[Senate Hearing 105-699]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 105-699
THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL
SERVICES
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 18, 1998
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
48-164 cc WASHINGTON : 1998
_______________________________________________________________________
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office,
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee, Chairman
WILLIAM V. ROTH, Jr., Delaware JOHN GLENN, Ohio
TED STEVENS, Alaska CARL LEVIN, Michigan
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
DON NICKLES, Oklahoma MAX CLELAND, Georgia
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
Hannah S. Sistare, Staff Director and Counsel
Leonard Weiss, Minority Staff Director
Lynn L. Baker, Chief Clerk
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION AND FEDERAL
SERVICES
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska CARL LEVIN, Michigan
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
DON NICKLES, Oklahoma ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania MAX CLELAND, Georgia
Mitchel B. Kugler, Staff Director
Linda J. Gustitus, Minority Staff Director
Julie A. Sander, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Opening statement:
Senator Cochran.............................................. 1
Senator Levin................................................ 7
WITNESSES
Wednesday, March 18, 1998
John Holum, Acting Under Secretary of State and Director, Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency................................. 2
Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., President and Executive Director, Arms
Control Association............................................ 16
Kathleen Bailey, Senior Fellow, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory..................................................... 22
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Bailey, Kathleen:
Testimony.................................................... 22
Prepared statement........................................... 53
Holum, John:
Testimony.................................................... 2
Prepared statement........................................... 37
Keeny, Spurgeon M., Jr.:
Testimony.................................................... 16
Prepared statement........................................... 45
THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 18, 1998
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on International Security,
Proliferation, and Federal Services,
of the Committee on Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, in room SD-342,
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran, Chairman of
the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Cochran, Stevens, Glenn, and Levin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. The Subcommittee will come to order.
I would like to welcome everyone to today's hearing of the
Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security,
Proliferation, and Federal Services.
Today's topic is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and
Nuclear Nonproliferation.
The White House working group on the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty has listed seven reasons for ratification of the CTBT.
Five of the reasons deal with nuclear nonproliferation.
Today we will examine each of these five arguments, trying
to determine the treaty's effect on nuclear weapons
proliferation.
The witnesses who will assist us in this undertaking are
John Holum, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
and Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security Affairs, who testified before this
Subcommittee last year; Spurgeon Keeny, president of the Arms
Control Association; and Dr. Kathleen Bailey, a senior fellow
at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and formerly the
assistant director for nuclear and weapons control at ACDA.
Secretary Holum, we have your prepared statement. We thank
you for that and it will be printed in the record in full.
We invite you to make any comments or statements you think
will be helpful to our Committee's understanding of the issue
before us.
You may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF JOHN HOLUM,\1\ ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE AND
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Mr. Holum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will have only a
brief opening statement so we can get to your questions.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Holum appears in the Appendix on
page 37.
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I want to thank the Subcommittee for holding hearings on
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and I salute your leadership
on what is a critical issue, both the test ban in particular
and nonproliferation, more generally.
At its very foundation, I believe that the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty overwhelmingly serves our national interest and
I would like to take a few minutes to describe why that is
true.
First, by constraining the development of more advanced
nuclear weapons by the declared nuclear powers, the CTBT
essentially eliminates the possibility of a renewed arms
competition such as characterized the Cold War. Without the
ability to conduct nuclear explosive tests, all five declared
nuclear weapon states will be effectively frozen at the current
levels of weapons development. A 50-year spiral of escalation
will be ended and the strategic arms reduction process will be
bolstered.
The United States is currently in a position to reap
maximum security benefits from such a freeze. Prompted by the
Congress, we have effectively left the test business. The last
U.S. nuclear test explosion was in 1992. We have no plans and
no military requirements to test. All the more reason then to
hold others to the same standard we already observe.
Second, the CTBT is a nonproliferation treaty. Even if a
non-nuclear weapon state was able to assemble a simple fission
weapon, the CTBT would force it to place confidence in an
untested design. The design of a two-stage thermonuclear weapon
is even more complicated and the confident development of such
a weapon even more dependent on test data.
Some observers rightly point out that the bomb used in
Hiroshima was never tested. Remember that we had to dig a hole
under a B-29 bomber to load it aboard. It would be a challenge
to say the least for any country, without explosive tests, to
design nuclear weapons in the sizes, shapes and weights most
dangerous to us, compact weapons deliverable in long-range
airplanes and missiles, or very small, low-yield nuclear
devices to be used by terrorists during regional conflicts.
Third, quite apart from the sheer technical obstacles to
nuclear weapon development posed by the test ban, the existence
of the treaty will strengthen international nonproliferation
standards and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime.
CTBT ratification is critical to our ability to effectively
enforce the NPT's global nonproliferation standards which
discourage most states from even considering nuclear weapon
programs. Not all states feel bound by norms or treaty
obligations. Even states that appear to be complying with the
legal obligations of the NPT may go quite far in pursuit of
nuclear weapons capabilities.
So, a challenge for the United States is to insist on
strict compliance by the non-nuclear weapon states with both
the letter and the spirit of the NPT. That requires a united
world, with the means to isolate and sanction those who do not
respect the law. It requires a strong global commitment to the
NPT, so countries will be prepared to negotiate new agreements
with the International Atomic Energy Agency incorporating the
strong new safeguards we finally achieved last year.
Consider the potential proliferation consequences of an
extended delay in our CTBT ratification. Such a delay would
likely open the door to postponements by Russia and by China.
These could be seen as repudiations of the commitments made at
the NPT Extension Conference and during the test ban
negotiations themselves.
It risks sending the message that the weapon states insist
on perpetuating indefinitely their Cold War reliance on nuclear
arms. We would effectively undermine our own efforts to
persuade the international community to join us in insisting on
strict compliance with the NPT, and in the process our failures
on CTBT could subvert a good and effective NPT regime.
The fourth reason to ratify the test ban is that it is
effectively verifiable. The United States successfully fought
for tough verification provisions in the negotiations and would
not have signed the treaty if we were not satisfied on this
score. Indeed, the CTBT will strengthen our means to monitor
nuclear testing worldwide.
Our judgment that the treaty is effectively verifiable
reflects the bottom line conclusion that U.S. nuclear
deterrence would not be undermined by any nuclear testing that
the United States might fail to detect. It further reflects our
belief that the treaty will effectively deter violations in
light of the significant possibility of detection, in
combination with the high political cost if a violation is
detected.
Moreover, the treaty's verification regime, along with our
national intelligence means and diplomatic efforts, will limit
an evader's options and provide us with the means to take
prompt and effective counter action should we suspect a
violation has occurred. In sum, we believe that the benefits of
the treaty to U.S. national security clearly outweigh the
potential costs and likelihood of potential violations.
We would be concerned about the possibility of any
violation, even a test with a nuclear yield of a few pounds.
Quite apart from the potential military significance of such a
test, it would have serious political consequences and would
warrant a strong response.
Remember that with or without the CTBT, monitoring the
nuclear related activities of the nuclear powers and potential
proliferators will continue to be a high priority job of the
intelligence community.
That brings me to the fifth reason to ratify the treaty. It
will improve our nuclear test monitoring capabilities.
The CTBT augments the current national technical means for
monitoring worldwide nuclear testing with additional tools and
data not previously available to the United States. It is a net
plus.
The CTBT establishes global networks of four different
kinds of sensors--seismic, hydroacoustic, radionuclide and
infrasound--that can detect explosions in different physical
environments. These networks, made up of 321 monitoring
stations, are called the International Monitoring System.
Data will flow in continuously from the IMS. Some of this
data will be recorded at stations in sensitive parts of the
world to which we would not otherwise have access. Consider,
for example, that the IMS includes 31 monitoring stations in
Russia, 11 in China and 17 in the Middle East.
The CTBT permits any party to request an on-site inspection
to clarify whether or not a violation has occurred, and allows
for the use of a range of technologies during that inspection
to gather any facts which might assist in identifying the
possible violation. With the assent of the CTBT decision-making
body, the executive council, the United States would thus be
able to ensure that ambiguous evidence is further investigated.
The treaty also provides the legal basis and an
international forum with which to promote and enforce a global
end to nuclear testing.
We had a demonstration of some of these capabilities last
summer, Mr. Chairman, in the Kara Sea near a former Soviet
nuclear testing facility where there had been ongoing activity.
Seismic sensors detected an event. This raised red flags about
potential tests in the area so we began collecting and
analyzing data.
The event, with a seismic signal equivalent to about 1/10th
of 1 kiloton, was detected by several IMS stations in Russia,
Norway, Sweden and Finland. Our intelligence community could
confidently locate the event in the Kara Sea, even though a
major seismic station in the region was out of commission.
After analysis, we were satisfied that there was no nuclear
explosion, based solely on remote sensing and study. If the
treaty were in force we could, of course, choose to use its on-
site inspection regime or consultation and clarification
procedures if there were similar incidents.
The CTBT will also allow us to maintain a safe and reliable
nuclear deterrent. In the summer of 1995 President Clinton
announced safeguards which collectively recognize and protect
the continued important contribution of nuclear weapons to U.S.
national security. The first safeguard mandated the conduct of
a stockpile stewardship program, for which there must be
sustained bipartisan support from the Congress, to ensure a
high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of our
nuclear weapons stockpile.
A program to maintain our nuclear deterrent under a CTBT
was established by the Department of Energy in close
collaboration with the Strategic Command and the Joint Staff of
the Department of Defense. It builds on DOE's rigorous program
of stockpile surveillance and component testing with more
sophisticated laboratory experimentation and advanced
computations. Its point of departure is a rich database of over
1,000 past nuclear weapon tests that characterize the operation
of our weapons and will serve as a benchmark for analyzing the
operation of those weapons in the future.
The program has earned the confidence of our military
leaders, independent weapon scientists, and the directors of
the three nuclear weapon laboratories. During a February, 1998
visit to Los Alamos National Laboratory, President Clinton was
joined by the laboratory directors, Dr. Browne of Los Alamos,
Dr. Robinson of Sandia and Dr. Tarter of Lawrence Livermore,
who affirmed their confidence that the stockpile stewardship
program will enable us to maintain America's nuclear deterrent
without testing.
Moreover, in the unlikely event doubts about our ability to
maintain the arsenal under CTBT arise at some point in the
future, the treaty provides for a withdrawal from the treaty if
a party decides that its supreme national interests are
jeopardized. President Clinton has already stated that the
safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons is a supreme
national interest.
And, if our nuclear deterrent cannot be certified, the
President, in consultation with the Congress, has made it clear
that he would be prepared to withdraw from the treaty in order
to conduct whatever testing might be required.
But, as we consider the state of our nuclear weapons, I am
pleased to report that the administration forwarded to the
Congress on February 12, 1998 the second annual certification
from the Secretaries of Defense and Energy that the nuclear
stockpile remains safe and reliable. This confirms that the
United States will enter the CTBT regime with a proven, well-
tested arsenal.
