[Senate Hearing 105-465]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 105-465
THE PLIGHT OF THE MONTAGNARDS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 10, 1998
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
47-164 CC WASHINGTON : 1998
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
James W. Nance, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Dr. Nguyen Dinh Thang, Executive Director, Boat People S.O.S.,
Fairfax, Virginia.............................................. 19
Rong Nay, Assistant Director, Montagnard Foundation, Montagnard
Human Rights Group, Cary, North Carolina....................... 22
Roth, Hon. Stanley O., Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs...................................... 3
Sommer, John F. Jr., Executive Director, American Legion,
Washington, D.C................................................ 15
Taft, Hon. Julia V., Assistant Secretary of State for Population,
Refugees, and Migration........................................ 4
Y Hin Nie, President, Montagnard Dega Association, Incorporated,
Greensboro, North Carolina..................................... 24
Appendix
Prepared statement of Hon. Stanley O. Roth....................... 31
Prepared statement of Hon. Julia V. Taft......................... 32
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to
Assistant Secretaries Roth and Taft.......................... 34
Prepared statement of John F. Sommer, Jr......................... 45
Prepared statement of Dr. Nguyen Dinh Thang...................... 49
Petition requesting the Administration to withhold waiving the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment for Vietnam.......................... 51
Additional material submitted for the record:
Letter submitted by Senator Bob Smith of New Hampshire......... 53
(iii)
THE PLIGHT OF THE MONTAGNARDS
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TUESDAY, MARCH 10, 1998
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m. In
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Helms, Hagel, Kerry and Robb.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
I just got my latest instructions from my boss back here
(indicating), and she is a good one.
I don't know how to begin this morning except from a
personal standpoint.
During the holidays, when the liberties of the American
people were safe and the Congress was not in session, and I was
in Raleigh and you Chuck, were in Virginia, a group of people
came to my home one morning; and I never was impressed more
with anybody.
In any case, it is a personal honor this morning to call
the Foreign Relations Committee into session for a hearing on
the plight of the Montagnards. This is a long overdue
assessment of the hardships the Montagnards have suffered in
communist Vietnam--largely, because they have worked with and
supported the U.S. Government and our fighting men and women in
Vietnam during that war.
The Montagnards' home is in the central highlands of
Vietnam. During the Vietnam War, they fought valiantly
alongside of U.S. troops. They suffered heavy casualties
fighting against the communist North Vietnamese troops and the
communist guerrilla forces in the South. After the United
States withdrew from Vietnam, the Montagnards continued
fighting for freedom and independence. But, sad to say, to this
date it has been to no avail.
As a result of their courageous anticommunism and their
association with the United States, the Montagnards continue to
experience difficulties in their everyday lives. The Vietnamese
Government interferes with the Montagnards applying for
permission to emigrate to the United States and restricts
humanitarian assistance agencies, including the Lutheran Family
Services in Raleigh, North Carolina, from reaching their people
who live in the highlands of Vietnam.
Many Montagnards are forced to substitute Vietnamese
citizens into their family units and pay exorbitant fees to get
exit permits. In addition, they are forbidden to use the mail
system, and they have been denied access to jobs, housing, and
education.
Nevertheless, the Clinton Administration has decided to go
ahead and waive the requirements of free emigration contained
so clearly in the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.
Back in November, I wrote to Secretary Albright asking her
to, ``urge the administration not to exercise Jackson-Vanik for
Vietnam but to insist upon Vietnam's full compliance with the
standards of free emigration before going forward with any
trade benefits.''
I do hope the administration's witnesses here this morning
will be able to provide some encouraging information about the
status of the decision to waive Jackson-Vanik in our
relationship with Vietnam and how the administration justifies
waiving it in light of the problems I have just identified.
Now I would be glad to hear from Senator Robb for any
opening statement he may have.
Senator Robb. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for that
opportunity. I wanted to come at least for a few minutes to
this hearing, because I share the same emotional attachment
that I suspect Senator Hagel has, and he is probably here for
the same reason. Both of us served in Vietnam. Both of us have
a very high regard for the Montagnards and all that they did in
support of our forces and our cause during that period. This is
what I would consider a humanitarian inquiry and hearing and is
very appropriate.
Because I am the ranking member of our Seapower
Subcommittee, I am going to have to depart. I will try to come
back. I would like to hear, hopefully, Secretary Roth's opening
statement before I go. I would like to come back and hear some
of the second panel of witnesses as well as Secretary Taft. I
think this is the kind of thing that we ought to be inquiring
into, and I personally thank you for your sensitivity to this
easy to overlook matter that affects what really is a great
nation, and we should not let it pass by so easily.
I have no opening statement. I am here for essentially the
same reasons that you called this hearing, and I thank you for
doing so.
The Chairman. If you don't have an opening statement, the
comments you have made will certainly be a good substitute.
Thank you so much, Senator.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I, too, wish to
express my thanks to you for convening this hearing on this
very important issue. I echo my friend and colleague, a fellow
Vietnam veteran, in his comments as well.
The Vietnam chapter was a very disgraceful chapter in the
history of this country. It is important that we get back to
some of these important issues and talk about what we need to
do to right some of the wrongs that were done by this country,
by this government.
This particular hearing dealing with this particular group
of people is a good place to begin. So I, too, like my friend
and colleague, Chuck Robb, look forward to our witnesses.
I again thank you, for putting this committee hearing
together.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Before we proceed--and we will begin with Mr. Roth--at my
home during the holidays, a delightful group of people came.
They played the instruments that are made from hollowed out
bamboo and brought some of their tapestry and cloth. They even
brought a jacket which I shall always treasure. These are
wonderful people.
I told them then, that as soon as I could manage it when I
got back to Washington, I would schedule this hearing. This
hearing is it.
Mr. Roth, you may begin.
STATEMENT OF HON. STANLEY O. ROTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
Mr. Roth. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of
the committee. I would like to begin by commending the
committee for holding a hearing on this subject. I agree with
the comments that have been made by all three members of the
committee that not enough attention has been paid to this
issue. I believe I am here today to give you an assurance that
I personally will pay attention to this issue. I have not yet
been to Vietnam in this capacity, in this job as Assistant
Secretary, although I have been there previously. Of course,
Assistant Secretary Taft has and will describe her trip. But I
want to assure you that on my first visit there, which I expect
will be in May, I will raise the set of issues concerning the
Montagnards in my meetings with all Vietnamese officials.
So I think this is a very timely hearing for me personally.
In terms of the substance of the issues, I will be
abnormally brief and let Assistant Secretary Taft talk; since
she has a greater frame of reference on this, having recently
been in Vietnam. I wanted to make only a few basic points.
First, I agree with your assessment that there are two
different sets of issues. One is the treatment of the
Montagnards within Vietnam itself. Their status as a minority
community and the status of having formerly fought with us has
led to discriminatory behavior. There are all kinds of
statistics indicating greater poverty, greater health problems,
and discrimination in benefits. I want to pledge to you that I
will undertake a personal effort--I, of course, cannot
guarantee success--in my conversations with the Vietnamese to
try to open up greater benefits for these people in Vietnam. In
that regard, I mean specifically Vietnamese benefits from their
own government and also access from American NGO groups who are
very anxious to provide what you and I would consider, I think,
humanitarian assistance--not political, not revolutionary, but
humanitarian assistance--to these people. I think they have a
right to it, and we will try to make that happen.
I will keep you apprised of any progress that I make and
will make sure that other senior State Department officials
from the political side of the house as well as the refugee,
democracy, and human rights side of the house do the same
thing.
The other set of issues concerns emigration and access to
exit permits so that this community can be interviewed for
emigration to the United States. Assistant Secretary Taft will
provide you with the status of those efforts.
The point I want to emphasize is that I believe the current
thrust of U.S. policy toward Vietnam, which has been gradual
progress toward normalization as we work out specific issues
with them on POW/MIA matters and on a series of economic
issues, should support the objectives that you and I both
share.
I believe that Ambassador Pete Peterson is enjoying
increasing success in his representations to the Vietnamese
Government on a variety of issues. We have seen dramatic
progress, for example, on the ROVR program concerning some of
the refugees this year. I think that is partly a function of
Pete's personal relationship and personality with the
Vietnamese; but also, because the Vietnamese welcome the
progress that has been made in the context of normalization.
I should add for the sake of accuracy that the President
has not yet made a decision on Jackson-Vanik. We have had
consultation with the Hill, as you know from your staff. The
decision is imminent, and I had expected it by the time of this
hearing. I think it will come down very shortly. But,
technically, the decision has not been made.
But the rationale has been not any factual disagreement
with you that the situation is not perfect but, rather, because
we think the very criteria of the law, that the waiver can be
made if we believe it will lead to further progress on
emigration issues, is going to be met in this regard. So it is
precisely because we want more progress and because we think
the track record to date that we have made with Vietnam on
emigration issues has been quite positive--over 480,000 people
have come to the United States under the ODP or Orderly
Departure Program--that this waiver should help, not hurt, the
situation. That is why the recommendation has gone forward to
the President for a decision.
Let me stop at that point.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Roth appears in the
Appendix.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Taft.
STATEMENT OF HON. JULIA V. TAFT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR POPULATION, REFUGEES, AND MIGRATION
Ms. Taft. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. I am really very honored and pleased to have the
opportunity to talk to you today about our experience in
processing Montagnards for admission to the United States.
The plight of the Montagnards is particularly compelling,
not only because of the long-standing relationship with our
armed forces but also, as Secretary Roth points out, because of
the discrimination and problems that the Montagnards face
politically and socially within the country.
While we have done quite a lot to bring in Montagnards in
our refugee processing program, we still have about 900 that we
are waiting to try to get exit permits for, interviews for,
which still remain in Vietnam. We are hoping in the very near
future that we will be able to have access to these people, and
that they will be processed in this fiscal year.
As you have pointed out, Mr. Chairman, so poignantly, the
Montagnards have had an incredibly brave existence, fighting
with their resistance force, trying to deal with their own
natural integrity and trying to promote the liberation, as they
call it, of oppressed races through the FULRO process.
These resistance activities actually ended in the early
1990's. But prior to that time, we were able to process a
number of Montagnards. Two particular groups, as you know, sir,
went to North Carolina.
In 1985, 201 Montagnards made their way to the Thai-
Cambodian border following 10 years of the resistance
activities. We processed those people in our refugee program
and brought them to North Carolina.
They were shortly followed by another 398 resistance
fighters that the peacekeeping operation in Cambodia found on
the northeastern border.
When we found those people, we also processed them to North
Carolina.
Now this was an unusual decision on the part of our
government, to have such a large concentration of refugees in
one particular area. But because of a very active and concerned
Vietnam Veterans Association and the wonderful support
structure and interest of the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee
Service, we made a decision to allow them all to go to North
Carolina. You must be very proud--and, of course, they are all
here to see you--very proud of the fact that your constituents
are such a generous people.
As a matter of fact, although I do not have all the
statistics for the other States, North Carolina has taken over
16,000 refugees in the last couple of decades, 6,200 of which
are Vietnamese.
During the late 1970's and early 1980's, when a large
number of boat people left Vietnam, very few of them were
Montagnards. They were not part of the exodus that went to the
Southeast Asian countries and to Hong Kong. The majority of
Montagnards that were processed to the United States--and it
was 1,042 at that time--have been admitted as refugees from
inside Vietnam. They had not left the country, and they were
part of what we call the Orderly Departure Program.
ODP was established in 1979 by the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees and by other concerned countries to try to find a
safe way to deal with the status of people who wanted to leave
Vietnam. We did not want them to have to leave on very unsafe
boats and resort to clandestine departures. It was at that
point that we established the processing program from inside
Vietnam.
Since its inception, as Mr. Roth has said, 486,000
Vietnamese have been processed directly from Vietnam to our
program. We currently have a caseload awaiting processing which
includes four categories of people.
One are the former reeducation camp detainees that also
includes the Montagnards. We have about 2,500 of them awaiting
processing.
In addition, we have the ROVR caseload, which are those
people who went to Southeast Asian camps and came back to
Vietnam. We are processing--hopefully we are processing--about
18,000 of those people. This is the current program that we are
accelerating with Vietnam.
We also have some Amerasians that we are hoping to be able
to process into the United States. Then there are the current
immigrant visa cases.
With regard to the Montagnards, when I was in Vietnam in
January, I did press upon the Vietnamese authorities our top
priority. I also told them I was going to be coming here today
and that they had better move quickly on this caseload. It is
amazing what a hearing can do.
But I am not the only voice. The Ambassador has been
strenuous in pushing forward both the ROVR program and the
Montagnard program. And, as I state in my formal submission
here, just last month, finally, the Ministry of Interior
decided that it would send representation up to the central
highlands to find the Montagnards that we had on our list. I
had said I am giving you these lists again and we would like
exit permits for these people.
They sent someone up there to identify these people and,
hopefully, we are going to see them for processing. If we do
not get any movement on this, I want to find out what other
ideas you have which might even include our sending Americans
up there to do the INS processing ourselves. We need to be
tough on this. The fact that we are having this hearing today,
I am sure, was directly related to their decision to send
someone up to the highlands.
What we are hoping to do this fiscal year is to complete
the processing of everyone that we have on our lists, which
include the ROVR's, which include the Amerasians, which include
the Montagnards and the reeducation camp personnel.
What we would like to do but we do not have authority to
do--and I hope that you will be supportive of it--is to pass
the McCain Amendment. The current McCain Amendment, which
expired September 30, allowed us the ability to process single
children over 21 of reeducation camp detainees who had been
processed through our system. We have not been able to
interview or process any since September, and the
administration would like very much to have authority to do
this through March 1999.
The House has passed a bill in this regard and we can
submit the specifics to you, sir. We would appreciate very much
your allowing us to have access to these people.
In closing, I want you to know that it is very moving to
see the audience here today, both the staff and the members of
this committee, but also the Montagnards who have come up from
North Carolina. This means everything to them, and I want to
assure you and them that the administration is going to work
very hard to process their fellow Montagnards to this country.
Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Taft appears in the
Appendix.]
The Chairman. That was a very encouraging statement.
Before we begin the questioning, let me mention one thing.
A year or so back I invited seven or eight Ambassadors from the
ASEAN nations to come to North Carolina. At the time I made the
invitation, Vietnam was not yet recognized.
But the question came up as to whether I would include the
Vietnam Ambassador. I made the judgment of why not, because we
could talk to him about this and other issues, which I did. He
made a number of representations to me in good faith. Now you
know that an ambassador does not run the country; he represents
a country. I hope Pete Peterson will talk to the folks over
there, and I hope we will stay behind the Ambassador here so
that we can get something done on this question.
I see the arrival of the distinguished Senator from
Massachusetts. Would you have a statement to make?
Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, just very briefly, if I may, I
thank you for the opportunity to do that, sir.
First of all, let me thank you for having this hearing.
This is an important topic. I know you have a number of
Montagnard residents in your State, as there are in other parts
of our country. These are people who fought with us, who
believed in us, who took great risks on behalf of freedom. We
clearly need to keep our eye well focused on their capacity to
emigrate and their rights.
I just would report for the record that I was in Vietnam in
January--actually just preceding Ms. Taft--and had a number of
meetings at all levels. I raised the issue of emigration
significantly.
What I found, and I think Ambassador Peterson has found, is
that there sometimes is a disconnect between policy and
implementation--and it is not unusual in Washington to have a
disconnect between policy and what happens in many of our
States.
I am confident that at the highest levels there is an
understanding of the need to move, as there was on the ROVR
program. When we raised the ROVR program with them, there was a
response. Cases were acted on, and we began to really move to
the interviews.
In fact, the greatest backlog now is in our ability to
interview people quickly. The Vietnamese have now located many
thousands of people for interviews, and we are sort of running
behind on the interview process.
I am confident that for the Montagnard issue, likewise,
this kind of focus will help to bring about a greater
commitment to reaching out and finding those folks to whom we
need to be helpful. I am confident that Ambassador Peterson,
who also feels this very strongly, is prepared to bring up any
individual cases, any individual names, to help press those and
guarantee that we continue to move forward.
But I know that the policy at the upper level has changed
and is committed to trying to facilitate the process. It is
often at the local level where, in fact, there are sometimes
some distinct differences of both opinion and ideology, even in
this evolution that is taking place in Vietnam. As a result it
is harder to have follow-through at all times.
I think Secretary Roth would agree that Vietnam has
increasingly been forthcoming when we have been able to point
to it.
But I also would say to my colleagues that it is very, very
important to place this in the larger context of a lot of other
issues that we are now cooperating on with Vietnam, including,
I might add, the larger interests we have in terms of regional
security with respect to China, the problems in Cambodia, and
the problems in Burma.
So I think when you balance it, there is a good opportunity
here to continue to make progress, Mr. Chairman; and I am
confident that this hearing is going to be able to help us do
that. I thank you for that.
The Chairman. I thank the Senator.
Mr. Roth, before we begin, there is another little matter
of common interest between you and me.
There are the despicable procedures in China where they
take political prisoners out of jail cells having weeks before
or months before determined about various organs and their
usefulness to various customers having $40,000 in U.S. money
and so forth. They are taking them out, shooting them, and
selling their organs to people in this country and in countries
all over the world.
Now you and I have discussed this. We have corresponded
about it. I just hope you will say for the record that you
intend to press on to bring an end to this despicable practice
by the Chinese.
Mr. Roth. You bet. In fact, I was going to inform you after
the hearing, but I can do it during the hearing, that, as a
followup to our last conversation, one of my deputies, Deputy
Assistant Secretary Susan Shirk is in China today. I received a
message about an hour prior to this hearing that she and our
China Director had raised this with their Chinese counterparts.
Again, our concerns were based upon the last arrests in New
York in this case and saying that we need more information,
that we simply cannot accept a flat denial, that they have to
investigate this matter and that we have to make more progress.
So we are pushing the Chinese on this issue. I cannot tell
you that we have achieved a breakthrough yet in terms of
behavior, but we are investigating every report and we are
being diligent.
The Chairman. I hope you will do everything possible to
make clear to the American people that this practice is going
on and that it is undeniable. They deny it is going on, but, of
course, it is. You know it and I know it. I hope that we can
work together, making clear that at least the American people
know what is going on in that respect.
Now, then, I have one question. Why did you not seek full
compliance with Jackson-Vanik for Vietnam instead of waiving
the amendment's requirement of free emigration?
Mr. Roth. One of the provisions in the Jackson-Vanik
legislation is that the waiver authority can be used if it is
believed that it will promote the objective of freer
emigration. Based upon the pattern of Vietnamese behavior to
date, the 480,000 people that have gotten out under the ODP
program plus some of the other steps that Assistant Secretary
Taft provided is real reason to believe--not just pie in the
sky hope but real reason to believe--that moving forward with
the Jackson-Vanik waiver and some of the additional programs
will increase our chances for making progress with the
Vietnamese on the remaining issues, which include the exit
permits under the ROVR program and the issues on the Montagnard
exit permits as well as the domestic conditions for them.
So this is a judgment call but based upon the criteria in
the legislation itself.
The Chairman. I'll tell you what, I will end my questioning
about it. Let's agree that you and I both will contact Pete
Peterson to let him know about the substance of this hearing
and also that we contact the Vietnamese Ambassador to the
United States.
