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(III)
ADMINISTRATION VIEWS ON THE PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1998

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. In room SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Helms, Lugar, Coverdell, Hagel, Smith, Thomas, Ashcroft, Grams, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Robb and Wellstone.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Madam Secretary, Mr. Secretary, and my fellow North Carolinian, General Shelton, we genuinely appreciate your coming here this morning as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducts its final hearing on the proposed expansion of NATO.

Now I say “final,” but that is not quite right. I am thinking about having one more hearing which would largely be devoted to Senators who want to make statements, but that has not been finalized yet. But this is the last time we will bother you for this.

The committee began its examination with your appearance, Madam Secretary, on, I believe, October 7 of last year. At that hearing, I suggested that you address three essential points. The first one was I asked you to identify a strategic rationale for the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO and you responded that the expansion of NATO will make America safer, it will make NATO stronger, and will make Europe more peaceful and united. And I believe that, even in spite of some of the faxes that I have been receiving from some of my conservative friends in the last 24 hours.

I am confident that the Poles, the Hungarians, and the Czechs will work with us to that end. They certainly have assured me that that is going to happen, and I know they have done the same with you.

Second, I emphasize my view that all NATO allies old and new must bear a fair burden of any costs related to expansion, a requirement that will be partially met through the cost sharing formula that has since been agreed to by the members of the alliance.
Now under that formula, the United States share will be even less than the Pentagon's original projection. But we must bear in mind that this is only a part of the burden sharing equation. The majority of the costs of making and keeping NATO militarily effective will be the responsibility of our allies, a point that this committee will emphasize in the Resolution of Ratification. It is assumed, of course, that the administration will continue its insistence that all NATO members must meet their commitments to the common defense. If not, the expansion of NATO this year may be followed shortly thereafter by NATO's collapse, and nobody wants that to happen.

Last, I ask, Madam Secretary, that you reassure the Senate that the NATO-Russia relationship will neither disrupt NATO decision-making nor diminish the security of the alliance. You made it very, very clear—and I am going to quote you—"Russia will never have a veto over NATO policy." That pretty much says it all.

On this point, I recognize that all of us have our work cut out for us in making the U.S.-Russian relationship work better. Now this does not imply that we will forego building closer relations with Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic. Of course, we must do that while building closer ties with Russia.

Now, then, this is a matter not entirely under our control and I think all of us realize that. Russia must signify its willingness to engage in a constructive relationship with the United States. Unfortunately, Russian intimidation of its neighbors, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by Russian companies, and the Russian Government's support of Saddam Hussein are scarcely encouraging. They certainly are not to me.

Now, Madam Secretary, since your appearance before this committee late last year, the Foreign Relations Committee has met six times to hear from more than 30 supporters, skeptics, and opponents of this expansion proposal. In my view, as well as that of many other Senators, your responses thus far have successfully weathered the test.

In recent weeks, unprecedented support of NATO expansion has been received by the committee. In addition to distinguished and well known leaders like Margaret Thatcher, Lech Walesa, and Mr. Havel, we have received endorsements from every living, former U.S. Secretary of State, numerous former Secretaries of Defense, and National Security Advisors, and more than 60 flag officers and general officers, including five distinguished former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

More important, we have heard from the leaders of organizations representing literally millions of average Americans, including the diverse ethnic community, religious groups, civic organizations, veterans organizations, and business groups, and all of this has been reinforced by the recent polling showing a substantial majority of Americans in support of NATO expansion.

Now all of that said, I should perhaps mention for the record that Section 2, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution makes the U.S. Senate the final arbiter in the extension of treaty agreements and commitments. We have heard all sides. We are called upon to fulfill that responsibility, and that is why we are gathered here this morning.
As the Senate takes up the Resolution of Ratification most likely in the next 2 weeks, I do hope that the vote will be overwhelmingly positive.

There is one other note, Madam Secretary, before I turn to the distinguished ranking member, Senator Biden. I think perhaps all of us are going to mention the Iraqi situation. This being a hearing on NATO expansion, it is important that it remain a hearing on NATO expansion; and this will be your final opportunity to speak on the NATO matter prior to this committee's acting on the question of the Resolution of Ratification. I do not think it is wise that we detract in any way from the NATO question.

At the same time, we cannot ignore the fact that Iraq is front and center on everybody's mind.

Secretary General Annan will brief the Security Council later today on his "deal" with Saddam, and I confess that I was already under the impression that we had a deal. It's called the U.N. Security Council Resolution 687.

But I must be honest. We are in a jam in this country. I have gone over—hastily, of course, because I just got it early this morning—the agreement that the Secretary General brought back. With the possible exception of Britain, much of the world appears of a mind to capitulate to Saddam Hussein and Saddam Hussein knows it. That is reflected in my brief reading of the agreement.

So at the eleventh hour, as U.S. planes were starting their engines, Saddam invited Kofi Annan to Baghdad to cut a deal. Now Mr. Annan is back, promising—if you will forgive a quote—"peace in our time," and we are in the disgraceful position of either going along with whatever deal Mr. Annan brought home or being regarded as the bad guys who rejected peace and insisted on war.

Madam Secretary, I know you would like to take just a few minutes and talk to us about Iraq. But you can do that, and I hope you will do it, following the statement by the distinguished ranking member, Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, Secretary Cohen, General Shelton, I should say at the outset in light of what the Chairman ended with that I think congratulations are in order. I think that your organizational skills and the might of the United States military, General, and your direction, and visits to the Middle East and Moscow, Secretary Cohen, and your leadership, Secretary Albright, have produced the best result possible.

As you know, I have been a very strong supporter of the use of force, of air strikes. As a matter of fact, I made the point to the President, Secretary Cohen, that when your wheels touched down, the other wheels should have taken off. But the truth of the matter is I think we are going to be in a much stronger position now if the agreement is what it appears to be. It's not that I believe Saddam is likely to forego his duplicity. But at least I hope we will be able to get out of the U.N. Security Council very strong words that if he does not meet the terms of this agreement, there will be greater support for the use of your forces, General, if they are called for.

I believe the President is correct—and this is my view; I am not speaking for him as I cannot and would not—that keeping forces
on station for the time being is essential and that there should be no doubt that the force would be used. But, most of all, I think this is vindication of a policy that diplomacy not backed by force is of little value, and diplomacy backed by force, where it is clear it will be used, at least has the potential to bring about the results we wanted.

I want to compliment you all, all three of you. Let me turn to NATO, because that is the subject of our hearing today. I am, as should come as no surprise to any of you, squarely in support of enlargement. In my view, the question is not whether to expand or maintain the status quo. In light of the dynamic change that has taken place in Europe over the last several years, it is essential for NATO to adjust or lose its vitality and lose its reason for being.

The primary purpose and the primary benefit of NATO since its inception has been the stability it has brought to Europe. This continues to be its primary function, in my view. People say with no threat, why NATO? Well, NATO is stability; stability is essential; when we lack stability in Europe, America's ability to conduct its foreign policy anywhere else in the world is seriously jeopardized. History shows that when there is a vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe, countries are forced to pursue their own individual security arrangements, and history has shown that this is not productive nor in our interest.

The prospect of enlargement has already brought positive impacts on this issue of stability, stimulating internal reforms in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic and encouraging them to resolve historic disputes with their neighbors, including border disputes.

History also shows that when the United States withdraws from the security debate in Europe, we pay a serious price. The people do not like to hear me say—and I suspect all three of you probably agree, at least I think you do—that we are a European power. The United States of America, like it or not, is a European power and must remain a European power in order to remain a power.

For some to suggest that the potential new members of NATO should gain membership in the European Union first or the WEU or any other European organization misses a gigantic point which is that we are not parties to that game. We are not involved in the EU. We do not only not call the shots, we aren't even at the table. And to have the United States withdraw at this moment from the one forum that allows us to have an impact on the security architecture of Europe, NATO, would be a serious mistake.

This is not to suggest—and I know Secretary Albright shares my view on this or I share her view—that it is not better for these Nations to be part of the EU; it is better for them to be integrated. Speaking for myself, the EU has not been very generous, or speedy, or moved with any alacrity in bringing about an expansion of the EU. These are very difficult economic and political decisions for them.

They should speed the process up. But to suggest that it should substitute for or should precede NATO membership not only flies
in the face of what history has shown with Greece, Turkey, and Spain, but it also takes us away from the table at the moment we should be at the table.

Those who vote for the resolution should understand one very important thing, which is that if you share the view of the speakers today, the Chairman, myself, or many others that we should expand, understand that we are signing on to a financial commitment.

General, I am going to talk to you today about that financial commitment and whether or not it in any way impairs our readiness or our ability to conduct our other military responsibilities that are on your plate. The most recent estimate of direct costs to the United States is $40 million a year over 10 years.

There are critics who suggest this is low balling in a big way. I think it is a realistic assessment. But whether it is $40 million, or $60 million, or $70 million, the truth is we should, all who decide to vote for expansion, understand that we are signing on to that commitment.

This reflects a realistic assessment of the conditions of the infrastructure in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic and the threats facing the NATO alliance that the first two studies in my view did not accurately reflect. It also reflects an equitable sharing of the burden among the members of NATO.

On this point of burden sharing and cost, we should not confuse the commitment, as I know former Senator Cohen knows well, the commitment our 15 other NATO allies made regarding their lift capacity and modernization. That was unrelated to expansion and has nothing to do directly with the cost of expansion. It is very difficult for those countries to meet that commitment because of Maastricht and their own internal situation.

But we should not confuse that with the cost of expansion, which is the purpose of our discussion today.

I will end in a moment, Mr. Chairman.

Many have raised the possibility that enlargement would damage our relations with Russia. I believe the stability in Central and Eastern Europe will enhance Russian security. I truly believe that. But in my experience of 27 years of holding public office, I never tell another person what their political interest is nor am I going to lecture another nation on what its security interest is. But I think history demonstrates that when there is stability in Central and Eastern Europe, Russian security and stability are more enhanced, not diminished.

I would add, Madam Secretary, what I told you when I debriefed you on the trip that I made several months ago to meet with every major Russian leader, that is, everyone who held any significant office and represented any faction in the Duma and/or in the political landscape. Not a single one viewed the enlargement of NATO as a physical threat. They were insulted, they didn't like it, they viewed it as a slap in the face, and so on. But none of them viewed it as a physical threat.

I think, if we act appropriately and follow the lead of Senator Lugar and the Nunn-Lugar approach to many other areas of our bilateral relationship with Russia, coupled with the good work that the Secretary General did in the NATO-Russian accord that pro-
vided transparency, as well as a message to Russia that we are not attempting to isolate it, I think in time—and I don’t mean in decades, I mean in years—Russia will view this as adding to their stability, not as destabilizing.

I do not believe the current differences with Russia, such as their failure to ratify START II or their stance on Iraq, are based on their reactions to NATO enlargement. Were that the case, how do you explain France’s stance on Iraq?

I should not have said that, I suppose, but, you know. [General laughter]

Senator BIDEN. From my discussions with Russian leaders, as I said, I do not believe NATO expansion relates to those two issues. Russia is going through a dynamic change. We always talk about the critics of expansion, talk about the dynamic change in Europe as if things will stay static in Russia.

It is as dynamic or more dynamic in Russia. The jury is still out, what will happen is uncertain, but expansion, in my view, is more likely to produce positive rather than negative results.

Opponents and proponents of NATO enlargement agree that we should do everything we can to increase prospects for positive change in Russia. On that note, it seems to me we should continue to implement Nunn-Lugar and, where possible, we should increase our multilateral assistance and interaction with Russia on a broad range of areas as long as they continue to implement free market reforms.

There should not be a timetable. This is the last point I will make. In my view, there should not be a timetable for invitation of other countries to join NATO. We should absorb the three countries in question. We should rationally determine and follow the Secretary’s language, which is: it is open to everyone, move when appropriate, but do not set an artificial date. Nor should there be a mandated pause in the consideration of future candidates.

We should not seek deadlines nor draw new lines in the future. NATO enlargement, to state the obvious, is an historic opportunity for the United States, an historic decision to be made. The situation in Europe, Russia, and the neighboring countries is dynamic, as fluid and dynamic as it has been at any time in this century.

Voting to enlarge NATO now sets a positive course, expanding the zone of stability eastward to give those dynamic forces of positive change a chance to take hold and bear fruit in the future.

I welcome you back. I thank you for your participation and your leadership.

The CHAIRMAN. Madam Secretary, it is all yours.

Senator SARBAKES. Mr. Chairman, I think, in view of the characterizations made at the outset of the hearing with respect to the Iraq situation, if the Secretaries choose to do so, we ought to give them some extra time in order to address that issue.

I appreciate that this is a NATO hearing and, obviously, it was scheduled some time ago for that purpose. But given that this is a fast moving event, that this just occurred, and particularly given some of the descriptions that were made at the outset of this hearing, I think we ought to give them some extra time to address that issue if they choose to do so.
The Chairman. Well, as I understand it, and I have been a member of this committee for quite a while, there is no limitation on the time. Each of the three witnesses may take as much time as they wish to make their points. So you may proceed, Madam Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary Albright. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you very much for welcoming my colleagues to my committee. I went to theirs, and so I am very glad that we have a chance to appear together here.

I will, in fact, turn to the subject of Iraq first, because I know that it is on everyone's mind. We will be having other meetings throughout the morning on this with you in different settings. But if I could, I would just make a few brief comments on this.

The Secretary General reached an agreement with the Iraqis on Sunday. He spoke with the President on Monday and today we are going to be hearing from him at the Security Council.

The agreement included a commitment to immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to all sites in Iraq, including the Presidential sites and other so-called sensitive sites that UNSCOM has never had access to. So in this way it is very clear that Saddam Hussein has reversed course.

Now, given Saddam's track record, what is important is whether he actually lives up to these commitments. There are some question marks and ambiguities in the agreement with respect to some of the procedures for the Presidential sites. These are the kinds of questions that the Secretary General is addressing, probably as we speak here, in New York at the Security Council.

We are going to have to work very closely with the Security Council and UNSCOM to make sure to close any possible loopholes. That is what Ambassador Richardson is doing. That is our task for today.

Kofi Annan has agreed to allow some diplomats to accompany the inspectors to the palace sites. Now that may be acceptable if the inspectors are free to conduct rigorous and professional inspections, and UNSCOM has to be in operational control—that is, deciding where they are going to go, the timing, et cetera.

We are keeping our military forces in the Gulf at a high state of preparedness while we see if Saddam Hussein does live up to these commitments, and we will continue to back diplomacy with force. I do think that we have found that this has been working and we will continue in that way.

UNSCOM, with our support, will test—and this is the key word—Iraq's promise thoroughly and comprehensively in the days and weeks ahead. I think as the President said yesterday, we will clarify, but we will also test. Then we will verify to see if they have complied.

I think those are the key words.

If Iraq interferes with the inspections or tries to undermine UNSCOM's efforts in any way, we will act firmly, forcefully, and without delay. We will not allow Saddam Hussein to take us from crisis to crisis.
Now the President has spoken to many of his colleagues. I have spoken to many foreign ministers. I believe that Secretary Cohen has also spoken to some of his counterparts. What we have seen is a general sense that the agreement is a useful one, but also that they are becoming exasperated with the way Saddam Hussein operates and, therefore, if we have to act militarily, it is my belief that we will have much greater international support for having gone this extra mile.

As the President told the American people yesterday, he hopes the agreement will prove to be a step forward; but the proof is in the testing, and the United States remains resolved and ready to secure by whatever means necessary Iraq's full compliance with its commitment to destroy its weapons of mass destruction.

We have very much valued the support from Congress. We will obviously continue to consult with you. But that is where we are now.

I don’t know whether you would like Secretary Cohen and General Shelton to speak to this now or for me to go on with my NATO statement, whichever way you prefer, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. They are nodding that you are to go on with your statement and I agree with them.

Secretary Albright. OK. Let me then proceed with my NATO statement.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, and members of the committee, it is an honor to appear with my colleagues to present the protocols of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 that will add Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO.

We view the ratification of these protocols as an essential part of a broader strategy to build an undivided democratic and peaceful Europe. We believe this goal is manifestly in America's own interest and that it merits your strong support.

This is not the first time we have discussed the larger NATO together. It is also not the first time that we, as a Nation, have considered the addition of new members to our alliance.

Almost 50 years ago, my predecessor, Dean Acheson, pointed out that if NATO was to be fully effective, it had to be open to as many countries as are in a position to further the democratic principles upon which the treaty was based to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area and to undertake the necessary responsibilities.

In the years since, the Senate has approved the admission into NATO of Greece, Turkey, Germany, and Spain. Each time the alliance grew stronger and this time will be no different.

But this moment is historic in another way, for if the Senate agrees, NATO will, for the first time, step across the line it was created to defend and overcome, the line that once so cruelly and arbitrarily divided Europe into East and West.

During the Cold War I am sure some of you had the strange experience of seeing that line up close. There were bunkers and barbed wire, minefields, and soldiers in watch towers fixing you in their cross hairs. On one side were free people living in sovereign countries; on the other were people who wanted to be free, living in countries suffocated by communism.
Go to the center of Europe today and you would have to use all
the powers of your imagination just to conjure up these images.
The legacy of the past is still visible east of the old divide, but in
the ways that matter the new democracies are becoming indistin-
guishable from their Western neighbors.

This geopolitical earthquake presented NATO with a blunt
choice: would our alliance be the last institution in Europe to treat
the Iron Curtain as something meaningful or would it aid in Eu-
rope's reunification and renewal? Would it exclude a whole group
of qualified democracies simply because they have been subjugated
in the past or would it be open to those free nations willing and
able to meet the responsibilities of membership?

I believe we have made the right choice. NATO's decision to ac-
cept qualified new members will make America safer, NATO
stronger, and Europe more stable and united.

Last October, I had the opportunity to make this case before you,
and I will try to summarize that case today and then will focus on
the questions and concerns that may still exist.

First, a larger NATO will make America safer by expanding the
area of Europe where wars do not happen. By making it clear that
we will fight, if necessary, to defend our new allies, we make it less
likely that we will ever be called upon to do so.

A second reason is that the very prospect of a larger NATO has
given the nations of Central and Eastern Europe an incentive to
solve their own problems. To align themselves with NATO, aspiring
allies have strengthened their democratic institutions, made sure
soldiers take orders from civilians, and resolved almost every old
border and ethnic dispute in the region. This is the kind of
progress that can ensure we are never again dragged into a conflict
in this region. It is the kind of progress that will continue if the
Senate says yes to a larger NATO.

A third reason why enlargement passes the test of national inter-
est is that we will make NATO itself stronger and more cohesive.
Our prospective allies are passionately committed to the alliance.
Their forces have risked their lives alongside ours from the Gulf
War to Bosnia. They will add strategic depth to the alliance, not
to mention well over 200,000 troops.

Two weeks ago, Foreign Minister Geremek of Poland was in
Washington along with his Czech and Hungarian colleagues, and
he was asked why his country wants to join NATO. He replied that
Poland wants to be anchored in the transatlantic community. He
said we owe to America this revival of Poland's attachment to the
West. Very simply, we owe our freedom to the United States.

Mr. Chairman, let us remember that these countries look for-
ward to assuming the heavy responsibilities of NATO membership
as an opportunity to show the world that they are now mature de-
mocracies able to give something back to the community of freedom
that stood by them in their years of darkness.

This point is especially important in light of our efforts to ensure
Iraqi compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions. When I
met with the foreign ministers of our three prospective allies 2
weeks ago, I asked them to ensure that their nations would stand
by our side come what may. Their response was swift and sure: if
we have to take military action, they will be with us.
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are already behaving as loyal allies and they will be good allies in the future. I know there are still serious critics who have legitimate questions about our policy. We have grappled with many of these questions ourselves and I want to address a few of them today.

Some revolve around the cost of a larger NATO. Since I was last here, Mr. Chairman, all 16 allies have agreed on the numbers and backed them up with commitments. We know today that the costs will be real, but also that they will be manageable, that they will be met, and that they will be shared fairly.

Another concern that I want to address is that adding new members to NATO could diminish the effectiveness of the alliance and make it harder to reach decisions; in short, that it could dilute NATO. But we have pursued NATO enlargement in a way that will make the alliance stronger, not weaker.

This is why President Clinton insisted at the Madrid Summit that only the strongest candidates be invited to join in this, the first round. As you know, the President was under some pressure both at home and abroad to agree to four or five new allies. He agreed to three because we are determined to preserve NATO’s integrity and strength. NATO is a military alliance, not a social club; but neither is it an inbred aristocracy.

We must be prudent enough to add members selectively, but we must be smart enough to add those members that will add to our own security. This in turn raises another question that I know a number of Senators have: namely, where will this process lead us and what about those countries that are not now being invited to join?

Part of the answer lies in NATO’s Partnership for Peace and in its new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. But an equally important part lies in NATO’s commitment to keep its door open to additional members. This is central to the logic of a larger NATO. After all, we set out on this policy because we believe that NATO cannot respect and must not perpetuate arbitrary lines of division in Europe.

Let me say very clearly that we have made no decisions about who the next members of NATO should be or when they might join. At the same time, it is vital that we preserve our flexibility and that of those who would lead the alliance in years to come.

Some now propose that we freeze the process of enlargement for some arbitrary number of years. Some of these people have said with candor that their real aim is to freeze the process forever.

Let me be clear: this administration opposes any effort in the Senate to mandate an artificial pause in the process of NATO enlargement.

Last July, President Clinton and I visited some of the countries that have not yet been invited to join NATO. We were met by enthusiastic crowds and by leaders who support the decisions the alliance made in Madrid. They know they still have a way to go. Yet just the possibility of joining has inspired them to accelerate reform, to reach out to their neighbors, and to reject the destructive nationalism of their region’s past.

A mandated pause would be heard from Tallinn in the North to Sofia in the South as the sound of an open door slamming shut.
It would be seen as a vote of no confidence in the reform minded governments from the Baltics to the Balkans. It would diminish the incentive Nations now have to cooperate with their neighbors and with NATO. It would fracture the consensus NATO itself has reached on its open door. It would be at once dangerous and utterly unnecessary since the Senate would, in any case, have to approve the admission of any new allies.

Mr. Chairman, let me take a few moments to discuss one final key concern, the impact of a larger NATO on Russia and on our ties with that country.

I want to stress that this concern has to do mostly with perceptions not reality. For example, there is a common perception that we are moving NATO, its tanks and bombers, and even its nuclear weapons, right up to Russia’s borders. The reality is quite different. Proximity is not the issue. Russia and NATO have shared a border since 1949. Both Russia and Norway know this as nothing new. There are no tensions along the border between Poland the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad and there won’t be if Poland is in NATO. Hungary and the Czech Republic, meanwhile, are closer to France than they are to the nearest corner of Russia.

As for weaponry, in the current and foreseeable security environment, NATO has no plan, no need, and no intention to station nuclear weapons in the new member countries, nor does it contemplate permanently stationing substantial combat forces. Just as important, the prospect of joining NATO has given our future allies the confidence to avoid big arms buildups.

If we do not enlarge NATO, the opposite could happen. The Central European nations would undoubtedly spend more on their own defense. As Senator Biden has pointed out, they would probably create their own mutual security arrangements, possibly anti-Russian in character. The very problems Russia fears a larger NATO will cause are precisely the problems a larger NATO will avoid.

A more worrisome perception is that Russian opposition to expansion, whether justified or not, is hurting our relationship with Moscow. But once again, the reality is different. I have spent much time during the last year talking with Russian Foreign Minister Primakov, and, in fact, I just got off the phone with him before this meeting, and also with other Russian leaders. We have made significant progress in a number of key areas.

This includes the critical question of arms control and nuclear safety. Russia is a year ahead of schedule in slicing apart nuclear weapons under the START I Treaty. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin have agreed on the outlines of a START III treaty. Russia has joined us in banning nuclear testing and followed us in ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention. And, as we speak, our experts are helping to build secure storage facilities for tons of fissile material and to upgrade security at nuclear weapons storage sites throughout Russia.

I do not pretend that everything is perfect in our relationship. We are, frankly, concerned about the slow pace of START II ratification. We have serious concerns about Russia’s relationship with Iran. Our perspectives on Iraq differ as well, though we share the same fundamental goal.
But it would be a big mistake to think that every time Russia does something we don't like it is to punish us for bringing Hungary or Poland into NATO. Our disagreements with Russia, especially about the Middle East and the Gulf, have come about because of the manner in which Russia is defining its national interests in that part of the world. These differences have existed long before NATO decided to expand.

If the Senate were to reject enlargement, we would not make them go away. We would, however, be turning our backs on three nations that have stood with us on Iraq, on Iran, and on a range of security issues that matter to America.

Mr. Chairman, there is a larger issue at stake here. Those critics who focus on Russia's opposition to enlargement are making an assumption that Russia will always define its national interests in a way that is inimical to ours. They assume Russia will always be threatened by the desires of former satellites to go their own way. I believe these assumptions sell Russia short. I believe they ignore the progress we have made and that Russia has made in coming to terms with a world that has radically changed.

I am confident America can build a true partnership with a new Russia. But the partnership we seek cannot be purchased by denying a dozen European countries the right to seek membership in NATO. A partnership built on an illegitimate moral compromise would not be genuine, and it would not last.

I am also confident that Russia can succeed in its effort to become a normal democratic power that expresses its greatness by working with others to shape a better world. That transformation will only be delayed if we give Russia a reason to believe it can still assert its greatness at the expense of its neighbors.

Mr. Chairman, for all these reasons and more I believe that the choice before you involves much, much more than the immediate future of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. In a sense, it involves the most basic question of all our foreign policy: how do we avoid war and maintain a principled peace?

My answer is that we need to remain vigilant and strong militarily and economically. We must strive to maintain the cordial relations among major powers which has lent brightness to the promise of our age. But we must also strengthen the proven alliances and institutions that provide order and security based on realism and law for nations large and small, institutions that deter aggression and that give us a means to marshall support against when deterrence fails. That is what NATO does. That is why we decided to keep it and to expand it. And that is why I thank you today for working with us to make this day possible.

Mr. Chairman, I have said that in the last years we have celebrated the 50th anniversary of everything. Sometimes we regret what happened 50 years ago and, accidentally, as we testify today, it is the 50th anniversary of the coup in Czechoslovakia.

