policy, a national question which calls for
the liberation of occupied Albanian lands, national identity,
and self-determination.
I do not have any further questions.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Senator Biden.
Mr. Ambassador, Senator D'Amato of New York had hoped to be
with us to ask you a few questions. He is tied up in another
hearing, but if there is no objection I will leave the record
open and he will submit to you some written questions.
Mr. Ambassador, we thank you. We appreciate your time and
your work, and we will now call up our second panel. We
recognize James Hooper with the Balkan Institute, John Fox with
the Open Society Institute, and former Congressman Joseph
DioGuardi with the Albanian-American Civic League.
We would ask each witness to limit their opening statement
to 5 or 10 minutes to allow time for questions.
We welcome our second panel, and if the room can come to
order, let's begin with Mr. Hooper. Sir, we thank you for
coming and invite your statement.
STATEMENT OF JAMES R. HOOPER, DIRECTOR, THE BALKAN INSTITUTE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Hooper. Senator, thank you very much. I appreciate the
invitation. I am very glad to be here.
The Serbian crackdown in Kosovo presents the United States
with a Bosnia-like situation. Remain on the sidelines and watch
ethnic cleansing unfold, or muster the political will to
intervene early and forcefully to prevent escalation, genocide,
and spillover to neighboring States that will destroy NATO's
credibility and upset the Dayton Peace Accords.
The level of political courage in Washington will determine
the level of slaughter in the Balkans. Serbian strong man
Slobodan Milosevic's troops have been attacking villages since
late February in defiance of the Christmas warning. The
credibility of the Christmas warning conveyed to Milosevic from
President Bush in December 1992 and renewed in 1993 by then-
Secretary of State Warren Christopher on behalf of the Clinton
administration has eroded.
That very specific threat of force helped keep the peace in
Kosovo for over 5 years, but Milosevic in February crossed the
line that Bush and Clinton had drawn with impunity, if not with
our blessing.
A resolute U.S. policy has given a de facto green light
that Milosevic has exploited with predictable effectiveness.
The only thing that will stop him now is a credible threat of
force by the President of the United States.
Could President Clinton mobilize Congress, the American
public, and the allies to support a tough conflict prevention
strategy in Kosovo? Milosevic is betting that the President
will not try and has calculated that in any case he would not
succeed. Once again, Serbia confronts Washington with a
defining moment in the Balkans.
At stake is the belief in American power, purpose, and
resolve to deal with the toughest postwar security problems in
Europe, preventing genocidal conflict and spillover of local
disputes into broader regional war, sustaining the credibility
of NATO, and ensuring the continued implementation of the
Dayton peace agreement in Bosnia.
Clinton blamed Bush for inheriting Bosnia. You cannot blame
Bush for Kosovo. Clinton administration officials conveniently
suggested during the Bosnia conflict that crises are best
nipped in the bud. In Kosovo, this is the bud. Confronting a
population ratio of 9 to 1 in the Kosovar Albanians' favor,
Milosevic has only two choices for altering the balance: Ethnic
cleansing, and/or partition.
The intensity of the conflict is escalating rapidly. Small-
scale ethnic cleansing, begun on President Bill Clinton's
watch, also threatens to expand in the coming weeks. We will
not have long to wait to determine whether nip-in-the-bud
represents policy conviction or the basis for a new genocide
apology.
The administration's crisis approach represents four points
of a political compass, rhetoric, economic sanctions,
diplomacy, and wishful thinking. Navigating with this compass
will steer the U.S. toward inevitable military involvement in a
Balkan-wide conflict after it becomes too late to prevent
conflict, and when our forces will have to shoot their way in
rather than deploy peacefully.
The consequences of a policy whose purpose is the avoidance
of risk, engagement, and responsibility, rather than the
deterrence of war, will be significantly greater risks, violent
engagements, and burdensome responsibilities for resolving
Kosovo, repairing NATO, and resuscitating Dayton.
A forceful strategy, as outlined in the following
proposals, will be needed to prevent conflict in Kosovo. The
administration should:
First, renew the Christmas warning threatening Milosevic
with military intervention if he continues to crack down in
Kosovo.
Second, restore the credibility of the Christmas warning by
disbanding the ineffective Contact Group and shifting the venue
for U.S. leadership and actio to NATO. NATO engagement is
critical.
Third, establish a NATO no-fly zone over Kosovo as an
immediate down-payment on a conflict prevention strategy.
Fourth, deploy a NATO observer mission to Kosovo. This will
relieve tensions there, undercut growing support for the Kosovo
Liberation Army, and provide justification for Kosovo Albanians
to engage in serious negotiations with Belgrade.
Fifth, link the NATO observer mission to NATO mandates to
take over the U.N. preventive deployment force in Macedonia and
establish a similar force in Albania.
Sixth, request that the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague
send the prosecutor immediately to Kosovo and Belgrade to
stress that the tribunal will hold Serbian officials, beginning
this time at the top, accountable for crimes against humanity
committed in Kosovo.
To show we mean business, NATO should apprehend indicted
Bosnian Serb war criminal Radovan Karadzic immediately. The
U.S. should also publicly call upon the tribunal to begin
preparing an indictment of Milosevic for crimes against
humanity in Bosnia.
Seventh, appoint a special envoy of recognized public
stature with responsibility only for Kosovo. This will reduce
Milosevic's incentive to trade off cooperation in Bosnia for
freedom of action in Kosovo and will give our diplomacy more
leverage.
Eighth, launch a major and sustained initiative to buildup
Serbia's democratic forces, to establish democracy and civic
society in Serbia. The root cause of our problems in the
Balkans is the U.S. failure over the past decade to advance
democracy in Serbia. It is time to make clear to everyone that
Milosevic is the troublemaker, not the peacemaker of the
Balkans, and so long as he is in power, the U.S. will be forced
to repeatedly confront him.
The conflict prevention proposals outlined above impose
considerable burdens on policymakers for ideas and
implementation, the Congress for support of the risks involved,
and especially on the President for leadership.
Better such risks and burdens in preventing conflict than
dealing with the consequences of an action and an American
political debate over who lost NATO.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hooper follows:]
Prepared Statement of James R. Hooper
The Serbian crack down in Kosovo presents the United States with a
Bosnia-like situation: Remain on the sidelines and watch ethnic
cleansing unfold. Or, muster the political will to intervene early and
forcefully to prevent escalation, genocide and spill over to
neighboring states that will destroy NATO's credibility and upset the
Dayton peace accords.
The level of political courage in Washington will determine the
level of slaughter in the Balkans. Serbian strong man Slobodan
Milosevic's troops have been attacking villages since late February, in
defiance of the Christmas warning. The credibility of the Christmas
warning--conveyed to Milosevic from President Bush in December 1992 and
renewed in 1993 by then-Secretary of State Christopher on behalf of the
Clinton administration--has eroded. That very specific threat of force
helped keep the peace in Kosovo for over five years. But Milosevic in
February crossed the line that Bush and Clinton had drawn, with
impunity, if not our blessing. Irresolute U.S. policy has given a de
facto green light that Milosevic has exploited with predictable
effectiveness. The only thing that will stop him now is a credible
threat of force by the President of the United States.
Could President Clinton mobilize Congress, the American, public and
the allies to support a tough conflict prevention strategy in Kosovo?
Milosevic is betting that the president will not try, and has
calculated that in any case he would not succeed once again, Serbia
confronts Washington with a defining moment in the Balkans.
U.S. Stakes in Kosovo
The stakes for the U.S. in this escalating crisis are self-evident
and compelling. First, the credibility of an enlarging NATO is at risk.
Ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and an expanding war in the Balkans will
undermine the viability of the alliance just as surely as did U.S.
inaction in Bosnia. Failure by the U.S. and its allies to prevent
genocidal conflict in Kosovo will hollow out the alliance. The
inevitable spill over of large-scale violence across the borders of
neighboring states will shift NATO's focus to messy conflict
containment, as Albania--no matter the wishes of its weak government--
is drawn into the fighting. Macedonia's delicate internal political
balance will be disrupted with harmful regional consequences. Greece
will find itself preoccupied with anticipating Turkey's response to the
war. The policy risks of forceful U.S. conflict prevention pale in
contrast to the burdens and dangers posed by battlefield ``facts''
being created by Belgrade.
Second, it is wishful thinking to expect that the Dayton peace
accords will somehow remain unaffected by the dynamic of conflict set
in motion in Kosovo. If NATO fails to stay Milosevic's hand in Kosovo,
he will be emboldened to up the ante in Bosnia. Tenuous reforms
promoted by some Bosnian Serbs will immediately be jeopardized. If
escalation in Kosovo occurs in conjunction with the September Bosnian
elections, we can look forward to an electoral campaign that lights up
the Balkan skyline with the fireworks of ultranationalist politicking.
Third, genocidal conflict in Kosovo will likely reinforce the trend
toward greater tolerance of intolerance that we see occurring
throughout much of Europe. Growing extreme nationalist and neo-fascist
political movements are steadily increasing their support, moving from
the margins toward the political mainstream and becoming an
increasingly worrisome minority in eastern Germany, France, Italy,
Austria, Denmark, and some of the former communist states of East
Central Europe. In Russia they have already entered the mainstream.
This will increase the temptation for democratic political parties and
governments to compromise with the anti-pluralist and anti-democratic
agendas of the extreme nationalists, many of whom openly identify with
Milosevic's policies and values.
Fourth, Kosovo is a challenge to U.S. leadership and resolve. The
Kosovo crisis tests the belief in American power, purpose and resolve
to deal with the toughest post-Cold War security problems in Europe.
Regrettably, until now the purpose of U.S. policy in Kosovo has been to
avoid risk, forceful engagement and responsibility for the outcome. The
United States needs to stop dithering and follow a conflict prevention
strategy that will deter conflict.
Background to the Crisis
The Serbs regard the province of Kosovo as the touchstone of their
national identity. But 90 percent of Kosovo's neatly two million
inhabitants are Kosovar Albanians and only ten percent are ethnic
Serbs. Milosevic consolidated his power in Serbia in the 1980s through
an ultranationalist appeal to restore Serb primacy in Kosovo. His first
step toward destroying Yugoslavia was to remove Kosovo's status as an
autonomous province in 1989. He did the same to the autonomous province
of Vojvodina, which has a large population of ethnic Hungarians. This
provided Serbia with two additional votes on the Yugoslav collective
presidency and signaled at an early stage that Milosevic aimed to
destroy pluralism in Yugoslavia. In Kosovo he redeemed his political
promises by establishing martial law and removing the Kosovar
Albanian's political, economic and educational rights.
But he could not yet persuade Serbs to settle there.
By 1992, with Serbia's war underway in Croatia and Bosnia, tensions
were rising perceptibly in Kosovo. On Christmas Day in 1992, President
Bush warned Milosevic, according to an authoritative New York Times
article, ``In the event of conflict in Kosavo caused by Serbian action,
the United States will be prepared to employ military force against the
Serbs in Kosovo and in Serbia proper.'' Secretary of State Warren
Christopher on behalf of the Clinton administration renewed the
Christmas warning shortly after taking office one month later.
For five years Washington's threat of force helped keep the peace
in the volatile province. But Kosovar Albanians, who had been promised
that the Dayton peace negotiations would address their concerns, were
literally shut out of the 1995 peace talks. U.S negotiators, fearing
that Milosevic would up the ante in Bosnia, succumbed to his demand
that Kosovo remain off the table.
The frustration felt by the Kosovar Albanians toward the West and
some of their own leaders increased exponentially after Dayton. The
Kosovo Albanians' elected president, Thrabim Rugova, found his
leadership, assumptions about Western support, and advocacy of non-
violence increasingly questioned by students, journalists and other
political figures. The first reports of a shadowy organization called
the Kosovo Liberation Army, or KLA, moreover, date from the post-Dayton
period. Belgrade's violent crack down against a number of Kosovar
Albanian villages, beginning in late February, has significantly
increased public sympathy for the KLA and projected the struggle as an
insurgency that draws in ever-greater numbers of Serbian military
troops as well as heavily-armed special police units reinforced by
irregular paramilitaries led by veteran war criminals of the Bosnian
and Croatian campaigns.
Meanwhile, Milosevic continues to experience his own frustrations
with a repressive status quo that has not improved the population ratio
for the Serbs, who continue to resist settling in a province that is
becoming steadily more volatile. Even homeless Serb refugees from
Croatia and Bosnia, offered homes in Kosovo, have found the situation
there so untenable that most of them depart shortly after arriving and
advise their friends to shun Kosovo.
To change the situation on the ground, Milosevic has two
fundamental policy options: ethnic cleansing or parition. He has been
rehearsing ethnic cleansing in Kosovo for the past two months, albeit
on a small scale. Large-scale ethnic cleansing would lead to hundreds,
then thousands, then perhaps tens of thousands of casualties and drive
hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians toward the nearest cross-
border sanctuaries in Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro.
This century's history teaches that those who commit genocide once
are likely to do it again, if permitted. Having already used ethnic
cleansing to achieve the de facto partition of Bosnia, Milosevic has no
compunctions about relying on it as a policy tool in Kosovo. That is
why all eyes now turn to Washington look to the U.S. for leadership in
preventing conflict. Balkan moderates understand that only the U.S. can
constrain Belgrade from using genocidal force and provide realistic
alternatives that could draw support from the advocates of violence.
Milosevic sees Washington as the only potential impediment to
achieving his objectives. That is why he has devoted such effort to
sowing discord among the allies and enlisting the support of Moscow.
While using Serbian troops to erase the red line that the U.S. drew
with the Christmas warning, he has focused the political discourse on
side issues: snookering Western diplomats into depicting his actions as
an effort to subdue KLA ``terrorists,'' obtaining an international
consensus that Kosovo is an ``internal issue,'' engaging the Contact
Group in counterproductive debate over imposition of irrelevant
economic sanctions, and implying that Western resistance to his aims in
Kosovo will tempt him to cause more trouble in Bosnia. NATO inaction
allows Milosevic to define the issues and lends credence to the belief
that the U.S. has given him the green light for conflict.
Policy Proposals
A forceful strategy, as outlined in the following proposals, will
be needed to prevent conflict in Kosovo. The Clinton administration
should:
1. Renew the Christmas warning, threatening Milosevic with U.S.
military intervention if he continues the crack down in Kosovo.
2. Restore the credibility of the Christmas warning by disbanding the
ineffective Contact Group and shifting the venue for U.S.
leadership and action to NATO. NATO engagement is critical.
3. Establish a NATO no-fly zone over Kosovo, as an immediate down
payment on a conflict prevention strategy.
4. Deploy a NATO observer mission to Kosovo. This will relieve tensions
there, undercut growing support for the Kosovo Liberation Army,
and provide the justification for Kosovar Albanians to engage
in serious negotiations with Belgrade,
5. Link the NATO observer mission to NATO mandates to take over the
UNPREDEP role in Macedonia and establish a force in Albania.
6. Request that the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague send the
Prosecutor immediately to Kosovo and Belgrade to stress that
the tribunal will hold Serbian officials--beginning this time
at the very top--accountable for crimes against humanity
committed in Kosovo. To show we mean business, NATO should
apprehend indicted Bosnian Serb war criminal Radovan Karadzic
immediately. The U.S. should also publicly call upon the
tribunal to begin preparing an indictment of Milosevi for
crimes against humanity in Bosnia.
7. Appoint a special envoy of recognized public stature with
responsibility only for Kosovo. This will also reduce
Milosevic's incentive to trade off ``cooperation'' in Bosnia
for freedom of action in Kosovo and will give our diplomacy
more leverage
8. Launch a major and sustained initiative to build up Serbia's
democratic forces to establish democracy and civic society in Serbia.
The root cause of our problems in the Balkans is the U.S failure over
the past decade to advance democracy in Serbia. It is time to make
clear to everyone that Milosevic is the troublemaker, not the
peacemaker, of the Balkans, and so long as he is in power, the U.S.
will be forced to repeatedly confront him.
The conflict prevention proposals outlined above impose
considerable burdens on policymakers for ideas and implementation, the
Congress for support of the risks involved, and especially on the
president for leadership. Better such risks and burdens than dealing
with the consequences of inaction and an American political debate over
who lost NATO.
Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Hooper. Mr. Fox.
STATEMENT OF JOHN FOX, DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON OFFICE, OPEN
SOCIETY INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Fox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden. Thank you
for the opportunity to speak here today.
On his trip to the Balkans 6 weeks ago, Deputy Secretary of
State Strobe Talbott offered a stark description of what is at
stake for the West in the Kosovo crisis. ``The dangerous
situation in Kosovo,'' he said, ``constitutes a dire threat to
regional stability, and therefore it poses a threat to the
vital interest of the United States.''
Mr. Talbott went further: ``Kosovo could yet turn out to be
the most explosive of all the powder kegs in this part of
Europe. If Kosovo truly blows, it could be even worse than
Bosnia, with the risk of war spreading in all directions,
including south and east.
``The dire emergency there is directly related to the peace
of Europe as a whole, and the implications are potentially
disastrous.''
The challenge to the international community, the Deputy
Secretary said, is, ``to prevent the brutal policies of
Belgrade from triggering a forth Balkan war in this century.''
A strikingly similar assessment of U.S. national interests
in Kosovo was rendered by both the Bush administration and by
the first Clinton administration. More importantly, this
strategic calculation was then backed by the credible threat of
force.
I would like to quote for the committee a portion of the
``Christmas warning'' letter that President Bush sent to
Slobodan Milosevic and to the Belgrade military leadership in
December 1992. This letter was authoritatively leaked to the
press at the time:
``In the event of the conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian
action, the United States will be prepared to employ military
force against the Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper.''
Senior administration officials stated that this force
would consist of air power, including strikes at Serbian air
bases, supply lines and other military installations. The
Christmas warning established a unilateral red line that
Belgrade did not cross until this year, in fact, after American
deterrence had been unaccountably let go by the second Clinton
administration.
What is the administration relying on instead of credible
force to back its diplomacy now that the Kosovo powder keg has
begun to blow? Rather than unilateral Christmas warnings, the
U.S. has been part of setting new lows and lowest common
denominator diplomacy through the six-nation Contact Group.
The vital interests of the United States are being
addressed with most of the hallmarks of failure that became
familiar to all of us during the 1992 to 1995 war in Bosnia:
empty threats, public wrangling with allies, endless
international conferences, ritual hand-wringing, limited
sanctions. And many of the same failed measures of the past
have been pulled off the diplomatic shelf once more: A new U.N.
arms embargo, a renewed assets freeze with plenty of advance
notice, unconditional support for Yugoslavia's territorial
integrity, robust finger-wagging at the parties to negotiate
their own solution, and new monitoring missions to supply
international spectators for the latest theater of conflict.
While the U.S. crafted and brokered a compromise ``dialog
and stabilization'' package for the April 29 Contact Group
meeting, Belgrade was trampling on the former American red
lines with impunity, including through major new force
deployments and offensives led by the Yugoslav National Army in
the interior of Kosovo.
In response, the U.S. package dropped several demands that
had been made on Belgrade at prior Contact Group meetings,
including allowing humanitarian agencies access and cooperating
with International War Crimes Tribunal investigations on war
crimes committed in Kosovo.
The April 29 package agreed in Rome watered down other key
Contact Group demands on withdrawal of Serbian security forces
and cessation of actions against the civilian population. It
also substantially reduced the cost for Belgrade to escape
future and current sanctions, including the diplomatic and
financial outer wall.
The Contact Group has even adopted a more respectful tone,
``recommending'' rather than ``requiring'' these reduced
measures, a gesture that was appreciatively noted by Belgrade.
For their part, the Yugoslav Army, Serbian security forces,
and Belgrade's extreme nationalist paramilitary units have been
less respectful on the ground, particularly as concerns
civilian lives.
The familiar elements of the Bosnia and Croatia ethnic
cleansing campaigns are out in force again: heavy weapons and
helicopter gunships firing indiscriminately on villages;
systematic slaughter of the elderly, women, and children;
execution-style murders of unarmed men; extended seiges; sniper
attacks against civilians; forcible expulsion of ethnic groups;
a violent state propaganda campaign against the latest enemy.
In the attacks in March and April that could be verified by
international media and monitors, the great majority of the
100-plus victims were ethnic Albanian civilians. In the intense
attacks and fighting that have been conducted in recent weeks
in areas mainly sealed to international coverage, there are
strong indications that the proportions have been similar.
Fighting has escalated sharply between Serbian forces and
the local ethnic Albanian insurgency, the Kosovo Liberation
Army. Where there were sporadic killings and attacks on Serbian
police 3 months ago by the KLA, which observers then believed
to number under 100 lightly armed men, since Belgrade's
crackdown 10 weeks ago the KLA has grown swiftly. It is now
estimated at many times that figure, and it is also thought to
be getting heavier arms. This on a territory about the size of
Connecticut, with 2 million residents, of whom more than 90
percent are ethnic Albanian, primarily Muslim.
The indiscriminate attacks on rural Albanian clans, in a
manner guaranteed to inflame the population and broaden support
for the insurgency, has drawn plenty of new volunteers for the
KLA. Some commentators have ironically called Milosevic the
KLA's top recruiting officer.
Mr. Chairman, for the past decade the international
community, and foremost the United States, has relied on the
Kosovo Albanians to maintain their patient dedication to
nonviolence to gain relief from the massive and violent
repression imposed by Belgrade, and to see their human rights
and political self-administration restored.
The Pristina leadership was widely praised in the West, and
told always to wait and their grievances would be addressed.
Wait until after the break-up of Yugoslavia. Wait until after
the war in Croatia and its settlement. Wait until after the war
in Bosnia. Wait until after the international intervention.
Wait until after Dayton. Wait until after Dayton turns the
corner. Wait until after the disastrous results of earlier
Balkan policy failures are sorted out. Just wait, and we'll get
to you.
The refusal of the U.S. to ensure that Kosovo was addressed
at Dayton was a severe blow to the moderate Albanian leaders.
Their credibility was further undermined when it became clear
that war criminals and their sponsors would be rewarded with
the Republika Srpska, a self-administered semi-State possessing
key elements of sovereignty, including a standing army.
For their heinous ethnic cleansing and seizure of territory
by force, the Bosnian Serbs were enjoying the virtual State
that Pristina longed for.
For their disciplined nonviolence, the Kosovo Albanian
leadership could only show photo ops and vague testimonials
from a succession of U.S. and European leaders.
The Kosovo Liberation Army stepped into this vacuum, and on
the ground the moderates on both the Albanian and Serb sides
are being eclipsed by the hard-liners. Among the complicating
factors now is that there is no Sinn Fein-type political wing
tied to the military KLA, which is itself, apparently, an
amalgam of guerrilla groups.