He is a very pleasant man. But he has not done anything.
Now I understand that it is difficult for an ambassador to tell
his president what to do, but I hope he will try.
I believe I will not ask another question at the moment.
Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. I just have one quick question, though not
so much on this, Mr. Secretary.
Until a year or so ago, there were a fair amount of
tensions between China and Vietnam and, indeed, in the region.
Now there appear to be much more significant overtures of
cooperation with respect to the Spratleys, with respect to
China's involvement in Cambodia with Hun Sen, with respect to
Burma also, where there is a significant presence.
Does that suggest anything to you about American presence
and influence in the region and perhaps other interests we may
have?
You might just share a thought or two on that at this
moment.
Mr. Roth. First, let me say on the narrow issue of China--
Vietnam relations, it is kind of a roller coaster. It goes up
and down. They have several sets of negotiations. They make
more progress on some than others. They are not doing
particularly well in trying to define the maritime dispute. I
would say, as far as I recall, they have made zero progress.
They have done better on their land dispute and their overall
atmosphere is better.
But this has the potential to revert at any point to a
situation of tension, particularly as they do drilling, as both
of them proceed with drilling efforts or exploration in the
South China Sea. So I would not want to over-state it.
On your bigger point, I think what it suggests is that the
United States cannot afford to be complacent about our
relationships in Southeast Asia or, indeed, in all of Asia;
that there are other influences out there. China is a rising
power, has increasingly active diplomacy in the areas your
pointed out, but in other areas as well. It is the largest
donor of food on the Korean Peninsula. It has had some
increasing role to play in some of the ASEAN institutions. It
has participated in the Thai bailout package. So we are seeing
a larger Chinese role.
All of this suggests to me that we need a vigorous American
role as well, that we need not to abandon the field to anyone,
and that applies on the economic front, the diplomatic front,
and the political front.
Senator Kerry. Could you share something with us? When I
went over there, I was significantly concerned, as I think a
number of us were, about the potential for a kind of
retrenchment, maybe a step backward in Vietnam because there
was a change of leadership taking place.
We have now had a few months to evaluate that. During the
time I was there, I voiced very significant concerns with the
Prime Minister and others about the need to move more rapidly
and forcefully with respect to economic reforms, and
particularly to try to bring to closure some of the
negotiations on specific projects and to embrace more of the
market system. They were talking about it, but there was a
seeming hesitancy at the time.
The prime minister at that time, the new prime minister and
the new deputy prime minister, who is also the foreign
minister, strongly stated that they are deeply committed to
proceeding faster with the reforms and, indeed, during the week
I was there, they articulated a much stronger, broader,
national policy. They actually brought in people from the
provinces and basically said this is the way we are going to do
it and this is how you have to move more adroitly to implement
some of these reforms.
I think they termed it the one door/one key policy or
something to that effect.
Can you share with us whether or not that progress
continues, whether or not it is your judgment that they are
moving down that road? Or have you drawn any other kinds of
conclusions about where the leadership may be moving in these
early months?
Mr. Roth. First let me say that I think the administration
has gone through exactly the same thinking process that you
did; that, you know, in looking at the leadership, there was
some concern that this might perhaps be a more conservative
leadership, less committed to economic reforms or some of the
other steps Vietnam has taken recently to reenter Southeast
Asia, as it were.
The rhetoric coming out of the initial few months has been
much better than we had feared. In Vietnam, all three leaders
seem committed to the reform programs of their predecessors on
the economic side and seem committed to ASEAN as well.
I guess the real issue is results. Are they going to be
successful in hammering through reforms? I think here it is
fair to point out that they are taking power at an unfortunate
time in the sense that the ``Asian flu,'' as it has come to be
known, has some impact on Vietnam as well. The willingness of
some people, of markets, to invest in many countries in
Southeast Asia is less now than before, and the fact that
Vietnam had some specific problems relating to inefficiencies
and corruption has made it more difficult and we are seeing
less foreign investment going in now than in previous years.
Some of the American companies--and you have met with their
representatives--have been discouraged about the pace of
events. So they are laboring under difficult circumstances now
to try to turn around the economy and resume the higher rate of
progress from the past.
I have not seen any recent reporting on specific results.
But what I would like to do is to get you a detailed answer for
the record to see if there are any specific implementation
steps that we can cite for you.
[The information referred to follows:]
The new leadership, headed by Party General Secretary Le
Kha Phieu, Prime Minister Phan Van Khai and President Tran Duc
Luong and operating by consensus as is Vietnamese custom, has
publicly voiced its commitment to economic reform. Vietnam has
recently taken positive measures, moving quickly to issue a
number of decrees. The Asian financial crisis, which is
beginning to negatively affect Vietnamese exports and forcing
investment inflows, has helped focus the new leadership on the
importance of a continuing commitment to economic reform.
However, the reforms and the rhetoric surrounding their
implementation suggest that the internal dispute over the
extent and pace of reform continues.
In general, recently announced changes are positive.
However, they focus on making more effective the country's
extensive system of administrative controls and procedures
rather than their elimination, demonstrating that the
Vietnamese government has yet to embrace a completely market-
oriented reform program.
The recently announced measures, many of which have not yet
been implemented, include reforms to the trade and foreign
investment regimes and the financial system. A number of the
reforms represent important steps such as the gradual
elimination of many export and import quotas; streamlining
investment procedures; elimination of some import bans;
expediting the processing of trade documents; and protection of
established foreign investments from the negative effects of
legal and regulatory changes. Many of the measures provide
incentives, such as tax breaks and favorable access to credit,
aimed at increasing exports from or foreign investment in
targeted sectors. Other reforms are inconsistent with a market-
oriented reform process. These include: the imposition of
foreign exchange controls; increase import controls; the
suspension of new banking licenses; and the monitoring of
enterprises with foreign investment to ``ensure thriftiness.''
Economic experts, including International Monetary Fund
staff, have warned that the reforms thus far undertaken by the
Vietnamese government do not go far enough. They warn that an
economic crisis will result from structural problems in the
Vietnamese economy and the spill over effects of the Asian
financial crisis if Vietnam does not immediately undertake
fundamental reforms including privatization of state
enterprises, financial sector reform, adoption of a flexible
exchange rate system and trade liberalization. It remains to be
seen if the current leadership is willing or able to reach
consensus on such a far-reaching program of structural economic
reform.
The U.S. Government is engaged in a dialogue with the
Vietnamese government to impress upon it the importance of
continued market-oriented economic reform. This dialogue is
supported by concrete action. The Agency for International
Development has initiated a Commercial Law Development Program
to help Vietnam draft laws and regulations consistent with an
open economy. We are also negotiating a bilateral trade
agreement, without which Vietnam cannot obtain Most Favored
Nation (MFN) trade treatment, that will embody market
principals and promote greater integration of Vietnam in the
world economy.
Mr. Roth. Let me also say for the record, Mr. Chairman,
that I agree to your proposal to call Pete Peterson and the
Vietnamese Ambassador and will do so today.
The Chairman. Very good.
This is interesting. Let me say to the young people who are
visitors here this morning, we encourage you to come. The media
cannot cover every detail and this is one in particular that I
wanted to be covered because of its impact on North Carolina
and because of the feelings that I have, and that I think most
people have, about the mistreatment of these people.
But I would say to the young people that our two witnesses
now are Hon. Stanley O. Roth, who is Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and the better
looking one of the two is Hon. Julia V. Taft, Assistant
Secretary of State for Population, Refugees and Migration.
I say to you young people again that we are glad to have
you. You may want to ask some of us a question after this
hearing is over.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Again, thanks to both of you for coming up this morning and
offering your thoughts.
Secretary Taft, what in your estimation is the Montagnard
population now in Vietnam?
Ms. Taft. I am not sure exactly what the overall Montagnard
population is, probably just several thousand. The ones that we
are hoping to be able to reach in our program are about 900 of
those.
Senator Hagel. So we don't know, generally, how many
Montagnard people there are left in the central highlands or in
Vietnam?
Ms. Taft. I don't know. We could submit that for the
record. I know that there are 54 ethnic groups. This is one of
the smaller ethnic groups that does remain. It is in the
central highlands, a quite remote area, which is particularly
disturbing because they do not have access to so many of the
other benefits that even the citizens of the rest of the
country have.
So it is their remoteness, their small number. They are a
minority; they have not really been able to integrate well; and
the ones that we are considering for the U.S. program are ones
who had a pre-1975 experience with us. In other words, they
were trained with our military, they fought with us--plus their
direct relatives and those who had been in reeducation camps
for 3 years or more.
So the 900 is not the total. But those are the most
vulnerable that we have been able to identify.
[The information referred to follows:]
Available information indicates there are 800,000 to
1,000,000 people in Vietnam who are collectively referred to as
Montagnards, from the French word for mountain people.
Senator Hagel. How do we treat their children? Do they
qualify?
Ms. Taft. Yes, sir. Yes, they do.
Senator Hagel. What about the Montagnard population in
Laos? Do we have any idea what the numbers are there?
Ms. Taft. I am not aware of any. There are some lowland Lao
and some Hmong still in Thailand. But I am not aware of any
Montagnards still in Thailand, certainly, that have come to our
attention for processing. And we have a pretty good network to
try to identify them. But I am not aware of any.
Stanley?
Mr. Roth. We have other ethnic problems in Laos, the Hmong
issue in particular, which is a major issue for us. But that is
a totally different situation.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Secretary Roth, you mentioned in your statement, as you
just did, Secretary Taft, other ethnic minorities. What are we
doing for the other ethnic minorities? What programs do they
qualify for to escape, if they choose to exit Vietnam?
Ms. Taft. Do you want me to take this?
Mr. Roth. Sure, go ahead.
Ms. Taft. First of all, we try not to have a situation
where people have to ``escape'' Vietnam. That is why with
Congressional consent we started the Orderly Departure Program
in Vietnam. It is one of the few countries in the world where
we actually process refugees in the country of origin.
Senator Hagel. Let me ask you this. Are we not still seeing
a situation where people are escaping because they cannot
qualify or comply with records? Everyone is happy and they are
able to leave if they want to leave?
Ms. Taft. Well, there are some people from the northern
part of Vietnam that still are boat people going to Vietnam.
But they are not really boat people fleeing persecution.
Senator Hagel. Going to or coming from?
Ms. Taft. I'm sorry. I meant going to Hong Kong.
What we are finding out of places like Haiphong is people
who are going to Hong Kong to try to work illegally and they go
back and forth. But there is no real exodus of people anymore
that we are aware of in Vietnam.
I think that this really speaks to the fact that there has
been an incredibly generous opportunity for people to resettle
in third countries. Ever since 1975, the U.S. has taken about
1.4 million Indochinese into our country from this area. So we
have an ongoing program. We have about, I would say, maybe
22,000 total that we are still looking at to come to the U.S.
in the various programs that we have--the Amerasian program,
the ROVR program, and our reeducation camp detainees.
So we are almost at the end of the major group processing.
There has been a question that a number of Montagnards and
advocates and other groups have asked which is: ``What happens
when we complete all of these smaller processing programs. Does
that mean we are closing down?''
I would like to say for the record now that my intention is
to advocate that we not do that, that we always hold open the
opportunity for individual cases of compelling humanitarian
need. We ought to be able to rescue those people and bring
those people into the United States for many years to come--but
not the kind of group eligibility that we are currently
processing right now.
We hope that those cases will be processed by the end of
this fiscal year and then regularize the immigration program.
This speaks to the Jackson-Vanik issue.
We think Vietnam very much wants to regularize the
emigration program and as soon as we finish the special refugee
designations, we think that it will get on a solid processing
track for immigration. We will begin our consular services.
That is the long-term view of how we will see the
emigration program evolving with the Government of Vietnam,
where people can be in the immigrant stream just like
immigrants from other nations who come to our country every
year.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Secretary Roth, would you like to add anything specifically
on the other ethnic minorities?
Mr. Roth. What I would like to suggest, since I do not have
any personal knowledge of 53 other ethnic groups, is that I get
you an answer from our embassy and submit it for the record.
I would merely note the obvious point that not all of these
groups, I would suspect not most of them, were involved in the
same type of resistance activities as the Montagnards. So their
case is probably significantly different.
But, rather than guess, why don't we get you a factual
answer for the record.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
We are not aware of any minority other than the various
ethnic groups referred to as Montagnards that have encountered
difficulty as a group in emigrating to the U.S. from Vietnam.
However, the Orderly Departure Program (ODP), which
processes Vietnamese emigration, does not break out statistics
on ODP applicants by ethnic group, with the exception of
Montagnards.
Vietnam's largest minority, the ethnic Chinese, who
suffered from anti-Chinese policies pursued by the Government
of Vietnam in the years immediately following the Vietnam War,
has comprised a substantial portion of applicants who have
successfully emigrated to the U.S. under ODP. Ethnic Chinese
continue to apply successfully for emigration to the U.S.
through the ODP program.
Our objective remains to ensure that all ODP and ROVR
applicants, who are not otherwise ineligible, are able to apply
without hindrance. When we encounter any case where we have
reason to believe that has not been true we have pursued the
issue vigorously with the Vietnamese government, and we will
continue to do so.
Senator Hagel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The testimony has been very interesting. I
have several more questions, but I believe I am going to submit
them in writing so that we can get to the next panel. But
before I do that, reference was made to all the progress that
has been made. That was made, was it not, without the benefit
of trade? Am I wrong or right about that?
Ms. Taft. Yes, sir. There have been negotiations for years
for the processing of refugees.
The Chairman. But the progress was made before the trade
benefits were authorized and approved by the United States, is
that not right?
Mr. Roth. We have not provided trade benefits yet, as you
know. We do not have a whole series of normal trade programs.
The Chairman. Yes, that is my point. If all of this
progress has been made before the decision is made to extend
trade benefits to them, how will trade benefits help them do
the right thing?
Mr. Roth. There is a concern that Ambassador Peterson has
had, which I share and many others share, that one can go
backward; that it is entirely possible that they can, for
example, not cooperate on the ROVR program or not cooperate on
access to the Montagnard areas, or not cooperate on a range of
other issues. What we are trying to do is to come up with a
strategy that maximizes the pace. We want to increase the pace
of the progress rather than have this incremental step where we
pull progress out slowly over a period of 20 years, which has
been the history in the refugee progress, and see if we can
speed things up and diversify progress in more areas across the
board.
The feeling is that with Jackson-Vanik and, hopefully, with
the provision of some of these trade benefits, we will increase
Vietnamese cooperation.
The Chairman. But they are thumbing their noses at us,
really.
Am I correct in my understanding that Pete Peterson cannot
even go up into this area? Is he not restricted from going
there?
Mr. Roth. I don't know that any Americans have gone, but I
will inquire as to any specific limitations on him.
The Chairman. Well, my information is very clear. How about
confirming it? I know, of course, what the answer is.
Mr. Roth. OK.
The Chairman. Anyway, I participated in making it possible
for their Ambassador to go to several points in North Carolina,
along with other Ambassadors of the ASEAN Nations. And here his
country won't even let our Ambassador go up there.
Ms. Taft. Excuse me, sir. We ought to check up on this, the
number of Americans who can go and what the Ambassador can do.
The Chairman. I hope you will. I think you will find that I
am right.
Ms. Taft. OK.
The Chairman. I will be glad for you to find out this
morning and come back and I will put you back on the witness
stand if I am wrong about it.
Ms. Taft. You are seldom wrong about anything, sir. So I
think you are right. [General laughter]
Ms. Taft. We will find out about that.
[The information referred to follows:]
USG personnel have regular and unencumbered access to every
area of Vietnam where Montagnards live, except for sensitive
military zones. Teams of personnel from Joint Task Force-Full
Accounting work constantly in every province of Vietnam,
including mountainous provinces and in areas of high
concentrations of Montagnards. Ambassador Peterson travelled to
the Central Highlands in September, 1997. Several Embassy
officers have travelled frequently through the northern and
central highlands on private trips without incident. Most
recently, officers from the Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh
City travelled there in late March and met with Montagnards.
While encountering deep-seated poverty and a high degree of
control by Vietnamese authorities, officers did not see
indications of serious repression. Although traveling in a
large group of consular officials, the officers were able to
speak privately with Vietnamese-speaking Montagnards.
The Chairman. Fine.
Ms. Taft. One of the points I also want to say, which
relates to the Vietnamese Ambassador, is this. Before I went in
January, I brought him in to discuss with him the deliverables
that I expected. This is because it is a long trip out there
and I wanted to make sure that the Vietnamese understood that
we wanted to see real progress on ROVR. When I got there, I was
overwhelmed with the detail in which they were able to address
every question that I had.
Now I did not get unanimous support on every request, but
they had paid attention, they had tried to be responsive. The
pressure was certainly on for them to deliver some real
commitments and we are seeing progress.
I just spoke with the Ambassador again a couple of weeks
ago. I think he is trying very hard.
What I think we will be able to do, because we have already
now been processing about 2,000 cases a month, is I hope by the
time of June, when you will be reviewing the Jackson-Vanik
waiver, we will show real benchmarks of achievement. It is part
of the pressure for them to continue support on the emigration
issue that has brought forth the kind of progress that we have
been able to see.
The Chairman. Young lady, I hope it works.
I thank both of you for coming this morning. You have been
excellent witnesses.
Ms. Taft. Thank you.
Mr. Roth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. We will now move to the second panel. It will
consist of Mr. John F. Sommer, Jr., who is Executive Director
of the American Legion in Washington; Dr. Nguyen Dinh Thang,
Executive Director of the Boat People S.O.S., of Fairfax,
Virginia; Mr. Rong Nay, Assistant Director of the Montagnard
Foundation, Montagnard Human Rights Group, Cary, North
Carolina; and Mr. Y Hin Nie, President, Montagnard Dega
Association, Incorporated, of Greensboro, North Carolina.
I welcome all four of you and particularly my fellow
Tarheels.
Mr. Sommer, they list you first and they have you sitting
at the right of the table. So, being a right winger, I will
call on you first.
STATEMENT OF JOHN F. SOMMER, JR., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AMERICAN
LEGION, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Sommer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to say on
behalf of the American Legion that I appreciate having been
invited to discuss the Montagnards historical relationship with
the United States, my personal account of serving with the
Montagnards, and some of the difficulties they and other
Vietnamese citizens are experiencing in light of Vietnam's
noncompliance with free emigration. I have also taken the
liberty of discussing some closely related issues of
significant importance to the American Legion in our full text.
In the interest of time, I would just like to mention that
we do have a substantial amount of information in the full
statement relating to the United States' history with the
Montagnards as well as the development of the Civilian
Irregular Defense Group, or CIDG, program, which,
unfortunately, time will not permit my getting into during this
hearing.
However, today, as has been true for the past quarter
century, stories abound from former Special Forces soldiers,
Special Operations troops, and assorted veterans who served
with Montagnards and other minorities regarding the loyalty,
dedication, heroism and friendship exhibited by these
indigenous fighters during the war. It is sad to say that many
of the Montagnards held out some degree of hope at the time of
the total U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam in 1975, that
their American allies would be returning to the Highlands to
rejoin them. That was not to be.
However, today, veterans among organizations such as the
Special Forces Association, the American Legion, and others are
actively involved in trying to provide humanitarian assistance
to those courageous individuals with whom they served.
