[Senate Hearing 105-268]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 105-268
MISSILE PROLIFERATION IN THE
INFORMATION AGE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,
PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL SERVICES
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 22, 1997
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINING OFFICE
44-228 cc WASHINGTON : 1997
_______________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee, Chairman
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine JOHN GLENN, Ohio
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas CARL LEVIN, Michigan
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
DON NICKLES, Oklahoma RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire MAX CLELAND, Georgia
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
Hannah S. Sistare, Staff Director and Counsel
Leonard Weiss, Minority Staff Director
Michal Sue Prosser, Chief Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION AND FEDERAL
SERVICES
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi, Chairman
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine CARL LEVIN, Michigan
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
DON NICKLES, Oklahoma RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire MAX CLELAND, Georgia
Mitchel B. Kugler, Staff Director
Linda Gustitus, Minority Staff Director
Julie Sander, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
------
Opening statements:
Page
Senator Cochran.............................................. 1
Senator Levin................................................ 3
WITNESSES
Monday, September 22, 1997
William R. Graham, Former Science Advisor to President Reagan and
Former Deputy Administrator of NASA............................ 4
Prepared statement........................................... 12
W. Seth Carus, Visiting Fellow, National Defense University...... 18
Prepared statement........................................... 25
General Bernard A. Schriever, USAF (Ret), prepared statement..... 31
MISSILE PROLIFERATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE
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MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1997
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on International Security,
Proliferation, and Federal Services,
of the Committee on Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Cochran and Levin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. If we could please come to order. I want
to welcome everybody to today's hearing of the Governmental
Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation,
and Federal Services.
The topic of our hearing this morning is missile
proliferation in the information age. We live in a time of
rapid technological change. The computers on our desktops have
computational and storage capabilities that were not just
unheard of, but undreamed of, only a generation ago. The
Internet has magnified those advances by linking hundreds of
thousands of computers and putting those resources at our
fingertips.
New constellations of satellites are being constructed
which will put us all in instantaneous and constant
communication with each other. Already, Global Positioning
System navigation satellites have enabled humans, for the first
time in history, to know precisely where they are at all times,
anywhere in the world, using a device that now costs about
$100.
We must acknowledge, however, that there are negative
consequences from the coupling of rapid technological advances
with the information age. These advances make it easier for
adversaries of the United States to obtain the means to
threaten our interests, and perhaps our homeland as well. The
same personal computer technology that enhances our lives also
makes it easier for less technologically advanced adversaries
to design and build weapons that put the United States at risk.
The Internet puts the technical resources of the United
States, and those of other countries, at the disposal of anyone
with a telephone line.
NASA, for example, maintains a database of over 2 million
technical documents, including detailed reports on the
construction of long-range ballistic missiles, available to
anyone with access to the World Wide Web. The U.S. Global
Positioning System may help ensure that a hiker is never lost
in the woods, but it also can aid adversaries in solving one of
the most critical challenges in building a long-range missile,
the problem of missile guidance.
Sophisticated hardware, too, is increasingly available and
affordable to those who are seeking it. Much of what was once
available only for military applications is now openly sold on
the commercial market. For example, in an innovative
countermeasures program, a small team of junior engineers at
the Air Force Phillips Laboratory has successfully procured
radar-absorbing material, inertial measurement units, rocket
motors, heat shield materials, and a multitude of other
components critical for building ballistic missiles, all
without identifying their government affiliation. They have
even managed to design and build a fully capable cruise
missile, using only publicly available information and
materials.
And some critical components are being sold on the black
market. Within the last 10 days, news reports have once again
detailed how guidance components from ICBMs dismantled under
the START treaty were shipped to Iraq to aid in that country's
development of long-range ballistic missiles. The ready
availability of components from some of the most threatening
weapons in the Russian arsenal underscores the seriousness of
this proliferation problem.
And the problem appears to be getting worse. The Central
Intelligence Agency reported in June of this year, and I am
going to quote, ``. . . countries determined to maintain
[weapons of mass destruction] programs over the long term have
been placing significant emphasis on securing their programs
against interdiction and disruption. In response to broader,
more effective export controls, these countries have been
trying to reduce their dependence by developing an indigenous
production capability. Many third world countries--with Iran
being the most prominent example--are responding to Western
counter-proliferation efforts by relying more on legitimate
commercial firms as procurement fronts and by developing more
convoluted procurement networks.''
The United States has good reason to be proud of both its
technical accomplishments and its willingness to share these
accomplishments with the rest of the world. America cannot,
however, ignore the potential consequences for American
security that are inherent in this openness. Much of the
sophisticated technology that is the cornerstone of our
security had to be invented by the United States. That same
technology is increasingly available to the rest of the world,
both allies and adversaries alike. And the record of America's
intelligence agencies in predicting how quickly our adversaries
will acquire advanced technology has been mixed. In the last 2
weeks, there have been very disturbing news reports based on
Israeli intelligence, that the Russian and Chinese scientific
establishments have been helping Iran develop long-range
ballistic missiles that could reach Central Europe within 3
years.
The fact is that the United States can be threatened by
technology other than the most advanced. Older technology, in
some cases 40 to 50 years old, is capable of presenting a
severe threat to the United States. It was 40 years ago that
the Atlas ICBM, America's first long-range missile, was built.
Relatively old technology, now more easily available, should
not be overlooked in its potential to threaten America and
American interests.
This hearing, then, will examine the extent to which
technological information, materials, and other resources that
make possible the proliferation of ballistic missiles are
available, both on the open and the black markets.
We are fortunate to have with us today Dr. William Graham,
who served as science advisor to President Reagan and as Deputy
Administrator of NASA, and Dr. W. Seth Carus, who is a visiting
fellow at the National Defense University. He is also a well-
known expert on proliferation.
Because the hearing had to be postponed from our scheduled
date last week, our third witness, retired Air Force General
Bernard Schriever, who built America's first Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile, is unable to be with us today, but he has
asked Dr. Graham to present his statement for the record.
Before we begin, let me note that while we intend to
examine the problem of proliferation in the information age, we
do not intend to make the problem easier to solve for
proliferators. We will not say specifically where some of this
information can be found, and we have asked the witnesses to be
sensitive to this challenge, also. If necessary, we will
compile these sources, though all are unclassified, in a
classified addendum in the hearing record.
Senator Cochran. Before we begin, I'll turn to my
distinguished colleague and Senator from Michigan, the Ranking
Member, Senator Levin is recognized.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will be
brief.
First, as you have noted, this hearing concerns an issue
that is highly significant to America's security, the
proliferation of missiles and missile technology and
information that could lead to the acquisition or the creation
of that technology. Both the Congress and the executive branch
in the last two administrations have devoted a great deal of
energy to this issue because of the threat to ourselves and our
allies in the world of the proliferation of missiles, missile
technology, and information.
It is rightfully one of the highest, if not the highest
national security priorities, and we have focussed significant
resources and intelligence efforts to address this problem.
We have done it in many ways, including trying to convince
other nations that missile proliferation is a threat to
international stability and security, and we have encouraged
other countries to join the missile technology control regime.
We have had some success in reducing the potential threat from
weapons of mass destruction in the states of the former Soviet
Union, through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program, which is administered by the Department of Defense, as
well as companion programs that are administered by the
Department of Energy and the State Department.
For instance, this Cooperative Threat Reduction Program has
helped to make Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan nuclear-free
states, after they first inherited thousands of nuclear weapons
from the collapse of the Soviet Union. We have recently reached
about the $4-billion-per-year level in spending on the
development and the deployment of defenses against ballistic
missiles, and we are working hard to prepare counter-
proliferation options that will be available if necessary
before missiles are launched against the United States or our
allies.
As hard as we try, there are going to be determined
governments which are going to challenge our efforts, and we
will devote sufficient resources and patience in order to
achieve some level of missile capability. That is the challenge
ahead of us. It is to try to stop those nations, particularly
nations which could threaten neighbors or other countries in
the world with missiles and who might actually use such
missiles.
We are facing a problem, a particular problem in the
information age. The proliferation of missiles is made more
difficult by the proliferation of information, and that is one
of the focusses of this morning's hearing. It is the
proliferation of information which is directly connected, short
term and even more so in the long term, to the proliferation of
missiles, and the question is to what extent do we focus on the
information explosion to try to somehow contain that and keep
that from getting into the hands of people who would misuse it,
and to what extent do we put our efforts into trying to prevent
the technologies from falling into their hands. It is that
balance of efforts.
We have got to do both, but the question is, like
everything else, when you have to put your focus in one place
and your secondary focus somewhere else, what should be our
focus, what specific actions should this government take that
we are now not taking, what actions should the rest of the
world take that maybe we can encourage and indeed help achieve
through one means or another which will reduce the threat of
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction which I think
is the major threat, the new threat that we face in this
Nation.
So this is a very important subject, and I am glad that you
are having a hearing such as this, this morning, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Senator Levin, for
your comments and your participation in these hearings.
Dr. Graham, welcome. You may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM R. GRAHAM, FORMER SCIENCE ADVISOR TO
PRESIDENT REAGAN AND FORMER DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR OF NASA
Mr. Graham. Thank you very much, Chairman Cochran and
Senator Levin. I am pleased to be able to testify here this
morning on the availability of long-range missile technology
throughout the world today, and as the Chairman said, when I
finish this testimony, I will be glad to present General
Schriever's testimony as well. He sends his apology and regret
that he had an unfortunate conflict in his schedule and was not
able to be here today.
It was 50 years ago that long-range ballistic missile
technology was an arcane and largely unexplored field. However,
in the last 50 years, we have seen enormous investments of
manpower and resources in this area, and today, several
generations of ballistic missile technology have been developed
and deployed.
During and immediately after World War II, ballistic
missile technology was treated by governments as a secret field
of research. Since that time, however, the need to educate,
train, and maintain a large cadre of ballistic missile and
space launch specialists, together with the relaxation of
government restrictions on the dissemination of ballistic
missile technology, hardware, software, and trained personnel,
have made useful knowledge of the subject widely available.
Today, opportunities for developing countries to acquire
long-range ballistic missile technology are at an all-time
high. The current situation is the result of the confluence of
at least five sources of opportunity; I will mention each one
of these and then give an example or two of each in my
testimony.
Long-range ballistic missile technology is available from
widely disseminated sources, as Senator Cochran mentioned.
Education in long-range ballistic missile technology is
openly available to students from throughout the world.
Long-range ballistic missile hardware and software are
openly available in the United States and throughout the world.
Scientists, engineers, and technicians experienced in long-
range ballistic missile technology are available to assist
developing countries.
Most important, and sometimes overlooked, it has been known
for over 40 years that it is possible to build ballistic
missiles of intercontinental range that can carry hundreds to
thousands of pounds of payload and deliver it with a high
degree of accuracy.
I will address each of these opportunities in turn and show
how they are used to overcome barriers in ballistic missile
development in key areas that include rocket propulsion,
lightweight structures, guidance and navigation, missile
staging, reentry vehicles, and systems integration.
First, let me mention briefly the availability of long-
range ballistic missile technical information. In surveying the
availability of such information on a worldwide basis, it is
important to note that there is a technological continuum
between short-range, intermediate-range, and long-range
systems, and technical information that applies to one range
usually applies to the other ranges as well.
I will give you one example of the type of information
available on the Internet and the great depth and breadth of
technical documentation that can be found there. I will just
read part of something that I downloaded from the Internet. The
full download is in my testimony transcript.
I will not give the reference of this. However, as you have
suggested, Mr. Chairman, I can provide that for an annex, if
you wish. ``The Aerospace Database is the electronic version of
the International Aerospace Abstracts,'' and I continue to
quote, ``It also contains abstracts of reports issued by NASA,
other U.S. Government agencies, international institutions,
universities, and private firms.''
``Dating back to 1962, the online Aerospace Database
contains more than 2 million references that you can search and
retrieve easily and cost effectively. And you can quickly
access them on a modem-equipped computer terminal. Once you
have located the reference you want, you can obtain a photocopy
or microfiche of the full text from . . .,'' the agency that
put up this page.
However, some places do not have good telecommunications,
and they have made provision for that. They say, ``The CD-ROM
version of our database is the cost-effective solution for
frequent database users. An especially good bargain for
international subscribers, it lets you avoid the
telecommunications requirements and costly connection charges
of online service.''
They go on to mention what is on the CD-ROM, which includes
an in-depth coverage of aeronautics, astronautics, space
sciences, chemistry and materials, engineering, mathematics,
and computer sciences, as well as others. They then give
instructions on how to subscribe to this service.
U.S. Government agencies are also a rich source of
unclassified technical information in missile technology. For
example, a small sample of online NASA document listings--and
this is a very small sample compared to what is available--
includes guidance of ballistic flight vehicles, experimental
development and testing of missiles, solid propellant ballistic
missiles, ballistic missile design, computation of reentry
trajectories for a single ballistic missile, and design of
missile flight tests in terms of estimation of errors derived,
or how accurately you can hit targets.
The U.S. Patent Office is another substantial source of
information on missile technology, and of course, it is not
only the United States, but all patent offices of the developed
countries have this same property. An online search of patents
was conducted for the key words ``missile'' and ``ballistic.''
A search time of 1.15 seconds was required to produce the
following hits, and this is the summary of what was found.
Under ``missile,'' we found 4,400 occurrences in 1,651 patents;
``guidance,'' 5,021 occurrences in 3,160 patents; ``missiles
and guidance,'' 255 patents.
Of those 255, I have abstracted about 10 on the list here,
which include: ballistic missile structure simulator; method
for guiding the final phase of ballistic missiles; methods and
apparatus for reducing ballistic missile range errors due to
viscosity uncertainties, air drag in particular; Polaris--you
will recall our first sublaunch ballistic missile--Polaris
guidance system; ballistic missile remote targeting system and
method; missile warheads; propellant grain design; a method for
compensating for atmospheric perturbations; thrust vector
controls for steering missiles; and method and an apparatus for
spreading warheads, spreading out multiple warheads from a
missile. Those are all open patents available through the
online facilities of the U.S. Patent Office.
There is a patent classification security process, by the
way, that is available in the United States, and patents can be
filed under that. However, the patents shown in my submission
have been released from that security system.
Let me go on to address the second point which is
educational opportunities that support long-range ballistic
missile acquisition.
Since 1954, there has been a steady increase in the number
of foreign students studying at American universities. In 1954,
there were about 40,000 foreign students in the United States.
By 1994, 40 years later, the number was 450,000, more than a
ten-fold increase. Recent studies by the National Science
Foundation and the Institute of International Education show
trends in several areas: the subject matter being studied, the
level of study, and changes in the national origin of the
foreign student body.
According to the Institute of International Education, for
the 1993 academic year, 45 percent of all foreign students in
the United States were studying at the graduate level. This is
an increase of about 10 percent over the level in 1990. These
students were studying at the highest levels of our educational
institutions.
The figures show that foreign graduate students are more
likely than Americans to study science and engineering. In
1995, the foreign student population earned 43 percent of U.S.
doctoral degrees in the physical sciences and 58 percent of the
degrees in engineering. Similarly, foreign students received
half of the mathematics doctorates and nearly half of all
computer science doctorates. By comparison, in the same period
only 23 percent of the social and behavioral sciences
doctorates were awarded to foreign-born students.
Mainland China continues to contribute the highest number
of foreign students, a number that has stood consistently at
about 10 percent of all students.
