

**IRAQ: CAN SADDAM BE OVERTHROWN?**

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**HEARING**  
BEFORE THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND  
SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS  
OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS  
SECOND SESSION

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## IRAQ: CAN SADDAM BE OVERTHROWN?

MONDAY, MARCH 2, 1998

U.S. SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN  
AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:50 p.m. in Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Brownback, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Senators Brownback and Robb.

Senator BROWNBACK. Let us call the hearing to order, if we could, and have our first witness, if you would care to go ahead, and you can sit up front, if you would like to.

I would like to welcome everyone to this very important hearing on Iraq, and I thank our witnesses for agreeing to testify, particularly on such short notice.

The Secretary-General's agreement with Iraq has generated a great deal of criticism, and most of it, I think, is well-deserved. For that, though, I do not fault Mr. Annan. Barring his own personal responsibility for some highly inappropriate statements about U.N. inspectors, who I believe to be real heroes, the fact is that Mr. Annan works for the Security Council.

The problem is truly quite simple, if also very difficult to resolve. Despite Mr. Annan's statements that Saddam can be trusted, the truth is that he cannot. Why? Because he does not want to give up his weapons of mass destruction and desire for regional domination, so unless we are prepared to keep sanctions on Iraq forever, we must be prepared to do something about the root cause of the problem, and that is Saddam Hussein himself.

The question before us today is how. The United States has in the past backed the Iraqi National Congress, an umbrella group for many of the different factions inside Iraq. Many critics believe that the INC no longer has the networks on the ground or the cohesiveness to present a real challenge.

I understand we have also backed the Iraqi National Court, a group of Iraqi ex-military men. Most of them were killed back in 1996, but neither of these groups, nor anyone else, has changed the bottom line Saddam Hussein is still in power.

Today, I would like our witnesses to think about the following question: What can the United States do to ratchet up pressure on Saddam?

Given the past failures of the opposition and the unwillingness of U.S. officials to back them up, is it realistic to support any oppo-

sition group? Even if the U.S. went forward with a program to stabilize or oust Saddam, can anyone seriously hope to dislodge him?

Our witnesses today are Mr. Ahmed Chalabi, president of the Iraqi National Congress. We also have presenting the Hon. R. James Woolsey, the former director of the CIA, and Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad of the Rand Corporation.

This is a difficult hearing, but one which must be held. If the problem is Saddam, we must see if there are alternatives to him, and God help us all around the world here and in Iraq as we consider these and deliberate on this topic.

We will have tough questions for the panelists. We need tough questions to be put forward to you and very clear answers from you as much as we possibly can, so we will look forward to your testimony.

I am delighted that joining me today is the ranking member of the subcommittee as well, Senator Robb from Virginia, who has a statement to make, and we may have some other members joining us as well as we go along, but Senator Robb, if you have a comment.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing. It is obviously an important hearing. We are dealing with a very sensitive and dicey subject matter, and almost every Member of Congress has his or her own prescription for how to resolve the current dilemma. That is one of the difficulties.

There are clear precedents for many of the activities that have been suggested, and there are very clear dangers to the United States and the international community for our failure to successfully complete any one of a number of options that may be considered.

I would say this topic in particular deserves as much bipartisanism as we can bring to the table. It is one where I think that clearly our national interest is very much involved and at stake, and it would be my hope that not only in this hearing, obviously, but in all of our deliberations, that we would consider the implications of whatever we may have to say in terms of what effect it might have on those who are most intimately involved with the decisionmaking process and the consequences of failing to take or failing to complete actions that may be suggested.

So again, Mr. Chairman, I acknowledge that this is an extraordinarily important and certainly timely topic, but I think it is important that we exercise much caution as we proceed so that we do not provide anyone with misunderstandings that might complicate the process for those who actually have to make the very difficult decisions involved and in which all of us will be asked to provide our advice and counsel at the appropriate time.

But with that, I thank you for calling the hearing, for chairing the hearing, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Senator Robb.

Mr. Chalabi, as the president of the Executive Council of the Iraqi National Congress, will be our first witness. We are delighted to have you here. There has been much written about the Iraqi National Congress and what it has gone through, its continued viability today.

I look forward to your testimony and then we will have a number of questions for you afterwards, but welcome to the committee. The floor is yours.

**STATEMENT OF AHMED CHALABI, PRESIDENT OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS, LONDON, ENGLAND**

Mr. CHALABI. Thank you very much, Senator.

I am honored to be here this afternoon to speak to your distinguished committee. Let me start by saying that I am Ahmed Chalabi, president of the Executive Council of the Iraqi National Congress. I am here as an elected representative of the Iraqi people, and in their name I am proud to speak with you today.

I think that it is important that the appeal of the Iraqi people for freedom be heard by the American people whom you represent. For too long, U.S.-Iraq policy has been decided by a small group of so-called experts who view the Iraqi people as incapable of self-government, as a people who require a brutal dictatorship to live and work together. Such a view is racist. It runs counter to 7,000 years of Iraqi history and to the universality of the principles of liberty and democracy central to United States foreign policy.

I am here today to appeal to the larger America, the America that believes in liberty and justice for all. I welcome the opportunity.

Iraq is the most strategically important country in the Middle East. It has a central geographical position, a talented and industrious population, abundant farmland and water, and lakes and lakes of oil. Iraq has the largest oil reserves of any nation on Earth. Iraq has so much oil that most of the country is still unexplored. This enormous wealth, this enormous potential is the birthright of the Iraqi people. It has been stolen from them by a tyrant.

You must realize that the Iraqi people are Saddam's first victims. Saddam and his gang of thugs took absolute power in 1968. Since that time, the Iraqi people have been driven into slavery, murdered by the hundreds of thousands, and shackled to a rapacious war machine responsible for the deaths of millions and, if the appeasement recently negotiated by the United Nations Secretary-General, now being debated in the United Nations Security Council, is allowed to stand, it is the Iraqi people who will be the first to suffer another slaughter.

Kofi Annan went to Baghdad to negotiate with Saddam Hussein. Kofi Annan is proud of the fact. Kofi Annan said that the agreement he negotiated was different, because he negotiated with President Saddam Hussein himself. Kofi Annan praised Saddam as a decisive man, as a man he could do business with, as a man whose concern was for his people.

Saddam is a mass murderer who is personally responsible for the genocidal slaughter of at least 200,000 Iraqi Kurds, 250,000 other Iraqis, Arabs in this case, and tens of thousands of Iraqi dissidents in the last 10 years.

Max van der Stoel, the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Iraq, has documented the repression of Iraq as the gravest violation of human rights since the second world war.

I might add that the Secretary-General has ignored last year's diplomatically inconvenient conclusions of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and the United Nations General Assembly, deploring Saddam's atrocities. The Iraqi people cannot ignore this horror. They must live with it every minute of their lives.

I have fought Saddam from the very first days of his terror. I have lost family members, thousands of friends and associates, and millions of countrymen to Saddam's death machine. I am sickened to see the Secretary-General of the United Nations smile and joke and shake hands with this despot.

I am only comforted by the fact that the civilized world and the American people will not stand for it. The U.S. House of Representatives and the United States Secretary of State have and soon, I hope, the U.S. Senate will call for Saddam's indictment on charges of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The evil of Saddam must be confronted with the strong arm of justice, not with the limp handshake of appeasement.

To make matters even worse, the Secretary-General also found it expedient to criticize UNSCOM, the United Nations Special Commission charged with disarming Saddam's nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile programs.

Kofi Annan called Captain Scott Ritter and UNSCOM inspectors cowboys, and implied that they should respect Saddam's sovereignty. I know from my own sources in Baghdad that Scott Ritter is an American hero. During the June 1996 stand-off with Saddam, while Scott Ritter was parked outside the infamous Abu Ghayb Prison and Presidential complex, Uday Hussein, Saddam's son, issued orders to a band of his drunken friends to have him assassinated.

The attack was carried out, but by the grace of God and the dissolution of the attackers it failed. In their drunken state, the men machine-gunned the Nissan Patrol of the Iraqi minders rather than that of the inspectors.

Scott Ritter is no cowboy. He is a former United States marine who fought against Saddam in the Gulf War and has been working selflessly for the United Nations to make Saddam honor the terms of the cease-fire ever since. Rather than attack him, the Secretary-General would do well to honor him. He is one of the best warriors the international community has produced in its quest to control Saddam's weapons of mass destruction.

But perhaps the Secretary-General's craven behavior does reflect the hard reality. Iraq will never be free of weapons of mass destruction as long as Saddam is in power. Iraq will never be at peace with its neighbors as long as Saddam's war machine is in place.

United Nations diplomats treat Saddam as Iraq's legitimate government. They cannot be expected to work for his removal from power. That is the work of the Iraqi people; and I say to you, in the name of the Iraqi people, Saddam is the problem. He can never be part of any solution.

The Iraqi people do not support Saddam Hussein. They never have, and they never will. God knows, they do not support Saddam's insane acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction. The Iraqi people know full well the horror of chemical and bi-

ological weapons. Saddam has gassed both the Iraqi Kurds and the Iraqi Arabs, killing tens of thousands of them. Thousands more Iraqi political prisoners have been subjected to torture and experiments with chemical and biological toxins.

Saddam's chemical and biological warfare industry enslaves tens of thousands of Iraqis who are virtually unprotected from the poisonous production. All of Iraq is threatened with annihilation if Saddam is ever able to launch the war of Middle Eastern domination he intends.

The Iraqi National Congress is committed to a future Iraq without weapons of mass destruction, to a future Iraq which renounces aggression as State policy, and to a future Iraq at peace with all its neighbors.

The Iraqi National Congress asks your help in removing the threat of Saddam's doomsday weapons from our people, from the region, and from the world. Helping the Iraqi people regain their country is the only solution. Saddam cannot be trusted. Saddam cannot be negotiated with. Saddam has proven that he will starve and murder every Iraqi and every person with the misfortune to fall under his control until he has enough horror weapons to dominate the Middle East and threaten the world. It is time to help the Iraqi people remove Saddam from power.

The only good thing about the agreement that was negotiated with Saddam was that it bought time and stopped a futile bombing campaign which would have killed thousands of Iraqis. Without the political program to accompany military action, military action is worse than useless. It is counterproductive.

Will you bomb my country now more than you did in 1991? Saddam does not care how many Iraqis are killed. He is executing and starving them himself by the tens of thousands right now. The Iraqi people do not need to be bombed for Saddam's sins. The Iraqi people need to be supported as they regain their country and reestablish Iraq as a productive member of the international community.

Such an Iraqi political program, consonant with both United States and Iraqi interests, is already in place in the Iraqi National Congress. The Iraqi National Congress was founded in 1992, with democratic conferences of Iraqi political forces in Vienna, Austria, and Salahuddin, Iraq.

The Salahuddin Conference of October 1992 was a defining moment in Iraqi politics. Parties from all over the country and all political strands came together on Iraqi soil and agreed to a future Iraqi representative government, organized as a parliamentary democracy. United States political support, particularly the support of the U.S. Congress, was critical in providing the hope of a free Iraq that was crucial in forging this consensus.

From mid-1988 until March 1991 there was an order, issued by the Secretary of State, that banned any member of the State Department from even meeting the Iraqi opposition. Pressure from Congress opened the door and led to the fruitful political discussion and past cooperation between the U.S. Government and the Iraqi National Congress. Cooperation can begin again, perhaps with another meeting of the Iraqi National Assembly in Washington, D.C.



to encompass the whole opposition and to elect a new leadership for the INC.

With United States political support and United States military protection, the Iraqi National Congress was able to build headquarters and bases inside Iraq, establish and program television and radio stations, organize medical clinics, and conduct intelligence and military operations against Saddam.

These activities were undertaken by Iraqis on Iraqi territory, using primarily Iraqi resources. At the height of the INC's operations, before Saddam was allowed to mass 400 Russian T-72 tanks against us, the INC directly employed nearly 7,000 Iraqis and had organized in-country networks involving thousands more. All were, and many are still, engaged in the fight against Saddam.

It is true that INC was hurt when Saddam's tanks were allowed to invade Arbil, our headquarters, slaughter our lightly armed troops, imprison and torture and execute our computer programmers, our TV engineers, and our medical relief staff. It is also true that the INC had open political assurances from the highest levels of the U.S. Government that the U.S. Government would protect the inhabitants of northern Iraq from Saddam's repression.

On the strength of these assurances, the INC did not acquire antitank defenses. In fact, the INC was actively discouraged by U.S. officials from doing so. We do not, and we hope you do not, intend to make the same mistake again.

It is important to realize that the strength of the Iraqi National Congress, as is the case with all democratic movements, is in the people of the country. Through INC broadcasts and INC networks and INC diplomacy, the INC is well-known inside Iraq and has a large but unorganized following.

I offer you an example with which you and your constituents might be familiar. During the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, the Iraqi Olympic flag-bearer defected to the Iraqi National Congress. Before his defection, he had never spoken to an INC member, and yet from INC radio he was familiar enough with the INC program for a democratic Iraq that within hours he was speaking for the INC on U.S. and international network television.

The INC's popular base is its greatest strength and Saddam's greatest weakness, and it is for this reason that I am here to ask for overt U.S. support, not covert U.S. action. Saddam can only be removed by a popular insurgency. He is coup-proof.

The Iraqi National Congress does not support the program now being attributed to the United States Central Intelligence Agency to use mercenary agents to conduct sabotage against the Iraqi people's infrastructure. The Iraqi National Congress rejects the Central Intelligence Agency's characterization of a small group of ex-Iraqi army officers as a major Iraqi opposition party.