It is very meaningful, I think, to this discussion because it is as a result of that coup that the West came to realize that a NATO was necessary and it was formed. And also, Mr. Chairman, it is as a result of that coup that my family had to come to the United States and, gratefully, we have lived here as Americans.
And so, I am very pleased that on this particular day I have the opportunity to ask all of you to agree to the ratification of these protocols.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Albright appears in the Appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Madam Secretary.

Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM S. COHEN, U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary COHEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden and other members. This is a unique experience for me to appear before this distinguished committee.

I spent 24 years in the Congress and never had the opportunity to appear before this committee. So I thank my distinguished colleague, as we used to say in the Senate, and associate myself with her very comprehensive remarks.

Mr. Chairman, I am looking at the anxious faces of the members who are here. I have a very long statement which I believe has been submitted for the record and for your review. It would probably take me through the end of the policy luncheons if I were to repeat it. I have looked also at a summary of my statement, and that will take me at least to the beginning of the policy luncheon. So I would like just to summarize everything very briefly, if I can, so that the members may have an opportunity to ask questions.

With respect to Iraq, very quickly, the President offered a tentative acceptance yesterday. He was tentative because of the ambiguities that exist in the document itself.

We all know the words about the empty vessels into which we pour the wine of meeting an intent, and that is exactly what has to take place before there can be a complete acceptance of the agreement.

As Secretary Albright has indicated, we need to clarify those ambiguities. We need to solidify the understanding of all the members of the Security Council as to what is intended by those words, and then we have to verify and enforce.

I don’t think we should become mesmerized over the presidential palaces. I have tried to make this point, as has Secretary Albright on many occasions. First, we have to understand what do they mean: buildings or compounds? And that is a big difference.

But, second, we should not overlook the “sensitive sites” which he has also barred the inspectors from. This is something that diverts us from time to time. We are insisting that we look at Republican Guard facilities. They have been barred from those sites as well.

So we have a lot to clarify before there can be any complete acceptance of this agreement. But I also agree with Secretary Albright and with Senator Biden, who made this point. It would be very difficult after this for any member of the Security Council to walk away from this agreement once the ambiguities are clarified.

It would undermine the credibility of the United Nations and I think even affect its viability in the future if it were not to stand behind this understanding once it is clarified.
Let me move quickly to NATO enlargement. I think it is obviously in the national interest, as Secretary Albright has laid out the case, and it needs not much further elaboration. There are three issues which I will just touch upon briefly.

First is cost; second is contributions and what do they bring to the table; and third is our relationship with Russia.

The price of admission to NATO is high. We talked about NATO being an open door, but that open door stands at the top of a very steep set of stairs. Each of these countries has to climb a set of stairs in terms of modernizing their societies, having an open and democratic system, subordinating their militaries to civilian control, promoting market economies—all of the ideals that we treasure.

These countries have to measure up to those standards. So the price of admission is high.

These countries, in my judgment, also want to be producers of security. They don’t want simply to be consumers.

What do they bring to the table? First is stability, as the Secretary has indicated. They also bring strategic depth—about 300,000 troops with specialized units in combat engineering and decontamination skills. There is the question can they afford it. Alliances save money. That is the key point.

These countries would need to reform and modernize their militaries under any circumstances. But in joining an alliance such as NATO, they are going to spend far less because they are going to rationalize their needs, integrate their capabilities into the NATO structure.

So the temptation to engage in spending because of fear of their neighbors or fear that they are going to be outspent by some other country that might pose a threat to them in the future is going to be diminished significantly.

They are committed to spending this money in order to modernize, and I think it is for a very simple reason. All of them are aware of Eisenhower’s dictum that a soldier’s pack is not as heavy as a prisoner’s chains.

For the past 40 years or more, they have lived with prisoner’s chains around their legs. They are now free. They want to join a freedom-loving institution that will protect them and provide security for the future. So they are willing to bear these costs.

Are they affordable? The answer is yes. Are they manageable? The answer is yes.

I presented to the Congress last year an estimate of what it would cost for NATO enlargement. I would like to repeat those figures because you are going to focus upon them.

At that time, I submitted numbers that would range between $27 billion and $35 billion over a 13 year period. But those numbers need to be broken down to three categories, as Senator Biden indicated.

We estimated last year—again, it was an estimate—that the new members over a 13 year period would have to spend somewhere between $10 billion and $13 billion; that the existing NATO members, excluding the United States, would have to spend $8 billion to $10 billion; and that the direct costs of engagement would total roughly $9 billion to $12 billion. Out of that portion, the costs of
four new members would be about $5.5 billion to $7 billion. That is the number we really should be focusing upon.

NATO has come back with figures that reduce the cost estimate to $1.5 billion over 10 years. So we have to focus on why there differences.

The first major difference is that we thought last year that there would be four countries invited, not three. So we added a country just to be on the safe side in terms of notional costs. Adjusting from four to three new members would cut approximately $1 billion from that $5.5 billion to the $7 billion figure.

Second, we found differences as a result of collecting empirical data. We actually sent people, trained officials to these sites, and they made an analysis of what was necessary. We found that those facilities are in far better shape than we estimated last year. The infrastructure is very sound, or at least much more sound than we thought when we made the estimate last year. This reduced our cost estimate further.

The third point is that there were differences in methodologies and requirements.

In the infrastructure, for example, we found we had been using some of these facilities as part of Partnership for Peace exercises. We have been engaged in joint exercises with these countries. We found that the facilities in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic are far better than we'd thought.

Second, we found in the Czech Republic, by way of example, that they had already done things that we had anticipated they would have to do as members of NATO. They had digitized their communications, both secure and nonsecure, in anticipation of becoming members of NATO. So that cost has already been absorbed by the Czech Republic.

But, basically, we have had our Joint Staff look at the military requirements proposed by NATO's Military Committee and they confirmed them. Our civilian experts confirmed that NATO's costing of these requirements produced cost figures which are legitimate. They are accurate and affordable.

Are there any deficiencies? The answer is yes. These three countries have a number of things they are going to have to do, like develop key personnel. They are going to have to downsize, first of all. Poland will come down, as I recall, roughly from about 220,000 down to about a 180,000 member force. Each of the other countries will downsize: the Czech Republic will have about 55,000 personnel, and Hungary will have about 51,000.

The next thing they have to focus on is personnel. They really have to get qualified people into the military and develop an NCO corps. That is what makes the United States as strong as it is today, and that is why they always look to us. How do we develop an NCO corps? That will be their number one priority.

They need much better training and must focus on interoperability with NATO through their command, control and communications systems. Then, after they really buildup their personnel, their training, and they are exercising command and control, then we get to the acquisition of weapon systems. That should be a much lower priority for all of these countries. They have to focus upon the first three.
With respect to Russia and new dividing lines, Secretary Albright has already touched upon this. The old lines in Europe are disappearing. Poland has resolved some of its disputes with Lithuania. Poland and the Ukraine have resolved their border disputes. Hungary and Romania, Italy and Slovenia, Germany and the Czech Republic—all are resolving long-standing disputes in anticipation of NATO enlargement.

We signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act last year. Again, Secretary Albright has covered this. Let me just give you the benefit of my experience.

I have been to Russia most recently, but prior to that time I made three trips to Bosnia last year. On my first visit to Bosnia, a Russian soldier came up to me. He took off his blue beret and gave it to me as an act of friendship, because he was so proud. He was representative of all those who were there. He was so proud to be standing next to NATO soldiers.

It is a real mission for them, and they feel a sense of pride.

I attended a going away ceremony for General Shetshov. General Joulwan at that time was SACEUR and was hosting a going away ceremony. They had a very moving, poignant ceremony for him and he repeated, as his successor, Trivolipov, has repeated “one team/one mission.” That is something General Joulwan felt very strongly about. They are one team and one mission in Bosnia today, and that is what we see in terms of our relationship with them in the future.

I just got back from my trip to Moscow. It was quite cold in terms of temperature, about 15 degrees below zero at one point, with a very strong wind. I met with members of the Duma as well as Minister Sergeyev.

I would like to pick up on one point that Senator Biden touched upon. We need to have more contact with the Russian Duma. The one thing that I think they resent the most is there has been a reduction in contact between members of Congress and members of the Russian Duma. Those exchanges are vital and they are valuable.

When you sit down across from a table of Russian legislators and they have an opportunity to press you and you have an opportunity to press them, that is the way in which you build the cohesion that is going to be necessary as we move forward to the next century.

So if I had one message to bring, I would say it is that we need more contact, not less; that when you have a separation of people, it is easy to demonize one another, to challenge the assumptions under which we operate, and to really cause more conflict than cooperation.

So I would hope that in the future we might stimulate greater communication and have them come over here and our members go over there. I think that can only be satisfactory for all of us.

Let me conclude with a quote taken from Donald Kagan’s book. He is a historian who wrote a book called The Origins of War, with a subtitle, The Preservation of Peace.

He said,

A persistent and repeated error throughout history has been the failure to understand that the preservation of peace requires active effort, planning, expenditure of resources, and sacrifice just as war does. In the modern world, especially, the sense that peace is natural and war an aberration has led to a failure in peacetime to
consider the possibility of another war, which, in turn, has prevented the efforts needed to preserve the peace.

Those are words we have to constantly keep in mind—that it requires dedication of resources and effort if we are going to preserve the peace and prevent the resumption of war.

If this century has taught us anything, it is that our security is inextricably linked and tied to peace, stability, and security in Europe. We have to hold up this lamplight of history so that we do not stumble on the path to the future.

In building a Europe for the 21st century that is whole and free, we are going to provide coming generations of Americans a future that is more secure, more peaceful, and more prosperous.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Cohen appears in the Appendix.]

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. General Shelton.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL HENRY H. SHELTON, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General Shelton. Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, I am happy to be here today along with Secretary Albright and Secretary Cohen to offer you my views on NATO enlargement.

As all of you are well aware, NATO has been a cornerstone of our national security strategy for almost 50 years. In recent years, the European and international security environments have changed and NATO must reflect these changes.

To be the strong force for peace in the future that it has been in the past, NATO is examining new concepts and new approaches to keeping pace with the rapidly changing world. NATO enlargement, the alliance’s initiative to embrace new partners, is fundamental to restructuring NATO for a new century.

The Joint Chiefs and I endorse the President’s support for this initiative because we are convinced that our strategic interests and the interests of our European friends and allies are better served with enlargement than without it.

Too often in this century we have been called upon to intervene in major conflicts on the European continent at great price to our Nation in blood and in treasure. We have learned that we can avoid war by joining hands with our friends and by extending a hand to yesterday’s adversaries to turn them into tomorrow’s friends.

In fact, no NATO country has ever been attacked by a neighbor in the nearly 5 decades of NATO’s existence.

We have lived through the most dangerous century in world history; and, even today, in Bosnia we can see the legacy of those earlier conflicts. That is why, in my view, we can only gain by encouraging deserving nations to join with us in the interest of peace.

But we must be sure that the candidates for NATO membership are up to the task. From the military perspective, it is important that new members bring genuine military capability to NATO.

Though meeting specific military standards are not required for admission, new members must be net contributors and not net consumers of security. They must be able to conduct coordinated oper-
ations with other NATO members. They must be prepared to participate fully in the defense planning process, and their military forces must reflect the shared values of our alliance, particularly the imperatives of civilian control which are so central to our democratic systems.

Of course, we do not expect new members right away to operate militarily at the same levels as members of long-standing. Helping new members become fully interoperable with NATO in critical areas, like command and control, alliance decisionmaking, and coordinated staff processes, will take both time and effort. However, all three prospective members have taken great strides in this regard, as mentioned by Secretary Cohen, by participating in numerous Partnership for Peace exercises over the past few years.

I share the view of my NATO counterparts, expressed to me during a number of recent visits to Europe, that to bring new members fully up to standard, NATO enlargement must occur in a deliberate way.

As part of this deliberate process, a recent study conducted by NATO and independently validated by the Joint Staff assessed the military requirements associated with admitting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to membership in the alliance. This 5 month study is thorough and militarily sound and is sufficiently detailed to serve as the basis for accurate cost estimates.

Considering the alternative, the prospect of future instability and conflict, I see the tradeoff between the projected costs of enlargement and the benefits of a stable Europe as very much in our favor.

I am also encouraged by the military performance of the NATO candidates in Partnership for Peace events, in military operations in the Balkans, and in other operations like Desert Storm. All three of the nations offered membership have already made important contributions to NATO operations in Bosnia and elsewhere. Poland has deployed a paratroop battalion to SFOR, a logistics battalion to the U.N. forces on the Golan Heights, an infantry battalion to Lebanon, and observers to eight other U.N. missions.

The Czech Republic provided a large mechanized battalion to SFOR and almost 1,000 Czech soldiers served with UNPROFOR during the Bosnian civil war. Before that, several hundred Czech chemical decontamination troops supported the coalition in the Gulf War.

Hungary provides an engineer battalion to SFOR today, a unit which has been with NATO in Bosnia since the beginning. Hungarian host Nation support and facilities have been critical to our ability to conduct operations in Bosnia.

As these examples demonstrate, the countries which we have invited to join NATO clearly possess military capabilities and a level of military competence and professionalism which will enhance NATO. Apart from their military value, these cooperative ventures demonstrate the willingness of new members to share the risks of collective security, a willingness that deserves our respect and our support.

Mr. Chairman, I believe the choice is clear. If we are to avoid the tragedies of this century in the next one, we must embrace the lessons we have learned at such great cost to achieve the peace we
owe our children and their children. One of those lessons is that peace is based on closer political, economic, and military ties; and NATO enlargement serves these ends very well.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before this distinguished committee. I will be happy to answer your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General. I thank all three of you. Admiral Nance and I made the judgment, since we saw so many people at previous hearings lined up in the hall who had no possibility of getting in, and decided to move the hearing here. Even so, there are people outside wanting to get in. Only some of them will.

I have checked with the staff and the number of Senators who are present along with the number who are expected to come to ask questions suggest that even if we limit our question period to 5 minutes, which I am going to do herewith, that will take us well past 12, in which case we will be glad to take you to the policy luncheon, Bill.

Secretary COHEN. Oh, I'm coming. [General laughter]

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask all three of you if my understanding is correct that you do not have any concerns about Russian threats or intimidation against neighboring States, such as Georgia, et cetera. You don't have any concern about that.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. No, sir.

General SHELTON. No, sir.

Secretary COHEN. [Nods negatively]

The CHAIRMAN. Let the record show that all three shook their heads in a negative manner.

Secretary COHEN. This is not to say there are not some threats to Georgia.

The CHAIRMAN. General Shelton, on behalf of our military, are you able to state without reservation that adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO will serve the national security interests of the United States?

General SHELTON. Yes, I am, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be helpful if you would identify some of the ways in which it would help the United States.

General SHELTON. I think, first of all, Mr. Chairman, that NATO has stood for stability and peace in Europe for over 50 years now. I think that, as we look toward the future, certainly we are inextricably linked to the European continent economically, politically, culturally, and militarily right now, and that stability and security on that continent is definitely in our best interests. NATO provides a forum for coordination, cooperation, and certainly for resolution of conflict within the NATO membership.

I feel that the more of this type of involvement that we have from members and the more members that we have that can resolve their differences in this manner, the better off we will be as a Nation and as a military.

Second, I think it is very important that we remember that these countries that we are inviting for new membership have also contributed to peace and stability throughout the world, as have the other NATO members, by contributing to peacekeeping, to peace enforcement, and when the time came in many cases, such as in the Gulf War, to fighting alongside America and, therefore, reduc-
ing the burden that our own forces would have placed on them otherwise.

The Chairman. Madam Secretary, some of us here have met with the foreign ministers of each of the three countries being added. They have indicated no problem whatsoever in making their portion of the contribution, the financial contribution, to the operation of NATO.

I gather from your statement that you think there will be no problem.

Secretary Albright. Mr. Chairman, they have made very clear that they are supportive of coming in to NATO. They have also made very clear through their budget adjustments that they are prepared to carry the burdens of NATO membership and they have, as Secretary Cohen explained, made already adjustments in the way that their military is operating in preparation for this.

So we feel satisfied that not only are they in theory interested in being a part of NATO but they have taken practical steps in order to become good functioning, good paying members of the NATO alliance.

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, as a former respected United States Senator, this question I am going to direct to you, because you have been there and done that.

Is it in your judgment a certainty that the executive branch understands the obligation to consult with the Senate before any future invitations for NATO membership are proposed?

Secretary Cohen. I think it is always wise, based upon my experience, Senator Helms, to consult with the Senate, the body that is going to ratify the accession of members into NATO. I don't think that this administration or any future administration wants to make a commitment without having consulted with the Congress in terms of its recommendations, either its support or lack of support. I think it is always helpful.

The Chairman. Well, I think as long as you are there, if any inclination to avoid the Senate or ignore the Senate occurs, you will say "wait a minute." Right?

Secretary Cohen. That's my belief—we need the Senate. The executive branch cannot simply amend treaties without the support of the Senate, obviously.

The Chairman. Exactly.

Secretary Cohen. So we would always seek the consultation with the Senate.

Secretary Albright. Mr. Chairman, even those of us that were not Senators believe that. [General laughter]

The Chairman. Pardon me?

Secretary Albright. Even those of us who have not been Senators believe that we need to consult.

The Chairman, I know my fellow North Carolinian does.

I see that my time is just about up.

Let me say in my remaining few seconds that I hope Senators will refrain from the tendency of speaking, making statements up to 30 seconds before the time elapses, and then ask a question and the poor witness is sitting there thinking what shall I do.

With that, Senator Biden. [General laughter]

Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I was going to ask the Secretary of Defense about the discrepancy in the cost estimates, but he explained that thoroughly. I will submit some questions in writing so we have it for the record in a little more detail.

The biggest criticisms that those of us who support enlargement get from very qualified and serious people—I believe they are in the minority, but, nonetheless, they are people for whom I have great respect, such as Howard Baker, General Scowcroft, with whom you are close friends, I know, Secretary Cohen, and others—seem to come down to three areas. One is whether or not the numbers are correct. I will leave that aside for now. The second is the impact upon Russia and our relationships with Russia. I spoke to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the names of some of those very people who I have mentioned were invoked. For example, they suggested that the reason why—and this is a question to you, Madam Secretary—the reason why the former Foreign Minister, the most recent Foreign Minister of Russia was sacked was because he had been put in a difficult position. Some say he was undermined by NATO expansion and that we have a harder lined, less sympathetic voice and partner in the present Foreign Minister of Russia.

How would you respond to that?

Secretary Albright. First of all, I would liken it to what is going on in the United States now, blaming everything on El Niño. Everything that the Russians do is now blamed on the fact that we are expanding NATO.

The Russians have their national interests which they will pursue no matter what, and we expect them to do so. Foreign Minister Primakov and I in our first meetings made very clear that we would both pursue our national interests.

I believe, as I have said many times, that they do not like NATO expansion but they are living with it. And, in fact, our relations are really excellent. There are any number of occasions when it is possible to make very clear that U.S.-Russian relations continue to be key to both our countries, that we are able to carry on, and that it does not affect relations in other countries.

Senator Biden. Let me be specific again, in following the admonition of the Chairman. It is also stated that the reason why START II has not been ratified is because of NATO expansion. That is not my view. But I would like to hear from any one of you on that.

Secretary Cohen?

Secretary Cohen. I just finished a 2 day stay in Moscow, meeting with the Minister of Defense, Mr. Sergeyev and also members of the Duma, and Mr. Primakov. Let me say that the prior Minister of Defense was released from office by President Yeltsin, because he was calling for more money for his defense needs.

Mr. Rodionov was entertained, I think by us, in a very generous way; and we made quite a bit of headway in dealing with him. He was released because he was calling for more money to support the military establishment.

During the meeting that I had with Minister Sergeyev, while there was a lot of attention focused on the fact that he read a statement to me in open session that criticized the United States for thinking about using force in Iraq, we had a 2½ hour session in
which all that was discussed during that 2½ hour session was how we could move forward on START II ratification, which he strongly supports, the need to go to START III, and to visit the Comprehensive Threat Reduction Program, the so-called Nunn-Lugar program, which is very much in our national interest.

So we spent 2½ hours talking about other issues.

Senator Biden. Mr. Secretary, I am going to submit some additional questions to reinforce that point. I don't know of your particular experience as you have just stated it, but it is clear to me that they have not moved on START II because of the costs to them. I mean, we should be leapfrogging, as you are doing, to START III and begin to worry about some of their concerns.

Secretary Cohen. I just want to pick up on the point Secretary Albright was making. They can always point to any issue for not ratifying START II. They can say it is NATO enlargement, although that issue was not raised to me at any time when I was there. It was more that we cannot ratify START II as long as you [the United States] are thinking about force in the Gulf.

Senator Biden. You know, one of the strongest arguments being used now is that as NATO expands, the only thing left is to rely on first strike, and so on.

Now, General, I only have a minute left and I will leave a specific question with you and will submit some in writing.

General, there is an article in the Defense News dated March 30: Officials Near Russian Partnership for Peace Agreement. I will read one paragraph:

While the scope of the offer pales in comparison to the individual partnership plans of many smaller Nations, such as Bulgaria, the fact that specific Russian forces and assets for the first time have been set aside for NATO related peacekeeping activities is considered a positive sign by NATO officials.

Can you reconcile for me the progress that appears to be made on the Partnership for Peace arrangements with NATO and this notion that expansion of NATO is going to just absolutely ruin our relationships with Russia, at least from a military perspective?

General Shelton. Senator Biden, from our perspective this expansion of the Partnership for Peace and getting the Russians more involved in every respect, to include liaison at NATO headquarters, is a way to try to turn this Iron Curtain that we have lived with for so many years into a picture window in terms of the Russians.

They want us to believe that they are a new Russia. Their resistance in looking at NATO is to think that we really are not against anyone. We are for peace and stability. And we think that the more we can get them involved through Partnership for Peace and the more military to military contacts we have, the more observers that they send to the exercises, the more that they will see this is not oriented against them but rather for stability and security.

Senator Biden. How did I do, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. You did great. Did great.

Senator Biden. OK.

Thank you very much.

The Chairman. That was an A-plus.

Senator Lugar.

Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
One of the advantages for the United States in NATO expansion has been the thought that NATO nations, including the ones that may be coming in, would share our ideals, would share our foreign policy interests when they were coincident, and the old “out-of-area” argument that has plagued NATO discussions for many years might begin to dissipate. In other words, we argued, I think during Desert Storm, that it was in the best interest of European countries in terms of their own energy security to participate with us. But we were still recruiting them one at a time, or they were volunteering in that situation.

The energy predicament in the Middle East is still just as critical for European countries, and we are now discussing the out-of-area situation in a context in which reciprocally, in addition to the support we give to the defense of European countries, we anticipate their support in terms of our security interests which we believe are coincident.

I am just curious in the current diplomatic situation in which all of you have been involved in consulting with European countries with regard to Iraq what sort of cooperation you have found. Is there any new look at this situation, given the new NATO, or is it still the old NATO? Or is it evolving? Or have you had time? After all, a lot of this diplomacy has occurred rapidly in terms of the quality of these visitations.

Second, reciprocally, the Europeans with whom I have visited, and you have seen a good many more, have admonished us that we ought to be taking different sorts of examinations of Iran, that they see European security tied in different ways with policy in Iran which sometimes runs counter to the one that we have.

To what extent do we listen to this? Do we discuss it? Could it be a part of the evolution of our diplomacy during this period of time in which maybe we have a stand-down with Saddam Hussein, hopefully a fairly long period, but we don’t know how long, in which we begin to work with our European friends to understand out-of-area, and we would take a look strategically at the entire region?

I would like for all three of you to comment, if you can.

Secretary Cohen. Let me take the easy question and give the tougher one to Secretary Albright.

The easier one for me is in terms of dealing with NATO itself and what has been the nature of our relationship as far as Iraq is concerned. If you will look at the record, 13 out of the 16 members offered support for the U.S. position. If you include the new members who would like to come in and hopefully will come in as a result of Senate action and that of others, 16 out of 19 will have supported the United States.

Senator Lugar. All three of the new applicants, so, are supportive.

Secretary Cohen. All three of the new applicants were very supportive. So that is a pretty strong statement coming out of the individual members.

Historically, of course, NATO has been designed to provide for collective security of the individual members, focused upon Europe. There has been quite an evolution that has taken place, if you recall, just 4 or 5 years ago. Germany had taken the position that...
it could not deploy its forces anywhere that it had occupied territory during World War II. This meant, for all practical purposes, that it would not deploy outside of German territory.

Today they are in Bosnia. They have made a very strong commitment to Bosnia. So they are in the process of evolving in terms of what out-of-area will mean for the future. But I can say that we had strong support from virtually all of the allies. The three that did not, of course, were France, Luxembourg and also Greece. Those were the three that did not share in supporting the United States.

Secretary Albright. Senator Lugar, I have to say, as Secretary Cohen has said, there has been an awful lot of exchange and interchange with our NATO partners throughout the Iraq crisis and we will continue to do so.

As far as general foreign policy, what is very interesting is that there are, obviously, national interests that are divergent but many that are the same, and we obviously spend a great deal of time dealing with the EU. At this particular stage, the United Kingdom is in the presidency of the EU, and they are very interested in looking at a series of subjects with us. Iran is, frankly, one of them.

While we may not agree on tactics because they are more interested in some exploring of more commercial ties, they are interested in talking about how to limit weapons of mass destruction as far as interaction with Iran is concerned.

So I think there will be more and more discussion, though the problem, if I may be so frank, is that the EU itself has a hard time coming up with a European view. So there is discussion among them before they have discussions with us.

But this is the wave of the future, I think, of trying to determine what national interests we all have in common.

Senator Lugar. General Shelton, do you have a comment?

General Shelton. I have nothing to add to what Secretary Cohen said, Senator Lugar, regarding the great support we have received from our NATO allies and, specifically, from the prospective new members.

Senator Lugar. I thank all of you. My own hope, and I am certain it is shared by you, is that we take this time to enrich this dialog with our allies to forge even stronger ties. I appreciate the point you have made that they were there. Sixteen of nineteen is impressive and a good argument for NATO expansion and the course that we are on. But it seems to me probably more intensive work and deeper roots in this particular situation are necessary.

Secretary Cohen. If I could just add, there was a conference, Mr. Chairman, the Wehrkunde Conference in Munich, Germany, which I would invite all members to attend in the future. It is one of the best conferences held dealing with security issues.