The National Science Foundation estimates that as many as
half of all science and engineering graduates return to their
country of origin.
When I was last in the government, Mr. Chairman, which was
a decade ago, there was, in fact, some imperative from U.S.
Government agencies to have these graduate students return to
their country of origin after they had been educated in
advanced technologies here.
According to the annual report of the Visa Office of the
State Department's Immigration and Naturalization Service, the
following number of non-immigrant visas have been issued in
Category F, which is students and their dependents, since 1984
for the countries indicated. To give you a sample of the
countries we are educating in technologies: North Korea, 98
visas; Iran, 16,854; Iraq, 2,007; Libya, 408; Syria, 9,308
visas; and China, 121,952. As far as I have been able to tell,
Mr. Chairman, neither the State Department nor the Immigration
and Naturalization Service nor anyone else tracks the actual
course of study of any of these students once they are given
student visas to come into the United States.
Postgraduate education in aerospace science and engineering
in the United States includes a wide range of subjects relevant
to long-range ballistic missiles, and I have just looked in the
online Internet catalog of one of our leading State
universities and listed various courses that they give at the
graduate level: astrodynamics, spacecraft attitude dynamics and
control, atmospheric flight methods, and so on.
I pulled up the prospectus for the course listed under
atmospheric flight control, which you might think relates just
to aircraft, and it says ``exposure to flight guidance and
control, draws heavily from vehicle dynamics as well as
feedback theory, careful treatment of the nonlinear aspects of
the problem is critical. Conventional synthesis techniques are
stressed, although modern methods are not ignored. Multivariate
systems analysis is included, along with flight-control design
objectives and hardware limitations. Emphasis on aircraft and
missiles,'' not just in aircraft study. I list another 10 or 12
courses, all relevant to missiles as well as aircraft design.
Professional societies are now largely worldwide
organizations and provide not only for the exchange of state-
of-the-art information, but for the continuing education of
their members.
I pulled up from the Internet one of the leading society's
web page, and they discuss their international outreach there.
In the international outreach, they say, the organization ``. .
. is the premier professional society for aerospace engineers,
scientists, designers, and other professionals, serving more
than 30,000 members worldwide. Our global range encompasses
seminars and conferences held at sites throughout the world;
technical papers, books, and journals published by
international authors, and the Aerospace Database,'' which was
referenced before, ``with over 2 million aerospace citations
accessible via the World Wide Web.''
This organization ``. . . is dedicated to forging
meaningful information exchange between crucial players on the
world's aerospace stage.''
They say, ``We strive to make our events, publications, and
services relevant to aerospace professionals everywhere,'' and
under conferences and seminars, they go on to say that the
society's international work centers are organized, sponsored,
or cosponsored for international conferences or seminars,
including a list of events that they give for 1996, which
include the Third International Symposium on Experimental and
Computational Aerothermodynamics of Internal Flows--subject is
useful in the design of jet engines and also rocket engines.
That conference was at Beijing, China. The professional
organization also sponsored the Seventh International
Spaceplanes and Hypersonic Systems and Technologies Conference
at Norfolk, Virginia.
They also provide continuing education for aerospace
professionals, and they note that they have over 25
professional development courses taught by internationally
renowned experts and attended by aerospace professionals from
around the world. ``Home courses of study are an excellent way
to enhance your career without expensive travel costs.''
In addition to that, they publish books which are excellent
reference textbooks on ballistic missile design. Some of them,
a few, are here with me.
Senator Cochran. I suggested to Senator Levin a minute ago
that that might be our assigned reading that you brought to us,
and we will invite all of the Members of our Subcommittee to
check out those books.
Mr. Graham. Very good.
Senator Levin. I wonder if we could make those books a part
of the record, Mr. Chairman. I am just kidding.
Senator Cochran. Well, we appreciate you bringing that to
our attention.
Mr. Graham. We can provide for a closed-book test at the
end of the hearing, if you wish, Senator. I think it should be
given to the witnesses as well as the Members.
This is typical of the extent to which ballistic missile
technology has diffused and is moving around the world today.
There is literally no reason that anyone interested in the
technology cannot educate himself in the field, either here in
the United States or at home in another country.
Ballistic missile hardware is also available widely. Each
year, the Defense Department must dispose of used, obsolete,
and surplus military equipment that when new cost tens of
billions of dollars. Some of the equipment is sold as-is, and
some is sold only after it has been made nonfunctional or
reduced to scrap. With such a high volume of surplus and the
emphasis that has been established on profits from its sale,
not all key technologies and equipment are demilitarized and
rendered useless before sold, not even the ones that in
retrospect should have been demilitarized or rendered useless.
The government provides a guide for purchasing surplus
military equipment entitled ``How to Buy Surplus Personal
Property from the United States Department of Defense,'' put
out by the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service. The
November 1994 edition, for example, which was the most current
one I was able to get on short notice, lists two categories of
particular interest to this hearing. One is Category 1440 which
includes guided missile, launchers, components, and remote
control systems; and the other is category 1450, guided missile
handling and service equipment.
One of the entries in these categories is shown here: a
console used in the service equipment category to test
assemblies from the LGM-30 missile. The LGM-30 missile is more
commonly known as the Minuteman missile, and this is a piece of
test equipment that was being sold for that purpose.
That item's listing had left the Internet by the time I
went to the site, but I found another one there that I show in
my testimony, which is a recorder-reproducer electronic data
processing unit, made by the Boeing company for the LGM-30
Minuteman missile, and it looks to me like a device used for
transferring data in and out of the LGM-30 Minuteman missile
system.
When surplus dealers purchase such equipment, it often
enters the commercial market. Here is a receipt for two missile
steering motors purchased for $100 each from a surplus dealer
that happened to be in Southern California. These are, indeed,
rocket motors designed for the control function of missiles and
space-launch vehicles.
For several years, China has been one of the major buyers
of----
Senator Cochran. And they were purchased for $100 each?
Mr. Graham. It was $100 each, yes. I have no idea what they
cost to build, but I would say if it were only a thousand times
that much, it would be surprising.
For several years, China has been one of the major buyers
of U.S. surplus military equipment, and ships scrap and not
scrap material directly to China in large storage containers.
Sales of military equipment, of course, are not limited to
the U.S. Government by any means. As a result of the difficult
economic conditions prevailing in Russia and other states of
the former Soviet Union today, more than surplus military
equipment, that is, military equipment which is fully
functional and with the operational forces, is for sale and
often at very low prices.
In addition, the atmosphere of pervasive criminality in
Russia today, coupled with the uncertain future of the Russian
economy and government, has created an environment in which
military hardware and technology flow into the developing world
through both official and unofficial channels. Examples
include: the official sale of cryogenic fuel rocket engines and
technology to India; unofficially, presumably, the Russian
long-range missile guidance components discovered in the Middle
East in the last few years, particularly precision gyroscopes
for missile navigation; several reports of a very large
transfer of SS-18 missile technology to China; and recent
reports of active assistance to the Iranian missile development
program by both Russian and Chinese technologists. This list
could continue, but the point is clear. Despite Russian
official participation in missile-related arms control regimes,
like the MTCR, access to Russian technology and know-how is
available for proliferant states.
This transfer of missile-related hardware does not end,
however, just at subassemblies or components. Government-to-
government sales of complete ballistic missile systems have
taken place and include the sale of the 3,000-kilometer class
CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missile system by China to
Saudi Arabia, the apparent sale of ground-mobile M-11 ballistic
missiles by China to Pakistan, and the sale of SCUD missiles to
Iran by North Korea. Note that particularly with these latter
two sales, the ballistic missile trade is now taking place
between countries of the developing world and does not require
the direct cooperation of countries of the developed world to
go forward.
I am going to just mention briefly that ballistic missile
software--computer programs--is also widely available, and
available through the Internet as well as elsewhere.
This graphic, also downloaded from the Internet,
accompanies the following description of a product that is
commercially available. The provider states: ``. . . (this) is
our flagship product and is unique in the world of launch
simulation programs. It combines a graphical user interface
with accurate trajectory modeling, targeting and optimization.
The analytical power of this package establishes a remarkably
higher level of productivity for the user . . . (it) can model
any rocket, missile, or launch vehicle from any planet,''
(presumably including the earth), ``to any set of burnout
conditions. Comprehensive function allows the user to directly
model the vehicle, optimize the trajectory, and cut and paste
the resulting maps, charts, and summary statements into
presentation charts or documents. The product is currently
available for Windows 95 and Windows NT.''
Another category of technical assistance for missile
proliferators that I mentioned in the introduction was the
availability of experienced scientists, engineers, and
technicians. There is today a glut on the world market of both
advanced hardware, including the components we mentioned, and
skilled personnel to assist other nations in using that
hardware and software. Many of these individuals were among the
elite of the Soviet Union and now face deprivation and hardship
if they do not take their skills abroad.
Recent newspaper reports that I mentioned show the Chinese
and Russian expertise helping Iran, and Dr. Carus, I believe,
will address that point further.
Let me give you just a sample biography of someone who was
my counterpart when I was President Reagan's science advisor.
This gentleman was the Secretary of the Department of Science
and Technology in India at the time. I will just read you a
little bit of his biography. Before he was the Secretary of
Science and Technology, he was a visiting scholar at Stanford
University, and before that, director of the Vicram Sarabati
Space Center, the prime R&D center and the largest
establishment of the Indian Space Research Organization. He
obtained his M.S.C. and Ph.D. in chemical engineering from
Birmingham University. Before going to the Space Center, he was
with the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, and with the
Summerfield Research Station, an agency established by the
British Ministry of Aviation, serving as a senior technical
officer, and he was for many years on the Solid Rocket
Technical Committee of the American Institute of Aeronautics
and Astronautics.
It goes on to show his other credits, but he is obviously a
very competent individual, and very knowledgeable. He presented
me with this book on polymer science when I was visiting India,
and even though he was the Minister of Science and Technology,
his principal interest was in the state of development of large
solid rocket engines that we were building for ballistic
missiles at the time.
How to get started? The big picture of missile system
development and integration is also available worldwide. The
United States has published several documents that can be used
as starter kits for long-range ballistic missile development.
One such document, ``Short-Range Ballistic Missile Technology
Infrastructure Requirement for Third-World Countries,'' put out
by the Arnold Engineering Center, is a very complete and
thorough analysis of the subject and I think an excellent
introduction for U.S. intelligence; unfortunately, it is an
excellent introduction for third-world proliferators as well.
It shows, among other things, how to use commercial
industries in a country as infrastructure to support ballistic
missile system development. It lists its objectives, ``The
primary objective of this report is to define the
infrastructure required for an indigenous third-world country's
short-range missile capability. These requirements are
described in terms of the technology and hardware that
compromise the design, manufacturing process, assembly,
testing, and deployment of'' tactical short-range ballistic
missiles. ``A secondary objective is to provide a training aide
for ballistic missile fundamentals.'' NASA has published
similar documents, Mr. Chairman.
In view of the availability today of technical literature,
education for students throughout the world, the world market
in ballistic missile hardware and software, the availability of
experienced scientists, engineers, and technicians, and the
certain knowledge that long-range ballistic missiles can and
have been built, there are no insurmountable barriers to any
nation developing such a capability.
As Germany demonstrated with its V-2 program and the United
States and the U.S.S.R. with their intercontinental ballistic
missile programs in the 1950's and 1960's, political will and
national priority are the major determinants of the rapidity
with which national ballistic missile programs are brought to
operational status. Even North Korea, which is one of the
poorest and most isolated of nations, unable to provide
subsistence for many of its inhabitants, not only has been able
to develop a series of increasingly longer-range ballistic
missiles, but has become a major supplier of ballistic missiles
and technology to some of the world's most irresponsible and
hostile regimes.
Other nations have demonstrated that it is possible to
purchase complete, operational missile systems. Today, no
missile development program will be obstructed by lack of
capability or of opportunity, and several countries hostile to
the United States are supporting their ballistic missile
acquisition programs with national will and determination.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Graham follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. GRAHAM
The Worldwide Availability of Long Range Ballistic Missile Technology
Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you
for the opportunity to testify on the availability of long range
ballistic missile technology throughout the world today.
Fifty years ago, long range ballistic missile technology was an
arcane and largely unexplored field. However, the last fifty years have
seen an enormous investment of manpower and monetary resources in that
area, so that today several generations of ballistic missile technology
have been developed and deployed.
During and immediately after WWII, ballistic missile technology was
treated by governments as a secret field of research. Since that time,
the need to educate, train, and maintain a large cadre of ballistic
missile and space launch vehicle specialists, together with the
relaxation of government restrictions on the dissemination of ballistic
missile technology, hardware, software, and trained personnel, have
made useful knowledge of the subject widely available.
Today, opportunities for developing countries to acquire long range
ballistic missiles are at an all-time high. The current situation is
the result of the confluence of at least five sources of opportunity:
LLong range ballistic missile technology is available from
widely disseminated sources.
LEducation in long range ballistic missile technology is
openly available to students from throughout the world.
LLong range ballistic missile hardware and software are
openly available in the United States and throughout the world.
LScientists, engineers, and technicians experienced in
long range ballistic missile technology are available to assist
developing countries.
LMost important, it has been known for over forty years
that it is possible to build ballistic missiles of intercontinental
range that can carry hundreds to thousands of pounds of payload with a
high degree of accuracy.
I will address each of these in turn, and discuss how these
opportunities can be used to overcome the barriers to ballistic missile
development in the key technological areas of rocket propulsion,
lightweight structures, guidance and navigation, missile staging,
reentry vehicles, and systems integration.
Availability of Long Range Ballistic Missile Technical Information
In surveying the availability of long range ballistic missile
technology worldwide, it is important to note that there is a
technological continuum between short range and long range systems, and
technical information that applies to one range usually applies to
other ranges as well.
The following is an example of the great depth and breadth of
technical documentation available through the Internet for purchase and
shipment worldwide:
``The Aerospace Database is the electronic version of
International Aerospace Abstracts. It also contains abstracts
of reports issued by NASA, other U.S. government agencies,
international institutions, universities, and private firms.
``Dating back to 1962, the online Aerospace Database contains
more than 2 million references that you can search and retrieve
easily and cost effectively. And you can quickly access them on
a modem-equipped computer terminal. Once you've located the
reference you want, you can obtain a photocopy or microfiche of
the full text from . . .
``The CD-ROM version of our database is the cost-effective
solution for frequent database users. An especially good
bargain for international subscribers, it lets you avoid the
telecommunications requirements and costly connection charges
of online service.
``The world's foremost source of scientific and technical
aerospace information available online or on CD-ROM anywhere in
the world. Access is available on a paid subscription basis
through . . .
``Updated monthly, the Aerospace Database online is perfect
for monitoring aerospace markets in other countries, gaining
access to the work of international aerospace leaders, staying
abreast of new products and trends, keeping up with emerging
technologies. In just seconds the Aerospace Database lets you
search more than 30 years of accumulated knowledge in aerospace
and related sciences. You'll find in-depth coverage of
aeronautics, astronautics, space sciences, chemistry and
materials, geosciences, life sciences, mathematics, and
computer sciences.
``You'll have the convenience of using the CD-ROM at your
desktop. No costly connection charges. Just an easy to use CD-
ROM for your own personal use. . . . Aerospace scientists and
engineers will find in-depth coverage of:
Laeronautics
Lastronautics
Lspace sciences
Lchemistry and materials
Lengineering
Lgeosciences
Llife sciences
Lmathematics
Lcomputer sciences
``Key Features:
``Sort your search results by title, journal name, author,
year of publication, or conference title. Use the Journal Name
index for fast selection of articles. Track articles by
original language of publication. Limit your search with
Conference Papers Only, Conference Title, Conference Sponsor,
or Conference Year.