The INC deplors the recent CIA-sponsored broadcasts promoting military rule in Iraq. It is not up to the CIA to determine Iraq's leadership. It is up to the Iraqi people.

The Iraqi National Congress is a democratic movement open to all Iraqi political parties. I am here in the name of the INC and the Iraqi people it represents to ask for an open U.S. commitment to support Iraqi democracy. Open U.S. support for the Iraqi Na-

tional Congress and the process of Iraqi democratic reconstruction is the best guarantee of U.S. interests.

International support for the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein has cost the Iraqi and the American people dearly. No matter what, another dictator cannot be allowed to replace Saddam. The cost to both our peoples would be enormous.

What should replace Saddam is a representative Iraqi Government. The Iraqi National Congress provides the Iraqi political movement. We look to the United States to provide the political, logistical, and military help the INC needs to confront and replace Saddam.

I want to emphasize that the INC does not request any U.S. occupying force. The Iraqi people are in Iraq. They already occupy Iraq. What is needed is not a U.S. army of occupation, but an Iraqi army of liberation.

Even so, United States leadership is required. Over 250,000 Iraqis were killed in 3 weeks after they heeded President Bush's call to rise against Saddam, only to find that General Schwarzkopf had carefully preserved and allowed the use of helicopter gunships and tanks that Saddam's thugs needed to slaughter the Iraqi people. They have the right to be afraid.

The regional States are also afraid. King Hussein of Jordan is a case in point. In 1995, he was enlisted by the United States in a hopeless coup-plot against Saddam Hussein from Jordanian territory. He was encouraged by the United States to call for Saddam's overthrow and yet, for the past month, senior U.S. officials in the administration have been at great pains to insist that they are not working to oust Saddam. Is it any wonder that King Hussein is now calling for dialog and reconciliation with the Iraqi dictator?

Absent U.S. leadership or a WMD capability, no regional State can stand against Saddam. The United States must lead. The United States cannot hide behind the fictions of United Nations enforcements or the will of the international coalition.

It was U.S. force that devastated Iraq in 1991. It is U.S. force that is on war alert in the Gulf now. Saddam knows he is at war with the United States, and I am sure that the United States servicemen and women deployed in the Gulf know this also, yet the Iraqi people do not resent this force. They embrace it.

This week, I was talking to Colonel Ken Bryer, now in the Pentagon's Office of Low Intensity Conflict, who recounted his experiences with tens of thousands of Iraqi POW's after the cease-fire. To a man, he said, their complaint was not that the United States had fought Saddam, but that the United States had not helped the Iraqi people remove Saddam from power.

The Iraqi National Congress believes that the proper response to Saddam Hussein's continued violation of the Gulf War cease-fire, to his continued criminal repression of the Iraqi people, and to his ongoing campaign of international terror is an open United States commitment to the overthrow of Saddam and to the establishment of a representative Iraqi Government.

Immediate actions include a United States declaration that Saddam is in material breach of United Nations Security Council resolution 687, the Gulf cease-fire resolution, and a United States declaration of military exclusion zones, in which Saddam's armored

forces and his artillery would not be allowed to operate south of the 31st parallel, north of the 35th parallel, and west of the Euphrates River.

In these areas, the United States would lift sanctions and assist the INC in establishing institutions for humanitarian relief of the liberated population, the maintenance of law and order, and the provision of basic services leading to the establishment of an effective provisional government.

This provisional government would commit to restore the independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Iraq. As a means of international reconciliation, the United States would declare its willingness to work with the provisional government and concurrently move to indict Saddam and his top henchman under U.S. and international law.

The Iraqi National Congress has the operational experience to make such a plan work. Right now, the INC is confronting Saddam on the ground and has the support of thousands of Iraqis, and the INC knows that, given any chance of success, millions of Iraqis are willing to risk their lives to fight Saddam.

In March 1991, only 7 years ago, 70 percent of the Iraqi population, over 15 million people, were in open revolt against Saddam. They will rise again. Give the Iraqi National Congress a base, protected from Saddam's tanks, give us the temporary support we need to feed and house and care for the liberated population, and we will give you a free Iraq, an Iraq free of weapons of mass destruction and a free market Iraq.

Best of all, the INC will do all this for free. The U.S. commitment to the security of the gulf is sufficient. The maintenance of the no-fly zones and the air-interdiction of Saddam's armor by U.S. forces assumed in the INC plan is virtually in place. The funds for humanitarian, logistical, and military assistance requested by the INC for the provisional government can be secured by Iraq's frozen assets, which are the property of the Iraqi people.

Once established in liberated areas, the wealth of the Iraqi people can be used for their salvation. All the Iraqi National Congress and the Iraqi people ask is a chance to free their country.

Seven years ago, the United States thought it had won a war with Saddam. The Iraqi people knew it was not so. In these 7 years we have fought and we have died in the hundreds of thousands at the hands of Saddam Hussein. Now that Saddam again threatens not only the Iraqi people but the region and the world, the Iraqi people ask you to give us the tools and let us finish the job.

Saddam is the Iraqi people's problem, and we are prepared to bear any burden to remove him from power. All we ask is a chance to free ourselves. We look to the United States to give us that chance.

Thank you.

Senator BROWBACK. Mr. Chalabi, you put forward a very powerful statement. There are a number of questions that I want to ask you about that, and I hope none of them are interpreted by you or anybody else as a lack of resolve or a question on this Senator's part, but simply that there are a number of logistical questions that people have about the viability in this area.

A number of us strongly support destabilizing Saddam Hussein, recognizing that the problem is Saddam, it is not the Iraqi people, and that we have got to get rid of the problem. We have a lot of questions about whether we can get just that done, and I do not want to trivialize at all the number of lives that have been lost by the Iraqi people in fighting Saddam, and your own statement about even the number of family members that you have lost is very touching to me, and I note those, and I know you have paid a very heavy price for standing up to this dictator and I thank you for it, and the American people thank you for that.

But I want to ask you some direct questions. The basic—and it is probably—this will boil everything down to the nutshell of it, is most of the American people, if not all of the American people support the removal of Saddam.

In 1991 we had half-a-million troops on the ground of a multilateral force in the region. We had defeated his army, and yet we did not remove that regime from power. What kind of commitment would be involved were the United States to commit itself to this goal now that we did not get accomplished in 1991?

Mr. CHALABI. Senator, in 1991 let me say that Saddam was almost overthrown. 14 out of 18 provinces were in open rebellion against him. It was only the decision by the U.S. Government to permit Saddam to use combat helicopters and tanks that crushed the uprising. I know for a fact from many people, generals who were with Saddam at the time who had defected to us since, that Saddam was finished. It was only the permission given by General Schwarzkopf to Saddam's generals to use combat helicopters and to permit the use of armor that crushed the rebellion.

But you ask, what now? I do not believe that there is a need for U.S. ground troops to enter Iraqi territory. I believe that the military exclusion zones we are asking for can be enforced from the air. I believe, Senator, that this will be confirmed to you by many military experts in those areas, and limited exclusion zones. Saddam's tanks and artillery will either have to defect to the opposition or to leave the area.

This is the place where the Iraqi people will establish a provisional government. We have experience with that. When people believed that Iraqi Kurdistan in the north was a safe haven, we went there on the ground, established ourselves, and established a very effective program of countering Saddam, of confronting Saddam, and of dealing with officers and soldiers and bureaucrats and officials and ministers within Saddam's government, so we have experience with that.

We need a commitment, a political commitment and a military commitment in terms of establishing the military exclusion zone for us to operate.

And we believe that we are not calling for a civil war. Saddam's divisions, even his Republican Guards, will come over to us. This was demonstrated by us in 1995, when we carried out operations against Saddam with no U.S. support and with some active U.S. discouragement at the time.

We were able to knock out two divisions and over 1,000 officers and men came over to us. They were interviewed by U.S. military intelligence personnel, who could verify to you the state of mind of

these people and how they wanted to come over to us. We can attract Saddam's military if we have a base on Iraqi territory to operate from.

Senator BROWNBACK. You noted in your testimony that your coalition was harmed significantly when Saddam was able to move into an area in the north and attack a number of people associated with your coalition. What is the current status of your coalition today, the Iraqi National Congress? Can you give us some description of where it stands today as a group, and the number of people or groups that you have working with your coalition today?

Mr. CHALABI. The Iraqi National Congress continues to have the membership of most of its original founders. Very few of the people who founded the Congress have pulled out. However, several important members hold their membership in abeyance now. That is because of two things. First, we lost Iraqi Kurdistan in the north as a base to operate from. It is no longer a friendly area, because Saddam has penetrated that area. That is one of the reasons that people hold their membership in abeyance.

And the other factor is, people perceive the United States to have pulled their support from us, which is true. We have received no United States support for at least 18 months now.

Now, we say that we are in a much better position than we were at 1992, when we established the Iraqi National Congress. There was nothing there. Now, we have people working and reporting from Iraq, reporting on activities and carrying out operations.

To give you some examples, we brought out the names of 160 people, specific details, about those people who were executed by Saddam in December.

We have on our Web site on the Internet a whole list of the Iraqi intelligence organizations, their members, their personnel, where they live, and the structures of these organizations.

In addition, I will give you another example of how we can operate inside Iraq. There is a campaign where the Iraqi National Congress is participating in the international campaign to indict Saddam. We were able to distribute a letter from the leader of this campaign, Ann Klueck, a member of the British Parliament, through the military mail of the Republican Guard, to 75 leading officers asking them to help us indict Saddam, on their desks. This caused major furor.

I can go through many things. However, I would say to you that I have reason to believe that, given an indication of U.S. support, the Iraqi people, through their political parties, will come over. The Kurds are a case in point.

The Kurdish parties now have been told by the United States that northern Iraq is no longer of interest to the United States. They were told this by leading officials in 1996, and that the north is not of strategic interest. The south is.

They have little choice but to try to accommodate themselves with Saddam. This is the reality. Saddam is the head of a totalitarian regime. If the Iraqi people do not get help, and if they do not feel the Iraqi National Congress which represents their aspirations does not have United States support, they cannot hold a hope for success. Given your support, we can be stronger than we ever were.

Senator BROWNBACK. And you believe that if we establish these military exclusion zones, the parameters of which you described, that the safe havens will flourish? If we just establish those military exclusion zones, you believe strongly that that will indeed occur?

Mr. CHALABI. No. It is not an automatic process. We have to have the means to go in there and to manage this operation. We have plans for this. We have plans for both civil and military things to do.

The first 10 days, the first 20 days, the first 100 days, it is not an automatic thing. We need support and we need funds that are required to make this thing run.

Senator BROWNBACK. Let me go at you very particularly on this point and, again, I mean no disrespect at all. You have suffered a great deal, and the Iraqi people have as well, but two of the major Kurdish groups have not been able to remain at peace with each other.

How can we expect the INC to hang together well enough to fight Saddam to maintain a viable coalition government even after he is no longer in power, if we were successful in doing that? Would we be able to, and what assurances can you give us that that would occur?

Mr. CHALABI. Senator, the Kurdish civil war is one of the greatest tragedies in modern Iraqi history. It is a personal tragedy for me, because it has shown me how fragile Saddam has made the Iraqi body politic, but let me tell you this, the Kurds are primarily to blame for fighting each other.

However, the Kurds overcame decades of rivalry and were united in the Iraqi National Congress for 2 years. They held up—they were given no hope. The feeling that they had was the United States will not assist the Iraqi National Congress in removing Saddam.

I will tell you an incident that has happened in Salahuddin. A high-level American delegation from the State Department and the NSC came to northern Iraq and met with both Kurdish leaders in my presence. In the first meeting with Mr. Massoud Barzani they were quite happy—in fact, they were ecstatic about the achievements that we have made.

They turned to Mr. Barzani and said to him, what can we do to raise the profile of the INC? He said, help us take the city of Mussad, in northern Iraq. It is an Arab city.

There was stunned silence. They said nothing, and the subject was never opened again. After they left, he turned to me and said, look, they are leading us down a blind alley. That is the kind of situation that prevailed then.

However, the Iraqi National Congress was very successful in conflict resolution and policing the cease-fire when the fighting broke out. We succeeded in stopping the fighting and helping to negotiate an agreement between the Kurdish parties. We were for 6 months we deployed about 1,200 troops to separate the two sides. We were promised U.S. help. No help was given to us. We ran out of resources. We pulled them out. The fighting started again in 1995.

Until Saddam came to Arbil there were seven meetings chaired by the United States State Department. At every time, every one

of those meetings, we are about to reach an agreement which requires funding, which was finally reduced to \$1 million to start operation and it would be self-funding.

The U.S. delegates would feel very encouraged, and when they are in the meetings they say, we will go and get everything. They go back to Washington, silence for 2 months until fighting restarts, and they start again.

We believe that we are successful at conflict resolution. We believe that we are successful in resolving the differences that may arise, and you can test that as we go along. Our performance is the answer to the guarantees.

I cannot give you a guarantee of the future. What I can tell you, measure me, judge me as I go along. Judge us as we go along.

Senator BROWNBACK. I want to have another round of questioning to come back to, but I would note the Foreign Relations Committee hopes to take up shortly an indictment resolution on Saddam Hussein, as one of the statements that you have made and a number of us believe should be taken and brought on forward as well.