Thanks to the delegation that was there—Senator McCain, Senator Warner, Senator Levin, as well as Senator Robb and others—they made it very clear that the United States would expect to receive support from the NATO members when their interests were involved in the Gulf as well as in Europe equal to the contribution the United States is making to their security in Europe; that we have interests that are mutual and they are not simply confined to the European theater.
I thought that point was made very strongly, and got everybody's attention.

Senator LUGAR. Very good.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome to our witnesses. Secretary Cohen, welcome to the Foreign Relations Committee.

Secretary COHEN. Thank you.

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, let me just briefly comment, as well, on the Iraq situation. I want to commend Secretary Albright, Secretary Cohen, you, General Shelton, and the members of the Joint Chiefs. I appreciate your characterization of this as a tentative approval of this agreement. The expressions of concern raised by the Chairman and others, while one may disagree with the rhetoric chosen, I think reflect the feelings of many of us here. We are very uneasy about this agreement. We hope it works. We all hope that a political and diplomatic solution to Iraq will be the answer here. But given past history in dealing with Saddam Hussein, one cannot be anything but doubtful, to put it mildly.

I am very pleased that the President has agreed to maintain a very strong U.S. military presence in the Gulf for the foreseeable future.

Nonetheless, I commend those of you who have been involved in this. I know it has been extremely difficult.

I regret that we in Congress had not debated this issue and adopted a resolution that we might have found some common ground on.

Secretary COHEN. There is still time.

Senator DODD. There may be, and I was going to suggest to the Chairman that we might try to find if there is not some language that we could agree on here as a way to express from the legislative body how we feel about this issue which might, in fact, strengthen our hand and position. But enough said on that. There will be another time to talk about it. Nevertheless, I wanted to express my views on it.

I wonder if I could pick up on a question that Senator Helms asked. I guess, Madam Secretary, maybe the question goes to you first on this. It concerns the issue of whether or not other commitments have been made.

I believe that we have no real choice here. In fact, I am certain the Senate very strongly will endorse the expansion of NATO. But the question arises: what next?

Secretary Cohen pointed out that, obviously, the Senate ought to be advised ahead of time before such commitments are given about the additional members of NATO. Let me just ask the question very bluntly here. Have we made any commitments beyond those which we are aware of to any additional countries that they will, in fact, be included in an expanded NATO?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. No, Senator Dodd, we have made no commitments. All we have said is that at the 1999 meeting we will review the process. But there have been no commitments made, and they know that, frankly.
Senator Dodd. I hope that is the case. Again, I think there are
good arguments for expanding NATO. But the issues raised about
cost I think are not unfounded.
We are watching a Europe with declining defense budgets going
on and I suspect that may continue for the foreseeable future.
We pick up about a quarter of the costs of NATO, is that correct,
the United States does?
Secretary Cohen. [Nods affirmatively]
General Shelton. [Nods affirmatively]
Senator Dodd. It seems to me that you are going to have with
these new countries joining NATO with their own domestic difficul-
ties, sorting out their policies, the pressures on them for, what is
it, $800 million to $1 billion annual cost a year—is that correct—
for each one of the new countries?
Secretary Cohen. Yes.
Senator Dodd. I am not knowledgeable enough about the Gross
Domestic Product of these nations, but these are not overwhelming
economies. And they are democratic governments with all the nor-
mal pressures that we see in our own society.
I wonder if you might, Mr. Secretary, and maybe General
Shelton with Secretary Cohen, comment on the issue of our own
force structure and modernization efforts in light of declining Euro-
pean defense budgets, the pressures on these economies, and
whether or not there are any legitimate concerns one ought to be
raising about whether or not we are going to be able to meet our
commitments for our own force structure in light of the kinds of
pressures we are seeing here.
Secretary Cohen. I think we are in very good shape to meet our
own requirements. Obviously, we are going through a moderniza-
tion program now. I will not belabor you with the QDR process.
But one thing we have tried to do is to design our forces for the
future, to make them more mobile and more flexible, and also to
take advantage of new technologies.
I think the Europeans are going to have to downsize, and they
are in the process of doing that. They are going to move away from
having a fixed type of military position to that of more highly flexi-
ble, mobile, and deployable units. They are doing that as we speak,
and they are going to be confronted with these kinds of choices that
you talked about.
But we have seen them undertake modernization as well and a
reshaping and redesigning of their forces as they are coming down
to be smaller. But we do not anticipate this will affect our abilities
and our obligations.
Senator Dodd. General Shelton, did you want to comment on
that?
General Shelton. Senator Dodd, the dollars through the FYDP
were included in the funding wedge for NATO enhancement. That
is from 1999 through 2003. So we do not see that having any im-
portance on modernization within our own forces.
In terms of the three prospective new members, for example, in
the case of the Czechs, their ministry of defense has been under
funded since 1989. But in 1999, it is the only department of their
government that will get an increase. It will start going up.
So we see a concerted effort on the part of all three in much the manner Secretary Cohen has just indicated, to start to come in line with NATO and a commitment on the part of the government to make sure that the Defense Department has what it needs in order to allow them to meet their commitments for membership.

Senator Dodd. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, I see the yellow light is on. Rather than ask an additional question, I will yield.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Hagel.

Senator Hagel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, add my welcome and best wishes to our three panelists. This has been a tough last few months for all three of you and I think you have handled yourselves very well and have been a credit to our country and to our allies.

I would like to pick up on a point that Senator Dodd made.

Secretary Cohen, you mentioned in your closing remarks dedication of resources. I am very concerned about what I see happening to our force structure. When you look out, starting with the Washington Post story of a week ago today, about stress and strain on our military, and you look at the numbers—General Shelton, I believe for the first time since 1979 the Army did not meet its recruitment quota—and you look at how since 1989 our Air Force has lost a third of its manpower—600 pilots we lost in 3 months last year—you know the numbers. This is the lowest defense budget, allocation of defense resources since World War II. 3.1 percent of our Gross Domestic Product goes to national defense. You know the numbers.

My question is this. If we are going to continue to take on new responsibilities and commitments, as we are, as we are talking today about NATO expansion—and as you know, all three of you, I am a very strong supporter of NATO expansion and have been for all of the reasons you mentioned and more—we are going to continue with a force structure in Iraq for who knows how long, or outside of Iraq in the Middle East. We must do that. On Bosnia, you all are going to come back up here, as you have been, and ask for more money for Bosnia. We are going to keep more forces there, presumably indefinitely. And there are all the other obligations in Korea, Asia, Germany.

How can we do this? I understand, Secretary Cohen, you talk about modernization and high tech weaponry. But I am concerned about what we are doing to our people.

I can tell you that at the base in Nebraska, Offutt Air Force Base, we have housing problems. We have major housing problems there. That is why a lot of these people are getting out.

You talk, Secretary Cohen, about how the infrastructure of any good outfit is the NCO corps, and General Shelton knows that especially that is true. But we are losing NCOs. If we do not pay attention to our people, we are going to find ourselves in a hell of a mess one of these days and we are taking all of this new responsibility on. We are not going to have any backup for that.
So I don't think I am alone in that. Secretary Cohen, you have been a member, a distinguished member, of the Armed Services Committee for many years and you know these numbers.

I would very much like to have the two of you reassure me that we are doing everything we can. As I read the President's budget, I think we are talking about eliminating 23,000 more uniformed military in his Fiscal Year 1999 budget.

How does this all work? How are we going to take on the new commitments?

Secretary Cohen. First of all, with respect to cuts in the end strength, as such, we have tried to take that out of combat support and civilian positions and not take them out of those who would be in the front line of our fighting force.

Second, with respect to how do we achieve these savings, I don't want to take your time to talk about the BRAC proceedings. It is very controversial. But the National Defense Panel, the QDR, virtually everyone has recommended reducing the size of our overhead.

The third point is that we are concerned about the loss of pilots. We are in a very competitive position, or I should say we are becoming less competitive with the private sector that is offering enormous sums of money to pilots and to others and a much more comfortable way of life.

So we have these challenges that we have to face up to. I think General Shelton can probably tell you what we are doing in terms of trying to reduce the stresses on those units that are overly utilized, which they called low density-high demand. We are facing problems with the over utilization of particular types of forces. But we are trying to address that. It is going to take, in some cases, more money. It is going to take, in some cases, reducing the operational tempo. We have a problem right now in terms of what we are doing in the Gulf as far as the high operational tempo. We have to take that into account. But it is a management problem and a challenge and it is one that we are wrestling with and hope to wrestle with in the coming years.

But as far as the new members coming in, as far as the costs are concerned, we think that those are fairly low and something that we can absorb quite easily. And what it gives us in the way of strategic depth and integrating those three countries into our architecture, the security architecture, we think the benefits far outweigh any burden we have to carry.

Senator Hagel. Bill, let me add just one thing. Quality of living for our people is a big problem. You never have enough money for this. You know that. But I am very, very concerned about what we are doing to our own people; because we are not paying attention, and we are not putting the resources there.

I think, quite frankly, this administration is going to have to come up and ask for more money in our defense budget. I don't know any way around this. We can talk about BRACs and base closings, Bill, but I think you are going to have to do better than that.

Secretary Cohen. There is another issue called the balanced budget agreement. As you know, there are firewalls that are up, at least this year. Next year, those walls come down. It will be a real
challenge to find out whether the members will resist shifting funds from defense into domestic programs or whether or not they will be willing to go higher in the way of appropriations or to take money out of the domestic progress for the military. That is going to be a real challenge next year.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

General Shelton?

General SHELTON. Senator, first of all, thanks very much for your support. I would tell you that balancing readiness, modernization, and quality of life is, in fact, the challenge for the Joint Chiefs.

As part of the QDR process, as we went through and looked at how we could increase the modernization account while still maintaining a trained and ready force and providing for the quality of life, we very quickly realized that the only way we could do that in a balanced budget era was if, in fact, we could take advantage of a revolution in business affairs as well as eliminate excess capacities. So I would just underscore what Secretary Cohen has said in that regard.

When it comes to trained and ready, I think today we have a trained and ready force. We see indications of that as we look at the force that stands poised right now in the Persian Gulf. There are some challenges. Secretary Cohen mentioned the pilots. Of course, that is driven not only by PERSTEMPO but also by a booming economy and the fact that the airlines are hiring at quite a rate, well above the historical average.

But, nevertheless, we have to deal with that, because that will have a long-term impact on our readiness.

Our low density/high demand units, the ones that we call on all the time and which are not in great supply, we now have a system which we did not have a year ago. So we monitor them, we manage them and a conscious decision is made whenever one of these units is going above the norm for their particular type of unit. We make a decision. We go back and challenge the requirement. We look for alternatives and, ultimately, we have to make a conscious decision either to send it or not to send it, to keep it within the given range so that our people can, in fact, sustain the pace.

We have several other systems in place right now to help us monitor both readiness as well as the PERS and OPERATIONAL TEMPO. We are able to manage it right now, but in terms of our long-term health, it will be critical in the coming years that we either reduce our capacities and capitalize on efficiencies or the top line will have to be moved up or we cannot maintain the readiness and provide for the quality of life as we try to keep our modernization accounts moving upward.

Senator HAGEL. I do not doubt the readiness. But I am concerned, like many of us, that we are stretching them so far that we are going to break them.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Robb.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I might reassure Senator Hagel that some of the questions he raised are going to be
taken up even this afternoon in the Readiness Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee and will be fully explored during those deliberations.

Madam Secretary, Mr. Secretary, General Shelton, we thank you for coming and for all that you have done in the last few days and weeks to both place the United States and the international community in a position where the Secretary General could come back and report to both the United Nations at some point today and at least tentatively before he left the theater all of the obligations that were required of Iraq under the U.N. Security Council resolutions would be fully and completely complied with.

I thank you for your brief mention of those developments. I have just a short question in that area and then I would like to do a very brief question with respect to the NATO enlargement which, as I think you know, I fully support as well.

I have just one question on the agreement, if you will, that Tariq Aziz and Kofi Annan signed in Baghdad which will be admittedly more fully briefed, developed, interpreted, and analyzed by the United States. Do you have any reason at this point to believe that there are any installations, entities, organizations, or other elements that might constitute some threat to the United States that are in any way excluded from the agreement that was signed in Baghdad by the Secretary General of the United Nations?

Secretary Albright. We have no reason to believe that. This is access to all sites, and we are going to make sure that that is what has been agreed to.

Senator Robb. Madam Secretary, do you have any reason to believe that there is either a specific or an implicit understanding as to the composition of any of the inspection teams that might require admittance to particular areas and that any particular individuals or classifications of individual might be excluded, again, either explicitly or implicitly?

Secretary Albright. It is our understanding that there is no classification or discrimination of that kind.

What is going to happen—and this, again, is one of the questions that needs to be clarified—that it is to all sites.

Senator Robb. Madam Secretary, do you have any reason to believe that there is either a specific or an implicit understanding as to the composition of any of the inspection teams that might require admittance to particular areas and that any particular individuals or classifications of individual might be excluded, again, either explicitly or implicitly?

Secretary Albright. It is our understanding that there is no classification or discrimination of that kind.

What is going to happen—and this, again, is one of the questions that needs to be clarified—is that these groups would be composed of experts drawn from UNSCOM and the IAEA, the atomic energy group, to be accompanied by diplomats; but that the operational control of those inspections would be under the inspectors, who would be the ones determining where to go and when to go—the operational aspects of this.

We think that we dealt with the issues of who was going to be part of it in terms of nationalities previously, and that is not our understanding of what has been reached here. But, again, these are the kinds of questions that need to be clarified.

Senator Robb. You do not have any reason to believe at this point, however, that any specific individuals that may have caused some consternation for Saddam Hussein would be on the exclusion list, again either explicitly or implicitly?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. As far as we know, there is no such agreement. But that is obviously one of the things that needs to be explored.

Senator ROBB. I have one other question in this area and this one might be directed at Secretary Cohen since he made the observation that a resolution would still be appropriate and welcome. I certainly agree and I, like Senator Dodd and others, wish that we had formally gone on record before the last brief recess to express our support for the United Nations and the U.S. position in this particular regard.

If we were to craft such a resolution at this point, would you welcome a very explicit trigger mechanism that would indicate support for specific action without additional consultation or warning should any of the provisions of the now reaffirmed agreement to abide by U.N. Security Council resolutions be reached in any way, shape, or form?

Secretary COHEN. I think it would be preferable to follow the lead that was taken by the British. They had a very vigorous debate in the House of Commons. I believe they passed—I am not sure about the number but it was something in this neighborhood—by something like 425 to 19, giving support to the government to pursue whatever measures necessary in order to enforce the U.N. resolutions.

I think that kind of general support would be very welcome.

Senator ROBB. We will see what we can do to help you on that particular score.

I did not mean to take all of my time with respect to Iraq. I have one question on NATO expansion.

A former colleague of ours, former Senator Gordon Humphrey, visited me and probably visited some of the others, expressing some very real reservations. It old him at the outset of our conversation that I took a different position, that I wholeheartedly supported the expansion. But he, nonetheless, made a number of points, one of which was that he felt that this alienation within the Russian people by the powerlessness that they might feel might diminish our ability to play the so-called Russian card against China in some future negotiations or strategic balancing as, indeed, we have talked about and occasionally played the China card previously against Russia.

Madam Secretary, would you like to respond?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Let me say that I do not agree with that, first of all because that is “old think,” frankly. We don’t operate that way. I think that what we are doing is establishing relations with these countries individually and that our national interests require us to deal with both those countries on a basis that is good for the United States.

I also think that it is a misreading of what is going on in Russia. Clearly, there are those who feel a powerlessness. But there have always been discussions within Russia as to whether to look outward or to look inward. Those have been going on for centuries.

I think we have to do everything we can to promote the democratic reform processes in Russia so that they feel very much a part of the world as we enter the 21st century. And I do not think we should be afraid of NATO expansion.
Senator ROBB. I agree and I thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.
Senator Smith.
Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, Mr. Secretary, General Shelton, thank you for being here today.
Yesterday, I did what I typically do when I am on the West Coast and I have a Tuesday schedule of voting. I got on a plane, but before doing so, I bought all of the weekly news magazines to find out what was happening or what had happened. When I came to Newsweek, I read about the “Clinton Doctrine.” It seemed to me that Newsweek was articulating a new foreign policy, a military strategy for dealing with chemical and biological weapons.
The thesis of the article, as I understood it, is that if there is a country that acquires these weapons and we don’t like their intentions, it will be the policy of the Clinton Administration that we “whack” them.
I wonder if you can confirm. Is there a Clinton Doctrine that reads that way? Do our allies support it? Will the administration seek the funds to prosecute it and will the American people support it in your view?
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Can I just begin this by saying that I do not believe half the things I have read in Newsweek this week, including the fact that the Chairman and I are having tiffs, which is not true, or what I wore someplace. So I would not take Newsweek seriously this week. [General laughter]
Senator SMITH. I wanted to ask the question for the simple reason that it is a stunning doctrine that is being propounded in the pages of the magazine and I, frankly, am genuinely interested in an answer to the question; because I think it is a serious one for our country to ask, if this is, in fact, a new doctrine that I think they ranked up with the Monroe Doctrine and others.
Secretary COHEN. I have not read the article, but let me say that this administration, like every administration, should be concerned about the proliferation of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons. We want to do our level best to discourage countries from acquiring them or building up their stocks and deploying them. That is a challenge that is going to face every administration.
We are trying to take measures which would discourage countries like China, for example, from transferring nuclear technology to Iran, to discourage Russia from transferring certain technology to Iran. We want to make sure that we try to confine this as best we can.
There are a number of countries here and it is growing. There is a proliferation of these weapons of mass destruction. We are going to have to contend with that in the future, in the next century as well as this one.
We have to develop domestic progress and we are doing that to provide for protection, assign the Guard and Reserves a more prominent role in dealing with that on a domestic level. But we do not have a doctrine, that I am aware of, that we are going to whack a country that has a chemical weapon or that with a biological weapon. That is news to me.
So I don’t know what the article said, whether that is an overreading of it. But by implication, I have never heard of it before.

General Shelton. I have not read the article, Senator. I am not aware of any change in our doctrine. But certainly, as the Secretary mentioned, counter proliferation in the future is something we are all concerned about, particularly as we look out toward 2010 and an environment in which this is obviously growing.

Then, finally, I would just say that I second and agree with Secretary Albright’s comments regarding the article that appeared in Newsweek regarding the “tiff” between the Secretary and myself. Not true.

Secretary Albright. Could I just make a serious comment about this?

I do think that the threats of the 21st century have to do with these weapons of mass destruction. I think one of the parts that has made it obviously complicated in explaining our position on Iraq is that in the past we have dealt with actual things that have happened, like the Iraqis crossing over into Kuwait, which is a physical act. We are now, when we deal with weapons of mass destruction, talking about a potential or future threat. We all, frankly, have to do a better job of explaining the problems of this future threat because it is the threat of the 21st century. You are going to be hearing a lot from us about this, not in terms of doctrine but in terms of explaining how one deals with bad things that have not happened yet but that might happen.

Senator Smith. I thank you for those answers.

I happen to have been one of the Senators at the Wehrkunde Conference and I must, frankly, admit that I was shocked as a newcomer to that forum at how little support existed among our European allies for what we were doing in Iraq or proposing to do. I was amazed, frankly, that we were being held to our promises in Bosnia without their support to help us in Europe.

I think, Madam Secretary, as we go forward and this becomes an issue, we need to figure out what our responsibility is in the world on these issues, that we engage them more than I think apparently they have been engaged to put up a united front against this kind of terror.

I will say one of the criticisms I have always heard against NATO enlargement is that it will somehow dilute the effectiveness of NATO. What I saw in Madrid, when NATO was signed, and what I saw at the Wehrkunde Conference is that the European allies that supported us were the Czechs, the Hungarians and the Poles.

So I think, far from diluting NATO, their inclusion will breathe back into it a new birth of freedom and a sense of what it is all about. So I welcome their inclusion.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Wellstone.

Senator Wellstone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, let me welcome all of you here and let me thank you for your leadership.

I want to say to Secretary Albright and General Shelton, as I said to the General earlier—we had a meeting, just a small number
of us—that I had concerns and had questions about where we were heading. I really appreciate your sensitivity and your honesty.

Let me ask two questions and then you all can just respond. That may be the best use of the 5 minutes. One is on Iraq and one is on NATO expansion.

There was a survey released last year by the U.N. Children's Fund which found that nearly 1 million Iraqi children under the age of 5 were chronically malnourished.

Now don’t misunderstand me. Saddam Hussein is a very cruel man, and this may not bother him in the least. But I have a policy question that I want to get some clarification on.

Are there any conditions under which a sanctions regime could be lifted or would be lifted, even if Saddam Hussein were still in power? We seem to have some confusion over that question and I want to get your response to that.

The second question has to do with NATO expansion. I think I am a bit in the minority on this, at least today. But I still have concerns and I want to quote Richard Pipes to get your reaction.

Let me start out by saying that I don’t think, Mr. Chairman, that I have ever dealt with a question that has been more difficult, especially from the point of view of face to face contact with people in my own State. I had on Valentine's Day a meeting with Czech-Americans, Polish-Americans, and Hungarian-Americans and they brought Valentine cookies with “Support NATO expansion” written on each cookie. I mean, this is the definition of Minnesota lobbying. [General laughter]

Senator WELLSTONE. Let me say that the words of George Kennan still are etched in my mind. I have a tremendous amount of respect for his wisdom.

Richard Pipes wrote a piece from which I quote:

Paranoia in Russia feeds on itself, seeking and finding confirmation in everything that happens emphatically, including the recent Western decision to expand NATO up to the very borders of the former Soviet Union. I know no Russian, regardless of political orientation, who favors it. To the contrary, NATO's projected expansion plays directly into the hands of the nationalists who exploit fears of the West to argue that Russia must reconstruct the empire and rebuild the military in order to hold its own in an unfriendly world.

I want to get your reaction.

Madam Secretary, I understand you cannot blame everything on NATO expansion as we are blaming everything on El Niño. On the other hand, I don’t see not the cooperation on Iraq, and the Duma not about to ratify START II. I worry. I read that the Russians are considering no longer abandoning the first use of tactical nuclear weapons, arguing that this may have to be their response.

So I am really worried about destabilization in Russia and in Europe. I want to get your response to that. Those are the two questions. If I could, may I get a response from each of you?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Let me try both and then yield to Secretary Cohen.

First of all, let me say that on Iraq, you have pointed to the poor children. The truth is that we care about those poor children more than Saddam Hussein does.

Senator WELLSTONE. I understand.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. We just voted to double the amount of oil that can be sold to get humanitarian assistance in there. Meanwhile, he builds palaces off other money. So it is not us. It is him. Our position has been that Saddam Hussein has to live up to all the relevant Security Council resolutions. That is our position and we believe that at this stage, talking about lifting sanctions is hypothetical. He is a long way from carrying out his obligations.

Senator WELLSTONE. If I could just interrupt, the point is that he has to live up to all of the U.N. resolutions? It is not a question that he has to be out of power? I just want to be clear on that point.

Secretary COHEN. Yes.
Secretary ALBRIGHT. Yes.

On the question of Russia, let me just say that I spoke to George Kennan a few days ago on his 94th birthday. He has been a remarkable influence on all of us in the United States. I find this very hard to say since I grew up on George Kennan, but I don't agree with his position on this.

I also do not agree with Mr. Pipes. I think that there are clearly such forces in Russia, but they would be there anyway. And I think that we would be rewarding those forces by limiting our own national interest as well as those of these countries that want to come in and not going forward with something that is, I believe, in the U.S. national interest and also in the interest of a secure and stable Europe.

Secretary COHEN. If I could respond, Secretary Albright has shared my sentiments exactly about what is taking place in Iraq with respect to children. Saddam Hussein has exhibited very little concern for their welfare, far less than we have.

As we have all indicated, once there is compliance with the resolutions, the sanctions can be lifted. The question is will he comply with the resolutions so they can be lifted.

With respect to Mr. Pipes, also a very well known scholar, let me say that you may recall when President Gorbachev was then in office, he said that a united Germany could never be part of NATO. We insisted that a united Germany would be part of NATO and we could structure it in a way that would not pose an offensive threat to the Russian people.

We now have a united Germany in NATO. We had Mr. Rodionov, as I mentioned, a former Minister of Defense, who came to the Pentagon to meet with the Joint Chiefs in the tank and go through NATO, the new NATO. We had Mr. Primakov, the Foreign Minister, come to the Pentagon and look at the proposed new NATO and how it would operate, to ask penetrating questions as he is accustomed to doing. I think we did not remove his doubts or his opposition, but we at least were able to answer some of those questions.

I think that the more we talk to them and show them how it will operate and how, as General Shelton has testified, stability actually works to their advantage as well, we also have to deal with this issue about first use of nuclear weapons.

I believe that is tied directly to the decline of their conventional forces. There has been a substantial degradation of their conven-
tional capability. They are concerned about it. I think it has prompted some of this talk about first use.

You may recall that for years the former Soviet Union declared its policy was no first use. Now that the documents have now been declassified, we are finding out that it was always their policy to resort to nuclear weapons if it was in their national security interest to do so—first or second.

With respect to a first use threat, I think we all obviously ought to be concerned about what is happening with their early warning capability, to make sure that they are satisfied that their national security interests are protected so that there is no inclination for them to resort on a hair trigger to a first use of nuclear weapons.

So we work with them. That is why we are so interested in getting ratification of START II, going on to START III, and is why we need to keep up these contacts. It is because when you see that kind of rhetoric coming out of Russia, it obviously is of concern. But we have to address their concerns. We need to help them, for example, restructure their military.

I have offered to do that with the new Minister of Defense as I did with his predecessor, to show them how we have dealt with our modernization. Is it relevant? Perhaps not. But this is the kind of dialog that needs to be carried on because we do have to have a good relationship with Russia. I think we can reduce their apprehensions and fears. They may always have some of them. But I think the way in which we reduce that level of fear is to continue the dialog and not simply to retreat and get involved in accusations.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

Senator Ashcroft.

Senator ASHCROFT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, Mr. Secretary, General Shelton, thank you very much for appearing before the committee.

With regard to Iraq and NATO expansion the administration seeks to rely more heavily on multilateral arrangements to advance our foreign policy interests.

I have stated serious questions and reservations about the expansion of NATO and its mission, particularly the expansion of its mission. I will address those further today.