``To subscribe, contact . . .''
U.S. government agencies are also a rich source of unclassified
technical information. For example, a small sample of on-line NASA
document listings include:
Guidance of Ballistic Flight Vehicles
Experimental Development and Testing of Missiles
Solid Propellant Ballistic Missiles
Ballistic Missile Design
Computation of the Reentry Trajectory of a Single Ballistic
Missile
Design of the Missile Flight Tests in terms of Estimation of
Errors Derived
The U.S. Patent Office is another substantial source of information
on missile technology. An on-line search of patents was conducted for
the key words missile and ballistic. A search time of 1.15 seconds was
required to produce the following hits:
Search Summary:
Missile: 4400 occurrences in 1,651 patents.
Guidance: 5021 occurrences in 3,160 patents.
(Missile AND Guidance): 255 patents.
Ten of the 255 patents identified are listed below:
Patent No. and Title:
4,465,464 Ballistic missile structure simulator
4,220,296 Method for guiding the final phase of ballistic
missiles
3,990,657 LMethod and apparatus for reducing ballistic missile
range errors due to Viscosity Uncertainties
4,476,562 Polaris guidance system
5,544,843 Ballistic missile remote targeting system and method
4,664,035 Missile warheads
4,936,092 Propellant grain design
4,111,382 LApparatus for compensating a ballistic missile for
atmospheric perturbations
5,662,290 Mechanism for thrust vector control using multiple
nozzles
5,619,010 Method and an apparatus for spreading warheads
Educational Opportunities Supporting Long Range Ballistic Missile
Acquisition
Since 1954 there has been a steady increase in the number of
foreign students studying at American universities. In 1954, there were
about 40,000 foreign students in the United States. By 1994, the number
was 450,000, more than a ten-fold increase. Recent studies by the
National Science Foundation (NSF)\1\ and the Institute of International
Education (IIE)\2\ show trends in several areas: the subject matter
being studied, the level of study, and changes in the national origin
of the foreign student body.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ U.S. National Science Foundation, Immigrant Scientists,
Engineers, and Technician: 1993. Division of Science Resource Studies,
NSF96-322 (Washington, DC: 1996)
\2\ Institute of International Education, Open Doors 1993-1994.
(New York: 1994)
LAccording to the IIE study, for the 1993 academic year,
45 percent of all foreign students in the United States were studying
at the graduate level, an increase of 10 percent over the level
recorded in 1990.
LThe figures show that foreign graduate students are more
likely than Americans to study science and engineering. In 1995, the
foreign student population earned 43 percent of the doctoral degrees in
the physical sciences, and 58 percent of the doctoral degrees in
engineering.\3\ Similarly, foreign students received 50 percent of the
mathematics doctorates and 49 percent of all computer science doctoral
degrees. By comparison, in the same period only 23 percent of the
social and behavioral doctorates were awarded to foreign-born students.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ U.S. National Science Foundation, Selected Data on Science and
Engineering Awards, 1995. NSF96-303 (Washington, DC: 1996) P. 46-49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LMainland China continues to contribute the highest number
of foreign students, a number that has stood consistently at about 10
percent of all foreign students.
LThe NSF estimates that as many as half of all Science and
Engineering graduates return to their country of origin.
According to the annual report of the Visa Office of the State
Department's Immigration and Naturalization Service, the following
number of non-immigrant visas have been issued in Category F (Students
and Dependents) since 1984 for the countries indicated:
LNorth Korea: 98
LIran: 16,854
LIraq: 2,007
LLibya: 408
LSyria: 9,308
LChina: 121,952
Post-Graduate Education in Aerospace Science and Engineering in the
United States
The U.S. Government does not track what foreign students are
actually studying at our universities; however, a visit to the
classrooms of leading technical graduate schools suggests that courses
in the most advanced aerospace and other related fields are very
popular. Typical of the courses available is the following list from
the graduate school of a leading state university, with one,
Atmospheric Flight Control, shown with its description emphasizing its
application to both aircraft and missiles:
601--Astrodynamics
602--Spacecraft Attitude Dynamics and Control
640--Atmospheric Flight Mechanics
641--Linear Systems Dynamics
642--Atmospheric Flight Control
Exposure to flight guidance and control. Draws heavily from
vehicle dynamics as well as feedback theory, and careful
treatment of the non-linear aspects of the problems is
critical. Conventional synthesis techniques are stressed,
although modern methods are not ignored. Multivariable system
analysis is included along with fight-control design objectives
and hardware limitations. Emphasis on aircraft and missiles.
643--Digital Control
644--Optimal Control of Aerospace Systems
650--Variational Methods in Structural Mechanics
651--Smart Structures
652--Finite Element Method in Engineering
653--Nonlinear Finite Element Analysis of Continua
654--Composite Structures
655--Structural Dynamics
656--Aeroelasticity
657--Theory of Structural Stability
661--Advanced Propulsion
662--Advanced Propulsion II
All of these courses provide education in key missile-related
areas.
Professional Societies
Professional societies in aeronautics and astronautics have become
international organizations in their membership and technical
activities. They provide a rich source of technical information and
post-university training worldwide. The following information, taken
from the Internet, describes a few of the programs of one of the
leading professional societies:
``International Outreach
``. . . is the premier professional society for aerospace
engineers, scientists, designers, and other professionals,
serving more than 30,000 members worldwide. Our global range
encompasses seminars and conferences held at sites throughout
the world; technical papers books and journals published by
international authors, and the Aerospace Database with over two
million aerospace citations accessible via the World Wide Web.
``. . . is dedicated to forging meaningful information
exchange between crucial players on the world's aerospace
stage. At our conferences, we bring together representatives
from governments, industry, and academia to debate and
collaborate on the new world of possibilities for the
international aviation, defense, and space communities. We
strive to make our events, publications, and services relevant
to aerospace professionals everywhere.
``Conferences and Seminars
Much of (the Society's) international work centers around (the
Society's) organized, sponsored, or cosponsored international
conferences or seminars, including these events in 1996:
LGlobal Air & Space International Conference and
Exhibition (Arlington, Virginia);
L. . . Aeroacoustics Conference (State College,
Pennsylvania);
L. . . Atmospheric Flight Mechanics Conference
(Xian, China);
L2nd Test and Evaluation International Aerospace
Forum (London, England);
L3rd International Symposium on Experimental and
Computational Aerothermodynamics of Internal Flows (Beijing,
China);
L20th Congress of the International Council of the
Aeronautical Sciences (Sorrento, Italy);
L7th International Conference on Adaptive
Structures Technologies;
L47th International Astronautical Federation
Congress (Beijing, China);
L1st World Aviation Congress and Exposition (Los
Angeles, California);
L9th Conference on Astronautics (Ottawa, Canada);
and
L7th International Spaceplanes and Hypersonic
Systems and Technologies Conference (Norfolk, Virginia).
``. . . has over 25 professional development courses taught
by internationally renowned experts and attended by aerospace
professionals from around the world. Home study courses are an
excellent way to enhance your career without expensive travel
costs!
``The . . . Calendar of Events is the best way for
International members to keep up-to-date on the latest . . .
conferences, seminars, and home study courses.
``International Member Activities
``The 47th IAF Congress in Beijing included a special meeting
of . . . members from China, hosted by the members of the
International Activities Committee present at the Congress.
This followed a similar gathering the year before in Oslo with
. . . members from Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. It was an
occasion to meet old friends again and to recall that . . .
organized the first exchange of delegations between China and
the United States as early as 1979. A productive exchange of
views regarding . . . its activities, and benefits for
international members also took place.''
Ballistic Missile-Related Hardware Availability
Each year, the Department of Defense disposes of used, obsolete,
surplus military equipment that when new cost tens of billions of
dollars. Some of the equipment is sold as is, and some is sold only
after it has been made non-functional or reduced to scrap. With such a
high volume of surplus and the emphasis that has been established on
profits from its sale, not all key technologies and equipment are
demilitarized and rendered useless before sold.
The government provides a guide for purchasing surplus military
equipment: How to buy Surplus Personal Property from the United States
Department of Defense, Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service. The
November 1994 edition lists:
Guided Missile Equipment
1440: Guided Missile, Launchers, Components and Remote Control
Systems
1450: Guided Missile Handling and Servicing Equipment
The following is a current listing from the Internet Site the
Department of Defense uses for surplus equipment sales:
``Welcome to Sales Assets
Text Descriptions & Photographs
(Photo Provided)
FSG49--Maintenance or Service Equipment
DTID: FE452870550197
Item Name: Recorder-Reproducer, Electronic Data Processing
Location: DRMO MINOT
Date: 3-Jun-97
Commodity Group: IIELEC
Federal Supply Class: 4935
NIIN or LSN: 00-004-3826
Unit of Issue: EA
Manufacturer Name: BOEING CO
Model/Part/Serial Number: P/N 25-66564-14
Rated Capacity: N/A
Purpose and/or End Item: LGM-30 MINUTEMAN
ID/Registration Number: N/A
Size/Dimensions/Weight: EST WT 240 LBS
Parts Missing/Detached: N/A
Condition: USED--FAIR CONDITION
Description: LTape RD-368/G, CI 10793AA, 110 VAC, In Hard-
Sided Metal Transit Case.
Last updated Thu Sep 11 07:26:20 EDT 1997''
When surplus dealers purchase such equipment, it often enters the
commercial market. Here is the receipt for two missile steering motors
purchased for $100 each from a surplus dealer in Southern California:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TH268.017
For several years, China has been one of the major buyers of U.S.
military surplus.
Sale of military equipment is not limited to the U.S. Government.
As a result of the difficult economic conditions prevailing in Russia
and other states of the former Soviet Union today, more than surplus
military equipment is for sale, often at very low prices.
In addition, the atmosphere of pervasive criminality in Russia,
coupled with the uncertain future of the Russian economy and
government, has created an environment in which military hardware and
technology flows into the developing world through both official and
``unofficial'' channels. Examples include: the sale of cryogenic fuel
rocket engines to India; Russian long-range missile guidance components
discovered in the Middle East; several reports of SS-18 technology
transfers to China; and recent reports of active assistance to the
Iranian missile development program. This list could continue, but the
point has already been made clear: despite Russian official
participation in missile-related arms control regimes like the MTCR,
access to Russian technology and know-how is available for proliferant
states.
Government-to-government sales of complete ballistic missile
systems include the sale of the 3,000 km. range CSS-2 system by China,
the apparent sale of the ground-mobile M-11 by China to Pakistan, and
the sale of SCUD missiles to Iran by North Korea. Note that ballistic
missile trade is now taking place between countries of the developing
world.
Ballistic Missile-Related Software Availability
There is a large body of commercial and educational ballistic
missile-related software available through textbooks, program
libraries, and directly through the Internet. The following is an
example of a commercial software-missile flight trajectory and
targeting program on the Internet:
``. . . is our flagship product and is unique in the world of
launch simulation programs. It combines a graphical user
interface with accurate trajectory modeling, targeting and
optimization. The analytical power of . . . establishes a
remarkably higher level of productivity for the user . . . can
model any rocket, missile, or launch vehicle from any planet to
any set of burnout conditions. Comprehensive function allows
the user to directly model the vehicle, optimize the
trajectory, and cut and paste the resulting maps, charts, and
summary statements into presentation charts or documents. The
product is currently available for Windows 95 and Windows NT.''
Experienced Scientists, Engineers, and Technicians
There is a glut on the world market of both advanced military
hardware, including ballistic missile components, and skilled personnel
to assist other nations with such hardware. Many of these individuals
were among the elite of the Soviet Union, and now face deprivation and
hardship if they do not take their skills abroad. Recent newspaper
reports state that several hundred Russian and Chinese experts are
currently in Iran helping the Iranians develop new ballistic missiles.
My fellow witness, Dr. Carus, will describe the transfer of ballistic
missile technology further.
How to Get Started:
The big picture view of missile system development and integration
is also available worldwide. The United States has published several
documents that can be used as ``starter kits'' for long range ballistic
system development. One such document is:
Short Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) Technology
Infrastructure Requirements for Third World Countries, AEDC
10405-04-91, September 1991, Arnold Engineering Development
Center, Air Force Systems Command. The Executive Summary of the
report contains the following:
``1.2 Objectives
L ``The primary objective of this report is to define the
infrastructure required for an indigenous Third World country's
short-range missile capability. These requirements are
described in terms of the technology and hardware that comprise
the design, manufacturing processes, assembly, testing, and
deployment of a tactical SRBM. A secondary objective is to
provide a training aid for ballistic missile fundamentals.''
NASA has published similar unclassified documents.
Conclusion
In view of the availability today of technical literature,
education for students throughout the world, the world market in
ballistic missile hardware and software, the availability of
experienced scientists, engineers, and technicians, and the certain
knowledge that long range ballistic missiles can and have been built,
there are no insurmountable barriers to any nation developing such a
capability.
As Germany demonstrated with its V-2 program and the United States
and U.S.S.R. with their intercontinental ballistic missile programs in
the 1950s and 60s, political will and national priority are the major
determinants of the rapidity with which national ballistic missile
programs are brought to operational status. Even North Korea, which is
one of the poorest and most isolated of nations, unable to provide
subsistence for many of its inhabitants, not only has been able to
develop a series of increasingly longer range ballistic missiles, but
has become a major supplier of ballistic missiles and technology to
some of the world's most irresponsible and hostile regimes. Other
nations have demonstrated that it is possible to purchase complete,
operational missile systems. Today, no missile development program will
be obstructed by lack of capability or opportunity, and several
countries hostile to the United States are supporting their ballistic
missile acquisition programs with national will and determination.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Dr. Graham, for your
interesting and complete review of the situation. We appreciate
that very much.
Dr. Carus, you may proceed with your statement.
We do have a statement from General Schriever, which we can
present.
Mr. Graham. Yes.
Senator Cochran. I will tell you what, why don't we go
ahead and have Dr. Carus' statement now. Then you can summarize
Dr. Schriever's statement and we will print it in the record.
Dr. Carus, you may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF W. SETH CARUS, VISITING FELLOW, NATIONAL DEFENSE
UNIVERSITY
Mr. Carus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is an honor to be asked to testify before this
Committee. There are few issues of greater national security
interest to the United States than the proliferation of
ballistic missiles, and for that reason, I am grateful for this
opportunity to present my views in today's hearings.
Before continuing, let me note that my testimony does not
necessarily reflect the views of the National Defense
University, where I am a visiting fellow, or the Center for
Naval Analyses, my home organization, or the Department of
Defense.
I would like to focus on one main issue today: our ability
to predict emerging missile threats. Sometimes we grow overly
confident of our ability to monitor and predict developments in
other countries. Despite the sometimes impressive achievements
of those following foreign ballistic missile programs, there is
considerable reason to worry that the United States could be
surprised by the activities of other countries as they seek to
acquire missile capabilities.
In the next few minutes, I will review three cases in which
the United States failed to accurately assess foreign ballistic
missile activities. Using these cases, I would like to draw
some general insights about potential limitations in our future
ability as a Nation to predict foreign missile development
activities.