If we believe in the merits of the test-ban treaty, then
the issue before us is really American leadership of the world.
The United States needs to promote the CTBT's entry into force,
not complicate it. Our ratification will encourage other
ratifications, just as U.S. ratification of the chemical
weapons convention facilitated its approval by Russia, China,
Pakistan, and Iran. The most effective means of moving
reluctant states is to make them feel the sting of isolation on
this issue, not to provide them with the cover of United States
inaction.
Mr. Chairman, I have tried to highlight for the
Subcommittee the reasons the CTBT is in the national security
interests of the United States. Its value has led four former
chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--Generals John
Shalikashvili, Colin Powell, David Jones, and Admiral William
Crowe--to endorse the treaty. And, significantly, it enjoys
overwhelming public support with some 70 percent of the people
favoring a treaty to prohibit further nuclear explosions
worldwide.
At its very core, here is what I suggest the CTBT issue
comes down to: The nuclear arms race is over; arsenals are
shrinking; our dramatically fewer remaining weapons can be kept
safe and reliable by other means; we don't need tests;
proliferators do; and the American people overwhelmingly want
testing stopped.
Under these circumstances, I think we should all agree that
what the world needs now is not more nuclear explosions;
rather, what it needs is more American leadership for another
strong tool we can use to rein in the nuclear danger.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for your and your
Subcommittee's time and consideration. This concludes my
prepared remarks, and I would be happy to answer your
questions.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Mr. Holum. Again, we
appreciate very much your being here today and your assistance
to our Subcommittee.
After discussing the first reason, as you see it, that the
administration negotiated and signed the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, which was to establish a freeze, in effect, on any
further develop-
ments by the declared nuclear weapon states, you talk about the
fact and in your statement describe the fact that, in your
judgment, the CTBT is a nonproliferation treaty. It will erect,
you say, a further barrier to the development of nuclear
weapons by states hostile to our interests and others.
Isn't that a hope rather than a fact? How does any
provision in the CTBT restrain the development of a rogue
weapons program in some country that does not have nuclear
weapons at this time? If that state is determined to develop a
nuclear weapon, can it do so without testing?
Mr. Holum. Actually, I would add an element to your
question, because obviously a country can stay outside the
treaty, and then it could conceivably proceed with testing. But
even in those circumstances, I think the establishment of a
strong international standard such as we have against nuclear
weapons themselves in the nonproliferation treaty, has a
constraining influence on non-members.
There are countries who would have been able to carry out a
nuclear test program and a declared nuclear program during the
lifetime of the NPT who have not. And I think part of the
reason they haven't is because they are aware that the
international community is opposed to that kind of activity and
they would be isolated in a variety of ways. So I think even
for non-members it has a constraining influence.
Now, for participants, it is possible to develop a simple
fission device without testing. Certainly that could be done.
At the same time, the ability to develop a boosted weapon that
could be reduced in size and delivered in the ways I described
earlier would be much harder. I think the experts would say
that, without testing, it would very likely be an impossible
task.
Similarly, the ability to design a two-stage, thermonuclear
device would be a challenge beyond the reach of countries
without testing.
Senator Cochran. You mentioned the CTBT has now been signed
by 150 countries, including the five nuclear weapon states.
Have any countries at this time ratified the treaty?
Mr. Holum. There are as of now, 10 countries that have
ratified.
Senator Cochran. Have either Russia or China ratified the
treaty?
Mr. Holum. No, they haven't.
Senator Cochran. In connection with Russia and China, we
had testimony at hearings last year that both countries have
come into the possession of advanced supercomputers that have
the capacity to help improve the lethality of nuclear weapons
and missile systems. In that connection, has the evidence of
that kind of activity been persuasive to the administration
that it is unlikely that either Russia or China would cease and
desist from improving the quality and maybe even the quantity
of certain types of its most advanced nuclear weapons, even
with the CTBT?
Mr. Holum. I think it is unlikely. I think all countries,
including the United States, would be facing a very daunting
challenge in trying to develop significant improvements in the
character of their weapons, even with supercomputing
capabilities.
Let me put this in context. We are aiming for a 100,000
million theoretical operations per second computing capability
in our supercomputer initiative as part of our Stockpile
Stewardship Program. The kinds of computers that are being
considered in the context of China and Russia are between 2,000
and 7,000 as compared to 100,000 MTOPS.
Even with that computing capability, dramatically improved
from where we are now, we won't be able to and don't expect to
go beyond validating what we have done in the past, drawing on
the data from 1,000 nuclear tests. We won't be able to develop
new designs even at our advanced stage. So the likelihood is
very low that Russia or China at a much lesser level of
development, drawing on data from fewer tests, would be able to
do that.
Senator Cochran. I have some other questions, but at this
time I am going to yield to my good friend and colleague from
Michigan, the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Senator
Levin, for any questions or comments he might have.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing. It is a very important subject. I wish
the other committees that have jurisdiction would hold hearings
on this subject. It would be very useful in terms of moving
this along either to ratification or rejection, hopefully
ratification from my perspective. But it is important that the
hearings take place, and, Mr. Chairman, in leading the way and
having this hearing I think you are performing a really
important service. And, again, whichever side of the debate one
is on, I think it is important that these issues be explored so
the Senate can exercise its will.
From my point of view, this treaty is clearly in the
national security interest. More important, the past four
Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have so stated. This
treaty really carries out the goal of Republican and Democratic
administrations since Dwight Eisenhower. The people strongly
support it. Our uniformed military strongly support it with the
safeguards that Mr. Holum has talked about. And I would hope
that the Senate would hold the necessary hearings so that we
can have a ratification debate and hopefully ratify it.
One of the points that Mr. Holum has talked about is the
connection between the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and
this treaty. We urged the extension of the NPT, the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, in 1995, and one of the arguments that we
made and the promise that we made was that nuclear weapon
states, led by us, would complete a comprehensive test ban
treaty in the next year. And we did that.
The argument that we made to the states that we were urging
to agree not to acquire nuclear weapons and not to follow the
lead of nuclear weapon states--in other words, to reject
nuclear weapons for their own inventories--that argument was
bolstered by our promise that we would support a comprehensive
test ban treaty.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty is vital to our own security.
We have supported it here in the Senate. If we don't carry out
a commitment that we made to the signatories of that treaty and
the people who agreed to extend that treaty, it seems to me we
undermine our credibility in arguing for its extension. We
cannot be put in that position. That would be a huge failure of
leadership on our part.
I have a number of questions, Mr. Holum, including one on
the verification issue. You say that it is going to be easier
for us to verify whether or not other countries have carried
out a nuclear explosion. As I understand it, this is true in a
number of ways, and I would like you to comment on it.
Assuming we ratify the CTBT, then we would have the right
to seek on-site inspections, which you referred to. If we don't
ratify the treaty, is it correct that we do not have the right
to make that request?
Mr. Holum. That is correct.
Senator Levin. All right. You have talked about a number of
monitoring stations. The total number again?
Mr. Holum. Three hundred and twenty one.
Senator Levin. There is a great deal of data that comes
from those monitoring stations. And is it correct that if we
ratify, we have access to that monitoring data, but if we don't
ratify, we don't?
Mr. Holum. That is true in part. Some of the data would
probably be available, for example, auxiliary seismic stations
that are, for example, posted on the Internet. We would have
that information, but not the data coming from the formal
International Monitoring System.
Senator Levin. How much of that data is posted on the
Internet?
Mr. Holum. I would have to get a specific answer to that
for you. The regime will add roughly 200 additional seismic and
other stations to the overall monitoring system that we do not
have as of now. So that is an order of magnitude, but I can
give you some more specifics.
Senator Levin. Would you also submit for the record
statements of prior presidents that might be available to you?
We may already have them, but I cannot find them readily. If
you could make sure that this Subcommittee has them, it would
be helpful.
Mr. Holum. Certainly.
Senator Levin. On the question of the safeguards, you made
reference to safeguards, including the commitment of the
President to use the supreme national interest clause in the
event that the Defense Department or the Department of Energy
could no longer certify that our nuclear inventory was secure
and safe. Is that correct?
Mr. Holum. Yes. It is a combination of the chairman of the
Strategic Command, the Nuclear Weapons Council, and the heads
of the three nuclear weapons laboratories.
Senator Levin. That was my question. So that the heads of
the labs have got to join in that certification?
Mr. Holum. That is right.
Senator Levin. Is that an annual certification?
Mr. Holum. It happens annually. We just had the second one.
Senator Levin. And which labs join in that certification?
All the three labs that you mentioned?
Mr. Holum. The three nuclear weapons labs.
Senator Levin. And each of their directors must certify
safety and security each year?
Mr. Holum. That is right.
Senator Levin. And if that isn't forthcoming, then at least
this President has said that he would be prepared to use the
supreme national interest clause to withdraw from the treaty?
Mr. Holum. Yes. It would be in consultation with the
Congress, obviously, and one of the questions, I suppose, that
would be raised is: Is this a problem that testing would solve?
But assuming that is the case, then this President has made
clear he would be prepared to withdraw from the treaty and
invoke the supreme national interest clause and conduct
whatever tests were necessary.
I would like to emphasize, too, that we don't expect that
to happen because we have very high confidence in the quality
of our weapons and in the capability of the Science-based
Stockpile Stewardship Program.
Senator Levin. In your prepared testimony and in your oral
testimony, you made the point that a CTBT would help to
preclude a new nuclear arms race and effectively freeze the
level of current nuclear weapons technology among the declared
nuclear weapon states. I think that has some obvious benefits
for the United States.
Can you elaborate on that statement?
Mr. Holum. Yes. Maybe I could do it this way: We have
conducted 1,000 nuclear weapon tests. That is hundreds more
than any other country in the world has conducted. We have the
most advanced computing capabilities in the world. We have the
best labs in the world. We have the best diagnostic
capabilities to evaluate and maintain the quality of our
weapons, the safety and the reliability of our stockpiles.
Under those circumstances, it seems to me a fairly obvious
conclusion that we benefit to the extent that we can lock every
country in the world, including ourselves, into place on the
nuclear weapons learning curve, because we are at a better
position than anyone else.
Now, there is an obvious value to the United States of
stopping the arms competition, at whatever state it is. But in
the current circumstance, the United States, it seems to me, is
in the best position to assure that our security will be
protected, to the extent nuclear weapons can accomplish that,
through the comprehensive test ban.
Senator Levin. A question has been raised about the
countries which have not ratified it--or have not signed it, to
be more accurate, including India, Pakistan, and North Korea.
Again, these are three countries that have not signed it or
ratified it.
Is it correct that the treaty provides for a conference of
states parties 3 years after the treaty was opened for
signature--so a conference presumably would then occur in late
1999--in order to consider alternative options to facilitate
early entry into force? And is it true that the only way we
could participate in that conference is if we had ratified the
treaty?