My personal experiences with the Montagnards in 1968 while
serving in the Fourth Infantry Division were all positive. I
developed an affinity and a respect for the people. I continue
to have a personal interest in the wellbeing of our former
allies and their families.
The plight of the Montagnards today remains most
unfortunate. Considerable resources in the form of humanitarian
assistance are poured into Vietnam each year by American NGO's,
but few, if any, of the programs are permitted by the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam Government to provide aid to the
Montagnards in the Central Highlands despite the horrendous
conditions of poverty and hopelessness that exist among the
tribal people.
An example is the Vietnam Highlands Assistance Project
which was developed by Lutheran Family Services in 1989. During
the nine years of its existence, the project has been allowed
access to the Central Highlands only once, although project
officials have continuously urged the Vietnam Peoples' Aid
Coordination Committee to allow NGO humanitarian access to the
Central Highlands.
The lack of humanitarian assistance is not the only problem
facing the Montagnards. We have seen and heard numerous
reports, both anecdotal and official, of the strife that has
beset Montagnards as well as ethnic Vietnamese citizens who
have attempted to emigrate from Vietnam. There are instances of
having to pay province officials exorbitant fees for exit
permits and in some cases bribes to other SRV officials in
their mostly futile attempts to negotiate the emigration
process.
Other issues reported include intimidation by SRV officials
who have been given such sensitive responsibilities as
commenting on the authenticity of documents or testimony
provided by refugee applicants during the interview process.
There are two especially compelling reports cited in the
full text of my statement. The first is a recent report
prepared by the Chief Counsel of the House International
Relations Subcommittee on International Operations and Human
Rights regarding his December 1997 trip to Vietnam. The second
is the State Department's own Human Rights Report on Vietnam
for 1997.
The former report states in part, and I quote, ``The
Montagnard population, many of whose members have particularly
strong ties to the United States and particularly compelling
refugee claims, continues to face problems that are even worse
than those of most other Vietnamese of humanitarian interest to
the United States. Because of their remote location and their
alienation from the mainstream of Vietnamese society, they are
particularly vulnerable to all of the abuses listed above. They
have even less access to information than other residents of
Vietnam and are even more helpless in the face of official
corruption. For instance, some Montagnard refugees resettled in
the United States have been forced by corrupt local officials
to leave family members behind and substitute nonfamily members
who then disappear upon arrival to the United States.''
In reference to the involvement of SRV staff, the same
report by the Chief Counsel of the House Subcommittee on
International Operations and Human Rights states in part, and I
quote, ``I was already familiar with what this can do to the
integrity of refugee programs. The presence of SRV officials at
the vast majority of UNHCR interviews with CPA returnees has
been an important factor in the derision with which the UNHCR's
zero persecution on return assurances have been greeted by
Vietnamese Americans, U.S. veterans groups, Ben Gilman, Chris
Smith, et all. Also, many applicants have written letters to
ODP stating that they were afraid to tell their stories in the
presence of government supplied interpreters and setting forth
the real story is an almost always unsuccessful effort to get a
denial reconsidered.''
Our full statement is replete with other examples of SRV's
onerous involvement in the emigration process, not only in ROVR
but also in the orderly departure program. Yet, in December
1997, the Clinton Administration announced that the President
was seriously considering waiving the requirements of the
Jackson-Vanik amendment for Vietnam.
It is obvious that Montagnards and other Vietnamese
citizens are not, by any stretch of the imagination, free to
leave Vietnam if they so wish. For the President to waive
Jackson-Vanik would be the same as closing the door forever on
the possibility that many of these deserving individuals could
ever be resettled outside of Vietnam.
In addition to Jackson-Vanik, 19 U.S.C. 2433 provides
authority for the President to withhold nondiscriminatory trade
treatment to countries based on cooperation with our efforts to
account for American military and civilian POW's and MIA's in
Southeast Asia.
It is contingent upon cooperation to achieve a complete
accounting of the POW's and MIA's to repatriate personnel who
are alive and to return the remains of those who are dead to
the United States. The SRV Government is not cooperating
anywhere near the extent to which it can. A degree of
cooperation is being offered in the joint field activities,
where our Joint Task Force Full Accounting and Vietnam's Office
of Seeking Missing Personnel are excavating crash sites and
other incidents.
Of course, the United States is paying Vietnam handsomely
for this assistance. It is the unilateral cooperation of the
central government that has not been forthcoming, and this is
detailed in our full statement.
The third concern is Vietnam's abysmal record on human
rights. In reviewing the State Department's Human Rights Report
for Vietnam for 1997, it is interesting to note the comments
that relate to one of the issues under consideration at this
hearing. Under ``Emigration and Repatriation,'' the following
is quoted:
Citizens must demonstrate eligibility to emigrate to
another country and show sponsorship abroad before the
government issues exit permits. Citizens' access to exit
permits was frequently constrained by factors outside the law.
Refugee and emigration visa applications to the Orderly
Departure Program sometimes encounter local officials who
arbitrarily delay or deny exit permits based on personal
animosities or the official's perception an applicant does not
meet program criteria or in order to extort a bribe.
There are some concerns that members of minority ethnic
groups, particularly nonethnic Vietnamese, such as the
Montagnards, may not have ready access to these programs. The
government denied exit permits for certain Montagnard
applicants for emigration.
As I said, that is from the State Department's own Human
Rights Report.
The American Legion has urged President Clinton in the
strongest possible terms to refrain from even proposing a
Jackson-Vanik waiver until such time that considerable
cooperation and improvements are advanced by the Government in
Vietnam in the three important areas that have been discussed
in this statement.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, we sincerely thank you for
scheduling today's hearing on these issues which rarely receive
the attention that they so justly deserve.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sommer appears in the
Appendix.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Sommer.
Please convey to your distinguished National Commander my
personal thanks and the thanks of many others for the interest
and support that the American Legion has given. I deeply
appreciate it.
Mr. Sommer. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Dr. Nguyen, I have the idea or the notion
that I may have mangled the pronunciation of your name. Would
you pronounce your name for me, please?
Dr. Nguyen. Yes. It is Thang Nguyen [Tong Win]. Please call
me Thang [Tong]. That will be easier for both of us.
The Chairman. Thank you and bless your heart. You may
proceed. Your full statement, prepared statement, will be
printed; and I am going to have the record printed for
distribution, because I think this is a matter of conscience
for this country, our country. You may proceed, sir.
STATEMENT OF DR. NGUYEN DINH THANG, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, BOAT
PEOPLE S.O.S., FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA
Dr. Nguyen. Thank you, sir.
First, I would like to express my deep appreciation to you,
Mr. Chairman, and the full committee for holding this very
important hearing to look into the realities with regard to
human rights conditions in Vietnam in general and particularly
the right to free emigration in the context of the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment.
I have been working on thousands of cases of refugees,
political prisoners, and victims of persecution in Vietnam over
the past 10 years. Just 3 months ago, I went to Vietnam, taking
part in a Congressional staff delegation, to look into those
issues, those very issues, in Vietnam. Therefore, I have come
to make this presentation based on my personal experiences.
The U.S. policy over the past few years has aggravated the
plight of victims of persecution in Vietnam, and at the same
time, unfortunately, has bolstered the government's repressive
grips on these victims.
In July, 1995, the administration normalized relations with
Vietnam with the promise that political liberalization and
improved human rights will follow. Well, things have not turned
out that way.
There are more religious leaders and dissidents today in
Vietnam in prison than 3 years ago. There is less freedom of
the press in Vietnam now than a decade ago. Secretaries Taft
and Roth did mention the very promising rhetoric from the
leadership, the new leadership, in Vietnam. However, the facts
are different.
There are very disturbing facts over the past few months.
For instance, immediately after the hard-line communists took
over the leadership of the party in December of last year,
there was a directive from the party to its rank and file
members working in foreign owned companies in Vietnam to form
party cells in those companies to infiltrate those foreign
owned companies.
Just last month, 3,000 agents from the Ministry of Interior
were sent under the disguise of priests and followers of the
Buddhist Church in its attempt to take virtual control of that
church in Vietnam. So I do not believe that things have changed
for the better over the past 3 months with the new leadership.
Also, the ongoing human rights dialog between the U.S. and
Vietnam has resulted in no concrete results so far.
In June, 1996, the administration endorsed a regional
policy that made it virtually impossible for victims of
persecution in Vietnam to escape from persecution. Those
already in first-asylum camps were repatriated en masse in
1996. Any escapees after that date to neighboring countries
will be automatically turned back to Vietnam and delivered back
into the hands of their persecutors in Vietnam.
With U.S. help, Vietnam has now joined the rank of the very
few countries in the whole world where victims of persecution
have no way out except through the official channels that are
totally under the control of the government, that is, of the
persecutors.
I would like to note that there is no program for victims
of persecution in general to get out of Vietnam if they do not
qualify under the Resettlement Opportunity for Vietnamese
Returnees, or ROVR program, or the Orderly Departure Program.
The administration is now considering waiving Jackson-Vanik
for Vietnam. That is adding insult to injury because that means
giving away the last leverage that our government has on
Vietnam with regard to free emigration. It also means giving
away the last hope for many victims of persecution of ever
leaving Vietnam.
The State Department has quoted many statistics to justify
the waiver. Well, those statistics are misleading and are out
of context.
For instance, they obscure the fact that Vietnam is now in
a Kafkaesque situation that the U.S. policy has helped to
create, which is that victims of persecution must get approval
from their persecutors in order to escape from persecution.
I would like to put on the record that there have been a
number of returnees who have again escaped to neighboring
countries who are now in hiding in Thailand, in Cambodia, or
even in Hong Kong. There is one case that I know very well and
have worked on. The victim, a Hoa Hao Buddhist, now in hiding
in Cambodia, has been required by the U.S. embassy in Phnom
Penh to return to Vietnam so as to apply through the official
channels at his own risk.
There is another case that I also have worked on for many
years. This is the case of Mr. Lam A Lu, a Montagnard, an
Evangelist, and an FULRO member who had fought alongside a Mr.
Y-Hin Nie, one of today's witnesses, until he was ambushed and
wounded and captured by the communists. He later escaped from
prison and went to Hong Kong. Despite seven bullet wounds on
his body to attest to his claims of persecution and despite the
many verifications by his fellow Montagnards from North
Carolina, he had been denied refugee status by the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees on the ground that his story was not
believable. He was repatriated in 1996.
Since then, he has been hiding somewhere in Vietnam, too
scared to go home to register for a family registration which
is required if he wants to get access to an interview under the
ROVR program. By the way, he had signed up for the ROVR
program, but he could not get access to the interview. So this
man is in limbo.
These statistics also obscure the fact that Vietnam has
repeatedly reneged on its promised cooperation with ROVR and
has dragged its feet, causing an 18 month delay in the
implementation of the program. Actually, immediately after
President Clinton normalized relations with Vietnam, the
Vietnamese Government reneged on its promise on ROVR.
Six months after the date the State Department had
initially expected to wrap up the program, which was September,
1997, 4,000 names are yet to be cleared by Vietnam for
interview under that program.
These statistics also ignore the large number of very
compelling cases, often of special interest to the U.S., who
continue to be denied access to interviews or exit permits
under both ROVR and ODP. They include many Montagnard, members
of ethnic minorities--for instance, Nung and Chinese
minorities--former U.S. Government employees, veterans of U.S.
Special Forces, former political prisoners, religious leaders
in detention, spouses and children of American citizens, et
cetera.
These statistics also ignore the rampant and systematic
corruption at all levels in the Vietnamese Government. Many
applicants must pay from hundreds to thousands of dollars in
exchange for exit permission.
Mr. Chairman, you probably have heard many stories from
Montagnard in North Carolina whose families must have paid
thousands of dollars in order to get out of Vietnam.
Considering Vietnam's annual average income of only $300 per
family, very few victims of persecution can afford that kind of
money and, therefore, access to those programs. Such monetary
extortion clearly violates the Jackson-Vanik amendment.
Waiving Jackson-Vanik at this time means no light at the
end of the tunnel for these victims of persecution. It will
also dim the hope for improved human rights in Vietnam. Sure
enough, even the bravest dissidents will feel betrayed and
discouraged by a U.S. policy that clearly favors the oppressor
over the oppressed.
In order to avoid such a catastrophic consequence, I offer
the following recommendations.
First, the U.S. should demand that Vietnam satisfactorily
resolve all cases, ROVR and ODP, that are of interest to the
U.S. and particularly cases raised by Members of Congress as a
condition for the waiver.
Vietnam can easily resolve all those cases by tomorrow if
it wants to. There is no reason why it cannot. The Vietnamese
Government has total control over the country, so there is no
excuse here. And let us not accept just promises or promising
rhetoric. Let us demand concrete results, at least on those
cases, of course, especially those cases.
Second, even if Vietnam has satisfactorily demonstrated its
cooperation, the waiver should only be announced with a clear
message that it will be rescinded at the first sign of
Vietnam's change of heart. Vietnam has already broken too many
of its promises. We need to keep its feet to the fire
constantly.
Finally, I believe that it would help if the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee request an independent investigation by the
General Accounting Office into each and every single case of
interest to the U.S. who are still being denied exit permission
and into the corrupt practices of Vietnamese officials. Such an
investigation will add pressure on Vietnam and force it to
truly cooperate.
Our policy should now focus on these victims of persecution
for the very reason that our past policy has made it almost
impossible for them to ever escape from Vietnam.
These known cases of special interest to the U.S. should be
the litmus test of Vietnam's cooperation and of the success of
the ROVR and ODP programs, not the statistics often quoted out
of context by the State Department.
There is no reason whatever for the U.S. Government to give
away our last leverage in such haste, in such hurry, and, at
the same time, to ignore the plight of victims of persecution
which U.S. policy has only made worse.
In closing, I would like to ask your permission, Mr.
Chairman, to include a joint statement by 23 Vietnamese
American communities across the country and the Vietnamese
Interfaith Council in America as part of the official record of
this hearing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Nguyen and the additional
material to which he referred appear in the Appendix.]
The Chairman. You are quite welcome, sir, and thank you for
a fine statement.
I think we should emphasize at every point that these great
people are being persecuted because they stood with the United
States in a conflict. They are being persecuted because they
did not join in a communist effort to destroy our men and women
and our armed forces. Sir, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF RONG NAY, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, MONTAGNARD
FOUNDATION, MONTAGNARD HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP, CARY, NORTH CAROLINA
Mr. Rong. Good morning.
Honorable Senator Helms, ladies and gentlemen, my name is
Rong Nay. I am a member of the Human Rights Committee of the
Montagnard Foundation. I represent the Montagnard people living
both in the United States and the central highlands of Vietnam.
Today I am privileged to relate to you the violations of
human rights of the Montagnard in the central highlands.
Who are the Montagnards? We call ourselves the ``Dega,''
and the French call us the ``Montagnards.'' This is because we
live in the mountains, in the central highlands, of Vietnam.
The Vietnamese also call us ``Moi,'' or ``savages.''
We, the Montagnards, are indigenous people living in the
central highlands for over 2,000 years. The last 150 years, our
land was a target for imperialistic invasion. The Montagnards
could not demand or defend their freedom and there was a silent
cry from the Montagnard people which is now being heard.
We are today a voice for the voiceless, who speak for those
who are forbidden to speak. We stand for the rights of those
whose rights have been stripped away.
We, the survivors, living in the United States, strive to
uphold the human dignity of those living in the central
highlands whose voices remain silent and whose borders are
closed.
In the war between the French and the Vietminh in Vietnam
from 1945 to 1954, the Montagnard troops fought and died for
the French and the Vietnamese. During the U.S. Government
backing of the South Vietnamese Government from 1962 to 1972,
the Montagnard people, troops, had been trained and fought
alongside the American Special Forces.
The Montagnards became caught in the middle and were
victims of the wars. Both the North and South Vietnamese
Governments exterminated our people and occupied our land.
More than a million of the Montagnard people were killed
while 85 percent of the Montagnard villages have been destroyed
or abandoned.
After Hanoi occupied South Vietnam in 1975, all the
property of the Montagnard people had been confiscated. Our
basic freedom, politics, and religious activities are outlawed.
Our legal rights cease to exist under communist law. All the
Montagnard leaders and preachers have been arrested and jailed.
I was in a communist jail for 1 year. On January 16, 1976,
I was the first prisoner to escape into the jungle where I led
thousands of Montagnard resistance forces while thousands of
Montagnard people fled to the jungle. We fought against the
Hanoi Government's extermination of the Montagnard people.
After 12 years, we realized we could not survive and asked
to be refugees in the United States. We continue struggling
because the days of our independence are gone.
Today, our situation has become even worse. The Hanoi
Government brought 2 million Vietnamese from the North to
settle throughout the central highlands and forced the
Montagnards to leave their villages and go live in the
mountains where the land cannot grow anything.
Hanoi refuses to permit Montagnards to emigrate. My wife
and four children had permission withheld for 4 years because I
was involved with the Montagnard Resistance forces.
Because of the powerful pressure from the United States
Government--thank you, Senator Helms--my wife and four children
came to the United States on January 14, 1994.
I cannot return home because the Hanoi Government still
considers me as the enemy. Many Montagnards are qualified as
legal immigrants, but their exit visas were not allowed.
Correspondence from U.S. immigration officials does not reach
Montagnard villages because the police confiscated the paper.
The Montagnard have been blocked from international
humanitarian aid since the collapse of Saigon in 1975. In 1980,
the foreign NGO's were permitted in Vietnam for relief, but no
American or other foreign humanitarian aid was permitted to go
to the central highlands for the Montagnards. Lutheran Family
Services Highlands Assistance Project was only allowed one to
deliver aid directly to leprosy clinics and to Montagnard
villages. We desperately need the opportunity to develop.
We, the Montagnard people, stand up and strive for our
rights to live freely and peacefully such as the people of the
free world.
The U.S. Government has been normalizing diplomatic
relations with Vietnam. If the U.S. Government gives aid to
Hanoi, Vietnamese will never help the Montagnards. Hanoi is
currently using financial aid to clear thousands of acres of
jungle in the central highlands and speed up their program of
genocide of the Montagnard people.
With our humble tears, we ask the U.S. Government to help
us negotiate the following before granting Most Favored Nation
Status to Vietnam.
Number one is convince the Vietnamese Government of the
following: the rights of the Montagnard people to live in the
central highlands, stopping forced assimilation and stopping
the program of genocide; to permit land and property ownership
for the Montagnards in the central highlands; permitting the
Montagnards to live in their own villages with their own
culture, traditions, tribal courts of law, schools, churches,
and dispensaries.
Number two is freedom to receive exit visas and access to
the Orderly Departure Program.
Number three is access for humanitarian aid to reach the
central highlands.
Thank you so much, Senator Helms and others today for
giving us hope. The Montagnard people pray for your help. Thank
you.
The Chairman. You have it as best as I deliver it. I think
you know that.
Sir, you are the last but not the least. You may proceed,
sir.
STATEMENT OF Y HIN NIE, PRESIDENT, MONTAGNARD DEGA ASSOCIATION,
INCORPORATED, GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA
Mr. Nie. Good morning Hon. Senator Helms, ladies and
gentlemen. My name is Y Hin Nie. On behalf of the Montagnard
Dega Association, I want to thank Senator Helms for his help in
bringing about this hearing. Further, I want to thank the
members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the State
Department for their interest and assistance in the matter of
human rights and the plight of the Montagnard community in
Vietnam.