The first case I would like to look at involves the Iraqi
Al Husayn missile. This was an extended-range version of the
Soviet-designed SCUD. The program has surprised the United
States in three distinct ways. First, the development of the
missile itself was unexpected. Second, the United States
underestimated the strategic importance of the missile during
the period leading up to the Gulf War in 1991. Finally, the
United States never detected the existence of Iraq's chemical
and biological missile warheads.
First, let me say a few words about the development of the
Al Husayn. Iraq purchased 819 of the SCUD-B missiles from the
Soviet Union. A large number of these missiles were fired at
Iran during the course of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. What was
not known, however, was that the Iraqis had launched an
extensive effort to develop an extended-range version of this
missile.
In August 1987, the Iraqis reported that they had
successfully tested a missile with a range of 650 kilometers.
At the time, this claim was generally discounted. Some people
believed that Iraq might be referring to a new Soviet-supplied
system. Others simply believed that the Iraqis were lying. Only
on February 29, 1988, when Iraq began firing Al Husayn missiles
at Iranian cities, deep inside Iran, did it become clear that
the Iraqis, in fact, did possess an extended-range missile.
This initiated the final round of the so-called War of the
Cities fought during the Iran-Iraq War. During the next 6
weeks, Iraq fired approximately 189 of the Al Husayn missiles
at Iranian cities, killing, according to Iranian estimates,
perhaps around 2,500 people.
It was the Iranians who analyzed the wreckage of the Al
Husayns and determined that the missiles were, in fact,
extensively modified SCUD-B's. The Al Husayn missile had a
range of 650 kilometers, as the Iraqis had claimed, compared
with only 300 kilometers for the standard Soviet-build SCUD-
B's. The Iraqis manufactured the Al Husayns by cannibalizing
their existing SCUD missiles. Reportedly, they took three SCUD-
B's, cut them up and used the components to construct two of
the extended-range missiles. Other modifications also were
needed, including a reduction in warhead weight. The missiles
were inaccurate and clearly had limited tactical military
utility. Yet in the context of the Iran-Iraq War, these Al
Husayns were a key strategic factor in forcing the Iranians to
sue for peace.
Unfortunately, the failure to identify the appearance of
the Al Husayn missiles was followed by another failure of even
greater significance when the United States failed to assess
the potential importance of these missiles in the period
leading up to the Gulf War in 1991. Because the Al Husayn
missiles were inaccurate and had only a small warhead, the U.S.
military and intelligence communities argued that the missiles
had no or limited military significance. What these communities
failed to understand was that the missile had considerable
political importance, especially in Israel, and that this might
have an impact on the ability of the United States to prosecute
the war against Iraq.
When Iraq began firing missiles at Israel, the government
of Israel came under considerable pressure to intervene in the
conflict to eliminate Iraq's missile launch capability. The
United States, however, believed that it was essential to keep
Israel out of the conflict in order to preserve the coalition
against Iraq. As a result, the United States was forced to send
Patriot missile batteries to Israel and to divert a significant
number of combat aircraft to operations against the SCUD
launchers. According to the U.S. Air Force, about 1,500 air
strikes during Desert Storm were directed against SCUD targets,
or about 3.5 percent of all the air strikes during the war.
These missions involved many of the most capable aircraft
available to the coalition forces. Yet, no missile launchers
are known to have been destroyed in the attacks.
Finally, after the end of the Gulf War, we learned that
Iraq had produced a significant number of chemical and
biological warheads for its SCUD missiles. While the
intelligence community assessed that Iraq was capable of
producing such warheads, it was never able to develop
convincing supporting evidence. After the end of the conflict,
the United Nations Special Commission, UNSCOM, began
investigations of Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons programs. In the course of their investigations, they
were told that Iraq had set aside 75 SCUD warheads for use with
nerve agents. It was only in late 1996, more than 5 years after
the end of the war, as a result of information obtained after
the defection of Husayn Kamal, that evidence emerged about
Iraq's biological warheads.
At that time, it was learned that Iraq had filled 25
missile warheads with biological agents. Now, the effectiveness
of these chemical and biological warheads is uncertain, but
their strategic significance is self-evident.
Moreover, we only have Saddam's word that most of the
warheads were destroyed, since UNSCOM itself only eliminated 29
of the 100 chemical and biological warheads. The result, the
Iraqis claim to have destroyed on their own.
The history of the Al Husayn program illustrates three
issues that complicate efforts to follow foreign missile
development programs. First, it is possible for missile
development programs to go completely undetected. Quite simply,
it is impossible to guarantee timely intelligence when a
country pursues programs that do not fit our preconceived
expectations.
Second, even when information is available on missile
capabilities, it is possible to misinterpret the significance
of the detected capabilities. It is not enough to understand
the technical capabilities of a missile. Even more important
are assessments of potential military and strategic impact.
Finally, existing missiles can be modified in ways
difficult to detect. Possession of missiles armed with chemical
and biological warheads clearly has extraordinary strategic
importance, and the failure to detect the existence of such
delivery systems demonstrate a serious limitation in
intelligence-gathering capabilities.
The second case I wanted to look at was the delivery of the
Chinese missiles to Saudi Arabia. In some ways, the Saudi
acquisition of Chinese DF-3 intermediate-range ballistic
missiles, which is sometimes called the CSS-2, was even a
greater surprise to the United States than the Iraqi Al Husayn
program.
As it happens, we now know a great deal about the Saudi
efforts to acquire these ballistic missiles, in part due to
some memoirs that were written by Saudi participants. It
appears that the Saudis believed that their country needed
ballistic missiles simply because so many other countries in
the Middle East possessed them. At that time, at least eight
other countries in the region had ballistic missiles. The
Saudis tried to purchase ballistic missiles from the United
States, and asked for permission to purchase the short-range
Lance missile. This request was rejected.
As a result, the Saudis looked for an alternative supplier.
They soon found that the Chinese were willing to supply the DF-
3 intermediate-range ballistic missiles with a range of at
least 2,500 kilometers. They conducted secret negotiations with
the Chinese and arranged to purchase a complete missile force
for an estimated $3 billion.
According to press reports, the United States discovered
the Chinese missiles by accident, and only as the missiles were
being deployed. Apparently, a photographic interpreter
identified some newly built bunkers in Saudi Arabia that looked
suspiciously like those that he knew were associated with
China's DF-3 ballistic missiles. At that point, the
intelligence community initiated an intensive effort to
identify the presence of the Chinese missiles.
The Saudi missile purchase case illustrates two important
points. First, it is difficult to anticipate developments when
countries can acquire missile capabilities through purchase of
complete, off-the-shelf systems.
Second, making predictions when a country intends to rely
on imported missiles requires an appreciation of the
motivations of both potential purchasers and suppliers.
Unfortunately, understanding motivations is difficult under the
best of circumstances. Consider that the Saudi requirement for
a ballistic missile was primarily motivated by political
concerns, and thus could be met equally well by a missile of
120-kilometer range, like the Lance, or with range of more than
2,500 kilometers, like the Chinese DF-3.
Finally, I would like to make a few comments about the
discovery of SS-23 missiles in Eastern Europe. In the wake of
the breakup of the Warsaw Pact, NATO countries discovered that
several Eastern European countries possessed SS-23 medium-range
ballistic missiles. The SS-23, which has a range of about 500
kilometers, was banned by the terms of the Intermediate Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty, the INF Treaty. Because of the military
and political significance of these missiles, they were a
priority target for intelligence organizations of the NATO
countries. Indeed, there were few areas of the world subject to
more intensive intelligence surveillance than Eastern Europe in
the 1980's. Yet, the Western countries were totally unaware
that the Soviet Union had given SS-23 missiles to East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria.
The Western countries only learned about these missiles
after the fall of the Communist regime in East Germany. In
March 1990, the successor leadership in East Germany reported
that the Soviet Union had provided 24 SS-23 missiles, 4 missile
launchers, 4 missile transporters, and other supporting
equipment to the East Germans. It is unclear when the SS-23's
were given to the East Germans, but it appears they were
deployed in Eastern Europe by the Soviet military in the 1984-
1985 time frame. The missiles were banned under the 1987 INF
Treaty. However, the INF Treaty only covered missiles in the
possession of the Soviet Union and the United States. So the
Soviets claimed that they had not violated the INF Treaty,
since the missiles were delivered before the INF Treaty was
signed.
This episode highlights one key issue about ballistic
missiles. As long as missiles are not fired, they are easy to
hide. Ballistic missiles do not necessarily require the
extensive operational training that other weapon systems
require. As a result, the country can acquire ballistic
missiles and keep them hidden away in secret storage
facilities.
These cases illustrate the fundamental difficulties that
are faced by those who follow trends in missile proliferations.
Before concluding my remarks, I would like to make some
additional points about two specific issues that affect
assessments of missile programs, the impact of foreign
assistance on indigenous missile development programs and some
significant limitations of the missile technology control
regime.
Technology provided by foreign individuals, organizations,
or governments can enable a proliferant country to develop
unexpected new capabilities. This is particularly important
when proliferating countries want to enhance sophistication or
range. External support can permit a country to overcome
technical challenges that otherwise would prevent it from
developing more capable systems. Foreign assistance also can
reduce costs and shorten the amount of time required to develop
complete systems.
The importance of foreign suppliers for missile development
programs has been demonstrated time after time. Iran apparently
depends on North Korea, Russia, and China for its missile
technology. Recent press reports suggest that the Russian
assistance to Iran has been growing, despite Russia's adherence
to the MTCR. Syria and Egypt also rely on North Korea. The
Indian Agni missile is based on a U.S. space-launch vehicle,
while the Indian Prithvi is an adaptation of the Soviet SA-2
surface-to-air missile. Similarly, the South Korean NHK-1 is an
adaptation of the U.S. Nike Hercules surface-to-air missile.
Most missile proliferation has resulted from transfers of
complete systems from one country to another. Thus, Israel
acquired its first ballistic missiles from France through the
MD-620 missile development program. This also accounts for the
widespread adoption of the SCUD missile produced either by the
former Soviet Union or North Korea. Many of the countries with
SCUD missiles, such as Vietnam, Yemen, and the United Arab
Emirates, lack the indigenous capabilities to develop their own
missiles, but by purchasing missiles from a foreign supplier,
they have been able to acquire significant military
capabilities.
This type of activity has been the focus of the missile
technology control regime, the MCTR. Thus, it is important to
understand the extent to which the MTCR poses an obstacle to
future missile developments and how its limitations might
impede efforts to assess missile programs.
Under the MTCR, adherents to the regime agree not to
transfer complete ballistic missile and cruise missile systems
that exceed certain capabilities and to control the export of
certain technologies needed to produce ballistic or cruise
missiles. The regime is supposed to treat equivalent systems,
such as space-launch vehicles, as restrictively as ballistic
missiles. It places equally strict restrictions on production
technology and major components as well.
The MTCR was negotiated among the G-7 countries in 1987,
but since then, an additional 22 countries have joined the
regime. In addition, some other countries have agreed to adhere
to the provisions of the regime.
The MTCR has had an important role in slowing the spread of
ballistic missile technology. It provided the framework for the
attack on the Condor missile program, a medium-range ballistic
missile system developed in Europe by West German, Italian, and
French companies, in cooperation with the governments of
Argentina, Egypt, and Iraq. Similarly, the MTCR provided the
context for negotiating an end to Soviet transfers of SCUD
missiles, even before Russia agreed to adhere to the regime.
Unfortunately, the regime has not ended all transfers of
missiles or missile technology. At present, it appears that the
MTCR has three main limitations which could have a significant
impact on the ability of the United States to monitor missile
development programs. First, there is no universal adherence.
Second, enforcement of its limitations are unevenly applied.
Third, as currently interpreted, it does not apply to space-
launch vehicles.
There are a few countries that refuse to accept the
technology transfer restraints of the MTCR. North Korea
continues to offer its SCUD-B and SCUD-C missiles, and there
are concerns that it intends to export its No Dong missile,
which could have a range of as much as 1,200 kilometers with
high-explosive warheads. Egypt, Iran, and Syria all depend on
North Korean assistance for their missile programs. While the
United States has attempted to convince the North Koreans to
halt their missile exports, these efforts have shown scanty
results. The latest rounds of talks was postponed recently due
to the defection of the North Korean diplomats based in Egypt.
The most serious problems, however, have resulted from the
continued refusal of China to abide by its commitments to
adhere to the MTCR. China has considerable expertise in the
missile arena, and has demonstrated capability to produce
missiles with great range and higher accuracies than those
produced by North Korea. The United States began talks with the
Chinese about missile transfers after the 1988 sale of the DF-3
intermediate-range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia.
On several occasions, the United States believed that it
had received assurance from China that it would end its missile
exports. Repeatedly, however, we have found China providing
equipment that violated these assurances.
In 1994, the Chinese told us once again of their commitment
to the MTCR. According to Winston Lord, ``As a result of the
sanctions we had imposed following China's sale of missile
equipment to Pakistan, China agreed not to export ground-to-
ground, MTCR-class missiles, and reaffirmed its commitments to
abide by the MTCR Guidelines and Annex.''
Unfortunately, recent Pakistani claims to have tested a
Hatf-3 missile with an 800-kilometer range casts doubts on
these Chinese assurances. It is generally agreed that if
Pakistan has such a missile, it either was provided a complete
Chinese missile, such as the M-9, or if the missile was
indigenously developed, the Pakistanis relied heavily on
Chinese technical assistance.
In the long run, however, the most serious potential
problem for the United States is the possibility that space-
launch vehicles will be used to create ballistic missiles. The
text of the MTCR requires that SLVs be treated as restrictively
as ballistic missiles. However, the current administration,
while requiring new MTCR members that are not nuclear weapon
states to eliminate MTCR-proscribed missiles, allows such new
members to continue SLV programs and to receive assistance on
those programs from other MTCR members.
Unfortunately, there is no real difference between a
ballistic missile and a space-launch vehicle. Thus, many
ballistic missiles have been adapted for use as space-launch
vehicles. There are also examples of the reverse, as with the
Indian Agni missile, which is based on the design of a space-
launch vehicle. These developments suggest that it will be
possible to use a space program to mask efforts to develop
ballistic missiles.
Of particular concern is the extent to which new generation
space-launch vehicles are beginning to look like ballistic
missiles. New space-launch vehicles now under development
generally require fewer people to operate, often are designed
to be fired from mobile launchers, and are designed to be
operated with minimal preparation. These characteristics are
needed to support the new constellation of communication
satellites that are now planned, which rely on large number of
satellites operating in low earth orbit. Unfortunately, these
same characteristics are useful for ballistic missiles as well
as space-launch vehicles.
This increases the possibility that countries might be able
to hide ballistic missile programs under the guise of permitted
SLV projects. Unfortunately, this will complicate the task of
those responsible for assessing missile developments, since
assessments will depend on difficult-to-make estimates of the
motivations for pursuing SLVs.
In conclusion, there is a great deal of reason for caution
in attempting to make firm predictions about missile
developments. We have been surprised in the past. It is likely
that we will be surprised again in the future. Ultimately, we
need to adopt policies that take into account the uncertainties
that are inherent in this prediction process.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carus follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. CARUS
Note: The views expressed in this testimony are those of the author
and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
It is an honor to testify before this subcommittee. There are few
issues of greater national security interest to the United States than
the proliferation of ballistic missiles, and for that reason I am
grateful for this opportunity to present my views to the subcommittee.
Before continuing, let me note that my testimony does not
necessarily reflect the views of the National Defense University, where
I am a visiting fellow, or the Center for Naval Analyses, my home
organization, or the Department of Defense.
