[Senate Hearing 105-451]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 105-451
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION [NATO] ENLARGEMENT COSTS
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HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SPECIAL HEARINGS
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
----------------------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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_______________________________________________________________________
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
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COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
SLADE GORTON, Washington DALE BUMPERS, Arkansas
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
CONRAD BURNS, Montana TOM HARKIN, Iowa
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire HARRY REID, Nevada
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado PATTY MURRAY, Washington
LARRY CRAIG, Idaho BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota
LAUCH FAIRCLOTH, North Carolina BARBARA BOXER, California
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
Steven J. Cortese, Staff Director
Lisa Sutherland, Deputy Staff Director
James H. English, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Tuesday, October 21, 1997
NATO ENLARGEMENT COSTS
Page
Statement of Hon. Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State,
Department of State............................................ 1
Statement of Hon. William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense,
Department of Defense.......................................... 1
Opening statement of Hon. Ted Stevens............................ 1
Statement of Hon. Patrick Leahy.................................. 3
Statement of Hon. Mitch McConnell................................ 5
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Statement of Hon. Barbara Mikulski............................... 8
Prepared statement of Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell............ 9
Statement of Hon. Arlen Specter.................................. 9
Statement of Hon. Harry Reid..................................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Statement of Hon. Conrad Burns................................... 12
Statement of Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison........................... 12
Statement of Hon. Dale Bumpers................................... 13
Statement of Hon. Tom Harkin..................................... 14
Statement of Hon. Slade Gorton................................... 15
Statement of Hon. Larry E. Craig................................. 16
Statement of Hon. Robert F. Bennett.............................. 16
Statement of Hon. Richard C. Shelby.............................. 16
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Prepared statement of Senator Thad Cochran....................... 17
Prepared statement of Senator Frank R. Lautenberg................ 17
Statement of Hon. Madeleine Albright............................. 18
Prepared statement........................................... 25
Statement of Hon. William S. Cohen............................... 30
The new Europe................................................... 30
Enlargement costs................................................ 32
Prepared statement of Hon. William S. Cohen...................... 35
Why enlarge NATO? First, some European history............... 35
Enlargement enhances NATO.................................... 36
The choice of new members.................................... 36
The NATO-Russia relationship................................. 37
The military requirements and costs of enlargement........... 37
Initial U.S. cost estimate................................... 38
Ongoing NATO work to help refine the cost estimate........... 39
NATO cost estimates may be lower............................. 39
Interoperability progress by the invitees.................... 39
Some deficiencies exist...................................... 40
Next steps at NATO........................................... 40
European burdensharing....................................... 41
The costs of not enlarging................................... 41
United States national security interests in Asia and Europe..... 42
Enlargement costs................................................ 43
Antipersonnel landmines.......................................... 44
NATO-Russia relations............................................ 45
U.S. contributions to NATO....................................... 47
United States in Bosnia.......................................... 48
Reform in Russia................................................. 49
Threats in Europe................................................ 50
Russia's reaction to enlargement................................. 52
Military purchases and requirements.............................. 53
CIA resignation.................................................. 53
Open door policy................................................. 53
Defense spending................................................. 55
Economic conditions.............................................. 56
Enlargement costs and burdensharing.............................. 56
Prepared statement of Senator Daniel K. Inouye................... 58
Russia's future.................................................. 59
United States role in NATO and Europe............................ 59
Consensus in NATO................................................ 60
Enlargement costs................................................ 60
United States troops in Europe................................... 60
Readiness impact................................................. 61
Additional committee questions................................... 62
Questions submitted to Secretary Madeleine Albright.............. 62
Questions submitted by Senator Mitch McConnell................... 62
Baltics...................................................... 62
NATO: general costs.......................................... 63
Questions submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg............... 64
Conflict with CBO estimates.................................. 64
Costs borne by U.S. taxpayer................................. 64
Prospective members not expecting loans...................... 65
NATO members agree with estimates............................ 65
NATO costs estimates different from United States............ 65
NATO members to increase defense spending.................... 66
Assurance United States won't pay more than their share...... 66
Plans sufficient to meet the costs........................... 66
Public opinion............................................... 67
Mass opinion and public policy............................... 67
Russia's role in NATO........................................ 68
Out of area interests........................................ 68
Consensus.................................................... 69
Allies pay less, we pay more................................. 69
Questions submitted by Senator Tom Harkin........................ 69
Public opinion............................................... 69
International monetary fund.................................. 70
Costs of more than three nations............................. 70
Comparison to Marshall Plan.................................. 71
OSCE: future expansion....................................... 71
Slovenia..................................................... 72
Arms control initiative along with NATO expansion............ 72
Democratic values of the three new members................... 72
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty problems..................... 73
Nuclear sharing.............................................. 73
Pilot training............................................... 73
Bilateral agreements......................................... 73
Vaults....................................................... 74
Dual-capable aircraft........................................ 74
Aircraft purchase plans...................................... 74
Nuclear sharing arrangements................................. 74
Questions submitted to Secretary William S. Cohen................ 74
Questions submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg............... 74
CBO option 1 versus administration's estimate................ 74
Costs of expansion to foreign aid budget..................... 75
Cost to new members.......................................... 76
Cost to the rest of NATO..................................... 77
Current NATO members......................................... 77
Prospective NATO members' ability to pay..................... 78
Public opinion regarding NATO expansion...................... 79
Public opinion in Russia..................................... 79
Russia's role in NATO........................................ 80
Out-of-area interests........................................ 80
Questions submitted by Senator Tom Harkin........................ 81
Consensus.................................................... 81
Costs of NATO: Who will pay the costs?....................... 81
Cost to new nations versus other needs....................... 82
Costs of membership for full list............................ 82
Marshall Plan for defense contractors........................ 82
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.......... 83
What about Slovenia?......................................... 83
Arms control initiative along with NATO expansion............ 83
Promotion of democratic values............................... 83
Nuclear nonproliferation..................................... 84
NATO enlargement and nuclear weapons policy.................. 84
NATO enlargement costs....................................... 86
Wednesday, October 22, 1997
NATO ENLARGEMENT COSTS AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE READINESS IMPACT
Statement of Gen. Henry H. Shelton, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Department of the Army, Department of Defense........... 95
Statement of Gen. Wesley K. Clark, Commander in Chief, U.S.
European Command, Department of the Army, Department of Defense 95
Opening statement of Hon. Ted Stevens............................ 95
Statement of Hon. Conrad Burns................................... 96
Statement of Hon. Lauch Faircloth................................ 96
Prepared statement........................................... 97
Prepared statement of Gen. Henry H. Shelton...................... 100
Costs of enlargement............................................. 101
NATO Security Investment Program [NSIP].......................... 102
The new countries................................................ 102
Prepared statement of Gen. Wesley K. Clark....................... 103
Costs of enlargement......................................... 103
Planning for enlargement..................................... 104
Military capabilities of new members......................... 104
Poland....................................................... 104
Hungary...................................................... 105
Czech Republic............................................... 105
Training/integration......................................... 105
NATO ministerial meetings........................................ 107
Russia and the NATO alliance..................................... 109
Personnel and the threat......................................... 110
Military construction............................................ 113
The Russians and instability..................................... 115
Allied contributions............................................. 116
Joint STARS...................................................... 119
U.S. force reduction............................................. 120
Additional committee questions................................... 123
Questions submitted to Gen. Henry H. Shelton..................... 123
Questions submitted by Senator Richard C. Shelby................. 123
Intelligence sharing......................................... 123
Enlargement and U.S. force structure decreases............... 124
NATO expansion in the QDR.................................... 124
Cost of NATO enlargement..................................... 124
NATO contingencies........................................... 125
NATO expansion............................................... 125
Military capabilities of prospective NATO members............ 125
European allies.............................................. 128
Threat....................................................... 128
Intelligence sharing......................................... 129
Questions submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg............... 130
Military capabilities of prospective new members............. 130
European allies.............................................. 131
Russia....................................................... 132
American military relationship with Russian military......... 132
Questions submitted to Gen. Wesley K. Clark...................... 133
Questions submitted by Senator Richard C. Shelby................. 133
NATO enlargement............................................. 133
Support for families of 1st Armored Division................. 134
Bosnia cost estimates........................................ 135
NATO enlargement............................................. 135
NATO enlargement logistics................................... 135
NATO enlargement............................................. 136
Questions submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg............... 136
Military capabilities of prospective NATO members............ 136
European allies.............................................. 138
NATO strategic concept....................................... 139
Threat....................................................... 139
Russia....................................................... 140
Intelligence sharing......................................... 140
American military relationship with Russian military......... 140
Thursday, October 23, 1997
GAO STUDIES ON NATO ENLARGEMENT COSTS
Statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Assistant Comptroller General
for National Security and International Relations, General
Accounting Office.............................................. 143
Opening statement of Hon. Ted Stevens............................ 143
NATO enlargement issues.......................................... 144
U.S. contributions to NATO common budgets........................ 144
Other assistance to candidate countries.......................... 145
NATO defense planning process.................................... 145
Comparison of DOD, CBO, and RAND enlargement estimates........... 146
Prepared statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr........................ 147
Summary of observations...................................... 148
U.S. contributions to common budgets and other funding
sources.................................................... 149
NATO's defense planning process.............................. 149
Key assumptions and cost estimates for NATO enlargement
studies.................................................... 150
Force goals have not been met.................................... 154
Affect of European monetary union on NATO enlargement............ 154
NATO requirements for new members................................ 156
U.S. obligations to pay.......................................... 156
NATO's requirements process...................................... 157
NATO enlargement costs are unclear............................... 158
Bosnia costs increase............................................ 158
NATO's schedule for costing reports.............................. 158
Cost estimates unclear........................................... 160
GAO to monitor NATO's December ministerial....................... 160
Support for U.S. forces overseas................................. 160
Resurgent Russia estimate........................................ 161
Budget for NATO security investment program...................... 161
DOD's future years defense plan.................................. 162
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION [NATO] ENLARGEMENT COSTS
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TUESDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1997
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met at 10 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Stevens, Specter, Gorton, McConnell,
Burns, Shelby, Bennett, Campbell, Craig, Hutchison, Inouye,
Leahy, Bumpers, Lautenberg, Harkin, Mikulski, Reid, and Dorgan.
NATO ENLARGEMENT COSTS
STATEMENTS OF:
HON. MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
HON. WILLIAM S. COHEN, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS
Chairman Stevens. Good morning. We are grateful to you,
Secretary Albright and Secretary Cohen, for coming to our
hearing. Senator Byrd is a little delayed but has indicated
that we should start, so we will proceed.
The end of the cold war triggered a series of events that
included the United States proposing expansion of the alliance
at the January 1994 NATO summit. On July 8, 1997, Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic were selected by NATO as
candidates for admission to the alliance. If the process is
successful, these three central European countries that
struggled so long under Communist domination will become full-
fledged members of NATO.
The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Senator Jesse Helms, has held several comprehensive hearings
earlier this month on many of the issues surrounding NATO
enlargement and will conduct several more hearings between now
and the time the Senate takes up the question of NATO
enlargement.
Today begins the first of 3 days of this committee's,
Senate Appropriations Committee, hearings designed to try and
understand the cost implications of NATO enlargement and its
impact on the modernization of our armed forces.
In 1949, to counter the growing communist menace in central
and Eastern Europe, the U.S. Senate deliberated ratification of
the North Atlantic Treaty. During the April 27, 1949, Senate
Foreign Relations Committee hearing, where the Secretary of
State, Dean Acheson, was the witness, Senator Hickenlooper
asked the highly regarded Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, the
following. He said:
I am interested in getting the answers as to whether or not
we are expected to supply substantial numbers--by that I do not
mean 1,000 or 2,000 or 500 or anything of that kind, but very
substantial numbers of troops and troops organizations of
American troops--to implement the land power of Western Europe
prior to aggression. Is that contemplated under article III, we
agree to maintain and develop the collective capacity to
resist? In other words, are we going to be expected to send
substantial numbers of troops over there as a more or less
permanent contribution to the development of these countries'
capacity to resist?
Secretary Acheson responded, ``The answer to that question
is a clear and absolute no.''
In September 1995, together with other Senators, including
Senator Hutchison and Inouye of this committee, I visited
Germany, Croatia, and Bosnia. During the trip we were assured
by the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe [SACEUR], General
Joulwan, that the Dayton peace accord would cost the United
States no more than $1 billion, and that the commitment of U.S.
troops would be limited to 1 year. I do not fault SACEUR for
that position; he was carrying out the expectations of his
Commander in Chief. But if I express some misgivings about the
adequacy of NATO enlargement cost estimates, please understand
that it has some historical basis.
And I think our distinguished witnesses will appreciate my
interest in avoiding an Acheson assessment of future
implications of NATO enlargement.
In a few moments we will hear from you, Madam Secretary and
Secretary Cohen, on your perspectives on NATO enlargement. I
anticipate you will address the knotty issues of cost of the
enlargement of the NATO mission following the end of the cold
war and how U.S. security interests and force structure may be
affected by this enlargement, and the impact of NATO
enlargement on the modernization of our U.S. military.
We look forward to your testimony. Just so people will know
what is coming, though, let me say that tomorrow the committee
will hear from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen.
Henry Shelton, and the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, Gen.
Wesley Clark regarding the defense budget issues associated
with Bosnia and the NATO enlargement.
On Thursday, we expect to hear from the General Accounting
Office to review the several NATO enlargement cost estimates
and to obtain its perspective on expansion costs and what the
tradeoffs may be.
The three candidate states are now in negotiations with
NATO and are filling out questionnaires, I am informed,
regarding the status and capabilities of their armed forces.
The purpose of the negotiation, I am told, is to ensure that
the candidate states understand their obligations under the
North Atlantic Treaty.
NATO intends to draft a protocol to the treaty by December
of this year, which will name the three states as candidates
for membership. The protocol must be approved by all 16 current
NATO members in order to amend the treaty and admit the new
members. We are informed the Senate may vote on the protocol in
the spring of 1998. If NATO enlargement is achieved, then the
33 candidate states will become members of the alliance in
April 1999.
The NATO Participation Act of 1994 states that candidate
states must make significant progress toward establishing
democratic institutions and free market structures, as well as
develop civilian control of the military and a policy of
prohibiting transfer of arms to countries supporting terrorism.
Despite the apparent success of the three candidate states
in achieving these NATO Participation Act goals, concerns
continue to be expressed in the United States about the
capacity and commitment of the candidate states to pay the
costs of NATO expansion, the degree of commitment by the
European NATO members to absorb their share of expansion costs,
and the fundamental questions of just what are the costs going
to be and what is a satisfactory degree of military enhancement
to the three states to be fully interoperable with NATO.
No matter how much enthusiasm there is for NATO
enlargement, in the final analysis NATO must be able to perform
its essential article V mission of collective defense, which
means that new members must achieve a satisfactory degree of
equipment, personnel, training commitment, and interoperability
to be able to support NATO.
That will come at a large cost to all of the 19 parties.
The cost debate has been a spirited one for several years.
Besides the administration cost study and those done by the
Congressional Budget Office, the RAND Corp., and the zero-cost
option prepared by the Potomac Foundation. NATO is now
conducting its own cost study, which is scheduled to be
completed in December.
As everyone is well aware, these cost studies have ranged
from zero to $126 billion over the next 12 years. It is
essential that the Senate obtain some solid numbers on which it
can rely. Recognizing that each estimate is a function of how
one sees the future threat and the organization of NATO,
assumptions can be made for more obvious scenarios and cost
estimates should follow with supportable logic.
As the CBO study notes, most defense analysts agree that
three steps should be considered key to establishing Western
allies, enabling them to assist and send reinforcement in the
event of an attack on one of the new members. The first
involves the instruction in NATO military doctrine and
procedures, as well as large-scale exercises with the alliance.
The second consists of improvements in interoperability of new
members' command, control, communications, and intelligence
system. Finally, the new states would need to upgrade their air
defenses to enable them, for example, to distinguish friendly
from hostile aircraft.
CBO estimates the total cost for such steps at $21.2
billion. We look forward to their revised analysis on Thursday.
Again, I do welcome you, Madam Secretary and Secretary
Cohen, and I apologize for the long opening statement. I
thought it was necessary to be clear as to why we are holding
these hearings when the others are going on.
I would yield to Senator Leahy as the ranking member's
representative at this time.
STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK LEAHY
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I agree with you, these are extremely important hearings. I
have discussed this matter of the expansion of NATO with both
Secretary Albright and Secretary Cohen.
Some would say that the debate is essentially over, given
the NATO leaders' invitation to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic to join the alliance earlier this summer in Madrid. In
many ways, though, I believe the debate is just beginning. And
I think the decision should only be made after exhaustive
consideration by the Senate.
It is about much more than simply adding three countries to
the alliance--the three countries with which I am sure the
witnesses and all members of this committee are very familiar.
It is also about how best to preserve and enhance the emerging
democracies of eastern Europe, how to enhance our own security
in Europe, about our relationship with Russia, a nation that
just a few years ago was the prime target of our NATO forces.
And I believe even more, Mr. Chairman, it is about the
future of the alliance itself. Some of the issues we are going
to discuss in the coming months were touched on when we debated
sending our troops to Bosnia. I said at that time that I felt
we were making a mistake in letting the United Nations handle
this, and that NATO really should be there and that the United
States had to show the leadership in NATO.
In fact, I believed then and I believe today that if NATO
had not become involved in the Bosnia peacekeeping operation
then we would be talking about the relevance of NATO today. I
think that NATO would have ended up being irrelevant. I think
it was important that the United States showed leadership in
NATO there. And, frankly, while this is not the purpose of the
hearing today, I think that we should make sure that NATO, with
U.S. participation, remains long enough to make sure that peace
takes root in Bosnia.
But expansion of NATO, the most successful defense alliance
in history, would have far-reaching consequences, some of which
we have only begun to understand and investigate. Issues
concern the cost of expansion, the political and social
ramifications, changes in the alliance's collective defense
capability, the overall mission of NATO. We do not have the
hard facts we need to proceed in a responsible and exhaustive
manner.
I am and always have been a strong supporter of NATO, but I
want to make sure that NATO is stronger, not weaker, because of
expansion. And I think the burden of persuasion is on those who
favor expansion. Those of us who are still undecided want to
hear the arguments. Opponents have asked many important
questions that deserve specific answers.
I am sympathetic to many of the administration's arguments.
I want to hear more. If the risk of war in Europe is going to
be substantially reduced by expanding NATO, that is a powerful
incentive to proceed. The fact that Secretary Albright, who
commands enormous respect, the fact that she speaks from
personal experience having grown up in Czechoslovakia, and is a
strong advocate of NATO expansion, that carries a great deal of
weight.
The fact that Secretary Cohen, who we have all worked with
on this committee, also carries a great deal of weight. But
NATO's 50th anniversary is quickly approaching. I want to make
sure that they have another 50th anniversary, Mr. Chairman,
when probably the only Member of the Senate still serving will
be Senator Thurmond, and the rest of us will be gone.
But I want to make sure that we do----
Chairman Stevens. Speak for yourself. [Laughter.]
Senator Leahy. I was waiting for that.
But I just want to make sure we do the right thing, because
NATO should be more than just ministers who meet in Brussels
and debate among themselves. NATO should be the strongest
military alliance history has ever known, but a military
alliance driven by democratic nations, and that is what makes
it work, but it also has to be more than just adding new people
or new countries; we have to make sure that actually
strengthens NATO and our security.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Stevens. Thank you, Senator.
Does any Senator here on our side have an opening
statement? Do you have an opening statement, Senator McConnell?
STATEMENT OF HON. MITCH MC CONNELL
Senator McConnell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Albright, this summer you made a pledge that the
new NATO Permanent Joint Council will offer Russia a voice, not
a veto over NATO affairs. This pledge is essential to securing
and sustaining support for the administration's NATO policy
and, more broadly, our goals in Europe.
But there should be no doubt that the Russians will test
the strength of your pledge. It is in their interest, for they
have learned that challenging U.S. policy resolve often yields
unintended or unexpected benefits.
Let me point to an example which affected the Subcommittee
on Foreign Operations. In the months leading up to the March
Helsinki summit, Russia waged an aggressive public relations
campaign opposing NATO expansion. With an administration intent
on avoiding a repeat of the 1994 summit, when President Yeltsin
warned Europe was in danger of plunging into a cold peace,
Russia's posturing over security concerns paid economic
dividends.
The day before the summit began, the administration advised
the subcommittee of plans to nearly triple the request for aid
to Russia. While the entire New Independent States [NIS]
request increased from $625 million to $990 million, only
Russia enjoyed a disproportionately large increase.
Just as an aside, given the growing cooperation between
Russia and Iran in the nuclear and ballistic missile field, I
do not think that Congress will sustain this increase. But it
seems to me the Russians made important gains in talks in their
dealings with the administration. Frankly, it is a little shade
short of extortion.
Since 1993, I have been on board for NATO expansion. It is
the right thing to do and long past the right time to do it.
But there is also the right way to do it. And that means
avoiding the mistakes which damaged our ties in Europe and the
NIS after the fall of the wall. That means clearly separating
our interests from Russian ambitions.
It is not enough to simply state that the Russians will
have a voice, not a veto. Confidence and stability depend upon
spelling out our terms. Basic conditions must be understood by
the Russians and underscored with the next class of candidates.
There should be common understanding that Russia will not have
a veto over any applicant because of its location or history
with Moscow. Eligibility will continue to be based exclusively
on a country's ability and commitment to fulfill NATO's
security obligations.
In addition, Russia should not have a veto over the
deployment of NATO troops or military modernization initiatives
undertaken by or on the territory of new or prospective member
states. And Russia must not have a veto over NATO's nuclear
policy relative to any new member.
Ambiguity on any of these points will cast a dangerous
shadow of uncertainty over NATO's future, inviting suspicions
that we are building a sacrificial buffer zone of nations which
have second-class security standing.
Improving the capabilities of central and Eastern European
nations to meet eligibility standards comes with a price tag,
some of which we have already seen in the increased increases
in the President's Partnership for Peace request, a program
which has been characterized as a path to NATO. However, it is
important to clarify today if and how both direct and indirect
costs will increase, especially if some nations view the
partnership as their only available alternative to NATO's
security umbrella.
In addition to costs related directly to the partnership
and NATO expansion, there is the question of costs associated
with other interim security arrangements. For example, I
welcome the Ukraine charter with NATO. However, it is not clear
which subcommittee or national budget will pay the costs of
Ukraine's participation in joint exercises. We need to
understand whether this charter is unique or will it be
replicated with other nations.
I believe that expanding NATO serves our interests. The
promise of membership alone has prompted several countries to
resolve border and ethnic disputes, a record of success which
will only improve with time. I am convinced it is far better to
consider candidates during this peaceful pause in history than
during a crisis. We should not repeat the devastating and
confused debate over NATO's role, reach, and responsibility
that we experienced in Bosnia.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Finally, let me repeat, expanding NATO's zone of stability
and security is the right thing to do, and now is the time to
do it. I hope these hearings offer both the American public and
future applicants the confidence that this committee will work
hard with the administration to assure it is carried out in the
right way.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Mitch McConnell
Since assuming the Chairmanship of the Foreign Operations
Subcommittee, I have had two priorities: to support countries
willing to accept the responsibilities of NATO membership and
to expand our commitment to Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and the
other new, non-Russian states in the former Soviet Union. These
mutually reinforcing, twin goals of expanding NATO and
strengthening the political and economic independence of the
new republics have a direct impact on U.S. interest in
stability in Europe.
1996 marked a significant shift in the Administration's
NATO policy. The explanation for this change may be as simple
as the arrival of a new national security team; or, it could
have been driven by the strong public support to include
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in NATO, sentiment which
was particularly strong in key election battleground states; or
it may have been influenced by the ongoing congressional
initiatives to increase security assistance to the Visegrad
nations. Of course, there's always the possibility that the
change came about because it was the right thing to do and the
right time to do it.
I may seem a little skeptical about the thinking which led
to the U.S. decision to support the invitation of new NATO
members, but my views have been shaped by several years of
contentious battles to secure adequate economic and security
aid and political support for non-Russian nations and NATO
applicants.
Until 1996, anyone reading the Subcommittee's hearing
records would sum up the testimony on the NIS and NATO much as
Strobe Talbott did--no admission criteria, no timetable, no
earmarks. Unfortunately, in Europe and the NIS this translated
into no entry and no support.
Against this tide, Congress managed to earmark $50 million
in security assistance for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic to improve both their military capabilities and
prospects for NATO admission. In the Senate, this year we
increased that earmark to $60 million and provided $18.3
million for Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Obviously, those
issues are still to be settled in conference.
In spite of Congressional efforts, over the past several
years, I think the Administration has allowed NATO and NIS
policy to get coiled up in controversies over our relationship
and course with Russia. We have been reluctant to sharply
define and defend American interests allowing Russian ambitions
to fill the void.
In this context, I continue to have reservations about how
the Founding Act will be implemented and how NATO's Permanent
Joint Council with Russia will operate. However, I welcome your
pledge, Secretary Albright, that the Council will offer Russia
a ``voice not a veto'' over NATO affairs. This pledge is
essential to securing and sustaining support for the
Administration's NATO policy and, more broadly, our goals in
Europe.
There is no question the Russians will test the strength of
your pledge. It is in their interests for they have learned
that challenging U.S. policy resolve often yields unintended or
unexpected benefits.
Let me point to an example which affected my Subcommittee.
In the months leading up to the March Helsinki summit, Russia
waged an aggressive public relations campaign opposing NATO
expansion. With an Administration intent upon avoiding a repeat
of the 1994 summit when President Yeltsin warned ``Europe was
in danger of plunging into a cold peace,'' Russia's challenge
over security issues paid economic dividends. The day before
the summit began, the Administration provided information to
the Subcommittee that it planned to nearly triple the request
for aid to Russia. While the entire NIS request increased from
$625 million to $900 million, only Russia enjoyed a
disproportionately large increase.
Since 1993, I have expressed support for expanding NATO. It
is the right thing to do and long past the right time to do it.
But, there is also the right way to do it, and that means we
must avoid the mistakes which damaged our ties in Europe and
the NIS after the fall of the wall--that means clearly
separating our interests from Russian ambitions.
It is not enough to simply state the Russians will have a
voice not a veto. Confidence and stability depend upon spelling
out what that means in unambiguous and clear terms. Basic
conditions must be understood by the Russians and underscored
with the next class of applicants.
There should be common understanding that Russia will not
have a veto over any applicant because of its location or
history with Moscow; eligibility will continue to be based
exclusively on a country's ability and commitment to fulfill
NATO's security obligations. In addition, Russia should not
have a veto over the deployment of NATO troops or military
modernization initiatives undertaken by or on the territory of
new member states. And, Russia must not have a veto over NATO's
nuclear policy relative to any new member.
Ambiguity on any of these points will cast a dangerous
shadow of uncertainty over NATO's future inviting suspicions
that we are building a sacrificial buffer zone of nations which
have second class security standing.
Improving the capabilities of Central and Eastern European
nations to meet eligibility standards comes with a price tag
some of which we have already seen in the incremental increases
in the President's Partnership for Peace request, a program
which has been characterized as a path to NATO. However, it is
important to clarify today if and how both direct and indirect
costs will increase, especially if some nations view the
Partnership as their only available alternative to NATO's
security umbrella.
In addition to costs related directly to the Partnership
and NATO expansion, there is the question of costs associated
with other interim security arrangements. For example, I
welcome the Ukraine's Charter with NATO, however, it is not
clear which Subcommittee or national budget will pay the costs
of Ukraine's participation in joint exercises. We need to
understand whether this Charter is unique or will it be
replicated with other nations?
I believe that expanding NATO serves our interests--the
promise of membership alone has prompted several countries to
resolve border and ethnic disputes, a record of success which
will only improve over with time. I am convinced it is far
better to consider candidates during this peaceful pause in
history than during crisis. We should not repeat the
devastating and confused debate over NATO's role, reach and
responsibilities that we experienced in Bosnia.
Expanding NATO's zone of stability and security is the
right thing to do and now is the time to do it. I hope these
hearings offer both the American public and future applicants
the confidence that this Committee will work hard with the
Administration to assure it is carried out the right way.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA MIKULSKI
Chairman Stevens. Do you have a statement, Senator
Mikulski?
Senator Mikulski. Yes; just very quickly, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I want to first of all thank you as the full
committee chairman of the Appropriations Committee for holding
a hearing on NATO expansion. I believe that this is the first
time in participation that this type of leadership has been
provided at the full committee level, and I say thank you both
in your hat as the Chair of the Subcommittee on Defense.
Mr. Chairman, I am a supporter of the expansion of NATO,
and was with President Clinton with a great deal of pride at
the NATO Madrid meeting, at the NATO announcement, and then
joined with him when we traveled to Poland together along with
the Secretary of State, Dr. Albright.
But, Mr. Chairman, it is not only that I support NATO. We
have to be sure that Congress supports NATO and that the
American people support NATO. When we vote on whether or not we
should expand NATO, I believe the results of that vote should
not come from a Presidential lobbying effort but from a
Presidential education effort.
I believe the American people, as well as the Congress,
needs to have three questions asked. No. 1, how will the
expansion of NATO, particularly with these three countries,
contribute to European stability and even greater global
stability? No. 2, how is it in the interest of the United
States of America? And No. 3, is the cost worth the price or
worth the investment? My own preliminary analysis indicates
that yes, the last part will be answered.
But, going back to when George Bush was President, I joined
hands with Senators Hank Brown and Paul Simon to be an advocate
for NATO expansion, and I believe that it did meet those tests
that were related to both our national interest as well as the
interest in European and geopolitical stability.
Mr. Chairman, we are now celebrating or have celebrated
over the last couple of years the 50th anniversary of three
important post-World War institutions--the United Nations and
its founding, the Marshall plan, and the creation of NATO. All
three have stood the test of time, and showed the wise, bold,
executive leadership, backed by a Congress, also with the
backbone to back Presidential leadership, as well as through
votes and appropriate funding, has truly stabilized the world
and laid the groundwork for western democracy.
We had the United Nations. We had the Marshall plan. And we
have now NATO. And I think if we want to continue to have those
pillars or that thinking in the 21st century we need to then
now seize this opportunity to keep the momentum going. As
Secretary Albright will say in her testimony, ``should we be
aligned with the old democracies forever and the new
democracies never?''
But after World War II, there were some countries that were
not new democracies, and they became new democracies because of
the Marshall plan, because of NATO and Presidential leadership.
So I look forward to hearing the testimony and participating in
this grand public education program.
Chairman Stevens. I believe Senator Campbell was next,
Senator Specter. Senator Campbell.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Senator Campbell. I think I will just submit a statement
for the record, Mr. Chairman, since we are running on in time.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell
As we open these three days of hearings on the important
topic of NATO expansion, it is fitting to keep in mind one
recently retired Senator who has played a pivotal role in
advancing the cause of NATO expansion. I am referring to my
good friend from Colorado, Hank Brown.
Few people have played a more significant role for the
cause of NATO expansion than Hank Brown. He started his efforts
after the Iron Curtain crumbled and never let up. His devotion
and successes in advancing NATO expansion has made Hank Brown a
warmly regarded household name throughout Central Europe,
including the three countries that have been invited to join
NATO in this first round of expansion, Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic.
In fact, in the Fall of 1996, the people of Poland showed
their highest regards for Senator Brown by awarding him
Honorary Polish Citizenship in the name of the historic Capital
of Poland, Krakow. This is one of Poland's most prestigious
honors. To this day only two other Americans have received this
honor--and both of them were Presidents--Ronald Reagan and
George Bush.
I recall a moving speech that Senator Mikulski--who sits on
this committee with me--gave on the Senate Floor just after the
Brown NATO Expansion Amendment passed last Fall. Senator
Mikulski said that her mother had just placed a picture of Hank
Brown in a place of honor on her fireplace mantle at home. I
hope it is still there. This is but one illustration of how the
debate over NATO expansion transcends party lines.
Hank Brown has been one of the most effective advocates of
securing freedom and peace for the people of Europe. I, for
one, miss his valuable leadership in the Senate on the cause of
NATO expansion.
Today, we continue on his work as we further examine the
cost and policy implications of NATO expansion. I join the two
Co-Chairmen of today's hearing, Senator Stevens and Senator
McConnell, and the rest of my colleagues, in welcoming the
distinguished Secretary of State Albright and Secretary of
Defense Cohen. We look forward to their testimony on this
important issue.
STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER
Chairman Stevens. Senator Specter.
Senator Specter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join my
colleagues in commending you for having this hearing. I think
it is very important for the Appropriations Committee to be
involved in this important subject.
I too favor expansion of NATO. I was really surprised a few
years back, attending a North Atlantic assembly meeting, to see
the Czech Republic there and Romania there with their placards
at the NATO assembly meeting as observers. And I think the time
has come, but it gives us an opportunity to examine some very
important questions on who is going to pay for expansion and,
beyond the contribution of the new members, the whole question
of burdensharing, which has been of critical importance for a
long time.
Certainly the sense of the Congress has been that the other
members of NATO have not borne an adequate share. And that is
intermixed with the question of Bosnia. So this gives us a
chance to take a look at some really fundamental questions.
I think there is another aspect that bears analysis and
that is what is happening with other key matters. For example,
when you push air into one section of the balloon, it comes out
in another section. There is enormous concern today about what
Russia is doing with respect to Iran on the transfer of nuclear
technology and missiles. And when we put the pressure on
through NATO it comes out someplace else. So there are a great
many indirect costs which have to be assessed here.
So I think these are very important hearings and I look
forward to the statements. Thank you very much.
Chairman Stevens. Senator Reid, do you have a comment?
STATEMENT OF HON. HARRY REID
Senator Reid. Mr. Chairman, I personally appreciate your
holding not only this hearing, but the others you have held to
give the Appropriations Committee a broad overview of our
responsibilities. This is certainly in keeping with some of the
other hearings that you have held and I hope that we will have
more of these as we approach the date when we must vote on NATO
enlargement.
I understand the importance of this hearing. I understand
the importance of the enlargement of NATO. My main concern, is
that we, as elected leaders, must understand going into NATO
expansion, the total costs associated with this venture. In the
administration's February 1997 report to Congress on the
enlargement of NATO, the total cost for new members was
estimated at $35 billion, spread over 12 years, and the United
States would be responsible for about $2 billion of the total.
So, we do have responsibilities, when we realize we have
not even paid in full our obligation to the United Nations,
this is something we should be concerned with. I support the
enlargement of NATO, but going into this, we must be aware and
recognize the costs that could be borne and should be borne by
us.
PREPARED STATEMENT
I would ask that my full statement be made part of record.
Chairman Stevens. Without objection.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Harry Reid
The prospect of enlarging NATO has been an issue for the
United States for several years now. In 1949, the North
Atlantic Treaty was signed establishing the organization now
known as NATO. The purpose of NATO was to tie Germany into a
series of economic, political, and military relationships to
help end Germany's threat to her neighbors. It was formed
against the backdrop of emerging post-war tensions from the
threat of Soviet expansionism and the concern over political
and economic security throughout Europe. Now, with the
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, there is an opportunity to
extend the stabilizing influence of NATO to include Eastern
European nations.
For almost 50 years, NATO has been a vital tool, an
implement which we used to ensure the security of both our
nation and of our European allies. The 16 member states pledge
to preserve each country's security through a combination of
political solidarity and military force. As we proceed into the
next era, we must be careful of diluting the military
effectiveness and political cohesion of this very successful
alliance.
The Senate has had only limited opportunity to fully
consider the ramifications of NATO expansion and I do not
believe that we have had adequate opportunity to debate the
advisability and the ultimate cost of NATO Enlargement.
In general, I support the benefits of NATO expansion.
However, I temper my support and I have serious reservations
about NATO enlargement due primarily to the costs associated
with this venture. Analysts indicate that the total cost of
NATO expansion, spread out over 10 to 13 years, will fall
somewhere between $10 to $125 billion, depending upon the
underlying assumptions and the projected threat. I have even
seen some estimates as high as $150 billion. It is this wide
disparity in enlargement costs that prevents me from lending my
full and unqualified support for NATO enlargement.
Americans, especially the elected officials within this
chamber must remain aware that NATO Enlargement is not risk-
free, that it could increase the popularity of Russia's anti-
western politicians, and that there are significant costs
associated with bringing three new member-states into the
alliance. We, the elected officials, have a responsibility to
fully understand the costs of NATO expansion before we commit
the Nation to such an immense, undoubtedly expensive and risky,
undertaking.
As a member of the Appropriations Committee, I remain
concerned about the true and total costs of expansion. I refer
primarily to the financial costs, but we must remember that
there are also political, military, and social costs associated
with this enlargement.
The United States, our NATO allies, as well as the new
member states will all bear the costs and responsibilities
associated with further Enlargement. To coin a phrase from
Secretary Albright ``there is no free ride, new members will be
expected to carry their fair share of the burden.''
In the Administration's February 1997 ``Report to Congress
on the Enlargement of NATO,'' it was estimated that total costs
for new members was $27 to $35 billion spread out over 12
years. The United States would be responsible for approximately
$2 billion of the total.
New NATO members will undoubtedly need to increase their
defense spending in order to successfully integrate into NATO.
For these new member countries, such expenditures on defense
will place enormous pressure on already strained budgets and
will divert money from other critical reforms. I further
anticipate that America's costs for NATO expansion will be
under additional pressure to grow knowing that some of our NATO
allies have not yet fully committed themselves to sharing the
financial burden.
I remain concerned that it will only be a matter of time
before Congress will be asked to appropriate additional funds
to support the new members. I fully anticipate that the United
States will eventually be asked to shoulder a greater burden
than is estimated in the Report to Congress.
As I just indicated, I remain concerned that the estimated
costs for enlargement will prove to be inaccurate. While I
support NATO Enlargement, I do not support NATO Enlargement at
any and all costs.
I remain committed to ensuring the continued viability of
NATO in our ever-changing world. Now, as always, a stable and
secure Europe is in our Nation's best interest. We realize that
NATO enlargement does not come free: security and stability
will always carry a price. However, I do believe that a more
accurate estimate of expansion costs is in order before this
treaty will be ripe to come before this body for consideration
for ratification.
STATEMENT OF HON. CONRAD BURNS
Chairman Stevens. Senator Burns.
Senator Burns. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding these
hearings. My statement will be very, very brief.
I have drawn the conclusion that as of this date, this
Tuesday, the role of NATO is pretty much a role of
stabilization in this great transition that is going on now in
Europe. I am also concerned about the tightening amount of
dollars that we have to spend, because it will affect our own
ability to take care of our own people.
And I continue to be concerned about some of the statements
coming from the foreign minister of Russia, the export of arms
and military technology to nations hostile to the USA. And then
a very parochial and political thing back home of who is the
enemy.
So I look forward to your statements today and I thank the
chairman for holding these hearings.
Chairman Stevens. Senator Hutchison.
STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do thank both of you for taking the time to visit both
with the Foreign Relations Committee and with our committee,
because we do share in the responsibility here.
I do not know a Member of Congress that does not support
NATO. I think many in Congress are asking the questions, is
NATO expansion going to strengthen the alliance of NATO, or is
it going to be the unraveling of this great security alliance.
I would hope that as we debate this issue that all of us focus
on how we can strengthen the NATO alliance and take the
opportunity to discuss these issues in relation to expansion,
so that we can keep the alliance strong for a long time to
come.
I think that the questions that should be asked are: What
is the mission of NATO going into the 21st century, and how
does it differ from the reasons for the formation of NATO? That
is not the issue that we will address today, but it is an
important issue for strengthening the alliance.
The issue that this committee will address is the second
major issue, and that, of course, is the cost of NATO and the
sharing of the cost in NATO, trying to make sure that America
bears its fair share and its responsibility for world peace and
European peace, but not bearing a burden that our taxpayers
would feel is not commensurate with our responsibility.
The cost estimates vary so much that I think and hope that
this committee can get into some of the specifics at the proper
time and when you are ready. To say that it is $35 billion over
10 years, our share will be $2 billion, and then to have many
of our allies in NATO jump up and say, well, we are not going
to increase our share certainly requires explanation.
The difference in the $35 billion figure and the $135
billion figure that is put forward by other entities I think
cries out for a clarification of just what is going to be the
responsibility of our country and NATO in expansion. What is
the basis of these cost estimates? How can we differ between
$35 billion and $125 billion? I think these are the questions
that this committee is going to focus on, and we want
specifics. Of course, there is a difference in what we would
prepare for and then the eventuality of actually having
hostilities.
So I appreciate your time. I think we are taking a first
step but it is a first step of many, and I hope that we will
get down to specifics. What are the cost estimates? What are
the bases of the cost estimates? And not only the cost
estimates of NATO but I as a member of this committee want to
know if we are also going to be responsible for any of the
costs that the countries coming into NATO would be required to
have and, therefore, we would be required to share in their
purchasing or their buildups.
And finally, I would just say that what we do with the
three countries that are before us today also has a bearing on
the way this alliance proceeds to expand in the future, and I
think we must be aware of the parameters that are set here and
the precedent-setting value of that for the future.
So I thank you for being here, and I think this is a very
good first step. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Stevens. Senator Bumpers.
STATEMENT OF HON. DALE BUMPERS
Senator Bumpers. Mr. Chairman, as Mo Udall used to say,
everything that needs to be said has been said, but everybody
has not said it. Let me add that I know what I think, and I
really came to hear what Secretary Cohen and Secretary Albright
think.
Having said that, let me say that I am probably going to
support this treaty but with considerable misgivings. I would
quote a member of the Duma, Sergey Baburin, when he said that
expanding NATO would be a historic mistake. And I agree with an
op ed piece in the Boston Globe I read last week which said,
make no mistake about it, you can put the best face on this
treaty, but the truth of the matter is, it is designed to hem
Russia in. I think that could possibly carry a very heavy price
for the United States in the future.
Mr. Baburin said that the Duma recently refused to ratify
an agreement over arms in Belarus because it wants to keep its
options open on reintroducing missiles into that country. He
also said NATO expansion will give a strategic character to
U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. That is why Russia has recently
changed its military doctrine and elevated the role of both
strategic and tactical nuclear weapons as the mainstay of its
defense. He went on to say that NATO expansion could undermine
Russian citizens' trust in their government.
I have always said that there might come a time for the
expansion of NATO, but considering Russia's economic troubles
and their obvious highly internal political disputes, I just
think we are going to have a very difficult time ever getting
the Russians to ratify the START treaties under NATO.
Secretary Albright, I see you shaking your head. I will be
anxious to hear your rebuttal to that, because I think some
sophisticated person of Zhiranovsky's charismatic qualities but
with a doctor's degree could become more credible and be the
next real threat we face from Russia.
So, as I say, I am probably going to vote for the treaty.
But, I have not committed to vote for it. If I do, I will do it
with considerable misgivings as to the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Stevens. Senator Harkin.
STATEMENT OF HON. TOM HARKIN
Senator Harkin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, I want to associate my remarks with the Senator from
Texas, Senator Hutchison, who raises some really serious
questions.
The controversy over the expansion of NATO is easy to
understand. It is an important security arrangement. We all
support NATO. But we are concerned about what may happen to
NATO in the future. There are costs or benefits, but we do not
know what the parameters of these are. I do not even know the
genesis of the proposal to expand NATO. Where did this spring
from? As I have tried to look back in time to find out where
this idea really sprang from, it seems like it came out of a
political campaign and then took on a life of its own.
Beyond, that I cannot seem to find the wellspring of this
idea.
Senator Reid. What do you have against political campaigns?
Senator Harkin. Well, political campaigns are fine.
Chairman Stevens. Let's not start a debate now.
Senator Harkin. But who is going to pay the cost? We have
estimates up to $35 billion over a 13-year period, the U.S.
share $1.5 to $2 billion. The Congressional Budget Office [CBO]
says it will cost $61 to $125 billion, with the U.S. share at
$5 to $19 billion. Who is right?
How much will it cost, and, again, who is going to pay? The
administration position is that the United States will pay no
more than 15 percent of the cost. Our European allies seem to
disagree. The British defense minister is quoted to have said,
``The accession of new members will result in a proportionate
reduction in the United Kingdom's share of NATO common
budgets.''
Well, if our allies expect to pay less for NATO, who is
going to pay more? Us? I do not know if it has been mentioned
yet, but the International Monetary Fund has raised serious
concerns about the expansion and the costs to the new nations.
The IMF has questions regarding the billions of dollars of
loans that are conditioned on fiscal constraint in nations like
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
Well, what is going to happen when they have to meet those
loan payments under IMF conditions? Will that mean that we jump
in and pay more of the expansion costs?
Also, I am wondering about the purpose of expansion. More
and more I am hearing that the purpose of expanding NATO is for
democracy, human rights, and market-based economies. Well,
fine. We are all for that. But would that not be more in line
with expanding the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe? And why would it not be receiving that kind of
attention, if we want to expand and protect democracy, human
rights, and market-based economies, rather than using the NATO
organization?
Secretary Albright, I have heard you compare the NATO
expansion to the Marshall plan. But I am aware or at least I am
informed that there were no military aspects of the Marshall
plan. It was economic. So if we are looking at this from an
economic means, then why are we not using a different
organization rather than using NATO?
My fear is that NATO expansion will not be a Marshall plan
to bring stability and democracy to the newly freed European
nations but, rather, a Marshall plan for defense contractors
who are chomping at the bit to sell weapons and make profits.
Billions of dollars in military upgrades are at stake in this
agreement.
Last, what is going to happen about future countries? We
already have a waiting list--Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania,
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, and Albania.
You can just keep going on. What will the cost be to push it
beyond the three countries that we are talking about?
So I have some very serious questions as to the cost and
the benefits of NATO expansion, what the genesis of it is, and
where it is leading and what is its purpose?
Now, having said that, I do not know whether I am going to
vote for it or not, but I have a lot of serious questions and
hope that these cost and benefit analyses will be done to the
satisfaction of this Senator and, I hope, of the Appropriations
Committee.
Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Stevens. Thank you. Senator Gorton.
STATEMENT OF HON. SLADE GORTON
Senator Gorton. Mr. Chairman, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization has been the most successful such organization in
human history because it prevented the very catastrophe that it
was designed to prevent. And the investment of the United
States and of our Western European allies in that organization
has been, in my view, perhaps the best-spent money that this
Nation has ever spent on its national security.
The organization was created to provide a degree of
security to its members that did not exist and could not have
existed without that organization. It provided that security,
but it provided a great deal more. That security allowed for
the economic growth and prosperity of Western Europeans and,
not at all incidentally, our own. It resulted in ending
historic enmities which had caused war after war on the
European continent.
And so it provided both security and freedom and
prosperity. And as a result, it created a tremendous
attraction, a magnetism toward nations that longed for the same
degree of security and freedom and prosperity, longed to be a
part of it, and who had as the central focus of their foreign
policies, once they became free, becoming a part of such a
successful organization.
The case against expanding the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization today is, I suspect, exactly identical to the case
against creating it in the first place, that it would aggravate
the Soviet Union or Russia. That turned out not to be the case
then; it will turn out not to be the case today.
Costs are significant, but they are not the significant
question, in my view, before the Senate. I believe that the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization should be open to all
nations in Europe that seek the same goals that we seek, that
wish to be secure themselves, that have shown a commitment to
liberty and democracy and opportunity for their citizens. And
my only regret, my sole regret in this case is that the list of
potential NATO members this time around is limited to these
three. The administration made a mistake. It seems to me it
made a mistake in not being more open and more aggressive in
that connection.
So I am comforted by the fact that it is our official
policy that this is only the first step and that other
countries, as they become qualified for NATO membership, will
be offered it under the same circumstances. But I think the
more promptly and the more enthusiastically that we ratify this
treaty the better off we will be, the better off Western Europe
will be, the better off the new three nations will be, and the
greater our chances for long-term peace and prosperity.
Chairman Stevens. Senator Craig.
STATEMENT OF HON. LARRY E. CRAIG
Senator Craig. Let me welcome, as all of you have, our two
Secretaries to the committee today. I am here to listen. I am
not a convert as to the proposal you bring. I think it has many
ramifications not yet clearly understood by the Senate, and I
am not prepared to vote for ratification at this time and I am
not confident that I ever will be.
But thank you for coming.
Chairman Stevens. Senator Bennett.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT F. BENNETT
Senator Bennett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have just
returned from a week in Europe. I went over with Senator Roth
and Members of the House to the North Atlantic assembly, which
was held in Romania. We went to Estonia and then to Germany,
where I have had the full treatment from Helmut Kohl, as well
as the defense minister and the foreign minister.
Clearly this was the main topic that was discussed in all
of these countries. I went over there somewhat skeptical about
NATO expansion. I have met with Senator Hutchison and with
former Senator Sam Nunn, and I think they raise very
legitimate, worthwhile issues that need to be examined.
At the same time, coming back from this experience in
Europe, meeting with the people over there, I recognize that
there are very valid reasons for us to consider this, and I
welcome both the Secretaries here and appreciate their adding
to my educational experience.
Chairman Stevens. Senator Shelby.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD C. SHELBY
Senator Shelby. Mr. Chairman, I have a written statement
that I would like to be made part of the record. With that I
have just got a few brief remarks because we are all waiting on
the Secretaries.
Everybody on the committee knows this would be a huge
expansion of our security commitments. Although it looks on its
face as worthy and it looks like an historic opportunity, I
think ultimately the American people are going to want to know
what it is going to cost us. Is it going to really benefit us?
And how is it going to benefit us?
I am looking forward to both the Secretaries answering
those questions here today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Richard C. Shelby
I strongly believe that the United States should commit to
a security guarantee with many of the nations of eastern and
central Europe. Before we admit new nations into NATO, however,
we must ascertain the political and economic ramifications of
an expanded NATO, and in this respect, I believe the
Administration has not come to terms with the political and
budgetary consequences of its proposal. First, notwithstanding
the Administration's claims, NATO expansion will constitute a
new division of Europe. Second, it has yet to provide Congress
with a realistic cost estimate of NATO expansion. In the end, I
am concerned that thus far the case being made for NATO
expansion is the latest manifestation of a twisted logic: When
an institution's mission becomes obsolete, expand it and hope
that it one day becomes relevant. I believe NATO can have an
important role to play, but the Administration has an
obligation to fully define that role and account for the costs
associated with it. I look forward to hearing today's testimony
and hope Secretaries Albright and Cohen will address my
concerns.
ADDITIONAL SUBMITTED STATEMENTS
Chairman Stevens. We have received several statements from
other members and they will be included in the record at this
point.
[The statements follow:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Thad Cochran
Mr. Chairman, this series of hearings will help our
Committee examine the costs and impacts of expanding the
membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to include
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. The proposed changes in
the 1949 Washington Treaty will begin a new era in our policy
in Eastern Europe if they are approved by the Senate.
It is my understanding that many of the cost estimates--
both for the new members, as well as the United States--will
not be available until December, when a NATO analysis is
complete and subsequent U.S. estimates can be made. However, I
believe that it is important that we begin now to carefully and
thoughtfully examine the costs associated with expanding NATO.
With cost estimates varying depending upon assumptions, it
is important that we have reliable information upon which to
base our decisions. Under the terms of the balanced budget
agreement, we all understand that the amount of funds available
to finance defense operations as a whole will not increase in
the near term. It is important that the Administration provide
us with a detailed proposal of what currently-funded items will
be reduced or eliminated to finance the U.S. commitment to NATO
expansion, if ratified. I believe that members of the Senate
are particularly concerned whether the costs to be paid by the
United States will affect our readiness, or result in deferred
development or maintenance of our defense infrastructure.
I look forward to the testimony of our distinguished panel
of witnesses.
------
Prepared Statement of Senator Frank R. Lautenberg
I welcome Secretary Albright and Secretary Cohen to the
Appropriations Committee this morning.
As the Senate considers whether or not it intends to give
its advice and consent to the expansion of NATO, this type of
exchange with the Administration is extremely helpful.
Many of the arguments in favor of NATO expansion are
compelling and, on balance, I'm inclined to support expansion.
However, I do have some concerns that I'd like the
Administration to address.
First, I think it is imperative for the Administration to
clarify the costs. The disparity in estimates between the
Administration, the CBO, and the Rand Corporation has caused a
tremendous amount of confusion about the true costs and who
will pay for those costs. We need to know if this round of NATO
expansion will cost $27 billion, $35 billion, $60 billion or
more.
We also need to know more clearly what the cost will be to
the American taxpayer. Under the Administration's estimate, the
American people will be asked to pay for no more than 16
percent of the direct costs of NATO expansion. The
Administration assumes that existing allies and new member
countries will pay the bulk of the costs.
Unfortunately, current NATO allies are complaining about
paying a substantial portion of the costs. I know NATO is
preparing a final cost estimate, and that estimates will be
refined.
As that process moves forward, it's vital for the
Administration to assure the American people that they will not
be asked to pay an unfair share of the burden for expanding
NATO. If expanding NATO is in America's interest, then it is
also in Europe's interest. The Europeans must be willing to pay
their fair share of the expansion costs.
I look forward to hearing from Secretary Albright and
Secretary Cohen about these and other issues today.
Chairman Stevens. Madam Secretary and Secretary Cohen, I
want you to know that this is the most attendance we have had
at this committee since we had our photograph taken.
[Laughter.]
I am delighted that you have attracted my friends here. You
see the frustration of being an appropriator. They all,
including myself, have very little occasion to speak before
cameras on matters of current concern.
I do want to make one other announcement I did not make,
and that was that after the first of the year we do intend to
have hearings for those in academia and private life who will
express points of view on costs. We will not go into Senator
Helms' area, but we want to continue and have public hearings
on the costs of this matter that is before us.
But let me thank you for your patience and your
consideration in being here. Bill, with due courtesy, we will
call on Secretary Albright first.
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE ALBRIGHT
Secretary Albright. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Secretary
Cohen.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I have listened
with great interest to your opening statements, and I would
agree that we are launched on one of the great debates of our
time and that we welcome such a debate. I thank you very much
for being a part of it.
When I testified before the Foreign Relations Committee, an
article was written about the fact that this is what hearings
ought to be like; it is where difficult questions are posed and
answers are provided, and all views are made known. I think
that from listening to all of us, I think we are going the same
direction here, and I am very grateful for it.
Secretary Cohen and I are very pleased to come before you
today to urge your support for the admission of the Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Poland to NATO. This initiative is the
culmination of years of hard work by the United States, by
NATO, and by the new democracies that wish to join our
alliance. All 16 NATO leaders have approved it, and many
Members of Congress have urged it.
Now the fate of NATO enlargement is in your hands, and I
welcome this because I know the commitment NATO enlargement
entails will only be meaningful if the American people and
their representatives understand and accept it. I am very glad
that this process has begun as early as it has, and I know that
before you decide we have to continue to address many of your
questions.
As appropriators, you will be highly focused, and rightly
so, on the issue of costs, and as appropriators I know you
believe that the cost of any public initiative must be
justified by its benefits. I want to explain today how America
will benefit from the investment we ask you to make and why I
believe the costs will be reasonable and equitably shared.
First, a larger NATO will make us safer by expanding the
area in Europe where wars simply do not happen. This is the
productive paradox at NATO's heart. By making clear that we
will fight, if necessary, to defend our allies, we make it less
likely that our troops will ever be called upon to do so.
Now you may say that no part of Europe faces any immediate
threat of armed attack today. That is true, for the first time
in history, and the purpose of NATO enlargement is to keep it
that way.
It is also fair to ask if our interest in preventing war in
central Europe is vital enough to justify a security
commitment. Some imply it is not. But let us not deceive
ourselves. The United States is a European power. We have an
interest in the fate of the 200 million people who live in the
nations between the Baltic and the Black Seas.
We waged the cold war in part because these nations were
held captive. We fought World War II in part because they had
been invaded. If there were a major threat to the security of
their region, I am certain we would choose to act, enlargement
or no enlargement. Expanding NATO now is simply the surest way
to prevent that kind of threat.
The second reason why enlargement passes the test of
national interest is that it will make NATO stronger and more
cohesive. The Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs are committed to
NATO and to its principles of shared responsibility. Their
forces have already risked their lives alongside ours from the
gulf war to Bosnia. Now they are asking to assume the
obligations of mature democratic statehood and to start taking
responsibility for the freedom and security of others. That is
an offer we should not refuse.
For whatever challenges the future may bring and wherever
we may face them, it will be in our interest to have a vigorous
and larger alliance with those European democracies that share
our values and our determination to defend them.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the third reason
why a larger NATO serves our interests is that the very promise
of it gives the nations of central and Eastern Europe an
incentive to solve their own problems. To align themselves with
NATO, aspiring countries have strengthened their democratic
institutions. They have made sure that soldiers answer to
civilians. They have signed 10 major accords that, taken
together, resolve virtually every potential ethnic and border
dispute in the region.