The Montagnard people believe in the trustworthiness of the
United States of America as the leader in democratic freedoms.
Particularly, we place our trust today in this hearing.
Since 1975, most of our people who immigrated to the United
States as refugees were combatants against the communist
tyranny in the aftermath of Vietnam's unification.
Allow me to sketch our role in the history of Vietnam and
the United States. I will then focus on the human rights
violations of religious persecution and restrictions on the
free emigration for our Montagnard people suffering in the
central highlands of Vietnam.
The Montagnard people were among those who suffered the
most from the Vietnam War. Our recent history is rooted in
events during and after the war. During the Vietnam War, many
of us were compatriots with U.S. Army groups.
On March 3, 1998, the History Channel profiled the Special
Forces' role in the Vietnam War prior to 1975. Retired Green
Berets who were interviewed there stated that the Montagnards
would sacrifice their lives to protect Americans' lives.
Our association with the Special Forces was evidence of the
Montagnards' status as traitors to the post-1975 Communist
Government of Vietnam. Consequently, restrictions were placed
on Montagnards and those who might wish to help.
The Government of Vietnam continues to restrict our people.
Nongovernmental organizations are not allowed access to the
central highlands, even organizations wanting only to help
leprosy victims, orphans, or those desperately ill Montagnards
with serious health problems.
Our people also cannot enjoy educational opportunities in
Vietnam or abroad. Montagnards who are eligible to join loved
ones in the United States have great difficulty obtaining their
exit visas. And our Christian believers struggle daily to hold
on to hope and their faith in the face of fear and persecution.
Our multicultural highlands people champion religious
integrity. Within our highlands community we have a strong and
growing Christian population of Evangelical Protestants and
Roman Catholics. About 200,000 Montagnard Christians have been
persecuted. Prior to 1975, the Americans and French brought the
news of Christ into the central highlands of Vietnam.
We, the Montagnard Christians, were growing and increasing
with approximately 180,000 fellowships. We were free to
practice our Christian church activities.
Unfortunately, after 1975, churches have been closed. The
authorities of Hanoi have used 80 percent of the churches for
storage, have used 15 percent of the church facilities for
government staff meetings, and have condemned 5 percent of the
churches.
Tragically, 50 percent of those who were pastors, priests,
and deacons are dead or are missing. Hanoi security tightly
controls the surviving 50 percent of the pastors.
Today, despite the government's interference and
restrictions, Christian numbers are increasing. God is making
miracles with his followers who do not stop going out to tell
the gospel of God. Sometimes the government security captures
them. On other occasions, security officers offer rewards of 1
million Vietnam dong for turning in the Christians.
Furthermore, security threatens to kill Christians or to
put them in jail for life if they continue to practice their
religion. Hanoi authorities always investigate Montagnard
believers. The authorities in Hanoi assert that Christians are
believers in an American religion and are involved with the
CIA.
Consequently, the authorities of Hanoi have persecuted,
tortured, and jailed 20 percent of the Christians. In short,
Montagnard Christians have been unable to practice their
religious beliefs.
Similarly, the Hanoi Government has denied exit visas for
spouses and children, as we know.
We want Vietnam to become a free, democratic, progressive
country where all citizens will be equally treated regardless
of race, religion, gender and ethnic background. We believe the
only way forward for our people is within a peaceful,
progressive, and united Vietnam, free of racism, territorial
conflict and religious intolerance.
When Vietnam has true equality for all its citizens, then
Montagnard families will have opportunity to emigrate just as
others depart from Vietnam. Many Montagnard had to wait year
after year to be reunited with loved ones. They are eligible to
emigrate from Vietnam, but they cannot obtain their exit visa.
Often, letters from the U.S. ODP officer never reach Montagnard
villages because local security destroys the information.
We feel so sad that our people are being punished because
we fought for freedom, because we fought side by side with our
American brothers.
The war is over. Families should be together.
Now is the time of healing and peace. Within the United
States, we increase in citizenship. In the future, we hope to
be able to support any projects that develop a peaceful,
progressive, multicultural path for our Montagnard people in
the highlands. We hope that the Hanoi authorities will allow
our people to develop and allow our highlands brothers and
sisters to practice their religion and preserve their culture.
If Hanoi authorities want full diplomatic normalization
with the United States of America, we suggest that the Hanoi
authorities allow freedom of emigration, freedom of religion,
access of humanitarian aid to reach the central highlands,
equal opportunity for our people, and to stop their persecution
of our tribal people for their former relationship with the
U.S. Army.
Today, on behalf of the Montagnard people, we would like
for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to note the
previously mentioned human rights violations of religion and
emigration. I ask you to report this issue to the President of
the United States. The Montagnard Christian churches look to
you to pray for them and to support these concerns.
By the grace of God, God will answer your prayers. We also
request that the committee bring this issue to the attention of
the Government of Vietnam so that Montagnards' rights may be
recognized and acted upon.
God bless you and the United States of America. Thank you,
Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
I have several questions that I am not even going to bother
to ask because you have answered them in your respective
statements.
I think it is clear that the persecution of your people is
the result of your having been anti-communist during the
confrontation in Vietnam. I think it is perfectly obvious that
there is still resentment because you stood with the United
States in that conflict and you stood with the thousands of
American soldiers who were sent halfway around the world to
fight a war they were not allowed to win.
So that is what we have. I guarantee you that, to the best
of my ability and the length of my cable tow--and I think you
understand what I am saying when I say that--I am going to
insist that you be restored of your rights.
So, I thank you.
Without objection, and I don't think I will hear any, we
will have the entire proceedings of this hearing printed for
adequate distribution for people who do not know what is going
on over there and who have no way of knowing because this has
been the least reported story of our time insofar as I know.
Now I have often said that the best speeches I have ever
made are the ones I make driving home after I made my speech.
It occurs to me, and I say this with every hearing over which I
preside, to ask does any of you have any further comment that
you might wish you had said earlier?
I will start with you, Mr. Sommer.
Mr. Sommer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One thing I think
needs to be said is that the U.S. Government especially has a
moral obligation to the Montagnard people.
In 1961, when we approached them to serve with us, they had
not been involved in the fray. But we recruited them, we
trained them, we armed them, and then in 1975, we left them
twisting in the wind. We certainly owe them not only our
deepest respect but we also have a moral obligation to do
everything that we can to try to be of assistance to them.
One thing that I failed to mention during my statement, and
if you have no objection, Mr. Chairman, is I would like to
enter into the record of the hearing a copy of the letter that
we wrote to President Clinton on February 2 from the American
Legion opposing the waiving of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.
The Chairman. Without objection, and there is none, it will
be made a part of the record.
Mr. Sommer. Thank you, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
February 2, 1998.
Honorable William Jefferson Clinton,
President of The United States,
The White House,
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW,
Washington, DC 20500,
Dear Mr. President:
The American Legion is extremely concerned at National Security
Advisor Samuel Berger's recent pronouncements that your Administration
is seriously considering waiving the requirements of the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment (19 U.S.C. 2432 (a)). It is our considered opinion that it is
premature to allow the Export-Import Bank to begin financing projects
ill Vietnam and likewise, to permit the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation to begin operations there. Obviously, these would be giant
steps toward the granting of Most Favored Nation status for the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
Jackson-Vanik renders communist governments ineligible for the
aforementioned economic concessions until their citizens are guaranteed
unfettered freedom of emigration. Tile American Legion can assure you
that this is not the case today in Vietnam. We have been actively
involved in the refugee situation, were vehemently opposed to the
forced repatriation of refugees from countries of first asylum absent
the opportunity to engage in a fair and equitable interview process,
and are cognizant that Vietnamese officials are not now abiding by the
provisions of the Resettlement Opportunities for Vietnamese Refugees
(ROVR) program. Of course, our primary concern in this regard is the
well being of these Vietnamese people who served along-side our
military personnel during the war, those who worked for the United
States government and their families. We have a moral obligation to
them.
Aside from the provisions of Jackson-Vanik, 19 U.S.C. 2433,
provides authority for the President to withhold nondiscriminatory
trade treatment to countries based on cooperation with our efforts to
account for American military and civilian POWs and MIAs in Southeast
Asia. It is contingent upon cooperation to achieve a complete
accounting of the POWs and MIAs, to repatriate such personnel who are
alive, and to return the remains of such personnel who are dead to the
United States.
The government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is not
cooperating anywhere near the extent to which it can. A degree of
cooperation is being offered in the conduct of the joint field
activities, where our Joint Task Force - Full Accounting and Vietnam's
Office on Seeking Missing Personnel are excavating crash sites and
other incident locations. Of course, the United States is paying
Vietnam handsomely for that assistance.
It is the unilateral cooperation by the central government that is
not forthcoming, nor has it been since you first took office in January
1993. In August 1993, a high ranking State Department official
specifically asked the Vietnamese government to turn over remains and
information relating to over eighty cases involving over ninety
individuals categorized as Last Known Alive and Special Remains Cases.
To the best of our knowledge, very little, if any, information that
correlates to those cases has been turned over by the SRV government.
National Commander Anthony O. Jordan and the undersigned met with
several high ranking Vietnamese government officials in December 1997,
and requested, among other things, increased unilateral cooperation in
helping to resolve those eases where the incidents took place in the
areas of Laos and Cambodia that were controlled by the Peoples Army of
Vietnam during the war. The American Legion and others, including
representatives of the Families, have formally requested this as well
as cooperation on issues of a similar nature for several years. We
continue to receive empty promises, but no substantial progress has
been forthcoming in any of these areas.
The third concern of The American Legion is Vietnam's abysmal
record on human rights. It is necessary to remain mindful that the
Vietnamese government continues to be a communist regime that actively
suppresses the human rights of its citizens. Unfortunately, despite the
lifting of the trade embargo and the normalization of diplomatic
relations, there has been 110 appreciable improvement. The only
apparent change is the diminished level of pressure that the US
government is placing on Vietnam to enhance its human rights practices.
The Vietnamese government continues to arrest and imprison political
and religious activists and hold them at will. Hanoi does not suffer
those who believe in freedom and democracy to espouse their feelings.
Mr. President, The American Legion urges you in the strongest
possible terms to refrain from proposing a Jackson-Vanik waiver until
such time that considerable cooperation and improvement are advanced by
the government of Vietnam in these three important areas.
Sincerely,
John F. Sommer, Jr.
Director
cc: Honorable Madeline K. Albright
Honorable William Cohen
Honorable Samuel Berger
The Chairman. Do you have a further comment you would like
to make, sir?
Dr. Nguyen. Yes, sir. I actually have three comments that I
have left out.
First, I fully agree with Secretary Taft and her comment
that Vietnam is only good at reacting to pressure. Therefore, I
think that we should maintain and sustain a pressure. Giving
away Jackson-Vanik at this time will only alleviate that
pressure. I don't see any reason why Vietnam should continue to
cooperate with our government in that regard once they got the
waiver.
There was also mention of the possible rescinding of that
waiver. But, as you very well know, once it is given out, it is
very hard to get it back.
The second comment is that Ms. Taft also mentioned the
number of 900 Montagnards being on the list of those waiting to
be interviewed. I think that figure has left out a lot of
others who do not even have access to the program.
As you may know, there are many political prisoners, former
political prisoners, dissidents who are now in exile in remote
areas or ethnic minorities, including Montagnard, who have been
living in the central highlands away from the big cities. They
do not have access to these programs because of the local
authorities' policy not to let them contact foreigners.
Actually, I know of several cases of returnees who are now
in detention in Vietnam. They have been told very explicitly
never, ever to contact foreigners, including ROVR and ODP
officials. So they have been left out of the list.
Finally, I would like to mention that late last year, I
went on a trip with Mr. Grover Joseph Rees, who is the Chief
Counsel of the House Subcommittee on International Operations
and Human Rights. During that trip, we met with several
dissidents in Vietnam. We asked every single one of them one
question, whether in its expansion of trade with Vietnam should
the U.S. Government expect that trade will bring along with it
democratic values, human rights, et cetera, or should we link
human rights with every step in our normalization of trade with
Vietnam.
To my surprise, at least, all of those dissidents,
including some active members of the Communist Party--all of
them--said you should, the U.S. should link human rights with
trade. No doubt about that. Otherwise, the U.S. Government will
only provide the Vietnamese Government, the Vietnamese
Communist Party with more resources, with more means to
suppress democracy.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Rong?
Mr. Rong. As for me, I, too, am concerned about the
possibility of a Montagnard interview before they can come to
the United States. A lot of the Montagnards are living in the
central highlands, far away from Saigon. They have no
transportation and they cannot drive over there.
Another problem is many correspondences from the Office of
Immigration over here does not reach the Montagnards' families
because the police confiscate it. They cannot get any
information. So many Montagnards do not interview.
The blame, they say, is theirs because they do not want to
go to the United States. But that is not true. It is because of
the problem that they don't know about their options.
We want to help the office organize a team to go to the
central highlands, go to Pleiku and Lam Dong, to interview
directly the Montagnard people. If things stay the same as
before, it is too difficult for the Montagnard to leave the
country.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Nie?
Mr. Nie. I am concerned about the Special Forces issue,
that is, if we have 50 persons of that here today in America,
might I ask you can we get Veterans benefits as the Hmong get
recognition by the USA? If that will be possible, it would be a
little bit of help for those 50 persons who live here in
America.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Again, I want to tell you that your testimony has been very
interesting, though in some respects depressing. But it is
something that ought to be known by the American people. I am
going to do my best to make sure that it is.
If there be no further business to come before the
committee, we stand in recess.
[Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., the committee recessed.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Prepared Statement of Hon. Stanley O. Roth
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have the opportunity to join
Assistant Secretary Taft in speaking today on the situation of the
Montagnard people in Vietnam. I would like to put the situation of the
Montagnards in the context of our broader relationship with Vietnam.
But first, I would like to emphasize to you the seriousness with which
we view the situation confronting Montagnards in Vietnam.
The sacrifices and suffering endured by thousands of Montagnards
who fought alongside Americans in Vietnam will never be forgotten in
this country. We recognize that the cost to the Montagnards of their
participation in the war was devastating and that it is something we
cannot and will not forget. We recognize, too, that living conditions
in the central highlands are much more severe than in other parts of
Vietnam and that Montagnards, in particular, have limited access to
necessities such as medical care and education.
We will continue to press the Vietnamese government to issue exit
permits to all Montagnards who are eligible to emigrate to the U.S.
through refugee programs such as QDP and ROVR and normal immigrant
visas. In that connection, let me underscore our conviction that
granting a Jackson-Vanik waiver in response to measurable progress on
the ground will promote the objectives of the Jackson-Vanik legislation
by leading to freer emigration from Vietnam.
Our efforts to move forward on Montagnard and other emigration
issues are part of a broad agenda with Vietnam. The first and most
important item on that agenda is obtaining an accounting of the missing
from the Vietnam War. We continue to receive excellent cooperation from
the Vietnamese government, which has permitted the normalization of
relations in other areas. Obtaining the fullest possible accounting for
POW/MIAs remains our highest priority in relations with Vietnam.
Normalization in other areas has not lessened the centrality of POW/MIA
accounting to the relationship, and every high level USG official to
visit Vietnam has stressed this point.
The presence of Ambassador Peterson, a former POW, in Hanoi is in
itself a symbol of the importance of the POW/MIA issue to Americans,
and his energy and commitment to the effort ensure that we will do our
best to continue to get results. Sustaining progress on POW/MIA
accounting will remain our highest priority objective in the future.
We have important national interests at play in Vietnam. We believe
it is in our interest to promote Vietnam's economic prosperity and
integration into the regional and international structures that enhance
regional stability and free trade. Among these are our dialogue on
human rights, and our growing cooperation on counter-narcotics.
Economic normalization, which we are working to advance, encompasses a
range of measures to promote trade and investment so that American
businessmen can take advantage of the considerable potential in this
dynamic and emerging market.
As with POW/MIA accounting, our contacts with Vietnam on migration
issues predate normalization. As Assistant Secretary Taft can explain,
certain minority groups such as the Montagnards have encountered
obstacles in emigrating from Vietnam. Nevertheless, Vietnam's record in
permitting free emigration has improved considerably since 1975. The
Orderly Departure Program (ODP) has been a solid success. Over 480,000
Vietnamese have emigrated to the U.S. through ODP. Many of these are of
special interest to the U.S., such as former detainees in reeducation
camps. Despite this progress to date, I would like to state
unequivocally that we will continue to press the Vietnamese government
to provide fair treatment to all who are eligible for emigration to the
U.S., including the Montagnards.
The question of free emigration is related closely, as you know, to
the waiver of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. Jackson-Vanik prohibits the
extension of certain U.S. economic benefits to countries that, among
other things, deny their citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate.
The statute authorizes the President to waive the Jackson-Vanik
requirements if doing so will lead to freer emigration from that
country.
We have recommended the President waive the Jackson-Vanik amendment
at this point because of significant improvements over the past year in
Vietnam's processing of exit permits for the Resettlement Opportunity
for Vietnamese Returnees (ROVR) cases. We will continue to monitor its
performance closely, using the prospect of renewal of the waiver to
press for further improvements in freedom of emigration. In this way,
the waiver will support the objectives of the Jackson-Vanik
legislation, promoting freedom of emigration from Vietnam.
A waiver of Jackson-Vanik is the next step in economic
normalization, a goal of both our countries However, a waiver of
Jackson-Vanik does not signal that we are ready to grant MFN status to
Vietnam. MFN will require completion of a bilateral trade agreement and
approval of the agreement by both houses of Congress.
A Jackson-Vanik waiver would, however, remove a key impediment to
extending export promotion and trade and investment support programs to
Vietnam, including the Export-Import Bank, Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC), USDA PL-480 and GSM export credit programs and
Maritime Administration Title XI programs. Without these programs, U.S.
companies are often at a disadvantage in competing with foreign firms
in the Vietnamese market.
Associated waivers of Foreign Assistance Act provisions are
prerequisites for most U.S. assistance to Vietnam. An exception is
humanitarian assistance to Vietnam, which has been provided for
prosthetics and rehabilitation services to war victims and to displaced
children and orphans. A broader U.S. assistance program, among other
things, will help the U.S influence Vietnam's progress toward an open
economy. It will focus largely on the transfer of knowledge to serve as
a catalyst for further structural and institutional change.
Human rights is an important component of our relationship with
Vietnam. We have made clear to Vietnamese leaders that progress in this
area will be necessary for our relationship to fully develop Although
there has been a modicum of improvement in the area of personal
freedoms, including reduced government interference in daily life,
Vietnam's overall human rights record has been poor. There have been
credible reports that local Vietnamese officials have denied ethnic
minorities, including the Montagnards, access to education, employment
and other services.
We have initiated a formal human rights dialogue in which we have
conveyed our concerns about human rights in both general and specific
human rights cases. Secretary Albright raised these issues prominently
with Vietnamese leaders during her visit last June to Vietnam. The
status of ethnic minorities and specifically Montagnards is a subject
we will continue to raise in the context of our human rights dialogue.