I would like to focus on one main issue in my presentation today:
Our ability to predict emerging missile threats. Sometimes we grow
overly confident of our ability to monitor and predict developments in
other countries. Despite the sometimes impressive achievements of those
following foreign ballistic missile programs, there is considerable
reason to worry that the United States could be surprised by the
activities of other countries as they seek to acquire missile
capabilities.
In the next few minutes, I will review three cases in which the
United States failed to accurately assess foreign ballistic missile
activities. Using these cases, I would then like to draw some general
insights about potential limitations in our future ability as a nation
to predict foreign missile development activities.
Iraqi Al Husayn missiles
The Iraqi military developed an extended range version of the
Soviet-designed Scud missile, which they called the Al Husayn. This has
surprised the United States in three distinct ways. First, the
development of the missile itself was unexpected. Second, the United
States underestimated the strategic significance of the missile during
the period leading up to the start of the Gulf War in 1991. Finally,
the United States never detected Iraq's chemical and biological missile
warheads.
First, let me say a few words about the development of the Al
Husayn missile. Iraq purchased 819 of the Scud B missiles from the
Soviet Union. A large number of these missiles were fired at Iran
during the course of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. What was not known,
however, was that the Iraqis had launched an extensive effort to
develop an extended range version of the Scud B.
In August 1987, the Iraqis reported that they had successfully
tested a missile with a range of 650 kilometers. At the time, this
claim was generally discounted. Some people believed that Iraq might be
referring to a new, longer-range Soviet-supplied missile. Others simply
believed that the Iraqis were lying about possessing such a system.
Only on February 29, 1988, when Iraq began firing Al Husayn missiles at
Iranian cities did it become clear that the Iraqis possessed an
extended range missile. This initiated the final round of the so-called
``The War of the Cities.'' During the next six weeks, Iraq fired
approximately 189 of the Al Husayn missiles at Iranian cities, killing
an estimated 2,500 people.
It was the Iranians who analyzed the wreckage of the Al Husayn's
and determined that the missiles were extensively modified Scud B
missiles. The Al Husayn missile had a range of 650 kilometers, compared
with only 300 kilometers for the standard Soviet-built Scud B. The
Iraqis manufactured the Al Husayns by cannibalizing existing Scud
missiles. Reportedly, they took three Scud Bs, cut them up, and used
the components to construct two of the extended-range missiles. Other
modifications also were needed, including a reduction in the warhead's
weight. The missiles were inaccurate and had limited tactical military
utility. Yet, in the context of the war with Iran, the missiles were a
key strategic factor in compelling the Iranians to sue for peace.
Unfortunately, the failure to identify the appearance of the Al
Husayn missiles was followed by another failure of even greater
strategic significance when the United States failed to assess the
potential importance of the missiles in the period leading up to the
Gulf War in 1991. Because the Al Husayn missiles were inaccurate and
had only a small warhead, the U.S. military and intelligence
communities argued that the missiles had no military significance. What
these communities failed to understand was that the missile had
considerable political importance, especially in Israel, and that this
might have an impact on the ability of the United States to prosecute
the war against Iraq. When Iraq began firing missiles at Israel, the
government of Israel came under considerable pressure to intervene in
the conflict to eliminate Iraq's missile launch capability. The United
States, however, believed that it was essential to keep Israel out of
the conflict in order to preserve the coalition against Iraq. As a
result, the United States was forced to send Patriot missile batteries
to Israel and to divert a significant number of combat aircraft to
operations against the Scud launchers. According to the U.S. Air Force,
1,459 air strikes during Desert Storm were directed against Scud
targets, or about 3.5 percent of all the air strikes during the war.
These missions involved many of the most capable aircraft available to
the Coalition forces, yet no missile launchers are known to have been
destroyed in the attacks.
Finally, after the end of the Gulf War, we learned that Iraq had
produced a significant number of chemical and biological warheads for
its Scud missiles. While the intelligence community assessed that Iraq
was capable of producing such warheads, it was never able to develop
convincing supporting evidence. After the end of the conflict, the
United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) began investigations of
Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs. In the
course of their investigations, they discovered that Iraq had set aside
75 Scud warheads to use with nerve agents. It was only in late 1996, as
a result of information obtained after the defection of Husayn Kamal,
that evidence emerged about Iraq's biological warheads. At that time,
it was learned that Iraq had filled 25 missile warheads with biological
agents: 13 with botulinum toxin, 10 with aflatoxin, and 2 with anthrax.
The effectiveness of these chemical and biological warheads is
uncertain, but the strategic significance is self-evident. Moreover, we
have only Saddam's word that most of the warheads were destroyed, since
UNSCOM itself only eliminated 29 of these warheads. The rest the Iraqis
claim to have destroyed on their own.
The history of the Al Husayn missile program illuminates three
issues that complicate efforts to follow foreign missile development
programs. First, missile development programs can go completely
undetected. Quite simply, it is impossible to guarantee timely
intelligence when a country pursues programs that do not fit
preconceived expectations. Second, even when information is available
on missile capabilities, it is possible to misinterpret the
significance of the detected capabilities. It is not enough to
understand the technical capabilities of a missile. Even more important
are assessments of potential military and strategic impact. Finally,
existing missiles can be modified in ways difficult to detect.
Possession of missiles armed with chemical and biological warheads has
extraordinary strategic importance, and the failure to detect the
existence of such delivery systems demonstrates a serious limitation in
intelligence gathering capabilities.
Saudi DF-3 (CSS-2) missiles
In some ways, the Saudi acquisition of Chinese DF-3 intermediate
range ballistic missiles (which is sometimes called the CSS-2), was an
even greater surprise to the United States than the Iraqi Al Husayn
program.
We now know a great deal about the Saudi efforts to acquire
ballistic missiles, partly due to memoirs written by Saudi participants
in the process. It appears that the Saudis believed that their country
needed ballistic missiles simply because so many other countries in the
Middle East possessed them. At that time, at least eight other
countries in the region had ballistic missiles. The Saudis tried to
purchase ballistic missiles from the United States, and asked for
permission to purchase short-range Lance missiles. This request was
rejected. As a result, the Saudis looked for an alternative supplier.
They soon found that the Chinese were willing to supply the DF-3
intermediate range ballistic missile with a range of 2,500 kilometers.
They conducted secret negotiations with the Chinese, and arranged to
purchase a complete missile force for an estimated $3 billion.
According to press reports, the United States discovered the
Chinese missiles by accident, and only as the missiles were being
deployed. Apparently, a photographic analyst identified some newly
built bunkers that looked suspiciously like those that he knew were
associated with China's DF-3 ballistic missiles. At that point, the
intelligence community initiated an intensive effort to identify the
Chinese missiles.
The Saudi missile purchase case illustrates two important points.
First, it is difficult to anticipate developments when countries can
acquire missile capabilities through purchase of complete, off-the-
shelf systems. Second, making predictions when a country intends to
rely on imported missiles requires an appreciation of the motivations
of both potential purchasers and suppliers. Unfortunately,
understanding motivations is difficult under the best of circumstances.
Consider that the Saudi requirement for a ballistic missile was
primarily motivated by political concerns, and thus could be met
equally well by a missile of 120 kilometers (the Lance) or 2,500
kilometers (the DF-3).
East European SS-23 missiles
In the wake of the break up of the Warsaw Pact, the NATO countries
discovered that several East European countries possessed SS-23 medium
range ballistic missiles. The SS-23, which has a range of 500
kilometers, was banned by the terms of the Intermediate Range Nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty. Because of the military and political significance
of these missiles, they were a priority target for intelligence
organizations of the NATO countries. Indeed, there were few areas of
the world subject to more intensive intelligence surveillance than
eastern Europe in the 1980s. Yet, the Western countries were totally
unaware that the Soviet Union had given SS-23 missiles to East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria.
The Western countries only learned about these weapons after the
fall of the Communist regime in East Germany. In March 1990, the
successor leadership in East Germany reported that the Soviet Union had
provided 24 SS-23 missiles, 4 missile launchers, 4 missile
transporters, and other supporting equipment to the East Germans. It is
unclear when the SS-23s were given to the East Germans, but it appears
that they were deployed in East Europe by the Soviet military in the
1984-1985 period. The missiles were banned under the 1987 INF treaty.
However, the INF treaty only covered missiles in the possession of the
Soviet Union and the United States, so the Soviets claimed that they
had not violated the INF treaty.
This episode highlights one key issue about ballistic missiles: As
long as missiles are not fired, it is easy to hide them. Ballistic
missiles do not necessarily require the extensive operational training
that many other weapons systems require. As a result, a country can
acquire ballistic missiles and keep them hidden away in secret storage
facilities.
Additional issues
These cases illustrate the fundamental difficulties that are faced
by those who follow trends in missile proliferation. Before concluding
my remarks, I would like to make some additional points about two
specific issues that affect assessments of missile programs: The impact
of foreign assistance on indigenous missile development programs and
some significant limitations of the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR).
Foreign assistance
Technology provided by foreign individuals, organizations, and
governments can enable a proliferant country to develop unexpected new
capabilities. This is particularly important when proliferating
countries want to enhance sophistication or range. External support can
permit a country to overcome technical challenges that otherwise would
prevent it from developing more capable systems. Foreign assistance
also can reduce costs and shorten the amount of time required to
complete development.
The importance of foreign suppliers for missile development
programs has been demonstrated time after time. Iran apparently depends
on North Korea, Russia, and China for its missile technology. Recent
press reports suggest that the Russian assistance to Iran has been
growing, despite Russia's adherence to the MTCR. Syria and Egypt also
rely on North Korea. The Indian Agni missile is based on a U.S. space
launch vehicle, while the Indian Prithvi is an adaptation of Soviet SA-
2 surface to air missile technology. Similarly, the South Korean NHK-1
is an adaptation of the U.S. Nike Hercules surface to air missile.
Most missile proliferation has resulted from transfers of complete
systems from one country to another. Thus, Israel acquired its first
ballistic missiles from France through the MD-620 missile development
program. This accounts for the widespread adoption of the Scud missile,
produced either by the former Soviet Union or North Korea. Many of the
countries with Scud missiles, such as Vietnam, Yemen, and the United
Arab Emirates, lack the indigenous capabilities to develop their own
missiles. But by purchasing missiles from a foreign supplier, they have
been able to acquire significant military capabilities.
This type of activity has been the focus of the MTCR. Thus, it is
important to understand the extent to which the MTCR poses an obstacle
to future missile developments, and how its limitations might impede
efforts to assess missile programs.
Impact of the MTCR
Under the MTCR adherents to the regime agree not to transfer
complete ballistic and cruise missile systems that exceed certain
capabilities and to control the export of certain technologies needed
to produce ballistic or cruise missiles. The regime is supposed to
treat equivalent systems, such as space launch vehicles, as
restrictively as ballistic missiles; it places equally strict
restrictions on production technology, and major components as well.
The MTCR was negotiated among the G-7 countries in 1987, but since then
an additional 22 countries have joined the regime. In addition, some
other countries have agreed to adhere to the provisions of the regime.
The MTCR has had an important role in slowing the spread of
ballistic missile technology. It provided the framework for the attack
on the Condor missile program, a medium range ballistic missile system
developed in Europe by West German, Italian, and French companies in
cooperation with the governments of Argentina, Egypt, and Iraq.
Similarly, the MTCR provided the context for negotiating an end to
Soviet transfers of Scud missiles, even before Russia agreed to adhere
to the regime.
Unfortunately, the regime has not ended all transfers of missiles
or missile technology. At present, it appears that the MTCR has three
main limitations, which could have a significant impact on the ability
of the United States to monitor missile development programs. First,
there is not universal adherence. Second, enforcement of its
limitations is unevenly applied. Third, as currently interpreted, it
does not apply to space launch vehicles. These limitations create
problems for those seeking to assess the potential impact of foreign
support on missile proliferation.
There are a few countries that refuse to accept the technology
transfer restraints. North Korea continues to offer its Scud-B and -C
missiles, and there are concerns that it intends to export its No Dong
missile, which could have a range of as much as 1,200 kilometers with a
conventional high explosives warhead. Egypt, Iran, and Syria all depend
on North Korean assistance for their missile programs. While the United
States has attempted to convince the North Koreans to halt their
missile exports, these efforts have shown scanty results. The latest
round of talks was postponed recently due to the defection of the North
Korean diplomats based in Egypt.
The most serious problems, however, have resulted from the
continued refusal of China to abide by its commitments to adhere to the
MTCR. China has considerable expertise in the missile arena, and has a
demonstrated capability to produce missiles with greater range and
higher accuracy than those produced by North Korea. The United States
began talks with the Chinese about missile transfers since the 1988
sale of the DF-3 intermediate range ballistic missile to Saudi Arabia.
On several occasions, the United States believed that it had
received assurances from China that it would end its missile exports.
Repeatedly, however, we have found China providing equipment that
violated such assurances. In 1994, the Chinese told us once again of
their commitment to the MTCR. According to Winston Lord, ``as a result
of the sanctions we had imposed following China's sales of missile
equipment to Pakistan, China agreed not to export ground-to-ground
MTCR-class missiles, and reaffirmed its commitments to abide by the
MTCR Guidelines and Annex.'' Unfortunately, recent Pakistani claims to
have tested a Hatf-3 missile with an 800-kilometer range casts doubt on
these Chinese assurances. It is generally agreed that if Pakistan has
such a missile, it either was provided a complete Chinese missile, such
as the M-9, or if the missile was indigenously developed the Pakistanis
relied heavily on Chinese technical assistance.
The most serious potential problem for the United States, however,
is the possibility that space launch vehicles will be used to create
ballistic missiles. The text of the MTCR requires that SLVs be treated
as restrictively as ballistic missiles. However, the current
administration, while requiring new MTCR members that are not nuclear
weapon states to eliminate MTCR-proscribed ballistic missiles, allows
such new members to continue SLV programs and to receive assistance on
those programs from other MTCR members.
Unfortunately, there is no real difference between a ballistic
missile and a space launch vehicle. Thus, many ballistic missiles have
been adapted for use as space launch vehicles. There are also examples
of the reverse, as with the Indian Agni missile, which is based on the
design of a space launch vehicle. These developments suggest that it
will be possible to use a space program to mask efforts to develop
ballistic missiles.
Of particular concern is the extent to which new generation space
launch vehicles are coming to look like ballistic missiles. New space
launch vehicles now under development generally require fewer people to
operate, often are designed to be fired from mobile launchers, and are
designed to be operated with minimal preparation. These characteristics
are needed to support the new constellations communication satellites
that are now planned, which rely on large numbers of satellites
operating in low earth orbit. Unfortunately, these same characteristics
are useful for ballistic missiles as well as space launch vehicles.
This increases the possibility that countries might be able to hide
ballistic missile programs under the guise of permitted SLV projects.
Unfortunately, this will complicate the task of those responsible for
assessing missile developments, since assessments will come to depend
on difficult to make estimates of the motivations for pursuing SLVs.
Implications
There is reason for caution in attempting to make firm predictions
about missile developments. We have been surprised in the past. It is
likely that we will be surprised again in the future. Ultimately, we
need to adopt policies that into account the uncertainties that are
inherent in the prediction process.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Dr. Carus.
Dr. Graham, could you summarize for us General Schriever's
statement? General Schriever was the father of our Atlas ICBM
program, program manager, in fact, 40 years ago. And then we
will just print his statement in the record in full.