Mr. Holum. That is correct. The conference is only among
the countries who have ratified.
Senator Levin. What is the advantage to us to participate
in such a conference?
Mr. Holum. Well, it is hard to imagine the United States, a
leading advocate of nonproliferation and arms control in the
world, not being present at a conference of that kind, that we
would disqualify ourselves. But we obviously would want to be
there in any case to exercise our right to participate in
deciding what to do.
This conference will happen if the treaty--or may happen if
the treaty hasn't gone into force by September of 1999. Then,
all the countries that have ratified will gather and plot a
strategy to decide on a course of action. Some people have
suggested they would consider something like provisional
application or other steps that might move the treaty forward.
The United States would be shut out of that process if we
weren't a participant.
Senator Levin. Finally, if we do not ratify, another
possible consequence would be, would it not, that other nuclear
weapon states that have unilaterally declared a moratorium on
nuclear testing, such as Russia and China, would be more likely
to resume testing?
Mr. Holum. That is really my greatest fear, Senator. If the
treaty does not enter into force, and particularly if the five
nuclear weapon states don't ratify in the near term, it is
quite possible to envision a circumstance where others would
decide they didn't want to be bound by what are now only
political commitments to a moratorium on nuclear testing. And
that, in turn, could have very serious consequences, I think,
for our nonproliferation efforts. And it is not so much the
viability of the NPT itself. I don't think the Treaty is in
danger of being repudiated because it is in the interests of
the member countries. That was the argument we made in 1995. It
is not a favor to us. It is a security instrument for all the
member states.
But, we are trying to strengthen that regime. We are trying
to be the driving force behind effective enforcement of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty. We want the international community
to listen when we say it is time to sanction or be prepared to
sanction North Korea, for example. We want them to listen to
us.
And if we are behind the curve, if we are slowing down the
train on the Comprehensive Test Ban, and if testing has resumed
because the United States failed to ratify, then I think our
whole ability to effectively enforce nonproliferation standards
will be undercut.
Senator Levin. Again, Mr. Chairman, let me thank you for
convening this hearing, and with Senator Glenn here, I also
want to just add a thank you to him. He is, of course, the
Ranking Member of the full Committee, and he has been such a
strong leader in the nonproliferation effort as long as he has
been here, that I am just glad he was able to join us here
today.
Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator, very much.
Senator Glenn.
Senator Glenn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Senator Levin. We worked together on a lot of these things
through the years, and I know you are going to continue to work
on them, too, even though I won't be here next year.
As I understand it, if we don't like what is going on with
the treaty, we can withdraw on, what, on 90 days' notice?
Mr. Holum. Six months, I believe.
Senator Glenn. Six months' notice. Has the U.S. Strategic
Command examined the implications of CTBT for national security
and deterrence, in particular?
Mr. Holum. Yes.
Senator Glenn. What is their conclusion?
Mr. Holum. The treaty has the endorsement of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. That obviously feeds up from the Strategic
Command.
Senator Glenn. OK. Strategic Command people also favor it,
I presume, then.
Mr. Holum. That is right, and as I mentioned earlier, the
Strategic Command is involved in the annual certification
process to make sure that the weapons in the stockpile will
continue to perform.
Senator Glenn. You have been before this Subcommittee many
times, and it is good to see you here again today on this same
subject. As far as capability of specific weapons, do we have
any information at this time that any of the weapons in the
current stockpile have given evidence of aging effects that
could affect their safety or their reliability if they had to
be used?
Mr. Holum. No. The short answer is no. A longer answer is
that the surveillance process of our weapons as part of the
Stockpile Stewardship Program routinely uncovers questions that
need to be answered, and we expect that to happen into the
future--in fact, more so into the more distant future when the
weapons have been around for 20 or 30 years.
But what we find is that we are able to fix those problems
either because they don't involve the physics package, through
testing of non-nuclear components and replacement or repair, or
through computational and other diagnostics if it does involve
the physics package.
So the experts will say there will be routine warts
uncovered in the process, but they will be things we can repair
and deal with. And if we can't, we can exercise supreme
national interest.
Senator Glenn. We all want to see that there is a high
degree of confidence that the stockpile remains safe and it
remains reliable. And there is a system in place to hopefully
ensure that. Could you describe that system and what is
consists of?
Mr. Holum. Well, it is a pretty comprehensive program, and
I would like to preface by saying that the testing that was
done through all those 1,000 tests, very few of those were for
safety or reliability. We tested weapons when we were in the
process of designing new ones, but less so when we were in the
process of making sure the old ones worked.
Now we have fewer weapons. They have all been well tested.
The most recent additions to the stockpile have been around for
a decade at least, so we know these weapons very well.
We have multiple labs that will stay in operation, nuclear
weapons labs checking each other's work, so there will be peer
review. There will be surveillance of the stockpile. Each year
11 samples of each kind of weapons will be removed from the
stockpile and dismantled and examined in great detail. One of
the 11 will be removed permanently from the stockpile and
basically autopsied, or given a very comprehensive review. The
others will be checked.
I understand the reason why they selected 11 is that if
they do 11 each year, then they will have a 90 percent
probability of catching problems that would affect 10 percent
of the stockpile within 2 years. I have no idea how that is
computed, but that is how it turns out.
It can be testing, obviously, of the non-nuclear part, and
replacement. There will be remanufacture of the nuclear parts
as necessary because we will use up, through this process, a
small number over time.
Then, of course, you have, as you have mentioned, the
certification process. Every year the people who basically rely
on and have charge of the stockpiles will be called upon to
certify their safety and reliability. So it is a very ambitious
program. It will cost $4.5 billion a year for 10 years
projected into the future.
Senator Glenn. That sounds like a pretty comprehensive
program.
We also have a lot more confidence, I think, in our
modeling, our computer modeling and so on, than we used to
have. If you go back 12 or 15 or 20 years ago when we were
first concerned about some of these matters and we were
interested in passing the amendments or the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978 and some of those things that we
worked on, we almost had to do testing to know what we were
doing back in some of those days. And I think what has
developed in the computer modeling field now, we have a great
deal more confidence now in knowing what the outcome would be
than we would have back in those days.
Mr. Holum. I think that is right.
Senator Glenn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Glenn. We appreciate
very much your participation in the hearing and your previous
active involvement and leadership in proliferation issues.
I remember coming out to Cincinnati, as a matter of fact,
the first hearing I ever chaired as a Member of this
Subcommittee, to chair a hearing at your request to look at the
situation at Fernald.
Senator Glenn. You didn't know what you were triggering off
then, and I didn't, either.
Senator Cochran. We went right into a firestorm of public
controversy. I recall that. We had more people at the hearing
than we expected.
Senator Glenn. Could I have 30 seconds?
Senator Cochran. Yes, sir.
Senator Glenn. Because that was really a seminal hearing if
there ever was one. The people at Fernald had complained about
some of the uranium dust and so on coming down over the area,
and I didn't know that this was--I didn't know how serious it
was or was not. But we decided we would have a hearing out
there, and so we went out and Senator Cochran chaired the
hearing--the community came in, and we had some other science
people who came in, too, and we found out the situation there
was far worse than we had thought it was going out. Instead of
placating the people and coming back to Washington and
forgetting it, it was what triggered off, literally--and I will
make this a short story.
What happened there in trying to clean up Fernald, we came
back, had the GAO do a study of that area, and it came back in-
dicting the whole process out there at that time. We got
estimates out of the GAO report how much it would cost to clean
up. We came back, and I got to thinking if it is that bad at
Fernald, it can't be that bad at other places. Well, we found
out Fernald was really better than many other places in the
weapons complex, and we now have a stack, I think, probably, of
GAO studies, maybe 3.5 or 4 feet high of the studies done
through the years, and it went to the 17 major nuclear plants
in 11 different states as part of the weapons complex.
At that time, the best estimate was that to clean up the
whole weapons complex it would cost somewhere, they estimated,
between $8 and $12 billion. And you know what has happened to
that estimate? Right now the estimate is that to do the job at
all these different places and clean up the way they would have
to be cleaned up, it is somewhere around $300 billion and
between 20 and 30 years if we can figure out how to do it all
eventually.
We have places like Hanford--well, I won't say we will
never get them cleaned up. It is going to be a major effort.
Anyway, that is what was triggered off with that first
little hearing in Cincinnati out there, and the costs have been
going up ever since on this whole thing.
Senator Cochran. Is that why you are leaving us and going
into outer space? [Laughter.]
Senator Glenn. No. I am going----
Senator Cochran. A safer environment.
Senator Glenn. If the schedule stays the same, I will be up
on election day. I will go any place to get out of an election
now. [Laughter.]
Senator Cochran. The fact is that we are all interested in
this subject, and I am learning as much as I possibly can about
the effects, as other Members are, too, of the treaty on our
efforts to try to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons
and what relationship there may be to the efforts we are making
with the NPT.
This treaty is different in one respect, I am told, from
any of the proposals that had previously been made by any other
president. We hear the history of the initiative goes back to
President Eisenhower where he recommended that a comprehensive
test ban treaty be negotiated. But as I understand it, he
didn't recommend that it be a zero-yield treaty, and even when
other presidents who followed would recommend and--would have a
moratorium from time to time--1958 to 1961, there was a
moratorium on testing. But even during that, President Kennedy
put in place four new nuclear devices that were available for
use if needed.
So President Clinton, as it turns out--if this is correct,
and I want you to tell me whether it is or not--is the first
president who has actually proposed and negotiated and signed a
treaty with a zero-yield prohibition. Is that correct?
Mr. Holum. I am not sure that is correct, but we can
certainly provide that information for you. I don't know
whether they had gotten to the point of talking about specific
yields. It is certainly the case that during the moratorium
under President Eisenhower, when he maintained he had a
moratorium on nuclear tests, that he had authorized conduct of
hydronuclear tests, or very small yields of a few pounds, in
order to correct a problem that they had uncovered regarding
one-point safety in some stockpile weapons. So it is true that
he at least considered that hydronuclear tests of small yields
would not violate a moratorium.
On the other hand, we looked at that issue very closely
during the course of the negotiations and basically concluded
that a zero-yield treaty was in our interests, that you could
not find among the nuclear weapon states a number for
permissible activities that would treat all five the same
unless you went into very large numbers, and then it wouldn't
be a test ban treaty, it would be a threshold treaty with a
lower threshold. But also, it would not be credible as a true
comprehensive test ban if we didn't go to zero. And in some
respect, although obviously there are huge problems of
verification going down to zero, this is easier to verify than
trying to decide whether a particular activity was above or
below, say, 10 pounds of nuclear yield, which is a very
challenging task. It is somewhat easier to determine that there
was no nuclear yield.