As usual in the former Yugoslavia, the international
community has done precious little for the moderates when it
counts.
Although there were signs of seriousness on this emerging
crisis in parts of the executive branch starting last year, the
administration took the calculated risk that it could make
Kosovo wait some more. The U.S. has decisively lost that
gamble, and is now grasping at the straws of Contact Group,
OSCE, European Union, United Nations, and even Russian
diplomacy. Anything, that is, except NATO.
U.S. Policy on Kosovo today is approximately where it was
on Bosnia in 1992, a policy memorably summarized by one senior
Bush administration official at that time as ``let it burn.''
There are new illusions about containing the conflict in
Kosovo, perhaps at the Albanian or Macedonian border, as if
fire walls can be built in the midst of such a blaze while its
source is ignored.
The iron laws that were allegedly learned by the
international community in Bosnia apply especially in Kosovo.
The first, post-cold war U.S. and NATO interests ultimately
cannot sustain a hemorrhaging of security and blood in the
Balkans. Second, the more the fire of local conflict is treated
as an internal affair, the faster and deeper it will become
regionalized. And third, the weaker the Western intervention,
the more it will cost, the longer it will last, the more
dangerous it will be.
There is a range of allied military force options that
could back serious U.S.-led diplomacy to reach the necessary
near-term outcome on Kosovo, measures not, however, sufficient
for a permanent settlement. The aim would be withdrawal of
Serbian security forces and establishment of self-
administration, which itself would have to be internationally
guaranteed.
The threat and possible use of force required to achieve
these purposes must simply be summoned by the commander-in-
chief, unless we are all to continue taking our chances with
``let it burn'' in the immediate vicinity of the most explosive
of powder kegs in this part of Europe.
Until the White House resolves itself to such action and
leadership, the present drift and half-measures will lead to
the inevitable result: Another chance for the President to
apologize for sitting out another genocide on his watch, with
the fourth Balkan War of this century raging and a fatally
wounded NATO at the center of his international legacy.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fox follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Fox
Mr Chairman, Members of the Committee, Ladies and Gentlemen:
On his trip to the Balkans six weeks ago, Deputy Secretary of State
Strobe Talbott offered a stark description of what is at stake for the
West in the Kosovo crisis. ``The dangerous situation'' in Kosovo, he
said, ``constitutes a dire threat to regional stability and therefore.
it poses a threat to the vital interests of the United States.'' Mr.
Talbott went further: ``Kosovo could yet turn out to be the most
explosive of all the powder kegs in this part of Europe. If Kosovo
truly blows, it could be even worse than Bosnia ... with the risk of
war spreading in all directions, including South and East ... The dire
emergency there is directly related to the peace of Europe as a whole
-- and the implications are potentially disastrous.'' The challenge to
the international community, the Deputy Secretary said, is ``to prevent
the brutal policies of Belgrade from triggering a fourth Balkan war in
this century.''
A strikingly similar assessment of U.S. national interests in
Kosovo was rendered by both the Bush Administration and by the first
Clinton Administration. More importantly, this strategic calculation
was then backed by the credible threat of force. I would like to quote
for the Committee a portion of the ``Christmas warning'' letter that
President Bush sent to Slobodan Milosevic and the Belgrade military
leadership in December 1992 (this letter was authoritatively leaked to
the press at the time): ``In the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by
Serbian action, the United States will be prepared to employ military
force against the Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper.'' Senior
administration officials stated that this force would consist of air
power, including strikes at Serbian air bases, supply lines and other
military installations.
The ``Christmas warning'' established a unilateral ``red line''
that Belgrade did not cross until this year, in fact after American
deterrence had been unaccountably let go by the second Clinton
administration. What is the administration relying on instead of
credible force to back its diplomacy now that the Kosovo powder keg has
begun to blow? Rather than unilateral Christmas warnings, the U.S. has
been part of setting new lows in lowest-common-denominator diplomacy
through the 6-nation Contact Group. The ``vital interests of the United
States'' are being addressed with most of the hallmarks of failure that
became familiar during the 1992-95 war in Bosnia: empty threats, public
wrangling with allies, endless international conferences, ritual hand-
wringing, limited sanctions. And many of the same failed measures of
the past have been pulled off the diplomatic shelf once more: a new
U.N. arms embargo, a renewed assets freeze with plenty of advance
notice, unconditional support for Yugoslavia's territorial integrity,
robust finger-wagging at ``the parties'' to negotiate their own
solution, and new monitoring missions to supply international
spectators for the latest theater of conflict.
While the US crafted and brokered a compromise ``dialogue and
stabilization package'' for the April 29 Contact Group meeting,
Belgrade was trampling on the former American red lines with impunity
-- including through major new force deployments and offensives led by
the Yugoslav National Army in the interior of Kosovo. In response, the
U.S. package dropped several demands that had been made on Belgrade at
prior Contact Group meetings, including allowing humanitarian agencies
access and cooperating with International War Crimes Tribunal
investigations on war crimes committed in Kosovo. The April 29 package
agreed in Rome watered down other key Contact Group demands on
withdrawal of Serbian security forces and cessation of actions against
the civilian population. It also substantially reduced the cost for
Belgrade to escape future and current sanctions, including the
diplomatic and financial ``outer wall.'' The Contact Group has even
adopted a more respectful tone, ``recommending'' rather than requiring
these reduced measures, a gesture that was appreciatively noted by
Belgrade.
For their part, the Yugoslav army, Serbian security forces, and
Belgrade's extreme nationalist paramilitary units have been less
respectful on the ground, particularly as concerns civilian lives. The
familiar elements of the Bosnia and Croatia ethnic cleansing campaigns
are out in force again: Heavy weapons and helicopter gun ships firing
indiscriminately on villages; the systematic slaughter of the elderly,
women, and children; execution-style murders of unarmed men; extended
sieges and sniper attacks against civilians; forcible expulsion of
ethnic groups; a violent state propaganda campaign against the latest
``enemy.'' In the attacks during March and April that could be verified
by international media and monitors, the great majority of the 100-plus
victims were ethnic Albanian civilians. In the intense attacks and
fighting that have been conducted in recent weeks in areas mainly
sealed to international coverage, there are strong indications that the
proportions have been similar.
Fighting has escalated sharply between Serbian forces and the local
ethnic Albanian insurgency, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Where
there were sporadic killings and attacks on Serbian police three months
ago by the KLA (which observers then believed to number under one
hundred lightly armed men), since Belgrade's crack down ten weeks ago
the KLA has grown swiftly; it is now estimated at many times that
figure and is also thought to be getting heavier arms. This on a
territory about the size of Connecticut, with 2 million residents of
whom more than 90% are ethnic Mbanian and mostly Muslim. The
indiscriminate attacks on rural Albanian clans, in a manner guaranteed
to inflame the population and broaden support for the insurgency, has
drawn plenty of new volunteers for the KLA. Some commentators have
ironically called Milosevic the KLA's best recruiting officer.
Because of tight restrictions on field access, daily televised
reports from the new killing fields are not as available as was often
possible in Bosnia, but the trends are clear. I quote from a message
sent this week by a Kosovo women's NGO whose information has been
consistently reliable: ``War is ongoing, although no one wants to name
it like that. Shellings happen every day at regions now known to public
opinion, in Drenica and in the Western part of Kosova, bordering with
Albania. Serbian troops are coming day by day. Tanks are doing their
duties. `Accidental killings' can include today, 2 May, three people
from the village of Vojnike two of them are women, killed in their
home... It is quite clear attacks are happening against families. Being
deployed in the woods of the villages, Serb forces are shelling houses
from a distance. Only today 24 houses were destroyed completely in two
villages of the Drenica region. People are trying to defend their
doorsteps, but no use... Violence is becoming widespread, it is
including other parts of Kosova. In Kacanik, bordering on Macedonia,
clashes have started too... Serb forces are out of control. The
situation is alarming.''
Mr. Chairman, for the past decade the international community, and
foremost the United States, has relied on the Kosovo Albanians to
maintain their patient dedication to non-violence to gain relief from
the massive and violent repression imposed by Belgrade, and to see
their human rights and political self-administration restored. The
Pristina leadership was widely praised in the West and told always to
wait and their grievances would be addressed: wait until after the
break-up of Yugoslavia; wait until after the war in Croatia and its
settlement; wait until after the war in Bosnia; wait until after the
international intervention; wait until after Dayton; wait until after
Dayton turned the corner; wait until after the disastrous results of
earlier Balkan policy failures were sorted out. Just wait and we'll get
to you.
The refusal of the U.S. to ensure that Kosovo was addressed at
Dayton was an severe blow to the moderate Kosovo leaders. Their
credibility was further undermined when it became clear that war
criminals and their sponsors would be rewarded with Republika Srpska, a
self-administered semi-state possessing key elements of sovereignty.
For their heinous ethnic cleansing and seizure of territory by force,
the Bosnian Serbs were enjoying the virtual state that Pristina longed
for. For their disciplined non-violence, the Kosovo Albanian leadership
could only show photo-ops and vague testimonials from a succession of
U.S. and European leaders. The Kosovo Liberation Army stepped into this
vacuum and on the ground the moderates on both the Albanian and Serb
sides are being eclipsed by the hard-liners. Among the complicating
factors is that there is no Sein Fein-type political wing tied to the
military KLA, which is itself apparently an amalgam of guerrilla
groups. As usual in the former Yugoslavia, the international community
has done precious little for the moderates when it counted.
Although there were signs of seriousness on this emerging crisis in
parts of the executive branch starting last year, the administration
took the calculated risk that it could make Kosovo wait some more. The
U.S. has decisively lost that gamble, and is now grasping at the straws
of Contact Group, OSCE, European Union, U.N. and Russian diplomacy.
Anything, that is, except NATO. U.S. policy on Kosovo today is
approximately where it was on Bosnia in 1992, a policy memorably
characterized by one senior Bush administration official at that time
as ``let it burn.'' There are new illusions about containing the
conflict to Kosovo, perhaps at the Albanian or Macedonian border, as if
fire walls can be built in the midst of such a blaze while its source
is ignored.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much. Congressman, welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH DIOGUARDI, VOLUNTEER PRESIDENT,
ALBANIAN-AMERICAN CIVIC LEAGUE
Mr. DioGuardi. Thank you, Senator. I recall being here in
this very room, facing you in February 1991, just over 7 years
ago, when you were concerned about what was going to happen in
Yugoslavia. I remember ending that testimony by saying that I
did not think that Yugoslavia was going to stay together. We
were all hoping that it would. The United States was banking
its foreign policy on it, and all we heard during that meeting
was how Albanian terrorists and separatists and the quest for
Greater Albania was going to destroy Yugoslavia. Now we see
what really destroyed Yugoslavia. It was there all the time--
the quest for Greater Serbia.
Slobodan Milosevic, walked into Kosovo in 1987 and brutally
occupied it. He took away its legitimate status as one of the
eight juridical units of the ConFederal Republic of Yugoslavia,
where Kosova had an equal vote with Serbia--its Presidency
rotated every year--and created in less than a few years not
only an apartheid but a Warsaw Ghetto that still exists in the
heart of Europe today.
I would not be concerned, Senator, about Greater Albania. I
would be concerned that we have already legitimized ethnic
cleansing by creating a phony republic called Srpska. It never
existed before but it is there now. Why? Because Slobodan
Milosevic wanted it--the person who in the news last Sunday is
targeted by his former friend, Rudovan Karadzic, in a book
saying he's about to now go to The Hague and he is going to
turn State's evidence. He is pointing the finger at his friend
Slobodan Milosevic as the architect of some of the most brutal,
unbelievable atrocities since the Nazi era, in Bosnia
We do not have to worry about Greater Albania. We have to
worry about what I was worried about in your hearing back in
February 1991. At that time I could only wave in front of you a
Serbian version of ``The expulsion of the Albanians,'' a paper
presented by Milosevic's mentor, Vaslo Cubrilovic, a professor,
former administrator of the Yugoslavia Government, in Belgrade,
March 13, 1937. I am now going to give you the English
translation. This is what Slobodan Milosevic has been weaned
on.
If you want to see what happened in Bosnia, what is
happening in Kosova today, read word for word, line by line,
exactly what is going on, their modus operandi, shelling
villages, burning them down, getting rid of Albanians at all
cost, because this is territory they want.
Milosevic will not abandon this, and as we keep waffling in
this body and in the State Department he will just go and take
more and more and more.
He bluffed his way right through Bosnia, and he got Srpska.
He is bluffing his way right now. He knows there is no real
resolve with the so called Christmas warning by President Bush,
later ratified by President Clinton.
But he sees and senses the waffling already. He hears
strong words on the part of Madeleine Albright. Then Madeleine
Albright is muffled by Clinton's National Security Adviser,
Sandy Berger. Then we have questions coming up in Congressman
Gilman's hearing a few weeks ago about the Christmas warning,
and a very luke warm response by Ambassador Gelbard, that ``we
have to meet with you in executive session.'' You heard it
again today. No direct response!
Don't you think Slobodan Milosevic is hearing those
responses? Don't you think he is ready to do more and more,
because he sees that the greatest superpower in the world has
lost its resolve and has a foreign policy which has abandoned
the principles upon which this country was formed?
Our foreign policy should be based on fundamental human
rights. That is one of the key determinants of our foreign
policy.
We have today, in Kosova, some of the most egregious
examples of violations of those human rights. In fact, Senator
Biden, during the hearing that you held in 1991--and it was a
wonderful hearing: It was the first time that all the ethnic
groups came together to talk about the problem. I had to fly in
reports from the Council on Human Rights and Freedom from
Pristina and other places--litanies of horror.
I do not have to do that today. You know why? All you have
to do is read our own State Department's U.S. country eport,
brought from the State Department. Here it is, the 1997
edition. But if you read the last 5 years you cannot believe
the litany of horrors listed against the Albanian people of
Kosova. What are we waiting for? Look at how many people have
been killed and brutally tortured, and detained, and
disappeared? Every criteria they use to measure a country's
human rights record has been violated in Kosova.
Why is there such a disconnect between these egregious
violations and our professed adherence to human rights when it
comes to foreign policy? Is there another deal in the wind?
Perhaps you did not ask the right questions to Ambassador
Gelbard. Are we placating Russia for some reason? They are
always there, supporting their first cousins the Serbs. That is
where the Serbs came from in the Sixth Century A.D., from the
Ukraine. We know they are blood brothers, or at least blood
cousins. And they are always there supporting them.
But what has Russia done for us in Iran, Iraq, and China,
and so many other places? They do not support us!
Why are we giving such deference to Russia? Why are we even
considering a Contact Group at this point, including Russia?
This is an issue that should be led by the United States of
America in NATO, without Russia. This is where it belongs.
That is what solved Bosnia, and the only reason today
Bosnia is not like Kosova, Mr. Chairman, is that we have troops
there. Who are we kidding? When are we going to wake up?
Another key element of our foreign policy that has been
abandoned is that we will do everything to preserve the
security of a vital area like the Balkans in Europe. If you
look at international law and how it defines where you have a
state of belligerency, you look at what the neighboring
countries are saying about what is going on there. Every one of
them is using language which is at the edge. Recently, the
foreign minister of Greece said Kosova is like a hand grenade.
If it goes any further, it is going to explode.
A Turkish spokesman of foreign policy said that the Kosova
crisis, if unchecked, could destabilize the Balkan region and
therefore European security.
NATO condemned the excessive use of force by the Yugoslav
Army in Kosova and said that the North Atlantic Council is
profoundly concerned about the deterioration of the situation
there and was considering ``possible further means to
maintaining stability in view of the risk of escalating the
conflict in the region.''
On April 27, a spokesman from the U.S. State Department
said that if the Contact Group members did not agree to a new
sanctions package the United States would act unilaterally.
The United States reiterated, the U.N. and the Contact
Group's call for the immediate withdrawal of the special police
units--which are nothing more than the Yugoslav Army--from
Kosova, and the need for unconditional dialog. Yet when the
Contact Group met in Rome on April 29, the United States
capitulated to a weak proposal for more sanctions under
pressure, especially from Russia, which, as I said before, has
gone out of its way not to support us in dealing with Iran,
Iraq, China, and many other areas.
It is obvious the sanctions are not really an issue to
Belgrade, which has already survived 6 tough years of economic
sanctions. In the meantime, how many Kosovar Albanians have to
be killed?
We talk about negotiations and we talk about so many
things, like no conditions, but, when do we get the point where
we say, wait a minute, thousands of Albanians are being killed!
Are these negotiations working? Should we now learn from the
experience we had in Bosnia, that Slobodan Milosevic
understands only one thing--the use of force or the threat
thereof. In the meantime, these sanctions will only serve to
bolster nationalistic fervor on Mr. Milosevic's behalf.
Only resolve will work, Mr. Chairman, and that will have to
come from the only superpower left in the world, the United
States of America taking the lead with our NATO allies.
In conclusion, the 2 million ethnic Albanians of Kosova,
who comprise more than 90 percent of the population there, have
no human, economic or political rights of any kind. Slobodan
Milosevic has illegally and brutally occupied Kosova for almost
10 years. I am not going to go through the history of Kosova
here, Mr. Chairman. I have a three-page addendum to my
testimony and I would like to offer it and my entire testimony
for the record. I am giving an abbreviated form of it here.
Senator Smith. We would be happy to receive it.
Mr. DioGuardi. But when you look at Kosova it is not a new
story. Kosova was part of Albania until 1916, as was that
population of Albanians in western Macedonia and Southeastern
Montenegro. That is why they are all contiguous. If you drew a
line around 7 million Albanians today, you have the former
State of Albania that came out of Turkish occupation on
November 28, 1912.
They are not looking to change those borders. The only one
looking to change borders is Slobodan Milosevic. But what
Albanians want is some peace in their lives, self-determination
and the ability to raise their families in peace, to be who
they want to be, and to save their national identity.
What we see right now is ethnic cleansing all over again,
in Kosova as we saw in Bosnia. It is time for our State
Department to understand that loose talk that brands the
victims as terrorists for defending themselves, their families,
their property--and I will even add, their sacred honor. It is
important to Albanians the way it was important to our Founding
Fathers, Mr. Chairman. This only serves to give the green light
to the real terrorists, Slobodan Milosevic and his henchmen,
who are massacring innocent people as we sit here speaking
today.
It is time for the United States to stand up for its own
principles and demand compliance with international human
rights conventions before more Albanians are needlessly
slaughtered and a new Balkan War is triggered--this time
involving neighboring Albania, Greece, Macedonia, Bulgaria, and
Turkey.
It is time for Congress to stand up and voice its outrage
at a foreign policy in the Balkans that has obviously failed to
preserve peace and security in this vital region of the world.
It is time for the United States to back up its tough words
with concrete actions, such as declaring a no-fly zone in
Kosova as we did in Bosnia. What is wrong with that? They are
using heavily armed helicopters right now to level villages;
and ringing Serbia's borders with NATO troops, and moving an
aircraft carrier off the coast of Montenegro.
These actions would not only reaffirm our resolve to stop
the escalation of the conflict in Kosovo, but I believe would
lead to a lasting peace for the Albanian people and all ethnic
groups in the Balkans.
I would like to also submit for the record, Mr. Chairman, a
book that I prepared a few years ago called, ``The Agony of
Kosova.'' It is a good reference book--with a three page index.
It shows what this body and the House has done since 1987, and
it shows that what we are talking about here today is nothing
new. It is just escalating. And our foreign policy is nothing
new. We are still waffling.
What we did in Bosnia, for some reason we are reluctant to
do in Kosova. And, when the Serbian regime talks about the
Albanian people as fundamentalists and terrorists, let us not
forget what my good friend Ben Gilman did a couple of years ago
at the Holocaust Museum in memorializing the Albanian people
and the State of Albania, as the only nation in Europe that did
not give one Jew to the Nazis.
That is now part of the Yad Vashem Holocaust Memorial in
Israel, and our U.S. Holocause Museum here in Washington. This
book ``Rescue in Albania,'' was written by an American Jew--
Harvey Sarner--to memorialize that fact, and I want to leave
you the letter that Ben Gilman sent to Members of this body and
the House to say that.
It is a shame that we cannot do something to save these
innocent Albanian people. The terrorist groups that come from
Belgrade--special police that are really criminals let out of
jail and dressed in police uniforms and army uniforms--are
running into Albanian homes to get bounty, to get currency.
They take their gold and kill the families on the spot.
In Drenica many women and children were killed in their
living rooms and bedrooms. We are still not allowed to go
there. There is a mass grave some place. We have testimony from
the women. They heard their husbands and young sons scream; 200
were taken away. There is a mass grave there someplace. We will
find it sooner or later, as we did in Bosnia.
But what are we waiting for? Is this the United States that
we want to represent, a country that stands on the sidelines as
a brutal dictator inflicts State-inspired terrorism on a group
of 2 million people who are defenseless today in Kosova?
What is wrong with a national liberation movement, Senator,
when there is no one there to defend you? What are they going
to wait for?
There are many articles written about when enough is
enough, and there was one just recently by my professor Hurst
Hannum from Tufts University. He said there are two instances
in which secession, as we did 222 years ago, should be
supported by the international community.
The first occurs when massive discriminatory human rights
violations approaching the scale of genocide are being
perpetrated. If there is no likelihood of a change in the
attitude of the Central Government, or if the majority
population supports the repression--as we just saw in that
phony referendum that Slobodan Milosevic just held in Serbia
because he does not want any international intervention--
secession may be the only effective remedy for the besieged
group. This is international law.
A second possible exception might find the right of
secession if reasonable demands for local self-government or
minority rights have been arbitrarily rejected by a Central
Government, even without accompanying violence.
So this is not an easy issue Senator Biden. It was not easy
in 1991 when you held your first hearing on Yugoslovia and it
is not easy today. But, let us not brand the victims as the
terrorists and let us not talk about Greater Albania, since
that is not on the table.
What is on the table constantly for 50 years, certainly the
last 10, is the quest for Greater Serbia, and we seem very
willing to give Mr. Milosevic what he wants. I hope we are not
going to do the same in Kosova as we did in Bosnia. It would be
a tragedy of the highest proportions, and I think it would only
lead to a very destabilized Balkans and a greater war later on.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. DioGuardi follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joseph J. DioGuardi
Mr. Chairman, on behalf of 400,000 Albanians in America, I want to
thank you for holding this important hearing on Kosova. For us and for
seven million Albanians living side by side in their historic lands
within and outside of the current State of Albania, U.S. foreign policy
in the Balkans has failed.
Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic managed to bluff and outwit the
West in Bosnia until he faced military force. All that he faces today
are more of the economic sanctions that he has managed to withstand for
years. President George Bush's threat of force (the so called Christmas
warning) kept Kosova relatively quiet for six years. As Milosevic again
applies brutal paramilitary force against Albanians in Kosova, we now
risk another Balkan war that this time will spill over into neighboring
states.
Six years ago, in 1992, Patrick Glynn wrote in an article entitled
``Yugoblunder'' that ``U.S. handling of the Yugoslav crisis is in fact
a case study in how not to conduct foreign policy in the post-cold war
world, combining lack of intellectual rigor and carelessness with what
[then] Senator Al Gore has termed `moral obtuseness' about the
conflicts and issues at stake. ... The main factor in the Bush
administration's mishandling of Yugoslavia was its devotion to
geopolitical `stability' at the expense of democratic values and human
rights.'' This is exactly what we are facing again today in Kosova.
Incredibly, our foreign policy in the Balkans, which is failing day
by day, is dependent on the cooperation of Slobodan Milosevic, who many
believe should be brought up on charges for his barbaric actions in
Bosnia and now in Kosova by the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. In
fact, on May 3, 1998, the Associated Press reported that Radovan
Karadzic, the Serbian warlord already indicted for crimes against
humanity in Bosnia, is preparing to corroborate Western intelligence
reports linking Milosevic directly to the July 1995 massacre of
thousands of Muslims in Srebrenica, which is considered to be one of
Europe's worst acts of genocide since the Nazi era. Yet we continue to
treat Milosevic as an equal partner on the international diplomatic
stage. Is this not a continuation of the ``moral obtuseness'' that Vice
President Gore lamented as a senator?
Are we going to repeat the failures in Bosnia that led us, finally,
to use measured force three years too late, resulting in the deaths of
more than 200,000 innocent civilians? It is happening already in
Kosova, where since the end of February, one third of this formerly
autonomous province has been completely surrounded by Serbian military
and paramilitary units using tanks, armored personnel carriers,
helicopters, and heavy artillery. As we speak, twenty villages in
Kosova are under twenty-four-hour shelling. It is ludicrous to believe
the Serbian press that this is a local police action, rather than a
carefully orchestrated effort by Slobodan Milosevic to continue his
campaign of ``ethnic cleansing'' of the Albanian population of Kosova
and, ultimately, of the Balkans. He has made no secret of his designs
for a ``Greater Serbia,'' and he is following in the footsteps of other
Serbian ultranationalists, whose main goal and political platform has
been the expulsion of the Albanians from their ancient lands in the
Balkans. (To understand this, one need only read ``The Expulsion of the
Albanians,'' a plan presented to the government in Belgrade in 1937 by
Dr. Vaso Cubrilovic, a prominent Serbian academician and government
minister.)
One of the main failures of our U.S. foreign policy towards Kosova
is the disconnect between our professed adherence to the fundamental
principles of human rights and our failure to assume a leadership role
in Kosova in the face of some of the most egregious examples of human
rights violations in modern history. One need only look at the State
Department's 1997 country report for Serbia to see a litany of horrors
against a population of two million Albania civilians in Kosova. While
the United States customarily places a premium on human rights in its
dealings with the international community, when it comes to Kosova, it
appears that we are bending over backwards to accommodate a war
criminal and his Russian supporters.
Why are we not adhering to our own stated foreign policy, set forth
by President Bush as he was leaving office and embraced by President
Clinton as he was entering office, that a ``line in the sand'' is drawn
in Kosova and that the United States will not tolerate any Serbian
troops there? Since the end of February, the Serbian army disguised as
police has surrounded the Drenice and Decan regions of Kosova and
slaughtered more than 150 people (many more are missing and seriously
wounded) At a hearing on March 12, Ambassador Robert Gelbard, the
president's envoy for the implementation of the Dayton Accords,
verified that the Bush/Clinton warning is the current foreign policy of
the United States. So why is the United States not enforcing its own
policy and allowing the Albanians of Kosova to be slaughtered? It is
clear by his actions that Milosevic views the United States as a
``paper tiger,'' with sanctions and no action. This has been the case
for the past ten years.
Another key objective of our foreign policy is to preserve peace
and security in Europe. As stated in Article 39 of the UN Charter, a
threat to peace occurs, among other things, when civil strife within a
state creates an immediate danger of a breach of the peace, and it goes
on to say that civil strife constitutes a breach of the peace if
actually recognized by most states as belligerency. This is clearly the
case in Kosova.
The Greek Foreign Defense Minister recently stated that ``Kosova is
like a hand grenade, and if we pull the pin anymore, it will explode.''
Likewise, a spokesperson from the Turkish Foreign Ministry stated that
``the Kosova crisis, if unchecked, could destabilize the Balkan region
and therefore European security.'' Above all, NATO condemned the
excessive use of force by the Yugoslav army in Kosova, and said that
the North Atlantic Council is profoundly concerned about the
deterioration of the situation there and was considering ``possible
further means'' to maintaining stability, in view of the risk of
escalating the conflict in the region.
On April 27, a spokesperson from the U.S. State Department said
that if the Contact Group members did not agree to a new sanctions
package, the United States would act unilaterally. The United States
reiterated the UN and the Contact Group's call for the immediate
withdrawal of special police units from Kosova and the need for
unconditional dialogue. And yet when the Contact Group met in Rome on
April 29, the United States capitulated to a weak proposal for more
sanctions under pressure especially from Russia, which has gone out its
way not to support us in dealing with Iran, Iraq, and China
It is obvious that the sanctions are not really an issue to
Belgrade, which has already survived six years of tough economic
sanctions In the meantime, how many Kosovar Albanians will die while
the sanctions remain in effect? The Albanian American Civic League, for
which I am the volunteer president, contends that sanctions will have
no effect on the Belgrade regime whatsoever. They will only serve to
bolster nationalistic fervor on Milosevic's behalf. Only resolve will
work, and that will have to come from the only superpower left in the
world, the United States of America taking the lead with our NATO
allies.
In conclusion, the two million ethnic Albanians of Kosova, who
comprise more than 90 percent of the population there, have no human,
economic, or political rights of any kind. Slobodan Milosevic has
illegally and brutally occupied Kosova for almost ten years. (See
addendum for a short history of Kosova.) Kosova is where he started the
carnage that led to the rape and pillage in Bosnia1 and now will lead
to an even greater Balkan war if we do not act now.
It is time for our State Department to understand that loose talk
that brands the victims as ``terrorists'' for defending themselves,
their families, and their property only serves to give a green light to
the real terrorists, Milosevic and his henchmen, to massacre innocent
people.
It is time for the United States to stand up for its own principles
and demand compliance with international human rights conventions
before more Albanians are needlessly slaughtered and a new Balkan war
is triggered, this time involving neighboring Macedonia, Albania,
Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey.
It is time for congress to stand up and voice its outrage at a
foreign policy in the Balkans that has obviously failed to preserve
peace and security in this vital region of the world. It is time for
the United States to back up its tough words with concrete actions--
such as declaring a no-fly zone in Kosova, ringing Serbia's borders
with NATO troops, and moving an aircraft carrier off the coast of
Montenegro. These actions would not only reaffirm our resolve to stop
the escalation of the conflict in Kosova, but, I believe, would lead to
a lasting peace for the Albanian people and all ethnic groups in the
Balkans.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
ADDENDUM
Testimony of the Hon. Joseph J. DioGuardi
A History of Serbian ``Ethnic Cleansing'' of the Albianians in Kosova
SERBIAN ``ETHNIC CLEANSING'' OF ALBANIANS IN KOSOVA
Kosova lies in the south of former Yugoslavia, bordered by Serbia
proper to the northeast, Montenegro to the north, Macedonia to the
south, and Albania to the southwest. More than 90 percent of its 2
million people are Albanian, and most of the rest are Serbs. Albanians
also live in large numbers in all of the aforementioned areas bordering
Kosova: 1 million in Macedonia; 100,000 in Montenegro; 50,000 in Serbia
proper (Presheve, Medvegie, and Bujanovc); and 3.5 million in the State
of Albania--a divided nation of about 7 million people living side by
side.
THE KOSOVA PROBLEM SINCE WORLD WAR II
The 1946 Yugoslav constitution recognized the separate identity of
Kosova. At the same time, it divided Albanian-inhabited lands among
Serbia, Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro. In 1963, under the
influence of Serbian secret police boss Alexander Rankovic, Kosova was
incorporated as a commune in Serbia. After Rankovic's fall in 1974,
Kosova was reinstated as an autonomous province and given federal
representation equal to that of the six Yugoslav republics of Serbia,
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Montenegro.
Following Tito's death, persecution by Serbian government troops
ensued, which led to massive student uprisings in Kosova in 1981. The
Serbian police and troops killed at least twenty-two Albanians and
beat, wounded, and arrested thousands more. From 1981 to 1988, official
statistics confirm the arrest and jailing of more than 7,000 people and
the incredible figure of 586,000 Albanians (more than 25 percent of the
population) who passed through the hands of the police for one reason
or another.
Serbian determination to strip Kosova of its independence
accelerated the violence. In 1989, the Serbian authorities forcibly
abolished the autonomy of Kosova and sent Yugoslav tanks to patrol the
streets. Six days of rioting ensued, during which more than 100
Albanians were killed and more than 900 were arrested.
In April 1990, facing more demonstrations, Serbia passed a special
law extending prior emergency measures. The people of Kosova through
their Assembly responded on July 2 with a declaration of independence.
Three days later, Serbia suspended the Kosova Assembly, falsely
purporting that the Serbian minority in Kosova was being oppressed by
the Albanian majority. Serbia then seized some seventy-five
enterprises, including hospitals and energy plants. On September 7,
following a general strike, the Assembly met secretly, proclaimed
Kosova a Republic within the Yugoslav federation, and adopted a
constitution. By September 17, its 111 Albanian members had been
arrested or had fled into hiding or exile.
On September 28, 1990, Serbia adopted a new constitution that
completely eliminated Kosova's autonomy. As of mid-1991, the people of
Kosova held a referendum in which 87 percent of the population
participated, resulting in a 99 percent vote in favor of an independent
state. On October 19, 1991, based on this referendum, Kosova was
declared a sovereign, independent state and a transitional government
was formed. On May 24, 1992, the first multiparty elections for
parliament and president of the Republic of Kosova took place. On June
23, 1992, however, the Serbian police used armed vehicles to prevent
the seating of the newly-elected government in Kosova.
In the years that followed, life for the Albanian people of Kosova
deteriorated dramatically. In spite of their policy of peaceful
resistance, the barbaric treatment at the hands of the Serbian police,
paramilitary, and military forces persisted unchecked on a daily basis.
KOSOVA UNDER SERBIAN OCCUPATION
Serbian police have expelled nearly all Albanian physicians,
dismissed 7,000 students, prohibited the use of Albanian as a language
of instruction, closed the University of Prishtina, replaced Albanian
judges with Serbian jurists, and engaged in random beatings,
kidnappings, torture, house searches, and killing. The Serbian
government has shut down Albanian radio and television operations and
used its own media to promote anti-Albanian racism in the region.
Economic strangulation has been a key element of Serbia's takeover
of Kosova. ``Compulsory administration'' has been imposed on most of
Kosova's more than one hundred economic centers, resulting in the
collapse of Kosova's economy. More than 75,000 Albanian families are
unemployed. It is estimated that close to half a million Albanians are
suffering from food shortages, and there is a very real danger of
widespread starvation. Many analysts believe that the Serbian
government is trying to bring the Albanian population to its knees
through hunger.
With no real recognition and intervention by the international
community to prevent the daily brutality inflicted on innocent
civilians, Albanians had no choice but to resort to the self defense of
their families, neighbors, property, and communities. The ill equipped
Kosova Liberation Army emerged from this struggle to survive and it has
declared itself as a defense force with no terrorist aims. The most
recent events in Kosova, from February 28 to March 8, 1998 in the
Drenica region, including the villages of Prekaz, Voynich, Llausha, and
Likosan clearly demonstrate what has been feared all along; namely that
the atrocities the world witnessed in Bosnia will be repeated in Kosova
and will result in a completely lopsided conflict in which the unarmed
civilian population of Kosova is massacred. A full-scale civil war is
certain to involve the larger Albanian population of Macedonia,
Montenegro, southern Serbia, and Albania, and this would make the
nightmare of a second genocidal war in Europe in this century a
reality.
CONCLUSION
The Albanian American Civic league believes that the West must play
an immediate role in stopping the Serbian assault on Albanian villages,
which has as its aim the ``ethnic cleansing'' of the Albanians of
Kosova. Because of the importance of the Balkans to our national
security, President Clinton had already dispatched some three hundred
American troops to neighboring Macedonia as observers, and we have
committed a substantial contingent of American soldiers in Bosnia. With
the recent, tragic Serbian assault on Kosova, it is now time to take
strong measures to prevent further bloodshed.
President Bush on his way out of office and President Clinton on
assuming office clearly put Slobodan Milosevic on notice that ``a line
had been drawn in the sand on Kosova.'' President Clinton should now
make good on this foreign policy declaration by implementing a swift
and powerful counter stroke against any further aggression against the
Albanians in Kosova.
Senator Smith. Thank you, gentlemen, all of you.
I must confess, I am uncertain as to what the policy of the
administration is in terms of a Christmas message, and what, if
anything, we are doing to prepare to enforce such a policy. I
hope to find out some answers myself on that, whether private
or otherwise.
But the Congressman has laid out some specific proposals,
that we declare a no-fly zone, ring the area with NATO troops
and park an aircraft carrier off the coast. I wonder if either
of you two would care to comment on that, how long it would be,
how effective it would be, and whether we ought to be doing it
unilaterally or involving all of NATO, and what spillover there
might be toward the peacekeeping in Bosnia.
Mr. Hooper. Senator, I think the only way to--there is a
lot of dissention now within NATO, and I think that is because
the United States, the Clinton administration has been
unwilling to exercise proper leadership on this issue.
What I think we are advocating, and what Congressman
DioGuardi is advocating, is conflict prevention, the kind of
military measures that are credible enough to prevent the kind
of conflict that will require even greater military measures,
greater risk, greater burdens, or the more disastrous
consequence if we do not act.
Senator Smith. Are these proposals adequate?
Mr. Hooper. I think some of them are, but I think it has to
go further. Certainly NATO has to be involved, and the only way
to involve the allies behind our leadership is to say that we
are prepared to act unilaterally. Once we do that we can be
sure they will be with us.
I think these proposals are some, but we need to also get
the tribunal involved to ensure that serious markers are put
down on war crimes, and we need to ensure that there is a
conflict prevention force, a NATO observation mission in Kosovo
itself so that it is not just ringed around Serbia and then
genocide could be allowed to take place within it, but that it
is prevented within Serbia as well, and Kosovo.
Senator Smith. Do you believe, Mr. Fox, anything short of
that may lead us to holding a hearing here, say, in 5 or 6
years, after lots of bloodshed, and trying to rally support for
a NATO peacekeeping force to expand into that area?
Mr. Fox. I think that the fuse on this one is very short,
that without an enhanced Christmas warning which backs a U.S.-
led mediation for an interim settlement, we will not see much.
We have a window now which is rapidly closing and may have
already closed, and the cardinal error of this administration
on Kosovo was to let go, to allow the Christmas warning to
erode.
It was really a reckless decision, one that needs, I think,
much more examination, and there has certainly been an
extremely active debate about it in the administration. Some of
the positions that are reflected here today I think are well-
reflected within the administration. They are obviously not
prevailing.
If the U.S. is not prepared to match with that level of
force the calculus of its national interest that was rendered
by Brent Scowcroft, by senior leadership of the Bush
administration and the first Clinton administration which
certainly some very clear exponents of Clinton foreign policy
have endorsed, then we are really in the soup and we will see,
surely, a much larger U.S. ground intervention later on to sort
out the fighting outside of Kosovo.
The problem with some of the measures that are being
considered, even on the margins, are in fact--I fear they would
send another wrong signal of isolating Kosovo and respecting
this issue as an internal matter.
The Helsinki Accord should not be rewritten ad hoc by the
U.S., of all countries. The Helsinki Accord is quite clear, as
are our other international covenants, that the territorial
integrity of a country, the respect for territorial integrity
of a country in Europe goes hand-in-hand with its adherence to
European standards, and that would certainly mean no use of
brutal force, certainly not ethnic cleansing against its
minorities.
Senator Smith. The Congressman has raised the issue of the
overlay of Russia's influence on Serbia or alliance with
Serbia. I wonder if either of you have a comment on that. How
does that impact American action?
Mr. Fox. I think the refusal of the administration to take
this to NATO has quite a bit to do with that fact, and in fact
I think some of our European allies are putting a higher
priority on keeping Russia as part of a lowest common
denominator diplomatic effort than they are to really facing up
to the fundamentals here.
Russia has not been friendly to peaceful outcomes in the
Balkans, and the Southern Balkans. I think it would be better
for the administration to question why Russia insists on
collecting war criminals and pariahs as its clients at this
late date, and why they cannot find some other Serbs to ally
themselves with.
There is as difference between a pro-Serb policy and a pro-
Serbs policy. There are a lot of Serbs, a lot of moderate
Serbs. There is not just one Serb, or one handful of Serbs, and
I think a good deal could be done to remind Moscow of that.
I think it would be more credible still if the U.S. had a
record of supporting democratic forces in the former
Yugoslavia, which it decidedly does not. We tend to take it as
it lays, and then wonder why there is no Lech Walesa or Vaclav
Havel.
Senator Smith. Mr. Hooper, do you have any comment?
Mr. Hooper. I think Milosevic has successfully tapped in to
the ultranationalist political tendencies in Russia and used
these very effectively to build support, because there is no
good democratic reason for Russia to support what he is doing.
In fact, quite to the contrary. It was against Yeltsin's
democratic instincts, and I think it shows how effective
Milosevic has been.
I certainly believe that the only way--that peace and
stability in the Balkans are not going to be safe and secure
until there is democracy in Belgrade. That is the key. That is
the bottom line.
The only way you get there from here is by setting the
ground rules, which the U.S. would have to do a credible threat
of force to ensure that this does not get any worse, and then
start working back until we have the kind of Government there
that will check the kind of, I think virulent ultranationalism
that we have seen in Belgrade that produces what we have seen,
not what we are seeing in Kosovo and what we have already seen
in Croatia and Bosnia.
Kosovo was implicit in what Milosevic did in Bosnia and
Croatia. We are now just seeing it become explicit.
Senator Smith. Thank you, gentlemen.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Gentlemen, welcome again.
As Mr. Hooper and Mr. Fox remember, we have had discussions
before, and I do not disagree with anything you have said about
democracy in Belgrade is the ultimate requirement to have peace
in the Balkans, but it seems to me we have a little bit of a
selective memory here.
My recollection of the Christmas warning, which I happened
to support, was that that warning was given at the very time
when the administration wanted to leave, the Bush
administration refused to do anything about the situation in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and when they were supporting, when the
Secretary of State said there was nothing we can do, and when
there was the easiest call to make because the least was
happening.
So I find this a little bit fascinating, the bashing that
is going on right now, but I happen to share your ultimate
view, as long as you all acknowledge that the previous
administration created the circumstance that allowed all of
this to take place.
You all make it sound like there was this Bush
administration that came along and stood firm and was there,
and while rape camps were set up, while tens of thousands of
people were being massacred, while the proportions of the
atrocities exceeded, not in kind but in number, by fiftyfold
what is going on here, and we stood by and said, ah, do not
move in Kosovo, but cross an international border, take the
whole JNA over there, go ahead and blow everyone away over
there--no problem. No warning, nothing. Remember that part?
Mr. Hooper. Senator, I want to assure you that if I can
speak for Mr. Fox here with me I think you are looking at the
two people who were the most active.
Senator Biden. You are looking at the one person who was
the most active up here, so I mildly resent----
Mr. Hooper. This administration's inaction, and when we
were still in the State Department----
Senator Biden. I remember. I just wanted to set the stage
here.
Mr. Fox. Senator, may I just say, I think the Christmas
warning may be the only thing the Bush administration did right
in the Balkans.
Senator Biden. Cynical me thought it was done because it
was the only one they thought they were not going to have to
exercise any force on at the time, but that is just--I have
been here too long. I am mildly cynical, based on everything
else that was not done.
Mr. DioGuardi. Senator, just to weigh in on that point,
because I was a Republican Congressman and very critical.
Senator Biden. I always thought you were a Democrat.
Mr. DioGuardi. But I would tell you that I was very
critical of the Bush administration. In fact, in my testimony,
which I did not read because I gave it for the record, I cited
an article 6 years ago by Patrick Glynn, Yugoblunder, where he
said the U.S. handling of the Yugoslav crisis is in fact a case
study in how not to conduct foreign policy in the post cold
war, combining a lack of intellectual rigor, carelessness, with
what then, Senator--and let me give a little plug--Al Gore
termed moral obtuseness about the conflicts and issues at
stake.
The main factor in the Bush administration's mishandling of
Yugoslavia was its devotion to geopolitical stability at the
expense of democratic values and human rights.
Senator Biden. I do not want to refight that political war,
but I want to sort of set the stage here a little bit for about
how, not the atrocities that are occurring, but the
circumstances are different.
It does not necessarily bring about a result different from
what you all are suggesting, but I want to make sure that we
know what we are talking about here, OK, or that I know what I
am talking about. You all know what you are talking about. I
want to make sure that I know what I am talking about and that
I know what you are talking about.
Now, this notion that the only solution now is to do
something we are having trouble even maintaining doing now, I
do not know if you remember, guys, we could not get anybody to
do anything, including half the Democrats, on Bosnia. Remember
that part? Have you got that part? Remember? And we are hanging
on by our fingernails in terms of support for the maintenance
of U.S. forces.
There is a resolution introduced today by Senator Hutchison
and Senator Byrd demanding and requiring--not a resolution, a
piece of legislation. I have not seen it. I was just told about
it by my staff--saying that American forces had to be drawn
down to no more than 2,500 by the year 2001, or 2000.
I mean, we are still fighting like hell just to keep--I
mean, I am on the floor or in the caucus or in a Senator's
office literally every week pleading the case, shuttling
basically back to Bosnia to make the case, progress is being
made, so the context in which this is all taking place now is
not different--well, it is different, but it is a totally
changed circumstance.
Now, here is what the proposals are. You are suggesting--
the suggestion is that the only reason NATO is not moving, or
we are not moving on NATO, is because of Russia. Well, the
Italians and the Greeks own a telecommunications system there.
You guys know this. I do not know why you do not say it. The
French are the French--you understand that part better than I
do--and the Germans are reluctant to move, ever, as it relates
to anything having to do with Serbia.