I know that some of you have been concerned that a larger
NATO might involve us in border and ethnic conflicts such as
the one in Bosnia. On the contrary, the decision to expand the
alliance has encouraged the resolution of exactly the kind of
disputes that might have led to future Bosnias.
I have been a student of central European history and I
have lived some of it myself. When I see Romanians and
Hungarians building a genuine friendship after centuries of
enmity, when I see Poles, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians forming
joint military units after years of suspicion, when I see
Czechs and Germans overcoming decades of mistrust, and when I
see central Europeans confident enough to improve their
political and economic ties with Russia, I know something
remarkable is happening.
NATO is doing for Europe's east precisely what it did for
Europe's west after World War II. This is another reminder that
the contingencies we do not want our troops to face are far
more easily avoided with NATO enlargement than without it. In
short, Mr. Chairman, a larger NATO will make America safer,
NATO stronger, and Europe more peaceful and united. That is
what we gain.
But we must also think about what would happen if we were
to turn the new applicants away. That would mean freezing NATO
at its cold war membership and preserving the old Iron Curtain
at its eastern frontier. It would mean locking out a whole
group of otherwise qualified democracies simply because they
were once, against their will, members of the Warsaw Pact.
Why would America choose to be allied with Europe's old
democracies forever but its new democracies never? That is the
one point that Senator Mikulski predicted I would make. Were we
to do that, confidence would crumble in central Europe, leading
to a search for security by other means, including arms
buildups and competitions among neighbors. This would be the
price, the very high price, of not enlarging NATO.
We have chosen a better way. We have chosen to look at the
landscape of the new Europe and to ask a simple question. Which
of these nations that are so clearly important to our security
are ready and able to contribute to our security? The answer to
that question is before the Senate awaiting your affirmation.
Mr. Chairman, I know I do not need to tell you that our
security has never come without a price. So let me address the
very real costs that this initiative will entail. Last
February, the administration made a preliminary estimate of the
total costs of a larger NATO. Since then we have settled on
three candidates and we are gaining a clearer understanding of
the capabilities they bring. NATO is now assessing the resource
implications of enlargement for its common-funded budgets. That
assessment will be submitted to us for approval in December.
NATO is also engaged in an intensive effort to determine
the level of forces our current and future allies will need to
put at the disposal of the alliance. NATO will not place a
price tag on these military improvements, but it will define
what is required.
I can assure you that we will continue to approach this
process with several basic principles in mind. The first and
most important principle is that the amount we and our allies
pay for a larger NATO must be a function of concrete military
requirements. Our discussion in these hearings and our
consultations with our allies should focus on defining the
level of military capability we want our old and new allies to
have in this changed security environment, and then making sure
that they commit to that level.
This may seem counterintuitive, Mr. Chairman, but even as
we work to ensure this initiative does not cost too much, we
also need to be careful that it does not end up costing too
little. In fact, it now appears, as we examine the assets and
infrastructure of our new allies, that our new allies bring to
NATO, that the commonly funded cost of integrating their armed
forces will turn out to be lower than we estimated in February.
Either way, the deciding factor will be bang, not buck. If
we can integrate these nations into the alliance, maintain
NATO's capabilities, and acquire the new ones we need at a
lower cost, that will be good news. But we must also be wary of
false economies and spend no less than we need to keep NATO
strong.
A second principle is that the costs within NATO's common-
funded budget must be equitably shared. The United States pays
about 25 percent of these costs, and that will not change.
A third principle is that each ally, old and new, must do
its share at home to meet its military obligations to NATO.
NATO is a collective defense alliance. We need to know that at
moments of crisis each member will be able to deliver on its
commitment to help defend new allies. The President, Secretary
Cohen, and I have been making these points loud and clear to
our current and future allies, and our message has been
received. I am confident today that the costs of a larger
alliance will be real but affordable and that NATO will emerge
from this process with its military capabilities as strong as
ever.
Let me explain why. First of all, I know that many of you
are worried that our new allies may not be able to pull their
weight in NATO. As we all know, just 10 years ago they were
members of the Warsaw Pact. Their militaries are not as
advanced as those of most of the NATO allies. I know that you,
Mr. Chairman, have expressed concern that we will have to fund
a massive program of assistance to help these countries meet
their new obligations.
I can assure that this will not be necessary. These
countries do not face the kind of threat our allies faced in
the 1950's. They have time to achieve a mature military
capability. What is more, these are not ruined nations
recovering from the devastation of a hot war. If you go to
Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw, which I know many of you have,
you will see some of the most vibrant economies in Europe.
These economies have grown by an annual average of 4 percent in
the last 3 years. Each of these nations is a member of the
OECD, which admits only the most advanced industrial economies.
Each has graduated or is about to graduate from our SEED aid
program.
In fact, Poland now funds its own military assistance
program to support its neighbors, Ukraine and Lithuania. All
three of these nations have paid their own way to send troops
to Bosnia and other trouble spots in Africa, Latin America, and
Asia, and we have seen clear signs that all three have the
political will to meet the responsibilities of NATO membership.
Poland already has the most advanced armed forces in the
region. Its government has unveiled a 15-year defense plan
which includes substantial resources for further modernization.
The Czech Government has pledged to increase defense
spending by 0.1 percent of GDP a year for the next 3 years. It
has unveiled a new budget that fulfills that commitment,
despite this summer's costly flooding disaster. As a result,
Czech defense spending will rise by 17 percent next year, the
equivalent of a 1-year $40 billion increase in America's
defense budget. The Czechs still have much work to do, but they
are determined to get it done.
Hungary has also committed itself to increased defense
spending by 0.1 percent of GDP a year over the next 5 years,
and while Hungary may not yet be in NATO, NATO is already in
Hungary. More than 100,000 American troops have passed through
NATO bases in that country on their way in or out of Bosnia.
Without hesitation, Hungary has fulfilled its responsibilities
as the supply lifeline for the largest and most complex
deployment in NATO's history.
Some people have argued that these new democracies should
not be asked to bear additional military burdens at a time when
they are still undergoing difficult economic transformations.
But these nations will be modernizing their armed forces in any
case, and they understand that in the long run it will be
cheaper to do so within NATO than outside it.
Ultimately, only the people of these countries can decide
what is best for their future. Today, in all three, solid
public majorities and every mainstream party support membership
in NATO. They are telling us they see no contradiction between
security and prosperity, and we should not substitute our
judgment for theirs.
Mr. Chairman and members, I know that many of you are
equally concerned about the willingness of our old allies to
meet their new commitments. Many of our Western European allies
are facing economic difficulties of their own, and many are
reducing public spending so they can participate in a single
European currency. But when the 16 allied leaders gathered in
Madrid in July, they made a commitment. They stated clearly
that a larger NATO would carry costs, that those costs would be
manageable, and that they would be met.
I am confident that our allies will pay their fair share of
the commonly funded costs of enlargement because we are going
to determine those costs together. As for their national
defense spending, that is something we cannot control. But I
believe that over time they can and will take necessary steps.
NATO's history gives us ample reason to believe that when
we set a long-term goal together, we meet it together. Our
European allies' commitment to the cause of a larger, stronger
NATO is as deep as ours, and that is no surprise. They need
this alliance. They provide the majority of its ground troops.
And over the course of history they have provided the
battlefield. They have the greatest possible stake in seeing
our initiative succeed.
Mr. Chairman, those are my reasons for confidence, and I
base my assessment on experience and on my best judgment of
what the immediate future may bring. But, you know, there is
one piece of equipment that I do not have at the State
Department, although I do hope that one day the Appropriations
Committee will fund it, and that is a crystal ball.
None of us can now know precisely what challenges we will
be facing in Europe 10, 20, or 50 years down the road. As you
know, President Clinton has pledged that the process of
enlargement will continue after 1999. A new round of
enlargement will carry cost implications that we cannot predict
today. But the Senate would still have to ratify the admission
of any additional members and approve any new costs.
I understand that for Congress our experience in Bosnia, as
you have stated, introduces another element of uncertainty, and
I acknowledge that our mission in that country has cost more
than the administration originally estimated. But I honestly
believe that the circumstances of NATO enlargement are
different. It is intrinsically difficult to predict the cost of
an overseas military deployment. The costs of NATO enlargement,
on the other hand, are more straightforward. They are budgeted
in advance and we have a veto.
We do not run our alliance on supplemental appropriations.
I know history offers other reasons to doubt our ability to
predict our future costs, and you have reminded us, Mr.
Chairman, that when NATO was created Secretary of State Acheson
was asked by Senator Hickenlooper of Iowa if it would require
the stationing of American troops in Europe. And, as you said,
he replied that it would not. Today you understandably fear
that history will repeat itself.
I agree that this story is instructive. It helps us
remember that when we decided to keep our troops in Europe in
the 1950's it was not just to meet a formal obligation. We did
so because there were new signs of Communist expansion in the
world, because we were concerned about the survival of
democracy in Europe, and because it was in our national
interest to meet that threat.
I do not believe we will face such a threat in Europe in
the foreseeable future. If I am proven wrong and we are called
upon to defend our new allies, then the costs of a larger NATO
would obviously grow. But then, if such a dire threat were to
arise, the cost of our entire defense budget would grow,
whether we enlarge NATO or not.
If I am wrong about our allies' willingness to pay their
share of the costs, that too is a problem we would face with or
without enlargement. For if our interest in the fate of
Europe's newly free nations were to be put at risk, we would
not stand idly by, whether we had a formal treaty commitment to
defend Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic or not.
The effect of NATO enlargement is to state plainly in
advance what we would do, in any case wish to do, if the
security of central Europe were threatened. In this way, it is
more likely that we will be able to deter such a threat from
ever arising.
That is why I am more comfortable facing an uncertain
future with a larger, stronger NATO than I would be were NATO
to stand still. I believe that President Vaclav Havel so
crisply put it when he came to Washington earlier this month,
that ``even the most costly preventive security is cheaper than
the cheapest war.''
Here is the strongest, most successful, most dependable
alliance we have ever had. Here are three democracies that wish
to share the responsibilities of that alliance. Here are three
nations that will help us bear the cost of defending freedom in
Europe and beyond because they know the cost of losing freedom.
In the conduct of foreign policy, we are often preoccupied
with crisis. We spend much of our time managing disagreements
with nations that do not see the world exactly as we do. In a
world where attention to what is wrong often drowns attention
to what is right, we must take care not to forget our friends.
We must not take for granted those upon whom we can rely.
Mr. Chairman, the first commandment of foreign policy is
much the same as the first commandment of politics--secure your
base. Indeed, across the whole scope of human activity from the
life of the family and the neighborhood to the politics of our
Nation and the world, when we want to get something done, we
start by banding together with those who are closest to us in
values and outlook.
That is why we cultivate our partnership with Europe and
that is why we seek to extend that partnership to those newly
free nations that have always been our allies in spirit, if
not, in fact, and we do so not just to advance our interests
across the Atlantic but because we need dependable democratic
allies to advance our interests in every part of the world.
Mr. Chairman and members, some questions were raised about
Russia, and I do not want to take too much time on this now so
that Secretary Cohen can speak, but let me just say that the
reason that we are doing what is going on here is that the
status quo was breached by an earthquake. And that was the end
of the Soviet Union.
Clearly it is that change that has required this to go
forward. There is no way to preserve NATO as it is currently
configured because the world is different because of the
breakup of the Soviet Union.
We have taken into consideration the fact that it is
important to help Russia now and the other states of the former
Soviet Republics of the former Soviet Union to move toward
democratic forms of government, and, Senator McConnell, the
funding for the New Independent States was decided long before
the Helsinki summit and it is in our interest because it is a
way to try to anchor the democratic movement.
Second, we have established, as you all know and we can
talk about it in much more detail, this Permanent Joint
Council, where Russia has a voice and not a veto. And while the
Russians will continue to say they do not like NATO
enlargement, the record is showing that they are adjusting to
this and that it has in no way changed our relationships with
them as we manage to develop a new relationship with them.
PREPARED STATEMENT
I do believe that START will be ratified in the Duma and
the chemical weapons convention is also on the way to being
ratified there. But I do not want to take more time on that.
Chairman Stevens. Thank you very much.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Madeleine Albright
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I am very pleased to come
before you today, together with Secretary Cohen, to urge your support
for the admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to NATO.
This initiative is the culmination of years of hard work--by the
United States, by NATO, and by the new democracies that wish to join
our Alliance. All 16 NATO leaders have approved it. Many members of
Congress have urged it.
Now the process of advice and consent has begun, and the fate of
NATO enlargement is in your hands. Our friends in Europe and around the
world are watching you. For they know that the United States is unique
in the power our constitutional system grants to the Senate over
foreign policy, especially over treaties.
I welcome this, because I know that the commitment NATO enlargement
entails will only be meaningful if the American people and their
representatives understand and accept it.
That is why I am glad, Mr. Chairman, that you have begun these
hearings at such an early stage in the process, and why I am happy that
you will be joined in your examination by the Foreign Relations,
Budget, and Armed Services Committees, by the NATO Observers' Group,
and by the House of Representatives.
I am hopeful that with your support, and after the full national
debate to which these hearings will contribute, the Senate will embrace
the addition of new members to NATO. I also know that before you
decide, the Administration must continue to address many questions.
As appropriators, you will be highly focused, and rightly so, on
the issue of costs. And as appropriators, I know you believe that the
cost of any public initiative must be justified by its benefits. I want
to explain today how America will benefit from the investment we ask
you to make, and why I believe the costs will be reasonable and
equitably shared.
Let me begin by asking you to recall the situation America faced in
the world during the first year of this decade. The Cold War had ended.
Our nation would no longer face a single, overriding threat
concentrated along a well defined frontier in Europe. Many people
wondered--and I know this is one of your concerns, Mr. Chairman--
whether we needed to continue paying such close attention to Europe and
NATO in the face of new challenges and opportunities in Asia.
But we did not lose sight of our interests across the Atlantic. Two
world wars in this century already taught us that when Europe and
America stand apart, we always pay a terrible price. What is more, we
recognized that the triumph of freedom in Europe did not mean we could
take its security for granted.
Before long, we saw Russia, with our help, build the foundations of
a modern market democracy; but we knew and still know that its success
is not assured. We saw war and genocide spread across the former
Yugoslavia; only our leadership of a NATO coalition put an end to that
horror. On Europe's horizon, we saw rogue states develop dangerous
weapons that might have our allies within their range and in their
sights. We knew enough from history and human experience to know that a
grave threat, if allowed to arise, would arise.
In that first year of the post-Cold War era, another event proved
the importance of our transatlantic partnership. American troops were
sent to the Gulf to lead a coalition against a tyrant's aggression. And
with us stood soldiers, sailors and aviators from virtually all our
NATO allies--joined, I might add, by men and women from some of the
brand new democracies of central Europe. We were reminded then that
when we are faced with new challenges, it helps to have old friends at
our side.
If a serious challenge were to develop in Asia or elsewhere, Mr.
Chairman, the last thing we would need is instability in Europe--and
the first thing we would want is for our European allies and partners
to stand with us. Indeed, whatever challenges the future may bring, it
will be in our interest to have a vigorous and larger alliance with
those European democracies that share our values and our determination
to defend them. It is that conviction we ask you to embrace today.
We recognize that NATO expansion involves a solemn expansion of
American responsibilities in Europe. As Americans we take our
commitments seriously, and we do not extend them lightly. Any major
extension of American commitments must advance our fundamental national
interests. Let me explain specifically why welcoming the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland into NATO meets that test.
First, a larger NATO will make us safer by expanding the area in
Europe where wars simply do not happen. This is the productive paradox
at NATO's heart: By making clear that we will fight, if necessary, to
defend our allies, we make it less likely that our troops will ever be
called upon to do so.
Now you may say that no part of Europe faces any immediate threat
of armed attack today. That is true, for the first time in all of
European history--in part because the existence of NATO has helped
deter such a threat. And the purpose of NATO enlargement is to keep it
that way.
It is also fair to ask if our interest in preventing war in central
Europe is vital enough to justify a security commitment. Some imply it
is not. But let us not deceive ourselves.
The United States is a European power. If we have an interest in
the lands west of the Oder River, then we surely have an interest in
the fate of the 200 million people who live in the nations between the
Baltic and Black Seas. We waged the Cold War in part because these
nations were held captive. We fought World War II in part because they
had been invaded. We know that half a continent cannot be secure if the
other half is in turmoil.
Now that the nations of central Europe are free, we want them to
succeed and we want them to be safe. For if there were a major threat
to the security of their region, if we were to wake up one morning to
the sight of cities being shelled and borders being overrun, I am
certain we would choose to act, enlargement or no enlargement.
Expanding NATO now is simply the surest way to prevent that kind of
threat from arising, and thus the need to make that kind of choice.
Mr. Chairman, the second reason why enlargement passes the test of
national interest is that it will make NATO stronger and more cohesive.
The Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs are passionately committed to NATO
and fully accept its principles of shared responsibility. Experience
has taught them to believe in a strong American leadership role in
Europe. Their forces have already risked their lives alongside ours
from the Gulf War to Bosnia. Recently, Czech soldiers joined our
British allies in securing a police station from heavily armed Bosnian
Serb extremists.
When the President went to the Madrid summit in July, he insisted
that NATO invite only the strongest candidates to join now. We settled
on three nations that will make a tangible military contribution to the
Alliance, three nations that have been our dependable partners ever
since they won their freedom--from the fight against nuclear
proliferation, to our effort to reform the U.N., to our support for
human rights--three nations that will be good allies.
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic do not look at NATO as a one
way street of reassurance. They are asking to assume the obligations of
mature democratic statehood and to start taking responsibility for the
freedom and security of others. That is an offer we should not refuse.
Mr. Chairman, the third reason why a larger NATO serves our
interests is that the very promise of it gives the nations of central
and eastern Europe an incentive to solve their own problems. To align
themselves with NATO, aspiring countries have strengthened their
democratic institutions. They have made sure that soldiers answer to
civilians, not the other way around. They have signed 10 major accords
that taken together resolve virtually every potential ethnic and border
dispute in the region.
I know that some of you have been concerned that a larger NATO
might involve us in border and ethnic conflicts such as the one in
Bosnia. On the contrary. The decision to expand the Alliance has
encouraged the resolution of exactly the kind of disputes that might
have led to future Bosnias. In fact, the three states we have invited
to join NATO have resolved every potential problem of this type.
I have been a student of central European history and I have lived
some of it myself. When I see Romanians and Hungarians building a
genuine friendship after centuries of enmity, when I see Poles,
Ukrainians and Lithuanians forming joint military units after years of
suspicion, when I see Czechs and Germans overcoming decades of
mistrust, when I see central Europeans confident enough to improve
their political and economic ties with Russia, I know something
remarkable is happening.
NATO is doing for Europe's east precisely what it did for Europe's
west after World War II. It is helping to vanquish old hatreds, to
promote integration and to create a secure environment for economic
prosperity.
This is another reminder that the contingencies we do not want our
troops to face, such as ethnic conflict, border skirmishes, and social
unrest are far more easily avoided with NATO enlargement than without
it. And if such contingencies were to arise, let me remind you that
NATO operates by consensus, and that the NATO treaty preserves a role
for our judgment and constitutional process in deciding how to respond.
In short, Mr. Chairman, a larger NATO will make America safer, NATO
stronger, and Europe more peaceful and united. That is the strategic
rationale. But I would be disingenuous if I did not tell you I see a
moral imperative as well. Indeed, there is no contradiction here
between realism and idealism, between pragmatism and principle, between
security and justice.
NATO defines a community of interest among the free nations of
North America and Europe that both preceded and outlasted the Cold War.
America has long stood for the proposition that this Atlantic community
should not be artificially divided and that its nations should be free
to shape their destiny.
We should also think about what would happen if we were to turn new
applicants away. That would mean freezing NATO at its Cold War
membership and preserving the old Iron Curtain as its eastern frontier.
It would mean locking out a whole group of otherwise qualified
democracies simply because they were once, against their will, members
of the Warsaw Pact.
Why would America choose to be allied with Europe's old democracies
forever, but its new democracies never? There is no acceptable answer
to that question. Instead, it would probably be said that we blocked
the aspirations of our would-be allies because Russia objected. And
that, in turn, could cause confidence to crumble in central Europe,
leading to a search for security by other means, including arms
buildups and competition among neighbors. This would be the price--the
very high price--of not enlarging NATO.
We have chosen a better way. We have chosen to look at the
landscape of the new Europe and to ask a simple question: Which of
these nations that are so clearly important to our security are ready
and able to contribute to our security? The answer to that question is
before the Senate, awaiting your affirmation.
Mr. Chairman, I know I do not need to tell you that our security
has never come without a price. So let me address the very real costs
that this initiative will entail.
Last February, at the behest of Congress and before we had decided
which nations to invite to membership, the Administration made a
preliminary estimate of the total costs of a larger NATO. We projected
how much our new allies would need to spend to adapt and modernize
their militaries, the investments our old allies would need to make to
extend security commitments eastward, as well as the direct costs
related to enlargement, including those that would be covered by NATO's
three common funded budgets.
Since then, we have settled on three candidates and we are gaining
a much clearer understanding of the capabilities they will bring to the
Alliance. NATO staff are now assessing the resource implications of
enlargement for NATO's common funded budgets--civil, military, and
infrastructure. That assessment will be submitted to us and the other
NATO ministers for approval at the December ministerial meeting of the
North Atlantic Council.
This process is important because the conclusions it reaches about
the commonly funded cost of enlargement will represent more than just
another estimate. They will represent a commitment.
NATO is also engaged in an intensive effort to determine the level
of forces our current and future allies will need to put at the
disposal of the Alliance to meet their new commitments. The NATO cost
study will not place a price tag on these military improvements, which
are national responsibilities. But the requirements it defines will be
part of NATO's next round of force planning, which will begin next
spring.
I can assure you that we will continue to approach this process
with several basic principles in mind.
The first and most important principle is that the amount we and
our allies pay for a larger NATO must be a function of concrete
military requirements. Our discussion in these hearings, and our
consultations with our allies, should focus on defining the level of
military capability we want our old and new allies to have in this
changed security environment, and then making sure that they commit to
that level.
This may seem counterintuitive, Mr. Chairman, but it now appears,
as we examine the assets and infrastructure our new allies bring to
NATO, that the commonly funded cost of integrating their armed forces
will turn out to be lower than we estimated in February.
Either way, the deciding factor will be bang not buck. If we can
integrate these nations into the Alliance, maintain NATO's capabilities
and acquire the new ones we need at a lower cost than we expected, that
will be good news. But we must also be wary of false economies and
spend no less than we need to keep NATO strong. We will not shortchange
NATO's effectiveness or its necessary investments in military
readiness.
A second principle is that costs within NATO's common funded budget
must be equitably shared. The United States pays about 25 percent of
these costs. That will not change. Our allies pay roughly three-
quarters of NATO's costs today. And that will still be the case in a
larger alliance, as old and new allies will pay 75 percent of the
common funded costs.
A third principle is that each ally, old and new, must do its share
at home to meet its military obligations to NATO and to preserve the
credibility of NATO's security guarantees. NATO's members contribute in
many different ways, from the United States, with our unequaled
military arsenal, to Iceland, which provides bases, but no army. Still,
NATO is a collective defense alliance. We need to know that at moments
of crisis, each member will be able to deliver on its commitment to
help defend new allies.
Mr. Chairman, the President, Secretary Cohen and I have been making
these points loud and clear to our current and future allies. Our
message has been received. As a result, I am confident that the costs
of a larger alliance will be real, but affordable, and that NATO will
emerge from this process with its military capabilities as strong and
credible as ever.
Let me explain why I feel so confident, with respect to our new and
old allies alike.
First of all, I know many of you are worried that Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic may not be able to pull their weight in NATO. As
we all know, just 10 years ago they were members of the Warsaw Pact.
Their militaries are not as advanced as those of most NATO allies.
I know that you, Mr. Chairman, have expressed concern that we will
have to fund a massive program of assistance to help these countries
meet their new obligations, just as we used the Marshall Plan and
military assistance to help our original NATO allies half a century
ago.
I can assure you this will not be necessary. These countries do not
face the kind of threat our allies faced in the 1950's. They have time
to achieve a mature military capability. After taking a hard look at
what they already bring to the table, we have no doubt they are on
their way to meeting that goal.
What is more, these are not ruined nations recovering from the
devastation of a hot war. If you go to Budapest, Prague and Warsaw you
will see some of the most vibrant economies in Europe. These economies
have grown by an annual average of 4 percent in the last 3 years, and
that trend is likely to continue for some time. Each of these nations
is a member of the OECD, which admits only the most advanced industrial
economies. Each has graduated, or is about to graduate from our SEED
aid program, because they just don't need that kind of help any more.
In fact, Poland now funds its own military assistance program to
support its neighbors, Ukraine and Lithuania. It has expanded its
global responsibilities by joining KEDO, which funds the dismantlement
of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. All three of these nations
have paid their own way to send troops to Bosnia and to other trouble
spots in Africa, Latin America, and Asia.
All three have pledged to increase the percentage of GDP they spend
on their armed forces. And we have seen clear signs that all three have
the political will to carry out that commitment.
Poland already has the most advanced armed forces in the region.
The Polish government recently unveiled a 15 year defense plan, which
includes substantial resources for further modernization. There was no
controversy whatsoever on this issue during Poland's recent election
campaign.
The Czech government has pledged to increase defense spending by
0.1 percent of GDP a year for the next three years. It recently
unveiled a new budget that completely fulfills that commitment, and it
did so after this summer's costly flooding disaster. As a result, Czech
defense spending will rise by 17 percent next year--about the
equivalent of a one-year $40 billion increase in America's defense
budget. The Czech Republic still has much work to do, but it is clearly
committed to getting the job done.
Hungary has also committed to increase defense spending by 0.1
percent of GDP a year over the next five years. And while Hungary may
not yet be in NATO, NATO is already in Hungary. More than 100,000
American troops have passed through NATO bases in that country on their
way in or out of Bosnia. The Hungarian parliament approved NATO's
request to use Hungarian territory within 72 hours of being asked.
Without hesitation, Hungary has fulfilled its responsibilities as the
supply lifeline for the largest and most complex deployment in NATO's
history.
Some people have argued that these new democracies should not be
asked to bear additional military burdens at a time when they are still
undergoing difficult economic transformations. But these nations plan
to spend roughly 2 percent of GDP on defense, a figure in line with the
defense burden shouldered by many NATO countries, and one that their
dynamic economies can readily sustain without neglecting other
priorities. They will be modernizing their armed forces in any case,
and they understand that in the long run, it will be cheaper to do so
within NATO than outside it. NATO's prospective members know they will
not have to fend for themselves if peace is threatened in their region.
This gives them a reason to avoid mortgaging their future on the arms
market. In fact, it has already given them the confidence to support
new limits on conventional arms in central Europe.
Ultimately, only the people of these countries can decide what is
best for their future. Today, in all three, solid public majorities and
every mainstream party support membership in NATO. They are telling us
they see no contradiction between security and prosperity, and we
should not substitute our judgment for theirs.
Mr. Chairman and members, I know that many of you are equally
concerned, if not more so, about the willingness of our old allies to
meet their commitments to a larger NATO. Many of our western European
allies are facing economic difficulties of their own. Many are reducing
public spending so they can participate in a single European currency.
Fiscal constraints are well known to this committee. But when the
16 allied leaders gathered in Madrid in July, they made a commitment.
They stated clearly in their final communique that a larger NATO would
carry costs, that those costs would be manageable, and that they would
be met.
I am confident that our allies will pay their fair share of the
commonly funded costs of enlargement because we are going to determine
those costs together. NATO's history gives us ample reason to believe
that once we set a long term goal together, we will meet it together.
As for our allies' national defense spending, that is something
that we obviously cannot control. But they understand the need to
ensure that their armed forces can meet the new commitments NATO is
taking on. What is more, some of the costs we expect our allies to
incur would need to be faced even if NATO were not growing, since they
would in any case have to adapt their power projection capabilities to
meet new challenges. Enlargement simply underscores the issue. So I
believe that over time they can and will take the necessary steps.
I am confident that our allies are not going to be free riders on
American leadership in central and eastern Europe because, frankly, up
to this point they have not been. The western European countries have
committed over $80 billion to support the central European democracies
through the end of the decade. The European Union has invited five
central European countries, including two that are not being considered
for NATO membership, to begin the process of joining its ranks.
America's efforts on behalf of democracy and peace in the world are
unparalleled, but in this region our European allies are making
substantial contributions.
Our European allies' commitment to the cause of a larger, stronger
NATO is as deep as ours, and that is no surprise. They need this
alliance. They provide the majority of its ground troops. Over the
course of history, they have provided the battlefield. They have the
greatest possible stake in seeing our initiative succeed.
Mr. Chairman, those are my reasons for confidence. I base my
assessment on my experience as Secretary of State in dealing with our
current and future allies in Europe, as well as on the experience of a
lifetime before that. I base it on my best judgment of what the
immediate future may bring. But you know, there is one piece of
equipment that I do not have at the State Department, although I hope
one day the Appropriations Committee will fund it: and that is a
crystal ball. None of us can know precisely what challenges we will be
facing in Europe 10 or 20 or 50 years down the road.
As you know, President Clinton has pledged that the process of
enlargement will continue after 1999. A new round of enlargement will
carry cost implications that we cannot predict today. I can assure you,
however, that the Senate would still have to ratify the admission of
any additional members. Any new costs would have to be approved by the
entire Congress.
I understand that for the Congress, our experience in Bosnia
introduces another element of uncertainty. I acknowledge that our
mission in that country has cost more than the Administration
originally estimated. But I honestly believe that the circumstances of
NATO enlargement are different.
It is intrinsically difficult to predict the cost of an overseas
military deployment in a potentially hostile setting. It is virtually
impossible to plan for every contingency, and once our troops are on
the ground, we have a moral obligation to give them the support they
need, even if it exceeds our original expectations. The costs of NATO
enlargement, on the other hand, are more straightforward; they are
budgeted in advance and we have a veto. We do not run our alliance on
supplemental appropriations.
I know history offers other reasons to doubt our ability to predict
future costs. You have reminded us, Mr. Chairman, that when NATO was
created, Secretary of State Acheson was asked by Senator Hickenlooper
of Iowa if it would require the permanent stationing of American troops
in Europe. He replied it would not. Today, you understandably fear that
history will repeat itself.
If you were to ask me today whether our continuing commitment to
NATO requires the continued stationing of U.S. troops in Europe, my
answer would be yes. We made that decision decades ago and reaffirmed
it after the Cold War. If you were to ask me if our commitment to a
larger NATO will require expanding our military presence across the
Atlantic, my answer would be that in the current and foreseeable
security environment in Europe, we simply see no need, and nor do our
future allies.
But I agree that this story is instructive. It helps us remember
that when we decided to keep our troops in Europe in the 1950's, it was
not just to meet a formal obligation. We did so because there were new
signs of communist expansion in the world, because we were concerned
about the survival of democracy in Europe, and because it was in our
national interest to meet that threat.
I do not believe we will face such a threat in Europe in the
foreseeable future. If I am proven wrong, and we are called upon to
send troops to defend our new allies, the cost of defending a larger
NATO would obviously grow. But then, if such a dire threat were to
arise, the cost of our entire defense budget would grow, whether we
enlarge NATO or not. If I am wrong about our allies' willingness to pay
their share of the costs, that too is a problem we would face with or
without enlargement. For if our interest in the fate of Europe's newly
free nations were put at risk, we would not stand idly by, whether we
had a formal treaty commitment to defend Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic or not.
The effect of NATO enlargement is to state plainly in advance what
we would in any case wish to do if the security of central Europe were
threatened. In this way, it is more likely that we will be able to
deter such a threat from ever arising.
That is why I am more comfortable facing an uncertain future with a
larger, stronger NATO than I would be were NATO to stand still. I
believe, as President Vaclav Havel so crisply put it when he came to
Washington earlier this month, that ``even the most costly preventive
security is cheaper than the cheapest war.''
So as you consider the cost issue, Mr. Chairman, I ask you to
consider that there is an even more fundamental issue at stake. It is
the value of military alliances to America's security and the
importance of our partnership with Europe.
Here is the strongest, most successful, most dependable alliance
America has ever had. Here are three democracies that wish to share the
responsibilities of that alliance. Here are three nations that I
believe will help us bear the cost of defending freedom, in Europe and
beyond, because they know the cost of losing freedom.
In the conduct of foreign policy, we are often preoccupied with
crisis. We spend much of our time managing disagreements with nations
that do not see the world exactly as we do. In a world where attention
to what is wrong often drowns out attention to what is right, we must
take care not to forget our friends. We must not take for granted those
upon whom we can rely.
Mr. Chairman, the first commandment of foreign policy is much the
same as the first commandment of politics: Secure your base. Indeed,
across the whole scope of human activity, from the life of the family
and the neighborhood, to the politics of our nation and the world, when
we want to get something done, we start by banding together with those
who are closest to us in values and outlook.
That is why we cultivate our partnership with Europe. That is why
we seek to extend that partnership to those newly free nations that
have always been our allies in spirit, if not in fact. We do so not
just to advance our interests across the Atlantic, but because we need
dependable democratic allies to advance our interests in every part of
the world.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM S. COHEN
Chairman Stevens. Secretary Cohen, we welcome you back to
your former place of employment. I am sure that you have
different duties now, and we look forward to your advice.
Secretary Cohen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I never
had the pleasure of appearing before such a large distinguished
group of Senators on the Appropriations Committee in my years
of service in the Senate.
The New Europe
Secretary Albright has said everything, Senator Bumpers,
and I will resist the temptation to repeat much of what she has
said, other than talking about, perhaps, the crystal ball. I
would submit that those who founded NATO did not possess any
greater clairvoyance or clarity in their day then we do today.
What they were convinced of, however, and they were possessed
of was a certitude of the necessity of American leadership, the
rightness of our values, and the benefits to our people, who
are going to benefit in the future from the enlargement of this
community of shared values throughout Europe.
So I think that whatever doubts exist must have existed
back then as well. Whatever threats existed, as Senator Gorton
has pointed out, exist today as well.
I would just make two or three key points supporting what
Secretary Albright has said. If it were a question of weakening
NATO, then the obvious answer would be, reject it. We are
convinced that by enlarging NATO that we are going to
strengthen NATO. We are going to strengthen those nations who
share our common values. They are the nations who have to climb
a very steep set of stairs. I have likened this climb to NATO
membership as walking through a door, but it is a door at the
very top of a steep set of stairs which they have to climb.
They have to reform their economies. They have to insist
upon civilian control of their military. They have to adopt
open market economies. They have to promote human and civil
rights. They have to basically adopt the same values that we
have, and, in addition to that, measure up to the article V
obligation they would be required to carry out in providing for
collective defense.
So it is a very steep set of stairs they have to climb. We
think that those nations who have been recommended for
accession are willing and are in the process of climbing those
stairs.
Will it contribute to new divisions in Europe? To the
contrary, as Secretary Albright has indicated, what we are
seeing is the erasing of the lines of division. As she pointed
out, just by virtue of these countries joining in this family
of NATO nations, we have seen Poland agreeing to resolve
difficulties with their neighbors, with Ukraine, with Hungary
agreeing with Romania, Italy, and Slovenia, Germany, and the
Czech Republic. They have resolved many of their border
disputes, their ethnic differences and rivalries because they
were eager to join in this family of nations.
Senator Bumpers, you raise an interesting point about
quoting from an Ambassador from Russia saying this is a
historic mistake. I recall that President Gorbachev made a
similar statement when he said a united Germany cannot be a
part of NATO. He said this would be very destructive, very
threatening, and we assured him that a united Germany could be,
in fact, incorporated and configured in such a way that it
would not present any kind of an offensive threat. And now we
have a united Germany that is a very solid member of NATO.
Will it appeal to Russian extremism? The quote from the
Globe that this is really designed to contain Russia--I would
use the opposite argument. What it is really designed to do is
to allow those who have escaped the prison of the Soviet Union
to remain free and not be pulled back into that dark prison
where they suffered for so many years. So it is not designed
against any country, not against Russia, but to allow those who
have escaped from imprisonment over the years to enjoy their
freedom and to enjoy a sense of security.
I had occasion to travel twice this year--I know Senator
Hutchison has been at least four or five times--but twice this
year to Bosnia. And on the first occasion I witnessed a
ceremony that was headed by our former SACEUR, and we were
giving a medal to General Shetsov. George Joulwan was
presenting a medal to him at that time because he was leading
his Russian soldiers in a mission side by side with American
soldiers. And it was one of the most emotional moments that I
can recall seeing, where Russians were proud to be serving side
by side with American soldiers.
Just recently, some 2 weeks ago, I had a meeting with
General Krivolapov. He gave a toast at the end of our meeting
and he said, ``one team, one mission.'' That to me does not
sound like it is appealing to Russian extremism but rather
building bridges with key members of the Russian military to
say that we are going to function as a team in the future.
Enlargement costs
I will address the issue of cost, because that really is
what many of you, if not all, are concerned about. What are the
costs of enlargement? Earlier this year I submitted a report to
the Congress that laid out three categories of costs. In
addition, there are three different reports. We have our DOD
study. There is also an assessment that was prepared by the
RAND Corp. And you also have one by CBO.
The reason for the great disparity depends upon the
assumptions that were made. With respect to--I will not go into
all the details to give you time for your questions, obviously,
but if you assume, as the CBO assumed, that you have a Russia
that now poses a significant threat of external aggression,
that they have rebuilt their economy, they have rebuilt their
military, they now are poised to attack the West, then
obviously you would have to match that kind of a buildup with
something corresponding.
Under those circumstances, they would insist that we have
11\2/3\ divisions, and 11\1/2\ wings, 5 brigade sets and so
forth. They had the maximum assumption of aggression on the
part of Russia directed toward the West. Under those
circumstances, you can, in fact, have a very high calculation
of what it would cost to defend against that.
DOD and RAND are quite close in terms of our initial
assessment. We assumed that the initial figures would run
roughly between $9 to $12 billion on direct enlargement costs,
$10 to $13 billion on the new members' military restructuring,
and the current number is $8 to $10 billion, to give a total
range of between $27 and $35 billion.
I think it is important to make a point here. The new
members will have to assume costs in any event. As Secretary
Albright pointed out, if they were not involved in getting into
NATO, they would have to reform their military. There would be
enormous costs that they would have to incur in any event.
By joining a collective security institution, they will
have to pay less. They will not have to spend money to try to
compete against their neighbors. They will be part of a
collective security arrangement, so they will spend less, not
more. But they will have to spend money. We estimated it would
cost between $10 and $13 billion.
The current members, non-U.S. NATO members, will have to
spend, according to our initial estimate, between $8 to $10
billion. Why? That is separate and apart from NATO enlargement.
It is because they have to reconfigure their forces. The cold
war is no longer in existence. They no longer have to maintain
the same sort of force structure, the same numbers. What they
have to do is to reform their military system so they become
more rapidly deployable, so they have greater mobility and
sustainability in terms of preparing for the future.
Those are costs that they will have to absorb in any event.
It is separate and totally apart from enlargement. The new
members, the existing European members of NATO, all have costs
that they will have to assume separate and apart from NATO
enlargement.
We then come back to the one category we said are the
direct costs for enlargement that we would have to contribute
to. And that is the $9 to $12 billion figure that has been
cited. Now, as Secretary Albright has said, we may have to
reduce that. As we have found from empirical experience, we may
have to, in fact, lower that number because of what we have
discovered.
First of all, I should point out that the $9 to $12 billion
figure was calculated based on four members coming in, not
three. So already we overestimated the costs that were involved
because we said what would it cost for four. Well, now we have
only three.
Second, we have found out that, notwithstanding the fact
that the Soviet Union might have been somewhat inferior in
terms of the quality of their military, they nonetheless had
devoted substantial resources to their former republics and
those who were under the aegis of the Soviet Union. We found,
for example, when East Germany became part of West Germany and
united, that the East Germans were far more prepared to go to
war on a much quicker basis than we in the West had
anticipated.
We are now finding, for example, that countries such as
Hungary are now better prepared than we had anticipated. We
found, for example, that, contrary to our assumption that they
would not be able to accept an F-16 squadron, they already
have. They have had a Dutch F-16 squadron that was present
several weeks ago before our team of assessors arrived to find
out what would need to be done.
We are finding that the Czech Republic has already taken
its own money and spent its resources on digitizing their
communications system before even contributing anything to NATO
enlargement itself. So what we are finding is that those
countries who are going to or are qualifying for admission,
assuming we ratify it, that they are taking measures which will
reduce the cost.
This brings me to the issue that our European friends have
been quoted as saying we are not going to pay. I would quote
for you, Senator Bumpers, I believe you said the British
minister of defense indicated they would not pay any increase
in funding. There is in the Washington Times on October 21,
today, a statement by George Robertson, the new minister of
defense, and let me just quote one paragraph. ``Because
enlargement is a high priority for NATO, we may have to delay
some lower priority projects. But if additional spending is
required, Britain will pay its share.'' And then it goes on.
I attended a ministerial meeting in Maastricht just a
couple of weeks ago, and I made it very clear that there are
costs involved for everyone. There are costs involved for the
three countries who wish to become part of NATO, and they will
have to bear those costs. There are costs involved for the
current European NATO members who have to modernize their
forces in order to move away from a defensive posture to one
where they are rapidly deployable and sustainable. They are in
the process of doing that. Those are their costs, separate and
independent.
And then there are the costs for the common fund. What are
the direct costs for enlargement? There is some dispute. Last
year NATO spent, total, $1.8 billion that went into the common
fund. We spent roughly $485 million of that. That was our
share, roughly the 24 percent that Secretary Albright has
talked about.
That will continue to be our share. What the Europeans have
said is, we believe we may be in a position to reprioritize, to
reprogram some of the lower priority funds that we might have,
be it in Belgium, be it in Germany, be it wherever it might be,
and place a higher priority on helping these three new nations
accelerate their entry into NATO.
If it is possible to do that without in any way
compromising the military effectiveness of NATO itself, then we
say fine. But we expect there to be additional costs. They may
not be as high as we originally estimated, but we are going to
be coming back to you. NATO defense officials are going around
to each of the NATO countries, each of the new members, making
an assessment, asking them to answer that DPQ, the defense
questionnaire that they have to fill out, and then we will make
an assessment in December, present that to the NATO alliance,
and we will have to present that to you next January and
February in order to say these are the most realistic numbers
that we can possibly give you.
Here is what the NATO military defense teams have done in
going out into the field to find out what each country needs to
do, to find out what will be required, and these are the
recommendations that we make. We will have to bring that back
to you. As the chairman has indicated, you have got some
private citizens coming back in January. We would expect the
vote to take place sometime next spring.
You will have the most detailed numbers we can possibly
present. But I would forewarn you that I think that the numbers
that we had that would go from the $27 billion to $35 billion
may be too high, and that the Europeans may be correct in this
regard, that we have overestimated.
One final point and then I will cease. When I appeared
before the ministerial in Maastricht, most of the Europeans
adopted the argument, Senator Harkin, that you made, that what
really is at stake, is that we want to sell a lot of high-end
equipment to all of those new European entrants. My reaction is
this, and my response was this. If we overestimate the costs
involved, which they think we have done, for the purpose of
simply selling more high-end equipment to these countries, the
Congress of the United States, the Senate, will reject it as
being unaffordable.
As Secretary Albright has said, if we underestimate it, you
will reject it because it is not credible. What we have to have
are really solid numbers. We do not have an interest in trying
to sell high-tech equipment to these three new nations coming
in.
The chairman has pointed out what they need most of all is
to start training their personnel. They have to start training
in, hopefully, the English language, or French--the two major
languages--to have greater communications capability. They have
to upgrade their command, control, communications. They have to
upgrade their infrastructure. They have to ultimately upgrade
their interoperability. And then finally you get to the
purchase of modern equipment, which is way down the line in
terms of priority.
So what we are trying to do basically is to put them in a
position where we can, in fact, communicate effectively, that
we have these command and control systems, that they take
measures to beef up their ability to accept reinforcements,
should they be necessary. But we are not interested in trying
to sell a lot of high-tech and high-end equipment to these new
nations. That is not in their interest and that is precisely
the reason why these military teams are going out to make an
assessment of what they need to do that will make them an
effective part of the new NATO.
So, Mr. Chairman, I have a long prepared statement which I
will forebear from repeating, because I know the time is
running and you have many questions you would like to ask.
But let me just conclude on this note. Whatever the costs
for enlargement, I think we also have to calculate what are the
costs of failing to enlarge. What would be the cost if we were
to reject these three countries from coming in?
Secretary Albright has quoted from Vaclav Havel. President
Eisenhower put it a different way. He said, ``A soldier's pack
is not as heavy as a prisoner's chains.'' And that is something
that these three countries have endured for too many decades.
They have had to carry around the weight of prisoner's chains.
They now have an opportunity to join the most successful
military institution in the history of the world, and to secure
their security and to promote their prosperity and their
stability.
PREPARED STATEMENT
That is in our vital interest and we ought to ratify for
those reasons alone. Thank you very much.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. William S. Cohen
Senator Stevens, Senator Byrd, Senator Inouye, members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. It
is a great privilege to appear with the Secretary of State to discuss
one of the President's top foreign policy objectives: NATO enlargement.
As you may know, we appeared together before the Senate Armed Services
Committee in April to discuss this same topic. I welcome the
opportunity to continue this dialogue with the Senate.
why enlarge nato? first, some european history
We are at an historic moment. By working together within the U.S.
Government, and within the NATO alliance, we can change the face of
Europe forever in the next few years. It is a challenge from which we
should not retreat.
Our veterans of the First World War witnessed how even the vast
Atlantic Ocean couldn't protect us from being drawn into the fiery
hatreds of the Old World. They marched into battle singing, ``We won't
be back 'til it's over, over there.'' But to our lasting regret, when
the guns of Autumn fell silent, America ignored the embers of hatred
that still smoldered in Europe and we missed the opportunity to prevent
another war, the deadliest in human history.
Millions of American sons returned to the very same terrain that
their fathers died defending, and thousands of them paid the ultimate
price for this missed opportunity. But those who fought in World War II
gave us a second chance to build a safer world.
President Truman, speaking of the Marshall Plan, said, ``Our
purpose from the end of the war to the present has never changed. It's
been to create a political and economic framework in which lasting
peace can be constructed.'' Western Europe embraced the Marshall Plan,
built strong democracies and economies, and developed a strong alliance
that we call NATO. But the other half of Europe was denied the Marshall
Plan when Joseph Stalin slammed down the Iron Curtain and began a
separation of the continent which would persist for fifty years.
Today, having emerged victorious from the long winter of the Cold
War, we have an historic opportunity and a very sober challenge. We
have the opportunity to complete George Marshall's vision, and the
challenge to secure a lasting peace in Europe whose security and
stability remains a vital interest of America.
enlargement enhances nato
Some question whether making NATO larger is going to make NATO
weaker and, therefore, weaken America. On the contrary, our definitive
answer is that enlargement must not and will not be allowed to dilute
NATO's military effectiveness or political cohesion. A larger NATO will
be a stronger NATO and will provide a wider allegiance in Europe to our
values. It was the creation of NATO in 1949 that halted Soviet designs
on western Europe. It was the enlargement of NATO, with Greece and
Turkey in 1952, West Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982, that helped
strengthen the wall of democracy. If, in the future, another direct
threat of attack arises, an enlarged NATO would have: additional
manpower, added military capability, more political support, and
greater strategic depth. More importantly, a larger NATO will help
bring stability for the 21st Century to Central Europe--the spawning
ground of crises throughout the 20th Century. We must seize this
opportunity to continue to shape the security environment in Europe. In
doing so, we will strengthen the political democracies and market
economies of Central and Eastern Europe, and thereby enhance stability
and reduce the risk that such a crisis will ever emerge. As was the
case with nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, in this new era NATO
enlargement is an insurance policy with an unusual twist: by paying a
modest premium, we not only will be protected in case of fire, we will
make a fire less likely to ignite.
THE CHOICE OF NEW MEMBERS
Formal membership in NATO carries as President Clinton has said,
``(t)he most solemn security guarantees.'' Enlargement must not, and
will not, be allowed to dilute NATO's military effectiveness nor its
political cohesion. Sincere aspiration is not enough to guarantee
membership in NATO. New members must demonstrate a commitment to:
democracy and the rule of law, an open market economic system, civilian
constitutional control of their militaries, peaceful resolution of
disputes with their neighbors, respect for human rights, and
development over time of military capabilities interoperable with NATO.
After discussions with allies, candidate countries, members of
Congress and within the Administration, the President decided the U.S.
would support extending invitations to the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland. The President met with the other leaders of the NATO nations in
a summit in July, and together they agreed to invite these nations to
begin accession talks to join the Alliance.
Enlarging NATO with these three nations will carry the promise of
peace and liberty into the next century.
You have heard it argued that by enlarging NATO we are going to
create a new dividing line in Europe. That argument fails to appreciate
the new dynamic that is underway in Europe, erasing these old lines and
avoiding these new divisions. The mere prospect of having NATO
membership has unleashed a powerful impetus for peace in Europe. Old
rivals have settled their historic disputes: Poland and Lithuania,
Poland and Ukraine, Hungary and Romania, Italy and Slovenia, Germany
and the Czech Republic. Without the prospect of NATO enlargement, these
smoldering embers--rather than being extinguished--would have been
fanned by nationalist fervor. This argument also fails to realize that
by not enlarging, we would allow to stand an illegitimate dividing line
drawn across the continent by Stalin fifty years ago. Some countries
would feel compelled to seek security via other avenues, including ones
potentially destabilizing and contrary to U.S. interests. We must move,
with Europe, into the future. The Poles, Hungarians and Czechs are
vital, vigorous and dynamic people. They share our ideals. They are
making remarkable recoveries from decades of foreign domination. Now
they want to return to their rightful place as equal partners in the
European family of free and democratic nations. We need them and they
need us.
If we are to ensure the achievement of our stated goal that
enlargement will not draw new dividing lines in Europe, we must
continue to give careful consideration to the security interests and
concerns of those states that were not chosen for membership at Madrid.
The door is open for future invitations, and no European nation is
excluded from consideration. We expect other nations to become members
as they meet the requirements. We need to continue to make clear to
other aspirant countries that active participation in PfP is the prime
pathway to membership in the Alliance, and to a solid security
relationship with NATO. At the same time, no state among the non-
selects has an ``assured invitation'' in 1999, or at any time, and
future invitees will be held to the same standards as the current
three. And, of course, any future accessions will, like these three,
require Senate approval.
THE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP
NATO is also embarking on a new relationship with Russia. There are
some who claim that enlarging NATO is going to feed extremism in Russia
and jeopardize Russia's move to democracy and its cooperation with the
West. We should not permit these fears to overwhelm the facts. NATO and
Russia are erasing old dividing lines every day, not least of which in
our interactions in Bosnia where Russian and NATO soldiers patrol side
by side in the cause of peace.
Mr. Chairman, permit me a moment of personal reflection. In
February, shortly after I was sworn in as the Secretary of Defense, I
traveled to Bosnia, and met with some of the American troops serving
there. During lunch, a Russian soldier came up to me and gave me his
beret as a gesture of peace, saying how proud he was to be serving
alongside Americans. Two weeks ago, I was again in Bosnia and met with
the new Russian commander, General Krivolapov. He concluded the meeting
by declaring, in a Russian version of General Joulwan's motto for SFOR,
``one team, one mission.'' Our new relationship with Moscow must
acknowledge Russia's changing role in Europe and not be forever bound
by the notion of a Russia in confrontation with NATO.
The objectives of NATO's new relationship with Russia are: to
recognize Russia's inherent importance in European security--after all,
they have been a major player in European security for 300 years; to
engage Russia in the new European security order; to facilitate a
security dialogue and; when desirable and appropriate, to cooperate
with Russia. Equally important to articulate are the things that NATO's
new relationship with Russia does not do: it does not allow Russian
participation in internal NATO issues; it does not give Russia a voice
or a veto over NATO's decisions; and it does not give Russia a de facto
membership in NATO.
the military requirements and costs of enlargement
And now, let me turn to a topic I know is of particular importance
to members of the Appropriations Committee: how much will enlargement
cost? And inextricably linked to the matter of cost--in fact the driver
of how much it will cost--is a second question: what exactly are the
military requirements of enlarging? These are complicated questions on
which reasonable people will disagree, and have already disagreed. But
let me walk you through the work we have done so far and the work we
are now doing.
There are new costs to enlarging, but these costs are affordable.
They are modest compared both to our total defense spending--and to the
costs and risks of not enlarging. To frame our discussion let me sketch
for you the three categories of costs.
First, there are the costs to new members to be able to develop
interoperable military forces to contribute to their own defense, the
defense of other NATO members and other NATO operations. While they
currently make a contribution, in order to be producers of security
over time, the new members must re-build, re-equip, and re-train their
forces. They must have smaller, better equipped, better supported, and
better led forces.
Second, there are also the costs to current members to meet the
requirements of NATO's new Strategic Concept, which is based on power
projection rather than positional defense, and which meets the needs of
an enlarged Alliance. Current members must do what they already have
undertaken to improve mobility, deployability, interoperability, and
flexibility. The key need for the current members is to proceed with
these efforts.
I want to stress that these two categories of costs are all actions
that the countries concerned would have to take to provide for their
own defense, with or without NATO enlargement. Indeed, to get
comparable levels of security without NATO enlargement the new members
would have to spend more. But for NATO to ensure its military potential
with enlargement, the capabilities which these other costs will fund,
will be needed. So it is important that the commitments actually be
met.
Finally, there are the costs to both new and old members of
integrating new members into NATO. These direct costs to enlarging,
costs which NATO would not have incurred but for enlarging, are
relatively modest. These direct costs are associated with enhancing
interoperability, extending NATO's integrated command, communications
and air defense surveillance.
From one point of view, these could be considered the only true
costs of NATO enlargement since they are the costs that would not be
incurred if NATO did not add new members. But we have also thought it
right to identify the first two categories of costs that will need to
be paid to ensure that an enlarged NATO is able to meet its
obligations.
INITIAL U.S. COST ESTIMATE
So, those are the three categories of costs. As you know, the
Department of Defense developed a notional estimate of the costs of
enlarging at the end of last year. This estimate was part of the
report, requested by the Congress, that the President submitted to you
in late February of this year.
Let me begin to make the link between costs and the military
requirements of enlarging. Our initial estimate assumed that while
there would be a need for serious defense capabilities for an enlarged
NATO, there is currently no threat of large-scale conventional
aggression in Europe, and that any such threat would take years to
develop. This is, of course, the same assumption as we make for our own
national planning.
Total costs for achieving all three categories were estimated as
$27 to $35 billion. These costs would be spread over the 13-year time
frame of 1997 through 2009--ten years after accession of new members.
Now, using the breakdown of responsibility for these costs which I just
outlined for you, the three categories of costs, let me give you what
we estimated each group would have to bear:
New member costs for restructuring their militaries were estimated
at about $10 to $13 billion over that time frame or about $800 million
to $1 billion per year. These costs would all be borne by the new
members, except to the limited extent Congress decides to continue
limited support to Central European militaries. (As you know, the U.S.
now provides about $100 million in Warsaw Initiative funding to all PfP
countries combined to support their participation in PfP.)
Current allies' costs for NATO regional reinforcement upgrades were
estimated at about $8 to $10 billion, or about $600 to $800 million per
year. These costs would be borne by the current allies. For decades
now, the U.S. has made no contribution to Allies' defense budgets
(except for some loans to Greece and Turkey).
It is important to note that our cost estimates to date do not
anticipate any added costs to the U.S. in this category because U.S.
forces are already readily deployable and sustainable. The requirement
to deploy to meet a contingency in places like Korea or Southwest Asia
is more demanding than a hypothetical crisis in Central Europe.
Direct enlargement costs for new and old allies were estimated at
about $9 to $12 billion, or about $700 to $900 million per year. This
again, is the cost of items such as communications, reinforcement
reception infrastructure, and other interoperability measures. We
estimated that about 60 percent of these costs, or about $5.5 to $7
billion would be paid for out of NATO common budgets over the ten years
following accession, that NATO budgets would be increased accordingly,
and that the U.S. would pay its standard 24 percent share of the NATO
common budget. With these assumptions, the U.S. share of the direct
costs of enlargement would be about $150 to $200 million per year.