With respect to Iraq, I am deeply, deeply disappointed at the outcome of the latest confrontation with Saddam Hussein. The sad truth is that Saddam Hussein is better off today than he was in October. He is better off across the board—militarily, politically, and economically.

He has been free of effective inspection for several months without any penalty. He has won greater prestige in the region and in the Arab world generally. He will be allowed to sell more oil. There is a growing high level discussion of dismantling the rest of the sanctions regime in some European capitals.

It could be that one day Saddam Hussein’s triumph will be the world’s tragedy. I am concerned about that.

He is the chief terrorist of a terrorist government. His weapons of mass destruction not only threaten our interests but our allies in the Middle East. He has demonstrated his willingness to use those weapons even against his own people.
It seems to me that the administration has adopted as its highest goal the preservation of the status quo, and there is a problem with that. Simply restoring the status quo without penalizing Saddam encourages adventurism by other rogue states around the world.

The penalty for stealing a car should not be simply to give the car back. I mean, if we did that domestically, we would find car theft on the rise and respect for law enforcement on the decline.

In making a new and untested agreement with the United Nations, Saddam has agreed to do nothing more, it appears to me, than he was obliged to do all along.

The preservation of a status quo, in my judgment, is not a diplomatic triumph, Madam Secretary. To me it is a tragedy if it is not more than that.

It appears to me that the clear winner in this round is Saddam Hussein. One reason he was able to defy the U.S. and prosper, I believe, was our inordinate reliance on the U.N. to conduct crucial parts of our foreign policy. When I consider an enlarged NATO with the ill defined out-of-area missions against the backdrop of this engagement with Iraq, I am disquieted and I have real reservations about what it means in regard to our foreign policy.

In the absence of a successful policy against Iraq, the United Nations and Russia were able to set the agenda throughout the recent crisis. U.N. foreign policy is one thing but U.S. foreign policy is another. Our foreign policy should not be written at the U.N. or subcontracted to Moscow or subservient to multilateral interests.

A second reason for Saddam Hussein having success I think was the inability of the President to summon strong support for his position from the American people and from our allies. This, too, should raise doubts, in my judgment, about the ability of an enlarged mission for NATO.

If our mission with NATO is ill defined, I think it is going to make it more difficult to summon the support of the American people. A lack of clear Presidential leadership on Iraq has not served the United States well in the Middle East, and I fear that a lack of responsible leadership in Europe will threaten the future of a strong NATO as well.

Madam Secretary, when you appeared before this committee on October 7, 1997, I asked you about NATO's mission in the future; specifically, if the alliance would be shifting from its traditional defense of the territory of Western European Nations in NATO to an organization which advanced the members' out-of-area interests. You responded that NATO would be advancing those out-of-area interests in the future, but you didn't give any real definition or realistic limits to those interests, which could extend from the Pacific Rim to Central America.

In other forums, you have been quoted as saying that NATO should evolve into “a force for peace from the Middle East to Central Africa.”

I fear that such a broad mission threatens the future of an alliance with such historical distinction. Without a clear post-Cold War mission, NATO could become nothing more than a mini-United Nations with a standing army for ill-defined peacekeeping operations as we have seen in Bosnia, an operation which has cost the United States over $6 billion since 1996. Potentially endless peace-
keeping missions divert scarce resources from a seriously diminished defense budget.

I thought Senator Hagel’s remarks were very important on that point.

The Washington Post reported days ago that our European allies already question a NATO structure that advances the vast political interests of its members rather than defending territory.

These reports raise serious questions.

Madam Secretary, in advancing out-of-area interests, where do you think the limits will be drawn in terms of NATO deployments and other operations.

Second, you have stated that NATO faces no immediate security threat. What will be the compelling rationale for the alliance in the future? Is it just the so-called interests without the defense of territory?

Secretary Albright. Thank you very much, Senator. You were very kind to put your critique out ahead of time, so I have a chance to quote from it.

I agree with you. U.S. foreign policy should not be written at the United Nations, subcontracted to Moscow, or servant to multilateral interests. It is none of the above.

First of all, I think it is very clear that the U.N. has been very useful in the Gulf, starting with President Bush and putting together a coalition there based, and the commitments that now need to be carried out were created some time ago at the end of the Gulf War.

We have made very clear what our national interests are, and at this time the U.N. is the best forum for carrying those out.

First of all, the tough sanctions regime, the toughest in the history of the world, is carried out because it is a multilateral sanctions regime. If we wanted to do it alone, we could not do that as we know that unilateral sanctions do not work as well as multilateral ones.

Second, our relationship with Moscow on this has been actually quite useful. They have also insisted on the fact that there be full, unfettered inspections, and they have insisted that there be repeat visits. So I see no problem there.

Clearly, there are times that a multilateral approach works.

I do not think that you would want us to do everything by ourselves. I think we have discussed here what burden sharing is about and that burden sharing is a way for others to help carry out some of the responsibilities of the Free World so that the United States does not have to do it alone.

In terms of out-of-area interests, let me say that what NATO is at this stage is reviewing its strategic concept, but it is at the start of that process. They are looking at which parts of it are valid and how to revise the text.

Our position is clear. We do not seek to change the basic function of the alliance of Article V, which is collective defense. So we have no problem about the basic function of NATO.

NATO itself is looking at various things that it wants to do out-of-area. Bosnia is one of those.

The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Ashcroft. Mr. Chairman, I think the Secretary may have suggested something. Is there currently an investigation of the redrafting of the NATO accord so as to establish a new purpose for NATO? You said they were currently looking at the language relating to out-of-area missions.

Secretary Albright. They are reviewing their strategic concept. This is an ongoing activity of NATO which they do.

Senator Ashcroft. If the concept is to be changed so that NATO becomes something that is different than what we originally developed it as in 1949, would that concept be resubmitted to the U.S. Senate for its review?

Secretary Albright. We will all be discussing it. I think that it is not a basic undoing of the treaty alliance that was signed. So it is my understanding that that is not what would happen.

It is an alliance that was created in 1949 and needs to make sure that it stays valid, vivid, and able to deal with the problems of the day. I know the things that I did in 1949 bear little relationship to what I am doing now.

The Chairman. Thank you very much.

Let the Chair say that I don't think I have ever made a speech that I didn't think while driving home “why didn't I say so and so?” I have not testified before many committees, but I want to give you an opportunity, if you have anything else to add to the record, to do so because this is important.

Let's take a few minutes for that, if you will.

We will start with you, Senator, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary Cohen. In response to which, Senator Helms?

The Chairman. Whatever.

Secretary Cohen. Just generally speaking?

Senator Biden. Is there anything you have not said?

The Chairman. If you are satisfied with everything you have said, fine.

Secretary Cohen. I don't have anything to add to what I have said before.

The Chairman. All right.

Madam Secretary.

Secretary Albright. I would just like to say, Mr. Chairman, that we are very grateful for all the time the committee has given to this very important issue. I think we are involved in an historic challenge and we are doing this together. I think we are all going to feel very good about what we are deciding here, and I very much welcome your partnership in this.

Thank you.

The Chairman. By the way, Madam Secretary, we get all sorts of calls in Senate offices. They tell me that we got one in mine from a gentlemen who suggested we make Mr. Annan Secretary of State. The young lady said what do I tell him. Just tell him, I said, that he, that Kofi, will not get a hearing. [General laughter]

Senator Biden. That settles it, then. [General laughter]

The Chairman. General?

General Shelton. I have nothing to add, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. It has been an honor to be here today.

The Chairman. Thank you all very much.
The record will remain open for 3 days for questions from Senators in writing. If the Secretaries and the General can get those answers in by Monday, it will allow us to proceed to a business meeting next week.

Thank you again for coming.

I thank the audience, all the aides, and everybody else for being here and for your patience.

Secretary Albright. Thank you.
Secretary Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. There being no further business to come before the committee, we stand in recess.

[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the committee recessed.]
Chairman Helms, Senator Biden, members of the committee: It is my high honor to appear with my colleagues to present the protocols of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 that will add Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO. We view the ratification of these protocols as an essential part of a broader strategy to build an undivided, democratic and peaceful Europe. We believe this goal is manifestly in America's own interest, and that it merits your strong support.

We are approaching the culmination of a remarkable process. It began four years ago when President Clinton and his fellow NATO leaders decided that the question was not whether NATO would welcome new members, but when and how it would do so. It moved forward in Madrid, when, after months of study and deliberation, the Alliance agreed that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic would make NATO stronger and met every qualification for membership. It advanced two weeks ago, when President Clinton transmitted to the Congress the documents that will, with your consent, make these three nations America's newest allies.

I want to stress today, Mr. Chairman, that from the start, the Administration’s decisions have been shaped by our consultations with you, with this committee and with others, with the NATO Observer Group, and with your colleagues in both Houses of Congress and both parties. Over the last few years, and especially the last few months, you have truly put the “advice” into the process of advice and consent. Our discussions have been a model of the kind of serious, bipartisan conversation we need to be having with the Congress and the American people about our nation’s role in the world.

Of course, this is not the first time we have discussed NATO enlargement together. It is also not the first time that we as a nation have considered the addition of new members to our alliance. Almost 50 years ago, my predecessor Secretary Dean Acheson transmitted to President Truman the original North Atlantic Treaty. He pointed out that if NATO was to be “fully effective” it had to be open to “as many countries as are in a position to further the democratic principles upon which the Treaty was based, to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area, and ... to undertake the necessary responsibilities.”

In the years since, the Senate has given its consent to the admission of Greece, Turkey, Germany and Spain into NATO. Each time, the Alliance became stronger. Each time, old divisions were overcome. Each time, new nations became anchored, once and for all, in the community of democracies that NATO exists to unite and protect. And this time will be no different.

But this moment is historic in another way. For if the Senate agrees, NATO will, for the first time, step across the line it was created to defend and overcome—the line that once so cruelly and arbitrarily divided Europe into east and west.

During the Cold War, I’m sure some of you had the strange experience of seeing that line up close. There were bunkers and barbed wire, mine fields and soldiers in watchtowers fixing you in their crosshairs. On one side were free people, living in sovereign countries. On the other were people who wanted to be free, living in countries being suffocated by communism.

Go to the center of Europe today, and you would have to use all the powers of your imagination to conjure up these images of that very recent past. There are still borders, of course, but they are there to manage the flow of trucks and tour buses, not to stop troops and tanks. On both sides, people vote and speak and buy and sell freely. Governments cooperate with one another. Soldiers train and serve together. The legacy of the past is still visible east of the old divide, but in the ways that matter, the new democracies are becoming indistinguishable from their western neighbors.
We are here today, Mr. Chairman, because the status quo in Europe was shattered by the geopolitical equivalent of an earthquake. That earthquake presented us with a dual challenge: first, how to preserve a favorable security environment into the next century; and second, how to seize the opportunity to build a Europe whole and free.

In meeting that challenge, NATO faced a blunt choice. Would our alliance be the last institution in Europe to continue to treat the Iron Curtain as something meaningful? Or would it aid in Europe’s reunification and renewal? Would it exclude from its ranks a whole group of qualified democracies simply because they had been subjugated in the past? Or would it be open to those free nations that are willing and able to meet the responsibilities of membership and to contribute to our security? I believe NATO made the right choice. NATO’s decision to accept qualified new members will make America safer, NATO stronger, and Europe more stable and united.

We recognize, Mr. Chairman, that the decision to build a larger NATO has implications for our security that must be weighed carefully. It involves solemn commitments. It is not cost-free. It can only be justified if it advances America’s strategic interests.

Last October, I had the opportunity to come before you to make the case that a larger NATO will serve our interests. I will try to summarize that case today, and then focus on the questions and concerns that may still exist.

First, a larger NATO will make America safer by expanding the area of Europe where wars do not happen. By making it clear that we will fight, if necessary, to defend our new allies, we make it less likely that we will ever be called upon to do so.

Is central Europe in immediate jeopardy today? It is not. But can we safely say that our interest in its security will never be threatened? History and experience do not permit us to say that, Mr. Chairman.

There is, after all, the obvious risk of ethnic conflict. There is the growing danger posed by rogue states with dangerous weapons. There are still questions about the future of Russia. Whatever the future may hold, it is hardly in our interest to have a group of vulnerable and excluded states in the heart of Europe. It will be in our interest to have a vigorous and larger alliance with those European democracies that share our values and our determination to defend them.

A second reason is that the very prospect of a larger NATO has given the nations of central and eastern Europe an incentive to solve their own problems. To align themselves with NATO, aspiring allies have strengthened their democratic institutions, improved respect for minority rights, made sure soldiers take orders from civilians, and resolved virtually every old border and ethnic dispute in the region. This is the kind of progress that can ensure outside powers are never again dragged into conflict in this region. This is the kind of progress that will continue if the Senate says yes to a larger NATO.

A third reason why enlargement passes the test of national interest is that it will make NATO itself stronger and more cohesive. Our prospective allies are passionately committed to NATO. Experience has taught them to believe in a strong American role in Europe. Their forces have risked their lives alongside ours from the Gulf War to Bosnia. They will add strategic depth to the Alliance, not to mention well over 200,000 troops.

Two weeks ago, Foreign Minister Geremek of Poland was in Washington along with his Czech and Hungarian colleagues, and he was asked why his country wants to join NATO. He replied that Poland wants to be anchored at long last in the institutions of the transatlantic community. He said “we owe to America this revival of Poland’s attachment to the West . . . Very simply, we owe our freedom to the United States.”

Mr. Chairman, let us remember that these countries look forward to assuming the heavy responsibilities of NATO membership not as a burden, but as an opportunity. An opportunity to show the world that they are now mature, capable democracies, ready, willing and able to give something back to the community of freedom that stood by them in their years of darkness.

This point should be especially important to us today. Our nation is now engaged in an effort to ensure Iraq’s compliance with UN Security Council resolutions. We have marshaling the support of other nations in this just cause. When I met with the Foreign Ministers of our three prospective allies two weeks ago, I asked them to stand by our side. Their response was swift and sure. If we have to take military action, they will be with us.

The bottom line is that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are already behaving as loyal allies. They will be good allies in the future, of that I have no doubt.
Nevertheless, I know that there are still serious critics who have legitimate questions about our policy. We have grappled with many of the same questions ourselves, and I want to address a few of them today.

Some of the concerns revolve around the potential cost of a larger NATO. The last time I was here, Mr. Chairman, we could only talk about estimates, for NATO had not yet come to agreement on this issue. Now, all 16 allies have agreed on the numbers and backed them up with commitments. We know today that the costs will be real, but also that they will be manageable, that they will be met, and that they will be shared fairly.

Some of those costs will be paid by our three new allies. I know some people have argued that these new democracies should not be asked to bear additional military burdens at a time when they are still undergoing difficult economic transformations. But these nations will be modernizing their armed forces in any case, and they have told us that in the long run it will be cheaper to do so within NATO than outside it.

Ultimately, only the people of these countries can decide what is best for their future. Today, in all three, solid public majorities and every mainstream party support membership in NATO. All three have growing economies. All three are building stronger, leaner, more professional armed forces. They are telling us they see no contradiction between security and prosperity and we should not substitute our judgment for theirs.

There are also people who worry that the cost of a larger NATO—to us and to our allies—will be far greater than the Alliance has projected. That fear is partly based on a natural belief that governments tend to underestimate costs, sometimes severely, sometimes on purpose. But that is not the case with NATO. Our contributions to NATO are a budgeted line item, not an open-ended entitlement. They are funded in an annual exercise that will be fully in your own control. There is no history of running NATO on supplemental appropriations.

That fear is also partly based on an assumption that we will someday have to respond to a military threat to our new allies. If we are called upon to send troops to defend our new allies, then the cost will surely grow. But then, if such a dire threat were to arise, the cost of our entire defense budget would grow, whether we enlarge NATO or not. If you believe, as I do, that we have a security interest in the fate of these countries, then the most effective—and cost-effective—way to protect that interest is to make them allies now. As President Havel of the Czech Republic has rightly said: “Even the costliest preventive security is cheaper than the cheapest war.”

Another concern that I want to address today is that adding new members to NATO could diminish the effectiveness of the Alliance and make it harder to reach decisions—in short, that it could dilute NATO. But we have pursued NATO enlargement in a way that will make the Alliance stronger, not weaker.

This is why we have insisted that any nation wishing to join NATO must meet the strict conditions that former Secretary of Defense Perry enunciated in 1995: They must be market democracies with civilian control of the military, good relations with neighbors and the ability to contribute to NATO’s mission of collective defense. This is why when President Clinton went to the Madrid summit last July, he insisted that only the strongest candidates be invited to join in this first round. As you know, the President was under some pressure, both at home and abroad, to agree to four or five new allies. He agreed to three, because we are determined to preserve NATO’s integrity and strength.

Ultimately, what matters is NATO’s effectiveness in action. We need to be confident that our allies have the resolve to stand with us when the going gets tough. So let us remember: When we asked Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to join us in the Gulf, they did not hesitate. When we asked them to put their soldiers in harm’s way in Bosnia, they did not hesitate. When we asked Hungary to open its bases to American troops, so they could deploy safely to Bosnia, it did not hesitate.

NATO is a military alliance, not a social club. But neither is it an inbred aristocracy. We must be prudent enough to add members selectively, but we must be smart enough to add those members that will add to our own security. These three will.

Others may in the future.

And that in turn, raises another question I know a number of Senators have: namely, where will this process lead us and what about those countries that are not now being invited to join?

Part of the answer lies in NATO’s Partnership for Peace and in its new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Through these arrangements, virtually every nation from Armenia to Finland can act side by side with NATO and help to shape the exercises and missions we undertake with them.
But an equally important part of the answer lies in NATO’s commitment to keep its door open to additional members. This is central to the logic of a larger NATO. After all, we set out on this policy because we believe that NATO cannot respect and must not perpetuate arbitrary lines of division in Europe. We gain nothing by ruling out a country as a future ally if it is important to our security, and if it proves that it is willing and able to contribute to our security.

Let me say very clearly that we have made no decisions about who the next members of NATO should be or when they might join. But we should also have some humility before the future.

How many people predicted in 1949 that Germany would so soon be a member of the Alliance? Who could have known in 1988 that in just ten years, members of the old Warsaw Pact would be in a position to join NATO? Who can tell today what Europe will look like even in a few years? This is just one reason why we want to preserve our flexibility—and that of those who will lead the Alliance in years to come.

Some now propose that we freeze the process of enlargement for some arbitrary number of years. Some of these people have said, with candor, that their real aim is to freeze the process forever. Let me be absolutely clear: this Administration opposes any effort in the Senate to mandate an artificial pause in the process of NATO enlargement.

Last July, Mr. Chairman, President Clinton and I had the amazing experience of traveling the length and breadth of central and eastern Europe. In those countries that were not invited to join NATO, we were met by enthusiastic crowds and by leaders who support the decisions the Alliance made in Madrid. They know they have a ways to go before they can be considered. Yet just the possibility of joining has inspired them to accelerate reform, to reach out to their neighbors, and to reject the destructive nationalism of their region’s past.

A mandated pause would be heard from Tallinn in the north to Sofia in the south as the sound of an open door slamming shut. It would be seen as a vote of no confidence in reform-minded governments from the Baltics to the Balkans. It would be taken as a sign that we have written these countries off and diminish the incentive they have to cooperate with their neighbors and with NATO. It would fracture the consensus NATO itself has reached on its open door. It would be at once dangerous and utterly unnecessary, since the Senate would in any case have to approve the admission of any new allies. It would defeat the very purpose of NATO enlargement.

Mr. Chairman, let me take a few moments to discuss one final key concern: the impact of a larger NATO on Russia and on our ties with that country. I want to stress that this concern has to do mostly with perceptions, not reality. And while perceptions can be important, our policies must follow from what we know to be true.

For example, there is a common perception that we are moving NATO, its tanks and bombers, and even its nuclear weapons right up to Russia’s borders, and that therefore Russia has a reason to be threatened by a larger NATO. The reality is quite different.

Proximity is not the issue. Russia and NATO have shared a common border since 1949—both Russia and Norway know this is nothing new. There are no tensions along the border between Poland and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea coast. Hungary and the Czech Republic, meanwhile, are closer to France than they are to the nearest corner of Russian soil.

As for weaponry, NATO has announced that in the current and foreseeable security environment, it has no plan, no need and no intention to station nuclear weapons in the new member countries, nor does it contemplate permanently stationing substantial combat forces. Just as important, the prospect of joining NATO has given our future allies the confidence to avoid arms buildups and to work constructively to establish lower limits on conventional forces. Their ties with Russia are more normal and cooperative today than at any time in history.

If we did not enlarge NATO, exactly the opposite could happen. The central European nations would feel isolated and insecure. They would undoubtedly spend more on defense and they might reject regional arms control. As Senator Biden has pointed out, they would probably create their own mutual security arrangements, which might well be anti-Russian in character. Ironically, the problems Russia fears a larger NATO will cause are precisely the problems a larger NATO will avoid.

A more worrisome perception is that Russian opposition to expansion, whether justified or not, is hurting our relationship with Moscow. But once again, the reality is different.

I have spent much time during the last year talking with my Russian counterpart, Foreign Minister Primakov and other Russian leaders. I can assure you that the issue of enlargement is not a cloud that shadows these discussions. I believe our
relationship is developing according to its own rhythms and priorities, and we have made significant progress in a number of key areas.

The new NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council is up and running. Russia is taking part in the Partnership for Peace. Our soldiers and diplomats are working together in Bosnia. Russia was a full participant at the Summit of the Eight in Denver last year, and we are helping it prepare for membership in the World Trade Organization. With our support, Russia has continued on the path of economic and democratic reform.

We are pushing ahead with arms control as well: Russia is a year ahead of schedule in slicing apart nuclear weapons under the START I treaty. We signed a START II protocol that helps clear the way for the next phase in strategic arms reductions, and, we hope, will expedite Russian ratification of that treaty. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin have agreed on the outlines of a START III treaty that would cut strategic arsenals to 80 percent below their Cold War peaks, once START II enters into force. Russia has joined us in banning nuclear testing and it has followed us in ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention. We have begun to adapt the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.

We are also working with Russia to improve the security of nuclear weapons and materials, making good use of the programs pioneered in the Nunn-Lugar legislation. We are helping Russia stop production of weapons-grade plutonium. As we speak, our experts are helping to build safe and secure storage facilities for tons of fissile material, and to upgrade security at nuclear weapons storage sites throughout Russia.

I am not here to pretend that everything is perfect in our relationship with Russia. We are frankly concerned about the slow pace of action on START II ratification. We have serious concerns about Russia's relationship with Iran. Our perspectives on Iraq differ as well, though we fully agree on the fundamental goal of full Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions.

But let us be clear. It is a big mistake to think that every time Russia does something we do not like, it is to "punish" us for bringing Hungary or Poland into NATO. Our disagreements with Russia, especially about the Middle East and Gulf, have come about because of the manner in which Russia is defining its national interests in that part of the world. These differences existed long before NATO decided to expand. If the Senate were to reject enlargement, we would not make them go away. We would, however, be turning our backs on three nations that have stood with us on Iraq, on Iran and on the range of security issues that matter to America.

Mr. Chairman, I think there is a larger issue at stake here. Those critics who focus on Russia's opposition to enlargement are making an assumption that Russia will always define its national interests in ways inimical to our own. These voices assume Russia will always be threatened and humiliated by the desire of its former satellites to go their own way; that it will never get over the end of its empire. They say that we should be realistic and accept this. They would have us ask Russia's neighbors to set aside their legitimate aspirations indefinitely for the sake of US-Russian cooperation.

I believe those assumptions sell Russia short. I believe they ignore the progress we have made, and that Russia has made in coming to terms with a world that has radically changed.

I am confident America can build a true partnership with a new Russia. But the partnership we seek cannot be purchased by denying a dozen European countries the right to seek membership in NATO. A partnership built on an illegitimate moral compromise would not be genuine and it would not last.

I am also confident that Russia can succeed in its effort to become a prosperous, stable democracy—that it is becoming a normal power that expresses its greatness by working with others to shape a more just and lawful world. That transformation will only be delayed if we give Russia any reason to believe that it can still assert its greatness at the expense of its neighbors in central Europe. It is much more likely to advance as Russia recognizes that the same rules apply to every part of Europe; that Poland is no different from Portugal in its right to pursue its own aspirations.

Mr. Chairman, for all these reasons and more, I believe that the choice before you involves much, much more than the immediate future of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. It involves the future security of the United States; the future of an undivided Europe; the future of Russia and the character of our relationship with it.

In a sense, it involves the most basic question of all in our foreign policy: how do we avoid war and maintain a principled peace?

For some people, the answer seems to revolve around catch phrases such as globalization, and the naive hope that people who trade and exchange e-mails won't
fight. But I do not believe we can bet our future on such an assumption. This is still a dangerous world.

We need to remain vigilant and strong, militarily and economically. We must strive to maintain the cordial relations among major powers which has lent brightness to the promise of our age. At the same time, we cannot assume that great power diplomacy alone will achieve the peaceful conditions in the future that it has so often failed to achieve in the past.

That is why we must also strengthen the proven alliances and institutions that provide order and security based on realism and law, for nations large and small. Institutions that deter aggression, and that give us a means to marshal support against it when deterrence fails.

That is what NATO does. That is why we decided to keep it after the Cold War ended. That is why we decided to expand it. That is why I thank you today, Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, for working with us to make this day possible.

I commend you and the Committee for the time and effort you have dedicated to this vital decision. The NATO enlargement debate has not always been in the limelight. It is not about responding to the crisis of the moment; it is about the less glamorous, less headline-grabbing business of preventing the crises of the future. It calls for serious attention to be paid to the long-term challenges facing our country. And that is what you have done, with an emphasis on patriotism, not partisanship.

I thank you for helping to make this Committee, and the Senate as a whole, our full partner in the creation of a larger, stronger, better NATO. I look forward to your questions today and in the days to come.

Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to Secretary Albright

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY CHAIRMAN HELMS

Question 1. Does the Administration understand the requirement to consult with and seek the advice of the Senate prior to reaching a decision to invite additional members to join NATO?

Answer. We understand fully the Senate's constitutional responsibility to advise and consent to the ratification of any Treaty into which the United States enters. As we have done in the past, as well as on this occasion, we will keep the Senate and the Foreign Relations Committee fully informed of significant developments with regard to possible future rounds of NATO enlargement and seek its advice on important decisions. We would of course be required to obtain the Senate's advice and consent to any future amendments to the Washington Treaty that enlarge NATO.