So we talk about all we have got to do is say, by the way,
NATO, we are going and they will follow. Well, you may be
right. You may be right, but I am not so sure that is right,
number 1.
Number 2, with regard to blaming the victims, I am not
blaming the victims. What I am trying to get straight here is
what this negotiation is supposed to be about and what we are
demanding of Milosevic.
It is real important, it seems to me, when we make a demand
we know what it is, and what is the demand? The demand first
and foremost is, is stop the atrocities. Nobody disagrees with
that.
The second demand is, at a minimum, at a minimum allow some
autonomy, at a minimum. But at a maximum, what are we asking
for? What should we impose? I mean, you have both said that
this notion of negotiation and repeating the Contact Group
involvement, all of those is just replaying all the wasted
years in Bosnia before we finally got to a point where at least
the atrocities have stopped, if not ratification of the
cleansing having occurred.
But what is it--you had a chance, as I have in the past,
and will probably never get it again in the light of my
attitude toward the man, but what do you say to Milosevic? What
is the bottom line we demand? Big nations cannot bluff. What is
the bottom line?
I asked Mr. Hooper and Mr. Fox. I know what the bottom line
is, but I will ask you as well, Congressman, because--anyway, I
will ask you.
Mr. Hooper. You start off with autonomy and work through
negotiations to autonomy plus. I think there are a variety of
solutions. One might well be Kosovo becoming a third republic
in the Federation with an equal level, or equal to a Serbia and
Montenegro. I think that would be an acceptable outcome to the
Kosovars. I believe that.
I think there are other outcomes that are possible as well.
The best single way to restore the loyalty of the Kosovar
Albanians to the Serbian State I believe is through democracy
in Belgrade. If you had that, our problems would be over, the
kind of conflict prevention we are talking about.
Senator Biden. You and I both know Belgrade well, and I am
being presumptuous in suggesting I know it well as well. We
both know it well.
I have been searching for that democratic middle in Serbia
for a whole hell of a long time. Do you want to give me any
names? Do you want to give me any ideas? You talk about who to
support. I have made visits. I have met with all of the
dissidents.
One of the most destabilizing--how can I say it? That is
the wrong word--most disappointing things was, I found that at
least half the opposition was more rabid nationalist than our
boy Milosevic was, so do you want to tell me--I mean, I am
looking here. I am all for it. Find me--show me--identify me--I
will go visit, literally--not figuratively, literally.
I met with 120 dissidents, quote-unquote, opponents to
Milosevic, went in a room with 60 or so in one room. I started
talking. They looked at me like, no, no, no, you got this all
wrong. We are more Serbian than Milosevic. They were literally,
literally, literally critical of Milosevic for being too
accommodating.
So I am desperately seeking Susan, OK, desperately looking.
The State Department is desperately looking. The West is
desperately looking. Have you got any ideas for me?
Mr. Hooper. Senator, they were not looking last year, and I
think that is----
Senator Biden. Forget them. I am looking now. Who do you
have in mind?
Mr. Hooper. Well, I would start with Vesna Pesic and Zoran
Djindjic.
Now, I realize these are leaders of two of the democratic
parties. They are democrats. I am not talking about the kind of
opposition ultranationalists who tried to trump Milosevic from
the other side, but essentially we are going to have to start
with people like that and buildup.
This is not going to be something that is going to be done
in 3 weeks, or 3 months. I do not know how long it will take.
But we are not going to find that--we are not going to be
able to tap into that democratic energy which I think is there
in Serbia until we decide whether to we are prepared to look
past Milosevic and start working with these people.
Senator Biden. Well, again, I am taking too much of the
chairman's time here, and I know we have got to go, but I would
really like to meet with each of you together or individually
to pursue this, because it has been something I have been
trying to seek in earnest here, and it is a very--as you well
know, if it is to be found, if it exists, the likelihood of it
being developed as a reasonable alternative--and I was just
pointing out that one of the two people you named boycotted the
election, the last election, and he lost all of his influence
when he did it, but it may change.
But the bottom line is this. It is worth the effort. We
should be pursuing it. I fully agree with you. I just think
time--you just said the fuse is short. I see no ability to
generate and produce that kind of indigenous democratic
initiative that coincides with the timeframe that is left on
the fuse.
A last question I will ask, and this idea of engaging NATO
and getting NATO involved, I think I have no hesitancy, and
have had none for 6 years now, of suggesting the United States
unilaterally suggest and promise and deliver on the use of
force. That is not anything I have any trouble with.
Here is the problem I have, the idea of thinking that you
are going to be able to negotiate, even with that kind of
commitment on the part of the United States, a NATO force that
is going to circle--the phrase used by two of you, I believe
the Congressman--well, maybe it is the Congressman. I am not
sure--that to circle Serbia, that means we are going to place
NATO troops in Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania--lots of
luck, seeing that happen.
I think we have a moral obligation to have some consonance
between what we suggest and the possibility of it ever
happening, and you may get NATO to conclude that it is worth
sending an observer force in. You may get NATO--I think that is
a stretch. You may get NATO to be able to do a number of
things, but to get that to happen I think is not a sound,
Were I in the State Department and you were present, I
suggested that to you, you would say, Joe, go back and get me
another solution. You know it, I know it, we all know it, and I
do not think it is responsible for us to suggest that as
something that we can or is likely to happen.
So here is my question, and this is to you, Congressman.
Is, in terms of where you think--if you have to pick a horse
here, do you suggest that we, the United States, use all our
influence and whatever force we are wiling to use to deal with
and promote and support the Democratic League of Kosovo, or the
Kosovo Liberation Army, because right now they are not in
tandem.
Mr. DioGuardi. Why don't we make the question more simple.
Why don't we look at international law, look at a population of
2 million people that is being brutalized every day----
Senator Biden. Because we have to look at reality.
Mr. DioGuardi. But you raise the issue when you asked where
is the ``George Washington'' that democratic leader we want to
find in Belgrade so we can solve the problem?
We may have to wait a long time to find him or her, but, in
the meantime, we cannot let the Albanian people be brutalized
and killed every day. I think there are things we have to do
right now. We have to face Slobodan Milosevic in the eye, as we
did in Bosnia, and say, get every one of those VJ army troops
out of Kosovo and, if you do not do it, we are going to take
some tough action.
Senator Biden. What action? Are we going to use physical
force?
Mr. DioGuardi. The argument that you made before is the
same argument that I heard from Bob Torricelli and Senator
McCain back in 1993, on the McLaughlin show. They were saying
the same thing. But, we did something, did we not? We waited 3
years, but sooner or later we got resolve, and we said
something had to be done. Why is this any different?
Senator Biden. Well, no, it is different--well, it is not
different. I just want to know what you suggest, because back
then, when I was in your position, I was suggesting we bomb
Belgrade. I was suggesting that we send American pilots in and
blow up all of the bridges on the Drina. I was suggesting we
take out his oil supplies. I was suggesting very specific
action.
Mr. DioGuardi. And isn't it interesting, we did not have to
go that far to begin the solution in Bosnia.
Senator Biden. And isn't it interesting that about 200,000
people were killed in the meantime by the time they did.
Mr. DioGuardi. Yes, and that is going to happen in Kosova
if we do not act now.
Senator Biden. That is why I want to know what you are
suggesting now.
Mr. DioGuardi. What we have to do right now is to enforce
international law. We have war criminals in Belgrade. We are
dealing with one right now.
I referred to that article before. I have a copy of it
right here. It was in the Gannett papers on Sunday. it shows
Slobodan Milosevic side-by-side Mr. Karadzic who has now got a
book coming out pointing the finger at him for all those
atrocities in Bosnia. Why are we not picking him up?
Senator Biden. Because the French let him walk around. That
is why.
Mr. DioGuardi. It seems to me that we have a double
standard here. If we are going to be the great United States of
America, standing up for oppressed people, and I believe we can
do that without sending military all over the world, let us
pick up the war criminals in Belgrade. We know who they are. We
know where they are.
Number 2, let us tell Mr. Milosevic, get every army troop
out of there--you know why? It is not just because we want him
to or because we like it. He is now on the brink of creating a
Balkan war.
You know the problems we have between Greece and Turkey.
You know how fragile Macedonia is. You know that we right now
have 600 troops on the border in Macedonia. What are we waiting
for?
If Milosevic keeps doing this, all he is doing is raising
the temperature and, as the Greek foreign minister said, the
hand grenade will explode and the Balkans will explode. We have
no choice. Let us do something now, rather than have to do 20
times more later on.
Senator Biden. I agree with you. I think there is a number
of things we can do. I think some of them, the things suggested
here today are totally unrealistic of what we are likely to do,
but I think there are a number of things we can do, and
starting with the Christmas warning.
I also think you have all helped to make the case. You say,
let us get NATO in. What do you think is going to happen in the
little vote to put NATO troops in Albania when Greece and
Turkey vote? What do you think, huh?
I want to be there at that meeting when you guys and your
diplomatic skills bring the Greeks and the Turks together on a
uniform vote.
We do have this little thing, in this little outfit called
NATO called consensus. You do not get them all, you do not get
any of them, you know. That is kind of the NATO thing.
Mr. DioGuardi. Senator, what happened then at the last
minute when we decided to do something to solve the situation
in Bosnia? Didn't we learn from that experience?
Senator Biden. There was less of an interest that they each
had there than there is ``inside Serbia.''
Mr. Fox. If I may, Senator, I think that this may be one of
the last moments that the membership in NATO has a convergent
interest on Kosovo, and that if this goes much further, that is
when the interests begin to diverge, and that is one of the
things that makes this so gravely dangerous.
I think the potential for the Kosovo conflict to split NATO
in a way that Bosnia even did not manage and, in fact, to drive
a major wedge in, transatlantically and within Europe, both
within and outside of NATO, is profound, and that is one of the
reasons that I believe we have to reverse-engineer this issue
from the point of saying, Strobe Talbott is right. I praise
Strobe Talbott for his analysis.
There are others in the administration who are right, who
understand this every bit as well as anybody in this room, I
would say, doubtless better for what they know additionally.
If we believe that it is an unacceptable outcome to have a
fourth Balkan war that draws in first Macedonia, Albania--I
happen in fact not to think that the Cordon Sanitaire makes any
sense, to be honest. I think it is a marginal measure, and it
is distracting, and it is impractical and all the rest, but I
would much rather invest in a postnegotiation guarantee inside
Kosovo.
But if we believe that this is an unacceptable outcome,
which I think we are all saying and I think we do agree, we
certainly agree with you, then we must do the necessary
measures to ensure that mediation takes place and we stop
dancing around with closing bank accounts in Cyprus and we get
to the heart of the matter.
The U.S.--I want to say it again. The U.S. under two
administrations, and I think both administrations were serious
about this and were considered about this. Certainly Belgrade
took it seriously, and I think the Kosovo Albanians took it
seriously, and the neighbors took it seriously.
These two administrations made a calculation that this was
such a profound interest of the U.S., a vital national security
interest, as Secretary Talbott says, that we were prepared to
act unilaterally. No United Nations, no OSCE, no Europeans, no
NATO. We were prepared to act unilaterally if necessary.
That is the beginning of wisdom, to get a baseline on
Kosovo, to get a grip on the Kosovo crisis rapidly, and it has
to start, as ever, in the Oval Office, and I think if that does
not happen, and if it does not happen fairly quickly, there
will be a disastrous legacy for this administration and for
NATO that will really make Bosnia look like the warm-up, Bosnia
pre-1995.
Senator Smith. Mr. Fox, I think we are going to need to
leave you with the last word on it.
The purpose of calling this hearing was simply to focus the
debate and to get some minds to working, and the part of the
role of the U.S. Senate is advising, not just consenting, and
hopefully we have the attention of our Government and we can
stimulate some resolve.
So we thank you all for participating, and with that we are
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
U.S. POLICY IN KOSOVO
----------
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 24, 1998
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:20 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Gordon H.
Smith, [chairman of the subcommittee], presiding.
Present: Senators Smith, Coverdell, Biden, and Dodd.
Senator Smith. We welcome you, ladies and gentlemen, to
this hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
European Affairs.
I have a statement that I will not read in the interests of
time out of respect for our witnesses, who we are anxious to
hear, but needless to say, this hearing on Kosovo is timely and
important, as this country begins to define what its response
will be in the face of a holocaust in our times, whether or not
we are going to respond too late, too little, at the expense of
much treasure and human life, or we are going to do something
affirmative now to try and restore civility and human decency.
That is really the issue confronting our country and our
alliance, and NATO, and with our allies.
I apologize to our witnesses for our delay in starting. No
one knows better than Senator Dole how votes get in the way of
hearings. Senator D'Amato knows that very well, too.
As Senator Coverdell has now joined us, and the Ranking
Member, Senator Biden, with your permission we will hear from
our witnesses, who are under a time schedule, and Senator
D'Amato will go first.
Senator, we welcome you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Senator Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Gordon H. Smith
The Foreign Relations Committee is meeting today to discuss the
ongoing crisis in Kosovo. We are fortunate to have with us two
individuals who have a wealth of knowledge and experience in this area:
former Majority Leader Bob Dole, who currently is serving as Chairman
of the International Commission on Missing Persons in the Former
Yugoslavia; and Ambassador Morton Abramowitz, who is a Board Member of
the International Crisis Group, a non-governmental organization that
has been active in the Balkans for over two years.
The European Subcommittee met seven weeks ago on this same subject
and heard from the Clinton Administration's representative on the
Balkans, Ambassador Robert Gelbard, as well as from three witnesses
from the private sector. Unfortunately, as we all have seen, the
situation in Kosovo has deteriorated since our last meeting. Mr.
Milosevic continues to ignore the demands of the international
community to withdraw his security forces from Kosovo; he makes
promises he has no intention of keeping; and he shows no indication
that he is serious about negotiating with the Kosovar Albanians. For
their part, the Kosovo Liberation Army is gaining strength and
influence in their effort to achieve an independent Kosovo, a
development that may make negotiating a peaceful settlement to the
conflict more challenging.
I am afraid that Mr. Milosevic does not respond to economic
sanctions or to measures such as freezing his government's foreign
assets and limiting new investment in Serbia. He understands one thing
only: the threat of and the use of force. I ask our witnesses--is it
time for the United States to use force against Serbia? Considering our
track record with Mr. Milosevic, can we convince him that we are
serious when we threaten such action? Do we have any other options but
to use force? Have we done enough to try to undermine the dictatorship
of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia? Whatever we decide, I want to make one
thing clear: the United States must act with or without the stamp of
approval from the United Nations Security Council.
The United States must not stand by and watch another massacre of
innocent civilians at the hands of Slobodan Milosevic.
I look forward to hearing from both of our witnesses this afternoon
and appreciate their willingness to discuss these issues with members
of the Committee.
STATEMENT OF HON. ALFONSE D'AMATO, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF NEW YORK
Senator D'Amato. Mr. Chairman, first of all, let me begin
by thanking you and our distinguished Ranking Member for
providing us with the opportunity to speak about Kosovo, and
certainly to be here with our colleague and former leader and
great Senator and great fighter for human rights. Senator Dole
is a double treat, and an honor.
Mr. Chairman, today I introduced in the Senate a resolution
stating that the United States has probable cause to believe
that Slobodan Milosevic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
has committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide, and that he should be publicly indicted by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
Indeed, I am sorry that we even assign to him the title of
president.
I think that it is incomprehensible and indeed, I am sorry
that in the resolution we refer to him in that manner, but that
is only for purposes of identification, because, Mr. Chairman,
I cannot think of a worse person--you have to really stretch--
who has created more harm, more destruction to more human lives
than Milosevic. It is difficult in this era, and he certainly
ranks with the Pol Pots of the world.
We will be seeking cosponsors for this resolution and I
would hope that we could get a unanimous vote and sponsorship
that would include all of the Members of the Senate and adopt
this in the near future.
Milosevic is the proximate cause for the trouble in Kosovo.
It was his political ambition to create a greater Serbia. He
fanned the smoldering embers of ethnic hatred into a
conflagration in Bosnia that killed and wounded hundreds of
thousands of people and displaced millions, millions of people.
I mean, it is hard to believe in this era, in this day and age,
in that area of the world, that we would allow that to take
place. He rode the groundswell of hatred into political power
and then distanced himself from the ultranationalists whose
help he used.
And since then, a coalition of opponents known as Together
has held great street demonstrations in Belgrade attempting to
force his resignation. Milosevic's party lost important local
elections across Serbia, and to stem this tide of opposition he
has now moved back toward the ultranationalists he once
abandoned and denied the Kosovar Albanian majority any relief
from the oppressive police State that he has established.
Milosevic apparently hoped that these actions would trigger
a violent response from the Kosovar Albanian majority, one he
could use to once again divide and suppress his domestic
opposition.
Well, he has got what he wanted, and he is using ethnic
hatred against the Kosovar Albanian majority to shore up his
domestic power base. So far, the United States has treated him
as the indispensable person, a terrible policy, a policy
fraught with nothing but bringing about contempt for anything
other than real power, the one key player without whom there
could be peace in Bosnia, and now without whom there cannot be
a peaceful settlement in Kosovo.
We have talked with him over and over. We have accorded him
the courtesies due a head of State, unfortunately.
Mr. Chairman, it is time to recognize who and what he is,
to make clear to the world that we hold him personally
responsible for the conflict in the Balkans. It is time to end
impunity for Milosevic.
My resolution calls upon the United States to turn over to
the International Criminal Tribunal all of the information we
possess that could serve as evidence against Milosevic, to work
with our allies to cause them to do the same and, once
Milosevic is indicted, to work to secure his apprehension and
his trial by the tribunal.
There is a considerable body of evidence on the public
record about Milosevic's role in first the Bosnian and now the
Kosovo conflicts. It has been collected and analyzed by
international legal experts, and in their opinion there is
enough evidence already to support a public indictment by the
tribunal, but there is also reason to believe that Governments
concerned with the Balkan conflicts have still more information
that, despite their obligation to support the International
Criminal Tribunal, they have not yet made available to that
tribunal.
I believe the United States should carefully review all of
the information we have and turn over absolutely every bit of
that evidence which they now possess and seek his indictment as
a killer. We must provide all that information. We should not
compromise intelligence sources, obviously, but we can and do
have credible evidence that will establish that he has been
part and parcel of the genocide that is taking place right now.
Action by the tribunal would signal to all participants in
the conflict that no one is above the law, not even Milosevic.
Mr. Chairman, we have to stand up and do what is right.
Once Milosevic is publicly indicted, the States that have
blocked or slowed necessary action to solve the Kosovo conflict
could not stand by him. Just as Karadzic and Mladic are now out
of power and in hiding, living on borrowed time, Milosevic
himself could not maintain his position of political power for
very long.
There is evidence that the democratic opposition in Serbia
that has so effectively been divided and suppressed is once
again rising. An indictment, especially one quickly followed by
the tribunal so-called superindictment process, at which
prosecutors publicly present the evidence supporting the
indictment to the tribunal, would undermine whatever
international legitimacy he still has.
The time has come for the Senate of the United States to
encourage this Nation to take the lead in this effort.
Milosevic should be publicly branded the war criminal we know
he is, and now this vital step would help save lives. It would
help stop the further ethnic cleansing and would strike a blow
for democracy. It is, I believe, the best way for us to
proceed, and I believe we have an obligation to come together
and to call the situation as it is.
Mr. Chairman, we look forward to your leadership and that
of the committee in helping us obtain a peaceful resolution,
and I believe this is one of the ways in which we can do that.
[The prepared statement of Senator D'Amato follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Alfonse D'Amato
Mr. Chairman:
I want to begin by thanking you and the distinguished Ranking
Member for providing me with this opportunity to speak about Kosovo. I
will not take much of your time, but I want to tell you about an
initiative I began earlier today and ask you to support it.
Today, I introduced in the Senate a resolution stating that the
United States has probable cause to believe that Slobodan Milosevic of
the rump Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has committed war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and genocide, and should be publicly indicted
by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. I am
seeking cosponsors for this resolution and I hope the Senate will adopt
it unanimously in the near future.
Milosevic is the proximate cause for the trouble in Kosovo. It was
his political ambition to create a ``Greater Serbia.'' He fanned the
smoldering embers of ethnic hatred into a conflagration in Bosnia that
killed and wounded hundreds of thousands of people and displaced
millions. He rode the ground swell of hatred into political power, and
then distanced himself from the ultra-nationalists whose help he used.
Since then, a coalition of opponents known as ``Together'' held
great street demonstrations in Belgrade, attempting to force his
resignation. And Milosevic's party lost important local elections
across Serbia. To stem this tide of opposition, he has now moved back
toward the ultra-nationalists he'd once abandoned, and denied to the
Kosovar Albanian majority any relief from the oppressive police state
he established there.
Milosevic apparently hoped that these actions would trigger a
violent response from the Kosovar Albanian majority, one he could use
to once again divide and suppress his domestic opposition. He got what
he wanted, and he's using ethnic hatred against the Kosovar Albanian
majority to shore up his domestic power base in Serbia.
So far, the United States has treated him as the ``indispensable
person,'' the one key player without whom there could not be peace in
Bosnia, and now, without whom there cannot be a peaceful settlement in
Kosovo. We have talked with him over and over again, according him the
courtesies due a head of state.
Mr. Chairman, it is time to recognize who and what he is, and to
make clear to the world that we hold him personally responsible for the
conflict in the Balkans. It is time to end impunity for Slobodan
Milosevic.
My resolution calls upon the United States to turn over to the
International Criminal Tribunal all of the information we possess that
could serve as evidence against Milosevic, to work with our allies to
cause them to do the same thing, and once Milosevic is indicted, to
work to secure his apprehension and trial by the Tribunal.
There is a considerable body of evidence on the public record about
Milosevic's role in first the Bosnian and now the Kosovo conflicts. It
has been collected and analyzed by international legal experts. In
their opinion, there is enough evidence already to support a public
indictment by the Tribunal. But there is also reason to believe that
governments concerned with the Balkan conflict have still more
information that, despite their obligation to support the International
Criminal Tribunal, they have not yet made available to the Tribunal.
I want the United States to carefully review all of the information
we have and turn over absolutely every bit of evidence that we have
that Milosevic is a killer. We must provide all of the information we
can without compromising intelligence sources and methods vital to the
safety of our troops and our own operations.
Action by the Tribunal would signal to all participants in the
conflict that no one is above the law, not even Milosevic.
Mr. Chairman, we have to stand up and do what's right. Once
Milosevic is publicly indicted, the states that have blocked or slowed
necessary action to solve the Kosovo conflict could not stand by him.