These costs are manageable. Projected U.S. requirements to meet
direct enlargement common budget costs is only a fraction of a
percentage point when compared with total U.S. defense spending ($266
billion in 1997). The projected U.S requirement is also modest when
considered in relation to total NATO common budget spending. In 1997,
these budgets totaled about $1.8 billion. The total U.S. contribution
to the three budgets was about $485 million, while the allies
contributed the other $1.3 billion. We expect these relative percentage
cost shares will stay the same--three European to one U.S.--in the
period when NATO is meeting the requirements of enlargement.
ongoing nato work to help refine the cost estimate
Several weeks ago, this Committee asked me for a refined cost
estimate. On 16 October I submitted a report based on our work done to
date. Since our work to respond in greater detail to your request will
dovetail with work being done at NATO, let me first tell you about what
the Alliance is doing. NATO has undertaken a review of the military
implications and costs of enlargement, what new members will bring to
the Alliance, and any additional requirements for current allies. The
U.S. has long argued that any NATO cost estimate must be driven by the
military requirements of enlargement. We were successful in pressing
that argument in the Alliance, and a review of the military
requirements is currently underway by the NATO staff. This level of
detailed information, was obviously not available to us when we did our
first cost study and it is still being formulated.
These reviews are ongoing at NATO this fall, with recommendations
to be completed in November for consideration by ministers in December.
The invitees worked with the NATO international staff to fill out a
special Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) as their initial step into
the NATO Defense Planning Process. All NATO allies fill out a DPQ
annually.
In an effort to better understand requirements as well as the
current capabilities of the invited nations, members of NATO's
international military staff have been conducting site visits at
various military facilities in the invited countries this summer. They
visited airfields and railheads in each country. This month they are
visiting other facilities in each country to try to ensure that the
first facilities they inspected are representative of the condition of
the majority of facilities in that country.
The international staff of NATO will then cost those new
requirements. That is part of the work that is to be completed in time
for the December ministerials. These estimates will therefore be
available to Congress well before any vote on enlargement.
NATO COST ESTIMATES MAY BE LOWER
Based on what we know now, I believe that the NATO cost estimates
will be lower than those which you received from us in February. First
the initial U.S. cost assessed four, not three, new members. Further,
the NATO estimate will address only the direct, common-funded costs.
National costs borne by each ally or prospective ally are separate
from, and will not be estimated by, the NATO work.
But I also expect the NATO cost estimates will be lower because
some things are better in the invited nations than people thought. As a
result of assessments NATO planners and logisticians have been
conducting, we believe the additional investment required to prepare
each of these nations, their military forces, and their infrastructures
for full NATO membership will be less than initially anticipated. Let
me share some examples of our experiences during these assessments to
show why this is the case.
INTEROPERABILITY PROGRESS BY THE INVITEES
When the American General heading a small NATO team visiting
Kecskemet Air Base asked his Hungarian host how he might accommodate a
squadron of NATO F-16's, he was surprised by the precision and detail
of the Hungarian response--and the level of installation readiness
already achieved. He commented that the Hungarians had done some
excellent research. He was told it wasn't just research. Hungary had
hosted a squadron of Dutch F-16's for several weeks in 1996, and a
United States Air National Guard squadron was scheduled to arrive the
week after the general's visit. The Dutch and American planes were in
Hungary as part of a series of PfP exercises designed to improve
interoperability. Thus Hungarians are already capable of handling NATO
aircraft at some of their airfields. There is less work that needs to
be done--and in turn--less money to be spent to improve these airfields
than we had estimated earlier this year. This example also shows how
PfP has contributed in direct and practical ways to preparing for NATO
membership.
In another example, an analyst monitoring the NATO Common Fund Cost
Study's progress noted that even though communications and information
systems requirements were increasing, the prospective costs to the
Czech Republic kept dropping. Upon closer inspection, it turned out the
Czechs had already anticipated requirements for secure and non-secure
digital communications programs and had applied NATO standards to the
national programs they are pursuing on their own. In short, the Czechs
had already spent their own money to fund some projects that we had
assumed would be paid for by NATO as a whole through the common
budgets.
Finally, an American General asked a Polish Major familiar with the
details of a particular rail complex whether we could reasonably expect
to transport a NATO armored division through it in one week's time. The
amused Major replied by asking the general how many Soviet heavy
divisions he thought they planned on moving through the same location
when trains were going the other way?
These examples demonstrate an important point. When we conducted
our initial cost study, we assumed a greater need for improving some
military bases and equipment. As we spend more time on the ground in
the countries of each of the invitees, learning the details of their
military forces and infrastructure, we are gaining a better
appreciation for just how well prepared they were to fight against
NATO. We will be modernizing from an extremely robust foundation. We
will not be building airfields from scratch. Accordingly, the direct
costs of enlargement will likely be less than we originally estimated.
In fact, NATO will be inheriting a great deal of usable infrastructure.
During the Cold War these levels of capabilities would have been
bad news stories, but today they are all good news stories. What I am
attempting to demonstrate is that we are increasingly impressed by the
levels of readiness, understanding, and initial success of the invitees
in working toward NATO interoperability. These capabilities will
contribute to driving down the need for NATO common-funded improvements
once they become members of NATO. These capabilities are generally
higher than we assumed in our February study on the requirements and
costs of enlargement. I'm convinced, as we delve deeper into the
circumstances in these countries, we will discover more examples of
infrastructure capabilities either inherited from the Cold War or built
up over the past three years through the Partnership for Peace.
SOME DEFICIENCIES EXIST
We will, of course, likely also find some deficiencies--especially
regarding personnel, specialized training, communications, and the
levels of funding for force modernization. While the three cannot be
expected to ``fix'' everything by 1999, each must have a serious
program that lays out a defined path toward the enhancement of their
defense capabilities.
We have told each invitee that its highest priority should be
investing in quality personnel. They must develop effective systems for
recruiting and retaining good troops. Key to this is the development of
an effective NCO corps. The next priority is training--including
English language training--for personnel and equipment are meaningless
without adequate training. The next priority is achievement of a real
degree of interoperability with NATO, including communications,
logistics, infrastructure for reinforcement, and air defense.
While it is clear that each of the invited nations must undergo
modernization of major weapons systems in the years ahead if it is to
remain a contributor to overall alliance security, acquiring high tech
weapons systems should not be a high priority.
These three countries are working hard to demonstrate that they are
ready for membership in NATO. After the Madrid Summit, I traveled to
Budapest while the President and Secretary Albright traveled to Warsaw
and Prague. We made these trips not only to congratulate them but to
remind them that the journey to Alliance membership had just begun, not
ended. In the past month, Assistant Secretary Kramer has traveled to
each of the invitees to discuss their preparations for membership. Each
of these nations wants to be a contributor to, not just a consumer of,
security. They are already contributing to the security of Europe by
restructuring and modernizing their militaries to operate with NATO, by
serving with our soldiers in Bosnia, and by helping to make a success
of the Partnership for Peace.
Each country has some work to do. The Czechs for example, in their
original DPQ responses to NATO, did not commit enough of their forces
to NATO missions but their most recent response commits virtually all
of their forces to NATO. Their future budgets need to allocate greater
resources for defense; they have promised to increase their defense
budget, currently 1.7 percent of GDP, to 2 percent by the year 2000.
While both Poland and Hungary have had similar deficiencies they are
overcoming them. Hungary has increased its budget and Poland has an
extensive fifteen year plan. I am encouraged by the rapid Czech
response to our and NATO's constructive criticism during the past few
weeks.
NEXT STEPS AT NATO
The NATO staff work I have been outlining for you, when forwarded
to Ministers in December, will provide the basis for a more refined
assessment of the costs associated with NATO enlargement. In order to
support the Congress' review of issues associated with enlargement, I
will, as I stated in my 16 October letter to Senator Stevens, provide
you with an update based on these NATO efforts in early 1998.
Once the military requirements and cost estimates are agreed to in
December, we will move forward to make good on the commitment
undertaken by national leaders at Madrid that, ``the resources
necessary to meet [the costs of enlargement] will be provided.'' Three
weeks ago in Maastricht, at the informal NATO defense ministerial, I
led the discussions on this issue.
I reminded my colleagues that at our defense ministerial in June,
we all pledged to play our full part: (1) in preparing the nations
invited to join NATO for their future roles and obligations as Alliance
members; (2) in providing sufficient resources to maintain the
Alliance's ability to perform its full range of missions; (3) in
implementing the Alliance's decisions to further enhance its relations
with partners; and (4) in acknowledging that, ``the admission of new
members * * * will involve the Alliance providing the resources which
enlargement will necessarily require.'' These commitments were
reaffirmed at the Summit in Madrid, where our Heads of State agreed:
(1) that there will be costs associated with the integration of new
members; (2) that these costs will be manageable; and (3) that the
resources necessary to meet these costs will be provided. There was no
disagreement on this topic among my colleagues in Maastricht. Still
under discussion is whether that portion of the direct costs of
enlargement which are a shared responsibility must result in a dollar
for dollar increase in the NATO common budget--or whether some can be
offset by reductions in lower priority programs currently in the common
budget. We continue to believe that additional resources will be
required.
We will keep you informed over the coming months as this discussion
continues.
EUROPEAN BURDENSHARING
Let me turn to the topic of burdensharing. Both the U.S. and our
NATO allies have made big cuts in our defense budgets since the end of
the Cold War. But, using the key indicators of burdensharing, as set by
Congress, most of our NATO allies still make very substantial
contributions to the common defense. For example, more than two-thirds
of the troops participating in SFOR are non-U.S. forces.
We believe the allies can and should do more to improve their
capability for this sort of mobile, flexible operation NATO will need
to be ready for in the future. Most have already made improvements, and
are committed to more. For example, Britain provides NATO's only
rapidly-deployable corps headquarters committed to NATO and British
forces are the backbone of the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid
Reaction Corps (ARRC). The U.K. also has the capability to deploy and
sustain a division-sized force of 20,000 to 25,000 personnel in a Gulf
War-style scenario.
France, in general, is restructuring its armed forces to be more
mobile and easily deployable. The French are establishing a Rapid
Action Force (FAR) designed for rapid response in both European and
overseas contingencies. France also participated heavily in IFOR
efforts to implement the Dayton peace accords in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. With nearly 10,000 troops, France was the third largest
troop contributor, after the U.S. and Britain, and was responsible for
one of the three geographic sectors--and continues to be in SFOR.
Likewise, Germany is standing up a Rapid Reaction Force of some
53,000 fully-equipped troops from the Army, Navy and Air Force. The
first units stood up in 1996 and the force will be fully capable in
1998. In general, German armed forces are in the process of re-creating
themselves into a mobile, deployable--rather than static home defense--
force.
The smaller European nations are also improving their forces. For
example, the Royal Netherlands Navy and Air Force have improved both
their transport and air defense capabilities with new procurements such
as: two KDC-10 transport/tankers (the Dutch can now deploy their own F-
16's without reliance on the U.S.); an amphibious-lift ship to make the
marine brigade self-deployable; and upgrades to their F-16 fleet and
their Patriot systems.
THE COSTS OF NOT ENLARGING
Before I leave the topic of costs, I would like to reiterate what
the President said in the Administration's February report: the costs
of enlargement must be balanced against the costs of not enlarging. If
we fail to seize this historic opportunity to help integrate,
consolidate and stabilize central and eastern Europe, we may pay a much
higher price later. If NATO fails to enlarge, the risk of instability
or conflict in the region would rise, with far reaching consequences
for the U.S. and our allies. The most cost effective way to guarantee
the stability of the region is to do so collectively with our European
partners through NATO.
The bottom line is that alliances save money. Collective defense is
more cost effective than national defense. NATO will allow the three
invitees to acquire the same degree of security their western European
neighbors already enjoy and to do so at a lower cost than would
otherwise be the case and enhance our own security in the process.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, if this century has taught us anything, it has taught
us that our security is inextricably tied to peace and security in
Europe. We must hold up the lamplight of history so that we do not
stumble on the footpath to the future. Most importantly, we can promote
U.S. interests by increasing the security and stability of Europe. In
so doing, we are building the Europe of the 21st Century in Europe,
whole, free and at peace.
Chairman Stevens. Well, thank you very much. Because of the
timeframe, I would ask that the members agree to a 5-minute
time limit, which I will apply to myself as well, and we will
proceed on the early bird rule.
Let me just state, to begin with, I do appreciate your
recent letter. It has just come to my attention, as a matter of
fact. It was received in our absence. I will see to it that
Secretary Cohen's letter is distributed to all members of the
committee today. It is an update on the cost estimates.
I do not have the ability to repeat the Hickenlooper-
Acheson sequence, Secretary Albright, but I wish there was a
way that I could assure those who will hold the positions we
now hold in the period after the enlargement of NATO that there
will not be a development on their watch compared to the
commitments that Secretary Acheson made.
I do not know yet how to do it, but I hope this committee
will find a way to put on the ratification resolution some real
impediments to the expansion of costs of our Nation in
connection with the enlarged NATO. We are a global nation. Our
competitors really are in the Pacific rather than in the
European area now. I appreciate your concern, Madam Secretary,
about the 200 million people in this region. We have equal
concern about the 3 billion people in the Pacific and to the
extent costs go up in this area, it is going to decrease our
ability to meet our commitments in the Pacific.
Now, what I would like to inquire of you, Madam Secretary,
is what assurances have been given to us that the enlarged NATO
will not bring about additional demands upon our military as we
faced in Bosnia. Bosnia is not under the mutual defense
concepts of NATO. It is an exercise of NATO in trying to
resurrect Europe from the threat brought about from the
disintegration of the former Yugoslavia.
Are we going to have similar engagements in the event there
is a disintegration of one of these member states in the
future? Do we have an obligation to go into these new member
states the way we have gone now into this area of the former
Yugoslavia? Is NATO committed to the internal defense of these
three member states the way we have committed our forces in
Bosnia? Is that an unfair question?
United States national security interests in Asia and Europe
Secretary Albright. No; first of all, Mr. Chairman, I
appreciate very much your concern about this. We obviously also
want to make sure that however we extend our commitment that it
is always done in the interest of the United States.
You have raised a number of questions, but let me just make
the following statement, because I know of your concern about
Asia. I am as concerned about Asia as you are, and I made a big
point of making sure that on my first trip I went to both
continents, and we have spent a great deal of time in terms of
developing institutions in Asia. I will continue to do that,
and I think Secretary Cohen can address our defense posture in
Asia, which is very robust.
There are a couple of different ways to answer what you
have asked. First of all, let me say that in terms of the
original agreement as we have been talking about NATO expansion
and the Founding Act, we have made quite clear, as NATO itself
has released its posture on conventional forces, and I will
state this specifically, and let me read it: ``In the current
and foreseeable security environment, the alliance will carry
out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the
necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for
reinforcement, rather than by additional permanent stationing
of substantial combat forces.''
That is a unilateral NATO statement that was made about
forces. Second, under the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty,
which, in fact, rules the number of forces that exist in
Europe, what you have seen is a steady decline in the number of
American forces. That is the way we see that treaty.
On the third point, as I said in my oral statement, we
frankly are eliminating, by enlarging NATO, some of the exact
kinds of problems that have led our intervention in Bosnia. I
think that we are helping to prevent those kinds of conflicts.
Also, while article V does mean that there is collective
defense, not all military activities within the NATO structure
are article V, or require that kind of response. So I would say
to you that while we do not have a crystal ball, the trends are
downward in the number of forces that the United States has in
Europe, and that the enlargement of NATO is one way to prevent
the kinds of conflicts such as Bosnia.
Chairman Stevens. Senator Leahy.
Enlargement costs
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I noticed that CBO says the cost of NATO expansion in
fiscal year 1999 will include $110 million from the foreign
operations budget. Is that amount included in the Defense
Department's estimate of the cost of NATO expansion for that
year?
Secretary Cohen. I am sorry?
Senator Leahy. There is $110 million for NATO expansion
that is going to have to come out of the foreign operations
budget. That $110 million, that is just for 1 year, fiscal year
1999. Is that amount in the Defense Department's estimate of
the cost of NATO expansion? Does anybody know?
Secretary Cohen. No.
Secretary Albright. It is in the State Department budget.
Senator Leahy. I know that, but is that $110 million on top
of what the Department of Defense predicts for expansion, or is
it within the amount that you have predicted?
Secretary Cohen. I think it would be part of that, but I
would have to go back and double check on it.
Senator Leahy. Could you double check because we are
talking about military grants, loans, training funds, and so
on. If we are going to spend $110 million of foreign ops money,
we want to know if it is in addition to what you are
predicting.
Secretary Cohen. It is separate.
Senator Leahy. OK. Could you provide, then, for the
committee exactly how that breaks down and how much both of you
expect to request for fiscal year 1999 for NATO expansion and
if there are programs that are going to have to be cut to do
that?
Antipersonnel landmines
Let me ask you another question that occurred to me as I
was coming here this morning. The day after the Nobel Peace
Prize was awarded to the International Campaign to Ban Land
Mines, President Yeltsin announced that Russia would sign the
land mine treaty. I do not know if he means it when the other
100 nations come to Ottawa to sign it in December or not.
To your knowledge, has the administration done anything to
either discourage or encourage Russia from signing the treaty?
Madam Secretary.
Secretary Albright. We have, as you know, all along been
trying to get a ban on antipersonnel land mines.
Senator Leahy. I understand that.
Secretary Albright. But we have not specifically done one
or the other.
Secretary Cohen. The answer is no.
Senator Leahy. Have we sought to encourage or discourage
Japan from signing the treaty in Ottawa in December?
Secretary Albright. We have not. I think that it will be
important for our experts to talk about how the signing of the
treaty will affect their obligations under the defense
guidelines.
Senator Leahy. So it is your understanding that prior to
Ottawa we will be having discussions with Japan on whether they
should or should not sign the treaty as written?
Secretary Cohen. I would like to answer that. I would hope
we would have discussions with Japan and virtually every other
member of NATO who is contemplating signing the treaty in terms
of how to reconcile the NATO Treaty obligations with the
banning of antipersonnel land mines. If it is going to prevent,
for example, those who do not sign from carrying out their
article V agreements, I think we have to clarify that, yes.
Senator Leahy. So then you would be in a position, as it is
now written, to discourage NATO members from signing.
Secretary Cohen. Not at all. What I want to know is whether
or not the treaty they are signing, if they intend to sign in
Ottawa, would override their article V obligations to NATO.
That would be a very important issue.
Senator Leahy. So you expect to be having those
conversations with the NATO countries between now and the
signing time in Ottawa?
Secretary Cohen. I would hope so.
Senator Leahy. Well, hope so or will have.
Secretary Cohen. I would encourage that, yes.
Senator Leahy. Is the United States putting pressure on
Australia, one last country, one way or the other, prior to
signing?
Secretary Cohen. The answer is no.
Secretary Albright. No; we have, Senator, just met with the
Australians. We did not. I just had a conversation with the
Japanese 2 days ago and I did not. And, as Secretary Cohen has
said, there needs to be some clarification, but no pressure.
Senator Leahy. And if in your judgment their signing would
not be consistent with their NATO obligations, would you make a
recommendation to them one way or the other whether they should
sign or not?
Secretary Cohen. I would like to make my own position very
clear. I think the President made the right decision in not
signing the treaty as drafted. I think it will put our troops
in serious jeopardy. Frankly, each country will have to make
its own decision. But I think they should sign this. If they
sign it, with full knowledge that if there is conflict between
article V obligations of the NATO Treaty or other
relationships, they should know about it before and not find
ourselves in a situation later.
Senator Leahy. That was not my question. I understand the
DOD's position on this, just as I have pointed out to the
President that if the administration had gotten into the
negotiation at the beginning, they probably would have reached
agreement and we would be signing in December.
But my question specifically was this. If you felt, after
talking to our NATO allies that their signing would be
inconsistent with their NATO obligations, would you make any
recommendation to them either way whether they should sign or
not?
Secretary Cohen. If I have a chance to talk to any of my
counterparts, I would point out that this is an area that we
have to discuss. If there is a conflict, we should know about
it before they sign rather than after, and then have to
reconcile the differences.
Senator Leahy. I will repeat the question.
Chairman Stevens. Senator, sorry. Your time has expired.
Senator Leahy. I would resubmit the question, then, for the
record, because frankly, Mr. Chairman, the Secretary has not
answered my question.
Chairman Stevens. Well, you will have another time around.
Senator McConnell.
NATO-Russia relations
Senator McConnell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As we all know, the Russians trained, financed, and
supported the Abkhaz succession movement. This is really a
question to either of you or both. What is your view of
Russia's regional ambitions today and the role that NATO might
play in that regard?
Secretary Albright. Well, it is a rather large question.
Senator McConnell. Well, take a shot at it.
Secretary Albright. Let me say that basically it is a
little different in each of their regional areas. They have, in
fact, been working with us, for instance, all of us together,
on resolving the Nagorno-Kharabakh issue, the Armenian-
Azerbaijani issue. On Georgia, we have been talking with them,
and there is a U.N. operation there also.
I think there is discussion generally, which I think will
become a larger part of the discussion, as to how we do
peacekeeping operations together. Secretary Cohen has talked
about Bosnia a little bit. I think that these are the kinds of
future discussions that we might have. But I think their
general picture at the moment is that they would like to see a
certain amount of stability on their borders.
Senator McConnell. Secretary Cohen, do you want to answer?
Secretary Cohen. Well, what we have tried to do is continue
a process that was initiated by Bill Perry when he was
Secretary of Defense, to establish strong military-to-military
ties and contacts. That was initiated with Bill Perry and I
have tried to continue that.
We have the Nunn-Lugar funds, which I think you made at
least oblique reference to in terms of what kind of
complications we might have in seeing a continuation of the
funding, in view of the fact that there have been some
allegations and stories about sales of weapons going into Iran.
But the Nunn-Lugar funding is very important to continuing that
relationship.
There has been a deterioration in their conventional forces
which has prompted some of their military officials to say that
in order to compensate for our deficiencies, we will just turn
to a tactical nuclear weapons or first-use type of strategy.
This is something that we would try to discourage very strongly
and hope that that does not take place. But in order to do
that, we have to maintain these relationships.
I met with the new minister, Sergeyev, and I also met with
the former minister, Rodianov, to impress upon him--I should
say them--the importance of ratifying START II. Minister
Sergeyev is a strong proponent of ratifying START II. I think
if they see it as in their interest to try to lower the
tensions, to build better relations, to try to get their
economy rationalized, to continue on the road that President
Yeltsin is on, and to rebuild their country with the proud
heritage it has had over the years, they will sign.
Senator McConnell. If I may, let me come back to you,
Secretary Albright. I had an opportunity, as you and I
discussed a couple of weeks ago, to visit the refugee camps in
Armenia and Azerbaijan during August. I am wondering, even
though I had mentioned the Abkhaz problem in my question, I
wondered if you could give me an update on the Minsk group, how
those discussions are coming and whether or not you believe we
are going to be able to play a major role in finally settling
the Armenian-Azerbaijan problem.
Secretary Albright. There is a three-way co-chairmanship
among the Russians, the French, and us. At that particular
discussion now, Strobe Talbott is our representative there. I
think there has been some progress on it.
I talked to Foreign Minister Primakov about it when we were
in New York during the U.N. General Assembly. There are some
hopeful signs. But it goes back and forth, I have to tell you
frankly. But the procedure, the process now, we believe is more
productive than it was previously in the Minsk group.
Senator McConnell. In your view, the Russians are playing a
positive role on those discussions, are they?
Secretary Albright. Yes; I would say so.
Senator McConnell. Do you think they would like to see this
dispute settled?
Secretary Albright. I think they would like to see it
resolved, and I know we would.
Senator McConnell. During the Permanent Joint Council
meetings, will Russia have any access to sensitive material
pertaining to force structures or military capabilities of
current, prospective or aspiring NATO members?
Secretary Cohen. The answer to that is no.
Senator McConnell. As I understand it, there is an ongoing
process by which any country having an interest in joining the
alliance can request individual meetings with current NATO
members and staff to discuss qualifications for acceptance. As
those requests for meetings occur, is Russia advised of those
meetings? Or do you know?
Secretary Cohen. Not to my knowledge. In fact, I recently
returned from Bulgaria and have talked with all of the
officials there. They are very interested at some future time,
assuming their economy allows it, and assuming their reforms
take place, to also request admission into NATO. And there is
no request coming from me or from the Defense Department that
we notify any Russian official about this.
Senator McConnell. So any information from these sessions
then would not be supplied to the Permanent Joint Council and
the Russians would not be involved in these discussions
regarding new membership in NATO through the Permanent Joint
Council?
Secretary Albright. That is not part of the agenda as it
was established at the Permanent Joint Council meeting we just
had.
Senator McConnell. So when you say, Madam Secretary, they
will have a voice, not a veto, that does not include briefings
about prior discussions between NATO and possible members?
Secretary Albright. They will not, Senator, have a part in
deciding who the new members of NATO will be, just as they have
not had a part in deciding the invitations that have been
issued this time.
What is established is a consultative mechanism on how we
can do preventive diplomacy. We are looking at a variety of
ways that the NATO members, plus Russia, can coordinate
activities. But if we disagree, then NATO will do its own
thing. But this does not enable them to be a part of intra-NATO
discussions and membership of new members is one of those kinds
of discussions.
Chairman Stevens. Senator, I am sorry. It is Senator
Hutchison's turn.
U.S. contributions to NATO
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Recently the President used his line item veto to veto
around $300 million of military construction projects, which
included projects such as operational headquarters
enhancements, ammunition storage facilities, corrosion control
facilities, maintenance facilities, almost all of which were in
our Department of Defense 5-year plan. At the same time, he
signed into law military construction of $150 million for NATO
enhancements, many of which were the same as he vetoed in U.S.
projects.
I think it is a concern when we are looking at costs that
we are assured that our priorities for our readiness to be able
to fight and win two major regional conflicts, I think
simultaneously, I think the administration believes nearly
simultaneously. I think these two are beginning to look like
priority issues. Are we going to spend so much on NATO
expansion? Are we going to prioritize NATO projects over U.S.
projects that are in our 5-year plan? And how would you
reconcile, Mr. Cohen, those kinds of vetoes? Is that something
that we are going to look forward to for the next 10 years if
we expand NATO?
Secretary Cohen. I think that obviously the President is
going to want to support those projects which strengthen U.S.
capability to provide our global commitments. To the extent
that NATO enlargement would be part of that, he is also going
to support those projects which would help strengthen that.
I think there is perhaps some confusion over the status of
some of the military construction projects. That is under
review right now by the administration as to whether there was
sufficient information on several of the projects in terms of
their progress, and whether they could have been executed in
this fiscal year.
But I think that to the extent we strengthen our full
capability of meeting these two major regional conflicts
simultaneously or nearly simultaneously has to be our top
priority. To the extent that an enlarged NATO also is part of
that responsibility, then obviously they would have to
coincide.
United States in Bosnia
Senator Hutchison. Well, my concern comes from the efforts
in Bosnia as well. I certainly think that the American people
will support operations like Bosnia on a short term, where we
see a chance for success. But if you are looking at extending
this, which both Secretary Albright and others in the
administration have indicated that we are going to stay beyond
June of next year, and that there is no exit strategy that we
have been given, I think this becomes a real concern about
whether we are going to be taking from our own readiness and
our ability to address issues in the Pacific, as mentioned by
our chairman, in the Middle East, in other concern areas around
the country.
How are you going to reconcile this and add another layer
such as this one? How do you reconcile that?
Secretary Cohen. I believe the committee has already spoken
on that issue. The committee, in passing its appropriation
bill, indicated that the funds for Bosnia at least would
terminate at the end of June 1998 unless the President were to
come forward with a proposed plan for deployment of troops--how
many, how long, what the impact would be upon readiness and
morale--and submit a supplemental request.
So I think the committee has already spoken on that issue.
But I think that the President, myself, Secretary Albright have
indicated the SFOR mission will end as such in June 1998. The
President has stated that the international community, of which
the United States is a part, will have a long-term interest in
stability in that region, what form that will be manifested has
to be determined, and Congress is going to play a co-equal role
in determining that.
Senator Hutchison. I am glad to hear you say that. So you
are then indicating that Congress is going to have a role, that
you take seriously the bill that was just passed saying that
there would be a supplemental appropriation and, hopefully, a
strategy for how we would succeed and what would be success so
that we would know when we would be able to leave?
Secretary Cohen. That is what the committee's bill
required.
Secretary Albright. Let me associate myself with that, so
that there is no sense of any different position. We have made
that quite clear, that the SFOR mission will end in the summer
of 1998, and that, as the Secretary has stated, there will be
some kind of international presence. No decisions have been
made that you will not be a part of.
Senator Hutchison. Well, I think that is important, because
we have seen now, with the operations in Bosnia, that the
administration changes the name of the mission and then goes
forward into staying there. And changing the name of the
mission is not going to end the commitment.
What we want to know is what do you envision as a policy,
what are the chances for success, what will be success, and
when can we exit. And changing the name from SFOR to something
else is not the answer. It is what is our long-term commitment
and will it take from our readiness.
Chairman Stevens. Senator, your time has expired.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you.
Chairman Stevens. Senator Bumpers.
Reform in Russia
Senator Bumpers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, let me say to both of you that you speak
extremely well and make the most persuasive case for
ratification of the treaty. I remember in 1978 Senator Henry
Bellman from Oklahoma, a man whom I really admired greatly,
after most of us had made long, lengthy speeches about why we
should ratify the Panama Canal Treaties, about an hour before
we voted got up and said, in less than 60 seconds, that he was
going to vote for the treaties because he thought we ought to
treat the Panamanians the way we would like to be treated,
which summarized the whole thing.
My view on this whole thing is probably more visceral than
it is cerebral. I think about an old farmer one time in my
State, when we had boycotted further grain shipments to Russia,
which you both remember very well. And one night in a meeting
he said, ``I think a fat, happy Russian is a lot less threat to
us than a starving Russian.'' I thought that was a very cogent
thought.
Now what we want is an economically vibrant, democratic
Russia, and we think that that would redound to our benefit. My
own visceral feeling is that if I were a Russian I would feel
that NATO expansion was designed to further hem me in, not to
assist me in building a democracy.
Let me say that, if the Russians feel threatened enough, I
think history shows that they will penalize their efforts to
build a vibrant economy in favor of building their military
forces back up. Now, some people fear that, because its economy
and conventional military forces are in a shambles, Russia will
respond to NATO expansion by putting more reliance on its
nuclear forces and on tactical nuclear weapons as a substitute
for conventional forces.
Secretary Cohen, let us just assume for the moment that
that is a true statement, that that proves to be the case. Is
the United States more secure if we lower the nuclear
threshold?
Secretary Cohen. No; we are not more secure if the
threshold is reduced, but that is not the situation. In my
discussions with Minister Sergeyev, for example, a head of the
strategic rocket forces who is now the minister of defense, he
strongly favors ratifying START II so that we can go on to
START III to lower the level of nuclear weapons in both of our
arsenals. It is in Russia's interest. He knows that. It is in
our interest, and we know that.
And that is the reason why we are keeping up these strong
contacts. It is the reason why, for example, we had Mr.
Primakov come over to meet with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
the tank. It is the reason why we invited the former minister
of defense to come and talk to us. We think that we are
persuading them that this is not directed in a hostile way
against Russia but, rather, we are hoping to spread more
prosperity and stability so that there will be less tension in
Europe rather than more.
So we think we can make that case, and we think we need the
leadership of President Yeltsin and Sergeyev and Chubias and
others, and that is the reason Secretary Albright has spent so
much time on this issue and dealing with her Russian
counterparts, the reason that I am spending so much time.
Senator Bumpers. But they have not ratified START II yet,
and they certainly have not ratified START III, and the
Communists are very dominant in the Duma right now and for the
foreseeable future it does not look like they are going to
ratify it.
Secretary Cohen. Well, I would tend to disagree. I think
that there are some very positive signs about that. I think
that we are moving ahead with negotiating with the Russians on
this, and it is in their self-interest. I think if you have the
minister of defense, who enjoys a very high reputation with all
of his military counterparts and with the President and, my
understanding is, with the Duma, that that makes a powerful
case for ratification because it is in their interest to ratify
it.
Threats in Europe
Senator Bumpers. Secretary Cohen, what is the threat to
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary?
Secretary Cohen. There is no current military threat from
Russia at this point or from any other country. What we have
seen is the threat in the future or in that region of central
Europe has been the question of instability. Peter Rodman
testified before the House National Security Committee, I
believe, recently and pointed out that what has been the threat
has been the location. Geography has positioned them between
two very large powers--one, Russia, one Germany.
Historically the countries--Poland, the Czech Republic,
Hungary--have been caught between either German and Russian
competition or German-Russian collusion. In any event, they
have found themselves oppressed in a way that none of us would
find tolerable.
So what it is is an opportunity for these countries to join
the Western family as such, or the European community of
freedom, stability, prosperity, and, hopefully, that will
produce even greater security for Russia as well.
Senator Bumpers. Mr. Chairman, let me make this closing
thought. Zbig Brzezinski has a new book out, which I thought
was rather impressive, in which he theorizes that anarchy is
always just a step away. I do not mean literally, but anarchy
is always a threat to the planet.
He theorizes that the only way you are going to be able to
stop that for the foreseeable future is for the United States
and the Eurasian continent to always have mutual defense
treaties and economic treaties which allow a certain amount of
prosperity and mutual interest in keeping peace everywhere.
And he also says in the book that that must include Russia,
and you must have an accommodation with China. I agree with
both those premises. And it seems to me that NATO expansion
causes me a great deal of pain on that point.
Secretary Albright. Could I respond, Mr. Chairman? I think
that we have been very conscious of what you have spoken about
here. First of all, how to allow these new countries to become
members of NATO, but at the same time not have Russia have a
sense of isolation. And that is why the Founding Act, I think,
has played a huge role in this.
The predictions about the Russians are not coming true. The
first meeting of this Permanent Joint Council was remarkable in
the way that the Russians were able to participate in the
discussion. Second, we know that they do not like NATO
enlargement, but they are finding a variety of other ways to
work with us and, as the Secretary has said, both Foreign
Minister Primakov and Defense Minister Sergeyev are now pushing
for the START Treaty to be ratified by the Duma because it is
to their advantage.
If I might say, I was working for Senator Muskie at the
time that Senator Bellman made that statement. Then I did work
for Zbig Brzezinski. Muskie said I had the great distinction of
being the only woman in the world that had gone from pole to
pole. [Laughter.]
I can tell you that Brzezinski is for the expansion of
NATO, as he sees it within that construct and also in the way
that the Permanent Joint Council is working.
So while you are not going to see the Russians applauding
the enlargement of NATO, they are, in fact, developing a very
good working relationship with us on a whole set of issues that
show a new relationship that is being now institutionalized in
the PJC.
Chairman Stevens. Senator Bennett.
Russia's reaction to enlargement
Senator Bennett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have enjoyed this a great deal and I hope I have learned
something. You are both familiar with Michael Mandelbaum's
piece called ``NATO Expansion: A Bridge to the 19th Century.''
I read it with great interest. We do not have the time to go
through all of his points to give you an opportunity to
respond, but let me pick out a few of them and get your
reactions to them, because I think he has been very thoughtful
in putting this together.
He says the prospect of expansion has already damaged the
West's relations with Russia, that it is not necessary to go
ahead with expansion. There has already been some damage, and
he cites some evidence to support that.
Let us suppose for just a moment that the treaty is
defeated. What would your crystal ball, however clouded and
unfunded it may be, tell you would be the response in Russia?
Assuming for just a moment that Dr. Mandelbaum is correct,
would there be a recovery of damage that may have been done or
has the damage been done, in which case the argument could be
made we might as well go ahead because we have already had the
problem?
Suppose the Senate rejected the treaty. What do you think
would be the reaction?
Secretary Albright. Well, thank you for asking that. I
think it is a very interesting question. First of all, I would
like to revert as much to my professor role as to my Secretary
role in this speculation.
Senator Bennett. That is what we all need.
Secretary Albright. I would say the following. First of
all, we have made very clear why NATO enlargement is important
and in the U.S. national interest and why it is important to
the countries that have been invited. There are those that say
that this gives solace to the extremists in Russia. I would say
that if this treaty is defeated, that gives solace to the
extremists in Russia. They will say that they are able to yet
again be in a position to manipulate Russian foreign policy,
and it would show that the Russians do have a voice over what
the United States and our allies would like to do in central
and Eastern Europe.
So I would say the opposite of what we want would happen,
that it, in fact, would give a great deal of strength to the
extremists that they had been able to do this.
I had a discussion with President Yeltsin, who says that he
wants us to see a new Russia, and we do see a new Russia and
that requires them to see a new NATO. And this new NATO is not
a threat to Russia. It is not designed in that way. It is
designed to deal with the problems of instability in central
and Eastern Europe, and those would be magnified if this treaty
were turned down.
I also totally disagree with Dr. Mandelbaum, who is a
professor and not in the Government, and I would note that our
position vis-a-vis Russia has not in any way deteriorated as a
result of our going forward with this.
Senator Bennett. Do you have anything to add to that?
Secretary Cohen. No; I think the Secretary of State has
said it very well. But I just point out I have enormous respect
for Michael Mandelbaum, but I also would point out what a great
country we live in that we can have brilliant intellectuals who
disagree with each other without penalty. We have Henry
Kissinger, who feels that we should enlarge NATO, but even
larger than we are currently contemplating, has a disagreement
in terms of the NATO-Russia charter, which we have talked
about.
But you have brilliant minds in this country and scholars
who each can have different opinions. I respect his opinion,
but I happen to disagree with him.
Military purchases and requirements
Senator Bennett. One of the issues that I heard from the
defense minister in Germany had to do with the speed with which
the new entrants into NATO would be equipped with modern
weapons. He made the comment that they do not need the very
latest and fanciest right away and that this could be a fairly
significant cost saving if you moved into this slowly.
Do you have a comment on that concept?
Secretary Cohen. Well, as a matter of fact, it is
contemplated that there will be an initial capability within
the first couple of years, but to have a mature military
capability to allow the full integration will take roughly 8 to
10 years. We contemplate that.
And, as the chairman has indicated before, we first have to
focus on training their personnel, upgrading their NCO corps,
language training, interoperability, and all the things prior
to getting into new, expensive equipment.
CIA resignation
Senator Bennett. One last question that has nothing
whatever to do with NATO expansion but takes advantage of your
being here. Gordon Oehler, who has headed the CIA's
nonproliferation center for more than 5 years, rather abruptly
announced his retirement. Do you attach any significance to
this? Is this a signal of any kind of attitude in the
administration toward proliferation and tracking proliferation?
I know we have talked on proliferation issues at other times
when you have been before the committee and I wanted to raise
this and give you an opportunity to comment.
Secretary Albright. Let me just say I know nothing about it
beyond what I read in the paper today. But I can also tell you
that dealing with proliferation is the highest priority item of
this administration, and we have made that clear across the
board in our dealings with countries and we will continue to do
so. I can assure you of that, Senator.
Senator Bennett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Stevens. Senator Harkin.
Open door policy
Senator Harkin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate your testimony and your responses to the
questions. I have listened as carefully as I have been able to
during this period of time.
I find myself in much the same position as Senator Bumpers.
I am not certain. I can see benefits to it. I have always
believed in the old adage that democracies do not attack one
another, and to the extent that we can put an umbrella over
democracies and bring them together into mutual defense
treaties, that is probably the best thing that we can do.
On the other hand, if you look at Russia and the other
countries and their histories, it raises some severe questions
about the total cost and what the impact will be down the road
on our relations with Russia.
There are two parts to my question. One, Secretary Cohen, I
want to get back to the weapons thing that we talked about, but
before that I want to talk about NATO expansion. What we are
talking about is three countries. That is all we are talking
about. But we always talk in terms of expanding beyond that.
What is contemplated, if this passes the Senate? When will
you be back again? When will this administration be back again
to ask for further expansion of NATO? How soon do we
contemplate that?
Secretary Albright. Senator, we have said that this is an
open door, and that all democracies and market economies in
Europe are eligible for this. But we have also made clear that
the next tranche would not be until 1999, if, in fact, there
are those that are ready to assume the responsibilities and
privileges of NATO membership.
I think it is very important here to think about the fact
that we cannot allow a line that was created at the end of the
Second World War to continue to dominate our view of Europe. We
need to see a free, democratic, and unified Europe, which I
believe is in America's national interest, and to have this be
static does not allow us to do that. And I do not think that we
should allow this artificial line that was created to be the
one that continues to be maintained.
Senator Harkin. I guess I am concerned about who can be
considered as new NATO nations. Could any member of the
Partnership for Peace be eligible?
Secretary Cohen. The answer is yes. Those who are, in fact,
engaging in the Partnership for Peace program are ones who are
trying to prepare themselves for future membership. But it is
up to them. You have, for example, Ukraine. Ukraine engages in
Partnership for Peace exercises. I attended one this summer.
They have not expressed any interest in joining NATO. But
they could at some future time. It will depend upon those
countries requesting admission. Then the question will be
whether the remaining NATO institution itself would agree.
There is no boundary as far as we are concerned. Those
countries who measure up by virtue of what they have done with
their economies, their societies, their militaries, if they
share our values and want to become part of NATO, would be open
for recommendation. Then a judgment would have to be reached by
consensus of all of the existing NATO members as to whether
they should be admitted, subject to ratification by the
parliaments.
Senator Harkin. So even Russia could be admitted?
Secretary Albright. Yes; technically.
Senator Harkin. And why should it not be?
Secretary Albright. Well, they have not----
Senator Harkin. Why should we not anticipate that down the
road bringing Russia in might be the best assurance that there
would not be a new dividing line.
Secretary Albright. We have, in fact, said that in
principle it is open to Russia. Russia has exhibited no
interest in becoming a member.
Senator Harkin. Not right now. None of us have this crystal
ball to see what they may be doing in the future.
Secretary Albright. I do think that we are all present at a
fantastic time where our imagination in many ways can be set
free in terms of looking at new institutional arrangements.
That is what we are doing every day in some form. And I find it
an exhilarating way of looking at a world that looks entirely
different from the one that we grew up with.
Senator Harkin. Well, let me put it this way. A lot of
time, signals are sent by things that people in one
administration or another says. Are any signals being sent
that, down the road, Russia could be a part of this?
Secretary Albright. The President has said, we have all
said, that actually the logic of this is that if they as a
democracy and a market economy, if down the line they would
like to be members of NATO, they could be. But it is definitely
hypothetical because they have said they are not interested.
Senator Harkin. But at least it is a possibility.
Defense spending
Second, on the weapons upgrades point that I raised, I know
what you are saying about getting in first with communications,
language training, command and control, and all that kind of
thing, but weapons systems do take long lead times, and, Madam
Secretary, you mentioned that the Czech Government, for
example, is increasing its defense spending by one-tenth of 1
percent of GDP a year for 3 years. Secretary Cohen, you
mentioned that also, and you said that they were going from 1.7
percent of GDP to 2 percent by the year 2000, or one-tenth of 1
percent per year.
You equated that to the equivalent of a 1-year increase of
17 percent, Secretary Albright, in the Czech Republic, a rise
of 17 percent by next year, the equivalent of a 1-year $40
billion increase in America's defense budget.
I just put in the margin of your written testimony, ``this
is good?'' I put a question mark. Is this good for the Czech
Republic? You say they have a dynamic economy. We have a
dynamic economy. What would happen if, Secretary Cohen, you
came up here next year and requested a $40 billion increase in
defense spending? It is not going to happen.
Secretary Cohen. I believe Secretary Weinberger did
precisely that during the Reagan years and was successful. A
lot depends on where you are starting from. The Czech Republic
is behind both Poland and Hungary in terms of their capability
at this point, but they have made it very clear that they
intend to reach that 2 percent level of GDP by the year 2000.
They have made a number of significant changes in recent weeks.
In fact, we pointed out that they were not allocating
enough of their military to a NATO commitment. Within a matter
of a couple of weeks, they now are allocating most of their
commitment of their military to NATO missions. So we have been
very pleased that they have been responsive to what we think
they need to do in terms of upgrading their capability to
eventually have that mature capability of being able to carry
out their article V requirements.
Economic conditions
Senator Harkin. Let me just say that in these countries
where the IMF has said you have got some real problems in terms
of loan repayments. I have not been to the Czech Republic. I
have been to others, and they have a lot of catching up to do
just in terms of their infrastructure--their sewers, their
roads, their bridges, their schools, their social structures,
everything. They have got a lot of catching up to do.
And so they have got to invest some money in
infrastructure. And if that is being taken away for the NATO
expansion, I have some real concerns as to what will happen in
those countries.
Secretary Cohen. If they were not included in NATO
expansion, they would still have defense requirements which
would be even greater, because then they would be outside of
the protective umbrella. As such, they might feel that they
have to go in a different direction to acquire the high tech
equipment which we are suggesting that they do not need at this
point.
Senator Harkin. So your point is that by including them in
NATO they will spend less than what they otherwise would.
Secretary Albright. Correct. President Havel has said that.
Chairman Stevens. Thank you, Senator. Senator Lautenberg.
Enlargement costs and burdensharing
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and thanks,
Secretary Albright, Secretary Cohen. We have quite an
impressive duo sitting at the table--formidable, I would say.
On balance, I am in favor of the expansion of NATO. I am,
however, concerned about a few things. I have always been
interested in burdensharing, because I do not always see our
relationships with some of our friends with whom we have
military alliances and, many of which are very prosperous
nations, as fair. Not until we tweaked them pretty hard did
they step up to the plate to carry their fair share of the
defense burden.
I listened carefully as Secretary Cohen talked about the
prospects that NATO expansion might cost less than originally
anticipated. But we have a fixed relationship of our share to
the total cost, and some of our allies are complaining that
they will not expand their share. It has come from France. It
has come from the United Kingdom, as I understand it. No?
Secretary Cohen. No.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, how about France? Can we agree on
that? Can we agree that France represents a fairly significant
example of reluctance to participate that could result in costs
passed along to the United States? Now if we see a decline in
the anticipated cost, will our share of those total costs stay
constant? Will our contribution go down?
Secretary Cohen. Our share will stay constant. Let me
respond.
Senator Lautenberg. Share constant but dollar value?
Secretary Cohen. Our dollar value will remain the same, as
will the percentage. We are looking at that $9 to $12 billion
figure which I mentioned initially. That is the one category
that involves NATO enlargement costs. The other two are
separate and apart. That is the figure that is likely to be
lower by virtue of what we have learned as far as the
capability of the three countries coming in.
The NATO countries, I spoke to the NATO ministerial
conference, and I indicated there are costs involved and
everybody will have to share in those costs. There will be
costs involved to the new members, to the existing non-U.S.
NATO members, in terms of reforming their military. And then,
when it comes to the enlargement, again it is about $1.8
billion in the NATO fund that we all contribute to.
Our portion of that is about $485 million for 1997. They
maintain--and there is no unanimity on this--the British
defense minister is reported in today's Washington Times, I
believe, as indicating if there are increases they will pay
their fair share of the increase. France had said it did not
feel there was any necessity for it. Germany has indicated they
could reprioritize and take lesser prioritized items and put
the money into the NATO common fund so that they could help
those three countries coming in.
It remains to be determined in terms of the defense
ministerial assessment. That will be done in December. I will
be happy to come back to you with some solid figures, as solid
as we can make them, before you have occasion to vote on this.
But I believe it is very clear to all of the NATO countries the
costs involved and they will all have to bear their fair share.
Senator Lautenberg. Right. But I am concerned about our
allies paying their fair share of the burden, recognizing
nonetheless that these are not the kinds of figures that break
the bank.
So if there is a decline in costs, do I hear you correctly
that our percentage share will stay the same? Or is it the
dollar amount that will determine how much we contribute?
Secretary Cohen. Well, the percentage, we still pay roughly
24 percent into the common fund. That is standard. The dollar
figures may come down because we may not have to reach that $9
to $12 billion figure.
Senator Lautenberg. It is simple enough. Therefore, it
would suggest that if costs go up, we will have the
responsibility of paying again our share and, thusly, more
dollars.
Secretary Cohen. As will they.
Senator Lautenberg. OK. I just would like to be able to
talk about this to my constituents as I try to prepare for
their questions.
What happens if countries decline to pay their fair share?
Those receivables, coming from a business background, must be
tough to collect.
Secretary Cohen. I turn them over to Secretary Albright.
Senator Lautenberg. I would be frightened of that, I would
say, if I was the debtor.
Secretary Cohen. Well, they have it in their own interests.
I mean, NATO functions as a consensus institution as such. We,
if we find that there are deficiencies, we point those
deficiencies out. For example, when I was in Maastricht, I said
I did not think they were moving ahead quite fast enough in
terms of the reforms that they needed to make, that they
pledged to make in 1991. It turns out that the British, of
course, have made significant improvements in their rapidly
deployable forces. They have about a 25,000-person capability
of deploying to the Persian Gulf, should that ever be
necessary, and sustain it.
The Germans are now putting together a rapid action force
that could be rapidly deployable. It will be about a 53,000-
person unit as such. Ten thousand will be stood up by next
year, by 1998. The French also have rapidly deployable forces
which they can deploy to Africa and elsewhere, which they are
doing.
And I might point out in terms of burdensharing you have
got France as the third largest contributor to SFOR, the United
Kingdom is the second largest contributor to SFOR. Germany now
has some 2,500 troops outside of German soil in Bosnia
contributing to that mission.
So we are seeing a lot of participation on the part of our
European friends.
Chairman Stevens. Senator, your time has expired.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, I close very quickly, Mr.
Chairman, by commending our witnesses and our friends here
today at the table for presenting a very cogent and persuasive
case.
Chairman Stevens. Thank you, Senator. Senator Inouye.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
apologize for being late. May I ask that my statement be made
part of the record?
Chairman Stevens. Yes.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Daniel K. Inouye
Mr. Chairman, I want to begin today by thanking you for
agreeing to hold this series of hearings on NATO enlargement. I
feel this is one of most serious issues to face our country
today.
Forty eight years ago, the United States determined that it
would serve our national interests to enter into a treaty with
our European allies to help guarantee peace in that region.
Since then, most would agree that the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization has been one of the clearest foreign policy
successes of this nation.
Each of the last ten Presidents has solidly supported the
NATO Alliance and our leadership role in that union. There has
never been a doubt about our national commitment to this
organization.
For nearly fifty years, NATO has in large measure been
responsible for keeping peace in Europe. Our men and women in
uniform were called upon twice this century to answer the
clarion call to help create, restore, and preserve democracy in
Europe. The losses faced by our nation in these bloody
conflicts were tragic. Since the creation of NATO none of
America's youth has been required to fight a major conflict in
that region.
Today, the situation in Europe seems much different than
that following World War II. Our most powerful European
adversary, the Soviet Union, has collapsed. While the dispute
in the Balkans might not lead one to proclaim that peace is at
hand, the man on the street no longer looks at Europe as the
potential trouble spot for this nation.
The question that we must now grapple with is what should
be the new role of the United States in the post-cold war era?
Some, including our esteemed witnesses here today will
argue forcefully that the United States must reaffirm its
commitment to European security. That such is the price of
global leadership. They contend that the United States should
embrace an expanding role for NATO, one that welcomes new
emerging democracies into this union.
It is their view that this is the clearest way to maintain
the peace in Europe. And, that it is the United States
strategic interest to support this objective.
Others maintain that the time for NATO is past. They argue
it is a relic focused on the Soviet Union. They contend that,
while the United States had a national interest in containing
and eventually defeating an expansionist Soviet Union, its
collapse has eliminated the need for the United States to take
an active role in intra-European matters.
Still others have argued that maintaining our role in NATO
is a good hedge against a future problem in that region, but
that does not argue for expanding NATO to include the former
satellite states of the Russian empire. And clearly, they
contend, it is not in the interest of the United States to pay
any amount to bring these countries into NATO.
Hopefully, at this meeting the witnesses can provide the
committee a detailed explanation of why this administration
supports NATO enlargement. Again, I thank you Mr. Chairman for
calling this hearing. This is a very important issue and I hope
the ensuing discussion will allow all members to better
understand the matter.
Russia's future
Senator Inouye. Madam Secretary, Mr. Secretary, I agree
that the circumstances of the latter one-half of the century
has placed upon us, whether we like it or not, the mantle of
global leadership. Global leadership is painful at times and
very costly. But I believe that it is in our best interest to
maintain that leadership.
And I agree with you that European security is an important
part of it. When NATO was originally conceived, we had an
adversary, the Russians, the Soviet Union. Today the picture
has changed, but still an important element is Russia. Mr.
Yeltsin at this moment seems very helpful to us. Do we have any
indication as to what sort of successor government we can
anticipate?
Secretary Albright. Well, it is our hope--more than a hope,
it is a projection--that basically as we work more with the
Russians and as we do what we can to help develop their
institutions, their democratic institutions, in a variety of
codes that we will add strength to the reform movement.
Democracy seems to be alive and well in Russia. There is a
lot of debate and discussion. There is the evolution of a
variety of institutions. And our policy is based on the fact
that we want to encourage those institutions so that whoever
the successor is is one who is grounded in more democratic
practices than we had seen previously.
United States role in NATO and Europe
Senator Inouye. Sorry I was not here to listen to the
discussions, but, Mr. Secretary, what would be the results if
the United States did not continue its leadership role in NATO
and began to withdraw our interest? What would happen in
Europe?
Secretary Cohen. I think we would see a replication of what
took place during the 20th century. After World War I, we
returned from our engagement in European affairs and we turned
our back on all of the sacrifices that were made. We allowed a
mechanized evil to run over much of Europe and found people
like yourself and Senator Stevens and others who were required
to make the same kind of sacrifices that perhaps your fathers
had made in World War I.
If we were to turn our back on being a world leader, then
we would find forces that could prove to unravel much of what
has been accomplished in the latter part of the 20th century.
We would find that there would be power centers that would seek
to fill the vacuum, that that would not be in our interest, and
we would find, inevitably, instability gathering momentum like
those storm clouds that Churchill talked about during the
1930's and 1940's.
I think that we would see great instability and possibly a
chaotic situation developing over a period of time. It is in
America's interest to be a global leader. If we sacrifice that
leadership or give it up, then we allow other powers who may
not share our values or our interests to take hold. I think
that would be a great abdication of our responsibility, be a
moral abdication.
Consensus in NATO
Senator Inouye. Madam Secretary, in the early days of NATO,
there was definitely a spirit of cooperation and enthusiasm. Do
you believe that that spirit still exists?
Secretary Albright. Senator, I do. First of all, Secretary
Cohen spoke about the number of activities that we do in common
with our NATO allies. I think we had a mini-discussion about
Bosnia. I have to say that we should see NATO's activities in
Bosnia as a major success and what has been accomplished there
as great steps forward.
In the meetings that I have attended of the NATO ministers
there is a sense of common purpose. There are disagreements, as
there are within, between and among democratic nations. But I
do think that there is a spirit of can-do within NATO, and a
desire to adapt to the post-cold war situation.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
Mr. Chairman, I commend you for holding these hearings.
Chairman Stevens. Well, I thank you, Senator, and thank the
two Secretaries. I feel a little frustration. I thought we were
going to talk about costs. We have been talking about a lot of
things other than cost. But I do want to ask you just two
questions, Secretary Cohen.
Enlargement costs
The ``Quadrennial Defense Review'' [QDR] did not
contemplate an enlarged NATO. Will we see a revision of that
based upon the concept of an enlarged NATO?
Secretary Cohen. As a matter of fact, the QDR did
contemplate an enlarged NATO, and that was factored in. We
estimated four new members, but only three in this. So it was
contemplated in the QDR. That assessment was made.
Chairman Stevens. I stand corrected. That was not my memory
of it, but I will go back and take a look at it.
United States troops in Europe
Well, if that is the case, we have approximately 100,000 of
our people on the continent today. Downstream, even at the
lower levels, it is projected in terms of the three nations
that they will provide about 200,000 more forces.
Secretary Cohen. About 300,000.
Chairman Stevens. 300,000. Well, then why can we not bring
some of our people home?
Secretary Cohen. Well, the question is always balancing
what signal that does, in fact, send. We have the 300,000 to be
contributed by the three new members, but we do not anticipate
forward-deploying any American troops on a permanent basis into
those regions. We would think, for example, we have a base that
we have the utilization of right now in Hungary, in Tazar,
where we train and retrain and upgrade the readiness of our
forces who are now in Bosnia.
We would anticipate having training missions in the Czech
Republic and also in Poland, but not permanent stationing of
American forces. So we think that by enlarging NATO we would
still have the same commitment that we have currently. We do
not see any reason why we would want to cut that commitment
back.
Readiness impact
Chairman Stevens. Well, I do not want to prolong this. I do
want to thank you both for coming. I just have the feeling as
we sit here looking at the defense plans we have less than one-
half of the ships that President Reagan thought we should have,
and they average 20 years of age. We are replacing three of
them this year. We have cut our B-2's down to less than one-
half of those we originally intended because of costs. Our B-
52's are retiring, as they should. They are being flown by the
grandsons of the people who built them.