Senator Cochran. There is some statement that you made in
your submission to the Subcommittee that at various stages in
the negotiations, the five nuclear weapon states have honored
some kind of moratorium or there has been, in fact, a
moratorium from time to time over the past 8 years in testing.
Have all five honored the moratorium as far as you know?
Mr. Holum. Yes. Well, when they have said they were in a
moratorium, we don't have any basis for believing that they
conducted nuclear tests. Remember that both France and China
continued nuclear testing, insisted on continuing nuclear
testing until 1995 when they concluded their test series and
decided they were prepared to go forward with the test ban. But
they announced that they were testing. They didn't try to hide
it.
Senator Cochran. One other question concerns me about this,
and it is the recent reports that you hear from Russia from
some of the top military leaders saying that with the
deteriorating capacity to defend their country in a
conventional way, with the sad condition of equipment and
armaments, not being able to pay armed forces personnel,
housing conditions are deplorable, and all the other things you
hear about, that their nuclear weapons are really the only
deterrent that they have that is dependable. And if that is
true, and then couple that with the fact that the new
supercomputer access that they have at the weapons systems labs
at Arzamas and other places that we have verified through
hearings and testimony from witnesses, it seems that they may
put more emphasis on the reliability of their nuclear deterrent
than they ever had in the past, even with the START II and--
which they haven't ratified, and the things that they are doing
under Nunn-Lugar to actually destroy some weapons and some
weapon sites.
But to what extent is that a problem? And would the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty serve our national security
interests given that situation in Russia today?
Mr. Holum. Well, I think the test ban has a particular
value in confining the Russians into thinking about what they
should, at most, be thinking about, and that is to maintain the
reliability of their existing stockpile. I have no doubt that
they will conduct very ambitious efforts to maintain a
stockpile that they feel is adequate for deterrent purposes. I
think the numbers under any cir-
cumstances are likely to come down, the numbers of their
overall nuclear forces. I hope that will be within the confines
of START II and START III to follow on. But they will want to
maintain for the reasons you have indicated--and we have been
reading the same reports--the reliability of their stockpile.
It worries me, as I am sure it concerns you, that they seem
to be placing more reliance on nuclear forces. It does not
necessarily follow that they will be prepared to or would want
to engage in a qualitative arms race that would require nuclear
testing. What does follow is that they will invest considerable
resources in maintaining their stockpile. And we have
anticipated that they would. They have been very clear that
they plan to.
Senator Cochran. Well, we appreciate very much your
testimony. Are there any other questions?
Senator Levin. Just one, if I could, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Holum, during your testimony, you said in your
presentation that CTBT is effectively verifiable. You said that
the United States fought for tough verification provisions, and
would not have signed the treaty if it were not effectively
verifiable. Then you went on to describe what you mean by
effective verification, including that there is no guarantee
that we could detect and attribute all tests worldwide should a
violation occur. You went on to say that there is a certain
acceptable level of uncertainty. But you didn't describe the
balancing that you and our administration went through in
determining that these provisions would, in toto, leave us in a
position where we could effectively verify and effectively
deter violations. That is in light of the significant
possibility of detection in combination with the high political
costs if a violation is detected.
I have tried to summarize your statement about effective
verification. The reason I do that is a moment ago you used the
term ``huge problem of verification.'' Here you were talking
about it as an even greater problem where you have to verify a
threshold. Still, on the generic issue, you talked about the
huge problem of verification. And I want you now to tell me--
can we have a big problem of verification at the same time it
is effectively verifiable? And if not, what did you mean by
that reference?
Mr. Holum. There is no question but what it is very
difficult to detect nuclear explosions of very small size, down
to a few pounds of yield or even hundredths of pounds of yield,
in that range. But it is also a huge problem for anyone to gain
any advantage, to gain any significant military value from
tests that small.
First of all, it is a hard problem to be able to conduct
one that small. You would have to have a great deal of
expertise in nuclear weapons and things like decoupling to have
the explosion isolated from--the chamber walls. You would have
to have expertise in containment, a variety of other things, to
be able to keep the test small and evasive.
Once you did that, the ``Jasons'' who have studied our
nuclear stockpile have concluded that even a country as
advanced and sophisticated as ours would need a series of
tests, an extended series of tests in the sub-kiloton level or
much larger, in order to make any significant improvements. So
what we are talking about in terms of effective verification is
basically two things: First, is the risk of detection and the
difficulty of conducting evasive scenarios, the risk of having
a larger yield than you thought, the risk of a whistleblower,
the risk of some means of this coming to the attention of the
international community; plus the political consequences and
potential for sanctions if you are caught will deter countries
from conducting even small tests. And, second, after analyzing
this all very carefully, we have concluded that any test that
we might not detect would not affect our ability to deter
nuclear war, would not undermine our deterrent. So it wouldn't
have significant military consequences for us.
So there is no guarantee that we can detect every nuclear
explosion that might occur. There is a guarantee under this
treaty that we can protect our national security.
Senator Levin. When you used the term ``huge problem''
relative to verification, you were referring then to that very
small test that might escape detection that you believe would
not be militarily significant?
Mr. Holum. That is right. It is difficult to detect
something of a very small size, but it is also very difficult
to do and I think it is unlikely that it would happen.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Mr. Holum. And if it did, it is unlikely it would have any
significant consequences for us.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for
your assistance in our effort to understand the relationship
between the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and nuclear
nonproliferation. Thank you.
Mr. Holum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Our next witnesses will be in a panel to
discuss further the issue before us today. Spurgeon Keeny is
president of the Arms Control Association. Dr. Kathleen Bailey
is a senior fellow at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
and formerly was Assistant Director for Nuclear and Weapons
Control at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
We welcome you both and appreciate very much your
attendance at our hearing. Mr. Keeny, we will call on you first
and ask you to proceed. We have a copy of your statement, and
it will be printed in the record in its entirety, and we ask
you to make any summary comments that you think will be helpful
to our understanding of this issue.
TESTIMONY OF SPURGEON M. KEENY, JR.,\1\ PRESIDENT AND EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION
Mr. Keeny. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Members of the
Subcommittee, I am honored to be here today at your invitation
to present my views on the relationship between the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and nuclear nonproliferation. I
particularly appreciate this opportunity to discuss this issue
with you, an issue which I have been involved in in a number of
capacities since 1948.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Keeny appears in the Appendix on
page 45.
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As outlined in my prepared statement, my involvement began
as an officer and civilian in Air Force intelligence, tracking
the emerging Soviet nuclear weapons program, the first case of
nuclear proliferation, and then as an active participant in the
initial efforts of Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy to
negotiate a comprehensive test ban.
Looking back on the past 50 years, I am indeed pleased that
the CTBT has at last been completed and is now before the
Senate for its advice and consent.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend you and your
Subcommittee for holding hearings on the impact of the CTBT on
U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy. This is the reason that
the treaty is of great importance to U.S. security.
As you requested, I will focus my remarks on the five
specific reasons for ratification from the White House Working
Group on the CTBT.
First, I agree with their first reason: ``The CTBT will
constrain the development of more advanced . . . weapons by the
declared nuclear powers.'' In fact, as a practical matter, I
believe it will prevent such developments by these States. By
these developments, I mean not only radical new concepts such
as the nuclear explosion pumped x-ray laser or pure fusion
weapons, but also new designs for classical two-stage
thermonuclear weapons with significantly different parameters
from existing weapons.
Even the very sophisticated research facilities and
advanced supercomputers called for in the U.S. Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Program will not permit the
development, production, and deployment of such advanced new
weapons in which responsible officials would have confidence.
Pursuit of new designs would appear to be even more problematic
in the case of other nuclear weapon states that will not share
the luxury of the elaborate facilities available to the United
States in its Stewardship Program.
Within the U.S. Stewardship Program, one might make minor
modifications in existing weapons designs to take into account
changes in materials or manufacturing techniques which could be
checked out by supercomputers and non-nuclear testing. However,
to maintain high confidence in the U.S. stockpile, such
modifications would have to be closely controlled and held to
an absolute minimum. And there is no reason to think many such
changes would be deemed necessary even over a very extended
period of time.
Now, all of this isn't to say that the CTBT can prevent
scientists in the weapons laboratories in this country or
abroad from thinking about new designs which might be of
interest in the unlikely event that the test ban regime
collapsed. It is indeed difficult, however, to imagine the
circumstances in which responsible political, military, or
scientific leaders in any nuclear weapon state would be
interested in employing unproven designs in the absence of
testing when a wide variety of highly reliable, proven weapons
are already available in their arsenals.
Second, I agree that ``The CTBT will strengthen the NPT
regime and the U.S. ability to lead the global nonproliferation
effort.'' Moreover, I believe the failure of the United States
to ratify the CTBT promptly will seriously undercut U.S.
ability to carry out its critical role in leading the global
nonproliferation effort.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which constitutes the
framework for the nonproliferation regime, is by its very
nature discriminatory since it divides the world into nuclear
weapons haves and have-nots. The treaty was based on the
correct assumption that most countries are more concerned with
preventing their neighbors and adversaries from acquiring
nuclear weapons than with maintaining the option to acquire
such weapons for themselves or, for that matter, with requiring
the existing nuclear weapon states to divest themselves of
weapons as a precondition. Nevertheless, serious concern about
the treaty's discriminatory nature was, and remains, a divisive
factor within the regime.
Article VI of the NPT was included to obligate the nuclear
weapon states ``to pursue negotiations in good faith on
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms
race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.''
When President Eisenhower initiated the first comprehensive
test ban negotiations in 1958, he then saw it as the best hope
to constrain both the nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union--
vertical proliferation--and the spread of nuclear weapons
beyond the three countries that then possessed them--horizontal
proliferation. President Kennedy shared these hopes and resumed
the negotiations that had been recessed after the shoot-down of
the U2 over Sverdlovsk. Unfortunately, these early negotiations
failed to produce an agreement.
A decade later, the NPT, which was successfully negotiated
under President Johnson and ratified by President Nixon,
provided a strong barrier to horizontal proliferation. The NPT
also banned nuclear testing for all non-nuclear weapon parties
to the treaty since they foreswore the development or
acquisition of nuclear explosive devices.
In these circumstances, the non-nuclear weapon states that
were parties to the treaty looked on the continued nuclear
testing by the nuclear powers as a constant reminder of the
discriminatory nature of the NPT. They looked on progress in
achieving a global comprehensive test ban as the most visible
demonstration of the willingness of the nuclear weapon states
to end the nuclear arms race. The global cessation of nuclear
testing has become the litmus test of the seriousness of the
nuclear weapon states to meet their obligations under Article
VI of the NPT.
When the NPT came up for renewal at its 25th anniversary
conference in 1995, there was considerable dissatisfaction with
the record of the nuclear weapon states in fulfilling their
obligations under Article VI, particularly with regard to the
nuclear test ban. The conference had to decide whether to
extend the NPT indefinitely or for only a fixed period.
