[Senate Hearing 105-559]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 105-559
DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA: THE NEW GENERATION OF AFRICAN LEADERS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 12, 1998
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
48-230 CC WASHINGTON : 1998
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
James W. Nance, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
JOHN, ASHCROFT, Missouri, Chairman
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
BILL FRIST, Tennessee PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Ayittey, Dr. George B.N., Associate Professor, Department of
Economics, American University and President of the Free Africa
Foundation, Washington, DC..................................... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Baker, Dr. Pauline, President, the Fund for Peace, Washington, DC 27
Prepared statement........................................... 30
Booker, Salih, Senior Fellow for Africa Studies, Council on
Foreign Relations, Washington, DC.............................. 34
Gordon, Dr. David F., Senior Fellow, Overseas Development
Council, Washington, DC........................................ 38
Prepared statement........................................... 41
Rice, Hon. Susan E., Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, Washington, DC........................................ 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
(iii)
DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA: THE NEW GENERATION OF AFRICAN LEADERS
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 12, 1998
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:06 p.m. In
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John
Ashcroft, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Ashcroft and Feingold.
Senator Ashcroft. The committee will come to order.
It is my pleasure to convene this hearing on Democracy in
Africa: The New Generation of African Leaders. This is
specifically an opportunity to focus on these leaders and their
policies to either promote or hinder political reform. ``That
to secure these rights,'' wrote Jefferson, ``governments are
instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed.''
It may seem odd for some to hear the Declaration read in
the context of a hearing on Africa. For those who hear mostly
of violence, bloodshed, and war in reference to Africa, the
principles of the Declaration might seem inapplicable and alien
to that troubled continent. Yet, to millions of Africans who
long to know freedom's embrace, the principles of the
Declaration are a constant source of hope and a focus of faith
and devotion.
Now some analysts have argued that Africa is not ready for
self-government, that Africa is too poorly educated, too
ethnically divided, and too economically poor. Upon hearing
those arguments, I cannot help but think of the harrowing
journeys and long lines millions of Africans endure just to
exercise their franchise.
Casting ballots alone, however, does not a democracy make.
Many of Africa's leaders have subverted the process of reform
to maintain their own hold on power. These leaders question the
feasibility of African democracy and then set about proving
their own predictions by inciting inter-ethnic violence,
silencing the press, or robbing their countries.
But there are also signs of hope. Economic growth appears
to be taking hold in certain countries. South Africa continues
to be an example of what can be achieved when political
leadership is committed to reconciliation.
The rise of a new generation of African leaders is
generally viewed as a positive development in Africa. Usually
comprised of President Laurent Kabila of the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Vice President Paul Kagame of Rwanda,
President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Prime Minister Meles
Zenawi of Ethiopia, and President Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea,
the new generation is best characterized by the pursuit of
African solutions for African problems--a greater independence
from the West and a less corrupt administration of their
countries.
To varying degrees, the administration views these leaders
as playing a central role in bringing prosperity to Africa.
In her recent trip to Africa, Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright stated that:
Africa's best new leaders have brought a new spirit of hope
and accomplishment to their countries and that spirit is
sweeping across the continent. They know the greatest authority
any leader can claim is the consent of the governed. They are
as diverse as the continent itself. But they share a common
vision of empowerment--for all their citizens, for their
Nations, and for their continent.
While Secretary Albright is to be applauded for her efforts
to increase U.S. engagement in Africa, such effusive statements
do not correspond to the political realities in the countries
of these new leaders. Without more cautious pronouncements from
senior administration officials, I fear we will wake up in
several years and find a new generation of African leaders has
become an old generation of African strong men.
These leaders have done much for their countries, but all
preside over de facto one-party States which do not allow for
self-government and have not established mechanisms for the
peaceful transfer of power. Political oppression, serious
violations of civil liberties, and a restricted press are all
elements of life in these countries.
These leaders certainly have replaced some of the most
corrupt and brutal governments in Africa. But their commitment
to genuine political reform and governmental institution
building still must be proven.
The position of the United States in defense of democracy
is less clear when we reverse course and promise to aid the
Democratic Republic of Congo after President Kabila has
suppressed opposition groups and undermined the U.N.
investigation of human rights atrocities. The position of the
United States is less clear when Angola helps topple the
democratically elected Government of the Republic of Congo
without so much as a U.S. sponsored U.N. resolution in
condemnation.
Neither the United States nor Africa is served by declaring
countries success stories before their time. I urge the
President in his upcoming trip to Africa to clarify U.S. policy
toward these new leaders who have an opportunity, a unique
opportunity, to consolidate political reform and set their
countries on the path to genuine stability.
It is my pleasure now to call upon Hon. Susan E. Rice,
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, to provide
testimony.
I am delighted to welcome you to the committee again,
Secretary Rice, and thank you for your willingness to
participate. I look forward to your contribution.
Thank you. Secretary Rice.
STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN E. RICE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Rice. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
With your permission, I would like to summarize my
statement and include it in its entirety in the record.
I would like to thank you for allowing me the opportunity
to testify before this subcommittee again on the issue of
Democracy in Africa. It has been only a few short months since
I appeared before the subcommittee to outline my vision for a
new U.S. policy toward Africa, if confirmed as Assistant
Secretary.
From the very outset, under President Clinton's leadership,
we have been steadfast in our pursuit of an aggressive policy
in support of democracy, political freedom, and human rights on
the African continent.
This is a pivotal time in both African and American
history. Our relationship with the continent is being recast
from one of indifference or dependency to one of genuine
partnership based on mutual respect and mutual interest.
There is a new interest in individual freedom and a
movement away from repressive, one-party systems. It is with
this new generation of Africans that we seek a dynamic, long-
term partnership for the 21st Century.
This partnership is being nurtured by the ascendance of
democracy and representative governance in Africa. Democracy
has taken root in many places on the continent, although not
with the intensity of the pace that some in the United States
might wish.
Africa's democratic march has been neither linear nor
monolithic, but it has registered significant headway.
In 1989, there were only five African countries that could
be described as democracies. Today, more than 20 countries have
governments resulting from elections generally deemed free and
fair by international observers.
We can be proud of United States efforts to advance African
democracy and support free electoral processes. Since 1989,
with Congress' support, we have invested more than $400 million
to spark, institutionalize, and then sustain democratic reform
in Africa. Yet elections are only a match to light the
democratic flame, a flame that can go out easily if not well
attended to.
Thus, the U.S. Government has programs in some 46 African
countries to consolidate and sustain the gains won through the
ballot box. Moreover, we have put promotion of democracy and
respect for human rights at the very top of our public and
private agendas with our African counterparts.
In Uganda, we have urged genuine political pluralism and
systems that incorporate a wider spectrum of political beliefs.
In Kenya, we have worked with international financial
institutions and other donors to make assistance contingent
upon stronger anti-corruption measures. We have also pressed
repeatedly for an inclusive process of constitutional reform,
to correct shortcomings in Kenya's democratic framework.
In Zambia, the United States has made plain that political
detainees, including Kenneth Kaunda, must be swiftly tried in a
fair and open process or released. We have also pressed
repeatedly for the lifting of the state of emergency.
United States' efforts to bolster respect for human rights
across the continent include support for legal reform,
improving administration of justice, and increasing citizens'
access to legal counsel and due process.
We are also working actively to empower African women, key
decision makers in this and the next century.
In crafting our overall assistance strategy, we take a
country to country approach. Indeed, each nation on the
continent is unique in its history, diversity, and culture.
Many African countries are on a path to participatory
democracy. However, some are on a rocky one and there have been
significant setbacks along this route.
Realizing that achieving full freedom is a continuous
process, we must stay actively engaged, even in flawed,
imperfect democracies. Countries struggling against long odds
to restore peace, stability, and prosperity after years of
repression need and deserve our encouragement, even for small
steps in the right direction.
Wherever possible, we should keep the lines of
communication open to press for genuine and sustainable
democracy and respect for human rights.
In Central Africa, especially, war, genocide, political and
economic disarray, and resultant refugee flows have destroyed
social cohesion, weakened the rule of law, and led to massive
human rights abuses. In this context, we believe support for
the people of the Democratic Republic of Congo is essential,
even as the record of the Congolese Government is mixed and
sometimes worrisome.
We remain deeply concerned by President Kabila's detention
of opposition leader Tshisekedi, the detention and harassment
of journalists, and by the trial of civilians before military
tribunals.
Nevertheless, our efforts must be directed at achieving a
successful transition to a post-Mobutu era in which respect for
human rights, democracy, and prosperity are assured.
In addition, we will continue to press hard and loudly for
a full accounting of human rights violations in the Congo and
the rest of the Great Lakes region.
Where repression is endemic, we will meet it with a tough
and sure response. Last year, we imposed sweeping new economic
sanctions on Sudan, because of its continued sponsorship of
international terrorism and its human rights abuses, including
slavery and religious persecution.
In Nigeria, we hold General Abacha to his promise to
undertake a genuine transition to civilian rule this year and
to establish a level playing field by allowing free political
activity, providing for an open press, and ending political
detention.
Let me state clearly and unequivocally, Mr. Chairman, that
an electoral victory by any military candidate in the
forthcoming Presidential elections in Nigeria would be
unacceptable. Nigeria needs and deserves a real transition to
democracy and civilian rule.
As democratization and respect for human rights is
dependent upon and closely linked to conflict resolution, so,
too, is economic growth and development necessary to sustain
African political stability.
As part of our overall efforts to lift the democratic tide
in Africa, we support Africa's long overdue integration into
the global economy. Thus we are pleased that the African Growth
and Opportunity Act, passed just yesterday by the House of
Representatives, is an important step forward in this effort.
We commend Senator Lugar and other co-sponsors for their
visionary leadership on this issue, and we hope the Senate will
be able to pass this landmark legislation as soon as possible.
We also hope the Senate will take another important step to
brighten Africa's prospects in the 21st century and consider
the speedy and favorable ratification of the United Nations
Convention to Combat Desertification.
This is an issue of particular importance to the African
continent and especially to the drought prone Sahelian region.
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by saying that next week,
President Clinton, as you know, will embark on an historic six
nation mission to the African continent, visiting Ghana,
Uganda, Rwanda, South Africa, Botswana and Senegal. At the very
top of his agenda will be promoting a partnership with Africa
for the 21st century, a partnership founded on a common
commitment to democratic principles and universal respect for
human rights.
The President will announce concrete steps to help the
Great Lakes region succeed in its transition to peace and
security as well as new initiatives to promote and sustain
democracy.
Although President Clinton's visit is a milestone in U.S.-
Africa relations, it must not be viewed as the terminus. We
must and we will continue our long-term efforts to help
Africans build a brighter future, not out of altruism alone but
out of a clear-minded understanding of our mutual interest in
working together to achieve peace, democracy, and prosperity.
But let me be very plain: We will never retreat from our
steadfast support for democratization and universal standards
of human rights in Africa. The breadth and depth of our
democracy programs and our diplomacy, starting at the beginning
of this administration, are testimony to our enduring
commitment to these principles.
Although Africans will definitely determine their own
destiny, the U.S. cannot afford to be a passive bystander in
their struggles, achievements, and regressions. We need to
promote policies that foster a level playing field, policies
based on partnership, not paternalism, and on democratic
aspirations, not past failures.
I look forward to working closely with you, Mr. Chairman,
and other members of this subcommittee as we seek stronger and
more productive ties between the United States and our African
partners.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Rice follows:]
Prepared Statement of Susan E. Rice
Good afternoon. Thank you for allowing me the opportunity, Mr.
Chairman, to testify before your distinguished Subcommittee on the
issue of democracy in Africa. It has only been a few short months since
I appeared before this Subcommittee to outline my vision for a new U.S.
policy towards Africa if confirmed as Assistant Secretary. From the
very outset, under President Clinton's leadership, we have been
steadfast in our pursuit of an aggressive policy in support of
democracy, political freedom and human rights on the African continent.
This is a pivotal time in both African and U.S. history. Our
relationship with the Continent is being recast from one of
indifference or dependency to one of genuine partnership based on
mutual respect and mutual interest. The Africa of today is no longer
the one of televised images of famine, war, and genocide that poured
into our living rooms over the past decade. Those images are
misleading. They are only part of a much greater story--a story of
change that South Africa's Deputy President Thabo Mbeki has called an
``African Renaissance.'' There is now an inspired determination--a new
mind set if you will--among the Continent's citizens to move from
exclusive to inclusive societies, from dependence to self-reliance, and
from poverty to prosperity. Africans from all walks of life--scholars,
teachers and crafts people--are finding strength in unity, dignity in
debate, and a desire to work for the rights and opportunities they have
long been denied. From strong women entrepreneurs in Ghana, to
Congolese civic leaders who have persevered despite 30 years of
Mobutuism, there is a new interest in individual freedom and a movement
away from repressive one-party systems. It is with this new generation
of Africans that we seek a dynamic long-term partnership for the 2lst
century.
This new partnership is being nurtured by the ascendance of
democracy and representative governance in Africa. Democracy has taken
root in many places on the Continent, although, not with the intensity
or pace some in the United States might wish. Africa's democratic march
has been neither linear nor monolithic, but it has registered
significant headway. In 1989, there were only five African countries
that could be described as democracies: today more than 20 countries
have governments resulting from elections deemed generally free and
fair by international observers. If the 1980's were the time of
gripping war, devastating famine, apartheid and despotism--the 1990's
are more a time of opening, of healing, and of slow but pulsing
progress.
In this decade, we have witnessed the dramatic end of apartheid in
South Africa. We saw the conclusion of protracted wars in the Horn of
Africa and the end of deadly strife in Mozambique, Liberia and, we
hope, in Angola. In West Africa, Benin embraced multi-party democracy
and established a vibrant legislature. Mali moved from confrontation to
consensus-building as the means of bridging differences rooted in the
past. Ghana formulated a viable constitution and conducted free and
fair national elections. Ethiopia transitioned from war and years of
Marxist government to a system of government that is a work in
progress, but a far cry from the days of the Derg. Indeed, democratic
institutions--however fragile and imperfect--form the basis for
governance in most nations in Sub-Saharan Africa.
We can be proud of U.S. efforts to advance African democracy and
support free electoral processes. Since 1989, we have invested more
than $400 million to spark, institutionalize and then sustain
democratic reform. In South Africa, the U.S. government provided
substantial assistance to the new Government of National Unity. In
Ghana, we trained 4,500 electoral observers and helped with a
comprehensive voter registration effort for the 1996 national and then
1997 local elections. We provided electoral assistance to Mozambique--
training 52,400 election officers and 32,000 political party poll
watchers and deploying them to over 7,000 voting locations. We provided
Zambians assistance with elections in 1994, supported Tanzanians in
their first multiparty contest in 1995, and aided Ugandans with the
establishment of a Constitutional Assembly. Proving that democracy has
a firm and growing hold in Southern Africa, we returned to assist
Namibia with its second-round of democratic national elections in 1994.
Yet elections are only a match to light the democratic flame--a
flame that can easily go out if not tended. Thus, the U.S. government
has programs in 46 African countries to consolidate and sustain the
gains won through the ballot box. In post election Malawi, for example,
we provided training and assistance to strengthen the parliament,
modernize the judiciary and enhance the election commission. Since
then, Malawi's parliament has passed constitutional safeguards on human
rights and enacted anti-corruption legislation. In post-apartheid South
Africa, we have supported the drafting of a progressive new
constitution and have assisted the remarkable Truth and Reconciliation
Commission process. To deal with threats to its young democracy, we are
also helping South African law enforcement authorities fight rising
crime in the country's growing cities.
To be clear, we have gone well past the point of merely funding
national elections. We are providing support to build strong
institutions and vibrant civil societies. In Kenya, we support a wide
range of pro-democracy groups that press for institutionalized
constitutional reform. We also sponsor regional programs to consolidate
democratic norms and increase networking and human rights advocacy
across Southern Africa. In Rwanda, we provided equipment to the Rwandan
Association of Journalists to strengthen the media's independence and
role in civil society. To foster a viable legislative branch, we have
provided training and simultaneous translation equipment to Rwanda's
nascent parliament. In Ethiopia--a country synonymous with famine just
a decade ago--this Administration has supported not only elections, but
decentralization, civil service reform and constitutional drafting.
Moreover, we have put promotion of democracy and respect for human
rights at the very top of our public and private agendas with our
African counterparts. We constantly engage African leaders on issues of
political reform and good governance, on the need for effective anti-
corruption efforts, and on the critical importance of the rule of law
and a predictable regulatory environment. In Uganda, we have urged
genuine political pluralism and systems that incorporate a wider
spectrum of political beliefs. In Kenya, we have worked with
international financial institutions and other donors to make
assistance contingent upon stronger anti-corruption measures. We also
have pressed repeatedly for an inclusive process of constitutional
reform to correct short-comings in Kenya's democratic framework. In
Zambia, the U.S. has made plain that political detainees--including
Kenneth Kaunda--must be swiftly tried in a fair and open process or
released. We have pressed repeatedly for the lifting of the State of
Emergency.
The United States' efforts to bolster respect for human rights
across the Continent include support for legal reform, improving
administration justice, and increasing citizens' access to legal
counsel and due process. In this area, we are plowing new ground. The
United States has strongly supported the International War Crimes
Tribunal for Rwanda and human rights field monitors in Rwanda and
Burundi. In Liberia, U.S. assistance helped launch the new Liberian
Human Rights Center, and this year it will fund that Center's outreach
programs country-wide. In Uganda, we support the Ugandan Law Reform
Commission, which is compiling all existing statutes and regulations to
allow access to legal information for all Ugandans.
We are working actively to empower African women--key decision
makers in this and the next century. U.S. supported-NGOs provide legal
assistance and advice to women in Tanzania; and in Mali, where we fund
civic and voter education programs, we will expand women's rights
training programs nation-wide. In Botswana, we have supported
grassroots NGOs that ensure human rights protection for women, children
and minorities. We work with the Malawian and the Namibian women's
caucuses to help them represent the needs of women by reviewing
legislation for gender sensitivity, forging cooperation across party
lines, and launching human rights awareness campaigns focused on the
rights of women and children in the region.
In crafting our overall assistance strategy, we take a country-to-
country approach. Indeed, each nation on the Continent is unique in its
history, diversity and culture. Many African countries are on a path to
participatory democracy--however, some are on a rocky one and there
have been significant setbacks along this route. Nascent democracies in
Sierra Leone and Congo-Brazzaville were toppled in violent take-overs.
Political competition and freedom of the press have been stifled in
many African nations. The Democratic Republic of the Congo will
continue to suffer from the effects of armed conflict and decades of
internal repression for years to come.
Realizing that achieving full freedom is a continuous process, we
must stay actively engaged even in flawed, imperfect democracies.
Countries struggling against long-odds to restore peace, stability and
prosperity after years of repression need and deserve our encouragement
for even small steps in the right direction. Wherever possible, we
should keep the lines of communication open to press for genuine and
sustainable democracy and respect for human rights.
In Central Africa especially, war, genocide, political and economic
disarray, and resultant refugee flows have destroyed social cohesion,
weakened the rule of law, and led to massive human rights abuses.
During Secretary Albright's recent visit to Africa, she announced the
launching of a Great Lakes Justice Initiative--an effort designed to
assist the states of the region to strengthen justice and respect for
the rule of law, so as to help break the cycle of violence and
impunity. We will be working actively and in partnership with the
governments in the region in developing this initiative. The Secretary
also pressed publicly and privately for concrete steps to ease ethnic
tensions, ensure inclusive government and stop human rights abuses. She
stressed the importance of the huge centrally-located African nation of
Congo to regional security and emphasized our support for the Congolese
people who suffered so much under the misrule of Mobutu.