I look at this as just being another added cost that will
further the deterioration of our ability to defend our national
interests. Bosnia certainly has been that. By the time it winds
up, even through July, we will have spent $8 to $9 billion we
did not contemplate in the prior 5-year plan prior to being
involved in Bosnia.
That quantifies into just so many ships we did not build,
so many planes we will not build, and so much modernization we
will not achieve. This is just another piece out of the armor
as far as I am concerned. I do not know how we can afford what
is being projected here without really cutting force structure,
and I do not see any indications that the Department has looked
at its force structure requirements as a result of an enlarged
NATO.
Have you?
Secretary Cohen. We have indeed. We contemplated
specifically enlargement of NATO in the QDR.
Chairman Stevens. In terms of reducing our capabilities?
That force structure was reduced as a result of the QDR.
Secretary Cohen. We are reducing force structure that was
considered to be unnecessary, but also to achieve some savings
and it was done in a moderate fashion. We took the force
structure mostly out of the support activities and not out of
the tooth, as such. We think we have got the right balance
right now.
Chairman Stevens. We will go into that tomorrow with the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. I do hope and I intend to keep the
questions to really the costs of this enlargement and its
impact upon our defense planning in terms of the hearings
tomorrow and on Thursday, when we get to the General Accounting
Office.
I am constrained to tell you that I have had requests from
three members who have not been able to ask questions to see if
we might arrange, sometime after the first of the year, a
return engagement for you two. That I know will be an
imposition, but we will try to work it out and limit the
questioning at that time to costs and how we are going to deal
with the problems of this committee with regard to
accommodating the impact of enlarged NATO on our defense plans.
Additional committee questions
But again I have to tell you I am being viewed as being an
opponent of an enlarged NATO. I am not an opponent of an
enlarged NATO. I am an opponent of additional drainage to the
funding stream for defense modernization, and I think the two
of us are getting very frustrated in our ability to maintain
this defense budget. We are operating under a cap, and anything
further that is going to increase costs is going to decrease
our ability to modernize. And that is to me a challenge that I
do not think the Department or the administration has met yet,
to tell us how can we afford what is going to come about as a
result of these plans.
But again we do thank you very much for coming.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted to Secretary Madeleine Albright
Questions Submitted by Senator Mitch McConnell
baltics
Question. What is United States policy regarding the entrance of
the Baltic countries into NATO?
Answer. At a press conference in Vilnius on July 13, following my
meeting with the three Baltic Foreign Ministers, I said the U.S.
welcomes Baltic aspirations and supports their efforts to join NATO
which can take place as they show themselves willing and able to assume
the responsibilities of membership and as NATO concludes that their
inclusion will serve the interests of the Alliance.
The Baltic states will have to meet the same high standards that
NATO has set for other aspiring Partners, but they will not be
disadvantaged due to their history or geography.
A year ago we launched our Baltic Action Plan to coordinate our
support aimed at integrating the Baltic states into European and trans-
Atlantic institutions.
We and the three Baltic governments recently completed negotiating
the text of the U.S.-Baltic Charter of Partnership. We have said
publicly that the Charter ``articulates a common vision for Europe
based on shared values. It is not a security guarantee. We are not
offering one; and they are not asking for one.'' We look forward to
signing the Charter in January.
At Bergen in September we launched our new three-track Northern
initiative: (1) strengthen U.S.-Baltic relations, helping them become
stronger candidates for integration; (2) promoting integration between
Northern Europe and Northern Russia; and (3) strengthen U.S.-Nordic
relations, expanding the U.S.-Nordic coalition to include Poland,
Germany and the EU.
We are also founding members of BALTSEA, a new group formed on
October 7 in Copenhagen to better coordinate military donor assistance
to the Baltic states. We intend to expand our own security assistance
program with the Baltic states to support their efforts to provide for
their legitimate security needs.
Question. As you know, we've provided $18.3 million to enhance the
Baltic capabilities. Can this Committee expect to see an increase in
military and economic assistance for these countries in the
Administrations' fiscal year 1999 budget request. If so, what specific
programs do you anticipate this assistance being used for?
Answer. For fiscal year 1998, we had planned to allocate $12.3
million for the three Baltic states (up from a total of $4.5 million in
fiscal year 1997). Most of this would go to cover the cost of
constructing the Regional Air Surveillance Coordination Center and
national nodes for airspace management. Your fiscal year 1998 earmark
provides more than enough to construct this facility and conduct
ongoing military assistance programs at existing or increased levels.
In fiscal year 1999, we will ask for increased authorization under
the Warsaw initiative program to both assure that NATO's first new
members will be successfully integrated and to provide more solid
support for those Partners who actively aspire to membership in the
future. For the Baltic states, we would budget a total of $15 million
to increase the activities and programs we already have. These programs
would be designed, based on a comprehensive State/DOD evaluation, to
help the Baltics provide for their legitimate defense needs as
sovereign European states. Much of this effort will also be geared
toward making the Baltic states more attractive candidates for NATO
membership in the future.
The programs supported by these funds could include: providing
peripheral support equipment for the regional airspace initiative;
supporting the deployment and expansion of the Baltic Peacekeeping
Battalion (BaltBat), a full schedule of PfP and bilateral exercises,
English language and officer training, procurement of tactical
communications equipment in support of BaltBat and Baltron, as well as
search and rescue.
NATO: GENERAL COSTS
Question. To address the concerns of countries not included in the
first round, the Administration has said we will strengthen Partnership
for Peace (PFP). The 1998 request was $70 million which was
supplemented by $20 million in loans to Central European countries.
If we are strengthening Partnership for Peace, what level of
support might we expect next year?
Answer. United States assistance through the Warsaw Initiative,
including Foreign Military Financing grants and loans (FMF), has been
instrumental in helping Partnership for Peace become an extremely
successful program for furthering cooperation between NATO and the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent
States.
Our fiscal year 1998 request for $70 million in FMF grants and $20
million in FMF loan subsidies will provide training and communications
and non-lethal equipment to our PFP partners to improve their
interoperability with NATO, continue their defense reforms, and
strengthen their regional cooperation.
In fiscal year 1999, we expect to request $100 million in FMF
grants and $20 million in FMF loan subsidies. This significant increase
in FMF grant funding will further one of the Administration's highest
priorities--NATO enlargement--by helping Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic meet the military requirements of NATO membership. This
funding will also further our Open Door policy by encouraging the
countries aspiring to NATO membership but not invited at Madrid to
further their aspirations and strengthen their compatibility and
cooperation with NATO.
We will be able to provide greater funding to the countries of
Southeastern Europe, including Romania, Bulgaria and the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, to encourage continued reforms, closer
regional cooperation, and greater stability. In the Baltics, our fiscal
year 1999 request will enable us to provide tactical communications
equipment in support of the Baltic Battalion, BALTRON (a Baltic naval
cooperative arrangement), and the Regional Airspace Initiative, as well
as search and rescue training.
Increased FMF will also enable us to strengthen the participation
of the eligible countries of the Newly Independent States in PFP. It
will build upon programs begun in fiscal year 1997, the first year NIS
countries were eligible for FMF, including providing English language
and NCO training, tactical communications and basic soldier equipment.
FMF will enhance regional cooperation through assistance to the Central
Asian Peacekeeping Battalion (Centrasbatt) and further Russian and
Ukrainian participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian activities and
operations.
Our fiscal year 1999 FMF loan subsidy request in support of the
Central Europe Defense Loan program will address deeper deficiencies
through qualitative improvements to eligible countries' defense
infrastructures.
Question. I was concerned about press reports from the July summit
that the French do not plan or expect to assume any additional costs
for NATO infrastructure improvements. Can you square their assertions
with your statement that current and new allies will bear 75 percent of
the costs for improvements?
Answer. NATO enlargement will entail some additional costs to
current members. At the NATO Summit in Madrid last July, all Allies
agreed that there would be costs, that the costs would be manageable,
and that the resources needed to meet them would be provided. We are
confident that the allies will meet their obligations.
Recently both senior British and German government officials placed
editorials in major American newspapers, stating that their governments
were pledged to provide their fair share of enlargement costs. On
October 21, British Secretary of Defense George Robertson stated in an
editorial in the Washington Times that ``[w]e all recognize that
bringing new members into NATO will incur a cost. * * * But if
additional spending is required, Britain will pay its share.'' On
November 4, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel stated in an editorial
in the Washington Post that ``[t]he debate on admitting new members
into the Alliance must take into account the political and military
rationale behind NATO enlargement * * * It goes without saying that
Europe and Germany * * * must bear their fair share of the costs of
NATO enlargement * * * This European contribution to the Alliance will
not drop with the admission of new members, but will further
increase.''
Our allies, including France, have a proven track record of meeting
their NATO responsibilities. The fact is that our NATO allies
consistently pay approximately 75 percent of all NATO common costs,
which includes infrastructure, while the U.S. pays about 25 percent.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg
CONFLICT WITH CBO ESTIMATES
Question. The U.S. has been providing roughly $100 million each
year in the Foreign Operations bill to help pay for expansion. The CBO
assumes that the U.S. will support the process of NATO expansion by
increasing the number of loans the U.S. subsidizes for the new members
to buy upgraded military hardware and by stepping up military-to-
military training and exercises. CBO estimates that these costs will
double. Why are these costs not included in the Administration's
estimate?
Answer. Relevant costs for such measures were included in the
Administration's estimate. For the February 1997 U.S. estimate of
enlargement costs, DOD developed enlargement requirements and then
estimated the costs for meeting those requirements. DOD assumed that
countries would pay for their own defense enhancements unless there was
evidence of likely assistance from other sources or where an
enhancement would likely qualify for NATO common funding. Estimated
U.S. enlargement costs included continued U.S. assistance for the
construction costs for Air Sovereignty Operations Centers under the
Regional Airspace Initiative and for language training through the
International Military Education and Training program. The United
States would share in additional costs only to the extent that the
United States, with Congressional approval, may choose to continue or
expand the current modest assistance being provided to the new
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.
The U.S. enlargement cost estimate also included costs for training
and exercises, including education in NATO languages and procedures for
new member forces, upgrades to existing exercise facilities in new
member countries, and transportation and operating costs for
incremental combined exercises tied specifically to enlargement.
COSTS BORNE BY U.S. TAXPAYER
Question. The Administration's estimate assumes that the costs to
new members and current allies will be borne by them with or without
NATO expansion. Shouldn't we apply the same standard to costs that will
be borne by the U.S. taxpayer out of the foreign operations bill and
include them in the overall estimate of the cost?
Answer. The Administration's estimate applied a consistent standard
of identifying costs relevant to enlargement, i.e. costs for
enhancements related to meeting the requirements outlined in the
February 1997 report. For those cases in which expenditures in the
foreign operations bill matched an identified requirement, the estimate
included them. We did not include in cost estimates military
requirements unrelated to an enlarged Alliance. Estimated U.S.
enlargement costs included continuing U.S. assistance for the
construction costs for Air Sovereignty Operations Centers under the
Regional Airspace Initiative and for language training through the
International Military Education and Training program. The United
States would share in additional costs only to the extent that the
United States, with Congressional approval, chose to continue or expand
the current assistance being provided to the new democracies of Central
and Eastern Europe.
The U.S. enlargement cost estimate also included costs for training
and exercises, including education in NATO languages and procedures for
new member forces, upgrades to existing exercise facilities in new
member countries, and transportation and operating costs for
incremental combined exercises tied specifically to enlargement.
PROSPECTIVE MEMBERS NOT EXPECTING LOANS
Question. Is there any evidence that prospective NATO members are
not expecting grants and loans from the U.S. for military upgrades?
Answer. With strong Congressional support, over the past four years
the United States has provided, under the Warsaw Initiative, grants to
countries of Central Europe, including those selected for NATO
membership. As set out in the appropriations for these grants and NATO
Participation Acts, one purpose was to prepare the countries which
received them for NATO membership. On that basis, Congress earmarked
significant portions of the grants to the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland. In addition, those three countries were eligible for loans as
well; to date we plan to make loans of $100 million to Poland and $80
million to the Czech Republic.
The Administration has requested continued funding for the Warsaw
Initiative in 1998 and will so do in 1999. While Poland, Hungary and
the Czech Republic will, of course, welcome these levels of continued
Warsaw Initiative funding through fiscal year 1999, we have created no
expectation for them of substantial additional increases. The
Administration has emphasized to each of these countries that they have
primary responsibility to fund the military restructuring and
modernization programs that are needed to bring their militaries up to
NATO standards. All three countries have demonstrated their willingness
to meet these responsibilities and are committed to putting sufficient
resources into their defense budgets. In addition, Warsaw initiative
funding will also be used to provide assistance to those countries not
included in this initial group of potential new members. We must
consider how these programs continue after the initial group actually
joins NATO.
NATO MEMBERS AGREE WITH ESTIMATES
Question. Do the prospective NATO countries agree with these
estimates?
Answer. Our European allies and prospective NATO members have
neither formally accepted nor rejected the Department of Defense's
notional estimate of enlargement costs contained in the President's
February 1997 Report to Congress.
In general, prospective members agree with the U.S. approach to
enlargement requirements and costs; they understand and have committed
to developing the capabilities required.
In their accession papers, the Czechs have agreed to pay a 0.9
percent national cost share of the NATO common budgets; Hungary has
agreed to a 0.65 percent national cost share; and the Poles have agreed
to a 2.48 percent national cost share.
nato costs estimates different from united states
Question. Why is there such a disparity between American and
European estimates about the cost of expanding NATO?
Answer. NATO's work on enlargement costs will be considered by NATO
Ministers at the December Ministerials.
The NATO cost study estimated costs of enlargement in all three of
NATO's common budgets; i.e., the civil, the military and the
infrastructure budgets. The NATO study generated a lower estimate of
NATO expansion costs than the earlier Department of Defense study for
the following main reasons:
--While the NATO study provided a more reliable estimate of common
costs, the study did not address other costs, such as the
national costs that old and new Alliance members will pay to
improve their military capabilities to meet the requirements of
an enlarged NATO. The DOD study included these costs;
--The Defense Department study was based on four new members, not
just the three that were actually invited;
--DOD cost analysis differed from NATO's methodology due to the
notional and illustrative nature of the previous DOD estimate
v. NATO's costing of specific requirements;
--Finally, the initial work being conducted by the NATO military
staff, based on actual visits to the countries, suggests that
the military infrastructure in the three invited states is more
readily usable by NATO than previously anticipated.
NATO MEMBERS TO INCREASE DEFENSE SPENDING
Question. NATO member countries have been paring defense spending
since the end of the Cold War, and our European allies have been
complaining about the U.S. cost estimate, saying that they won't pay so
large a share of the costs. President Chirac has said that Paris
intends to pay nothing extra for NATO expansion. The U.K. has said
America's cost estimates are 40 percent too high. The German Defense
Minister has called for a ``realistic calculation of costs, not on the
basis of the Cold War.''
I was encouraged by Secretary Albright's comments before the
Foreign Relations Committee on October 7 on the issue of burdensharing.
At that hearing, Secretary Albright said: ``I will insist that our old
allies share this burden fairly. That is what NATO is all about.''
Given the tough fiscal qualifications for entry into the European
Monetary Union, is it realistic to expect European members of NATO to
increase--rather than reduce--spending?
Answer. At the Defense Ministers meeting in Brussels in June 1997,
Ministers acknowledged that ``the admission of new members * * * will
involve the Alliance providing the resources which enlargement will
necessarily require.'' Later, in July at Madrid, all allies agreed that
there will be costs associated with the integration of new members,
that these costs will be manageable, and that the resources necessary
to meet these costs will be provided.
Recently, both senior European officials placed editorials in major
American newspapers, stating that their governments were pledged to
provide their fair share of enlargement costs. On November 4, German
Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel stated in an editorial in the Washington
Post that ``* * * It goes without saying that Europe and Germany * * *
must bear their fair share of the costs of NATO enlargement. * * * This
European contribution to the Alliance will not drop with the admission
of new members, but will further increase''.
assurance united states won't pay more than their share
Question. Under the Administration's current burden sharing
arrangement, the U.S. will pay for roughly 16 percent of the direct
NATO expansion costs. Current and prospective NATO allies will pay the
rest. As the cost estimates are refined during the upcoming months, can
you assure me that the American people will not be asked to pay a
greater share of the costs?
Answer. The estimate of the U.S. share of the costs of enlargement
were based largely on the distribution of cost in NATO's commonly
funded budgets: the civil budget, the military budget and the
infrastructure budget. Based on long-standing NATO financial
arrangements, the U.S. share is roughly 24 percent of each of these
budgets. This share will be adjusted slightly to take into account the
contribution of new members.
In addition, the U.S. also provides limited military modernization
assistance to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, as well as to
some other countries of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union
through the Congressionally-funded Warsaw Initiative. In fiscal year
1998, the Administration has requested $70 million in FMF grants and
$20 million in FMF loan subsidies for this program.
We should point out that the 16 percent figure mentioned in the
question came from an OSD report which included more than commonly
funded costs, but also what new member and current members must spend
directly to meet NATO defense requirements.
PLANS SUFFICIENT TO MEET THE COSTS
Question. The economic strength of the prospective NATO countries
is a mixed bag. GDP growth in Poland may reach 6 percent in 1996. On
the other hand, Hungary's economy experienced modest growth in 1994 and
1995, but it declined to 1 percent in 1996. In 1996, the Czech economy
grew by about 4 percent. However, GDP growth for 1997 was estimated to
drop to 2.7 percent. Although these prospective NATO countries need to
continue to focus on strengthening their economies, NATO expansion will
require them to spend additional resources on their defense budget.
Meeting the Administration's cost estimate will require the new
countries to increase their budgets by roughly 20 percent in real terms
over the next 15 years. Meanwhile, defense spending in each of the
prospective NATO countries has declined since the Cold War ended.
What evidence does the Administration have demonstrating that
prospective NATO members are planning to accommodate defense budget
increases over the next 10 to 15 years?
Are plans sufficient to meet the costs of NATO expansion?
Given economic pressures in each of the prospective NATO countries,
are these plans realistic?
Answer. NATO's Economic Committee, tasked with addressing the
macroeconomic forecasts in each of the invitee countries, has produced
a preliminary report which addresses this question. In the case of
Poland and the Czech Republic, substantial initiatives have been taken
in order to increase future defense expenditures. In the Czech
Republic, this will take place under the form of an annual addition to
the ``military expenditures'' share of the Ministry of Defense budget
of the equivalent of 0.1 percent of GDP until the year 2000. In Poland,
a new 15-year defense plan between 1998 and 2012 of $10 billion will
provide long-term funding, mostly in the field of modern equipment
procurement. In Hungary, long term decisions hinged on the outcome of
the recently completed referendum, but an increase of the defense
budgets by 0.1 percent of GDP from 1998 to 2001 has been announced.
The budget plans of the three countries have been analyzed using
various economic parameters and forecasts. Each country has its unique
economic challenges. Nonetheless, based on currently identified
military requirements, the Economics Committee has preliminarily
assessed that the defense plans are achievable and that enlargement
costs, while not insignificant, are affordable. NATO will continue to
work with the prospective members to ensure their budget plans account
for NATO military requirements.
PUBLIC OPINION
Question. Russian political leaders across the political spectrum
strongly oppose enlargement, although President Yeltsin apparently
concluded that he would rather work with the West than fight us. For
now, public opinion shows that among ordinary Russians, NATO
enlargement is not a significant issue.
Under what circumstances could you see public opinion in Russia
swinging in the opposite direction?
Answer. Our transparent and open approach to enlargement--and the
Alliance's emphasis on the fact that enlargement threatens the security
of no country--will help undercut any efforts to portray enlargement as
an issue which should concern Russians unduly or negatively affect
their lives or national security.
Regarding wide swings in Russian public opinion on enlargement, we
do not forecase such circumstances in the foreseeable future.
Most ordinary Russians do not consider NATO enlargement a salient
issue. Given the negative images of NATO that have been presented to
Russians for decades and the strong public sense of national decline,
there is at least a latent distrust of the Alliance among average
Russians. That sentiment has not gained much ground as Russians are
preoccupied with more immediate issues, such as the economy,
employment, and crime.
Question. Is any current or potential leader in Russia capable of
arousing public sentiment against expansion?
Answer. Some leaders, such as Communist Party leader Zyuganov and
nationalist leader Zhirinovskiy, have already sought to arouse public
sentiment against NATO enlargement, but without notable success,
largely due to the lack of interest among the Russian public in the
issue of NATO enlargement.
The ability of current or future leaders would depend in large
measure on the domestic political and economic situation. Presently,
social and economic concerns figure most prominently for most Russians.
There would be little obvious political advantage to be gained
presently by seeking to make enlargement a major issue, given that
there are no national elections on the immediate horizon.
MASS OPINION AND PUBLIC POLICY
Question. To what extent does mass public opinion in Russia
regarding NATO expansion have an impact on Russian government policy?
Answer. Public opinion mainly affects Russian government policy on
any international issue indirectly. For example, public dissatisfaction
with Russia's general status in the world played a significant role in
the way both President Yeltsin and his Communist opponent, Gennadiy
Zyuganov, positioned themselves in the 1996 presidential election.
Although the Russian government is sensitive to its assessment of
mass opinion, that fact remains that the Russian public is little
interested in NATO enlargement. Since there is little negative mass
public opinion on enlargement, there is a negligible effect on
government policy. Opposition to NATO enlargement is confined largely
to the Russian political elite.
RUSSIA'S ROLE IN NATO
Question. Regardless of what the Russians want, I am curious about
the long-term Administration thinking regarding Russia. Is the
Administration's ultimate policy goal to include Russia as a full-
fledged member of NATO? Is the relationship outlined in the NATO-Russia
Founding Act and permanent Joint Council sustainable over the long run?
What would the reaction to Russia as a full-fledged NATO member be
among current and prospective NATO members?
Answer. Russia has not expressed an interest in joining NATO, nor
has the United States or NATO been contemplating Russian membership in
the Alliance. The United States and its Allies have stated repeatedly,
most recently at the NATO summit in Madrid last July, that NATO
membership is open to all European democracies who express interest in
joining, meet the requirements for membership and whose inclusion the
Alliance believes will contribute to the overall security of its
members.
We believe there is value in not preemptively excluding any
European state from consideration for membership. For this position to
be credible, it must include Russia. But in reality, if we ever get to
the point where Russia and NATO are seriously talking about Russian
membership, it would be a very different world--a very different
Russia, and a very different NATO, in a very different Europe.
We continue to see great value in deepening cooperation between
NATO and Russia as outlined in the Founding Act. The Permanent Joint
Council provides us the framework to further develop NATO's deepening
relationship with Russia. But the PJC cannot substitute for the parties
themselves. Our success in realizing the goals described in the
Founding Act will depend on the sustained interest and commitment of
both NATO and Russia. We expect that, as the NATO-Russia relationship
yields benefits to both NATO and Russia, both parties will continue to
work together and seek additional opportunities to further build this
partnership.
OUT OF AREA INTERESTS
Question. In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on
October 7, Secretary Albright highlighted that, in addition to regional
defense, NATO agreed to adapt the alliance to meet ``out of area''
interests. Bosnia, as a non-NATO member without the guarantee of
Article V protection, is one example of an ``out of area'' operation.
Peacekeeping and crisis management beyond alliance borders are types of
missions I've heard to which new members might contribute. What does
``out of area'' mean exactly? Does it include the Middle East? Asia?
Answer. The current NATO ``Area of Responsibility'', or AOR, is
defined as the territorial integrity of the sixteen members of the
Alliance. ``Out of Area'' has never been formally defined by the
Alliance but has traditionally been judged by its members to be areas
that either border the Alliance or that can influence or threaten its
AOR. The Gulf War was not an ``out of area'' mission for NATO, but our
success in that operation relied heavily on work completed earlier by
NATO to ensure interoperability among allies. While there are currently
no circumstances in the Asian region which merit NATO's consideration
as an ``out of area'' mission, we cannot rule out the possibility for
doing so if a threat to NATO's AOR were to emerge.
Question. By what standards will participation in an ``out of
area'' operation be judged?
Answer. U.S. participation in an ``out of area'' operation will be
determined by U.S. national interests, and will be executed in
accordance with the USCINCEUR contingency plans. If an ``out of area''
operation is deemed to be in the U.S. National Security Interest as
stipulated through such a plan, the U.S. could conceivably contribute
to the operation. It is important to note that any such deployment
would have to be approved by the North Atlantic Council (in which the
U.S. participates with full veto powers) after formal consideration.
Question. Will NATO take on peacekeeping tasks that are currently
the responsibility of the United Nations? What tasks?
Answer. NATO may, on a case-by-case basis, take on peacekeeping
tasks as requested by and in coordination with the United Nations. The
ongoing NATO operations in Bosnia serve as an example of a United
Nations peacekeeping operation that was taken over by NATO. In this
instance, the NAC, acting upon a request for assistance by the U.N.
agreed to undertake the mission. Again, it would take a NAC decision to
implement any future operations of a similar nature.
CONSENSUS
Question. NATO has operated effectively by consensus. If the
organization grows--especially beyond the inclusion of the Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Poland many have expressed concern about its
ability to reach consensus.
How would consensus be reached in an organization that is almost
double the size of the existing organization?
Answer. NATO has met the challenge of growth in an organization
that works by consensus before. NATO has added four countries at
different times since its inception and has been fully able to
accomplish its goals without compromising its commitment to consensus
decision making. The countries we are adding now share our perspective
on security, NATO's mission and goals, and the need to keep the
organization's effectiveness and efficiency strong. Future NATO members
will also need to share these attributes before they will be invited to
join the Alliance. Thus, we have no concerns about the ability of a
larger, stronger Alliance to reach consensus on the issues it
considers.
ALLIES PAY LESS, WE PAY MORE
Question. I understand that the Administration position is that the
U.S. will pay no more than 15 percent of the costs, leaving the lion's
share to our NATO allies. However, our European allies seem to
disagree. To quote the British Defense Ministry, ``the accession of new
members to [sic] result in a proportionate reduction in the U.K. share
of NATO common budgets.'' Other NATO nations seem to agree with this
point. If our allies expect to pay less for NATO, doesn't it follow
that we will pay more?
Answer. At the NATO Summit in Madrid last July, all Allies agreed
that there would be costs, that the costs would be manageable, and that
the resources needed to meet them would be provided. We are confident
that the allies will meet their obligations. Our allies have a proven
track record of meeting their NATO responsibilities. The fact is that
our NATO allies consistently pay approximately 75 percent of all NATO
common costs, which includes infrastructure, while the U.S. pays about
25 percent.
Recently, both senior British and German government officials
placed editorials in major American newspapers, stating that their
governments were pledged to provide their fair share of enlargement
costs. On October 21, British State Secretary for Defense George
Robertson stated in an editorial in the Washington Times that ``[w]e
all recognize that bringing new members into NATO will incur a cost * *
* But, if additional spending is required, Britain will pay its
share.'' Most recently, on November 4, German Foreign Minister Klaus
Kinkel stated in an editorial in the Washington Post that ``[t]he
debate on admitting new members into the Alliance must take into
account the political and military rationale behind NATO enlargement *
* *. This European contribution to the Alliance will not drop with the
admission of new members, but will further increase.''
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Harkin
PUBLIC OPINION
Question. While public opinion regarding the question of NATO
expansion has been consistently strong in Poland, it has been weaker in
the Czech Republic and Hungary. What do the public opinion polls in
each of the prospective countries indicate about the resilience and
durability of the public's support for NATO membership, especially if
public sacrifice is required?
Answer. The turnout in Hungary's November 16 referendum
demonstrates that there is strong and resilient support for NATO
throughout Central Europe and not just in Poland.
NATO enjoys popular and multi-partisan political support in all
three countries. The governing coalitions in each country are strongly
pro-NATO and no mainstream party in any of the countries opposes NATO
membership.
--In Poland, opinion polls routinely show that over 80 percent of
citizens support their country's integration into NATO.
--In Hungary's Referendum, 85 percent of the voters supported their
country's integration with NATO.
--Recent USIA polls show that almost 60 percent of Czechs favor NATO
accession. 29 percent of Czechs oppose NATO membership.
In both Hungary and the Czech Republic, there has been a
substantial increase in public support since NATO extended an
invitation to these nations at the July Madrid Summit. As the public
grows more knowledgeable about NATO and sheds Cold War images of the
Alliance as an offensive force, public support has increased.
The invitations at Madrid also overcame skepticism in Central
Europe whether the West would welcome security links to former members
of the Warsaw Pact.
While some polls indicate some resistance to social spending cuts
to pay for military modernization, basing of NATO forces, or overseas
deployments, public support for practical examples, however,
demonstrates the opposite. We need to look at what these countries are
actually doing:
Basing of NATO forces.--Hungary approved U.S. use of Taszar Air
Base--the U.S. staging base supporting IFOR and SFOR operations in
Bosnia--in 72 hours, as well as an important training area and one
other smaller support base. In addition, Hungary provided a support
base at Pecs for the Nordics. NATO's use of the bases continues to
enjoy wide popular support. Finally, the Hungarians are the first
central Europeans to sign a bilateral Status of Forces Agreement to
protect U.S. personnel stationed in, or passing through, Hungary.
Foreign Deployments.--All three countries have contingents serving
in SFOR. Public support for deployment of troops in Bosnia remains
high.
Cutting social spending to pay for modernization.--When austerity
measures were introduced in Spring 1997, the Czech government
maintained and later increased defense spending while cutting all other
Ministries. Even Opposition parties supported the increased defense
budget.
The Polish government has stated that it will increase its current
levels of defense spending despite extensive flood damage earlier this
year.
Closer examination of military infrastructure in Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic revealed that these countries were better
prepared for NATO integration than previously thought. While we expect
these countries to pay their share of integration costs, we do not
expect those costs to be onerous.
Central Europe is an economically dynamic area which enjoys solid
economic growth. Assuming moderate growth and a constant budget share
for defense, the defense budgets in this region will significantly
increase in real terms over the next decade. If properly used, those
funds will enable the three countries to meet their financial
obligations.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
Question. The New York Times reported earlier this year that the
International Monetary Fund has concerns over the cost of expansion for
the new nations themselves. The IMF understandably has questions
regarding the billion in dollars of loans that are conditioned on
fiscal constraint by nations such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic. Do you share the concerns of the IMF that the increased costs
to the new nations could mean a huge and difficult burden?
Answer. We agree with the IMF that the countries in transition must
exercise fiscal constraint. In consultation with the IMF, Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic have adopted sound monetary and fiscal
policies, including central government budgets with reduced budget
deficits. These budgets adequately cover their commitments to increase
military spending.
Positive growth rates in each country will enable the governments
to increase defense spending and fulfill their commitment to paying the
direct costs of NATO enlargement without taking on additional debt
burden. Of course, these countries have other significant needs which
they will consider in deciding how much can be spent on defense.
Most of the reforms in the defense sector related to NATO
membership are necessary for an effective military in a modern
democratic state. Moreover, the cost of defense would undoubtedly be
higher if these countries did not join NATO.
COSTS OF MORE THAN THREE NATIONS
Question. What about the cost for adding additional nations to NATO
beyond the three? How much will it cost for not just the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland, but also Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Bulgaria, etc.? Please provide cost estimates for an expanded list
beyond the first three nations.
Answer. Allies are currently focusing attention on the
requirements, costs and the process of successfully bringing into NATO
the three countries initially invited to join: Poland, the Czech
Republic and Hungary. NATO has made no decision yet regarding admission
of new members beyond these three countries. When the Alliance decides
to admit identifiable new members, the cost issue, and the issue of
military requirements to ensure that NATO remains capable of defending
all members, can be effectively addressed.
COMPARISON TO MARSHALL PLAN
Question. Secretary Albright, it is interesting to hear you compare
NATO expansion to the Marshall Plan. I could ask for the details of the
military elements of the original Marshall Plan. Of course, there were
really none. Instead, let me ask you to detail the economic components
of NATO expansion? What are the civilian or political elements of NATO
expansion?
Answer. The Marshall Plan, while focusing on civilian programs, had
the effect of increasing stability and strengthening democracy just as
NATO enlargement is doing. By extending the zone of stability and
security which NATO provides to the countries to NATO's east, we
further our goal of an undivided, democratic, and peaceful Europe.
The United States is a European power. Two world wars in this
century have taught us that when Europe and America stand apart, we pay
a terrible price. We know that we cannot take Europe's security for
granted.
By enlarging NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic, we expand the area in Europe where wars are not likely to
happen. By making clear that we will fight, if necessary, to defend our
allies, we make it less likely that our troops will ever be called upon
to do so. We have seen in Bosnia what happens when instability and
insecurity in Europe are allowed to fester. We have an opportunity to
make it less likely that such a conflict will happen again.
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are committed to NATO and
accept its shared responsibility. Their admission will make NATO
stronger and more cohesive, and will decrease the likelihood of
conflicts that could involve our troops or threaten our security. That
is why a stronger NATO is in our interests.
Enhancing security in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will
help consolidate democracy and stability in these countries. Enhancing
their security by admitting them to NATO is the surest and most cost
effective way to prevent a major threat to security in the region.
Central Europe is an economically dynamic area--the fastest growing
in all of Europe. Its economies are projected to continue to grow at 4
to 5 percent annually, in real terms. Such growth will make it easier
for these states to modernize their militaries, even as they invest in
their economic and social transformations.
OSCE: FUTURE EXPANSION
Question. Why hasn't the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe been receiving the same attention as NATO expansion recently?
If a primary goal for NATO expansion is the protection of democracy and
stability among the European nations, why can't the power and resources
of the OSCE be expanded? Are there any initiatives for the OSCE that
are being pursued?
Answer. We see the conflict prevention and regional stabilization
role increasingly played by the OSCE as a natural complement to NATO in
European security. As OSCE has taken on more tasks in places like
Bosnia, Albania--and now, Croatia--we have increased our investment in
the organization, as have many of our European allies. In Bosnia, the
OSCE fully supervised Federation municipal elections this year, and
will also supervise upcoming Republika Srpska elections this month.
OSCE's new mission in Tirana has taken on the role of the overall
coordinator for all international efforts in Albania. In Croatia, the
OSCE mission will assume the United Nations Transitional Administration
in Eastern Slavonia's (UNTAES) functions in Eastern Slavonia and extend
similar monitoring to the rest of the country.
We are also working closely with other OSCE states in the ongoing
security model dialogue to develop a consensus about the ways the OSCE
can work with those states that need help to make the transition to
democracy and free market economics. Our goals include assisting states
to improve their compliance with the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE
commitments, improving the OSCE's ability to identify and defuse
potential conflicts, in particular through its field missions, and
identifying practical steps the OSCE could take to enhance cooperation
with other European security organizations, particularly in the area of
conflict prevention and crisis management.
Further development of the OSCE as a complement to NATO and other
European security organizations is a key part of achieving our long-
term European security goals. We are determined to remain engaged and
are grateful for Congress' continuing political and financial support
so that we can help the OSCE achieve its full potential.
SLOVENIA
Question. What is the status of Slovenia's application to join
NATO? What are its prospects for joining NATO during the next expansion
round?
Answer. Slovenia has made great strides in reforming its military,
building active security links with its neighbors, and increasing the
interoperability of its forces with NATO. We continue to work with
Slovenia to help it prepare for consideration in future rounds of NATO
Enlargement.
The Madrid Summit decision made clear that the message for Slovenia
is not ``no,'' but ``not yet.''
Slovenia still has much work ahead. The reform process is not
complete and Slovenia must invest in its own military capabilities so
that it can become a producer of security in the region and a potential
ally capable of shouldering its share of the defense burden in
Southeastern Europe.
Slovenia was a serious contender for the first round. The country
is continuing its policy of seeking greater economic, political, and
security integration with Euro-Atlantic structures. If it maintains its
current direction, we believe that Slovenia would be an excellent
candidate inclusion in a future round of NATO Enlargement.
arms control initiative along with nato expansion
Question. One of the motivations we hear for an expanded NATO is to
protect nations against future military threats. For example, one hears
a lot about a renewed Russian military power, although not necessarily
from the Administration. What arms control initiatives are being
pursued to reduce or avoid such future threats?
Answer. As the NATO enlargement process proceeds, the U.S. and its
Allies are engaged in negotiations on the adaptation of the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) to ensure its continued
viability into the next century. Originally negotiated to preserve a
military balance between two groups of States Parties, corresponding to
the membership of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact, the CFE Treaty caps
the equipment holdings of the major conventional armies in Europe, thus
ensuring predictability about these levels for the future. It has
helped prevent destabilizing concentrations of forces anywhere in the
Treaty's area of application, from the Atlantic to the Urals. The
Treaty has also helped ensure military stability throughout the CFE
area--for those states that are members of an alliance as well as those
that are not. The U.S. and its NATO Allies have put forward proposals
over the course of the past year to ensure that these benefits are
preserved--and even enhanced--as the geopolitical landscape in Europe
continues to change.
The U.S. and Russia are also fully implementing START I which
entered into force three years ago and mandates significant reductions
in strategic nuclear weapons. President Yeltsin has promised Russia
will ratify START II in the near future which will make even deeper
cuts. Once START II is ratified, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin have
committed to begin negotiations on START III with the aim of reducing
strategic weapons to 2,000 to 2,500 on each side, an 80 percent
reduction from cold war levels.
Russia has recently ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention and
has pledged to destroy its stockpile of 40,000 tons of chemical
munitions and declared to participate in a regime which is aimed at
stopping the proliferation of chemical weapons.
Russia is also a signatory to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and is working with the U.S. to
improve the security of its nuclear materials through a variety of U.S.
funded programs.
The U.S. and its NATO allies are also engaged in a number of
bilateral and multilateral military to military programs designed to
increase cooperation and understanding between NATO and Russia.
democratic values of the three new members
Question. What measures have been taken to ensure that NATO's new
members uphold values about democracy, the rule of law, and human
rights? What part of NATO's organizational structure is responsible for
the internal implementation of the Alliance's values?
Answer. In the eight-plus years since the fall of the Berlin Wall
that effectively ended Communist rule, the three invitees' political
institutions have matured rapidly. Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians now
enjoy the benefits of a fully functioning parliamentary democracy,
including free speech, free assembly, and a vigorous, free press.
Each of the three invitees has enshrined basic human rights and
freedoms--such as speech, assembly, and religion--in a Constitution,
which, as in our own case, is the highest law of the land.
The United States and other NATO allies have made clear to the
three invitees on numerous occasions that NATO membership requires the
acceptance of shared democratic values. Specifically, we have pointed
to the ``Perry Principles,'' with their focus on democracy/human
rights; free market development; civilian control of the military; good
relations with neighbors; and interoperability with NATO.
The Alliance is an alliance of shared democratic values. The North
Atlantic Council (NAC), the supreme decisionmaking body of the
Alliance, is the embodiment of these values, since it represents a
forum in which democratic nations have freely agreed to decide security
matters on an equal footing.
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY PROBLEMS
Question. South Africa and other nations have expressed concern in
April of this year that despite the political statements by NATO for
nuclear weapons non-deployment that bring these nations into the
political planning group and tying these states into nuclear planning
and deterrence is a form of proliferation. Is the Administration
addressing any Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty problems associated
with NATO expansion?
Answer. NATO's nuclear forces continue to be an essential part of
U.S. overall deterrence policy, and the Alliance will continue to
maintain nuclear forces based in Europe. Moreover, there is widespread
participation by European NATO allies in collective nuclear defense
planning, in basing of nuclear forces, and in consultation
arrangements. However, the participation by NATO non-nuclear weapons
states in these activities in no way contravenes Article I of the NPT.
This question of NPT Article I and its impact on NATO nuclear forces
was debated at length during the negotiation of the NPT. All concerned
accepted that the final language of Article I would not preclude the
type of nuclear planning, basing, and consultative arrangements that
have taken place in NATO since NPT entry-into-force in 1970.
NUCLEAR SHARING
Question. In the ``Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation
and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation'' NATO's members
``reiterate that they have no intention, no plan and no reason to
deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members nor any need to
change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy--and do
not foresee any future need to do so.'' According to the
administration's point of view, does this statement commit the U.S. and
its European allies: (a) to maintain the presence of U.S. nuclear
weapons on the territory of all NATO member nations currently hosting
U.S. nuclear weapons?; (b) to not reduce the number of U.S. nuclear
weapons beyond the numbers agreed by the alliance members for 1998?;
and (c) to maintain and not change the NATO system of nuclear sharing
as currently practiced?
Answer. The short answer to all three questions is ``no.'' The
statement is a matter of NATO policy, not a legal commitment. Moreover,
NATO will retain its existing, much-reduced, nuclear capabilities, and
retain its right to modify its nuclear posture or policy should
circumstances warrant.
PILOT TRAINING
Question. Does the NATO statement--reiterated in the Founding Act--
preclude training pilots from the possible new member states in nuclear
missions during peacetime and transferring the necessary equipment to
these countries as soon as these countries have introduced into service
dual capable aircraft?
Answer. As noted earlier, the statement in the Founding Act is not
legally binding on the members of the Alliance. Nonetheless, NATO's
current nuclear posture has been judged adequate for an enlarged
Alliance. Thus, there are no plans to train new member states' pilots
in nuclear missions during peacetime nor to transfer equipment or
infrastructure to support these countries' dual-capable aircraft in a
nuclear role.
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS
Question. Does the administration intend or plan to conclude
bilateral agreements with future new member states to the effect of or
similar to the ``Agreements for Cooperation for Mutual Defense
Purposes'' concluded with other NATO members participating in NATO
nuclear sharing? If so, what are the administration's plans?
Answer. We have no such intentions or plans.
VAULTS
Question. Which airbases in European NATO countries are currently
equipped with WS3-storage vaults for U.S. nuclear weapons and which
airbases are to be equipped according to current plans? How many vaults
have been built or will be built on each of the airbases of the new
NATO states?
Answer. We would be happy to provide a classified briefing to
cleared personnel to discuss this subject.
DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT
Question. Are the new member states, according to the
administration's point of view, expected to equip at least one unit
within its air forces with Western dual-capable aircraft? By when
should such equipment programs be completed?
Answer. From the Administration's point of view, there are no
plans, nor are there any requirements, for the new member states to
equip at least one unit within their air forces with Western dual-
capable aircraft. Nonetheless, members of the Alliance may purchase
dual-capable aircraft for use in a conventional role, as has been done
by some current NATO members who do not participate in nuclear programs
of cooperation. The fact that a certain type aircraft is dual-capable
is not an indication that such an aircraft is indeed nuclear certified
or has an assigned nuclear role.
AIRCRAFT PURCHASE PLANS
Question. Which types of aircraft considered by the new member
states fulfill the requirement of providing DCA to NATO's future
posture?
Answer. None of the aircraft currently in or planned to be in the
inventory of new member states fulfill the requirement of providing DCA
to NATO's future posture, since we have no plans to change NATO's
future nuclear posture or to provide nuclear certification to any of
the new member states' aircraft.
NUCLEAR SHARING ARRANGEMENTS
Question. What other preparations are under consideration to
prepare the new member states for participation in NATO nuclear sharing
arrangements?
Answer. New members will, as do current members, contribute to the
development and implementation of NATO's strategy, including its
nuclear component. New members will be eligible to join the Nuclear
Planning Group (NPG) and its subordinate bodies (NPG Staff Group, High
Level Group, and the Senior-Level Weapons Protection Group), and to
participate in nuclear consultations during exercises and crisis.
During the interim period leading to accession, they will be offered
periodic briefings on the main nuclear-related issues which the NPG
Staff Group is addressing as part of its work program, but all such
briefings during the interim period will be unclassified due to the
sensitivity of nuclear matters.
______
Questions Submitted to Secretary William S. Cohen
Questions Submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg
CBO OPTION 1 VERSUS ADMINISTRATION'S ESTIMATE
Question. Unfortunately, an exact comparison of the costs of NATO
expansion between the CBO and the Administration isn't possible because
both make different assumptions about threat environment and the kinds
of military upgrades that are necessary. Nonetheless, CBO does have an
expansion option of $60.6 billion that is similar to the
Administration's estimate. Both assume a relatively benign security
situation. Nonetheless, the Administration estimates the overall costs
of expansion at $27 to $35 billion, and the CBO estimates the overall
cost at $60.6 billion.
Even more, the CBO estimates that the U.S. will pay almost two and
a half to three times more to expand NATO than the Administration
estimates. The CBO estimates the cost to the U.S. at $4.8 billion and
the Administration estimates the cost at $1.5 to $2 billion.
In light of the fact that both options assume a relatively similar
security situation, why does the CBO estimate that it will cost the
U.S. two and a half to three times as much as the Administration
estimates?
Answer. In general, CBO estimates are larger than the
Administration's because CBO assumed significantly more extensive
upgrades than did DOD. The vast majority of the difference is accounted
for by the following items:
Combat Aircraft.--Given the substantial comparative advantage
enjoyed by current NATO members in combat aircraft, the DOD estimate
assumed procurement of 18 refurbished F-16's for each potential new
member. The CBO analysis assumes an aggregate fighter force structure
more than half again as large as DOD's projections, and replaces a much
larger share of it. In addition, for potential new members' older,
obsolescing aircraft, CBO assumed installation of new electronics.
Air Defense.--The CBO assumed that the potential new members would
acquire Patriot systems, whereas DOD assumed potential new members
would upgrade their ground based air defense to less expensive I-HAWK
type systems.
C\3\I.--The DOD estimate assumed refurbishment/renovation of
existing headquarters facilities, including necessary communications
and intelligence equipment and interfaces with NATO commands.
Additional interfaces are assumed down to the brigade level among
potential new members' forces. In contrast, as we understand the CBO
estimate, it outfitted national military headquarters and potential new
member forces with numbers and types of communications and intelligence
equipment based on much more demanding U.S. standards.
Exercise Facilities.--The DOD estimate upgraded exercise facilities
at five brigade-sized sites and a battalion-sized site, compared to
CBO's estimate to build large-scale, modern multinational training
facilities for ground and air forces.
Road and Rail.--Based on intelligence assessments, the DOD
assessment of potential new members' road and rail infrastructure was
on the whole more favorable than that of CBO. In addition, in the DOD
estimate, we assumed that international investment in the invited
countries' economies would lead to a greater degree of upgrades to road
and rail links than in the CBO study.
Question. Why is there such a disparity in the overall estimate if
the threat both estimates assume is similar?
Answer. As described above, the CBO assumed that much more
extensive upgrades would be required in virtually every category
evaluated, compared to the assessments embodied in the Department's
notional cost estimates.
COSTS OF EXPANSION TO FOREIGN AID BUDGET
Question. The U.S. has been providing roughly $100 million each
year in the Foreign Operations bill to help pay for expansion. The CBO
assumes that the U.S. will support the process of NATO expansion by
increasing the number of loans the U.S. subsidizes for the new members
to buy upgraded military hardware and by stepping up military-to-
military training and exercises. CBO estimates that these costs will
double. Why are these costs not included in the Administration's
estimate?
Answer. Relevant costs for such measures were included in the
Administration's estimate. For the February 1997 U.S. estimate of
enlargement costs, DOD developed enlargement requirements and then
estimated the costs for meeting those requirements. DOD assumed that
countries would pay for their own defense enhancements unless there was
evidence of likely assistance from other sources or where an
enhancement would likely qualify for NATO common funding. Estimated
U.S. enlargement costs included continuing U.S. assistance for the
construction costs for Air Sovereignty Operations Centers under the
Regional Airspace Initiative and for language training through the
International Military Education and Training program. The United
States would share in additional costs only to the extent that the
United States, with Congressional approval, may choose to continue or
expand the current modest assistance being provided to the new
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.
The U.S. enlargement cost estimate also included costs for training
and exercises, including education in NATO languages and procedures for
new member forces, upgrades to existing exercise facilities in new
member countries, and transportation and operating costs for
incremental combined exercises tied specifically to enlargement.
Question. The Administration's estimate assumes that the costs to
new members and current allies will be borne by them with or without
NATO expansion. Shouldn't we apply the same standard to costs that will
be borne by the U.S. taxpayer out of the foreign operations bill and
include them in the overall estimate of the cost?
Answer. The Administration's estimate applied a consistent standard
of identifying costs relevant to enlargement, i.e., costs for
enhancements related to meeting the requirements outlined in the
February 1997 report. For those cases in which expenditures in the
foreign operations bill matched those for the requirements, the
estimate included them; we did not include in enlargement cost
estimates military requirements unrelated to an enlarged Alliance.
Estimated U.S. enlargement costs included continuing U.S. assistance
for the construction costs for Air Sovereignty Operations Centers under
the Regional Airspace Initiative and for language training through the
International Military Education and Training program.
Question. Is there any evidence that prospective NATO members are
not expecting grants and loans from the U.S. for military upgrades?
Answer. Yes, there is some evidence that prospective NATO members
do not have these expectations. They understand that they are expected
to shoulder substantial national costs, as all other members do.
For example, the Czech government plans to increase their 1998
national defense spending from roughly $900 million to $1.1 billion,
which represents about 1.88 percent of projected GDP. This is above the
0.1 percent annual increase that they had pledged for next year which
would have raised defense spending from 1.7 percent to 1.8 percent of
GDP for fiscal year 1998. Prime Minister Klaus told Secretary Cohen in
November that he did not see any problem with Parliament passing the
government's budget next month.
The Hungarians have increased their 1997 national defense budget to
about $800 million, which represents about 1.8 percent of projected
GDP. Hungary has stated that it plans to link defense spending growth
to the rate of GDP growth and to increase the percentage of GDP
dedicated to defense by 0.1 percent annually for the next five years.
If so, Hungarian defense spending may increase in real terms by 3 to 8
percent annually during the next four years.
Poland spent 2.3 percent of GDP on defense in 1996. Poland's 15-
year modernization plan calls for annual increases in defense spending
which are pegged to the rate of GDP growth. Based on a conservative
estimate of 4.2 percent annual economic growth, Polish defense spending
should increase approximately 3.2 percent annually.
Of course, we would share in more of any such costs only to the
extent that the United States, with Congressional approval, may choose
to continue or expand the current modest assistance being provided to
the military modernization of the new democracies of Central and
Eastern Europe through programs like the Warsaw Initiative.
COST TO NEW MEMBERS
Question. The Administration and the CBO are not in sync on the
question of the cost of expansion to the new members. CBO estimates
that expansion will cost the new members $42 billion, and the
Administration estimates that it will cost them between $13 to $17.5
billion.
Why is there such a disparity in the cost estimates for the new
members?
Answer. As described in the answer to Question No. 1, the CBO
assumed that much more extensive upgrades would be required in
virtually every category evaluated, compared to the assessments
embodied in the Department's notional cost estimates.
Question. Please provide, for the record, a breakout of the costs
of expansion to each of the new countries?
Answer. According to DOD's notional estimates, the breakout of NATO
enlargement costs by each potential new member country studied is as
follows:
In billions
Czech Republic.......................................... $2.3 to $3.1
Hungary................................................. 2.6 to 3.6
Poland.................................................. 7.5 to 10.1
--------------------------------------------------------
____________________________________________________
Total............................................. 12.4 to 16.8
NATO is currently working on its own enlargement cost estimate, to
be provided to Ministers in December.
Question. Do the prospective NATO countries agree with these
estimates?
Answer. Our European allies and prospective NATO members have
neither formally accepted nor rejected the Department of Defense's
notional estimate of enlargement costs contained in the President's
February 1997 Report to Congress. At the conclusion of the NATO Summit
in Madrid in July 1997, the current allies re-affirmed that the costs
of enlargement would be borne.
In general, prospective members agree with the U.S. approach to
enlargement requirements and costs; they understand and have committed
to developing the capabilities required.
In their accession papers, the Czechs have agreed to pay a 0.9
percent national cost share of the NATO common budgets; Hungary has
agreed to a 0.65 percent national cost share; and the Poles have agreed
to a 2.48 percent national cost share.
COST TO THE REST OF NATO
Question. The Administration and the CBO appear to agree about the
cost of expanding NATO to our current European allies. CBO estimates it
will cost our current European allies $13.8 billion to expand NATO, and
the Administration estimates that it will cost $12.5 to $15.5 billion.
However, the Europeans are claiming that the U.S. is over-estimating
costs. For example, President Chirac says NATO expansion can be managed
by reallocating funds and that Paris intends to pay nothing extra. Why
is there such a disparity between American and European estimates about
the cost of expanding NATO?
Answer. There are several aspects to the cost issue. The President
presented the Congress with our notional cost estimate in February.
Currently, NATO is working on a refined enlargement cost estimate.
Based on what we know now, I believe that the NATO cost estimates
will be lower than those which you received from us in February. First
the initial cost study assessed four, not three new members. Further,
the NATO estimate will address only direct, common-funded costs.
But I also expect the NATO cost estimates will be lower because
some things are better in the invited nations than people thought. As a
result of assessments NATO planners and logisticians have been
conducting, we believe the additional investment required to prepare
each of these nations, their military forces, and their infrastructures
for full NATO membership will be less than initially anticipated.
Despite what has been reported in the press, our allies have
formally agreed to pay the costs necessary to meet enlargement
requirements. Recently, both senior British and German government
officials placed editorials in major American newspapers, stating that
their governments were pledged to provide their fair share of
enlargement costs. On October 21, British Secretary of Defense George
Robertson stated in an editorial in the Washington Times that ``[w]e
all recognize that bringing new members into NATO will incur a cost. *
* * But, if additional spending is required, Britain will pay its
share''. Most recently, on 4 November, German Foreign Minister Klaus
Kinkel stated in an editorial in the Washington Post that ``[t]he
debate on admitting new members into the Alliance must take into
account the political and military rationale behind NATO enlargement. *
* * It goes without saying that Europe and Germany * * * must bear
their fair share of the costs of NATO enlargement. * * * This European
contribution to the Alliance will not drop with the admission of new
members, but will further increase''.
CURRENT NATO MEMBERS
Question. NATO member countries have been paring defense spending
since the end of the Cold War, and our European allies have been
complaining about the U.S. cost estimate, saying that they won't pay so
large a share of the costs. President Chirac has said that Paris
intends to pay nothing extra for NATO expansion. The U.K. has said
America's cost estimates are 40 percent too high. The German Defense
Minister has called for a ``realistic calculation of costs, not on the
basis of the Cold War.''
I was encouraged by Secretary Albright's comments before the
Foreign Relations Committee on October 7 on the issue of burden
sharing. At that hearing, Secretary Albright said: ``I will insist that
our old allies share this burden fairly. That is what NATO is all
about.''
Under the Administration's current burden sharing arrangement, the
U.S. will pay for roughly 16 percent of the direct NATO expansion
costs. Current and prospective NATO allies will pay the rest. As the
cost estimates are refined during the upcoming months, can you assure
me that the American people will not be asked to pay a greater share of
the costs?
Answer. The Administration's estimate of enlargement costs assumed
that the United States would pay its current share (approximately 24
percent) of NATO common-funded budgets. In 1997, NATO common budgets
totaled about $1.8 billion. The total U.S. contribution to these
budgets was about $485 million, while the allies contributed the other
$1.3 billion.
In the context of an enlarged Alliance, we expect that the relative
national cost share contributions that prevail now will stay about the
same--three European dollar equivalents to one U.S. dollar.
Question. Given the tough fiscal qualifications for entry into the
European Monetary Union, is it realistic to expect European members of
NATO to increase--rather than reduce--spending?
Answer. At the Defense Ministers meeting in Brussels this past
June, Ministers acknowledged that ``the admission of new members * * *
will involve the Alliance providing the resources which enlargement
will necessarily require.'' Later, in July at Madrid, all allies agreed
that there will be costs associated with the integration of new
members, that these costs will be manageable, and that the resources
necessary to meet these costs will be provided.
Recently, both senior British and German government officials
placed editorials in major American newspapers, stating that their
governments were pledged to provide their fair share of enlargement
costs. On October 21, British Secretary of Defense George Robertson
stated in an editorial in the Washington Times that ``[w]e all
recognize that bringing new members into NATO will incur a cost. * * *
But, if additional spending is required, Britain will pay its share''.
Most recently, on 4 November, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel
stated in an editorial in the Washington Post that ``[t]he debate on
admitting new members into the Alliance must take into account the
political and military rationale behind NATO enlargement. * * * It goes
without saying that Europe and Germany * * * must bear their fair share
of the costs of NATO enlargement. * * * This European contribution to
the Alliance will not drop with the admission of new members, but will
further increase''.
Our initial estimate of overall enlargement costs for current
Allies represents less than 1 percent of their projected defense
spending. Thus, spending increases are not required. What will be
necessary, and is already underway, is a small reallocation of Allies'
defense programs toward developing more deployable forces. But we have
all been downsizing and restructuring simultaneously since the end of
the Cold War, so this is not a new dynamic.