In view of the significance of the decision, the conference
sought approval of indefinite extension by consensus rather
than the simply majority required by the treaty. This consensus
was achieved by the adoption of a resolution of principles and
objectives which contained many commendable generalizations but
one very specific objective: The completion of a universal CTB
Treaty no later than the end of 1996.
To the surprise of many, the treat was completed on
schedule, in large part due to the initiatives taken by
President Clinton, and the CTBT was opened for signature on
September 24, 1996. To date, 149 states have signed the treaty,
including the five nuclear weapon states, and eight countries,
by my count--soon to be joined by France and Britain--have
ratified the treaty. However, most key countries, including
Russia and China, as has been pointed out, will not move on
ratification until the U.S. Senate acts.
Third, I agree that ``The CTBT will constrain `rogue'
states' nuclear weapons development and other states' nuclear
capabilities.'' The treaty cannot by itself, however, prevent
such states from obtaining a first generation nuclear weapons
capability. When the CTBT enters into force with essentially
worldwide support, including the five nuclear weapon states, an
international legal norm against testing will have been
established. While this could not prevent testing by a rogue
state, the act of testing would, by violating a universal norm,
put that state at odds with the entire international community
and make it a prime candidate for serious sanctions.
Technically, however, such a rogue state could develop a
first generation nuclear weapon without testing. Such a weapon
would probably be similar to the untested gun-type U-235 weapon
that destroyed Hiroshima or the plutonium implosion weapon that
had been successfully tested at Trinity prior to use against
Nagasaki, or the early U-235 implosion weapons tested by China.
Such weapons are known to have been developed without tests by
South Africa and presumably by Israel and Pakistan as well.
Such a rogue state would not, however, be able to go very
far in optimizing or miniaturizing fission weapons and would
certainly not be able to develop thermonuclear weapons without
extensive testing or access to detailed plans and direct
technical assistance from a nuclear weapon state that had
successfully developed and tested them.
Although the undeclared nuclear weapon states--India,
Israel, and Pakistan--which presumably already have first
generation weapons, are more experienced in the field, they
would also not be able to develop thermonuclear weapons without
testing or external assistance by a nuclear weapon State. If a
state were a member of the NPT, such a program would, of
course, be a violation of the NPT and would probably be
revealed by the new, more intrusive IAEA inspection program,
which can inspect suspicious sites.
Fourth, I agree that ``The CTBT will improve America's
ability to detect and deter nuclear explosive testing.'' Under
the CTBT, the establishment of the International Monitoring
System, with stations in Russia and China, and mandated
procedures for on-site inspections of suspicious events will
significantly supplement the already impressive unilateral U.S.
system of national technical means with which the United States
has successfully monitoring nuclear testing worldwide since the
first Soviet nuclear test in August 1949.
The International Monitoring System, when fully
operational, is designed to have a worldwide detection
capability down to about 1 kiloton, although I believe in
geographic areas of special interest it will be considerably
better than that. The IMS has the advantage that it will be an
open international operation so that all parties to the treaty
have access to the data and will not be solely dependent on
United States conclusions, which are often based on data that
the United States is not prepared to share and which some
parties may perceive as biased. Moreover, the treaty
establishes specific procedures to allow on-site inspections of
suspicious events. The prospect of on-site inspections should
act as a powerful deterrent since they would have a good chance
of identifying even very small tests; and if the country where
the event occurred rejected or obstructed the inspections, the
action in itself would strongly suggest that the party in
question was trying to hide a clandestine test. In making the
case for inspections of a suspicious event, the United States
can also present information from its powerful classified
national technical means system that it would not be willing to
share with the rest of the world on a routine basis.
As discussed in more detail in my prepared statement, the
powerful synergistic effect of U.S. National Technical Means
capabilities and the International Monitoring System is well
illustrated by the earthquake in the vicinity of Novaya Zemlya
on August 16 last year. U.S. photo reconnaissance alerted U.S.
intelligence agencies when it detected unusual activity at the
Novaya Zemlya site in August, activity that in retrospect was
probably associated with permitted subcritical experiments of
the type the United States was conducting at the same time at
the Nevada test site.
Concern that it might be a nuclear test was eliminated when
seismic data that became available within days determined it
was an earthquake 130 kilometers from the test site beneath the
floor of the Arctic Ocean. If the CTBT had been in force and
the event had been close to the test site, the United States
could have requested an on-site inspection and would certainly
have had a strong case to obtain it.
In judging the effectiveness of a detection system, it must
be recognized that every system that depends upon technical
measures has a threshold below which signals are lost in the
background noise. While in the case of the CTBT one can, with
high confidence, detect tests down to 1 kiloton equivalent and
with less confidence to considerably lower levels, there will
always be a range of yields above zero that cannot be detected.
Despite these technical limitations, the verification
system can still be correctly defined as effective because the
tests below the threshold do not constitute a security risk to
the United States. Clandestine testing below the threshold by
the nuclear weapon states would not permit development of
radically new or significantly improved nuclear weapons. In the
case of non-nuclear weapon states, tests below the threshold
would not contribute to the production of a first generation
primitive weapon, which would either be tested at full yield or
be produced without testing since little would be gained by the
testing of such weapons at very low yields.
I should add that, in addition to detection by sensors
recording the event itself, a potential clandestine tester
would have to take into account the possibility that his
actions would be revealed by human sources or by a failure of
communications security. Such sources of information, although
unquantifiable, should have a significant deterrent effect on
low-yield clandestine testing.
Fifth, I agree that ``CTBT ratification by the United
States and others will constrain non-signatories from
conducting nuclear tests.'' Moreover, I believe ratification is
critical to the U.S. efforts to maintain an effective
leadership role in maintaining and strengthening the nuclear
nonproliferation regime, which is the principal constraint on
testing by non-nuclear weapon states.
It has been suggested that the Senate does not have to
hurry in considering the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty since
India, one of the 44 countries that must ratify the treaty for
it to enter into force, has stated emphatically that it will
not sign the treaty. The urgency for the U.S. action derives
not only because our leadership role will probably stimulate a
wave of ratifications, including Russia and China, but also
because it will give the United States a seat at a special
conference that can be called after September 24, 1999--3 years
after the treaty was opened for signature--to decide what
measures can be taken to accelerate the ratification process
and facilitate early entry into force of the treaty. If Indian
participation does not appear to be forthcoming, the conference
can recommend a number of ways to bring the treaty into force
provisionally. If the United States fails to ratify the treaty
before September 24, 1999, it will only be able to participate
in the conference as an observer, without a vote or voice in
these efforts to bring into force a treaty in which it has
played such a central role over the years.
In the year 2000, there will be a major NPT Review
Conference. The main focus of attention at that conference will
be on the extent the nuclear weapon states have met their
obligations under Article VI and implemented the Principles and
Objectives Resolution that accompanied the indefinite extension
of the NPT. If the United States has ratified the CTBT and the
treaty is moving toward entry into force, the United States
will be in a very strong position to press the conference to
support its other efforts to strengthen the nonproliferation
regime with respect to potential proliferators. But if the
treaty has been rejected or is still before the Senate, the
United States will be strongly attacked at the NPT Review
Conference as the barrier to an effective nonproliferation
regime and will lose much of the leadership role it has
rightfully achieved over the years.
In summary, I believe the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is
an extremely important component of the U.S. strategy to
establish a permanent global nonproliferation regime. I urge
the Senate to act promptly to give its advice and consent to
the treaty in order to reinforce the leadership role of the
United States in extending and strengthening the
nonproliferation regime.
Thank you, and I am, of course, willing to answer questions
on my testimony or any other part of this issue.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Keeny, thank you so much for your
presentation to our Subcommittee.
We have Dr. Kathleen Bailey with us, and unless Senator
Stevens has any questions or comments at this time, I am going
to call on Dr. Bailey to proceed.
Senator Stevens. Please do.
Senator Cochran. We have your statement. It will be printed
in the record in full, and we encourage you to make whatever
comments you think would be helpful to the Subcommittee.
TESTIMONY OF KATHLEEN BAILEY,\1\ SENIOR FELLOW, LAWRENCE
LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY
Ms. Bailey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you and Members of the
Subcommittee to address the relationship between the nuclear
nonproliferation regime and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
CTBT. The views I express today are my own and not necessarily
those of any institution.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Bailey appears in the Appendix on
page 53.
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Let me start with my conclusion, which is that the CTBT
fails the cost/benefit test. Specifically, it will not
accomplish the nonproliferation goals as set out for it by the
administration and, at the same time, the treaty will seriously
degrade the U.S. nuclear deterrent and, thus, will have a high
national security cost. I would like to take each of the five
principal nonproliferation goals as set out by the
administration for the CTBT and give you the bottom-line
conclusion that I have made about them.
Goal No. 1 that I will discuss is that the CTBT is alleged
to constrain nuclear proliferation. The CTBT will not
meaningfully constrain nations that want to acquire a workable
nuclear weapons design. A state that wants to produce a nuclear
weapon can do so without nuclear testing. As acknowledged by
the two previous speakers, the Hiroshima bomb as well as South
Africa's arsenal were untested devices.
Furthermore, non-boosted, implosion-type weapons may be
designed with high confidence, without testing.
Testing is not essential today as it was in the past for
proliferating nations because the information related to
nuclear weapons is now widespread. University courses, the
information superhighway, advanced computers, new materials,
and production technologies--all of these enable a nation to
design with high confidence a weapon that would in the not-so-
distant past have been considered relatively sophisticated.
Now, critics may argue that new proliferators would want to
test a device design, just as the United States usually does,
before stockpiling it. However, there are important differences
between proliferators' needs, perspectives, and targeting
requirements versus those of the United States and Russia.
During the Cold War, both sides focused on targeting one
another's military sites. A premier objective has been pinpoint
strikes against small targets such as silos, rather than
cities. This dictated high-performance delivery systems, which,
in turn, required tight parameters on the allowable weight,
size, shape, safety measures, and yield.
Now, by comparison, proliferant nations are not likely to
target silos. Instead, they are likely to target cities. Their
delivery vehicles may be ships, boats, trucks, or Scud-type
missiles. Proliferators may not care whether the yield they
obtain is exact. They may not have tight restrictions imposed
by advanced delivery systems or safety standards like those
that we and Russia have. And they are unlikely to have highly
complex weapons designs. Furthermore, proliferators may have an
entirely different standard for reliability. All of this boils
down to one thing: It is quite feasible for a nation to develop
a device that will work as long as it does not matter if the
yield is exactly known and there are no exacting specifications
which must be met.
Goal No. 2 is to save the nonproliferation regime. I
contend that the NPT is at risk and ratification of the CTBT
will not save the NPT. There are at least three major
challenges to the Non-Proliferation Treaty which threaten to
unravel it: The demand for a timetable for zero nuclear
weapons; growing dissatisfaction with U.S. technology transfer
restrictions; and erosion of NPT's contribution to security.