We believe support for the people of Congo is essential even as the
record of the Congolese government is mixed and sometimes worrisome. We
remain deeply concerned by President Kabila's detention of opposition
leader Etienne Tshisekedi, the detention and harassment of journalists,
and by the trial of civilians before military tribunals. Working with
the friends of Congo and bilaterally, our efforts must be directed at
achieving a successful transition to a post-Mobutu era in which respect
for human rights, democracy and prosperity are assured. In addition, we
will continue to press hard and loudly for a full accounting of human
rights violations in the Congo and the rest of the Great Lakes Region.
We must nurture latent democratic processes, promote economic growth,
and foster reconciliation throughout the region.
Where repression is endemic, we will meet it with a tough and sure
response. Late last year, we imposed sweeping new economic sanctions
against the government of Sudan because of its continued sponsorship of
international terrorism and its human rights abuses, including slavery
and religious persecution. In Nigeria, we hold General Abacha to his
promise to undertake a genuine transition to civilian rule this year
and to establish a level playing field by allowing free political
activity, providing for an open press and ending political detention.
Let me state clearly and unequivocally to you today that an electoral
victory by any military candidate in the forthcoming presidential
elections would be unacceptable. Nigeria needs and deserves a real
transition to democracy and civilian rule.
Throughout Africa, the Administration complements its hands-on
support for grassroots democracy by helping African countries prevent,
resolve and recover from conflict. U.S. leadership and resources were
instrumental in bringing an end to the wars in Mozambique and Angola.
Our diplomats are actively engaged in Burundi to help forge a peaceful
resolution to the persistent conflict there. We have provided more than
$90 million to the West African peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, in order to
bring peace to Liberia, and we are the largest investor in developing
the OAU's Conflict Management Center. In addition, we have launched an
African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) to enhance the capacity of
African nations to respond to humanitarian crises and peacekeeping
challenges.
As democratization and respect for human rights is dependent upon,
and closely linked to, conflict resolution so too is economic growth
and development necessary to sustain African political stability. Thus,
as part of our overall efforts to lift the democratic tide in Africa,
we support Africa's long-overdue integration into the global economy.
Trade, investment, assistance and debt relief will nurture Africa's
budding democracies and help relieve the endemic poverty that plagues
Africa--poverty that spurs unrest and insecurity. Through President
Clinton's Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity and
legislation now pending before Congress--the African Growth and
Opportunity Act--we are committed to helping countries that undertake
dynamic economic reforms reap the additional benefits of increased
access to U.S. markets. We are pleased that the African Growth and
Opportunity Act passed the House yesterday. We commend Senator Lugar
and other co-sponsors for their leadership on this issue and hope the
Senate will be able to pass this legislation as soon as possible.
We also hope the Senate will take another important step to help
brighten Africa's prospects in the 21st century--the ratification of
the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification. This is an
issue of particular importance to the African continent, and especially
to the drought-prone Sahelian region.
Next week, President Clinton will embark on an historic six-nation
mission to the African continent--visiting Ghana, Uganda, Rwanda, South
Africa, Botswana and Senegal. At the top of his agenda will be
promoting a partnership with Africa for the 21st century--a partnership
founded on a common commitment to democratic principles and universal
respect for human rights. The President will announce concrete steps to
help the Great Lakes Region succeed in its transition to peace and
stability, as well as new initiatives to promote and sustain democracy.
Although President Clinton's visit is a milestone in U.S.-Africa
relations, it must not be viewed as an end-zone. We must and we will
continue our long-term efforts to help Africans build a brighter
future--not out of altruism alone--but out of a clear-minded
understanding of our mutual interest in working together to achieve
peace, democracy and prosperity.
Mr. Chairman, let me be very plain: we will never retreat from our
steadfast support for democratization and universal standards of human
rights in Africa. The breadth and depth of our democracy programs and
diplomacy starting at the beginning of this administration are
testimony to our enduring commitment to these principles. Although
Africans will determine their own destiny, the U.S. cannot afford to be
a passive bystander in their struggles, achievements and regressions.
We need to create policies that foster a level playing field--policies
based on partnership, not paternalism, and on democratic aspirations,
not past failures. I look forward to working closely and constructively
with you and other members of this Subcommittee as we seek stronger and
more productive ties between the United States and its African
partners. Thank you.
Senator Ashcroft. Thank you, Secretary Rice.
If you would be available to answer a few questions, I
would be grateful.
Dr. Rice. As always.
Senator Ashcroft. Thank you.
How important a factor are these new leaders from Uganda,
Rwanda, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo
for the administration as U.S. Africa policy is being
formulated? What role do they have with respect to U.S. policy
in Africa? Do they have a role of influence outside their own
borders?
Dr. Rice. Mr. Chairman, let me begin by saying that I think
the term ``new leaders'' has taken on several connotations that
are not what we intended when we used that term.
When we talk about ``new leaders,'' we mean a group of
individuals as diverse as President Konare of Mali, President
Mkapa of Tanzania, and Deputy President Thabo Mbeki of South
Africa, among others.
We are pointing to individuals who are committed to finding
new solutions to problems in Africa, who have a vision for
Africa that is inclusive, that is forward looking, that is
self-reliant, in which the citizens of their countries enjoy
prosperity, are not burdened by corruption, and have an
opportunity to express their will freely and in an environment
where their basic human rights will be respected.
Now as for the countries you pointed to, some of them have
visionary, relatively new leaders, and we have worked closely
with them on issues of mutual interest. We see them as playing
an important role in several respects.
Let me mention in particular in this regard Prime Minister
Meles of Ethiopia, President Isaias of Eritrea, and President
Museveni of Uganda. These leaders have come together with a
vision for not only Eastern and Central Africa, but the
continent as a whole, that we largely support. It is a vision
of self reliance, of sustained economic growth and prosperity,
and of a sustainable form of democracy that takes into account
the particular histories of individual countries but does not
compromise on fundamental principles of respect for human
rights.
But they come from countries that have emerged from
conflict, conflicts that have been deadly and, in many cases,
long-lasting. Their progress thus far has been laudable, but
the results are not perfect. We think in many respects there is
a long way to go in a number of countries in Africa when it
comes to democracy as we know it and respect for human rights.
But we think it is important that, where there is positive
progress and the proper motivation, the United States step in
to try to accelerate the achievement of lasting democracy and
respect for human rights.
Senator Ashcroft. When you say you take into account
individual histories, what factors in the history of a country
are considered in terms of affecting what kind of expectation,
is held for democratic reform in that country? Would you give
some examples of that.
Dr. Rice. Let me take an extreme example but an important
one--and that is Rwanda--which has suffered recurrent genocide
over many years but, most recently, obviously, the tragic
genocide of 1994. That is a country that has been torn asunder
by ethnic violence, by long-standing economic competition, and
by a history of colonialism which, in fact, has been very
pernicious in that particular context.
In that light, while we certainly insist upon the need for
respect for human rights and for an inclusive political system,
it is hard to imagine that an overnight transformation to a
multiparty democracy will be sustainable and can happen without
great bloodshed.
So we think it is very important that Rwanda, as well as
other countries, move in that direction; but they have to do so
in a way that takes account of their particular histories and
experiences so that the democracy that emerges ultimately can
be sustained.
Senator Ashcroft. In which areas are the new leaders likely
to cooperate with each other and in which areas are their
policy objectives likely to diverge?
Dr. Rice. I think the area of greatest convergence is
probably in the security realm, particularly if you are talking
about those new leaders in the Central and East African region.
There they have come together to try to counter a common threat
from the Government of Sudan, which has exported terrorism not
only far afield abroad but also most directly in the
neighboring countries.
As you know, they are cooperating in an effort to try to
bring about change in the government in Sudan.
They also came together when they perceived the common
threat that Mobutu's Zaire posed. While we had urged and would
much have preferred a negotiated solution to the conflict in
Zaire, the leaders of the region determined that it was in
their mutual interest to try to end the security threats posed
by the refugee camps in Eastern Zaire and to bring a halt to
Mobutu's 30 years of destabilizing his neighbors.
Their interests may diverge when it comes to the path they
take to democratization and to the degree that they are able to
achieve in the near-term what we would call full and universal
respect for human rights.
Let me just finally say that another area of convergence
is, I think, a mutual aspiration for economic prosperity, a
relative commitment to end corruption, and a desire to form
economic partnerships and regional integration that might
sustain otherwise fairly fragile economies in a regional
cooperative fashion and bring prosperity to their people.
Senator Ashcroft. I want to thank you for taking your time,
Secretary Rice, to come and make a presentation to the
committee.
The Senate is in the midst of a vote. It is my habit to
vote with the Senate during the time interval allowed. So I beg
the indulgence and tolerance of those of you who are interested
individuals who have come here and those who have come to make
presentations.
It is my decision now to recess the subcommittee for about
15 minutes while I go and vote in accordance with my
responsibilities.
[Recess]
Senator Ashcroft. It is my pleasure to reconvene the
subcommittee meeting and to thank you all for your patience
during this time when you were required to stay so that I might
have the opportunity to vote.
It is my pleasure now to call upon the Senator from
Wisconsin, Senator Feingold, for either remarks or questions,
whatever he chooses.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for
not being able to be here at the beginning. We have four or
five different things going on at once, as so often happens
here, and I apologize.
I thank Secretary Rice for waiting for a while so that I
could ask her some questions. I will make a statement later.
One thing I wanted to ask you, Madam Secretary, is how does
the administration assess the record of African leaders, in
particular, in holding their militaries accountable for
observing international humanitarian law and, in general, how
can this country encourage civilian control of the military in
some of these key African countries?
Dr. Rice. Senator, I think the record of African
governments in that regard is mixed. Those that are on the path
to democracy and respect for human rights have generally done a
fairly good job. Even in some countries where the leadership of
the country may have come to power by military means, there is
a fair degree of control of the military.
But this is a persistent problem in a number of places; and
there are a number of countries, as you well know, where
civilian control of the military is weak, at best.
In my opinion, one of the best things that we can do in
this regard is to continue our efforts to help professionalize
African militaries, particularly through IMET programs and
particularly through expanded IMET, which is targeted at human
rights training and training of a responsible officer corps
that is responsible to civilian control.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
I would now like to ask a few questions about the
President's upcoming trip to Africa. I am delighted. This is
something that I have mentioned at many hearings over the years
and was extremely pleased to see the Secretary of State make
the effort and spend substantial time in Africa.
I guess you have outlined some of the goals of the trip.
But I would like to ask you about some of the details if you
are able to discuss them.
To what extent is the President planning to meet with
nongovernmental voices, such as opposition leaders,
journalists, women's groups, and the like?
Dr. Rice. To the extent possible in what, as you can
imagine, is a very tight schedule, he will try to make
opportunity to do just that. We expect that in at least one
location he will have a meeting with civil society leaders
from, we hope, a variety of countries in Africa to talk about
their experiences, to hear their concerns, and to show that the
United States is committed to the promotion and sustainment of
civil society.
In various countries he will also have the opportunity to
see some opposition leaders. Some of that will be in the
context of larger meetings or in social contexts. He may also
have a meeting here and there with individual opposition
leaders. That has been an important consideration in putting
together the trip and, to the greatest extent possible, we have
tried to factor that in.
Senator Feingold. I appreciate that.
How will the President respond to the inevitable questions
he will get about our Nigeria policy?
Dr. Rice. Senator, as you well know, we have been in a
long, drawn-out process of looking at our Nigeria policy. That
process I hope will soon be coming to a conclusion. It
certainly has accelerated in the last several weeks.
As I said in my opening statement, we will hold Nigeria and
General Abacha to his own stated commitment to effect a
transition to civilian democratic rule this year. Were he not
to do that, and were a military candidate of any stripe to
emerge victorious from that election, we would consider that
unacceptable. Obviously, as we finalize our policy review, we
will be looking very much forward to consultations with you,
the Chairman, and others about that policy and seek your
guidance.
But soon thereafter we want to begin the process of talking
to key allies and partners in Africa to consider what steps we
might take in response to various possible outcomes in Nigeria.
Senator Feingold. I appreciate hearing that. Let me
respectfully suggest that perhaps the President, when he is in
Africa, could express some of the points that you just made, if
that is something you could suggest to him that he do.
Which African heads of State will join the President at the
regional summit in Uganda? What is the rationale in picking
which leaders would be involved?
Dr. Rice. I think the final list of participants has not
been finally determined. But there will be leaders from East
and Central Africa. I can name a few if that is useful, but I
do not want to leave you with the impression that it is a
finite set, necessarily.
At this point we expect Prime Minister Meles of Ethiopia to
be there, obviously President Museveni, President Mkapa,
President Moi of Kenya, President Bizimungu of Rwanda, and
President Kabila of former Zaire, now Congo.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
With regard to the role of Reverend Jesse Jackson as a
Special Envoy for Democracy and Governance in Africa, could you
say a little bit about his role in helping to shape U.S. Africa
policy and how do you think his efforts have gone?
Dr. Rice. Reverend Jackson is playing a unique, but very
valuable role. His role focuses on the democracy side of our
policy, which is a very fundamental element of the overall
policy toward Africa. He has a limited amount of time (60 days
per calendar year) by government regulation that he can spend
on Africa policy in his informal status.
So we are trying to use his time in a targeted and
effective fashion.
He has, for the most part, been used as a trouble shooter.
He has been dispatched twice to Kenya, once to the Democratic
Republic of Congo, where his mission was to primarily
underscore that our interest in the Congo was not in any
particular leader or any government but in the long-term
transformation of that country. Therefore, he met with a broad
variety of opposition leaders as well as with civil society.
Unfortunately, he did not have the opportunity to meet with
President Kabila, which had been his intention.
He has also spent time in Liberia and Zambia.
I hope and expect that he will make similar missions in the
future, both when there are troubles on the horizon that fall
into the category of democratization, where he may be able to
lend the voice and weight of the U.S. Government, but also
where there are opportunities.
Senator Feingold. Let me be clear that I am enthusiastic
about his involvement in this. I think he can contribute a
great deal.
Mr. Chairman, I have just one more question following on
that about the incident you alluded to in Congo where, as I
understand it, the last minute there was a decision by
President Kabila not to meet with Reverend Jackson.
Does this represent a rift in our United States-Congo
relations? As I understand it, it had something to do with
Reverend Jackson's meeting with opposition leader Etienne
Tshisekedi. Does this threaten at all Reverend Jackson's
ability to perform his duties in other countries?
Dr. Rice. I would not say it represents a rift, and I
certainly do not think it affects his ability to perform his
duties in other countries.
I think it was an unfortunate decision by the Government of
Congo to decide at the last minute not to see Reverend Jackson.
We don't know precisely why they made that decision, although
there are some indications that it may have been out of pique
that he had met with opposition leaders prior to meeting with
the President.
We think that was a missed opportunity and an unfortunate
incident. It is reflective of a pattern of behavior that is a
little bit erratic and sometimes worrisome, as I said in my
testimony.
But, having said that, I think our challenge with respect
to the Congo is much broader than President Kabila or any
individual leader or party. It is a huge country in the heart
of Africa whose future will affect the fate of all of Central
and Southern Africa.
So our interest is in trying to intersect with this window
of opportunity, this post-Mobutu era, and to try, as best we
can, with others in the international community in the region
to encourage the Congo to achieve its potential, to ultimately
achieve democracy, full respect for human rights, and economic
prosperity.
If we succeed, the benefits for all of Africa are
substantial. If Congo fails, the ramifications for the region
could be dire.
Senator Feingold. I appreciate your comments about Congo.
Let me just be absolutely clear. I think President Kabila
should have met with Reverend Jackson, and this was not a good
reason not to meet with him. I don't want anybody to interpret
my remarks as a criticism of Reverend Jackson. I am pleased
that he attempted to meet with President Kabila.
Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Rice. Thank you.
Senator Ashcroft. Let me thank the Assistant Secretary for
coming and for spending the time that she did. Also, thank you
for waiting while it was necessary for us to be absent in order
to vote.
We thank you for your cooperation with the subcommittee and
look forward to working with you further.
Dr. Rice. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Response of Assistant Secretary Rice to a Further Question for the
Record Submitted by Senator Brownback
Question. What is this administration's plan to engage in a
constructive dialogue to promote free and fair elections this August in
Nigeria?
Answer. The upcoming election is an opportunity for Nigeria to
advance democracy in Africa and take a large step toward realizing its
vast potential for leadership on the continent.
We have publicly and privately let Nigerian officials know the
criteria we believe necessary for a free and fair election: release of
political prisoners, a contest open to all legitimate candidates,
parties allowed to organize and select viable candidates, candidates
and parties free to campaign throughout the country, the press free to
report on the process without fear of harassment or suppression, and
equal access to state-owned media by all candidates.
We are concerned about the direction the transition appears to be
taking. If steps are, not taken to create more political space, we
believe the transition will not lead to a credible civilian government
and the realization of Nigeria's potential for enormous good on the
continent.
Senator Ashcroft. It is now my pleasure to call upon the
next panel of witnesses: Dr. George Ayittey, Associate
Professor at American University; Dr. Pauline Baker, President
of the Fund for Peace; Mr. Salih Booker, Senior Fellow for
Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Dr.
David Gordon, Senior Fellow at the Overseas Development
Council.
Dr. George B. N. Ayittey is Associate Professor of
Economics at the American University and President of the Free
Africa Foundation, Washington, DC.
Dr. Ayittey, I am honored that you would be here to make a
presentation to the subcommittee. I welcome your contribution.
If you can, try to limit your opening remarks to about five
minutes. We have 65 minutes in which to complete this hearing
and at some time I think the Ranking Member of the subcommittee
wants to make a statement of his own.
With that in mind, I welcome you and thank you for your
willingness to help us. We look forward to hearing your remarks
and asking you questions.
STATEMENT OF DR. GEORGE B.N. AYITTEY, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR,
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY AND PRESIDENT OF
THE FREE AFRICA FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC.
Dr. Ayittey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a longer
prepared statement, but I would hope to summarize it within the
timeframe that you indicated.
I would like to than you for this opportunity to testify
before this Subcommittee on Africa. As I understand it, the
purpose of this hearing is to determine the prospects for
democracy and of the new leaders, the new African leaders, and
how the U.S. should interact and help them. Specifically, the
new leaders comprise the following: Presidents Museveni of
Uganda, Paul Kagame of Rwanda, Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, Isaias
Afwerki of Eritrea, and Laurent Kabila of the Congo.
Mr. Chairman, these leaders share certain characteristics.
They all have a military background and they have all
successfully waged recently a guerrilla campaign to remove
corrupt and tyrannical regimes from power. They have inherited
shattered economies, collapsed infrastructure, and, therefore,
they are in the process of rebuilding their countries.
We all know about the 1994 Rwanda massacre in which more
than 700,000 Tutsis were slaughtered. Paul Kagame faces a very
formidable task of healing ethnic wounds in Rwanda and also
rebuilding the country.
Senator Ashcroft. Doctor, would you please bring the
microphone closer to you so that we can all hear.
I am not sure about the audience. Can you hear him in the
back of the room?
I see that they are having trouble. They would like to hear
you. I am sorry that I did not ask you to do this sooner. So
please project your voice right into the microphone.
Dr. Ayittey. OK.
In the Democratic Republic of Congo before a collapse in
October, 1996, after 32 years of misrule by the late Mobutu
Sese Seko, there, too, we have had government structures which
have collapsed, the infrastructure has crumbled, roads have
completely disintegrated, and there is a formidable task of
also rebuilding this country.