Vietnam has historical interests in the region, particularly in
relation to its neighbors in Cambodia, Laos, China and in the South
China Sea. Dialogue among the U.S., Vietnam and its neighbors can
contribute to the peaceful resolution of conflicting interests.
Vietnam's membership in ASEAN and APEC, its participation in the ASEAN
Regional Forum, and its growing ties to regional and world markets
exemplify the new constructive role that it is beginning to play. This
is a role that we should encourage. By developing bilateral ties as we
are doing, we can encourage Vietnam to behave responsibly in the region
and the world.
Let me conclude by saying that nothing is more important in our
relations with Vietnam than meeting our commitments--to the families of
our POW/MIAs and to those who served beside us. We will do everything
in our power to live up to these important responsibilities.
__________
Prepared Statement of Hon. Julia V. Taft
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I welcome this opportunity
to be here today to discuss with you our experiences with processing
Montagnards for admission to the United States. I look forward to your
questions because I believe it is only when our mutual concerns are on
the table that we can most effectively move forward together.
Montagnards
The Montagnards are ethnic minorities from the Central Highlands of
Vietnam. Many of the Montagnards fought with U.S. troops, including the
Special Forces, during the Vietnam conflict. At the end of the war,
some of the highlanders escaped SRV captivity and fled into the jungle
where they joined a Montagnard resistance movement known as ``FULRO,''
(FULRO stands for United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races)
and continued to fight the Vietnamese Communists. These resistance
activities continued until the early 1990's.
In 1985, a group of 201 Montagnards made their way to the Thai-
Cambodian border following ten years' of resistance activities based in
the jungles of Cambodia against the Vietnamese government. This group
was processed for admission to the United States as refugees and was
resettled in North Carolina in November 1986.
Eight years later, in September 1992, another 398 Montagnard
resistance fighters were discovered by United Nations Peacekeeping
forces in northeastern Cambodia. Because of security concerns in
Cambodia at the time, the group was quickly processed and moved to the
United States. This group was also resettled in North Carolina.
These Montagnards were resettled in North Carolina because of the
intense interest of North Carolina communities, led by Vietnam veterans
in the area, in resettling the Montagnards. Because of the outstanding
record of North Carolina and the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee
Service in refugee resettlement, the State Department agreed to this
concentrated approach to Montagnard resettlement. Since the U.S.
refugee resettlement program started, 16,225 refugees have resettled in
North Carolina, nearly 6,200 of whom are Vietnamese.
Orderly Departure Program (ODP)
During the late-1970's and early-1980's when large numbers of
people left Vietnam on boats, only a few Montagnards fled in this
manner. The majority of the more than 1,600 Montagnards who have been
admitted to the U.S. as refugees have been processed through the in-
country refugee processing program known as the Orderly Departure
Program (ODP). ODP was originally established in mid-1979, when the
international community, led by the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), sought a legal and safe means for people to
depart Vietnam without having to resort to unsafe, clandestine boat
departures. The United States and twenty-nine other countries
originally participated in the program. UNHCR's involvement ceased
during the early 1990's. Under ODP, Vietnamese are processed for
admission to the United States as refugees, Amerasian immigrants, or
immigrant visa beneficiaries.
Since late-1979 the program has considered applications from
persons who were imprisoned for substantial periods as a result of
their previous association with the U.S. or were otherwise closely
associated with U.S. policies and programs. Applications for family
reunification by spouses, children, parents, and siblings of residents
of the U.S. were also considered.
Currently, ODP is processing the remaining caseload of former re-
education camp detainees which includes Montagnard cases, qualified
ROVR (Resettlement Opportunity for Vietnamese Returnees) applicants,
some Amerasians, and current immigrant visa cases.
Since its inception, more than 600,000 Vietnamese have been
processed through the ODP. Of this number, some 486,000 Vietnamese have
been approved for admission to the U.S., including 230,949 who were
admitted as refugees.
Montagnard Processing Under ODP
Since 1985, when we began keeping records that identified
Montagnards specifically within the overall ODP population, our records
indicate that 2,504 Montagnards have been determined to be eligible for
consideration for admission to the U.S. as refugees. Of this number,
1,042 Montagnards were approved by INS for admission, 531 were denied
at the time of interview or found not qualified by INS, and 893 were
scheduled for interview but failed to appear. An additional 38 persons
are awaiting INS interview or final INS interview decisions.
Persons found not qualified for processing for the most part have
been those who did not qualify for the former reeducation camp
detainees program because their reed detention was not due to pre-1975
association with the U.S. or South Vietnamese governments.
Of particular concern to the United States are the 893 Montagnards
who have been scheduled for an INS interview but who have failed to
appear. Many of these applicants have informed us that this has been
due to their inability to secure exit permission, a requirement of the
Vietnamese government. This is a serious problem.
Also of great concern to us is the failure of Montagnard
beneficiaries of Immigrant Visa (IV) petitions to appear for interviews
with U.S. consular officers. ODP records indicate that 58 Montagnards
have current visa petitions on file but 30 have failed to attend
scheduled interviews, many citing their inability to obtain exit
permission from the SRV. The remaining individuals have not responded
to ODP inquiries about their situation. ODP will not terminate any
Montagnard IV cases if lack of an exit permit is the reason for not
pursuing the application.
While it is possible that some Montagnard refugee and immigrant
visa applicants fail to appear for their scheduled interviews due to
poor communications and transportation between the Central Highlands
and Ho Chi Minh City, we doubt that this is the primary reason. Rather,
it appears that the Vietnamese government has denied passports and exit
permits to the relatives of those Montagnards who are suspected of
involvement in anti-government activities, such as FULRO.
To highlight the importance of the lack of access for Montagnards
and other ODP processing issues, in January I traveled to Vietnam to
discuss with Vietnamese officials ways to complete the processing of
the remaining ODP cases. Since arriving in Hanoi in May 1997,
Ambassador Peterson has regularly called on the Ministers of Interior
and Foreign Affairs as well as other government officials to emphasize
the priority the United States Government places on this issue and to
urge the Vietnamese government to facilitate access to ODP for eligible
Montagnards and other Vietnamese applicants. Throughout the years of
ODP's existence, access to ODP for the Montagnards has been a standard
item on the ODP agenda at almost every official meeting with the SRV to
discuss ODP processing.
Last October, Vietnam announced that is was taking steps to
accelerate procedures to clear ROVR applicants for interview. These new
procedures have resulted in the clearance for interview of nearly
14,000 ROVR applicants during the past four months. During my
discussions in Hanoi, Vietnam agreed to further ROVR program
modifications to the departure clearance procedures for INS-approved
ROVR cases. The SRV has expressed the desire to successfully conclude
all extraordinary U.S. admissions programs so that we can move toward
establishment of a ``normal'' migration relationship consistent with
normalization of our overall bilateral relationship. We are hopeful
that the SRV will shortly agree to similar expedited processing
procedures for the Montagnards and other ODP programs.
I am pleased to note that, on February 26, the Vietnamese Ministry
of Foreign Affairs informed us that staff from the Ho Chi Minh City
Ministry of Interior office had already travelled to the Central
Highlands to interview some of the Montagnards on the ODP list and that
ODP would be able to interview them soon. That is good news, but I want
to assure you that we will not put this issue to rest until we are
granted access to all eligible Montagnard cases.
McCain Amendment
Of vital importance to the U.S. government is the completion of the
processing of the remaining reeducation detainees caseload in Vietnam,
the program that includes the Montagnard refugee cases. To complete
this processing, the Administration requests the support of the
Congress for a quick extension of the McCain Amendment which provides
for the admission of the single, over 21 year old children of former
reeducation camp detainees. This provision expired on September 30,
1997, but we believe it should be extended until March 31, 1999 in
order to permit the humane conclusion of the program.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, while we are seeing tangible progress, I want to
assure you that we will continue to stress the importance of these
issues in all of our dealings with the Vietnamese until all eligible
ODP cases, both refugee and immigrant visa applicants, are permitted to
attend their ODP interview. The Montagnards, have been and will
continue to be at the top of this agenda.
Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to express our
appreciation to this committee and to all in Congress who support our
mutual efforts to alleviate some of the world's pain by assisting
refugees.
That concludes my remarks. I will be happy to respond to your
questions.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to Assistant
Secretaries Roth and Taft
Responses to Questions Submitted by Chairman Helms
Assistant Secretaries Roth and Taft
Question. The Vietnamese Constitution says it provides for freedom
of worship. However, religious groups must obtain the government's
permission to hold meetings, build places of worship and operate
religious schools. If these groups do not obtain permission, they are
in violation of Vietnamese law and subject to arrest. In fact,
according to the 1997 State Department Human Rights Report on Vietnam,
``Non-governmental organizations abroad reported continued arrests and
government harassment'' of some Protestant ethnic groups. Has the
Administration raised the issue of religious persecution, in particular
with the Montagnards, in its meetings with the Vietnamese government?
Should the U.S. be focusing more on democracy in Vietnam as a solution
to problems in human rights as well as emigration?
Answer. We regularly raise the issue of religious freedom with the
Vietnamese government. During their separate visits to Vietnam last
year, Secretary Albright and Treasury Secretary Rubin both raised
religious freedom at the highest levels. Our Embassy in Hanoi
frequently discusses religious persecution, including specific cases of
detentions of religious workers, with Vietnamese authorities. Freedom
of religion is also a major theme of our regular bilateral human rights
dialogue.
We have long held that progress toward democratization will lead to
significant improvements in human rights. We therefore give great
attention to urging the Vietnamese government to allow greater freedom
of expression and a plurality of ideas. We also believe that our focus
on promoting the.rule of law in Vietnam will lead to much greater
respect for individual rights.
Assistant Secretary Roth
Question. Has Ambassador Peterson and U.S. Embassy staff been
restricted in their travels to Montagnard villages in the Central
Highlands in Vietnam? If not, when did Ambassador Peterson and U.S.
Embassy staff meet with Montagnards? Did they have an opportunity to
meet with Montagnards alone or were SRV officials present during these
visits?
Answer. USG personnel have regular and unencumbered access to every
area of Vietnam where Montagnards live, except for sensitive military
zones. Teams of personnel from Joint Task Force-Full Accounting work
constantly in every province of Vietnam, including mountainous
provinces and in areas of high concentrations of Montagnards.
Ambassador Peterson travelled to the Central Highlands in September,
1997. Several Embassy officers have travelled frequently through the
northern and central highlands on private trips without incident. Most
recently, officers from the Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City
travelled there in late March and met with Montagnards. While
encountering deep-seated poverty and a high degree of control by
Vietnamese authorities, officers did not see indications of serious
repression. Although traveling in a large group of consular officials,
the officers were able to speak privately with Vietnamese-speaking
Montagnards.
Question. According to the 1997 State Department Human Rights
Report on Vietnam, most Montagnards do not have access to departure
programs and the Vietnamese government denies certain Montagnards exit
permits necessary for emigration. Mr. Roth's testimony states ``the
waiver will support the objectives of the Jackson-Vanik legislation,
promoting freedom of emigration from Vietnam.'' Please explain how the
waiver will support freer emigration? Why did the Administration
proceed with extending trade benefits when Vietnam has not fully
complied with the free emigration requirements of Jackson-Vanik?
Answer. The majority of Vietnamese, including most Montagnards, do
not qualify for resettlement in the U.S. Vietnamese who were imprisoned
for substantial periods (usually three years or more) for previous
association with the U.S., or who were associated with U.S. policies
and programs, have access to the Orderly Departure Program (ODP) .
Family reunification comprises another category.
Since 1985, 2,504 Montagnards have been determined to be eligible
to emigrate to the U.S. as refugees. Of these, INS has approved 1,042
Montagnards for admission to the U.S., 531 were found to be not
qualified or were denied, and 893 were scheduled for interview but
failed to appear. An additional 38 persons are awaiting INS interview
or final INS decision.
We remain committed to obtaining exit permission from the
Vietnamese government for those who are eligible for our programs,
including Montagnards, and will continue to urge Vietnam to issue exit
permits to eligible applicants.
Vietnam has complied with the criteria for waiving the Jackson-
Vanik amendment by providing assurances that its emigration practices
will lead substantially to the achievement of the objectives of the
legislation, i.e. freer emigration, and by improving its emigration
practices over the years. Vietnam's record is not perfect; however, it
has liberalized its emigration policy considerably, by permitting the
emigration of over 480,00 Vietnamese from Vietnam to the U.S. under the
Orderly Departure Program (ODP) and implementing the Resettlement
Opportunity for Vietnamese Returnees (ROVR), beginning in 1997.
Granting a waiver of the Jackson-Vanik amendment to Vietnam will
support freer emigration by demonstrating to the Vietnamese government
that it can obtain tangible benefits by cooperating with us on
emigration issues. Vietnam dramatically improved its implementation of
the ROVR initiative as a direct result of our linkage of improved
performance on ROVR and granting a waiver of Jackson-Vanik. The
prospect of annual renewal of the Jackson-Vanik waiver will encourage
Vietnam to further liberalize its emigration policies.
Question. The Vietnamese government has restricted humanitarian aid
to the Montagnard population living in the central highlands. Lutheran
Family Services and other NGO's (nongovernmental organizations) are
prevented from carrying out medical, educational and development
programs targeted at the ethnic minority populations. Has the State
Department asked the Vietnamese government why assistance continues to
be restricted to the Montagnards in the highlands?
Answer. We have long been aware of the problems encountered by
Lutheran Family Services and other NGO's in establishing assistance
programs for the Montagnards in the central highlands. We have
discussed the problems with NGO's concerned, including Lutheran Family
Services. These problems apparently stem from long-standing Vietnamese
suspicions of the intentions of Americans wishing to work in the
central highlands.
The Charge, Deputy Chief of Mission and a political officer raised
the Lutheran Family Services case on several occasions in 1996 and 1997
with the Vietnamese agency responsible for oversight of most NGO's
working in Vietnam.
On each occasion, the leadership of that agency, the People's Aid
Coordinating Committee (PACCOM), agreed to look into the situation, but
to our knowledge the position of the Vietnamese government restricting
Lutheran Family Services from working in the highlands has not changed.
The Ambassador and Embassy, as well as visiting American officials,
will continue to raise this issue with Vietnamese authorities in order
to ensure that the agencies are able to continue their important work.
We note that some NGOs are carrying out projects in the Central
Highlands provinces of Kontum, Gia Lai and Lam Dong. There are projects
on health, gender, income generation, environment, water and
sanitation, institution building, education, community development,
forestry, disabilities, vocational training and agriculture. Among the
NGOs operating in Montagnard areas are Caritas Australia, Overseas
Service Bureau (Australia), Handicap Internati6nal (Belgium),
Netherlands Leprosy Relief Agency, Netherlands Vietnam Medical
Committee, International Development Association (South Korea), The
World Wildlife Fund (USA), Church of Nazarene International (USA),
HealthEd (USA), Cooperative Services International (USA), U.S.-
Indochina Reconciliation Project (USA), Institute of International
Education (USA), Population Council (USA), and Volunteers in Asia (USA)
Question. The Vietnamese government requires that Montagnards and
other refugees--participating in departure programs--obtain necessary
exit permits first, before they are eligible to be interviewed for
departure. Ms. Taft's written testimony states, ``many Montagnards have
been unable to secure exit permission from the Vietnamese government--
and that this is a serious problem.'' What steps will the
Administration take if exit permits continue to be withheld from
Montagnards and other eligible refugees? Would this for example affect
a future decision on granting Vietnam--Most Favored Nation status?
Answer. As Assistant Secretary Roth said in his testimony,
``nothing is more important in our relations with Vietnam than meeting
our commitments.'' We have repeatedly raised the question of exit
permits for Montagnards and other ODP applicants with Vietnamese
officials. Since his arrival last May, Ambassador Peterson has stressed
the importance of these issues in meetings with Foreign Minister Cam
and other senior Vietnamese officials.
We will continue to stress the importance of issuing exit permits
in our contacts with the Vietnamese and press the Vietnamese
government, both here and in Hanoi, to issue exit permits to all
Vietnamese, including Montagnards, whom we have found eligible for
emigration from Vietnam to the U.S.
Vietnam's implementation of its commitments on emigration matters
will be reviewed both when renewal of the waiver of the Jackson-Vanik
amendment comes up in June and at the point in the future when we
consider whether to grant MEN status to Vietnam.
Assistant Secretary Taft
Question. Many Montagnards--as well as members of other persecuted
groups, such as religious leaders and ethnic Chinese--have been barred
from access to U.S. resettlement programs. This problem is especially
bad for those who live in remote areas, or who have been exiled to such
areas. There are also many people whom we have already interviewed and
approved for admission to the U.S. but who have been denied exit
permission by Vietnam. Now that illegal escape is no longer possible--
because neighboring countries return escapees to Vietnam without giving
them a refugee interview--what has the U.S. government done to ensure
free and unhindered emigration for such cases?
Answer. The United States remains concerned that some 3,400 Orderly
Departure Program applicants have been unable to attend their ODP
interviews because Vietnamese authorities have not issued them an exit
permit. Throughout the years of ODP's existence, access to ODP for
eligible applicants has been a priority issue on the ODP agenda at
almost every official meeting with the SRV to discuss ODP progressing.
During my meetings with SRV officials in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City
in January, I raised this issue and stressed the importance the U.S.
places on access for these individuals. want to assure you that we will
not put this issue to rest until to all eligible ODP cases are granted
access to ODP interviews.
You expressed concern that Vietnamese can no longer seek asylum in
neighboring countries. Small numbers of Vietnamese continue to depart
Vietnam clandestinely. Vietnamese asylum seekers arriving in countries
in the region are treated in accordance with the national laws of the
receiving country and international practice, including the principle
of non-return of those found to have a well-founded fear persecution if
returned to their country of origin. Asylum seekers found to have a
well-founded fear are permitted to pursue resettlement in a third
country. Those found not to have a well-founded fear are returned to
Vietnam. This has been the practice in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong
since February 14, 1994. At the February 1994, meeting of the CPA
Steering Committee, CPA participants, including the United States,
approved these procedures for handling newly arrived Vietnamese asylum
seekers.
Question. At the official announcement of the ROVR program in April
1996, the State Department expected that processing of cases would
start in September 1996 and would conclude a year later. What has
caused the delay in the processing of ROVR cases? The Vietnamese
government has recently given us permission to interview several
thousand ROVR applicants. But some 4,000 cases submitted to the State
Department more than a year ago including some of the most compelling
political and religious cases--are still not cleared by Vietnam for
interview. What's holding back these 4,000 cases?
Answer. Though we had initially hoped to begin processing ROVR
cases in September 1996, it was not until January 1997 that we were
able to reach agreement with the SRV concerning the implementation of
the ROVR program. Based on the terms of this agreement, the U.S.
submitted lists of applicants and possible applicants to the Vietnamese
government. The Vietnamese government originally agreed to issue exit
permits to all those who expressed interest in pursuing a ROVR
interview and who also met general exit permit criteria under
Vietnamese law. Both sides agreed in January 1997 to seek a rate of
about 1,500 persons interviewed per month beginning in April, 1997, and
continuing to the end of the program. However, the Vietnamese
government was not able to process applicants for exit permission
quickly enough to reach this number, and interviews began very slowly.