Now, I have outlined detail on all three of these in my
written testimony, but verbally I will address only one of them
now.
A contradiction exists, as Spurgeon Keeny pointed out, in
that the nuclear weapon states pledged in the NPT that they
would work in good faith toward total nuclear disarmament.
Simultaneously, however, the nuclear weapon states have
continued to rely on nuclear deterrence for security, and they
have said that disarmament is a long-term rather than a near-
term goal.
At the NPT Review and Extension Conference of 1995, the
United States and others agreed to negotiate a CTBT, touting it
as a step toward total nuclear disarmament. Now, however, NPT
parties are in the process of discovering that the CTBT does
not constitute a step toward disarmament that they had thought
it was. This is because nuclear weapon states are not by any
means abandoning nuclear deterrence but are instead taking
steps to assure that their stockpiles will remain safe and
reliable and, therefore, usable despite the testing ban. The
U.S. Stockpile Stewardship Program is designed to defeat
nuclear erosion. Thus, the goal set for the CTBT by many
nations is effectively undermined by a successful Stockpile
Stewardship Program.
It is the dependence of the nuclear weapon states on
nuclear deterrence, despite the NPT commitment to disarmament,
that is the source of greatest danger to the non-proliferation
treaty, and this conflict will persist regardless of whether
the CTBT is ratified by the United States or not.
Goal No. 3, establishing an international norm, I will also
gloss over fairly briefly because I view it as pretty
inconsequential. History is replete with examples when norms
and even legally binding treaties, which are a much stronger
constraint, have failed to inhibit nations. For example, the
Biological Weapons Convention set up an international norm
against biological weapons production, possession, use, but we
have two examples today of nations that we know are pursuing
and have in their hands biological weapons. One is Iraq; the
other is Russia. And we don't know how many others. So
international norms come and go without much effect.
Let's turn to goal No. 3. The administration has declared
that the CTBT is effectively verifiable. Let me define what I
mean by effective verification, and I think it is a generally
accepted definition. It means ``high confidence that militarily
significant cheating will be detected in a timely manner.'' In
the case of the CTBT, of course, this would mean that you are
highly confident that you will be able to detect within hours
or a few days of the event any nuclear testing which will
provide the test with significant, militarily significant
information.
Now, there are two questions that we need to answer in
looking at the CTBT. First is: What yield nuclear test give
you, or gives the tester, militarily significant information?
The second question is: Can the CTBT verification system detect
to that level?
Now, I have taken the conservative approach and said that
the basic cutoff point of militarily useful testing is 500
tons, and I selected that number because of the attachment that
you will see in my testimony. This colorful table was put
together in 1995 by the three nuclear weapons laboratories for
presentation to the administration to explain why our nuclear
weapons designers would like to be able to continue testing at
a level of 500 tons under the CTBT. So we assume for the sake
of argument that a very low number, 500 tons--or it could, of
course, be 10 kilotons or some other higher number, but let's
assume 500 tons is militarily useful.
The International Monitoring System of the CTBT is expected
to provide the ability to detect, locate, and identify non-
evasive testing of 1 kiloton or greater. Thus, it is clear that
the monitoring system will not be able to detect 500 tons or
more, up to a kiloton.
However--and this is a very important point--a Nation may
conduct nuclear tests evasively which would allow several
kilotons to be tested with little or no risk of detection. One
method by which this might be done is decoupling--that is,
detonation of the device in a cavity that can reduce the signal
by as much as a factor of 70. This means, for example, that a
kiloton explosion would be made to look seismically like a 14-
ton explosion fully coupled. A 10-kiloton explosion would look
only like a 0.14-kiloton explosion.
Let me give an example, an interesting one. The United
States conducted two nuclear tests in the Tatum salt dome
located at Chilton, Mississippi. Sterling, the test conducted
on December 3, 1966, had a yield of 380 tons, but the apparent
seismic yield was only 5.3 tons. Thus, you can see that the
salt dome decoupling effect made the test look much, much
smaller.
Now, in his testimony, John Holum said that decoupling was
a sophisticated measure, that it would be difficult for
countries to achieve. That is patently untrue. I would like to
quote from a document that I got recently from an unclassified
intelligence community report. It says, ``The decoupling
scenario is credible for many countries for at least two
reasons: First, the worldwide mining and petroleum literature
indicates that construction of large cavities in both hard rock
and salt is feasible, with costs that would be relatively small
compared to those required for the production of materials for
a nuclear device; second, literature and symposia indicate that
containment of particulate and gaseous debris is feasible in
both salt and hard rock.''
So I would suggest to you that decoupling is not a terribly
big challenge and that it is quite a feasible scenario.
However, let's assume that the country is unable to get a
large cavity and is not able to decouple its device. What could
it do? Well, I would suggest that one of the easiest things to
do would be to put the device that it wanted to test on a
barge, send it out to the ocean, let the detonation occur, and
wait for the International Monitoring System and the New York
Times and CNN to tell them what the yield was. That test would
be very difficult to attribute, and perhaps impossible.
So the bottom line is this comprehensive test ban is not
effectively verifiable, and militarily significant testing can
take place with very little or no risk of detection.
Let's turn now to goal No. 4, which is constraining nuclear
modernization. I would agree with administration officials that
say that the CTBT will constrain the United States and others
from being able to modernize their nuclear weapons. But I would
see this as a bad thing, not a good thing. Let me give you some
examples of three instances in which we would need possibly to
modernize our nuclear forces.
In one case, we might need to increase safety measures for
our nuclear weapons. We cannot say what new technologies will
be discovered in the future that would greatly enhance the
safety of our nuclear weapons. It is like saying in 1949 we
didn't know that airbags would come along in the 1990's for
automobiles. Well, that technology was unknown then. The same
kind of thing happens. Technology marches. You find out later
that there is a new discovery that you could apply to an old
problem of safety, and you need to be able to test to implement
that.
Second, modernization may be needed for new requirements.
We say that we don't have any current new requirements that
would make us need a new device design or testing. But that
might change. There may be emerging threats. For example,
Desert Storm taught us that we need to be able to strike deeply
buried targets such as hardened underground bunkers, and so we
modified the B-61-11 bomb. There may be future instances in
which we would need to have a new or redesigned bomb.
There may be emerging defensive technologies. There may be
a quantum leap somewhere in which Russia or some other Nation
may develop a technology that would render our weapons obsolete
overnight, and we would need to be able to adjust our deterrent
to meet that counter-force challenge.
We would also need to adjust new delivery systems. Years
ago we didn't anticipate the global positioning system--the
satellite system that enables pinpoint accuracy, and that has
revolutionized delivery systems. Well, what if there is a new
discovery in the future that would enable us to have a more
streamlined, lightweight, effective delivery system. If that is
the case, we may need a new warhead to go with it. So we should
not preclude U.S. ability to test should we need to change our
nuclear arsenal.
I would like to raise here another consideration which is
not mentioned by the administration and I think is terribly
important, and that is that the CTBT may actually promote
nuclear proliferation. Nuclear testing has demonstrated to our
allies, as well as to potential adversaries, that we have a
strong commitment to our allies and that our nuclear deterrence
is strong. Any decline in that confidence that we have or in
our commitment to nuclear deterrence could signal to other
nations that are now under our nuclear umbrella that we are not
serious. And I would suggest to you that sophisticated
nations--Japan, Germany, Italy, who knows which countries--
would revisit whether or not they might need their own nuclear
option in the future.
So the punchline is the CTBT will not meaningfully
accomplish the five nonproliferation goals set out for it. It
won't stop nations from designing and deploying nuclear
weapons. It will not save the NPT. It will not detect
militarily significant cheating. And the international norm
that it would create is essentially not meaningful.
Thus, the potential benefits of the CTBT to nuclear
nonproliferation is meager. On the other hand, the CTBT will
have a profound impact on the ability of the United States to
assure that its nuclear weapons continue to be safe, reliable,
and effective. Ratifying the CTBT will foreclose the ability of
the United States to modernize its nuclear forces because U.S.
compliance will be certain. So the limited political benefits
of the CTBT are vastly outweighed by the costs to national
security.
I would like to take one moment to correct what I view are
some omissions or errors in fact of statements that have been
made here today. I will be very brief.
One is that it was stated that we have had no need for
nuclear testing since the 1992--since the moratorium began in
1992. Sig Hecker, the former Director of Los Alamos National
Laboratory, said in writing last fall that indeed there have
been instances since 1992 that, had we not had a moratorium in
effect, the U.S. technical community would have advised a
nuclear test. That is the first point.
The second is Senator Glenn pointed out that computers
today are ``able to replace testing.'' Laboratory directors
have said that computers will not replace testing. Virtual
reality cannot replace reality. More importantly, the head of
the advanced supercomputer program at Lawrence Livermore has
said that the success of the initiative is uncertain and we
won't know for quite some time whether or not the computer
systems will perform as planned.
Finally, it was noted that--a question was asked whether or
not other nations had honored moratoria in the past. The answer
is no, they have not. Not only did the Soviet Union break out
of the moratorium, leaving us flat-footed in the 1958 to 1961
time, but also, as former Secretary of Defense Perry testified
before Congress in January of 1996, the current moratorium may
have been broken by Russia. No further public details were
given on that so I can't go beyond that, but it appears that
there was suspicious activity then.
There are other factual difficulties, but I will stop now
and turn to questions. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Dr. Bailey and Mr.
Keeny.
If NPT signatory nations like Iran, North Korea, or Iraq
are intent on acquiring nuclear weapons, in what way would the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty make the acquisition more
difficult? Mr. Keeny.
Mr. Keeny. As has been pointed out before, if the CTBT were
in effect and they signed it, they would be forced back into
developing weapons without testing, which, as we have
recognized, is certainly a possibility. If they don't sign it,
if they don't ratify it and become a party, they certainly have
the legal right to test. But if the test ban has become really
an international norm, it puts tremendous pressure on them. And
as an example of that, it is interesting that in the past
several countries that have pursued nuclear weapons, with the
exception of India's test in 1974, Pakistan and Israel and
South Africa did not conduct nuclear tests even though they
legally would have been permitted to do so. Presumably, they
felt for their own particular political reasons considerable
pressure from the even more informal norm that this would be
ill advised for them to do it.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Bailey.
Ms. Bailey. Senator, there is already an international norm
against development of nuclear weapons. There is even a treaty.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty already accomplishes that.
Iran and Iraq are both signatories. Iraq broke the treaty, and
Iran is suspected to be doing it.
The CTBT doesn't do anything that the NPT doesn't do, and
there is no technical barrier that the CTBT presents.
Senator Cochran. Do you think there is any legitimate
reason for a declared nuclear power to develop more advanced
nuclear weapons?
Mr. Keeny.