Question 2. How does NATO currently resolve disputes among its members? Are improvements necessary in this process?

Answer. NATO has a dispute resolution mechanism—the North Atlantic Council (NAC)—where its members discuss common security concerns, coordinate their security policies in mutually beneficial ways, and prepare for common security challenges. It provides a robust but flexible framework within which member states have been able effectively to ease tensions, build mutual confidence, and reduce or eliminate areas of conflict. Working through the NAC and other NATO fora, Allies have developed the habit and practice of constant consultation and interaction on a wide range of issues and policies that concern their basic national interests. Within NATO, the Allies have reinforced their commitment to managing differences through dialogue and consultation. The NATO Secretary General also plays an active role in dealing with disputes between allies. Beyond this, however, we do not believe it is in the interests of the U.S. or the Alliance to subordinate NATO's core mission of collective defense to the settlement of disputes among members that might reach well beyond the security realm. There are other institutions available to perform this function, and we support them.

Question 3. Should the North Atlantic Treaty be revised to allow for the expulsion of members who do not meet NATO's principles of democracy?

Answer. Creation of a mechanism to allow expulsion of members who do not live up to NATO's principles of democracy would require revision of the NATO Treaty. We looked into this question informally last year at the request of a member of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and found no support among the Allies for such a revision of Treaty. An expulsion provision would, moreover, require abandoning the core principle of consensus in NATO decision-making, which we regard as a key factor protecting U.S. freedom of action under the Treaty.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BIDEN

Question 1. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said that such missions as peace operations and humanitarian assistance are the marks of a collective security organization and not a collective defense organization. How do you respond to such criticism?

Answer. We have made it clear that NATO will remain a military alliance, dedicated to a core mission of collective defense. NATO’s other missions—from crisis management to operations like Bosnia—neither replace nor diminish that core mission. They are fully in line with Article IV of the Washington Treaty. In the post-Cold War world NATO is faced less with a single overarching threat than with a spectrum of possible dangers, many outside NATO territory, for which it must be prepared. NATO has the ability to do both, and the force structures required are compatible.

NATO is also not getting into “nation-building.” Enlarging the Alliance reinforces democratic trends in the region, but NATO itself does not conduct democracy promotion programs. And no mission can be undertaken without a consensus among the Allies. However, the unique organization and prestige that NATO can bring to securing allied interests in stability make it a resource that cannot be left aside in extraordinary circumstances. The success to date of the NATO-led effort in Bosnia underlines this.

Question 2. Will NATO membership cause defense spending in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to increase at the expense of more important domestic priorities? If so, do you foresee problems down the road in their ability to fulfill their commitment to the Alliance?

Answer. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have all identified defense spending as one of their most important domestic priorities.

They realize that most of the defense spending related to NATO membership is necessary for an effective military in a modern democratic state. Moreover, the cost of defense would undoubtedly be higher if the invitees did not join NATO.

Positive growth rates and sound fiscal and monetary policy in each country will enable the invitees to increase defense spending and fulfill commitments to pay the direct costs of NATO enlargement.

Of course, the invitees will have to consider other significant needs to determine how much can be spent on defense. We do not foresee, however, problems down the road in their ability to maintain the financial commitment necessary to be effective Allies.

Question 3. How are financial contributions shared between NATO and Russia to pay for the Permanent Joint Council?

Answer. NATO and Russia have agreed to share all costs associated with Founding Act, including operation of the Permanent Joint Council and activities conducted under its auspices. NATO and Russia are currently engaged in working out the detailed arrangement for determining and distributing those costs, including how to evaluate such in-kind contributions as interpreting services.

U.S. policy is to ensure that costs are shared equitably between NATO and Russia. Russia's willingness to assume an equitable share of costs is one of the factors NATO will consider in assessing the degree of Russian interest in and commitment to developing the NATO-Russia relationship.

Question 4. The NATO-Russia Founding Act is expected to allow unprecedented access to NATO structures and deliberations, including a permanent Russia liaison at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Will Russia permit similar representation by NATO at the Russian General Staff? Will the United States insist that absolute reciprocity between NATO and Russia be achieved?

Answer. The Founding Act does not provide Russia with access to NATO deliberations. The North Atlantic Council remains the supreme decision making body of the Alliance where internal Alliance matters are discussed and decided. Only members of NATO are represented on the North Atlantic Council. The Permanent Joint Council, created by the Founding Act, provides Russia with a voice on European security issues in which it has a legitimate interest, but it does not give Russia a role in the North Atlantic Council or a veto over NATO's decision-making or actions.
To support the military components of the Permanent Joint Council and the enhanced military cooperation envisioned by the Founding Act, the Act provides for NATO and Russia to establish military liaison missions at various levels on the basis of reciprocity. To date, NATO and Russia have not finalized any arrangements to establish military liaison missions, either at NATO or in Russia.

The NATO-Russia relationship is a two way street. The Founding Act explicitly commits NATO and Russia to develop their relationship on the basis of reciprocity. This commitment was undertaken at the highest political level both within the Alliance and in Russia and applies to military as well as diplomatic relations. In other words, any Russian military liaison missions will have appropriate NATO counterparts.

Questions Submitted by Senator Feingold

Question 1. How do you explain the disparities between the various cost estimates for the United States’ share of NATO enlargement, which have ranged from $2 billion to $7 billion?

1. What are the latest estimates for the United States’ share of NATO enlargement?
2. How confident are you that the United States’ share will not rise above $7 billion?

Answer. The NATO study and the U.S. estimate came to different conclusions because they were different in several key areas. First, the portion of the Administration’s earlier U.S. cost estimate that addressed what the Alliance would collectively pay is $4.9–6.2B (not $27–35B), and should be compared to the $1.5B NATO estimate.

Second, prior to NATO’s identification of new members, the Administration outlined general requirements and an illustrative cost estimate for four potential new members; after the July 1997 Madrid Summit at which NATO named the three invitees, NATO identified detailed military requirements and a common-funded cost estimate for three new members.

Third, NATO’s studies were based on more recent and detailed data on new members’ infrastructure (e.g., airbases, road and rail networks), including site visits, that revealed significantly better conditions than the Administration had previously assessed. Other factors included the following. The Administration assumed common funding for some requirements (e.g., airfield off-loading equipment) that NATO determined are nationally funded. The Administration also used higher cost factors for needed upgrades (e.g., air defense C2) in some instances.

Finally, there were modest differences in requirements with a significant cost impact. While some military requirements differ, the differences are modest and not operationally significant. Both studies use the same reinforcement strategy and developed broadly similar military requirements, including the number and types of reinforcing forces and reception facilities. However, the Administration’s study included some requirements that NATO did not include (e.g., more ambitious upgrades to airfields and training facilities).

In the Administration’s February 1998 Report to the Congress on the Military Requirements and Costs of NATO Enlargement, they assessed the resource implications of enlargement based on NATO’s agreed cost estimate of about $1.5 billion from 1998 through 2008. The U.S. share of these enlargement costs is estimated to be around $400 million over this period.

There is about $412M in the Administration’s FY99 budget request for direct national contributions to NATO’s common-funded military budgets. When this request was finalized, none of this money was earmarked for enlargement-related requirements. The United States expects to incur about $10M in enlargement costs in FY99, which will be met from within the $412M budget request.

In FY00–01, the Administration expects to request $5–12 million above current budget levels for NATO common-funded military budgets to cover projected enlargement costs. Beginning in FY02, as the bulk of enlargement costs begin to be incurred, the Administration expects that virtually all of the estimated enlargement costs will have to be reflected in increased DOD budget requests for contributions to NATO’s common-funded military budgets. The Administration projects that its budget request in FY02 will need to be increased by around $32M to cover estimated enlargement costs.

In 2003 and beyond, the funding picture is less clear, because NATO only assessed in detail the impact of enlargement on common-funded budgets out to 2002. NATO expects that common-funded enlargement costs will peak in 2005. Considering this likely expenditure profile, the Administration believes that most or all of these estimated costs will require resources above current budget levels for NATO common-funded military budgets.
The Administration’s review concluded that NATO developed a sound and reliable cost estimate, provided that the specific facilities to be selected during NATO’s ongoing force planning process have essentially the same characteristics as those visited by the International Staff during NATO’s development of its cost estimate. The Department has every reason to expect that this will be the case, thus we are very confident that the U.S. share will not rise above $7 billion.

Question 2. To what extent are the governments of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic prepared to take on the financial commitment involved in NATO membership?

Answer. We are confident that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will take on the financial commitment involved in NATO membership. Indeed, to prepare for this commitment, all three have increased their defense budgets to fund necessary defense reforms, and to bring them in line with the standard outlays of NATO Allies.

Further, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have adopted sound monetary and fiscal policies, including government budgets with reduced deficits. These budgets adequately cover their commitments to increased military spending.

These policies, coupled with positive growth rates in each country, will enable the governments to increase defense spending and fulfill their commitment to pay the direct costs of NATO enlargement. Of course, these countries have to consider other significant needs to determine how much can be spent on defense.

Most of the reforms in the defense sector related to NATO membership are necessary for an effective military in a modern democratic state. Moreover, the cost of defense would undoubtedly be higher if these countries did not join NATO.

Question 3. Some have expressed concern about the problems the United States experienced in attempting to build a coalition against Iraq, including disagreement with some of our NATO partners. What does this suggest about the cohesiveness of NATO as a military alliance?

Answer. It suggests that nearly all of our NATO allies are with us as partners in tangible ways when we face such a challenge. All members of the NATO Alliance decried Saddam’s flouting of UN Security Council resolutions. Thirteen out of sixteen NATO allies offered support for the international coalition formed to ensure Saddam’s full compliance with those resolutions. Additionally, the three states that have been invited to join NATO were also very supportive, meaning that sixteen out of nineteen nations backed the coalition.

Question 4. When do you anticipate a second round of NATO enlargement? Is the probability of a second round contingent on a successful implementation of the first round? What countries do you think would be included in a second round of NATO enlargement?

Answer. Speculation as to when the next round of NATO enlargement might take place and which countries might be included would be premature and ultimately damaging to the process. We are committed to review the enlargement process at the NATO Summit in 1999. However, there has been no decision as yet that any new countries will be selected in 1999, and no country is guaranteed a place in any future round. Our present priorities are to ensure that the current round of enlargement is successful and to help those countries that aspire to NATO membership in the future to become the best candidates they can be. Clearly, a smooth and successful first round is the best way to ensure the process continues.

Question 5. Do you think we will continue to have waves of enlargement until all qualified countries have been included?

Answer. We believe it is unwise to provide an exact answer for when and where the enlargement process will end. We have said that these first new members will not be the last, but we would be guilty of hubris if we pretended to know what states might look attractive 20 or 30 years from today. The writers of the original NATO Treaty left this question vague as well, and for a reason. They said we should remain open to the possibility of adding any European state that was in a position to contribute to the security of the Alliance. It was a good idea then; it remains a good idea now. We also should understand the dangers of drawing an arbitrary line prematurely.

Whenever we and our successors consider adding new states, we must follow a few principles: new members must make the Alliance stronger, not weaker, and we must preserve the cohesion of the Alliance. As long as we follow those principles, we will be in good shape.
Question 6. What impact will NATO enlargement have on our relations with Russia? Will this change if all European countries except Russia are accepted into NATO?

Answer. Many Russian leaders and politicians have expressed opposition to NATO enlargement and argue that enlargement threatens Russia in a period of strategic weakness. This is obviously an inaccurate statement: NATO enlargement threatens no country.

U.S.-Russian relations are marked by continued cooperation across a broad range of issues: more nuclear weapons than ever are being destroyed, and the START II treaty is on the Duma’s agenda. We continue to work closely with the Russian Federation, both at the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council as well as on the ground in Bosnia. The U.S. continues its multifaceted efforts to assist Russia in building a market economy based on rule of law.

It is a mistake to think that the fate of Russian democracy hinges on whether NATO expands or not. Russia’s future as a free and prosperous nation will depend upon the ability of its leaders and citizens to build a stable, free, and open society to stimulate economic growth, and to spread its benefits. NATO enlargement as an issue has not been at the heart of Russian domestic politics. Most average Russians are concerned more with the economy and employment than enlargement.

On the last issue of Europe in, Russia out, I would state that I cannot respond to hypothetical questions. However, our policy is to support Russian integration into global security and economic institutions. Whether we will face in the future such a situation is unknown, but we expect our policy towards Russia to remain one of engagement, not isolation.

Prepared Statement of Secretary Cohen

Senator Helms, Senator Biden, members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. It is a great privilege to be here to discuss one of the President’s top foreign policy objectives: NATO enlargement. Last year the Secretary of State and I appeared jointly before the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees to discuss this topic. I welcome the opportunity to continue our dialogue with the Senate.

Why Enlarge NATO?

Nowhere are American concerns more vital or our efforts more focused than in Europe. The United States maintains a strong and real commitment to Europe as demonstrated by our troops on the ground, our capacity to reinforce as needed, and our political engagement in seeking to resolve problems. America makes this commitment not as an act of charity, but because the security of Europe is vital to our own security, as events in this century have shown.

Twice before, our veterans witnessed how even the vast Atlantic Ocean could not protect us from being drawn into the fiery hatreds of the Old World. In World War I they marched into battle singing, “We won’t be back ’til it’s over, over there.” But to our lasting regret, when the guns of August fell silent, America ignored the embers of hatred that still smoldered in Europe and we missed the opportunity to prevent another war, the deadliest in human history.

Millions of American sons returned to the very same terrain that their fathers died defending, and thousands of them paid the ultimate price for this missed opportunity. But those who fought in World War II gave us a second chance to build a safer world. President Truman, speaking of the Marshall Plan, said, “Our purpose from the end of the war to the present has never changed. It’s been to create a political and economic framework in which lasting peace can be constructed.” Western Europe embraced the Marshall Plan, built strong democracies and economies, and developed the strong alliance that we call NATO. And American workers prospered as Western Europe’s economy flourished under the protective umbrella of security and stability ensured by NATO. But Joseph Stalin denied the Marshall Plan to the other half of Europe when he slammed down the Iron Curtain and began a separation of the continent which would last for fifty years.

Today, having emerged victorious from the long winter of the Cold War, we have an historic opportunity to complete George Marshall’s vision and a chance to build a security system for all of Europe. And we need to do so. For unfortunately, while the massive Soviet threat has evaporated, we continue to face problems as well as opportunities. A stable Europe is necessary to anchor America’s worldwide presence.
Threats to European stability and security can still arise from old national and ethnic hatreds, from home-grown and state-sponsored terrorism, from threats from unstable regions outside Europe, and from adversaries prepared to use nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

Enlargement Enhances NATO

Some ask whether a larger NATO will be a weaker NATO. A larger NATO will be a stronger NATO and will provide a wider allegiance in Europe to our values. It was the creation of NATO in 1949 that halted Soviet designs on western Europe. It was the enlargement of NATO, with Greece and Turkey in 1952, West Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982, that helped strengthen the bulwark of democracy in Europe. If, in the future, another direct threat of attack arises, an enlarged NATO would have additional manpower, added military capability, more political support, and greater strategic depth. Enlargement will enhance, not dilute, NATO's military effectiveness and political cohesion.

Further, by providing an institutional framework for improving relations among both members and non-members, an enlarged NATO will secure stability for the Twenty-first Century in Central Europe—the spawning ground of crises throughout the Twentieth Century. We must seize this opportunity to continue to shape the security environment in Europe. In doing so, we will provide the security framework in which the political democracies and market economies of Central Europe can flourish, and thereby enhance stability and reduce the risk that such crises will ever emerge. As was the case with nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, in this new era NATO enlargement is an insurance policy with an unusual twist: by paying a modest premium, we not only will be protected in case of fire, we will make a fire less likely to ignite.

The Choice of New Members

Formal membership in NATO carries as President Clinton has said, “(t)he most solemn security guarantees.” Admission to NATO has been likened to a door—but I would emphasize that it is a door at the top of a staircase. The door is open, but the stairs are steep. And any country seeking to walk through the open door must first ascend those stairs. Sincere aspiration is not enough to guarantee membership in NATO. New members must demonstrate a commitment to: democracy and the rule of law, an open market economic system, civilian constitutional control of their militaries, peaceful resolution of disputes with their neighbors, respect for human rights, and development over time of military capabilities interoperable with NATO. After discussions with allies, candidate countries, members of Congress and within the Administration, the President decided the U.S. would support extending invitations to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The President met with the other leaders of the NATO nations in a summit last July, and together they agreed to invite these nations to begin accession talks to join the Alliance.

You have heard it argued that by enlarging NATO we are going to create a new dividing line in Europe. That argument fails to appreciate the new dynamic that is underway in Europe, erasing these old lines and avoiding these new divisions. The mere prospect of having NATO membership has unleashed a powerful impetus for peace in Europe. Old rivals have settled their historic disputes: Poland and Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine, Hungary and Romania, Italy and Slovenia, and Germany and the Czech Republic. Without the prospect of NATO enlargement, these smoldering embers—rather than being extinguished—could have been fanned by nationalist fervor.

This argument also fails to realize that by not enlarging, we would allow to stand an illegitimate dividing line drawn across the continent by Stalin fifty years ago. Without NATO enlargement, some countries would feel compelled to seek security via other avenues, including ones potentially destabilizing and contrary to U.S. interests. We must move, with Europe, into the future. The Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs are vital, vigorous, and dynamic people. They share our ideals. They are making remarkable recoveries from decades of foreign domination. Now they want to return to their rightful place as equal partners in the European family of free and democratic nations. We need them and they need us.

To ensure that enlargement does not draw new dividing lines in Europe, we must continue to give careful consideration to the security interests and concerns of those states that were not chosen for membership at the NATO Summit in Madrid. With no time lines drawn, the door to membership is open for future invitations, and no European nation is excluded from consideration. We expect other nations to become members as they meet the requirements. We need to continue to make clear to other aspirant countries that active participation in an enhanced Partnership for Peace
program is the primary pathway to membership in the Alliance and to a solid security relationship with NATO. At the same time, there are no “assured invitations” in 1999, or at any time, and future invitees will be held to the same standards as the current three. And, of course, any future accessions will, like these three, require Senate approval.

What About Russia?

Any vision of future European security and prosperity must include Russia. NATO has embarked on a new relationship with Russia. NATO and Russia are erasing old dividing lines every day, not least in our interactions in Bosnia where Russian and NATO soldiers patrol side by side in the cause of peace. There are some who claim that enlarging NATO is going to feed extremism in Russia and jeopardize Russia’s move toward democracy and cooperation with the West.

Mr. Chairman, we should not permit these fears to overwhelm the facts. Permit me a moment of personal reflection. In February 1997, shortly after I was sworn in as the Secretary of Defense, I traveled to Bosnia, and met with some of the American troops serving there. During lunch, a Russian soldier came up to me and gave me his beret as a gesture of peace, saying how proud he was to be serving alongside Americans. I still have that beret in my office.

Last fall, on another trip to Bosnia, I met with the Russian commander, General Krivolapov. He concluded the meeting by declaring, in Russian, “one team, one mission” SFOR’s motto adopted by General Joulwan. Our new relationship with Moscow must acknowledge Russia’s changing role in Europe and not be forever bound by the notion of a Russia in confrontation with NATO. At the same time, we cannot acquiesce to every Russian request.

The objectives of NATO’s new relationship with Russia are: to recognize Russia’s inherent importance in European security—after all, they have been a major factor in European security for 300 years; to engage Russia in the new European security order; to facilitate a security dialogue; and, when desirable and appropriate, to cooperate with Russia. Russia is going to play a role in Europe in any case. Our objective is to ensure, through the development of the NATO-Russian relationship and a growing network of bilateral and multilateral ties, that this role is a positive one. Equally important to remember are the limits to NATO’s new relationship with Russia: it does not allow Russian participation in internal NATO issues; it does not give Russia a voice or a veto over NATO’s decisions; and it does not give Russia a de facto membership in NATO or a role in determining who will gain admission to NATO.

Having reviewed the big picture in which enlargement will occur, let me focus in detail on several specific questions I have often been asked. First,

Will An Enlarged Alliance Be Militarily Effective?

Yes. It is my unshakable conviction that we must continue to have a militarily defensible and strong Alliance from the first day of enlargement. We cannot invite new members into NATO if the Alliance cannot extend the same guarantees to them that we have so successfully extended to all NATO members for the last forty-nine years. Conversely, the new members cannot expect to be mere consumers of NATO’s security; they must be able to contribute to their own defense and to the security of the Alliance as a whole. Let me share with you some information about, and experiences we have had with, the three invited nations.

First, some troop numbers: Poland will have a force, after restructuring, of 180,000, roughly the size of the forces of Spain (200,000). After their restructuring, the Czech Republic and Hungary will have forces of 55,000 and 51,000, respectively, roughly the size of the armed forces of Portugal (56,000). Combined, the three invitees will add almost 300,000 soldiers, sailors and airmen to the Alliance, including units with unique and specialized capabilities such as chemical decontamination and combat engineering.

Poland

With the largest and most capable military in Eastern Europe, Poland has brought its 24 years of peacekeeping experience to NATO’s efforts in Bosnia. These deployments with multinational operations have enabled Polish troops to gain experience which has greatly enhanced their interoperability with NATO. Poland has a 400-person airborne infantry battalion in SFOR’s U.S. sector, a 355-person logistics battalion in the Golan Heights, an infantry battalion and military hospital (632 troops) in Lebanon and troops supporting eight United Nations’ observer missions. In 1989, they established a military training center for UN operations in southeastern Poland. In 1992, the Poles deployed an infantry battalion with UN forces in
Croatia. Since then, Poland has shown an increased willingness to provide combat forces as reflected by their commitment to IFOR and SFOR.

Czech Republic

The Czech Republic currently has a 620-person mechanized infantry battalion in SFOR, and prior to that it contributed an 870-person mechanized infantry battalion to IFOR and a 985-person infantry battalion to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The Czechs also deployed a 200-man decontamination unit to DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

Hungary

Hungary contributed a 400–500 man engineer battalion to conduct bridging and other engineering operations in support of IFOR. This battalion, now reduced in number to 200–250, is currently deployed in support of SFOR. Hungary's support to IFOR and SFOR also included allowing U.S. and NATO forces to station at its airfields, use its facilities and transit its airspace. Hungary demonstrated its ability to operate as part of the NATO team with every bridge that was built and every plane that landed and took off from its airfields. Over 95,000 U.S. military personnel rotated in and out of IFOR and SFOR assignments through the Hungarian air base at Tastzar. U.S. armor units conducted live fire training at Hungarian ranges to calibrate their guns prior to deploying to Bosnia, and again upon redeployment.

In short, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are already working with NATO and NATO Allies in the field.

Is NATO's Military Requirements Study Militarily Sound and Robust?

The U.S. has long argued that any NATO cost estimate must be driven by the military requirements of enlargement. We were successful in pressing that argument in the Alliance, and a review of the military requirements was undertaken by the NATO military commanders last summer.

As part of the process of developing the military requirements of enlargement, the invitees worked with the NATO international staff to fill out a special Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) as their initial step into the NATO Defense Planning Process. This reply gave detailed information from each country on the forces each would commit to NATO as their contribution to collective defense. All NATO allies provide this transparency into their defense plans.

Also, in an effort to better understand requirements as well as the current capabilities of the invited nations, members of NATO's international military staff conducted site visits at various military facilities in the invited countries last year. They visited airfields and railheads in each country.

On the basis of this work, NATO's military commanders produced a report laying out an initial assessment of the military requirements of enlargement. In an open hearing I can only talk about this report in broad terms. However, it sets forth requirements for communications, reinforcement of the new nations, air defense, and training and exercises.

This report underwent an intensive review by the Joint Staff and OSD staff which found the military requirements study to be thorough, militarily sound, and based on a range of reasonable contingencies. The requirements, as agreed to by all member nations of NATO, will enable the Alliance to effectively counter all anticipated contingencies. As a result of that review, senior military officers on the Joint Staff recommended that the U.S. accept the document. We did, and in the first week of December, the Alliance agreed to the report.

How Much Will Enlargement Cost?

When I appeared before the Senate Appropriators last fall, I stated my belief that the forthcoming NATO estimate of the costs of enlargement would be lower than the estimate you received from us in February 1997. This has turned out to be the case. Let me explain why.

The February 1997 study outlined three categories of costs: 1) the costs to new members to continue to restructure their militaries, 2) the costs of force improvements already being pursued by existing members, and 3) costs related directly to enlargement (i.e., for ensuring interoperability between the forces of current and new members). The bulk of the difference between the two studies is that the NATO study covered only the common-funded direct enlargement costs. This is because NATO is not responsible for the other two costs: individual nations are. Those costs, which we included because they provide important context when thinking about enlargement, still seem reasonable to us. We also expect that they can be paid for by the nations of NATO, both old and new.
In the third category of costs, DoD estimated that direct enlargement costs would be about $9±12 billion over a thirteen year period. These costs included upgrades to communications, air defense, reinforcement reception infrastructure, and other interoperability measures. A portion of these costs would be common-funded by NATO, about $5.5–7.0 billion. And since the share of the common-funded budgets is approximately one quarter, we estimated that the U.S. share would total around $1.52 billion over a ten-year period.

By contrast, NATO estimated that the total common-funded costs of adding the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to the Alliance would be about $1.5 billion over the next ten years. The U.S. share of that total cost would be about $400 million over ten years.

The obvious question is: Why is there a difference between the February 1997 DoD estimate of $5.5–7.0 billion for NATO’s common-funded costs and the December 1997 NATO estimate of $1.5 billion for these costs?

The overall point to keep in mind is that DoD made a notional estimate based on general information while NATO made a detailed estimate based on more recent and complete information. But here are some specific reasons for the differences.

First, the initial U.S. cost estimate assessed four, not three, potential new members. If the U.S. analysis had studied only the three countries invited to join NATO, the overall U.S. estimate would have been lower by another $1.1±1.4 billion, and the common-funded portion of the DoD study would have been around $4.9±6.2 billion.

Second, the “good news” is that the new members’ forces and infrastructure are in better condition than we earlier assumed. In preparing its estimate, NATO conducted on-site visits and learned that the additional investment required to prepare new members’ forces and infrastructure for NATO membership will be less than DoD initially estimated based on its sources.