PROSPECTIVE NATO MEMBERS' ABILITY TO PAY
Question. The economic strength of the prospective NATO countries
is a mixed bag. GDP growth in Poland may reach 6 percent in 1996. On
the other hand, Hungary's economy experienced modest growth in 1994 and
1995, but it declined 1 percent in 1996. In 1996, the Czech economy
grew by about 4 percent. However, GDP growth for 1997 was estimated to
drop to 2.7 percent. Although these prospective NATO countries need to
continue to focus on strengthening their economies, NATO expansion will
require them to spend additional resources on their defense budget.
Meeting the Administration's cost estimate will require the new
countries to increase their budgets by roughly 20 percent in real terms
over the next 15 years. Meanwhile, defense spending in each of the
prospective NATO countries has declined since the Cold War ended. What
evidence does the Administration have demonstrating that prospective
NATO members are planning to accommodate defense budget increases over
the next 10 to 15 years?
Answer. All three invited countries are planning to accommodate
defense budget increases. For new members, the costs of NATO
enlargement will be a manageable percentage of their planned military
budgets.
For example, the Czech government has approved plans to increase
their 1998 national defense spending to about $1.1 billion, which
represents about 1.88 percent of projected GDP. The Czech Republic has
stated its plans to link defense spending growth to the rate of GDP
growth and to increase the percentage of GDP dedicated to defense by
0.1 annually for the next 3 years which will raise it from the current
1.7 percent in fiscal year 1997 to 2.0 percent in 2000.
The Hungarians have increased their 1997 national defense budget to
about $800 million, which represents about 1.8 percent of projected
GDP. Hungary has stated that it plans to link defense spending growth
to the rate of GDP growth and to increase the percentage of GDP
dedicated to defense by 0.1 percent annually for the next five years.
If so, Hungarian defense spending may increase in real terms by 3 to 8
percent annually during the next four years.
Poland spent 2.3 percent of GDP on defense in 1996. Poland's 15-
year modernization plan calls for annual increases in defense spending
which are pegged to the rate of GDP growth. Based on a conservative
estimate of 4.2 percent annual economic growth, Polish defense spending
should increase approximately 3.2 percent annually.
The three invited countries are also pledging national funds to
NATO's three common budgets. In their accession papers, the Czechs have
agreed to pay a 0.9 percent national cost share of the NATO common
budgets; Hungary has agreed to a 0.65 percent national cost share; and
the Poles have agreed to a 2.48 percent national cost share.
The Administration's study did not suggest that new members would
need to increase their budgets by 20 percent to develop the required
capabilities. Rather, the portion of new members' projected budgets
devoted to meeting the requirements would be about 20 percent. Some
percentage of new members' budgets already includes such programs.
Question. Are plans sufficient to meet the costs of NATO expansion?
Answer. For new members, the costs of NATO enlargement will be a
manageable percentage of their current military budgets. Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic are already beginning to invest in
modernizing and restructuring their forces. The costs can be met by a
combination of modest increases in the percentage of GDP devoted to
defense to bring them into line with NATO averages, a growing GDP base
as growth advances, and probably most important, reduction in the size
of their manpower base.
Throughout this effort, NATO as a whole and the United States in
particular will try to help new members set priorities in their plans
and programs in order to focus their resources on the most critical
areas first. The Administration's study did not suggest that new
members would need to increase their budgets by 20 percent to develop
the required capabilities. Rather, the portion of new members'
projected budgets devoted to meeting the requirements would be about 20
percent. Some percentage of new members' budgets already includes such
programs.
Question. Given economic pressures in each of the prospective NATO
countries, are these plans realistic?
Answer. As I indicated in my responses to Questions Nos. 12 and 13,
for new members, the costs of NATO enlargement will be a manageable
percentage of their current military budgets. Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic are already beginning to invest in modernizing and
restructuring their forces. From all indications, these plans are sound
and realistic, given prevailing economic and spending forecasts.
Throughout this effort, NATO as a whole and the United States in
particular will try to help new members set priorities in their plans
and programs in order to focus their resources on the most critical
areas first. The Administration's study did not suggest that new
members would need to increase their budgets by 20 percent to develop
the required capabilities. Rather, the portion of new members'
projected budgets devoted to meeting the requirements would be about 20
percent. Some percentage of new members' budgets already includes such
programs.
PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING NATO EXPANSION
Question. While public opinion regarding the question of NATO
expansion has been consistently strong in Poland, it has been weaker in
the Czech Republic and Hungary. What do the public opinion polls in
each of the prospective countries indicate about the resilience and
durability of the public's support for NATO membership, especially if
public sacrifice is required?
Answer. Three-fourths of the Polish public support joining NATO and
many (44 percent) are strong proponents. Asked how they would vote ``if
a referendum were held tomorrow,'' nearly eight in ten (79 percent) say
they would vote to join NATO. The Polish public is willing to accept
the many responsibilities associated with NATO membership. A solid
majority approve of sending Polish forces to defend other NATO members
and allowing routine NATO exercises to take place in Poland. While
nearly nine in ten Poles (88 percent) believe that membership in NATO
will increase the amount their government spends on defense, a majority
(55 percent) say they would support such an increase.
In the Czech Republic, support for membership continues to rise.
According to a September poll, 63 percent of Czechs say they would vote
to join NATO in a hypothetical referendum, a two percent rise since
May. Both foreign and defense officials are actively engaged in
educating the Czech people on the importance of joining NATO and steady
increases in popular support both to join NATO and to take on the
responsibilities of NATO membership are expected.
Support for Hungarian accession into NATO has been steadily rising.
Pre-referendum polling indicated that popular support was fluctuating
from 54 percent to 60 to 65 percent. Press reports on the November 16th
referendum indicate that about 85 percent of eligible voters favored
accession.
PUBLIC OPINION IN RUSSIA
Question. Russian political leaders across the spectrum strongly
oppose enlargement, although President Yeltsin apparently concluded he
would rather work with the West than fight us. For now, public opinion
shows that among ordinary Russians, NATO enlargement is not a
significant issue. Under what circumstances could you see public
opinion in Russia swinging in the opposite direction?
Answer. While most ordinary Russians do not consider NATO
enlargement a salient issue, one must nevertheless assume, given the
negative images of NATO that have been presented to Russians for
decades and the strong public sense of national decline, that there is
at least a widespread latent distrust of the Alliance. Mobilizing this
latent tendency into more strongly expressed mass opposition would
depend on the degree to which opponents of NATO among the elite could
make the case that enlargement--or something related to enlargement--
was having a tangible negative effect on people's daily lives or
imminently threatening Russian security.
Question. Is any current or potential leader in Russia capable of
arousing public sentiment against expansion?
Answer. Various leaders have already sought to arouse public
sentiment against expansion but without notable success. The ability of
current or future leaders to do so would depend in large measure on the
domestic political and economic situation in Russia. At present, social
and economic issues are the most salient with the Russian public. In
addition, with no elections on the immediate horizon, there would be
little obvious political advantage to be gained at present by seeking
to make enlargement a major issue. It would not be surprising, however,
if the Communists, Vladimir Zhirinovsky's ``Liberal Democrats,'' and
other so-called ``national-patriotic'' groups sought to make the
Yeltsin administration's inability to stop enlargement a theme in the
next parliamentary and presidential elections, now scheduled for 1999
and 2000.
Question. To what extent does mass public opinion in Russia
regarding NATO expansion have an impact on Russian government policy?
Answer. The main effect of mass public opinion on Russian
government policy on any international issue, including that of NATO
enlargement, is mainly indirect. For example, public dissatisfaction
with Russia's general status in the world played a significant role in
the way both President Yeltsin and his Communist opponent, Gennadiy
Zhuganov, positioned themselves in the 1996 presidential election and
in Yeltsin's decision after the first round to bring Aleksandr Lebed
into his Administration. Both the executive and legislative branches of
the Russian state are sensitive to their own assessments of mass
opinion. Other than in the electoral process, however, how this
sensitivity is reflected in policy depends on other aspects of the
power relationships and rivalries in Moscow.
RUSSIA'S ROLE IN NATO
Question. Regardless of what the Russians want, I am curious about
the long term Administration's thinking regarding Russia. Is the
Administration's ultimate goal to include Russia as a full-fledged
member of NATO?
Answer. The Administration's ultimate goal is for a democratic and
stable Russia to play an important and cooperative role in European
security. A post-Cold War order which does not engage Russia cannot
successfully maintain stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area.
I believe that the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Permanent Joint
Council it created can be valuable tools in this process of engaging
Russia. The Founding Act and PJC do not give Russia a place or a veto
in the Alliance, but do create a forum for consultation, and where
possible and desirable, cooperation between NATO and Russia.
While NATO's Madrid Declaration makes clear that the Alliance
remains open to new members, to date, Russia has not applied for NATO
membership. If a time comes when Russia does apply to join NATO, the
United States and our allies will have to consider that application on
its merits.
Question. Is the relationship outlined in the NATO-Russia Founding
Act and the Permanent Joint Council sustainable over the long run?
Answer. While the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council is still a
young forum, it has already proven to be an important venue for
discussion between NATO and Russia, and a place in which a more
trusting relationship is being built. It is our hope and that of our
allies, that the Founding Act and PJC will continue to play this
constructive role for the foreseeable future. To a large extent, the
PJC's success, both short- and long-term, is contingent on both
parties' continued willingness to engage with each other in a
constructive manner.
Question. What would the reaction to Russia as a full-fledged NATO
Member be among current and prospective NATO members?
Answer. Russia has not applied for NATO membership and we have had
no indication that Russia intends to do so in the foreseeable future. I
would venture that when and if Russia seeks NATO membership, the
security environment in Europe will be sufficiently different from the
present, and that any comments I could make now on the reaction among
others to that event would be pure speculation.
OUT-OF-AREA INTERESTS
Question. In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on
October 7, Secretary Albright highlighted that, in addition to regional
defense, NATO agreed to adapt the alliance to meet ``out of area''
interests. Bosnia, as a non-NATO member without the guarantee of
Article V protection, is one example of an ``out of area'' operation.
Peacekeeping and crisis management beyond alliance borders are types of
missions I've heard to which new members might contribute. What does
``out of area'' mean exactly? Does it include the Middle East? Asia?
Answer. The current NATO ``Area of Responsibility'', or AOR, is
defined as the territorial integrity of the sixteen members of the
Alliance. ``Out of Area'' has never been formally defined by the
Alliance but has been judged by its members to be areas that either
border the Alliance or that can influence or threaten its AOR. No
country from the Asian region currently falls under the ``out of area''
purview.
Question. By what standards will participation in an ``out of
area'' operation be judged?
Answer. U.S. participation in an ``out of area'' operation will be
determined in accordance with the USCINCEUR contingency plans. If an
``out of area'' operation is deemed to be in the U.S. National Security
Interest as stipulated through such a plan, the U.S. could conceivably
contribute to the operation. It is important to note that any such
deployment would have to be approved by the North Atlantic Council (in
which the U.S. participates with full veto powers) after formal
consideration.
Question. Will NATO take on peacekeeping tasks that are currently
the responsibility of the United Nations? What tasks?
Answer. NATO may, on a case-by-case basis, take on peacekeeping
tasks that the United Nations is currently conducting. Again, it would
take a NAC decision to implement such an operation.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Harkin
CONSENSUS
Question. NATO has operated effectively by consensus. If the
organization grows--especially beyond the inclusion of the Czech
republic, Hungary and Poland--many have expressed concern about its
ability to reach consensus. How would consensus be reached in an
organization that is almost double the size of the existing
organization?
Answer. Since the time that the Alliance decided to admit new
members, it has realized the importance of enlarging in a manner that
preserves the military capability and political cohesion of NATO.
The Alliance made the commitment to build consensus on all issues
an explicit criteria for membership in NATO. In the accession process,
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic recognized and accepted that the
Alliance relies upon commonality of views, based on the principle of
consensus in decision making, and state in their letters of intent to
join the Alliance that they will work for consensus within the
Alliance.
Concern for preservation of the political cohesion of NATO was one
of the basic factors which informed President Clinton's decision last
June to support the admission of just three new members to the
Alliance. The President was determined that NATO avoid diluting itself
by pursuing a hasty or overly-ambitious enlargement which could
undercut the vitality of the Alliance.
Our vision of NATO enlargement is that as the nations of Europe
develop their democracy and their capacity to contribute to NATO's
purposes, they should become members of the Alliance in a steady but
gradual and deliberate process, one that reflects their own development
and NATO's ability to assimilate new members without weakening its
military effectiveness or its political cohesion.
COSTS OF NATO: WHO WILL PAY THE COSTS?
Question. I understand that the Administration position is that the
U.S. will pay no more than 15 percent of the costs, leaving the lion's
share to our NATO allies. However, our European allies seem to
disagree. To quote the British Defense Ministry, ``the accession of new
members to [sic] result in a proportionate reduction in the U.K. share
of NATO common budgets''. Other NATO nations seem to agree with this
point. If our allies expect to pay less for NATO, doesn't it follow
that we will pay more?
Answer. The distribution of costs will be in accordance with long-
standing NATO financial principles. The U.S. share of NATO's common-
funded budgets is about 24 percent. U.S. estimated costs are incurred
largely through our share of those direct enlargement measures that are
common-funded. We do not expect that U.S. contributions to these
common-funded budgets will change drastically because of enlargement.
The U.S. would share in more of the overall costs only to the extent
that the U.S., with Congressional approval, may choose to continue or
expand the current modest assistance being provided to the military
modernization of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe
through programs like the Warsaw Initiative.
Recently, both senior British and German government officials
placed editorials in major American newspapers, stating that their
governments were pledged to provide their fair share of enlargement
costs. On October 21, British Secretary of Defense George Robertson
stated in an editorial in the Washington Times that ``[w]e all
recognize that bringing new members into NATO will incur a cost. * * *
But, if additional spending is required, Britain will pay its share''.
Most recently, on 4 November, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel
stated in an editorial in the Washington Post that ``[t]he debate on
admitting new members into the Alliance must take into account the
political and military rationale behind NATO enlargement. * * * It goes
without saying that Europe and Germany * * * must bear their fair share
of the costs of NATO enlargement. * * * This European contribution to
the Alliance will not drop with the admission of new members, but will
further increase''.
COST TO NEW NATIONS VERSUS OTHER NEEDS
Question. The New York Times reported earlier this year that the
International Monetary Fund has concerns over the cost of expansion for
the new nations themselves. The IMF understandably has questions
regarding the billions of dollars in loans that are conditioned on
fiscal constraint by nations such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic. Do you share the concerns of the IMF that the increased costs
to the new nations could mean a huge and difficult burden?
Answer. From our best assessments, we understand that for new
members, the costs of NATO enlargement will be a manageable percentage
of their current military budgets.
For example, the Czech government has approved plans to increase
their 1998 national defense spending to about $1.1 billion, which
represents about 1.88 percent of projected GDP. The Czech Republic has
stated its plans to link defense spending growth to the rate of GDP
growth and to increase the percentage of GDP dedicated to defense by
0.1 annually for the next 3 years which will raise it from the current
1.7 percent in fiscal year 1997 to 2.0 percent in 2000.
The Hungarians have increased their 1997 national defense budget to
about $800 million, which represents about 1.8 percent of projected
GDP. Hungary has stated that it plans to link defense spending growth
to the rate of GDP growth and to increase the percentage of GDP
dedicated to defense by 0.1 percent annually for the next five years.
If so, Hungarian defense spending may increase in real terms by 3 to 8
percent annually during the next four years.
Poland spent 2.3 percent of GDP on defense in 1996. Poland's 15-
year modernization plan calls for annual increases in defense spending
which are pegged to the rate of GDP growth. Based on a conservative
estimate of 4.2 percent annual economic growth, Polish defense spending
should increase approximately 3.2 percent annually.
Throughout this effort, NATO as a whole and the United States in
particular will try to help new members set priorities in their plans
and programs in order to focus their resources on the most critical
areas first.
COSTS OF MEMBERSHIP FOR FULL LIST
Question. What about the cost for adding additional nations to NATO
beyond the three? How much will it cost for not just the Czech
republic, Hungary and Poland, but also Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Bulgaria, etc.? Please provide cost estimates for an expanded list
beyond the first three nations.
Answer. DOD notionally estimates the cost of integrating Slovenia
into the Alliance at about $600 to $700 million over a thirteen-year
period. DOD has not estimated the cost for integrating other potential
new members.
MARSHALL PLAN FOR DEFENSE CONTRACTORS
Question. Secretary Cohen, does the Administration estimates for
NATO expansion costs include any increases in the U.S. subsidies for
overseas weapon sales? Has the Pentagon been approached by any U.S.
arms manufacturers to expand the current arms subsidy program?
Answer. The Administration's February 1997 estimate did not include
increases in these subsidies. While it is clear that each of the
invited nations must undergo modernization of major weapons systems in
the years ahead if it is to be a contributor to overall alliance
security, acquiring high tech weapons systems should not be the highest
priority. We have told each invitee that its highest priority should be
investing in quality personnel: recruiting and training good troops,
and developing an effective NCO corps. The second priority should be
training those troops. The next priority is achievement of a real
degree of interoperability with NATO, including communications,
logistics, infrastructure for reinforcement, and air defense.
ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Question. Why hasn't the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe been receiving the same attention as NATO expansion recently?
If a primary goal for NATO expansion is the protection of democracy and
stability among the European nations, why can't the power and resources
of the OSCE be expanded? Are there any initiatives for the OSCE that
are being pursued?
Answer. There is a wide measure of consensus throughout the
membership of the OSCE that the Organization is doing an effective job
carrying out its mandates in the areas of enhancing and protecting
European democracy and stability and that it is a vital part of the
mosaic of European security institutions. This mosaic of institutions,
each of which contributes its own unique capabilities, includes both
OSCE and NATO as well as other bodies. Because of our respect for the
unique contribution made by the OSCE, the United States is actively
engaged with the other members of the Organization to strengthen its
capabilities to carry out its existing mandates and to expand its work
into the economic and environmental areas. Throughout these efforts,
the United States has sought to focus attention on enhancing the OSCE's
practical work rather than creating new theoretical structures.
WHAT ABOUT SLOVENIA?
Question. What is the status of Slovenia's application to join
NATO? What are its prospects for joining NATO during the next expansion
round?
Answer. Slovenia has made progress towards reaching the level of
political, economic, social and military reform needed for membership
in the Alliance. During the Madrid Summit, Allied leaders took special
note of the positive developments towards democracy and the rule of law
in Slovenia.
It is premature to speculate about Slovenia's (or any other
state's) prospects for membership. The Administration has stressed that
no state should assume it has an ``assured invitation'' for the next
round of enlargement. In our conversations with all interested Partner
states, we have stressed that active participation in the Partnership
for Peace remains the prime pathway to membership in NATO. We also have
stressed that the criteria for membership will remain the same:
democracy, a market economy, civilian control of the military, good
relations with neighboring states, and compatibility with NATO forces.
ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE ALONG WITH NATO EXPANSION
Question. One of the motivations we hear for an expanded NATO is to
protect nations against future military threats. For example, one hears
a lot about a renewed Russian military power, although not necessarily
from the Administration. What arms control initiatives are being
pursued to reduce or avoid such future threats?
Answer. The key initiative to enhance arms control in the European
area is adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
(CFE). The CFE Treaty, which entered into force in 1992, has been a
critical cornerstone of European security and stability, resulting to
date in the reduction (by destruction or conversion) of over 50,000
items of Treaty-limited conventional weapons equipment (TLE). In
recognition of the changing European security environment, the 30 CFE
parties (including Russia) agreed in December 1996 to adapt the Treaty
to enhance its effectiveness and to improve the security of each party.
The parties have agreed that there will be no increase in total numbers
of permitted TLE, that their objective should be to achieve overall
lower force levels and to continue to preclude any potentially
destabilizing build-up of forces in different regions, and that they
will exercise restraint during adaptation negotiations with respect to
their force levels and deployments. CFE adaptation will also preserve
and enhance the Treaty's transparency and verification measures,
contributing further to a stable and predictable security environment.
Adaptation negotiations are currently underway in the CFE Treaty's
Joint Consultative Group in Vienna.
PROMOTION OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES
Question. What measures have been taken to ensure that NATO's new
members uphold values about democracy, the rule of law, and human
rights?
Answer. There are many programs sponsored by the Department of
Defense that expose Democratic values to the young soldiers as well as
to the senior military and civilian leadership of potential new member
countries. Especially emphasized is civilian control of the military
and the ways in which that concept is carried out in the West.
There are information exchange programs between our military and
civilian defense establishments that discuss important fundamentals
such as the role in defense establishments of legislative relations and
public liaison. The National Defense University also conducts seminars
on civilian control. Other DOD initiatives expose civilian defense
ministry personnel to the tools which civilian ministries must employ,
such as defense budgeting and planning, to exercise civilian control.
Soldiers and civilians also attend professional military education and
training courses (through IMET) which focus on civil-military
relations, human rights and other Democratic values. Young soldiers
also attend our military academies and other military training
facilities.
Another example of a DOD program which stresses civilian control is
the Regional Airspace Initiative (RAI). To be eligible to participate
in the RAI, countries must reorganize the way in which they ensure air
sovereignty (such as air traffic management) so that it is managed by
civilian agencies like it is done in the West.
Probably the best way in which Democratic values are passed on to
potential new members is through the hundreds of contacts between U.S./
Allied soldiers and their counterparts in PFP. Through interaction in
PFP exercises and other PFP events, as well as U.S.-sponsored ``in the
spirit of PFP'' events, Partner soldiers are shown by example how
democratic values are upheld in the West.
Question. What part of NATO's organizational structure is
responsible for internal implementation of the Alliance's values?
Answer. NATO is an alliance of sovereign states in which decisions
are taken under the rule of unanimity. Throughout its almost half-
century of existence, the Alliance has never been given responsibility
for supervising the internal affairs of its members. The United States,
for one, would never accept such an imposition on its sovereignty.
That said, since its establishment by the 1949 Washington Treaty,
NATO has always identified itself as an alliance founded on the
principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. During
the accession process, each new member will reiterate its support for
these principles. Each of the new members, as well as each of the
current Allies, realizes that it could not long remain a viable member
of the Alliance in the absence of a democratic system of government.
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
Question. South Africa and other nations have expressed concern in
April of this year that despite the political statements by NATO for
nuclear weapons non-deployment that bring these nations into the
political planning group and tying these states into nuclear planning
and deterrence is a form of proliferation. Is the Administration
addressing any Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty problems associated
with NATO expansion?
Answer. First, there are no ``Non-Proliferation treaty problems
associated with NATO expansion''. All the new NATO countries have
signed and ratified the NPT. By doing so, they have agreed not to
receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, or other
explosive devices (Article II). If NPT signatories attempted to acquire
nuclear weapons, they would break their commitment to the NPT, whether
they were in NATO or not.
There is no requirement to change NATO's current nuclear posture.
NATO countries have no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy
nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states, nor any need to
change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy--nor do
they foresee any future need to do so.
The new NATO members are expected to support NATO's strategic
concept, including its nuclear components. They will, as do current
members, contribute to the development and implementation of NATO's
strategy, including its nuclear component. They are eligible to become
members of the Nuclear Planning Group and its subordinate bodies and to
participate in the political oversight of NATO's nuclear posture as
well as in nuclear consultations during exercises and in crises. The
NATO defense ministers in the Nuclear Planning Group confirmed in 1996
that NATO's nuclear forces are not targeted at any country, neither on
NATO's periphery or elsewhere.
NATO ENLARGEMENT AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY
Question. In the ``Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation
and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation'' NATO's members
``reiterate that they have no intention, no plan and no reason to
deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members nor any need to
change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy--and do
not foresee any future need to do so.'' According to the
administration's point of view, does this statement commit the U.S. and
its European allies:
(a) to maintain the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on the
territory of all NATO member nations currently hosting U.S. nuclear
weapons?
(b) to not reduce the number of U.S. nuclear weapons beyond the
numbers agreed by the alliance members for 1998?
(c) to maintain and not change the NATO system of nuclear sharing
as currently practiced?
Answer. The origin of the statement above stems from early 1995
when, as part of the NATO Enlargement Study effort, the NATO High Level
Group, which has a continuing remit from Defense Ministers to review
matters involving nuclear policy and force structure, reached the
judgment that in the current security environment NATO's current
nuclear posture was adequate for an enlarged Alliance. Foreign and
Defense Ministers reaffirmed that decision in December 1996 with the
statement that NATO has ``no intention, no plan, and no reason'' to
deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new NATO members. NATO Heads
of State and Government reaffirmed the statement in the Founding Act.
As such, the statement is a matter of NATO policy, not a legal
commitment. Moreover, NATO will retain its existing, much-reduced,
nuclear capabilities, and retain its right to modify its nuclear
posture or policy should circumstances warrant.
Question. Does the NATO statement--reiterated in the Founding Act--
preclude training pilots from the possible new member states in nuclear
missions during peacetime and transferring the necessary equipment to
these countries as soon as these countries have introduced into service
dual capable aircraft?
Answer. As noted earlier, the statement in the Founding Act is not
legally binding on the members of the Alliance. Nonetheless, NATO's
current nuclear posture has been judged adequate for an enlarged
Alliance. Thus, there are no plans and no foreseeable reason to train
new member states' pilots in nuclear missions during peacetime nor to
transfer equipment or infrastructure to support these countries' dual-
capable aircraft in a nuclear role.
Question. Does the administration intend or plan to conclude
bilateral agreements with future new member states to the effect of or
similar to the ``Agreements for Cooperation for Mutual Defense
Purposes'' concluded with other NATO members participating in NATO
nuclear sharing? If so, what are the administration's plans?
Answer. No. We have no such intentions or plans.
Question. Which airbases in European NATO countries are currently
equipped with WS3-storage vaults for U.S. nuclear weapons and which
airbases are to be equipped according to current plans? How many vaults
have been built or will be built on each of the airbases of the new
NATO states?
Answer. We would be happy to provide a classified briefing to
cleared personnel to discuss this subject.
Question. Are the new member states, according to the
administration's point of view, expected to equip at least one unit
within its air forces with Western dual-capable aircraft? By when
should such equipment programs be completed?
Answer. From the Administration's point of view, there are no
plans, nor are there any requirements, for the new member states to
equip at least one unit within their air forces with Western dual-
capable aircraft. Nonetheless, members of the Alliance may purchase
dual-capable aircraft for use in a conventional role, as has been done
by some current NATO members who do not participate in nuclear programs
of cooperation. The fact that a certain type aircraft is dual-capable
is not an indication that such an aircraft is indeed nuclear certified
or has an assigned nuclear role.
Question. Which types of aircraft considered by the new member
states fulfill the requirement of providing DCA to NATO's future
posture?
Answer. None of the aircraft currently in or planned to be in the
inventory of new member states fulfill the requirement of providing DCA
to NATO's future posture, since we have no plans to change NATO's
future nuclear posture or to provide nuclear certification to any of
the new member states' aircraft.
Question. What other preparations are under consideration to
prepare the new member states for participation in NATO nuclear sharing
arrangements?
Answer. New members will, as do current members, contribute to the
development and implementation of NATO's strategy, including its
nuclear component. New members will be eligible to join the Nuclear
Planning Group (NPG) and its subordinate bodies (NPG Staff Group and
High Level Group), and to participate in nuclear consultations during
exercises and crisis. During the interim period leading to accession,
they will be offered periodic briefings on the main nuclear-related
issues which the NPG Staff Group is addressing as part of its work
program, but all such briefings will be unclassified due to the
sensitivity of nuclear matters.
NATO ENLARGEMENT COSTS
Question. Could the Administration provide a detailed record of
U.S. contributions to all bi- and multilateral defense and defense
industry related projects and programs under which (a) the new member
states, and (b) the other PFP members receive(d) weapons systems,
military equipment, training or other defense-related services such as
financial aid, financial loans, or debt waivers during the 1990-1997
timeframe?
Answer. The Department of State handles financial aid and related
actions for the U.S. PFP program, the Warsaw Initiative. Those items
that the Department of Defense is responsible for are accounted for in
the attached spreadsheets on Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants,
International Military Education and Training (IMET), and Excess
Defense Article (EDA) Offers.
The question asked for information on the transfers of defense
articles and services to all Partner countries. Such transfers are
conducted under the auspices of the Arms Export Control Act and the
Foreign Assistance Act, as amended. However, the Department of Defense
offers initiatives to Partners that, while not transfers of defense
articles and services, assist their participation in PFP and ``in the
spirit of PFP'' activities. DOD also offers information exchange
programs which help expose Partners to democratic values as they
pertain to the military in a democratic society. The exchanges
particularly emphasize aspects of civilian control of the military.
These initiatives are provided in the attached spreadsheet.
DOD WARSAW INITIATIVE PROGRAMS--FISCAL YEAR 1995-97 EXPENDITURES
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amount Country
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FISCAL YEAR 1995 PROGRAMS
Partnership Information Management System (PIMS). $5,921,326 All Partners.\1\
Defense Resource Management Study................ 929,199 Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania.
Emergency Preparedness Planning Seminar.......... 750,000 All Partners.
Transport of Excess Defense Articles to Albania.. 145,000 Albania.
Regional Airspace Initiative Study............... 2,000,000 Poland, Hungary, Czech Rep., Romania.
Czech C\4\/Hungarian NAVAIDS Studies............. 975,718 Czech Rep, Hungary.
English Language Development Study............... 385,000 NA.
J-8 PfP Workshop and Gaming Program.............. 300,000 All Partners Invited.
Albania MOD Advisor (EUCOM)...................... 200,000 Albania.
Support for Partner Participation in PFP 18,240,868 All Partners.
Exercises.
----------------
Fiscal year 1995 total..................... 29,847,111
================
FISCAL YEAR 1996 PROGRAMS
Regional Airspace Initiative (RAI)/Czech C\4\I 1,972,000 Baltics, Czech Rep (C\4\I).
Study.
Partnership Information Management System (PIMS). 3,533,600 All Partners.\1\
Defense Resource Management Study................ 2,140,562 Czech Rep, Ukraine, Slovak., Balts.
EDA Transport.................................... 2,520,000 Albania, Bulgaria, Balts.
Marshall Legacy Symposium........................ 1,975,000 All Partners.\1\
NATO Environmental Conference (NATO CCMS)........ 67,600 All Partners.\1\
Ukraine Emergency Preparedness Exercise.......... 1,017,000 Ukraine--all Partners invited.
Albanian Defense Advisor (EUCOM)................. 200,000 Albania.
General Officers Program......................... 40,000 Russia.
NDU PFP Conference............................... 13,200 All Partners.\1\
Public Affairs Information Exchange.............. 25,000 Hungary, Czech Rep, Poland.
Support for Partner Participation in PFP 26,478,000 All Partners.\1\
Exercises.
----------------
Fiscal year 1996 total..................... 39,981,962
================
FISCAL YEAR 1997 PROGRAMS
Regional Airspace Initiative (RAI)............... 710,000 Bulgaria, FYROM, Lithuania.
NAVAIDS Study.................................... 850,000 Bulgaria, Poland.
C\4\ Studies..................................... 1,820,000 Hungary, Poland.
Partnership Information Management System (PIMS). 4,475,305 All Partners.\1\
Defense Resource Management Study................ 2,151,000 Czech Rep, Ukraine, Slovak., Balts, NIS.
Personnel and Readiness Exchange................. 200,000 All Partners.
General Officers Program......................... 150,000 Russia, Ukraine.
EDA Transport.................................... 1,000,000 Baltics, Bulgaria.
NATO Environmental Conference (NATO CCMS)........ 170,695 All Partners.\1\
Hungarian Emergency Preparedness Conference...... 20,000 All Partners.\1\
NDU PFP Conference............................... 25,000 All Partners.\1\
Public Affairs Information Exchange.............. 20,000 Poland, Romania.
Support for Partner Participation in PFP 28,700,000 All Partners.
Exercises.
----------------
Fiscal year 1997 total..................... 40,292,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Except Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland.
NA: Not available.
FMF GRANTS
[In thousands of dollars]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CENTRAL EUROPE
Albania \1\.......................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 2,525 100 2,625
Bulgaria............................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 4,275 3,000 7,275
Czech Republic....................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 8,900 9,087 17,987
Estonia.............................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... \2\ 706 \3\ 1,500 1,500 3,706
FYROM................................................ ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 750 1,648 2,398
Hungary \4\.......................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 3,200 10,087 13,287
Latvia............................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... \2\ 706 \3\ 1,500 1,500 3,706
Lithuania............................................ ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... \2\ 706 \3\ 1,500 1,500 3,706
Poland \4\........................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 1,000 16,475 12,587 30,062
Romania.............................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 9,275 6,500 15,775
Slovakia............................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 3,550 6,000 9,550
Slovenia............................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 400 1,000 1,400
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Totals......................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 3,118 53,850 54,509 111,477
==================================================================================================
NIS
Belarus.............................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Georgia.............................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 700 700
Kazakhstan........................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 1,500 1,500
Kyrgyzstan........................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 800 800
Moldova.............................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 800 800
Russia............................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 2,250 2,250
Turkmenistan......................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 500 500
Ukraine.............................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 5,250 5,250
Uzbekistan........................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 1,000 1,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Totals......................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 12,800 12,800
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Albania: In fiscal year 1997, State exchanged $1.5 million of Albania's $1.6 million fiscal year 1997 FMF allocation for PKO authority.
\2\ These FMF funds were provided for Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT) and were augmented by $9.779 million PKO funds in fiscal year 1995 and
fiscal year 1996, plus another $750,000 in fiscal year 1996 FMF. Total USG grant assistance to BALTBAT: $12.647 million.
\3\ $250,000 of each of these nations' allocations was earmarked for BALTBAT.
\4\ Fiscal year 1997 data for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic each reflect $587,000 in reprogrammed excess CE defense loan subsidy funds. An
additional $18.24 million in subsidies may also be available.
IMET
[In thousands of dollars]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CENTRAL EUROPE
Albania.............................................. ......... ......... 128 172 165 226 432 666 1,789
Bulgaria............................................. ......... ......... 333 279 300 400 708 903 2,923
Czech Republic \1\................................... ......... 246 648 530 500 500 795 737 3,956
Estonia.............................................. ......... ......... 61 88 152 180 386 572 1,439
FYROM................................................ ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 125 249 319 693
Hungary.............................................. ......... 250 641 699 700 796 1,034 1,014 5,134
Latvia............................................... ......... ......... 46 113 195 197 388 535 1,474
Lithuania............................................ ......... ......... 72 148 150 196 498 523 1,587
Poland............................................... ......... 351 2,095 684 700 747 1,021 1,000 6,598
Romania.............................................. ......... ......... ......... 309 312 460 758 922 2,761
Slovakia \1\......................................... ......... ......... ......... 128 296 253 471 621 1,769
Slovenia............................................. ......... ......... ......... 82 113 150 253 400 998
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.......................................... ......... 847 4,024 3,232 3,583 4,230 6,993 8,212 31,121
==================================================================================================
NIS
Belarus.............................................. ......... ......... ......... 97 100 94 279 273 843
Georgia.............................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... 63 82 302 312 759
Kazakhstan........................................... ......... ......... ......... 163 90 97 388 389 1,127
Kyrgyzstan........................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... 50 60 231 257 598
Moldova.............................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... 57 106 273 268 704
Russia............................................... ......... ......... 132 455 471 413 760 842 3,073
Turkmenistan......................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... 50 118 213 262 643
Ukraine.............................................. ......... ......... 77 379 600 707 1,019 1,015 3,797
Uzbekistan........................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 95 293 286 674
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.......................................... ......... ......... 209 1,094 1,481 1,772 3,758 3,904 12,218
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Czech Republic numbers include IMET provided to the unified Czechoslovakia (1991: $246; 1992: $648; and 1993: $61).
EDA GRANT OFFERS
[Then-current value, in thousands of dollars]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CENTRAL EUROPE
Albania.............................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... 258 609 33,452 115 34,434
Bulgaria............................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 453 7,310 6 7,769
Czech Republic....................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ( \1\ ) ......... ......... ( \1\ )
Estonia.............................................. ......... ......... ......... 466 613 659 8,887 1,343 11,968
FYROM................................................ ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Hungary.............................................. ......... ......... ......... 7,142 584 ( \1\ ) ......... 84 7,810
Latvia............................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... 221 268 10,062 ......... 10,551
Lithuania............................................ ......... ......... ......... ......... 168 292 7,135 45 7,640
Poland............................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... 398 ......... ......... ......... 398
Romania.............................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 4,337 ......... ......... 4,337
Slovakia............................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 11 ......... ......... 11
Slovenia............................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.......................................... ......... ......... ......... 7,608 2,242 6,629 66,846 1,593 84,918
==================================================================================================
NIS
Belarus (See note 1.)................................ ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Georgia.............................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Kazakhstan........................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Kyrgyzstan........................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Moldova.............................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Russia............................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Turkmenistan......................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Ukraine.............................................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
Uzbekistan........................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.......................................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Less than $100,000.
Note 1: NIS countries become technically eligible for grant EDA in fiscal year 1996; however, Belarus is not eligible for EDA.
Note 2: Offers do not necessarily result in actual deliveries. Significantly, Hungary and Bulgaria rejected C-130 offers.
Note 3: Large numbers generally represent either C-130 or wartime host nation support equipment.
committee recess
Chairman Stevens. If there is nothing further, the
committee will stand in recess.
[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., Tuesday, October 21, the
committee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday,
October 22.]
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION [NATO] ENLARGEMENT COSTS
----------
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1997
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met at 10:04 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Stevens, Domenici, Gorton, Burns,
Faircloth, Hutchison, Inouye, Bumpers, Lautenberg, and
Mikulski.
NATO ENLARGEMENT COSTS AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE READINESS IMPACT
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
STATEMENTS OF:
GEN. HENRY H. SHELTON, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
GEN. WESLEY K. CLARK, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. EUROPEAN
COMMAND, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS
Chairman Stevens. We appreciate your being with us this
morning, Generals. We are going to continue now our hearing on
NATO expansion costs. I do welcome you, General Shelton, as the
new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Clark as
the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.
We had a very interesting hearing yesterday on the policy
aspects of NATO expansion, and today we would like you, the two
commanders who face the challenge in implementing this process,
to help us understand how it will be done. Of course, our
primary interest is in the funding of this process.
Within our 5-year funding agreement you will face difficult
tradeoffs to pay for the costs of expansion, if there are
additional costs. General Clark, I am sure that you will make
the process work within NATO and the European Command, and,
General Shelton, you are now the president and Secretary of
Defense's principle military advisor for our total global
aspects of military strategy.
We have some real concerns. I believe that we cannot accept
a reduction in the United States presence in Asia, the Pacific,
and Latin America, in the Middle East as a cost of expanding
NATO. But I do welcome your views on these matters.
Your written statements will be included in the record in
full. I do not know if we are going to be joined by any other
members this morning. I do welcome my friend, the chairman of
the Military Construction Subcommittee, Senator Burns, if he
has comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. CONRAD BURNS
Senator Burns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, let
me congratulate both of you for the fine job that you do for
this country and especially General Shelton, who just assumed
this new job. It was a great selection.
I think the chairman hit the nail on the head when he said
that we have to deal with not only policy--is it correct policy
to do so--and the ramifications of that policy further down the
line and what it does. Where do we want to be in 20 years as
far as Europe, as far as NATO is concerned, and the position of
this country?
I am not saying that we have not looked into the future 20
years hence, but sometimes we do not all have the same crystal
balls, and we get different pictures of what might happen.
We are dealing especially in military construction, where
we have tried to refocus our money that we spend for our men
and women in uniform to quality of life--health care centers,
child care centers, better facilities. And, as you know, we
have some of our enlisted personnel that their living
conditions could be better.
In order to maintain a strictly voluntary army,
professional army, as it is today, and the best in the world,
we have an obligation to those people. And when I say that,
then I have to put a footnote that whenever we take a look at
expansion, maybe it would make good policy, but do we have the
ways and means to get where we want to be and still maintain
the quality of life with a finite figure as far as dollars we
spend on our military.
So we have to weigh all of those things, and I am not real
sure that I am smart enough by myself to get that done. We rely
heavily on your recommendations and your judgment on what we
need in order to fulfill the mission of this country after the
policy is made. So we will be working a lot with you. I am sort
of trying to put together a trip. We may not get it done but,
General Clark, we want to come to see you and to take a look
and sit down in an environment where we can discuss some things
with regard not only to the European Command but also with NATO
and your role. We are very much looking forward to that.
I think the only way we get those things done, we have to
just sort of sit down in that kind of a setting and work at it.
So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling these hearings.
They are very, very important to our committee, who has to make
some very, very tough decisions and, of course, with Senator
Stevens, chairman of the full Appropriations Committee, and his
work in the defense area, making some very, very tough
decisions with regard to that too.
So thank you very much.
Chairman Stevens. Senator Faircloth.
STATEMENT OF HON. LAUCH FAIRCLOTH
Senator Faircloth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for being here, Generals.
There are two things about this NATO expansion proposal
that do concern me. First, we do not know what it is going to
cost. The General Accounting Office [GAO] has said that the
costs could be substantially higher or lower than Department
estimates. In other words, they have no idea what it is going
to cost. If we have no idea how much it is going to cost, how
could we measure if the benefits, if there are any, are worth
the costs?
And, second, the Department has based its cost estimate on
the belief that there is not a significant conventional threat
in Europe, which there would appear not to be, and presumably
this means Russia. But what about the nonconventional threats?
We are going to go ahead and try and strengthen NATO against a
threat that does not seem to be there, while we are leaving the
door wide open for missile attacks from rogue nations around
the world that we would not be prepared for, and NATO would
have, presumably, no effect on. I see that as a greater threat
than the lesser, conventional threat.
Also, I would like to know what is going to be the Russian
role in NATO and if they are going to be eventually a partner
of it. I guess my question is, if everything from Vladivostok
to Calais is in NATO, then why do you need NATO, if the whole
of Europe and the original enemy, would be in it?
The administration has been dragging its feet on providing
a ballistic missile shield for the United States. It has openly
opposed the Senate's effort to set a date certain for
establishing a national missile defense. In my opinion, the
umbrella of security for the United States is at least as
important as for Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, and I
think the issues need to be linked.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Mr. Chairman, I ask that my entire statement be made a part
of the record, and I look forward to hearing from General
Shelton and General Clark.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Lauch Faircloth
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Back when there was a Cold War,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was a great success for
the democracies of Europe that were threatened by an
unpredictable superpower to the east. There was a danger of a
ground war in Europe, and through NATO, sufficient protection
was attained. President Reagan sapped that Soviet threat, yet
this does not mean that we should be using NATO now as a trade
or economic alliance.
We do not know what an expansion of NATO will cost the
American taxpayers. The General Accounting Office has stated
that the costs could be ``substantially higher or lower'' than
the Defense Department's estimates--in other words, we have no
idea. And if we have no idea, how can we measure whether the
benefits of expansion, if any, are worth the cost? Certainly,
we cannot assume that ``larger'' automatically means
``stronger.'' It also can mean unwieldy, cumbersome, and more
bureaucratic.
As much as I want to encourage Poland, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and other former Soviet satellites to adopt economic
policies that will help make their citizens more free, I need
to be sure that a NATO expansion will not cause the United
States to take on additional dollar or troop commitments. We
will need to see our European allies take on a bigger
commitment in the future because I do not want to create any
more excuses to send our troops on ``peacekeeping'' missions.
Misusing our military, as we've seen over the past several
years, not only wastes U.S. taxpayers' money but degrades the
image of what used to be known as the world's most feared
fighting forces.
The arguments for this expansion claim the benefit of added
protection for Europe. The Department, however, believes that
there is not a ``significant conventional threat'' today facing
Europe, even though one could materialize in the future. So it
would appear that we would be fortifying our front door against
a ``conventional'' threat, which does not exist, while we
continue to leave the back door wide open to a non-conventional
threat.
Both our continents are now vulnerable to an attack from
smaller, terrorist countries that are becoming more and more
capable of raining down ballistic missiles with nuclear,
biological, and chemical warheads. This is a greater threat to
our national interests than an East versus West ground war in
Europe. In my opinion, the umbrella of security for the U.S. is
at least as important as it is for Poland, the Czech Republic,
and Hungary. Consideration for expanding NATO needs to be
linked with National Missile Defense. This would be a forward-
looking assessment of our whole national security picture.
I encourage the President to be as supportive of National
Missile Defense as he is of NATO expansion.
Chairman Stevens. Thank you. Both your statements will be
made a part of the record.
General Shelton, as I said, is the new chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is not only an honor to have you
present, but it is your first appearance before our committee.
We spend a great deal of time with the people who work with
you, so we are pleased to have you and your staff that is
behind you and look forward to your views.
I will tell you that I think your views, the views of you
two gentlemen, will have more to do with how the members of
this committee vote than anyone else that will come before it,
because we do try our best to pursue actions that you think are
in the best interests of our national defense.
Thank you very much for coming.
Senator Faircloth. Mr. Chairman, may I just make a brief
statement? General Shelton is from North Carolina, the eastern
part of North Carolina, so we can believe unquestionably what
he tells us, and his judgment will be beyond reproach.
Chairman Stevens. My grandmother used to tell me it is easy
to take a boy from the hills, but the question is whether you
can take the hills from the boy. Nice to have you here,
General.
General Shelton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished Senators, I am pleased to come
before you today to speak on the subject of NATO enlargement.
As you are well aware, NATO has been a cornerstone of our peace
and security in Europe for almost 50 years. In fact, we will
celebrate the 50th anniversary in 1999.
In recent years, the European and international security
environment has changed, and this change must be tied directly
to our national security strategy. To be the strong force for
peace in the future that it has been in the past, NATO is
examining new concepts and new approaches to keep peace and
keep pace with a rapidly changing world.
NATO enlargement, the alliance's initiative to embrace new
partners, is fundamental to restructuring NATO for a new
century. Every NATO country shares in the cost, as well as the
benefits, of membership in the alliance, and that will include
NATO enlargement.
Mr. Chairman, the Joint Chiefs and I endorse the
President's support for this initiative because we are
convinced that our strategic interests and the interests of our
European friends and allies are better served with enlargement
than without it.
Mr. Chairman, too often in this century we have been called
upon to intervene in the major conflicts on the European
continent at a great price to our Nation, in blood and in our
treasure. We learned the hard way that we can avoid war by
joining hands with our friends and by extending a hand to
yesterday's adversaries to turn them into tomorrow's friends.
In fact, no NATO country has ever been attacked in the nearly
five decades of NATO's existence.
We have lived through the most dangerous century in world
history, and even today in Bosnia we can see the legacy of
those earlier conflicts. That is why, in my view, we can only
gain by encouraging deserving nations to join with us in the
interest of peace. But we must be sure that candidates for NATO
membership are up to the task.
From the military perspective, it is important that new
members bring genuine military capabilities to NATO though
specific military standards are not required for admission. We
must ensure that new members are net contributors and not net
consumers of security.
They must be able to conduct coordinated operations with
other NATO members. They must participate fully in the defense
planning process. And their military forces must reflect the
shared values of our alliance, particularly the imperative of
civilian control, which is so central to our democratic
systems.
Of course, we do not expect new members right away to
operate at the same level as members of long standing, nor do
we expect them to bear alone all the costs associated with
joining the alliance. That is why I share the view of my NATO
counterparts, expressed to me during my recent trips to Europe,
that NATO enlargement must occur in a deliberate way. We must
carefully and prudently assess the cost of bringing in new
members, just as we weigh the benefits to us and to NATO as a
whole.
Part of that responsibility is to capture the military
requirements for NATO enlargement as precisely as we can, and
to provide an accurate basis for our cost estimates. We are
doing just that.
As General Clark will tell you in a moment, the major NATO
commands are currently conducting a comprehensive study of the
military requirements associated with NATO enlargement. I share
the view of Secretary Cohen that these requirements must be the
foundation upon which NATO cost estimates are based. The
results will be ready soon, but based on what I have seen thus
far I am confident that the benefits of NATO enlargement, a
more stable and secure Europe, will far outweigh the financial
cost we will incur.
Just as we must assess our costs accurately, we are also
obligated to apportion them fairly. As Secretary Albright said
in testimony before your colleagues on the Foreign Relations
Committee, the United States will insist that our allies pay
their fair share. And I would note that new members will pay
the largest share.
On balance, I am confident that the methodology that we are
using to project costs is sound. Considering the alternative,
the prospect of future instability and conflict, I see the
tradeoff between the projected cost of enlargement and the
value of a stable Europe as much in our favor.
I am also encouraged by the military performance of NATO
candidates in Partnership for Peace events, in military
operations in the Balkans, and in other operations like Desert
Storm. If these operations are any guide, they are well on
their way to achieving levels of military competence and
professionalism which will enhance NATO.
And apart from their military value, these cooperative
ventures suggest a willingness to share the risk of collective
security that deserves our respect and our support.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that the choice before us is clear.
If we are to avoid the tragedies of this century in the next
one, then we must embrace the lessons that we have learned at
such great cost to achieve the peace that we owe our children
and their children. One of those lessons is that peace is based
on closer ties--politically, economically, and militarily--and
NATO enlargement serves these ends very well.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to address this
distinguished committee. I look forward to answering your
questions shortly, and at this time I would like to turn the
microphone over to General Clark. Thank you, sir.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gen. Henry H. Shelton
Mr. Chairman, as you are all well aware, NATO has been a
cornerstone of our national security strategy for almost fifty
years. In recent years, the European and international security
environment has changed, and this change must be tied directly
into our national security strategy. To be the strong force for
peace in the future that it has been in the past, NATO is
examining new concepts and new approaches to keep pace with a
rapidly changing world.
``NATO Enlargement''--the Alliance's initiative to embrace
new partners--is fundamental to restructuring NATO for a new
century. Every NATO country shares in the costs as well as the
benefits of membership in the Alliance, and that will include
NATO Enlargement. The Joint Chiefs and I endorse the
President's support for this initiative, because we are
convinced that our strategic interests, and the interests of
our European friends and allies, are better served with
Enlargement than without it. Too often in this century, we have
been called upon to intervene in major conflicts on the
European continent, at great price to our nation, in blood and
in treasure. We learned, the hard way, that we can avoid war by
joining hands with our friends, and extending a hand to
yesterday's adversaries, to turn them into tomorrow's friends.
In fact, no NATO country has ever been attacked in the nearly
five decades of NATO's existence.
We have lived through the most dangerous century in world
history, and even today, in Bosnia, we can see the legacy of
those earlier conflicts. That is why, in my view, we can only
gain by encouraging deserving nations to join with us in the
interests of peace. But we must be sure that candidates for
NATO membership are up to the task.
From the military perspective, it is important that new
members bring genuine military capability to NATO, though
specific military standards are not required for admission. We
must ensure that new members are ``net contributors'' and not
``net consumers'' of security. They must be able to conduct
coordinated operations with other NATO members. They must
participate fully in the defense planning process. And their
military forces must reflect the shared values of our Alliance,
particularly the imperative of civilian control which is so
central to our democratic systems.
Of course we do not expect new members, right away, to
operate at the same levels as members of long standing. Nor do
we expect them to bear alone all the costs associated with
joining the Alliance. That is why I share the view of my NATO
counterparts, expressed to me during two recent visits to
Europe, that NATO Enlargement must occur in a deliberate way.
We must carefully and prudently assess the costs of bringing in
new members, just as we weigh the benefits to us and to NATO as
a whole. Part of that responsibility is to capture the military
requirements of NATO Enlargement as precisely as we can, to
provide an accurate basis for the costing experts. We are doing
just that.
As General Clark will tell you in a moment, the major NATO
commands are currently conducting a comprehensive study of the
military requirements associated with NATO Enlargement. I share
the view of Secretary Cohen that these requirements must be the
foundation upon which NATO cost estimates are based. The
results will be ready soon, but based on what I have seen so
far, I am confident that the benefits of NATO Enlargement--a
more stable and secure Europe--will far outweigh the financial
costs we incur.
Just as we must assess our costs accurately, we are also
obligated to apportion them fairly. As Secretary Albright said
in testimony before your colleagues on the Foreign Relations
Committee, the United States will insist that our allies pay
their fair share. And I would note that new members will pay
the largest share. On balance, I am confident that the
methodology we are using to project future costs is sound.
Considering the alternative, the prospect of future instability
and conflict, I see the tradeoff between the projected costs of
Enlargement, and the value of a stable Europe, as very much in
our favor.
I am also encouraged by the military performance of NATO
candidates, in Partnership for Peace events, in military
operations in the Balkans, and in other operations like Desert
Storm. If these operations are any guide, they are well on
their way to achieving levels of military competence and
professionalism which will enhance NATO. And apart from their
military value, these cooperative ventures suggest a
willingness to share the risks of collective security that
deserves our respect and support.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that the choice before us is clear.
If we are to avoid the tragedies of this century in the next
one, then we must embrace the lessons we learned at such great
cost, to achieve the peace we owe to our children, and their
children. One of those lessons is that peace is based on closer
ties, politically, economically, and militarily--and NATO
Enlargement serves those ends very well.
Chairman Stevens. General Clark.
General Clark. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the
committee, it is a privilege and a pleasure to be here today to
discuss NATO enlargement.
I think we are living in a unique period of history. We
have unique opportunities and we have some unique challenges.
And NATO enlargement is an appropriate policy to address both
the opportunities and the challenges.
As you know, sir, I have two sets of responsibilities,
first as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and in this role my
staff has been addressing the military requirements of
enlargement and is supporting NATO headquarters by determining
military requirements, identifying training needs, and
conducting operational planning for all missions in Supreme
Allied Command, Europe.
In my second hat, I am the Commander in Chief, U.S. forces
in Europe, and in this role we have been engaged in providing
U.S. military support and assistance to the three prospective
new members.
Costs of enlargement
Turning to the costs of enlargement first, it is best to
group these costs into three categories. The first is the cost
borne by the new members for their own national security and
their contributions to the alliance. Although we do not yet
know the full extent of the defense requirements these
countries will identify in the force planning process, each
country has professed its willingness to commit additional
resources to live up to its obligations.
My force planners in NATO tell me that their initial
assessment of the respective countries' force proposals
indicates that the plans that these nations are developing will
be appropriate for the strategic circumstances of the 21st
century.
Now, the second category of costs are the expenses to be
borne by the present 16 member nations to enhance their own
contributions to the alliance in support of accession. We have
established that fulfilling the existing force goals will fully
prepare all current members for the strategic requirements
introduced by NATO enlargement.
The third category of cost consists of the NATO common-
funded accounts, of which there are two major areas. First is
the military budget, which covers travel, common operations,
maintenance, civilian salaries and pensions, training and
exercises.
NATO Security Investment Program [NSIP]
The other account is the NATO Security Investment Program.
This account totals about $800 million annually, and it
provides for infrastructure improvements that are required for
the NATO common missions. Now this is the area most impacted by
the enlargement decision.
The requirements for command and control, integrated air
defense, reinforcement infrastructure, training and exercises,
and related projects are the subjects of a vigorous study that
has been taken by my headquarters and will come to me in
approximately 2 weeks. This will list the requirements but not
the costs. The study then goes to NATO headquarters, where the
requirements are costed. And we are pointing up toward having
this report completed to support the December ministerial
meeting in Brussels.
The new countries
Mr. Chairman, I would tell you that NATO welcomes the
military capabilities that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic can bring to the alliance. All three nations have
transitioned their militaries to civilian control under
democratic political leadership. And although they have
inventories of predominantly Soviet equipment, they recognize
the need to modernize.
As with many other nations, they are downsizing their force
structures to finance modernization. We have been active with
all three nations in the Partnership for Peace Program, and
they have all contributed units to the implementation and
stabilization forces in Bosnia. Poland and the Czech Republic
also contributed forces to the gulf war coalition. Hungary has
served as an invaluable staging area for NATO forces in Bosnia.
In working with the invited nations, we have learned to
respect and value their capabilities. All three are moving to
adopt's NATO's standards and doctrine. Through the Partnership
for Peace Program and our Bosnian interface we have built a
solid foundation for interoperability. And I would add that
during our survey of military facilities in the three new
nations, we have been very pleasantly surprised by both the
quantity and the quality of the infrastructure that we saw.
Our goal is to make the new nations providers of security
rather than consumers of security as quickly as possible. And
so even before accession we have been taking active measures to
assist. Our major NATO commanders have been interfacing with
the three nations. For example, one of the component commands
of NATO, AIRCENT, which is the air arm of NATO's central
region, has been working to develop a graduated and disciplined
program to improve interoperability with the new nations.
AIRCENT has prepared an air interoperability handbook. They are
pursuing an air operation English course. They have supported
the European regional airspace initiative to develop a common
air picture, and so forth.