We would like to go another round of questioning, but for the moment I will turn it over to Senator Robb.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chalabi, I think that you may have been alluding, in your last response to the chairman's question, to the specific sentence from your testimony that I would like to inquire about first, since you are on that topic.

You said, and I quote, it is also true that the INC had open political assurances from the highest level of the U.S. Government that the U.S. Government would protect the inhabitants of northern Iraq from Saddam's repression. There is not much ambiguity in that statement. Are you suggesting that the President of the United States directly conveyed to you or to others the assurances that that statement would suggest?

Mr. CHALABI. The Vice President did so in a letter addressed to me dated August 4, 1996—1993, I am sorry.

He says in that letter the President and I will continue to support the coalition and prevent Saddam from repressing the inhabitants of Northern Iraq. That letter exists. I have a copy of it.

Senator ROBB. And you interpreted that to mean, in an absolute sense, that the United States would intervene directly against Saddam if he should attack any of the Kurdish opposition in northern Iraq?

Mr. CHALABI. Yes. Not only I interpreted it, but the thousands of people who came, and the hundreds who got killed. We established the INC bases in northern Iraq based on this letter, and the President said it to the INC delegation.

That letter goes on—it is quite detailed. It says that we will provide—he said Secretary Christopher, National Security Advisor Lake and myself have given you solid commitments to help you establish a democratic Iraq.

Senator ROBB. To establish a democratic Iraq, *et cetera*, but—

Mr. CHALABI. The first clause, yes, about protecting the inhabitants of northern Iraq from Saddam.

Senator ROBB. But you interpreted that to mean direct military intervention by the United States. Did you have any followup correspondence with anyone in authority to provide that kind of assurance that such a reaction or plan of action was actually contemplated in response to any of the actions that the Kurdish opposition in northern Iraq might have been contemplating?

Mr. CHALABI. I had many discussions over that period, but I was mostly in northern Iraq. I stayed most of my time in northern Iraq from 1995 until 1996. I had no reason to believe the United States would not protect the area from Saddam. They had the no-fly zone.

Senator ROBB. Again, I am not attempting to debate at this point. I am just trying to make sure that I understand the nature of the commitment that you have suggested and the nature of the communications, and any implications that flow from it.

Mr. CHALABI. I have had verbal assurances from various U.S. officials that, in fact, the United States will not stand idly by and let Saddam march into the northern safe haven.

Senator ROBB. But were you ever given any specific reason to believe that there were forces tasked to respond to a specific provocation by Saddam?

Mr. CHALABI. There were U.S. aircraft flying all over northern Iraq. I believe that those aircraft would have been there flying on a daily basis.

Senator ROBB. In other words, your reliance on the characterization of the correspondence that you just alluded to from the Vice President was based on your belief that whatever protection rendered would have been from the air assets that were flying out of the northern launching points for U.N. and U.S. no-fly suppression?

Mr. CHALABI. Yes, sir. Those aircraft we believe were there to protect the inhabitants.

Senator ROBB. Do you think those aircraft themselves would have been adequate to provide the kind of protection you have suggested?

Mr. CHALABI. More than adequate, sir, had they bombed a few times Saddam's tanks.

Senator ROBB. What would you have desired the aircraft that were operating in the northern no-fly zone to do that they did not do?

Mr. CHALABI. They did not interfere with Saddam's massing of his armor against the city of Arbil. It took him about 11 days to do that, and they did not prevent him from launching his attack when he did against the city of Arbil with 400 tanks, but we believe they could have done it.

Senator ROBB. I do not want to pursue this beyond where we are right now in this forum, but you believe that you had a commitment to act against that kind of a buildup? I will just leave it at that.

Mr. CHALABI. OK.

Senator ROBB. But that was your understanding?

Mr. CHALABI. Our understanding was yes.

Senator ROBB. OK. Let me ask you another question that relates to the latter part of your testimony, and that regards the funding.



The very last paragraph of your prepared testimony you said, best of all the INC will do all of this for free, and then you talk about the number of assets that the international community and specifically the United States already has in place and then you talk about, military assistance requested by the INC for the provisional government can be secured by Iraq's frozen assets, which are the property of the Iraqi people.

First of all, do you know what constitute the frozen assets, and by what claim do those belong to the Iraqi people?

Mr. CHALABI. Those are held now in the name of the Iraqi Government, and they are frozen. We know there are claims against them from American companies who have debts now. However, those assets are still held in the name of the Iraqi Government.

If there is a provisional government and if Saddam is delegitimated, then one would expect that it would be possible, although complicated, for the United States to say that we can block a certain amount of these funds and lend money against them to the provisional government. That is the idea.

Senator ROBB. Again, I am in sympathy, empathy with the desire to find an alternative to the current government in Iraq, make no mistake about that, but I want to also make sure that we understand, even on the basis of your statement, what you are asking the United States to do.

Now, as you suggested, what are referred to as frozen Iraqi assets are, in fact, international claims, international payments that happen to be frozen because of the fortuity of that particular action. They do not represent the kind of assets that would provide a base of support.

I know they have been referred to by any number of commentators as a source of potential funding because of the difficulty of the process of direct appropriations here in the United States for activities that might be either overt, covert, whatever the case may be, and a current desire to find a "pot of money," but it is important to understand what those assets represent and what they do not represent in terms of essentially government assets that are available to some other entity that might represent in provisional form the people of Iraq.

Is this the only way that you can see to fund any potential provisional opposition by the Iraqi National Congress and others that might be brought into some common undertaking to eventually displace, without going into details, Saddam and his current regime?

Mr. CHALABI. No, Senator. There are several other alternatives. There is an alternative of, if the United States would support the provisional government it can appropriate money for a loan to this provisional government which would be repaid immediately out of oil that would be produced from the areas in the south.

Senator ROBB. To whom would the U.S. Government appropriate this loan, I think is the way you are describing it?

Mr. CHALABI. To the provisional government that would be established, the Iraqi provisional government. Sir, this has been done in the past. The money was given to the president of Haiti from Haitian accounts in Panama. It was done the same way, also. There are precedents farther back.

The point is that it is a legal issue. If the United States, as a sovereign State, decides that Saddam no longer represents the Iraqi people, that he has hijacked the territory he is in, and that somebody else represents the Iraqi people, they can with all due process provide a loan to this other entity, which they would—which they are ready to deal with.

That also would be enforced by an indictment against Saddam. How can he be legitimate if he is indicted as a war criminal?

Senator ROBB. As you know, there are some technical and legal complications that are involved, but I will not go into those right now. My time on the first round has expired.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Senator Robb.

Do you have a copy of the letter from the Vice President with you, Mr. Chalabi?

Mr. CHALABI. Yes, I do, but not on me right now. I can produce it. I have it here in Washington.

Senator BROWNBACK. Would you give that to the committee, and we will enter it into the record.

Mr. CHALABI. I will do so, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

THE VICE PRESIDENT,  
Washington, DC,  
August 4, 1993.

Mr. Ahmad Chalabi,  
*President of the Executive Council,*  
*Iraqi National Congress,*  
*Trevor House, 100 Brompton Road,*  
*London, SW3 1E8, United Kingdom.*

Dear Mr. Chalabi:

Thank you for your letter of May 12, 1993 on behalf of the distinguished leadership of the Iraqi National Congress (INC). It was a privilege for me to meet with these spokespersons for millions of oppressed Iraqi citizens and to convey my country's respect, admiration, and support. The President and I share the concerns you raise in your letter, and I assure you that we will not turn our backs on the Kurds or the other Iraqi communities subjected to the repression of Saddam Hussein's regime.

Our policy toward Iraq is clear. We insist on full Iraqi compliance with all of the United Nations Security Council resolutions. This includes U.N. Resolution 688, which demands an end to Iraq's repression of its people and highlights the plight of the Kurds. Since April 1991, coalition forces have protected the inhabitants of northern Iraq from Baghdad's repression, and the Administration is committed to continuing that effort.

The Administration also fully supports humanitarian relief efforts in Iraq and a robust U.N. guard presence there. We recently took the lead in organizing a donors conference in Geneva to assist the relief operations in northern Iraq, and we are seeking additional international funding for the U.N. escrow account that finances U.N. programs in Iraq.

Secretary Christopher, National Security Advisor Lake, and I made a solid commitment to INC representatives in our meetings, and we pledged our support for a democratic alternative to the Saddam Hussein regime. I can assure you that the U.S. intends to live up to these commitments and to give whatever additional support we can reasonable provide to encourage you in your struggle for a democratic Iraq.

Sincerely,

AL GORE

Senator BROWNBACK. I want to go into another particular line of questioning, if we could, on what happens to Iraq if Saddam is removed. I think we need to get him out of there, and he is the problem. But, obviously, one of the risks in supporting some of the

groups fighting against Saddam is that we may end up promoting the dissolution of Iraq, into a Kurdish state, a Shiite state, a Sunni state. And how do you see this risk, in happening? And that is what some experts are putting forward would actually happen.

What is your response to their assertion?

Mr. CHALABI. Sir, no Iraqi leader of any faction has called for the dissolution of Iraq. The Kurdish leaders of Iraq have not called for an independent Kurdistan in Iraq. The Shia have no reason to secede from Iraq. They happen to be a majority of the population, as a sect.

However, it is only experts in Washington and other capitals who say that there is a danger of the dissolution of Iraq. Let me put it to you this way. How would a Kurdish state survive? It would be surrounded. It has no ports. It has no access to the world except through Iran, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. And all of them would be hostile to it.

Why would the Kurdish leaders do that? They have no reason to do it. And the links that are forged between the Iraqi population as a whole will demonstrate to you that the Kurds have very little incentive to do that.

As for the Shia and the Sunnis, they are both Arabs. Iraq preceded Saddam. If we go into history, one will discover that there was a parliamentary government in Iraq under the Monarchy. The parliament was not perfect, but there were elections. The elections were no more corrupt than the British elections of a century ago—1860, for example. There were elections. There were cabinets, and they had to get a vote of confidence in parliament. Iraq will not break up.

The other thing I would like to tell you is that the civil service in Iraq is not all lackeys of Saddam. They have experts. They have people who have demonstrated their ability to run things. That would still be in place.

Besides, there is another factor which is very important. One, we are calling for the indictment of Saddam and a handful of his closest associates. We are calling for an amnesty for everybody else. So that we can start the process of reconciliation.

The forces that are portrayed as splitting up Iraq are simply not there. The United States can play a role to stem foreign influences which would take advantage of the situation in Iraq. Iraq's neighbors have not shown restraint in dealing with Iraq.

I believe that the United States, externally, can contain the problem and can help the Iraqi people remain as one country.

Senator BROWNBACK. You call for the United States to establish these military exclusion zones by some support. No one can foresee the future, but how long would you project you would need U.S. protection of these zones established in the region if we were to go forward with such a strategy?

Mr. CHALABI. Sir, I think this would not be a very lengthy process.

Why do I say that? My view is that if Saddam loses the access to the sea and loses most of Iraq's oil production—and anyway, he would have no way to get it out to the world, and he would lose his access to the world—the people around Saddam who are very

close to him would begin to question his capability of getting out of this.

We have experience with that, again, when we were established in Iraqi Kurdistan in the north. We had many contacts from leading elements within Saddam's government who wanted some sign that we would be supported to take power in Iraq. And they have said that they would be prepared to deal with us.

If these things—if the issue of a military exclusion is established and if we have a presence in those zones, and we are—it is perceived that we have the support of the United States, by enforcing this military exclusion zone, we believe that almost virtually all Saddam's military force, within a matter of months, will be over.

I would remind you here, Senator, that the United States thought that they were going to have a no-fly zone for a short period of time. We are 7 years now.

Senator BROWNBACK. Yes.

Mr. CHALABI. Yes. I mean, half measures will drag on. Full measures will come to closure.

Senator BROWNBACK. What does it do to the Iraqi people and to your group, with the administration here saying, well, we are not going to actively insist on the ouster of Saddam? You note that in your statement, that this has created difficulties for you. What does that do to you?

Mr. CHALABI. It removes—you see, people think of the United States in the Middle East as able to do almost everything. You do not think so. Many Americans do not think so. But the impression that people have of the United States in the Middle East is that it can do a lot. If the United States says, Saddam, we do not want to remove Saddam or we are not working to remove him, they conclude they want him to stay. That is devastating for the Iraqi people and for opposition forces. And it is devastating for the regional states who want to oppose Saddam, when they hear that the United States does not want to remove him, and they seek to come to some compromise with him.

Senator BROWNBACK. So let me put the corollary to that. What if we declare that our objective is the destabilization and ultimately the ouster of Saddam Hussein?

Mr. CHALABI. If you declare that and if you then take practical steps to demonstrate your seriousness, almost everybody in the Middle East, in the Arab world, will fall in line behind you.

Senator BROWNBACK. Senator Robb, another round?

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just to be clear on the last point that you made, if we take practical steps, the steps that you outlined, which would in effect constitute a continuation of current activities, plus some means to fund the activities of the Iraqi National Congress, is that what you are suggesting would be practical steps? Or are you suggesting something that would involve more overt and specific military action directed against Saddam Hussein or the leadership structure in Iraq?

Mr. CHALABI. Sir, I would suggest, first, a political action. Which is working to indict Saddam Hussein. This is not military action. This is a political statement and a pursuit of a political and judicial objective by the United States. This would be taken very seriously,

as a fact that the United States will not deal with Saddam as they would not deal with Karadich, for example.

Senator ROBB. I am not quarreling with that. And I understand that.