Third, there were differences in cost methodology and modest differences in the requirements that led to the remainder of the difference. For example, DoD assumed that some upgrades would be eligible for common funding that NATO officials have since stated would not be eligible. Also modest differences in requirements had a significant impact on the cost difference, but do not detract from NATO’s capability for Article V collective defense with new members.

Because the estimates differ by more than a factor of four, some have asked: Have military requirements been sacrificed by NATO to save money? No. While some military requirements differ, the differences are modest and not operationally significant. Both studies use the same reinforcement strategy and developed broadly similar military requirements. Most importantly, the numbers and type of reinforcing forces and reception facilities are almost identical. However, the U.S. study included some requirements that NATO did not include such as additional upgrades to airfields and training facilities. Site surveys conducted by NATO have revealed that these upgrades are not necessary. As I stated earlier, the Joint Staff thoroughly reviewed these requirements and is confident that they will enable the Alliance to meet any anticipated military contingency in the projected security environment.

Let me give you some examples that show you why we are confident in our assessment:

Some of the improvements in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic’s infrastructure are due directly to their participation in the Partnership For Peace program. For example, due to preparations for PfP exercises and lessons learned from those events, the new members’ airfields generally are more capable of receiving and supporting western aircraft than assumed earlier. F–16s, which are sensitive to foreign object damage, recently operated effectively from a Hungarian airfield. This progress means that there is less work that needs to be done—and in turn—less money that needs to be spent to improve these airfields than estimated earlier.

A scout platoon leader and scout platoon sergeant from an elite American Airborne Battalion were invited to participate in training within a Hungarian counter-part unit. Expecting a fairly modest PfP exercise, they were surprised when catapulted into some of the most rigorous and demanding training they had ever experienced, including a live-fire obstacle course, extended operations under nuclear, biological and chemical conditions, and grueling physical demands.

A recent PfP session of the NATO Council of National Armaments Directors addressed the subject of inexpensively refurbishing and modernizing Polish, Czech, and Hungarian T–72 tanks, which is the best way to meet relevant target force goals at reasonable expense to the newly invited members. The Ukrainians offered to not only refurbish and modernize them, but to render them interoperable with NATO—all at a very reasonable price. In short order the Russians, Latvians, and Lithuanians sought to join the project, complementing efforts Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians already had underway.
Some Deficiencies Exist

We have found some deficiencies in the new countries' forces as the NATO review process continues—especially regarding personnel, specialized training, communications, and the levels of funding for force modernization. While the three cannot be expected to "fix" everything by 1999, each has a serious program that lays out a defined path toward the enhancement of their defense capabilities.

We have told each invitee that its highest priority should be investing in quality personnel. They must develop effective systems for recruiting and retaining good troops. Key to this is the development of an effective NCO corps. The next priority is training—including English language training—for better personnel and new equipment is meaningless without adequate training. The next priority is achievement of a high degree of interoperability with NATO, including communications, logistics, infrastructure for reinforcement, and air defense.

While it is clear that each of the invited nations must undergo modernization of major weapons systems in the years ahead if it is to remain a contributor to overall alliance security, acquiring high tech weapons systems should be a lower priority than personnel and training.

These three countries are working hard to demonstrate that they are ready for membership in NATO. As I outlined earlier, they have each begun the process of participating in NATO's defense planning by submitting Defense Planning Questionnaire responses. This process put them in close contact with NATO international staff members who are beginning the education process on what is required of our NATO allies. The three invitees also hosted many visits this summer and fall from the international military staff as they conducted surveys of representative military facilities in each country. Each of these nations wants to be a contributor to, not just a consumer of, security. They are already contributing to the security of Europe by restructuring and modernizing their militaries to operate with NATO, by serving with our soldiers in Bosnia, and by helping to make a success of the Partnership for Peace.

The costs of enlargement will be manageable for the likely new members as well. The three invitees and NATO have agreed to specific cost shares that will govern their contributions to NATO—Together the three countries will contribute about 4% to NATO's common-funded budgets. Each of them have committed to sufficient funding in their defense budgets to pay for enlargement requirements. The Czechs raised defense spending from 1.7% of GDP in 1997 to 1.88% of GDP in 1998. They intend to raise this to 2% by the year 2000. While both Poland and Hungary have had similar deficiencies they are overcoming them. Hungary has increased its budget to about 1.8% of projected GDP and plans to increase that percentage by 0.1 percent annually for the next five years. We are particularly pleased with Poland's extensive fifteen-year plan. Expected growth in their Gross Domestic Products and savings from force restructuring also will help fund these costs. Most importantly, the costs of joining NATO for the new members will certainly be less than what the three countries would have to spend if they did not join NATO and were solely responsible for their national security.

How Much Will it Cost the U.S.?

NATO has estimated that enlargement will cost the Alliance about $1.5 billion over ten years. The United States pays about 25% of the NATO common-funded budgets each year. Our allies provide the remaining 75% of the NATO common-funded budgets. Our share will not increase because of NATO enlargement. This means that the United States will pay substantially less than the $150–200 million per year that we notionally estimated last February.

Will the Allies Do Their Part?

Since my last appearance before the Congress on this topic last October, the Alliance has twice reaffirmed its commitment to provide the resources necessary to support enlargement. At the meeting of all NATO defense ministers in early December we agreed, "(t)he costs associated with the accession of the three invitees will be manageable, and that the resources necessary to meet these costs will be provided in accordance with our general procedures under which each Ally bears its fair share." Shortly thereafter, the foreign ministers met and reaffirmed the Alliance's support for this principle.

The Europeans fully understand the need to meet the financial requirements of enlarging. In October of last year, George Robertson, the British Minister of Defence, wrote in the Washington Times about European burdensharing as it pertains to enlargement, "(I)f additional spending is required, Britain will pay its
share. We contribute nearly one-sixth of NATO’s common budget and the European allies some 70 percent of the total. These shares will apply equally to the costs of enlargement.

In November, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel wrote an editorial in the Washington Post that said, “It goes without saying that Europe and Germany, like the United States, must bear their fair share of the costs of NATO enlargement … Already now the European Alliance partners are financing roughly 70 percent of the joint NATO budgets and making available 95 percent of NATO forces in Europe. This European contribution to the Alliance will not drop with the admission of new members but will further increase.”

While it is true that both the U.S. and our NATO Allies have made big cuts in our defense budgets since the end of the Cold War, most of our NATO Allies still make very substantial contributions to the common defense. For example, more than two-thirds of the troops currently participating in SFOR are non-U.S. forces.

For some time we have pressed our allies to do more to improve their capability for mobile, flexible operations which NATO will undertake in the future. They have responded with specific improvements, and are committed to more. For example, Britain provides NATO’s only rapidly-deployable corps headquarters committed to NATO and British forces are the backbone of the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). The U.K. also has the capability to deploy and sustain a division-sized force of 20–25,000 personnel and, as you all know, the British aircraft carrier HMS Invincible recently deployed to the Gulf in support of the latest military buildup there.

France, in general, is restructuring its armed forces to be more mobile and easily deployable. The French are establishing a Rapid Action Force (FAR) designed for rapid response in both European and overseas contingencies. France also participated heavily in IFOR efforts to implement the Dayton peace accords in Bosnia and Herzegovina. With nearly 8,000 troops, France was the third largest troop contributor, after the U.S. and Britain, and was responsible for one of the three geographic sectors—and continues to be in SFOR.

Likewise, Germany is standing up a Rapid Reaction Force of some 53,000 fully-equipped troops from the Army, Navy and Air Force. The first units stood up in 1996 and the force will be fully capable this year. In general, German armed forces are in the process of re-creating themselves into a mobile, deployable force.

The smaller European nations are also improving their forces. For example, the Royal Netherlands Navy and Air Force have improved both their transport and air defense capabilities with new procurements such as: two KDC–10 transport/tankers (the Dutch can now deploy their own F–16s without reliance on the U.S.); an amphibious-lift ship to make the marine brigade self-deployable; and upgrades to their F–16 fleet and their Patriot systems.

The Costs of Not Enlarging

The most important point to make about costs is that there would be greater costs and greater risks to not enlarging. If we fail to seize this historic opportunity to help integrate, consolidate, and stabilize Central Europe, we would risk a much higher price later. The most efficient and cost effective way to guarantee stability is to do so collectively through NATO. That was true in the Cold War. It is true now. It will be true in the future.

The costs of collective defense are manageable for all concerned. Alliances save money. Collective defense is both cheaper and stronger than relying solely on national defense.

A decision to defer enlargement, much less to withhold it altogether, would send a message to Central Europe that their future does not lie with NATO and the West. It would falsely validate the old divisions of the Cold War. The resulting sense of isolation and vulnerability would destabilize the region and encourage nationalist and disruptive forces throughout Europe. Similarly, a mandated pause of arbitrary duration before future rounds of enlargement would heighten insecurity and be destabilizing.

Unless we move forward, NATO will remain stuck in the past, in danger of irrelevance, while the United States will be seen as inconstant and unreliable in its leadership, and as withdrawing from its responsibilities and interests in Europe and in the world.

Conclusion

In the conclusion to his book, On the Origins of War, historian Donald Kagan states:
A persistent and repeated error throughout history has been the failure to understand that the preservation of peace requires active effort, planning, the expenditure of resources, and sacrifice, just as war does. In the modern world especially the sense that peace is natural and war an aberration has led to a failure in peacetime to consider the possibility of another war, which in turn, has prevented the efforts needed to preserve the peace.

If this century has taught us anything, it is that our security is inextricably tied to peace and security in Europe. We must hold up the lamplight of history so that we do not stumble on the footpath to the future. In building a Europe of the 21st Century that is whole and free, we will also provide coming generations of Americans a future that is more secure, peaceful and prosperous.

**Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to Secretary Cohen**

**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BIDEN**

**Question 1.** Are Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic capable of contributing to the costs of their inclusion into NATO? Are you satisfied with the level of defense spending in each of the three countries?

**Answer.** All three invited countries are planning to accommodate defense budget increases. For new members, the costs of NATO enlargement will be a manageable percentage of their planned military budgets.

For example, the Czech government has approved plans to increase its 1998 national defense spending to about $1.1 billion, which represents about 1.88% of projected GDP. The Czech Republic has stated its plans to link defense spending growth to the rate of GDP growth and to increase the percentage of GDP dedicated to defense by 0.1 annually for the next 3 years which will raise it from the current 1.7% in FY97 to 2.0% in 2000.

The Hungarians have increased their 1997 national defense budget to about $800 million, which represents about 1.8% of projected GDP. Hungary has stated that it plans to link defense spending growth to the rate of GDP growth and to increase the percentage of GDP dedicated to defense by 0.1 percent annually for the next five years. If so, Hungarian defense spending may increase in real terms by 3 to 8% annually during the next four years.

Poland spent 2.3 percent of GDP on defense in 1996. Poland’s 15-year modernization plan calls for annual increases in defense spending which are pegged to the rate of GDP growth. Based on a conservative estimate of 4.2 percent annual economic growth, Polish defense spending should increase approximately 3.2 percent annually.

The three invited countries are also pledging national funds to NATO’s three common budgets. In their accession papers, the Czechs have agreed to pay a .9% national cost share of the NATO common budgets; Hungary has agreed to a .65% national cost share; and the Poles have agreed to a 2.48% national cost share, I am confident the three invited countries will dedicate the resources necessary to meet their national and multilateral obligations.

**Question 2.** What are the main tasks that absolutely must get done by the invitee’s respective governments and militaries prior to the proposed accession date of April 1999? Do you have full confidence that they will do so?

**Answer.** As the Administration has said in the past, it is imperative that invited NATO members achieve some goals that are fundamental to current Alliance members:

- Democratic societies
- Free and functioning markets
- Civilian control of the military
- Peaceful resolution of disputes with their neighbors

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have made excellent progress in achieving these goals and should continue their progress in these areas before and after accession.

Their militaries must become reasonably interoperable with NATO before the Alliance can extend a guarantee for collective defense to new members. The NATO military commanders have determined that, at a minimum, these countries’ military headquarters must have communication connectivity with NATO headquarters, and
their air defense systems must be integrated into NATO's air defense system prior to accession. Our military agrees with that assessment. NATO and the new members' militaries are well on their way to meeting these requirements and obtaining broader interoperability with NATO militaries, and we are confident that these objectives will be met prior to accession.

**Question 3.** What is our recourse if they fail to meet such tasks by then?

**Answer.** As I indicated in my response to your Question #2, we are confident the Alliance will meet these requirements prior to accession. These two pre-accession requirements are essential elements to ensure that NATO can operate with new members in a collective defense scenario that involves defending new member territories. There is no reason to expect that the Alliance and the invitees will not meet these goals prior to accession, but if for some reason they did not, interim measures (e.g. temporary increased reliance on aerial communications, leased/loaned air defense communications systems) would be necessary while the more permanent capabilities were being developed to fulfill requirements.

**Question 4.** What effects are declining European defense budgets having on NATO's capability to accomplish its missions? Do declining European defense budgets in part signal a reluctance of allied governments and populations to bear a share of the burden for developing a power projection capability and the direct costs of enlargement?

**Answer.** Despite declining defense budgets, our European allies have made considerable progress over the past six years toward building the needed capabilities for the Alliance's new doctrine. These are capabilities the Alliance would need whether or not NATO added members. We expect these efforts to continue in the future.

The UK, for example, makes substantial contributions: its troops form the core of the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, and it has the capability to deploy and sustain a division-sized force of 20–25,000 personnel in a Gulf War-style scenario. Currently, they have an aircraft carrier, **HMS Invincible**, deployed to the Persian Gulf to support U.S. forces positioned there.

The French are establishing a Rapid Reaction Force (FAR), designed for rapid response in both European and overseas contingencies. With nearly 8,000 troops in Bosnia, France (along with the UK) was the second largest force contributor to IFOR after the U.S.

The Italians (as their efforts in Albania have demonstrated) are upgrading their ability to project forces to areas of need.

Germany also is currently increasing its capability to deploy forces: a 53,000-man Crisis Reaction Force (CRF) unit is being formed, and will be fully operational by the end of 1998. (Germany has 2,500 troops in Bosnia, the first time it has deployed troops outside its territory since the founding of NATO).

Our smaller European allies are also making significant improvements: the Dutch Navy and Air Force have improved their transport and air defense capabilities by procuring air-to-air tankers; acquiring an amphibious-lift ship for their marines and making upgrades to their F–16s and Patriot missile systems.

It is clear that more work needs to be done to improve the capability of the European forces for mobility, deployability and sustainability. Senior US officials in Washington and at NATO continue to press the European Allies to fulfill the commitments they have already accepted to make available forces for Alliance defense.

**Question 5.** What events could drive the cost of NATO enlargement upward, e.g., continued Russian opposition, another ethnic war in central Europe, a breakdown in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty negotiations?

**Answer.** NATO's initial estimate of the common-funded enlargement costs is based on the Alliance defending new members on their territories, given the projected security environment. A significant change in that environment, due to a deterioration of events in Russia or the emergence of a hostile regional power, would increase the cost of defense for Alliance members, including the United States.

NATO's cost estimate is subject to normal uncertainties associated with its ongoing planning process, which could lead to changes in the actual costs of enlargement. While not probable, costs could grow or diminish for a number of reasons. Changes may occur as plans to upgrade facilities are finalized, or as detailed engineering surveys of facilities provide more complete information. Also, NATO could choose to make exceptions to its common-funding eligibility criteria over the planning period, which would affect common costs.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR FEINGOLD

Question 1. How do you explain the disparities between the various cost estimates for the United States's share of NATO enlargement, which have ranged from $2 to $7 billion? What are the latest estimates for the United States’s share of NATO enlargement? How confident are you that the United States’s share will not rise above $7 billion?

Answer. First, let's compare apples to apples where we can. The portion of our earlier U.S. cost estimate that addressed what the Alliance would collectively pay is $4.9±6.2B (not $27±35B), and should be compared to the $1.5B NATO estimate.

Second, prior to NATO's identification of new members, DOD outlined general requirements and an illustrative cost estimate for four potential new members; after the July 1997 Madrid Summit at which NATO named the three invitees, NATO identified detailed military requirements and a common-funded cost estimate for three new members.

Third, NATO's studies were based on more recent and detailed data on new members' infrastructure (e.g., airbases, road and rail networks), including site visits, that revealed significantly better conditions than DOD had previously assessed. Other factors included the following, DOD assumed common funding for some requirements (e.g., airfield off-loading equipment) that NATO determined are nationally funded. DOD also used higher cost factors for needed upgrades (e.g., air defense C2) in some instances.

Finally, there were modest differences in requirements with a significant cost impact. While some military requirements differ, the differences are modest and not operationally significant. Both studies use the same reinforcement strategy and developed broadly similar military requirements, including the number and types of reinforcing forces and reception facilities. However, the DOD study included some requirements that NATO did not include (e.g., more ambitious upgrades to airfields and training facilities).

In our recent Report to the Congress on the Military Requirements and Costs of NATO Enlargement, DOD assessed the resource implications of enlargement based on NATO's agreed cost estimate of about $1.5 billion from 1998 through 2008. The U.S. share of these enlargement costs is estimated to be around $400 million over this period.

There is about $412M in DOD's FY99 budget request for direct national contributions to NATO's common-funded military budgets. When this request was finalized, none of this money was earmarked for enlargement-related requirements. The United States expects to incur about $10M in enlargement costs in FY99, which will be met from within the $412M budget request.

In FY00-01, DOD expects to request $5–12 million above current budget levels for NATO common-funded military budgets to cover projected enlargement costs. Beginning in FY02, as the bulk of enlargement costs begin to be incurred, DOD expects that virtually all of the estimated enlargement costs will have to be reflected in increased DOD budget requests for contributions to NATO's common-funded military budgets. DOD projects that its budget request in FY02 will need to be increased by around $32M to cover estimated enlargement costs.

In 2003 and beyond, the funding picture is less clear, because NATO only assessed in detail the impact of enlargement on common-funded budgets out to 2002. NATO expects that common-funded enlargement costs will peak in 2005. Considering this likely expenditure profile, DOD believes that most or all of these estimated costs will require resources above current budget levels for NATO common-funded military budgets.

DOD's review concluded that NATO developed a sound and reliable cost estimate—provided that the specific facilities to be selected during NATO's ongoing force planning process have essentially the same characteristics as those visited by the International Staff during NATO's development of its cost estimate. The Department has every reason to expect that this will be the case. Thus, DOD is very confident that the U.S. share will not rise above $7 billion.

Question 2. To what extent are the governments of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic prepared to take on the financial commitment involved in NATO membership?

Answer. All three invited countries are planning to accommodate defense budget increases. For new members, the costs of NATO enlargement will be a manageable percentage of their planned military budgets.

For example, the Czech government has approved plans to increase its 1998 national defense spending to about $1.1 billion, which represents about 1.88% of projected GDP. The Czech Republic has stated its plans to link defense spending
growth to the rate of GDP growth and to increase the percentage of GDP dedicated
to defense by 0.1 annually for the next 3 years which will raise it from the current
1.7% in FY97 to 2.0% in 2000.

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million, which represents about 1.8% of projected GDP. Hungary has stated that it
plans to link defense spending growth to the rate of GDP growth and to increase the
percentage of GDP dedicated to defense by 0.1 percent annually for the next five
years. If so, Hungarian defense spending may increase in real terms by 3 to 8% an-
nually during the next four years.

Poland spent 2.3 percent of GDP on defense in 1996. Poland’s 15-year moderniza-
tion plan calls for annual increases in defense spending which are pegged to the
rate of GDP growth. Based on a conservative estimate of 4.2 percent annual eco-
nomic growth, Polish defense spending should increase approximately 3.2 percent
annually.

The three invited countries are also pledging national funds to NATO’s three com-
mom budgets. In their accession papers, the Czechs have agreed to pay a .9% na-
tional cost share of the NATO common budgets; Hungary has agreed to a .65% na-
tional cost share; and the Poles have agreed to a 2.48% national cost share.

Question 3. How will NATO distribute financial and military responsibilities
among the member states following enlargement?

Answer. Enlargement costs will be distributed among NATO allies according to
long-standing NATO financial principles. The U.S. pays about 25% of NATO’s com-
mom-funded costs. The Europeans will contribute the remaining 75 percent. The
three new members will contribute together approximately 4% to NATO’s common-
funded budgets; hence after the new members join, NATO is likely to make minor
adjustments to some national cost shares to rebalance the cost shares among nine-
teen, rather than sixteen NATO allies.

U.S. estimated enlargement costs are incurred largely through our share of those
enlargement measures that are common-funded. The United States would share in
more of the overall costs only to the extent that the United States, with Congres-
sional approval, chooses to continue or expand the current modest assistance being
provided to the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe through programs
like the Warsaw Initiative.

NATO will distribute military responsibilities among the Allies, both old and new,
through the collective defense planning process. This process provides a framework
within which national and NATO defense planning can be harmonized to meet the
Alliance’s agreed military requirements. For example, through NATO’s ongoing
Force Goals process, NATO ensures that Allies will continue to develop the nec-

Question 4. Do Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have the military capac-
ity to assume their responsibilities? Are these three countries prepared to assume
the costs involved in modernizing their forces to meet NATO standards?

Answer. In terms of raw numbers, Poland, after restructuring its military, will
have 180,000 troops—roughly the same size force as Spain (200,000); the Czech Re-
public, after restructuring its military, will have 55,000 troops (roughly the size of
Portugal, some 56,000 personnel); and Hungary, after restructuring its military, will
have 51,000 troops, also roughly the same size as Portugal.

Poland currently has 1,050 troops (as of 31 January 1998) in multinational peace-
keeping operations, more than any other country. Among their deployed units are
a 470-person airborne infantry battalion in SFOR; a 355-person logistics battalion
in the Golan Heights; and 632 troops in Lebanon. These deployments with multi-
national operations have enabled Polish troops to gain experience which has greatly
enhanced their interoperability with NATO.

The Czechs had already anticipated NATO requirements for secure and nonsecure
digital communications programs, and had applied NATO standards to the national
programs they are pursuing on their own. In short, the Czechs had already spent
their own money to fund some projects that we had assumed would be paid for by
NATO as a whole through the common budgets.

The Czechs provided a 200-man decontamination unit to Operations DESERT
SHIELD and DESERT STORM, and an infantry battalion to UNPROFOR in Cro-
atia. They have also provided a mechanized infantry battalion to both IPOR and
SFOR. The 850-man battalion in SFOR has received high marks from SACEUR, the
Canadians and the British. It represents the largest contribution from the region,
and on a per capita basis, is on a par with the U.S. efforts. The Czechs have also
deployed UN observers in Croatia (UNTAES and UNMOP), Macedonia (UNPREDEP), Georgia (UNOMIG) and Liberia (UNOMIL).

Hungary hosted a squadron of Dutch F-16s for several weeks in 1996 at squadron at that same location. These units were in Hungary as part of a series of PFP exercises designed to improve interoperability. We were impressed by the fact that the Hungarians are already capable of handling NATO aircraft at their airfields. There is far less work that needs to be done—and in turn—far less money to be spent to improve these airfields than we had estimated earlier.

Hungary initially contributed a 400–500 man engineer battalion to conduct bridging and other engineering operations in support of IFOR. This battalion, now reduced in number to 200–250, is currently in support of SFOR. Hungary’s support to SFOR also includes allowing U.S. and NATO forces to transit its airspace, station at its airfields and use its facilities. Hungary demonstrated its ability to operate as part of the NATO team with every bridge that was built and every plane that landed and took off from its airfields.

Over 95,000 U.S. military personnel have rotated in and out of IFOR and SFOR assignments through the Hungarian airbase at Taszar. U.S. armor units calibrate their guns at Hungarian ranges prior to deploying to Bosnia, and again upon redeploying.

With contributions such as these, coupled with a demonstrated will to assist allies in need (including during the recent crisis with Iraq), the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will clearly enhance NATO’s military effectiveness.

As explained in my response to Question #2, these three countries are prepared to assume the costs involved in modernizing their forces to meet NATO standards.

Question 5. What commitments have we received from current NATO members regarding their bearing some of the costs of enlargement?

Answer. Our allies have made a number of public statements about their intentions in this regard. At the Defense Ministerial in Brussels in December 1997, all ministers stated that “admitting new members will have resource implications for the Alliance. … [But the] costs associated with the accession of the three invitees will be manageable, and … the resources necessary to meet these costs will be provided in accordance with our agreed procedures under which each Ally bears its fair share.”

Last fall, senior British and German government officials placed Op-Ed pieces in major American newspapers, stating that their governments were pledged to provide their fair share of enlargement costs.

On October 21, British Secretary of Defense George Robertson stated in an Op-Ed piece in the Washington Times that “[w]e all recognize that bringing new members into NATO will incur a cost. … But, if additional spending is required, Britain will pay its share”.

On 4 November, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel stated in an Op-Ed piece in the Washington Post that “[t]he debate on admitting new members into the Alliance must take into account the political and military rationale behind NATO enlargement. … It goes without saying that Europe and Germany … must bear their fair share of the costs of NATO enlargement. … This European contribution to the Alliance will not drop with the admission of new members, but will further increase”.

Most recently, on 9 February, German Foreign Minister Volker Ruehe, in a Los Angeles Times Op-Ed piece, reiterated that while NATO enlargement entailed costs, “there will be no free ride. … Our American friends can rest assured that their European allies are assuming and will continue to assume their fair share of the common bill and burden”.

Our allies have echoed these assurances in our conversations with them at NATO and bilaterally. I believe these very public statements are positive reassurance that our European allies are committed to meeting the burden-sharing challenges of enlargement.

Question 6. Some have expressed concern about the problems the United States experienced in recent months in attempting to build a coalition against Iraq, including disagreement with some of our NATO partners. What does this suggest about the cohesiveness of NATO as a military alliance?

Answer. US efforts to build an effective military coalition against Saddam Hussein from among our NATO allies have been successful.

The US has received pledges of direct military contributions from most NATO nations, including Canada, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, The Netherlands, Romania, Norway, the Czech Republic, and Belgium, and pledges of operational support (such as basing rights) from Germany, Iceland, Portugal and
Spain. Before the agreement between Iraq and the United Nations, we were awaiting official approval of military support from Bulgaria, Italy, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia. In addition to these pledges, the US has received military contributions from many other non-European allies, such as Argentina and Australia, among others.

We continue to assess the military requirements needed to organize and effectively operate a credible military force against Iraq, should all diplomatic efforts to obtain Iraqi compliance with United Nations mandates fail.