The United States-European Command has also had significant
involvement with these new countries. In 1992 we started a
joint contact team program with Poland. We now have the same in
Hungary and the Czech Republic. These joint contact teams
establish numerous programs that help the militaries to
transform themselves and they also provide key advice and
access to U.S. support.
The State partnership program is now in place, which
matches United States National Guard units from Illinois with
Poland, from Ohio with Hungary, and from Texas with the Czech
Republic. All of these activities, as well as bilateral
security assistance efforts, have accelerated the progress of
interoperability and reduced the remaining tasks for full
interoperability with NATO.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Mr. Chairman and Senators, thank you for the opportunity to
be here this morning. I look forward now to answering your
questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gen. Wesley K. Clark
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, it is a
privilege and a pleasure to be here today to discuss NATO enlargement.
First, let me note that NATO's decision to enlarge has been a
political decision, made by all 16 allies together. I agree that it is
important that we take advantage of the opportunities and address the
challenges presented by this unique period in history, and NATO is the
security organization best suited for this purpose. As you know, I have
two sets of responsibilities, first as Supreme Allied Commander Europe,
and in this role my staff has been addressing the military requirements
of enlargement and is supporting NATO HQ by determining military
requirements, identifying training needs and conducting operational
planning for all missions in Allied Command Europe. As Commander in
Chief, U.S. Forces in Europe, I have been engaged in providing U.S.
military support and assistance to the three prospective new members.
COSTS OF ENLARGEMENT
In considering potential costs of enlargement, it is best to group
costs into three categories. First is the cost borne by the new members
for their own national security and contributions to the Alliance.
Although we do not yet know the full extent of the defense requirements
these countries will identify, each has professed its willingness to
commit additional resources to live up to its obligations. As a
percentage of Gross Domestic Product, Poland is spending 2.2 percent on
defense, Hungary is increasing to 1.8 percent and the Czech Republic is
increasing to 2 percent. This compares to the NATO average of 2.2
percent. Moreover, the projected growth rates of their economies is
higher than the average for current NATO nations, so the defense
budgets will become larger in absolute terms. Clearly, the newly
invited members are willing to bear the cost of their own defense. My
force planners tell me that their initial assessment of their force
proposals indicates that these nations' plans will be appropriate for
the strategic circumstances of the 21st century.
The second category of cost is expenses borne by the present 16
member nations to enhance their own contributions to the alliance in
support of accession. As NATO has adapted from a static defense to
emphasize more-mobile operational concepts, the operational and
strategic deployability of forces has been strengthened. As NATO
enlarges, this characteristic is clearly desirable because it offers an
alternative to larger permanently stationed forces. These force
requirements are routinely developed through the NATO force planning
process and funded by each nation. We have established that fulfilling
existing force goals will fully prepare all current members for the
strategic requirements introduced by NATO enlargement.
The third category of costs consists of the NATO common-funded
accounts of which there are two major areas: The Military Budget which
covers travel, common operations and maintenance, civilian salaries and
pensions, training and exercises, etc. The other account is the NATO
Security Investment Program or NSIP. This account, approximately $800
million in size, provides for infrastructure improvements and is the
area most impacted by enlargement. The NATO Senior Resource Board
prioritizes and funds projects to be executed from all these common
accounts. The ongoing accession process will recommend projects
required to improve infrastructure in the three invited countries to
meet the minimum military requirement for an Article V response. It is
this category of costs that will directly impact U.S. and allied
expenditures for enlargement. National contributions to common funds
are agreed on at the ministerial level and have remained fairly
constant over the years. Presently, the U.S. provides about one-fourth
of the NATO common funds. The requirements for command and control,
integrated air defense, reinforcement infrastructure, training and
exercises, and related projects are the subject of a rigorous study
that will be submitted to me in two weeks. I am confident that we have
addressed all potential requirements in a comprehensive manner, and
that NATO's final report based upon our requirements will accurately
capture costs to NATO through the first decade after enlargement. This
report is intended to support the December ministerials in Brussels.
PLANNING FOR ENLARGEMENT
Every year, NATO submits a Defense Planning Questionnaire to each
of its members. This DPQ document is used by each nation to provide a
self-assessment of its military capabilities and contributions to the
Alliance. This year, the three newly invited nations have also
completed the DPQ. Because this is their first effort at this process,
the SHAPE staff has worked closely with them to produce this detailed
document. From this information, we are establishing Target Force Goals
for the invited nations. Their force goals are ``Targets'' for this
cycle because we recognize that accession does not occur until all
nations ratify the process with a target of 1999. We are in the middle
of this process now. NATO and SHAPE force planners have traveled to
each of the three nations to assess their military capabilities. By the
spring ministerials, NATO will be able to describe Target Force Goals
for the new nations.
MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF NEW MEMBERS
We welcome the military capabilities that Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic bring to the alliance. First and foremost, all three
nations have transitioned their militaries to civilian control under
democratic political leadership. Although all have inventories of
predominantly Soviet equipment, they recognize the need to modernize.
As with many other nations, they are downsizing their force structures
to finance modernization. We have been active with all three nations in
the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and they have all contributed
units to the Implementation and Stabilization Forces in Bosnia. Poland
and the Czech Republic also contributed forces to the Gulf War
Coalition. Hungary has served as an invaluable staging area for NATO
forces in Bosnia. In working with the invited nations, we have learned
to respect and value their capabilities. All three are moving to adopt
NATO standards and doctrine. Through the Partnership for Peace Program
and our Bosnian interface, we have built a solid foundation for
interoperability. During our survey of military facilities in the three
new nations, we have been pleasantly surprised by both the quantity and
quality of the infrastructure we saw. Let me expand on what they have
found.
POLAND
By far the largest of the three, Poland's military is downsizing
from 214,000 to 180,000 troops. They have 1,700 tanks, 1,400 Armoured
Combat Vehicles (ACV's), 340 fighter aircraft, and a modest navy. At
the recent ministerials in Maastricht, their Defense Minister pointed
out that NATO membership is broadly supported in Poland by all
political parties and 90 percent of the population. Key priorities are
to enhance interoperability with NATO forces with modernization of
equipment, starting with command and control elements and education in
the English language and professional military courses. They have
developed a fifteen-year plan to upgrade their military and are
financing it with 2.2 percent of their GDP allocated toward defense.
Our survey team was especially impressed with the infrastructure
located in the Malbork area which featured a superb airfield, expansive
training complex, extensive rail support to both and proximity to
Baltic ports. This could prove to be an excellent NATO training complex
comparable to Grafenwohr, Bergen, or Irwin.
HUNGARY
Hungary has 67,000 troops, 800 tanks, 1,300 ACV's and 150 fighter
aircraft. They are weaning themselves from conscription and developing
a professional corps of non-commissioned officers. At Maastricht, their
Defense Minister said that Hungary recognizes its requirement to
finance its proper share for NATO membership. They are prepared to
commit the bulk of their forces to the common defense and are ready to
participate in other Alliance missions such as peace keeping and
humanitarian operations. Hungary is initiating a comprehensive defense
review in 1998 to posture its military to fully integrate into the NATO
structure. They are emphasizing inter-operability, especially in
command and control, air defense and air control. The government has
pledged to raise their defense expenditures by 0.1 percent of their GDP
annually until 2001 when they will be spending 1.81 percent of GDP on
defense. Hungary's NATO accession is supported by all political parties
and they have launched a campaign to increase public awareness and
support. Hungary has already demonstrated its ability to support major
NATO force projections. Taborfalva and Taszar, the bases that supported
IFOR and SFOR deployments have been used by thousands of NATO troops.
CZECH REPUBLIC
The Czech military has 65,000 troops, 950 tanks, 1,360 ACV's and
140 fighter aircraft. They committed to the challenge of meeting NATO
standards. Their Defense Minister has identified the priority areas
that they need to fix such as increasing the budget, defense planning
and interoperability. Despite funding recovery from devastating floods,
they are increasing their defense budget and by the year 2000 will be
spending 2 percent of their GDP on defense. They have formed a high-
level committee to address integration issues, chaired by the Prime
Minister. They have pledged 90 percent of their forces to NATO's use
and are aggressively pursuing language training, interoperability of
air defense as well as command and control functions. They have
recognized the need to build public support for NATO integration and
are working a media campaign to inform the public. We can in fact see
the momentum building in the Czech Republic, as evidenced by their
energetic efforts to bring communication and information systems up to
NATO standards even prior to accession.
TRAINING/INTEGRATION
As the SHAPE staff works with NATO in assessing capabilities and
requirements for the new nations, one area that I have directed them to
examine closely is the area of training. Although we have a solid
record of combined operations and exercises with the three nations, we
have not fully exploited the capacity of structured command training to
teach and reinforce NATO doctrine and standards, particularly
leadership and decision making. We have found it very successful in
economically training our own forces, and I think it will have a direct
application to rapidly enhancing the interoperability of our NATO
allies. My goal is to make the new nations providers of security rather
than consumers of security as quickly as possible.
Let me share how some of our major NATO Commands have been
interfacing with the three new nations. From an air perspective one of
my components, AIRCENT, the air arm of NATO's Central Region, has been
interfacing with the Air Forces of the three new nations. Because
flying safety demands close cooperation of all users, AIRCENT has
developed a graduated and disciplined program to address
interoperability with the new nations. They have prepared an Air
Interoperability Handbook with separate sections on Flight Safety, Air
Defense, Logistics, Air Refueling, etc. They are also pursuing an Air
Operation English Course to supplement basic English courses. They have
supported the European ``Regional Airspace Initiative'' to provide a
common picture of air traffic in the region, with standardized command
and control. This air picture will be exportable to NATO air command
and control centers throughout Europe. All three invited nations have
fully subscribed to this initiative.
On the ground, LANDCENT is even further along with respect to
integration due to their long cooperative experience in Bosnia. Forces
from Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have been full participants
in both IFOR and SFOR. The Poles have been key players in the Nord-Pol
Brigade where English is the language of command. The Czechs have been
full partners with the Canadians and British. The Hungarian engineer
battalion has been so useful and effective, our force planners are
requesting that Hungary provide it permanently to NATO's Rapid Reaction
Force. There remains a lot of work to be done of course, but the
combination of Partnership for Peace and Balkan Peacekeeping have
already welded a great deal of ground cooperation with the newly
invited countries.
From a maritime perspective, only Poland has a navy, so less
integration is required than in the above cases. Poland has been active
in PfP naval activities and has successfully accomplished a number of
exercises with NATO, particularly with their German and Danish
counterparts.
These examples demonstrate the range of activities we are pursuing
to enhance our present activities with partner nations and when
political guidance is received, to rapidly integrate the new nations.
These initiatives serve to invest first ``between the ears'' rather
than for additional hardware.
The U.S. European Command also has significant involvement with the
three new countries. In 1992, we started a Joint Contact Team Program
with Poland and now have the same in Hungary and the Czech Republic. In
addition to numerous engagement activities common to all countries in
the region, EUCOM has intensified the exercise schedule with the three
invited nations and has increased their opportunity to attend courses
at the George C. Marshall Center where the role of the military in a
democracy is emphasized. The State Partnership program matches U.S.
National Guard units from Illinois with Poland, Ohio with Hungary and
Texas with the Czech Republic. All of these activities, as well as bi-
lateral security assistance efforts have accelerated the progress of
interoperability and reduced the remaining tasks for full
interoperability with NATO.
CONCLUSION
Throughout the remainder of this century and into the next, the
United States has the historic opportunity to help expand security and
democracy in Europe. Adapting NATO to the present day realities is the
most important step we can take toward making this possibility become
reality. NATO will continue to set the conditions for peace in Europe
well into the 21st Century, and, as in the past, U.S. leadership will
remain key to success. Any assessment of costs should include the
potential costs and risks of not taking advantage of these rare
circumstances.
Again, I appreciate the opportunity to address the committee and I
look forward to answering your questions.
Chairman Stevens. General Clark, when is that meeting in
Brussels that you mentioned?
General Clark. The NATO ministerials in December will be on
December 2-4 for the ministers of defense and December 16-17
for the ministers of foreign affairs.
Chairman Stevens. It appears we are sort of premature on
this hearing, then, I think. I apologize for that. I thought we
were further along in assessing these costs. I think we have to
handle these hearings from that point of view.
We will have additional hearings after the first of the
year. We had intended to listen to some of the people from
academia at that time. But I think it would be well if we could
schedule a hearing after you have had time to assess the
reports that you and General Shelton have mentioned.
I think it is going to be critical for us to have an
analysis of these projected costs because of our experience
with Bosnia. We did hold hearings. We were assured as to costs.
And we have now seen the costs of Bosnia just literally go off
the wall. If there is going to be a similar experience within
the new member countries in terms of assessing what their costs
will be, I think it will have an enormous impact upon our
budgetary concepts here in the United States.
Let me just say this. I made my statement at the beginning,
and I do want to follow our process here and move it along a
little faster than we did yesterday. So unless there is severe
objection, what I am going to do is say each member has 5
minutes. You may ask questions or make a statement, whatever
you would like to do, and we will pursue that on the basis of
the early bird rule.
I have had my statement, and I turn to Senator Burns.
Senator Burns. I would yield to my friend from New Mexico.
I think you have other obligations; is that right, Senator
Domenici?
Senator Domenici. I do, and I do not know that I have any
questions, but I would raise one for the committee and one for
the generals that I would hope they would look at.
Chairman Stevens. Senator Burns yields to Senator Domenici.
Senator Domenici. Yesterday, Generals, we had a hearing in
the Budget Committee--Senator Lautenberg and I were there and
then he had to leave to come to the meeting here--and it
centered around a subject that most Americans are not familiar
with yet but we will be familiar with soon, and that is the
European Union countries and the new European monetary union.
It is in the offing. It will occur prior to enlargement, I
would assume, at least its first steps. And I would like to
make sure that you all are looking at what the economic
commitments, the fiscal commitments, that are going to be
imposed on the European community, including, by coincidence,
the three countries that we are closest to saying we should
bring into NATO. They are all going to have pressures to
dramatically reduce their deficits.
A condition to joining that union is a dramatic reduction
in the annual expenditures of those countries. I think it is
absolutely necessary that the economic people that help you be
able to tell us about the implications of that pressure to
reduce expenditures to get their deficits in line so that they
can have a unified currency. Mr. Chairman, you cannot imagine
the changes that are already being made in their budgets just
in anticipation of joining this union.
I think we ought to know what is the potential impact of
that on current members' and future members' ability to meet
their military commitments. It is most interesting. We are, on
the one hand, saying we think they are going to have to
increase their military commitments. On the other hand, they
are talking about reducing their expenditures that they can
make to stay within their union.
I just want to put that on the record. Mr. Chairman, I
believe if you take a trip, as you plan this issue ought to be
raised not by the appropriators. We are going to take a trip on
the Budget Committee to look at this overall European monetary
situation. We will want to know what does the EMU really mean
in the future in terms of their ability to meet military
commitments, when they are being pressured to reduce the amount
of money they spend in their budgets?
I thank you for yielding, Senator, and that is all I have
to say.
NATO ministerial meetings
Chairman Stevens. Well, you make an extremely important
point, Senator, and I welcome your contribution. I think we
ought to know before the day is out here what the timeframe is.
Can you tell us now, General Clark? Is that possible?
General Clark. As I recall, the first set of meetings is
the first week of December, and there is another set of
meetings the third week of December. So I would say by the 17th
of December all of the NATO meetings should be concluded.
Chairman Stevens. That would be not only the estimates of
requirements but the cost of those per country will be analyzed
at the ministerial?
General Clark. That is correct, Senator. The common costs
for both the military budget and the NATO security investment
program are what will be reported in December.
Chairman Stevens. Senator Faircloth, you made a statement.
Do you have any further statement at this time?
Senator Faircloth. No; I do not.
Chairman Stevens. Senator Bumpers.
Senator Bumpers. General Clark perhaps this question would
be best directed to you. Does NATO have any kind of a doctrine
for settlement of disputes within the borders of a member? I am
talking about violent disputes, something close to civil war.
General Clark. Yes; we do. Of course, one of the reasons
that people, countries want to be included in NATO is the very
close consultative process that occurs on a day-by-day basis at
NATO headquarters amongst Ambassadors, and the twice and three
times yearly meetings of ministers, key ministers of foreign
affairs and state.
This provides the foundation for the resolution of all
problems. Now, in addition, we have stated that one of the
preconditions for the invitation of these three countries and
others who might be interested in joining NATO is that disputes
with neighbors must be satisfactorily resolved as a
precondition for joining.
Senator Bumpers. If I may, that brings me to the next
question and you can include the answer to that also. Because
the next question was, do we have a doctrine or do we have
rules for how NATO will deal with border disputes between
member nations.
General Clark. Well, we would settle these in the context
of the ongoing business of the alliance.
Senator Bumpers. What does that mean?
General Clark. There is consultation and dispute resolution
and problemsolving constantly at work at all levels of the
alliance. This is done in the military at the major NATO
command levels. It is done at the international military staff.
It is done in Brussels at the North Atlantic Council, with
permanent representatives.
So whatever issues may arise are dealt with by the standing
mechanisms of NATO. This is one of the features that
distinguishes NATO and makes NATO such a robust and effective
alliance. It provides full-time, integrated consultation on all
matters affecting security for its members.
Senator Bumpers. Does NATO have the authority to send
troops into a civil conflict within one of its member nations?
General Clark. NATO has a pledge for collective defense,
that is under article V, and all of the members are committed
to work together if there is a violation of a border of another
member. Obviously, diplomatically NATO is going to do
everything it can to prevent a quarrel arising between members.
Were that to happen, it would be dealt with in the consultative
mechanisms and the North Atlantic Council, composed of the
member nations of NATO, would have to decide the appropriate
response.
Russia and the NATO alliance
Senator Bumpers. I saw something the other day--I do not
know where it was, some sort of an intelligence document that
had been leaked to the press that said, and Russia later on
said, so what is the big deal--and the document presumably said
that Russia has already made a determination that they are
going to move toward a tactical nuclear force and not try to
rebuild their conventional forces.
Are you familiar with that story?
General Clark. Yes, Senator, I am.
Senator Bumpers. Could you confirm it? Is that the present
doctrine in Russian military circles?
General Clark. Well, my understanding of the doctrine is
that there is no reason for them to try to build the excessive
military forces that they had when they were the Soviet Union
and that represented the Warsaw Pact. They do have a large
inventory of tactical nuclear weapons.
Now how they would actually use those weapons or threaten
to use them is not clear, and I do not have any insight on the
doctrine to that. But I do know that the conventional forces
are not, as I understand it, projected to grow back to what
they were previously.
Senator Bumpers. When you consider 70 years of Soviet-
American relations and the history of the Soviet Union and the
hostility that existed between the two nations for all of that
time, we have a little difficulty in this country turning loose
the cold war mentality, and I am sure that is true in Russia
too.
We say that we will never introduce tactical nuclear
weapons in any nation that joins Russia. If you were the chief
military guy in Russia, what would you tell President Yelstin?
Would you accept that just on our word that we would never do
it? This is not a formal part of NATO's doctrine, is it? And it
is not a formal part of the agreement to admit Poland, the
Czech Republic, and Hungary?
We just simply say do not worry, Russia; we are not going
to introduce tactical weapons into these three nations. Would
you be willing to accept that as the chief military advisor in
Russia?
General Clark. Senator, I think that the Russian military
advisors have to be realistic enough to appreciate the fact
that the security environment is dynamic, and at the present
time NATO has stated it has no reason and has no intent to
introduce any nuclear weapons into the territories of these
prospective new members.
And should the relationships continue to improve, as they
have in the past, I would think that would be a very sound
assumption for the Russian military to continue to rely on.
General Shelton. If I might add, Senator, the Founding Act,
a part of the NATO expansion plan, itself, along with the
Permanent Joint Military Council provides two other high-level
forums within which they could express any reservations or any
concerns they had about NATO's plans. But, to second what
General Clark says, no plan, no intent, no reason to introduce
these weapons into the new members.
Senator Bumpers. I see my time is up. Thank you.
Chairman Stevens. Senator Faircloth, do you have a
question?
Senator Faircloth. Yes, I do. My question would be, General
Clark, where does Russia fit into this expansion of NATO? Is
there a potential to bring Russia into NATO? Is that not being
considered?
General Clark. Well, from NATO's perspective, Senator, we
have said that the alliance is open to new members, and no
nation is excluded from the consideration that it could someday
want to become a new member.
Now, Russia has said thus far, as I understand it, that
they do not intend to become a new member. But I would also
note that they are working very closely with us. As you may
know, I have a Russian deputy at NATO, a deputy for Russian
forces that are engaged with us and working with us on the
ground in Bosnia. In Bosnia there is a Russian airborne brigade
with two battalions and a brigade headquarters, with a very
fine Russian colonel there.
And I give orders through my Russian deputy to this Russian
brigade. So they are involved very closely with us in
peacekeeping. They want to expand and deepen this relationship.
And they want the partnership to go well beyond what is
currently in place on the ground in Bosnia.
So I have hopes that we can expand and deepen the
relationship with Russia.
Senator Faircloth. Thank you.
Chairman Stevens. Senator Mikulski.
Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
would like first to welcome you, General Shelton. We have not
yet had a chance to become acquainted, but I really want to
give you my enthusiastic congratulations as the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs and look forward to working with you on many
issues facing the military.
General Shelton. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Mikulski. And, of course, a very cordial welcome to
you, General Clark.
General Clark. Thank you.
Personnel and the threat
Senator Mikulski. My question goes to--I have two areas of
questioning--one, personnel, and then the other what threat are
we dealing with. Know that I am a supporter of NATO expansion,
an enthusiastic supporter. And while we are looking at the cost
let me go to the personnel issues, not our personnel but their
personnel in the three countries.
As I understand it, while we are looking at cost I am also
looking at benefit. I understand that as part of the
requirement to join NATO the new nations joining NATO must have
a military capability among their officer corps to speak
English. Am I correct in that?
General Clark. That is correct.
Senator Mikulski. What is the nature of that? Does that
mean five generals per country? Does it mean that the ability
to speak English goes through the entire ranks? If so, how do
they learn English and what do you think would be the impact of
a whole new generation of Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs with an
incredible ability to speak English, who are part of an officer
corps, both as officers and then when they go to civilian life?
Could you elaborate on that? Like how many will have to
speak English? Who is going to train them? And what do you
think will be the impact not only in the military but the
future nature of that in those countries? And who is going to
pay the cost of that teaching?
General Shelton. First of all, just to give you the facts,
Senator, right up front, it varies between the new member
nations right now. From Hungary there are already roughly 10
percent of the officers that speak the NATO language, 7 percent
in Poland, and 2 percent in the Czech Republic.
There is a program underway, and I will let General Clark
address that.
General Clark. For some time we have had a variety of
efforts to improve the NATO interoperability, including the
ability to speak English. One of these programs is at the
Marshall Center, where we bring officers in from these three
countries, they study English, they participate in the defense
studies. We also have sponsored the development of language
laboratories for these officers in their own countries. Other
nations--Germany and England and The Netherlands--are also
sponsoring training in English language for the officers for
these countries.
So there is a broad array of programs underway, some
financed directly by the United States, others financed by our
allies, to help prepare these officers.
Senator Mikulski. Do you have a goal on what percentage of
the officers will be speaking English? Is it 15 percent, 20
percent?
General Clark. To the best of my knowledge, we have not
established a numerical goal. But clearly there is a practice
standard at work. Their forces have to be able to interoperate
with ours. And the principal language for operations is
English, and this is the language that is being used primarily
in Bosnia today, and this is the experience that these
countries are drawing from, from their participation there.
Senator Mikulski. Do you anticipate that this really
profound educational effort that is going on for really a whole
group of military personnel of all ages and all officer corps
levels, do you think that has an impact on building democratic
institutions in those countries and ties to the United States
of America that outweigh the benefits of only interoperability,
which, of course, is the reason for doing this?
General Clark. Absolutely.
Senator Mikulski. General Shelton, did you want to
elaborate?
General Shelton. Very clearly, Senator, I think that is one
of the great side benefits, so to speak, that comes out of
this. And I might add opening up the communications, the
ability to consult, the ability to talk to their counterparts
when operating together all adds to building democratic and not
only democratic but shared values in a lot of areas.
Senator Mikulski. Do you also feel that one of the other
dynamics is that by interacting with NATO democracies they have
a clearer understanding of what it is to be military operating
under parliamentary democracies, which further democratizes the
military in these new countries?
General Shelton. Very clearly, and not only just in NATO
but throughout the world where our forces operate. One of the
benefits and one of the things that we try to inculcate in the
forces that we operate with are democratic principles--civilian
control of the military as an example. We try to teach our
partners, our military counterparts how we operate and how the
civilian control of the military works.
And that is true not only in NATO but down in South
America, in the Pacific, et cetera.
Senator Mikulski. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up. Let
me just say a few things to you and to some of the members.
When I had the opportunity to travel, particularly with the
Pacific dialog with Senator Glenn, Senator Cohen, and Senator
Nunn, when we went to countries like Malaysia and Thailand they
were so eager to be involved with our military, not only
because we had the best technology, not only because we had
brilliant tactics, but also our code of conduct, that the
military embraced a code of conduct under a civilian head of a
military and it was for their officer corps to see what it was
like to be part of democratic militaries.
Now, as they convert from a comrade military, though they
never really embraced them in their heart and soul, this then
is a whole other benefit which I think, when you have a
military that is working with democratic military, because what
has always been the tool of instability has been who controls
the military and who controls the military's mind.
So here it is reinforcing a democratic state of mind. I
also believe that the cost of English is a benefit that will
accrue both in terms of democratic institutions, but even in
terms of our economy. So when we analyze the cost, we use the
term ``collateral benefits,'' but I think these collateral
benefits are going to be part of the intrinsic benefits.
I share those thoughts with my colleagues just as they are
analyzing this. General Shelton, thank you, and, General Clark,
thank you.
General Shelton. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Stevens. Thank you. Senator Burns.
Senator Burns. Senator Mikulski brought up saying we are
going to start establishing a democratic military, and I almost
had a heart attack. I made corporal in the U.S. Marine Corps,
and I did not see anything democratic about that. [Laughter.]
We never did get to take a vote.
Senator Bumpers. I am a former marine, and that is the only
mistake I can ever remember the Marine Corps making--making you
a corporal. [Laughter.]
Senator Burns. I would have made sergeant, but I think
there was a ship tied up at White Beach--well, that had quite a
lot to do with a lot of things back in those days.
But, anyway, thank you. I am not real sure that Senator
Bumpers, for those of you who may not know, may have had a hand
in getting General Clark into the military academy, he has been
around here that long. He has been around as long as dirt.
[Laughter.]
General, I think all of us who live in the political
arena--and I direct this to either one of you but principally
to General Clark--I want to pick up on what Senator Domenici
raised, I think a bona fide question that maybe we should
consider here, with the expansion of the EU and what they are
doing with their budgets, and also knowing of your expertise or
somewhat expertise in political science and your interest in
that--and I think you are a man in the right place probably at
the right time to understand some of these things.
But also, we have to go back home and we have to justify
what we are doing to our own constituents. And I know with me
we put $156 million into the NATO Security Investment Program
this time so far as military construction is concerned. My
question with our expansion to the three, how that impacts that
particular line and can we do that plus fulfill our obligations
like Aviano and some things that we have to do in other areas
that are sort of beyond the planning stages and ready to put
into effect.
Can you give me an overall on what impact that will have,
because we are dealing with finite numbers?
Military construction
General Clark. Senator, it is my understanding that once we
develop requirements, those requirements will go up to Brussels
for costing. And the NATO staff up there will look at the cost
of the requirements--whether it is airfield improvement or
whatever else. And this is something that will have to be dealt
with by the NATO military committees that work these issues.
So at this point I do not know what the magnitude of the
requirements will be and how they will impact on the existing
funding programs. But we have made very clear from the outset
that there were going to be costs associated with NATO
expansion and the job of my staff is to come up with good solid
military requirements that will assure that we can meet our
article V commitments when we bring these countries in.
Senator Burns. I may have to agree with the chairman this
morning. Maybe this hearing and maybe our asking those kinds of
questions is premature until after your meetings in December.
Is that a correct assumption?
General Clark. For that particular level of detail, it is,
sir.
Senator Burns. Whenever we talk about mission expansion, we
understand that the cost of the Bosnian situation is starting
to become critical and brings on quite a lot of concern on this
committee and the rest of the Congress. People, when I talk--I
was down to a stock show, of all things, but they still are
concerned about mission creep in Bosnia and what our role is
there, that SFOR may be turning into EFOR, and they are
concerned about that.
So I think most of my questions, Mr. Chairman, are really
basically on my end of it could be premature to December, but I
wanted to make that point, and maybe even our trip over there
might even be put off until after the first of the year,
whenever we can talk about more things that we have on the
table and we will have more to talk about.
That may be a distinct possibility also. But I thank you
and my time is up.
Chairman Stevens. Senator Lautenberg.
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I too, General
Shelton, add my congratulations to you and wish you well in
your very important assignment.
General Shelton. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Lautenberg. Of course, General Clark, the same goes
to you, but I think that is a more recent action.
General Clark. Thank you, sir.
Senator Lautenberg. I have a couple of questions. First of
all, let me say at the outset my inclination is to support NATO
expansion, but there are things I feel I must know to be able
to communicate my views as to why I support it. The costs are a
significant factor. Of course, our security is the most
important factor.
Now we have seen various cost estimates. The administration
has one, CBO has one, RAND Corp. has another. Does the Defense
Department have one of its own?
General Shelton. Senator, we do, in fact, have one,
although I would tell you up front the estimate was done before
the final three prospective new members were decided. But the
Department's estimate that you have heard several times or seen
in the press, I am sure, runs about $150 to $200 million per
year.
This again--how much it costs and the reason you see such a
disparity in the estimates between CBO, RAND, and DOD is based
on the assumptions that you make about the threat. It is based
on how quickly you plan to ramp up the three prospective new
members to a full capability. And this can have a tremendous
impact.
For example, in the CBO study their threat saw a resurgence
of the Soviet Union and a necessity to ramp up the three new
member nations very rapidly. The DOD study, on the other hand,
looks at what has been confirmed by the GAO as a realistic
threat--the same one basically that we used for the QDR--which
did not see a resurgence of the Soviet Union but looked at what
we think is the threat going out to about 2015 and viewed a
more gradual ramping up of the prospective new members vice
trying to do it overnight.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, just as a footnote here, the
response of our longtime friends and allies about paying for
the costs of expansion hardly seems enthusiastic. The United
Kingdom says America's cost estimates are $27 to $35 billion,
too high by about 40 percent. France says that NATO expansion
can be managed by reallocating funds and that it intends to pay
nothing extra. Germany says that they want to see a realistic
calculation of costs, not one that is based on the cold war.
So the cost issue is significant, and I think we are going
to have to get something more specific about costs and
burdensharing to hang our hat on before we move forward.
Secretary Albright has said that theoretically Russia would
be able to join NATO if it meets the criteria. So far Russia
has indicated that they do not want to be a part of NATO.
Is including Russia as a full-fledged member a good or a
bad idea? Do either of you have a view on that?
The Russians and instability
General Shelton. Senator, I would say from my perspective
that having an open process, as we have, that allows any member
in Europe to apply for admission is the right answer. Again, to
my knowledge, the Russians have not expressed any interest in
becoming a part of NATO.
But I think, on the other hand, it would be a mistake to
say that you are excluded from ever being able to become a
member of NATO at this point.
Senator Lautenberg. Then I would like to carry this
further. If we bring into NATO those in Eastern Europe, who
want to be members, it may be good for our security. It may be
good for our relationships.
Of course, they have to pass all the tests, including the
readiness test as well as the financial test. But if we are
going to bring new members into NATO and we have got the full-
fledged membership going even beyond the three, because
everyone feels that three would be an invitation to others and
certainly the door is not going to be closed if they qualify--
we need to know more about the threat. Where is the threat?
Where does it come from?
General Shelton. I think I will take it first, Wes. First
of all, I see potentially three threats. First is the
instability inside Europe itself, and we have seen that in
Bosnia, in which we are participating right now. We have
threats from the outside, outside being represented by
transnational threats, by weapons of mass destruction,
terrorism. And then finally, as some have postulated, a revival
of a Russian threat.
So there are three threats potentially that we have to
watch for.
Senator Lautenberg. But the door is not closed to Russia.
Senator Bumpers talked about their tactical nuclear forces
would get their principal investment. I cannot imagine that
those weapons are being developed to take care of Chechnya or
what have you. So is that a signal of some kind that says OK,
if we have to go to war, we know that we have got to be able to
carry this thing pretty far off our boundaries, and with
weapons of mass destruction.
What does that tell us? What is the possibility there? What
is their inclination?
General Clark. First of all, Senator, I am not sure that
anybody has said--and certainly we do not have any evidence to
indicate, that I am aware of--that their tactical nuclear
weapons will get the majority of their investment. It is my
understanding these weapons are the leftovers. This is what
happened. They are not covered under the strategic arms
reduction talks, and they were more or less left over.
The conventional forces have rapidly come down in size.
What is left are these nuclear weapons. There has been talk
repeatedly that maybe this could form the basis for giving
Russia a sense of protection from other threats that would mean
they would not have to rebuild large conventional forces.
So I think that there is substantial, still substantial
uncertainty in where Russia is going. I think we can very much
shape the direction that Russia perceives its threats and where
Russia may want to go with its defense programs.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Stevens. Thank you very much.
Senator Hutchison.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I too want to welcome General Shelton for your first
appearance here at the Appropriations Committee.
General Shelton. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Hutchison. And I want to thank General Clark for
going with me on my last trip to Bosnia. It was very helpful to
see the changes in Bosnia. I think my first trip was with
Senator Stevens, and I have been there four times, and I think
the ability to see it on the ground is essential to really
begin to have an opinion on the policies.
I have a question for each of you, and I am going to first
talk to General Clark and ask you to comment on information
that was given to us yesterday from Secretary Cohen. He roughly
laid out the parameters of the administration's view of the
cost of expansion at about $35 billion, and he allocated that
at about $10 to $12 billion for the general NATO expansion, of
which we would pay our part, roughly $2 billion, then
approximately $10 billion for the new members to beef up their
operations and come in, and then the third part was $10 to $12
billion for our present European allies to upgrade their own
rapid deployment capabilities.
Now, lay that on top of the fact that at least France and
Germany have said they are not going to increase their defense
expenditures. Do you see that they will spend that $10 billion
that does not come out of our part for their rapid deployment
capabilities, and if they do what they say they are going to
do, which is not increase their share, who is going to make up
that difference or what will have to be done to accommodate
this shortfall?
Allied contributions
General Clark. Senator, I do not have any independent means
of validating the DOD cost study for what the shortfalls are
for our other alliance members. So I am not able to say whether
it is $10 billion, $5 billion or what. We just do not operate
it that way inside NATO.
What we have seen, though, is some very, very encouraging
responses since 1992 by our NATO allies to the new strategic
concept for the alliance. If you permit me, I would just like
to cover some of those because I do not think they have
received very much notice in the United States.
The United Kingdom has a joint rapid deployment force. It
has built a new headquarters. It is procuring 100 new attack
and support helicopters. It is purchasing 25 new C-130's, 2 RO/
RO ships, and 2 amphibious assault ships.
Germany is creating a rapid reaction force that will be a
joint unit with 53,000 troops that should reach its operational
capability in 1998. And I could go on through the list.
The force planning process that NATO uses is very effective
and it has been met with very good response. So on balance we
are encouraged that we are going to be able to meet the
strategic requirements that are facing the alliance and that
will continue to face us after the accession of the new
members.
General Shelton. Senator, if I could add onto that, we also
are seeing that of the common-funded areas today 75 percent of
our partners in NATO are paying their share right now. I do not
believe, like you, everything I read in the newspapers, and
that is where I have heard or read some of the statements made
about not paying.
I can tell you that in meeting over in Maastricht along
with the meetings that I had on the second trip to Europe just
recently that I have heard in those particular forums three
things. No. 1 is they all realize there will be costs
associated with this. They also understand that the cost, as it
appears right now, based on the studies that have been done by
us as well as the way it appears to be going within NATO now,
that they will be manageable costs, and they all understand the
costs will have to be paid if we are to expand.
Senator Hutchison. Well, my time is almost up, so I cannot
follow up on that, because I want to ask you, as the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs, the person who will be setting the
priorities, you stated some of the other threats that we are
facing outside of Europe, and you are going to have to
establish the priorities.
I am concerned when I see the President vetoing military
construction in America that is operational support, 300
million dollars' worth, while at the same time he signed the
exact same types of projects for NATO, to the cost of $150
million. I have to ask if our priorities are going to be set so
that all of the threats that we are being faced with, that you
have already outlined and which we could go into more detail on
if we had time, are you going to be able to look at all of that
and put NATO in context for the threat and the potential
reaction to those threats when the time comes?
General Shelton. Senator, I can assure you that from my
perspective as the Chairman there is absolutely nothing that
has any higher priority than our readiness accounts, our
modernization accounts, and our quality of life accounts. But
as I look at the cost of the current estimate that DOD has done
and make an assumption that this is somewhere in the ballpark
of what will come out of NATO, these costs are less than one-
tenth of 1 percent of DOD's budget, and what we gain from that
in terms of the NATO collective security, the alliance, I think
fully justifies that type of an expenditure.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you.
Chairman Stevens. Senator Inouye.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Before proceeding, I wish to add my congratulations to you,
General Shelton.
General Shelton. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Inouye. The chairman, in issuing this call for the
meeting, entitled the subject to ``NATO Enlargement Costs and
DOD Readiness Impacts.'' The chairman and I have been very
concerned about the readiness of our forces, so I will ask a
general question.
Will the additional NATO enlargement costs have any direct
impact upon the readiness of our forces?
General Shelton. Senator, from my perspective, as we
currently speak in the DOD budget, starting in fiscal year
2000, we have built into that budget, into the POM, $100
million, increasing up to $200 million by 2003. That was done
as a part of the QDR process, with a vision toward NATO
enlargement occurring or expansion occurring.
Again, O&M, quality of life, modernization are of the
utmost importance to us, without a doubt, but for this price,
less than one-tenth of 1 percent, I think it is worth what we
pay for it for what we get out of it.
Senator Inouye. It is not any weakening of our readiness
level?
General Shelton. To the contrary, as I would see it, the
collective security arrangements that come out of this, long
term for the United States, really put us in great shape
compared to what it costs us, even though that cost occurs
early on and continues.
Senator Inouye. I realize, General, that in discussing
threats we must make guesstimates, at best. Prior to World War
I, no one suggested that an assassination in Bosnia would cause
World War I. I think all of us will admit now, we were woefully
unprepared for World War II. In fact, we are lucky that we were
given the opportunity to build up our forces.
In the Korean conflict, once again we sent a very bad
message to the world that we were not ready for anything. So
there are some of us here who have seen war and who have seen
blood and believe that the best way to prevent war is to be
ready for war. Are we ready for war?
General Shelton. From my assessment as Chairman, the answer
is unequivocally yes. Do we have some challenges within some of
our accounts right now, again the answer to that question is
yes. But we are well prepared today. We have a trained and
ready force. And I do not see the long-term cost associated
with NATO expansion as being detrimental to our readiness.
Senator Inouye. Do you think that involvement in NATO would
enhance our readiness?
General Shelton. It would enhance our security, readiness
being a little different from security. The requirement to have
to use our forces I think would be reduced by having an
expanded or enlarged NATO.
The readiness per se, if we looked at it in a purely
hypothetical manner and say every penny that we get our hands
on will go directly into either another exercise or operation
or modernization or building more barracks, then you could
argue that every dollar you take away from that will result in
less of one of the three things that I have said are extremely
important to us.
But in a larger context reducing the requirements to have
to use these forces I think are extremely important to us as
well. And I put this in that context, that this reduces the
possibility that we would have to use the forces that we want
to keep trained and ready.
Senator Inouye. As our Nation's No. 1 military leader, you
are in favor of NATO enlargement.
General Shelton. Yes, sir, I am.
Senator Inouye. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Stevens. Generals, I keep looking at costs and
wondering where we are going to get the money for our own
modernization programs, and I came across one yesterday after
the hearing. I want to direct your attention to the ground
surveillance statement, the joint surveillance target attack
radar system, Joint STARS.
Joint STARS
Now Senator Inouye and I had visited that here when it was
a testbed, and then we found it when we went over to Desert
Storm and we were there the night they brought it in. It was
still a testbed but we made it operational right then at the
time. You all did; we did not.
We offered Joint STARS to NATO, a package of six aircraft
and ground equipment, for $3 billion to meet the advanced
ground surveillance [AGS] system requirements of NATO. That was
scaled back to four aircraft and common ground equipment based
on a lack of support from Britain, France, and Germany.
Now we have a new proposal that we have offered at $2.14
billion for four aircraft, and we will pay 49.5 percent of that
cost to NATO. I think this sort of begs the question for many
of us. We paid the cost of developing that, and now we are
going to pay more than $1 billion to make it available to NATO.
We seem to pay on both ends.
And yet we are still meeting opposition from our NATO
allies with the proposal. Instead, I understand they are going
to independently develop systems to meet the NATO AGS
requirement.
Now is there not a message there for us in terms of paying
and paying and paying? We develop a system. Certainly they can
replicate it. There is no question about that. And we will have
to pay for what they replicate when we pay our cost to the NATO
acquisition eventually, will we not, General? And that will be
the way it comes, if they adopt another system, a competing
system to what we have already developed and proved to the
world, we will pay for that too.
Is that not right?
General Clark. Senator, there is no question about it, that
when you are looking at defense procurement there is hot
competition between various manufacturers, and when those
manufacturers are in different nations, then the competition is
even more intense.
Chairman Stevens. I understand that, General. What I am
saying is this committee will review and pay for the cost. We
have already paid for JSTARS, but if NATO, where you are,
decides to take the European version, we will pay almost 50
percent of that too. Now I am beginning to question our
involvement in NATO in terms of the fact that the United States
continues to pay the bulk of the costs no matter where it goes.
We are paying more than anybody else in Bosnia. We are
paying more than anybody else right now to support NATO. Why
should we continue to do this?
General Clark. These are the shares that generally have
been assessed based on relative gross national products of the
partners, and that has been used as the basis upon which shares
were developed. So we typically pay about 28 percent of the
infrastructure cost, and it depends on what program it is as to
what our share is.
But that is the basic method for assessment.
Chairman Stevens. Well, I quit going to the NATO assembly
because for year after year after year I asked them to review
that, but we continue to pay the same amount that we did 15, 20
years ago. Are we going to get a new allocation if NATO is
enlarged? Will our costs come down?
General Clark. I need to get you an answer for the record
on that, Senator. It is my understanding that there will be a
reallocation, but I have not heard anything definitive on that.
[The information follows:]
Yes. The U.S. percentage cost shares in the three NATO
common funded budgets (National Security Investment Program
(NSIP), Military and Civil Budgets), along with the cost shares
of all other existing NATO members, will be reduced
proportionally based on the added participation of the three
new members. If the budgets are maintained at their current
levels, then the U.S. and other existing members will pay less
than they do now. However, budget levels may be increased to
pay for the cost of enlargement, in which case the U.S., while
paying a lower percentage, may actually pay a greater amount of
funds.
Chairman Stevens. Well, when we were new Senators I
remember listening on the floor to Senator Mansfield, and I
went over and sat and listened to him because Senator Jackson
and I had great regard for him, and yet here he was, saying we
should bring our forces back from Europe at that time. And I
think we voted against--I know we did--against Senator
Mansfield.
U.S. force reduction
Now we have a situation, as I asked Senator Cohen
yesterday, where we are going to have about 300,000 more forces
in NATO if it is enlarged. And as our commander there, General
Clark, do you think we will be able to bring some of our forces
back? We have 100,000 there now. If we had 300,000 from these
new NATO countries, will we be able to have some offsetting
cost and bring some of ours back?
General Clark. Senator, I think you have to look at the
functions that the U.S. forces perform over there before you
can answer that question.
Our forces are the glue of the alliance. They are there not
only to meet NATO's interests but to meet our own American
interests. They participate in the Mediterranean. They are
available to be deployed as a contingency force outside of NATO
areas, and we did this during the gulf war, and they were very
effective in that purpose.
When they are there, they are available to help shape the
international environment. Those forces today are serving a
very important function, for example in strengthening the
relationship and reducing the remnants of the cold war
attitudes that are residual in Russia.
So I think we are getting a substantial benefit for the
forces that are there, and I would hope that we would continue
to maintain the level of approximately 100,000 forces in
Europe.
General Shelton. And, Senator, if I might add to that, we
also I think show a total commitment to peace and stability on
the European continent in addition to that. And we also have
forward-deployed forces, which reduce the strategic mobility
required if we have to move forces into that part of the world
to reinforce, or for whatever reason.
And so there is a substantial savings in that regard, and
one of the most critical parts of it is the time we save.
Without the strategic mobility assets ready to start moving our
forces instantaneously, then you have already bought quite a
bit of time to be able to reinforce or to react to an
environment.
Chairman Stevens. Well, I predict to you gentlemen that
there will be people sitting here in 2007, 2008 that will have
a different point of view, and it does seem to me that what we
are hearing in these statements of my colleagues, they are all
saying, you know, yes, we believe in NATO, but if there is a
stable Europe is that the place to keep our forces.
Isn't the instability somewhere else in the world, then? We
are locking ourselves into a period here, it seems to me, that
we are going to rue the day when we have some real crisis
somewhere else in the world and they are tied down here, tied
down in the NATO structure.
Now I think I am going to go back and get out Senator
Mansfield's speeches and read them to the Senate, because, you
know, the older I get, the more I understand what Mike was
saying at the time, that forever is a long time. We kept forces
in Europe now for more than 50 years after World War II, and we
continue to build them up, and we continue to increase the cost
of keeping them there.
The cost per person over there now is just enormous
compared to the original cost of keeping our people there. They
were draftees then. They were unaccompanied tours. We were not
providing all of the things we are providing over there now. We
were not paying costs to nations that were there at the time.
We do not get much host nation support any more in NATO.
I see just an ever-increasing cost of our presence in NATO,
and I do not know why we do not put something on this to say,
look, if we get 300,000 more forces over there, let us bring
part of our people back. It does not cost as much to keep them
here as it does to keep them over there. The cost factor is
going to have to be looked into, as far as I am concerned,
before we are through.
And I look forward to the results of your December
ministerials, General Clark. But I again say, you know, I do
not know how we are going to maintain the force that I believe
we will need in the period of 2003 to 2023 at the rate we are
going now.
General Shelton, your ships, as I said yesterday, average
20 years of age today. They are being replaced at the rate of
two to three per year. It does not take a rocket scientist to
tell you that by the time my and his watch are over the average
age of our naval vessels is going to be somewhere around 30.
General Shelton. I know.
Chairman Stevens. Now where are you going to get the money
to replace them if you increase the cost of keeping people in
NATO and we increase our payments to NATO, and we face
something like this JSTARS thing. I think that is what really
irritates us.
We are going to pay one-half of the cost of developing a
competing system to one we have already proven to the world is
available and we offered to make it available to them at less
than cost. Now somehow or other I think that the Nation has to
understand where we are going as far as this readiness concept
is concerned.
My friends ask, are we ready today. Yes; I think you are
ready today. But I do not think you are going to be ready in
2003 if you keep spending money in Bosnia the way we are going
to spend it and spend money in expanding NATO and do not
modernize this force. I do not know. Somehow or other you are
going to have to prove to me that we are capable of modernizing
this force and replacing the aircraft, replacing the ships,
replacing the tanks, replacing the other systems we need and
developing new ones before we add to the cost of our military
because of an enlarged NATO.
It is cost that is driving me and the need for
modernization, not the question of whether NATO should be
enlarged. Of course, NATO should be enlarged. That is not the
question. The question is who should pay for it, and every one
of our colleagues has read what has been reported in the
European press.
France is not going to pay any more. We visited Britain.
They are not going to pay any more. Germany says they are not
going to pay any more. And by definition there are more costs,
and we are being told and you and the two Secretaries said,
well, do not worry. It is not going to cost us any more.
But that has not been proven to me yet. So I would hope
that you do not mind if we say to you, after you have this
ministerial and get those costs, we would like to have you come
back and tell us what the analysis is and how they justify
telling us that we can fit it into this program and continue to
modernize and maintain our capability to defend this country.
As I said, that has not been proven to me yet, that we
should proceed on the course we are on and just assume that the
money will be there.
General Shelton. Senator, as you probably recall from the
QDR process, in terms of modernization we are counting very
heavily on three things. One was a reduction in our
infrastructure, one was a revolution in military affairs, and
one was a revolution in business affairs. And, of course, that
will have to be done in conjunction with Congress, but that is
going to be critical for us as well as we look at how we
modernize our U.S. forces.
Chairman Stevens. Well, I have to confess to you that
yesterday I did not read that you had the money in the QDR for
this, and you have mentioned today that there is $100 million
going up to $200 million. I did not see that.
General Shelton. Starting in 2000.
Chairman Stevens. I am glad to know that it is there. I do
not think it is enough if you look at the cost of our
involvement in Bosnia. I do not think it is enough to say that
is what it is going to cost us to bring these people in and
make them interoperable and make them part of the force that we
are a part of.
I think the interoperability costs alone are going to be
staggering. We will wait and see what you all tell us.
Do you have any further comments?
Senator Hutchison. Yes; and I appreciate very much what you
said. But I just want to reinforce the chairman and the ranking
member. We are looking at an average of over $3 billion a year
in Bosnia right now. This is a committee that has increased the
President's defense budget year after year. The defense budget
is going to be about where it is now.
So I would just ask you, as you are putting these costs
together, to look at the priorities, look at the threats that
we face throughout the world, and make sure you understand that
with the defense budget what it is and the choices that we
have, there is an issue right now in the defense authorization
bill where there is an effort being made to severely curtail
competition in depot maintenance, which is another $100 million
per project that will be wasted if we are not able to have
competitive bids on that, in addition to the infrastructure
that you are talking about bringing down.
Everything that we have been told since I have been in the
United States Senate about being able to be ready with a
smaller force structure depends on lift and rapid deployment,
and I worry very much that we are cutting back in this country
to too great an extent, that we are not looking at the full
range of our security risks when we are building up so much
with NATO military construction, with NATO investment, with
investments in Bosnia.
I just hope that you will think about these priorities as
you are assessing what the costs will be and what our share is
and what our fair share should be with regard to stability in
Europe.
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inouye. General, I have had the privilege of
serving with the chairman now for over 25 years on this
committee, and one thing I have learned, take his words very
seriously.
Senator Hutchison. Other than his wonderful personality.
[Laughter.]
Additional committee questions
Chairman Stevens. Enough of that. We will continue these
hearings tomorrow. But I do thank you very much, and we are
very grateful to you for what you do. You are both
distinguished officers and have proven yourself in the field
and certainly proven yourself to get where you are today. And
we respect you for what you are doing.
Thank you very much.
General Shelton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
Senators.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted to Gen. Henry H. Shelton
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard C. Shelby
INTELLIGENCE SHARING
Question. What is the status of military to military meetings with
regard to arrangements about intelligence gathering and intelligence
sharing?
Answer. The Defense Intelligence Agency established relationships
with its counterpart organizations in the three prospective NATO
members in 1992. Since that time these nations have all concluded
General Security Agreements on the protection of classified military
information with the United States. The relationships both at the
leadership and working levels have become increasingly comfortable. All
three countries send students to our Combined Strategic Intelligence
Training Program where they learn about U.S. intelligence doctrine and
have an opportunity to interact with mid-grade officers from allied
military intelligence organizations. The primary focus of current
exchanges with these nations has been in Bosnia, where interaction
between the militaries of these nations and those of the Alliance has
been excellent. In particular, as part of IFOR/SFOR, military units of
these nations have gained experience in using U.S. military
intelligence and also in the application of tactical intelligence in a
NATO military environment. Military and intelligence relationships
between the U.S./NATO and these three countries continue to mature in a
very satisfactory and mutually beneficial manner.
ENLARGEMENT AND U.S. FORCE STRUCTURE DECREASES
Question. For several years, I have been extremely concerned about
the defense budget topline and the concomitant shortages we are
experiencing in virtually every facet of defense spending, end strength
goals, and near-term and long-term readiness. These problems are
especially vexing when no one takes into account the fact that our
troops are being deployed at a record pace. With this in mind, will
enlargement allow us to decrease our force structure in Europe and
apply the savings into those program areas that need it, like
modernization? Is NATO enlargement just another ``event on the
operational continuum'' that will push our forces to the breaking point
more quickly than if NATO was not enlarged?
Answer. NATO Enlargement is not a factor in determining the size or
shape of U.S. military forces in Europe. Maintaining a sufficient level
of U.S. military forces in Europe is essential to preserving U.S.
influence and leadership there and in adjacent regions. For the
foreseeable future, this forward deployed presence will remain
approximately 100,000. This size is sufficient to respond to plausible
crises, provide tangible evidence of America's commitment to preserve
regional stability, actively participate in multinational training,
reinforce our bi-lateral relations with key partners, bolster U.S.
leverage in helping allies shape allied defense capabilities, and
minimize the likelihood of having to deploy additional forces from
CONUS in the early stages of a regional crisis. This force anchors both
NATO's deterrent capability and the alliance's ability to respond to
out-of-area contingencies.
NATO EXPANSION IN THE QDR
Question. General Shelton, I was surprised by Secretary Cohen's
statement during testimony to this Committee yesterday that the
Quadrennial Defense Review takes into account the admission of our new
nations to NATO. It was my understanding that the QDR does not
contemplate NATO expansion into its strategy. While I realize the QDR
was presented prior to your appointment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, I would appreciate learning in detail how the proposal to
expand NATO impacted the QDR. If the QDR does not in fact contemplate
additional nations joining NATO, how do you reconcile this omission and
what accounts in the DOD budget do you intend to use as bill payers for
the costs of NATO expansion in the fiscal year 1999 budget submission?
Answer. The Joint Chiefs of Staff provided a strategic assessment
to the Secretary of Defense prior to the QDR process that assumed the
likely addition of an unspecified number of new members to NATO between
now and 2010. This was based on the stated NATO and USG policy, since
1992, of seeking to admit new members to the Alliance, while
acknowledging that such admissions would not occur until and unless
ratified by the U.S. Congress and the Parliaments of all NATO members.
This assumption is reflected in the Defense Strategy's discussion on
successful adaptation of our alliances. During development of the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), it was anticipated that there would
be costs associated with NATO enlargement and it was designated as one
of a number of priority areas for funding. Funds sufficient to cover
our expected share of enlargement costs are provided in the FYDP.
The cost will be sourced from infrastructure and force structure
savings. Therefore, cancellation of programs or reduction to troop
readiness is not needed.
We anticipate that the funding will be divided between O&M (which
funds the U.S. contribution to the NATO Military Budget), and Military
Construction funds (which funds the U.S. contribution to the NATO
Security Investment Program).
Specific details of how this funding stream will be apportioned
between O&M and MilCon funds will be decided as the Department develops
its fiscal year 2000 budget.
COST OF NATO ENLARGEMENT
Question. All Administration cost estimates that I have seen assume
no military deployment, extended or otherwise, like Bosnia. In your
opinion, is that wise or realistic, and if so, why? Let me ask a
related question: What trade-off to modernization, R&D, end strength,
and readiness would have to be made if we faced another prolonged
``engagement'' either simultaneously or subsequently to Bosnia?
Answer. It is Department of Defense Policy to budget for known,
ongoing contingencies only. The Department does not budget for
unforeseen crises. Therefore, the methodology for estimating costs
associated with NATO enlargement is consistent with Department of
Defense policy.
Current cost estimates for NATO enlargement represent common
funding requirements for NATO infrastructure investment. These are
primarily military construction and procurement requirements to provide
capabilities for interoperability between armed forces of current and
new members; and to extend NATO's integrated command, communications,
and air defense surveillance systems.
The Department of Defense is analyzing the recently completed NATO
Enlargement Study. This study provides SHAPE's analysis of NATO's
military requirements for enlargement. The Department is in the process
of refining initial cost estimates based upon the study's findings. The
Department will be able to provide refined cost estimates in early
1998.
As with other priorities, NATO enlargement requirements will
compete for resources in the budget development process. In this
rigorous process, programs are resourced within the context of the
entire Defense program. As you know, we are already looking at
requirements for fiscal years 2000 through 2003 in our Future Years
Defense Plan, and NATO enlargement costs are included. Funding NATO
enlargement will involve resources across appropriations within the
Department. Readiness remains the Department's number one priority and
will not be compromised.
NATO CONTINGENCIES
Question. What type of contingencies may involve the United States
if the three prospective nations are admitted to NATO? What steps are
you taking to incorporate these scenarios into our military planning
and budget?