Mr. Graham. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I will do that.
It is a pleasure to be representing him, as he is such a
distinguished American who led us into the post-war era,
matching and ultimately exceeding the Soviet ballistic missile
program in the 1950's and the 1960's.
He said that he wishes to focus only on the missile
delivery platforms in the hearing today and not on the
warheads, in that he was responsible for the development of
intercontinental ballistic missiles. Of course, he had the
weapons packages as well under his purview. And he wanted to
share his experiences in order to assist you in drawing your
own conclusions concerning when and how nations with interests
hostile to the United States might acquire ballistic missiles
capable of reaching us.
Much speculation exists concerning the question of when and
how nations can acquire ballistic missiles of intercontinental
range. When it comes to the development of ballistic missiles,
it is General Schriever's personal experience that increasing
the range is actually quite simple to achieve. The more
difficult problems he lists are accuracy and system
integration.
Over four decades ago, General Schriever undertook as a
matter of a highest national priority the development of the
intercontinental ballistic missile in the Atlas program, which
became America's first ICBM, as you noted, Mr. Chairman. This
program was accorded one of the highest priorities in our
national security of the day. Remember that in the technology
of the mid-1950's, that was an era of slide rules and vacuum-
tube computers. These were the analytical tools that he and his
engineers used. He pioneered the use of solid-state computers
for not only the program scheduling and control functions, but
also for technical matters and for the guidance of the missile
itself. Such use was not commonplace. However, today virtually
anyone can purchase a computer with capabilities orders of
magnitude greater than what he used at the time.
He then goes on to note the breathtaking amount of
information that is available today through the Internet and
elsewhere and describes, somewhat along the lines that I
described earlier, what that information is.
He notes that this stands in stark contrast to the
relatively rudimentary base of capabilities that we had
available 40 years ago. In fact, he notes the biggest obstacles
in building the Atlas ICBM are not obstacles today. How to
address what were then the obstacles is now commonly taught in
American graduate schools.
General Schriever noted that improving a missiles range is
among the easiest and most straightforward things to do. One
needs only to add additional boosters, either on top or on the
sides of the missile, or both, and that is what he did four
decades ago by taking the Thor intermediate-range ballistic
missile and adding an upper stage to create the first U.S.
ballistic launch vehicle having intercontinental range. This
``kluged'' or compiled upper stage demonstrated a 5,000-mile
range, (about 8,300 kilometers), greater than the distance from
North Korea to the West Coast. It achieved the required 3- to
5-mile accuracy at the time, and indeed, if you look at our
current fleet of space-launch vehicles, we still stack the
stages and add strap-on boosters. The Delta launch vehicles
uses strap-ons; the Delta itself a derivative of a Thor. The
Atlas uses the Centaur upper stage for space launch, and the
Titan-3 and Titan-4 use both strap-ons and upper stages to
deliver the largest payloads to orbit.
He wanted to remind you, too, that the United States
imposed strict requirements on our ICBMs with respect to
responsiveness and maintainability, as well as accuracy. The
United States had originally sought an accuracy of 1,500
meters, about 5,000 feet. However, the prospects for
lightweight nuclear weapons with high yields enabled the United
States to relax the accuracy requirements to 3 to 5 miles. This
significantly reduced the guidance problem. Yet, even the 3 to
5 miles of accuracy was aimed at war-fighting applications. If
the only requirement for a ballistic missile were to hold
population centers at risk, when using weapons of mass
destruction, accuracy requirements could be further relaxed
from even the 3- to 5-mile figure. Thereby, guidance becomes a
relatively straightforward problem to solve, made even easier
through the commercial availability of global positioning
system signals, but in fact, commercially available inertial
systems alone can also do this job.
General Schriever identified systems integration as a major
task when he managed the ICBM programs. This was due to the
fact that virtually all of the components and subsystems were
first of a kind. He pioneered, but by no means had time to
refine, the idea of black-box testing as a way of testing
subsystems. Such testing is now well refined and procedures are
systematic and well known, and I believe the piece of equipment
we showed you earlier was one such black-box tester.
In addition, today, components of many key subsystems are
available for purchase on the open market, leaving little
question as to their operability.
General Schriever also did a great deal of integrated
system testing--ballistic missile testing. He did so due to a
lack of either understanding of the basic physics--in some
cases, for example, re-entry conditions--or analytical modeling
capability, which as we mentioned was rather embryonic at that
stage.
Today, both the physics and the analytical capabilities are
readily available. As a result, much of the integrated testing
General Schriever conducted to assess a vehicle's structural
response to dynamics of flight could today be done with
computer analysis. The mysteries he worked his way through 40
years ago are today taught as engineering problems in any good
American graduate school.
In conclusion, experience taught General Schriever that
necessity is the mother of invention. That was the case in
developing the U.S. ICBM program. The government provided the
priority necessary to get the job done. For example, from
program start to operational status, it required just over 5
years in the case of the Atlas and the Titan programs which he
led. The Minuteman, which he also led, which introduced solid
propellants and launch from underground silos, became
operational in just under 5 years.
Our experience should lead us to be prudent regarding what
unfriendly nations might do in today's environment with respect
to their ICBM range and schedule. Furthermore, as Dr. Carus
mentioned, intelligence estimates are not infallible. In
General Schriever's opinion, the will, rather than the know-
how, is the key factor for nations to achieve an earlier ICBM
capability than now projected.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of General Schriever follows:]
PRERPARED STATEMENT OF GENERAL SCHRIEVER
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, it is a pleasure to
appear before you today to discuss the issue of missile proliferation
in the information age. Concerns about the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and the means to deliver such weapons are leading to
serious debate--and in some cases action. While acquiring the weapons
of mass destruction--the payload and the weapon's delivery platform--
such as the missiles--have some common obstacles, today I will focus on
the missile delivery platforms only. Having been responsible for the
development of our intercontinental ballistic missiles, I wish to share
some of my experiences in order to assist you in drawing your own
conclusions concerning when and how nations with interests hostile to
the United States might acquire ballistic missiles capable of reaching
us.
Much speculation exists concerning the question of when and how
nations with interests hostile to the United States could acquire
ballistic missiles of intercontinental range. When it comes to the
development of ballistic missiles, it is my personal experience that
increased range is actually quite simple to achieve. The more difficult
problems are accuracy and integration.
Over four decades ago, we undertook as a matter of the highest
national priority the development of the intercontinental ballistic
missile in the Atlas program, which became America's first ICBM. This
program was treated as one of the highest priority national security
issues of its day. Remember that the technology of the mid-1950's, was
an era of slide rules and vacuum tube computers. These were the
analytic tools we used. We pioneered the use of solid state computers
for not only program scheduling and control but also for technical
matters. Such use is now commonplace. Furthermore, today virtually
anyone can purchase a computer with capabilities orders of magnitude
greater than we used.
As Bill Graham has described, a breathtaking amount of information
is also available through open sources--particularly the Internet.
Today's availability of (1) design aiding software available on the
Internet for free, (2) subsystem drawings available from patents and
other sources, (3) state of the art technical papers in professional
journals and (4) information from organizations whose primary mission
is to promote the use of technologies that are relevant to long range
ballistic missiles, stand in stark contrast to the relatively
rudimentary base of capabilities we had available 40 years ago. In
fact, our biggest obstacles to building America's first ICBM--the Atlas
ICBM--are not obstacles today. How to address what then were obstacles
is commonly now taught in America's graduate schools.
As I said, improving a missile's range is among the easiest and
most straightforward things to do. One needs only to add additional
boosters--either on top or on the sides of an existing missile. That's
what we did four decades ago by taking the Thor intermediate range
ballistic missile and adding a upper stage to create our first
ballistic launch vehicle having intercontinental range. This ``kluged''
upper stage demonstrated a 5,000 mile range. In terms of kilometers,
that's about 8,300 kilometers, which is greater than the distance from
North Korea to the west coast of the United States. It did so, while
also achieving the required 3-5 mile accuracy. Indeed, if you look at
our current fleet of launch vehicles, we still stack and strap-on
boosters. The Titan and Delta launch vehicles use strap-ons while the
Atlas uses the Centaur upper stage.
Remember, we imposed strict requirements on our ICBMs with respect
to responsiveness, maintainability as well as accuracy. We originally
sought an accuracy of 1500 meters. However, the prospects for
lightweight nuclear weapons with high yield enabled us to relax the
accuracy requirements to 3-5 miles. This significantly reduced the
guidance problem. Yet, even the requirement of 3-5 miles was aimed at
war fighting applications. If the only requirement is to hold
population centers at risk--when using weapons of mass destruction,
accuracy requirements can even be further relaxed. Thereby guidance
becomes a relatively straightforward problem to solve--made even easier
through the commercial availability of global positioning system
signals. In fact commercial available inertial systems can alone do
this job.
System integration was a major task during the time I managed the
ICBM programs. This was due to the fact that virtually all of the
components and subsystems were first of a kind items. We pioneered, but
by no means refined, the idea of black box testing as a way of testing
subsystems. Such testing is now well refined and procedures are
systematic and well known. In addition, today components and many of
the key subsystems are available for purchase on the open market--
leaving little question as to their operability. We also did a great
deal of integrated testing. We did so due to a lack of either an
understanding of the basic physics--for example, re-entry conditions--
or analytical modeling capability. Today both the physics and the
analytical capability are readily available. As a result, much of the
integrated testing we conducted--to assess a vehicle's structural
responses to the dynamics of flight--could today be done using computer
analysis. The mysteries we worked our way through 40 years ago are
today taught as engineering problems in any good American graduate
school.
In conclusion, experience has taught me that necessity is the
mother of invention. This was the case in developing the U.S. ICBM
program. The government provided the priority necessary to get the job
done. For example, from program start to operational status required
just over 5 years in the case of both the Atlas and the Titan programs
to reach operational status. The Minuteman, which introduced solid
propellants, became operational in just under 5 years. Our experience
should lead us to be prudent regarding what certain unfriendly nations
might do in today's environment with respect to both ICBM range and
schedule. Furthermore, intelligence estimates are not infallible. In my
opinion, the ``will'' rather than the ``know-how'' is the key factor
for these nations to achieve an earlier ICBM capability than now
projected.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much.
Let me ask a couple of questions about General Schriever's
statement to both of you and get your reactions, and then I am
going to yield to my good friend from Michigan for any
questions he might have.
General Schriever stated that he built this first ICBM by
adding an upper stage to the intermediate-range Thor missile.
Does this mean, based on this experience, that other nation
states, if they decide to build ICBMs, and first developed a
shorter-range missile capability, is this indicative of the
capacity to then take that next step? Is it logical to assume
that they could do that without a great deal of difficulty? Is
that your conclusion?
Mr. Graham. Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman, and I believe that is
General Schriever's conclusion as well.
He noted as a man of great precision that the Thor system
was never made militarily operational as an ICBM. It was his
backup to the Atlas Centaur program, but it was the first to
achieve the long distance, and that capability of adding a
second stage can certainly be used by countries today to extend
missile range to intercontinental distances once they have
achieved the shorter-range missiles.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Carus, General Schriever also talked
about the fact that during this time frame of just over 5 years
from the start of the program to operational status, they, I
assume, had some flight testing before the missiles were ready
to use. Are you aware of what kind of testing program or how
long that took, and is a testing program necessary in order for
a nation state to develop and maintain a lethal and capable
missile system?
Mr. Carus. I am not closely familiar with that system, but
if one looks at the early history of our ballistic missile
program, say through the 1960's, it was typical for us to have
large numbers of launches to test various parameters of the
missile.
I think we still tend to like to do a fair amount of
testing, as did the Soviet Union. However, we know from
experience that some of the proliferant countries are less
concerned with reliability and performance issues than we are,
and as a result, have not tested their systems as much as we
would.
Senator Cochran. I think in the Iran-Iraq War, we saw
missiles being used that had not been tested, or the first we
knew even of the existence of the missiles was when they fired
them. Is that accurate?
Mr. Carus. The Iraqis had fired the Al Husayn missile in
some test flights, but only a small number. They developed a
variant that, as far as I know, they had not tested before
using.
Senator Cochran. In terms of intelligence, too, we know
about missiles when they are fired, but we do not necessarily
know about them if they are not fired. Is this one of the
challenges for the intelligence community? I think you touched
on this in your prepared statement. What, if anything, can we
do to improve our intelligence-gathering capability so we can
have more reliable and accurate information about this kind of
thing?
Mr. Carus. Actually, there is a subset of the issue which I
would like to address first, if I may, and that has to do with
the problem of cruise missiles.
In the case of cruise missiles, we could detect a test and
still not know what its range is if it is never tested to its
maximum range.
In the case of ballistic missiles, I think we tend to
believe that somebody would have to fire it at least once or
twice before they would have any confidence that the system
would work, which I think emphasizes the importance of us
maintaining the resource investments and the various kinds of
intelligence-gathering systems that we have deployed to monitor
tests of this character in places like North Korea or Iran.
Senator Cochran. To follow up on that, is it possible that
we would not know a country had a long-range ballistic missile
until it was launched?
Mr. Carus. It is possible, and in fact, it appears to have
happened. I believe it was late 1989. The Iraqis launched what
they claimed was a space-launch vehicle, which nobody had known
anything about until it went up into space. In fact, there was
a little bit of confusion at the time because for a period of
time we thought that they might have actually orbited
something. As it turns out, the rocket blew up before it
reached that kind of altitude, but I think that shows that it
is possible to develop some fairly substantial systems on the
quiet without us necessarily being able to detect them.
Mr. Graham. Mr. Chairman, might I also add an answer to
your reliable and accurate information question from the
intelligence community?
Senator Cochran. Sure.
Mr. Graham. I believe they are addressing the wrong
question, and have been addressing the wrong question for many
years. The question they have been addressing is what do we
know about developing countries' long-range ballistic missile
capability. I believe the right question is what information do
we know to persuade us that developing countries are not
developing long-range ballistic missiles, and while that sounds
like a nuance, another example of that would be the difference,
say, between the intelligence reports in the early 1940's that
they had no information the Japanese were developing shallow-
water torpedoes, and the discovery we made on December 7, 1941,
at Pearl Harbor--that, in fact, we just did not know that the
Japanese had developed shallow-water torpedoes and, therefore
felt safe to put our Pacific fleet in a shallow-water harbor.
The key information for military purposes is to what extent
do you have confidence that a hostile capability is not being
developed. That is a much harder question. Nonetheless, that
seems to me to be the one of military relevance, and there are
other things we can do in addition to just challenging the
intelligence community with that question to get insight into
what is going on in the developing world.
Senator Cochran. Thank you. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
yielding to me so I could get in a few questions before I have
to leave, and I appreciate that.
First, Dr. Graham, you make reference to a number of
documents which have been made public, which have technology
information relative to short-range ballistic missiles on
page--well, there is no page number, but in 1991--you are
familiar with this--it says here that the Arnold Engineering
Development Center of the Air Force Systems Command released a
report. I think you testified that, in effect, I think you are
saying, that that should not have been released. Is that your
argument that that contained classified information in
September of 1991?
Mr. Graham. The classification is for government officials
to decide.
Senator Levin. Well, should it have been classified as
secret?
Mr. Graham. In my view, that document should have been
restricted for official use in the United States, at an
absolute minimum, and not made generally available.
Senator Levin. Does that mean classified, or is that
something less than classified?
Mr. Graham. Well, ``For Official Use Only'' is one level of
classification.