Mr. CHALABI. The next thing that would be required is some form of demonstrable support for the opposition, a place where the opposition can operate from Iraq, as they did back before 1996 August, from northern Iraq, where they were established with perceived United States protection.

Senator ROBB. But, again, does that involve, then, in your—in the case that you are suggesting, a specific commitment to use military force, whatever force might be necessary, to protect an area from Saddam's tanks, aggression of any kind, so that the Iraqi National Congress or some other fully constituted body or opposition body could operate with relative impunity in that area?

Mr. CHALABI. Sir, we require an umbrella until we are armed ourselves by adequate weaponry.

Senator ROBB. But, again, umbrella can be a somewhat ambiguous way to describe it. Again, you specifically took issue with the failure to provide what you believed was the necessary support in northern Iraq in a previous instance. What are you suggesting the United States would make a commitment to do to fulfill the kind of an obligation that you have just suggested?

Mr. CHALABI. To interdict the movement of Saddam's tanks and artillery from the air. That is the extent of what—

Senator ROBB. In other words, a no-fly, no-drive zone in and around the protected area would constitute, in your judgment, the practical limitations of the kind of support that you believe is necessary?

Mr. CHALABI. Direct U.S. military support, plus acquiring arms, weapons, for us to deal with the smaller issues.

Senator ROBB. By acquiring arms, you mean providing arms or providing resources so that you can acquire arms?

Mr. CHALABI. Either, sir. Either one will do. There are plenty of arms around the world available. If we have the resources, we can buy them. But we prefer that the United States provides them.

Senator ROBB. Well, this is departing just a bit from what was described earlier as free. Again, I am not attempting to take issue with you specifically, because I share and I think that the chairman is correct in saying that virtually all Members of Congress, and certainly the administration believes, that the Iraqi people would be far better off in a post-Saddam environment than they are today. I do not think anyone would question that. The means to accomplish that particular objective are disputed.

Let me ask one other question.

Mr. CHALABI. But, sir, may I say that if the decision is made to provide a loan to the provisional government, then part of this money would be used to purchase those things.

Senator ROBB. I understand that aspect of it. Again, I am going back to what additional commitment the United States would have to make to permit you and the Iraqi National Congress and any others who might act in concert with you to carry out the mission that you believe would ultimately result in a new government for the Iraqi people.

Mr. CHALABI. Yes.

Senator ROBB. And as I say, we share the ultimate objective.

You made a specific point of singling out King Hussein of Jordan in your testimony earlier, about having been enlisted by the United States in a hopeless coup attempt against Saddam Hussein from Jordanian territory, *et cetera*. I understand that Jordanian officials have raised some serious questions about activities that you may have been connected with, with Petrobank. For clarification and for our understanding of the relationship, and particularly the transfers of money that might be involved, could you clarify any misunderstandings that might exist on that front?

Mr. CHALABI. Yes, sir. If you recall, during the eighties and the early nineties, Jordan was an ally of Saddam Hussein. I have and my family has a very longstanding relationship with the Jordanian Royal family. And we were invited to make this institution in Jordan.

I built this institution. However, my opposition to Saddam Hussein was known. In 1989, Saddam exerted pressure on the King. And the friends of Saddam came to power in Jordan. And I became a victim of a coup, a martial law coup, to take over this institution. And that is what happened. They took over the bank by a martial law coup. And they tried to run it for a year. They were unable to. They liquidated it. And I became a victim of a martial law military tribunal. That is the story.

Now, I have a written document, which I can provide for you, explaining this and explaining all these things. However, I should point out to you—

Senator ROBB. Let me just add that any information you have that would bear on this subject that you could provide to the committee would be very much appreciated.

Mr. CHALABI. I have that with me today. I can provide it to you.

However, I would like to point out to you that I met with King Hussein subsequent to that incident several times. And he embraced me and we talked about the political future of Iraq. I also met with the Crown Prince several times in public areas, and we continue to conduct a relationship with them. They tried to solve this problem, but the current situation on the ground in Jordan now is very difficult. They cannot appear to be helping a leading opponent of Saddam Hussein. They would run into difficulty inside the country.

Senator ROBB. But may I interpret from your response to that question that if the situation with respect to Saddam Hussein were resolved to the satisfaction of the Iraqi National Congress and the regional countries that are most concerned about his potential threats and intimidation in the absence of any resolution to this question, that the concern that has been expressed by Jordanian officials would disappear? That this is the type of concern that must remain alive in the context of the uncertain environment that we are experiencing today, but would not continue beyond the resolution of the Iraqi leadership question?

Mr. CHALABI. I believe so, sir. I think that any concern would disappear right away. But I believe that the leading Jordanian officials will tell you privately that the concern is no longer there.

Senator ROBB. Well, if you would provide that to the committee, it would be very much appreciated.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BROWNBACk. Thank you, Senator Robb.

Mr. Chalabi, thank you very much for your courage and your commitment. You have presented a very clear statement and commitment and concern and direction for us to be able to mull over. Some of those actions this committee will be taking up in considering shortly. So, thank you for that and Godspeed.

Mr. CHALABI. Thank you.

Senator BROWNBACk. We will call up the next panel, the Hon. R. James Woolsey, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency here in Washington, D.C.; Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad, Director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program, Project Air Force, for the RAND Corporation; and Dr. Richard N. Haass, Director of Foreign Policy Studies of the Brookings Institute.

We appreciate you gentlemen very much for being here and for sitting through the prior testimony. You may want to—and we will take all of your written statements in for the record. I think you can get a flavor of what the committee is interested. And certainly all of you are familiar with this discussion taking place. So I think you are very cognizant of what Congress is chewing on. And that is, how do we get rid of the real problem, and can we get rid of the real problem, which is Saddam Hussein?

And so we hope you can give us very clear and forthright testimony as we go forward.

Mr. Woolsey, we have got you first down on the program, so if you would care to present your statement, we would appreciate that. Thanks for joining us.

**STATEMENT OF R. JAMES. WOOLSEY, FORMER DIRECTOR,  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

Mr. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate the committee's indulgence. When I received the call about testifying today, late last week, I was out of town. I got back last night. So I have no prepared written statement. If it is all right, I will speak extemporaneously for just a few minutes on four points: What I perceive to be the essence of the problem, what mistakes we have made in the past, what we ought to do now, and what we ought not to do now.

As the chairman knows, I was Director of Central Intelligence from February 1993 to January 1995. And so for the last 3-plus years, I have been an outside observer of this issue, and I have no inside knowledge dating from after January 1995. In my judgment, the essence of the problem is the Baathist nationalist regime, which Saddam heads—it, and he as its head—are guilty of murder of both the Iraqi people, to a great extent, and also of aggression against Iraq's neighbors, on certainly more than one occasion.

This is a major matter for the United States, I believe, for three reasons. First of all, because of our concern for the Iraqi people and their neighbors, both those who are oppressed and those who would be oppressed if Saddam's aggression succeeds in the future. Second, his possession of weapons of mass destruction and the wherewithal to make more of them, and ballistic missiles to carry them. And,

third, the fact that this whole dispute sits right at the heart of approximately 80 percent of the world's proven oil reserves. About 65 percent of those reserves lie in the Persian Gulf, and perhaps another 15 percent or so in the basin of the Caspian Sea just north of the area we are talking about.

So approximately 80 percent of the world's oil reserves, over the long run, are essentially held by one of two types of regimes now: psychopathic predators, such as Saddam's regime, or vulnerable autocrats. And that is not a happy situation for the world, for any of us.

Second, what mistakes have we made in the past with respect to dealing with Iraq?

In my judgment, beginning almost in the closing hours of the Gulf War, at the end of the Bush administration and for the first 5-plus years of this administration, our policy with regard to Iraq has been both flaccid and feckless. We have had no long-run strategy for dealing with this nation and the threat that its government poses.

In 1991, as Mr. Chalabi said, we abandoned the Marsh Arabs, the Shia of the South, to being murdered in large numbers by Saddam's forces, when we had the forces there to stop it. In 1993, it was as demonstrable as these things ever get that Saddam and his regime attempted to assassinate former President George Bush. The U.S. Government, at the time, fired a few cruise missiles at night into an empty building so that no one would be hurt, a pin-prick response. And in 1996, when Saddam came north into Arbil, murdering hundreds of Iraqis, perhaps thousands, the United States and its military force, particularly its air power, also stood silent.

Why did we follow these policies from the spring of 1991 until today?

I believe there are two reasons. First, there has been a general view, I suppose, among government policymakers that it is better to bear those ills we have than fly to others that we know not of. People have been concerned to some extent about the dissolution of Iraq and the uncertainties that would be produced by some future absent Saddam. And, second, we have listened rather closely to some of Iraq's neighbors, our friends in Saudi Arabia and otherwise, who were particularly concerned about uncertainty.

On the whole, I believe this has been a bad call. It has been a mistake to avoid the uncertainty of the future and to believe we could deal with a weakened Saddam instead. I believe both the Bush administration and the Clinton administration have made that mistake.

Third, what should we do now?

We have not had a long-term strategy, and we need one. I agree with Mr. Chalabi, what we need is an open program, no more covert than absolutely necessary. I would hope that it could be entirely open. I might call it containment-plus, but that is a big plus.

I believe we need to espouse democracy and representative institutions for Iraq. I believe that the desire of the Iraqi people on this can be made clear and will become clear as that goal becomes more likely. I believe the Iraqi people and their neighbors and the world deserves an Iraqi Government with leaders who exhibit the values



for which Mr. Chalabi speaks, rather than the danger for all of us exhibited by Saddam's regime.

The only point at which I would differ with him is that I believe such a policy is not easy, and it may take years. We have already wasted over 6 years by the feckless and flaccid policy we have had since the spring of 1991. And it may well take a long time before what he has suggested, and others will suggest and I am suggesting, will take effect. Nonetheless, one has to begin when one can begin.

I believe it would be wise for us to recognize a government in exile. Probably the Iraqi National Congress is the only realistic place to start. We should use sea power to stop Saddam's smuggling of oil from which he gains substantial resources today. I would not object to fully controlled sales, such as the Security Council has approved, the proceeds of which would go to the Iraqi people for food and medicine. But the smuggling which goes on in the Gulf, we should stop.

Insofar as it is possible, we should provide any frozen assets or loans based on such assets to such a government in exile, either to make it possible for it to arm itself or to assist with arms, particularly some specialized arms such as antitank weapons.

I believe we should remove the sanctions from the liberated areas of Iraq. And if those areas expand, continue to remove sanctions from areas that are not under Saddam's control. If possible, any liberated areas should be able to export oil and to profit thereby.

I think it is wise and important to bring charges against Saddam and others senior in his government for war crimes before international tribunals. I believe that we should protect the north and the south with air power, as Mr. Chalabi suggested—as we did not do in 1991 and as we did not do in 1996—whenever Saddam seeks to exercise military power in those parts of the country.

Saddam is in breach of the current cease-fire, which has been in effect since the spring of 1991. And I believe we need no further authority to conduct ourselves in such a way as to enforce that cease-fire.

I believe broadcasting into Iraq is an excellent idea. Lech Walesa and Václav Havel both said that Radio Free Europe was the single most important thing that the United States did during the cold war.

Based on my prior occupation for 2 years, a bit of pride suggests that I should at least remind this committee that for most of its existence, Radio Free Europe was a CIA covert action. It ceased being covert in the 1970's. It is now a fine functioning institution. I know that the head of Radio Free Europe, Mr. Thomas Dyne, would be delighted to begin broadcasting into Iraq, and it would also be fine, I believe, for the Iraqi government in exile, of course, to do that.

I believe that we should prepare to use force from the air when—and I do not say if—when Saddam violates the most recent agreement that was negotiated by Kofi Annan. When that violation occurs, when he blocks inspections, we should not limit our air strikes to sites where there might or might not be weapons of mass destruction or the wherewithal to produce them. The latter would

be very difficult to do, to have any particular effect on weapons of mass destruction, because the ones we are most concerned about—for example, biological weapons—are not only small themselves and easily moved, but they are also made by equipment which is small and easily moved.

Making anthrax is just about as difficult as running a microbrewery attached to a restaurant, with one or two added steps added. And the equipment can be packed up just about that easily. There are 100 million lethal doses in a gram of anthrax, at least theoretically. And Secretary Cohen's 5-pound bag of sugar, if distributed properly, could kill hundreds of thousands of people.

So I believe that it is important for us to realize that as the Special Republican Guard and the Special Security Organization, which are responsible for Saddam's security, themselves move around the country, hiding him and also moving weapons of mass destruction and the wherewithal to make them, it is going to be very difficult for us to find important and useful targets associated, for example, with anthrax production. But we should prepare, of course, when he next blocks inspections, to destroy the air defenses of Iraq, to have a major effect by using air strikes on the infrastructure of his government—and by that I mean the Republican Guard and their weapons—and to destroy, if we can, some of the sites that might be associated with weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.

I believe we should also use that opportunity to establish a no-fly zone over the entire country. If Saddam had not been able to move infantry around by helicopter in the past, he would have had more difficulty than he has had in putting down revolts and rebellions in the north and the south.

What should we not do?

I believe, first of all, we should not deceive ourselves that this agreement of the last few days is going to last. My attitude toward it is very much the one that Mr. Chalabi expressed.

I believe that we should also not, at least at the present time, consider invading Iraq with ground forces. I do not believe that is necessary, and also I do not believe there is the support here or in the Congress or among our allies to do it.