Answer. In general, the major contingency that the U.S. could be
involved in if the three prospective members are admitted to NATO is
the Article 5 defense of an attacked member. At present, however, NATO
military authorities have not yet completed detailed contingency
planning that involves the new members.
As for budgeting for these contingencies, it is Department of
Defense policy to budget only for known, ongoing contingencies.
However, once contingency plans are developed, they will impact NATO's
Defense Planning Process and Defense Planning Questionnaire. It is
through this process that the U.S. will take the scenarios into our
military planning.
NATO EXPANSION
Question. It is my understanding that the European members of NATO
lack the sustainment capability for prolonged operations. Specifically,
NATO's European members have an inadequate Combat Support (CS) and
Combat Service Support (CSS) elements, and therefore, NATO planners
have no alternative except to rely heavily on the United States to
provide that type of critical support for NATO operations. If NATO is
weak in CS and CSS units, should we look to the three prospective
members for that CS and CSS capability? Would this proposal improve
NATO's capability to conduct sustained operations without U.S.
logistical involvement?
Answer. I would not characterize NATO as being weak in Combat
Support (CS) or Combat Service Support (CSS) forces. Since NATO's
creation, military forces of several European member nations have been
tailored toward an ``Article V'' scenario, which is the collective
defense of NATO nations. Their forces relied upon some military support
functions being performed by their own nations' civilian
infrastructure, in defending their own soil. In the past several years,
NATO has become involved in ``non-Article V'' operations, such as in
Bosnia, and has seen the need for military CS and CSS increase.
Therefore, any increase in NATO's support forces would obviously
contribute toward sustainment issues in non-Article V operations. Such
an increase would be generated through NATO's Defense Planning Process
and Force Goals.
Regarding our nation's logistical involvement, we must always
maintain the capability to logistically support our own forces, whether
we're in a NATO operation or somewhere else in the world. Having
additional logistical support options within NATO would obviously
relieve the potential reliance of U.S. support forces by Allied nations
in a multinational operation.
MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF PROSPECTIVE NATO MEMBERS
Question. Based on NATO's experience working with the prospective
members in the Partnership For Peace program and in Bosnia, I'm
interested in knowing your assessment of the strengths and weaknesses
of their militaries. How will the addition of Poland, the Czech
Republic, and Hungary to NATO add to the alliance's ability to fulfill
its collective defense mission?
Answer. The greatest strengths of the armed forces of the three
NATO invitee states is their commitment to constitutional civilian
control of the military, democracy and reform. Senior civilian leaders
in all three states have taken steps to ensure that their militaries
follow the guidance of civilian authorities. In addition, reforms to
instill commitment to democratic principles, as well as to improve
defense planning and staff procedures, are underway in all three
countries. These reforms have made considerable progress. Hungary's
willingness to allow NATO Allies to use Hungarian facilities in support
of IFOR/SFOR operations indicates the desire to put words into action
in support of NATO. Additionally, each country possesses a reservoir of
talented, trainable professional officers who will form the core of
their restructured militaries.
The principal weakness of the three militaries is their current
limited ability to operate in conjunction with NATO military forces.
Four areas in particular--air defense, command, control and
communications, military infrastructure and training to NATO
standards--are of greatest concern because they directly affect the
Alliance's ability to reinforce these states in time of crisis.
Early warning and command and control for air defenses are
extremely weak in all three countries, but are being aided by the U.S.-
sponsored Regional Airspace Initiative.
Planning for command, control and communications upgrades is
underway that will establish connectivity between NATO and the three
invitees at the highest levels of government and the military shortly
after accession.
All three countries are currently working with NATO to determine
which infrastructure needs to be upgraded. Several areas that require
attention after accession are: cargo-handling capabilities, ammunition
storage facilities and POL (petroleum, oils and lubricants) storage and
distribution. A number of areas require more modest improvements,
including air bases, road and rail networks, staging areas, ports and
headquarters facilities.
All three invitees are working to develop their officers and non-
commissioned officers, to adopt NATO doctrine, to build understanding
of tactical procedures, and to increase the number of troops proficient
in NATO languages, particularly English. NATO's Partnership for Peace
program and the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia-Herzegovina have
been important tools for improving interoperability with the Alliance
in all these areas.
Question. What are the most serious military deficiencies of each
as candidates for NATO?
Answer. The Czechs, Poles and Hungarians are all focusing on the
deficiencies that we believe present the greatest challenges:
personnel; training and the adoption of NATO doctrine; and
interoperability.
Personnel
We have made it clear to all three that serious, effective military
personnel reform must be accomplished as soon as possible within the
Armed Forces, and all three have begun to take the necessary steps. The
Czechs agree that they need to create a Western-structured military,
reliant on an effective Non-Commissioned Officer corps, with quality,
well-trained forces that are properly recruited, paid, housed, and
retained. To accomplish these goals, they understand that they need to
dedicate the required resources and, in some cases, pass appropriate
legislation.
Personnel reforms will encompass perhaps the most drastic and the
most difficult changes to the Polish military. The military has
announced plans to cut total forces from 230,000 to 198,000 by 1999,
and to 180,000 by 2004. It will increase the number of career soldiers
from 36 percent to 50 percent of total troops, and it plans to improve
the junior-to-senior officer ratio from its current 50:50 to a more
appropriate 70:30 by the year 2012. To reflect better the reliance by
NATO militaries on a skilled, professional NCO corps, Poland plans to
increase the number of NCO's to one-third of its total forces and to
invest heavily in their training.
Difficult personnel reforms are also needed in Hungary. Hungary's
priority areas for personnel also include improving the ratio of junior
to senior officers and of officers to NCO's, but they also plan to
address quality of life issues for the military, win a 23 percent pay
raise for the military in 1998 (Parliament votes on this issue in early
December), and enact legislation on pay standards (scheduled to take
effect on January 1, 1999). The military has stated that it will cut
ground forces personnel from the present 59,715 to 34,000 by 2005, and
Air Force personnel from the current 17,500 to 14,000. Hungary hopes to
have a 60:40 professional to conscript ratio by the end of the century.
Another important objective is to increase the present one-to-one
proportion of NCO's to officers to two-to-one, and ultimately three-to-
one. The length of service for conscripts will be reduced from 12 to 9
months.
Like Poland and Hungary, personnel reforms will be perhaps the most
drastic and most difficult change for the Czech military to implement.
The Czechs assured us during a recent visit to Prague by Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy Fred Pang that
personnel reform is their number one military priority. They pledged to
develop, with our support, a concrete action plan that will address and
correct their personnel deficiencies.
The Czechs began the process of implementing personnel reform back
in March when it approved the National Defense Concept. The primary
objective of the concept is to reorient the military away from the
heavy, manpower-intensive Soviet-style corps of the Warsaw Pact and
toward smaller, more mobile, NATO-compatible units in both the Czech
Ground Forces (Army) and Air Forces. The plan aims to downsize the
armed forces to 55,000; develop a professional cadre of career
soldiers; standardize structures along NATO lines; improve the quality
of military life; and, most importantly, develop a professional NCO
corps. The implementation of this plan, which started on July 1, is
scheduled for completion by the end of 1998.
Training and NATO Doctrine
Each country has begun to aggressively adopt NATO doctrine and
incorporate it into their training programs. Within the PfP framework,
all have obtained NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAG's) and
regulations and are translating them as fast as they receive the
documents from Brussels. All three have also set up NATO Integration
departments in the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, as well
as in the General Staff, to help achieve their prioritized
interoperability goals and facilitate their swift operational
integration into the Alliance.
Training will become a crucial element of each country's
integration plans. The operational experience gained through active
participation in PfP exercises has greatly improved the ability of all
three invitees to operate jointly with NATO forces. Each country is
conducting staff exchanges with the United States in such areas as
acquisition, budget and finance, logistics, public affairs and
legislative affairs.
The one million dollars Poland received from the United States
under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program
has provided training in such key areas as English language skills, NCO
development, and logistics. Poland has also received training from
other Allies in logistics, English language, C\3\, and defense
planning. English language proficiency is a critical element of NATO
interoperability, and Poland plans to have 25 percent of officers in
NATO-designated units proficient by 1999. Over 1,100 officers per year
are currently studying NATO languages (primarily English).
The Hungarians have placed a great deal of emphasis on training.
Two of Hungary's highest priorities are to increase English proficiency
and to improve the quality of professional training, and the one
million dollars in IMET funds which the United States provided in 1997
has been spent wisely in both areas. NATO Allies also provide training
to Hungary in NATO doctrine, recruitment, defense planning, and force
modernization.
Training provided by the United States and Allies has directly
impacted both Hungarian operational capabilities and senior-level
defense planning and reform. The Chief of the Defense Staff and
Commander of the HDF is the first officer of his grade and
responsibility from all of Central and Eastern Europe to attend the
U.S. Army War College. His First Deputy Chief of Staff is also a U.S.
War College graduate. Together, based on their U.S.-training, they have
successfully restructured the Hungarian General Staff and Service
Staffs along NATO lines to be more compatible and interoperable with
NATO.
The Czech Republic rightfully views the Partnership for Peace (PfP)
program as the most direct path to achieving NATO compatibility, and
its participation with the United States and other Allies have enabled
it to begin developing the capabilities needed for it to operate with
NATO forces. Active PfP participation, coupled with its peacekeeping
activities, already allows Prague to contribute well-trained and
seasoned personnel that are familiar with NATO procedures and
operations. The Czechs have used the $800,000 in IMET funds provided by
the United States in 1997 for training in such areas as English
language skills, NCO development, and defense planning.
The Czech Republic has also received training from other Allies--
the United Kingdom, France and Germany, among others--in C\3\,
logistics, air defense, and air traffic control.
Interoperability
The third broad area of national effort for each of these countries
is interoperability with a focus on C\3\, air defense architecture,
logistics, and infrastructure. All three invitees will be making
significant investments to infrastructure improvements--some of which
they would have made whether they were invited to join the Alliance or
not--and they know that those improvements will be costly. We are
finding, however, that some of the infrastructure inherited from the
Warsaw Pact is adequate and does not require significant modifications
for NATO use.
All three countries are also moving quickly ahead on initiatives to
improve interoperability in key areas. For example, sweeping reforms to
existing air defense and air traffic control systems have greatly
improved the three invitees' ability to defend and manage their
airspace. When their Air Sovereignty Operations Centers (ASOC) come on-
line in 1998, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will have
consolidated control of their civilian and military air traffic control
networks into one streamlined system and be ready to establish a future
link with NATO's air defense system when the political decision to do
so is made. Hungary has already completed the installation of
``identification-friend-or-foe'' (IFF) transponders to their modern
combat aircraft, and Poland and the Czech Republic plan to do so by
1999. Shortcomings exist in terms of the quality of their equipment,
but this is not critical in the near-term. Units from all three
selectees participate successfully in the NATO-led Stabilization Force
(SFOR) with this equipment. The key point is communications. Most of
these countries' modern Warsaw Pact equipment can continue to be used
and made to operate satisfactorily with NATO forces' equipment, so long
as communications can be upgraded for compatibility.
Question. What can each prospective member offer the alliance
militarily in the interim?
Answer. While the three selects are not formally NATO members, they
already have appreciable capabilities, as demonstrated by their
performance in Bosnia; however, improvements are still necessary. They
have developed plans on how to improve in critical interoperability
areas and will continue to increase and improve their capabilities,
provided sufficient resources are obtained from their parliaments.
Poland has already committed to meeting all 41 of NATO's
interoperability objectives, Hungary has pledged to meet 38, and the
Czech Republic has promised to attain 31.
All three states are capable of defending their own territory
against current and projected threats in the short- to near-term. This
would prove invaluable in an Article V operation that might take place
within their own borders.
In addition, all three invitees can contribute military forces to
peacekeeping and other non-Article V missions. Forces capable of
conducting such operations are currently limited to a few Rapid
Reaction units, which amount to several high-readiness, well trained
battalions. As capabilities improve, they will be able to project power
better and develop the capability to more flexibly deploy their troops
abroad.
EUROPEAN ALLIES
Question. What really is the limit of their ability to reprogram
funds to cover the cost of NATO expansion?
Answer. The allies have said that they are willing to reallocate
money from efficiencies and economies within the three NATO common
budgets to cover the cost of upgrading and improving common
requirements. The total for these common budgets currently is about
$1.8 billion. Additionally, they have indicated a willingness to pay
their ``fair share'' of direct enlargement costs. Our European allies
would not include force modernization, either for new members, or for
themselves, as part of these direct costs. We believe that additional
funds will be required over and above those made available through
reprioritization.
THREAT
Question. A key issue that many members of Congress will be
considering as we contemplate the issue of NATO expansion is the threat
level in Europe and the likelihood that U.S. troops would be involved
in a conflict on behalf of a new NATO member. What is the threat to
Europe? Are we more likely to see a flare up of border clashes or the
type of ethnic strife we have seen in former Yugoslavia?
Answer. While Article 5 collective defense is still the cornerstone
of NATO's strategy, the Alliance, as it accommodates the new strategic
landscape, has put emphasis on its ability to respond to Article 4 type
contingencies that exhibit the potential for escalation. NATO assesses
that Russia poses only a minimal threat over the next decade, owing to
its greatly diminished military. Conceivably, there does exist the
possibility of conflict emerging among various contiguous states within
Europe. On NATO's southern flank, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya are
identified as potential threats to the Alliance during the near- to
long-term. Threats from these nations fall into several functional
threat areas, to include terrorism, religious extremism, development
and possession of weapons of mass destruction, and direct
destabilization of neighboring nations. Instability among nations in
North Africa and the Mediterranean littoral in general, is viewed by
NATO as potentially threatening in that it might fuel refugee flows,
narcotics trafficking, and organized crime, all of which have the
potential for spilling over into Europe.
The potential for political instability in the Balkans remains
relatively high. Indeed, it is this type of threat which is assessed in
NATO as the most likely near-term threat to the Alliance. Within the
former Yugoslavia, border clashes, ethnic strife and general
instability will remain serious threats for the foreseeable future
(although, NATO's present commitment to stabilization efforts will
continue to reduce these threats in former Yugoslavia.) Tensions in
Kosovo have not abated, and the potential for violent Serbian
repression there continues to fuel fears in Macedonia and Greece of a
spillover crisis in the form of refugees. Macedonia itself will remain
vulnerable to internal ethnic strife, a scenario which could in turn
destabilize its neighbors. Similar low intensity conflict threats will
continue to fester throughout the Balkans. Recurrences of civil unrest,
similar to what recently happened in Albania, will remain possible for
the near-term in countries like Bulgaria and Romania. Driven by ethnic
and political strife, poor economies, and lingering undemocratic
tendencies, the weaker Balkan nations will remain volatile and will
challenge the Alliance's ability to maintain regional stability.
Question. What are the foreseeable threats to the national security
of each prospective member that might involve the use of NATO troops?
Answer. Prospective NATO members are stable and face no foreseeable
internal threats (as do some of their neighbors). Nor are there
currently identifiable external, strategic threats to these nations'
security. [Deleted.]
Question. As NATO expands, how likely is it that Russia would want
to or be able to build up its armed forces and pose a threat to NATO
countries?
Answer. Russia is exhibiting those tendencies which will lead to a
type of military that will become a positive component on the European
and global landscape. We agree with NATO's current threat estimate
which identifies little strategic threat to the Alliance from Russia
for the foreseeable future. While Russia may concentrate additional
forces on the border areas and orient its armed forces against the West
in general, its military capability will be severely constrained by its
own harsh economic realities.
Question. Do NATO allies and incoming members share the American
assessment of the threat in Europe? What are the differences?
Answer. The United States, its fellow NATO allies, and prospective
NATO members largely agree on the nature and scope of threat to the
Alliance, now and in the future. There are however minor differences in
threat perceptions. For example, the European allies, particularly
``southern'' nations perceive the threat emanating from the
Mediterranean littoral as more serious than the Atlantic powers do. The
closer proximity of some allies to unstable North African countries has
led to disagreement over where to bolster the Alliance--both in terms
of new members and in terms of the level of European control of the
southern region in NATO. Similarly, prospective NATO members--each
having a history of repeated Russian invasions, appear to see a
resurgent Russian threat as far more likely than do other allies.
INTELLIGENCE SHARING
Question. As I understand it, new NATO members will have the same
access to intelligence information that current NATO allies have. Are
you confident that the prospective NATO members have severed all ties
with Russian intelligence and security agencies?
Answer. In spite of a long history of close intelligence sharing
with Russia and other former Soviet states, prospective NATO members
have, to the best of our knowledge, ended these relationships. The high
value intelligence officials in these countries place on NATO
membership far outweighs any possible benefit in maintaining residual
ties to Russia. Moreover, counterintelligence efforts in these
countries have been mounted to closely monitor the behavior of retired
Russian military personnel and other Russians living in their
respective countries. These efforts are predominantly aimed against any
Russian infiltration of intelligence operations. Moreover, the
intelligence organizations have signed agreements and adopted security
procedures to safeguard NATO classified documents. All three
prospective members have restructured their intelligence services to
mirror those of the West, in order to ensure security of classified
NATO information.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg
MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF PROSPECTIVE NEW MEMBERS
Question. What is the greatest strategic value of each prospective
member to the NATO alliance?
Answer. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are each enhancing
NATO's mission of a stable and secure European continent through
unilateral initiatives along their borders and thus contributing to
collective defense. They act as a benchmark against ethnic strife and
demonstrate support for contingencies to quell disturbances on the
continent as in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For example, the Czech Republic has
made great progress in establishing broad democratic control over its
armed forces and has also cultivated close ties with all its neighbors.
No border is in dispute with Germany, Austria, Poland or Slovakia, and
the Czechs have no conflicts with neighboring countries relating to
minority ethnic groups. Since the Madrid Summit, Prague has also
increased its trilateral regional defense cooperation with Warsaw and
Budapest. Bilaterally, the Czechs have also contributed to the security
of Central Europe by resolving historical disputes and developing close
ties with Germany. In 1993, they signed a military cooperation
agreement with Germany, and they have worked closely with the German
military since then.
The invitees have dramatically improved in the last several years
regarding military strength and interoperability capabilities. Each of
the invitees has substantially improved their ability to contribute to
the work of the Alliance as evidenced in their excellent performance on
Partnership for Peace exercises and through deployments with both IFOR
and SFOR. As a result, the greatest strategic contribution that each
NATO invitee brings to the Alliance occurs through the process of
collective defense.
Poland is forming joint NATO-interoperable peacekeeping battalions
with both Ukraine and Lithuania, efforts which not only improve its
ability to deploy to peacekeeping operations, but which also reassure
both Kiev and Vilnius that their future lies with Europe. It is also
working with Germany and Denmark to form a trilateral mechanized
infantry corps that would be fully integrated into the NATO force
structure. Poland has undertaken active defense cooperation with the
Baltic states, particularly Lithuania, to reassure them of Europe's
commitment to their security. Poland has also made efforts to normalize
relations with Moscow, which reinforces the increasingly close
cooperation between NATO and Russia.
Hungary participates in several Central-European regional
cooperation organizations that indirectly reduce the effects of risks
and instability. Hungary has concluded more than 170 cooperation
agreements with its neighbors, encompassing a broad variety of fields.
Its agreements with Romania and Slovakia are especially significant.
Agreements with Slovenia, Italy, and with Romania, to form peacekeeping
units in the future are especially noteworthy.
Numerically, the invitees bring some 347,000 troops and a
significant force structure to supplement existing NATO capabilities.
As seen in Bosnia and through numerous PfP exercises, these new nations
have demonstrated they can operate with current NATO members and also
bring strengths and areas of military expertise that are of significant
benefit to the alliance.
Poland
With the largest and most capable military in Central and Eastern
Europe, Poland has brought its 25 years of peacekeeping experience to
NATO's efforts in Bosnia. Since 1974, Poland has participated in more
peacekeeping operations than any former Warsaw Pact country and thereby
gained experience which has served to greatly enhance the NATO-
interoperability of its forces. It currently has a 400-person airborne
infantry battalion in SFOR, a 355-person logistics battalion in the
Golan Heights (UNDOF), an infantry battalion and military hospital (632
troops) in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 53 soldiers in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES),
and troops supporting eight U.N. observer missions. It currently has a
400-person airborne battalion in SFOR as part of the U.S. sector. In
1989, they established a military training center for U.N. operations
in southeastern Poland. In 1992, the Poles deployed an infantry
battalion with U.N. forces in Croatia. Since then, Poland has shown an
increased willingness to provide combat forces in support of
peacekeeping, as reflected by their commitment to IFOR and SFOR. Poland
is currently working to establish joint peacekeeping battalions with
Ukraine and Lithuania, and the Poles have contributed to U.N. efforts
in Rwanda (UNIMIR), Georgia (UNOMIG), Tajikistan (UNMOT), Iraq/Kuwait
(UNIKOM), the Western Sahara (MINURSO) and Cambodia (UNTAC).
Czech Republic
The Czech Republic currently has a 620-person mechanized battalion
in SFOR, and prior to that it contributed an 870-person mechanized
battalion to IFOR and a 985-person infantry battalion in UNPROFOR. The
Czechs also deployed a 200-man decontamination unit to Desert Shield/
Desert Storm and have also provided observers to U.N. observer missions
in Croatia (UNTAES), the Prevlaka Peninsula (UNMOP), the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (UNPREDEP), Mozambique (UNOMOZ), Georgia
(UNOMIG) and Liberia (UNOMIL).
Hungary
Hungary contributed a 400-500 man engineer battalion to conduct
bridging and other engineering operations in support of IFOR. This
battalion, now reduced in number to 200-250, is currently deployed in
support of SFOR. Hungary's support to IFOR and SFOR also included
allowing U.S. and NATO forces to transit its airspace, station at its
airfields and use its facilities. Hungary's ability to operate as part
of the NATO team was demonstrated with every bridge that was built and
every plane that landed and took off from its airfields. Over 80,000
U.S. military personnel rotated in and out of IFOR and SFOR assignments
through the Hungarian airbase at Taszar. U.S. artillery units calibrate
their guns at Hungarian ranges prior to deploying to Bosnia, and again
upon re-deploying. All three countries have begun training their troops
in NATO doctrine in earnest, and all three will be able to make a
substantial contribution to the force projection, strategic depth, and
capabilities of the Alliance. From this perspective, an Alliance with
nineteen committed Allies has more to offer than one with sixteen, and
a larger Alliance can spread the fiscal and operational burden more
evenly. In short, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are already
working with NATO and NATO allies in the field.
Question. How difficult will it be to fully integrate these members
and how long will it take?
Answer. All three invitees have been active contributors and
participants in the Partnership For Peace Program. They have
contributed units to the Implementation and Stabilization Force in
Bosnia. Hungary has served as a valuable staging area for Bosnia
deployments. In addition, Poland and the Czech Republic contributed
forces to the Gulf War Coalition. The three countries are currently
transitioning to NATO standards and doctrine. Senior DOD officials have
conducted site surveys of military facilities and capabilities, and
there are many encouraging signs. Poland has developed a 15-year plan
to upgrade their military structure and are financing it with 2.4
percent of their GDP allocated toward defense. Key priorities are to
enhance interoperability with NATO forces through a modernization of
equipment and to increase the number of professional military courses
and English language training opportunities. Hungary is prepared to
commit the bulk of their forces to Alliance missions such as peace
keeping and humanitarian operations. They are currently initiating a
comprehensive defense review in order to posture their military to be
fully integrated into NATO, emphasizing inter-operability, especially
in command and control, air defense and air control. The Czech Republic
has pledged 90 percent of their forces to NATO's use and are
aggressively pursuing language training, interoperability of air
defense and command and control upgrades.
While much more work remains to be done, we are confident that the
three NATO invitees will accomplish all the necessary tasks to meet
minimum NATO standards for accession by 1999. Full integration is a
longer term issue and could take an estimated 10-15 years as these
nations restructure and rebuild their militaries under democratic
principles.
EUROPEAN ALLIES
Question. Our European allies have said they can cover the cost of
NATO expansion through reallocation of funds in their defense budgets.
Is it true?
Answer. No. We believe that additional funds will be required over
and above those made available through reprioritization. Our European
Allies are committed to strengthening the Alliance through NATO
Enlargement. As such, they have agreed to pay for their fair share of
enlargement related costs. The allies pay the majority of NATO common
costs year in and year out. While the U.S. pays in about 25 percent of
NATO common costs, our European allies pay out the other 75 percent of
those costs--some $1.3 billion last year. We expect them--and they have
pledged--to provide the resources necessary to support a successful
enlargement effort.
Question. In 1991, NATO adopted a ``strategic concept'' that called
for making our forces more deployable, lighter, and easier to project.
Have our European allies adapted their force structure to meet the 1991
strategic concept?
Answer. Yes. NATO's military doctrine has changed since 1991, going
from a reliance on in-place forces for a static defense to a
requirement for a more mobile, flexible, military capability to respond
to problems when and where they arise. We knew in 1991 that this was to
be a long-term project, just as the United States expects to take a
number of years to field completely new capabilities.
Our European allies have made considerable progress over the past
six years toward building the needed capabilities for the Alliance's
new doctrine. Some examples: The UK now has the capability to deploy
and sustain a division-sized force of 20,000-25,000 personnel in a Gulf
War-style scenario. France is establishing a Rapid Reaction Force
designed for rapid response in both European and overseas
contingencies. The Italians, as demonstrated in Albania, are upgrading
their ability to project forces to areas of need. Additionally, Germany
is developing a Crisis Reaction Force that will eventually have the
capability to deploy approximately 50,000 personnel. Clearly, these are
capabilities the Alliance would need whether or not NATO added new
members.
It is clear however, that more work needs to be done to improve the
capability of the European forces for mobility, deployability and
sustainability. Senior U.S. officials in Washington and at NATO
continue to press the European Allies to fulfill the commitments they
have already accepted to make available forces for Alliance defense.
Question. Do we expect them to make further force structure
adjustments to accommodate the inclusion of new members?
Answer. Absolutely. The Alliance is currently going through
comprehensive internal and external adaptation in anticipation of
gaining three new members in 1999. The most important aspect of these
adaptation issues is military integration and inter-operability between
and among new and existing members. Any force structure adjustments to
accommodate the inclusion of new members will be identified through
NATO's Defense Planning Process.
Question. Since defense spending in the countries of our European
allies has been on the steady decline, how can they do this?
Answer. While Alliance members are experiencing budget cuts, they
are also downsizing and restructuring current force configurations.
Costs will be sourced from anticipated infrastructure and force
structure savings.
RUSSIA
Question. The Administration has said that theoretically, Russia
would be able to join NATO if it meets the criteria. However, the
Administration has also said that so far, Russia has said it doesn't
want to be a part of NATO. Regardless of what Russians want, I am
curious about our long-term thinking regarding Russia. Is our ultimate
military goal to include Russia as a full-fledged member of NATO?
Answer. I support Secretary of State Albright's position on
admitting Russia into the Alliance: ``NATO membership is open to all
European democracies who express interest, meet the requirements of
membership and whose inclusion the Alliance believes will contribute to
overall security of its members. The fact is, if we ever get to the
point where Russia and NATO are seriously talking about membership, it
would be a very different world--a very different Russia, and a very
different NATO, in a very different Europe.'' There has been no
discussion to have as an ultimate military goal the inclusion of Russia
as a full-fledged member of NATO.
Question. Is including Russia as a full fledged member a good or a
bad idea in your view? Why?
Answer. You are correct to state that Russia has not expressed an
interest in joining NATO, nor has NATO been contemplating Russian
membership. It is important to note that any decision on potential
Russian membership would be made by NATO political authorities and
would be contingent upon subsequent approval by each member nation. It
is premature to make an assessment on Russian potential membership in
NATO.
AMERICAN MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIAN MILITARY
Question. I'm curious about your relationship with the Russian
military. How will NATO expansion affect the American military's
relationship with Russia's military leaders? Has it already had an
impact? Are they less or more cooperative? Do you expect that to
change?
Answer. Our military relationship with Russia's military leaders
will continue to remain strong despite NATO expansion, especially if we
ensure the successful development of the NATO-Russia relationship.
Although much more work needs to be done, our cooperative relationship
is steadily improving.
Yes, In the early stages of NATO expansion, Russian military
officials were slow to respond to U.S. initiatives to improve our
military-to-military relations. Political and military officials in
Moscow considered the U.S. as the driving force behind an expanding
NATO that continued to view Russia as an opponent. In addition, the
high rate of turnover at the top of Russia's defense organizations has
made it politically risky to be viewed as a supporter of a closer
relationship with the United States. But as Russia maintains a course
of internal reform, respect for its neighbors' independence, and
cooperation with the West, NATO continues to evolve in the direction of
maximum inclusiveness--including a relationship with Russia.
More. Today, we are experiencing with Russia a level of trust and
cooperation previously unknown since NATO's post Cold War
transformation began. As Russia's political and military leaders
increasingly recognize NATO's reformation as building a stabilizing
force for a democratic Europe, to include Russia, rather than as a
force projected against Russia, the tensions associated with an
expanding NATO begin to decline. Russia has also realized that it
cannot stop NATO expansion and now understands cooperation and
interaction with the U.S. and the West is the best means to influence
its future position in Europe.
We expect this recent trend towards an improved relationship to
continue. By including Russia in PfP activities and steadily pursuing
our military-to-military contacts at all levels, we continue to
strengthen the bridge of trust and cooperation between our militaries.
______
Questions Submitted to Gen. Wesley K. Clark
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard C. Shelby
NATO ENLARGEMENT
Question. What is the status of military-to-military meetings with
respect to arrangements about intelligence gathering and intelligence
sharing?
Answer. [Deleted.]
Question. For several years, I have been extremely concerned about
the defense budget topline and the concomitant shortages we are
experiencing in virtually every facet of defense spending, end strength
goals and near term and long term readiness. These problems are
especially vexing when one takes into account the fact that our troops
are being deployed at a record pace. With this in mind, will
enlargement allow us to decrease our force structure in Europe and
apply the savings into those program areas that need it, like
modernization? Is NATO enlargement just another ``event on the
operational continuum'' that will push our forces to the breaking point
more quickly than if NATO was not enlarged?
Answer. NATO enlargement may not allow us to decrease our force
structure in Europe. No immediate savings are evident.
USEUCOM defines its force requirements primarily in terms of the
force structure required to implement our peacetime and wartime
taskings. This force structure based on studies begun in 1990, has been
repeatedly re-validated in DOD and Congressional studies. The strategic
concepts of shape and respond defined in the Quadrennial Defense
Review, generate the requirements for the USEUCOM force structure.
Shape.--The DOD complements other instruments of national power to
shape or influence the international security environment. Forces
permanently stationed abroad, forces rotationally deployed and
temporarily deployed all contribute to shaping with programs such as
defense cooperation, security assistance, training and arms
cooperation. Although the impact of this concept is large, the force
structure dedicated exclusively to shaping activities is a small
portion of European Troop Strength. Engagement exercises can be
manpower intensive but are of short duration and are typically
conducted by in-theater response forces with augmentation from the
reserve components. Small groups of staff officers at the embassies and
on headquarters staffs manage security assistance. The Joint Contact
Team is manned primarily by teams on temporary orders and individual
reservists on temporary active duty. The Marshall Center has a
permanent staff of under 200 personnel, and the German government pays
many of these. U.S. leadership in the NATO arena is critical--we do
this with forward presence and engagement activities.
Respond.--The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and the U.S.
response to NATO's Defense Planning Questionnaire are the primary force
structure drivers for USEUCOM. Respond requires the ability to form on
short notice a capable, interoperable, joint task force for commitment
in the region or elsewhere. Reinforcing an existing structure already
in the command is many times faster than reconstructing an organization
that at the start of the crisis has major pieces missing. It is
important that we continue our force contributions to NATO at
approximately the current level. The present number of operations, and
the dangers of a future that is still uncertain, make this a necessity.
Furthermore, at a time when NATO adaptation requires decisions that
will have impact for decades, American leadership is vital; that
leadership is secured by our contribution to the Alliance's military
capability. Respond also requires that USEUCOM respond to crises
throughout the region as directed by the NCA. These events put
tremendous stress on USEUCOM forces. There is little indication that
these requirements will decrease in the future, and there is a real
chance that they will increase.
NATO enlargement is more than ``just another event on the
operational continuum.'' It will mean a larger zone of security and
stability in Europe thereby allowing the new democracies to flourish.
It will also help heal old wounds in Europe encouraging abstention from
costly arms buildups. As present operations tempo and personnel tempo
for our land component, USAREUR, are near all-time highs, any
additional NATO exercises or operations established as a direct result
of NATO enlargement would have to be balanced by a corresponding
decrease in U.S. participation in existing exercises and/or operations.
SUPPORT FOR FAMILIES OF 1ST ARMORED DIVISION
Question. General Clark, in a related question, (a) what steps have
you taken to provide for the families of the soldiers from the 1st
Armored Division in Germany who are being deployed to Bosnia for the
second time in 18 months? (b) Do you see any evidence that this
deployment will have a greater impact on the families of the soldiers
who are participating in their third peacekeeping mission in 18 months?
(c) Do you have assets to take care of these families? (d) If not, what
do you need?
Answer. (a) With the initial deployment, USAREUR developed and
established an effective system for family support and assistance
which, per USAREUR Regulation 608-2, our commanders ensure operates
continuously. This family support system (FSS) is implemented in three
phases, pre-deployment, deployment and post-deployment. Pre-deployment
support consists of Family Support Group (FSG) Training, unit-level
personal financial readiness training, Family Assistance Center (FAC)
Certification, Rear Detachment Commander/Family Support Liaison (RDC/
FSL) Training, unit and community-level family assistance plans and a
regular program of command information which confirms the unit and
family partnership. Unit family support plans and community family
assistance plans are coordinated and in place prior to deployment.
Deployment support or sustainment requires the smooth networking of
the various FSS systems within the community. Well-trained FSG's,
RDC's, FSL's help maintain information flow and stability within the
families. The FAC's operate for extended hours allowing greater
flexibility for families to access services. 24-hour emergency service
is offered in each community. Additional personnel augment existing FAC
staff to allow flexible work schedules.
Post-deployment preparation and assistance consists of coordinating
reunion activities and providing information and training on reunion-
related family issues both to the returning soldier and the waiting
family. Additionally, in anticipation of increased stress levels
connected with reunion, counseling services are monitored and counselor
support can adjusted from community to community as needed.
(b) USAREUR deployed approximately 54 percent for the second time,
and 1 percent for a third. Initial feedback from the families indicates
that adjustment to this deployment is good. Families are knowledgeable
about the available support services and their previous experience with
deployment in Europe was mostly positive. The 1AD command made a point
of notifying their personnel well in advance of this deployment,
including providing specific end-of-deployment by individual where
possible--with the period of time for this mission well-defined,
although families are feeling some stress with this additional
deployment, knowing when it will end eases some of the difficulty of
the separation. The families undergoing a third deployment are of
particular interest--their commands are well-aware of who they are and
ensure appropriate support--however it is fact that first-time
deployers generally have more family support requirements. There is no
evidence to date that this deployment will have a greater impact on
families than any previous deployment.
(c) USAREUR is currently adequately resourced to deal with the
deployment challenges, including personnel staffing at the Army
Community Service (ACS) Facilities. Maintaining the current level of
funding for family support programs will be sufficient to take care of
the 1AD families. The staffing level and quality of personnel working
in the FAC's directly impacts support to the families during
deployment--essential to maintaining mission readiness and current Army
OPTEMPO in Europe.
(d) We currently have no additional needs/requirements to ensure
adequate support for our 1AD families.
BOSNIA COST ESTIMATES
Question. All Administration cost estimates that I have seen assume
no military deployment, extended or otherwise, like Bosnia. In your
opinion, is that wise or realistic and, if so, why? Let me ask a
related question: what tradeoffs to modernization, R&D, end strength
and readiness would have to be made if we faced another prolonged
``engagement'' either simultaneously or subsequently to Bosnia?
Answer. Senator, the Department of Defense has always responded to
unforeseen, assigned missions, making tradeoffs when needed. Congress
has always been reluctant to provide funds for unspecified military
operations. And, the Congress has been very supportive of our troops in
Bosnia and provided funding to reimburse the DOD. It would, from my
point of view, be ideal if a mechanism could be found to provide funds
for unforeseen contingencies in advance so that readiness impacts could
be minimized, however that is a decision for the wisdom of the
representatives of the taxpayers. With respect to tradeoffs if we faced
another prolonged ``engagement'', I am afraid I can't answer with any
fidelity from my seat as CINCEUR. Many factors would be involved such
as what time of the year the engagement began, where it was, and what
its magnitude was. The fundamental decisions on tradeoffs would have to
be made by the Secretary of Defense with the advice from the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. While the history of those tradeoffs indicates that
there would be impacts to readiness and modernization in particular, I
cannot speculate on what those might be.
NATO ENLARGEMENT
Question. What type of contingencies may involve the United States
if the three prospective nations are admitted to NATO? What steps are
you taking to incorporate these possible scenarios into our military
planning and budget?
Answer. Article V contingencies: [deleted].
Non-Article V contingencies: Non-Article V contingencies include
humanitarian relief operation in the case of a natural disaster or
influx of refugees. The latter could result from renewed hostilities in
Bosnia or drastic economic downturn in Eastern Europe.
[Deleted.]
NATO ENLARGEMENT LOGISTICS
Question. It is my understanding that the European members of NATO
lack the sustainment capability necessary for prolonged operations.
Specifically, NATO's European members have inadequate Combat Support
(CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) elements and, therefore, NATO
planners have no alternative except to rely heavily on the U.S. to
provide that type of critical support for NATO operations. If NATO is
weak in CS and CSS units, should we look to the three prospective
members for that CS and CSS capability? Would this proposal improve
NATO's capability to conduct sustained operation without U.S.
logistical involvement?
Answer. The support provided by our NATO allies is based on the
planning principle of Collective Defense Benchmark. Within NATO we plan
for combat capability for future not present possible scenarios--we are
currently planning for the 1998-2004 period. A review of our allies
current status shows that our European met all their CS requirements
for the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps and the ACE Mobile Force Land.
[Deleted.] Additionally, our European allies have recently made
significant improvements in their CSS to these units--in fact Turkey
recently met all their requirements. Another example of how the
Europeans have met the CS/CSS obligations has been in Bosnia. In Both
IFOR and now SFOR Logistics have been a national responsibility and our
European allies have fulfilled their requirements.
In regard to the three candidate nations the NATO staff has
examined the full range of their combat and support capabilities
through a highly intensive Defense Planning Questionnaire--we believe
that they can become full partners within NATO and provide full combat
ready and support units immediately upon assession. This report will be
reviewed by an Office of the Secretary of Defense. Hungary will be able
to provide outstanding engineering service support based on their
proven results of supporting NATO Bosnian deployments. The Czech
Republic has outstanding biological and chemical warfare capabilities.
The Polish military has the most well-rounded capability in CS and CSS
areas. However, we must not lose sight of the target--we are focused on
developing all NATO forces for operations in the 2004 time-frame and
the military three candidate countries will evolve into a inter-
operable functioning force structure.
NATO ENLARGEMENT
Question. General Clark, is this proposal [Senator Shelby's
proposal to look to the three prospective members to provide the CS/CSS
capability in which he believes NATO is weak] credible? Do you believe
this would promote tiered resourcing among NATO members or tension
among members that is similar to the friction between the active Army
and National Guard?
Answer. NATO continues to maintain a robust capability to provide
for the collective defense of the Allies and in response to a changing
security environment is aggressively pursuing a strategic concept that
increasingly relies on a contingency response capability. There are at
present four NATO committees at work to assess specific country
capabilities and costs; the results of these analyses will be briefed
at the December 1997 ministerials. However, it is not unreasonable to
predict aspirant future CS/CSS support to NATO, though it is not
feasible at this time. We are not suggesting they specialize in CS/CSS.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg
MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF PROSPECTIVE NATO MEMBERS
Question. Based on NATO's experience working with the prospective
members in the Partnership for Peace Program and in Bosnia, I'm
interested in knowing your assessment of the strengths and weakness of
their militaries.
How will the addition of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to
NATO add to the alliance's ability to fulfill its collective defense
mission?
Answer. These countries have established militaries and
infrastructure able to support NATO missions. Poland has a force of
more than 200,000, roughly the size of the forces of the United Kingdom
(228,000) and Spain (200,000). The Czech Republic and Hungary both have
forces greater than 50,000, roughly the size of the armed forces of
Portugal (56,000) and Canada (64,830). Combined, the three invitees
will add significant numbers of soldiers, sailors and airmen to the
Alliance, including units with unique and specialized capabilities such
as chemical decontamination and combat engineering.
The three countries also bring a fairly robust infrastructure: NATO
would immediately attain 8 Rapid Reaction Brigades capable of
deployment and reinforcement of other NATO forces; 96 paved runways
capable of handling C-130 aircraft; 361,000 KM of roadway; 41,000 km of
standard gauge railway; 22 merchant marine ships, 6 of which have total
of 70,000 tons of roll-on/roll-off capability. Additionally, with the
growth of three strong democratic governments in Central Europe, within
the umbrage of NATO, the possibility of regional conflict is reduced,
thereby increasing the strategic depth of security within Europe.
Question. What is the greatest strategic value of each prospective
member to the NATO alliance?
Answer. From an alliance perspective the greatest value is the
collective integration of three former totalitarian states into our
democratic alliance--this has increased the strategic depth and
security within Europe, thereby extending NATO's zone of stability and
security further eastward across the European Continent. Additionally,
as European democracies mature, it will allow NATO, through our PfP
program, to pro-actively engage the NIS of the Caucuses and the Stans,
giving these emerging countries a democratic security model in this
highly volatile area of the world.
Poland has the most developed military of the three and occupies a
large amount of key territory in the center of Europe. They have
already taken on a leadership role in their region by forming joint
NATO-interoperable peacekeeping battalions with both Ukraine and
Lithuania, efforts which not only improve its ability to deploy to
peacekeeping operations, but which also reassure both Kiev and Vilnius
that their future lies with Europe. It is also working with Germany and
Denmark to form a trilateral mechanized infantry corps that would be
fully integrated into the NATO force structure.
The Czech Republic's strategic role is different but not any less
important. It serves as a political role model for Central and Eastern
Europe. It has made great progress in establishing broad democratic
control over its armed forces since 1989 it has been a fully
functioning democracy. Bilaterally, the Czechs have also contributed to
the security of Central Europe by resolving historical disputes and
developing close ties with Germany. In 1993, they signed a military
cooperation agreement with Germany, and they have worked closely with
the German military since then.
Hungary's geographical location has already proven its strategic
value. IFOR and SFOR have used Hungary as a launch point for two
years--NATO troops are stationed there now and operating missions from
there now. Further, Hungary participates in several Central-European
regional cooperation organizations that indirectly reduce the effects
of risks and instability. Hungary has concluded more than 170
cooperation agreements with its neighbors, encompassing a broad variety
of fields. Especially noteworthy are agreements with Slovenia and Italy
to form a trilateral peacekeeping brigade; an agreement with Romania to
form a combined peacekeeping battalion; and a treaty with neighboring
Slovakia on good-neighborly relations and friendly cooperation that
covers everything from protecting the environment, to protecting
minorities, to pledging never to use force against each other.
Question. What are the most serious military deficiencies of each
as candidates for NATO?
Answer. The Czechs, Poles and Hungarians are all focusing on the
deficiencies that we believe present the greatest challenges:
personnel; adoption of NATO doctrine, training, and interoperability.
The first area they need to address is the personnel systems within
their militaries. None of the three countries possess a professional
NCO Corps based on our Western model; additionally they need to attract
and recruit professional officers capable of functioning within
civilian democratic control. Each of the countries recognize these
personnel problems and have plans in place to remedy the situation. The
military doctrine of the three countries was based on old Soviet
tactics, but each country has begun to restructure their forces along
the NATO model of mobility and deployability--they have demonstrated
their recent improvements while participating with NATO forces in
Bosnia. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall these countries devoted their
resources toward developing their market economies and naturally let
their commitment has a goal of military forces become less of a
priority. Today each nation is committed to matching the NATO standard
of approximately 2 percent of their GDP toward defense spending. A
return to full combat capability will not occur overnight, but with the
proper allocation of resources each of the countries will achieve the
proper level of training, IAW NATO Doctrine, within the current six
year Deliberate Planning Process. Finally, interoperability is a common
challenge facing the three countries, particularly in the regard to
radars, communication, and navigational equipment. Their present Soviet
vintage military equipment will need to be replaced over the next 6
years, as it exceeds its useful life-span. As the equipment is
replaced, NATO interoperability issues will be resolved. As mentioned
earlier, with a 2 percent GDP commitment to defense spending force
modernization/interoperability issues have been addressed by the three
countries. Even in their present state, the three nations can provide
real combat capability to NATO--they will be able to meet NATO
requirements for Article V and non-Article V operations immediately
upon accession into NATO. It is NATO's intent to make use of their
strengths right away and take the long term view in fixing these
deficiencies.
Question. How difficult will it be to fully integrate these new
members and how long will it take?
Answer. Each nation will be able to immediately contribute forces
for NATO Article V and non-Article V operations. NATO will soon
implement a new Alliance command structure which reflects the new
reality of the changed security environment in Europe. The new command
structure provides the needed flexibility between strategic, regional,
and sub-regional command relationships. This will allow the three
countries to be immediately integrated into the NATO command
structure--a full partner from day one. We are not starting from
scratch--all three have viable militaries that are participating
successfully with NATO units right now in SFOR. Like every military,
each country has its strengths and weaknesses. SHAPE planners are
developing Target Force Goals for the three invitees for release in
February 1998 that will take their strengths and put them to use
immediately upon accession. This iterative process will continue
through each NATO force planning cycle to further increase their
integration into more complex missions--just as we do for other NATO
members. Full integration should be looked at in terms of 10-15 years,
but with each country contributing something important to the NATO
combat mission.
Question. What can each prospective member offer the alliance
militarily in the interim?
Answer. Each country brings a well exercised and proven military
capability immediately upon accession into NATO. They have participated
in numerous U.N. and coalition operations ranging from on-going Peace-
Keeping operations to Humanitarian Relief missions--they are
experienced. As stated each nation also provides a significant NATO
compatible infrastructure and associated facilities.
Poland.--With the largest and most capable military in Central and
Eastern Europe, Poland has brought its 25 years of peacekeeping
experience to NATO's efforts in Bosnia. Since 1974, Poland has
participated in more peacekeeping operations than any former Warsaw
Pact country, and it currently has more personnel in U.N. peacekeeping,
military observer and civilian police missions than any other country.
It currently has a 400-person airborne infantry battalion in SFOR's
U.S. sector, a 355-person logistics battalion in the Golan Heights
(UNDOF), an infantry battalion and military hospital (632 troops) in
Lebanon (UNIFIL), 53 soldiers in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES), and troops
supporting eight U.N. observer missions. Poland is currently working to
establish joint peacekeeping battalions with Ukraine and Lithuania, and
the Poles have contributed to U.N. efforts in Rwanda (UNIMIR), Georgia
(UNOMIG), Tajikistan (UNMOT), Iraq/Kuwait (UNIKOM), the Western Sahara
(MINURSO) and Cambodia (UNTAC). Poland has declared its willingness to
commit all of its operational military forces to NATO. One-third will
be designated as ``NATO-Assigned,'' meaning they will be fully
integrated into the NATO force structure and placed under the
operational command or control of a NATO commander when called upon.
The types of units to be assigned to NATO include airborne, armor and
air defense units, as well as fighter squadrons and transport aircraft.
Poland will designate the remaining two-thirds of its armed forces as
``NATO Earmarked,'' meaning they could be put under NATO operational
command or control in time of need.
Czech Republic.--The Czech Republic currently has a 620-person
mechanized battalion in SFOR, and prior to that it contributed an 870-
person mechanized battalion to IFOR and a 985-person infantry battalion
in UNPROFOR. The Czechs also deployed a 200-man decontamination unit to
Desert Shield/Desert Storm and have provided observers to U.N. observer
missions in Croatia (UNTAES), the Prevlaka Peninsula (UNMOP), the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (UNPREDEP), Mozambique (UNOMOZ),
Georgia (UNOMIG) and Liberia (UNOMIL). Since its DPQ submission, Czech
officials have noted that they are willing to earmark up to 90 percent
of their operational forces to NATO in times of crisis. The Czech
Republic is also expected to assign to NATO's force structure elements
of both their immediate and rapid reaction brigades, as well as fighter
and combat helicopter squadrons, search and rescue units, chemical
defense units, and mechanized and artillery brigades.
Hungary.--Hungary contributed a 400-500 man engineer battalion to
conduct bridging and other engineering operations in support of IFOR.
This battalion, now reduced in number to 200-250, is currently deployed
in support of SFOR. Hungary's support to IFOR and SFOR also included
allowing U.S. and NATO forces to transit its airspace, station at its
airfields and use its facilities. Over 80,000 U.S. military personnel
rotated in and out of IFOR and SFOR assignments through the Hungarian
airbase at Taszar. U.S. armor units calibrate their guns at Hungarian
ranges prior to deploying to Bosnia, and again upon re-deploying. Past
Hungarian peacekeeping contributions have included a 39-troop
contingent in Cyprus (recently increased to more than 100) as part of
an Austrian battalion assigned to UNFICYP; a 26 soldier and 15
policemen contingent in the Sinai (MFO); and 20 observers in Iraq/
Kuwait (UNIKOM), Angola (UNAVEM), Cambodia (UNTAC), Mozambique
(UNOMOZ), Tajikistan (UNMOT), and Georgia (UNOMIG). Hungary may also
provide forces to the U.N. Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade
(SHIRBRIG). Presently, Hungary has assigned to NATO both immediate
reaction and rapid reaction forces, consisting of combat brigades and
battalions, support brigades and battalions, fighter squadrons,
artillery units, and anti-air, anti-armor and combat helicopter assets.
EUROPEAN ALLIES
Question. Our European allies have said they can cover the cost of
NATO expansion through reallocation of funds in their defense budgets.
Is this true?
Answer. Some of NATO allies, notably France and Germany, believe
that sufficient resources are currently available within the existing
NATO budget, combined with reallocating funds from their budgets, to
pay their fair share of the costs of expansion. Our allies share our
mutual commitment to enlargement and only want to be assured that if
the funds required are not found within the existing NATO budget that
they, like the U.S., will only pay their fare-share utilizing NATO and
national resources. I believe they will honor this commitment.
Question. What really is the limit of their ability to reprogram
funds to cover the costs of NATO expansion?
Answer. Members of the Alliance contribute to common funded
accounts according to agreed-upon cost shares. The three new members
will also share common expenses. Based on the stated military
requirements, NATO is computing the cost of enlargement for the common
funded accounts to be delivered for the upcoming ministerial. The
analysis was based on the minimum military requirements for
interoperability, C\3\I, air defense and reinforcement; costing was
based on typical NATO military common-funded facilities.
Based on their initial analysis it appears that the shared
infrastructure cost of enlargement will be approximately $1.5 billion
over a 10-year period; approximately $4.3 million of requirements have
been identified for 1998. Based on the U.S. 25 percent contribution to
the infrastructure budget our cost will be $375 million over the 10
year period. The ability of NATO nations to reprogram their funds to
cover the costs of expansion will be determined by each individual
nation.
NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT
Question. In 1991 NATO adopted a ``strategic concept'' that called
for making our forces more deployable, lighter, and easier to project.
Have our European allies adapted their force structure to meet the
1991 strategic concept?
Answer. Our allies have begun to adapt their force structure but
many projected requirements have not been met. In 1991, the U.S.
adopted a power-projection strategy. We decided, in order to be able to
respond flexibly to a wide range of possible contingencies, our forces
would require effective surveillance and intelligence, flexible command
and control, mobility within and outside the regions, strong defenses
against nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and missiles, and
appropriate logistics and transport capabilities.
In response to those decisions, NATO developed force goals that
emphasize those requirements. Many of those projected requirements have
not been met. In addition to lift, there are substantial support assets
required at the core level. For example, construction engineers, heavy
equipment lifters, port offloaders, mobile maintenance, mobile
medicine, and field hospitals. Current NATO force goals accommodate all
of these, and are in the process of being met.
Question. Do we expect them to make further force structure
adjustments to accommodate the inclusion of new members?
Answer. Yes. The decision to invite new NATO members has
implications for defense planning. NATO is currently examining how
enlargement will affect NATO's defense requirements. In light of this
ongoing analysis, any further comments on specific force structure
adjustments on the part of our European allies would be premature at
this time.
Question. Since defense spending in the countries of our European
allies has been on the steady decline, how can they do this?
Answer. Almost all allies have made significant reductions in their
defense expenditure, both in real terms and as a percentage of GDP. In
some countries, defense budgets risk further reductions as governments
continue efforts to meet their financial targets. A few countries are
projecting real growth in defense expenditure but most are anticipating
zero growth or further reductions. The process of adapting the
Alliance's new force structure has proved more expensive for some
countries than had been expected and there are now major shortfalls in
some essential modernization programs, especially relating to strategic
capabilities.
The proportions of GDP devoted to defense vary considerably between
allies. This needs to be addressed to ensure more equitable burden
sharing. Provided that overall defense performance is not jeopardized,
the efforts of many allies to make more effective use of national and
collective resources to accommodate the inclusion of new members can
make an important contribution to sustaining capabilities and programs.
Allies performance in meeting resource guidance will be assessed in
successive defense reviews; and within this broad guidance, our allies
should aim to take into account the cost implications of enlargement.
THREAT
Question. A key issue that many members of Congress will be
considering as we contemplate the issue of NATO expansion is the threat
level in Europe and the likelihood that U.S. troops would be involved
in a conflict on behalf of a new NATO member.
What is the threat in Europe? Are we more likely to see a flare up
of border clashes or the type of civil ethnic strife we have seen in
the former Yugoslavia?
Answer. No large-scale conventional threat to NATO in the near-term
is foreseen. However, the threats and risks to the alliance are varied.
The nations of the Alliance are faced with regional instability,
Islamic extremism, nationalism, state-sponsored terrorism,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, and
economic and political instability. [Deleted.]
Question. What are the foreseeable threats to the national security
of each prospective member of NATO that might involve the use of NATO
troops?
Answer. [Deleted.]
Question. As NATO expands, how likely is it that Russia would want
to or be able to build up its forces and pose a threat to NATO
countries?
Answer. [Deleted.]
Question. Do NATO allies and incoming members share the American
assessment of the threat in Europe? What are the differences?
Answer. NATO allies and Invitees share the American assessment of
the threat in Europe, however, the degree and priority of concern vary.
[Deleted.]
NATO allies, incoming members, and the U.S. recognize the same
threats to the security of Europe, although degree of concern will vary
due to geography and history.
RUSSIA
Question. The Administration has said that, theoretically, Russia
would be able to join NATO if it meets the criteria. However, the
Administration has also said that, so far, Russia has said it doesn't
want to be a part of NATO.
Regardless of what the Russians want, I am curious about our long-
term thinking regarding Russia. Is our ultimate military goal to
include Russia as a full-fledged member of NATO?
Answer. I support the position that ``NATO membership is open to
all European democracies who express interest, meet the requirements of
membership and whose inclusion the Alliance believes will contribute to
overall security of its members. The fact is, if we ever get to the
point where Russia and NATO are seriously talking about membership, it
would be a very different world--a very different Russia, and a very
different NATO, in a very different Europe.''
The question of Russian membership in NATO is a political one that
would have to be decided by the collective NATO membership. At the
moment, NATO is more interested in institutionalizing the processes
embodied in the NATO-Russia Founding Act and engaging the Russians via
its provisions.
Question. Is including Russia as a full-fledged member a good or
bad idea in your view? Why?
Answer. Russian membership in NATO would have to be weighed
carefully. Membership would require Russia to meet all the essential
political criteria and military obligations. As you know, Russia is
both a European and Asian nation with a complex security equation.
Russian membership in NATO would require a fundamental transformation
of NATO from a Euro-Atlantic Security organization to a Atlantic-
Eurasian alliance, redefining the Alliance's Area of Responsibility and
a reassessing of the security environment and risks. This would
necessitate the reorganization of the NATO military command structure.
With this in mind and the associated economic costs, many NATO nations
would not be disposed to supporting Russian membership in NATO. Moscow
as well would probably have several reservations associated with the
political and military requirements of membership. However, Russia and
NATO have just begun the implementation of the special relationship
codified in the Founding Act. The Founding Act reaffirmed the
determination of NATO and Russia to overcome the vestiges of
confrontation, strengthen mutual trust and cooperation, and commitment
to achieving the shared goal of a stable, peaceful, and undivided
Europe. This document will be the basis for guiding the relationship
between NATO and Russia for the near-term and foreseeable future.
INTELLIGENCE SHARING
Question. As I understand it, new NATO members will have the same
access to intelligence information that current NATO allies have.