Senator Levin. Well, I think it would be useful to ask the
Defense Department, even though this is some years ago, as to
why a document like that was not restricted, and the same thing
with other information which is referred to in Dr. Graham's
testimony. There are some NASA references in here.
I think it would be helpful, Mr. Chairman, if the
Subcommittee referred the documents to the Defense Department
and to NASA and to request their comment on it since they are
not here today. Would that be possible?
Senator Cochran. Well, let's talk about that. I do not know
whether there is a statute of limitations.
Senator Levin. No, I am not talking about any action. I am
just curious as to why a document like that, if they could help
us out, would not have been restricted.
Senator Cochran. I would be glad to join you in writing
them a letter to ask them that.
Senator Levin. Right, OK.
Mr. Graham. I would add, Senator, that this type of
information is widely available. I brought examples of it, but
certainly nothing comprehensive you would find many places
where this information would have to be classified if that were
to be done.
The point of my testimony was that this information is so
widely available that that restriction of it at this point is
going to be ineffective.
Senator Levin. Well, I am not talking about restricting it
at this point. I am talking about why wasn't material like this
restricted, to try to get a philosophy from them, the same with
the Patent Office. There is a reference in here to the Patent
Office, Dr. Graham says, as another substantial source of
information on missile technology and search time of 1.15
seconds produced the following hits, and then there is 1,651
patents on missiles and 3,160 patents on guidance systems. I
mean, I think we ought to ask them to comment if this is a
current program, a current policy. Why is it that that should
be made public? Why is that not classified now, so we can get
an idea as to what is the guidance that they have on this kind
of an issue?
Presumably, it is your testimony that that should not be
made public. I assume that is why you are here today.
Mr. Graham. No. My testimony is that this information is
widely available, Senator. It is a policy judgment as to
whether it should be made available or not. I am just stating
the facts that it is, indeed, available.
Senator Levin. Well, then I think it would be useful to ask
the Patent Office as to what the basis of their policy judgment
is. So, again, if the Chairman wants to----
Senator Cochran. I think that is an appropriate thing for
us to ask the Patent Office, what is their policy, how do they
decide what goes out on the Internet, or is available on their
page, or in any other way to the general public. That is
appropriate, I think, and I would be glad to join you in that
inquiry.
Senator Levin. OK, thank you.
On the surplus property issue, there is some Minuteman
engines and a few other things that you have made reference
here to, and I think it would be useful to find out from the
Defense Department as to what is there or what steps were taken
to make sure that no sensitive equipment was disposed of as
surplus. I am sure there are very strict rules as to what is
declared surplus and were those rules applied, and if so, why
would this not be sensitive. If it is not sensitive and if it
violated the rules, how did that happen, and if the rules are
not strict enough, they ought to be more restrictive.
Can you summarize, perhaps, the rules that applied before
something can be declared surplus, like those old engines,
perhaps the guts were taken out of them or they were in some
way made useless other than as scrap? What are, in general, the
rules before equipment can be declared surplus to avoid
transferring equipment which might be militarily useful or
sensitive?
Mr. Graham. If it is all right, I will provide the details
for the record, but the general process is that the equipment
is reviewed, and it is given one of several categories of
military applicability that extend all the way from not
militarily applicable in any particular way and can be sold as-
is--an example might be a desk or a chair--to something which
is extremely militarily critical and sensitive and has to be
shredded or reduced to completely inoperable and unengineerable
scrap before it is made available.
There are a number of categories in between, where critical
military components are removed or critical software is taken
out. That is the process.
The difficulty comes in when the Defense Department
attempts to do that with literally tens of billions of dollars
worth of surplus equipment each year. It is very easy for
mistakes or oversights to occur in the process, and that is
when critical military technology manages to be sent offshore.
Senator Levin. Do you know what level of classification or
elimination of any militarily sensitive parts were applied to,
for instance, the recorder and the reproducer of that LGM-30
Minuteman? I mean, was there a mistake made in that?
Mr. Graham. I would have to review the details of that and
ask the government if they viewed that as a mistake or not.
That is their classification problem.
Senator Levin. Do you know whether that was sold as-is or
whether pieces were removed or what?
Mr. Graham. Again, that would have to come from the Defense
Department. I do know, though, that when an inquiry was made
concerning the item that you saw in the display, subsequent to
that inquiry from the congressional staff, the item was, in
fact, destroyed before sale.
Senator Levin. So that, that may have been a mistake?
Mr. Graham. That would have to be directed to the people
who did it. Apparently, its status changed after congressional
staff inquiry.
Senator Levin. Well, I think it would be useful to find out
whether or not that was based on a misclassification or whether
or not it was classified properly or whatever.
I think it is helpful to get the agencies' responses when
this kind of information surfaces, so we can get the full story
and find out whether or not the classification was erroneous,
whether it was mistaken, if so, were steps taken to avoid that
in the future, was there anybody who perhaps was disciplined if
there was sloppiness or negligence in the process. I think it
is useful to hear from the agency on this kind of an issue,
even though something may have happened that should not have.
Maybe it is too late to stop that. At least it would sensitive
agencies in terms of future activity, and if there answer is
nothing inappropriate happened, we ought to have that for the
record, too, I think, Mr. Chairman.
I would make the same kind of request for that information.
Let's get the agencies' position on that, and again, if they
made a mistake, they ought to own up to it and let us know.
Senator Cochran. What is your reaction to his comments, Dr.
Graham?
Mr. Graham. I think there are serious concerns. I think, in
fact, this subject has a very long and unfortunately extensive
history of items being misclassified and exported. So these are
by no means singular or unique examples, and in my view, they
are not even the most egregious examples.
I think either through your GAO or other organs of the
Congress, you can find a great deal of information on the
subject already collected.
Senator Levin. That is more reason, I think, to let the
agencies know when this kind of information surfaces, Mr.
Chairman. So I would urge that this testimony be sent off to
the Department of Defense, the folks who declare things
surplus, and ask for their comment on it.
Senator Cochran. I think we should first check with the
GAO----
Senator Levin. Or the GAO.
Senator Cochran [continuing]. And see if there have been
some investigations in this area and see what they have on
file. We might revisit it through an inquiry handled by them.
Senator Levin. That would be great.
Senator Cochran. Is that OK?
Senator Levin. Then I just had a couple of questions, if I
could, for Dr. Carus.
On the question of whether or not a country would deploy a
missile and consider it operational, if they had not tested
it--and here, I want to talk about a country which is
developing its own missile, not buying a complete missile.
Obviously, that is a totally different situation. Were they
developing a missile, would it not be usual, just prudent to
test a missile that has to re-enter and hit a target before it
is deployed?
Mr. Carus. I think in the conditions that you specify,
which is to say an indigenous development where you are not
merely copying something that somebody else has provided you,
that you would do at least some minimal level of testing, at
least one launch.
Whether you do more, I think, would depend on the extent to
which you were concerned about reliability of the system.
Senator Levin. On the Al Husayn missile that you made
reference to in your testimony, you say that in August 1987,
the Iraqis reported that they had successfully tested a missile
with a range. Did they report that in 1987?
Mr. Carus. They reported it at the time of the launch.
Senator Levin. Prior?
Mr. Carus. At the time of the launch.
Senator Levin. At the time.
And did we doubt that?
Mr. Carus. My understanding--and I was not in government at
the time, so I do not know what was officially going on, but my
understanding is that, in fact, people did doubt that they had
done what they claim, which is to say develop their own 650-
kilometer-range missile.
Senator Levin. Do you know whether or not we noticed that a
missile had been launched?
Mr. Carus. Typically----
Senator Levin. No. I mean in that case.
Mr. Carus. In that particular case, as I said, I was not in
government at that time. I know that most of the missiles
launched during the Iran-Iraq War, which, of course, mostly
were 300-kilometer-range missiles, were not detected at the
time of launch.
Senator Levin. You are talking about what range?
Mr. Carus. The SCUD, the standard SCUD-B's. We detected
some of them, but only a fraction of the ones that were
launched.
Senator Levin. The last question is about space-launch
vehicle technology and the difficulty of determining whether
technology would be used for space-launch vehicles or for
ballistic missiles.
How do you prevent access of nations to space-launch
vehicle technology? How do you decide, or would you, which
nations could have space-launch capability and which ones
cannot?
Mr. Carus. Well, I think as a starting point, one has to be
skeptical of countries that formerly had ballistic missile
programs, whether or not a space-launch program was going to be
a way of hiding a ballistic missile program. So that, for
example, a country like Brazil that pursued both space-launch
programs and ballistic missile programs, one would at least
have to be concerned that by giving up the ballistic missile
program as the price of joining the MTCR that they may, in
fact, just be trying to hide the continuation of their former
ballistic missile.
Senator Levin. How do you act on that concern? Do you
prevent them from getting technology which could be used for
space launch?
Mr. Carus. Well, in this particular case, I think the
appropriate response would have been to say that under the
terms of admission to the MTCR that we would ask for a
termination of space-launch vehicle programs, as well as
ballistic missile programs.
Senator Levin. But isn't the very guideline of MTCR--
doesn't it specifically say that it is not designed to impede
national space programs?
Mr. Carus. Well, when the MTCR was originally negotiated,
it included the G-7 countries, all of whom in one way or the
other participated in space-launch programs.
However, like a lot of the export control regimes, they are
technically not designed to impede legitimate activity. We also
often take a skeptical view of what is going on. Thus, under
the Chemical Weapons Convention, we are not going to impede
chemical industries, but yet, we still pursue export controls
because we recognize that while in theory chemical industries
are a good thing, in practice sometimes they are not.
Given that, in fact, we have seen this overlap between
space-launch programs and ballistic missile programs, it just
strikes me that there is reason to be skeptical.
Now, if you take the position that it is impossible to
constrain space-launch programs, I think it has some very
serious implications over the long run for U.S. security
because it suggests that we are going to see more ICBMs sooner
rather than later.
I mean, the advantage of a program intended to impede the
spread of SLV programs is that, in fact, it reduces the chances
that you are going to see additional ICBMs out there, which I
think from our point of view is a good thing.
Senator Levin. Right, but it also, then, increases the
chances that people are not going to join the MTCR because
every country has a right to engage in space launches, right?
Mr. Carus. Well, the question there, I guess, is whether or
not the tradeoff that you are making is one that you feel
comfortable with. Whether getting somebody to join the MTCR and
eliminate certain activities, while at the same time accepting
they are pursuing other activities, is a fair tradeoff.
I am not convinced that it is that clear-cut in an either/
or situation. To some extent, it is a matter of what carrots we
are willing to offer, as well as what sticks.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Levin.
The Washington Times recently reported on the Russian and
Chinese assistance to Iran, and specifically to their ballistic
missile program by providing assistance in the form of wind
tunnel testing of missile nose cones, the design of guidance
and propulsion systems, development of solid fuel, and
telemetry equipment. This sounds disturbing on its face.
How concerned should we be about this kind of assistance
being provided by Russian and Chinese technicians to Iran?
Dr. Graham.
Mr. Graham. Well, Mr. Chairman, there is no question that
Russia and, to some degree, China are expert and experienced in
these fields, and that by bringing them into Iran, they will
certainly help accelerate Iranian ballistic missile development
programs. These are key areas. My guess is if they have several
hundred technicians in Iran, they are certainly not limited to
these areas. These are critical areas in ballistic missile
system design, and therefore, I think they can play a
substantial role in letting the Iranians produce ballistic
missiles of increasingly longer range in short times.
Senator Cochran. I know that we have an active effort
underway with Russia to try to discuss and resolve some of
these problems and threats that this may pose to the Middle
East, in particular, but also to worldwide stability.
Dr. Carus, what suggestions would you give if you were a
policy-maker in the government about what we can do to try to
help influence the actions of the Russian and Chinese
governments in this area?
Mr. Carus. Well, I think the experience we have had is that
you have to be willing to elevate issues like this to a very
high level.
As I mentioned in my testimony, we have been going around
with the Chinese on this issue for nearly a decade now with
very uneven success.
Part of the problem in that particular case is that the
Chinese are aware that when push comes to shove, we are
disinclined to push the issue as seriously as it perhaps
deserves, and as a result, essentially believe that they can
get away with whatever they are doing.
I think the same approach is likely to be true in the case
of Russia. If, in fact, we take it as seriously as we should
take it, it means that you have to elevate the issue to a very
high level, which is to say Presidential level discussions, and
you have to make it clear that if, in fact, the reports are
true that the United States will take them very seriously and
there will be repercussions.
Senator Cochran. The Washington Post recently described the
transfer to Iraq of gyroscopes from Russian long-range
ballistic missiles. This took place nearly 2 years ago, in
fact. Can you explain, Dr. Graham, why such devices are
important, if they are, and how much help they would be to a
country like Iraq in developing a long-range missile system?
Mr. Graham. Well, the gyroscopes and the associated
accelerometers, Mr. Chairman, are the elements that define the
accuracy of the missile. They control the guidance and
navigation of the missile and are used to direct it to the
target. They are precision instruments, and while instruments
that can achieve city-sized accuracy are available
commercially, these were even finer instruments and can achieve
greater accuracy than that needed just to hit cities. So I
would view them as instruments used in advanced stages of an
Iraqi ballistic missile program.
By the way, they are not particularly valuable for short-
range missiles--missiles of the Al Husayn type of distances.
They become really valuable when you go to longer distances,
where small errors in the initial guidance will end up as
bigger misses at the other end. So I believe they show an Iraqi
interest in moving toward longer range ballistic missiles.
Senator Cochran. As countries try to extend the range of
their missile forces, are there technologies that are necessary
for them to be able to accomplish this, and are those
technologies available from the sources you described, Dr.
Graham, in your testimony?
Mr. Graham. There are such technologies, and I believe I
identified most of them, Mr. Chairman.
I did not emphasize in my discussion the similarity between
the technologies necessary for space-launch vehicles, that is,
the devices to carry satellites to orbit, and the technologies
for ICBMs, but if you take space-launch vehicle technology and
add to it the re-entry vehicle, you have an ICBM. I believe
that any notion that we can allow countries to develop space-
launch vehicles and restrict their development of ICBMs is an
exercise in U.S. self-delusion, and if the MTCR allows one and
prohibits the other, it may be a diplomatic vehicle, but it
certainly is not a vehicle of technical substance that will
reduce the ICBM development of other countries.
Senator Cochran. Well, given the facts and the similarities
between those capabilities, developing space-launch capability
and the ICBM capability, can you tell us if you know what
countries are trying to acquire space-launched capabilities?
Dr. Carus.
Mr. Carus. Over the course of the last decade, there have
been a lot of countries that at least have expressed an
interest in this, many of which have not developed real
capabilities.
In addition, to the major suppliers of space-launch
capabilities, which is to say the Chinese, the Russians, the
Europeans through the ARIANE program, and the United States, we
also have a number of other countries that periodically put
things into orbit, such as Japan, India, Israel.
In addition, there have been a number of countries which
have not reached that stage, but which, in fact, are either
actively pursuing or were in the recent past, which includes
Brazil, Ukraine, Argentina, though that program has come to an
end--South Africa, though I believe that program also has come
to an end.
Mr. Graham. Iraq.
Mr. Carus. Iraq, South Korea, and Indonesia, though I think
the Indonesians are in very early stages of exploration.
So there are a lot of countries that have gone through this
process at some time or another in the recent past.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Graham, do you have any additional
comments on that subject?
Mr. Graham. No, Mr. Chairman. I think Dr. Carus has covered
it. There may be a couple we have left off the list, but the
list is long.