Now there is also a similar situation that we have in
Ethiopia and also in Eritrea. These new leaders need all the
help that they can get. I believe that the U.S. should help
them in whatever way it can.
I am heartened to note that the Clinton administration is
paying more attention to Africa, especially the Central African
region, because after a period of abandonment and benign
neglect, as an African, it seems to me that the administration
is now placing Africa on the front burner.
Since 1995, the White House has held a series of high level
conferences on Africa and sent senior administration officials
on various African tours. The former Secretary of State, Warren
Christopher, was in Africa in 1996 to promote the African
Crisis Response Initiative. This was also followed by the First
Lady, Hillary Clinton, and Chelsea visiting Africa in 1997.
Also this was followed by Madeleine Albright who was in Africa
last October. Of course, we know that this month President
Clinton will be going to Africa.
Also, this week, yesterday, the Congress passed the African
Growth and Employment Initiative Act.
Mr. Chairman, there are bound to be differences of opinion
in regard to how best the U.S. can help Africa. I am sure you
have heard some lament in some quarters that the U.S. is not
doing enough to help Africa or that the help must be coupled
with some substantial debt cancellation.
In my opinion, however, the issue is not so much whether
the U.S. should help Africa or not. I think, rather, what the
issue is is helping Africa effectively.
This is because since 1990, more than $400 billion in
various Western aid and credits have been pumped into Africa
with very negligible results. Somalia is a case in point where
in 1993, it cost the international community $3.5 billion in a
humanitarian mission. Somalia represents a case where quite
often the U.S. wades into a complex African situation without
understanding the causes of the crisis and then withdraws when
the going gets tough.
Nor is the issue whether there are any success stories in
Africa. There are. But these success stories are few.
Economically, the continent of Africa is making some very,
very painful progress. Politically, we find some serious
setbacks in the democratization process.
Right now, we have had the number of democracies in Africa
increase from 4 in 1990 to a figure like 15 today. These series
of races occurred, some of them occurred last year, when
democratically elected governments in Congo and also in Sierra
Leone were removed by military soldiers.
Clearly, more needs to be done to help Africa, the new
leaders in Africa, in their efforts to democratize Africa. But
I believe that consistency in substance should be the
overarching tenets of U.S. efforts to promote democracy.
It is true that the Clinton administration is doing far
more than its predecessor governments. But the objectives right
now are muddled and the signals that we are getting from the
administration are confusing.
You may remember that after Madeleine Albright returned
from Africa there was some talk among the administration
officials that Africa needs stability and not democracy. Also
very disturbing was the administration's response to the recent
setbacks in the African democratization process, which has been
muted and rather disappointing. The administration's policy on
Nigeria seems to be in total disarray, although today we heard
from the Assistant Secretary of State, Susan Rice, that there
might be a new policy in the offing.
Mr. Chairman, the issue is not so much what the policy
should be but, rather, the approach to African problems and
efforts to promote democracy.
When I hear the term ``new leaders,'' it sort of conjures
up some eerie reminiscences to the cold war, because the
mistake that was made during that particular period was to
emphasize, to place so much faith in the leadership rather than
in institutions.
I believe that there ought to be a shift. It is not so much
what these new leaders say or what they profess their
commitments to be but, rather, the institutions.
Mr. Chairman, let me say that we cannot build democracy in
Africa without having in place the supporting institutions.
These supporting institutions are not that many. There are only
five of them. If I may relate them to you: first we need to
have an independent judiciary in Africa. That independent
judiciary is the only institution which can effectively insure
that we have rule of law in Africa.
We also need to have an independent media. We also need to
have an independent central bank, and we also need to have a
neutral and professional armed forces or security forces.
Now if you look across Africa, in the cases of the recent
implosions in Ethiopia, Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, and Sierra
Leone, all these countries blew up under military regimes
simply because the military has not been a professional force
in Africa. In fact, they have been the most destabilizing force
in Africa.
I would like also to point out to you that there is one
solution to all these crises in Africa. All these countries
have been blowing up simply because of one particular factor
and that factor is power. Power in Africa is the root cause of
all these implosions.
The reason is that political power in Africa has become the
passport to great personal wealth. Almost all the richest
people in Africa are heads of State and ministers. Therefore,
when you talk about government in Africa, government is not
what you and I understand it as here in the West. Government,
as you and I understand it, does not exist in many parts of
Africa. What you have in many African countries is a Mafia
State and that is government which has been hijacked by
gangsters. They use the instruments of government power to
enrich themselves and exclude everybody else.
Therefore, the problem that we have in many African
countries is the practice of politics of exclusion.
Now those who have been excluded from power have two
options which are to rise up and overthrow the ruling elites or
to secede. These have been the seeds of instability in Africa.
Mr. Chairman, we have a solution in Africa and that
solution has been tried and worked successfully in Benin and
South Africa. That solution is called a Sovereign National
Conference.
This is what the South Africans, the blacks and whites in
South Africa, were able to do to have a democratic dispensation
for their country. It also worked in Benin. And, therefore, to
conclude my testimony, I will urge you that in the future it is
not what the new leaders tell us but, rather, the institutions
that they establish in Africa. These institutions, we know what
they are--the Sovereign National Conference, an independent
judiciary, an independent media, a professional and neutral
force. This is what I believe U.S. aid should be tied to.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Ayittey follows:]
Prepared Statement of George B.N. Ayittey, Ph.D. \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The author, a native of Ghana, is an Associate Professor of
Economics at The American University and president of The Free Africa
Foundation, both in Washington. He is the author of Indigenous African
Institutions (1991), Africa Betrayed, which won the 1993 H. L. Mencken
Award for ``Best Book,'' and Africa In Chaos, which was published this
year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen. Thank you for the opportunity
to testify before this Subcommittee on Africa. As I understand it, the
purpose of this hearing is to determine the prospects for democracy
under the current generation of ``new African leaders'' and how the
U.S. should interact with and help them. Specifically, these new
leaders comprise, though not exclusively, of the following: Presidents
Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Paul Kagame of Rwanda, Meles Zenawi of
Ethiopia, Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea, Laurent Kabila of the Democratic
Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire.
Common Characteristics
These ``new leaders'' share certain common characteristics. They
all have a military background. Impatient and angry at the appalling
social misery, reckless economic mismanagement and flagrant injustices
in their countries, they all assumed political power after waging a
successful guerrilla campaign to oust corrupt and tyrannical regimes.
They inherited shattered economies, fragmented societies and states
that have nearly disintegrated. Upon their shoulders rests the
formidable task of rebuilding collapsed infrastructure, restoring basic
essential social services, healing social wounds, repaying huge foreign
debts and promoting economic development--all at the same time with an
empty treasury.
Consider Rwanda, for example. Paul Kagame took over in 1994 a
country that had been torn asunder by ethnic bloodletting. In an orgy
of violence and genocide, about 700,000 Tutsis were slaughtered in
April 1994. Paul Kagame faces the difficult task of bringing to justice
the Hutu extremists who participated in the Rwandan genocide at a time
when the judiciary system had been destroyed. More than 80 percent of
Rwandan judges have been killed, or fled into exile. Over 100,000 Hutu
extremists languish in jail, awaiting trial and the pace of prosecution
has been excruciatingly slow. Deep ethnic mistrust pervades Rwandan
society. The country is still in turmoil. Ethnic tension and warfare
flare up occasionally, claiming tens of innocent victims. Ethnic wounds
must be healed, confiscated Tutsi property returned, infrastructure
rebuilt and the country's development efforts restarted by the new
government of Paul Kagame.
The Democratic Republic of The Congo (Formerly Zaire)
Before it imploded in October 1996, the fictional state of Zaire
was already in an advanced stage of decay after 32 years of arrant
kleptocratic rule by the late and former president Mobutu Sese Seko.
Government structures had collapsed, infrastructure had crumbled, paved
roads had been reduced to cratered cartways. Hospitals lacked basic
medical supplies; electricity and water supplies were sporadic at best.
Civil servants and soldiers had gone for months without pay.
Hyperinflation raged at 23,000 percent a year. The Zairean currency was
worthless. A new bank note of 5 million zaire, introduced in January
1993, was worth only 3 U.S. cents. The late and former president,
Mobutu Sese Seko, who was long backed by Western powers, plundered the
treasury to amass a personal fortune worth $10 billion at one point.
President Laurent Kabila faces the herculean task of rebuilding
this shattered country and at the same time honor the repayment
obligations on the country's $9 billion foreign debt. The new leaders
of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda face similar tasks of rebuilding
shattered societies and collapsed economies, while at the same time
promoting ethnic reconciliation and establishing democratic rule.
President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda has brought peace and stability to
his country and has embarked on a credible economic liberalization
program. Only time will tell if these reforms are sustainable.
Nevertheless, the new leaders need all the help they can get and the
U.S. should assist them in any way it can in their efforts to rebuild
their countries.
Increasing U.S. Attention To Africa
I am heartened to note that the Clinton Administration is paying
increasing attention to Africa, especially the Central African region.
After a period of abandonment or benign neglect, the Clinton
Administration is placing Africa on the front burner. Since 1995, the
White House has held a series of high-level conferences on Africa and
sent senior administration officials on various African tours. In
September 1996, former Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, toured
five African nations to promote the new U.S.-supported African Crisis
Response Initiative (ACRI). This was to comprise 10,000 to 25,000
troops, which would be deployed to intervene in serious crises--cases
of insurrection, genocide or civil strife to avert a Rwanda-like
conflagration in crisis-laden African countries, such as Burundi, where
an estimated 150,000 Burundians have perished in ethnic warfare since
1993.
First Lady Hillary Clinton and Chelsea followed with a visit to
Africa in February 1997 and in October, seven African countries were
toured by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. This month (March),
President Clinton, will be visiting Africa for the first time. He will
hold a regional summit of the leaders of central African nations in
Uganda. Then this week, Congress will pass the administration's
``Africa Growth and Investment Opportunity In Africa: The End of
Dependency Act.''
The new Africa initiative seeks ``to create a transition path from
development assistance to economic self-sufficiency for sub-Saharan
African countries.'' The Bill will authorize a one time appropriation
of $150 million for an equity fund and $500 million for a
infrastructure fund beginning in 1998. These funds will be used to
mobilize private savings from developed economies for equity investment
in Africa; stimulate the growth of securities markets in Africa;
improve access to third party equity and management advice for Africa's
small and medium-sized firms. The infrastructure funds are intended to
help improve the operations of telecommunications, roads, railways and
power plants in Africa. These improvements, it was hoped, would help
attract U.S. investors to potentially profitable projects in Africa. At
the June 1997 G-7 Summit conference in Denver, President Clinton sought
to sell this program to other donor countries.
A Critical Assessment of U.S. Efforts To Promote Democracy In Africa
Mr. Chairman, there are bound to be differences of opinion
regarding how best the U.S. can help Africa. I am sure you will hear
lament in some quarters that the U.S. is not doing enough to help
Africa and that any help must be coupled with debt cancellation. In my
opinion, however, the issue is not so much whether Africa should or
should not be helped; rather, it is helping Africa effectively. More
than $400 billion in aid and various credits have been pumped into
Africa since 1960 but the results have been negligible. The 1993
humanitarian mission into Somalia is a case in point. It cost the
international community more than $3.5 billion, a large part of which
was borne by the U.S., not to mention the lives of 18 U.S. Rangers who
perished needlessly during that mission. Eventually, that mission had
to be abandoned and Somalia today is still in a state of anarchy.
Nor is the issue whether there aren't any success stories in
Africa; there are but they are few: Botswana, Eritrea, Guinea,
Mauritius, and Uganda apart from South Africa. Neither is it the
absence of any hopeful signs in Africa. The continent of Africa is
making progress but it has been painfully slow. In 1996, for example,
Africa's gross domestic product did register a 5 percent rate of
growth. Although this rate was expected to drop back to 3.4 percent for
1997, some estimates project a 4.7% rate of growth for 1998. They are
all higher than the 2 percent growth rate of the early 1990s but
subtract an average population growth rate of 3 percent and that leaves
miserly rates of growth of less than 2 percent in GDP per capita. These
rates are woefully insufficient to reduce Africa's average poverty
rates, which are among the highest in the world. In fact, a recent
report from the International Labor Organization estimates that in Sub-
Saharan Africa, the proportion of the population living in poverty will
increase to over 50% by the year 2000.
Politically, the democratization process in Africa has suffered
some serious setbacks. The number of African democracies increased from
4 in 1990 to 15 in 1995 and then dropped to the now 13 (Benin,
Botswana, Cape Verde Islands, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius,
Namibia, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles Islands, South Africa
and Zambia). Wily despots learned new tricks to beat back the
democratic challenge in such countries as Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Togo,
Zimbabwe and others. They wrote the rules of the game, manipulated the
transition process and rigged elections to return themselves to power.
Serious reverses occurred in 1997 when reactionary forces overthrew
democratically-elected governments in Sierra Leone and Congo-
Brazzaville, the latter with French support. (France and the French oil
company, Elf Acquitaine provided $150 million to the forces of General
Denis Sassou-Nguesso to overthrow President Pascal Lissouba).
Clearly, more needs to be done to help the new leaders of Africa
but in these efforts consistency and substance should be the over-
arching tenets of U.S. efforts to promote democracy in Africa. Although
the Clinton administration is doing far more that its predecessor
administrations, the objectives are muddled, the signals are confusing
and the policies vacillatory. In fact, the U.S.'s record in promoting
democracy in Africa has been bleak.
After spending tens of millions of U.S. taxpayers' money on African
democratization, the administration appeared to be retreating last
year. Although Madeleine Albright pledged $40 million in new aid for
democratic reforms during her trip, some U.S. officials were saying
Africa needed stability before democracy and that the continent lacked
a ``democratic culture.'' Fortunately, the administration now appears
to be back on track promoting democracy and we hope it will stay on
track.
More disturbing, the administration's response to recent setbacks
in the African democratization process has been muted and
disappointing. The Clinton administration did little but wink at
manifest cases of fraud and ``conflicts of interest,'' where incumbents
manipulated electoral rules to return themselves to power. Nor did the
Clinton administration respond vigorously to the outrageous rape of
democracy in Congo-Brazzaville. Worse, the administration's own
policies toward Nigeria, the most populous black African nation in the
region, is in total disarray.
Nigeria's crass attempts at ``hide-and-seek bazooka'' democracy by
its ever-competent military thugs have placed the country in a
perpetual state of transition to democratic rule. Four of the five
parties approved by General Sani Abacha's regime, have all adopted him
as their presidential candidate in the forthcoming August elections.
Nobody has seen Nigeria's constitution; yet it is being amended by the
Abacha regime to guide the transition process. On March 3, pro-Abacha
rallies were held in Abuja but when the Coalition For A United Nigeria
planned a pro-democracy, anti-Abacha rallies in Lagos, police declared
them ``illegal.'' Imagine.
Limited sanctions were imposed against Nigeria following the brutal
hanging of human rights activist, Ken Saro Wiwa, and 8 other Ogoni
activists in November 1995. But aggressive lobbying efforts by agents
of the Abacha regime have succeeded in eviscerating the
administration's initiatives toward Nigeria.
According to Randall Echolls, a spokesman of the jailed political
leader, Moshood Abiola, the Abacha regime spent almost $5 million in
1996 on P-R campaigns to spruce up it shattered image. Several of the
PR agents are black Americans. For example, Johnny Ford organized the
World Conference of Mayors in Abuja in December last year, which was
attended by Washington D.C.'s mayor, Marion Barry. While it is true
that President Clinton will not be stopping over in Nigeria, nothing
prevents Nigeria's brutal military dictator from attending the region
summit in Uganda where President Clinton will deliver a speech.
At issue here is not so much the policy but the approach. It must
send clear signals. It must be stripped of symbolism; lives are at
stake in Africa. It must avoid the blunders of the past. Furthermore,
it should support African initiatives or ``home-grown'' African
solutions. After all, Africans problems must be solved by Africans. The
U.S. can help but it cannot supplant the efforts Africans themselves
are making.
U.S. Blunders In The Past
During the Cold War, the geopolitical and strategic importance of
Africa attracted the attention of the superpowers. With its rich supply
of minerals and its large potential market for foreign goods, Africa
became a terrain on which the Western and Soviet blocs and other
foreign powers competed for access, power, and influence, often by
playing one country against another. African leaders also benefited
enormously from the Cold War game. They touted their ideological
importance to both sides and played one superpower against the other to
extract maximum concessions and aid. The continent thus became a
theater of superpower rivalry, intrigues, and blunders.
Nigeria, for example, which was regarded as a substantial prize
because of its size and mineral wealth, became the object of intense
superpower competition. The East met West in 1988 in the hangars of
Makurdi Air Base in central Nigeria. As The Washington Post (23 July,
1994) reported: ``Soviet military advisers hovered around two dozen
MiG-21 fighter jets supplied by Moscow to Nigeria's long-serving
military government. British advisers watched over 15 Jaguar fighter-
bombers sold to balance the Soviet supplies. Americans ferried supplies
for nine C-130 transport planes. Czechs tended approximately two dozen
L-39 jet trainers they had sold. Italians carried spare parts for eight
G-222 aircraft'' (A1).
Seduced by the charisma and the verbiage of Third World despots,
the West provided them with substantial military and economic aid. ``In
the past, we have had, for national security reasons, to consort with
dictators,'' admitted former U.S. Ambassador Smith Hempstone (The
Washington Post, 6 May, 1993, A7). But the heavy Western investment in
these tyrants, who often were blatantly corrupt and brutally
repressive, invariably drew the ire of the people of the Third World.
The subsequent overthrow of these dictators often unleashed a wave of
intense anti-American or anti-Western sentiment. Tensions rose even
further when these corrupt ex-leaders almost always managed to escape
to the West with their booty.
Similarly, the West often obliged and supported pro-capitalist
African dictators, despite their hideously repressive and neo Communist
regimes. For geopolitical, economic, and other reasons, the West
propped up tyrants in Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi,
and Zaire, as Cold War allies to the detriment of democratic movements.
To check the spread of Marxism in Africa, the United States, in
particular, sought and nurtured alliances with ``pro-West'' regimes in
Kenya, Malawi, South Africa, and Zaire and with guerrilla groups (UNITA
in Angola). Substantial American investment poured into these countries
and military support was covertly supplied to UNITA. At the same time,
the U.S. government attempted to woo socialist/Marxist regimes in
Ghana, Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. U.S. Secretary of
State Warren Christopher confirmed that ``During the long Cold War
period, America's policies toward Africa were often determined not by
how they affected Africa, but by what advantage they brought to
Washington or Moscow'' (The Economist, 29 May, 1993, 46).
After the Cold War, Western foreign policy objectives were
overhauled. Greater emphasis was placed on promotion of democracy,
respect for human rights, better governance, transparency, and
accountability, among others. In May 1990, for example, the U.S.
Congress and the White House reshaped the U.S. foreign aid program in
light of global political changes and reordered priorities. President
George Bush sought new flexibility to boost aid to emerging democracies
in Eastern Europe, Panama, and Nicaragua. Assistant Secretary of State
for Africa Herman J. Cohen announced in May 1990 that, along with
economic adjustment and the observance of human rights, democratization
would soon be included as the third prerequisite for U.S. development
aid. Shortly after the establishment of the policy of tying bilateral
aid to political conditions such as the World Bank, the U.S. Congress
called to do the same for multilateral aid.
But beyond the rhetoric, nothing much changed underneath the
surface. It was ``business as usual.'' Old friends remained old
friends. The reformist winds of change that blew across Africa in the
early 19905 subsided rather quickly. The West stood by and watched as
wily autocrats honed their skills to beat back the democratic
challenge. Africa's democratization experience in the 1990s has been
marked by vapid Western pronouncements, truculent duplicity, and
scurrilous abandonment. When the going got tough, the West cut and ran.