Question 7. When do you anticipate a second round of NATO enlargement? Is the possibility of a second round contingent on the successful implementation of the first round? What countries do you think would be included in a second round of NATO enlargement?

Answer. To further our goal of an undivided Europe, we have always maintained that enlargement should not be a one-time event, but a process. Our policy has been to have a robust “open door” in principle, but with great flexibility and non-specificity, thus leaving our options open. At Madrid, NATO invited three countries to initiate accession talks with the goal of bringing them into the Alliance in the spring of 1999. While we agreed NATO will review the process in 1999, we made no decisions or formal commitments regarding other future members. Given these agreements, it would be inappropriate for me to speculate about future rounds or potential candidates. Should the Alliance again invite new members, the Senate will again be asked for its consideration.

At the same time, the President and Congress have said many times that we do not expect or want the first to be the last. In our view, NATO’s enlargement should continue beyond the first three. We believe that the best guarantee for the open door is a solid success with the first round.

Question 8. Do you think we will continue to have waves of enlargement until all qualified countries have been included?

Answer. As I stated in my answer to Question #7, we have always maintained that enlargement should not be a one-time event, but a process. Our policy has been to have a robust “open door” in principle, but with great flexibility and non-specificity, thus leaving our options open.

At Madrid, NATO invited three countries to initiate accession talks with the goal of bringing them into the Alliance in the spring of 1999. While we agreed NATO will review the process in 1999, we made no decisions or formal commitments regarding other future members. Given these agreements, it would be inappropriate for me to speculate about future rounds or potential candidates. Should the Alliance again invite new members, the Senate will again be asked for its consideration.

Question 9. What impact will NATO enlargement have on our relations with Russia? Will this change if all European countries except Russia are eventually admitted into NATO?

Answer. The evolution of Russian policy is a critical part of America’s future security picture. Despite Russian objections to NATO enlargement, I believe that the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act is symbolic of the success the U.S. and our allies are having in engaging Russia in Europe’s new Security architecture and ensuring a voice for Russia—but not a veto within NATO—in the dialogue over security challenges in Europe’s future.

The Founding Act makes clear that Russia has no grounds to fear aggression from NATO. The Act repeats NATO’s 1996 statement that NATO has “no intention, no plan, and no reason” to deploy nuclear weapons or storage sites on new members’ territory and the Alliance’s 1997 statement that, in the current and foreseeable security environment, NATO will carry out its collective defense and other missions through interoperability, integration and capability for reinforcement, rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces on the territory of new members.

Along with these indications of NATOs peaceable intent, the Act also creates the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, a venue for exchange of views and a bridge to joint NATO-Russia action, when possible. The PJC gives us the opportunity to pursue concrete areas of mutual interest with Russia and to increase trust between Russia and the West.

For the U.S., both a democratic, peaceful Russia and an enlarged NATO are essential elements in the transformation of Europe’s security architecture. There is no “either/or” choice in pursuing these goals; neither is it a matter of who does or does not join NATO. We believe both can be achieved because they are mutually reinforcing. Our task is to reconcile the tensions between NATO, Europe and Russia by
working within political, military and institutional frameworks to demonstrate that these results can be achieved.

Prepared Statement of General Shelton

The North Atlantic Treaty organization has been a cornerstone of our national security strategy for almost fifty years. In recent years, the European and international security environment has changed and our national security strategy must adapt to reflect those changes. To be the strong force for peace in the future that it has been in the past, NATO is examining new concepts and new approaches to keep pace with a rapidly changing world.

“NATO Enlargement”—the Alliance’s initiative to embrace new allies—is fundamental to restructuring NATO for a new century. The Joint Chiefs and I endorse the President's support for this initiative because we are convinced that our strategic interests and the interests of our European friends and allies are better served with Enlargement than without it. Too often in this century, we have been called upon to intervene in major conflicts on the European continent, at great price to our nation in blood and in treasure. We learned, the hard way, that we can avoid war by joining with our friends and extending a hand to yesterday's adversaries to turn them into tomorrow's friends.

In fact, in sharp contrast to the first half of this century, no NATO country has ever been attacked by a neighbor in the nearly five decades of NATO's existence. We have lived through the most dangerous century in world history and even today, in Bosnia, we can see the legacy of those earlier conflicts. That is why, in my view, we can only gain by encouraging deserving nations to join with us in the interests of peace.

But we must be sure that candidates for NATO membership are up to the task. Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, the three nations offered membership last summer in Madrid, clearly deserve the opportunity to join NATO. Each of these nations has embraced meaningful reform, and each has demonstrated a commitment to the following principles:

- Democracy and the Rule of Law
- A Free Market Economic System
- Civilian Constitutional Control of Their Militaries
- Peaceful Resolution of Disputes With Neighbors
- Respect for Human Rights
- Gradual Development of Military Capabilities Interoperable With NATO

From the military perspective, it is important that new members bring genuine military capability to NATO—and Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic will do that. As you know, every NATO country shares in the costs as well as the benefits of membership in the Alliance, and that core principle will also apply to new members. Though meeting specific military standards is not required for admission, we must ensure that new members are "net contributors" and not "net consumers" of security.

That means they must be able to conduct coordinated operations with other NATO members. They must participate fully in the defense planning process. And their military forces must reflect the shared values of our Alliance, particularly the imperative of civilian control which is so central to our democratic systems.

Of course we do not expect new members, right away, to operate militarily at the same levels as members of long standing. Helping new members become fully interoperable with NATO will take time and effort, specifically in key areas like command and control, defense planning, and coordinated staff processes. That is why I share the view of my NATO counterparts, that integration of new members into the NATO military structure should take place in a measured, evolutionary way. We must carefully and prudently assess the military capabilities of prospective new members as we have throughout NATO history's when new members were brought on board.

The Bi-Major NATO Command (MNC) Military Requirements Study

One such assessment was recently completed in December. As a result of the Madrid Summit in July, NATO's military committee tasked SHAPE, in cooperation with SACLANT, to identify requirements stemming from the proposed enlargement of the Alliance. Specifically, SHAPE was tasked to conduct, with SACLANT's cooperation, an analysis of the military requirements that would affect commonly-
funded investment and Operating and Maintenance costs relevant to the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary.

Conducted over a five-month period by a capable and experienced SHAPE staff, the study focused on the requirements for reinforcement, integrated air defense, essential C3I capabilities and training. When finished, the Joint Staff also analyzed this report and found it to be thorough, militarily sound, based on a range of reasonable contingencies, and sufficiently detailed to enable the development of reasonably accurate cost estimates. The Bi-MNC Study is interim in nature and can be refined based on the results of the ongoing NATO defense planning process, which now incorporates the newly invited members. With respect to the invitees this process will include:

- Developing target force proposals for acceptance by the new members as target force goals.
- Formal agreements between NATO and the invitee countries on facilities to which NATO will have access for reinforcement purposes.
- Detailed operational planning for reinforcement operations to include the identification of units, transportation routes, sustainment, and host nation support; and
- Identifying and completing NATO capability packages necessary to meet enlargement requirements. This process will involve detailed site surveys of agreed NATO reinforcement sites, leading to upgraded facilities which meet NATO standards.

I understand copies of the NATO requirements study have been provided to the Senate staff. Although I will not discuss detailed findings of the report, I do want to highlight the fact that the study found reinforcement and infrastructure requirements to be significantly less than originally estimated by the DoD in last February’s report from the Administration. This is important since these relate directly to NATO’s ability to assist in defending new members against external attack. I would also note that NATO’s study produced very similar requirements to the February study. This is important for two reasons. First, it confirms that we did not risk NATO capabilities for the sake of cost. In fact, the NATO study was done completely without regard for costs. Second, it helped verify that the forces and requirements identified to support Article V operations are sufficient.

In looking at NATO’s ability to defend new member states, NATO and the US, in separate studies, evaluated worst case defense scenarios. Both studies concluded that forces drawn from NATO's existing assets, in conjunction with the host nation forces, would be adequate to defend the new members.

In fact, these studies revealed that the forces needed to defend new members are roughly half the size of some current Article V defense plans. They also confirm that these operations might actually be easier to support logistically than some potential NATO plans involving current allies, due to the quality and quantity of existing infrastructure in the invited countries, and the fact that they are closer geographically to the center of Europe. Moreover, the NATO study is firmly based on actual site visits to assess existing infrastructure and on detailed interaction with the invitees and current members to assess military capabilities. To a great extent, these important features are absent from previous enlargement studies.

**Military Capabilities**

As I mentioned earlier, we must be sure that the accession process enhances, not detracts from, our overall military capability. NATO’s military effectiveness must remain a fundamental priority. That said, I can state with confidence that bringing in the new nations will strengthen NATO’s security. Though each new member must improve in key areas like interoperability, operational readiness, force structure, and modernization, all three are well on the way.

For example, Poland has the largest and most capable military in Central and Eastern Europe and brings 24 years of peacekeeping experience to NATO’s efforts in Bosnia. Since 1974, Poland has participated in more peacekeeping operations than any former Warsaw Pact country, and it currently has more personnel in UN peacekeeping, military observer and civilian police missions than any other country. These deployments, each a multinational operation, have enabled Polish troops to gain valuable experience which greatly enhances their interoperability with NATO partners.

Poland currently has an airborne infantry battalion in the US sector in Bosnia, a logistics battalion in the Golan Heights (UNDOF), an infantry battalion and military hospital (632 troops) in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and small contingents in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES), as well as troops supporting eight other UN observer missions.
In 1989, they established a military training center for UN operations in southeastern Poland. In 1992, the Poles deployed an infantry battalion with UN forces in Croatia. Since then, Poland has shown an increased willingness to provide combat forces in support of peacekeeping, as reflected by their commitment to IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia. Poland is currently working to establish joint peacekeeping battalions with Ukraine and Lithuania, and the Poles have contributed to UN efforts in Rwanda (UNIMIR), Georgia (UNOMIG), Tajikistan (UNMOT), Iraq/Kuwait (UNIKOM), the Western Sahara (MINURSO), and Cambodia (UNTAC).

The Czech Republic currently has a mechanized battalion in Bosnia with SFOR, and prior to that it contributed a mechanized battalion to IFOR. The Czechs also deployed a decontamination unit to DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and provided observers to UN observer missions in Croatia (UNTAES), the Prevulka Peninsula (UNMOP), the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (UNPREDEP), Mozambique (UNOMOZ), Georgia (UNOMIG), and Liberia (UNOMIL).

Hungary contributed an engineer battalion in support of IFOR and continues to provide the same support to SFOR. Hungary's support to NATO operations in Bosnia also included permission to use its airspace, airfields, and military facilities. Hungary demonstrated its ability to operate as part of the NATO team with every bridge that was built and every plane that landed and took off from its airfields. Over 95,000 US military personnel rotated in and out of IFOR and SFOR assignments through the Hungarian airbase at Taszar. Additionally, US armor units calibrate their guns at Hungarian ranges prior to deploying to Bosnia, and again upon redeploying.

Past Hungarian peacekeeping contributions have included a contingent in Cyprus as part of an Austrian battalion assigned to UNFICYP; a contingent in the Sinai (MFO); and contributions in Iraq/Kuwait (UNIKOM), Angola (UNAVEM), Cambodia (UNTAC), Mozambique (UNOMOZ), Tajikistan (UNMOT), and Georgia (UNOMIG). Hungary may also provide forces to the UN Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG).

As these examples demonstrate, the nations invited to join NATO clearly possess military capabilities that will enhance NATO. Our ultimate goal, however, is to assist them in their efforts to become fully interoperable with their NATO allies. Not surprisingly, their armed forces will have to shed their former Warsaw Pact doctrine and thinking in favor of NATO processes and procedures. Though these transformations will not be complete by 1999, we are working hard to ensure that each new member has a plan to effect such a transformation over time. The Partnership for Peace program is the foundation of this process, as is the NATO Defense Planning Process. We also focus on bilateral assistance targeted on key military priorities for each country in order to maximize our assistance in the shortest possible time.

The Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program has proven itself a major contributor to easing ethnic and border disputes in Europe. But the PfP program, particularly the conduct of military exercises, has also been a training ground for NATO enlargement. For example, in 1997 alone, Poland participated in 22 PfP exercises in which the United States also took part; the highlight of these events was exercise BRAVE EAGLE, one of the largest and most complex PfP exercises to date, which Poland hosted. Poland also participates in hundreds of bilateral and multilateral exercises, seminars, and other activities with other Partners and NATO Allies, all of which contribute to improved interoperability.

Hungary has also been an enthusiastic participant in PfP, and was in fact the first Partner to include a PfP line item in its defense budget. Like Poland, Hungary has participated extensively in bilateral and multilateral military exercises and activities which have produced valuable lessons learned. Hungary participated in 17 multilateral PfP exercises in 1997 along with the US, and it will host a major exercise this Spring. Since the Madrid Summit, Hungary has volunteered to participate as one of twelve NATO teams assessing Albania's post-conflict military.

The Czech Republic participated in 18 multinational PfP exercises with US involvement in 1997. They also conducted numerous joint training activities with
other NATO members, including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, France and the United Kingdom. The Czech Republic has been particularly closely involved with Germany, conducting 100 combined events in 1997 alone.

In addition, during the last three years all three countries have participated in PIP's Planning and Review Process (PARP), in which NATO established 45 specific Interoperability Objectives (IOs). Examples of these objectives include: command and control of search and rescue operations, ground refueling of aircraft, commonality of airfield procedures, use of NATO communications procedures and terminology, aircraft IFF system, logistics support, and interoperability of communications equipment and of air navigation aids. Poland committed to attain 41 IOs by 1999, Hungary pledged to reach 38, and the Czech Republic promised to meet 31.

In many cases, the new member states have used interoperability objectives as guideposts for procurement decisions—decisions they have made and implemented—in advance of NATO membership. For example, NATO analysts noted that even though communications and information systems requirements increased, the cost estimates for the Czech Republic kept dropping. Closer inspection revealed it turned out the Czechs had already anticipated the requirements for secure and non-secure digital communications programs and had applied NATO standards to the national programs they are pursuing on their own. Because of PIP, the Czech MOD had already programmed funds for projects we had expected to pay for with fund with NATO Common Funds.

As these examples demonstrate, the new member states are making real progress toward the goal of achieving military capabilities which will enhance the Alliance. And apart from their military value, these cooperative ventures suggest a willingness to share the risks of collective security that deserves our respect and support. All three countries' active participation in PIP activities and exercises have helped them prepare for the burdens and responsibilities of NATO membership. Experience gained through PIP was integral, for example, in each country's preparation of its DPQ reply.

**NATO's Assessment of DPQ Results**

NATO conducts an annual assessment of each member's force and financial plans through the annual Defense Planning Questionnaire. Each response to the DPQ has three parts: a statement of national defense policy, responses to previous NATO force goals, and military service sections detailing forces and assets available to NATO. The reply to the DPQ reflects each ally's capability to meet its Force Goals. As part of the accession process, NATO prepared a special DPQ for the three new member nations. Representatives of the NATO International Staff and International Military Staff made frequent visits to the invited countries to help their Ministries of Defense prepare DPQ responses.

The DPQ responses helped define enlargement military requirements and the extension of the Article 5 guarantee to the three invitees. This process included balancing their inputs with the defense plans of existing allies and the likely effect on NATO's common funded budgets. The DPQ responses also provided a valuable baseline against which to develop Target Force Goals for the three nations. The Target Force Goals are intended to give them an early indication of their requirements as Alliance members. The Target Force Goals are being discussed now and will be finalized later this spring.

The invitee Target Force Proposals, which derive from the DPQ process, will focus on eight key areas: interoperability; force contributions; command and control; air defense; logistics; reception and host nation support; force modernization; and training, doctrine and safety. Requirements such as force modernization are addressed as longer term requirements.

NATO's Defense Review Committee (DRC) and the SACEUR analyzed the DPQ submissions. Both provided a generally positive assessment of the military capabilities of the invitees and identified interoperability shortcomings within the three militaries. None of the shortfalls were deemed insurmountable, though full interoperability will require some effort in a number of important areas including command & control, air defense, readiness, logistics, and personnel.

The NATO assessment confirms that the three new member states all plan to increase the resources they make available for defense. Their priorities focus on developing essential interoperability in the short term, and modernization and procurement in the long term. All three countries project significant increases in defense spending, in real terms, to 2002. Together, with savings realized from the radical downsizing and restructuring of their Armed Forces, the resource plans provide a
basis for significant interoperability improvements with NATO and increased expenditures for procurement.

All three invitees place the highest priority on achieving NATO integrated command and control, with priority given at the strategic level and for those forces slated for NATO's rapid response units. Steady progress is being made to achieve communications interoperability with modern C3 systems, enhanced English language training, and combined operations in Bosnia and in PfP exercises. The NATO assessment notes that:

Building on progress made in the implementation of PfP's Planning and Review Process (PARP) objectives, the three nations have been able to establish the minimum required level of interoperability in C2 particularly for potential contributions to NATO's reaction forces and the highest echelon forces.

Shortcomings within the three new member countries were clearly identified by the NATO assessment. The assessment also noted that each nation is making major efforts to address the most critical shortfalls. Additionally, each nation is taking a conservative, practical approach towards attaining its interoperability objectives. This is best reflected in the decision by all three to forego the purchase of major military end items (e.g. aircraft and armor), in order to focus their efforts and resources on the activities and equipment most needed for fundamental interoperability. Particular efforts include working to correct personnel imbalances, addressing reception and logistics infrastructure, improving air defense and airspace management, conducting selective modernization of older equipment, improving the readiness of select units and squadrons, and teaching English en masse. The assessment confirms these efforts are the essential building blocks of interoperability.

The three invitees are also tackling the difficult problems associated with major manpower cuts and organizational restructuring. As former Warsaw Pact members, they built their forces on the Soviet model of a large and well-defined cadre of professional officers, a practically non-existent NCO corps, and large conscript armies. Officers regularly performed NCO type duties and a general lack of initiative pervaded lower echelons. The NATO assessment observed that all three invitees are working hard to eliminate this inefficient legacy by reducing the number of officers in upper echelons, blending conscripts with professional soldiers, and most importantly, by building a strong and empowered NCO corps as in the Western model. As with other initiatives, those units slated for commitment to rapid reaction forces receive priority.

Czech Republic force plans continue the ongoing and comprehensive restructuring of its armed force. Czech military priorities were initially neglected after 1989, resulting in wide-scale equipment obsolescence, training deficiencies, readiness problems, and serious personnel imbalances. Czech national policy has since changed and the result is reflected in its active PfP participation, excellent performance in Bosnia, and strong role during the 1997 national floods. Czech plans include an extensive modernization program and gradually increased defense spending. The Czech MOD has a five year investment plan focused on NATO military integration which it expects to be fully funded. It is building its military to support a published “National Defense Strategy” which stresses compatibility with NATO. The Army plans to pare down to a rapid reaction Brigade and six mechanized Brigades linked with modern command and control. Air Force reductions in older aircraft and equipment will permit measured aircraft and air defense acquisitions while freeing up additional funding for readiness and additional pilot training.

The Hungarian Defense Force (HDF) is working to complete the reorganization it began in 1995. Lack of funding and political inattention after 1989, initially left the HDF in marginal condition as it struggled with an increasingly unbalanced personnel system, aging equipment and reduced training opportunities. Hungary remained active internationally through participation in several successful peacekeeping endeavors. Hungarian interoperability with NATO substantially improved after 1994 with the advent of PfP.

The HDF is reducing to two divisions, with two independent brigades and a light infantry battalion designated for rapid reaction. Its Air Force is retiring its older aircraft and equipment, allowing it to better maintain its modern MIG–29s and increase pilot training hours. While the bulk of Hungarian C2 is antiquated and not NATO interoperable, the report notes that Hungary is placing heavy emphasis on this issue through modernization.

Similarly, the Polish military developed a fifteen year restructuring and modernization program. They seek to develop a smaller, but more capable force structure with an emphasis on well-equipped mobile forces. While the Navy plans to retain its current size, both the Polish Army and Air Force will significantly downsize.
The Army will completely restructure into a leaner, more deployable force centered around three Corps, while the Air Force will focus on improving readiness by increasing the flying hours of its pilots to get them closer to NATO standards. Poland is also modernizing its C2 capabilities, which currently are not up to NATO standards. Logistics, especially those assets dedicated to units deploying out of Poland, are being gradually upgraded, while a high priority is being placed on reception facilities. Modernization of its air defense force is a priority, though for now, Poland prudently has avoided the high cost of complex tactical ballistic missile defenses.

To summarize, the NATO assessment states that the invitees face challenges in restructuring their militaries; however, the assessment also identifies those challenges and the efforts required by the invitees to correct their deficiencies. It describes the substantial and pragmatic efforts underway in the three new member countries to attain real NATO interoperability. Initial efforts focus on communications and language interoperability, followed closely by restructuring their forces and improving air defenses, air space management, logistics and receiving facilities, training and readiness and equipment modernization.

The improvements will take time. Full interoperability will not come overnight; however, the NATO assessment confirms that the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland are on their way to becoming important contributing members of the NATO Alliance.

NATO-Russia

Finally, it is important I address a concern sometimes voiced regarding NATO enlargement and Russia. Some critics state that NATO enlargement would cause significant problems with the NATO-Russia relationship. Actions to date prove this has not been the case. Since the signing of the Founding Act in May 1997, we have seen increased military-to-military cooperation between the Alliance and Russia.

For example, Russia recently assigned LTG Zavarzin as their Military Representative to NATO HQs in Brussels. LTG Zavarzin now works through NATO’s new Permanent Joint Council of Military Representatives to enhance practical NATO-Russia military cooperation. The Russians also presented NATO with their Partnership for Peace Individual Partnership Program. Russia is working closely with NATO to establish military liaison missions at SHAPE and NATO HQs and NATO is working to establish a military liaison mission in Moscow. Finally, General Anatoly Kvashnin, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, recently visited NATO HQs and addressed the Military Committee on Russian military reform. These significant events indicate that the NATO-Russia military relationship is moving forward in a positive direction.

Conclusion

I believe the choice before us is clear. If we are to avoid the tragedies of this century in the next one, then we must embrace the lessons we have learned at such great cost to achieve the peace we owe to our children and their children. One of those lessons is that peace is based on closer ties, politically, economically, and militarily with our European allies—and NATO Enlargement serves those ends very well.

NATO stands as a unifying force for peace and stability. The Alliance provided the secure environment in which European nations, devastated by World War II, could rebuild their economies, bring prosperity to their peoples, and allow political and economic integration to grow.

Nearly 500,000 US military members died in two terrible wars in Europe this century. Every town in America has family members buried in European and American graves due to these European wars.

These wars erupted in Central and Eastern Europe, precisely where NATO intends to enlarge. The nations in these regions were geographically, politically and ethnically unstable, and were caught outside any functional security umbrella beyond “balance of power” agreements. Now, NATO enlargement will help bring stability and security to this part of Europe, conclusively affirming that NATO members have learned from the region’s history.

That is why NATO’s enlargement is in the US national interest, why US security remains linked to Europe, and why enlargement benefits all European nations.
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to General Shelton

Question 1. Are our current NATO allies willing to dedicate the resources necessary to fulfill their obligation as NATO members? How will NATO enlargement affect the commitments of the US and its allies?

Answer. Clearly, NATO enlargement will bring about new responsibilities that must be shared among current and new allies. At the Madrid Summit, the allies agreed that there will be costs, they will be manageable, and that the resources necessary to meet those costs will be provided.

The Alliance has taken two more opportunities to reaffirm its commitment to provide the resources necessary to support enlargement. At the meeting of all NATO defense ministers in early December they agreed, "[c]osts associated with the accession of the three invitees will be manageable, and that the resources necessary to meet these costs will be provided in accordance with our general procedures under which each Ally bears its fair share." Shortly thereafter, the foreign ministers met and reaffirmed the Alliance's support for this principle.

The Europeans have stated a willingness to meet the financial requirements of enlarging. In October of last year, George Robertson, the British Minister of Defense, wrote an Op-Ed piece that was printed in the Washington Times. He had this to say about European burdensharing as it pertains to enlargement, "[I]f additional spending is required, Britain will pay its share. We contribute nearly one-sixth of NATO's common budget and the European allies some 70 percent of the total. These shares will apply equally to the costs of enlargement."

In November of last year, the German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, wrote an Op-Ed piece which appeared in the Washington Post. In it he said, "It goes without saying that Europe and Germany, like the United States must bear their fair share of the costs of NATO enlargement." Most recently, on 9 February, German Foreign Minister Volker Ruehe, in a Los Angeles Times Op-Ed piece, reiterated that while NATO enlargement entailed costs, "there will be no free ride. . . . Our American friends can rest assured that their European allies are assuming and will continue to assume their fair share of the common bill and burden."

The European Alliance partners are already financing roughly 75 percent of the joint NATO budgets and making available 95 percent of NATO forces in Europe. This European contribution to the Alliance will not drop with the admission of new members but will further increase.

While it is true that both the US and our NATO allies have made big cuts in our defense budgets since the end of the Cold War, most of our NATO allies still make significant contributions to the common defense. For example, more than two-thirds of the troops currently participating in SFOR are non-US forces.

For some time the US has pressed the allies to do more to improve their capability for mobile, flexible operations which NATO will undertake in the future. They have responded with specific improvements, and are committed to more. For example, Britain provides NATO's only rapidly deployable corps headquarters committed to NATO and British forces are the backbone of the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). Additionally, the British aircraft carrier HMS Invincible recently deployed to the Gulf in support of the latest military buildup there.

France, in general, is restructuring its armed forces to be more mobile and easily deployable. The French are establishing a Rapid Action Force (FAR) designed for rapid response in both European and overseas contingencies. France also participated heavily in IFOR efforts to implement the Dayton peace accords in Bosnia and Herzegovina. With nearly 10,000 troops, France was the third largest troop contributor, after the US and Britain, was responsible for one of the three geographic sectors—and continues to be in SFOR.

Likewise, Germany is standing up a Rapid Reaction Force of some 53,000 fully-equipped troops from the Army, Navy and Air Force. The first units stood up in 1996 and the force will be fully capable in 1998. In general, German armed forces are in the process of re-creating themselves into a mobile, deployable—rather than static home defense—force.