Just as Karadzic and Mladic are now out of power and in hiding, living
on borrowed time, Milosevic himself could not maintain his position of
political power for very long. There is evidence that the democratic
opposition in Serbia that he so effectively has divided and suppressed
is once again rising. An indictment, especially one quickly followed by
the Tribunal's so-called ``super indictment process,'' at which
prosecutors publicly present the evidence supporting the indictment to
the Tribunal, would undermine whatever international legitimacy
Milosevic still has.
The time has come for the Senate to encourage the United States to
take the lead in this effort. Milosevic should be publicly branded the
war criminal we know he is, and soon. This vital step would help save
Kosovo from further ethic cleansing and would strike a blow for a
democratic future for Serbia itself.
Thank you.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Senator D'Amato. We certainly
share your feeling of urgency. This committee met 7 weeks ago
on this issue, and the situation has only deteriorated since
that time.
We are very appreciative that Senator Dole and Ambassador
Abramowitz would take their time to join with us to discuss
this issue and their views of it. Both know the issue well, and
specifically the former Majority Leader, who is currently
serving as chairman of the International Commission on Missing
Persons in the former Yugoslavia, can speak to this issue from
first-hand experience.
Senator Dole, we thank you for being here, and we invite
your testimony.
Senator D'Amato. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Senator D'Amato.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT DOLE, CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION ON MISSING PERSONS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
WASHINGTON, DC
Senator Dole. I want to thank my former colleagues. Let me
say first, I am here as a volunteer. I am not retained by
anybody.
I am here because I believe in this issue, just as Senator
Biden and Senator Coverdell did when I was in the Senate, and I
really believe that had not the Senate persisted a few years
ago we would not have had the Dayton Accords. We would not have
what we have now in Bosnia, and I really believe it is going to
take the same determination by Members of the Senate of both
parties in a bipartisan way to get some meaningful action now,
and it is an honor to be here.
I certainly share the views expressed by my colleague,
Senator D'Amato. He has been there. In fact, he went with me
one time. We had trouble getting in, as I recall.
But 3 years after we have had the Dayton Accords, we have
got the same trouble again with Milosevic, and I know
Ambassador Holbrooke is making every effort to send him a
message. In fact, today, I think, I read on the wire Holbrooke
met with some of the KLA rebels, and he said in effect these
people are beleaguered. They do not have supplies. That is the
case in Kosovo. They do not have the supplies and they are
beleaguered.
But we saw what happened--I remember Haris Silajdzic came
to my office before anything even started in Bosnia and he sat
in the Leader's office and he told me, unless something was
done, A, B, C, D, and E would happen, thousands of people would
be killed, innocent women and children, he gave me a forecast
that was almost perfect, if we did not step in and do
something, not just us but NATO and Europe.
So we have seen what happened. We have seen how many
refugees are still trying to find a way back home, whether it
is Croatia or Serbia or Bosnia, mostly in Bosnia.
I happened to be--I have agreed with President Clinton to
be Chairman of the International Commission on Missing Persons.
There are about 20 to 30,000 people who just disappeared in
Bosnia; 82 percent are Bosniaks. They are men between the ages
of 10 and 70. They were taken from their homes. They were
starved and tortured and executed and dumped into mass graves.
And whenever I go there--and I have been there three times,
we will be going again in July, or August--we meet with the
mothers. And, we all know what the trauma was, for the mothers,
after Vietnam in the United States, and I remember specifically
meeting with a mother in Zagreb, Croatia, because all the
mothers had little buttons, and they had pictures of their
sons, missing sons. And most of these women are peasant women.
They are not well-educated. That is all they have. They do not
have any material goods. All they had were their children,
their sons in this case.
I remember coming around to the lady and asking her to tell
her story, and she had a button with four pictures, all of her
sons, taken from their home. She believes they still could be
alive. I think it is highly doubtful.
But like any other mother, she would like us, in our
capacity in trying to locate and identify missing persons'
remains--really, they are not bodies, but remains, so she can
end her grief. So she can bring some kind of closure to this
particular tragedy, that was started by Milosevic. We do not
want to forget where it started.
I used to fuss at the Bush administration because I thought
they sort of gave, maybe not a green light, but it was at least
proceed with caution, but proceed. They did not discourage
Milosevic, and there has not been much discouragement since,
and I think it is fair to say that Senator D'Amato's already
referred to it, Milosevic's rise to power was on the tide of
extreme nationalism, and it began in Kosovo, a few years before
the war against Bosnia.
I visited Kosovo with Senator D'Amato and Senator Nickles
and Connie Mack and two or three others, and I remember the
difficulty we had getting into Pristina. We were told there
were 20,000 people waiting to greet us, just to say hello to
Americans, and they were beaten and driven away by Serb police
forces before we could arrive there.
First of all, we were told we could not go there alone
without taking the Serbian foreign minister, and we persisted,
and they finally let us into Pristina, without him. It seemed
to me even then it was pretty obvious there were going to be
some big, big problems down the road.
Milosevic was determined to expand power and control
through the use of force and, as you know, he stripped Kosovo
of any political power. Ethnic Albanians cannot operate their
own schools. They must learn Serbian. The Albanians, of course,
outnumber the Serbs by 9 to 1, about 2 million to 180,000 I
think it is, but they do not have their own hospitals, and they
deliver babies in a room about this size, one after another,
with no real medical equipment.
I think we understand what has happened. When you strip
anybody of everything they have, their dignity, their power,
their autonomy, and then expect them to be happy, it is not
going to last very long.
After Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, the
Yugoslav Army, which was under his control, Milosevic's
control, began its brutal attacks, and 1 year later the
Yugoslav Army again supported Bosnian Serb forces against the
Bosnian Government and its citizens.
And here, I want to make a distinction between Milosevic
and the Serbian people. We have all heard about the Serbian
mothers going to Kosovo to try to rescue their sons. In my
view, I do not know whether I would say quite what Senator
D'Amato said, because Milosevic was, I guess, elected
president, or at least he is president, but I do believe that
he does not represent the views of most Serbian people.
I found the families in Belgrade, the ones we visited with,
had the same concerns. Their economy was ruined and devastated.
Many Serbs do not have jobs. They do not have opportunities
because of Milosevic, and whenever he gets in trouble he goes
down and starts shooting somebody in Bosnia or Kosovo or
somewhere else, to get his numbers up.
But I would just say, with this recent history in mind, it
cannot be a surprise that Milosevic has turned his attention
back to Kosovo. He is using the same bloody tactics and causing
the same human suffering. Unfortunately, what is also the same,
is the hand-wringing and indecisiveness that marked U.S. and
Western policies toward Bosnia until the summer of 1995.
I think it is fair to say that we just have not had strong
leadership. I know the President--in fact, I recently wrote
President Clinton a letter. He sent me a response which I
received just a few days ago. I think he is sincere when he
says he wants to bring this to a stop. He wants to end the
violence.
But we have even retreated from the so-called Christmas
warnings which were articulated by both Presidents Bush and
Clinton and advocated that the Kosovar Albanians negotiate with
Milosevic without an international mediator and while attacks
were taking place and, as we all know, that is a fruitless
exercise.
So it seems to me that there are several things we might
do. The time for prevention, in my view, has already passed.
The opportunity to resolve the status of Kosovo at Dayton was
missed, so there is no other realistic option left, then, but
to threaten Milosevic with force and be prepared to carry out
that threat.
This is the only message that I believe is worth delivering
to Belgrade. I am therefore gravely concerned that the action
taken to date is not enough to prevent another Bosnia, even
with NATO jets only miles away Serb forces continue to lay
mines, attack Albanian villages, and move additional troops and
equipment into Kosovo. As our experience with aggression
against Bosnia demonstrated, the longer we wait to take action
the more effort it takes. We either act now--there have been
about 300 killed now, and there are some missing--or deal with
the deadly, much more severe consequences later.
Certainly everyone on this panel has knowledge about this
and may keep more current than I do. But, I would recommend
first that we deliver a real ultimatum to Milosevic--and maybe
Holbrooke will do that when he goes back to Belgrade tomorrow--
but if Milosevic does not halt the attacks on Kosovo, pull back
his forces, and agree to participate in internationally
mediated talks, NATO will conduct air strikes against military
installations in Serbia.
Second, establish a NATO no-fly zone over Kosovo which, if
violated, will be met with swift and decisive military
retribution.
Third, extend the sanctions imposed on Serbia and establish
a comprehensive economic embargo which includes a ban on the
export of fuel to Serbia. It is imperative, however, that these
sanctions be imposed in conjunction with, rather than as
substitute for U.S.-NATO military threat.
Clearly, the objective of these actions is to support a
negotiated solution that will bring a genuine and lasting peace
to Kosovo. In that regard, I would like to discuss the end game
for any negotiations.
There has been a lot of discussion to the effect that if we
use force, we will be supporting independence for Kosovo. Mr.
Chairman, I do not take that view. First, in using force, NATO
would be acting to prevent a wider war that could involve
Albania, Macedonia, Greece, Bulgaria, among others.
Second, NATO would put Milosevic back in his box and end
the violence he has wrought.
Third, NATO would create a more level playing field for
negotiations. Milosevic would never have gone to Dayton if NATO
had not conducted air strikes against Bosnian-Serb targets, at
least that is my view.
Finally, in my view, negotiations should be centered on
establishing Kosovo as a republic with the same status as
Serbia and Montenegro and with international guarantees. I
believe that the Kosovar leadership would support such a
solution. In fact, I think there is a willingness on the part
of the Kosovar leadership to come to the table in some
internationally mediated negotiation.
For nearly 10 years, while under increasing repression,
President Rugova and Prime Minister Bukoshi have supported a
moderate approach and rejected force to achieve their political
aims. Now under attack in a real war situation the ethnic
Albanians they represent, have lost their patience, and some
not surprisingly have supported the Kosovo Liberation Army, the
KLA.
If NATO acts resolutely, this will not only bring Milosevic
to the table, but it will also bolster the credibility of
Rugova and Bukoshi among the people who elected them.
I would conclude by asking that my entire statement be made
a part of the record. I am certain that you have heard much of
this before, but I want to make one last statement, and that is
about humanitarian aid. I have just been advised that the
International Committee on the Red Cross has been very active
in that area. It is critical that the United States provide
logistical and material support to the humanitarian aid effort
and do all it can to ease the suffering of the Kosovars.
Tens of thousands who have been forced out of their homes
have fled in fear. They lack food. They lack medicine.
I met with some of the women who were here from Kosovo, as
you may have. I met with them this morning, and the stories
they tell you are almost unreal. You cannot believe it, but you
do believe it because you know it is the truth about the
suffering that is happening in all of Kosovo.
Unless we address the real problem, and the real problem is
Milosevic's genocidal expansionist regime, we will condemn
ourselves to the costly mistakes of Western delay and inaction
in Bosnia.
And again, whether we like it or not, we have to provide
the leadership. I must say Prime Minister Blair has been very
forthcoming in his statements, and the statement just again
today, saying the military option is still on the table. I
believe that with our leadership we could probably end this
crisis and end this reign of terror.
I also want to thank Senator Tim Johnson for contacting me
and indicating that he is in the process of trying to round up
some Senate support for a resolution he has introduced.
So, Mr. Chairman, and my colleagues, I thank you very much,
and I know you understand the importance of this. There are
many people in this room who come from Kosovo who now live in
the United States. They understand the importance of this, and
I have confidence the Senate will do whatever it takes to do
the appropriate thing.
[The prepared statement of Senator Dole follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Bob Dole
Mr. Chairman: I appreciate the opportunity to testify before your
Subcommittee on the vitally important situation in Kosova.
Three years after the Dayton Accords ended the fighting in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Slobodan Milosevic is back at it again. This time his
forces are in Kosova, driving out and killing Albanians. However, if
the United States waits three years again to take effective action,
Kosova's two million Albanians will fare even worse than their Bosnian
neighbors.
This is not a new problem. In fact, Milosevic's rise to power on
the tide of extreme nationalism began in Kosova. Two years before the
war against Bosnia, I visited Kosova with a delegation that included
six United States Senators, including Don Nickles, Connie Mack, and
Alfonse D'Amato, from whom you will hear today. In Pristina, the
capital, we were greeted by Albanians who only hours earlier had been
tear-gassed and clubbed by Serbian police forces.
It was clear even then, that Slobodan Milosevic was determined to
expand his power and control through the use of force. He had stripped
Kosova of its political autonomy and status and imposed martial law.
Later, after Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, the Yugoslav
Army, which was under his control, began its brutal attacks. One year
later, the Yugoslav Army again supported Bosnian Serb forces against
the Bosnian government and its citizens.
Mr. Chairman, with this recent history in mind, it cannot be a
surprise that Milosevic has turned his attention back to Kosova--using
the same bloody tactics and causing the same human suffering.
Unfortunately, what is also the same, is the hand wringing and
indecisiveness that marked U.S. and Western policies toward Bosnia
until the summer of 1995.
I think it is fair to say that in recent months, the United States
has not exercised sufficient leadership. The administration has
retreated from the so-called ``Christmas warnings'' to Milosevic
articulated by both Presidents Bush and Clinton. and advocated that the
Kosovar Albanians negotiate with Milosevic--without an international
mediator and while attacks were taking place.
This tepid response to the escalating violence has not only
emboldened Milosevic, but also eroded American credibility. It seems
that only British Prime Minister Blair has advocated responding in a
way that reflects a recognition that there is a war going on right now.
If this war continues the price will not only be paid by the Kosovar
Albanians, but by NATO, Europe and the United States.
Make no mistake, the time for prevention has come and gone. The
opportunity to resolve the status of Kosova at Dayton was missed. And
so, there is no other realistic option left than to threaten Milosevic
with force and be prepared to carry out that threat. This is the only
message worth delivering to Belgrade.
I am therefore gravely concerned that the action taken to date is
not enough to prevent another ``Bosnia.'' Even with NATO jets only
miles away, Serb forces continued to lay mines, attack Albanian
villages. and move additional troops and equipment into Kosova.
As our experience with the aggression against Bosnia demonstrated,
the longer we wait to take action, the more effort it takes. We can act
now, or deal with the deadly, much more severe consequences later.
With those lessons in mind, I wrote to President Clinton two weeks
ago to express my concerns and recommend a strong course of action. In
his response, the President cited NATO's accelerated contingency
planning and stated that the Administration was not ruling anything
out.
What I recommended specifically to the President was that he lead
our allies in taking three immediate actions:
First, deliver an ultimatum to Slobodan Milosevic that if he does
not halt the attacks on Kosova, pull back his forces, and agree to
participate in internationally mediated talks, NATO will conduct air
strikes against military installations in Serbia
Second, establish a NATO no-fly zone over Kosova, which if violated
will be met with swift and decisive military retribution.
Third, extend the sanctions imposed on Serbia and establish a
comprehensive economic embargo, which includes a ban on the export of
fuel to Serbia. It is imperative, however, that these sanctions he
imposed in conjunction with--rather than as a substitute for--a U.S.
NATO military threat.
Clearly, the objective of these actions is to support a negotiated
solution that will bring a genuine and lasting peace to Kosova.
In that regard, I would like to discuss the end game for any
negotiations. There has been a lot of discussion to the effect that if
we use force we will be supporting independence for Kosova. Mr.
Chairman, I do not take that view.
First, in using force, NATO would be acting to prevent a wider war
that could involve Albania, Macedonia, Greece, and Bulgaria, among
others.
Second, NATO would put Milosevic back in his box and end the
violence he has wrought.
Third, NATO would create a more level playing-field for
negotiations. Milosevic would never have gone to Dayton if NATO had not
conducted air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets.
Finally, in my view, negotiations should be centered on
establishing Kosova as a republic, with the same status as Serbia and
Montenegro, and with international guarantees.
I believe that the Kosovar leadership would support such a
solution. For nearly ten years while under increasing repression,
President Rugova and Prime Minister Bukoshi have supported a moderate
approach and rejected force to achieve their political aims. But, now
under attack and in a real war situation, the ethnic Albanians they
represent have lost their patience--and some, not surprisingly, have
supported the Kosovar Liberation Army (KLA). If NATO acts resolutely.
this will not only bring Milosevic to the table, it will also bolster
the credibility of Rugova and Bukoshi among the people who elected
them.
Before I conclude, I would like to bring attention to the growing
humanitarian crisis. It is critical that the United States provide
logistical and material support to the humanitarian aid effort and do
all it can to ease the suffering of the Kosovars, tens of thousands who
have been forced out of their homes or fled in fear. The people are
lacking adequate food, medicine and shelter. I would strongly urge the
members of the appropriations committees in the Congress to include
funding for emergency humanitarian relief in the foreign operations
bill.
As essential as this humanitarian aid is, it is not a substitute
for political and military action. We must remember that, like Bosnia,
this is not a humanitarian crisis, rather it is a political and
military crisis with severe humanitarian consequences.
Mr. Chairman, unless we address the real problem--Milosevic's
genocidal expansionist regime--we will condemn ourselves to the costly
mistakes of Western delays and inaction in Bosnia. America must provide
leadership to end this crisis and Milosevic's reign of terror once and
for all.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Senator Dole. Ambassador
Abramowitz, we know Senator Dole has to leave by 5 p.m. I would
like to ask if we could question him first.
Senator Dole, recently we were favored with a visit of the
Prime Minister of France, Mr. Juspin, and I am not certain
whether our two countries are on the same page with respect to
the former Yugoslavia. I pursued with him the issue of Kosovo
and wanted to know whether we were on the same page, and even
raised the idea of perhaps acting militarily.
He said we were on the same page, and if there was any
action at all it should be done by NATO, but NATO should not
act until the United Nations Security Council gave its green
light. I wonder if you have any comment about that, if that is
realistic, if that is a prescription that simply will not
respond to this situation.
Senator Dole. Well, first it would be--I would not say
precedent-setting, but it would be refreshing to find France on
the same side. That would be news, and that would be welcome.
But you know, we have the Russians as members of the
Security Council and, of course, obviously they have a close
relationship with the Serbs and Slavic nations, and I know
Milosevic made the trek to see Yeltsin and others in Russia
recently. We may want to go get a resolution of some kind, but
it seems to me we have that authority.
I do not think--I mean, we can delay this. That is one way
to delay it, is to go back to the United Nations and wait
another 30 or 60 days, and I assume maybe after Holbrooke
leaves that Milosevic will be a good boy for a while and then
in a couple of weeks something else will happen and he will
start his terror again in Kosovo, but I am not certain I would
agree with the French Prime Minister.
Senator Smith. I did not think you would, but I thought I
would ask anyway, to put it in the context of what
international pressure we ought to be governed by as we
contemplate taking some military action.
Senator Dole. Well, it would be great--you know, we thought
for a long time this was something the Europeans could handle,
but as it turned out it again took our efforts and our
leadership. I commend the administration for the efforts in
Dayton, but I think they came far too late. As I said, I think
the Bush administration was also gujilty of delaying and
withholding action. They wanted to keep an undivided
Yugoslavia, which was not even practical, because it already
had a declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia.
I think we have to provide the leadership, and I would hope
that President Clinton understands that. I think it is a
question of how is he going to get support. I think he has
support from Tony Blair, but Milosevic has been through this
dozens of times, and he is familiar with all the tough
rhetoric. He has heard it all. If nothing happens afterwards,
he is going to keep doing it.
Senator Smith. Senator Dole, on the front page of the New
York Times today there is a very heart-rending account of the
death of a Serbian boy in Kosovo, and I think it is at least
apparent that the KLA were responsible for his death.
Is it not fair to say if we do not do something soon, that
the other side is arming as we speak, and that the atrocities
will then be going the other way? I wonder if you have a
thought on that, and what we might do to try to hold back the
violence that may come from the other side?
Senator Dole. That is why I think it is important, and
maybe Ambassador Abramowitz has a different view, that we do
everything that we can now to stop Milosevic. if you have
mediated negotiations and have the Serbs pull out, and the KLA
would have no choice but to continue to defend their people.
And I would assume there are some KLA membes who are, while I
would not say terrorists, are capable of terrorist-style acts.
Maybe a few.
Meanwhile, because we have not stopped Milosevic, the KLA
continues to grow. But if somebody has got to protect your home
and you have got an invading force, and you do not belong to
the KLA or any other group, you are probably going to sign up.
You are going to join up, and that is what is happening.
And the longer we wait, the longer the international
community waits to take some action, the more of this you are
going to have. Who wants anyone killed, Serb or Albanian? I do
not know of anybody who is wishing for that, certainly not
young boys, and I happened to see that picture in the New York
Times, the 13-year-old.
But it is going to increase, as you indicated, unless some
action is taken.
Senator Smith. We welcome Senator Dodd. I would turn to
Senator Biden for his comments.
Senator Biden. Mr. Leader, it is good to see you again. We
are glad to have you here.
As you recall, you and I also made a trip. For the longest
time there were not many of us. You, me, Joe Lieberman, a few
others, who were the thorn in the side of our colleagues in the
Senate and Bush and Clinton.
Let me make a statement, and just tell me whether you agree
with it or not. By the way, I note parenthetically that Tony
Blair is saying all the right things, but he is making all the
wrong policies.
Blair said that we should use force, but that NATO needs a
U.N. mandate first. We are not going to get a U.N. mandate.
Russia will veto that in all probability. We should try, but
they are going to veto it, and so it seems to me we are not
going to get the support the President needs from the U.N.
We are also not likely to get a voluntary response from the
rest of NATO unless we make it an absolute demand privately. I
think the only thing that is going to embolden the President to
use force, if we have to use it alone, which I think we should
do if we have to, is if he gets support from here, from the
Congress.
That is what happened last time. It was not until we
convinced the Congress that anyone was emboldened enough to go
it alone, and only after we said we were going to go it alone,
and I am oversimplifying slightly, did NATO decide to come
along.
And so can you see any other prescription, other than that?
I cannot figure out how to do it, other than that.
Senator Dole. I do not think it will happen, and I remember
when we got 69 votes to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia. That
was enough to override a veto, and then things started to
happen, but not until then. And, the effort was, as you know,
totally bipartisan. I remember some people were sort of slow
coming in that direction, but once they had been there and seen
what was happening, they were supportive. I think it gave
President Clinton support. He needed the support.
Senator Biden. He did. The first visit that I made was in
April 1993, which has been publicized by our friend Mr.
Milosevic. I had a long 3-hour meeting with Mr. Milosevic, and
at one point in his office, it was late at night, he looked
across this little, tiny table from me and he said, ``what do
you think of me?'' I said, ``I think you are a gosh-darned war
criminal, and I think you should be tried as one.''
The reason I recite that is his response. He looked at me,
cool as a cucumber and said, in effect, ``lots of luck in your
senior year.'' I mean, ``have a good day. By the way, do you
want to speak with Radavan Karadzic?'' I said, ``I thought you
had no control over him.'' He said, ``well, I don't. Would you
like to speak to him?''