Although virtually all Western governments made lofty statements
about the virtues of democracy, they did little to aid and establish it
in Africa. There have been more than 170 changes of government in
Africa since 1960, but one would be hard pressed to name five countries
that the West successfully democratized from 1970 to 1990. The record
since 1990 has been dismal. Pro-democracy forces in Benin, Cape Verde
Islands, Zambia, Malawi and other newly democraticized African
countries received little help from Western governments. Nor have
democratic forces in Ghana, Nigeria, and Kenya for that matter.
On 29 December 1992, Kenya held its first multiparty elections in
26 years. Every indication pointed to a fraudulent outcome. Opposition
parties were given barely two months to campaign. In his campaign
speeches Moi, who has earned a reputation for political thuggery, vowed
that he would crush his opponents ``like rats.'' On 9 December,
candidates or their agents were required to hand in their papers in
person. ``Nearly 50 opposition activists were barred from doing do, by
various means. They met illegal roadblocks, papers were snatched from
their grasp, some were kidnaped. No KANU candidate met such
obstructions'' (The Economist, 26 December, 1992, 52). Opposition
candidates and their supporters were harassed, voter registration rolls
were manipulated, opposition rallies were restricted, and the state
media was biased in favor of the ruling party. Moi handily ``won'' the
elections, although disunity among Kenya's opposition parties played a
role. Yet, U.S. response to this massive electoral outrage in Kenya was
meek.
To be sure, Western governments cannot dictate the type of
democracy that will be suitable for the African people themselves. But
the West can indicate what it will not accept: democratic malfeasance
(manipulation and control of the transition process by one side) or
unlevel political playing fields (opposition parties denied access to
the state media and stripped of state resources).
Democracy is not dictated or imposed. It is a participatory
exercise. In South Africa, all the various political parties and anti-
apartheid organizations gathered together in a Convention for a
Democratic South Africa to create a new society for their country. But
in Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Togo, and many other African
countries, incumbent governments drew up the transition programs by
themselves without the participation of political parties, which were
banned.
If Western governments will not help the pro-democracy groups, they
should at the very least be fair, neutral, and consistent. In South
Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) received funds and materiel
from Western governments. Similarly in Poland, Solidarity received
substantial assistance from Western governments. So why not help the
Lech Walesas and Mandelas of the rest of Africa? But rather sadly,
Western aid to African pro-democracy forces or civil society has been
appalling and virtually non-existent. Further, the standard applied to
Kenya and Nigeria should be the same one applied to Ghana and Togo.
Unfortunately, official Western approach to democratization in Africa
has been marked by blatant inconsistencies and double speak.
This record makes me skeptical of the Clinton administration's
efforts to promote democracy under Africa's new leaders.
Understanding Africa's Problems
The U.S. can help Africa if only it understands Africa's problems.
Else, it will continue to repeat its 1993 Somalia blunder. One word,
power, explains why Africa is in its current state of chaos, carnage,
never-ending cycles of civil wars, violence, and collapsing economies.
The struggle for power, its monopolization by one individual or group,
and the subsequent refusal to relinquish or share it.
The competition for political power has always been ferocious
because, in Africa, politics offers the passport to fabulous wealth.
``Government,'' as it is understood in the West does not exist in many
African countries. What exists is a ``mafia state''--a government
hijacked by a phalanx of gangsters, crooks and vagabonds. This cabal of
criminals use the machinery of government to perpetuate themselves in
power and to enrich themselves, their cronies, relatives and tribesmen.
All others are excluded (``the politics of exclusion''). The richest
persons in Africa are heads of state and ministers. Often, the chief
bandit is the head of state himself.
Those who capture the state transform it into their own personal
property, never wanting to give up power. It is this adamant refusal of
African despots or the ruling elites to relinquish or share political
power that lies at the root of all of Africa's civil wars. In fact, the
destruction of an African country, regardless of the professed ideology
of its government or foreign patron, always always begins with some
dispute over the electoral process. The blockage of the democratic
process or the refusal to hold elections plunged Angola, Chad,
Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia, and Sudan into civil war. The
manipulation of the electoral process by hardliners destroyed Rwanda
(1993), and Sierra Leone (1992). The subversion of the electoral
process in Liberia (1985) eventually set off a civil war in 1989 and
instigated civil strife in Cameroon (1991), Congo (1992), Togo (1992)
and Kenya (1992). Finally, the annulment of electoral results by the
military started Algeria's civil war (1992) and plunged Nigeria into
political turmoil (1993).
Government, therefore, is totally divorced from the people in many
African countries. Therefore, Western governments must always make a
distinction between African governments or leaders and the African
people. The two are not necessarily synonymous since the leaders do not
represent the people. The expression, ``The U.S. is helping Africans
reform their economies,'' is very misleading. Who is being helped: the
leaders or the people? This distinction is often not made by the
Clinton Administration in its moves to show concern for and grapple
with the Africa's economic crisis.
The first attempt was a June 27,1994 White House gathering ``to
raise the profile of Africa,'' ``express solidarity with its people,''
and proclaimed a new mantra: ``true partnership with African
leadership.'' It turned out to be a public relations fluff with little
substance. In attendance was a preponderance of apologists and
representatives of failed African governments. Ten years earlier, a
White House conference on the Soviet Union would have drawn its
speakers and guests from the exiled Russian dissident community. There
were no exiled African dissidents at 27 June 1994 White House
Conference on Africa.
On 17 June 1997, White House called another conference on Africa
for President Clinton to announce his new policy toward Africa. Again,
no exiled African dissident was invited. At that gathering, President
Clinton's painted overly optimistic portrait of ``a dynamic new Africa
making dramatic strides toward democracy and prosperity'' (The
Washington Post, 18 June 1997, Al 8). Such a portrait is more apt to
breed cynicism. There have been no such ``dramatic strides'' but rather
``baby steps.''
As desirable as the ouster of Mobutu of Zaire, Mengistu of Ethiopia
and Habryimana of Rwanda might be, the U.S. and the international
community need to be extremely wary of enthusiastically embracing
people who shoot their way to power in Africa. Such active and open
support for a rebel insurgency poses a serious setback to the
democratization process in Africa. It sends a dangerous signal and
delivers a destabilizing jolt to a continent already reeling from
wanton brutality, chaos and carnage. Other insurgencies would be
encouraged. Indeed, this was precisely the case in Sierra Leone, where
the band of military goons led by Captain Paul Koroma overthrew the
democratically-elected government of Tejan Kabbah, who has been
restored to power, and Congo (Brazzaville), where the civilian
government of Pascal Lissouba was overthrown by General Sassou Nguesso;
both in 1997.
More importantly, Africa's postcolonial experience with rebel
leaders has been ghastly and trenchantly disconcerting, hardly
inspiring confidence and hope. Most of the rebel leaders, who set out
to remove tyrants from power, often turned out be crocodile liberators,
who left wanton carnage and human debris in their wake. They preached
``democracy'' but were themselves closet dictators, exhibiting the same
tyrannical tendencies they so loudly denounce in the despots they
replaced. And hitched to their movement was a cacophonous assortment of
quack revolutionaries, vampire elites and intellectual hyenas. Even
before they removed the despot, they squabbled among themselves over
ministerial posts and government appointments.
Africa's liberation struggle has been a truculent tale of one
betrayal after another. Are these ``new leaders'' simply new wine in an
old bottle? There is a popular saying among Africans, which goes like
this: ``They all come and do the same thing all over again.'' A sense
of deja vu pervades the African community.
The Solution
There is a simple indigenously African solution to all these
crises. When a crisis erupts in an African village, the chief and the
elders would summon a village meeting--similar to New England's town
hall meetings. There, the issue was debated by the people until a
consensus was reached. Once a decision was taken, all, including the
chief, were required to abide by it.
In recent years, this indigenous African tradition was revived and
reconstituted as ``sovereign national conferences'' and used to ordain
a democratic dispensation for Benin, Cape Verde Islands, Congo, Malawi,
Mali, Zambia and South Africa. Benin's 9-day ``national conference''
began on Feb 19, 1990, with 488 delegates, representing various
political, religious, trade union, and other groups encompassing the
broad spectrum of Beninois society. The conference, whose chairman was
Father Isidore de Souza, held ``sovereign power'' with its decisions
binding on all, including the government. It stripped President
Matthieu Kerekou of power, scheduled multiparty elections and ended 17
years of autocratic Marxist rule.
South Africa used exactly the same vehicle to make that arduous but
peaceful transition to a multi-racial democratic society. The
Convention For A Democratic South Africa (CODESA) began deliberations
in July, 1991, with 228 delegates drawn from about 25 political parties
and various anti-apartheid groups. CODESA was ``sovereign'' and strove
to reach a ``working consensus'' on an interim constitution. It set a
date for the March 1994 elections and established the composition of a
transitional government to rule until then.
By contrast, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana,
Kenya, Niger, Zimbabwe and several African countries refused to hold
national conferences. The electoral process was blatantly manipulated
and rigged to return despots to power.
Consider Niger, for example, where a military thug, General Ibrahim
Bare Mainassara, seized power in a Jan 27 1996 coup. Under intense
pressure from both the domestic and the international community, Gen.
Mainassara held presidential elections on July 6,1996, which he himself
contested. Opposition parties were given less than two months to
campaign. When early results showed that he was losing, Mainassara
sacked and replaced the Independent National Electoral Commission
(CENI) with his own appointees, placed his opponents under guard in
their own houses and cut off their phone lines. A ban on public
gatherings in Niamey was imposed on July 9 and security forces were
deployed at candidates' homes and opposition party offices. The
floodlit Palais des Sports, where the results were centralized was
guarded by an armored car and heavy machine guns mounted on pickup
trucks. Two radio stations were stopped from broadcasting and all of
the country's international phone lines were shut down. After the
Supreme Court, with bazookas pointed at its building, declared
Mainassara the ``winner,'' the opposition candidates were released.
Other African countries, such as Nigeria, Togo and Zaire, held
these conferences but so devilishly manipulated them to render them
utterly useless. Togo's 1992 national conference went nowhere.
Nigeria's 5-year transition program, started by former dictator, Gen.
Ibrahim Babangida in 1985, was s-t-r-e-t-c-h-e-d with frequent
interruptions, devious maneuvers and broken promises. For 8 years,
Babangida went through political contortions and dribbles (hence the
name ``Maradona'' after Brazilian soccer star), constantly shifting the
goal posts, reneging on four occasions to return the country to
civilian rule and finally annulling the June 12, 1993 elections, which
were the most free and fair in Nigeria's history, and throwing the
winner, Chief Moshood Abiola, into jail.
Babangida's charade was immediately followed by General Sani
Abacha's scam transition, replete with suffocating chicanery,
manipulation and acrobatics. The June 1995 Constitutional Conference
turned out to be a wicked fraud. Above all, the Constitutional
Conference was not sovereign.
It must be made clear it is not the new leaders who must determine
the democratic future of their respective countries. This issue, as
well as when and how to hold elections, are decided at a sovereign
national conference. This is the vehicle which was successfully used to
democratize Benin and South Africa. Moreover, it is an indigenous
African institution.
Recommendations
To conclude this testimony, Mr. Chairman, let me say that helping
Africa really doesn't take much, using a better approach that
understands Africa's problems. During the Cold War, the U.S. invested
heavily in the anti-communist rhetoric of Africa's strongmen. Even
today, there is still heavy emphasis on ``leaders,'' as in ``the new
leaders of Africa.'' This should be de-emphasized and the focus placed
on institutions.
You cannot establish democracy in Africa without having in place
the supporting institutions. In fact, the real causes of the Africa's
economic decline and chronic instability are the absence of a few key
institutions: an independent central bank, an independent judiciary, an
independent media, a professional and neutral security forces (military
an police), and a sovereign national conference--the mechanism for
peaceful resolution of conflicts and transfer of political power. The
absence of these critical institutions has banished the rule of law,
respect for property rights, security of persons and property, social,
political, and economic stability from much of Africa. As a result,
corruption is rampant, commercial and personal property is arbitrarily
seized by drunken soldiers, dissidents frequently ``disappear'' and
senseless civil wars rage for years on end. Throw in crumbling
infrastructure and that creates an environment that deters even African
investors, so why would Americans want to invest in such a place? This
environment cannot be cleaned up by the United States but by Africans
themselves.
We may preach all we want about ``accountability,''
``transparency,'' ``combating corruption,'' and so on. But all these
would not mean a thing until we have in place an independent judiciary
to enforce rule of law and an independent media to expose criminal
wrongdoing. Quite often, Western governments and donor agencies talk
through their hats. They pontificate ad nauseam about ``middle class,''
``civil society,'' and ``democracy''--as if these emerge out of thin
air. They place the emphasis on the outcome, with little or no focus on
the institutions and processes that are necessary to achieve those
desirable outcomes. They have watched silently as brutalities were
heaped on civil society--the wellspring of reform and change and have
done next to nothing to assist or fund the activities of indigenous
African nongovernmental organizations or helped nurture civil society.
All experts agree that civil society would put the brakes on
tyrannical excesses of African regimes. But for civil society to
perform its watchdog role, as well as to instigate change, two key
institutions are critical: freedom of expression and freedom of
association. But since independence there has been a systematic
strangulation of freedom of expression in Africa. The state monopolized
the information media and turned it into propaganda organ for the party
elite. Anyone not in the government's party was necessarily a
dissident, and any newspaper editor or journalist who published the
slightest criticism of an insignificant government policy was branded a
``contra'' and jailed or killed, including journalists who for years
had praised government measures. Even newspapers that have lavished
praises on the government were closed for carrying an occasional
critique.
After the collapse of communism in 1989, a brief gust ``of change''
swept across Africa. In a number of countries, long-standing autocrats
were toppled. Free and independent newspapers sprouted and flourished
but, by 1995, had begun to suffer a series of setbacks. According to
New York-based Freedom House, of Africa's 54 countries, only seven have
a free press. Of the 20 countries throughout the world where the press
is most shackled, nine are in Africa: Algeria, Burundi, Egypt,
Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, and Zaire. Countries
in the ``not-free'' category include Angola, Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Chad, Eritrea, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia,
Mauritania, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Togo, and Tunisia (The
African Observer 6-19 June 1996, 25).
Kakuna Kerina, program coordinator for sub-Saharan Africa for the
Committee to Protect Journalists, a New York-based group, sent a letter
in 1996 to the OAU reminding it that injudicious detention, censorship,
and intimidation of journalists work against the public's right to
information and the right to hold and express opinions and ideas. Both
rights are guaranteed under Article 19 of the U.N. Charter and Article
9 of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, to which most
African countries are signatories. Kerina pointed to Nigeria, Cote
d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Zambia, Angola, Kenya, Liberia, and Cameroon as
nations where the press is severely restricted.
Most bewildering, said Kerina, is the fact that press and general
freedoms are most restricted in those African countries that multiparty
democracies. The strangulation of the press in the post cold War period
has been most evident in West Africa, where ``at least 12 journalists
have been detained in Ivory Coast, The Gambia, Ghana, Sierra Leone and
Nigeria in the past month. Since 1994, West African governments have
seized dozens of magazines and newspapers, deported journalists, and
closed independent radio stations in Cameroon, Togo, The Gambia, Mali
and Gabon'' (The Washington Times, 6 April 1995, A15).
Due to the explosion in the number of satellite dishes, electronic
communications (fax machines, the internet, e-mail, etc.), much more
information is now available in Africa. The new technology has severely
hindered the ability of African dictators to control the flow of
information and keep their people in the dark. In their desperate
attempts to retain control, defamation or libel suits and murder have
become the choice tactics of corrupt regimes. ``At least 30 libel suits
have been filed against the independent press by leading members of the
government in what is seen largely as an attempt to stifle freedom of
expression,'' said Kwesi Pratt, Jr. president of the Private Newspaper
Publishers Association of Ghana (Free Press, 20 December-2 January
1997).
In Angola, BBC reporter Gustavo Costa was slapped with a defamation
suit in June 1994 by oil minister Albna Affis after filing stories
about government corruption. On 18 January 1995 Ricardo de Melo, the
editor of the Luanda-based Impartial Fax, was killed for writing
stories about official corruption.
In Cameroon, Emmanuel Noubissie Ngankam, director of the
independent Dikalo was given a one-year suspended sentence, fined CFA 5
million ($8,800), and ordered to pay CFA 15 million in damages after
publishing an article alleging that the former minister of public works
and transportation had expropriated property in the capital Yaounde.
Also in Cameroon, staff at two other newspapers, La Nouvelle Expression
and Galaxie, were sued for defamation by Augustin Frederick Kodock,
state planning and regional development minister, over newspaper
articles alleging that the minister's private secretary had embezzled
large sums of money. Then ``the Cameroonian newspaper which reported
President Biya's marriage to a 24-year-old has been suspended by the
government. When Perspectives-Hebdo ran the story on March 17, 1994,
police quickly seized all available copies. Joseph-Marie Besseri, the
publisher, said the official reason for the ban was failure to show the
edition to censors before distribution, as the law requires. He denies
the charge'' (African News Weekly, 8 April 1994, 5).
Similarly in Sudan, journalists must register with a state-
appointed press council or risk jail terms and fines. According to The
African Observer (8-21 August 1995), ``So far, more than 596
journalists have done so. However, 37 were rejected on the grounds that
they were inexperienced. Some of the rejects are graduates of
journalism schools, others hold masters degrees in social studies.
Those rejected were given a second chance. They were made to sit an
examination in mid-July, but only 19 of the 37 passed the exam, which
tested their knowledge of the achievements of el Bashir's government.''
(21)
In a dramatic testimony before the House Africa and International
Operations and Human Rights Subcommittee in January 1996, Larry
Diamond, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution in California, made
this observation:
Historically, Nigeria has had the most vibrant and
pluralistic civil society in Africa (with the possible
exception of South Africa.) One of the most tragic consequences
of military rule has been the decimation of and degradation of
this sector as well. Interest groups, such as the labor
movement, the professional associations, and women's
organizations have been infiltrated, corrupted, and subverted
by the authoritarian state. Those that would not bend have been
relentlessly hounded and repressed. The most independent
publications have suffered prolonged closures and more subtle
forms of state pressure, such as cutting off access to
newsprint at affordable cost. Human rights groups have suffered
constant surveillance, harassment, intimidation, and repeated
arrest. Several leading human rights figures are now in jail.
The decimation of civil society not only handicaps the campaign
for a transition to democracy, it also weakens the
infrastructure that could help to develop and sustain that
democracy after transition (Congressional Records, January
1996).
There has been no letup in the brutal clamp down of ``dissident''
activity. Beginning in 1994, Nigeria's military government closed three
publishing houses--effectively shutting nearly 20 publications--for 14
months. Security agents also have arrested more than 40 journalists,
detaining some for several days The Washington Post, 7 April 1996,
A18). The repression forced Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka to flee his own
native Nigeria after instances such as the following:
Armed security forces descended on a book launching at Nkpolu
Oraoorukwo Town Hall, firing tear gas at citizens and causing
pandemonium. The object of their ire was the book, entitled My
Ordeal--A Prison Memoir of a Student Activist, written by
Christian Akani, Campaign for Democracy chairman in River
State. It expresses the hardships of Nigeria and the treatment
meted out to those who express displeasure with the country's
policies. The security operatives who came to the launching
claimed that the organizers did not obtain security clearance
for such activities (African News Weekly, 18 November 1994, 4).