Senator Cochran. Could you more fully explain why
acquisition of a space-launch vehicle aids the long-range
missile program?
Mr. Graham. Well, yes, Mr. Chairman. The space-launch
vehicle provides a booster and the associated guidance and
navigation system to take the payload from the surface of the
earth above the atmosphere into space, and from that point on,
it is a matter of, first, Newton's laws as to when it comes
back down again or goes into orbit, and that depends primarily
on the direction and speed of the payload, and then, second,
where it comes down is a function of the directions and speed
of the payload and the re-entry characteristics of the vehicle
that protects the payload, and of course, the aerodynamic
forces that work on the reentry vehicle.
These are all very well understood and have been
extensively developed and documented over the last 40 years.
The only piece of space-launch vehicle that is not an ICBM is
the re-entry package, and the re-entry package can be developed
initially in wind tunnels, on shorter-range vehicles, and
through computational methods. So, very late in the development
of a space-launch vehicle program, you can still turn it into
an ICBM.
I would say it goes the other way, too. All of our unmanned
space-launch vehicles today began life as ICBMs, or at least as
long-range ballistic missiles. The Atlas was the first ICBM and
now is a space-launch vehicle. The Titan is now being used as a
space-launch vehicle, and the Thor is now called the Delta, and
that is a space-launch vehicle. So that gives you a sense of
the interchangeability of these two roles for ballistic
missiles.
Senator Cochran. You have pointed out that we may not
always know who is doing what in this missile development
business--Dr. Carus specifically talked about the difficulty of
knowing whether someone really had missiles available to use,
until they used them--and one example we talked about was
Iraq's SCUD missiles and the advanced version of the longer-
range missile that it used. Isn't another good example of that
situation when North Korea tested its No Dong missile in 1993?
I am told that the CIA was surprised, and there was no
information really obtained relating to that launch, and that
some describe that as an intelligence failure. Is that an
accurate statement of what the facts were?
Mr. Carus. I would like to be brief and just say that my
own involvement in that case suggests to me that in that
particular instance, the intelligence community was doing a
pretty good job. There were some issues and concerns, but I
would say that they were not surprised at that particular time;
that, in fact, they were alerted to the fact that a missile was
going to be fired and had prepared--had taken steps to try to
follow it.
As I said in the opening of my testimony, there are a lot
of cases where the intelligence community has done a very good
job. That, I would say, is a case where at least they were
aware that something was going to happen when we are on the
ball.
Senator Cochran. Is there any new technique or regime that
you would suggest be considered if the U.S. intelligence
process is going to be improved?
Dr. Carus, you mentioned ``preconceived expectations,''
where you try to decide what you should expect a country to do
based on a certain set of facts. Should we start thinking about
the capabilities in a different way?
Mr. Carus. I think any time you are looking at a country
which is trying to develop capabilities in a different context,
both economically, politically, and also technologically, you
have to be worried, and one of the problems we have is that
countries trying to get longer-range missile capabilities are
entering with access to a type of technology that, as we have
discussed, was not available when we got into the business.
So that, for example, you could imagine somebody taking a
look at something like the U.S. Pegasus rocket, which is a
small winged-looking vehicle designed to be launched from an
aircraft to put things into orbit. That might be an alternative
model for somebody to pursue from a traditional ICBM.
My guess is that if somebody were to pursue such an
approach, we would not be certain what was going on, simply
because it was not following a traditional development program
pattern.
Senator Cochran. And it seems logical that some states who
are seeking to develop ballistic missile capabilities may not
want anybody else to know about it, and they would try to mask
or obscure what they were doing from U.S. intelligence efforts
or other efforts. Are there important activities that U.S.
intelligence sources just would not be able to see?
Mr. Carus. My general feeling is that if somebody wanted an
intercontinental ballistic missile that they had any confidence
in, they would have to test it in a way that we would pick up
on it. The complexity comes in when you take the caveats to
that.
Thus, for example, if somebody had a missile that appeared
capable of reaching the United States, I am not sure that the
reliability of it would be significant in the context of an
emerging crisis.
Thus, for example, if going into the Gulf War, we had had
concerns that Iraq had missiles that actually could have
reached the United States, I am sure it would have had an
impact on the debate here in Congress about how we should
approach Iraq. Hopefully, we would have taken the same
decision, but it would have completely changed the political
context in which our decisions were being made.
Mr. Graham. Mr. Chairman, could I add an answer to your
question about intelligence procedures and processes we might
follow to avoid being surprised?
Senator Cochran. Yes, Dr. Graham, surely.
Mr. Graham. We need to change the question from ``What do
you see?'' to ``What do you have certain knowledge that
countries are not doing?'' That is the militarily operable
question.
I believe we also have to scrutinize the assumptions that
are made in intelligence analyses, assumptions such as that
missiles will be developed entirely from indigenous sources
without outside help, or other absurd assumptions. Nonetheless,
those creep into intelligence analyses from time to time.
As any good systems analyst knows, you can get any answer
you want if you have complete control of the assumptions going
into the analysis.
I would also then add that we should probably develop a new
variant of intelligence called intelligence anticipation. Right
now intelligence only tells us about what people see, and you
are not going to see anything today that is going to lead to
substantial consequences 10 years from now. So we should be
thinking about it and trying to analyze how countries with
various stated intentions could act if they wished to carry
them into the future in ballistic missiles and other areas.
Finally, I would put something I call ``try-int,'' try
intelligence--on the list; that is to say, rather than just
watching to see if some country does something, if we think it
is possible for a developing world country to do something,
let's get a group together with the resources and education and
access of that third-world country and let them try to do it
and see what they come up with. That has actually been done a
few times, not as far as I know by the intelligence community,
but by other organizations in the government. The results have
been startling and I believe profound. So I think there are
many things that can be done to augment the intelligence
process that would give us a better anticipation of what to
expect in the foreseeable future.
Senator Cochran. There is a comment in your statement, Dr.
Carus, about the fact that Iran, Syria, and Egypt all have
obtained from North Korea information and technology for
missile development. What accounts, if you know, for North
Korea's apparent expertise in this area of technology?
Mr. Carus. Well, I think it actually goes back to the
points that were made earlier that there was a will and a
perceived need to have this kind of capability. So the North
Koreans in the early 1980's went out of their way to acquire
ballistic missiles, the SCUDs, that they could use as copies.
They had earlier tried to buy them from the Chinese without
success, and they basically got other people to pay the
financial cost, took advantage of the fact that they had some
technical expertise, and reverse-engineered this missile.
I think what that primarily reflected was the fact that
they had a national leadership that made this a high priority,
both for their own national security and also as an export
item, because it has been a major earner of hard currency for
the Iranians in the past.
In many ways, it is very surprising because North Korea is
not necessarily a technologically sophisticated country.
However, they clearly had the technology needed in order to
pursue a 1940's, early 1950's vintage missile system.
Senator Cochran. There was a comment in Dr. Schriever's
statement which described design requirements in terms of
accuracy, operational readiness, and maintainability. If these
requirements are not necessary, how much easier is it for a
country to build a long-range ballistic missile?
Mr. Graham. Well, relaxing these certainly make it
substantially easier. Having the requirement that the missile
be available on short notice, 24 hours a day, is an extremely
difficult challenge because it does not mean you can launch it
when you are ready. It means you launch it when you are told
to, and by relaxing that, by being able to launch when you know
your missiles are in good condition and full working order, it
lowers the long-term reliability requirements on the missile,
and that, in turn, greatly eases the engineering problems of
building the missile.
Senator Cochran. To what extent does the assistance that
comes from Russia and China to Iran to develop a missile of
2,000-kilometers range also help Iran obtain longer-range
missiles?
Mr. Graham. I think the 2,000-kilometer missiles are the
step before you go to the longer-range missiles, and it will
give them the leverage by the techniques that General Schriever
discusses, either in terms of add-on boosters or add-on stages,
to let them go to a substantially longer-range missile in a
period that is months to years, but certainly not decades.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Carus.
Mr. Carus. If I may add to that, sir, one of the biggest
problems the Iranians have had in their missile program is
something that the General referred to in his testimony which
was systems integration. It is the reason why the Iranians, who
have at least the same technical competence as the North
Koreans were, in fact, forced to go to the North Koreans to buy
turnkey SCUD production facilities and complete SCUDs.
The biggest concern I have about this external assistance,
especially these recent reports about Russian assistance, is
that the Iranians would receive help in learning how to
undertake these kinds of systems integration. Once they are
able to do it once, whether it is on a 500-kilometer-range
missile or a 2,000-kilometer-range missile, they are going to
be able to do it again and again because this is a skill that
can be reapplied.
If, in fact, that is what they learn, it will have serious
long-term repercussions in terms of our ability to constrain
Iranian missile programs.
Senator Cochran. A missile that has not been operationally
tested is, of course, less reliable than one that has, but can
such a missile still be considered sufficiently reliable or
lethal, as a threat to use in a crisis or to create enough of
an impression of being useful for a potential foe of the United
States or some of our allies?
Mr. Carus. We have a little bit of experience with this. It
is reported that of the North Korean-supplied missiles that the
Iranians used during the Iran-Iraq War, something on the order
of 10 percent of them blew up in the launch process. What that
tends to suggest is that countries that have different criteria
of operational effectiveness are not going to demand the same
level of perfection that we would; that, in fact, for their
purposes, 90 percent of them getting in the air is fine. They
do not need perfection.
Similarly, from what we could see, the Iraqi missiles had
tremendous problems. They were breaking up in the air. It is
one of the things the Iranians noticed about those missiles. It
is one of the reasons our missile defenses had problems in
dealing with the Iraqi missiles. From the Iraqi point of view,
that was OK. They did not need a system of the same operational
and militarily effectiveness as we would demand, which again I
think suggests that for some of these countries they will
accept levels of quality that would be simply unacceptable here
in the United States.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Carus, you suggested that an effective
Missile Technology Control Regime will make it easier to track
missile development programs, I think. If that is what you said
or believe, what could be done to enhance the effectiveness of
the MTCR?
Mr. Carus. I think the first thing that has to be done is
enforce its existing provisions. If a country supplies
technology in violation of the agreement, whether it is because
they are a formal member of the agreement or because they have
agreed to adhere to its provisions, we have to be willing to
apply a tremendous amount of pressure to get them to comply.
Second, I think we have to be very skeptical about efforts
by countries to acquire so-called legitimate space-launch
vehicle programs. At one time, the United States took a hard
line on that issue. We did not allow the Argentineans to join
the MTCR until they killed the Condor program, even though the
Argentineans argued that it could be used as a space-launch
program, which in fact is true.
In the last few years, we have been less hard line on that,
and I think it has been a mistake. It would be appropriate, I
think, to take another look at that policy.
Senator Cochran. How do we extend the controls or
restrictions on the assistance provided by technologists or
scientists that we have talked about and that you all have
discussed as an issue and a challenge? How do we respond to
that more effectively?
Mr. Carus. Well, we have taken steps to try to help
countries that want to respond to it. We have training programs
that U.S. Customs and other law enforcement agencies provide to
help some of the newly independent states learn how to
implement export control regulations. To the extent that those
countries are interested in enforcing these kinds of laws, I
think there are mechanisms to help them do it better.
The difficulty comes really in cases where there is less
enthusiasm for enforcing laws of this kind.
Mr. Graham. As a practical matter, too, Mr. Chairman,
restricting that information is going to be very difficult, and
I do not think whatever actions we take, we will find much
comfort in them, but, certainly, the United States could take
more of an interest in the fields of study that foreign
students, particularly from countries like Iran, Iraq, Libya,
Syria, China, are going to pursue when they come into advanced
education in the United States.
Once visas are issued, as I understand the process, the
foreign student's actual course of study is neither checked or
monitored by the U.S. Government. It seems to me it would make
sense to review the visas in terms of what it is they say they
are going to study and then periodically review what it is they
are studying to see if those correspond.
I think we could go through the whole process. The
professional organizations could be sensitive to the concerns
of missile proliferation. I am sure they are to some degree,
but that could probably be raised, and we could tighten up our
own surplus equipment disposal and encourage our allies to do
that as well. So I think there are opportunities all along the
way.
These will have the effect of slowing down the transfer
process to some degree. By no means will they stop it, however.
Senator Cochran. It seems, too, that the proliferation of
information through the availability of the Internet and other
sources creates another question, at least, about what we can
do to mitigate the dangers created by the expansion and
accessibility of so much information.
I am not suggesting we need a worldwide book-burning or
document-shredding. That is not the answer, of course, but what
is? Is there anything that we can contemplate doing about that?
Mr. Carus. Well, I think the reality is that if a country
is willing to expend the resources and devote the--and make the
program a national priority, that we cannot count on
successfully stopping missile development programs.
We have had successes in raising the cost and slowing
programs down, and in some of those cases, there have been
political changes that have led to the termination of the
programs. That, I think, is sort of our best case.
However, as we have seen in some countries that are less
tractable, we are not going to have successes across the board.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Graham.
Mr. Graham. Ultimately, I believe the United States is
going to have to realize that in the future, it will live in a
world where an increasing number of countries, not all friendly
to the United States, will have ballistic missiles of
increasing range, which will eventually not only reach our
allies around the world, but reach our homeland as well.
Senator Cochran. The export controls and multilateral
regimes like the Missile Technology Control Regime can help
slow the spread of missile technology, as you suggest, but even
the best controls on sensitive technology are never 100-percent
effective, we have found. Is the advent of the information age
and the increasing availability of missile technology further
undermining the effectiveness of technology controls?
Mr. Graham. I think, without question, the effectiveness of
it is questionable to begin with, and it undoubtedly becomes
effective as information is more widely and more rapidly
disseminated.
Senator Cochran. Well, this seems to me to be a very strong
argument for a more adequate and effective defense capability.
Is that a conclusion that you draw, Dr. Graham or Dr. Carus?
Mr. Graham. Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman. I do not know how
else the United States can live in a world of increasing long-
range ballistic missiles in the hands of an increasing number
of countries, some of which are quite open about their
intention to be hostile to the United States and to work
against our purposes in the world.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Carus.
Mr. Carus. I think there is certainly, to some extent,
widespread agreement on that issue. Certainly, the
transformation that I have seen over the last decade in terms
of theater missile defenses indicates that we have really gone
a long way in that regard.
When I first got involved in that issue in the mid-1980's,
I can remember the antagonism that existed towards theater-
level missile defenses. In the wake of the Gulf War, I am not
sure that kind of antagonism exists anymore, which I think is a
good thing because it is very clear that under today's
circumstances, our military forces and friendly countries are,
even as we speak, vulnerable to missile attacks using certainly
chemical and maybe biological warheads, as well as conventional
warheads.
We have efforts underway to try to defend against those
missiles, other than active defenses, but at the moment, you
would have to say that those alternatives are not yet mature.
We have no reliable way of hunting down and killing missile-
launchers, for example.
So that the only thing that we really have to provide at
least some level of protection for our forces and for our
allies are active missile defense, and I do not think that is
going to change any time in the near future.
Senator Cochran. Let me thank you both for your very
generous commitment of time and effort to help us with this
hearing, preparing your statements and being here presenting
your testimony and answering our questions. You have been very
patient and very, very helpful, and for that, we are grateful
to you. We express the appreciation of our Committee for your
assistance.
This concludes our hearing. We will have another hearing
soon, and we will make an announcement about that. The
Committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:11 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]