Mr. Keeny. No, I don't, and presumably that is a decision
that the military and the laboratories have agreed to, that our
present arsenal meets our present nuclear requirements. There
are no major new ideas pressing to be explored, and it was
interesting when the congressional legislation led to a
moratorium on testing, the question came up whether there were
some tests that had to be pursued. They had great difficulty
pulling together a handful of tests that should be given
consideration.
We have a very mature nuclear stockpile, and no clear
demands to change it, to elaborate on it, while we have a real
interest in not seeing the other nuclear weapon states, for
example, China, moving to catch up or possibly introducing new
ideas that might destabilize a very satisfactory deterrent
posture in which we find ourselves now in the post-Cold War
environment.
So I fail to see any pressing need on our part, and I am
encouraged that the other nuclear weapon states were willing to
go along with the test ban, suggesting that they, too, are
satisfied with their general nuclear posture.
Senator Cochran. Thank you.
Dr. Bailey.
Ms. Bailey. Absolutely, we need to maintain the flexibility
to have nuclear weapons designs. There may be new threats, for
example, chemical, or biological. What if we need to have a
nuclear weapon that would detonate and burn up the biological
agent in a particular bunker? We can't do that conventionally.
We can do it with nuclear. What if we need a small tailor-made
nuclear weapon to do that? We may discover new safety measures.
We would need to do new designs then.
Additionally, new technologies by Russia or China, in terms
of defending against our nuclear arsenal, our nuclear
deterrent, could cause us to have to re-tailor our arsenal. We
need to maintain the flexibility to do that.
Senator Cochran. Thank you.
Senator Stevens.
Senator Stevens. Mr. Keeny, do you think our nuclear
deterrent is credible if we do ratify this treaty?
Mr. Keeny. I think there is no question about it. We have
an overwhelming nuclear deterrent, and with the new policy
enunciated that we are focusing on a nuclear deterrent posture
as opposed to a protracted war-fighting posture, numerically
and qualitatively our stockpile is an overwhelming deterrent,
and it clearly would continue to be so at a much lower level.
There is no reason to think it could be any stronger if you
modified the stockpile in any way whatsoever.
Senator Stevens. Well, then, let's turn it over. Do you
think it is credible if we maintain the full complement of our
testing staff and maintain at 100 percent of capability our
testing facilities? Do you think it is credible for us to say
we are not going to test?
Mr. Keeny. I understand----
Senator Stevens. You know that the budget before us now
says we are going to keep everything we have got. All the
testing facilities will be maintained at 100 percent. All the
staff will be kept at 100 percent. All of the readiness to test
will be kept at 100 percent. But we will also have over here a
whole new group that will perform all of the functions that
have been outlined for a country that doesn't test.
Now, is that credible, too?
Mr. Keeny. Well, it may not be necessary, but it is
certainly credible in the eyes of the rest of the world. I
think that you must have a stewardship program of some sort,
the ability to keep track of the status of existing weapons and
to, as necessary refabricate components in the weapons or the
entire weapon.
I think the present Stewardship Program is extremely
generous and is an insurance policy of extremely generous
proportions. I think no one should have any concerns that with
this amount of effort we are in a position to maintain the
reliability and safety of the stockpile and would be in a
position to very quickly accelerate our efforts if the regime
does break down.
So I would say, I think, the activity could be successfully
done on a more modest level, but if the Congress is prepared to
fund the program at this level and it gives additional
reinsurance, I would certainly support it.
I think other countries will do it on a much less ambitious
level. Apparently, the Russian approach to stockpile
reliability is based more on periodic refabrication of the
weapons. We, by our science-based Stewardship Program, will
monitor them extremely close and will be in a position to make
minor modifications more frequently, and presumably have to do
a complete refabrication on a much longer time scale.
Clearly, a lot of the funding of this program is based in
maintaining the laboratories to have an interesting and
detailed program to attract and maintain competent people in
the business, and this is a legitimate insurance policy. How
much you are prepared to expend on this is a national security
decision that should take into account your other security
requirements.
Ms. Bailey. Senator, may I comment on the question?
Senator Stevens. Yes.
Ms. Bailey. The Nevada test site cannot be maintained in
ready condition absent some level of nuclear testing. Lawrence
Livermore Laboratory Director Bruce Tarter has already said
that we are 2 years away from being able to conduct a nuclear
test right now. You can't keep the good people, the skill
levels up and so forth, absent some kind of testing.
So even with Safeguard F, for example, when the national
security might determine that we needed to have a test, we
would still be 2 years away from a test. Your question, which
is a good one is: Does the maintenance of a test site not
signal our ability to have a strong deterrent? The answer is no
because we won't be able to keep that test site ready to go.
Senator Stevens. Well, I don't think it would be maintained
either, but the beginning part of the program indicates that we
would keep both up--at a cost, I might add, of something like
20 C-17's a year. The duplication and cost would build us 20 C-
17s.
I have some real questions about this treaty now that I
didn't have before when I have seen the quantification of what
it is going to cost to maintain this dual track in this
program, and that is why I came over here today. I seriously
question this program now.
Ms. Bailey. The big fear of people at my laboratory, the
designers particularly, is that what we will get is the worst
of both worlds; that is, that the stockpile stewardship--the
lukewarm advocacy of it by arms control advocates will
completely fade once the CTBT is ratified, if it is ratified,
and then we won't have either testing or a Stockpile
Stewardship Program.
Senator Stevens. Well, I just feel that successive
Congresses will edge and cut both sides of this program.
Neither one of them will be creditable after a series of years,
and that will mean we will be forced to rebuild our
conventional systems at a much higher rate to maintain our
credibility as a superpower. I really think this needs to be
rethought, and I hope that you will continue the hearings,
Senator.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Senator Stevens.
Let me ask a question, Mr. Keeny, about the alternatives
that might be available, feasible, to a ban on testing.
First of all, what is the harm of testing? Is there any
measurable realistic harm to the environment or the health and
safety of American citizens for a low-level testing program to
ensure reliability of weapons?
Mr. Keeny. Well, the harm is international politics. I
would say that unless one is extremely careless or incompetent,
there is little danger to the health and safety of the American
people from underground testing, properly conducted.
The danger of this is that we are going to persuade the
rest of the world we are interested in preventing them from
having nuclear capabilities, but we have no intention ourselves
to in any way constrain our own programs. And not only will we
insist on indefinite continuation of nuclear armaments, but we
will insist on continuing to improve and make them, at least in
the eyes of the rest of the world, more dangerous to
international security. And I think this is a problem we have
in dealing with the international community.
We would like to be in a position that we can get maximum
support from the international community when situations such
as Iraq or North Korea or whatever happens next come along that
they will support sanctions, they will support our leadership
role in assuring there will not be further nuclear
proliferation, because that could be dangerous to the health of
our friends and allies abroad and eventually to ourselves as
well.
That is the argument for the comprehensive test ban. One
can imagine that if the whole regime collapses and testing
becomes much more general and goes above ground and we have
atmospheric testing, that would endanger the American citizens'
health and well-being. But I think that is unlikely, or at
least for the foreseeable future. So this should be looked on
in terms of our broader international objectives to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries that we
consider rogue countries or simply to countries--if the regime
breaks down and many countries become nuclear-capable, it would
be a very, very frightening world.
I remember in my earlier days in this issue wise men
generally were saying in the 1960's that there were going to be
scores or many dozens of nuclear weapon states by the end of
the 1970's, which is now a long time ago. They were wrong. And
we were very fortunate. But I think if we found most of the
industrialized states developing nuclear capabilities, which
they could very easily, or many other countries developing more
modest but capabilities that might be used, it would just be an
extremely dangerous world. And if conflicts emerged, as they
almost certainly will in the future, you have an increasing
probability that there would actually be use of nuclear weapons
and could well be in situations into which the United States
would be drawn. And that would be very dangerous to the health
of American citizens, in the military and otherwise.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Bailey, what is the alternative to the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
both of which have had Republican and Democratic
administrations alike support in one form or another and rely
upon more and more as a way to ensure a norm of behavior that
is consistent with the goal and hope that Mr. Keeny has
expressed? What is the alternative?
Ms. Bailey. Let's take each treaty separately, if you don't
mind.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is adhered to by
states because they see it in their security interest to do so.
They want to prevent nuclear proliferation in their regions and
so forth. It is not because they are afraid of U.S. nuclear
weapons or the declared nuclear weapons states. So I think that
there isn't an alternative. States will continue to support the
NPT because it is in their security interest to do so.
Now, what is the alternative to the comprehensive test ban?
I would suggest that we go back and reconsider what previous
presidents, all presidents prior to President Clinton
considered, and that is, a limitation in the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty that would allow us to conduct some level of nuclear
tests to keep our deterrent strong.
Clinton was the first one that came out with zero yield, so
the treaty is very different today than the one that we have
been talking about for 40 years. I think that we will continue
to need some level of nuclear testing not only if we choose to
support stockpile stewardship, we need to be able to calibrate
the stockpile stewardship; or if we choose to do rebuilds, we
need to be able to prove the processes by which we will do the
nuclear rebuilds. So testing is integral there. So the
alternative, if you really want a CTBT, is to revisit it, go
back and make it what previous presidents were doing, that is,
a time-limited treat with some level of testing that will allow
us to keep our deterrent strong.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Keeny, what is your reaction to that?
Mr. Keeny. Well, I would like to say a word about the
statements that have been made a number of times here about
previous presidents. I think it is simply not correct. When
Eisenhower initiated the treaty on the discontinuance of
nuclear weapons, it was for a comprehensive test ban. That was
his intention, and that was what the formulation was.
Now, it is true that the agreement was not reached. One
never got to the point of defining what is a nuclear explosion.
But the thinking about it was in terms of a de minimis
definition initially. As problems developed, various other
formulations were considered, one to deal differently with
underground testing. At that time there had only been a single
underground test, the Rainier test. So it was a new phenomenon.
And then subsequently there was thought given to various types
of threshold test bans. But both Eisenhower and Kennedy had
addressed the proposition of a comprehensive test ban. But, of
course, there was never an agreement reached and certainly
nothing signed.
Under President Carter, the pursuit was of a comprehensive
test ban, although there, again, the negotiation, although it
went quite far in some regards, never came to a question of the
definition of nuclear explosion. There was never an agreed U.S.
position, and there was nothing agreed to with the Soviet
Union.
So I think one should be very careful in saying this is a
unique approach that was never conceived of. I do think it is
true that when Clinton made a formal statement of having a zero
yield, without specifically defining it, he went a step further
than had been achieved in the previous negotiations. But I
think you misread the objectives of Eisenhower, Kennedy, and
Carter when you suggest that really the notion there was to
continue testing at a level such that it would have any
relevance to deterrence.