I also do not believe that we should attempt to assassinate Saddam or even arrange a coup against him. This is not Afghanistan. We do not have an outside base of operations in order to support activities such as those we supported in Afghanistan in the 1980's. And as far as assassinations go, at the present writing, they are of course a violation of American law, since they violate the executive order. Executive orders can, in principle, be changed.

But, in practical terms, it would be impossible, I believe, to find Saddam, in case anyone should actually want to try such an undertaking. If he were killed, I believe that we would be most likely to get a continuation of the Baathist nationalist regime and in individuals making decisions who are as undesirable and virtually lawless as he.

And, finally and most importantly—although if I had been other than an infant during the time of World War II and had been in a position of government decisionmaking—yes, I would have supported American assistance to the assassination of Hitler, if we had

been able to figure out how to do that. But World War II was a struggle to the death, a world war between a whole totalitarian system and our own way of life. I believe that as the world's dominant political, economic and, in many ways, cultural power, the United States should not tell the world now that we support assassination as a tool of statecraft.

I believe it was wrong for us to try such assassinations of Fidel Castro in the early 1960's. I believe that by making assassination a tool of foreign policy in ordinary times, times other than something like World War II, we send a signal to the world that undercuts American values. That also signals to much of the world that we believe it is appropriate for them to use assassination as such a tool.

The United States has dealt with terrible dictators before, over the course of many years. And we have triumphed. We are still here and most of them are not. We can triumph again. But I believe the only way we will triumph—and it will probably be something that will take a number of years—is by cleaving objectively and clearly to our democratic values and to institutions of Iraqis who support those values.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Mr. Woolsey.

And I certainly agree with your statement, that we should not revert to the use of assassination attempts as a nation. It does undermine us severely, I think, in what we stand for. And it seems like to me, a number of people are making the case here that we should be very open and very clear about what our intents are in the Middle East, particularly dealing with Iraq.

I look forward to some questioning.

Dr. Khalilzad, thank you very much for joining us today, and we look forward to your testimony.

**STATEMENT OF ZALMAY KHALILZAD, DIRECTOR, STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE PROGRAM, PROJECT AIR FORCE, RAND CORPORATION**

Dr. KHALILZAD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I should like to begin my statement with four broad points on our objective and strategy toward Iraq. First, since the end of the Gulf War, one of our main objectives in dealing with Iraq has been the elimination of its weapons of mass destruction and its long-range missile programs. Although significant progress has been made, Iraq has refused to come clean and give up completely its weapons of mass destruction and long-range missile programs.

The recent agreement brokered by Kofi Annan will probably do little to change this. Saddam has repeatedly agreed to cooperate with the U.N. before, and has just as frequently broken his promises.

Second, a gap is evident between our objectives, the elimination of Iraq's WMD and missile programs and our containment strategy as practiced, which has included, among other things, no-fly zones and the occasional use or threat of use of military strikes. This strategy has not produced the elimination of the WMD programs. Although some argue that we may eventually succeed if we stay the course in the coming years, this is becoming increasingly dif-

ficult. Support for our strategy is eroding, both in the region and in the world.

Third, if we continue with our current approach, we will probably ultimately confront two alternatives. One, abandoning our objective and allowing Iraqi WMD and missiles, or sending a large number of U.S. air and ground forces to Iraq for combat to eliminate both Saddam and his WMD program.

Fourth, we can still avoid these unpleasant alternatives. In addition to maintaining a robust military capability in the region and pressing Iraq to allow UNSCOM to do its job, we should seriously consider encouraging the establishment of and support for a broad-based opposition to remove Saddam from power. The ultimate goal should be to establish a regime that has peaceful intentions in the region, pursues good relations with the United States, and respects the rights of the Iraqi people.

Can Saddam Hussein be overthrown?

That is the question, Mr. Chairman, that you asked. In my judgment, overthrowing Saddam will be difficult. He has a large security and intelligence apparatus devoted to his personal security. He is brutal and has killed, as Mr. Chalabi mentioned, tens of thousands of his people. Nevertheless, he can be overthrown. There are, in my judgment, several options.

First, a U.S.-led military operation to liberate Iraq. This will require a large-scale military operation, involving air and ground forces. An invasion of Iraq could involve significant casualties and might risk involvement in a protracted war. Once Saddam is removed from power, the United States would incur long-term obligations and costs of occupation.

Air strikes are unlikely to do the job by themselves, even if a carefully considered decision was made to go after Saddam. He moves frequently, employs deception, and maintains tight security about his location and his movements. To succeed, one would need real-time intelligence on his location and the capability to strike targets effectively within the window provided by intelligence.

Second, encouraging the Iraqi military to remove him from power. Since Desert Storm, this has been the option tacitly sought by the United States. According to press reports, we have provided support and encouragement to former military officers for such an operation.

However, all attempted coups against Saddam have failed. He has been both efficient and ruthless in crushing coup plotters. Whether future coup attempts will succeed remains uncertain. Equally uncertain is the type of regime that might be produced by a military coup. It is likely that a coup would produce another dictatorial regime.

Three, supporting the Iraqi people in establishing a broad-based and democratic opposition, and assisting it in starting an effective insurgency, aimed at liberating the country from Saddam Hussein. A new regime produced by such a movement is likely to be better in terms of Iraqi and U.S. interests than continued rule by Saddam or another military regime.

Why have past efforts to support the Iraqi opposition failed?

The best opportunity to remove Saddam from power was in 1991, when Iraqis in the southern and the northern parts of the country

rebelled. The Iraqi opposition included some senior military officers, who wanted U.S. assistance to liberate their country. The U.S. could have helped the opposition efforts by allowing them access to captured Iraqi military equipment and by preventing Saddam's use of helicopters and tanks to put them down.

Once it became clear that Saddam would not fall without any U.S. role, the United States changed course and began to encourage unrest. Starting in 1991, the U.S. sought to remove Saddam by encouraging coups and providing limited support to opposition movements, such as the National Congress that Mr. Chalabi represents, and the Iraqi National Accord.

The U.S. efforts, while well intentioned, were flawed. The U.S. effort had serious limitations. First, the U.S. spent roughly \$100 million to aid the opposition. But much of that money was spent for public relations and propaganda, not military aid. The military arms of the opposition remained weak.

Second, the U.S. was not willing to compensate for opposition military weakness by providing direct military support when the opposition forces engaged the Iraqi armed forces. This refusal resulted in the opposition's loss of confidence in the United States. As a result, U.S. influence over the opposition also declined over time.

After 1991, the U.S. had developed excellent ties with the two main Kurdish groups. But by 1996, one of the groups had come under Iran's influence and the other under Saddam's.

Third, the U.S. also did not convince key regional states, such as Turkey, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, that effective support for the opposition was in their strategic interest.

Fourth, and finally, the U.S. refused to protect Saddam's opponents in 1996, when he moved against them in the Northern Security Zone. Hundreds of opposition members who worked with the U.S. were evacuated to Guam, and hundreds more were killed.

What can be done now?

In my judgment, it is not too late to build a broad-based resistance movement to Saddam Hussein that could, in time, overthrow the current regime. Success will require a determined effort and cooperation from regional states. Such an effort would require the following measures:

First, we must regain the confidence of the Iraqi people. Since 1991, they have had the worst of both worlds: Saddam and sanctions. Given their experience, many Iraqis do not believe that we want Saddam removed. To change their mind about U.S. intentions will require both forceful statements supporting the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and concrete actions.

Second, Washington should encourage establishment of a broad-based opposition, including Kurds and Arabs, both Shiite and Sunnis. In cooperation with Turkey, we should seek an end to the war between the two Kurdish factions, the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.

In addition, the resistance forces should expand their activities from the Shiite south and the Kurdish north to the tribal regions in western Iraq.

Third, the resistance forces will need to develop a strong military arm. And here perhaps I differ a little bit with Jim.

To do this, they will need military assistance, including antitank equipment, intelligence, training, and logistical support. The opposition will also need political support, including the establishment of a Radio Free Iraq.

Fourth, the resistance forces will need support from key regional states, such as Turkey, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. Getting the regional states to go along will require U.S. leadership. Turkey is likely to become willing to provide a logistical base of support for the Iraqi resistance forces if it is assured a key role in the distribution of assistance. Such a role will alleviate Turkish fears and concerns that a strong Kurdish movement in Iraq will spread to Turkey or produce an independent Kurdistan.

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, both of which have expressed support for the establishment of a new regime in Iraq, should provide logistical support and share the cost of supporting the anti-Saddam resistance movement.

Jordan can play a key role in support of resistance in western Iraq. Amman already is home to some of the opposition groups.

Fifth, as the resistance grows, it will require more financial support. The U.S. should consider supporting the lifting of sanctions on areas of Iraq that come under the control of the provisional government. On this I agree with what Jim has said. Similarly, we should be willing to support the release of frozen assets, as Mr. Chalabi mentioned, which amount to over \$1.5 billion, to the provisional government.

Sixth, the U.S. should maintain a robust military capability in the area, both to coerce Saddam and to support the Iraqi resistance. Moreover, should we use force against Saddam the next time he violates his agreements, we should launch a campaign that also takes the needs of the Iraqi resistance into account. Targets could include Saddam's pillar of power, such as the Republican Guards, his intelligence organizations, and part of his control apparatus. Air power could also help create safe havens in the south and in the west.

We could go further and use our forces in the region to protect the areas that come under the control of the provisional government.

The above strategy, I do not want to mislead, will be very difficult to follow. And success is not certain. However, the current policy of mixing sanctions with the threat of force is losing support.

Thus, unless we are willing to accept an Iraq armed with weapons of mass destruction, we must consider adjusting our strategy.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Khalilzad follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ZALMAY KHALILZAD

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for this opportunity to testify before this subcommittee on Iraq and to commend you for holding this hearing. Now is a good time to review our objective and our strategy. The views expressed here are my own and should not be interpreted as representing those of the RAND Corporation or any of the agencies or others sponsoring its research.

I should like to begin my statement with four broad points on our objectives and strategy towards Iraq.

(1) Since the end of the Gulf war, one of our main objectives in dealing with Iraq has been the elimination of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and its long range missile programs. Although significant progress has been made, Iraq has re-

fused to come clean and give up completely its weapons program. The recent agreement brokered by Kofi Annan will probably do little to change this. Saddam has repeatedly agreed to cooperate with the UN and just as frequently broken his promises.

(2) A gap is evident between our objective—the elimination of Iraq’s WMD and missile programs—and our “containment” strategy, which has included among other things sanctions, “no fly” zones, and the occasional use or threat of military strikes. This strategy has not produced the elimination of the WMD programs. Although some argue that we may eventually succeed if we stay the course in the coming years, this is becoming increasingly difficult. Support for our strategy is eroding, both in the region and in the world.

(3) We will probably ultimately confront two alternatives: abandoning our objective and allowing Iraqi WMD and missiles or sending a large number of US air and ground forces to Iraq for combat to eliminate both Saddam’s regime and his WMD program.

(4) We can still avoid these unpleasant alternatives. In addition, to maintaining a robust military capability in the region and pressing Iraq to allow UNSCOM to do its job, we should seriously consider encouraging the establishment of and support for a broad-based opposition to remove Saddam from power. The ultimate goal should be to establish a regime that has peaceful intentions in the region, pursues good relations with the United States, and respects the rights of the Iraqi people.

#### **Will Saddam’s Overthrow Be Beneficial?**

The removal of a leader does not always produce positive results. In the case of Iraq, however, things cannot be worse. Saddam has killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, invaded two of his neighbors, used chemical weapons with disturbing regularity, spoiled the Gulf environment with oil slicks and burning the Kuwait oil fields, supported international terrorism, pursued weapons of mass destruction, and sought regional hegemony. Thus, it is hard to imagine a successor regime worse than Saddam. But the question is not just would a new leader be better, but how to ensure that the successor government was the best possible one for the United States, the region, and the people of Iraq.

The replacement of Saddam by another strongman, while a marginal improvement, is not enough. Another dictatorship bent on regional hegemony is unlikely to seek regional peace or give up Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Only a broad-based democratic regime offers the best prospects for an Iraq which pursues peace at home, with the Gulf states and with the United States. Such an Iraq can be integrated in regional security arrangements and can have the confidence to give up its WMD and long range missile programs.

#### **Can Saddam Hussein be Overthrown?**

Overthrowing Saddam is difficult. He has a large security and intelligence apparatus devoted to his personal security. He is brutal and has killed thousands of his opponents. Nevertheless, he can be overthrown. There are several options:

(A) U.S.-led military operations to liberate Iraq. This will require a large-scale military operation involving air and ground forces. An invasion of Iraq could involve significant casualties and might risk involvement in a protracted war. Once Saddam is removed from power, the United States would incur long-term obligations and costs of occupation. Air strikes alone are unlikely to do the job even if a carefully considered decision was made to go after Saddam. He moves frequently, employs deception, and maintains tight security about his locations and his movements. To succeed, one would need real-time intelligence on his location and the capability to strike targets effectively within the window provided by intelligence.

(B) Encourage the Iraqi military to remove him from power. Since Desert Storm, this has been the option tacitly sought by the United States. According to press reports, we have provided support and encouragement to former military officers for such an operation. However, all attempted coups against Saddam have failed. He has been both efficient and ruthless in crushing coup plotters. Whether future coups attempts will succeed remains uncertain. Equally uncertain is the type of regime that might be produced by a military coup. It is likely that a coup would produce another dictatorial regime.