It was 11 at night. He dialed the telephone in his office.
Fifteen minutes later, a guy with hair I wish I had, a brain I
am glad I do not, and an attitude I do not wish on anyone came
up the stairs, out of breath, literally gasping for air--my
word to this--walked in the room, sat down next to Milosevic
and said, ``Mr. President, I am sorry I am late. I am sorry.''
And I looked at Milosevic and said, ``no control, huh?''
This guy has control. The only thing he has ever responded
to is force, nothing else. The real questions are, are we going
to go it alone, and then maybe bring people along, and, second,
are we going to make it clear to the KLA that we are not
looking for an independent Kosovo? That is not our purpose.
It is a difficult spot. The longer we delay, the worse it
is. But I am delaying opportunity for my colleagues to ask
questions.
Senator Dole. I would just add, it seems to me Milosevic
understands the U.S. Senate, and he knows there are 100
Members. When you get to have 60 or 70 on one side or the
other, he understands that, so I think that helps.
My view is that he is a very charming person to sit down
with, and you say, well, stay for lunch, or stay for dinner, or
stay all night, or stay all week. When you meet Tudjman,
Milosevic is sort of the charmer of the group, because he wants
to get rid of sanctions.
I was there in January and he said, well, 2 years is long
enough. There have been sanctions long enough. I said, well,
what about Kosovo? Oh, we are making great progress in Kosovo.
I am going to announce a big educational program.
And weeks later we had the first people killed. You cannot
trust him.
Senator Smith. Senator Coverdell.
Senator Coverdell. Mr. Leader, it is good to have you back,
as always, to see you continuing to make such substantial
contributions to our Nation.
I am interpreting you as concluding that the U.N.
resolution is a delayed tactic, and that we would probably not
get the resolution, and you have therefore concluded that the
United States should be prepared to act unilaterally.
Kosovo is not a household word. There would have to be, I
think, substantial moral leadership to bring the Nation to
understand why we were doing this. In a moment, I would like
you to just comment on my general observations.
In a meeting that occurred earlier in the week regarding
this subject I raised the question, as the world's only
superpower, more and more it seems to me we are confronted
with, but in the end we will have to go it alone, and there are
limits. We are paying a price for that kind of commitment, and
the ability to maintain a force that has sufficient resources
to be trained and sufficient resources to have the ultimate in
research. These resources are being diluted, because of ongoing
commitments that we have made as a Nation.
It seems to me somewhere along the way we need to step back
and say what kind of criteria will govern globally in these
kinds of decisions. We can point to five or six places on the
map at any time where there is true tragedy occurring that you
could argue requires intervention and, as I said, there are
limits.
I think the limits ought to be broader than just cultural.
We have great cultural relationship with Europe, and I would be
interested in any thought that you have given to this broader
question.
I do not take exception with your frankly very emotional
statement that you made. I do not know how anybody could not
empathize with it. But I do think this discussion requires that
we step back and think through the extent and breadth of what
we can do in these kinds of situations, and I know you have
given this some thought, and I would like to have your
observations.
Senator Dole. I would just say briefly that--and you are
right, we cannot kick every sleeping dog. We cannot just go
around the world and say, well, here is a problem, let us take
care of it on our own.
But I think there is a larger question here, and my view is
that as this continues to escalate what we have going in Bosnia
is going to fall apart. I mean, if we cannot control the
Serbian police in Kosovo I look for something to erupt in
Bosnia where we now have at least peace as long as we are
there, as long as Americans are there. Thirty four other
nations are also participating. For that reason I think there
is a direct link.
And it was my view from the start we would not be in that
part of the world today had we lifted the arms embargo years
ago, as you voted to do, and as we all voted to do, because the
Bosnians could have fought their own battles. I mean, there is
a right of self-defense. It is guaranteed in the United Nations
charter, but we would not give the Bosnians that right, and now
we are paying for it, billions and billions of dollars.
American forces have been there a couple of years, and I
think they should continue to stay for a while, maybe reduce
their numbers. I think this is the legacy of that nonpolicy
that stated back in the early nineties and continued until,
again, the U.S. Senate spoke with some authority with 69 votes.
So I think I would make an exception in this case and
ensure that the United States stands up and takes effective
action. If this continued to spread too to Montenegro and to
other countries, Albania, who knows where, it might end in a
greater conflict. I think it is again a part of the problem
that we did not resolve properly in the first place in
Yugoslavia, and it is still there to be dealt with, and I think
we have to finish it. If it is up to us to do it alone, we have
to finish it.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much. Mr. Leader, it is nice
to have you back here.
Mr Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent to have a
statement included in the record regarding this.
Senator Smith. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Dodd follows:]
COPY TO COME
Senator Dodd. I would just note that back in March, in
fact, several of us authored a resolution on Kosovo that was
sort of a beginning process of sending the sort of signal that
you do, and we just had a vote a few minutes ago, the last vote
we cast here on the floor of the Senate, basically on this
issue, and it basically said--and the language is pretty
irresistible, I suppose because I think the language, the
opening phrase of it was, we will not stay indefinitely.
No one wants to vote for something that says we are going
to stay indefinitely. Five of us voted against the resolution,
Senator Biden and myself, Senator Lieberman, Senator Cleland,
and Senator Robb, for the simple reason I think it sends a very
confusing signal.
I mean, if you are sitting back in Serbia today and you are
watching the U.S. Senate cast a vote 90 to 5 that says we are
not staying indefinitely, now, that is a good message for the
folks back home here, because there is some concern that we
have a strong strain of isolationism, and certainly you are
more aware of this than most of us, going back to a time in our
country where it took a one vote margin to get a draft, when
Europe was burning.
Franklin Roosevelt ran for reelection in 1940 promising
that we would not engage in a world conflict, and so it is an
appealing thing.
But I suspect that today if you were sitting there,
Milosevic, wondering what the Senate is up to, we just voted 90
to 5 to say we are not going to stay indefinitely, and no one
wants to stay indefinitely, but I question the wisdom of these
kinds of resolutions at the same time we are trying to convince
international bodies and organizations to be supportive of
resolutions and to join us if necessary in exercising military
force to deal with these situations. We look like we want it
all different ways. We really do not want to send a message.
I do not know whether you have any comment on that at all.
What I really wanted to ask you about in addition to that
point was the point that you just raised in response to my good
friend and colleague, Senator Coverdell's question about the
ripple effect, and you sort of alluded to it in your comments
here.
One of the things that is different about Kosovo that was
true of Bosnia was in the case of Kosovo there is a strong ally
who is willing to stand up and be supportive, and that is
Albania, which Bosnia did not really have in its neighborhood.
Croatia was involved, but they had their own self-interest,
and there was some confusion about where they were in all of
this, whereas Albania has been very forceful in providing
support and assistance to Kosovo, and so I suspect that if we
do not do something here in addition to the tragedy in Kosovo
that you have probably identified here there is a very real
possibility, it appears to me--and I may be wrong about this.
I do not claim any great expertise in this part of the
world at all, but I think we may be looking at a situation that
spins out of control in to Macedonia and further down into the
peninsula, and I wondered if you might further comment on that.
I see my time is up at this point, but whether or not you
see any--we are trying to raise the level of awareness here. If
you do not respond to this, we may find this situation expand
exponentially beyond control.
Senator Dole. That is the point I tried to make. Of course,
Albania is probably the poorest country in that part of the
world, but there are a lot of refugees are fleeing there. I am
not certain they are going to have the resources to take care
of them, but they are able to provide weapons.
And, of course, Iran is looking at this very carefully, and
other countries that we have some interest in, but you look at
the map and you have got Montenegro and Albania, you have got
Macedonia and Greece and Turkey, and pretty soon you have got a
big, big problem.
I think the ripple effect, in my view it is not based on
any super knowledge, but it just seems to me, having been there
several times, if the Serbs get away with this in Kosovo, what
is going to happen in Bosnia again, where they have lost
250,000 women and children for the most part. I wish Milosevic
would listen, but I think he has got a hearing problem. He does
not hear anything. He is--like Senator Biden indicated, he
keeps you there for 3 hours and you talk to him directly, and
it is just like water off a duck, and then he gets ready for
the next visitor.
There may be some way to do it, but I think one way--and
again, Ambassador Abramowitz is going to touch on that, and
that is mediation. But this means genuine negotiations, with a
credible threat of force, and U.S. leadership as a firm
mediator. But it is going to be up to us to provide the
leadership, and it starts right here in the U.S. Senate.
Senator Dodd. Could you just comment, and I do not have any
specific knowledge about the resolution in the Senate, but
would you at least express some degree of caution about
resolutions, however well-intentioned here, that sometimes send
confusing signals?
Senator Dole. That is my view. We worked hours and hours
with a lot of people involved in the resolutions we crafted,
and the more we made it specific, the more we talked about
lifting the arms embargo, which made a lot of sense to a lot of
people, regardless of party or philosophy, then I think we were
on the right track.
I think the others may serve some purpose, but I think if
we are really serious about it there ought to be a concerted
effort to say, OK, let us really work on a real resolution. Let
us bring that up in a bipartisan way and get a good vote for it
and give the President support.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Smith. I think Senator Dole, if I could put a
little more perspective on Senator Dodd's comment and question,
we are in a real struggle up here in the U.S. Senate, because--
and I agree, it sends the wrong message to Mr. Milosevic, but
we are also trying to send a message to the President that we
are hollowing out our military, and we cannot have it both
ways.
We are spending our military budget on Bosnia and
peacekeeping and in the meantime we have got pilots quitting
and we have got difficulty with morale in our own military and,
frankly, Bosnia is a part of that and so we cannot have it both
ways. We have got to put our wallet where our words are, and I
do not think we are doing that.
So that was the other side of the message, but I agree with
Senator Dodd, and I do not want Mr. Milosevic to misinterpret
what was done.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, there is a third aspect to
this, and that was, it stopped a worse resolution. I was not
for this, but you had a good friend and colleague from Texas
and Senator Byrd, whom no one takes lightly, offering a
resolution saying, we are out by a date certain, and we reduce
numbers by a date certain.
I was able to be pure on this one, but I am not sure if I--
given the choice of this versus the other--might have voted for
this, although it was a bad idea all around.
Senator Smith. The other was worse.
Senator Dodd. A lot worse. I am sure he knows about that,
too.
Senator Smith. Senator Dole, it is past 5. We thank you for
your generosity and your time and your comments. Ambassador
Abramowitz, we welcome you.
STATEMENT OF HON. MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS
GROUP; AND FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH
Ambassador Abramowitz. Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss Kosovo
with you. It is a privilege to appear with Senator Dole, who
has been a consistent voice of realism and conscience in this
very sad continuing story of the end of Yugoslavia.
Senator Biden, I have also read your statement a few days
ago, and that was a very excellent piece of work.
I want to discuss the Kosovo current situation and what I
think we should do. I am not going to discuss U.S. policy
because it is not clear to me what U.S. policy is. The rhetoric
on it changes every day.
And I will try to be brief. I would like first to make a
number of points which I think need to be kept in mind when
looking at this issue. First, we all have enormous trouble
sorting out the competing demands of history, sovereignty,
self-determination, justice, and stability.
For example, Bosnia was a State in 1992, a new State, not
as old as modern Serbia, in which ethnic groups were
intermingled and Bosnian Serbs made up 35 to 40 percent of the
population. Because of the massive support of the Yugoslav
National Army, the Bosnian Serbs were allowed to forcibly carve
out and win implicit international recognition at Dayton for a
virtually independent State within Bosnia.
The Albanians of Kosovo who make up 90 percent of the
region have been denied such an opportunity in great part
because they do not yet have the arms.
Similarly, second, a question: Who are the terrorists? Mr.
Milosevic says they are the Albanian separatists. Many in the
West seem to go along with that judgment. They put the rebel
movement that is fighting a brutal apartheid on a lower moral
footing than Mr. Milosevic's State terrorism.
Mr. Milosevic, of course, has been responsible, as we have
heard, or largely responsible in the past 10 years for the
imposition of a virtual police State in Kosovo and Bosnia, with
the deaths of hundreds of thousands, the displacement of
millions, and the empowerment and support of war criminals.
He is perceived now as carrying out his rightful authority
as the president of Serbia. He is not a candidate for the
American terrorist list.
The stakes in Kosovo are great. Senator Dodd, you brought
them up. The future of Kosovo, Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and
Albania, and perhaps a wider area including Greece, Bulgaria,
and Turkey. For Americans, a particular concern is the
stability of Bosnia, where we have 8,000 troops, and which
could be seriously threatened, the stability of which could be
seriously threatened by what happens in Kosovo.
Conceivably also Mr. Milosevic may use his influence among
Bosnian Serbs to threaten us on Kosovo. He could probably bring
down Mr. Dodek. The enormity of the stakes does not appear to
make it easier for western nations to know what to do. NATO is
divided. The U.S. Government is again split, and the Russians
have their own views.
Mr. Milosevic is well aware of this, and he has shown a
capacity to take advantage of our differences to spurn western
demands.
Fourthly, there is a wild card here, and that is the
stability of the Milosevic regime. He is leading his already
destitute country down a blind alley in Kosovo. He faces a
mini-revolt in Montenegro, and even the Hungarians in Vojvodina
are getting restive over the war in Kosovo and seeing their
sons go to that war. Some analysts his hold on his own faithful
may be weakening.
Military morale--the military have largely been kept out of
the Kosovo war to date--is by all accounts bad. Few in Serbia
would regret his departure, but it would raise plenty of
uncertainties for Kosovo and other Balkan issues.
Finally, the parties in this issue cannot solve this
problem by themselves. The West will have to be involved in
some fashion for a long time to come if we are going to
maintain peace in that part of the world.
Now, let me try to summarize briefly what I think are the
main elements of the current situation. First, the violence
started because after many years of a nonviolent policy by the
Albanians there was no change in their situation in Kosovo. We
told them to be quiet and we will improve the situation, but
nothing happened. Many Albanians came to believe that only
violence would produce serious western help.
That violence is continuing and I would guess it is likely
to escalate. It is not on the order of Bosnia, and not likely,
soon, to become so, since Kosovar Albanians have few large
weapons and little military organization or experience.
Some believe that the casualty figures, 300 or so, are
understated. Some think they are exaggerated. I do not know.
Having destroyed Albanian villages along the Albanian-
Kosovo border, the Serbs seem now focused on sealing the border
and preventing refugees. They fear more refugees will be the
only trigger for a western military response.
So far--this is very important--the fighting has not
expanded to the populous areas of Kosovo adjoining Macedonia.
That could well happen, could well happen soon, bringing both a
humanitarian crisis and big trouble for Macedonia if there is
an outflow of refugees.
Few had heard of the Kosovo Liberation Army, the KLA, a
year ago. Now they have a Web site. The violent Serb attacks
against KLA areas this year have done much to generate support
for the KLA in Kosovo and abroad.
The leadership of Mr. Rugova has been seriously weakened,
perhaps fatally. Albanians are increasingly rallying to the
banner of the KLA and many in Kosovo now openly demonstrate
shouting, UJK, which is the Albanian initials for it.
Some Albanians are thirsting for revenge against the Serbs
after these many years of Serb rule. The KLA is in effective
control of a large portion of Kosovo. We still know little
about them, their size, their capabilities, their leadership,
and their organization.
The KLA probably believes that more violence will produce
western military actio against Serbia. Regrettably, there are
reports that they are now targeting Serb civilians and driving
them out of Kosovo. If that is true, it could well land them on
the terrorist list.
Western diplomacy over the past 5 months has not stopped
the violence and has failed to produce any political change in
Kosovo. The only way Serbia can continue to rule in Kosovo is
either through continuing greater repression or by moving
massive numbers of Serbs into Kosovo, or driving massive
numbers of Albanians out of Kosovo.
The Kosovo Albanians are fed up with Serb rule, and it is
unlikely they will allow themselves to continue to be ruled by
Belgrade for much longer. Whether that means independence now
remains to be seen. In any event, the status quo is thoroughly
unacceptable.
The question now is whether the situation in Kosovo can be
changed without more violence, which gets out of control and
radicalizes all Albanians, including those in Macedonia.
Progress toward ending the violence in Kosovo requires in
my view at least two things. First, an immediate Serb stand-
down in their military campaign, but this has to be coupled
with 2) a concrete offer and an urgent implementation of
serious political change in Kosovo.
Now, how can we achieve those two things, and they may be
insufficient. Here I think are some of the options.
First, the West can label the KLA as terrorists and close
the border, help close the Albanian border to them, while at
the same time insisting that Milosevic accompany these moves
with a cessation of fighting, immediate political change in
Kosovo, and serious negotiations with the Albanians. Many
believe U.S policy is headed in that direction.
Second, we can take a chance on the fighting not escalating
too much, being a low-intensity war for a couple of years, and
wait for Mr. Milosevic to fall, changing the whole equation.
Third, and alternatively, we can threaten Mr. Milosevic
that we will destroy much of his military establishment if he
refuses to halt the military campaign and immediately offer
real political change in Kosovo.
Frankly, it is hard to avoid the judgment that, despite the
tough rhetoric, NATO is reluctant to use force, and I do not
think they will use force unless there are many more refugees
coming from Kosovo, particularly coming into Macedonia.
Fourth, if we are unwilling to use force, we can make it
clear to Milosevic that if he is not prepared to stop the
violence and make quick and serious political change in Kosovo,
immediate political change, we will do everything we can to
bring him down, including supporting the KLA. Obviously, if he
agrees we have to pressure the Albanians to stop the violence.
There is no longer any easy answer, if there ever was one.
The situation gets worse and worse and, in fact, neither the
West nor Milosevic knows what to do.
My own prescription is as follows. This is the best I can
do. First, western diplomacy cannot continue to dawdle. It is
imperative to stop the violence now before we have a permanent
war, the elimination of the nonviolent Albanian leadership,
refugees into Macedonia, and a radicalization of Albanians
throughout the Balkans.
This will not be achieved simply by putting pressure on the
weaker party, the Albanians, and hoping that Milosevic will
deliver something. The KLA will not go quietly, and we will be
accused of perfidy of the worst sort. Political change in
Kosovo cannot follow years down the pike. It has to come now.
Unconditional negotiations in this case are a myth. They could
last for years. You have to have change now.
The basic fact is that right now, whether we like it or
not, Milosevic remains in control and it is his call whether
there is going to be war or peace. I would point out that he
has never, since the Bosnian war, began, taken any politically
difficult actions unless he is under great pressure. I suspect
he will do the same in Kosovo.
We are not likely to get Serb agreement at this point to
simply remove their forces, since it would lead to Albanian
control of Kosovo and the exodus of the remaining 180,000 or so
Serbs. We must make contact with KLA, get to know them, and try
to influence them.
Their attacks on Serb civilians and efforts to drive the
Serbs out of Kosovo must be stopped. We need to bring them
seriously into any negotiation. Peace can no longer be achieved
without their participation.
I believe the Albanians should begin immediately forming a
coalition Government made up of all political groupings within
Kosovo. This could accelerate political change in Kosovo and
may contribute to unfreezing the current gridlock.
If NATO refuses to persuade Milosevic to make the right
moves, and that seems quite possible, he must be pressured to
do so either through force or through support of the KLA.
Western forces must be involved in the implementation of
any settlement. These are not self-enforcing settlements.
Independence may ultimately take place whatever our current
rhetoric against it, but insistence on it now I believe is
likely to be a formula for continued violence.
That is my best shot at it, Senators.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Abramowitz follows:]
Prepared Statement of Morton Abramowitz
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: I appreciate the
opportunity to discuss Kosovo with you. It is a privilege to appear
with Senator Dole, who has been a consistent voice of realism and
conscience in this sad continuing story of the end of Yugoslavia.
I will discuss the current Kosovo situation and what I think we
should do. I will not discuss U.S. policy because it is not clear to me
what it is. The rhetoric changes every day. I will be brief. (I should
note that these comments are my own opinion and do not reflect an
official position of the International Crisis Group.)
Let me first make a number of points which need to be kept in mind
in looking at the Kosovo issue.
1. We all have enormous trouble sorting out the often competing demands
of history, sovereignty, self-determination, justice, and
stability. For example, Bosnia was a state in 1992--a new
independent state not as old as Serbia--in which ethnic groups
were intermingled and Bosnian Serbs made up 35-40 percent of
the population. Because of the massive support of the Yugoslav
National Army, the Bosnian Serbs were allowed to forcibly carve
out and win implicit international recognition for a virtually
independent state within Bosnia. The Albanians of Kosovo. who
make up 90 percent of the region, have been denied such an
opportunity, in great part because they do not yet have the
arms.
2. Similarly, who are the terrorists? Mr. Milosevic says they are the
Albanian separatists. Many in the West seem to go along with
that judgment. They put the rebel movement that is fighting a
brutal apartheid on a lower moral footing than Milosevic's
state terrorism. Mr. Milosevic has of course been largely
responsible in the past 10 years for the imposition of a
virtual police state in Kosovo, and in Bosnia for the deaths of
hundreds of thousands, the displacements of millions, and the
empowerment and support of war criminals. He is perceived now
as carrying out his rightful authority in Kosovo. He is not a
candidate for the American terrorist list.
3. The stakes in Kosovo are great: the future of Kosovo, Serbia,
Macedonia, Bosnia, and Albania, and perhaps a wider area
including Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey. For Americans, a
particular concern is the stability of Bosnia, where we have
forces and which could be seriously threatened by developments
in Kosovo. Conceivably Milosevic may use his influence among
Bosnian Serbs to threaten us on Kosovo. The enormity of the
stakes does not appear to make it easier for Western nations to
know what to do. NATO is divided, the U.S. Government is again
split, and the Russians have their own notions. Mr. Milosevic
is well aware of this and has shown a capacity to take
advantage of our differences to spurn Western demands.
4. There is a wild card--the stability of the Milosevic regime. Mr.
Milosevic is leading his already destitute country down a blind
alley in Kosovo. He faces a mini-revolt in Montenegro and even
the Hungarians in Vojvodina are getting restive over the
deepening Kosovo war. Some analysts believe his hold on his own
faithful may be weakening. Military morale is by all accounts
bad. Few in Serbia would regret his departure but it would
raise plenty of uncertainties for Kosovo and other Balkan
issues.
5. The parties on their own cannot solve this problem. The West will
have to be involved in some fashion for a long time to come, if
peace is to be maintained.
I would like now to summarize briefly the main elements of the
current situation:
--The violence started because many years of a non-violent policy
by the Albanians produced no change in their situation in Kosovo. Many
came to believe that only violence would produce serious Western help.