The officers fired tear gas into the crowd, which hastily
dispersed, then seized copies of the book and arrested the author who
was taken to an undisclosed location. Imagine. So when Shi'ite Muslims
in Zaria (Nigeria) went on a demonstration in October 1996, ``they
carried coffins in case security agents opened fire on them during the
procession.''
The barbaric crackdown on political dissent and journalists has had
an unintended effect of boosting urban crime. With the police going
after political activists, Nigerian armed robbers have been having a
field day, raiding one house after another with impunity. ``No day
passes without a robbery here or there. It is so common now as the
police have focused their attention on just quelling political
demonstrations to the detriment of curbing crime,'' said Lanre
Olorunsogo, a tenant in Onike, a Lagos suburb (African Observer, 23
August-5 September 1994, 4). How can civil society emerge under these
circumstances?
The other right vital for the sustenance of civil society--freedom
of association--has progressively been squelched in postcolonial
Africa. In many countries, gatherings of more than persons required
official sanction or they can be broken up by thugs or gun-toting
zombies. In Cameroon, police disrupted a meeting of the opposition
Union for Change on 19 August 1993, and arrested and detained the
party's administrative secretary, Francois Evembe, over an article
published on 9 August 1993 entitled ``The problem is the Man that
Resides at Etoudi [government house]'' (Index on Censorship, October
1993, 42).
In Nigeria, clearance must be obtained from a paranoid military
government to hold even a seminar or conference, because such a
gathering might pose a threat to state security. Consider these events
as reported by Index on Censorship (March, 1993, 38):
On November 27, 1992, more than 250 police and state security
forces disrupted a vigil for democracy in Lagos organized by
the Civil Liberties Organization. Police subsequently visited
vigil organizers Peter Eriose and Imogeo Ewhuba and threatened
them with arrest if they continued their pro-democracy
activities. Eriose went into hiding.
On December 1, 1992, 500 security agents prevented members of
the Campaign for Democracy (CD) from holding a meeting at the
Nigeria Union of Journalists in Lagos. The same day, several
people on a pro-democracy march in Kano State were arrested,
including Dr. Wada Abubakar, former deputy governor of Kano
State, Onuana Ammani, former president of the Social Democratic
Party, and Wada Waziri, a former union leader.
On December 2, 1992, police and security agents took over the
senate chambers at the former National Assembly Complex where
the Civil Liberties Organization was planning a seminar on
``Women and Taxation in Nigeria.'' The seminar was rescheduled
for 15 December, but previously granted permission was
withdrawn the evening before and police refused participants
entry to the premises.
On March 19, 1996, Government agents blocked the U.S. Ambassador,
Walter Carrington, from a conference organized by the American Studies
Association of Nigeria in the northern city of Kaduna. The organization
often sponsors forums on a wide range of topics. Security agents turned
Carrington and several embassy staffers away from the conference and
then broke up the gathering (The Washington Post 20 March 1997, A14).
In September 1997, pro-democracy and human rights groups held a
reception in honor of U.S. Ambassador, Walter Carrington, who was
leaving Nigeria. ``Security agents broke down the gate at the house
where the reception was being held. After entering the residence, they
drew their guns and broke up the gathering'' (The Washington Post, 3
October 1997, A9).
On 7 July 1997 Kenyan opposition politicians and human rights
activists organized protests to push the government of Daniel arap Moi,
in power for 19 years, to reform electoral and other laws that are
viewed as oppressive. The government's response was swift and
ferocious. Riot police and elite paramilitary General Service Unit
officers charged into the protest rallies, firing tear gas and live
rounds. Eleven people were killed and dozens were injured.
Riot police even charged into Nairobi's All Saints Cathedral where
about 100 people were praying. They lobbed a tear gas canister that
landed near the altar and beat bloody numerous parishioners. ``We were
in the middle of the service when they broke in, fired tear gas into
the house of God. This is Kenyan justice for you. Even in God's house
they beat innocent protesters,'' said Rev. Peter Njoka (The Washington
Times, 8 July 1997, A11). ``These are the actions of fellows who are
really primitive,'' said Mike Kibaki of the Democratic Party, whom
police clubbed on the shoulders while he was in the cathedral (The
Washington Post 8 July 1997, A8).
Moi and ruling party leaders claim that the opposition parties seek
to foment violence and are too disorganized and divided to rule the
country effectively. ``How can we tell the people what we are offering
if we cannot meet,'' asked Kimani Kangethe, a political activist who
helped organize the Nairobi protests. ``Moi does not want to reason,''
Kangethe said (The Washington Post, 8 July 1997, A8).
On 11 May 1995 over 80,000 Ghanaians, exercising their
constitutional right, marched through the principal streets of Accra,
the capital, to protest the high cost of living. Article 21, Section
1(e), of Ghana's 1992 constitution states: ``All persons shall have the
right to freedom of assembly including freedom to take part in
processions and demonstrations.'' ``We are protesting because we are
hungry,'' said Kojo Dan, an accountant. ``We are not against the
Government. We are civil servants.'' But the government unleashed its
paramilitary organ--the Association for the Defense of the Revolution,
ACDR--whose members fired on the peaceful demonstrators, killing four
and seriously injuring about 20. (The Ghanaian Chronicle, 17 May 1995,
3).
To conclude, Mr. Chairman, instead of persuading, cajoling, bribing
or jaw-boning African autocrats to reform their abominable political
systems, the focus should be shifted from ``leaders'' to
``institutions.'' It is not the professed ``commitment'' of the new
leaders that should draw U.S. financial assistance. Rather, it is the
convocation of a sovereign national conference, the establishment of an
independent central bank, an independent judiciary, an independent
media, a professional and neutral security forces (military and police)
that should be the basis of U.S. relationship with the ``new
leaders''--and indeed all--the leaders of Africa. Because it is these
very institutions the African people need to come up with their own
solutions to their problems.
Mr. Chairman, I can assure you that the establishment of these few
institutions would ensure that a great majority of Africa's incessant
problems would be resolved and the continent placed on a fast-growth
track. Guaranteed.
Thank you.
Senator Ashcroft. Thank you very much. I very much
appreciate your remarks.
I think we will withhold questions until we have had the
opportunity to hear Dr. Baker. Then I believe I will call on
the Senator from Wisconsin to make his remarks and ask any
questions he may want of the panel while he still has the
opportunity to be with the subcommittee.
So, Dr. Baker, if you can, please summarize. As you know, I
am not going to be very strict about the time limit, but I
would appreciate your observation of the sensitivities of the
subcommittee.
STATEMENT OF DR. PAULINE BAKER, PRESIDENT, THE FUND FOR PEACE,
WASHINGTON, DC.
Dr. Baker. I will certainly try to observe your suggestion.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Feingold, I want to thank you both
for giving me this opportunity to testify today.
Can you hear me all right?
Senator Ashcroft. We can hear you better.
How is the audience doing in the back? Can you hear her?
Dr. Baker. All right. I will pull the microphone closer.
Thank you.
It is a particular honor for me to testify here today
because, as you may know, I used to be a professional staff
member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and was Staff
Director of the Africa Subcommittee. So I really do appreciate
the role you play and I applaud you for this hearing.
I have a longer statement. I am going to be brief and go
through it fairly quickly. I will just touch on the highlights.
So I would appreciate it if the full statement could be placed
in the record.
Senator Ashcroft. Without objection, any statements by any
of the witnesses that they choose to submit will be included in
the record.
Thank you.
Dr. Baker. Thank you.
When I was here at the committee--and I won't tell you how
many years ago that was--we were asking the same sorts of
questions that you are raising today of the first generation of
post independence leaders in Africa. Who are these leaders?
What are their priorities? How effective will they be in really
promoting genuine political and economic development?
While it was not clear at the outset, I think it is fair to
say that there is general agreement today that that first
generation failed. Some were well motivated, but few really
fulfilled the promise of African independence.
I will not go through the litany of woes in the past, but I
think it is a good starting point; because it does present some
indications of whether or not, as I think Professor Ayittey
very eloquently said, we should put so much stock in leaders as
opposed to institutions and processes.
In the 1990's, however, there are some encouraging signs of
change. In fact, some people have even been talking about an
African renaissance, a term which captures this idea of a
second independence or a rebirth.
I think Nelson Mandela and the remarkable transition in
South Africa embodies that hope. But also there has been a lot
of progress in Southern Africa as a whole, and I think to that
extent the term may apply.
There are other encouraging signs as well. The butchers of
Africa, such as Idi Amin and Mengistu, have left the scene.
There has been some progress in democratization, multi-party
elections, market oriented economic changes, et cetera.
These positive images of Africa, though, in my view have
been somewhat overblown. Particularly, I think this concept of
the new generation of leaders is indicative of that.
The term refers, as I think it was indicated earlier, to a
small network of East and Central African leaders whose support
of democratization is weak or nonexistent. Nor are they as
often portrayed as inclusive of all elements of their society
as many have suggested.
This portrait of this new leadership was summed up in an
article in ``Foreign Affairs'' recently by Dan Connell and
Frank Smyth. They portrayed them as a young vanguard of
determined nationalists.
Nationalists they may be. But they are more representative
in my view of the overall fluidity and instability of African
politics than democratization, which is by no means a stable or
enduring process in Africa yet.
For example, we frequently point to the fact that there
have been several elections in Africa, and that is true. But
the quality of elections has eroded. Political transitions
often mock democracy; and I think Senator Feingold suggested
this in his comments about Nigeria, the continent's most
populous country, where the political transition has really
been a sham.
In some cases, the elections have been successful; but
there has been backsliding on democratization, such as in
Zambia, or total breakdowns, if not backsliding, as in Sierra
Leone.
So we have to look very closely at this thesis of a new
generation of leaders. Are they saviors of Africa or are they
simply a new group of strong men who will be a new
authoritarian group?
My principal concern in this sort of uncritical embrace of
them is that we are, in fact, embracing a new generation of
strong men in the name of postcold war stability and economic
reform, just as we have pumped up the old generation in the
name of cold war stability and anti communism.
If so, we could be nurturing the kind of crony capitalism
in Africa that is undermining Asia and encouraging a replay of
the pattern of personal rule that has dogged the continent for
decades.
Now I do want to stress here that I do think the
administration deserves praise for raising the salience of
Africa. I do think that they are trying to recast the
relationship of the United States with Africa. In that sense,
they have to listen to leaders of Africa.
Admitting our failure to not respond to the genocide in
Rwanda is another good step. The African Trade and Opportunity
legislation is a good step. The visits to Africa from Hillary
Clinton to the Secretary of State to the President are very,
very good and are long overdue.
We also have to recognize that, I think, as Assistant
Secretary of State Susan Rice said, things are not easy.
Recovering from genocide is not easy.
Nonetheless, my concern is that we are tolerating human
rights abuses and calling nondemocratic leaders democratic
simply because they apply favorable economic policies. If so,
we are inviting another round of disillusionment, as we had
with the first generation of African leaders.
These African leaders, as I said before, came to power
through force of arms. They are not inclusive. They are
ethnically allied or related, and they represent a very close
network of allies.
They are united not so much by common values but by common
enemies, and I think they are going to continue to do that.
There are two problems with this new axis of power in
Africa. First, they tend to establish a standard of behavior
that defies international norms of human rights. We know that
Congo and Rwanda still stand accused of many human rights
violations and, unless these are addressed, even though we are
addressing other issues, it is going to continue to fuel the
cauldrons of ethnic conflict and we are not going to break the
cycle of impunity.
Second--and this is a new development--the leaders openly
defy the international norm of noninterference in the internal
affairs of other States.
Now there has been, of course, a long history of
interference in the internal affairs of other States, with many
States supporting rebels across borders. Of course, the world
breathed a sign of relief when people like Mobutu left the
scene, even if it required external intervention.
But what we are seeing now is that armies are openly
crossing borders to topple regimes. The question here is what
are the limits to this military intervention. What country will
be next on the list?
Is this the sort of international behavior that we really
want to encourage in Africa?
It is not just these five leaders that we have been talking
about. Angola, as was mentioned, was very pivotal to the change
in Zaire. Nigeria is leading the ECOWAS peacekeeping operation
in Liberia and Sierra Leone but has also operated elsewhere in
the region in ways that defy international standards.
So what is the U.S. to do if these are the threats to
Africa? I will be very brief and run through them very quickly.
First, I think we have to consistently reiterate our
commitment to the principles of democracy and human rights and
deal promptly and directly with the difficult problem areas.
This includes not just Central Africa but the hard cases like
Nigeria as well.
Second, the U.S. should act before the worst happens. We
talk a lot about preventive diplomacy. We say we are sorry that
we did not act earlier in Rwanda. But if there is genocidal
violence in Rwanda or Burundi again, I don't think we are any
better prepared for that eventuality now than we had been in
the past.
Third, we must begin to address the institutional needs of
State building in Africa along with democratization. This means
more than pressing for elections. It means aiding in the
rebuilding of the essential institutions, including a
professional system of justice, the police, a civil service,
and even a professionalized army.
Fourth, we should not fall into old habits of raising false
hopes. We tend to over promise and under deliver in Africa. We
preach democracy and human rights and then not follow through
or, worse, gloss over the deficiencies when they are apparent.
We regret that we have not acted sooner but then do nothing
concrete to prevent another genocide in Central Africa.
Maybe the President's trip in Africa will be a step
forward, particularly with the summit, in order to rectify some
of these deficiencies.
In conclusion, let me just say that I think the President's
trip to Africa really is a good opportunity to address some of
these problems. I hope that he tells it like it is in Africa
and that he addresses these deeper issues.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Baker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Pauline H. Baker \1\
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\1\ The views expressed in this testimony are those of the author.
They do not necessarily represent the views of The Fund for Peace or
its projects.
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I appreciate the opportunity to testify today on the prospects for
democracy in Africa and the role the so-called ``new generation of
leaders.'' It is a special honor to be here because I was a
professional staff member for this committee some years ago. At that
time, we were asking the same kind of questions of the first post-
independence generation: Who are the leaders of Africa? What are their
priorities? How effective will they be in promoting genuine political
and economic development?
While it was not clear at the outset, there is general agreement
today that the post independent leaders were a disappointment. Some
were well motivated, but few fulfilled the promise of African
independence. There has been some progress, for instance in education,
and much political experimentation in the nearly four decades of
independence. However, Africa has stagnated economically and its state
institutions have decayed. Vast amounts of government revenue were
squandered in white elephant projects or ended up in leaders' private
oversees bank accounts.
Some countries lapsed into military rule, others into single-party
or one-man dictatorships. Consequently, the majority of the African
population is worse off today than they were at independence.
In the 1990s, however, there are encouraging signs of change. Some
have even argued that the continent is on the threshold of an ``African
renaissance,'' a term which captures the idea of a ``rebirth'' or ``a
second independence.'' The remarkable transition in South Africa and
the inspiring model of Nelson Mandela embodies this hope. So does the
progress made in ending conflicts in southern Africa. If the peace
accord in Angola holds, southern Africa will be without war for the
first time in its post-colonial history.
There are other encouraging trends as well. The butchers of Africa,
such as Uganda's Idi Amin or Ethiopia's Mengistu, have left the scene.
Some African countries have registered impressive economic growth
rates. Several nations have moved in the direction of democratization,
holding sovereign national conferences, an innovative mode of political
transition, which resulted in changes in parts of Francophone Africa.
Since 1990, multiparty elections have been conducted in more than
thirty countries. In addition, the ideological battles are over.
Market-oriented reforms have been adopted in most countries and
hundreds of state-owned corporations have been privatized.
However, these positive images of Africa are not always what they
seem. The portrayal of a ``new generation of leaders'' represents, in
my view, one of the distortions. Oddly, the term does not refer to
Nelson Mandela or other popularly elected leaders, nor to the
impressive way that civil society has pressed for democracy. Rather the
term refers to a small network of east and central African leaders
whose support of democratization is weak or non-existent. Yet, they are
seen by many, including the Clinton Administration, as representing a
set of rulers who are introducing a degree of accountability and
egalitarianism that will end the African legacy of chaos and despotism.
As summarized in a recent article by Dan Connell and Frank
Smyth,\2\ these leaders are a young vanguard of determined
nationalists. They include Eritrea's Isaias Afwerki, Ethiopia's Meles
Zenawi, Rwanda's Paul Kagame, and Uganda's Yoweri Kaguta Museveni.
Lately, Lauent Kabila of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly
Zaire) has been added to the group.
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\2\ Dan Connell and Frank Smyth, ``Africa's New Bloc,'' Foreign
Affairs, March/April 1998, 80-94.
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Nationalists they may be. However, they are more representative of
the overall fluidity and instability of African politics than
democratization, which is by no means a stable and enduring process in
Africa. This can be seen in several trends. For example, while the
frequency of elections has increased, the quality of elections has
eroded. Political transitions often mock democracy, following the form
but not the substance of change. Nigeria, Africa's most populous
country, annulled elections in 1993 and the military regime has jailed
or driven into exile political opponents, journalists, and human rights
advocates. Its political transition, which promises a return to
civilian rule in October 1998, is a sham. Even where political
transitions have been successful, there has been backsliding, such as
in Zambia, or breakdowns, such as in Sierra Leone.
Generalizations can be deceptive and one must look closely at what
is actually occurring on the ground. This is especially true of the
``new generation'' thesis. On the surface, these leaders appear as the
new saviors of Africa, poised to lead the continent out of
authoritarianism and chaos. On deeper examination, they act like the
kind of authoritarians they are purported to oppose, except that they
are more concerned with economic development and preach self-
discipline.
My concern is that we are embracing a new generation of strong men
in the name of post-Cold War stability and economic reform just as we
propped up the old generation in the name of Cold War stability and
anti-communism. If so, we could be nurturing the kind of crony
capitalism in Africa that is undermining Asia and encouraging a replay
of the pattern of personal rule that has dogged the continent for
decades.
The Administration deserves praise for raising the salience of
Africa. In many ways, they are breaking new ground by trying to
redefine the US relationship with the continent. Admitting our failure
to respond to the genocide in Rwanda is a good starting point. The
African Trade and Opportunity legislation is a further small step in
that direction. Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
and President Clinton are bringing more attention to the continent by
traveling there. This is long overdue. However, while some parts of
Africa may be on the mend, and the Administration is right to support
it, the continent as a whole is not yet ripe for renaissance.
Naturally, we must understand that many of the new leaders are
rebuilding shattered societies. It is not easy to recover from
genocide, reverse decades of dictatorship, and patch together collapsed
states. In calling for democratization, I am not calling for instant
democracy. Building institutions takes time. Security issues often come
first. There are few trained personnel to work with and scare resources
to reconstruct economies. Nonetheless, tolerating human rights abuses
and calling non-democratic leaders democratic simply because they apply
favorable economic policies merely invites another round of
disillusionment.
Who are these new leaders? These four or five leaders (out of a
continent of 48 states) have ambitions to remake the continent in their
image. They came to power, and largely are staying in power, through
force of arms. They run de facto single party or no party states that
tolerate little opposition. They are ethically related or allied. Both
Ethiopia's Meles and Eritrea's Isaias are Tigrean. Uganda's Museveni,
the oldest of the group who came to power in 1986, is a member of a
minority ethnic group but he came to power with the assistance of
Rwandan Tutsis who had fled Hutu domination. With Museveni's aid, these
same Tutsis drove out extremist Hutus in Rwanda who perpetrated the
1994 genocide. In turn, they backed the installation of Laurent Kabila
in the Congo. Thus, these new leaders represent a close-knit network of
military allies dominated largely by the Tigreans and the Tutsis.