(C) Supporting the Iraqi people in establishing a broad-based and democratic opposition and assist it in starting a more effective insurgency aimed at liberating their country from Saddam Hussein. A new regime produced by a such a movement is likely to be better in terms of Iraqi and US interests than continued rule by Saddam or another military regime.

### **Why Past Efforts to Support the Iraqi Opposition Failed?**

The best opportunity to remove Saddam from power was in 1991, when Iraqis in southern and northern parts of the country rebelled. The Iraqi opposition, including some senior military officers, wanted U.S. assistance to liberate their country. The U.S. could have helped the opposition efforts by allowing them access to captured Iraqi military equipment and by preventing Saddam's regime from using helicopters and tanks to put down the opposition.

Once it became clear that Saddam would not fall without any U.S. role, the United States changed course and began to encourage unrest. Starting in 1991, the U.S. sought to remove Saddam by encouraging coups and providing limited support to opposition movements such as the Iraqi National Congress and the Iraqi National Accord.

The U.S. efforts, while well intentioned, were flawed. U.S. efforts had several limitations:

First, The U.S. spent roughly \$100 million to aid the opposition, but much of the money was spent for public relations and propaganda, not military aid. The military arms of the opposition remained weak.

Second, the U.S. was not willing to compensate for opposition military weakness by providing direct military support when the opposition forces engaged the Iraqi armed forces. This refusal resulted in the opposition's loss of confidence in the U.S. As a result, U.S. influence over the opposition also declined over time. After 1991, the U.S. had developed excellent ties with the two main Kurdish groups, but by 1996 one of the groups had come under Iran's influence and the other under Saddam's.

Third, The U.S. also did not convince the key regional states such as Turkey, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Jordan that support for the opposition was in their strategic interest.

Fourth, the U.S. refused to protect Saddam's opponents in 1996 when he moved against them in the Northern Security Zone. Hundreds of opposition members who worked with the U.S. were evacuated to Guam and hundreds more were killed.

### **What is the Current State of the Opposition?**

Saddam today lacks in popular support and terror is his main weapon. A number of forces including some tribes, secular and religious parties, and ethnically-based movements are willing to defy the Iraqi dictator. However, the opposition is fractured. They do not coordinate their activities, and some of the resistance forces might be penetrated by Saddam. Although the potential for broad popular support is there, the groups have been unable to mobilize it. In addition, the opposition lacks substantial external support. Indeed, the limited support provided by rival external powers actually hinders cooperation, as Iraq's neighbors have different intentions and thus support different opposition movements.

### **What Can be Done Now?**

It is not too late to build a broad-based resistance movement to Saddam Hussein that could, in time, overthrow the current regime. Success will require a determined effort and cooperation from regional states. Such an effort would require the following measures:

First, we must regain the confidence of the Iraqi people. Since 1991, they have had the worst of both worlds: Saddam and sanctions. Given their experience, many Iraqis do not believe that we want Saddam removed. To change their mind about U.S. intentions will require both forceful statements supporting the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and concrete actions.

Second, Washington should encourage the establishment of a broad-based opposition—including Kurds and Arabs—both Shiites and Sunnis. In cooperation with Turkey, we should seek an end to the fratricidal war between the two Kurdish factions—the Kurdish Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. In addition, the resistance forces should expand their activities from the Shiite South and the Kurdish North to the tribal regions in western Iraq.

Third, the resistance forces will need to develop a strong military arm. To do so, they will need military assistance, including anti-tank equipment, intelligence, training, and logistical support. The opposition will also need political support, including the establishment of a Radio Free Iraq.

Fourth, the resistance forces will need support from key regional states such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan. Getting the regional states to go along will require U.S. leadership. Turkey is likely to become willing to provide a logistical base of support for Iraqi resistance forces if it is assured a key role in the distribu-



tion of assistance. Such a role will alleviate Turkish fears that a strong Kurdish movement in Iraq will spread to Turkey. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, both of which have expressed support for the establishment of a new regime in Iraq, should provide logistical support and share the cost of supporting the anti-Saddam resistance movement. Jordan can play a key role in support of resistance in western Iraq. Amman already is home to some of the opposition groups.

Fifth, as the resistance grows, it will require more financial support. The U.S. should consider supporting the lifting of sanctions on areas of Iraq that come under the control of the provisional government. Similarly, we should be willing to support the release of frozen Iraqi assets, which amount to over 1.5 billion dollars to the provisional government.

Sixth, the U.S. should maintain a robust military capability in the area both to coerce Saddam and to support the Iraqi resistance. Moreover, should we use force against Saddam the next time he violates his agreements, we could launch a campaign that also takes the needs of the Iraqi resistance into account. Targets could include Saddam's pillars of power such as the Republican Guards, his intelligence organizations, and parts of his control apparatus. Air power could also help create safe havens in the South and West. We could go further and use our forces in the region to help protect the areas that come under the control of the provisional government.

The above strategy is difficult, and its success is not certain. However, the current policy of mixing sanctions with the threat of force is losing support. Thus, unless we are willing to accept an Iraq armed with weapons of mass destruction, we must consider adjusting our strategy.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, and for your clarity of statement that you give us. And we look forward to some questioning.

Dr. Haass, thank you very much for joining our committee and for being so patient. The floor is yours.

**STATEMENT OF RICHARD N. HAASS, PH.D., DIRECTOR,  
FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION**

Dr. HAASS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you and Senator Robb for this opportunity. I am also glad to appear next to my two colleagues here, who gave extraordinarily thoughtful statements.

If it is acceptable with you, I will just make a few remarks and have a formal statement for the record.

Senator BROWNBACK. Without objection.

Dr. HAASS. Thank you.

You asked the question, and it is an important one, which is whether Saddam can be overthrown. The first question, though, is should he be overthrown. And I do not think we should assume that the answer to that is yes. I, however, would argue—and I think most people here would agree—that clearly, the people of Iraq would be better off if Saddam were to be overthrown. But it is also important to recognize that simply getting rid of Saddam is not a panacea. That alone will not solve the problems posed by Iraq for the United States.

Second, to say that Saddam should be overthrown—or to put it another way, and I think Senator Robb used this formulation, that the people of Iraq would be better off if he were to go—is not the same as saying that his overthrow ought to dominate American foreign policy. It is not enough for a policy aim to be desirable. It has also got to be doable.

And, secondly, you have got to look at the costs and benefits of a particular policy, and weigh it against the alternatives. To be specific, while I believe that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein would be desirable, I am not that sure it is doable. And I do not

believe, on balance, that a policy that is dedicated to that end would be the best policy for the United States to adopt at this point.

Let me explain how I came to this conclusion. I can only think of three ways to overthrow Saddam Hussein. First is assassination. And there I essentially subscribe to everything Jim Woolsey, the former Director of Central Intelligence, had to say. It is hard to do. It is in some ways morally wrong to do.

And the only point I would add to what he said is that we, living in perhaps the most open society in the world, we have got to think twice, and then some, before we try to make assassination a more common practice of international relations. Americans are members of what is the most vulnerable of all societies to assassination. We really ought to think long and hard before we try to make this a more acceptable practice in international relations.

Secondly, many people have put forth the idea of occupation, building on the model of Germany and Japan after World War II or in some ways the model more recently of Haiti and Panama; namely, that we would go in, we would occupy Iraq, we would hunt down Saddam, we would arrest him, and we would try then to set up a political process which brought about a more desirable regime.

It would be too hard to do, too expensive to do. The American people would have a real problem with the cost of that policy. Even more so, people and governments of the region would have real problems with it.

What began as a liberation would very quickly look like an occupation. And I just think we would get bogged down in Iraq. And it would be, again, terribly, terribly complicated and expensive by every measure of the word "expensive" to pull off.

What about the third approach? It is sometimes called the Afghan model. It is sometimes called the liberation model. It is essentially what Mr. Chalabi was talking about before you today. And we heard versions of it both from Mr. Woolsey and Dr. Khalilzad.

The more I look at it the less I am convinced that it is viable. And I wish my conclusions were otherwise, but they are not. And I have come to this conclusion for several reasons. First of all, one cannot speak of the Iraqi opposition as if it were a singular entity. Despite the existence of the organization that Mr. Chalabi represents, there are really Iraqi oppositions, in the plural. They are not simply rival organizations, but there are very powerful factions within his organization.

So the idea that one has sitting out there this Iraqi opposition that is unified and ready to act cohesively is correct. Were it only so, but I am afraid it is not.

Second, even an optimist would have to agree that a process along these lines that we have heard explained here today would take years. Which is another way of saying this proposed policy of liberation does not offer an answer to the United States during that time. We need a policy for the next several years at a minimum. And I would argue that policy ought to be containment. Because, even at best, a policy of liberation is not a near-term answer.

Third, I think we have underestimated the risks, at least in the conversation I have heard here today. Yes, one can speak of historical parallels, but there are also negative historical parallels. Hun-

gary comes to mind in 1956, as does the Bay of Pigs several years later.

So I think there is a real risk for the United States. What happens if a little bit of American help is not enough? If a little bit of help to protect an enclave is not enough? If a little bit of air power is not enough? We are then on the hook of one of two decisions. Either we leave people in the lurch, which I would think is morally indefensible, or we have to get involved completely, which leads us to the previous option, which is essentially invading and occupying Iraq.

This option is fine—the liberation option, I mean, is fine—but only if you assume it works. The real problem with the liberation option is that it is all too easy to see why it will not work. In which case, again, I think we are presented with a terrible, terrible choice.

As others have pointed out, there is a lack of local partners. I simply do not see who in this case would be our Pakistan. What would be the country that would funnel in the arms and provide a base for American support?

I do not see any local state ready to step up to that. In part, this is because they are not 100 percent sure about the goals of the Iraqi opposition. And, above all, the Turks are not sure. Despite pronouncements to the contrary from the Kurds, I have yet to meet a Turkish official who in his heart of hearts was not worried that the real goal or the real outcome of this process would be increased pressures for a separate, independent Kurdistan, something that would threaten the integrity of Turkey, which is, as you know, a NATO ally and a close friend.

Let me state two other problems with what I see as the liberation, or Afghan, model.

First, I fear it could be counterproductive. It could actually reinforce the Sunni core. We saw something like that in 1991 in Iraq, when largely geographically and ethnically based opposition movements, in the north with the Kurds and in the south with the Shia, had the boomerang effect of increasing the disposition of the largely Sunni Moslem military core that Saddam has wrapped himself in to rally around the flag. No matter what the opposition said, the Sunnis saw the rebellion as a threat to the integrity of their country, they saw it as a threat to their position, and they saw it as a threat to their lives.

And I do not believe today that any pronouncements by an organized Iraqi opposition could allay those fears. The consequence of that will again be that the very people whose assistance we need, the Sunni core that surrounds Saddam, will be more disposed to support Saddam if we were to support the opposition.

Last, it is easy for me to see how this policy goes awry in one or another way, which is that it leads to a civil war amongst Iraqis and, perhaps more worrisome, to a regional war. We have sense of this on a smaller scale in Lebanon. But I do not think it takes a great leap of geopolitical imagination to envision a scenario where Iraqis are at one another's throats along ethnic lines, geographic lines and political lines, and that Iraq's neighbors cannot resist the temptation to try to influence the outcome of that struggle.

Indeed, I think it takes a much larger leap of faith to imagine they would adopt a hands-off policy. At a minimum, they would be funneling in arms and money. But they would probably also be funneling in irregulars. And I think you would see people from Iran, from Turkey and from Syria entering the fray. And what had begun as an isolated civil war all too easily could become an extraordinarily dangerous regional war.

So let me come back to the question you all raised: Can Saddam be overthrown?

Probably, but not definitely, yes. But it would certainly not be cheap and it would certainly not be easy.

Which leads me then to the real alternative, which is the policy of containment. The goal of the policy would be to limit the threat posed by Saddam, to promote compliance with his international obligations.

What would it take?

Well, let me just say I agree with the others who have criticized what I am about to say. It would be extraordinarily difficult. We have reached the point where the United States has no good options, no cheap options, no guaranteed options. And I would put containment in that same area. Though I support it, I support it in some ways as the least bad option now available to the United States.

What it would take—and it would be very hard, as I said—are steps to shore up the international coalition. Critical here would be the Arabs. Two things more than anything else would be needed to shore up Arab support. One is to do something on the sanctions front. And we have already done quite a lot with Resolution 1153, which provides Iraq extraordinary levels of resources to buy any food and medicine.

But I would be willing to 1 day exercise paragraph 22 of Resolution 687 if, as the Resolution requires, Iraq were to comply fully with all the requirements in the area of weapons of mass destruction and, second, only if we introduced an escrow account, much as was done under Resolution 986. If this were done, any revenues raised by Iraq from the export of oil would not simply go into the pockets of Saddam Hussein or the coffers of his government.

There has to be a capture mechanism to make sure that money goes to compensating the victims of Iraqi aggression, to pay for U.N. inspectors, and to ensure that money could not be used to import arms. Because one of the things that would stay in effect, even if we reach this point, is the ban on Iraqi conventional military imports and the ban on Iraqi dual-use imports.

And the only way I know of really making sure that these bans stick is to make sure that Saddam Hussein does not get any revenues directly, but rather they are captured by an escrow account that is doled out to him only for specific and controlled purposes.

What else would have to be done to gain Arab support?