Are you confident that the prospective NATO members have severed
all ties with Russian intelligence and security agencies?
Answer. [Deleted.]
AMERICAN MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIAN MILITARY
Question. I'm curious about your relationship with the Russian
military.
How will NATO expansion affect the American military's relationship
with Russia's military leaders? Has it already had an impact? Are they
less or more cooperative? Do you expect that to change?
Answer. My experience with the Russian military has been very
positive. I work daily with Gen. Lt. Krivolapov, my Deputy for Russian
Forces in SFOR. A common understanding and appreciation of the SFOR
mission has evolved at all levels, strategic, operational, and
tactical. In IFOR/SFOR, NATO and Russia have conducted an unprecedented
military to military consultative process, involving numerous meetings
with the Russian Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff and
routine, working discussions with my Gen. Lt. Krivolapov, who is
permanently assigned to my headquarters.
Recently, I met with Russian MOD Sergeyev in the Netherlands.
Russian Chief of the General Staff, Gen. Kvashnin and I conducted a
joint visit to Bosnia to see first-hand Russian and U.S. soldiers
implementing the difficult tasks associated with the SFOR mission. I
have received an invitation from Col. Gen. Kvashnin and plan to visit
in early 1998. This consultative process has strengthened mutual
understanding and respect and provided an essential communication link
between NATO and Russian military authorities. Moreover, NATO and
Russian military forces have been working shoulder to shoulder in
Bosnia for almost two years. Mutual trust and confidence has developed
between NATO and Russian soldiers. The numbers of Russian soldiers
exposed to NATO and U.S. military operations in SFOR is impressive,
particularly in light of the limited exposure of the Russian military
to their western counterparts since the end of the Cold War.
In Bosnia, over 4,000 Russian Airborne Troops have served with U.S.
and NATO forces in a common mission with common tactics and common
rules of engagements. This number includes 2 Russian General Staff
Representatives to SHAPE, 4 Brigade Commanders, 7 Russian Airborne
Forces Generals, 9 Battalion Commanders, 52 Company Commanders, 196
Platoon Commanders, and over 3,400 other officers and soldiers. This
operation represents the most significant U.S.-Russian military
cooperation since War II and I am strongly in favor of the Founding
Act's mandate to develop this relationship further based on the SFOR
operation.
I am encouraged by Russia's establishment of a permanent mission in
Brussels, headed by Gen. Lt. Zavarzin. Gen. Lt. Zavarzin has already
visited my headquarters. I strongly support Russia's robust
participation in the PfP program, including permanent representation in
the Partnership Coordination Center in Mons. It is my hope that Russian
will follow through with their plans to develop a new Individual
Partnership Program for PfP. The Russian military is also interested in
establishing a permanent military presence at my headquarters in Mons
and support the establishment of a permanent NATO presence with Russian
MOD/GS in Moscow. It is my goal to continue to develop a strong, stable
military to military relationship with Russia, building on the
achievements in IFOR and SFOR and the Founding Act.
COMMITTEE RECESS
Chairman Stevens. If there is nothing further, the
committee will recess until tomorrow morning at 10 a.m.
[Whereupon, at 11:26 a.m., Wednesday, October 22, the
committee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday,
October 23.]
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION [NATO] ENLARGEMENT COSTS
----------
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1997
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met at 10:01 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Stevens, Gorton, Campbell, Hutchison, and
Inouye.
GAO STUDIES ON NATO ENLARGEMENT COSTS
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
STATEMENT OF HENRY L. HINTON, JR., ASSISTANT
COMPTROLLER GENERAL FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
ACCOMPANIED BY:
HAROLD J. JOHNSON, JR., ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND FOREIGN TRADE ISSUES, NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION
F. JAMES SHAFER, JR., ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND FOREIGN TRADE ISSUES, NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS
Chairman Stevens. Good morning. I appreciate the witnesses
being here. This is a strange day in the Senate. There is a
markup in the Commerce Committee and another one in another
committee, and we have two votes at 11 o'clock. So I would
prefer that we just go ahead and have an opportunity for you to
make your statement, and, hopefully, there will be other
Senators here and if they have questions they will be able to
ask them. If not, they have your statement, Mr. Hinton, and we
would ask that you respond to questions if they decide to
submit them.
Again, we are continuing the hearings we have had to try
and get a better understanding of what the NATO expansion costs
are going to be. GAO has completed two studies which evaluate
the NATO costing estimates. These reports raise some questions
about the accuracy and reliability of the estimates that have
been provided already by others, and we were told yesterday
that there is a new costing process going on at NATO and there
will be a ministerial meeting in NATO in the first weeks of
December.
We will probably review those after the first of the year.
But we want to work with you throughout the consideration of
the debate on the NATO expansion, and I think that you will
find that Congress will put strong emphasis on the results of
your studies.
We have your statements in the record, and let me see if
Senator Campbell has an opening statement.
Senator Campbell. No; I have none, Mr. Chairman, other than
to say I am sorry I have been in and out. As you can tell by
this turnout this morning, we have many conflicts. But I wanted
to thank you for the hearing. I have been reading with interest
the testimony, and I think my big concern, like many of the
members of the committee, has not been policy as much as it has
been what it is going to cost the taxpayers.
I just appreciate your doing this hearing. Thank you.
Chairman Stevens. Mr. Hinton, we have your statement for
the record, but I want you to give your statement to the full
extent that you wish to present it. You have with you Mr.
Harold Johnson, I see, and Mr. James Shafer.
Mr. Hinton. Yes, sir, two of my colleagues have been
actively involved in looking at NATO issues.
Chairman Stevens. Well, let us proceed with your statement
and see who else comes before we start the question period.
Mr. Hinton. Very well. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am
pleased to be here today to help the committee sort through
some of the issues related to the cost and financial
obligations of expanding NATO.
NATO enlargement issues
My testimony today will address three issues--one, current
U.S. costs to support NATO's common budgets and other funding
that supports relations with central and East European nations
and promote NATO enlargement; two, NATO's defense planning
process, which will form the basis for more definitive cost
estimates for an enlarge alliance; and, three, our evaluation
of the recent DOD study of NATO expansion and a comparison of
DOD's studies with studies by CBO and the RAND Corp.
Mr. Chairman, in a few moments I am going to be referring
to the tables of my prepared statement as I go through my
summary.
To begin, Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that the
ultimate cost of NATO enlargement will be contingent on several
factors that have not yet been determined. Specifically, NATO
has yet to formally define its future strategy for defending
the expanded alliance or the force and facility requirements of
the newly invited states. Nor has NATO determined how costs of
expanding the alliance will be financed.
NATO's process for doing so is underway and is expected, as
you said, Mr. Chairman, to be completed later next year. And
right now the date I have is June 1998 when it will be
completed.
U.S. contributions to NATO common budgets
Now let me turn briefly to the U.S. contributions to NATO's
common budgets and other funding sources. As it does now, the
United States will fund its share of NATO enlargement primarily
through contributions to the three common budgets. The NATO
security investment program pays for infrastructure items that
are over and above the needs of the member nations, including,
for example, communication links to NATO headquarters or
reinforcement reception facilities such as increased apron
space at existing airfields.
The military budget pays for NATO's AWACS program and
military headquarters cost. The civil budget pays primarily for
NATO's international staff and operations and maintenance costs
for its civilian facility at Brussels.
For fiscal year 1997, the U.S. contribution for the three
common budgets was about $470 million: $172 million for the
security investment program, $252 million for NATO's military
budget, and about $44.5 million for NATO's civil budget.
Any increases to the U.S. budget accounts would be
reflected primarily through increased funding requests for the
DOD military construction budget from which the security
investment program is funded, the Army's O&M budget, from which
the military budget is funded. Both of those accounts reside in
the 050 budget function. And last the State Department's
contributions to international organizations from which the
civil budget is funded. That is the 150 account.
In addition, the United States could choose to help members
in their efforts to meet their NATO membership obligations
through continued foreign military financing grants and/or
loans, or through the international military education and
training grants, and joint exercises.
Other assistance to candidate countries
The three candidate countries and other countries have been
receiving such assistance since the inception of the
Partnership for Peace Program, and this has enabled some of
these countries to be more prepared for NATO membership. In
fiscal year 1997, over $120 million was programmed for these
activities, and about $60 million of this amount was targeted
to the three candidates for NATO membership.
This is strictly bilateral assistance that may assist the
candidates and other countries' participation in PFP to meet
certain NATO standards, but it is not directly related to NATO
decisions concerning military requirements or enlargement. Any
increased funding for this bilateral assistance would be funded
through the international affairs or national defense budget
functions.
NATO defense planning process
With regard to NATO's defense planning process, NATO
planners are now developing military requirements and are close
to completing their analysis. These requirements will be
ultimately translated into costs eligible for common funding. I
should point out, Mr. Chairman, that, according to officials at
the U.S. mission to NATO, it is unlikely that any additional
military capability requirements will be placed on NATO members
over and above the force goals that they have already agreed to
provide.
In other words, if current force goals are attained, NATO
will have sufficient forces to respond to likely contingencies
in the current and new member countries. Therefore, it can be
concluded that although enlargement of the alliance is another
reason for current allies to attain their force goals, it will
not add any new, unknown costs to existing members' force
plans. Nonetheless, this is a very important issue and stresses
the need for our allies to meet their force goals.
NATO officials plan to present their cost estimates for
approval at the NATO defense ministerial meeting in early
December. However, it will not be until June 1998 that NATO
will make decisions about whether or how much to increase the
common budgets, which would then be shared among current and
new members. Until this has been done, Mr. Chairman, the
implications for the U.S. contributions to NATO's common
budgets will be unclear.
If you could turn to attachment I of my prepared statement,
there is a table about milestones for decisionmaking around
NATO enlargement. I would like to call your attention to the
middle section of that table, which lays out the various
reports that are now being prepared at NATO that will be
considered as they go through the decisionmaking process this
December and carrying forward through June 1998.
You can see that those reports cover requirements, commonly
funded items, infrastructure, communications, interoperability
issues, and the studies that will eventually lead to cost
estimates.
Comparison of DOD, CBO, and RAND enlargement estimates
Last, Mr. Chairman, let me turn to the cost studies on NATO
enlargement. As you know, CBO, DOD, and RAND developed cost
estimates for enlarging NATO before invitations were extended
to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic and, therefore,
before NATO had assessed its current military needs or
developed military requirements that could be used to make more
accurate cost estimates.
We found the estimates in these studies to be speculative,
and that the ranges of estimates, from $10 to $125 billion, to
be substantially different depending upon the assumptions that
were used. In some instances, the cost range estimates overlap.
However, this may be coincidental, since the assumptions and
force postures used to develop the estimates were different.
Thus, it is not surprising that the debate on this issue
has been surrounded by some confusion. In August, Mr. Chairman,
we issued a report in response to a request by Messrs. Gilman
and Hamilton of the House International Relations Committee
evaluating DOD's study and comparing DOD's estimate to the
estimates by CBO and RAND.
An analysis of DOD's cost estimate to enlarge NATO
indicates that its key assumptions were generally reasonable
and were largely consistent with the views of United States,
NATO, and foreign officials that we spoke with. In particular,
the assumption that large-scale conventional security threats
will remain low significantly influenced the estimate. However,
DOD's lack of supporting cost documentation and its decision to
include cost elements that were not directly related to
enlargement call into question the overall estimate.
Because of the uncertainties associated with enlargement
and DOD's estimating procedures, the actual cost of NATO
enlargement could be substantially different from DOD's
estimated cost of about $27 to $35 billion.
If I could have you turn to attachment II of my prepared
statement, we have provided a table that will help you see how
DOD broke out the $27 to $35 billion estimate. There are a
couple points that I would like to mention.
In the first two columns of the table, where you see the
new member share and the current allies' share, DOD's
assumption is that the new members and the allies would pay
their share of those costs. There are indications that direct
enlargement, which is the third line down, that NATO has gone
in and visited with some of the new invitees, and that some of
the costs for infrastructure improvements may be less than what
they had originally anticipated. This means that those costs
that you see in that third line may be lower.
One point that I would like to mention concerns the middle
line dealing with the current members' reinforcement
enhancements. Throughout our study of DOD's work, we have not
seen any comprehensive assessment of where the allies stand in
terms of meeting their current force goals.
This is a very important point, as NATO proceeds in
implementing its new defense strategy, and we have not seen
that. We have anecdotal information about various countries in
terms of what they have done, but we have not seen a
comprehensive assessment across all the allies about where they
are in meeting the force goals.
As I mentioned, CBO and RAND developed a range of cost
estimates for NATO enlargement, including estimates that employ
a defense strategy similar to DOD's. That is, each member would
have a basic self-defense capability and the ability to rapidly
receive NATO reinforcements. CBO's estimates range from $61 to
$125 billion. RAND's estimates range from $10 to $110 billion.
If you would turn to the last page of my prepared
statement, Mr. Chairman, we have attempted to capture these
three studies in this table. There are several factors that
account for the differences between DOD's estimate and the
estimates of CBO and RAND.
For example, CBO assumed a much larger reinforcement force
and much more extensive modernization, infrastructure, and
training costs than DOD did. RAND, on the other hand, assumed a
somewhat larger reinforcement force and higher training and air
defense modernization costs than DOD did.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening statement. My
colleagues and I would be happy to address any questions you or
the other members of the committee may have.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I am pleased to be here
today to help the Committee sort through some of the issues related to
the cost and financial obligations of expanding the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO). My testimony today will address three
issues: (1) current U.S. costs to support NATO's common budgets and
other funding that supports relations with Central and East European
nations and promotes NATO enlargement; (2) NATO's defense planning
process, which will form the basis for more definitive cost estimates
for an enlarged alliance; and (3) our evaluation of the recent
Department of Defense (DOD) study of NATO expansion and a comparison of
DOD's study with studies of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and
the Rand Corporation.
SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS
The ultimate cost of NATO enlargement will be contingent on several
factors that have not yet been determined. Specifically, NATO has yet
to formally define (1) its strategy for defending the expanded
alliance, (2) force and facility requirements of the newly invited
states, and (3) how costs of expanding the alliance will be financed.
Also unknown is the long-term security threat environment in Europe.
NATO's process for determining the cost of enlargement is underway and
expected to be completed by June 1998.
In fiscal year 1997, the United States contributed about $470
million directly to NATO to support its three commonly funded budgets,
the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP), the military budget, and
the civil budget. This is about 25 percent of the total funding for
these budgets. It is through proposed increases to these budgets,
primarily the NSIP and to a lesser extent the civil budget, that most
of the direct cost of NATO enlargement will be reflected and therefore
where the United States is likely to incur additional costs.
Additionally, over $120 million was programmed in fiscal year 1997
for Warsaw Initiative activities in the three countries that are
candidates for NATO membership and other Partnership for Peace (PFP)
countries.\1\ This money was provided to help pay for Foreign Military
Financing grants and loans, exercises, and other PFP-related
activities. Funding for these activities will continue, but the
allocation between the candidates for NATO membership and all other PFP
participants may change over time. This funding is strictly bilateral
assistance that may assist the candidate countries and other countries
participating in PFP to meet certain NATO standards, but it is not
directly related to NATO decisions concerning military requirements or
enlargement.
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\1\ In 1994 NATO launched a wide-ranging cooperative effort--known
as PFP--with nonmember countries to promote democracy, expand
cooperation, and strengthen relationships between NATO and nonmember
countries. Participation of countries in PFP plays a role in NATO's
decisions regarding expansion. For further information see ``NATO
Enlargement: U.S. and International Efforts to Assist Potential New
Member States'' (GAO/NSIAD-97-164, June 27, 1997).
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NATO defense planners are now developing military requirements
through their defense planning process and are close to completing
their analyses. These requirements will ultimately be translated into
costs eligible for common funding. NATO officials plan to present their
cost estimates for these items for approval at the NATO defense
ministerial meeting in early December 1997. However, it will not be
until June 1998 that NATO will make decisions about whether or how much
to increase the common budgets, which would then be shared among
current and new members. Until this has been done, the implications for
the U.S. contributions to NATO's common budgets will be unclear.
As you know, DOD, CBO, and Rand developed cost estimates for
enlarging NATO before invitations were extended to Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic and therefore before NATO had assessed its current
military needs or developed military requirements that could be used to
make more accurate cost estimates. Thus, the ranges of these
estimates--from $10 billion to $125 billion--are substantially
different, depending on the assumptions used. In some instances, the
cost range estimates overlap; however, this may be coincidental, since
the assumptions and force postures used to develop the estimates were
different. Thus, it is not surprising that the debate on this issue has
been surrounded by some confusion.
Our analysis of DOD's cost estimate to enlarge NATO indicates that
its key assumptions were generally reasonable and were largely
consistent with the views of U.S., NATO, and foreign government
officials.\2\ In particular, the assumption that large-scale
conventional security threats will remain low significantly influenced
the estimate. However, DOD's lack of supporting cost documentation and
its decision to include cost elements that were not directly related to
enlargement call into question its overall estimate. Because of the
uncertainties associated with enlargement and DOD's estimating
procedures, the actual cost of NATO enlargement could be substantially
different from DOD's estimated cost of about $27 billion to $35
billion.
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\2\ See our report ``NATO Enlargement: Cost Estimates Developed to
Date Are Notional'' (GAO/NSIAD-97-209, Aug. 18, 1997).
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Rand and CBO cost estimates are no more reliable than DOD's, based
on our comparison of the three studies. CBO and Rand developed a range
of cost estimates for NATO enlargement, including estimates that employ
a defense strategy similar to DOD's. Several factors account for the
differences between DOD's estimate and the CBO and Rand estimates,
including those estimates that employed defense strategies similar to
DOD's. For example, CBO assumed a much larger reinforcement force and
much more extensive modernization, infrastructure, and training costs
than DOD did. Rand assumed a somewhat larger reinforcement force and
higher training and air defense modernization costs than DOD did.
u.s. contributions to common budgets and other funding sources
As it does now, the United States will fund its share of NATO
enlargement primarily through contributions to the three common
budgets. NSIP pays for infrastructure items that are over and above the
needs of the member nations, including communications links to NATO
headquarters or reinforcement reception facilities, such as increased
apron space at existing airfields. The military budget pays for NATO's
AWACS program and military headquarters costs, and the civil budget
pays primarily for NATO's international staff and operation and
maintenance costs of its civilian facility in Brussels. For fiscal year
1997 the U.S. contribution for the three common budgets was about $470
million: $172 million for the NSIP, $252 million for NATO's military
budget, and $44.5 million for NATO's civil budget. Any increases to the
U.S. budget accounts would be reflected primarily through increased
funding requests for the DOD military construction budget from which
the NSIP is funded, the Army operations and maintenance budget from
which the military budget is funded (both part of the National Defense
050 budget function), and the State Department's contributions to
international organizations from which the civil budget is funded (part
of the International Affairs 150 budget function).
While NATO will not have finalized its common infrastructure
requirements for new members until December 1997 or decided whether or
how much to increase the common budgets until June 1998, DOD and State
Department officials told us that the civil and NSIP budgets are likely
to increase by only 5 to 10 percent and the military budget will
probably not increase at all. This would mean an increase of about $20
million annually for the U.S. contribution to NATO. However, as I
indicated, NATO has yet to make decisions on these matters. In
addition, the United States could choose to help new members in their
efforts to meet their NATO membership obligations through continued
Foreign Military Financing grants and/or loans, International Military
Education and Training grants, and assistance for training activities.
The three candidate countries and other PFP countries have been
receiving assistance through these accounts since the inception of the
PFP program, and this has enabled some of these countries to be more
prepared for NATO membership. In fiscal year 1997, over $120 million
was programmed for these activities, and about $60 million of this
amount went to the three candidates for NATO membership. Any increased
funding for such assistance would be funded through the International
Affairs and Defense budget functions.
NATO'S DEFENSE PLANNING PROCESS
It is through NATO's defense planning process that decisions are
made on how the defense burden will be shared, what military
requirements will be satisfied, and what shortfalls will exist.
NATO's New Strategic Concept, adopted in Rome in 1991, places
greater emphasis on crisis management and conflict prevention and
outlines the characteristics of the force structure. Key features
include (1) smaller, more mobile and flexible forces that can counter
multifaceted risks, possibly outside the NATO area; (2) fewer troops
stationed away from their home countries; (3) reduced readiness levels
for many active units; (4) emphasis on building up forces in a crisis;
(5) reduced reliance on nuclear weapons; and (6) immediate and rapid
reaction forces, main defense forces (including multinational corps),
and augmentation forces. Although NATO has not defined exactly the type
and amount of equipment and training needed, it has encouraged nations
to invest in transport, air refueling, and reconnaissance aircraft and
improved command and control equipment, among other items.
NATO's force-planning and goal-setting process involves two
interrelated phases that run concurrently: setting force goals and
responding to a defense planning questionnaire. The force goals, which
are developed every 2 years, define NATO's requirements. The major NATO
commanders propose force goals for each nation based on command
requirements. Each nation typically has over 100 force goals. NATO and
national officials frequently consult one another while developing
force goals and national defense plans. NATO commanders are unlikely to
demand that member nations establish units or acquire equipment they do
not have.
In its annual response to NATO's defense planning questionnaire,
each member verifies its commitment for the previous year, defines its
commitment for the next year, and lays out plans for the following 5
years. Alliance members review each nation's questionnaire and, in
meetings, can question national plans and urge member nations to alter
their plans. After finishing their reviews, generally in October or
November, NATO staff write a report summarizing each nation's plans and
assessing national commitments to NATO. Once NATO members approve this
report, it becomes the alliance's consensus view on each country's
strengths and weaknesses and plan to support the force structure. It is
through this process that NATO determines what shortfalls exist, for
example, in combat support and combat service support capabilities.
According to U.S. officials, NATO is preparing several reports to
be presented for approval at the defense ministerial meetings in
December 1997. One report will discuss the additional military
capability requirements existing alliance members will face as a result
of the alliance's enlargement. According to officials at the U.S.
mission and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, it is unlikely
that any additional military capability requirements will be placed on
NATO members over and above the force goals they have already agreed to
provide. In other words, if current force goals are attained, NATO will
have sufficient resources to respond to likely contingencies in current
and new member countries. Therefore, it can be concluded that although
enlargement of the alliance is another reason for current allies to
attain their force goals, it will not add any new, unknown costs to
existing members' force plans.
Other reports resulting from this process will discuss the
requirements for commonly funded items in the new nations and their
estimated costs. These items include infrastructure that will enable
the new allies to receive NATO reinforcements in times of crisis,
communication systems between NATO and their national headquarters, and
a tie-in to NATO's air defense system. How these projects will be
financed by NATO, for example, whether they will be financed within
existing budgets or by increasing the size of NATO's common budgets,
will not be determined until June 1998. Therefore, the impact of these
costs on the U.S. contributions to NATO's common budgets and the U.S.
budget will be unknown until next spring.
Another report will present an assessment of the capabilities and
shortfalls in the military forces of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic. NATO does not and will not estimate the costs of the
shortfalls of either the current or the new member states, but once
these shortfalls are identified, cost estimates can be made by others.
However, even though new members' capabilities and shortfalls will be
identified in December, these countries' force goals will not be set
until the spring. These force goals will, in effect, be a roadmap for
the new members on how to address their shortfalls. (See attachment I
for a timeline illustrating these events.)
key assumptions and cost estimates for nato enlargement studies
When the DOD, CBO, and Rand studies were completed, many key cost
determinants had not been established. Consequently, each study made a
series of key assumptions that had important implications for each
studies' results.
DOD made the following key assumptions:
--Specific nations would be invited to join NATO in the first round
of enlargement.\3\
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\3\ The number of countries DOD assumed would be invited to join
NATO and the actual countries that were the basis for the estimate are
classified information.
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--NATO would continue to rely on its existing post-Cold War strategy
to carry out its collective defense obligations (that is, each
member state would have a basic self-defense capability and the
ability to rapidly receive NATO reinforcements).\4\
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\4\ NATO adopted a new post-Cold War strategic concept at its Rome
summit meeting in 1991. The concept provides for substantial reductions
in the size and readiness of NATO's forces but increased force
mobility, flexibility, and ability to adapt to the changed threat
environment.
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--NATO would not be confronted by a significant conventional military
threat for the foreseeable future, and such a threat would take
many years to develop.
--NATO would continue to use existing criteria for determining which
items would be funded in common and which costs would be
allocated among members.\5\
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\5\ NATO funds only those facilities or portions of facilities that
are over and above the needs of an individual country's national
security requirements. For example, NATO would fund only the portion of
infrastructure at an air base that is beyond the host nation's own
needs, such as hangars for reinforcing aircraft, but not hangars for
the host country's aircraft.
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Using these assumptions, DOD estimated the cost of enlarging NATO
would range from about $27 billion to $35 billion from 1997 through
2009. The estimate was broken down as follows: about $8 billion to $10
billion for improvements in current NATO members' regional
reinforcement capabilities, such as developing mobile logistics and
other combat support capabilities; about $10 billion to $13 billion for
restructuring and modernizing new members' militaries (for example,
selectively upgrading self-defense capabilities); and about $9 billion
to $12 billion for costs directly attributable to NATO enlargement (for
example, costs of ensuring that current and new members' forces are
interoperable and capable of combined NATO operations and of upgrading
or constructing facilities to receive NATO reinforcements).
DOD estimated the U.S. share of these costs would range from about
$1.5 billion to $2 billion--averaging $150 million to $200 million
annually from 2000 to 2009. The estimated U.S. share chiefly consisted
of a portion of direct enlargement costs commonly funded through NATO's
Security Investment Program. DOD assumed that the other costs would be
borne by the new members and other current member states and concluded
that they could afford these costs, although this would be challenging
for new members. (See attachment II.)
DOD's Key Assumptions Were Reasonable, But Cost Estimates Are
Speculative
In our review of DOD's study of NATO enlargement, we (1) assessed
the reasonableness of DOD's key assumptions, (2) attempted to verify
pricing information used as the basis for estimating enlargement costs,
(3) looked into whether certain cost categories were actually linked to
enlargement, and (4) identified factors excluded from the study that
could affect enlargement costs.
We concluded that DOD's assumptions were reasonable. The assumption
regarding the threat was probably the most significant variable in
estimating the cost of enlargement. Based on information available to
us, we concluded that it was reasonable to assume the threat would be
low and there would be a fairly long warning time if a serious threat
developed. This assumption, and the assumption that the post-Cold War
strategic concept would be employed, provided the basis for DOD's
judgments concerning required regional reinforcement capabilities, new
members' force modernization, and to a large extent those items
categorized as direct enlargement costs.
DOD also assumed that during 1997-2009, new members would increase
their real defense spending at an average annual rate of 1 to 2
percent. Both private and government analysts project gross domestic
product (GDP) growth rates averaging 4 to 5 percent annually for the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland during 1997-2001. Thus, projected
increases in defense budgets appear affordable. Analysts also point out
that potential new member countries face real fiscal constraints,
especially in the short term. An increase in defense budgets at the
expense of pressing social concerns becomes a matter of setting
national priorities, which are difficult to predict. If these
countries' growth rates do not meet expectations, their ability to
increase real defense spending becomes more problematic.
DOD further assumed that current NATO members would on average
maintain constant real defense spending levels during 1997-2009.\6\
Analysts have expressed somewhat greater concern about this assumption
and generally consider it to be an optimistic, but reasonable
projection. Some analysts indicated that defense spending in some
current member states may decline further over the next several years.
Such declines would partly be due to economic requirements associated
with entry into the European Monetary Union.\7\
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\6\ In 1996, defense spending as a percent of the gross domestic
product was 2 percent for Italy, 1.7 percent for Germany, 2.9 percent
for the United Kingdom, and 3 percent for France. If the gross domestic
product increases in real terms, these percentages will decline under
DOD's assumption of constant real defense spending.
\7\ Under the European Monetary Union, scheduled to go into effect
January 1, 1999, the European Union would have a common central bank
and monetary policy and a single currency called the euro. According to
the Maastricht Treaty, the primary goal of the common central bank is
price stability. The treaty requires that the economies of the
participating countries converge toward certain performance goals in
terms of inflation, long-term interest rates, exchange rate stability,
and budget deficits (no greater than 3 percent of GDP) and debt (no
greater than 60 percent of GDP).
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Despite our conclusion that DOD's underlying assumptions were
sound, for several reasons we concluded that its estimates are quite
speculative. First, DOD's pricing of many individual cost elements were
``best guesses'' and lacked supporting documentation. This was the case
for all three categories of costs: direct enlargement costs, current
members' reinforcement enhancements, and new members' modernization
requirements. Most of the infrastructure upgrade and refurbishment cost
estimates were based on judgments. For example, DOD's estimate of $140
million to $240 million for upgrading a new member's existing air base
into a NATO collocated operating base was not based on surveys of
actual facilities but on expert judgment. We were told that the actual
cost could easily be double--or half--the estimate.
DOD's estimated costs for training and modernization were notional,
and actual costs may vary substantially. DOD analysts did not project
training tempos and specific exercise costs. Instead, they extrapolated
U.S. and NATO training and exercise costs and evaluated the results
from the point of view of affordability. DOD's estimate for
modernization and restructuring of new members' ground forces was also
notional and was based on improving 25 percent of the new members'
forces. However, it did not specify what upgrades would be done and how
much they would cost.
Second, we could find no linkage between DOD's estimated cost of $8
billion to $10 billion for remedying current shortfalls in NATO's
reinforcement capabilities and enlargement of the alliance. Neither DOD
nor NATO could point to any specific reinforcement shortfalls that
would result from enlargement that do not already exist. However,
existing shortfalls could impair the implementation of NATO's new
strategic concept. DOD officials told us that while reinforcement needs
would not be greater in an enlarged NATO, enlargement makes eliminating
the shortfalls essential. This issue is important in the context of
burdensharing because DOD's estimate shows that these costs would be
covered by our current NATO allies but not shared by the United States.
Finally, NATO has yet to determine what military capabilities,
modernization, and restructuring will be sought from new members.
Consequently, DOD had little solid basis for its $10 billion to $13
billion estimate for this cost category. Moreover, DOD and new member
governments have noted that new members are likely to incur costs to
restructure and modernize their forces whether or not they join NATO.
Indeed, some countries have indicated that they may need to spend more
for these purposes if they do not become NATO members. DOD showed these
costs as being covered entirely by the new members.
Potential Additional Costs of Enlargement
NATO enlargement could entail costs in addition to those included
in DOD's estimates, including costs for assistance to enhance the
Partnership for Peace or other bilateral assistance for countries not
invited to join NATO in July 1997. In addition, the United States may
provide assistance to help new members restructure and modernize their
forces. For example, Polish officials said they may need up to $2
billion in credits to buy multipurpose aircraft. While not an added
cost of enlargement, such assistance would represent a shift in the
cost burden from the new member countries to the countries providing
assistance. DOD did not include such costs in its estimate of the U.S.
share, though it acknowledged that the cost was possible. Moreover,
U.S. and NATO officials have stated that additional countries may be
invited to join NATO in the future, most likely in 1999. DOD's cost
estimate did not take into account a second or third round of
invitations. If additional countries are invited, cost of enlargement
would obviously increase.
Comparison of the DOD, CBO, and Rand Estimates
CBO and Rand estimated the cost of incorporating the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia into NATO. They based their
estimates on a range of NATO defense postures, from enhanced self-
defense with minimal NATO interoperability to the forward stationing of
NATO troops in new member states. However, they also noted that the
current lack of a major threat in Europe could allow NATO to spend as
little as it chose in enlarging the alliance.
Because of the uncertainties of future threats, and the many
possible ways to defend an enlarged NATO, CBO examined five
illustrative options to provide such a defense. Each option built on
the previous one in scope and cost. CBO estimated that the cost of the
five options over the 15-year period would range from $61 billion to
$125 billion. Of that total, CBO estimated that the United States might
be expected to pay between $5 billion and $19 billion. CBO included in
its range of options a $109 billion estimate that was predicated on a
resurgent Russian threat, although it was based on a self-defense and
reinforcement strategy similar to that used by DOD.\8\ Of this $109
billion, CBO estimated that the United States would pay $13 billion.
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\8\ CBO's lowest estimate is based on a low-threat assessment; the
additional costs are predicated on a resurgent Russian threat.
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Similarly, Rand developed estimates for four options to defend an
enlarged NATO that build upon one another, from only self-defense
support at a cost of $10 billion to $20 billion to the forward
deployment of forces in new member states at a cost of $55 billion to
$110 billion. These options include a middle option that would cost
about $42 billion that was also based on a self-defense and
reinforcement strategy. Rand estimated that the United States would pay
$5 billion to $6 billion of this $42 billion in total costs.
Several factors account for the differences between DOD's estimates
and the CBO and Rand estimates, even those that employed defense
strategies similar to DOD's. (Attachment III illustrates the major
results and key assumptions of the three estimates.)
CBO's cost estimate is significantly higher than DOD's for the
following reasons:
--DOD assumed reinforcements of 4 divisions and 6 wings, whereas CBO
assumed a force of 11\2/3\ divisions and 11\1/2\ wings and a
much larger infrastructure for this force in the new member
states.
--CBO's modernization costs are much higher than DOD's and include
the purchase of 350 new aircraft and 1,150 new tanks for the
new member states. DOD assumed that about 25 percent of the new
member states' ground forces would be modernized through
upgrades and that each nation would procure a single squadron
of refurbished Western combat aircraft.
--CBO assumed much higher training costs, $23 billion, which include
annual, large-scale combined exercises. DOD included $2 billion
to $4 billion for training.
--CBO included the purchase of Patriot air defense missiles at a cost
of $8.7 billion, which is considerably higher than DOD's
assumed purchase of refurbished I-HAWK type missiles at $1.9
billion to $2.6 billion.
--CBO's infrastructure costs were much higher than DOD's and included
new construction, such as extending the NATO fuel pipeline,
which CBO assumed would meet U.S. standards. DOD assumed
planned refurbishment of existing facilities that would meet
minimal wartime standards.
Rand's cost estimate is somewhat higher than DOD's, although both
were based on similar threat assessments. First, its reinforcement
package was larger--5 divisions and 10 wings--and therefore
infrastructure costs were higher. Second, it assumed new members would
purchase the more expensive Patriot air defense system rather than the
refurbished I-HAWK's. Finally, it assumed greater training costs than
did DOD. The author of the Rand study stated that if he had used DOD's
assumptions, the cost range would have been almost identical to DOD's.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy
to respond to any questions you or other Committee members may have.
______
Attachment I.--NATO enlargement timeline
Date Activity
September 1995.......................................... NATO issues study on enlargement.
July 1997............................................... NATO issues invitations to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to begin accessions talks.
October/November 1997................................... NATO prepares several reports:
--additional military capability requirements for existing alliance members that will result
from the alliance's enlargement;
--requirements for commonly funded items in the new member nations, including:
infrastructure that will enable the new allies to receive NATO reinforcements in times of
crisis; communication systems between NATO and their national headquarters; and a tie-in to
NATO's air defense system;
--cost estimates for items eligible for common funding presented by NATO officials; and
--the capabilities and shortfalls in the military forces of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic.
Early December 1997..................................... NATO defense ministerial meeting to approve the above reports.
Spring 1998............................................. New members' force goals set.
June 1998............................................... NATO decides whether or how much to increase the common budgets, which would then be shared
among current and new members.
April 1999.............................................. Target date for new member accession into NATO.
______
ATTACHMENT II.--CATEGORIES AND SHARE OF COSTS
[Dollars in billions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New members' Current
Cost category share allies' share U.S. share Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New members' military restructuring and
modernization.................................. $10 to $13 .............. .............. $10 to $13
Current members' reinforcement enhancements..... .............. $8 to $10 .............. $8 to $10
Direct enlargement.............................. $3 to $44.5 $4.5 to $5.5 $1.5 to $2 $9 to $12
---------------------------------------------------------------
Total..................................... $13 to $17.5 $12.5 to $15.5 $1.5 to $2 $27 to $35
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ATTACHMENT III.--DOD, CBO, AND RAND ESTIMATES
[Dollars in billions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assumption DOD CBO RAND
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total cost................... $27-$35 in constant $61-$125 in constant 1997 $10-$110 in constant 1996
1997 dollars. dollars ($109 for a defense dollars ($42 for a defense
strategy similar to DOD's). strategy similar to DOD's).
U.S. cost share.............. $1.5-$2.0............ $13.1 \1\................... $5-$6 \1\.
Notional new NATO members.... A small group Poland, Hungary, Czech Poland, Hungary, Czech
(details classified). Republic, Slovakia. Republic, Slovakia.
Time period.................. 1997-2009............ 1996-2010................... Approximately 1995-2010.
Threat assessment............ Low threat........... A resurgent Russia \1\...... Low threat \1\.
Comparable force posture 4 divisions/6 wings.. 11.7 divisions/11.5 wings 5 divisions/10 wings \1\.
options. \1\.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ These assumptions correspond to the estimate based on a defense strategy similar to DOD's.
Chairman Stevens. Senator Inouye has come in. Do you have
an opening statement, Senator?
Senator Inouye. No, Mr. Chairman.
Force goals have not been met
Chairman Stevens. You mentioned, Mr. Hinton, that some of
our allies have not met their current force goals. Can you tell
us now which of the allies that applies to and how far off they
are from their force goals now?
Mr. Hinton. That is the study that we have not seen, Mr.
Chairman. We have heard some about what the Brits have done and
others, but we have not seen that comprehensive analysis across
the full membership as to where they stand against those goals.
Affect of European monetary union on NATO enlargement
Chairman Stevens. Senator Domenici yesterday mentioned the
new European Community [EC] goals to eliminate deficits in
order to have the right to use common currency. Are you
familiar with that problem he mentioned?
Mr. Hinton. Yes, sir.
Chairman Stevens. Is that a problem you could analyze for
us as the time goes ahead now, so that we can have some study
of that for the January-February timeframe? He indicates that
in order to be a party to the EC monetary change that emerging
nations, and particularly the three that would become part of
the NATO enlargement process, would have to restrict their
spending in order to comply. And yet the NATO requirements
would mandate that they expand their spending in order to be
prepared to be a NATO member.
Would that be within your competence to look at that
problem?
Mr. Hinton. Yes, sir; I think we could take a look at that
for you. We have had some discussions with Senator Domenici's
staff on this issue, as they have been outlining the series of
hearings that they are having. We have not begun that work, but
I think we could look at it.
It does create a challenge for those members as to how they
are going to accomplish the goals of meeting the force goals
for NATO expansion as well as the goals that are going to be
laid out for joining the European Union.
Chairman Stevens. I do not want to have two separate
requests, so I would hope that you and your staff would
coordinate the requests from the Budget Committee and this
committee so we would have one report that would cover both of
our needs.
But it does seem to me, those of us that have been over
there and have visited, that there is a real apparent rush to
acquire aircraft in particular. The difference between the DOD
and the CBO analysis, and RAND too, I guess, really looks to
the problem of whether or not there is a resurgent Russia and
whether or not there is a need for an increased number of wings
of aircraft and an increase in the number of divisions that
would be required in the new NATO members.
Now I think that that conflict between the economic posture
of the country in order to be an economic partner, on the one
hand, of an expanded European Community as compared to being a
fully performing member of an expanded NATO is a very real one,
and that we should have some guidance as to what will be the
impact of the economic constraints.
It appears that it would stretch out the time within which
the new members could comply with NATO, because I assume that
the economic mandate would be the most compelling to comply
with in the first instance.
Mr. Hinton. Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding that as
they have been going through the requirements determination
process in NATO that the push has been on trying to move away
from buying major aircraft, for example, and focusing more on
logistical support requirements that you would need in the
early years to be interoperable with the other NATO elements.
And over time we may learn, in the December timeframe and
as we move to the June 1998 timeframe, when we see some of
these costs, exactly what are behind those costs, and we would
see those requirements. I think your point is right on mark,
and that needs to be looked at.
Mr. Johnson. Could I elaborate just slightly on your
question? I think the problem that you describe also applies to
current allies. The difficulty is that they need, in order to
belong to the European monetary union, they need to get their
deficits and debt under control within certain guidelines. That
limits the amount of spending for defense, and it places a
great deal of pressure on their defense budgets. That is part
of the problem with not meeting their force goals.
So it is on both sides. It does not just apply to the new
members coming in; the problem also applies to the existing
allies.
Chairman Stevens. Mr. Johnson, it applies to us too. We
have already committed to a 5-year plan that supposedly will
get us to the point where we have eliminated our deficits and
bring us closer to having a means to control the expansion of
our own debt.
Mr. Johnson. That is right.
Chairman Stevens. Maybe it is a good thing we are not
applying for membership to the EC.
Senator Campbell.
NATO requirements for new members
Senator Campbell. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
During yesterday's hearing General Shelton and General
Clark testified that NATO is developing these military
requirements for the invited members. I wanted to focus on that
just a little bit. As I understood your testimony, Mr. Hinton,
you estimate there will not be a significant increase in what
is called the common budget for NATO. Did I understand you to
say that?
Mr. Hinton. What I said there is that we will not know what
the exact estimates are going to be until we get in and see the
data coming out of the June timeframe, when the costs are going
to be there.
Senator Campbell. All right. These new estimates are going
to be discussed in December.
Mr. Hinton. Right. But what has come up recently, Senator
Campbell, from testimony from Secretary Cohen and some of what
you heard yesterday, was that we have gone into some of the new
member states and looked at their infrastructure. What we have
seen is that some of the conditions are better than what we
thought they were when DOD prepared the initial study back
early this year.
Therefore, the costs of the direct enlargement could be
considerably lower than what DOD had in its study, but we will
not know for sure until later in 1998.
Senator Campbell. Can you provide the committee with an
update of the GAO work on that issue?
Mr. Hinton. We would be happy to update the analysis of
DOD's report up here to the committee.
[The information follows:]
The updated DOD study is scheduled for release the end of
February 1998. GAO will provide the Committee with its analysis
of this report shortly after we receive it.
Senator Campbell. But, in addition to that, as I understand
it, we have given about $60 million so far to those three
candidate members. Is that correct?
Mr. Johnson. Right.
U.S. obligations to pay
Senator Campbell. I guess my concern is in the title of
your testimony which says it all--cost implications to the
United States remain unclear. I am concerned a little bit if we
are expected to foot the bill for these additional military
requirements that will be put on the new members. That is one
thing.
The other thing, I guess, is really a policy question. I am
also concerned about what would prevent them from sharing
whatever technology we give them in terms of equipment or
money, since some of them were former Warsaw Pact members, and
I am sure some of the people are still involved in their
administrative decisionmaking coalition at their headquarters
and still have some possible leanings to the old Warsaw Pact.
That would kind of concern me.
Would you comment on that?
Mr. Hinton. On your cost question, Senator, if you look at
the table designated attachment II in the direct enlargement
line, as well as to the two lines above, when DOD did its study
one of the assumptions was that the new members would be
responsible for their share and that we would not be obligated
to pay for that.
What we, the United States, would have an obligation to pay
would be those costs that would likely come up from the direct
enlargement that are shared by all members, and on that bottom
line over in the third column you see what that number was in
DOD's study. The indications from Secretary Cohen and the folks
that were testifying yesterday is that could be----
Senator Campbell. I understand what you are saying, but
apparently it is not what we are doing if we have already given
them $60 million. That was basically the question I had. If
there are military requirements for these invited new members,
are we going to get stuck with the bill, regardless of what
your chart says?
Mr. Hinton. I understand that. Now the $60 million that I
referred to earlier is bilateral assistance that we are giving
in working with the other countries in terms of the Partnership
for Peace Program. It is not tied into the numbers that would
come out through the common budgets.
Senator Campbell. It was $60 million of American taxpayers'
money.
NATO's requirements process
Mr. Hinton. You are exactly right. And on the technology
question that you raised, Senator, as NATO goes through the
requirements determination process and puts out the force goals
and the countries come back and respond to the defense planning
questionnaire you will be able to see where NATO is going to be
looking to the new members as to what they can provide for the
common defense of the whole alliance.
And I think that would put some boundaries around the
technology question that you had.
Senator Campbell. OK. Well, I will not belabor it, Mr.
Chairman, but I think it is going to be kind of a one-way
street when we talk about who is going to provide what and who
is going to pay for it.
Mr. Hinton. I think that is a significant issue for the
committee to be concerned about. I think that it is important
to get the right information and the most current information
as you go into the decisionmaking process here in the Congress,
and I think it is also important to determine whether the
allies are living up to their commitments so that we do not
find ourselves having to pay for that too.
Senator Campbell. I appreciate that. I just have a feeling
that when we all come to the table and define who is going to
be responsible for each thing, that the three new member
countries are going to come with very little to offer in terms
of balancing the cost for their own defense. But I thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Stevens. Thank you. Senator Hutchison.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
NATO enlargement costs are unclear
In your report, of course, I am sure it has been said you
are saying that not only are you not able to quantify all of
the costs, but neither have any of the others who have
attempted to do this, including the Department of Defense,
RAND, CBO. Everyone who has looked at it is saying it is
impossible to quantify.
But at some point this committee is going to have to have a
bottom line, and it is my hope that this committee is going to
have enough information to set a ceiling on what our share it--
determine what our fair share is, what are the reasonable
requirements, and set a limit on our share so that there will
be no question about that.
But I would like to ask you if, in your looking at this, if
there is going to be a way for you to determine what our share
really is. Now, we have in the President's or the Department of
Defense estimate the overall NATO share, the new member share,
and then the other ally commitments for their own rapid
deployment improvements.
Bosnia costs increase
Are you able to quantify in the numbers what is really our
share--not just our share of the overall, but are we going to
have a share in the new member share? Are we going to have
requirements outside of NATO, as we do in Bosnia, that are not
even factored in? The cost of Bosnia was supposed to be $2
billion. We are up to $7 billion, and that still does not
include all of the peripheral things we do in support of the
Bosnia operation that is not actually there.
So in your looking at this are you going to be comfortable
that when we say our share is x million or x hundreds of
millions that we will know what really is our share?
NATO's schedule for costing reports
Mr. Hinton. I think, Senator, as the process carries itself
out in what NATO is doing right now and the studies are being
done that are highlighted in our statement, beginning in
December you will be getting more definitive answers to the
requirements, to what the new members bring to the alliance to
meet the force goals, and I think you will also see more
definitive requirements around some of the infrastructure costs
that are going to be involved to bring them up to what you need
to receive reinforcements.
Now, on that point, those items that may be of a common
nature, that are over and above what the individual countries
are responsible for, there may be an obligation for the United
States to pay some part of that. However, it is not known right
now what those costs will be.
I hope that, and we would be happy to continue to look
behind the numbers that are provided by NATO as to what they
exactly mean, how they were determined, the priorities that are
there amongst some of the projects to help inform the debate up
here when you all have to make the decision on deciding about
enlargement. And, hopefully, at that point we can move to more
concrete information about the true cost.
Now when it goes beyond NATO----
Senator Hutchison. To the periphery.
Mr. Hinton. Right. I do not know that we will have that as
part of this process.
Senator Hutchison. Do you think it is legitimate to
consider that when we are looking at what our bottom line is
going to be?
Mr. Hinton. Well, I think that, and I know this committee
was involved in trying to put in place over in the Department a
process to bring more oversight to the cost of peacekeeping
operations, and that has been helpful in the process. But I
think NATO is going to be one piece, and maybe that is another
subject that is going to have to be looked at, maybe
independent of what the NATO situation is, because there are
several peacekeeping operations around which the United States
has an obligation to be a part of right now.
But in terms of NATO, I think that is going to be fairly
well defined. But any decisions to go outside of NATO will
create, in the future, a situation like Bosnia, and you just
have to find out what the operation is going to be, what it
requires, and what are the costs of going into that operation.
One key point we have learned in looking at the other
peacekeeping operations is the importance of having an exit
strategy and trying to adhere to that.
But a lot of that goes into factoring the cost. But I do
not think that is going to be part of what you will see coming
out of the NATO process that I am aware of right now.
Senator Hutchison. Well, we have not seen an exit strategy
on anything else we have done in the last few years, so I am
not optimistic about that.
Well, I just am very concerned in looking at Bosnia as an
example. I do not think $7 billion is anywhere close to the
real cost of Bosnia, because you are not including operations
on the perimeter that support that operation, and I am worried
that we are going to have other costs that might not be
included, and all I can say is I hope you will try to figure a
way to determine, to the best extent that you can, what the
real commitment is, whether it is our share, allies' share, new
member share, contingencies for others not paying their fair
share, if that is going to be our responsibility.
There are a lot of things out there that I hope you will
find a way to quantify.
Mr. Hinton. Thank you, ma'am.
Chairman Stevens. Do you have any questions, Danny?
Cost estimates unclear
Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, I just want to note that
nothing is clear at this time, and I hope that we will be in a
position to make the necessary decisions on this committee. I
hope that your agency will continue to monitor the progress of
resolving these estimates.
For example, do you have anyone monitoring the ministerial
meetings this December?
Mr. Hinton. Not at the moment.
Senator Inouye. I think it would help, so that we would
know the basis for the decisions.
Mr. Hinton. We will be happy to see what we can do on that.
Senator Inouye. Do you have any recommendations? I know
that you have stated that the assumptions of DOD seem
reasonable, but the estimates are speculative. Do you have
anything that is less speculative?
Mr. Hinton. Not based on the work that we have done to
date. I do not have any at this time. But, as has been brought
up, I would expect that as we go down and get more involved
into the process that that would--the potential for us coming
up with recommendations on improving the process is good.
Senator Inouye. That would be extremely helpful, sir. Thank
you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
GAO to monitor NATO's December ministerial
Chairman Stevens. Mr. Hinton, as a former chairman of the
Governmental Affairs Committee, I have relied very heavily upon
your agency. I defended it on the basis that you are shared
staff of the Congress, and that the use of your organization
will actually reduce the costs of the Congress.
So, following up on what Senator Inouye has said, I want
you to notify the NATO people that your people are going to be
at NATO at the request of this committee. We will not have
people there observing that, because you will. And if they do
not give you access to what is going on over there the way they
would give our committee, I want you to notify us about that,
and we will straighten it out for you fairly quickly.
I just do not feel we should keep a whole series of
congressional observers there during the ministerial meetings,
and what we are really after is an analysis of what their
conclusions are, not the reasons for their conclusions. So I do
hope that you will be able to do that.
Support for U.S. forces overseas
Second, yesterday I raised with General Clark the increased
costs of the military units in Europe, and this is without
regard to the current problem of the NATO enlargement, as
compared to the costs of support of our forces in Asia. I am of
the impression from our hearings in the past that we have
substantial support from Korea and Japan, but a substantial
increase in costs of maintaining our forces in the NATO
structure.
Have you ever made a comparison of that?
Mr. Hinton. No, sir, but we can do that. We can do that. I
can lay those out for you and I think I can bring some
information that will help you see that data.
Chairman Stevens. I never thought I would get to the day
where I was sounding like Senator Mansfield. I am not sure I
have that capability in the first place, but beyond that it has
occurred to me that with an increase of 300,000 troops in NATO
it may well be that the best place for some of our troops that
are going to be stationed overseas is to increase our
deployments in the Asian area and Pacific, where I believe that
the problems of the 21st century will occur first.
But, in any event, I would like to have that comparison, if
you can prepare it.
Resurgent Russia estimate
Last, let me say this--two points really. One of the basic
differences in the estimates that we have is the assumption by
CBO of a resurgent Russia. I think that makes these comparisons
really difficult to understand, and it would seem to me that
the underlying question in the whole NATO organization is, is
there going to be a resurgent Russia. Is there going to be a
new alliance in that area. I do not ask you to analyze that.
But I do think we ought to ask and I intend to ask RAND and
the CBO to give us their analysis without regard to that
question, and I want to have you look at the question of what
difference it would make in your analysis if there was a
resurgent Russia. We intend to ask the DOD to do the same
thing. What would be the costs of preparing to meet a resurgent
Russia?
I guess the other side of that coin would be what would be
the decrease in costs if Russia joined NATO. That was what
Senator Faircloth was looking at yesterday.
Budget for NATO security investment program
Last, in the current budget this year the President asked
for military construction for the NATO security investment
program at less than the previous year. It is my understanding
that 1997 we had $172.6 million, and the President's request
was $170 million, roughly. We have appropriated now $152.6
million for improvements in infrastructure or communications in
NATO.
That is a cost-sharing account for which we provide 25
percent. That is the same account you mentioned, was it not?
Mr. Hinton. The security investment program.
Chairman Stevens. You anticipated that that might increase.
Mr. Hinton. What we are being told is that there could be
some increase to that account.
Chairman Stevens. I have to tell you I get a little lost in
this because yesterday I was told that on the European
alternative to the joint surveillance target attack radar
system [JSTARS] we would pay 49 percent of the cost if they
went that way on a new system. Even though we have our own, if
they decide to get another one for NATO, we still pay 49.5
percent of the cost of a new system, notwithstanding the fact
that we have offered them the system we have, which I think is
the finest in the world, at less than cost.
Now have you ever made an analysis of the different
percentages of the costs as how they are assessed to the United
States in terms of NATO costs?
Mr. Hinton. No; we have not.
Chairman Stevens. We pay 25 percent of the NATO security
investment program. If we pay 49.5 percent of a new system for
air defense, I would like to know what is the background of
some of this differential in the costs that we actually pay as
part of NATO, and I see no reason why we should not ask NATO to
review these costs for the future.
They were obviously put into place back in the days when we
had probably the only super economy in the world. There are
several others that are challenging us now that are part of
NATO, and we ought to ask that those costs be reviewed, as well
as the costs of the enlargement process.
Mr. Hinton. We can do that for you, Mr. Chairman. I am
aware of the 25 percent. We have information on that. But the
49 percent is a new number for me.
[The information follows:]
GAO's analysis of the pending NATO acquisition of a new air
defense system is ongoing and will be provided to the Committee
in February 1998.
Mr. Johnson. I have not heard about that 49 percent. But
that is similar to the cost share on the AWACS system.
Chairman Stevens. Well, we are told that the cost for this
NATO enlargement is somewhere in the vicinity of $100 to $200
million a year for the next 10 years, a little bit more than 10
years--11 years. That seems hard for me to believe, in view of
the current cost to us of our share in the NATO infrastructure
and communications account. We are paying more than that now
just for the existing fully matured NATO.
So I do think that the whole committee wants some
assistance in trying to make sure that when we are looking at
the barrel we know whether we are looking at a full barrel of
apples or an empty barrel of apples as far as these
comparisons. And so far I have no confidence in what we have
been given in terms of the estimates of the costs for the NATO
enlargement--none. They are all fraught with assumptions that
no one will defend.
Mr. Hinton. I share your concern, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Stevens. I am not blaming you either.
DOD's future years defense plan
Mr. Hinton. We have become aware of DOD's plan to put into
the future years defense program a placeholder for NATO
expansion that is going to deal with the amount of money that
you just mentioned right there.
On the other hand, and this is why this is somewhat
confusing and you do not know whether the glass is one-half
full or one-half empty, we are hearing from some of our visits
that the ultimate costs or increase around the NATO security
investment program and the civil budget may be to the range of
about 5 to 10 percent.
Now if that were to be the case, that turns out to be about
$20 million. So there is a big delta right there that I cannot
explain the difference to you because I do not have all the raw
data that I need to get behind some of that. And the reason for
that is some of that data is just not available at the moment.
Chairman Stevens. They are the same people that told us
that the deployment in Bosnia could not cost more than $1
billion in 18 months.
Mr. Hinton. Yes, sir; and, you know, on that operation we
have followed that for the committees in terms of monitoring
the costs and reporting the reasons for the changes in the
cost, and we have watched that grow over the last couple of
years substantially.
Chairman Stevens. Gentlemen, do you have any further
questions?
Senator Campbell. Mr. Chairman, I had just one comment. I
certainly support your decision to try and include GAO in these
enlargement proceedings so we can get a better handle on the
cost. But, as I understand it, we are going to be dealing with
the resolution of ratification in early 1998. Looking at their
timeline in attachment I, it says in spring of 1998 the new
members will force goal set. In June 1998 NATO will decide on
how much to increase the common budgets.
So, at best, we might not get the numbers back that we
need. If we are going to vote on ratification before they even
find out the increased costs, it is still going to put us at a
disadvantage.
Chairman Stevens. I think the Senator has a point. There is
no question about it, and I do not think we can control that
timetable, our only device for being able to control the
reservations we put on the resolution of ratification.
CONCLUSION OF HEARINGS
Well, we do thank you very much and look forward to working
with you. If you need any documentation for our request, we
will notify DOD and notify the State Department of our request
to your agency. Thank you very much.
Mr. Hinton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 10:47 a.m., Thursday, October 23, the
hearings were concluded, and the committee was recessed, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
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