Last October, Vietnam announced that it was taking steps to accelerate
procedures to clear ROVR applicants for interview. As of March 30,
these new procedures have resulted in the clearance for interview of
14,196 of the 18,400 currently eligible for consideration under the
program.
The first ROVR interviews began in Ho Chi Minh City at the ODP
office site at the beginning of April 1997, but involved only 52
people. After this initial group, the interview pace began slowly to
pick up. As of March 30, 1998 specially trained INS adjudicators have
interviewed some 5,603 ROVR applicants and approved for admission to
the U.S. 4,651. INS officers are now interviewing approximately 1,900
ROVR applicants each month. At this pace, we expect to complete ROVR
interviews in late-September or early-October 1998.
Concerning individuals that have not been cleared, as of March 30,
2,853 individuals eligible for consideration under ROVR have not yet
been cleared for interview. However, we expect that these individuals
will be cleared for interview in the near future. SRV officials have
informed us that another 1,330 individuals have not been cleared for
interview; the majority, 606, because the SRV has been unable to locate
the individuals due to address problems. We are confident that we will
be able to provide the SRV with new contact addresses.
Finally, 156 ROVR principal applicants have repeatedly refused to
meet with Ministry of Interior officials to process their cases for
interview clearance.
Question. As you know, many Montagnards and other politically
suspect Vietnamese have been denied ``household registration'' by
theCommunist authorities. Can people without family registrationget
access to U.S. refugee interviews?
Answer. Household registries are not required for an ODP interview.
However, household registries are normally required by local Vietnamese
authorities when individuals apply for exit permits. With the exception
of ROVR cases, the SRV requires that ODP applicants be issued exit
permits prior to their ODP interviews.
Question. Some applicants who have shown up for refugee interviews
have been turned away by Vietnamese-government employed receptionists
for lack of household registration, citizenship identity cards, or
other documents--even though they have appointments or letter of
invitation from the U.S. refugee program. What can applicants do in
such circumstances? What will the U.S. embassy in Vietnam do to help?
Answer. Steps have been taken to prevent the problems associated
with SRV staff at the Orderly Departure Program processing site in Ho
Chi Minh City (HCMC). The entire SRV work force was terminated by the
HCMC Foreign Affairs Office (FAO) in December 1997. Since January 1,
1998, all Vietnamese nationals working for ODP in HCMC--interpreters,
clerical, and other support staff--have been contract employees of the
USG through contracts issued by the Vietnamese government's contracting
agency. Use of this contracting agency is required by the SRV. This is
the same procedure that all foreign governments, companies, and other
organizations operating in Vietnam must follow in order to hire
Vietnamese nationals. Though the contracting agency is involved in
legally executing the contracts and ensuring that all appropriate SRV
taxes and fees are paid, the USG has complete control over the
selection, training, supervision, direction, and termination or
dismissal of these employees.
Since the implementation of the new employment practices, we are
not aware of any applicants experiencing difficulties in gaining access
to the ODP processing site. Persons who may have had difficulties in
the past should contact ODP, explain what happened and request that
their appointments be rescheduled.
Question. Vietnam has announced that ROVR applicants no longer need
exit permits for accessing ROVR interviews. This announcement is
welcome. Unfortunately, there is still a requirement that we receive
someone's name on a list from the SRV before we can interview that
person. This raises the unfortunate prospect that the same people who
were denied exit visas under the old procedures will now be excluded
from interviews by being kept off of the SRV interview lists. What does
the United States plan to do to ensure that we get access to these
compelling cases?
Answer. We are pleased with the new clearance procedures the SRV
initiated in early-October 1997. As of March 30, 1998 this change has
resulted in the clearance for interview of 14,196 ROVR-eligible
individuals; 77 percent of the eligible applicant pool. The SRV has
also notified us that 1,330 people have not been cleared and provided
us with specific information concerning the reasons for non-clearance
of these individuals. An analysis of these lists indicates that the
majority of the names have not been cleared because of address
problems. We are confident that we will be able to provide the SRV with
new contact addresses.
Currently we are awaiting SRV clearance decisions on 2,853 ROVR
applicants. We expect that clearance for these individuals will be
received shortly.
Once we have received the final clearance lists, we will compare
our lists and the SRV lists and ask for an accounting for any cases
that have not been accounted for by the SRV.
We are committed to ensuring that all eligible ROVR cases have an
opportunity to have their cases adjudicated, to complete interviews
quickly, and expedite the departure of approved ROVR applicants. We
believe that the SRV shares this commitment.
Question. What assurances do we have that people whom we interview
and who are deemed admissible to the U.S. under ROVR will be able to
get post-adjudication exit permits?
Answer. During my meetings in Hanoi in January, Vietnam agreed to
program modifications to the departure clearance procedures for INS-
approved ROVR cases. We began implementing these new departure
procedures in February. As of March 30, 1,126 ROVR applicants had
departed Vietnam and another 460 were scheduled to depart shortly. With
the new procedures now fully in place, we expect monthly departures of
approved ROVR applicants to be between 1,500 and 2,000 starting in
April. Given our experience over the past two months we believe that
the SRV is fully cooperating in expediting the new departure procedures
for ROVR cases. We will continue to monitor the process closely.
Question. Let me give you an example of a Montagnard refugee who
appears to be in deep trouble in Viet Nam. Lam A Lu was a member of
FULRO, the Montagnard resistance movement. He was badly wounded in a
Communist ambush, and managed to escape to Hong Kong. He had a very
compelling refugee claim--he even showed the Hong Kong interviewers the
seven bullet holes in his body--and his story was verified by his
fellow Montagnards in North Carolina. Nevertheless, Lu was denied
refugee status and sent back to Vietnam in 1996. He does not dare to
return to his hometown to apply for ``household registration,'' because
he fears retribution by the local authorities. He is eligible under
ROVR but is not on the list of the Vietnamese government has given us
permission to interview--and it is doubtful that he will ever be on any
such list, because he has no household registration, and because the
Vietnamese government will only give us the names of people who have
been personally contacted by the Ministry of the Interior. What can we
do for Lam A Lu and others like him? Why can't we just insist that the
Vietnamese government give us access to all these people before we
extend further economic concessions, such as a Jackson-Vanik waiver?
Answer. I am pleased to inform you that Lam A Lu has been cleared
for interview by SRV officials and will be scheduled for a ROVR
interview soon.
We believe that the new clearance procedures are working well and
that eligible ROVR applicants will have an opportunity to have their
cases adjudicated. We will continue to monitor this situation
carefully, and will raise directly with SRV authorities the cases of
any eligible ROVR applicants not cleared for an interview.
Question. There have been credible reports that administrative
roadblocks--not just the exit permit requirement, but other problems as
well--and corruption still prevent many returnees from accessing the
ROVR program. What is especially troubling is that several returnees
are reported to have been placed under house arrest and prohibited from
contacting foreigners. What can the U.S. government do on behalf of
these people? What effort has the U.S. government undertaken to
identify and locate such cases?
Answer. Since November, when Vietnamese authorities changed
procedures for clearing ROVR applicants for interview over 14,000 of
the currently nearly 18,400 eligible ROVR applicants have been cleared
for interview. Vietnamese authorities have informed us that another
1,330 have not been cleared, the majority due to address problems. We
are confident that we will be able to provide the SRV with new contact
addresses. Another 2,851 individuals remain to be cleared for interview
by the SRV.
Concerning individuals reported to be under house arrest or
experiencing other difficulties, anytime the USG becomes aware of
reports of returnees experiencing such problems the information is
passed to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees office in
Vietnam with a request that UNHCR look into the situation. UNHCR is
responsible for monitoring repatriates and providing assistance, as
required.
UNHCR currently employs seven expatriate monitors who are
Vietnamese and Nung speakers. An important part of the monitor's work
is visiting returnees in their homes throughout the country. The agenda
and location for each monitoring mission is set by UNHCR. The dates and
the province are announced to the Vietnamese authorities, while UNHCR
independently chooses which returnees to visit. On many but not all
monitoring visits, UNHCR staff may be accompanied by Vietnamese
authorities. Since 1989, UNHCR monitors have met with approximately 25-
29 percent of the returnees. Returnees are visited in their homes or
are received and interviewed on the premises of the two UNHCR offices
in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. UNHCR monitors pay special attention to
those returnees who claimed or were reported to have faced arrest,
detention or imprisonment after their return to Vietnam. According to
UNHCR since 1989, of the nearly 110,000 Vietnamese who returned to
Vietnam, a total of 275 individuals were arrested, detained, and/or
imprisoned, all of them in connection with common crimes they committed
prior to their escape from or after their return to Vietnam.
Question. There have been reports of very unsatisfactory monitoring
and protection provided by the office of the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) in Vietnam. For instance, a number of returnees
currently placed under house surveillance and constantly harassed by
the security police have reported that UNHCR had not been able to do
much on their behalf. UNHCR monitors tend to characterize such
treatment--and even the frequent denial of household registration to
returnees who are suspect for political, religious, and/or ethnic
reasons--not as persecution or mistreatment but as just an aspect of
living in Vietnam. What kind of monitoring and protection, if any, does
the U.S. embassy in Vietnam itself provide to returnees?
Answer. Since the establishment of an official U.S. presence in
Vietnam in 1994, Embassy officials have visited returnee areas to
monitor the effectiveness of USG funded reintegration assistance
programs and meet with returnees. In addition, since 1990 officers of
the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration have regularly
traveled to Vietnam to monitor programs for returnees. Neither our own
monitoring visits from Washington nor those of U.S. Embassy personnel
stationed in Hanoi have detected any patterns of persecution by the
Vietnamese authorities against those who have returned. UNHCR and non-
governmental organizations who work on a daily basis with returnees
report similar results.
If you know of any particular cases of concern we will follow up
immediately.
Question. A number of returnees have reportedly escaped again due
to the persecution they faced upon repatriation. If they are eligible
for ROVR, can they get an interview outside of Vietnam? If not, can the
U.S. provide some kind of protection to these people if they have to
return to Vietnam for the interview?
Answer. Interviews for consideration for admission to the United
States under the special adjudication standards established for the
ROVR program are available only in Vietnam. Individuals who felt
compelled to flee Vietnam a second time and who fear returning should
contact the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
in the country they fled to and seek UNHCR's assistance. If UNHCR
determines that the individual has a valid claim to refugee status,
UNHCR may refer the case to the United States for resettlement
consideration. The U.S. refugee program accepts referrals from the
UNHCR and prepares and presents such cases to an officer of the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service for adjudication.
Question. The U.S. State Department was a signatory to the
Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA). Is it true that with the conclusion
of the Comprehensive Plan of Action in 1996, victims of persecution
from Vietnam who escape to neighboring countries will be automatically
deported? If so, how can such victims ever escape from persecution?
Does the U.S. have any program to protect or resettle such victims of
persecution--who may not meet ROVR and ODP criteria even though they do
have a well-founded fear of persecution for political, religious, or
ethnic reasons--directly from Vietnam? If so, how many of these ``non-
category'' refugees have been allowed to leave Vietnam for the United
States within the last year?
Answer. Since February 15, 1994 Vietnamese asylum seekers arriving
in neighboring countries have been treated like any other asylum
seekers in accordance with the national laws of the receiving country
and internationally accepted practices.
On February 14, 1994 the Steering Committee of the Comprehensive
Plan of Action (CPA) adopted new procedures for newly arrived
Vietnamese asylum seekers in the countries of first asylum in Southeast
Asia and Hong Kong. The Steering Committee declared that screening
procedures under the CPA should no longer be applicable to Vietnamese
arriving in first asylum countries after February 14, 1994.
In 1995, the U.S. refugee program established a Priority Two
category for the consideration of the claims of Vietnamese who did not
meet previous ODP criteria (e.g., a minimum of three years in a
reeducation camp because of association with U.S. programs and policies
in Vietnam or five years of employment with the USG) but who present
credible claims of post-1975 persecution because of political,
religious, or human rights activities. According to ODP statistics
compiled in January 1998, 565 such cases have been presented to the ODP
Director and INS for consideration. Of this number, eighty-three have
been authorized for processing, 113 have been determined not to be
eligible for consideration, and 369 are pending. Many of the cases
presented for consideration were old cases which did not meet the
interview eligibility criteria for existing ODP programs. We are not
aware of any applications from individuals claiming to have recently
experienced persecution because of their political, religious, or human
rights activities.
Question. Re-ed survivors and widows who missed the 1994 ODP
deadline: In May 1997 the State Department agreed to consider late
applications on a case-by-case basis and to consider on the merits
those who missed the deadline for good cause. These people include, but
are not limited to, Montagnards. How many post-deadline cases (both
Montagnards and non-Montagnards) have been favorably considered, other
than those of the list referred to in the cable.
Answer. The agreement referred to in your question was under
discussion in May 1997 but the instructions to the Orderly Departure
Program Office (ODP) were issued jointly by the Department of State and
INS Headquarters in July 1997. These instructions authorized
exceptional consideration of ethnic Montagnard former reeducation camp
detainee cases who contacted the ODP after the September 30, 1994
deadline for direct registration and were otherwise qualified for
consideration because they had the requisite three years in reeducation
because of association with U.S. programs and policies in Vietnam.
Approximately 110 cases of Montagnards were included in this special
extension. This was the second time that ODP was authorized to accept
applications for Montagnards received after the 1994 deadline. The
first extension was authorized in January 1996.
Question. Widows: In May 1997 the State Department also agreed to
discontinue the requirement that widows of re-education camp victims
provide documentary evidence--typically obtainable only from the
Communist authorities--of their marriage and their husband's death.
Instead, those who could prove their cases by other credible evidence
would be considered. Unfortunately, I am informed that widows who
missed the 1994 deadline because they did not have the documentation
that was then required--but who later came forward with evidence other
than documentation--have been turned away on the ground that this
policy does not apply to them. If so, I hope this policy will be
reconsidered. If not, do we know how many applications from such widows
have been granted?
Answer. A May 6, 1997 letter from the Department's Assistant
Secretary for Legislative Affairs to Representative Christopher Smith,
Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human
Rights of the House International Relations Committee, stated that ``we
will review any cases which Members of Congress present to us which
appear eligible under the re-education subprogram except for a lack of
documentation. This agreement applied to widows who had applied for
consideration under the reeducation subprogram of ODP prior to the
September 1994 deadline but who had not been interviewed because of a
lack of documentation. We are not aware of any widows in this category
being denied access to the program. If you are aware of any such cases,
we would be pleased to review them.
Question. Government employees: What is the status of the review of
the shocking high denial rate for former U.S. government employees who
have been interviewed by ODP? Why have government employee interviews
been discontinued pending the outcome of the review?
Answer. The review of the denied former USG employee (i.e., persons
who worked for the USG for a minimum of five years) cases is being
conducted by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. We understand
that INS has completed the review and is now in the process of writing
up the results. The INS review focused on the application of the
Lautenberg standard in the cases of former USG employees.
In November 1996, we suspended the systematic processing of former
USG employee cases after the Vietnamese Government informed us that
they would no longer issue exit permits to these applicants During the
previous two years we had not interviewed more than a handful of these
cases and the INS approval rate for these cases had dropped below five
percent. However, if qualified applicants in this program notify us
that they have received an exit permit from the SRV we will present
their case to INS for adjudication.
Question. The ROVR program employs its own interpreters. This is a
big improvement over the ODP program, which uses interpreters provided
by Vietnam's Ministry of Interior. Many ODP applicants have reported
fear of retribution if they tell U.S. officials about mistreatment and
persecution in the presence of Ministry of Interior officials. Why has
the U.S. not demanded that our own interpreters be also used for the
ODP program?
Answer. Steps have been taken to prevent the problems associated
with SRV staff at the ODP site. The entire SRV Working Group work force
was terminated in December 1997, and only those in whom the JVA and ODP
Director had confidence were rehired. This new system was implemented
in January 1998. The USG now has complete control over all personnel
working in the ODP site in HCMC.
Question. Vietnam now allows applicants without exit permits to be
interviewed under ROVR. Why doesn't the State Department demand that
Vietnam extend this same procedure to the entire ODP program?
Considering that a large number of Montagnards and other compelling
cases continue to be denied exit permit under ODP, why not require
similar improvements in the ODP program as well?
Answer. During my trip to Vietnam in January, I raised this issue
with SRV officials, both in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. The SRV has
expressed the desire to successfully conclude all extraordinary U.S.
admissions programs so that we can move toward establishment of a
``normal'' migration relationship consistent with normalization of our
overall bilateral relationship. We are hopeful that the SRV will soon
agree to similar expedited interview clearance procedures for the
Montagnards and other ODP programs.
Assistant Secretary Roth
Question. There have been credible reports of monetary extortion by
Vietnamese officials in exchange for exit permits. Many applicants
under ROVR and ODP must pay hundreds to thousands of dollars in order
to get required documents or get their application processed. This is a
clear violation of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. How does the State
Department intend to deal with this issue? What kind of intervention
can it provide to victims of extortion?
Answer. We have raised the problem of corruption with Vietnamese
officials on numerous occasions, both generally in terms of its drag on
economic development and specifically as a hardship for would-be
emigrants who are forced to pay illegal charges for exit and other
documents.
The Vietnamese have assured us that extra-legal charges for exit
permits do not result from Vietnamese government policies and that the
government has issued directives to local officials ordering the
cessation of such practices.
Vietnamese authorities recognize that the problem of corruption by
Vietnamese party and government officials is serious and they have
campaigned strenuously to reduce corruption, so far with little
apparent success.
We will continue to press the Vietnamese government, both generally
and on any specific cases we find, to ensure that exit permits are
issued to those eligible for emigration from Vietnam to the U.S.
without illegal charges.
If you are aware of any specific cases, we would appreciate your
passing them to us, so that we can follow up.
Assistant Secretary Taft
Question. The ``LAVAS cases''--35 close relatives of U.S. citizens
and/or lawful permanent residents who were forced back from Hong Kong
to Vietnam even though they were beneficiaries of INS-approved
immigrant visa petitions, and were immediately eligible for legal
immigration to the United States--have also been the subject of
considerable interest in Congress. Although most of these people have
been back in Vietnam for about a year now, and although about half have
been interviewed by ODP, only 2 have been granted visas. 12 have been
denied, either for failure to prove the relationship or for failure to
prove that the applicant will not be a public charge. Isn't this
rejection rate unusually high?
Answer. According to our records there are 36 individuals in the
so-called ``LAVAS cases'' group. Of this number: (1) four have been
approved for immigration to the United States; (2) eleven have been
denied for documentation or public charge reasons; (3) one has been
interviewed and the results are pending; (4) two did not appear for a
scheduled interview; (5) six have not responded to instruction packets
sent to applicants eligible to have their IV cases processed; and (6)
we have been provided the names of twelve other individuals who are
reported to have been part of the LAVAS case, but for whom we have no
other information.
The denials are due to problems in documenting the claimed
relationships (221(g)) and in satisfying the public charge provision of
the INA (212(a)(4)). Providing the evidence required by U.S. law is the
responsibility of the applicants and their sponsors. We expect that
most of the denials on these groups will eventually be overcome on
presentation of additional evidence substantiating the claimed
relationship or documenting that the sponsor in the U.S. has the
required financial resources to support his or her spouse.