These men came to power by joining forces to eliminate their
opponents. Often, this was done with understandable justification--to
overthrow Mengistu in Ethiopia, to remove Mobutu in Zaire, and to stop
genocide in Rwanda. But we should recognize that common enemies, not
common values, unite them. While they do not always agree, they have a
common strategic vision of the continent and their assertive role in
it. After Zaire, their next target seems to be Sudan, which supports
rebel groups in Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda. Thus, there is a
convergence of interests between the US and the alliance formed around
Khartoum.
However, there are many problems with this new axis of power.
First, the alliance has established a standard of behavior that defies
international norms of human rights. Accusations of severe human rights
abuses plague Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in
particular, both of which have been resistant to international
inspection and monitors. This merely fuels the cauldrons of ethnic
animosity and suspicion as the cycle of impunity continues. Second,
these leaders openly defy the international norm of noninterference in
the internal affairs of other states. True, the world heaved a sign of
relief when Mengistu and Mobutu were driven from power, and neighboring
states in Africa have supported rebel activities for decades. What is
disturbing is that armies are openly crossing borders to topple
regimes. What are the limits to this military intervention? What
country will be next on the list? Is this the sort of international
behavior that we want to encourage?
Looking broadly at Africa, we may already be seeing the
consequences of this trend. It is not a new era of accountability and
egalitarianism that is emerging but an era of home grown hegemonic
power. Angola, for example, was a pivotal actor in the overthrow of
Mobutu and now, after years of war with UNITA, has one of the most
battle-hardened armies in Africa. Nigeria, despite its own internal
political crisis, has led the West African organization of ECOWAS
(Economic Community of West African States) to end the civil conflicts
in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Neither Angola nor Nigeria is a stable
democracy. Neither is checked by continental or extra-continental
powers. Thus, we may be witnessing a second scramble for Africa, this
time by Africans themselves.
If so, what should the US do? First, the US must reiterate its
commitment to the principles of democracy and human rights, and deal
promptly and directly with the difficult problem areas. That means
meeting with opposition leaders; encouraging more pluralism and open
debate; pressing for more political inclusion; developing civil
society; supporting a free press; and refusing to support fraudulent
elections and phony political transitions. If we promote democracy
within states, we will be promoting peace among states. Second, the US
should act before the worse happens. We waited in Rwanda in 1994 and
are now saying we are sorry we did not act sooner, when we could have
supported a UN intervention to stop the genocide. In similar fashion,
we are waiting as the crisis grows in Nigeria. We may likewise regret
that delay down the road. We talk a lot about preventive diplomacy, but
do little to act on it.
Third, we must begin to address the institutional needs of state
building along with democratization. This means more than pressing for
elections. It means aiding in the rebuilding of essential state
institutions, including a professional system of justice, police, and
civil service. Where appropriate, it could even mean helping to
professionalize African armies so that they are disciplined and
restricted in their missions to defending their own borders and doing
civic action projects, such as building roads, bridges, and schools. We
could assist Rwanda in rebuilding its courts, jails, and corrections
service, provided it agrees to provide access to human rights
organizations. Similar reciprocal relationships could be developed with
the leaders of the Congo, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea, all of whom say
that they are committed to instilling accountability. Let us build upon
that sentiment and test it.
Fourth, let us not fall into old habits of raising false hopes. We
tend to over promise and under deliver in Africa. We preach democracy
and human rights and then not follow through or, worse, gloss over the
deficiencies when they are apparent. We regret that we had not acted
sooner to prevent genocide but do nothing to prevent it from happening
again. If Rwanda or Burundi descends into genocidal violence again, is
the US any better prepared to stop it?
Finally, the president's trip to Africa this month represents a
genuine opportunity to place the US-African relationship on a new
footing, based on a non-patronizing attitude. To accomplish this,
however, the President must fulfill the promise of Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright to ``tell it like it is.'' I sincerely hope that he
does.
Senator Ashcroft. Thank you, Dr. Baker.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
hearing two of the witnesses. I regret that I can only make a
statement at this point and cannot hear from the other two. I
confess on the record that I am not always genuinely
disappointed when I have to leave a hearing. But never is that
true of the chairman, who is the chairman of two of my
subcommittees.
This is a very special hearing to me, and I really
appreciate the opportunity to say a few words about it.
This is an important time in U.S. policy toward Africa. We
are in between the visit of the Secretary of State and the
visit of the President. These visits, as both of you have said
so far, signal what I believe is a serious commitment to the
African continent.
In addition, I would also like to note for the record that
our hearing today comes just less than 24 hours after the House
of Representatives has debated and passed the historic Africa
Growth and Opportunity Act. This is another positive sign of
Africa getting the attention it really, really needs to get.
This legislation represents an important effort by our
colleagues in the House to introduce a new paradigm in their
approach of the U.S. Congress to Africa and I commend them for
their efforts. I have not reviewed all of the legislation. I do
have some concerns about it. But the fact is, at least on the
floor of the House, there was a bill with regard to this part
of the world and that happens all too infrequently.
In the context of these events, this hearing takes on more
significance. The topic of democracy in Africa allows us to
review the progress of democracy across the continent since the
end of the World War and it allows us to take a look at what
has happened with respect to U.S. policy during that time.
The subtopic, which you both talked about, the new
generation of African leaders, puts sort of an added twist to
the subject. Many people have been using this term. You have
both gone over it with regard to the new leaders, some of the
new leaders in Africa. They are, by some, held up as model
leaders who have overcome great odds to achieve relative
success in their countries.
But in my view, and I think it is fair to say in the view
of the first two witnesses, these leaders have exhibited only
moderate commitments to democratization and human rights. In
particular, there has been little institutionalization of
structures that would foster an environment in which democracy
and human rights can flourish. I think this threatens the
sustainability of any of the positive moves that may have been
achieved.
Because, Mr. Chairman, I am not convinced that the three,
four, or five leaders that are generally referred to as the
``new generation of African leaders'' truly represent the best
that Africa has to offer in terms of democracy, I think we
should heed the advice of Dr. Ayittey who gave a good focus
from the historical point of view of the danger of looking at
Africa and its future with regard to these individuals rather
than institutions. I think that is a terribly important remark
so that we do not fall into that trap again.
True, they have made important contributions to the
continent. In fact, Mr. Chairman, I think one of the most
interesting conversations I have had in the 5\1/2\ years as a
member of this committee is just talking with President
Museveni about his concepts of political parties, how it is
different than the Western view, how we cannot assume simply
because we have a particular kind of party system that this is
the right system for any African country.
So there are interesting concepts there. It is true that
the countries have undergone impressive economic growth. It is
true that they have managed to establish a level of security
for their citizens that is essential in the region. These are
significant. But I do not think that U.S. foreign policy in
Africa should emphasize these accomplishments without also
recognizing the important accomplishments made elsewhere.
So, for me, the question is how do we sort of decide
whether or not this kind of approach is working. I think that
the emphasis on institutions and independent judiciary and the
like is a more instructive one.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I just want to return for a second
to the issue of Nigeria, the continent's largest country. This
is really going to be a test of whether this is really a new
era of democratization or whether we are going to continue to
go backward in one of the absolutely key countries.
Again, I am glad Assistant Secretary Rice was here. I am
glad to hear that progress is being made on formulating this
Nigeria policy. It has been a long time in coming and I really
would hope it could be in as reasonable and final form as
possible before the President leaves on his trip so that when
he is asked questions, which he will be asked, about Nigeria,
he is able to speak to the problems that exist with regard to
democratization in Nigeria.
I thank the chair again very much for letting me interrupt
this panel.
Senator Ashcroft. I am grateful to the Senator from
Wisconsin for his interest. I join him in his commendation of
the administration and the Congress for expressing a focus on
Africa, which I think is important and perhaps overdue.
So thank you very much for helping.
I now would call on Mr. Salih Booker, who is a Senior
Fellow for Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations
here in Washington, DC.
Mr. Booker, I want to thank you for coming to the
subcommittee. We have about 38 minutes left. Certainly do not
take over half of it.
If you can limit yourself, it will give us time to have a
discussion. Mr. Booker.
STATEMENT OF SALIH BOOKER, SENIOR FELLOW FOR AFRICA STUDIES,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Booker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
extending an invitation for me to testify before the
subcommittee today.
I would like to note at the onset that the Council on
Foreign Relations does not take an institutional stand on any
foreign affairs issue, and I am solely responsible for this
statement.
Mr. Chairman, you are, no doubt, familiar with the trend
within the current discourse on Africa which argues that there
is a nascent renaissance occurring on the continent. My
colleagues here today have commented on this as well.
This outlook points to very real changes that have occurred
across the enormous length and breadth of the continent since
the dawn of this decade in the areas of conflict resolution,
economic growth and reform, political change and, indeed,
democratization.
These accomplishments are impressive: The end of conflicts
throughout Southern Africa, Ethiopia, and more recently in
Liberia, to name a few; the achievement of aggregate growth
rates of roughly five percent for three years running, and
mostly multiparty Presidential elections in over two-thirds of
the Nations in Africa, many of whom have now conducted such
contests twice during this new era, as well as a large number
of other national elections for parliaments, local and regional
legislators, mayors, et cetera.
So in America, long-time supporters of Africa proclaim that
the glass is now half full, while the continent's committed
detractors seize upon the tragedies afflicting a handful of
traumatized States and declare that the glass is half empty.
Mr. Chairman, I accept that they are both looking at the
same glass. When I see a renaissance in Africa, I recognize
that it is fragile. Where I see chaos still in Africa, I
recognize that there is hope for rebirth.
Africa's tenuous renewal is largely self generated; and to
succeed, however, the 53 sovereign countries of this continent
of nearly 800 million people will require supportive policies
from the international community, especially the industrialized
countries, and particularly the United States.
Today's hearing on the eve of President Clinton's historic
first visit to Africa seeks to assess the prospects for
democracy in Africa, specifically focusing on the so-called
``new generation of leaders'' in five Eastern and Central
African States.
I will try to be brief and to the point. But I do want to
point out that we are focusing on essentially 5 leaders and 5
countries out of a total of 53 and out of an enormous
continent; and that they are, perhaps, reflective of the
important changes in their particular subregions, but that
there are momentous changes occurring throughout the rest of
the continent.
Much has been written and said about this so-called new
generation of leaders in the countries we are focusing on
today, the five that have been named and mentioned already
(Isaias, Meles, Museveni, Kagame, and Kabila).
The treatment of this theme is often superficial; because
the history of each country, the experience of each individual
leader, and the movements that produced them are unique. But
with the exception of Laurent Kabila, they do, however, share
several important characteristics which I will, at the risk of
a similar superficial generalization, list as follows.
Each has come to power following a long period of armed
struggle carried out by disciplined and organized political
movement that forged generally collective decision making
practices. They have been criticized here today for coming to
power through armed struggle, through the gun, so to speak. But
we have to bear in mind that, indeed, they had no choice in
these particular cases; and in each case they overthrew
corrupt, dictatorial regimes.
The four of them are each considered hard working, serious,
and dedicated to ensuring that their governments resist the
corruption that became the cancer of post colonial African
States. They are also younger and generally more educated than
the previous generation. They strive to promote increasingly
self reliant development strategies. They remain capable
military strategists and have demonstrated a will and capacity
to act collectively to further national security interests, as
evidenced by their roles in the overthrow of the genocidal
Rwandan Government and the dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko in
the former Zaire.
They are allied in their opposition to the military junta
and National Islamic Front government in Sudan and in their
support for the Sudanese People's Liberation Army and the
National Democratic Alliance of Sudan, of which the SPLA is a
partner.
Internally, they are each promoting development strategies
that acknowledge the importance of developing an indigenous
private sector, attracting foreign investment, and increasing
their trading relations with their regional neighbors and the
global community more broadly.
This is often referred to as their ``shift from Marx to
markets.''
They are committed to a vision of increasing regional
cooperation and economic integration in their immediate region
and, ultimately, they have a pan-African vision for the entire
continent.
They are experimenting with different forms of governance
which are not only aimed at maintaining themselves in power but
also at providing avenues for political and economic
development within stable national political systems,
unthreatened by sectarian, ethnic, or communal violence.
I would argue that they recognize the dangers of economic,
social, and political exclusion to their own rule and to their
own dream of transformation.
I mentioned that I would not list Laurent Kabila in this
category of the new leaders, this group of five. I think
Laurent Kabila is more of a ``Rip Van Winkle'' figure, who was
recently awakened and carried to the capital in Kinshasa from
which he now rules. To some degree, he is still looking around
for Tito, Mao, and others in trying to come to grips with the
modern era.
I think also in his particular case there is an opportunity
for the United States to work hard to ensure that the
transition that is supposed to be taking place in Congo is
successful. I think if that happens, indeed we may find that
Laurent Kabila is a transitional figure.
Mr. Chairman, I and other analysts have often referred to
the other new leaders, new generation leaders, as ``soldier
princes.'' This is to denote their military backgrounds but
also their noble intentions and, perhaps more subtly, to
suggest their imperial tendency in the style of their
governments and their regional visions.
The question posed today is: ``Are they just another form
of strong man?'' ``Are they simply a more enlightened or more
pro-capitalist version of the African big-men rulers of
yesterday?''
I think Dr. Baker and others have pointed out some of the
arguments suggesting that they are simply a new generation of
big-men.
I, however, believe that I would disagree, though I am
critical of their lack of political inclusion. But I think
engaging this new leadership to promote mutual security,
economic, and political interests in Africa, while a gamble, I
think it is a gamble worth taking in Eastern and Central Africa
right now--again, with the exception of Laurent Kabila.
I think we need to consider the realities of the regions
and appreciate that these leaders are pursuing a program for
economic transformation and the promotion of security that we,
the United States, share. We need not and should not embrace
individuals. But we can invest in the processes to achieve
transformation that these governments are promoting. Indeed, we
can help build the independent institutions that Professor
Ayittey referred to.
We cannot and should not abandon our support for democratic
change and we should invest in those areas that we can.
These governments have a long-term vision. But they are not
sure that the United States does. They don't know if the United
States considers our interests in Africa, our economic
interests, our security interests, or our political interests
as vital U.S. national interests that will keep us engaged over
the long run and prepared to commit the level of resources
needed to insure that these transformations succeed.
Mr. Chairman, in closing, let me just argue that we need to
continue to invest development resources, promote trade and
investment, and offer support for debt reduction and supportive
programs with the international financial institutions for
these very countries as part of a partnership that clearly
includes democratization as an equal objective to those of
promoting economic development and security.
But the scale of our commitment is likely to affect the
depth of our influence. I think this is a fundamental point
that I would like to leave with the subcommittee today; that
is, our engagement with these new leaders in Eastern and
Central Africa, in particular, is perhaps the best hope for
supporting this transformation that may occur in those two
subregions. But we have to demonstrate that our commitment is a
long-term commitment and if we really want to exercise
influence over the democratization process, then we have to be
prepared to demonstrate that we will commit the resources and
that we consider our interests vital enough that we will remain
engaged over the long haul.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ashcroft. Thank you very much, Mr. Booker.
Dr. David Gordon is a Senior Fellow of the Overseas
Development Council here in Washington, DC.
I am pleased to introduce you now at this time, Dr. Gordon.
When you are finished, we will have an opportunity for
discussion, answering questions, and maybe even discussion
between panel members to help us clarify views that have been
expressed. Dr. Gordon.
STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID F. GORDON, SENIOR FELLOW, OVERSEAS
DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend you
and the subcommittee for holding this hearing today and in
particular for inviting me to testify.
The views that I express today are my own and do not
necessarily reflect those of my colleagues at the Overseas
Development Council. They grow out of work that I have been
undertaking with Professor Joel Barkan of the University of
Iowa.
Africa is in the midst of profound change and America's
opportunity to affect these transitions and promote democracy
and development has never been better. While Africa remains in
some ways a continent in crisis, it is also the site of major
new experiments in governance, peace building, and free market
reform.
It is important, however, to stress that democratization is
a long-term project in Africa, as it has been everywhere.
African countries that have embarked upon democracy are
generally in the early stages of the process. They are not yet
consolidated democracies.
There is a new generation emerging all over Africa that is
committed to a new vision for the continent and its place in
the world. This emerging cadre of African leaders, be they in
government, in the private sector, or in other sections of
civil society, eschew ideology and grand visions and are
oriented toward pragmatism and problem solving.
When foreign policy pundits talk about the new leaders of
Africa, they are really talking about a sub-group of this
larger phenomenon. I want to associate myself with Salih's
comments about the importance of the larger phenomenon. But
these individuals in Central Africa and the Horn of Africa are
important as well.
Attention is focused on these five because of the assertive
attitude they have taken to the outside world and their
willingness to engage forcefully in regional affairs. Some hail
them as the new saviors of the continent; others condemn them
as little more than modernized versions of Africa's traditional
autocrats.
I discount both of these views and believe that a more
nuanced understanding of the new leaders should inform U.S.
Africa policy.
For these new leaders, the struggle is not against
neocolonialism or imperialism but against tribalism and
corruption. All are committed to sweeping away the failures of
the past.
Their experiences in liberating their countries from the
control of the Mengistus and Amins of Africa has given the new
leaders a great deal of confidence, often slipping into hubris.
But a central characteristic of these new leaders is their
belief in the responsibility of Africans to solve their own
problems.
The new leaders also share a skepticism toward the outside
world, a view shaped by the failure of the international
community to sustain effective responses in both Somalia and
especially in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.
But there is also considerable variation among these
leaders.
First of all, the so-called new leaders of Africa are not
all that new. Museveni has been in office for more than a
decade; Meles and Isaias are approaching seven years; and,
while Kabila is new in power, I agree with Salih that he
represents a political style that harks back to earlier
generations of African leaders.
While all are pragmatic and have given up what was an
earlier commitment to Marxism, only Museveni has really
delivered a comprehensive set of market driven economic
reforms.
On the dimension of political stability, only Isaias
governs a truly stable country with a broad-based political
regime. While Meles and Museveni have brought peace to their
countries, they have not yet won legitimacy in large sections
of their population.
Kagame dominates a country which remains at war, while
Kabila has yet to reestablish a national political system for
the Congo, and who knows if he has either the capacity or the
will?
While none are democrats in our sense of the term,
democratization has proceeded in varying paces in several of
the countries. Free and fair elections have been held in Uganda
to return Museveni to power and elect a parliament. Elections
in Ethiopia have not been fully free, while Eritrea, for all
practical purposes, is a one party State, albeit an apparently
popular one.
At the center of the debate about democracy in U.S. Africa
policy is the question of what approach the United States
should take toward the new leaders.
I believe that we should be broadly encouraging and
supportive of the new leaders. While these individuals are not
as morally compelling as Nelson Mandela, they do bring a new
courage, energy, and honesty to the African scene. But at the
same time, we must keep our eyes open and treat them as mature
partners, calling them to account when they err, but in a
manner that is mindful that we do not have a monopoly on
wisdom.
We need to be particularly concerned that the political
scene in all of these countries remains dominated by
individuals rather than institutions. The new leaders rule over
regimes that are brittle, and thus, vulnerable. They are likely
to evolve either into more inclusive polities or slip back into
the authoritarianism of the eighties and before.
Such a return to authoritarianism with its attendant loss
of legitimacy risks State collapse and civil war, and that is
why it is important for the United States to maintain a focus
on democracy as a goal of its policy and diplomacy in these
States.
That is also why democratization is in the self-interest of
these leaders.
We must be careful to not lose sight of these realities
where other foreign policy goals are at stake. While it is in
our interest to work closely with Ethiopia and Uganda to deal
with Sudan, the viability of such a policy is at risk as long
as neither Meles nor Museveni preside over inclusive and stable
polities.