--The violence is continuing and will likely escalate. It is not on
the order of Bosnia and not likely soon to become so since the Kosovo
Albanians have few large weapons and little military organization or
experience. Some believe the casualty figures--300--are understated.
Some believe they are exaggerated. Having destroyed Albanian villages
along the Albania/Kosovo border, the Serbs seem now focused on sealing
the border and preventing refugees. They fear more refugees will
trigger a Western military response. So far the fighting has not
expanded to the populous areas adjoining Macedonia. That could well
happen, bringing both a humanitarian crisis and big trouble for
Macedonia if there is an outflow of refugees.
--Few had heard of the KLA a year ago. Now the violent Serb attacks
against KLA areas this year have done much to generate support for the
KLA in Kosovo and abroad. The leadership of Mr. Rugova has been
seriously weakened. perhaps fatally. Albanians are increasingly
rallying to the banner of the KLA and now openly demonstrate for them.
Some Albanians are thirsting for revenge against Serbs. The KLA is in
effective control of a large portion of Kosovo. We still know little
about them--their size, capabilities, leadership, and organization. The
KLA probably believes that more violence will produce Western military
action against Serbia. Regrettably there are reports that they are now
targeting Serb civilians and driving them out of Kosovo. If true it
could well land them on the terrorist list.
--Western diplomacy over the past five months has not stopped the
violence and has failed to produce any political change in Kosovo.
--The only way Serbia can continue to rule in Kosovo is either
through continuing greater repression, or by moving massive numbers of
Serbs into Kosovo, or driving massive numbers of Albanians out of
Kosovo. The Kosovo Albanians are fed up with Serb rule and it is
unlikely that they will allow themselves to continue to be ruled by
Belgrade for much longer. Whether that means independence remains to be
seen. In any event the status quo has become thoroughly unacceptable to
them.
The question now is whether the situation in Kosovo can be changed
without more violence, which gets out of control in and radicalizes all
Albanians, including those in Macedonia.
Progress towards ending the violence in Kosovo requires. my view,
at least two things: (1) an immediate Serb stand-down in their military
campaign, coupled with (2) a concrete offer and urgent implementation
of serious political change in Kosovo.
How might this be achieved? These are some of the options.
1. The West can label the KLA terrorists and help close the Albanian
border to them but insist that Milosevic accompany these moves
with a cessation of fighting, immediate political change in
Kosovo, and serious negotiations with the Albanians. Many
believe US policy is headed in this direction.
2. We can take a chance on the fighting not escalating too much, and
wait for Milosevic to fall, changing the whole equation.
3. Alternatively, we can threaten Milosevic that we will destroy much
of his military establishment if he refuses to halt the
military campaign and immediately offer real political change.
It is hard to avoid the judgment that despite the tough
rhetoric NATO is reluctant to use force unless there are many
more refugees from Kosovo, particularly flowing into Macedonia.
4. If we are unwilling to use force we can make it clear to Milosevic
that, if he is not prepared to stop the violence and make quick
and serious political change in Kosovo, we will do everything
we can to bring him down, including supporting the KLA. If he
agrees we must pressure the Albanians to stop the violence.
There is no longer any easy answer, if there ever was one. The
situation gets worse and worse and in fact neither Milosevic nor the
West knows what to do. My own prescription is as follows:
--Western diplomacy cannot continue to dawdle. It is imperative to
stop the violence now before we have a permanent war, the elimination
of the non-violent Albanian leadership, refugees into Macedonia, and a
radicalization of Albanians throughout the Balkans.
--This will not be achieved simply by putting pressure on the
weaker party--the Albanians--and hoping that Milosevic will deliver
something. The KLA will not go quietly, and we will be accused of
perfidy; political change in Kosovo cannot follow several years down
the pike. Unconditional negotiations in this case are a myth. The basic
fact is that right now Milosevic remains in control, and it is his call
whether there will be war or peace. He has never since the Bosnian war
began taken any politically difficult action unless under great
pressure.
--We will not likely get Serb agreement at this point to simply
remove their forces. since it would lead to Albanian control of Kosovo
and the exodus of most remaining Serbs.
--We must make contact with the KLA, get to know them, and try to
influence them. Their attacks on Serb civilians and efforts to drive
them out of Kosovo must be stopped. We need to bring them seriously
into any negotiations. Peace can no longer be achieved without them.
--The Albanian should begin immediately forming a coalition
government made up of all political groupings. This could accelerate
political change in Kosovo and some unfreezing of the gridlock.
--If NATO refuses to persuade Milosevic to make the right moves.
and that seems likely, he must be pressured to do so, either through
force or through support of the KLA
--Western forces must be involved in the implementation of any
settlement.
--Independence may ultimately take place, whatever our current
rhetoric. But insistence on it now is likely to be a formula for
continued violence.
--Independence may ultimately take place, whatever our current
rhetoric. But insistence on it now is likely to be a formula for
continued violence.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Ambassador Abramowitz. We do have
a vote. There is only a few minutes remaining. Senator
Coverdell will be back momentarily to occupy the chair while I
go and vote. If you would like to remain, we can do that.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Ambassador Abramowitz. We do have
a vote. There is only a few minutes remaining. Senator
Coverdell will be back momentarily to occupy the chair while I
go and vote. If you would like to remain, we can do that.
Senator Biden. It would be nice if you could.
I think you have been the most thoughtful person writing
about this in the press, and the thing I appreciate so much is
your candor that the further down the road we get, there is no
good solution. We are getting to the point where any decision
we make is problematic, and I would like to explore just a
little of that with you if I may, but we have less than 3
minutes now to vote.
Senator Smith. We will stand in recess, and we will convene
again as soon as Senator Coverdell returns.
[Recess.]
Senator Coverdell. Mr. Ambassador, we all apologize. This
is out of our control, and I did not hear the conclusion of
your testimony. I wonder if you might sort of summarize that,
and then while we have a few moments, if there are other
thoughts you would like to contribute while we wait for Members
to return.
Ambassador Abramowitz. What I was trying to convey,
Senator, is that we are really in a terrible situation. The
alternatives are very difficult. They may not be successful.
But if we do nothing, if we do not stop the violence and we do
not change immediately the political situation in Kosovo,
fundamental change, we will see escalation of the war with all
sorts of ramifications, and I basically had a variety of
points--I am sorry. Let me back track.
I listed a certain number of things we could do to approach
this, but I came myself to a proposal which I thought, and I
say this with very great humility because it is very hard, I
thought best met the situation, and it was sort of like an
eight point--or I do not know how many here, but let me briefly
for you just sort of summarize them quickly.
First, that we cannot continue to let our diplomacy dawdle.
We are dawdling. This has been going on for 5 months, and it is
not getting any better. It is getting worse, and if we do not
stop the violence we are going to have a permanent war. It may
be low-level right now, but it could spread, and it could
spread to other parts of Kosovo, and that would impact on the
situation particularly in Macedonia.
If we saw sizable numbers of refugees moving from Kosovo to
Macedonia, it would be a terrible blow to the stability of that
State.
I said second we are not going to do this by putting
pressure on the Albanians, they are the weaker party, and
hoping that somehow or another, after we put pressure on the
Albanians, that Milosevic is going to deliver a solution. The
Albanians will not accept that, and it is--I think it is
morally odious.
The fact is that Milosevic is in control, and he has the
power to make peace or war now, and I am not sure he is willing
to do so. It has never been h is wont to do steps which are
politically dangerous.
In the end, I honestly believe that the West may have to
say, this is a solution, and this is what you have to do.
I do not believe we can get the Serbs to remove their
forces. I do believe they ought to remove their police forces,
but if they removed all their forces, Kosovo would revert
quickly to control of the KLA and the elimination of all Serbs.
I think we have got to get in contact with the KLA. We have
got to get to know them. They are an essential part of the
solution now. They are a major factor, and we need to bring
them into negotiations.
I believe the Albanians, in order to unfreeze the
situation, should start to create a coalition Government, get
all the political parties, political groupings, and set up a
concerted political effort.
Now, the key, if Milosevic is unwilling to do those two
things, 1) stop the violence and make immediate changes in
Kosovo--and the two in my view are interrelated. You cannot
stop the violence and then take 12 or 20 months to start
negotiating something. That is not acceptable any more, and the
Albanians will not accept that.
If he refuses to do that, then I think we have to either
pressure him with a threat and the use of force, not something
anybody particularly likes, or we have to make it clear to him
that we will do our best to unseat him and we will support the
Kosovar Liberation Army.
I also believe this is a long-term effort. We may have to
have western forces to police the settlement. I do not think
you can have a settlement last without that, at least certainly
for the first few years.
I also believe that finally, while independence may
eventually take place, it is probably likely, given the
demographics and what has happened over the last 10 years, I
believe the effort to insist on it right now is a formula for
continued violence.
So in essence I believe we have to proceed down a
continuum. That is the best I can do, as I said before.
Senator Coverdell. Well, yours, as Senator Dole's, is very
thought-provoking. Expand on the coalition Government concept,
and let me just say from my limited time there, which is now
some 2 years, that you could already sense an intractability on
both sides, and that is why I am coming to your point about the
coalition Government and wondering--
Ambassador Abramowitz. I was talking about a coalition
among the Albanian parties. There is a very new factor here
which has become very important, and that is the Kosovar
Liberation Army.
They have the guns. They are drawing significant political
support, and I believe that somehow or another they and all
Albanians have now got to be brought into new political
groupings. It is my own view, and I cannot say I am confident
in asserting it.
I am asserting it in part because I am trying to see ways
of breaking the political deadlock and getting something going,
so I believe also establishing a new coalition will make the
KLA a real part of the negotiating effort, sort of like the
analogy is frequently made between--I am not sure it is
appropriate here. They mention it between the IRA and Sinn
Fein, that there is a political arm through the armed
separatist movement.
Senator Coverdell. If these negotiations, pressures that
you speak of do not work, and there is certainly a high
probability that they would not, would you share your
observations on how we interact with Europe? That is saying
yes, NATO should act, but only with a Security Council
resolution, Europe in general, and then that being impractical,
the role of the United States in a unilateral force.
Ambassador Abramowitz. Well, if we were to resort to force,
if we felt the compulsion to resort to force, obviously it
would be better to have the United Nations resolution. I think
everybody would welcome that. Unfortunately, there seems to be
in my view some indications that nations are hiding behind this
so they do not have to fight, so they do not have to use force,
and expecting the Chinese and/or the Russians to veto this.
I believe in the end we have to look at how seriously we
think the stakes are. If we think the stakes are
extraordinarily important, that the violence stop and not
expand, then I believe we will have to proceed with friends in
Europe. I do not believe we would be alone, but I believe it is
a very major difficulty for NATO.
It is a test for NATO whether NATO is going to stand up and
say they are going to deal with this problem, and I believe in
the end I think most NATO members would go along, but I cannot
say that with great certainty, and obviously I do not have the
political job of making that happen, so it is sort of easy for
me to assert that.
Senator Coverdell. I am going to turn to our Ranking Member
in just a moment, but we are in an interesting time warp. We
have now voted on another resolution expressing frustration, I
believe, in our country and in the Congress that is beginning
to surface about the sharing of responsibilities in Bosnia in
general, and I think those motions, at least at the moment,
really the activists are disconnected from their effect on
this, but we now had two, just during the course of this
hearing.
It strikes me that, with the nature of the terrain and
geography, that a forced decision has to accept substantial
collateral casualties. Obviously, we cannot be unmindful of
that. Do you have any comment?
Ambassador Abramowitz. I can only offer you some thoughts.
It is not an area--although I had worked in the Pentagon many
years ago, it is not an area that I feel myself particularly an
expert. I had always felt that the only force we would use if
we had to resort to force was to focus on destroying the
infrastructure, the communications, and the supply depots of
the Serbian military police establishment.
I was not focusing on putting troops into Kosovo. I was not
in any way doing that, and I am not--I cannot say how much
collateral damage. I know we did a similar thing in Bosnia with
very few lives being lost. Bosnia is, of course, not Serbia.
Serbia has a much bigger military establishment.
I cannot really answer that with knowledge, and I cannot
sit here and tell you that it is going to work, that a sizable
attack will work.
My own view is that it would, but obviously I cannot tell
you that with certainty. The question is, what are the
alternatives, and you cannot just look at it simply in terms of
one way of proceeding.
I mean, if we want certainty, then we can get out of there
and let them fight, but there are all sorts of costs to that,
and we lived through that already, and therefore I believe,
while no one certainly wants to use that option, I believe we
have reached the point where we cannot proceed without getting
two things I believe are essential from Mr. Milosevic who,
after all, has the power, which is an end to the violence now,
and an immediate political change in Kosovo.
I am not trying to determine what that political change
should be, but that is something which has to be discussed and,
as I said before, I think the only way to achieve that is if
the West proposes a settlement.
Senator Coverdell. Do you believe, if that kind of course
is exercised on Milosevic, given where we are and the dawdling
policy you describe, that we can convince the Albanians equally
that the violence must stop, or are they at a point, emotion-
driven and the like, where they feel they have more to gain by
continuing?
Ambassador Abramowitz. That is a very good question. I do
not feel knowledgeable enough about that to answer. My own
instincts are that if we get those two things from Milosevic I
believe we have the capacity to persuade the Albanians to go
along with that. If we do not, we are in pretty sad shape.
Senator Coverdell. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, or Mr. Ambassador, I think a piece of this is
always missing. I found the biggest struggle in a personal
sense that I had in making the case here about the Balkans
beginning in 1992 was, understandably convincing our colleagues
and the American people what is America's security interest.
Where does America's national interest lie? I mean, what
difference does it make? What difference does it make whether
or not there is a Greater Serbia that includes all of Bosnia or
Croatia and whether or not Kosovo is the victim of an ethnic
cleansing that works.
I wonder if you agree with the first part of what I would
like to discuss with you, namely that the disintegration of
Kosovo, which is increasing geometrically every day, has the
genuine seeds for a third Balkan War. By that Balkan War, I
want to explain to folks who may be listening to this, I mean,
a war that envelops Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and
Turkey.
I mean, a serious, serious European conflict that affects
our interest in significant ways, whether it is NATO unity, or
the spread of that conflict within Central and Eastern Europe.
So I think the stakes are very, very high here.
So my first question to you is, is this really a
humanitarian concern you are expressing, or do you believe
there is a vital U.S. interest in settling the situation in
Kosovo?
Ambassador Abramowitz. No. I am expressing both. I think
there is an extraordinary important humanitarian concern, but
in a way, more important as a policy, looking at it from a
policy sense, I think you have just very well described what is
involved.
It involves the cohesion of the alliance, the seeds of a
possible wider conflict--both of those are inherently involved
in this issue, and we do not know right now how this is going
to play out, and I do not think we should take the risk of
those two things occurring.
But--and you also pointed out, and I could not agree with
you more and I would argue it is one of the reasons,
notwithstanding our leadership ultimately in Bosnia, that the
French and the Germans acted, and that is that if, in fact,
there is a exodus of people, and if there is a refugee problem,
that gets the attention of our European friends.
Ambassador Abramowitz. Particularly if you tell them to go
on to Germany.
Senator Biden. That is exactly right, precisely, and I
think that is one of the reasons why the KLA is doing what they
are doing.
I might note parenthetically that I have it on authority
from sources whom I put some stock in, that there is not a
conscious policy arrived at as expressed in the New York Times
today by the KLA to target Serb civilians.
There is no evidence at this point that that is a concerted
policy arrived at like the Serbs in Bosnia arrived at. About 3
years ago on the first trip, when Senator Dole came, and my
third trip to Bosnia they were targeting children in the Muslim
sector of Sarajevo for the purpose of scaring parents out onto
the streets because their children were being victimized. There
is no sense of that at this point in Kosovo in my view, and I
say that for the press that is here, because I do not think the
New York Times assertion is correct.
But the longer we wait it seems to me the closer we are to
a pure Hobson's Choice, because the independence of Kosovo at
this moment under these circumstances might very well find us
in a position where we are talking about a Greater Albania,
which would have a significant impact on destabilizing the
region.
So I agree with your proposition that whatever happens has
to happen quickly, which leads me to my second question. I was
the first guy to call for air strikes in Bosnia, and I wrote
that lift and strike policy and all of that, so I have been
through this before--I do not say that out of pride of
authorship.
I believe that significant, sustained air strikes in Serbia
would be a very different deal than they were in Bosnia,
because we are dealing with a much more sophisticated military.
I think the President would have to say, that there is likely
to be collateral civilian damage and damage to American
forces--this will not be without cost. This will not be
painless.
Second, because the first thing we would have to do is
suppress the Serbian air defense system, there is likely to be
collateral civilian damage on the ground in Serbia, because we
would have to strike in areas near Belgrade, maybe in Belgrade,
but I am suggesting that if all else fails, we should do that.
I want to be up front about this. I am not suggesting that
this would be a painless undertaking. Are you still prepared to
support, if all other avenues fail, and I mean in the near
term, the use of significant air power, knowing what our
military tells me--and I believe them--that there is likely to
be both collateral damage as well as possibly loss of U.S.
lives, U.S. airmen's lives?
Ambassador Abramowitz. Obviously, like you, I certainly
would not like to see that, but I believe the stakes are such--
and let me back track for a minute, and I cannot dispute what
you said about the differences between bombing Serbia and
bombing in Bosnia.
I believe the stakes are such that if we cannot get him to
agree to what I think are the indispensable requirements, that
we have two choices, one of which we must do. One is to use air
power, and the other is to undermine him and support the KLA.
We have to do one or both of them.
Senator Biden. Well, one of the good pieces of news is that
I think to date Prime Minister Nano of Albania is acting very
responsibly. As a matter of fact, he has just come out for
Kosovo's becoming a republic within Yugoslavia, but without the
right of secession. That happens to be exactly what I advocated
here 2 weeks ago.
But the point I am making is this. Nano's statement does
not bode well for the notion of a Greater Albania. In other
words, you do not have the Albanian prime minister making
statements that would invite the KLA to in effect become part
of Albania. I think this is a very helpful step in dealing with
what is to the naked eye a very intractable problem. There are
no good answers left here.
Ambassador Abramowitz. I think the more we dawdle, the more
likely the developments are in the direction of Greater
Albania.
Senator Biden. I do, too, but my point is that I am
pleased, and I want to publicly acknowledge that the Albanian
prime minister is playing a constructive role at this point. If
Milosevic were the prime minister of Albania, he would be
calling for a Greater Albania now. He would be calling for and
appealing to the nationalism of all Albanians in the region.
So I just wanted to state for the record that even though I
said the alternative for Greater Albania is also destabilizing,
my staff reminded me that I should point out that this is not
what the Albanian Government is calling for.
Ambassador Abramowitz. I applaud his statement, but he is,
of course, not in a very strong position.
Senator Biden. I agree with that, and that is why I would
again reemphasize my agreement with your point that time is of
the essence.
Now, let me ask you one last question, if I may, and I
appreciate the chairman's giving me this much time. By the way,
I was not being solicitous before I left about your thoughtful
writing.
You know, when we were going through the debate on Bosnia
in 1994 in the Foreign Relations Committee room in a closed
session, I was in a very heated discussion about what we should
be doing in lifting the embargo and using air power and
crossing the Drina if need be. One of my colleagues asked me a
question that brought into sharp focus something I wondered
about all through my college and graduate school years.
Here I was, sitting in a seat that may very well have been
occupied by Vandenberg as the senior member of the Foreign
Relations Committee, and I could never understand how we could
have failed to act in the thirties in the face of what was so
patently obvious what was going on, and then I realized how,
and I am not being facetious when I say this.
One of my colleagues looked at me and said, ``OK, Joe, you
may be right. Your argument seems logical, but can you
guarantee me that no American will be killed?'' All of a sudden
it struck me that this must have been the standard being
applied back in 1937 and 1938 and 1939, when we knew we had the
force to be able to do something even as weak as we were.
The reason I keep saying this is that I do not want to be
accused of not having been straightforward about this from the
outset, or of promising--not that my colleagues would put any
more stock in my statements than anyone else's--of promising
anyone this is an easy road, or that the price may not be
higher using force, even if it is only air power, in Serbia,
than it was using it in Bosnia.
The targets, it seems to me, have to be the ones you have
stated. One of the things I have observed about the Balkans, no
matter what country you are talking about, is that whatever
little booty is possessed, people are desirous of keeping it.
Let me be more precise about that. The Yugoslav Army is
real, but it has limited assets and resources, notwithstanding
the fact that they are significant relative to Bosnia. I am
operating on the assumption that Milosevic's circumstance
politically is tenuous enough because his policies are not
widely shared by the average citizen in Serbia in my view.
Nonetheless, we should not misunderstand, Kosovo and Kosovo
Field near Pristina, in particular, are viewed as the cradle of
Serbian nationality, Serbian identity, so we should not kid
ourselves about that.
Still, support for his policies is not widespread. I am of
the view that if the Serbian Officer Corps believes that the
price they have to pay to sustain Milosevic's policy is that
they will run the risk of being badly disabled, I think it has
the possibility of impacting upon Milosevic.
So my question to you is, what is your view about the
popular reaction to dedicated air strikes on military targets
over a period of time? Some suggest that they would just
embolden and rally the people of Serbia around Milosevic, and
others of us say that they are likely to be the only thing to
get his attention, because they may very well undermine him
with the only element of Serbian nationalism that has any oomph
left, and that is the military.
Do you have a view on that?
Ambassador Abramowitz. Yes, I do, and you have very well
stated the dilemma. There are two views. One is that it will
cause the Serbian people, the Serbian military to rally around
him, and the other is that it will demonstrate the terrible
dilemma that he has led his country into.
If I could tell you a brief story, I saw a very prominent
Serbian political leader back in 1995 to try to ask him his
perspective on what happened when the war in Yugoslavia, in the
former Yugoslavia began, and I said to him, tell me, if in 1992
NATO had--and this was a man very close to Milosevic during
that whole period.
If, at that time in 1992, NATO had sent an unmistakable
message to you, or had begun to sort of mobilize forces, would
you have started or continued the war, and he looked at me and
laughed, and he said, are you out of your mind? Do you think we
want a war with NATO?
That is basically my perspective on it.
Senator Biden. Mine as well. I thank you, and thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Smith. Mr. Ambassador, we apologize for the
disruption of the vote, but we thank you for your very
perceptive testimony, and all of you who have attended today.
Hopefully we are helping to lay a foundation for doing
something and getting us beyond just words but some action that
can save some lives for our country and theirs, and so we thank
you.
Senator Coverdell.
Senator Coverdell. The observations have been directly on
Kosovo, the Serbians, and Milosevic. Do you have any
observations as to how we might be more effective in sharing
with our European allies the very concern that you have?