We have to have a more energetic policy toward the Middle East peace process. I realize that while this matter comes under the jurisdiction of this subcommittee, it is not a subject of today. I would simply say that there is linkage there. It is a fact of life. And Arab enthusiasm for working with us to take on Saddam is diminished

by the perception in Arab eyes that we have a lack of enthusiasm for pursuing peace in the Middle East.

We also have to make Iraq policy a priority with the Europeans and the Russians. And that might mean adjusting other policies that are important to them, such as the pace, for example, of NATO enlargement or the question of secondary sanctions that are being threatened to be introduced under the ILSA legislation.

In the case of Iran, we need to think about a more nuanced policy. That makes sense on its own merits. I also think, though, that this shift would present Saddam with a degree of encirclement and isolation that would help us in our larger aims.

I would, though, emphasize two other things most of all. One is to some extent echoing my colleagues here. Any use of force must be intense, and it must go after Saddam's domestic sources of support: the Republican Guards (the people and their equipment), the internal security forces, and Saddam's ability to communicate with his people. Any use of force ought to go after that.

I would point out that was not something we did during Desert Storm. Going after this sort of target was largely incidental. We did a little bit of it, but we did not design Desert Storm toward this end. Now, any military operation should be designed toward this end.

Secondly, we need to adopt a new policy toward weapons of mass destruction and their possible use by the Iraqi Government. We should be clear and say the following: If you ever use weapons of mass destruction of whatever sort, the United States will adopt a policy of explicitly seeking your ouster and a change in government. And those in any way responsible for the use of weapons of mass destruction will be held to account.

We ought to say that now as a deterrent against the Iraqi Government actually using any weapons of mass destruction which the inspectors prove unable to locate and destroy.

If we adopt the policy that I have laid out here, I believe we will have a successful policy of containment. I also think there is a potential bonus. If we pursue this policy and if we are tested and we use force in the way I have described, I actually think we can affect those closest to Saddam, those who actually continue to have the best chance to get rid of him. And I think we have the potential to move them to act.

I am not guaranteeing that. I am simply saying that is the potential bonus of the sort of policy I have laid out. But we have to go into this policy without expecting that bonus. And we have to remind ourselves, containment worked in the Cold War. Containment is working in Korea. Containment has worked for nearly 7 years in the Gulf. It can continue to work. It is doable. It is affordable. It protects our core interests.

I would simply say in closing that a policy of containment succeeds if it is not allowed to fail. By contrast, a policy of rollback fails unless it is able to succeed. For that reason I believe that a policy of containment most serves the interest of this country.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Haass follows:]

## PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD HAASS

The immediate result of the recent stand-off with Iraq is that the United States and the world community will continue to face an Iraq headed by Saddam Hussein who possesses some weapons of mass destruction. It is thus not surprising that this Committee has posed the question "Can Saddam be overthrown?"

A more basic question, however, is "Should Saddam be overthrown?" The short answer is "yes." The people of Iraq and indeed people everywhere almost certainly would be better off if Saddam were no longer in power.

Still, it is important to keep in mind that getting rid of Saddam is not a panacea. As we have seen in Afghanistan, ousting regimes is one thing, restoring order and installing a better system something else again. A policy that resulted in an Iraq that was the site not only of prolonged civil war but also regional conflict involving Syria, Iran, Turkey and possibly others would hardly qualify as a success.

Moreover, to say that the world would be a better place if Saddam were to be overthrown is not to say that overthrowing Saddam should become the central purpose of American policy toward Iraq. As a general rule, a policy must not only be desirable but doable; in addition, the expected benefits and costs of a particular course of action must appear better than what could be reasonably expected from pursuing the alternatives. By these criteria, a policy dedicated to overthrowing Saddam does not appear to be the best option available to the United States at this time.

In principle, one can design three variations of a policy that would make Saddam Hussein's removal from power the core objective. The three variations of such a roll-back policy are assassination, providing support to Iraqi opposition elements, or by taking control of the country. Each is discussed below.

Is assassination, as some have suggested, an option? The short answer is no. As Fidel Castro's continued rule suggests, it tends to be difficult to carry out. Moreover, assassination raises a host of legal, moral and political problems. An Executive Order continues in force that precludes assassination. Any change in this order would set off a major domestic and international debate that would damage the reputation of the United States. In addition, we need to think twice before weakening this norm for more practical reasons. The United States is the most open society in the world. We are as a result highly vulnerable to assassination and retaliation ourselves.

A second version of roll-back would borrow from the experience in Afghanistan. Thus, some individuals are advocating that the United States promote Saddam's ouster by supporting the Iraqi opposition with money, radio broadcasts, arms, and air power.

This proposal, however, overlooks the reality that the Iraqi opposition is weak and divided. "Oppositions" would be more accurate. Building a strong, united opposition is an uncertain proposition that at a minimum would take years. During that time, the United States would still require another policy to deal with the more immediate challenges posed by the regime. A better parallel than Afghanistan might be to Hungary in 1956 or the Bay of Pigs, where U.S. support for local opponents of regimes was enough to get them in trouble but not enough to put them over the top. Providing direct military help for the Iraqi opposition would prove even more dangerous. We would be investing U.S. prestige and risking U.S. lives in situations in which it could be impossible to distinguish between friend and foe. Such a commitment could lead the United States to undertake a full-fledged intervention and occupation if limited support for opposition elements proved insufficient. The parallel to Afghanistan breaks down in other ways as well. Where is our "Pakistan" here? What local country is likely to step forward to be our partner? Neighboring countries, including our ally Turkey, are likely to oppose some of the goals of various Iraqi factions, while U.S. support for Iraqi factions that are in any way defined by geography or ethnicity could easily increase Iraqi military (and Sunni Muslim) support for the central government.

More realistic in some ways than this indirect or "lite" form of roll-back would be occupying Iraq with ground forces, akin to what we did in Germany and Japan after World War II and on a far more modest scale in Panama and Haiti. But such "nation building" in Iraq could well take years, place U.S. forces in non-battlefield situations where they could not exploit their stand-off and precision-guided munitions, and generate intense resistance and casualties. Iraqi employment of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. forces or those assisting them cannot be ruled out. There would be little appetite here at home for a course of action that would almost certainly prove expensive in both financial and human terms. Nor would there be any more support in the region for such a policy, one that would seem to many to

constitute an unacceptable form of “neo-colonialism.” What began as liberation would likely come to be seen as occupation.

What, then, is the answer to the question that informs this hearing? Can Saddam be overthrown? The answer is “yes”, but not for certain, and certainly not easily or cheaply. The only sure approach would require a massive investment of time, resources and possibly lives. We do not know how much resistance to us (and support for Saddam) would materialize, how much terrorism might be unleashed in retaliation, how much support we could expect in the region. Nor can we be confident of what sort of leadership and system would come to replace the current one.

The alternative to roll-back in any of its various forms is containment. Under a containment strategy, the principal goal of U.S. policy would be to limit Iraq’s ability to threaten the region and to encourage its compliance with the many resolutions passed by the UN Security Council in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Getting rid of Saddam would constitute a secondary aim.

Making containment work would be far from easy. It is beyond our capacity to do alone. As a result, and more than anything else, we would need to shore up the international coalition that has helped keep Saddam in a box for some seven years now.

Regenerating Arab support—essential if we are to mount any significant military operation—requires that we continue to support generous Iraqi exports of oil if it needs revenue to pay for needed food and medicine. More important, the United States should declare that it is prepared to allow Iraq to resume unlimited oil exports if it complies fully with the UN requirement that it not possess nor produce chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or long range missiles and if it accepts that any money earned from exports be funneled into a mechanism controlled by the United Nations. This would ensure that no funds could be used to purchase arms (which would remain forbidden) and would pay for ongoing work of the weapons inspectors (to continue in perpetuity). Proceeds would also be used to purchase food, medicine and consumer goods for the Iraqi people, to compensate Kuwaitis and others for war losses, and to pay Iraq’s debts. This latter provision should encourage France and Russia to support the introduction of such a provision. Moreover, issuing such a declaration now will not change anything regarding the status of sanctions unless and until Saddam is certified by UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors. But even a change in declaratory policy will have the immediate benefit of strengthening our position in the Arab world where current U.S. policy—that Saddam comply with every aspect of every resolution before he receives any sanctions relief—is seen as unreasonable and unfair.

We also need a more energetic policy toward Middle East peace. Linkage here is a fact of life. One need not and should not equate Israel and Iraq (or ignore Palestinian and Syrian shortcomings) to recognize that U.S. determination to press Saddam contrasts markedly with American passivity when confronted with Israeli reluctance to implement the Oslo accords or cease unilateral actions that complicate the search for peace. The willingness and ability of Arab governments to work with us against Saddam requires that we do something to reduce this perceived double standard.

Rebuilding the coalition more broadly will require, too, that we make Iraq a diplomatic priority. This may mean going slow on subsequent phases of NATO enlargement—in particular, possible Baltic entry—so as not to further alienate Russia. (That moving slowly may also be good for NATO lest it dilute its capacity to act is an added benefit.) Shoring up the anti-Iraq coalition may also mean eschewing secondary sanctions that penalize France and others in Europe when they do not join U.S. boycotts of Cuba or Iran.

A more nuanced U.S. approach toward Iran—one that embraced a reciprocal “road-map” for improving relations—would help in other ways, as it would threaten Saddam with further isolation or even encirclement. The good news is that all these policy adjustments make sense on their merits. No American interest would be sacrificed or compromised to make our Iraq policy more effective.

Any use of military force should be large and sustained if Iraq again seeks to block UN weapons inspectors or if it masses forces against or attacks one of its neighbors. The target should be Republican Guard troops and their equipment, other internal security forces, communications networks—in short, Saddam’s power base. To make this possible, the United States should maintain an augmented military capacity in the region on an open-ended basis.

An element of deterrence should also be introduced into U.S. policy. Specifically, Saddam Hussein should be informed that if there is any use of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq, or if there is any use of WMD by others that can be traced back to Iraq, the United States will do whatever is necessary to remove the regime and bring all those responsible to justice.

A containment policy along the lines outlined here promises to be better than explicit roll-back options. It may not offer the promise of a near-term solution that Americans tend to favor, but it will limit the problem. Moreover, it is both doable and affordable, something that cannot be said of more ambitious proposals. As a rule, containment succeeds unless it is allowed to fail; roll-back fails unless it is able to succeed.

To make containment effective, though, will require that it become a priority of American foreign policy. It is not enough for the president and his chief lieutenants to turn their attention to Iraq after Saddam creates a crisis. As was demonstrated in our struggle with the Soviet Union, and as is demonstrated by what we are doing in Korea, containment—"longterm, patient but vigilant" in George Kennan's original formulation—can work if we are prepared to commit to it.

Moreover, Kennan's original formulation teaches us something else. A successful containment policy can set in motion forces that can actually lead to the demise of the regime in question. Change, if and when it comes to Iraq, is most likely to come from actions taken by those in or near the center of power who have access to Saddam and who would not be opposed by the majority of those in or near power. This is what took place in the Soviet Union and much of the formerly communist world. As a result, it is quite possible that the policy most likely to result in Saddam's ouster is one that does not place this goal at the center of what it is we are trying to bring about.

In the case of Iraq, this argues for a policy that would relax export restrictions on Iraq only in the event of its full compliance with WMD-related obligations, maintain critical import sanctions for the foreseeable future, and regularly remind the Iraqi people of improvements they can expect when they are led by a different leadership that meets its international obligations. It would also require a readiness to attack directly and with great intensity Saddam's domestic sources of support on those occasions military force is justified. If all this leads to a change in Iraq's leadership, so much the better. But the advantage of containment over the alternatives is that it protects our core interests even if Saddam manages to hang on for months or even years.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Dr. Haass.

We are going to close this hearing at 5, if we can, so we will each try to make our questions maybe as germane and as short as possible. And if we can get as many answers as we could, I would appreciate that.

Having said that, I want to violate that at the very outset. I have the Vice President's letter to Dr. Chalabi that is interesting from the standpoint of its statements in here. And we will enter this fully into the record.

But it says in this August 4, 1993 letter:

The President and I share the concerns you raised in your letter, and I assure you that we will not turn our backs on the Kurds or the other Iraqi communities subjected to the repression of Saddam Hussein's regime. Since April 1991, coalition forces have protected the inhabitants of northern Iraq from Baghdad's repression, and the administration is committed to continuing that effort.

And then it states their pledge of support for a democratic alternative to Saddam Hussein's regime:

I can assure you that the U.S. intends to live up to these commitments and to give whatever additional support we can reasonably provide to encourage you in your struggle for a democratic Iraq.

I can see what they base their views upon. We will enter that into the record.

Mr. Woolsey and Dr. Khalilzad, if we could, I take it really from what you are stating, you think we should reject the U.N.-negotiated agreement and pursue this different, long-term strategy of destabilizing Saddam?

Mr. WOOLSEY. I would put it a little differently, Mr. Chairman. I do not have any real confidence that the U.N.-negotiated agreement is going to deter Saddam for more than a very brief period,



if at all, from interfering with the U.N. inspections. But I would not advocate rejecting it out of hand.

I do not believe it is inconsistent for us to insist on the full observation by Saddam of the U.N. resolutions and this agreement, and to go ahead and proceed to adopt a policy, that, for as long as it takes, we will politically and economically support a government in exile because we think his is illegitimate. And if he moves against the Kurds in the north or the Shia in the south, then we should protect them, as we did not in 1991 and 1996. And if he gives us an opportunity, by—and I think he will—interfering with U.N. inspections, then we should then use that opportunity to execute the type of military strikes I describe.