Similarly, in the Great Lakes, downplaying democratization
in Rwanda and Congo risks putting the United States in a
position of uncritical support of narrowly based regimes that
will not bring stability to these countries.
The choice between democracy promotion on the one hand and
a concern for regional stability on the other is, Mr. Chairman,
a false one. The U.S. can and must pursue both. The new leaders
seek mature relations with us, not the paternalism of the past.
We should take the same approach to them.
Will Meles or Museveni not join with the United States to
contain the Sudan because the U.S. continues to urge further
democratization in these countries? Of course not. They are not
doing it to please us. They are doing it because it is in their
own interests.
How can the U.S. translate these concerns into an effective
policy vis-a-vis the new leaders?
Consider the particular case of U.S. policy toward Uganda.
Some argue that the United States should not push Museveni to
deepen the democratization process. What I am suggesting is
that, while broadly cooperating with and supporting the
Museveni Government, the U.S. should maintain a significant
dialog and program focused on the need to deepen the
democratization process in order to sustain Uganda's remarkable
progress.
Issues to be addressed might include strengthening the rule
of law and transparency and accountability of government,
making decentralization, a policy commitment of that
government, meaningful, and insuring that electoral competition
exists no matter what the political party framework the country
adopts.
Can such a policy work? In looking at how to approach the
new leaders in the Great Lakes and the Horn, U.S. policy makers
need to review their experience in dealing with a similar
figure in West Africa, Ghana's Jerry Rawlings.
In the late 1980's, Rawlings, who had come to power through
a military coup, undertook a tough economic reform program with
the support of the IMF and the World Bank. The U.S. strongly
supported this effort but continued to engage the Rawlings
regime on the need to move to a more open and broad-based
political system.
In the early 1990's, Rawlings established a multi-party
system. But the first elections failed to win the legitimacy of
large segments of the population. In response, the United
States, while continuing its support of Rawlings' government,
engaged with the Ghanaian opposition to explore means of
bringing them back into the political process. This led to a
very large effort to improve the electoral machinery in Ghana.
Ghana's second elections were held in 1996; and, while the
outcome was quite similar to the first, this time they gained
broad legitimacy and have led to the active participation of
the opposition in parliament and a broad and open political
debate in the country about a wide range of issues.
By having a steady policy of engagement with a dynamic new
leader but not losing sight of the importance of political
reform and democratization to sustain economic policy reforms
and growth, the U.S. has played a positive role in Ghana's
evolution.
Many of today's new leaders in the Great Lakes and the Horn
have political views similar to those of Rawlings seven or
eight years ago. We should shape an approach to them that
learns from our successful experiences in Ghana.
In two weeks, Mr. Chairman, President Clinton will have the
opportunity to directly engage many of Africa's new leaders.
The President will be carrying a message of partnership and of
the need for more mature relations based on mutual self-
interest.
Central to this partnership should be and I believe will be
a continuing commitment to the principle of democracy and
active promotion of democratization.
The arrival of Africa's new leaders represents an historic
opportunity for the continent. Africa's cycles of despair can
be broken. But it will require a commitment to vision,
engagement, and pragmatism by our leaders in the promotion of
democracy in Africa.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Gordon follows:]
Prepared Statement of David F. Gordon
I want to thank Chairman Ashcroft, Senator Feingold, and other
members of the subcommittee for inviting me to testify today on the
topic of African democracy and the new leadership which is emerging in
many states in Africa. The views that I express this afternoon are my
own and do not necessarily reflect those of my colleagues at the
Overseas Development Council or its Board of Directors. They grow out
of work that I have been undertaking with Professor Joel Barkan of the
University of Iowa and the U.S. Institute of Peace.
Events on the ground in Africa and new political initiatives in
this country are reshaping U.S.-Africa relations and creating new
possibilities for more productive engagement. Africa is in the midst of
profound change, and America's opportunity to affect these transitions
and promote democracy and development has perhaps never been better.
The timing of these hearings is propitious, on the eve of the most
extensive Presidential visit to Africa ever and amidst congressional
debate over the most important piece of legislation pertaining to
Africa in many years, the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. I commend
the subcommittee for showing foresight to open hearings on these
matters, so we might more fully understand how to embrace these new
opportunities to promote U.S. interests in African democracy, political
stability, and economic self-reliance.
The tidal wave of change which swept over Europe at the end of the
Cold War seven years ago rippled across Africa as well. While the
transformation has not been as sudden or dramatic as in Europe, the
changes have been equally profound. Long-suppressed political energies
have been released and old alliances have been reordered. Several
longstanding civil conflicts have been resolved. In some countries, new
forms of conflict have been released. But, perhaps most importantly, a
new style of leadership has emerged. This new generation of leaders is
more independent, more assertive, unfettered by the blinders of Cold
War ideology, and pragmatically committed to economic and political
reform. While changes are evident across virtually the entire
continent, they are most striking and challenging in the Horn of Africa
and the Great Lakes States--although I should hasten to add that by
``the Great Lakes States,'' I refer to the likes of Uganda and Rwanda
and not Vermont.
The African Balance Sheet
To many, the budding of democracy and economic rebirth in Africa
has gone unnoticed: through the eyes of the media, images of political
and economic trends on the African continent are overwhelmingly
negative. War, famine and chaos appear to be the order of the day. The
collapse of the Mobutu regime in Zaire, the toppling of the elected
president in the neighboring Republic of Congo, continued ethnic
conflict and tension in Rwanda and Burundi, the overthrow of a recently
elected government in Sierra Leone, and deadly political strife in
Kenya all made their way into the headlines last year.
But the media ignore much of the current reality in Africa. Good
things are happening in Africa in addition to the not so good; and not
in isolated instances. On the whole, Africa is better off, both
economically and politically, than it was at the end of the Cold War,
when the U.S. began earnest effort to promote economic and political
reform. The continent is no longer an unvarigated wasteland of
kleptocratic regimes, turmoil, and economic stagnation. While we cannot
ignore the persistence of failed states such as Somalia, nor oppressive
authoritarian rule as in Nigeria and the Sudan, nor continual ethnic
conflict and political unrest in parts of Central Africa, all African
countries must not be lumped together and pronounced disasters.
There are now ``many Africas.'' Indeed, the defining characteristic
of contemporary Africa is the increasing differentiation among states.
While Africa remains, in some ways, a continent in crisis, it is also
the site of major new experiments in governance, peace-building and
free market reform.
Since 1990, more than three dozen African states have conducted
multi-party elections, reflecting significant political liberalization
and democratization across the continent. While elections are the most
visible manifestations of democratization, equally important are
significant improvements in the rule of law, civil liberties--
particularly the strengthening of civil society and the reemergence of
a free press-and a decline in human rights abuses. It is important,
however, to stress that democratization is a long-term project in
Africa, as it has been every where. African countries that have
embarked upon democracy are generally in the early stages of
democratization--the transition from authoritarian rule. Many have what
might be called ``hybrid'' regimes, which combine democratic and non-
democratic elements. They are not yet consolidated democracies.
Despite continuing conflicts, especially in Central Africa, a
recent study by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
found that there is in fact less conflict on the continent today than
in the last years of the Cold War. South Africa, Mozambique, Chad,
Ethiopia, Eritrea and Namibia and hopefully even Liberia are among the
countries having resolved deadly conflicts.
Aggregate economic growth rates for Africa in the past three years
are more than double those of the previous decade, and no longer lag
dramatically behind the rest of the developing world. Trade and
investment in Africa is growing rapidly after an almost continuous
decline since the early 1970s. The IMF estimates that foreign private
capital investment in Africa, which had all but dried up in the 1980s,
grew to nearly $10 billion per year in 1996. And Africa's social
indicators show that progress is not confined to small privileged
elites. Average life expectancy has increased from 40 to 50 in the past
generation while literacy rates have doubled to over 50 percent.
Perhaps most importantly, there is a new generation emerging all
over Africa that is committed to a new vision of the continent and its
place in the world. This emerging cadre of African leaders--be they in
government, the private sector or other sections of civil society have
been heavily influenced by the technological revolution and the global
trends towards democratic governance and market-based, private sector
focused economic policies. They eschew ideology and grand visions, and
are oriented towards pragmatism and problem solving. Many have spent a
good deal of time overseas, most often in the West, and seek to
translate effectively the benefits of global technology and culture
into their local idioms.
Africa's ``New Leaders''
Who are these ``new leaders?'' If one includes the leaders of all
African countries that have experienced a change of government or
regime since 1990, the list of ``New Leaders'' would number over
thirty, and include such dissimilar individuals as Charles Taylor of
Liberia, Nigeria's Sani Abacha, Zambian Frederick Chiluba and South
Africa's Nelson Mandela, leaders with little in common in terms of
their personal agendas or visions for their countries or for Africa.
A different definition of ``New Leaders'' focuses on the broad
generational change described above. And when foreign policy pundits
talk about ``the new leaders of Africa'' they tend to focus on four or
five individuals who rule in Central Africa or the Horn: Meles Zanawi
of Ethiopia, Isaias Afeworki of Eritrea, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda,
Paul Kagame of Rwanda and (perhaps) Laurent Kabila of the Congo.
Attention has focused on these five because of the assertive
attitude they have taken towards the outside world and their
willingness to engage forcefully in regional affairs, such as the
overthrow of President Mobutu of Zaire. Some hail them as the new
saviors of Africa; others condemn them as little more than a modernized
version of Africa's traditional autocratic ``big men.''
I discount both of these views, and believe that a more nuanced
understanding of these ``New Leaders'' must inform U.S. Africa policy.
What really sets this group apart is not their ``newness'' or what
they are for, but what they are against. For these ``New Leaders'' the
struggle is not against neo-colonialism or imperialism, but against
tribalism and corruption. They have inherited nations devastated by
corrupt, statist autocrats who wrecked their economies and impoverished
the citizenry. All are committed to sweeping away the failures of the
past including the political class associated with these failures in
their respective countries.
Their experience in liberating their countries from the control of
the Mengistus and Amins of Africa has given the ``New Leaders'' a great
deal of confidence, often slipping into hubris. These leaders share a
powerful confidence in their own judgments and do not take advice
easily. A central characteristic of these ``New Leaders'' is their
belief in the responsibility of Africans to solve their own problems.
All desire to assert African control of the continent's destiny, and
all reject a deferential attitude toward outsiders and the advice they
proffer. While Africa's leaders have traditionally sought more aid, the
``New Leaders'' are more concerned about aid dependence, and pride
themselves on projects completed without foreign assistance.
The ``New Leaders'' also share a skepticism towards the outside
world, a view shaped by the failure of the international community to
support them in their fights against the ancien regimes as well as its
inability to sustain effective responses in both Somalia and,
especially, in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. This has led the ``New
Leaders'' to strike out on their own, an attitude most vividly
demonstrated by their willingness to respond to regional security
issues--violating the heretofore sacrosanct OAU doctrine of African
non-intervention in their neighbors' affairs.
The conventional wisdom about the new leaders is that all have
embraced economic reform, re-established political stability and
reduced human rights abuses, but resisted multiparty democracy, and
that this strategy has achieved dramatic results. As such, they
deserve, and indeed have received, the support of the international
community because they are truly committed to putting their own houses
in order.
But on closer inspection, one also finds considerable variation
among the chosen five. First of all, the so-called ``new'' leaders of
Africa are not all new. Museveni has been in office for more than a
decade; Meles and Isaias are approaching seven years. While Kabila is
new in power, he represents a political style that harks back to
earlier generations of African leaders.
In respect to economic reform and the establishment of a strong
free market economy, while all are pragmatic and have given up most of
what was an earlier commitment to Marxism, only Museveni has really
delivered a comprehensive set of economic reforms. The others, while
they reject the old-state run economic model, retain the tendency to
distrust the capitalists. The ``New Leaders'' do appear to all
subscribe to the notion that economic development precedes democracy,
and reject the view that democratization and development are mutually
supportive processes that occur at roughly the same time.
On the dimension of political stability, only Isajas governs a
truly stable country with a broad based political regime. While Meles,
Jsaias and Museveni have brought peace to their countries, they have
not yet won legitimacy in large sections of the population. Kagame
rules a country which remains at war, while Kabila has yet to re-
establish a national political system for the Congo, and there are
serious doubts whether he has the inclination to do so.
On the dimension of managing ethnic conflict, their approaches also
vary. Ethiopia is committed to ethnic-based decentralization; while
Uganda has established decentralized structures of governance to
counter ethnic conflict. But in both cases it remains to be seen
whether a meaningful devolution of power will be made to sub-national
units of government. Isaias does not face serious ethnic issues while
Kagame and Kabila are yet to undertake earnest efforts to deal with the
difficult ethnic issues in Rwanda and the Congo.
The ``New Leaders'' also have very different attitudes towards
democracy. While none are ``democrats'' in our sense of the term,
democratization has proceeded in varying paces in several of the
countries. Free and fair elections have been held in Uganda to return
Museveni to power and elect a new parliament. Elections in Ethiopia
have not been fully free, while Eritrea is for all practical purposes a
one party state, albeit a popular one. In Rwanda and Congo, the ruling
regimes have made verbal commitments to democratic elections, but
political circumstances do not seem to be moving in that direction.
Democratization and U.S. Africa Policy
The mixed record of democratization in Africa and the emergence of
regimes led by individuals who appear to be committed to effective
governance and real economic development, but not necessarily Western-
style democracy, has led some analysts and foreign policy makers to
question the wisdom of democracy and democracy promotion as core themes
of U.S. Africa policy. The skepticism about prospects for democracy and
democracy promotion is being generated by a curious convergence of
perspectives between those who continue to view Africa as a continent
of economic stagnation and war, and those who are inclined to gloss
over the less-promising details of the African reality.
It is a skepticism that is also part of a broader intellectual
disenchantment with the so-called ``third wave'' of democratization as
represented by Robert D. Kaplan's recent Atlantic Monthly article
entitled ``Was Democracy Just a Moment?'' and Fareed Zakaria's ``The
Rise of Illiberal Democracy,'' in the December, 1997, issue of Foreign
Affairs. These critics of democracy selectively seize on the downside
manifestations of democratization and conclude that American support
for democratization has made things worse rather than better, and
therefore is not in the U.S. interest.
The critics of US. efforts to promote democracy in Africa base
their argument on a combination of four assumptions:
First, that the social and economic conditions in Africa are not
propitious for the sustainability of democracy; and that economic
development is a precondition for democratization on the continent. In
Kaplan's words, ``democracy emerges successfully only as a capstone to
other social and economic achievements.''
Second, that economic development and the reconstitution of failed
states--the preconditions for democracy--are advanced most rapidly by a
period of enlightened authoritarian rule. A 1997 Time article described
Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni as the Lee Kuan Yew of Africa,
highlighting the fact that President Lee brought prosperity to
Singapore through a combination of effective economic policies and
autocratic politics and suggesting that Museveni was doing the same.
Museveni himself has argued that his ``no-party'' model is more attuned
to African realities than is multi-party democracy.
Third, that aggressive promotion of democracy runs at cross-
purposes with other, more important foreign policy goals, especially in
Central Africa. These goals include the establishment of stable and
effective governments; strengthening regional security arrangements,
especially among the ``frontline states'' bordering Sudan; preventing
the re-emergence of genocide; and more effectively integrating Africa
into the global economy.
Fourth, that democracy promotion is an exercise of forcing Western
values on Africa, a form of cultural imperialism that is both self-
defeating (What is the point of holding an election if all that happens
is one ethnic-based regime replaces another?) and is rejected by the
``New Leaders'' who are committed to finding their own forms of
democracy.
To what extent does such skepticism shape U.S. Africa policy? To
what extent should it?
Although Secretary Albright and other Administration officials have
reiterated their support for democratization in Africa, questions
persist about the status of democracy in U.S. Africa policy. In
particular, human rights and pro-democracy groups have continued to
criticize the Clinton Administration, especially in regard to the Great
Lakes region, and believe that the Administration's new activism
regarding Africa will lead to economic and strategic considerations
that effectively crowd out a concern with democracy and human rights.
During Albright's December trip to Africa, her frequent statements on
the need for the United States to ``listen more and talk less'' was
widely interpreted in the media, both in Africa and in the United
States, as marking a step hack from the active support for democracy
that has been a hallmark of U.S. Africa policy since the fall of the
Berlin Wall.
I believe that the new skepticism about democracy in Africa and the
four assumptions on which it is based are unwarranted and reflect a
distorted understanding of the African experience.
Is successful economic development a precondition for democracy? In
Africa, the return to economic growth has been inextricably linked to
political reform. Most, albeit not all, of the countries that are now
experiencing positive rates of economic growth are countries that have
embarked on democratic transitions, or where there has been genuine
political liberalization. This is not surprising given the failure of
authoritarian rule to have a positive developmental impact for most of
Africa's independence period. It has been asserted many times that
economic reform and democratization cannot occur simultaneously, but
that is precisely what has been happening all across the continent.
Moreover, those countries which have made the strongest commitment to
democracy and the rule of law--Botswana, Mauritius, South Africa and
Ghana--have been among the most successful in attracting foreign direct
investment to their non-mineral sectors.
Is ``enlightened authoritarianism,'' in the image of Lee Kuan Yew,
the path for progress in Africa? Uganda in fact represents a more
complicated case than superficial comparisons reveal. Uganda's
sustained economic growth rate of seven to nine percent in recent years
cannot be attributed to enlightened authoritarianism. While President
Yoweri Museveni has encouraged the comparisons between himself and Lee
Kuan Yew of Singapore, the analogy is stretched. Museveni's
``movement'' based government does not lend itself neatly to the
authoritarian label. Uganda has one of the freest presses in Africa.
Dissent is permitted to a much greater extent than in Singapore.
Despite the lack of a multi-party system, Uganda under Museveni has
experienced a substantial measure of political liberalization matching
that of most African countries under more formal multi-party rule.
But the presumed link between--good economic performance and the
rise of enlightened authoritarian rule really falls apart when one
looks at which African countries are at the forefront of economic
growth. The countries with the highest aggregate growth rates over the
long-term are Botswana and Mauritius, two countries with the longest
record of democratic rule. More recently, positive growth rates have
returned to Benin, Ghana, Mozambique, and South Africa, countries where
the resurgence of democracy has been the strongest. Indeed, the link
between relatively good economic performance and democracy in Africa
goes back decades. From independence through the 1970s, those
relatively open and politically competitive African countries--
Botswana, Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, the Gambia and Kenya--were among the
continent's best long-term economic performers.
Does promoting democracy endanger more important U.S. security
interests in Africa? Because neither economic development nor political
stability are likely to occur in Africa without accountable and
inclusive government, democratization, and particularly democratic
consolidation, is a critical component of viable governance. The United
States should therefore not back away from this process, but continue
to nurture it. We must be careful not to lose sight of this reality
where other foreign policy goals are at stake. This is particularly
true in central Africa where the U.S. seeks to contain the Sudan, bring
peace to the Great Lakes, and support the reconstruction of the Congo.
While it is in our interest to work closely with Ethiopia and Uganda to
deal with Sudan, the viability of such a policy is at risk so long as
neither Meles nor Museveni preside over inclusive and stable polities.
Similarly, in the Great Lakes, downplaying democratization in Rwanda
and Congo risks putting the U.S. in a position of uncritical support of
narrowly-based regimes that will not bring stability to these
countries.
The choice between democracy promotion on the one hand, and a
concern for regional stability on the other, is largely a false one.