The smaller European nations are also improving their forces. For example, the Royal Netherlands Navy and Air Force have improved both their transport and air defense capabilities with new procurements such as: two KC–10 transport/tankers (the Dutch can now deploy their own F–16s without reliance on the US); an amphibious-lift ship to make the marine brigade self-deployable; and upgrades to their F–16 fleet and their Patriot systems.
As for the impact of enlargement on US commitments, in my mind, the net result of enhanced stability will add, not detract from our readiness posture. My top priority as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to preserve our military readiness and I'll do everything in my power to ensure that nothing we do regarding NATO enlargement negatively impacts on readiness. I see nothing in the NATO enlargement concept that will detract from our overall readiness. To the contrary, the addition of over 200,000 troops and the military equipment and capabilities that the three new countries bring to the Alliance can only reduce the demands on current members.

Our response to the crisis in the Gulf reflects successes in maintaining a ready military force. The priority we give to deployed and "first to fight" forces enables us to surge in response to threats to US national security. There are some readiness challenges that we have to deal with, and we are closely monitoring our low density/high demand units, our spare parts inventory, and our personnel tempo and operational tempo to ensure that short term situations do not become long-term problems. Clearly, we have finite resources to support our global security responsibilities. If we are not compensated for the additional, unprogrammed costs of such deployments, readiness and modernization will suffer in the long run.

Question 2. What are some of the initiatives you hope to work on in the PJC Military Committee as part of your military-to-military efforts in that new body?

Answer. The highest priority initiative in the NATO-Russia military-to-military relationship is reaching agreement on a plan for establishment of the first of the reciprocal Military Liaison Missions (MLMs) provided for in the Founding Act. We will soon begin negotiations with Russia on a document that will serve as the Terms of Reference to establish Russian Military Liaison Missions at NATO, SHAPE and SACLANT HQs. NATO will establish a Military Liaison Mission in Moscow. The daily contact between NATO and Russian military officers will go a long way to increase transparency and openness required to breakdown "Cold War" stereotypes.

An important US objective is to deepen Russia's participation in Partnership for Peace (PPP) as a priority item for the coming months. Russia recently submitted her Individual Partnership Program to NATO. Since the signing of the Founding Act Russia has indicated an increased interest to participate in PPP. We hope to have Russia host a PPP exercise on Russian soil sometime in the future. PPP will offer many opportunities for NATO and Russian, and other PPP member militaries to work side by side to build a solid military relationship.

Finally, the key areas for cooperation and consultation to be worked in Permanent Joint Council Military Representatives (PJC–MR) in the future are: conflict prevention; peacekeeping operations, on a case-by-case basis; arms control issues; nuclear safety issues; prevention of the proliferation of NBC weapons; possible cooperation in Theater Missile Defense; air traffic safety; air defense matters; combating terrorism and drug trafficking.

Questions Submitted by Senator Feingold

Question 1. Some have argued that the new military commitments that the United States will incur under an enlarged NATO, coupled with our extensive involvement in Bosnia, will impact negatively on our general military readiness, particularly in light of the recent deployments to the Persian Gulf. Please comment on this assertion. How would your response change if NATO were to enlarge beyond the first round?

Answer. My top priority as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to preserve our military readiness, and I'll do everything in my power to ensure that nothing we do regarding NATO enlargement negatively impacts on readiness. I see nothing in the NATO enlargement concept that will detract from our overall readiness. To the contrary, the additional troops, military equipment and capabilities that the three new countries bring to the Alliance can only reduce the demands on current members.

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Should NATO expand beyond the first round, my answer remains that the benefits of enlargement outweigh the costs.

**Question 2.** How will NATO distribute financial and military responsibilities among the member states following enlargement?

**Answer.** The distribution of costs will be in accordance with standard NATO financial principles that determine cost shares of NATO’s common funded accounts based on national GDP as well as other factors. The US share is about 25%. The European share will be about 75%, with a combined contribution of the three prospective new members of about 4% to NATO’s common funded budgets. At accession, NATO is likely to make minor adjustments to some national cost shares to rebalance them among nineteen, rather than sixteen NATO allies.

The military responsibilities will also be determined through standard NATO procedures. As part of NATO’s defense planning process, the sharing of roles and responsibilities and recognition of mutual commitments are key principles. In determining the size and nature of their contribution to the collective defense, each member nation must take into account the overall needs of the Alliance. They follow agreed defense planning procedures which provide the methodology for determining the required forces to implement the Alliance policies and defense plans. The planning process takes many quantitative and qualitative factors into account, ensuring all relevant considerations are jointly examined to enable the best use to be made of national assets.

**Question 3.** Do Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have the military capacity to assume their responsibilities? Are these three countries prepared to assume the costs involved in modernizing their forces to meet NATO standards?

**Answer.** As seen in Bosnia and in numerous PfP exercises, these new members have demonstrated that they can operate with current NATO forces, and that they bring strengths and areas of military expertise that are of significant benefit to the Alliance. I can state with confidence that the new nations will strengthen NATO’s security. Though each new member must improve in key areas like interoperability, operational readiness, force structure, and modernization, all three are on the way. For example, Poland has the largest and most capable military in Central and Eastern Europe and brings 24 years of peacekeeping experience to NATO’s efforts in Bosnia. Since 1974, Poland has participated in more peacekeeping operations than any former Warsaw Pact country, and it currently has more personnel in UN peacekeeping, military observer and civilian police missions than any other country. These deployments, each a multinational operation, have enabled Polish troops to gain valuable experience which greatly enhances their interoperability with NATO partners.

Poland currently has an airborne infantry battalion in the US sector in Bosnia, a logistics battalion in the Golan Heights (UNDOF), an infantry battalion and military hospital (632 troops) in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and small contingents in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES), as well as troops supporting eight other UN observer missions. In 1989, they established a military training center for UN operations in southeastern Poland.

In 1992, the Poles deployed an infantry battalion with UN forces in Croatia. Since then, Poland has shown an increased willingness to provide combat forces in support of peacekeeping, as reflected by their commitment to IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia. Poland is currently working to establish joint peacekeeping battalions with Ukraine and Lithuania, and the Poles have contributed to UN efforts in Rwanda (UNMIR), Georgia (UNOMIG), Tajikistan (UNMOT), Iraq/Kuwait (UNIKOM), the Western Sahara (MINURSO), and Cambodia (UNTAC).

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Past Hungarian peacekeeping contributions have included a contingent in Cyprus as part of an Austrian battalion assigned to UNFICYP; a contingent in the Sinai (MFO); and contributions in Iraq/Kuwait (UNIKOM), Angola (UNAVEM), Cambodia (UNTAC), Mozambique (UNOMOZ), Tajikistan (UNMOT), and Georgia (UNOMIG). Hungary may also provide forces to the UN Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG).

All three new member states supported Coalition Forces during Operation Desert Storm. Poland provided two medical ships while Hungary offered use of its airfields to assist in deployment and redeployment. Hungary also provided a small contingent of medical personnel to the region. The Czech Republic deployed several hundred chemical decontamination troops as part of the Coalition. And each of the newly invited members have voiced support for current US policy in the Gulf.

The costs of enlargement will be manageable for the new members. The three invitees and NATO have agreed to specific cost shares that will govern their contributions to NATO—together the three countries will contribute about 4% to NATO’s common-funded budgets. Each of them have committed to sufficient funding in their defense budgets to pay for enlargement requirements. Some examples follow:

The Czech government has approved plans to increase its 1998 national defense spending to about $1.1 billion, which represents about 1.88% of projected GDP. The Czech Republic has stated its plans to link defense spending growth to the rate of GDP growth and to increase the percentage of GDP dedicated to defense by 0.1% annually for the next 3 years which will raise it from the current 1.7% in FY97 to 2.0% in 2000.

The Hungarians have increased their 1997 national defense budget to about $800 million, which represents about 1.8% of projected GDP. Hungary has stated that it plans to link defense spending growth to the rate of GDP growth and to increase the percentage of GDP dedicated to defense by 0.1 percent annually for the next five years. If so, Hungarian defense spending may increase in real terms by 3 to 8% annually during the next four years.

Poland spent 2.3 percent of GDP on defense in 1996, Poland’s 15 year modernization plan calls for annual increases in defense spending which are pegged to the rate of GDP growth. Based on a conservative estimate of 4.2 percent annual economic growth, Polish defense spending should increase approximately 3.2 percent annually.

Most importantly, the costs of joining NATO for the new members will certainly be less than what the three countries would have to spend if they did not join NATO and were solely responsible for their national security. With or without enlargement, these countries would still face modernization of their militaries. Without the security offered by NATO membership, the required spending would certainly be far greater.

**Question 4. What commitments have we received from current NATO members regarding their bearing some of the costs of enlargement?**

**Answer.** Clearly, NATO enlargement will bring about new responsibilities that must be shared among current and new allies. At the Madrid Summit, the allies agreed that there will be costs, they will be manageable, and that the resources necessary to meet those costs will be provided.

The Alliance has taken two more opportunities to reaffirm its commitment to provide the resources necessary to support enlargement. At the meeting of all NATO defense ministers in early December they agreed, “[c]osts associated with the accession of the three invitees will be manageable, and that the resources necessary to meet these costs will be provided in accordance with our general procedures under which each Ally bears its fair share.” Shortly thereafter, the foreign ministers met and reaffirmed the Alliance’s support for this principle.

The Europeans have stated a willingness to meet the financial requirements of enlarging. In October of last year, George Robertson, the British Minister of Defense, wrote an Op-Ed piece that was printed in the *Washington Times*. He had this to say about European burdensharing as it pertains to enlargement, “(I)f additional spending is required, Britain will pay its share. We contribute nearly one-sixth of NATO’s common budget and the European allies some 70 percent of the total. These shares will apply equally to the costs of enlargement.”

In November of last year, the German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, wrote an Op-Ed piece which appeared in the *Washington Post*. In it he said, “It goes without saying that Europe and Germany, like the United States must bear their fair share
of the costs of NATO enlargement." Most recently, on 9 February, German Foreign 
Minister Volker Ruehe, in a Los Angeles Times Op-Ed piece, reiterated that while 
NATO enlargement entailed costs, "there will be no free ride. ... Our American 
friends can rest assured that their European allies are assuming and will continue 
to assume their fair share of the common bill and burden".

The European Alliance partners are already financing roughly 75 percent of the 
joint NATO budgets and making available 95 percent of NATO forces in Europe. 
This European contribution to the Alliance will not drop with the admission of new 
members but will further increase."

While it is true that both the US and our NATO allies have made big cuts in our 
defense budgets since the end of the Cold War, most of our NATO allies still make 
significant contributions to the common defense. For example, more than two-thirds 
of the troops currently participating in SFOR are non-US. forces.

For some time the US has pressed the allies to do more to improve their capabil-
ity for mobile, flexible operations which NATO will undertake in the future. They 
have responded with specific improvements, and are committed to more. For exam-
ple, Britain provides NATO’s only rapidly deployable corps headquarters committed 
to NATO and British forces are the backbone of the Allied Command Europe (ACE) 
Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). Additionally, the British aircraft carrier HMS Invinci-
ble recently deployed to the Gulf in support of the latest military buildup there.

France, in general, is restructuring its armed forces to be more mobile and easily 
deployable. The French are establishing a Rapid Action Force (FAR) designed for 
rapid response in both European and overseas contingencies. France also partici-
pated heavily in IFOR efforts to implement the Dayton peace accords in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. With nearly 10,000 troops, France was the third largest troop contrib-
utor, after the US and Britain, was responsible for one of the three geographic sec-
tors—and continues to be in SFOR.

Likewise, Germany is standing up a Rapid Reaction Force of some 53,000 fully-
equipped troops from the Army, Navy and Air Force. The first units stood up in 
1996 and the force will be fully capable in 1998. In general, German armed forces 
are in the process of re-creating themselves into a mobile, deployable—rather than 
static home defense force.

The smaller European nations are also improving their forces. For example, the 
Royal Netherlands Navy and Air Force have improved both their transport and air 
defense capabilities with new procurements such as: two KDC–10 transport/tankers 
(the Dutch can now deploy their own F–16s without reliance on the US); an amphib-
ious-lift ship to make the marine brigade self-deployable; and upgrades to their 
F–16 fleet and their Patriot systems.

Joint Statement of Senator Lugar and Senator Roth

(Senator Lugar is joined in this statement by Senator William Roth, Jr. [Republican 
of Delaware], Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and Chairman of the 
Senate NATO Observer Group.)

Recently, General Brent Scowcroft, Alton Fye and former Senators Howard 
Baker and Sam Nunn expressed their concerns about NATO’s plans to extend mem-
bership to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. We disagree with their assess-
ments and recommendations regarding how enlargement will affect NATO and the 
future of European security.

First, there has been no “rush” to expand the Alliance. As early advocates of 
NATO enlargement, we are pleased that President Clinton endorsed the proposal in 
1996. The revolutions restoring these countries independence took place in 1989; 
a decade will have passed before the countries join the Alliance and we reverse Sta-
lin’s artificial and forceful exclusion of these democracies from western institutions. 
In terms of Senate consideration, it is important to note that NATO enlargement has 
received more scrutiny in the form of hearings and consultations than did the 
Washington Treaty, the original document which created the Alliance. In fact, 
NATO enlargement has been endorsed by Congress each year since 1994.

The argument to “slow this train down” out of fear that other nations might try 
to “jump aboard” ignores the deliberate and open course the US and the Alliance 
have taken in enlargement. The question of enlargement must not be a blanket 
policy which ignores the qualifications of individual nations, but an Alliance assess-
ment of each application based on three principles: (1) strategic interests; (2) per-
ception of threats to security and stability; and (3) actions taken by prospective
members to complete their democratic transitions and to harmonize their policies with NATO’s political aims and security policies.

NATO’s “open door” entrance policy—which should not be misunderstood as an “open-ended” policy—has given countries of Central and Eastern Europe the incentive to accelerate reforms, peacefully settle disputes with neighbors, and increase regional cooperation. To repudiate the “open-door” policy, as advocated by some, would risk undermining the tremendous gains in democracy, market reform and reconciliation that has swept across the region in the last decade. The result of a “closed-door” policy could be new dividing lines across Europe, with those on the outside feeling disillusioned and insecure and thus prone to adopting the competitive and destabilizing security policies of Europe’s past.

Some propose that NATO enlargement be tied to the expansion of the European Union (EU). EU enlargement is highly desirable on its own merits, but using it as a kind of gateway for NATO aspirants would subordinate the “cornerstone” of trans-Atlantic security to a primarily economic institution to which the U.S. doesn’t belong. It would bind the freedom and flexibility of a transatlantic Alliance led by the U.S. to the actions of a strictly European institution. Transferring decision-making power to an enterprise which has been unable to develop a common security policy and which failed to stop the fighting in the former Yugoslavia would not bode well for the future of European security. The EU decision-making process is notorious for being cumbersome, slow, and expressing the lowest common denominator. All of these traits are antithetical to the demands of a military alliance which places a premium on timely, decisive action.

Finally, conditioning NATO membership on EU membership would relegate some NATO allies to second-class status. The role of the U.S., Canada, and Turkey, none of whom are members of the EU, would be significantly diminished in the enlargement process. This could very quickly lead to a division within the Alliance.

Critics assert that NATO enlargement repeats the mistake of the Versailles Treaty by mistreating a former adversary, Russia. We disagree that NATO enlargement constitutes a punishment or isolation of Russia. The argument ignores the open and inclusive manner in which NATO has approached Russia. NATO has extended the hand of partnership through the NATO-Russia Founding Act and today Russian troops serve with NATO forces in Bosnia. Finally, unlike the punishing economic retribution carried out under the Versailles regime, the West has extended some $100 billion since 1991 to help Russia’s democratic and economic reforms and over $2 billion in weapon dismantlement and security assistance.

Others suggest that Russian antagonism is “sure to grow as NATO enlarges.” The United States and its NATO allies have both common and divergent interests with Russia, whether NATO enlarges or not. Differences over Iraq, Iran, the Caucasus, arms sales, and religious freedom are not due to, nor dependent upon, NATO enlargement. It is a mistake to view Russia as an essentially reactive power and to blame its actions solely on NATO enlargement or other Western behavior. Many reject NATO enlargement out of a desire to preserve Russia’s sphere of influence. If Russia cannot accept the legitimate right of its neighbors to choose their security arrangements, then NATO’s role in Central and Eastern Europe is even more important.

The accession of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to NATO will strengthen the Alliance, eliminate de-stabilizing and immoral dividing lines, and thereby consolidate peace and stability in Europe. A stable and peaceful Europe will benefit the United States and all of Europe, including Russia.

Prepared Statement of Senator Biden

I am squarely in support of enlargement. The question is not whether to expand NATO or maintain the status quo. In light of the dynamic change in Europe it is essential for NATO to adjust or risk losing its viability and purpose.

The primary purpose and benefit of NATO since its inception has been stability in Europe. This continues to be its function. History shows that when there is a vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe, countries are forced to pursue their own individual security arrangements.

The prospect of enlargement has already had a positive impact on stability, stimulating internal reforms in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic and encouraging them to resolve historic disputes with their neighbors.

History also shows that when the United States withdraws from the security debate in Europe, we pay a price. We are a European power. For some to suggest that potential new members gain admission to the European Union before entry into
NATO would put the future of Europe in the hands of organizations to which the United States does not belong.

Those who vote for this resolution should be clear about the costs. The most recent estimate of direct costs to the United States is $40 million a year over ten years. This reflects a realistic assessment of the condition of infrastructure in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, and of the threats facing the NATO alliance. It also reflects an equitable sharing of the burden among the members of NATO. Many have raised the possibility that enlargement would damage our relations with Russia. I believe that stability in Central and Eastern Europe will enhance Russia’s security. Yet I don’t dismiss the concerns that have been raised by some of my colleagues. That’s why I strongly backed the NATO-Russia Pounding Act. This accord has created transparency in NATO for Russia and demonstrated that our purpose is not to isolate Russia from the West.

I don’t believe current differences with Russia, such as its failure to ratify START II or its stance on Iraq, are based on a reaction to NATO enlargement. From my discussions with Russian leaders I don’t believe any of them see NATO enlargement as a military threat.

Russia is going through dynamic change, which while painful for the Russian people, will result in its eventual evolution into a more democratic and market driven society. Opponents and proponents of NATO enlargement agree that we should do everything we can to increase the prospects for positive change in Russia. We should continue to implement the Nunn-Lugar program. Where possible, we should increase our multilateral assistance and interaction with Russia in a broad range of areas as long as they continue to implement free market reforms.

There should not be a timetable for an invitation to other countries to join NATO, nor should there be a mandated pause in the consideration of future candidates. We should not set deadlines or draw new lines for the future.

NATO enlargement is a historic opportunity for the United States. The situation in Europe, Russia and neighboring countries is dynamic. Voting to enlarge NATO now sets a positive course, expanding the zone of stability eastward to give those dynamic forces of positive change a chance to take hold and bear fruit for the future.

Prepared Statement of Senator Feingold

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for holding this hearing today on the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and for holding the series of hearings on this important issue last year. I also want to take this opportunity to thank Secretary Albright, Secretary Cohen, and General Shelton for appearing before this committee today and for their countless hours of work on NATO enlargement and for their commitment to its success.

Today, this committee will consider the protocols to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) As we all know, NATO has been one of the most important factors in maintaining peace in Europe since the devastation of World War II. As we prepare to mark the alliance’s 50th anniversary next year, it is appropriate to look back on its successes and also look forward to see what role NATO will play in the next 50 years. The world will be a much different place in 1999 than it was in 1949 when this alliance was formed as a buffer against Soviet aggressions and as a means of protection for nations whose peoples had just emerged from one of the costliest wars—in both human and financial terms—in our history.

Today, nearly a half a century later, the Iron Curtain has fallen and the Soviet regime is no more. The changing face of Europe is marked by newly-independent countries eagerly embracing democracy for the first time in more than two generations. But the people of these former Soviet satellite countries are still live in the shadow of the history of Soviet domination. These nations and their people seek to rejoin the West, and seek a means to ensure that they will never again fall victim to a Soviet-style regime.

These nations, which have become our friends and trading partners, are caught, both literally and figuratively, between the new, democratic Russia and the West. This is a critical time for the newly-independent states of Eastern Europe as they seek to establish themselves as countries in their own right, finally free of the yoke of Soviet domination.

Many of my constituents, and indeed many people around the world, have a special interest in this debate due to their ethnic heritage or their memories of the iron fist of Soviet rule which the people of Eastern Europe were forced to endure for so
long. I share their commitment to a Europe in which these countries will never again fall victim to such oppression.

It is only natural that these Eastern European countries would seek to join NATO, an alliance which shines as a beacon of democracy and security on the European continent. The proposed enlargement of this alliance represents a crossroads in American foreign policy, and, indeed in the fragile balance of power in Europe. Some opposed to enlarging this alliance have said that it would create a new series of dividing lines in Europe, between NATO, Russia, and those countries which are caught in the middle—neither members of NATO nor under the sphere of Russian influence. Others have argued that all countries meeting the criteria for membership in NATO should be allowed to join. Opponents fear that this would lead to a different dividing line—one between Russia and the rest of Europe.

The proposed enlargement embodied in the protocols we are considering today leads to many questions: How many countries? How many rounds of enlargement? What about Russia? What about those that may be left out? It is my view that the newly-independent countries in Europe should not be forever caught between Russia and the West. It is also my strong view that the United States must proceed carefully so that we do not damage our relationship with a democratic Russia. Unfortunately, parts of the debate over NATO enlargement have taken on an “us versus them” quality. We must not forget that the Russian Federation is not the Soviet Union, and that we should encourage democracy wherever it takes root. Instead of the “us versus them” of the Cold War era, this debate should be about the new landscape of Europe. We must not make Russia feel as if it is being ganged up on by the West. We must encourage democracy there as we do elsewhere on the globe, and we must encourage the newly-independent states to take control of their own futures. That is why the Administration helped to successfully negotiate the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

I am supportive of the fundamental goals of NATO enlargement. However, I do have some concerns, that I know are shared by many other Members of Congress, about the commitment—financial and otherwise—the United States will undertake as it pursues enlargement of the alliance.

On that point, Mr. Chairman, I would like to speak for a moment on one of my concerns about this debate: the disparity among the various estimates on the financial commitment the United States would be undertaking if NATO enlargement were to proceed. There have been at least three major studies conducted on this subject, each of which has taken a different approach with respect to the basis for their estimates. While I understand that it is impossible to account for all of the different variables that will be included in this endeavor, each study assumes a different set of costs, and thus reaches very different cost projections for the U.S. share of this undertaking—anywhere from $2 billion to $7 billion.

The American taxpayer is being asked to bear up to $7 billion to enlarge a military alliance which has no discernable enemy, and none looms on the horizon. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been no clear threat against the NATO alliance—and there still is not—yet the United States may have to spend up to $7 billion to enlarge it. With the passage of a balanced-budget plan last year, the United States is finally on the road to getting its financial house in order. I am concerned about the implications that the unknown cost of enlarging NATO will have on our efforts to get to—and to maintain—a balanced federal budget.

The myriad cost estimates involved in this first round of NATO enlargement also leads me to wonder if we will have a clearer picture of the cost of future rounds, or if we will be faced with the same financial uncertainties that loom before us today. There are also concerns about the impact of new U.S. commitments to NATO on America’s general military readiness.

Nevertheless, as I stated earlier, I share the Administration’s basic views on the nature of enlarging this alliance. The people of Eastern Europe must never again be subject to the conditions they were forced to endure under Soviet rule. They see NATO membership as a means to ensure their future safety. My concern is about the extent of the commitment the United States will be making, and the uncertainty regarding the price tag that American taxpayers will be asked to pay in this time of fiscal restraint and personal sacrifice. Should the Senate ratify the protocols we are considering today, I will continue to monitor the new U.S. commitments to NATO—financial and otherwise—through the regular congressional budget and appropriations process.

I welcome the debate that the full Senate is about to undertake on this important issue, and look forward to the testimony of the witnesses that have joined us today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Prepared Statement of Senator Grams

Madame Secretary, it was fitting that you were the lead witness as our series of hearings commenced, and that you are once again before this Committee as these hearings come to a close. I am sure that you agree that these hearings have provided an excellent forum to explore the benefits of expanding NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. They also have brought to the forefront of debate certain concerns which I believe should be addressed in the Resolution of Ratification.

I started this process as a strong supporter of NATO expansion, and I remain committed to securing that achievement. However, the Senate does not just have the responsibility to determine whether Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic should be admitted to NATO, but also to shape what kind of organization they would be joining.

For nearly fifty years, NATO has been a successful military alliance with a clearly defined mission: protecting the territorial integrity of its members, defending them from external aggression and preventing the domination of Europe by any single power. I look forward to ensuring that NATO's mission will remain intact.

Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are eager to join NATO to guarantee their territorial integrity, not to participate in a nation-building exercise. It is imperative to make sure that NATO expansion does not result in a dilution of NATO's mission, and that prospective members receive the same strong security guarantee that NATO members have traditionally enjoyed.

Critics of NATO expansion often argue that the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO will destabilize Russia and threaten its evolution into a democratic state. I do not believe that will be the case.

I have no doubt that Russia, if given the choice, would like to maintain a “sphere of influence” in Central Europe, or barring that, a buffer zone. But this is 1998, not 1948, and Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have the right and the ability to reject the former, and the United States has a vital interest in denying the latter. As Dr. Kissinger noted, “basing European and Atlantic security on a no man’s land between Germany and Russia runs counter to historical experience.” A greater security dilemma would be created by ceding to Russian demands than proceeding with enlargement.

The potential problems arising from the Administration’s plan to expand NATO are far more likely to be caused by Russia’s inclusion in NATO decision making, not Russia’s exclusion. The Senate must make sure that Russia will not have a role in certain NATO deliberations, such as the future expansion of the alliance, arms control issues, procurement policy and strategic doctrine. We need to reject Russian attempts to link NATO expansion to US concessions in arms control negotiations and limitations on the number of troops or type of weapons systems on the territory of the new members.

Furthermore, we need to make sure that there is a clear, equitable distribution of the costs of expansion. American taxpayers should not have to pay the costs of modernizing the forces of our current allies, because they have failed to live up to their previous commitments. Nor should our taxpayers pay more if any of our European allies refuse to pay their fair share.

I believe that all of these concerns can be addressed in the Resolution of Ratification. NATO is an alliance, not a collective security arrangement. I am convinced that a NATO which includes Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will be a stronger, more viable institution as long as NATO retains its essential character throughout this transition.