But I would not advocate simply rejecting the U.N.-negotiated agreement as long as he permits inspections—perhaps for a while—on an un-interfered basis. Then, fine. The more those continue, the better off we are.

Senator BROWNBACK. I think a number of us have been critical that we have bought the same bad horse the third time here. So let us get prepared for when the agreement gets violated.

Mr. WOOLSEY. I agree with that. I do not think this agreement is going to last, and I think we should get prepared for when it is violated. But insofar as the combination of Mr. Annan and Mr. Butler and the official from Sri Lanka, who has been appointed the head of this commission, works in such a way as to have the United Nations as a whole insist on full and unfettered inspections, then we are better off. Because if Saddam violates that, it will help draw support to the steps we would then have to take.

The agreement does have some ambiguity in it in places. And I think that what is really important, though, is for the inspections to be carried out the way they were under Mr. Ekeus and under Mr. Butler; namely, whether they are looking at Presidential palaces or anything else, the only person who knew where the inspectors were going was the head of the team. The helicopters would take off without anyone on the team knowing where they were going, much less the Iraqis. And that was one of the things that led to a struggle in a helicopter between an Iraqi and a U.N. official at one point.

I think it is very important that the UNSCOM work in such a way that the diplomats who are along for the ride and the window dressing not have any advance notice of where the inspection is going and not be able to interfere with it. If they want to sit there and say diplomatic things, I suppose that is all right.

Senator BROWNBACK. Mr. Woolsey, you have stated that the development of these weapons of mass destruction is little more complicated than a microbrewery associated to a restaurant.

Mr. WOOLSEY. Making them.

Senator BROWNBACK. Making them. If that is indeed the case, then we cannot eliminate his ability to produce weapons of mass destruction, can we?

Mr. WOOLSEY. I think that is right. Not only can we not eliminate the people who know how to do it, not only can we not eliminate the equipment, which he could replace relatively easily, but, most importantly, we cannot eliminate the motivation of people who would do what he has done. This is one of the main things

that leads me to believe we should adopt the long-term policy to get the regime removed, even if it takes years, that I described.

If the only problem was nuclear weapons, and if the only way he was producing fissionable material was a big, fat target like the Osirak reactor that the Israelis so wisely destroyed at the beginning of the eighties, then the situation might have some differences. But we cannot, as a matter of the physics of the way these weapons are produced, actually take away his ability to develop and produce them.

And particularly, if sanctions are lifted and Saddam has billions a year coming in as a result of oil, there are lots of places in the world you can buy extended range SCUD's and anthrax grows in a lot of cow pastures. This is not rocket science and it is not like building a large reactor to produce fissionable material.

Senator BROWNBACK. Dr. Haass, building on that statement, I tend to—I agree with him, and I generally think most people do, that we cannot eliminate his ability to develop weapons of mass destruction, that the problem is Saddam. Yet you continue to believe that the alternatives are such and the ability to get to the alternatives of Saddam are so difficult that you think containment is the strategy to pursue. It leaves him with the weapons. It leaves him in power. It leaves him increasingly in power. And containment has been falling apart for us. We are not able to hold it together.

Why would you continue to support that strategy, which seems to be falling apart on us?

Dr. HAASS. Mr. Chairman, to say it has been falling apart is a bit rough on the policy. True, it is weaker today than it was 7 years ago—in some cases, considerably weaker. But I would also say the glass is half full in a couple of areas. The fact that sanctions are as robust as they are after 7 years is extraordinary. I have just completed a study of the history of sanctions. These really stand out on the positive side.

For all the differences, there still is a large degree of international support for Saddam meeting his obligations.

Senator BROWNBACK. Because my time is limited, I want to get in here and make sure to get my point to you, and then ask you to respond directly to it. It has been loosening. And if we go further down this road, it is unlikely we will be able to contain his ability to get more resources into his regime.

Dr. HAASS. Two things on that very quickly, then. If we were to simply leave the condition alone, it could get weaker. I agree with you. That is a real risk. What I tried to lay out and what I hope this administration adopts is an awfully robust or muscular version of containment. But I take your point. There is a risk. If we allow the policy to drift, it will unravel.

Containment is at least as demanding, in certain ways, as these alternative policies. It is not the easy choice. So it is asking a lot of the administration. It is asking a lot of the countries in the region. I just think, all things being equal, it is more doable, with less risk and cost, than the alternative. But I do not argue your premise, that it is by no means a guaranteed success. I take that as a real warning that we had better put our shoulder to the wheel or our position will continue to get weaker.

Senator BROWNBACK. Senator Robb.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Given the time constraints that we are now under, let me just ask a couple of general questions, I guess the first one to my friend, Mr. Woolsey, here. Given your view, and I think widely shared, about the virtual impossibility of complete elimination of the current inventory, whatever it might be, that has been undisclosed, and certainly the inability to guarantee that no future inventory could be produced on relatively short order, should we abandon as a principle tenet of our policy an attempt to deal with that question altogether?

Mr. WOOLSEY. No, I do not think we should abandon it altogether, because there may be some things we can do. For example, on ballistic missiles, targeting the facilities that manufacture the shorter-range and, theoretically, legal ballistic missiles.

Senator ROBB. Well, let me be more specific, then. With respect to CW and BW, excluding delivery capability and excluding nuclear, which I think all of us put in a separate category, as you have suggested, should we be less concerned about these terrible agents of death and mass destruction than we are?

Mr. WOOLSEY. No. Some CW sites could probably be targeted. BW is very difficult. But Saddam has been moving things around, with this Special Security Organization and Special Republican Guard that in fact guard him. And if the intelligence available to UNSCOM is effective, they may, by being vigorous and having no-notice inspections and the like in the way I describe, be able to uncover some things. And although it is difficult, I think it is worthwhile continuing to make it important. It is just that what I object to is saying that it is the only thing we are trying to do. Because that undercuts our ability, our justification, for striking at the Republican Guard and the infrastructure of his regime.

Senator ROBB. But if it makes our objective always unobtainable, in terms of an absolute sense, should we find some way of modifying what would, in effect, be completion or success on that particular aspect of our policy?

Mr. WOOLSEY. Well, the only way, I think, to succeed in this objective is to get the regime out over the long run. I think there may be some things we can do, and we should continue to pursue them with respect to weapons of mass destruction, but that the main thrust, however we describe it, the main thrust of any air strikes ought to be to make it harder for him to exercise power.

Senator ROBB. That I understand. And I agree with that and have focused on that for some time.

Let me ask a couple of questions about oil. Everybody has made some reference to it in one way or another. And there is an implicit suggestion, I think, that if we can carve out a little territory and install a provisional government of some sort and allow them to export oil without sanctions, although continuing to keep sanctions on the part over which Saddam maintains control, as a practical matter, is there sufficient ability to produce and export oil by any prospective provisional part of what could become a Balkanized Iraq if it is not already?

Mr. WOOLSEY. Let me let the others speak to this. But I believe that in the north, particularly if Mosul were taken by the support-

ers of democracy in Iraq, and for some parts of the south, it would be feasible, depending upon exactly what areas were held, for a provisional government to export. It would take some repair to infrastructure. It would take cooperation in the north with Turkey and the like. But it is not impossible.

Senator ROBB. In other words, it is something that you think is doable, to use a term that Dr. Haass was using earlier in another context?

Mr. WOOLSEY. With some work and effort. And a lot depends on how broad or how widely the writ of a provisional government would run, especially in the north.

Senator ROBB. All right. Now, let me ask a question then about the possibility of placing money in escrow from the export of oil under existing circumstances, if you will. If Saddam is still in power and if we are putting the money in escrow, what incentive is there going to be for him to even export or in any way play that game, if you will? That removes from him any incentive—and, again, I am not an advocate for Saddam, so I do not want anything I might say to be misunderstood or misconstrued—but what incentive remains for Saddam to, in effect, let that happen?

Dr. HAASS. Well, the incentive for him is that it still gives him the potential access to a greater sum of money. And a lot depends upon what the list is of things he can spend it on.

If we make the list inclusive, short of conventional arms and certain dual-use technologies, that still gives him considerable incentive to comply.

Senator ROBB. In other words, you think that is a, quote, deal that he would accept?

Dr. HAASS. Well, he has already accepted less than that by his acceptance, first, of Resolution 986 and, more recently Resolution 1153, where he has accepted the right to produce various amounts of oil, so many billions of dollars worth over 6 months, in order to buy a very narrow list of commodities—initially, just food and medicine; more recently, food, medicine and certain types of infrastructure to repair things domestically within Iraq.

Senator ROBB. But he has not permitted the free distribution of the humanitarian items to the intended targets?

Dr. HAASS. Senator, I do not think, with or without sanctions, you are ever going to have Saddam Hussein allowing the free distribution of—

Senator ROBB. Well, that is really the point I am getting at. I am trying to see if there is a way to have an agreement that is binding and enforceable and doable, if you will, in that area.

Dr. HAASS. There are two obstacles. One is getting others to agree that this ought to be a requirement. The Russians and the French in particular will largely resist us. And they will say, you are rewriting the resolution; it is not there. We will argue there is a precedent for it. And, second, Saddam will obviously try to get it unfettered. He wants the money to come directly to him. There is the U.S. vote, though. Right now, that process can only happen if we allow it to go forward.

Senator ROBB. OK. Well, I think we are all essentially on the same wavelength here.

Let me ask one question, if I may, of all three. And, Dr. Khalilzad, you may want to take this one to start off with. But the question of communications. We have talked about Radio Free Iraq, some means of communicating effectively with, quote, the people.

We know, in North Korea, that there are means that Kim Jung-Il and his father, Kim Il-Sung, and what have you, had by taking all but a single or a couple of bands out of the radios and other real means of controlling the information that actually reached the vast majority of the North Korean people. In Iraq, we have a different situation. We do not have at least that kind of control.

First of all, is enough of the international message, via CNN and others, actually getting through, notwithstanding the fact that it is illegal to have downlinks and whatever the case may be? And is there an effective way to reach this population, particularly those who are in a position to bring about change in government and to encourage those who might support such change if they felt there was a chance of succeeding?

Dr. KHALILZAD. Mr. Chairman, I think you are right that the situation in Iraq is not as bad as the one in North Korea, with regard to the regime's control over the population, in terms of access to information. However, what is missing is the ability of the opposition to communicate broadly with the Iraqi people. And Radio Free Iraq would perform that role.

We do broadcast to Iraq via VOA. And based on some interviews that I have done on VOA and the reactions that I have gotten from inside Iraq, people do listen to VOA. But VOA reflects U.S. views. But what we are advocating is something similar to Radio Free Europe, and available to the democratic forces in Iraq, so that their message can reach the Iraqi people.

Senator ROBB. On the question of communication—and this is my final question, just to followup, Mr. Chairman—do either Mr. Woolsey or Dr. Haass have any additional thoughts on how we can more effectively communicate? I cannot remember now who said what about the morale of the Iraqi people. Certainly the first witness had a lot to say about that and a lot of speculation about what they might do under certain circumstances.

In this capacity, would you comment on our ability to communicate and the likelihood that this would succeed to the degree that Mr. Chalabi suggested in terms of rallying the Iraqi people to some cause that would be an alternative to Saddam?

Dr. HAASS. I would say two things very quickly. With radios you could do something. The more local support you had, the better it would be just in terms of transmission. You could possibly do some things through leafletting. But I think you have put your finger on the key issue. It is less how we get it in there and more what the content of the message is.

And we have to think real hard about whether the message is meant to stimulate any sort of general popular uprising, which would be extremely dangerous, or more to simply send out a signal to those who are close to Saddam, saying, here is the shape of a better future without him, and lay out a course where Iraq could once again regain entry into international society.

But we need to be careful—and it is something that Dr. Khalilzad mentioned—about how much it would be us and how

much of it would be in the hands of Iraqi opposition elements. Because to the extent it was the latter, we would have to think awfully hard about the control of the content.

Mr. WOOLSEY. If I could just add one quick point.

Senator ROBB. Please.

Mr. WOOLSEY. VOA is sort of the American perspective on things. The genius of Radio Free Europe was that it was the radio that would have existed in, say, Poland if Poland had been free. And a lot of it, of course, was staffed by expatriates and the like.

I think two things would be very useful. One is to let Radio Free Europe establish the U.S. Government broadcasting into Iraq in the same way it broadcast into Eastern Europe and into the Soviet Union with Radio Liberty during the cold war. And, second, to provide some assistance to the government in exile, so that it too could broadcast.

If we are talking shortwave and talking radio, the expenses are not huge. Television is tough. Having a satellite dish puts you under suspicion and all the rest. But shortwave radio, from many places in the world, can reach Iraq. And I think there is a role for both Radio Free Europe and for an Iraqi opposition radio broadcast that they themselves would do.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, gentlemen.

May I just join the chairman—I know he is going to thank you—but for three very thoughtful statements, not entirely in sync, but I think exhibiting the kind of range of obstacles and challenges that we face in a more thoughtful way than an occasional sound bite might suggest that the deliberations are considering. And you have made a valuable contribution to that effort, and I thank you.

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BROWNBAC. Yes, thank you. This was the McNeil-Lehrer version of discussion on this topic. [Laughter.]

Senator BROWNBAC. I appreciate it very much. They were thoughtful presentations, good fodder for us to chew on, on a very tough, difficult subject.

Thank you all for attending. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]