The U.S. can and should pursue both. This will no doubt create some
tensions, but there is no reason to believe that promotion of democracy
will undermine the bilateral relationship with the ``New Leaders'' or
compromise other foreign policy goals. The ``New Leaders'' seek mature
relations with the U.S., not the paternalism of the past. We should
take the same approach towards them. Will Meles or Museveni not join
with the US to contain the Sudan because the U.S. continues to urge
further democratization in their countries? Of course not. They aren't
doing it to please us, but because it is in their own interests. Will
the vigorous promotion of democracy in these countries make life more
complicated for our ambassadors there? Probably, but articulating the
complexity and rationale for U.S. policy is what professional diplomats
are paid to do.
Is democracy a Western, alien value, unsuited to African soil? In
Africa, as elsewhere where democratization has been most vigorously
resisted, the argument that democracy is an alien value is often merely
a justification for the continuation of authoritarian rule. Indeed,
this rhetoric harks back to the. initial rejection of liberal democracy
and the search for ``African democracy'' by the early architects of
one-party rule during the 1960s such as Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and
Julius Nyerere in Tanzania. Those who argue that democratization in
Africa is an alien imposition forget that the current demand for
democracy across the continent has come primarily from within by those
who challenged incumbent authoritarian regimes in the streets (e.g. in
Benin, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Zaire). External actors
played only a supportive role in the initiation of Africa's recent
political evolution.
If allowed to determine U.S. Africa policy, skepticism towards
democracy and democratization will result in outcomes that are in
neither the U.S. nor Africa's interest. In particular, stepping away
from a commitment to democracy in Africa will lead the United States
back to a Cold War-like policy of supporting regimes out of short-term
tactical considerations. Such a policy will undermine Africa's
democratic forces, and result in less rather than more progress on
political consolidation, conflict-resolution and economic development.
Having become serious about democratization since the end of the Cold
War, are we to retreat from this goal just when the policy of its
promotion is bearing fruit? I submit that the answer should be an
emphatic ``no.''
The failure to stay the course in respect to democracy promotion
also risks abandoning those individuals and groups that have fought
hard to bring democracy to their countries, people who have often
pursued their quest with tangible support, both technical and
diplomatic, from the United States. This will undermine the credibility
of past and current policies in such countries as Kenya where we have
worked hard to nurture a democratic transition in the face of a hostile
regime, but where much progress in the form of a vibrant civil society
and the beginning of constitutional reform, has nonetheless been made.
It may also generate a backlash against the U.S. and other Western
governments from Africa's democrats.
Dealing With the ``New Leaders''
At the center of the debate about democracy in U.S. Africa policy
is the question of what approach the U.S. should take towards the ``New
Leaders'' in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa. Following her trip
to Africa, critical editorials in both The Washington Post and The New
York Times took Secretary Albright to task for too tight an embrace of
these regimes and their leaders.
I believe that we should be broadly encouraging and supportive of
the ``New Leaders.'' While these individuals are not as morally
compelling as Nelson Mandela, they do bring a new courage, a new energy
and a new honesty to the African scene. But at the same time, we must
keep our eyes open and treat them as mature partners, calling them to
account when they err, but in a manner that is mindful that we do not
have a monopoly on wisdom.
We need to be particularly concerned that the political scene in
all of these countries remains dominated by individuals rather than
institutions. Continued restrictions on civil society combined with
limitations on multipartyism will make real accountability ultimately
impossible. The ``New Leaders'' rule over regimes that are brittle and
thus vulnerable. They are likely to evolve either into more inclusive--
and more democratic--polities or slip back into the forms of
authoritarian rule that characterized Africa throughout the 1980s. And
such a return to authoritarianism with its attendant loss of legitimacy
risks state collapse and civil war. That is why it is important for the
United States to maintain a focus on democracy as a goal of its policy
and diplomacy in these states. That is also why democratization is in
the self-interest of those in power.
Consider these realities in the states of the Great Lakes and the
Horn, which are high priorities for the Clinton Administration:
In Uganda, with the northern third of his country fertile ground
for rebellions his army finds difficult to control, Museveni must find
a way to incorporate the people of the region into the national polity
in the same way he earlier reached out to the Baganda to consolidate
his regime in the south. After nearly twelve years in power, he must
also build institutions that will facilitate a smooth transfer of power
to a successor.
In Ethiopia, Meles must likewise craft appropriate mechanisms--
perhaps via that country's nascent federal structures--to bring the
currently-alienated Amhara and Oromo (the country's two largest ethnic
groups) back into the political process if long-term stability is to be
established.
In Rwanda, the prospects for stability turn on whether the Tutsi-
based minority regime led by Kagame can deal with the Hutu majority
politically rather than militarily. The rural areas are now nearly 95
percent Hutu, a context that makes successful counterinsurgency
operations almost impossible without an effective political component.
This may ultimately require the negotiated partition of Rwanda into
designated regions for each ethnic group. But the continued reliance on
a primarily military option by the minority regime will result in more
carnage and perhaps even its collapse.
Similarly in the Congo, Laurent Kabila may have filled a vacuum at
the center, but his regime must reach an accommodation with regional
political elites who command extensive followings in Kivu, Kasai and
Katanga, or become the victim of its own hubris.
The bottom line is that in none of these cases is stability or
prosperity likely to be realized on a long-term basis without the
establishment of more liberal and inclusive polities in which a
diversity of interests bargain, share, and possibly alternate power
with each another.
How can the United States translate these concerns into an
effective policy vis-a-vis the ``New Leaders?'' Consider the particular
case of U.S. policy toward Uganda. Some argue that the U.S. should not
push Museveni to deepen the democratization process, either because
authoritarianism is just what Uganda needs, or because Museveni has
already put Uganda on the path toward democracy, albeit one that
differs from the Western model. What I am suggesting is that, while
broadly cooperating with and supporting the Museveni regime, the U.S.
should maintain a significant dialogue and program about the need to
deepen the democratization process in Uganda in order to sustain that
country's remarkable progress. Issues to be addressed might include:
strengthening the rule of law and transparency and accountability of
government, making decentralization meaningful, and ensuring electoral
competition no matter what political framework the country adopts.
Can such a policy work? In looking at how to approach the ``New
Leaders'' in the Great Lakes and the Horn, U.S. policy-makers need to
review their experience in dealing with a similar figure in West
Africa, Ghana's Jerry Rawlings. In the late 1980s, Rawlings, who had
come to power through a military coup, undertook a tough economic
reform program with support of the IMF and the World Bank. The U.S.
strongly supported this effort, but continued to engage the Rawlings
regime with the need to move to a more open and broad-based political
system, echoing the views of Ghana's strongly democratic middle class.
In the early 1990s, Rawlings established a multi-party system, but
the first elections, held in 1992, failed to win the legitimacy of
large segments of the population. In response, the U.S., while
continuing its support of the Rawlings government, engaged with the
Ghanaian opposition to explore means of bringing them back into the
political process. This led a very large and multi-year effort by USAID
to improve the electoral machinery in Ghana. Ghana's second elections
were held in 1996. While the outcome was quite similar to the first,
this time they gained broad legitimacy and have led to the active
participation of the opposition in parliament and a broad and open
political debate about a wide range of issues.
By having a steady policy of engagement with a dynamic new leader,
but not losing sight of the importance of political reform and
democratization to sustain economic policy reforms and growth, the U.S.
played a positive role in Ghana's evolution. Many of today's ``New
Leaders'' in the Great Lakes and the Horn have political views similar
to Rawlings' seven or eight years ago. We should shape an approach to
them that learns from our successful experiences in Ghana.
In both in the Clinton Administration and in the Congress, there is
a new and welcome engagement with Africa. In two weeks, President
Clinton will embark on an extended trip to Africa in which he will have
the opportunity to directly engage many of Africa's ``New Leaders.''
The President will be carrying a message of partnership and of the need
for more mature relations based on mutual self-interest. Central to
this partnership should be, and I believe will be, a continuing
commitment to the principle of democracy and active promotion of
democratization.
Sustaining this dimension of U.S. foreign policy is critical at the
very time when democracy is an increasingly established fact in parts
of the continent, and the potential of its emergence elsewhere is
greater than ever before. The arrival of Africa's ``New Leaders''
represents an historic opportunity for the continent. Africa's cycles
of despair can be broken. But it will require a commitment to vision,
engagement and pragmatism by our leaders in the promotion of democracy
in Africa.
Senator Ashcroft. We thank each of you for coming. I am
grateful to you.
Dr. Baker, I think it was your testimony before the
subcommittee that raised questions about the quality of some of
the elections. That raises an issue for me.
It seems to me that we are trying to figure out to what
degree improved democratization is authentic and to what degree
it might be just a facade--whether or not we are dealing with
strong men in sheep's clothing, so to speak, who have learned
to be slick enough to have the form of democracy if not the
substance thereof.
Could you comment on that? Is it your view that
inadequacies in reform have been overlooked in the effort to
satiate the demand for genuine democratic change?
Dr. Baker. Yes, I would be happy to.
I think that we have tended, first of all, to stress
elections too much, sometimes, in Africa, to the exclusion of
really looking at them. We have made some very bad mistakes.
In the case of Liberia, for example, in previous
administrations, we had sanctified what was clearly a bad
election in Liberia, which was the beginning of the collapse of
the Liberian State. When you get a government that goes through
the form but not the substance of legitimization, you are not
helping the country at all.
We have gotten more of those today. There have been a lot
of elections which have been flawed. We have international
monitors who come out and say well, ``they are reasonably free
and fair'' rather than that ``they are free and fair.''
I think that is an adequate characterization of some
elections and it is not so bad to say that if you have the long
view that democratization is a process and sometimes has to be
looked at as a staged process.
But we should not just look at elections. We should really
look at the birth of civil society, which I think is the really
good news in Africa recently, and the pressures from below.
For example, to get back to elections, when there are
genuine elections in Africa, one of the most encouraging things
for me is that there have enormously high turnouts in Africa,
extraordinary turnouts, with people coming from the rural
areas, standing in the hot tropical sun, sometimes for days, to
be able to cast their votes.
To me, that shows that there is a real demand for
participation.
I think we should stress elections as a vital step, but not
the only step, for transition regimes. As we discussed before,
I think when you have hijacked electoral processes, as in
Nigeria, you deepen a crisis. There is where you are going to
have to go back to some form of electoral process to put things
right.
Senator Ashcroft. Mr. Booker, you said that we needed to
demonstrate a long-term commitment, that we need to show that
we are prepared to stay there and that we need to commit the
level of resources to insure success.
Do you imply by that the ultimate success of Africa is in
the hands of the United States and its resources and not in the
hands of Africans?
Do you also imply that there is no behavior on the part of
individuals in Africa that should cause us to disengage? Dr.
Gordon also used the term ``engagement.''
I guess what I am struggling with is if, to insure the
level of resources, to insure success, that sounds to me like a
blank check. It does not seem to be related, necessarily, to
the development, say, of institutions, as Dr. Ayittey called
for.
Would you clarify that. Frankly, as others of you want to
chime in, please do so.
Mr. Booker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
If I could briefly comment on the last question of the
quality of elections, because I think it is critical, an
American writer once had a title called ``Hunting is not those
heads on the wall.'' I think that is a critical problem in
Africa, that it is the process leading up to the elections, as
opposed to the actual ``shoot'' itself.
We are experiencing that now in Nigeria and we recently
experienced it in Kenya, where one could safely predict the
outcome of the elections because the process leading up to it,
the year ahead of the election, was so skewed, the environment
so constrained for any real political competition to occur that
the conclusion was a foregone conclusion.
The holdover despots that still do exist in Africa have
learned this game very well. That is one of the real problems
with promoting democratization, insuring that the process
leading up to elections does allow for a real competition.
On the specific question you addressed to me, I do not
intend to suggest that Africa's future rests with the United
States' commitment of resources or a long-term diplomatic
commitment, or any other country's. It truly does rest with
Africans themselves and that is one of the encouraging features
of at least four of these new leaders, as they are called.
I do, however, believe that our relationship with this new
generation and our ability to influence the course of events
and their commitment to democratization will very much be
affected by our willingness to demonstrate the depth of our
commitment, and part of that will have to do with the resources
that we commit, whether it is development cooperation, whether
that funding is spent to help strengthen and reform
judiciaries, whether it is spent to help establish a new
electoral commission. Our simply calling for democratization,
our simply criticizing human rights abuses when they occur
without also engaging in a proactive and constructive effort to
help these very poor and struggling countries to make progress
I think is just cynical.
In particular, these new leaders--and the reason I raise
this is because I think they are uncertain about the United
States. They are really uncertain about our commitment to
democratization.
We have a new Africa policy team. You heard from Dr. Susan
Rice today. We have a new Africa policy emerging. There is the
economic piece, the trade and investment initiative. There is
the security piece, the African Crisis Response Force for
training armed forces to deal with peacekeeping efforts. But
when it comes to democratization, there is not necessarily a
new initiative or a new framework that really clearly
articulates what is U.S. democratization policy in Africa.
Instead, what we have is a special envoy, the Reverend
Jesse Jackson, who has had mixed reviews on his two trips.
Fortunately, the second trip received much better reviews in
terms of demonstrating a commitment to democratic forces in
Africa.
But his is a part-time assignment. I think the
administration is beginning to try to articulate a more
coherent democracy policy. Part of it is investing in
elections. Part of it is investing in second wave activities,
like strengthening independent institutions. But part of it has
to remain in the traditional domain of public and private
diplomacy and the application of pressure, particularly in
egregious cases--for example, I would think like Nigeria.
Senator Ashcroft. Dr. Gordon, did you have a comment?
Dr. Gordon. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Let me say that I think the elections in Africa are going
in both directions. I think both incumbents are learning a bit
about electoral manipulation. But even in countries where
elections are not perfect, you have very large turnout, you
have a growing capacity of independent electoral commissions.
The recent elections in Kenya, which were hardly perfect
elections, showed an enormous effort by Kenyan civil society at
electoral monitoring that I think is laying the basis for that
country's transition to democracy.
So I do not agree with the characterization of electoral
processes in Africa as going in a negative direction.
I did not mean to suggest for one moment that the evolution
of Africa is going to be primarily determined by the United
States nor that we should engage everywhere in Africa and have
a blank check. Au contraire.
I think that we cannot expect to find easy situations in
which we face an environment that is one-sided. We are going to
be dealing with grey areas. These hybrid regimes have elements
of democracy and elements of authoritarianism. We have to be
willing to engage in those kinds of circumstances, and, in
particular, we have to look at whether a situation is improving
or whether it is getting worse.
I think we should be more selective in our distribution of
foreign aid. I think that we should not give any African
government a blank check on U.S. foreign aid. U.S. foreign aid
should depend upon performance, both in terms of economic
policy and in terms of good governance.
But I do think that the United States has an enormous
opportunity. It has enormous respect in Africa. Africans are
looking at the United States as a model. They are looking at
the United States for support. I think that our engagement in
both democratization and economic reform in Africa in the
1990's has had important results, even though we have not,
frankly, spent a lot of money in doing it.
Senator Ashcroft. Dr. Ayittey, I was very pleased to hear
your focus on institutions rather than on individuals. It seems
to me that even when we think we have democratic reform we have
to wait for a transition to find out if we really have it.
It occurs to me that the jury is still out on South Africa
to see whether or not the transition can be made there
successfully, although I think all of us are encouraged when we
see things moving in the right direction.
You mentioned the need for an independent judicial system,
the need for a professional military, the need for elections,
the need for a free press and a number of institutions. There
is probably another one there that I do not recollect at the
moment.
Do you think our discussion has inordinately focused on
elections to the detriment of these other institutions? Would
you give us a few minutes, as we close this hearing, to relate
these other institutions to the stability, and the
democratization of these African Nations?
Dr. Ayittey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The reason why I
focused on the institutions is because there is one fact which
we must face. This is, number one, we must distinguish between
African leaders and the African people. The two are not
necessarily synonymous.
There are many leaders in Africa who do not represent their
people. I think Americans would be angry or would be resentful
if they had somebody who was speaking on their behalf whom they
did not choose.
We have these cases in many African countries. Therefore,
we must always distinguish between leaders and people.
The second fact, point, which I like to make is that the
U.S. cannot solve Africa's problems for Africa. Africans
ultimately bear the responsibility of solving their own
problems. The U.S. can help. But it cannot supplant the efforts
Africans themselves are making.
Now for us to be able to come to grips with our problems,
we need to have an enforce in which we can freely speak and
expose our problems, discuss our problems, and find solutions
to them. For this, you need to have some basic freedoms--
freedom of expression, freedom of thought, freedom to publish.
Therefore you need to have a free media.
We have not had this in many parts of Africa in the post
colonial period because the State has been monopolized by the
State. We have very few independent newspapers.
As a matter of fact, Nigeria is a typical example. If you
publish something which an African Government does not like,
pouf, you are dead. You need an independent judiciary also to
enforce the rule of law. In many parts of Africa, what you have
is lawlessness. You cannot invest in these countries because
your property and even your personal safety cannot be
guaranteed.
We also talk about civil society. For civil society to
work, we need to have certain basic freedoms--freedom of
association, for example, and also freedom of expression. We
don't have that.
So when American officials talk about helping Africa, talk
about civil so you, for example, they do not have a civil
society in Africa in the past 30 years. American aid has not
gone to the indigenous African organizations, we need civil
society to help them do their jobs.
If you take, let's say, the processes of elections, for
example, in recent years of course we have had elections. But
the rules were written by the incumbents. The electoral
commission was chosen by the incumbent. The playing field was
not level. Again, the State media only gave media coverage to
the incumbent.
The political playing field was not level. You could not
protest against this or even take this matter to court because
the judiciary was all in the government's pocket. Therefore,
all that we are asking is for some basic minimum institutions.
I have been to the World Bank. I have been to USAID. I have
told the World Bank that look, you are in Africa trying to
promote economic reform. You are trying to persuade African
Governments to sell off State-owned enterprises. Well, the
media is a State-owned enterprise and it ought to be the first
critical institution to be placed on the auction block to be
sold.
If African governments will not sell off the media, if Moi
will not sell off the media, the television and so forth, don't
give him aid.
I think we need to tie the U.S. aid to the establishment of
these various institutions because they will help us Africans
to look for and find solutions to our own problems.
Senator Ashcroft. I thank you very much for those comments.
I want to express my appreciation to all of the
participants at the hearing today. We have held the hearing in
the midst of votes in the Senate. Again, my presence is
required on the Senate floor.
Democracy is not too fragile to survive, in my judgment.
Democracy is ultimately survivable. It is tyranny and
oppression that have been responsible for violence and
bloodshed in Africa and they continue to plague not only Africa
but other parts of the world.
When implemented prudently, I think democracy in Africa has
been a stabilizing force that has eased social tension and has
given disparate groups a voice in governance. But that has been
all too infrequent.
The potential of the new leaders may be promising. But I
think each missed opportunity sends a chill up and down our
spines and leads us to suspect that Africa is heading down the
road of oppression from the past rather than the road of
opportunity and progress of the future.
I think we need to implement policies which encourage
Africa to chart a course of genuine political and economic
reform in the future.
I want to indicate to you my gratitude for your
participation in the hearing. You have offered, I think, to
present more complete materials than the oral remarks you have
made. The subcommittee record will remain open.
If there are submissions, I would like to indicate that the
record will remain open until March 19 at 5 p.m. If there are
things that you did not get a chance to say in response to
inquiries or you feel like we did not understand properly what
you said or you need to repeat things which we may have missed,
I would invite you to submit those.
With that in mind, I appreciate your willingness to come
and share your expertise with us. I am grateful for it. The
subcommittee is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, subject
to the call of the Chair.]
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