It would strike me they, among all, would be more committed
to this than you or we, and yet the reticence is obvious and
apparent.
Ambassador Abramowitz. Well, I have a perspective on that
that may be wrong. I think the reticence is great because we
have reticence, and if we are certain as to what we are about,
if we can clarify our thinking on how to deal with this, I
believe that would change things. The Europeans are reticent
because we are, and as I said before, I am not sure where we
are at.
I mean, I would hope that obviously that our diplomacy
succeeds, but right now I do not know what we are trying to do.
Senator Coverdell. I appreciate the observation. I thank
the chair for allowing me to intervene with a final question.
Senator Smith. You are welcome, Senator.
We are going to include Senator Biden's statement in the
record, and again, we thank you all for your attendance today.
We are adjourned.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
First, Mr. Chairman, I would like to compliment you on calling this
hearing. There is no foreign policy issue of greater urgency facing the
United States than the crisis in Kosovo.
Second, I would like to welcome our two distinguished witnesses,
former Majority Leader Dole and Ambassador Abramowitz. Aside from their
many other achievements and services to this country, Senator Dole and
Ambassador Abramowitz are two of our leading experts on the Balkans,
and I am looking forward to benefiting from their expertise today.
Mr. Chairman, we all know the proximate cause for this hearing: the
unspeakable atrocities being carried out by Serbian special police and
Yugoslav Army units in Kosovo.
Claiming that he is merely utilizing a country's legitimate right
to put down domestic rebellion, Milosevic has let loose his storm
troopers to slaughter civilians and combatants alike. Clearly the
civilized world, led by the United States, must act quickly in order to
prevent a repeat of the Bosnian tragedy.
But before we act, we must confront weighty issues of fundamental
principle, of strategy, and of tactics.
One issue of fundamental principle is the basis for intervention in
what, strictly speaking, is an internal affair of a state. No one
denies that Kosovo is a province of Serbia, albeit one whose autonomy
was illegally revoked nine years ago.
Can intervention be justified on the grounds that Serbia is
wantonly violating the fundamental human rights it has pledged to
uphold as a signatory to OSCE and U.N. conventions?
A second issue of fundamental principle is whether NATO requires a
U.N. Security Council mandate in order to take military action.
My own view is that the possible spread of the warfare in Kosovo
poses a clear and present danger to vital security interests of NATO
member states, the United States included, and therefore obviates the
necessity to go to the U.N. for a mandate. I would like your opinions
on this issue.
What we do on Kosovo also has highly important strategic
implications, above all for continued American leadership in the post-
Cold War world.
No one--certainly not this Senator--relishes the idea of sending
American forces into harm's way once again. But if the Kosovo situation
is sufficiently dangerous to our security--as I believe it is--then the
question boils down to whether or not to act now, or temporize as we
did in Bosnia, and then have to go in later at far greater risk and
cost in blood and treasure.
Let us also not forget that U.S. leadership is inextricably bound
to the very future of NATO. I would pose the following hypothetical
question, which is rapidly becoming a real one:
What should we do if we consider it in the vital interest of the
United States to intervene militarily in Kosovo, but our European
allies insist on the need for a U.N. Security Council mandate, which
they know Russia would veto? Should we then ``go it alone'' and thereby
risk fracturing NATO?
Another basic strategic question we must face is how much to factor
in Russia's outspoken opposition to possible NATO military intervention
in Kosovo. Specifically, is the Russian Defense Ministry's warning of a
``new Cold War'' just standard public diplomacy hyperbole, or does it
reflect the real state of current sentiment in Moscow?
If it is the latter, should maintenance of reasonably good
relations with Russia outweigh other priorities in the Balkans?
Finally, Mr. Chairman, there are tactical issues, specific to
Kosovo, which we need to confront.
Other than putting an immediate halt to the blood-letting, what are
our goals in Kosovo? Autonomy within Serbia, which Kosovo enjoyed from
1974 to 1989, could be revoked again and is, therefore, unrealistic.
I am against independence for Kosovo because such a move would
seriously destabilize the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and
thereby open the Pandora's Box of a wider Balkan conflict.
Therefore, my own preference, which I outlined last week on the
Senate floor, is for republic-status for Kosovo within a federal
Yugoslavia, but without the right of secession. This outcome, however,
must be negotiated by the Kosovars and the Serbs, not imposed from the
outside.
Other tactical issues concern possible military intervention.
How effective would air strikes alone be against the Serbian
forces?
Would ground troops also be necessary to end hostilities and get
serious negotiations started?
Furthermore, is the United States even in contact with the Kosovo
Liberation Army? Could we be certain of its cooperation in any cease
fire we broker?
No one should doubt the difficulty of resolving these basic
questions--of fundamental principles, of strategy, and of tactics. But
I anticipate that our distinguished witnesses will help us shed light
on these and other thorny issues.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 6 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject
to the call of the Chair.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Hearing of May 6, 1998
United States Department of State,
Washington, DC 20520
May 15, 1998
The Hon. Jesse Helms,
Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Following the May 6, 1998 hearing at which Special Representative
Robert Gelbard testified, additional questions were submitted for the
record. Please find enclosed the responses to those questions.
If you have any further questions, please do nor hesitate to
contact us.
Sincerely,
Barbara Larkin,
Assistant Secretary,
Legislative Affairs.
Reponse of Ambassador Gelbard to Question asked by Senator Biden
Question. Why is it not legally or politically possible for the
Bosnian election rules to be changed in time for the September 1998
elections so that each of the three members of the joint presidency are
elected at large, rather than just one ethnic constituency?
Answer. Your question goes to the heart of the reason for the
structure of the Dayton Constitution.
A copy of Annex 4, Article V that deals with the election of the
tripartite Presidency is attached. The Dayton Constitution ensures
representation for all ethnic groups and preserve the ethnic balance.
For this reason, the constitution provides for a Bosniac, a Croat and a
Serb in the tripartite Presidency.
A pluralistic electoral system is the major long-term political
goal for BiH. The Office of the High Representative is charged with
writing the Permanent Election Law that will govern future elections.
The Peace Implementation Council anticipates using that new law to
effect progressive change in the electoral system.
As part of this process, the OSCE and OHE consulted legal
authorities to see if it would be possible have a direct election for
the Presidency without a constitutional change. Legal opinion was that
this would not be possible. Therefore, any such change, were it to be
proposed, would require approval as an amendment to the Constitution by
both chambers of the Parliamentary Assembly including a two-thirds
majority of the lower house of the Bosnian Parliament.
It is generally considered that election of the members at large
would be unacceptable to Bosnian Croats who, as the smallest ethnic
group, feel they could be excluded. Such an eventuality could also
impact directly on cooperation in the Federation.
For the September 1998 general elections, we believe recent PEC
rule changes should encourage further modest movement toward a
pluralistic legislature, thus making constitutional change possible in
the future, if that is the desired route of the signatories of the
Dayton Accords.
______
ARTICLE V
Presidency
The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of three
Members: one Bosniac and one Croat, each directly elected from the
territory of the Federation, and one Serb directly elected from the
territory of the Republika Srpska.
1. Election and Term.
(a) Members of the Presidency shall be directly elected in each
Entity (with each voter voting to fill one seat on the
Presidency) in accordance with an election law adopted by the
Parliamentary Assembly. The first election, however, shall take
place in accordance with Annex 3 to the General Framework
Agreement. Any vacancy in the Presidency shall be filled from
the relevant Entity in accordance with a law to be adopted by
the Parliamentary Assembly.
(b) The term of the Members of the Presidency elected in the first
election shall be two years; the term of Members subsequently
elected shall be four years Members shall be eligible to
succeed themselves once and shall thereafter be ineligible for
four years.
2. Procedures.
(a) The Presidency shall determine its own rules of procedure, which
shall provide for adequate notice of all meetings of the
Presidency.
(b) The Members of the Presidency shall appoint from their Members a
Chair. For the first term of the Presidency, the Chair shall be
the Member who received the highest number of votes.
Thereafter, the method of selecting the Chair, by rotation or
otherwise, shall be determined by the Parliamentary Assembly,
subiect to Article IV(3).
(c) The Presidency shall endeavor to adopt all Presidency Decisions
(i.e.. those concerning matters arising under Article
lll(l)(a)-(e)) by consensus. Such decisions may, subject to
paragraph (d) below, nevertheless be adopted by two Members
when all efforts to reach consensus have failed.
(d) A dissenting Member of the Presidency may declare a Presidency
Decision to be destructive of a vital interest of the Entity
from the territory from which he was elected, provided that he
does so within three days of its adoption. Such a Decision
shall be referred immediately to the National Assembly of the
Republika Srpska. if the declaration was made by the Member
from that territory; to the Bosniac Delegates of the House of
Peoples of the Federation, if the declaration was made by the
Bosniac Member; or to the Croat Delegates of that body, if the
declaration was made by the Croat Member. If the declaration is
confirmed by a two-thirds vote of those persons within ten days
of the referral, the challenged Presidency Decision shall not
take effect.
3. Powers. The Presidency shall have responsibility for:
(a) Conducting the foreign policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
(b) Appointing ambassadors and other international representatives of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, no more than two-thirds of whom may be
selected from the territory of the Federation.
(c) Representing Bosnia and Herzegovina in international and European
organizations and institutions and seeking membership in such
organizations and institutions of which Bosnia and Herzegovina
is not a member.
(d) Negotiating, denouncing, and, with the consent of the
Parliamentary Assembly, ratifying treaties of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
(e) Executing decisions of the Parliamentary Assembly.
(f) Proposing, upon the recommendation of the Council of Ministers,
an annual budget to the Parliamentary Assembly.
(g) Reporting as requested, but not less than annually, to the
Parliamentary Assembly on expenditures by the Presidency.
(h) Coordinating as necessary with international and nongovernmental
organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
(i) Performing such other functions as may be necessary to carry out
its duties, as may be assigned to it by the Parliamentary
Assembly, or as may be agreed by the Entities.
4. Council of Ministers. The Presidency shall nominate the Chair of the
Council of Ministers, who shall take office upon the approval
of the House of Representatives. The Chair shall nominate a
Foreign Minister, a Minister for Foreign Trade, and other
Ministers as may be appropriate, who shall take office upon the
approval of the House of Representatives.
(a) Together the Chair and the Ministers shall constitute the Council
of Ministers. with responsibilIty for carrying out the policies
and decisions of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the fields referred
to in Article 111(1), (4), and (5) and reporting to the
Parliamentary Assembly (including, at least annually, on
expenditures by Bosnia and Herzegovina).
(b) No more than two-thirds of all Ministers may be appointed from
the territory of the Federation. The Chair shall also nominate
Deputy Ministers (who shall not be of the same constituent
people as their Ministers), who shall take office upon the
approval of the House of Representatives.
(c) The Council of Ministers shall resign if at any time there is a
vote of no-confidence by the Parliamentary Assembly.
______
Responses of Hon. Robert S. Gelbard to Questions Asked by Senator
D'Amato
Question. What plans does the United States have to deal with the
humanitarian emergency that would arise if Serbian ethnic cleansing in
Kosovo were to drive hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians across
international borders into Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia?
Answer. For several months, the Department has been working with
the Macedonian and Albanian governments, as well as the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Committee for the Red
Cross (ICRC) and other humanitarian organizations in Albania and
Macedonia to ensure that contingency planning is at an appropriate
level. The Department was pleased to see the international community's
quick, comprehensive response in the last month to the humanitarian
needs of the 15,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees in Albania and 65-80,000
displaced persons in Kosovo. NATO's Civil Emergency Planning cell and
members have been responsive to USC's call for NATO logistical support
for humanitarian organizations. There have been no reported refugee
flows to Macedonia.
In response to the UN and JCRC emergency appeals, the Department's
Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration has contributed $3.55
million to humanitarian organizations and will hold an additional $1.45
million in reserve. AID/Food for Peace is finalizing an additional $1
million contribution as well. In addition to those funds that will
address the humanitarian needs of refugees, Albanian families hosting
refugees and internally displaced persons, a portion of these funds
will go to continued contingency planning and preparedness in Macedonia
and Albania. We are confident that the international community and
government in Macedonia will respond quickly, if there are refugee
flows into Macedonia.
Context: In December 1992, President Bush sent a letter to
Milosevic warning him that ``In the event of a conflict in Kosovo
caused by Serbian action, the U.S. will be prepared to employ military
force against the Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper.'' This
language is classified SECRET/NODIS, but the New York Times and other
U.S. paper have reported the warning accurately. The UNCLASS version of
the warning notes only that ``The United States will respond in the
event of Serb-incident violence in Kosovo'' and does not make reference
to military intervention. The Clinton Administration reaffirmed the
``Christmas Warning'' in early 1993, but there has been little
reference to it since.
Question. Is the Christmas Warning still in force? Why doesn't the
Administration reiterate it?
Answer. There has been no change in U.S. policy regarding our
readiness to use force in the event of continued serious violence in
Kosovo.
As the President has said, all options are on the table, including
the use of military force. That is our position--that we are prepared
to use force. We would prefer that the situation be resolved through
talks--peaceful dialogue--and the NATO planning is done in support of
forceful diplomacy.
We have also made clear to the Kosovar Albanian leadership that we
will not tolerate violent acts committed by extremist elements in the
Albanian community.
Question. Is the United States actively gathering evidence on the
conduct of Serbian and Federal Republic of Yugoslavian forces in Kosovo
for submission if warranted to the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague? Has the United States found grounds
for the submission of such evidence?
Answer. The United States has been among the leaders in drawing the
attention of the international community to the fact that the ongoing
mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) applies to current events in Kosovo. On March 13,
1998, Secretary Albright announced the United States was contributing
more than $1 million for the support of the investigations of the
Office of the Prosecutor (QTP) in Kosovo and for other investigative
priorities.
The policy of the United States is to cooperate fully with the
Tribunal and to expect all other States to do the same. The
Administration reports to the Congress, including the House
Appropriations and International Relations Committees as well as the
Senate Appropriation and Foreign Relations Committees, every six months
on information-sharing with the OTP. The last such report was provided
in April 1998. These reports are unclassified. Information is provided
to the OTP in response to specific requests by the OTP and in
compliance with provisions of U.S. law and Rule 70 of the Tribunal's
rules of procedure, which apply to the confidentiality of information.
While the OTP has publicly disclosed its ongoing investigation into
events in Kosovo, the existence or extent of any requests by the OTP to
the U.S. Government for information on Kosovo are not a matter of
public record. It is a matter of public record that the U.S. policy of
full cooperation with the Tribunal, which has been in effect since the
Tribunal was established in 1993, continues in effect and without
limitation to any particular investigation.
Question. What configuration of internal Serbian political forces
is necessary, in your opinion, in order to permit Slobodan Milosevic to
come to the negotiating table without preconditions to talk with
Kosovar Albanian leaders under international mediation? When and how
will that condition be achieved?
Answer. From the outset of armed hostilities in Kosovo in March,
the international community has demanded that the Serb side make a
serious offer of dialogue with Kosovar Albanian leaders. We believe
that Milosevic can enter a serious, substantive dialogue immediately.
We will not accept any excuses from Milosevic or others that internal
forces somehow render him unable to accept this baseline demand of the
international community, which is essential for the resolution of the
conflict.
Question. Clearly, events in Kosovo have acquired a momentum of
their own. Serbian armed assaults against Kosovar Albanian villages
have boosted membership in and support for the Kosovo Liberation Army
while undercutting the political legitimacy of established Kosovar
Albanian political leaders. When, in your judgment, will time run out
on realistic prospects for a peaceful, negotiated settlement?
Answer. It is impossible to pinpoint a specific set of events that
would make a peaceful, negotiated settlement impossible.
Despite the deterioration of the situation on the ground in Kosovo
and the increasing radicalization of Kosovar Albanians, we believe that
there is still opportunity for dialogue and negotiation.
We will continue to push to get a meaningful dialogue started
between the government of the FRY and Kosovar Albanian leaders. We are
working with both sides to achieve a cease-fire so that negotiations
can go forward. The July 8 Contact Group statement calls for ``an
immediate cessation of hostilities in Kosovo to pave the way for
continuous talks between Belgrade and the Kosovo Albanian leadership on
additional confidence building measures and the future status of
Kosovo'' and says that ``Contact Group members will pursue this goal
through immediate talks with both Belgrade and the Kosovo Albanians.''
The main goal of U.S. policy toward Kosovo now seems to be to begin
a negotiation between Belgrade and the Kosovar Albanians in the
presence of an international third party. This means that we ultimately
want to see a deal, or agreement between Milosevic and the Kosovars.
What indication do we have that Milosevic wants to make a deal?
Certainly he is not under the same pressure he was for Dayton and,
absent NATO air strikes, he will not be. Furthermore, do we really
believe he wants a way out of the Kosovo crisis, when the crisis itself
is what seems to enhance his power and popularity in Serbia?
Ultimately, is it not also true that we are again relying on
Milosevic to have enough dictatorial power to be able to make a deal
stick? Are we not perpetuating his regime by relying on it rather than
isolating it? Does the United States believe there will ever be
genuine, long-term stability in the Balkans as long as Milosevic is in
power, and if not, are we considering the extent to which we are
perpetuating his rule?
Answer. We believe that Milosevic is under significant pressure,
and, along with our allies, we are continuing to step up this pressure
to force him to the negotiating table. We have already instituted
comprehensive economic sanctions and an arms embargo. Milosevic is
currently isolated from the international community.
We have made it clear that sanctions and isolation will continue
until Milosevic meets the demands of the Contact Group and makes a
serious effort to negotiate with Kosovar Albanian leaders. The Contact
Group has called for action in the UN Security Council to lock in the
commitments Milosevic made to President Yeltsin as well as the
requirements of the Contact Group.
Much as we would prefer that Milosevic not be in charge, he is the
person to deal with now to get a dialogue going or a settlement
implemented. The only alternative to dialogue is war, which is
unacceptable.
If Milosevic fails to take the required steps, the Contact Group
has made it clear that it will consider further action, including
action that would require UN Security Council authorization.
Milosevic faces a clear choice. If he fails to implement fully the
demands of the international community and make a credible attempt to
solve the Kosovo crisis peacefully, he will continue to face
international isolation, sanctions, and possible military action.
Question. It seems that the only thing Milosevic really responds to
is a credible threat of the use of force, which demonstrates the
resolve of the international community to stop him. Do you agree, and,
if not, do you believe the current sanctions announced by the Contact
Group in Bonn and Rome are credible, given clear differences between
the Contact Group countries, or sufficiently strong to compel Milosevic
to respond positively? If Milosevic does not respond positively, are we
ultimately willing to reissue the warning of military intervention
first made by President Bush and then reiterated by President Clinton?
Is there a possibility that, now, we could issue a no-fly zone over
Kosovo through the United Nations that would be enforced by NATO?
Answer. We have taken decisive steps to increase the pressure on
Milosevic to show positive movement on Kosovo. We fully support UN
Security Council Resolution 1160, which institutes an arms embargo on
the FRY. The U.S. and the EU have both imposed an investment ban on
Serbia and a freeze on the funds of the FRY and Serbian governments.
The EU is preparing to implement a ban on flights by Yugoslav air
carriers. The U.S. has suspended indefinitely the consideration of an
application by JAT (the Yugoslav national airline) to resume flights to
the U.S. There are no U.S. commercial carriers flying to Belgrade at
this time. We have made it clear to Milosevic that, if he fails to show
positive movement, we will continue to increase the pressure on him;
this may include further action in the UN Security Council. We will
continue to work with our allies to ensure that sanctions are as
effective as possible. We have exempted the pro-reform government of
Montenegro from all sanctions.
We are prepared to use force if the situation in Kosovo warrants
this. As the President has said, all options remain on the table, and
NATO military planners are in the process of developing a full range of
options in the event NATO decides to act in response to the crisis in
Kosovo. In addition, on July 8 the Contact Group stated that if
Milosevic does not fully implement his commitments to President Yeltsin
and the requirements of the Contact Group, ``the Contact Group will
consider further action under the United Nations Charter, including
action that may require the authorization of a UN Security Council
resolution, to bring about compliance by those who block the process.''
Such actions could include, but would not be limited to, declaration
and enforcement of a no-fly zone over Kosovo or parts of the FRY.
However, Russian reluctance to support UN Security Council
authorization of a more robust policy towards Kosovo is a limiting
factor that needs to be taken into consideration.
______
Reponse of Ambassador Gelbard to Questions asked by Senator Biden and
Senator D'Amato
Question. The OSCE has been mentioned as part of the international
response to the Kosovo crisis, with former Spanish Prime Minister
Felipe Gonzalez being offered as a high-level envoy and the Mission to
Kosovo which was expelled in 1993 readied for return.
What priority does the Administration place on OSCE involvement?
Answer. The U.S. continues to place a high priority on OSCE
involvement in the resolution of this crisis. FRY authorities
continuing refusal to comply with key OSCE and Contact Group demands
has, however, placed a practical limitation on OSCE activities within
the FRY. Key OSCE and Contact Group conditions include acceptance of
the OSCE Chairman-in-Office's (CiO's) Personal Representative Felipe
Gonzalez, the return of the OSCE Missions of Long Duration, and the
implementation of key stabilization measures. The OSCE continues to
play an important role through its border monitoring activities in
Albania, and its mission in FYROM. Recently, the CiO has opened
preliminary talks with FRY authorities regarding the possible return of
the OSCE Missions and FRY's status at the OSCE.
Question. Is the United States giving adequate attention to the
advantages of deploying international monitors on the ground to report
on what is happening, regardless of whether agreement can be reached on
the terms for a negotiation with a high level envoy?
Answer. Yes. Regarding OSCE missions, the U.S. has continuously
urged at high levels FRY authorities to reinstate the OSCE Missions of
Long Duration in Kosovo, Sanjak, and Vojvodina. The return of these
missions would serve as an important confidence building measure, and
would provide clear, unbiased reporting from the region. FRY
authorities have to date been unwilling to accept the return of these
missions without unacceptable preconditions.
The U.S. and other countries with Embassies in Belgrade have
established a Kosovo monitoring capability, staffed by Embassy
personnel, which have been increased for this purpose. Milosevic agreed
to this in conversations with U.S. diplomats and confirmed it in his
Moscow meeting with President Yeltsin. We have been monitoring the
situation in Kosovo for several months and are increasing our presence
there significantly, with hopes for reaching our full plan for
operations and staffing as soon as the remaining security and
communications provisions can be put into place. These efforts will
help provide a clearer picture of the situation in Kosovo, as well as
help reassure the inhabitants, of all ethnic groups, of the
international community's concern.