Another point is on the testing that took place during the
moratorium. Actually, I was indirectly involved because my
boss, George Kistikowsky, who was Eisenhower's second science
adviser, was a key person in the decision as to whether to go
ahead with these very small yield tests and concluded this
would be a reasonable thing to do. They were limited to a few
pounds of yield, and it related to some very specific safety
problems that existed at the time.
But you must remember, these were unilateral moratorium
that each side interpreted as they saw fit, and it was
interesting how strict Eisenhower was in constraining any
testing that was to be allowed under the moratorium.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much for that information
and that perspective. That is very helpful.
Dr. Bailey, are there any other comments or observations
that you would like to make?
Ms. Bailey. I would like to observe that that is not
technically accurate. First of all, previous presidents called
in the directors of national laboratories when this
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was being considered, and they
heard briefings and previous Presi-
dents decided that the United States did need to maintain some
level, some yield of testing. President Clinton was the first
president that did not call in the laboratory directors and
personally hear the briefing. Instead, it was done at the
Secretary of Energy level. The briefings that took place about
why we need testing were heard by Secretary O'Leary, and it was
decided at that level, not at the presidential level.
It is very important to realize that in previous
negotiations of the comprehensive test ban, it was assumed that
there would be some level of testing to enable the United
States to keep its deterrent strong, safe, and reliable. And
that is just a fact. It can be documented in history.
Mr. Keeny. Well, I just don't know how you can say
something is just a fact. The kind of testing that some people
were discussing had little to do with maintaining our
deterrent. You know, the suggestion that was made so frequently
that a country with 12,000 strategic nuclear weapons and highly
sophisticated and competent delivery systems is going to lose
its deterrent capability overnight because of some possible
problem with certain weapons, simply shows no comprehension of
what deterrence is about. To suggest that any of these
developments would suddenly have left the United States
impotent and obsolete is simply way off the mark.
I think when Eisenhower was pursuing the nuclear test ban,
it was with the intention of stopping the development of
nuclear weapons, which he saw as a threat to the survival of
the United States and to the international community.
I think a person it would be very useful for you to talk to
would be General Andy Goodpastor, who, as you know, was
Eisenhower's----
Senator Cochran. We have had him before the Subcommittee.
Mr. Keeny [continuing]. Personal military aide and very
close to him personally. And I think he would say that at the
beginning Eisenhower thought nuclear weapons were just another
much more powerful and dangerous type of weapon, military
armament, but that with the rapid escalation during his term
and the introduction of thermonuclear weapons and the sort of
open-ended expansion that seemed available, he was deeply
seized with the danger of the situation and really sought very
sincerely at that early date to try to stop the development of
further nuclear weapons, and saw the one handle on it at that
time seemed to be through testing, because everyone felt that
with increasingly high-yield weapons, the tests were
indispensable to continue this progress.
But I would strongly suggest that you talk with General
Andy Goodpastor, because I think he is one of the few people
who is still around who can reflect what Eisenhower's actual
concerns about these matters were.
Now, I think it is true the laboratory directors always in
the past have basically opposed a test ban, and I think most of
them would be frank to say so. Their job was to make nuclear
weapons, and they wanted--they had ideas and they wanted to
continue to improve them.
Senator Cochran. Do you suppose that the generosity of this
Stockpile Stewardship Program may be the price that we pay for
the support of the laboratory directors now for the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty?
Mr. Keeny. Well, I wouldn't want to put it that way. I
think a more generous----
Senator Cochran. I didn't put it that way, either. I asked
the question.
Mr. Keeny. Well, I think it did, but I think it is the
price for their support. But to put it in a little more
generous terms, I think it met their concerns about this narrow
question of stockpile reliability and safety. I think it is
unfair to say they just did it because they wanted to maintain
a large and expensive establishment. I think the program did
buy their support in that it answered the question that they
were seized with: How can I, as a responsible manager of the
scientific program, say these weapons are reliable and safe
unless I have a lot of tools at my disposal? And having
received them, I think they are clearly satisfied, and I think
this is the first time that there has been clear support of all
of the laboratory directors for the test ban. And it reflects
on the one hand the Stewardship Program, but it also reflects
an honest man's assessment of the fact that we have a very
mature stockpile, we have a very secure deterrent, and we are
not faced with an opponent of uncertain dimensions, as the
Soviet Union was at the height of the Cold War.
So I acknowledge that the laboratory directors have done a
responsible and honest appraisal of the situation and have
decided that their responsibilities can be met without
continuing an aggressive development program.
Senator Cochran. Thank you.
Senator Glenn.
Senator Glenn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize, and I
apologize to our witnesses today that I had to be in and out so
much. I have been out more than in, I guess today. But I had
some other things I couldn't avoid, so I am sorry I wasn't
here.
I have been impressed with the fact of what you just
mentioned that the heads of our three major labs involved with
this, Lawrence Livermore and Sandia and Los Alamos, all who are
certainly highly technically competent people, favor this as
long as the safeguard--or so long as the program is underway,
the safeguard program to make sure that everything is still in
working order if we happen to need it.
We also have the statements by four of the former Joint
Chiefs of Staff--Shalikashvili, Powell, Crowe, and Jones--and
they certainly are people who look at the technical background
of this thing and are very happy with it. So I just think that
this is the way we ought to go, and I am sorry I wasn't here
for all the discussion previously, but I just wanted to make
sure that my views were brought forward on that.
I noted in particular the statement by Dr. Tarter at
Lawrence Livermore, and his statement was that, ``We have
maintained the nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear
testing since 1992 when the United States entered into a
nuclear test moratorium. President Clinton has since signed a
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty aimed at ending nuclear
explosive testing on a worldwide basis. Three important factors
have enabled us to meet the chal-
lenge to date: First, the weapons intended for the enduring
stockpile all have good pedigrees; they went into the stockpile
with blue-chip credentials. To date, we have seen no signs of
catastrophic aging; however, vigilance is required because
nuclear weapons age in very dynamic, not necessarily
predictable ways. Both the difficult task of assessing an ever
older stockpile and the new challenge of certifying refurbished
weapons increase the complexity of stockpile stewardship as
time passes.'' That is his first point.
Second, ``we have been able to meet the challenge because
of the expertise residing in the technical staff, hands-on
nuclear design, engineering, and test experience accumulated
through the development of weapons now in the stockpile, but
that experience base is also aging. So we are taking important
steps to archive that experience and make prudent use of it
while we have it. That includes working with the next
generation of scientists and engineers to tend to the current
needs of the stockpile and lay the foundation for the long-term
program for stockpile stewardship.''
Third point: ``We have worked closely with Assistant
Secretary Vic Reese and others in defense programs to design
the overall program and provide the technical basis for its
ambitious goals. We achieved what capabilities the program
needs by when and worked throughout the 1990's to achieve,
enabling scientific and engineering advances. Steady technical
progress on a number of fronts moves us closer to the long-term
goals of the Stockpile Stewardship Program.''
So the points he makes--and certainly there is no one more
experienced in nuclear matters than the Lawrence Laboratory out
there, and the head, the director of it, Dr. Tarter. So I think
when we have that and the former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, I come down on the side that I think it is safe to go
ahead with this. And I don't ask that as a question, obviously.
It is more a statement than anything else, but I wanted to get
my views on record.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Glenn.
Dr. Bailey, we were talking about the twin programs of
maintaining a testing capability at the same time we have the
Stockpile Stewardship Program and the attendant costs that that
is going to require us, as Appropriations Committee members,
and others to deal with. Senator Stevens made a very compelling
statement about the seriousness of that as a dilemma.
What is your reaction to the situation in terms of trying
to design a program for maintaining the deterrent that we have
to have in view of the facts that we find existing around the
world in terms of nuclear threats that threaten our security
interest? Are we getting into a position where we are
overreacting to the threat or to the possible deterioration of
our deterrent by spending these huge sums of money? I don't
know whether you have looked into the program that is outlined,
but it is a very costly program at the laboratories. And I
didn't realize that, as Senator Stevens said, we were also
going to be maintaining the same kind of capability of testing
and having the people in place and all of that, facilities, as
if there were no test ban in effect.
Is all of that necessary?
Ms. Bailey. The laboratory directors agreed with the
statement that Senator Glenn has set out on the basis that
there would be a Stockpile Stewardship Program and equally, if
not more important, that there would be Safeguard F--that is,
the national security clause escape clause that would allow us
to conduct a nuclear test if we needed to.
They said at the same time that this would not be as good,
technically, as nuclear weapons testing. It would never give
you the kind of confidence in the reliability and safety of
your weapons that testing would, but that we could make do with
it. It would be sufficient, in other words.
If you take away either of those two points, either the
Stockpile Stewardship or the ability to test in an emergency, I
think that you would lose the laboratory directors' support.
You would have an unacceptable level of erosion in our
confidence in the stockpile.
Now, if your question is do we need to have confidence in
the stockpile, I would say yes, for two basic reasons. We still
face a capability in Russia and emerging in China that is
extremely powerful. So while intent matters a great deal,
capability matters even more. And as we have heard today,
Russia is actually increasing its reliance on nuclear
deterrence and increasing, I would add, its nuclear weapons
capabilities. And I can go into that if you wish.
The other part of it is that there are proliferant nations
developing or having already acquired weapons of mass
destruction against which our nuclear deterrent may be the only
effective response.
So, yes, we still need the deterrent because the threats
are there. The directors of the technical laboratories have
said we either need to test or, at a bare minimum, we need to
have the escape testing clause coupled with the Stockpile
Stewardship Program.
Now, having said all that, my personal view is that
stopping testing is a political imperative. It is not something
that is technically driven. If we need to test in order to
prove stockpile stewardship or to maintain our deterrent, it
seems to me that we need to do a good scrub on the costs versus
benefits of that political imperative. And if it is going to be
extremely costly in terms of our deterrent and in terms of
finances, is it really worth the political gain that you would
get by satisfying the worldwide clamor for us to cease testing?
The nonproliferation goals that the administration has set out
for this treaty cannot and will not be accomplished.
And I think that is the key. We need to keep our eye on the
key. And the key is that you can't meet the nonproliferation
goals of this treaty.
Senator Cochran. Well, I think this has been a very helpful
and certainly informative hearing. I have learned a lot, and I
know that the others who have had an opportunity to come hear
the testimony and the questions and answers have learned a
great deal as well. While it is not a requirement of non-
government witnesses to respond to questions that are submitted
after a hearing, I have been told that there may be Senators on
the Subcommittee that would like to have the opportunity to
submit questions to this panel. And if you have the opportunity
to receive those questions, I hope you could respond if you
can. We can't require you to, but that has been a request I
have received, and I submit that to you for your consideration.
This concludes the hearing. We appreciate so much the
participation of our outstanding witnesses who have testified
today. We will continue to review the implications for
nonproliferation with respect to the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty and other issues in this Subcommittee during the balance
of the year. For the time being, though, the hearing will be in
recess.
[Whereupon, at 4:24 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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