Question. There are returnees who were eligible to apply for ROVR,
but who did not do so due to various extenuating circumstances. For
instance, some people who were being detained in the refugee camps for
anti-repatriation activities were not offered access to ROVR. Also,
some people in Sikieu did not apply because an official SRV delegation,
which had been sent to persuade asylum seekers to return, instead told
them ROVR was a trick and they should not sign up for it. I understand
that people who could show good cause for not signing up for ROVR in
the camps were to be allowed to sign up in-country, even though they
did not return until after June 30. The only such applicants of whose
cases I was aware are persons who claim that they were ``intimidated''
from signing up by anti-repatriation campmates. What mechanism do we
have for accepting in-country ROVR applications, and what has the
success rate been so far for applicants other than ``intimidatees''?
Answer. There has always been a provision for initiating ROVR
processing for individuals who meet eligibility criteria, but for some
compelling reason were unable to register, such as because they were in
detention.
ROVR was created in order to identify and offer resettlement
interviews in Vietnam to those screened-out Vietnamese boat people who
may be of special interest to the U.S. due to their previous
experiences or associations in Vietnam. Under ROVR, any Vietnamese who
returned to Vietnam from the first asylum camps between October 1, 1995
and June 30, 1996 (or who volunteered to return to Vietnam prior to
June 30, 1996) could request consideration for a resettlement
interview.
The eligibility criteria to qualify for an interview under this
initiative were crafted to be broad and generous for two reasons: to
ensure that no one of special interest to the U.S. would be excluded
and to encourage those remaining in first asylum camps to register and
then return peacefully and voluntarily to Vietnam.
The program was designed to offer resettlement interviews to those
who:
had close association with the U.S. presence in
Vietnam or with the former government in South Vietnam prior to
1975;
were members of certain ethnic groups (Montagnards and
Nung);
persons detained for political or religious activity;
persons who were religious leaders in Vietnam;
and others determined to be of significant interest to
the U.S. based on their experiences in Vietnam prior to
fleeing.
Individuals who believe that they meet these criteria and wish to
be considered for an interview should contact the ODP office in
Bangkok, Thailand. Their applications should include the following
information: (1) date of return to Vietnam or if returned after June
30, 1996 date of application for voluntary return; (2) information
about their reasons for not registering in camp; and (3) information
about the reason they should be considered of special interest to the
U.S. (such as association with the U.S. presence in Vietnam before
1975).
Assistant Secretaries Roth and Taft
Question. What is the State Department's assessment of the human
rights conditions in Vietnam? Have they improved over the past two
years or have they worsened? How many religious leaders and how many
political prisoners have been released from detention over that period?
How many continue to be in prison?
Answer. As noted in the Department of State Human Rights Report,
while Vietnam's human rights record has been generally poor, there have
been some positive developments. The government represses basic
political and some religious freedoms. The government arbitrarily
arrests citizens, including carrying out detentions for the peaceful
expression of political and religious objections to government
policies.
Among the positive developments during the past two years is the
trend toward reduced government interference in citizens' daily lives.
The government has allowed citizens slightly greater freedom of
expression and assembly to protest grievances. A small number of
dissidents has been released from prison, including political prisoners
Doan Thanh Liem (February 1996), Hoang Minh Chinh (June 1996), Ha Si
Phu (December 1996), Le Hong Ha (August 1997) and Pham Duc Kham
(September 1997).
The Vietnamese government claims it does not hold any political or
religious prisoners. It does not usually publicize the arrests of
citizens for political reasons and frequently conducts closed trials,
making it difficult to know exactly how many political and religious
prisoners there are. Amnesty International lists 54 prisoners held for
political reasons, but suggests that the total may be higher. Some
overseas Vietnamese groups have claimed that there are as many as 1,000
political and religious prisoners in the country; other sources put the
figure closer to 200 persons.
We routinely raise the cases of a number of jailed political and
religious dissidents with the Vietnamese, both here and in Vietnam.
Occasionally the Vietnamese government has released a prisoner on the
condition that he or she leave the country; Liem and Kham, for
instance, were welcomed to the United States on their release. We
remain very concerned about several other prominent political and
religious prisoners who reportedly suffer from health problems, and
will continue to press for their release with the Vietnamese
government.
Response to Question Submitted by Senator Kerry
Assistant Secretary Roth
Question. How committed is the new Vietnamese leadership to
accelerated economic reform? What real progress has been made in recent
months?
Answer. The new leadership, headed by Party General Secretary Le
Kha Phieu, Prime Minister Phan Van Khai and President Tran Duc Luong
and operating by consensus as is Vietnamese custom, has publicly voiced
its commitment to economic reform. Vietnam has recently taken positive
measures, moving quickly to issue a number of decrees. The Asian
financial crisis, which is beginning to negatively affect Vietnamese
exports and foreign investment inflows, has helped focus the new
leadership on the importance of a continuing commitment to economic
reform. However, the reforms and the rhetoric surrounding their
implementation suggest that the internal dispute over the extent and
pace of reform continues.
In general, recently announced changes are positive. However, they
focus on making more effective the country's extensive system of
administrative controls and procedures rather than their elimination,
demonstrating that the Vietnamese government has yet to embrace a
completely market-oriented reform program.
The recently announced measures, many of which have not yet been
implemented, include reforms to the trade and foreign investment
regimes and the financial system. A number of the reforms represent
important steps such as the gradual elimination of many export and
import quotas; streamlining investment procedures; elimination of some
import bans; expediting the processing of trade documents; and
protection of established foreign investments from the negative effects
of legal and regulatory changes. Many of the measures provide
incentives, such as tax breaks and favorable access to credit, aimed at
increasing exports from or foreign investment in targeted sectors Other
measures taken, however, are inconsistent with a market-oriented reform
process. These include: the imposition of foreign exchange controls;
increasing import controls; the suspension of new banking licenses; and
the monitoring of enterprises with foreign investment to ``ensure
thriftiness.''
Economic experts, including International Monetary Fund staff, have
warned that the reforms thus far undertaken by the Vietnamese
government do not go far enough. They warn that an economic crisis will
result from structural problems in the Vietnamese economy and the spill
over effects of the Asian financial crisis if Vietnam does not
immediately undertake fundamental reforms including privatization of
state enterprises, financial sector reform, adoption of a flexible
exchange rate system and trade liberalization. It remains to be seen if
the current leadership is willing or able to reach consensus on such a
far-reaching program of structural economic reform.
The U.S. Government is engaged in a dialogue with the Vietnamese
government to impress upon it the importance of continued market-
oriented economic reform. This dialogue is supported by concrete
action. The Agency for International Development has initiated a
Commercial Law Development Program to help Vietnam draft laws and
regulations consistent with an open economy. We are also negotiating a
bilateral trade agreement, without which Vietnam cannot obtain Most
Favored Nation (MEN) trade treatment, that will embody market
principals and promote greater integration of Vietnam in the world
economy.
Response to Question Submitted by Senator Hagel
Assistant Secretary Roth
Question. How have minority groups in Vietnam other than the
Montagnards fared in seeking to emigrate to the U.S.?
Answer. We are not aware of any minority other than the various
ethnic groups referred to as Montagnards that have encountered
difficulty as a group in emigrating to the U.S. from Vietnam.
However, the Orderly Departure Program (ODP), which processes
Vietnamese emigration, does not break out statistics on ODP applicants
by ethnic group, with the exception of Montagnards.
Vietnam's largest ethnic minority, the ethnic Chinese, who suffered
from anti-Chinese policies pursued by the Government of Vietnam in the
years immediately following the Vietnam War, has comprised a
substantial portion of applicants who have successfully emigrated to
the U.S. under ODP. Ethnic Chinese continue to apply successfully for
emigration to the U.S. through the ODP program.
Our objective remains to ensure that all ODP and ROVR applicants,
who are not otherwise ineligible, are able to apply without hindrance.
When we encounter any case where we have reason to believe that has not
been true we have pursued the issue vigorously with the Vietnamese
government, and we will continue to do so.
__________
Prepared Statement of John F. Sommer, Jr.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
On behalf of The American Legion, I appreciate the invitation to
appear today to discuss the Montagnard's historical relationship with
the United States during the Vietnam war, and my personal account while
serving alongside the Montagnards. In addition, I have been asked to
speak of the difficulties Montagnards and other Vietnamese refugees are
experiencing in light of Vietnam's noncompliance with free emigration.
We have taken this opportunity to address some closely related issues
that are of significance.
According to available information published by the Montagnard
Foundation and other sources, over two thousand years ago the
indigenous Montagnard people settled along the coast and in the fertile
valleys of Vietnam. Over the next several hundred years, other peoples
of varying cultures gradually migrated into their homelands. The
Montagnards were forced deeper and deeper into the highlands where they
remained, farming this mountainous area in their ancient manner for
generations. Meanwhile, they were subjected to the whims of whatever
regime happened to be controlling the country -and more specifically
the highlands--at any given time through the years.
Immediately prior to the First Indochina War, the French organized
what could be construed as a Montagnard Army to assist in liberating
the four provinces of the Montagnard in Central Vietnam from the
occupying communist Viet Minh forces.
According to information made available by the Fourth World
Documentation Project of the Center for World Indigenous Studies,
following four months of combat, the four provinces, Kon-Tum, Plei-Ku,
Daklak, and Haut Donai, were liberated from the occupation of the Viet
Minh. And because of the bloodshed, sacrifice, courage and loyalty of
the Montagnards, the French created an autonomous country which was
called ``Pays Montagnards du Sud Indochinois'' (P.M.S.I.), which
translates to the ``Country of the Montagnards of South Indochina.''
During the war itself, the Montagnard troops were reportedly used by
the French basically as a deployment for strategic defense against the
Viet Minh. Following the Geneva Convention in July 1954 the Indochina
War ended, and for all intents and purposes, P.M.S.I. ceased to exist
in the legal sense of the term.
History reflects that the United States military's involvement with
the Montagnard people commenced in the Fall of 1961 when, with the
permission of the South Vietnamese government, US representatives
approached the tribal leaders of a Rhade camp at Buon Enao in Darlac
province. The Americans initially involved were a representative of the
US Embassy and an Army Special Forces medical sergeant. The proposition
offered--and after a period of discussion and deliberation accepted--
was to provide weapons and training in turn for the Montagnards'
declaration for the South Vietnamese government and participation in a
village self-defense program. Normally such a program would have been
carried out under the command and control of the South Vietnamese Army
and its US military advisors. However, it was determined that this
project would, at least in the beginning, be carried out separately, in
the absence of a guarantee that the Rhade experiment would be
successful, especially in view of the Vietnamese government's failure
to follow through on other promises to the Montagnards.
Reportedly, by mid-December the pilot project was successfully
completed, and the program was extended to forty other Rhade villages
within a radius often to fifteen kilometers of Buon Enao. Additional
soldiers from the US 1st Special Forces Group and the Vietnamese
Special Forces were deployed to assist in the expansion, and by the
Spring of 1962, the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CDG) program was
rapidly growing. Increasing responsibility for training was assumed by
the South Vietnamese Special Forces, and trained Rhade cadre began
training local strike forces and village defenders, with US Special
Forces troops serving as advisors to the ``trained trainers.''
By the latter part of 1964, the successful program had spread
beyond the Rhade, to include other Montagnard tribal groups, other
minority groups such as Cambodians and Nung tribesmen, and additional
US Special Forces detachments including some of the 5th Special.
Forces. Correspondingly, the responsibilities of the CIDG increased, to
include missions such as the border surveillance program. In 1969 the
transfer of CIDG forces to the Vietnamese military commenced, many of
the CIDG units were converted to Vietnamese Ranger units, and others
were renamed as Border Ranger units. The transfer was, as we understand
it, completed sometime in 1971.
This is not to say there weren't a number of difficulties that
arose during the development of the CIDG. However, by most accounts it
was a significantly successful program.
Today stories abound from former Special Forces soldiers, Special
Operations troops, and assorted veterans who served with Montagnards,
the Nung, Cambodians and others, regarding the loyalty, dedication,
heroism and friendship exhibited by these indigenous fighters.
It is sad to say that many--if not most--of the Montagnard held out
some degree of hope following the total US withdrawal from South
Vietnam in 1975 that their American allies would return to the
highlands to rejoin them. That was not to be. However, today veterans
among organizations such as The American Legion, the Special Forces
Association and others are actively involved in trying to provide
humanitarian assistance to those courageous individuals with whom they
served.
My personal experience with the Montagnards was limited to 1968,
while serving as a combat medic with an infantry company in the First
Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division, located in the Central Highlands.
On a few occasions our unit worked in conjunction with the CIDG and
their American advisors, basically securing hilltops or fire support
bases, and in one instance a Special Forces camp. There was a general
communication problem, but it did not ever prohibit us from trading
rations with them. They liked our C rations, and their LRRP-type rice-
based rations were a welcome change of menu for us.
My role as a medic, and during the latter part of my tour as
Noncommissioned Officer in Charge of a Battalion Aid Station, offered
the opportunity to provide medical treatment to Montagnards in a number
of different situations including MEDCAP operations to their villages,
on an emergency basis at the Aid Station, and others.
While serving as NCOIC of the Aid Station near Pleiku, I also
frequently participated in night ambushes around Montagnard villages.
The purpose of these operations was to protect the villages from the
North Vietnamese Army units and Viet Cong who were operating in that
area. A location would be established near the village at dusk, and
then be moved to a more strategic defensive position after dark. Our
patrol would always go through the village on the way in so that the
Montagnards would know we would be there during the night.
All of my personal experiences with the Montagnards--whether CIDG
or civilian villagers--were positive, and I developed an affinity and
respect for the people. Unfortunately, during my trips to Vietnam since
1991, the opportunity to return to the Central Highlands has not
presented itself, understanding that it has only been within the recent
past that westerners have been permitted to travel in that border area.
In addition to embracing The American Legion's strong position that we
have a moral obligation to assist those who fought side by side with us
during the war, I have a personal interest in the well being of our
former allies and their families.
The plight of the Montagnards today remains most unfortunate.
Millions of dollars and thousands of man-hours of humanitarian
assistance are expended in Vietnam by American NGOs each year. However,
few--if any--of these organizations are permitted by the Vietnamese
government to develop and administer programs that would provide
humanitarian aid to the Montagnards in the Central Highlands, despite
the horrendous conditions of poverty and hopelessness that exist among
the tribal people.
An example is the Vietnam Highlands Assistance Project which was
developed by Lutheran Family Services in 1989. During the nine years
since it was established, the project has only been allowed access to
the Central Highlands on one occasion, though not for a lack of trying.
Project officials have continuously pushed Vietnam's Peoples Aid
Coordination Committee (PACCOM) for NGO humanitarian access to the
Central Highlands.
Of course, the failure of the Vietnamese government to allow the
provision of humanitarian assistance in the highlands is not the only
problem facing the Montagnards. We have seen and heard numerous
reports--some anecdotal and others official--of the strife that has
beset Montagnards who have attempted to emigrate from Vietnam. It is
often reported that many have been forced to pay province officials
exorbitant fees for exit permits, and then in some cases bribes to
other Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) officials, in their mostly
futile attempts to negotiate the emigration process.
This situation regarding the Montagnard is concisely described in a
recent report prepared by the Chief Counsel of the House International
Relations Committee's Subcommittee on International Operations and
Human Rights following his December 1997 trip to Vietnam. The report
states in part:
The Montagnard population--many of whose members have
particularly strong ties to the United States and particularly
compelling refugee claims--continues to face problems that are
even worse than those of most other Vietnamese of humanitarian
interest to the United States. Because of their remote location
and their alienation from the mainstream of Vietnamese society
they are particularly vulnerable to all of the abuses listed
above. They have even less access to information than other
residents of Viet Nam, and are even more helpless in the face
of official corruption. For instance, some Montagnard refugees
resettled in the United States have been forced by corrupt
local officials to leave family members behind and substitute
non-family members who then disappear upon their arrival in the
United States.
One of the obstacles that has prevented Montagnards from leaving
Vietnam, and has also blocked the emigration attempts of ethnic
Vietnamese, has included the use of translators provided by the SRV by
our own Orderly Departure Program (ODP), and Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS). These SRV interpreters have been
responsible for such sensitive issues as commenting on the authenticity
of documents or testimony provided by refugee applicants during the
interview process. It is commonly known that numerous applicants whose
emigration cases were denied have complained, some in writing, to ODP
officials that they were intimidated by SRV officials being present
during their interviews, and that the presence of these individuals
encumbered their ability to openly disclose the extent of their
involvement with the US, relevant information surrounding their
persecution by the SRV, and related matters. Beyond that, reports from
applicants whose cases were both approved and denied have charged that
some SRV provided employees have solicited bribes for favorable
results, and offered threats or otherwise intimidated applicants who
were not willing to pay.
In reference to the involvement of SRV staff, the aforementioned
report by the Chief Counsel of the House Subcommittee on International
Operations and Human Rights states in part:
I was already familiar with what this can do the integrity of
regee programs. The presence of SRV officials at the vast
majority of UNHCR interviews with CPA returnees has been an
important factor in the derision with which the UNHCR's ``zero-
persecution-on-return'' assurances have been greeted by
Vietnamese-Americans, U.S. veterans' groups, Ben Gilman, Chris
Smith, et al. Also, many applicants have written letters to ODP
stating that they were afraid to tell their stories in the
presence of government-supplied interpreters, and setting forth
the ``real'' story in an almost-always-unsuccessful effort to
get a denial reconsidered.
It has been reported that effective January 1, 1998 a private
employment agency is being used to hire the interpreters and others who
have been furnished by SRV. However, it appears that the cases of
applicants who were adversely impacted based on the previous policy
will not be re-reviewed, which would be most unfortunate.
The Resettlement Opportunities for Vietnamese Returnees (ROVR)
program was not viewed favorably by The American Legion from the
outset, and SRVs failure to hold up its end of the bargain since
implementation has been even more disconcerting. The purpose of ROVR
was to create conditions under which ``Boat People'' would voluntarily
return to Vietnam from the refugee camps in countries of first asylum.
Those who met the US-defined criteria of ``refugee'' and returned to
Vietnam, would be interviewed and, if found eligible, be granted
passage to the United States. In turn, SRV agreed to not take reprisals
against them for having fled the country, and to issue exit permits
necessary for them to become involved with US emigration officials in
preparation of leaving Vietnam.
SRVs cooperation in furnishing the US with names of those who are
to be interviewed has been sporadic. As of mid-December, 6,000 had been
provided, which was about one-third of those that had been requested.
Exit permits have not been provided to many of those who were supposed
to receive them based on their meeting US criteria. We understand that
as of recently the exit permits are no longer required prior to seeking
interviews from ODP, but they continue to be required at a later time
during the process. With respect to the SRV pledge of no reprisals, the
previously mentioned House Subcommittee report contains the following:
The shocking extent of SRV involvement in the administration
of all our programs--as well as in the UNHCR monitoring
program--makes highly suspect any assessment that returnees are
not facing political problems on their return. The SRV internal
security apparatus is pervasive. Maintenance of control over
the lives of ordinary citizens appears to be among the
government's highest priorities. Of the dozen or so returnees
we visited--some ``officially'' in the presence of SRV
personnel, others ``unofficially'' after satisfying ourselves
that we had managed to evade surveillance--all but three had
been denied household registration, which is the essential
prerequisite to a decent life in Viet NAM. Several had been
frequently visited by security officials demanding to know
about their past political and/or religious activities and
warning them of severe reprisals for any further such
activities. All those whom the SRV government knew we intended
to visit had been interrogated in anticipation of our visit.
Several had been given detailed instructions about what to say
and what not to say. A few returnees are known to have been
imprisoned since their return--most for ostensibly nonpolitical
crimes such as illegal escape, others on overtly political
charges.
It is important to note that ROVR is not the only measure of
Vietnam's cooperation on the emigration issue. The Orderly Departure
Program is equally as important. We understand that the ODP,
implemented nearly twenty years ago, potentially has thousands of cases
that are unresolved for one reason or another. These include cases of
re-education camp survivors and their widows, former US government
employees, Amerasians, and others. All of them are individuals who did
not leave the country at the urging of the US, based on promises that
if they met the criteria, the US would process them out. It has
recently been reported that there is an artificially high ``no-show''
rate in the ODP, generated by the fact that many people who are
eligible for interviews cannot get exit permits. Also, many who tried
prior to the first of the year were either turned away by SRV staff, or
the applicants refused to comply with their demands for bribes.
In December 1997, the Clinton Administration announced that the
President was seriously considering waiving the requirements of the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment (19 U.S.C. 2432(a)). Briefly, Jackson-Vanik
renders communist governments ineligible for economic concessions
through the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation until their citizens are guaranteed unfettered freedom of
emigration.
It is obvious to The American Legion, among others, that
Montagnards and other Vietnamese citizens are not by any stretch of the
imagination free to leave Vietnam if they so wish. The examples set
forth in this statement are only a snapshot of the abysmal SRV-
controlled situations that exist within ROVR and ODP--programs that
were established to assist refugees in emigrating--not forcefully
prevent them from leaving a country where they are subject to
harassment and persecution. The United States has a moral obligation to
help these individuals in any way we can possibly do so. For the
President to waive Jackson-Vanik would be the same as closing the door
forever on the possibility that many of these deserving individuals
could ever be resettled outside of Vietnam.
In addition to the provisions of Jackson-Vanik, 19 U.S.C. 2433
provides authority for the President to withhold nondiscriminatory
trade treatment to countries based on cooperation with our efforts to
account for American military and civilian POWs and MIAs in Southeast
Asia. It is contingent upon cooperation to achieve a complete
accounting of the POWs and MIAs, to repatriate such personnel who are
alive, and to return the remains of such personnel who are dead to the
United States.
On a related issue, last week President Clinton certified that
Vietnam is ``fully cooperating in good faith'' with US efforts to
account for missing American soldiers from the Vietnam war, as required
under section 609 of Public Law 105-119. The American Legion does not
agree with the President's determination. To begin with, the
certification would have been more credible if the President had waited
to review the forthcoming National Intelligence Estimate on the Vietnam
POW/MIA Issue that is expected to be completed later this Spring.
The government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is not
cooperating anywhere near the extent to which it can. A degree of
cooperation is being offered in the conduct of the joint field
activities, where our Joint Task Force--Full Accounting and Vietnam's
Office on Seeking Missing Personnel are excavating crash sites and
other incident locations. Of course, the United States is paying
Vietnam handsomely for that assistance.
It is the unilateral cooperation by the central government that is
not forthcoming. In August 1993, a high ranking State Department
official specifically asked the Vietnamese government to turn over
remains and information relating to over eighty cases involving over
ninety individuals categorized as Last Known Alive, and Special Remains
Cases. To the best of our knowledge, very little, if any information
correlating to those cases has been turned over by the SRV government.
National Commander Anthony G. Jordan and this witness met with
several high ranking Vietnamese government officials in December 1997,
and requested, among other things, increased unilateral cooperation in
helping to resolve those cases where the incidents took place in the
areas of Laos and Cambodia that were controlled by the Peoples Army of
Vietnam during the war. The American Legion and others, including
representatives of the families, have formally requested this as well
as unilateral cooperation on other similar issues for several years. We
continue to receive empty promises, but no substantial progress has
been forthcoming.
The third concern of The American Legion is Vietnam's abysmal
record on human rights. It is necessary to remain mindful that the
government of SRV continues to be a communist regime that actively
suppresses the human rights of many of its citizens. Unfortunately,
despite the lifting of the trade embargo and the normalization of
diplomatic relations, there has been no appreciable improvement. The
only apparent change is the diminished level of pressure that the US
government is placing on Vietnam to enhance its human rights practices.
The SRV government continues to arrest and imprison political and
religious activists and hold them at will. Hanoi does not suffer those
who believe in freedom and democracy to espouse their feelings.
In reviewing the State Department's Human Rights Report on Vietnam
for 1997, it is interesting to note the comments that relate to one of
the issues under consideration at this Hearing. Under the section of
the report relating to the subjects of Emigration and Repatriation is
the following:
Citizens must demonstrate eligibility to emigrate to another
country and show sponsorship abroad, before the Government
issues exit permits. Citizens' access to exit permits was
frequently constrained by factors outside the law. Refugee and
immigrant visa applications to the Orderly Departure Program
(ODP) sometimes encounter local officials who arbitrarily delay
or deny exit permits based on personal animosities or on the
official's perception an applicant does not meet program
criteria, or in order to extort a bribe.
There are some concerns that members of minority ethnic
groups, particularly nonethnic Vietnamese such as the
Montagnards, may not have ready access to these programs. The
Government denied exit permits for certain Montagnard
applicants for emigration.
The American Legion has urged President Clinton in the strongest
possible terms to refrain from even proposing a Jackson-Vanik waiver
until such time that considerable cooperation and improvement are
advanced by the government of Vietnam in the three important areas that
are discussed in this statement.
Mr. Chairman, we sincerely thank you for scheduling today's hearing
on these issues which rarely receive the attention that they justly
deserve.
__________
Prepared Statement of Dr. Nguyen Dinh Thang
In July 1995, to justify normalized relations with Communist
Vietnam, Administration officials explained to the public and Congress
that expanded relations would bring along political liberalization,
democratic values, and improved human rights. Two and a half years
later, reality has proven the contrary.
Since normalization, the Communist government has further
restricted freedoms and has increased its violations of human rights:
more religious leaders and dissidents have been arrested or placed
under administrative detention, more citizens than ever have been
detained and charged simply for criticizing corrupt government
practices, there is much less freedom of the press now than before
normalization. The future looks even bleaker after hardline Communists
took over the leadership of the Party three months ago. Last month, the
government sent 3,000 agents, disguised as priests and followers, to
infiltrate all levels of the Buddhist Church so as to monitor and
control all of the Church's activities. Also last month, the communist
Party ordered its members to infiltrate foreign-owned companies via
formation of party cells among workers. Comparison of the State
Department's most recent human rights country report with the one two
years ago attests to the failure of the U.S. policy in promoting human
rights in Vietnam.
This Administration's policy in recent years has also made it
virtually impossible for victims of persecution in Vietnam to escape
from their persecutors.
In a multilateral agreement with countries in the region, the U.S.
supports a new refugee policy, effective July 1996, that automatically
returns escapees to the Vietnamese government. Those already in first-
asylum camps were repatriated en masse in 1996. With the help of this
misguided policy, Vietnam has become one of the very few countries in
the world where victims of persecution have no way out, except through
official channels that are under the complete control of the Communist
government. The State Department Inspector General in his Report of
Inspection released two months ago recognizes this most disturbing
reality: the U.S. Government does not have control over key aspects of
the resettlement process; Vietnam does.
Making its case for the waiver, the U.S. Administration has
completely ignored this Kafkaeque situation that it has helped to
create: victims of persecution must get approval from their persecutors
in order to escape from persecution. In one case that I have worked on
since 1996, the victim, now in hiding in Cambodia, has been told by the
U.S. embassy in Phnom Penh to return to Vietnam and apply for exit
through the official channel--at his own risk. This illustrates how
U.S. policy towards Vietnam of late favors the oppressor over the
oppressed.
The State Department has quoted statistics to justify the
recommended waiver: 14,000 names have been cleared by Vietnam for
interview under the Resettlement Opportunity for Vietnamese Returnees
(ROVR) program and 470,000 individuals already resettled under the
Orderly Departure Program (ODP). But these statistics are misleading:
the State Department has failed to mention those, particularly victims
of persecution with the most compelling and deserving claims, who have
been denied access to these programs.
The State Department had initially expected to conclude ROVR
interviews by September of last year. Vietnam however twice reneged on
its promised cooperation and caused the 18-month delay in the
implementation of the program. As of today, six months after the ROVR
program was initially expected to wrap up, 4,000 names are still not
cleared for interview. Among them there are religious leaders currently
placed under police surveillance, human rights activists condemned to
house arrest for their past activities in first-asylum camps, and
individuals imprisoned on political and religious charges. Three months
ago, I joined a Congressional staffer in a fact-finding mission to
Vietnam. We met some of these returnees or their relatives. Some of
them had been told, bluntly, that the government had decided that they
should not leave. There were also several returnees, who were in hiding
to avoid retribution by the authorities. They of course did not have
access to the program, despite their eligibility. According to my
latest information, their situations have not changed.
It is important to note that clearance for interview does not mean
approval for exit. Often family registration and citizenship identity
card are required for exit permission. Two thirds of the returnees we
met during our trip were without these documents, which made them
personna non grata in their own country. They were not be able to get
legal employment, apply for a business license, seek admission to
hospital, or send their children to school. Last week, a returnee, a
Chinese ethnic who had worked as an interpreter for the U.S.
government, informed me that the Ministry of Interior had told him he
would have no chance of ever leaving Vietnam for lack of these required
documents.
It would be a major omission not to mention the rampant and
systematic corruption at all levels of government in Vietnam. Most
applicants must pay Vietnamese officials large amounts of money in
order to gain access to U.S. programs or to get exit permission. I have
carefully documented cases of Vietnamese, now in the U.S., who had to
pay several thousand U.S. dollars in exchange for exit permission. ROVR
applicants living in My Tho, Can Tho and Bien Hoa provinces are
routinely required to pay five million dongs, equivalent to $400, in
order to have their applications vetted by the local authorities. This
is just initial payment; they have to pay more at every step in the
process. Considering Vietnam's annual average income of only $300, few
victims of persecution can afford such exhorbitantly large bribes. Such
monetary extortion also violates the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.
Victims of persecution hoping to get out of Vietnam under ODP fare
even worse. The State Department has failed to acknowledge that many of
the most compelling cases, often of highest political and humanitarian
interest to the U.S., are not among its figure of 470,000 individuals
successfully resettled under ODP. Many Montagnards, members of ethnic
minorities, former U.S. government employees, veterans of U.S. special
forces, former political prisoners exiled to remote areas, religious
leaders, spouses and children of American citizens, etc. have been
excluded from the program. Over the years I have personally worked,
often without success, on many such cases. For some unknown reasons,
the State Department has restricted the free emigration condition under
Jackson-Vanik to just ROVR, leaving in limbo victims of persecution
eligible under ODP. Such restrictive interpretation was clearly not the
intent of Congress when it passed the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.
Waiving Jackson-Vanik at this time will be a major mistake. Such a
waiver, premature and unjustifiable as Vietnam continues to deny exit
permission to a large number of victims of persecution, will give away
the last leverage that could be used to force Vietnam into fully
cooperating with U.S. resettlement programs, and will deny victims of
persecution their last hope of ever leaving Vietnam.
In order to avoid such a catastrophic consequence, I would like to
make the following recommendations.
1. The U.S. should demand that Vietnam satisfactorily resolve
all cases--ROVR and ODP--of interest to the U.S., particularly
cases raised by members of Congress, as a condition for the
waiver. Vietnam can easily prove its true cooperation and its
deserving the waiver by resolving all these cases tomorrow. I
have submitted several lists of such cases to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and to the State Department. I am
working with other non-governmental organizations to compile
additional lists for submission.
2. Even after Vietnam has satisfactorily resolved all
existing cases of special interest to the U.S., the waiver
should only be announced with a clear message that it will be
rescinded at the first sign of Vietnam's failure to cooperate
in the future. For as long as the Vietnamese government
violates the basic human rights of its citizens, and for as
long as escape from persecution must be pre-approved by the
persecutors, such a guarrantee is absolutely necessary.
3. As an additional safety measure, I recommend that the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee request an independent
investigation by the General Accounting Office into each and
every case in the said lists of victims of persecution and into
the corrupt practices of Vietnamese officials. Such an in depth
case-by-case investigation will add pressure on Vietnam to
truly cooperate. In case Vietnam does not cooperate, this
investigation may suggest ways to cope with the underlying
problems.
These specific cases should be the litmus test of Vietnam's stated
cooperation and of the success of the ROVR and ODP programs, not the
statistics quoted out of context by the State Department. There is no
reason for the U.S. government to give away our last leverage in such a
hurry and to ignore the plight of victims of persecution in Vietnam,
which recent U.S. policy has only made worse.
______
Petition Letter Requesting the Administration to Withhold Waiving the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment Requirements for Vietnam
March 10, 1998.
The Honorable Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
United States Senate,
450 Senate Dirksen Office Building,
Washington, D.C. 20510.
Dear Senator Helms:
On behalf of 23 Vietnamese-American communities throughout the
United States and the Vietnamese Inter-faith Council in the USA, we
write to seek your intervention with the Clinton Administration from
granting the Socialist Republic of Vietnam a waiver of the Jackson-
Vanik requirement. We are disturbed by news that the Administration
intends to waive the Amendment's requirements, despite the fact that
Vietnam continues to suppress the rights of its citizens, including the
right to free emigration.
Vietnam's recent change in the procedure under the Resettlement
Opportunity for Vietnamese Returnees, or ROVR, only delays the
requirements for exit permits wherein applicants approved for
resettlement still need exit permits to emigrate abroad. There is
mounting evidence that local authorities have harassed and extort
applicants in their requests for exit permits. Widespread corruption by
communist officials presents a major obstacle to free emigration.
Vietnamese officials have demanded thousands of dollars from applicants
in exchange for exit permits out of the country. Most returnees cannot
afford such bribes.
Also, we call your attention to the deterioration in human rights
conditions in Vietnam since the U.S. established diplomatic relations
with that country in 1995. An untold number of political dissidents and
religious leaders have been imprisoned by the Hanoi regime. In April of
1997, the communist authorities implemented an Administrative Detention
Directive, 31/CP, which allows for detention of individuals for up to
two years without a hearing or trial.
There is no accurate number of people being detained under the
auspices of the Directive since the authorities make every effort to
keep this potentially damaging information a secret. However, it is
known that every province in Vietnam has at least one administrative
detention center where people are held for up to two years, without
trial, for committing a wide range of activities from promoting human
rights to vagrancy. According to a 1997 Human Rights Watch report on
Vietnam, a detention center in the southern province of An Giang holds
``an average of 200 individuals at any one time.''
While Hanoi endorses the free flow of investment dollars into
Vietnam from foreign investors, it regularly cracks down on the free
flow of information and freedom of expression from its own citizens.
Late last year, the Hanoi regime established new procedures to tighten
its grips on the press, foreign and domestic. In November of 1997, the
editor of a Vietnamese language trade journal was arrested for exposing
high-level corruption. The arrest has had a chilling effect on an
already near freezing climate on Vietnam's ability to provide fair and
accurate news to its citizens.
The increasing pace of diplomatic activity between the U.S. and
Vietnam, especially in the area of trade, provides a viable opportunity
for our country to take a firm stand for freedom and democracy in a
land that we have sacrificed 58,000 of our best and brightest for those
same ideals. Our country should not grant Most Favored Nation
privileges to communist Vietnam unless and until Hanoi respects the
rights of its own citizens to speak, worship, and assemble freely. We
should make Hanoi account for its own conduct if it wants the full
privilege of free trade with our country.
If we are to trade with Vietnam, we should trade with a conscience,
never forgetting that principles of freedom have led this nation to
economic greatness. Respect for the basic tenets of freedom is
consistent with and can even promote a healthy economic climate in a
free market economy. We should stand on the side of the Vietnamese
people, not with their oppressor. Our long-term investment in Vietnam
should be in its citizens, not with its oppressive government.
Vietnam has not made sufficient progress on free emigration or
improvements in its human rights conduct to justify a waiver of
Jackson-Vanik. We call on you to intervene with the Administration by
requesting the President to not waive the requirements of Jackson-Vanik
at this time.
Thank you for your concern and assistance in this important issue.
Sincerely yours,
Venerable Thich Minh Dung, Executive Director, Vietnamese Inter-faith
Council in the USA
Huynh Quoc Binh, President, Vietnamese Community of Oregon
Tran Van Luan, President, Vietnamese Community of Seattle, Washington
Do Trong Duc, President, Vietnamese Community of Southern California
Lai Duc Hung, Secretary General, Alliance of Vietnamese Associations in
Northern California
Dr. Tran Luong Ngoc Ho, President, Vietnamese Amercian Community of
Illinois
Nguyen Cao Quyen, Chairman, Vietnamese Community of Washington, D.C.,
Virginia, and Maryland
Le Anh Tuan, President, Vietnamese Community of Boston, Massachusetts
Dominic Thac Pham, President, Vietnamese Community of Georgia
Dr. Bui Quang Tien, President, Federation of Vietnamese-American
Associations of San Diego
Tran Van Dang, Chairman, Vietnamese Community of New York
Nguyen Cao My, President, Vietnamese Community of Houston & Vicinity
Tu Van Be, Chairman, Vietnamese Community of Oklahoma
Nguyen Thua Long, President, Vietnamese Community of Louisiana
Tran Anh Tuan, President, Vietnamese Association of Charlotte, North
Carolina
Hinh Van Nam, President, Vietnamese Community of Clark County,
Washington
Pham Van Yen, President, Vietnamese Community of Minnesota
Tran Giao, President, Vietnamese Community of Northwest New Jersey
Nguyen Ngoc Thu, President, Vietnamese Community of Northwest
Pennsylvania
Nguyen Loi, President, Vietnamese Community of Syracuse, New York
Nguyen Van An, President, Vietnamese Community of Endicott, New York
Nguyen Vinh, President, Vietnamese Community of Utica, New York
Nguyen Van Tuong, President, Vietnamese Community of Dallas, Texas
Dr. Nguyen Van Chat, President, Vietnamese Community of Fort Worth,
Texas
__________
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Letter Submitted by Senator Bob Smith of New Hampshire
March 10, 1998.
The Honorable Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D.C. 20510.
Dear Jesse:
I want to add my own special welcome to John Sommer, Executive
Director of The American Legion, who is testifying before you this
morning on Vietnam issues.
Although John is not a constituent of mine, he is, nonetheless,
someone I have worked closely with for several years. I have always
been impressed with his principles, his dedication to the people of
Vietnam, and his outspoken concerns for American POWs amd MIAs still
unaccounted for from the war.
I am pleased you have invited him to appear this morning on behalf
of our Nation's largest national veterans service organization, The
American Legion. I have no doubt you will agree with much of John's
testimony on behalf of his fine organization.
I thank you, as always, for your continued efforts to resolve those
issues that still provent the United States and communist Vietnam from
fully healing the wounds of war.
With warmest regards,
Bob Smith,
United States Senate.